Quotation and Description
Prolegomena to a New Account of the Language of Mind

M.J. Hutchings

Ph.D.
University of Edinburgh
1974
It is not a **something**, but not a **nothing** either!

Ludwig Wittgenstein,

'Philosophical Investigations',

I: 304.
Preface

This thesis is unusual in that it represents only part of the work that has been carried out in pursuance of the degree. The chapters that are presented here as prolegomena to an account of the language of mind appeared in draft form as the first three of eleven making up that account. The further chapters dealt with thoughts, experiences, incorrigibility, perception, belief and knowledge, and intentional action, before reaching conclusions about mind and the body and some more tentative speculations about the self. Inclusion of all this matter would have made the thesis unreasonably long and would have delayed its presentation beyond this present date, which is already late enough.

It is my hope that the present three chapters do form, as an introductory group laying the foundation for the approach to specific areas of mental language, a coherent whole. To further this end, I have introduced into chapter 2 matter that might otherwise have been retained for chapters 10 and 11. This seemed to be good policy, even though it has the disadvantage that the matter must seem more highly speculative in this context than it would have at the conclusion of the whole work.

In my bibliography I have adopted the policy of including only those works that I have actually mentioned; but, with this in mind, I have in the body of the thesis tried to refer to all those writings which have contributed substantially to this part of my work. I hope, therefore, that I have not omitted any that are relevant here but which might otherwise have been mentioned only in a later chapter. I realise, however, that, having secured
a place in the bibliography for Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' through its provision of the epigraph, I should do the same for Everett Hall's 'Our Knowledge of Fact and Value' and Romane Clark's 'Sensuous Judgements' through their mention here. Though my own views were formed independently of either, I should recognize the former as a distant forerunner, and the latter as the closest current approach to my own ideas.

Now that this thesis is complete, I should like to thank Professor Sir Alfred Ayer for supporting my application to be admitted as a candidate despite my failure as a student of his: Dr Geoffrey Madell, my supervisor, for coping with the early manifestations of my return to philosophy: Mr Errol Bedford, Mr Stanley Eveling and Dr Madell for seminars which further aided the recovery of philosophical fluency: Professor Peter Heath for his valuable distaste for the original beginning of chapter 1: Professor Ronald Hepburn for his friendly interest: Mr David Carroll for helping with the proof reading: Mrs Hilary Pieler for her competent typing and cheerful encouragement in the final days: and Elisabeth, my wife, for reading all of the final draft and making innumerable suggestions for the improvement of its wording, as well as making all the difference between wordlessness at Oxford and loquacity at Edinburgh.
Contents

Chapter 1: Mind and Description: a possible incompatibility 1

Chapter 2: Recent Descriptive Theories of Mind 90

Chapter 3: Quotation 182

Bibliography
The concept of mind suggests a reality that is non-objective; but the idea that mental language does not have the descriptive function of objective language has often been taken to imply a lack of ontological force. Can the language of mind be shown to have a valid ontological role even though it is non-descriptive?

Linguistic forms need not always have the same role; so, while language originates as an adjunct of our response to the material environment, it is not restricted to roles so developed. Description is, however, the original function which arises directly out of the structure of perception, the unity of predicates in the descriptive subject term corresponding to the unity of qualities in immediate perceptual recognition.

Descriptive predicates correspond to properties that are based in reality but identified in relation to language, while the subject terms indicate not bare but clothed particulars. These, however, have the status of Kantian appearances. In particular they lack any absolute principle of identity over time. The ontological weakness is further illustrated in terms of events and of the limitations revealed by Science. There is room, therefore, for another mode of language to establish its ontological value, and for another aspect of being to provide an alternative principle of identity to the objective.

The Identity Theory is an example of a descriptive theory of mind. Its difficulty in coping with mental predicates might lead one to a double aspect theory. The topic-neutral account of experiences, including experiences of colours, can be defended against some criticisms, but it fails to cover the "colourfulness" of experiences. This does not consist in descriptive properties but is a bearer of intentional
meaning. This "aspect" of reality must therefore be represented in a non-descriptive language - the language of mind. While Central State Materialism provides specifications of corresponding elements in the descriptive aspect, Functionalism comes close to formulating the role of mental language but fails to convey its ontological import.

III

Quotation is proposed as a model for the language of mind. It is not descriptive. Direct quotations do not indicate words but meaningfully reproduce them, with singular terms retaining their referential power in this opaque context. Similarly, indirect quotations do not indicate meanings, but convey meaning through reproductions of the originals adapted to the new context. It is insignificant, therefore, that the oratio obliqua 'that' attaches itself to the words following. The subject term and verb introducing quotations can also be seen to function in a way close to quotation. Quotation treats the original speaker as a "samesayer" and as an originator of meaning with oneself. It therefore meets the demands of the previous chapter.
CHAPTER 1

Mind and Description: a possible incompatibility

I

To write on mind is to go in search of one's subject. What it is or, indeed, whether it is, can only be found at the end of a long investigation. For a starting place, our only sure knowledge is that a distinction has been drawn: mind has been set on one side over against matter.

In the course of man's attempt to understand reality, it is natural that he should have set himself in a position of priority, considering himself, from a privileged point of view, with an interest that he would not bestow on other objects such as dogs or stones. Personal interest would not of itself, however, justify him in claiming himself to be essentially different from all those other objects that he found about him. He has, none the less, proposed that there is an essential duality in nature realised only in some beings: in himself certainly, in dogs possibly, and in stones certainly not. He has seen himself, that is, as containing a second element drawn from an entirely different realm of being to that of physical existence, to that of the matter of which common objects and his own body are formed. The weight that he has placed on this other element as a constituent of his being has varied. Sometimes he has given it equal weight with his physical being while at other times he has gone so far as to claim that it forms his essential being, reducing the body to a quite subordinate role. Through all its forms, however, this belief has played the central
role in man's conceptualization of himself and of his relation with the world. 'Mind' is just one of the names by which the second element in man has been known. Others are 'soul' and 'spirit', but 'mind' is the most appropriate to the present context though, as I shall explain shortly, it is not ideal for the purpose.

The account of a second element of reality in man was developed to meet various needs. With names such as 'soul' and 'spirit' a prominent purpose was to facilitate expression of a belief in an after-life for the individual when, as a body, he had died. The term 'mind' has, however, scarcely any connection with this role. It is tied firmly to the living person through its connection with two other purposes for which the second element was introduced. The first of these purposes was to provide an explanation for man's remarkable abilities which seemed far beyond the imaginable capacities of a mere material object; the other, and the more important, was to provide a way to express what it was like to live as a man. In that life a man seemed to be acquainted with himself in quite other ways than those in which he was acquainted with other objects. He could, it is true, see and touch the surface of his body as he could the surfaces of other objects; but, much more remarkable, he continually lived through a great range of states and activities. His awareness of these conditions seemed far more intimate and was quite unparalleled in his relation to any other objects. Thinking, taking deliberate action, suffering, enjoying, took priority in man's view of himself over any of the facts that he could note about himself as he could about other objects. These conditions, too, could be taken
as providing the required explanation of his remarkable abilities, for did he not live through the planning and execution of the activities that revealed those abilities?

Introduced, as it was, for such diffuse purposes, this concept of a second being of man did not embody clearly defined limits. What pertained most essentially to this second being were those powers that seemed to render man most distinct from other objects. Thus, its core was generally taken to lie in the intellectual or cognitive powers, thinking, reasoning, judging, comprehending, knowing, etc., which were supposed to distinguish man from other animals as well as from inanimate objects. These powers lead with little apparent break into the linguistic powers, speaking, describing, explaining, understanding, etc., which have always been taken as prime evidence of mind. The intellectual powers also seem closely linked with initiation of human behaviour other than linguistic. Close connections can also be found with man's sensory powers, though here we come to the periphery of what has been considered to belong to this second element in man. Successful seeing, feeling, tasting, smelling and hearing depend on recognition, the identification of what is sensed; but, cognitive as they are, these powers may be shared by animals. Another reason, though, for including these in the powers of mind is the very lively contribution that they make to man's lived experience of himself.

Philosophical discussion about the nature of this second element of man has been in general agreement about the range of powers to be attributed to it. Certainly there have been differences, as some
point of view brought forward one or another particular aspect; but these have been mainly differences of emphasis. There seems little truth, for instance, in the recent suggestion by Anthony Kenny that the map of mind and matter was completely redrawn at what is generally regarded as the beginning of modern philosophy. Kenny tells us that Descartes set the boundary of mind between 'consciousness and clockwork', while for Aquinas it had been set between 'intellect and sense'.¹ The evidence he provides, however, is only that they differed over what was to be regarded as essential to the soul. Aquinas did believe that there could be no sensation in the soul when it was detached from the body, and Descartes, attributing to the soul what he could not doubt belonged to himself, did naturally include in the first rank not only thoughts but sensations as well.² If one is concerned, however, as it seems one should be, with functions of the mind, or soul, in living men, then, for Aquinas as for Descartes, they do include sensations. "The soul in man is one in number", he says, "at once sensory, intellectual and nutritive".³

The contrasting emphases displayed by Aquinas and Descartes do correspond, however, to a general division between approaches to the problem of this second being of man. Sometimes it is his distinctive powers that take foremost position and sometimes the lived through

---

¹ 'Cartesian Privacy', pp. 352-3.

² Since they rest on two quite different notions of essentiality, these two positions are quite compatible. Thus it could still be true for Descartes that he could only be in pain if he had a body, even if his knowledge that he was in pain was prior to his knowledge that he had a body.

³ 'Summa Theologicae', 1a, 75-83, p. 63. This does, of course, point to a difference, but that consists in Descartes' exclusion of 'nutrition' rather than his inclusion of the sensory.
experience of himself. Which it is depends largely on the point of view adopted, whether that of an external observer or that of the self-expounder. The two approaches need to be combined, though, for the intended distinction between the two modes of being can be realised in its full complexity only when it is recognized that the mental life, that which the individual takes himself to live through, is mainly characterized in terms of its objective context and results. What the first-person approach discovers is highly dependent on the teachings of the observational approach.

The choice of the word 'mind' to stand for the second element of being is inevitable in the present context of philosophical discussion. It should be recognized, however, that it does carry connotations that would naturally push one towards certain interpretations of what it is used to stand for. These tendencies must be resisted, for I am not interested in what is, as it happens, meant by the word 'mind' but in the puzzling combination of features of man for which it is the most convenient word at hand. Whatever specific interpretations the word may bring with it must therefore be set aside, if the whole problem is to be approached from an unbiased position.

It must first be recognized, therefore, that the word 'mind' is distinctly intellectual in its sympathies. It is most at home in those accounts that place great weight on man's rationality. It also gives encouragement to those who look to language to provide a criterion for the presence of the second element. Despite these biases drawn from its common use, it has not, however, been taken in
philosophical discussion to exclude sensation. None the less, the question, 'Have other animals minds?', has been likely to receive a negative answer on the grounds that animals are incapable of rational thought and lack the use of language. At the same time it was, to say the very least, doubtful that they lacked sensation. It appears, therefore, that following the sense of the word 'mind' too closely may lead one into contradictions in the main investigation. If 'mind' is intended to mark a crucial division of reality, then sensation cannot fall on one side of the divide in man and on the other in animals. Even if the undertaking is described in less high-flown terms, attention to niceties of meaning in relation to 'mind' would still seem to divert one from giving an orderly comprehensive account of man and the other animals.

I wish to leave open the question of where the boundaries should be drawn, whether between the intellectual and the sensory, between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, between man and all other animals, or along entirely different lines. There is, too, another dimension in which we must be on our guard against having our options decided for us by the word 'mind'. Other words which have filled the same role, such as 'soul', suggest that they actually stand for the self or at least the self in one of its aspects; but not so 'mind'. What it suggests is rather that it stands for a part of our being somewhat apart from the self, for we speak of 'my mind' as we do of 'my body'. Perhaps, though, this similarity of form is delusive. The latter expression suggests that I, the soul, do possess the body as something distinct; but the latter may suggest only that I, a combination of
mind and body, have the mind as a part of me. Whatever it may suggest, however, this form of words clearly does not have the power to rule out the identification of what 'mind' stands for, or indeed of what 'body' stands for, with the self or with some aspect of the self. The tendency is there, though, and should be noted.

There are many other common idioms in which 'mind' makes a puzzling appearance. Many of these were recently collected together by Roger Squires as ammunition for an onslaught on the concept of mind.¹ One can 'give someone a piece of one's mind', or 'take a load off someone's mind' or 'have an idea running through one's mind'. Not all such expressions convey so blatantly materialistic an impression and they differ considerably in the degree to which they are obviously metaphorical; but their general effect is to suggest that the mind is an object lodged in the body in a way not comprehensibly different from the heart or the brain. In the course of his entertaining article, Squires argues that there is no place for minds conceived of in this way as parts of persons. He therefore concludes that "minds (and if the halo fits, souls) should be written off as an intellectual loss",² and dismisses mentalism as "the metaphysics of the Stone Age",³ of which the common idioms he adduces are the detritus.

This particular assault is not perhaps to be taken very seriously as an attack on mind rather than on a particular view of mind; but it

¹ 'On One's Mind'
does bring vividly to notice the problem of treating mind as an object. One can understand the temptation of treating this other being of man on somewhat the same lines as his body; for objects are what we are used to dealing with, what our perceptions inform us of and what our language is designed to facilitate talk of. To succumb to this temptation, however, is surely to be profoundly unimaginative. The distinction between mind and matter cuts deeper than any distinction between flesh and bone and should place all flesh and bone and their like on one side. It seems an evasion to suggest that only material objects are then left behind rather than the objective in its totality. We should move instead into another dimension, take completely different conceptual bearings as some thinkers have indeed done. Here one might again contrast Aquinas and Descartes. The latter did conceive the mind rather as an object in causal interaction with another object, the body; but Aquinas thought in terms of what was in this context a more sophisticated notion: the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the form of the body.

One factor in the development of the concept of mind that must not be ignored is the concurrent lack of understanding of the human body. The growth of man's knowledge of the workings of his own body and in particular of the brain and the nervous system is a recent occurrence. We now understand sufficient of the incredible complexity of the brain to believe it capable of materially causing all our behaviour; and, giving further substance to this belief, we have created objects that are capable of reproducing, and indeed surpassing,
some of man's most treasured abilities. During most of the period with which we are concerned, however, man was unable to recognize his body's capacities. It was, therefore, plausible to introduce some other non-material object which, because its workings need not be visualized, could be thought to make up somehow for the supposed incompetencies of the body.

Now, however, that we do have a juster appreciation of the body's capacities, this must play a part in determining the way in which we conceive of mind. One possible outcome that must be faced is that, should there prove no need of mind to explain objective human capacities, parsimony might demand a denial that there was any such reality as mind. Many are indeed willing to take this step; but, even if all the behavioural powers were physically explicable, there would still be the manner in which a man lives through his states and activities that would require explanation. What is needed to meet that demand, however, is not another object or another range of objective occurrences, but reality in an altogether different guise. If the accumulating evidence points to the conclusion that the body is objectively competent, mind, if it is to hope for a role at all, must mesh into the corporeal being of man after some more sophisticated model than cog into cog.

What I wish to argue, therefore, is that mind is non-objective, but none the less real. It has to be recognized, however, that this thesis is not clear enough in itself to provide a goal in relation to which all discussion can be organized. There are direct arguments that can be presented in its favour; but we need also an intermediary
claim, the establishment of which could fill out the meaning of the other. What this claim might be should be quite apparent if we reflect that what we are arguing about has not only been a subject of philosophical discussion for centuries but appears informally from day to day in the speech of millions. The language in which men speak of their thoughts, their experiences and their emotions is the language of mind; and, in proposing that mind is non-objective, I do not believe that I am proposing a revolution in this on-going scheme. That I am at variance with most philosophers is true, but it is part of my complaint against them that they have misinterpreted the common function of this mental language. Thus, the intermediary claim that it is proper for me to make contends that the language of mind is non-objective: that is, that the logical form of this language and the way it functions are not those of the descriptive language proper to speech about objects. This contention clearly supports the claim that mind is non-objective - the first part of my original thesis; but the conclusion of that thesis, that mind is none the less real, would also benefit from a similar linguistic intermediary. This must be the claim that the language of mind, despite its non-objective, non-descriptive character, has none the less genuine ontological force.

II

The contention that mental language is not descriptive has been
with us for some time. An early pointer was provided by G.A. Paul's 'Is there a Problem about Sense Data?'. There he argued that the language of sense data did not provide a fresh range of objective descriptions but only another form of words for talking about how things seem to us. In so far, however, as Paul can be seen as undermining only a deviant philosophical jargon, his argument cannot be taken as showing that genuine mental language is not descriptive - and might even gain force from the assumption that it is. A much more genuine example is provided by Austin's analysis of 'know', where he suggested that the purpose of the expression 'I know' is not to describe myself as being in some sort of objective mental condition but to give an assurance of my credentials for making a statement. Another aspect of mental language then received much the same treatment when H.L.A. Hart considered the ascription of actions to persons. Against the traditional view that saying someone did something involves the descriptive assertion that some mental event occurred in addition to the physical movement, he argued that the additional function was not descriptive. In his view, this function was the social one of ascribing responsibility to the person for the physical movement and its results.

Though Austin's context gives his argument wider application than Hart's, both these accounts are of comparatively limited scope.

1 Ibid., Flew (II), pp. 103-106.
2 'Other Minds', Flew pp. 123-47.
For a general theory of the non-descriptive character of mental language we can turn to Ryle. In 'The Concept of Mind' he attacked the conception of mind on the analogy of the body, arguing that to bring mind under a common framework of concepts such as 'thing', 'stuff', 'attribute', 'state', 'process', 'change', 'cause' and 'effect' was to commit a "category mistake". By a category mistake he meant the misuse of expressions in such a way as to misrepresent their relations and the ways in which assertions containing them were to be validated. In this case his target was the misuse of mental terms involving logically improper "operations with the concepts of mental powers and processes".\(^1\) Revealing this misuse, he thought, would dissipate "the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter", and not "by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind" but by showing that the two areas of discourse could not be merged.\(^2\) He therefore provided extensive illustrations of the use of mental language which he took to show both that mental language is functionally quite distinct and also that, however separate its role, it does relate to events drawn from the same sum total as those mentioned in an objective description of human behaviour. He therefore reaches the more substantive claim that "(a person's) life is not a double series of events taking place in two kinds of stuff;

---

1 Ibid., p. 19.

2 Op. cit., p. 8. Note the appearance of 'process' as both a favoured and, above, a forbidden concept. This is indicative of the linguistic difficulties of presenting the distinction, but Ryle would argue that 'process' had different meanings in the two contexts: Op. cit., p. 22.

it is one concatenation of events, the differences between some and other classes of which largely consist in the applicability or inapplicability to them of logically different types of law-propositions and law-like propositions. Mental language is seen here, therefore, as providing law-like propositions that classify some of the common store of events in their own peculiar non-descriptive way.

Mental language as portrayed by Ryle is obviously full of life, but the denial of descriptive force does make its rationale seem somewhat problematic. Theories such as those of Austin and Hart give an effect of devaluing their subject matter. Just as ethical theories that stress approval rather than what is approved, seem to undermine the activity they discuss, so theories which stress the social function of mental language seem to remove its foundation. Words are, of course, used to convey assurance and to ascribe responsibility, but their grounds for doing this seem largely destroyed if it is denied that they also ascribe conditions justifying the assurance or sustaining the responsibility. Ryle's account is more complex and less forthright, but it may none the less give rise to the same doubts.

The negative side of Ryle's programme is reasonably clear, but it is not nearly so evident what positive account of the mental he was offering. Having exorcised what he called "the Ghost in the


2 J. W. Cornman, who brings together all these examples of 'use analysis' of mental language, adduces Nowell-Smith, 'Ethics': 'Metaphysics, Reference and Language', pp. 227-39.
Machine", it may well seem that he was left with only the machine. He has therefore been accused of behaviourism, but while this does undoubtedly contribute one thread to his thought - Warnock called it "the Ghost in 'The Concept of Mind'"2 - his more general insistence on the autonomy of mental language, as well as his explicit denials3, shows that this is not his real doctrine. Assertions in mental terms are not, on his account, translatable into objective descriptions of physical behaviour. This does not bestow any autonomy on mind, as against mental language, however, for he does not provide the assertions with any alternative ontological role. The law-like propositions that they express are, he says, "inference tickets" which licence one to move "from asserting factual statements to asserting other factual statements"4. Therefore, while he does insist on talking of persons rather than of bodies5, it is hard to see how persons are anything but bodies treated in a rather ornate fashion. One is not saved from the prejudice that what exists is describable and that description is the linguistic mode of approach to reality. The different linguistic manoeuvres that are carried out in mental language are on this view, therefore, irrelevant to ontology. The single range of events upon which mental terminology imposes its idiosyncratic classifications are then

really defined by objective description.

In his discussion of this approach to the problem of mind, Cornman suggests that writers such as Ryle need to establish the premise that "sentences logically unlike indicative sentences of the form 'x is blue' in respects A, B, C, . . . are not descriptive". This demand can be interpreted as going beyond the need to draw distinctions between the logical forms of descriptive and mental language. Such distinctions, by themselves, will lead only to the isolation of mental language at the likely cost, as we have seen, of its ontological force. This would run counter to our natural intuitions and is to be avoided if possible. We are free, however, to interpret Cornman's request as requiring a circumstantial explanation of description which will set it and its logical form in the context from which it naturally arises. Given this account, the way would be open to giving a similar account of mental language showing the different context from which it gains both its logical form and its distinctive natural force.

III

I do not wish to argue only that the language of mind is non-descriptive. My second aim is to show that, even so, it still possesses

---

1 'Metaphysics, Reference and Language', p. 249.
ontological value. I shall not, therefore, rely on the logical structures of objective description and of mental language to establish the distinction. I shall also attempt to place description in the context of general human abilities, relating it in particular to perception: for it is through this connection that the ontological force of description can be explained and evaluated. I shall then show that mental language plays an entirely different role. This role is not related in the same way to perception as description is, but this does not deprive it of all power to represent reality. We are not in this world only as perceivers.

To argue that mental language functions in a mode other than objective description is fraught with difficulties, particularly if the argument must not forfeit the language's claims to ontological relevance. One troublesome difficulty, though not, I hope, a serious one, is the strong attachment of the available vocabulary to the objective. I have already mentioned the tendency for 'mind' to gather objective connotations to itself; but there is a parallel tendency with the expressions that we use to speak of mental events. This difficulty may sometimes make my theory hard to formulate, but I can take comfort from the thought that I am not likely to be led astray by the superficial features of words since in many cases I must work against them.

In order to show that mental language functions in a mode distinct from that of objective language, I must first establish that objective description does itself constitute a distinct mode of language. I can best explain what I mean by 'description' by saying that description
is what is understood to be carried out with a subject-predicate sentence according to a conventional analysis of such sentences; that is, with the subject term something is picked out and with the predicate something is said about it.

It would generally be held that this procedure can range indifferently over a wide variety of things, that the notions of 'picking out' and 'saying something about' are not tied to any particular subject-matter. For instance, we can seemingly pick out numbers as well as material objects. This might lead to an objection against the use of the word 'description' for, even if we can say something about the numbers picked out just as we can say something about material objects, it is not natural to say that we describe numbers. It is my contention, however, that these notions of 'picking out' and 'saying something about' belong essentially with material objects. The use of subject-predicate sentences to talk about numbers, or about any other sort of non-objective "thing", is derivative.

I shall later have more to say about the way in which language develops as an adjunct of objective perception. Here I want only to insist that the language so developed, with its general syntactic structure, is the core language that is adapted for all purposes. In particular, the subject-predicate sentence form permits the positing of artificial subjects, for instance propositions, and it contributes to the construction of logical systems, such as that of number. In either case the language form takes on a life of its own, and one day might even say, to bring out the contrast, that these new subject matters are of its own creation in comparison with the material situation it
was itself created to cope with. In these extended uses, nothing exists for the subject expression to pick out in the way that a material object exists to be picked out: and, given this lack, nothing can be said about anything in the way in which a predicate says something about a material object, because there is nothing suitable to have anything said about it.

This suggests that there must be various forms of truth. The truth of an arithmetical equation such as \(2 + 2 = 4\) is of another kind than the truth of a descriptive statement such as 'the flower is red'; and that again is different from the representational truth of a picture. I wish to contend that it is also different from the truth of a mental report such as 'I am in pain'. Of course, 'true' is expressing the same sort of commendation in each case but the differences are as important as the similarity.

IV

I am conscious that what I have said here runs contrary to a strong trend in recent discussion. This trend supports the opinion that the same forms of expression have the same existential force whatever contexts they occur in. The most famous doctrine of this sort is Quine's 'To be is to be the value of a (bound) variable'.

1 'On What There Is', Landesman, p. 225.
As Quine makes clear, such a formula is not intended to provide a rule by which we can choose a language or decide what really exists. It comes into operation only when the language has been chosen. It does then claim to tell us what ontological commitments we accept by using certain expressions within that language.

A ruling such as Quine's can also forbid us to say certain things. Thus Alonzo Church chided Ayer for inconsistency in asserting that, while it makes sense to say that there is something that someone believes, this does not imply that there exists something to be believed. If this were merely a call for philosophical clarity, Ayer could respond by placing 'there is something that someone believes' in quotes as an accepted expression in common language, to be kept at the doorstep of his philosophy because ontologically misleading. The real force of the doctrine, however, is that we should not be permitted to say both that there are numbers, etc., and that they do not exist as material objects do. And it is certainly not the intention of its proponents to let us get away with the obvious move of refusing to use such expressions as 'there is' anywhere but in the common material object language; nor should we accept the inconvenience.

The full implications of this approach are probably most clearly displayed in Carnap's article, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'. There the everyday language in which we talk about things is presented as just one among many that we may choose to accept. Its one
distinction, according to Carnap, is that it is a language that we have in fact accepted at a very early age. He realises that this acceptance does not have an appearance of free choice, and he tries to bring the language into line with others by suggesting that we can at least freely reject it. Here, however, we realise that just as its acceptance went with the acceptance of "the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events",¹ so must its rejection be more than a linguistic matter. We surely accept the system mainly by behaving appropriately to our circumstances as defined by it. Similarly a rejection of it will mainly be shown by a cessation of such appropriate behaviour. It cannot be a matter, as Carnap imagines, of merely turning to another language or falling silent. It is doubtful whether a genuine rejection of the system could be carried through; and if it could the experimenter would scarcely survive for long.²

This provides a somewhat pragmatic answer to Quine's claim that "the distinction between there being one sense of 'there are' for concrete objects and another for abstract ones, and there being just one sense of 'there are' for both, makes no sense".³ Our ontological commitment

² The justice of this is apparent if we consider that a man's own existence as an object is what primarily commits him to the existence of objects.
³ 'Word and Object', p. 242. Quine seems to have overreached himself here by attempting too great subtlety; for what becomes of his insistence that there is equal ontological commitment if a claim that the meaning is the same makes no sense?
is lived, as well as displayed in the use of certain linguistic forms. There seems sense enough in the suggestion that these linguistic forms, such as 'there is', gain their ontological reputation through their use in the object language. That they are found useful in other contexts need not mean that they carry the same ontological commitment into those contexts.

V

Language begins, for each individual, as a part of his response to the material environment. It plays a role, though a fairly late one, in his objectification of the world, the creation of a coherent and comprehensible system in which he (or his body) is distinguished as one object among many. But language cannot, of course, be regarded simply as something that the individual masters. It is a system of communication, and teaching a child to speak plays an important part in bringing him up as a member of society. But this social dimension does not detach the origins of language from objects. Within the general facilitation of social intercourse the naming of objects is a dominant feature, for this lays the foundation for his sharing the common understanding of reality through the social symbolic scheme. And that, surely, must have been the sort of pay-off through which the phylogenetic development of language prospered.

The question which we have to ask is whether the special
connection between language and material objects is merely contingent: whether it merely so happens that language is first applied to material objects, employing standard functions by means of which it is equally applicable to many other types of referent? The alternative is that the material object language, and to a certain extent all language, gains its character from the material object context in which it was formed. In the case of this latter alternative, what would be carried over into other contexts would be the general practice of the use of social signs together, probably, with some of the sign structures developed in the original context. What would not be assured would be that language would maintain its original functions. New contexts and new uses would be expected to produce new functions, even if these were carried out with the same tools as had been developed to deal with the material situation.

In this case, which I think to be the more plausible, it could well be that our basic intuitions of what language is and of how language functions would be formed in relation to its use in the objective context. Given such intuitions it would be easy to suppose that they applied to language in a wide variety of its uses, because the occurrence of the same linguistic forms would provide a reassuring suggestion of uniformity. Thus the subject-predicate sentence is no doubt quite as evident in talk of minds as it is in talk of bodies, and this may encourage the supposition that the one case conforms to the other. If, however, the basic intuitive analysis of the function of a subject-predicate sentence is derived from the particular character of its material object use, the same analysis may be inappropriate to
In recent philosophy, the suggestion that there is a special tie between language and material objects naturally brings to mind the work of Professor Strawson and, in particular, his book 'Individuals'. There he contended both that particulars were the paradigm logical subjects and that material bodies (along with persons) were the primary particulars.

Strawson's discussion tends to pitch its claims rather higher than is necessary for my purpose, both in relation to the necessity of something like material objects to experience and language and in relation to necessary conditions for successful communication. I should therefore regard much of what he says as compatible with what I wish to put forward here; but I should not expect my own suggestions to be refuted if his claims were shown to be too extreme. I am concerned only with the language we have and the use we make of it, and to a large extent I am concerned with paradigm cases of that use. Thus we may manage to communicate about particular objects by using the predicate, and not the particular-indicating subject expression, to carry our common understanding; ¹ for example, the question 'Who is coming?' may have for answer, 'James, whom you do not know, is coming'. This, however, is a sophisticated complication that should not undermine our intuition that it is the purpose of the subject expression to direct the hearer's attention to what one is talking about. This is indeed a trivial example of the sort of case that I

¹ Strawson would seemingly have denied this at the time when he wrote 'Individuals' (see, for example, p. 181), though his article 'Identifying Reference and Truth Values' indicates that he would now accept it.
mentioned above, where a linguistic form can be used in a deviant functional manner. Such deviations can only arise in an already well established language that has been built up on the basis of regular functions for specific forms.

VI

At this point I want to concentrate on one part of Strawson's discussion in 'Individuals': the part where he asks what conditions "must be satisfied in order for it to be the case that an identifying reference to a particular is made by a speaker and correctly understood by a hearer". The first condition is that there is just one particular to which the speaker refers. For this purpose, Strawson says, "it is not enough that there should be at least one particular which his description fits. There must be at most one such particular which he has in mind. But he cannot, for himself, distinguish the particular that he has in mind by the fact that it is the one that he has in mind. So there must be some description he could give, though it need not be the one that he does give, which applies uniquely to the one he has in mind and does

1 Ibid., p. 181.

2 Strawson uses 'description' here to refer to phrases such as are classified as definite and indefinite descriptions. In the following pages I shall also use the word in this sense rather than in the wider sense introduced above.
not include the phrase, 'the one I have in mind'."¹ The same condition must be satisfied by the hearer so that he also has just one particular in mind. This particular must be the same one as the speaker has in mind, but the description by which the hearer can specify it need not be the same one as that by which the speaker can.

My interest in this argument is not in whether it does in fact express a necessary condition for referential identification. Identifying reference is itself a paradigm case, not to be equated, as Strawson equates it,² with the introduction of particulars into propositions. Apart from the case already mentioned where the predicate bears the common understanding, one could point to the use of indefinite descriptions which do introduce particulars, but do not in general achieve identifying reference; for example, 'A man came in' does introduce a particular man who can henceforth be referred to as 'the man who came in', but only rarely would produce the response 'Oh, I know who you mean.' If identifying reference is a paradigm, there can be no harm in treating it in paradigmatic fashion. It may be that there are instances where speaker or hearer cannot provide a suitable description but which would be established as instances by our providing a description.³ None the less the standard case, which

---

³ We clearly have to, in any case, for those instances where the speaker's and hearer's different descriptions have to be shown to specify the same particular. Many counter-examples have been presented by Keith Donellan in 'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions', though the force of many of these may have been undermined by Steven Boer in 'Reference and Identifying Descriptions'.

/cont'd
must cover very nearly every conceivable instance, even if a few escape, does involve both speaker and hearer being able, in some not too stringent sense, to provide descriptive specifications of the particular.

We generally manage to communicate about particulars, then, because particulars are represented in our minds by definite and indefinite descriptions. It is, of course, the definite descriptions that secure specific reference; but it may be somewhat misleading to concentrate entirely on those. Not only will indefinite descriptions serve as elements in complex definite descriptions as need arises, but many an indefinite description will graduate as a definite description as circumstances change, and not only because it comes in time to specify a particular uniquely but because of its sufficiency in a particular context. What concentrated attention on a few definite descriptions was the desire to specify the necessary conditions for satisfactory communication. With such a purpose one turns to those cases where communication only just takes place, where the connection with the particular is as tenuous as it can be. But quite as interesting from a general point of view are those cases where the particular concerned is very familiar to both speaker and hearer. In such a case there may be a great wealth of descriptions

I think, however, that one of the examples, at least, survives as an objection. This is the case of a child who, remembering nothing else, says 'Tom is a nice man' after a night's sleep during which he was woken to be introduced to someone named Tom. I am at least unconvinced by Boer's objection (Op. cit., p. 215) that the child fails to refer.
contained in the understanding that both have of the particular. Even if the speaker refers to it by a proper name that is in itself totally uninformative, he will yet raise in the hearer's mind many true descriptions. Such a particular is over-specified, and there is no point in asking by which description it was singled out.

Between this extreme and the other of just-successful reference lie many degrees of understanding and familiarity which permit communication about particulars. Subject terms have, as Strawson suggests, a completeness in themselves. However bare themselves of descriptive value, they can stand for a whole cluster of descriptions. Before ever a predicate is attached to them, they can evoke a little world of information. Strawson, who adopts the expression from Frege, explains 'completeness', however, in terms of facts rather than of descriptions. Although subject terms do not explicitly state facts, he says, "they perform their role only because they present or represent facts, only because they presuppose, or embody, or covertly carry, propositions which they do not explicitly affirm". With nearly all these expressions of the relation between subject expressions and facts I can agree. I still think it worth while, however, to suggest that their completeness is first a matter of descriptions rather than one of facts; and I do still mean by 'descriptions' here, definite or indefinite description phrases rather than whole descriptive statements.

1 'Individuals', p. 187.
Let me explain by means of one of Strawson's examples. He suggests that a group of speakers can only converse about Socrates if there is just one person, Socrates, of whom a reasonable proportion of the propositions they connect with the name are true. He proposes to get at these propositions by the artificial procedure of getting them to write down what they consider salient facts about Socrates. In what sense, however, would these facts be present, backing up people's meaning and understanding in a discussion about Socrates? To speak or think of Socrates can be, for example, to speak or think of the teacher of Plato. This can be spelled out as a fact: 'Socrates was the teacher of Plato'; but surely it need not be so spelled out. 'The teacher of Plato' can be substituted for, or amalgamated with, 'Socrates', rather than being attached to it by a verbal tie. When one does think a fact about Socrates, few or many descriptions will crowd into the subject term. Thus 'Socrates drank poison' might have the functional value of 'Socrates, an ancient Greek philosopher, (and) the teacher of Plato, drank poison'. It would be implausible to suggest that this was really to have several propositions (three, or more?) in one's mind at the same time.

This discussion might here be illuminated by what Strawson calls a pair of platitudes, his Principles of the Presumption of Ignorance and of the Presumption of Knowledge. These express the necessary conditions for the main type of useful communication: that the

---

2 'Identifying Reference and Truth Values', Strawson p. 76.
audience should on the one hand be in need of information and yet on the other understand enough to know what the speaker is referring to. This understanding can be represented in a simplifying fashion as an ability to replace, or rather supplement, the speaker's referential subject term with synonyms or other expressions that denote the same object. The ignorance of the audience demands, however, that further information should be added to the conglomerate of their interpretations of the speaker's subject term. It is here that the predicate comes into its own in spelling out a fact, something that is not known to them. The completeness of the subject expression is in contrast a matter of the non-propositional aggregation of descriptions.

In a sense, this is not a criticism of Strawson; for it is true that subject terms do, indirectly, contain facts. The descriptions I have been talking about clearly are assimilated facts. What needs to be told to us today is known by us tomorrow, amalgamated in our understanding of the particular, and just as descriptions are condensed factual propositions, so they can be reconstituted as propositions, particularly for the purpose of passing on the information to others. I think, however, that my insistence on descriptions, rather than factual propositions, as what the completeness of subject expressions directly comprehends, is most important to the understanding of the basic type of subject-predicate statement, of description in the wider sense, to which I now revert.
VII

The discussion of subject expressions in the last Section has proceeded without overt mention of material objects as what they primarily indicate, but not without an informal assumption that the account had to fit our talk about material objects before it fitted anything else. The time has now come to justify the claim that description, the conventional use of subject-predicate statements, is indeed fundamentally associated with material objects. I suggested above that this would be an affinity derived from the origin of language. We have therefore to consider the natural setting in which this language functions. The link between language and material object is of course perception; it is only through perceiving objects that we can describe them. \(^1\) We should therefore ask whether subject-predicate statements show, in their essentials, any signs of an origin in association with perception. In particular I shall be interested in whether the subject expression's double relation with descriptive phrases, functional incorporation and attachment by a verbal tie, can be paralleled in perception.

It used to be thought that perception was achieved through a

---

\(^1\) I do not mean by this, as one sense of 'description' would suggest, that we can only thus give an account of their appearances, but that it is only thus that we can talk about them at all. It is true that we can, as sophisticated language users, describe objects that we have never perceived, but that does depend on the perception of those objects, or at least of some objects, by others. The paradigm case of material object perception, without which all other would be impossible, rests on our own perceptions.
process of inference from the basic information provided by our senses. We were supposed, by studying colour patches, to infer that there was, for example, a bus before us. This view of perception is now in full retreat both in philosophy and in psychology. It is recognized that what emerges into consciousness is highly conceptualized. The simple information of colour distribution, as on a plane projection, is not readily available, as amateur artists are only too well aware. The sense of sight does not function like a camera nor the sense of hearing like a tape-recorder. One is functionally aware not of sensations or phenomenological objects but of material objects; and this, in essentials, is a mode of awareness that dates approximately from the time when one could begin learning to speak.

In perceiving material objects one generally recognizes them immediately, though in many cases only under a vague general description: as a flower, for instance. This limited recognition once achieved, one can go on to attend to specific features of the object: 'It has long stamens' or 'Its petals are lemon yellow in colour'. The interesting feature that I want to stress here is that these developments on the original recognition of a flower may either add to the information explicitly or implicitly contained in the immediate perception, or unpack the information that was only implicit. In order to express the character of the immediate perception, we might say perhaps that it was of a flower as something attached to a plant, of distinctive colour from the leaves, and of an acceptably flower-like shape; but we would say this not to specify the actual concepts
involved but to express its minimal character. Both the stamens
and the specific colour were not mentioned, but there is a difference
between these two cases. The stamens were probably not perceived
at all; they may have been out of sight. Therefore the information
that they were long would be obtained entirely by further perceptual
probing. The colour of the petals, however, is quite another matter.
There was probably no need for any further inspection; we could have
shut our eyes immediately and still have said 'lemon yellow'. This
is not to say though that the colour was, after all, explicit in the
original perception. We did not take notice of the colour; so,
having shut our eyes, we should have thought for the first time what
the colour was.

We did not perceive this flower as a flower through noticing
the stamens or the specific colour. This was seemingly a case of a
type of flower that was comparatively unfamiliar to us; but suppose
it was a type with which we were very familiar and of which we knew
the name. Then it would seem necessary, for us to be able to give
it its name, that we should notice the colour and shape that
distinguish it from flowers with other names. But, apparently, this
is not so; we should have perceived it directly, under its name, as
a recognitional unity. Shutting our eyes we would no doubt be able
to say what colour it was, though we might find ourselves drawing on
our knowledge of that type of flower as well as on the immediately
preceding perception; but it is doubtful whether we would give a
satisfactory account of its shape. Again we have a possible
distinction between what was implicit in the perception and what was
not present in it at all.
The features that are implicitly contained by a perception will include not only features that would seem immediately apparent to the senses but also features that are already understood to belong to the object, or type of object, recognized. That is, the functional value of the perception will not be drawn entirely from the immediate sensory information; it will also be drawn from the store of information connected with the verbal expression for what is perceived. The features, on the other hand, that will be added through further perceptual attention will typically include special features of this specimen or attributes of a familiar object special to the occasion, features that are not included in our understanding of the particular or of the type of object. Suppose, for instance, that we see a man whom we know. We do not notice then or later the features of his face, though it is, in a sense, by those that we recognize him, and we do not notice that he is old, or that he is intelligent, a bachelor, or our creditor, though all are implicitly comprehended in our perception; but we may notice, separately from our perception of who is there, what clothes he is wearing and what he is doing, if this information is particular to the occasion and not contained in the recognitional schema.

VIII

I hope that a clear parallel is now emerging between the subject-predicate statement as I analysed it and the perceptual setting in which
I suggested it had its original and determining role. The immediate percep-
tion is explicitly simple like the subject expression; but it incorporates,
again like the subject expression, a functional complexity. As the subject
expression can contain many descriptions, so the perception can contain man-
Many implicit cognitions, derived both from the senses and from the understand-
ing. On the other hand, we can notice further aspects of the object that is perceived, just as we can attach a predicate to the subject expression that adds to someone's understand-
ing of what is referred to. This completes the analogy, so that the movement of attention from the comprehended object to the specific quality or detail corresponds to the movement in the proposition from subject to predicate. Undoubtedly, however, the really striking similarity is that between the subject expression and the immediate perceptual recognition of an object. The value of our perceptions lies in the wealth of information that they embody, available but not often fully activated. Similarly the value of the subject expression rests on the descriptions it contains, for though we rarely make them all explicit, it is upon them that the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the expression depends. Further, the meaning of our perceptions does of course depend on constant up-dating by attention to fresh information, and the completeness of the subject expression would be barren without its capacity to condense fresh factual propositions and expand into others at need.

It might be objected to this analogy between description and perception that I am merely comparing one thing with its reflection. This objection might take two forms. In the first it would suggest
that perception has the character that it does, in adult human beings, only because it is thoroughly dependent on language. In the other it would suggest that perception only appears to have this character: we can only think about perception in terms of its linguistic results, our descriptions of what we perceive, and therefore the real nature of perception, whatever that may be, is hidden from us under the linguistic structure.

With the first form of this objection I can sympathize, for I readily accept what I take to be its main premise: that adult human perception is thoroughly permeated with language, functioning for it and through it in a seemingly perfect symbiosis. Whereas, though, the objection would present this as evidence that language provides the essential structure for such perception, I see it as revealing language as a natural growth out of perception, as an offspring that carries the system that begets it to a far higher level of achievement but only by developing in sympathy with it in the same fundamental structure. To decide between these two interpretations seems a developmental question; but it would be too facile to say that language must develop out of perception because awareness precedes talking. I have to face the argument that while perception may in some form or other be prior to language, it is only in conjunction with language, and perhaps derivatively from language, that it gains the structure that supports its resemblance to description, the resemblance on which I have laid such weight. Evidence is needed that perception has the required structure independently of language; and such evidence will of course also dispose of the second form of
the objection with which I am much less in sympathy, denying as it
does the common ground I see between myself and the objection in its
first form.

It might be suggested that perception, before it is conjoined
with language, can only be a matter of constant reactions to repeated
patterns of stimuli, and that it must therefore be an awareness of
universals rather than of particulars: but this would be to
underestimate the abilities that a child possesses before he learns
any words, and indeed the abilities of animals that never learn any
words. A child will at first put words to his own purposes, using
'mama' for instance to indicate that he wants something, no matter
from whom. In this deviant use the word clearly replaces a demanding
cry; but conventional uses of words may also build on the child's
capacities rather than depend on the development of entirely new
abilities. The space through which a baby crawls will at first have
been structured for him entirely by his immediate interests; but, by
the time that he learns to speak, some objects, notably people, will
be understood to be independent particulars with a continuous
existence from one perception of them to another. For instance, a
child will clearly recognize his mother, behaving differently towards
her than to any other object and showing particular signs of expectation
of her reappearance. His idea of his mother is of just the sort to
support the use of a name such as would potentially serve as the
subject of a sentence; but it is not surprising that this idea takes
some time to become attached to a noise. So little is this early
development of understanding dependent on language, indeed, that by
that time the child's interest may have passed on to other tasks. The word 'mama' may thus seem a convenient tool for noting similarities and get applied to any woman whatsoever. This is not because the child cannot distinguish his mother, or even other individual women, but because he has his own use for a word: a use which happens to be closer to that for 'woman' than to that for the word which people have tried to teach him.

In the case of animals, what will come to mind is not their ability to distinguish particulars over an extended length of time – one might surmise that if animals talked they would speak only in the present tense –, but their very much more developed ability to deal with three-dimensional objects in continuous circumstances. Their capacity to deal with other animals, for instance, as they move through space, shows up clearly as an ability to recognize particulars of various types and to notice present features of those particulars, notably what they are doing. There is no plausibility in the suggestion that this recognition might be only of universals for it is not altogether dependent on perceptual continuity, even if one does not claim for them long-term reidentification. To suggest that a cat, for instance, shows no belief in the continued existence of the mouse that it is chasing, when the mouse runs under something that hides it from view, is surely absurd. The cat's senses supply it with integrated information that represents a mouse which is to be held in attention while it is apparent and, if it disappears, to be searched for and to be expected to reappear. The cat has no more need than we do to spend its time extrapolating from more basic
information in order to track the mouse as a continuous existent.

I have written the last two paragraphs with one eye to Strawson's contention that, in the last analysis, all particulars rest on, or unfold into, facts. The type of facts that Strawson has in mind are such that their statement involves the demonstrative placing of universal features. He suggests, for instance, that thoughts of cats are based on facts about cat-features. Cat-features are remarkably like cats, for the concept of a cat-feature involves "the idea of a characteristic shape, of a characteristic pattern for the occupation of space". What does distinguish this concept from the concept of a cat is that it provides no distinction, among cases of 'more cat', between cases of 'same cat again' and 'another cat'. As I have pointed out, however, this condition takes us back beneath the surface of pre-linguistic capacities. We do not have to proceed to thoughts of cats by way of thoughts of cat-features because our senses already provide us with recognition of the 'same', and of the 'similar though distinct'.

Strawson would protest that he was not concerned with charting any actual development but with giving a coherent and intelligible explanation of our conceptual scheme. Our conceptual scheme is not, though, a dead thing to be provided with foundations, but a living

1 'Individuals', p. 211.
thing with its own roots. It is no doubt tempting to put forward some class of statements as conceptually more basic, on the grounds that they make more limited claims; but the likely result is distortion of the actual structure of experience and language. The sense datum theory is the exemplar of this type of limited claim theory that provides a quite unnecessary and misleading conceptual foundation for our everyday statements. It is to be feared that this part of Strawson’s theory approaches this model. I do not doubt that in giving an account of our perception of objects, and hence in giving a full account of our ability to refer to objects, universals will have an important role: but these universals will be patterns of sensory stimulation and such-like: not basic constituents of our conceptual scheme. To transfer them from scientific explanation to conceptual analysis can only distort the relation of language to reality.

IX

The purpose of my excursion into genetic psychology was to dispose of the suggestion that the completeness of the subject expression was achieved by unification of linguistic facts rather than through its being the direct successor of the unity of sensory recognition. What this move defends is the more important contention that the typical use of the subject expression in a description not only corresponds to perceptual recognition but is
the result of the core transformation in a social formalization of perception. The perceptions of those who speak a language are facilitated and enriched by the common understanding; but this can only be through the natural structural affinity of language to perception. Conversely language has objective meaning, not through a mere association with our experiences, but through its intrinsic relation with them. Telling other people facts about objects is a development of our ability to concentrate on specific aspects of perceived objects; but the multiplicity of predicates not only makes for variety in communication but enables a much greater complexity of information to be coalesced in perceptual recognition.

An implication of this view is that the roles of subject expressions and of predicates are essentially contrasted. There need be no controversy over the subject expression's role to pick out some item; but it has often been suggested that predicates too perform a similar role. If they do not have a function exactly similar to the subject expression's indication, it is yet thought that they perform a function that can be subsumed with indication under some name of wider scope such as 'the introduction of terms'.

1 The word that might be expected to occur at this point is 'reference', but I prefer to reserve that word for what people do - which should be distinguished from what the words they use do.

2 E.g., Strawson, op. cit., p. 146. This is not the place to offer a full criticism of the term theory of propositions. Its development can be traced through Ramsey's being confused ('Universals', Landesman, pp. 85-6) by some thoroughly confusing remarks by Russell ('On the Relations of Universals and Particulars', e.g., Landesman, p. 23). The confusion is basically an uncertainty whether propositions are objective or conceptual and is marked by a careless disregard for the use of inverted commas.
This train of thought is on the one hand a remarkable example of the tendency already mentioned, to assimilate all uses of language to description; on the other it is a response to the transformability of predicates into subject expressions. If 'Socrates is wise' can be rewritten as 'Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates', why should we not allow that 'is wise' introduces some item as 'wisdom', as a subject expression, may be presumed to do? 'Wisdom', however, is surely derivative from 'wise', and it is therefore more plausible to argue in the opposite direction that 'wisdom' does not introduce any item since 'is wise' does not. Some small indication that this is so is given by consideration of the converse of 'wisdom'. As Peter Geach has stressed, a distinctive feature of predicates is that they carry the negation of a proposition. The negation of a standard subject expression, if this is conceivable at all, is presumably an expression that stands for the whole of existence bar the object denoted by the original subject expression; 'Not this cat' must stand, if for anything, for everything in the universe apart from this cat. But a subject expression such as 'wisdom' does have a natural negation, viz. 'unwisdom'. We might say therefore that wisdom does not exist in any universe from which it can be picked out or introduced as an item; it forms, with its negation, a closed "world" of its own.

This link with negation elucidates the use of predicates

---

as a reaction to, or treatment of, the items picked out by subject expressions, rather than as an introduction of a further range of items. The reaction or treatment may be given as appropriate, or explicitly withheld as inappropriate, to the identified object. But in denying that predicates introduce a further range of non-linguistic items, it would be a mistake to go to the other extreme of claiming that universals are entirely linguistic. There is some truth in this old doctrine, however. As John Searle says, "Universals are not entities in the world, but in our mode of representing the world; they are, therefore, identified not by appealing to facts, but in the utterance of expressions having the relevant meanings." In other words, what universal we are dealing with is determined by what predicate we are using, and more precisely by the exact shade of meaning of that predicate, which is entirely determined by the quirks of language use and not by set divisions in reality.

That universals are identified by reference to language does not imply a thorough-going nominalism. It does not force us to think that what red objects, for example, have in common must be only that they are all called 'red'. It is well worth asserting the platitude that what red things have in common is that they are red.\(^1\)

---


Renford Bambrough has introduced this type of platitude as a summary expression of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's complete solution of the problem of universals ("Universals and Family Resemblance", Pitcher, p. 185.). Bambrough is too optimistic, for an explanation needs to be given of the natural features that he takes for granted, the prelinguistic similarities and differences on which the linguistic classification is based.
This does not deny that the class of red things consists of just those that are, or could be, properly called 'red'. But it does insist that the grounds for the propriety of this naming lie in reality; that there are common natures in objects, or many continuums of similarity between them, which support our classification. Our language draws the boundaries, but the ground on which they are drawn is provided by reality.

We can recognize this in the way that language-linked universals are grouped together in our understanding. We may recognize that there are several based in one unspecified feature of an object. For example, 'X has a temperature of 10°C.' introduces a different universal than does 'X has a temperature of 283°A.', though it has been shown that these values are equivalent. Similarly, 'X is brittle' introduces a different universal than does 'X has its molecules bonded in such and such a way', even though it is just the molecules being bonded in that way that makes X brittle. In each case, therefore, we may be inclined to say that there is just one real property of the object involved in both universals. This, however, would be to fall into the error of supposing that predicates introduce countable entities. It is true that we can recognize a certain priority among universals. Thus the Absolute scale may be regarded as more basic than the Centigrade scale, and the molecules being bonded in a certain way may seem more basic than the dispositional brittleness. It would

---

1 Both examples are due to Max Deutscher, 'Mental and Physical Properties', pp. 74-5.
be a mistake, though, to suppose that corresponding to these universals are what must be distinguished as the veritable properties of the objects. These more basic universals are still relative to language and perception, and not different in kind from the more superficial. It does not really make sense, therefore, to try to count properties. We can speak of a property corresponding to every universal, or we can restrict them to universals that we consider to be particularly basic, or we can think of properties as underlying all universals however basic. Whatever we do, it will clearly be a convention and not an objective enumeration.

Even if properties are not countable, there is in objects a genuine basis for perceptual reactions and through them for linguistic classifications. Linguistic universals, the proper repetition of a word in different circumstances, therefore correspond to objective universals, such aspects of the property continuum as underlie the universals of perceptual reaction, the recurrent summation of sensory information, now organised according to the linguistic scheme. This triple generalization can be seen most clearly in a simple case such as that of 'red'. Objects differ in a way which is understood to place them in a continuum, of which one dimension runs from red to violet. Our experience of colour is also naturally organized in a continuum, rather different from the former in that the dimension mentioned becomes circular with violet leading into red again. Since this structure of experience has a functional value in itself, it may provide an effective way of discriminating objects before colour words are learned or
colours discriminated in consciousness; but the functional organization that we know comes with the learning of colour words. The word 'red' delimits a certain range of the experiential continuum and through it of the objective continuum. The experiential range thereafter takes on a common functional value, all experiences within the range having a joint interpretation. Similarly the objects, the relevant properties of which fall within the range, are grouped together, by perception as well as by linguistic description, as so relevantly similar as to be of one class.

The predicates that we use do not always, of course, have so direct a connection with experiential simplicities. Even while we speak in commonplace terms of the most familiar material objects, the greater number of predicates could not be supposed to reflect a natural classification of experience. On the contrary, it is evident that they presuppose a prior perceptual recognition and understanding of objects. They are, in Miss Anscombe's terms, 'substance-involving' or 'substantial'.1 Far from offering themselves as original constituents for the notion of an object, they function only as elaborations upon that notion. Thus, a term like 'malleable' makes no pretence to be a straight categorization of experience after the fashion of 'red', but is

---

1 G.E.M. Anscombe, 'Substance', p. 73. Miss Anscombe introduced these terms in the course of arguing that particulars necessarily retain certain properties while they remain those particulars. As used here, however, they are not intended to carry an implication of essentialism. An object may come to be, or cease to be, malleable, while remaining the same object. Miss Anscombe's argument can indeed be seen as enlarging the distinction between substance-involving and substantial predicates, as arguing a great difference between predicates such as 'malleable' and 'a horse', both of which are equally apposite to my present purpose.
obviously dependent for its sense on some basic notion of an object, a potential subject of malleability.

It is important to realise this common feature of so many predicates in order to come to a proper understanding of the ontological force of descriptive language. I have already spoken of the way in which a subject term is able to pick out an object by means of powers of characterization that might more properly be understood to belong to predicates. These powers it borrows from predicates with which it is understood to be connected, and linguistic indication is therefore far from analogous to a simple pointing. Similarly, we can now recognize that the characterization of objects through predicates is far from being a straight-forward attachment of quite distinct elements to the core denotation. Predicates, in general, build up the concept of what is indicated as an object; but the later, more sophisticated ones presuppose the object as represented by their predecessors. This progress parallels the development of more sophisticated constants of interaction between the person and reality. We advance from sensory constants such as 'red' to more complex perceptual constants such as 'malleable'. Such a constant depends on the prior recognition of objects that can be picked out as of different characters. In this case an object is noted as one that will respond in certain ways to being pulled and prodded. The ability to use the word 'malleable' arises as a joint product of perceptual and pulling-prodding abilities, both organized according to a basic objective understanding.
The fact of this interaction between subject and predicate should warn us against supposing that subject and predicate provide us with a clear model of the ontological structure of the things that we perceive. Such a model has often been accepted, but things are not really constructed out of distinct entities: indicated objects on the one hand and qualities on the other. The supposition that they are appeared in full force in the Aristotelian 'substance and accident'; but in English philosophy it is most familiar in John Locke's less than enthusiastic account.

Lock felt that 'substance' was a shadowy notion, but he was driven to accept it by his doubt that the genuinely experienced qualities could have the power to exist on their own account. To give the qualities some existential prop, substance had to be accepted even though nothing could be known of it since it was out of the reach of experience. The steps leading to this surrender were clearly outlined by Locke himself. "All the ideas of all the sensible qualities of a cherry come into the mind by sensation... The ideas of these qualities are perceived by the mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence, i.e., that they cannot exist or subsist by themselves... Hence the mind perceives the necessary connexion with inherence or being supported, which being a relative idea superadded to the red colour in a cherry... the mind frames the correlative idea of a support."¹ The conclusion

seems inevitable enough, but hidden in the first sentence is the crucial assumption that need not have been made: the assumption that qualities are distinctly perceived, independent of any awareness of an object.

I have already mentioned the decline of that view of perception which built it upon awareness of qualities. Join this with the recognition that the very conception of most qualities involves the notion of an object, and it should be clear that we no longer need suppose with Locke that qualities are free objects in need of external support. Yet there are still those who take qualities to be separately given and who also, therefore, accept the need for some equivalently separate type of entity to sustain them.

These separate entities have generally been referred to in recent discussions as "bare particulars". Their advocates, such as Bergmann and Allaire, have not been so pessimistic as Locke about the possibility of making their acquaintance. Allaire, for instance, argues that a bare particular is presented in our awareness of one object as numerically different from another. But while he presents this idea in an attempt to show that there is phenomenological as well as dialectical evidence for bare particulars, his critics are to some extent justified in finding it altogether dialectical. They overstate their case, however, as when Hochberg says "To be acquainted with an object is not to be acquainted with

---

1 'Bare Particulars', pp. 6-7.
2 V.C. Chappell, 'Particulars Re-Clothed'; H. Hochberg, 'Ontology and Acquaintance'.

it as a particular ontological analysis holds or reveals it to be";¹ for perception can be reformed by the understanding. The main obstacle to being acquainted with some thing as some theory holds it to be is the thing's not fitting the theory. Thus there seems no reason why Allaire should not come to be aware of bare particulars through convincing himself of their existence - provided there are such things. On the other hand, he cannot claim the experience so gained, which may be delusory, as convincing evidence of their existence.²

Few of those who make the visual experiment, however, are likely to agree that they have caught a glimpse of a bare particular. The main support for the existence of such entities must be dialectical; and the most promising argument suggests that they are required to individuate objects. Consider two objects with all their non-relational qualities in common. These, so the argument runs, would not be distinct objects if they were only complexes of qualities. Their individuality is ensured only by their having bare particulars as constituents. What, though, of their relational qualities; could not spatial relations, for instance, individuate them? The answer given is that relations only hold between objects that are already distinct. In Allaire's words, "The fact that spatial relations imply diversity does not

² Hochberg does also make the point (Op. cit., p. 51) that someone who claims acquaintance with a bare particular on the basis of acquaintance with an object is claiming acquaintance not just with that object under another description but with a constituent of that object. But, given the unclarified sense of 'constituent', it is not clear whether this is a more serious objection.
ground the difference between two things but, at most, our knowledge that there is a difference to be grounded."

The idea seems to be that space would of itself be incapable of holding mere complexes of qualities apart. Objects, on this view, can only be kept distinct by being pinned out in space by bare particulars. But such is the obscurity of the notion of ontological priority that it is by no means clear why this view should be preferred. If qualities can be treated so distinctly, why should they be regarded as forming a dependent category? Could not complexes of qualities supply their own ontological identity as bare particulars are supposed to do for themselves? As Hochberg has pointed out, we need not accept the principle that only simple particulars can be simply different. The rules of the game are not so clear that we need feel prevented from saying that two complexes are just different. Then it could be argued, alternatively, that complexes are distinguished ontologically by containing different combinations of qualities. It is true that one would have to recognize the possibility of two complexes with all their non-relational qualities in common; but this difficulty could probably be circumvented by including relational qualities among those making up each complex.

If only one is prepared to accept the treatment of qualities

---

1 'Relations and the Problem of Individuation', p. 63.
2 'Universals, Particulars and Predication', pp. 89-95.
3 See, for example, Hochberg, 'Things and Descriptions', p. 43.
as isolatable realities, quite a plausible case can be made out for
the contention that objects are complexes of qualities, as is shown
best, perhaps, by Hochberg in his 'Things and Descriptions'. He
is persuasive in dismissing the bare particular as "a hypostatization
of (the indicating) function of a sign". The apparent strength
of his account does derive, though, more from the weakness of its
antagonist than from virtues of its own. The bare particular
account can be made to seem ontologically fanciful and the force
of its objections to the quality-complex theory can be overcome.
One is left, however, with the suspicion that the notion of a
complex is none the less almost as fanciful. The familiarity of
qualities is an advantage; but is there any sense in speaking of
them as if they could be taken, linked together and organized into
objects?

   It is interesting to note how the word 'complex' provides a
vehicle for the ontologically essential indicating function. The
bare particular theory did treat that function as altogether self-
sufficient, thus depriving the indicated object of all character.
Here, however, the indicating function is surely not taken seriously
enough. What we have is a dummy object conjured into existence
by the use of a convenient noun. Much capital is thus made of our
natural tendency to credit any noun with picking out some element
of reality; but, at the same time, this pointing is deprived of its
ontological priority. The individuated particular, the complex,

1 Ibid., p. 41.
is subsidiary to its characterizing elements, the qualities.

It is significant, no doubt, that Hochberg displays indifference whether phenomenal or physical objects are to be discussed and that he does, in fact, choose the phenomenal.¹ It is at least questionable whether there are any such objects; and, even if we allow that there are, they lack the independent 'out there' character of physical objects. There will always be a suspicion that to talk of phenomenal objects is only to recast our talk of sensuous qualities in the form, without the substance, of the language of genuine external perception. An account such as Hochberg's could therefore prove to be well suited to phenomenal objects; but it would be quite mistaken to think of it as extensible into a general ontology.

If we direct our attention to objects in physical space, the notion that they are somehow compounded of qualities becomes quite unconvincing. Even if we allow that the commonplace notions of attaching, mixing or grouping would have to be transcended², it still seems naive to suppose that any such operation could be carried out on objective qualities. When an object changes, we may perhaps say that it gains or loses certain qualities; but this should not be taken as a serious representation of the change. A count of the differing qualities would be not so much a measure of change as a measure of our capacity for description relative to the changing object.

¹ 'Universals, Particulars and Predication', p. 87.

² So far transcended that, as Long points out ('Particulars and their Qualities', p. 199), the ontological tie between the qualities (and that name restates the problem rather than solves it) cannot be compresence in space-time or any other predicative relation.
The object-dependence of qualities may perhaps be brought out most convincingly with respect to location. Our first thought may be that the placing of qualities is a simple matter on the lines of 'green here and red over there'; but, as Douglas Long has stressed, more attentive consideration of particular examples soon undermines this first confidence. Some of the most obviously troublesome cases are those of shape. Think, for instance, of the roundness of a ball. Where is this located? One can say where the round surface of the ball is located; but is that where the roundness is located on its own account? Could it be said to be spread out in space where the surface is, and would it, therefore, be regarded as round in itself?

These problems are not restricted to qualities of shape. Colours are seemingly as easily placed as any, but are revealed on little further consideration as also lacking location in themselves. A pigmented surface can be located, but the colour itself is neither that surface nor another thing in exactly the same location. Long therefore reaches the conclusion that we cannot understand the location of qualities independently of the location of things having those qualities. "To say, for example, that redness is at $s_1t_1$ can only make sense if we understand it to mean that something red occupies $s_1t_1$."  

In the same article, Long goes on to present what might be regarded as a common-sense theory of 'clothed particulars'. In

---

1 'Particulars and their Qualities', p. 198.
denying both bare particulars and bare qualities - the latter 'bare' in the way that cupboards rather than bodies may be - , he accepts the natural ontology at its face value. Objects are, as we have always thought, things such as their qualities make them. There are particulars to be recognized and located; and these are not complexes of qualities. On the other hand, the suggestion that these particulars "are both intrinsically without qualities and yet somehow characterized by them is not intelligible". Therefore, "In the sense that the concept of a qualified particular is not analysable in these terms" (of bare qualities and bare particulars), "that concept must be regarded as being basic to the metaphysical framework in terms of which we speak of particulars and their qualities".¹

This is surely entirely right; not least because it does not make any claim for the ultimate validity of the metaphysical framework. The qualified particular is clearly not of a character to satisfy those who are looking for a final ontological simplicity. It has to be accepted as an element in a perceptual ontology, one that has a conceptual complexity corresponding to the perceptual process; but while we speak of particulars and their qualities, these are inseparable. There is no future for attempts to reconstruct our natural ontology by giving independent priority either to particulars or to qualities. This is not to deny absolutely the possibility of any more fundamental ontology. Given, however, the close connection between language and perception and between the

structure of our language and the object/quality distinction, the formulation of any such ontology would be fraught with difficulty. That need not prevent us, however, from recognizing that the perceptual ontology does have limitations.

XI

My final aim in the last section was to argue that the particular/qualities structure is a product of our perceptual relation with the world rather than an authentic uninterpreted structure of that world as it really is. Some doubt would follow from this whether the objects that we pick out have any genuine status as entities; whether they may not be appearances, in a Kantian sense, mediating between us and whatever really is.

This is a question that I wish to pursue; but, if I may wish to diminish the significance of material objects, I should perhaps explain first how I could associate myself, in section v, with Strawson's theory of the primacy of material bodies as particulars in our conceptual scheme. Strawson can be taken to advocate the ontological priority of material bodies, and the position that I wish to take may seem to deny this; but, before deciding whether there is an incompatibility, one must make quite clear the relevant senses of 'ontological priority'.

The needed clarification may be obtained, indirectly, through
consideration of a writer who is reluctant to make the necessary distinctions. In criticizing Strawson, J.M.E. Moravscik offered what he took to be a general definition of ontological priority. "To say that $x$ is ontologically prior to $y$ means that the existence of $x$ is a necessary condition of the existence of $y$, but the existence of $y$ is not a necessary condition of the existence of $x$."

Now, this definition is clearly appropriate to an ontology in which we attempt to state the structure of existence as, to the best of our understanding, we consider it to be. There is, however, quite another way in which ontological priority can be thought of. In the place of priority according to the judgment of the completed ontology, we may intend priority within the development of the ontology. It may be, perhaps, only by supposing the existence of one type of entity that we can discover the existence of another type. Then, in the internal evidential structure of our ontology, the first type would be prior to the second; and this priority, too, may with good sense be referred to as an ontological priority. It might be called priority in the order of understanding or existemological priority, to distinguish it from the priority defined by Moravscik, which in its turn might be called priority in the order of being or existential priority.

Strawson's theory awards priority to material bodies with

---

1 'Strawson and Ontological Priority', p. 107.
respect to identification. This is clearly a case of priority
in the order of understanding; and, unless one adopts an idealist
position which views objects as dependent on mind for their existence,
it would provide no evidence of priority in the order of being.
While material bodies would, on this theory, be prior to any other
particulars in the evidential structure of our ontology, they might
yet be existentially subsidiary in the final judgement of that
ontology. It is even possible that they would be relegated to the
marginal status, doubtfully real or unreal, which goes with the name
'appearance'.

Such a priority is clearly incompatible with the definition
given by Moravscik; and yet he does attempt to force it into this
pattern, treating dependence with respect to identification as just
one among many different possible dependencies corresponding to
different conditions of existence. He therefore argues, for
instance, that a full concept of an animal commits us to the existence
of events such as eating. Of course, we do generally understand
that animals cannot exist without some such events; but that follows
our recognition of events. This does not prove that the identification
of events is not, as Strawson would have it, dependent on the

1 'Individuals', pp. 38-39.
2 At one point Moravscik does recognize that Strawson's priority
should be regarded as one of 'ontological commitment' (Op. cit.,
p. 112); but he is prompted to this by a doubt whether ident-
ification can be a sufficient condition of existence, not by
its not being a necessary condition.
identification of some material bodies. Still less does it prove that the way we talk and think about events is not, as I would have it, dependent on the way we talk and think about material objects, which itself develops from the structure of our perception of those objects.

This confusion about the different senses of ontological priority is apparent also when Strawson's view is criticized on the ground that the stuff of which objects are made must be ontologically prior to them. This objection has been presented at length by Henry Laycock in his 'Some Questions of Ontology'. He starts from the very reasonable assertion that before there can be a sphere of bronze or a pool of water, there must first be bronze or water.\footnote{Ibid, p. 3.} From this there naturally follows the contention that material objects are not ontologically more fundamental than stuff or matter,\footnote{Op. cit., p. 9.} a contention that, in the sense of existential priority, can be allowed. As with events, however, the existential priority of stuff would have no necessary bearing on the priority of material objects with respect to identification. It is remarkable that Laycock does not recognize this, for he does distinguish epistemological priority in much the same sense, so that one kind of entity may be epistemologically more basic than another without being existentially more basic.\footnote{Op. cit., p. 40.} He only introduces this type of priority, however, to deal with the relation between stuff and the elements of
which stuff is composed: what science tells us are atoms and molecules. Stuff is clearly more basic epistemologically than its elements, which are only discovered after protracted investigation into the nature of stuffs. On the other hand, the elements would seem to be, if anything, existentially prior to the stuff.

While Laycock recognizes epistemological priority between stuff and its elements, the same pattern could be found where he does not think to find it, between, for instance, pools or drops and water. As we speak of these, there is, no doubt, a conceptual dependency of the pools and drops on the water, informally recognizing its existential priority. There is, in Laycock's words, "a particularization over stuff". That does not mean, however, that man did not have to recognize particulars such as pools and drops before he could develop the notion of water, that the epistemological development was not a "generalization over particulars".

Names for different stuffs are intermediate in character between words that stand for objects and words that characterize them. It is not surprising, therefore, that someone should hold, as Quine does, that mass terms are a survival from a stage in conceptual development before the dichotomy between singular and general terms was established. But this is surely to mistake the structural compromise for the inchoate. As a linguistic phenomenon, the use of names of stuffs seems a more complex development, designed to cope with aspects of reality that the perception and description of qualified particulars could not cover. Its

---

2 'Word and Object', p. 95
intermediate character would then be due, not to its representing a common origin, but to its borrowing from the available elements in the language of perceptual objects.

The natural bias of language towards material objects comes out very clearly in the difficulties that writers display in dealing with notions of stuff. There may be much that is problematical about objects, but to find the problems one must break through the mask of a language that comprehends them all too well. With stuffs, on the other hand, problems are already apparent in the language. Firstly, the word for a stuff has a generality which links it with words for qualities, a characteristic that is naturally most obvious when such a word appears as a predicate. Thus, 'This is water' seems to have much in common with 'This is green'. It is this aspect that Strawson emphasizes in his account of these words.\(^1\) This means, in the context of his theory of term introduction which offers the alternatives of introducing objects or introducing concepts, that they must be taken to introduce concepts. But this is a totally implausible suggestion in relation to the same words' occurrences as genuine underived subject terms in such phrases as 'Snow is falling'; hence Laycock's jibe that, on Strawson's interpretation taken literally, this would mean that "the universal itself was falling (out of the Platonic heaven, presumably)".\(^2\)

It will not do, on the other hand, to place all the weight

---

1 'Individuals', pp. 202-203.
on the resemblance to singular subject expressions. Though Quine is right, in contrast to Strawson, in recognizing that a stuff such as water is as real or concrete as any particular object, he is mistaken in thinking that it must therefore be such an object.\footnote{\textit{Word and Object}, p. 98.} Objects are typically perceptible wholes, which water is not. Perhaps water's being so scattered through the universe as it is does not altogether rule out its being regarded as a single object; but the fact remains that, scattered as it is, it has never been so regarded. Supposing that all water was gathered together into a single comprehensible body, we could give that body a name as a single object; but 'water' is not already a potential name for that body.

Trying to steer a course that will avoid the misleading emphases of Strawson and Quine, Laycock notes that mass terms, such as 'water', function in very much the same way as plural sortal terms such as 'apples'.\footnote{Op. cit., pp. 35-38.} With such terms there might be a hint how the indicating and characterizing functions could be joined, there being many objects to be both indicated and characterized as of the same kind: but Laycock's attempt to develop this line soon runs into fantasy. He proposes that there is a sort of atomism presupposed in our common speech of stuffs, so that to speak of water is to speak of water elements.\footnote{Op. cit., pp. 38-40.} This is a more bizarre interpretation of common understanding that Quine's single object.
Helen Cartwright is surely correct when she stresses the point that mass nouns provide not an arithmetic as sortal nouns do but a measure.\(^1\) When a stuff is spoken of, it is an occasion for asking 'How much?' rather than 'How many?'. This simple recognition will not solve all problems about stuffs; but their connection with the more sophisticated question 'How much?' does suggest again the comparative complexity of the notion of stuff in relation to the main drift of our conceptual scheme.

This complexity stems from the difficulty of accommodating a response to many particulars (e.g., pools and drops) that does not differentiate them but that does indicate rather than characterize. We might well regret, given the existential and explanatory relations of stuff to objects, that this is so. We might have a more God-like view of the universe if stuffs were the general currency of our understanding. The fact remains that we do have difficulty in comprehending a general target for indication, because our perceptual predilections are for indicating objects that we can really see or grasp and for characterizing these on the basis of generalized interactions with reality. It is this objective perception that our language develops out of and is designed to serve. No wonder then that there is evidence of strain when we have to deal with stuff that scatters and recombines, but is always the same and not thereby destroyed or reconstructed.

---

1 'Quantities', p. 27.
One area in which limitations of the perceptual ontology can be sought is that of the durational identity of its objects. These objects are said to come into existence, to last for some period of time and to then go out of existence. Are there any good grounds, though, for supposing that the beginning and the end of these objects constitutes a genuine origin or cessation in reality? It might be that the occasions noted as their beginnings and endings do involve comparatively large changes in a basic process, but that these changes are only distinguishable in degree (and that not infallibly) and not in kind from those occurring during the period of their existence.

One way of expressing this doubt is by asking whether it is possible to determine objectively whether an object picked out at one time is or is not the same object as one picked out at another time. It would naturally be assumed that identity could be so established, providing certain conditions were satisfied. These conditions might be that an object had been traced in a continuous path through space and time and that its character had not changed too much in the interim. Is it certain, however, that any conditions such as these could be sufficient to establish a real identity, rather than a conventional one imposed by our interests?

In recent times Peter Geach has strongly upheld the view that identity is always relative to some classification; so that
"it makes no sense to judge whether $x$ and $y$ are 'the same' or whether $x$ remains 'the same', unless we add or understand some general term - "the same F"." So expressed, this view relates not only to identity over time but also to present identity; but here I want to concentrate on the former application. In this application it suggests firstly that any decision about the identity through time of an entity must be restricted to that entity under a certain characterization; and secondly that the decision might vary as we discussed the entity under different general terms. A suitable example would be bronze that is successively formed into two statues. While it would be the identical piece of bronze over the whole period, it would not be the identical statue.\(^1\)

Strangely, this view has been considered to be a form of essentialism,\(^2\) as if the object's being relative to a general term meant that there was an object that necessarily possessed the qualities prescribed by the general term. But this is obviously a case of modality de dicto rather than of modality de re.\(^4\) All the necessity derives from the fact that the object, while it is counted the same object, must retain suitable characteristics. Its being counted the same object shows only that there is a continuous point of application for the same general term. This

\(^1\) 'Reference and Generality', p. 39.

\(^2\) The example is John Perry's ('The same F', p. 198) with Sydney Shoemaker's practical substitution of bronze for clay ('Wiggins on Identity', p. 530.)

\(^3\) E.g., by Loux, 'Recent Work in Ontology', p. 134.

\(^4\) Plantinga, 'De Re et de Dicto'.
can have no implication for what is picked out, since the same element of reality, \( x \), may be indicated by different general terms, \( F, G \), etc. It is clear, therefore, that a general term does not determine the nature of an element of reality to which it is applicable. The boundaries that we have are limits of application and not essential limits in reality.

This view is also regarded, not least by Geach himself, as leading to an assault on (the so-called) Leibniz' Law: 'For any entity, \( x \), and any entity, \( y \), \( x \) is identical with \( y \) if and only if for any property, \( F \), \( x \) is characterized by \( F \) if and only if \( y \) is characterized by \( F' \).^2 My concern, however, is only with that part of Geach's view that relates to identity over time. Whether that part is incompatible with Leibniz' Law depends on whether the Law itself is reckoned to cover identity over time. Its great plausibility rests on its interpretation in terms of contemporaneous identity and of present-defined properties. To extend it to cover identity over time requires the dating of properties or of their possession. It may be thought that little can be achieved by this, however, since the Law will still fail to express the real requirements of identity over time, such as a continuous path through space and time. It is true that the Law should not in any case be regarded as a recipe for establishing identity; but it does express a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for identity, and this is obviously quite vacuous when one has to study, as one

1 'Identity', pp. 3 - 5.
2 Feldman, 'Leibniz and "Leibniz' Law"', p. 511.
clearly must, a $t_1$ object to discover the properties of a $t_2$ object at $t_1$. In other words, one must assume identity over time before operating the Law.

Leibniz' Law might still be permitted the role of expressing implications of identity over time, if this did not have any harmful results. Unfortunately, however, to allow it this role is to destroy its main function of formulating contemporaneous identity. The examples that can be adduced in support of Geach's view show either that identity is a non-transitive relation - which is not to be allowed - or that Leibniz' Law formulates either contemporaneous identity or identity over time but not both. Let us say, for example, that this bronze, $x$, at time $t$ is identical with that bronze, $X$, at time $T$, for at time $t$ bronze $X$ has all the properties of $x$ and vice versa. On the other hand, this statue, $y$, at time $t$ is not identical with statue $Y$, or bronze $X$, at time $T$ because statue $y$ does not exist and has no properties at all at time $T$. This means that statue $y$ cannot be identical with bronze $x$, due to the transitivity of the identity relation, $x$'s identity with $X$ and $y$'s non-identity with $X$.

Given the choice between Leibniz' Law as a formulation of contemporaneous identity and as a formulation of identity over time, the former would seem obviously preferable. Remarkably, however, the latter has been chosen by the main opposition to Geach. David Wiggins\(^1\) and, later but more clearly, John Perry\(^2\) have insisted

---

1 'Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity'
2 'The Same F'.
that particulars cannot be the same F but not the same C. They prefer to see two particulars, the statue and the piece of bronze, in the one thing, rather than admit that identity over time is not formulated by Leibniz’ Law.

Wiggins and Perry do recognize a form of identity or sameness which is not relative to general terms - or, at least, not to any but an altogether basic one such as 'thing'. Wiggins, thinking of the relation between components or fragments and whole, speaks of the constitutive 'is'.¹ Shoemaker points out that this needs to be supplemented by a symmetrical relation; and, following Perry, he suggests that the relation 'being composed of the same matter' can in many cases be expressed by 'is one and the same thing as'.² This notion, which is that expressed by Leibniz' Law restricted to purely contemporaneous properties, seems a much more desirable property than the unrestricted identity over time. Both Wiggins and Perry, however, prefer to reserve the term 'identical' for the latter.³

Wiggins employs a symbolism that endorses Geach’s connection of the general term with the identity relation;⁴ but Perry brings out better the structure of this alternative view by allowing identity to be a single relation and allocating specificity to the names; so that x is the same F as y because x is by definition

2 'Wiggins on Identity', p. 531.
an F, y is by definition an F, and x is the same as y.¹ This account of identity, unlike Geach's, is thus genuinely essentialist, for it makes an object fully dependent on the way in which it is picked out. Thus Wiggins says, "how we do our singling out determines both what we single out, and (which is the same thing) the principle of individuation of what we single out, and (again the same thing) the conditions of the existence of what we have singled out."² Now, the apparent implication of this is that the necessity in the object is one and the same as the necessity in the categorization; there has been an amalgamation of modality de re and modality de dicto because objects are thought- or concept-dependent.

Wiggins does not recognize this, however, for he says that the existence of what we have singled out "is independent of our thought . . . , even if our individuation of it (obviously) cannot be". "It was there before we picked it out", he continues, "but to pick it out you have to pick it out."² This is rather like saying that the round area of flat paper, that we have just drawn a line around, was there before we set pencil to paper, existing in its own right as an essentially flat round area; and not only this, but further that, whenever the paper is bent, this particular is destroyed along with an infinite number of other flat-shape particulars. Such a multiplication of entities is not to

be permitted, even on the smaller scale envisaged by Wiggins and Perry.

Before considering how this population increase is to be avoided, let us introduce a further possible conception of identity. This is the fourth and last combination of views on the necessary relativity of identity to general terms and on the possibility of one object's being the same F but not the same G. Geach approved of both, Perry of neither, Wiggins of the first but not the second; the remaining combination is the one, therefore, that favours the second but not the first. Just such a view has been advanced by Douglas Odegard, who characterizes it as Lockean. He points out that it is quite possible to combine two notions of identity; a general unrestricted sense can exist alongside one tied to specific general terms. While, therefore, in the first sense it can be stated outright that one object is identical with another, in the second sense it can be said that they are the same F but not the same G.

Odegard, whose interest is in identity through time, arranges this seemingly paradoxical combination by awarding unrestricted identity to any objects that are the same F for any general term 'F'. I doubt whether this arrangement can prove satisfactory.

1 'Identity through Time', pp. 29-31.
3 My view will appear at variance with Odegard's as I develop it here. More specifically, I doubt whether a general notion of identity over time can be valid to cover both material continuity and continuity as a perceptual object regardless of material continuity. Further, given the wide variety of general terms and the heavy dependence of some of these on specific interests of ours, I doubt whether a general notion of identity to cover all perceptual objects, distinguished under any general term, could be of value.
but want instead to achieve the same combination by contrasting contemporaneous identity with identity over time. Contemporaneous identity is absolute identity, identity over time is relative to
general terms.

Let us return to Wiggins and Perry and their threatened multiplication of entities. Wiggins' idea was that an entity exists as it is singled out and therefore necessarily possesses the properties understood in the term that singles it out. What was apparently one thing could then be singled out as many different entities as different terms were applied to it. Now, it is my contention that some part of reality¹ can indeed be singled out in different terms; and those different terms represent different perceptual interpretations of that reality. Where I diverge from Wiggins is in my ontological estimate of the perceptual 'objects' that may thus seem to accumulate. I have already proposed in the previous two sections that perceptual objects would lack status in a serious ontology, and I now wish to give greater substance to this suggestion.

What is picked out in perception or in immediate reference is some genuine reality, more fundamental than the perceptual object it is interpreted as. The notion of contemporaneous identity is then the idea of one reality being picked out by two
different names. Thus, 'this piece of bronze' and 'this statue' may at one time indicate the same reality. They can be said to

¹ When I speak of 'parts' of reality, and later of 'realities', these expressions are not really satisfactory. They must not be thought of as count nouns.
do so because they can be shown not to do anything more. If the conditions of contemporaneous identity, as specified by Leibniz' Law, are satisfied, piece of bronze and statue have exactly the same properties. At the one time, that is, their names offer exactly the same specification of reality. They are, therefore, incapable of indicating different realities.

Contemporaneous identity is, then, a matter of two names indicating the same underlying reality. What that reality is we perhaps do not know. Whatever it is, it lies beyond the range of perceptual characterization. It is consequently independent of the general terms under which perceptual objects are classified, and the identity it mediates is therefore quite independent of any of those terms. In contemporaneous identity, as I have already said, we have absolute identity. 1

Identity over time, however, presents us with an entirely different picture. The reality that is picked out at one instant does not have a defined past or future as an object. Origin, continuity and end belong to the object in its perceptual characterization. Thus 'this statue' will function, over some

---

1 This is clearly a straight contradiction of that part of Geach's account that refers to contemporaneous identity. The sort of example, however, that can be brought forward in support of Geach on this point, rests on concepts such as 'official'. The same man can be different officials according to the roles he is playing. Such a concept, though, is so obviously conventional and non-objective in its application that it makes no pretense of providing an inventory of reality. We can easily understand what is meant by 'x is an official, y is an official, and x is the same as y, but x is not the same official as y'. The real question is whether 'x is the same as y' has to be understood as 'x is the same man as y'; and the answer to that question is surely negative, since 'x is the same man as y' will not provide a repetition of the difficulty found with 'official'. 

period, as a continuous indicator of some reality. But there is no guarantee that the parts of reality that it picks out later will constitute a future which is in some way naturally proper to the part of reality that it originally picked out.

That a perceptual object's history is independent of the reality it represents at one time has a corollary. If the continuation depends on the classification and is not defined by the reality originally picked out, different names, that at one time indicate the same reality, may specify different pasts and futures. Identity over time is, therefore, not absolute but relative to general terms. Though the piece of bronze and the statue are at one time the same reality, this does not mean that they may not diverge at other times. At some other time they may indicate different realities, at yet another one may indicate some reality and the other may indicate nothing.

The low ontological status of these durational conceptually-defined objects is confirmed if one considers how, even in perceptual terms, they lack clear plurality. Wiggins would have us make sharp distinctions between these "entities", but when we perceive an object or refer to it we are under no obligation to be precise as to its classification. As Tobias Chapman says, "more than one general concept can play a part in the reference of a term even though the concepts involved provide different criteria of identity for the entity that is named".\(^1\) Even the perceptual

\(^1\) 'Identity and Reference', p. 548.
object, therefore, only gains a more precisely defined history as it is more precisely defined itself. In so far as it remains undefined, the one object may contain many futures, may be the same P as a future object but not the same G.

To say, as I have above, that perceptual objects are interpretations of reality and that their histories do not necessarily correspond with a consequential development in reality, does not mean that we cannot regard some classifications as giving a more stable representation of reality than others. This is well shown by the classical example of the ship that is rebuilt plank by plank. The end product is indeed the same ship, but that only provides a particularly clear example of the later phase of an object not representing the future of the reality represented by the object in its original phase. The collection of planks that is taken from the ship, on the other hand, even the ash, etc., if the planks are burnt, forms a much more plausible approximation to a representation of the future being of whatever was picked out by the original ‘ship’.

The principle by which we prefer the collection of planks to the rebuilt ship as a representation of a real continuity is clearly a general preference for the preservation of matter. This principle conforms to our scientific understanding of what is to count as the same existence, the basic reality against which we chart the changing constitution of perceptual objects. Is this however, the only standard by which we can judge of real rather than apparent continuity? The question arises from the case of living things. These certainly do not achieve a real identity
over time through their preserving the same matter; indeed, among perceptual objects they are notable for their failure to do this. Yet we are strongly inclined to say that there must be an identity here stronger than that of any lifeless assemblage of material.

Probably, it is living things that provide much of the motivation for the essentialist approach. It should be clear, however, that this type of account cannot supply a principle of real unity. Leibniz' Law can only confirm our prejudices in favour of the identity; and, so far as those prejudices are expressed in terms of properties possessed at different times, examples such as caterpillars and butterflies or leptocephali and conger eels\(^1\) show them to be thoroughly ill-grounded. There are, however, good reasons for counting caterpillar and butterfly as the same thing, reasons that will become apparent in a scientific account of how one develops into the other. It is the preservation and self-development of organization that living things have to offer as the grounds for granting them more than perceptual continuity. Whether that is evidence of a more genuine unity over time depends on whether organization can be regarded as an alternative to matter as a basic mode of continuous existence.

Among living things, the example of most interest to us is, of course, man. In our own case we may suspect that there is an entirely different principle of identity, one that might or might not apply to other types of creature. This is the unity of

\(^1\) Wiggins tells us (Op. cit., p. 59) that leptocephali are young conger eels, which were long thought to be a distinct form of creature.
consciousness, mediated by memory and the continuity of ideas and intentions. In my full account of mind, I hope to give a persuasive account of what we have to say in terms of this other form of continuity, which may justify our supposing that it represents a genuine unity. If accepted, this would give persons an identity over time on grounds quite different from, and superior to, those provided by perceptual reidentification.

The introduction of other criteria of identity need not lead to conflict. The weakness of the perceptual descriptive scheme as a survey of real entities does not rule out the possibility that a genuine unity coincides with a perceptual identity. I have not said that a perceptual object necessarily does not represent a genuine continuity in reality, only that it does not establish it. There may be, too, a justifiable hope of a more positive relation between the subjective account of mind and a more serious external ontology. Here we must bear in mind the suggestion that the scientific recognition of organization may be as relevant to real continuity as that of constancy of matter. Since the individuation of minds coincides with the individuation of organized living things, this may offer a way of holding together the subjective and objective findings as recognizable accounts of the one reality. In descriptive perceptual terms there may be some artificiality in making an essential break between living body and corpse; but not in terms of consciousness or in terms of self-perpetuating organization.
A natural ontology that may seem to give a closer approximation than the object ontology to an underlying reality is an ontology of events. We have a natural capacity to react to happenings about us, as, for example, to a loud noise. This ability becomes subordinate, however, to the rich growth of our main perceptual system in terms of objects; events do not become a basic furniture of our world in the way that objects do. The mature recognition of events is in general not nearly so automatic or conceptually explicit as is the recognition of objects. Events are rather vague at the edges, both in respect of duration and in respect of what is to be included in them at any one time. Here, therefore, we might be thought to have a rather more open relation with reality, which is not so strictly conceptualized as in the immediate transformation of object perception. In an eventful context we might give ourselves a running commentary covering the interesting aspects of what was happening, but this would not be a catalogue of clearly individuated events.

None the less, the way we speak of events does tend to be modelled on the way we speak of objects. As Donald Davidson says, our language seems to supply here all the machinery of reference: 'not only appropriate singular terms, but the full apparatus of definite and indefinite articles, sortal predicates, counting, quantification and identity statements'. We seem therefore to

1 'Events as Particulars', p. 25.
be committed to events as things; and this commitment I should analyse on the same lines as our commitment to objects. I should therefore say that an event, as it is characterized, is an appearance, an interpretation of reality. Two event descriptions can, however, interpret the same stretch of reality because they fail to pick out different stretches. These are then different descriptions of the one event. Thus Brutus' stabbing of Caesar is the same event as Brutus' killing of Caesar (under a suitable interpretation of 'killing') because these phrases fail to pick out different stretches of reality.

In the case of objects, this character of appearance and interpretation is generally hidden from us by the ease and conviction of our perception of them. In the case of events, however, the comparative awkwardness of the perception allows us to recognize more easily the dependence of these supposed entities on our characterization of them. It is not surprising, therefore, that there should be considerable opposition to the treatment of events as things. The counter-proposals range over various degrees of language dependence, but it is the more moderate, I feel, that are the most interesting. I am not so concerned, therefore, with the views of Roderick Chisholm, Davidson's main sparring-partner, which provide the current advocacy of extreme language dependence. Events are sometimes identified with facts, a view most commonly associated with Austin. This generally

1 See Davidson, 'The Individuation of Events', pp. 229-30.
2 In 'Events and Propositions' and 'States of Affairs again'.

In
constitutes an objectivisation of facts; but Chisholm, bringing facts back into the linguistic fold, brings events along with them. He identifies facts with true propositions and makes propositions, facts and events all species of states of affairs.¹

Chisholm's view might be thought to provide a corresponding theory for events to a nominalist view of qualities. More moderate views of language dependence suggest that events are indeed not like things but like qualities under a more reasonable interpretation. Just as which quality is picked out may be thought of as dependent on the word used, so, on this type of view, which event is picked out is dependent on which words are used. There is no identification across non-equivalent descriptions, but the distinctions are none the less drawn on a real basis.

One who might seem to be a proponent of such a view, but who probably is not, is R.M. Martin. He certainly thinks that events which Davidson would treat as identical, such as Brutus' stabbing and killing of Caesar, are only simultaneous.² This difference of opinion seems to be based, however, only on the belief that the names of events are so specific that they do in fact single out different stretches of reality. If this is so, Martin is essentially in agreement with Davidson on the objective character of events.

¹ 'Events and Propositions', pp. 20-21. This unholy alliance is seemingly achieved by the use of symbols and the disuse of inverted commas ('p is true' and 'p occurs', but contrast 'the man is drunk is true' and 'the man is drunk occurs') through the mediation of the indirect quotation form ('that the man is drunk is true' and 'that the man is drunk occurs', the first of which is of course all right, and the second of which may be odd enough to slip past the native language speaker's instinctive censorship).

There is no suggestion that the name can define a particular reality as one event rather than another.

Such a suggestion can be found in the work of Jaegwon Kim. Like Martin, Kim thinks that Brutus' stabbing of Caesar is distinct from Brutus' killing of Caesar; but his reason is not that they do in fact pick out different contemporaneous realities. Instead he concentrates on the causal explanation of each, pointing out that an explanation of why Brutus stabbed Caesar may be quite different from an explanation of why Brutus killed Caesar.\(^1\) His suggestion is that events are primarily identified as "objects of explanation and relata of causal relation"; and, therefore, that we can justifiably regard the stabbing and the killing as different events.\(^2\)

Before criticizing it, I want to bring out what I think is interesting in this suggestion. In picking out events we do often take a very selective attitude to a stretch of reality. To speak of stabbing rather than of killing is more specific, but even here we abstract from the whole occurrence, many details of which seem irrelevant. This selectivity is even more apparent with respect to the causal setting of an event, for that provides a far larger universe of aspects to be neglected. It is this causal setting, too, in its wider sense that would seem to offer a comprehensive definition of what really occurs. Our selectivity

---

1 E.g., 'He had a knife handy' v. 'He thought all dictators should be killed'.

2 'Events and Descriptions: some considerations', p. 213.
in relation to the causes of an occurrence therefore brings out particularly clearly the degree to which our perceptions of events involve abstraction from reality.

What is wrong with Kim's suggestion is that the causal account understood in the name of an event does not fully determine the individuation of the event, which is after all the occurrence and not its causes. We can distinguish between the explanation of why Brutus stabbed Caesar and a causal explanation of the stabbing-event. The latter explanation is far more independent of the particular term used to specify the event and can include any factors that we can draw from the total causal setting. We therefore recognize the event as reidentifiable under different names and different causal explanations. Once again, as with objects, our supposed entity may be only an appearance; but some event names may still pick out an identical reality since the appearances are not relevantly distinct.

The case of events thus illuminates the general perceptual-descriptive system, through the particularly evident disparity between the interpreted event and the underlying reality. It is also, however, of considerable interest in itself, not least in relation to the study of mind where, with the exception perhaps of the self, we may seem, even at first sight, to have to do with events rather than with objects.
In this chapter I have been working towards two goals. The first is to establish a close link between the descriptive mode of language and perception, and the second is to show the limitations of that mode as a representation of reality; thus opening the way to the acceptance of the language of mind as a distinct mode and to the sympathetic assessment of it as a representation of reality.

To express the limitations of perception and its associated descriptive language, I have suggested that perceptual objects should be allotted the status of appearances in the context of a serious ontology. Such a claim is always, of course, to be connected with Kant. When Kant spoke of empirical objects as appearances, he did, however, regard them as appearances of transcendental objects, of things-in-themselves, whereas I have suggested that the underlying reality is non-objective. It is true that the Kantian thing-in-itself has little objective character - our idea of it is an "indeterminate concept of an intelligible entity, namely of a something in general outside our sensibility"; but Kant's attachment to the category 'thing' is still evident.

What perhaps I need to stress here, therefore, is that use of the word 'appearance' does not demand the existence of an object as its complement. If the appearances are objects as we ordinarily

1 'Critique of Pure Reason', pp. 84-5.
understand them, then there is no reason why the reality that they are appearances of must itself consist of objects. In its use here, the word 'appearance' has clearly been detached from its usual relation to objects in the analysis of perception, and it retains only its function of granting a reduced ontological status to an epistemological intermediary.

The prejudice in favour of objects, if I may call it that, is even more apparent in the work of a recent refurbisher of the Kantian doctrine. Wilfred Sellars writes, 'a consistent scientific realist must hold that the world of everyday experience is a phenomenal world in the Kantian sense, existing only as the contents of actual and obtainable conceptual representings, the obtainability of which is explained not, as for Kant, by things in themselves known only to God, but by scientific objects'. 1 By 'scientific objects' Sellars means to refer to sub-atomic particles. We might, therefore, as I shall remark presently, take the use of 'object' as not altogether literal. It is clear from other passages, however, that Sellars intends no such caution. The most striking of these occurs as the final gesture in his attempt to fit sensory experiences into his scientific realism. In general he suggests that experiences are to be specified through adverbial modifications of the verb 'to sense'. He now writes, however, speaking of an experience of a red rectangle, "at the end of the road somehow the phrase 'a red rectangle' will lose its adverbial status and, by a final transposition, will become once again a common noun for particulars" 2

---

1 'Science and Metaphysics', p. 173.
meaning by 'particulars' those same scientific objects. Such a
far-fetched hypothesis reveals great faith in the particularity of
the underlying scientific reality; but the discoveries of modern
science surely show that a micro-physical account of reality cannot
be expressed in terms of objects. They lend support, rather, to
my contention that the objective language is intimately connected
with perception.

The particles of modern physics bear no resemblance to
Democritean atoms. Those, as was only natural, were minimal objects
modelled on those that we are familiar with in perception; but
reality is not so obliging. Our perceptual powers have been
considerably extended through the use of microscopes so that we
have been able to see, or see pictures of, smaller and smaller
objects. As the Uncertainty Principle shows, however, there is
a necessary limit to that extension: one which, none the less,
falls short of the micro-limit to reality, if there is any such
thing. There are other ways, however, of finding out about micro-
physical reality than looking at it; and it is conceivable that
these might have enabled us to go on thinking about reality beyond
the limits of perception in the same familiar objective terms.
With the discovery of wave-particle duality, however, the old ways
of thought would no longer serve. Heisenberg linked this specifically
with a break-down in visualization when he wrote "It is very difficult
to modify our language so that it will be able to describe these

---

1 This apparent dismissal of Sellars does not reveal how much
the later parts of my account of mind gain, in constructive
disagreement, from his strenuously thoughtful work.
atomic processes, for words can only describe things of which we can form mental pictures.\textsuperscript{1} It is important, however, to realise that the difficulty is of a quite different order than that which might attend the attempt to visualize Democritean atoms. If we think of a wave as a probability distribution for the location of a particle, it might be supposed that reality consisted of an object — the particular — in a somewhat uncertain location. Even if this object were bare of familiar properties, the object language would not then completely fail us. The double-slit experiment, however, showed that the probability distribution of photons of light depended on the interaction of the chance of going through one slit with the chance of going through the other, photon by photon. Thus reality cannot be just a particle that passes through one slit or another; it must be both the particle or energy field and the probability distribution for the location of its centre. In other words, the particle is only an aspect of something to which we can only give mathematical expression; though, appropriately, it is the guise under which the reality is most often apparent to us object-perceivers.

The break-down of perception seems to bring with it, therefore, the nemesis of the object language. We can talk of particles, but this gives only an illusion that the language has successfully crossed the barrier. The scientific search for basic reality appears, therefore, to bear out my contention that descriptive language is essentially tied to perception and that it cannot be regarded as the prime model for all linguistic representation of reality.

\textsuperscript{1} 'The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory', quoted by Hanson, 'Patterns of Discovery', p. 219.
The general evaluation of objective description does not place so low an ontological value on this form of language as I have been suggesting is its due. On the contrary, the logical form of objective description is often taken as the very standard of ontological force in language. When it comes, therefore, to thinking about mind, the natural tendency has been to treat it in these terms; to ask whether mind or mental events can be established as descriptive objects and, if so, what kinds of objects, and bearing what sorts of relation to the human body and to events in the human brain.

There are several ways in which it may be tempting to assimilate mental language to objective description. These are conveniently ordered by two main distinctions, one covering the scope of the intended object and the other the point of view from which it is approached. On one side of the first distinction we have treatment of the mind, or of the conscious self, as a single object which may be descriptively characterized by mental predicates, while on the other we have treatment of conditions of mind as distinct objects, or at least as states or events conceived of as objective particulars. The second distinction divides an external approach to mind or mental events, which treats them like other objects as open to third-person perceptual investigation, from an internal approach by which each person's mind is known primarily through his own privileged inspection.

Remembering David Hume's failure to discover his own self by
introspection¹, we may reckon that treating the whole mental self as an object consorts most comfortably with the external approach. Since it is the human body that confronts the external observer's eye, this will generally, though not necessarily, have the corollary, that the mental self is regarded as identical with the corporeal self. This account can take two forms. The most frugal theory will assert that the self is indeed identical with the material body as it is accounted for in the language of physical science, that no other properties than the material are required to substantiate a being with any of the states or abilities generally connected with the mental. The other theory, however, will regard a person as a more complex being, uniting in a single object both material properties and properties that are of an entirely different kind, correctly distinguished as belonging to a separate category - the mental.

I shall have much more to say of these theories, and particularly of the first, in my next chapter. There are alternative accounts of the mental self that make it a quite separate entity from the human body. These naturally depend far more on the internal approach, though this may supply encouragement rather than good evidence. Conscious experience makes great demands of its devotees but, as Hume's comment admits, does not afford them a glimpse of an objective self. If it is imperceptible, I would argue that the notion of an object should be dropped; but there has, of course, been a tendency to think of the self as a particular to be characterized by mental

¹ "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception". ("A Treatise of Human Nature", p. 252.)
predicates as the body is by material ones. One is then, however, faced with the considerable problem of how the one descriptive object, the self or mind, is to be related to the other, the body. Different answers to this question have on the whole determined the different varieties of this sort of theory.

One way in which the self has been conceptually distinguished from material objects has been by calling it a 'subject'. It has been recognized that the perceiver, the originator of actions, stands in a position quite different from that of the object that is perceived or acted upon. Not enough attention, though, has been paid to the effect that this different position has upon language. I would argue that the use of language is relative to these two positions, and that its logical structure is highly sensitive to the difference. As it is, however, the subject is often treated as a descriptive entity and thus, in effect, as an object.

We may take Kant as an eminent example of one who has differentiated between subject and object but failed to carry the distinction through. For Kant there are two conceptions of the self: an empirical self and a transcendental self. These parallel the contrast in the outer world between objects in space and time and the things-in-themselves of which they are appearances. To match the outer sense which presents these appearances to us, Kant introduces an inner sense which presents the empirical self to us as the appearance of the unknowable transcendental self, which is again a thing-in-itself. Thus the self is objective in two senses,

---

1 'Critique of Pure Reason', p. 28.
whether on the level of material things or on that of the underlying reality. No doubt, Kant was right to feel that there was a problem about the unity of the self that could not be solved, as Strawson would have him solve it, by relying on the commonplace external criteria of identity for a man. With his belief in things-in-themselves as the underlying external reality, it was natural, however, that he could not break away from the idea that this unity must involve a similar objective identity.

The many ways in which the objectification of the self can be carried out may be matched by the many ways in which particular mental happenings can be treated in an objective fashion. The exterior approach produces various accounts corresponding roughly to the different treatments of the self. If the self is regarded as altogether identical with the material body, then particular mental happenings also will be considered identical with mere physical happenings. If the identity of the self allows, however, a mental aspect, the mental happenings could either themselves share in the dual nature of the self or be quite non-physical, related to the self by some of its specifically non-material predicates.

Particular mental happenings are, however, very much the natural field of the internal approach. The self may fail to make an appearance to the most introspectively inclined, but there is no difficulty in supposing that one is aware of one's experiences

---

1 'The Bounds of Sense', pp. 162-169.
as objects of an inner attention. I must argue, however, that this is only to delude oneself with a misconception. In my general account of mind as non-descriptive I cannot allow such a thing as an inner sense. Of course I am aware of a cut in my finger or of the position of my foot; but the senses by which I am aware of these things are, in these terms, as external as sight and hearing. By an inner sense is meant one which sets a perceptual distance between myself and my own experiences.

The claim that there is no such inner sense is inextricably bound up with the claim that the language of mind is not descriptive. It is by showing that the language of mind conforms to a different model that I can hope to show that we need make no claim to perceive events of the mind; while arguments against an inner sense support the denial that the language of mind is descriptive, for, as this chapter has been intended to show, description is tied to perception. I have also argued that description is not so ontologically valuable as to be indispensable. My long-term aim, therefore, is to show that what goes on in the mind can be represented in language without there having been an intervening perception to turn existence into descriptive information.
CHAPTER 2

Recent Descriptive Theories of Mind

I

In my over-all strategy, I hope to discredit the descriptive interpretation of the language of mind mainly through the presentation of a convincing alternative. If that alternative can be made sufficiently attractive, if it can be shown to solve long-standing problems, then this end will be achieved; for acceptance goes to that theory that provides the most comprehensive and coherent picture, the one that leaves the fewest unsolved problems, leaving the other to wither away. It is not fruitful to exercise old complaints, or even new ones, against old theories, for what can take their place requires a complete reconceptualization of the situation. In philosophy, as in science, theories cannot be built out of the destruction of their predecessors. None the less, it is necessary to indicate the sort of difficulties that the old approach ran into, in order to show by contrast the value of a new theory that avoids those difficulties. This, then, is one good, though limited, reason for giving space to an account of the rival view. Fortunately, however, the theories with which it is most appropriate to illustrate the descriptive approach are such as to make their discussion profitable in other directions.

The focal point for discussions of mind has, in the recent past, been provided by the Identity Theory of mind which was
introduced about fifteen years ago. In the period since its introduction this theory has broadened and changed to become what is known as Central State Materialism. It has also received much criticism, both from traditional mentalist points of view and from a newer position known as Functionalism. The Identity Theory itself can be taken to be, in one if not in all ways, a paradigm example of descriptive accounts of mind; and, consequently, it serves very well to illustrate the limitations of such accounts. After isolating what I take to be its crucial weakness, I shall, therefore, introduce one aspect of my theory by contrast with it. At the other extreme, Functionalism can be seen as leading into the sort of account that I wish to give, even though it does not itself contain a sufficient reappraisal of the distinctive role of the language of mind and therefore remains tied to a materialist ontology.

It is Central State Materialism, however, that provides the most interesting positive reason for the discussion of these theories. As early as the very first section of this thesis, I suggested one particular reason why it should now be easier to accept a non-

---

1 This dates its effective introduction from J.J.C. Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes', though this followed in the steps of U.T. Place's 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' and was preceded by the publication of Herbert Feigl's rather different theory in the original form of 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"'.

2 This theory is mainly associated with the work of D.M. Armstrong. It is succinctly presented in David Lewis' 'An Argument for the Identity Theory' and at much greater length in Armstrong's 'A Materialist Theory of the Mind'.

3 The functionalist criticism first appeared in Hilary Putnam's 'Minds and Machines', and he and Jerry Fodor are regarded as the theory's main protagonists.
descriptive theory of mind. With the advance of neuro-physiology, the body can be seen as competent to act as the objective initiator of all the multifarious activities of man. To remove mind out of the realm of what can be described is to leave a space that needs to be filled by new descriptions. The value of Central State Materialism is that it does broach the problem of providing a descriptive account of the objective origins of human behaviour. As a theory of mind it is, I contend, false; but it may provide the needed descriptive counter-part to the non-descriptive account of mind.

II

The Identity Theory of Mind proposes that mental occurrences are contingently identifiable with certain physical processes in the brain. Its name is, to some extent, a misnomer, for, in all its original manifestations, it was intended as a theory of limited scope that did not purport to cover the whole of the mental. Whether the favoured term was 'consciousness' (Place), 'sensations' (Smart) or 'raw feels' (Peigl), what was to enter the identity from the mental side was limited to the lived-through-experience aspect of mind. As presented by Place and Smart, the theory was intended as a contribution to a general materialist ontology and formed an attack on what was regarded as the most recalcitrant feature of the
mental, leaving other aspects to be dealt with by methods that had already been adumbrated. Feigl, on the other hand, was not biased towards materialism and placed quite as much weight on his raw feels as on the neural events with which they were supposed to be identified. He, too, however, agreed in splitting off these experiences from other aspects of the mental that he grouped together as intentional and therefore as "logical" rather than as objective or "psychological".

The proposal, then, that the progenitors of the Identity Theory advanced was, in Smart's formulation, "the thesis that sensations are brain processes". To clarify this contention, they disassociated it from a thesis that might possibly have been confused with it. The factual identity of sensation and brain process would not imply that the name of the sensation meant the same as the name of the brain process. 'After-image' or 'ache' would not mean the same as 'brain process of sort X'. The discovery of any one of these identities was claimed to be an empirical one. Before the discovery, therefore, the names could not be understood to have the same reference; and, even after the discovery, the names could continue to have different senses so that what was said in statements expressed in terms of the sensation would still be different from what was said in statements expressed in terms of the brain process.

1 Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', Borst pp. 42-43.
2 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"', pp. 78-79.
3 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 55.
The Identity Theory has built into its foundations, therefore, grounds for the rejection of one traditional objection to materialist theories of mind. It had been argued that we could not possibly be speaking of a material process when we spoke of an experience in our customary manner; for we could not mean a material process when we had no intention of speaking of one and, moreover, had no idea of what any such process might be. The confusion in this argument, as Smart pointed out, is between meaning as sense and meaning as reference. Identity of reference does not demand identity of sense and when empirically established cannot have been preceded by it.

In all its forms, therefore, the Identity Theory seeks to establish an empirical bridge between two conceptual systems, the mental and the neuro-physiological. It strives to meet in quasi-scientific terms the challenge to the concept of mind posed by our greatly increased knowledge of the brain and our recognition of what it may be shown to be capable of. The originators of the theory - or the theories - differed greatly, however, in the degree to which they wished to bring the mental under the sway of science. While allowing science full scope, Feigl still set the mental and the physical in equal balance. Place and Smart, on the other hand, were motivated by the desire to submit everything to the rule of science, and they therefore weighted the identity in favour of the physical.

Of these two attitudes, it is Feigl's that I am more in accord with. At first sight, too, its equal balance would seem to carry an advantage as a fair reflection of an impartiality in the identity itself. To express an identity it is necessary to yoke together two characterizations of the one object. The impression then given is that each characterization must be of equal weight because each is of equal importance to the expression of the identity. This presumption may be partly based, however, on the irrational feeling that, in any identity, two objects are found to be one. In so far as the two sides of a true identity are distinct, they are, of course, only characterizations. Competence to pick out the object is what is required of them in playing their role in the identity, and it is not clear that this ensures them a place in the final account; for stricter standards may be exercised once the identity has been established. One characterization may then be subordinated to the other as being less informative, or even as being misleading, about the nature of the object. Despite my sympathy for Feigl's attitude, therefore, I do not think that his balance between the mental and the physical gains immediate support from the apparent equality of the identity relation.

1 Whether the mental can in fact be thus subordinated to the physical is quite another question that I shall discuss later.
III

The sheer weight of discussion has made the Place/Smart line the standard version of the Identity Theory. In this form, as I have said, the theory makes a determined effort to reduce the mental to the physical. The language of science is preferred to the language of mind on the grounds that it will afford a fuller explanation and more accurate prediction of 'mental' states, and that it brings these states together with all the other states of the universe under one explanatory umbrella. The theory thus sets out to rectify what is taken to be a long-standing neglect of Occam's razor: the principle that entities should not be multiplied without good reason. Where two entities, mental and physical, had been envisaged, there was to be only one; but Feigl's version would have achieved as much. The materialist version does not stay at entities, therefore, but insists that any properties of sensations, mentioned in mental language, can be further elucidated in the language of science. The take-over is therefore comprehensive. No part of mental language, subject term or predicate, is to be left with a distinct ontological role.

Seen from the point of view of scientific inquiry, the theory therefore appears as an attempt to provide a justified authorization of a comprehensive account of human nature. The scientist is to be licensed to say that his account is a full and complete one that

---

leaves nothing out. He is to be allowed to treat a relation, that might otherwise appear to be nothing more than a correlation, as an identity. In discovering, for example, a brain condition that concurs in a law-like way with the experience of pain, he can claim to have discovered the real identity of the pain experience, and not merely a physical occurrence that always accompanies that experience.

As the theory warrants contingent identifications of mental states with physical states, there has been some temptation to regard the theory itself as being empirically establishable. Place, in particular, argued that the theory could not be established by conceptual arguments alone. Once the conceptual ground had been cleared, there would still remain the job of establishing that there were suitable physical processes to satisfy criteria of identity with each mental process. In this he differed from Smart, who was inclined to stress that, however many satisfactory correlations were obtained between physical and mental processes, these could not be empirically established as identities. On Smart's view, therefore, the theory made a claim that could not be substantiated by any amount of scientific evidence.

This disagreement clearly arises from a difference over what is to count as establishing a theory. Place is thinking in terms of a scientific theory which, while it certainly has to attract by its conceptual coherence and simplicity, can only be established by being checked against old and new observations. Smart, on the

---

1 'Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis', Borst, p. 85.
other hand, sees it as a philosophical theory which more or less takes for granted the success of science if it were once given its head; and a philosophical theory is finally supported by such conceptual arguments as philosophers find persuasive. That there is something odd about Place's view is apparent in the title of his article: 'Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis'. To adopt a materialist view towards anything is surely to regard it as appropriate subject matter for science. One can then develop suitable scientific theories to explicate it, but materialism does not need to, and indeed cannot, appear as one of the hypotheses to be established by scientific methods. It is not materialism, therefore, that could be established by the observations that Place calls for, but a particular theory about the nature - assumed to be material - of what we now call 'sensations'.

This is an important point, for scientific theories, unlike philosophical theories, can be developed on credit. By describing the evidence in their own terms, scientific theories are permitted to count their chickens before they are hatched. If, then, the Identity Theory were a scientific theory, it would require only the successful completion of Place's series of observations to establish it; for its interpretation of those observations would already have prejudged the issue. The identity theory, however, is external to science. In intention, it is a permit allowing the writ of science to run in further areas, and as such it would not mesh into the net of scientific explanation. Once accepted, it would be eliminable; for it would never appear in a final scientific account.
If there was but one set of entities with only scientifically explicable properties, these would properly be spoken of in physical terms alone.

Another way of making this point is to observe that the scientific account of man under the standard Identity Theory would be exactly the same as the scientific account of man under the doctrine of Parallelism: the theory that to every mental event there is a physical correlate. Both these theories demand a perfect correlation between the mental and the physical and differ only in their account of this conjunction. There is no experimental evidence that can discriminate between them; and, therefore, neither can appear as a justified part of the scientific account.

If the Identity Theory was taken to be a scientific theory, there can be little doubt that only time and scientific investigation would be needed before its acceptance. This has been shown best, perhaps, in a joint article by Richard Routley and Valerie Macrae.¹ They argue painstakingly for the identity of sensations and physical occurrences on an analogy with lightning and an electrical discharge.² They show that identity has many advantages over theories that either propose a looser relationship or the complete extinction of the one in the other.³ They therefore conclude that the identity should be

---

¹ 'On the Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences'.
³ The case for correlation, as against identity, has been argued, notably by Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim. Reference to such physical laws as the Boyle–Charles Law (Kim, 'On the Psycho-physical Identity Theory', O'Connor p. 199) which relates temperature to mean kinetic energy without identifying the two

/cont'd
accepted, once there is a satisfactory scientific account of the physiological occurrences that explains their causal dependence on and responsibility for the circumstances normally connected with the sensations. They do not, however, settle the question whether it is possible to regard sensations as analogous to lightning and therefore as amenable to scientific treatment.

It is the non-scientific nature of the Identity Theory that justifies the great weight that Smart places on Occam's razor in his defence of the theory. If mind is to be handed over to science, it will be of our own accord rather than at the dictates of science. Occam's razor is a plea that a philosopher can recognize even if it scarcely amounts to an argument. A theory such as parallelism is embarrassing in its proliferation of entities if - but it is an important 'if' - no positive justification can be found for its duplication of occurrences. The official Identity Theory, on the other hand, is parsimonious and has no ontological excrescences to explain. We should also admit that we cannot be unmoved by the offer of science to provide a better explanation and prediction of 'mental' events than we can now provide in mental terms. It may not matter, therefore, if no better conceptual reasons can be found for the acceptance of the Identity Theory; and Smart, for one, has

--

3 /cont'd

does, however, reveal our attitude to properties rather than to the events with which we are concerned in the case of mind. Brandt and Kim do argue that events are property-like ('The Logic of the Identity Theory', O'Connor pp. 214-215); but I have already contested Kim's views on this subject in my first chapter.

admitted that he neither has a conclusive reason nor expects to find one. The onus still seems to be on the opponent of the Identity Theory to show why it should not be accepted.

IV

According to the Identity Theory, particular conscious experiences are empirically identifiable with particular brain processes. What is it that takes place in any such cross-identification, and what are its necessary antecedents? In the identification, a thing known under one name is recognized as the same as a thing known under another name. It is clear, therefore, that, before the cross-identification can take place, the thing must have been separately identified under two different names. In the case of the Identity Theory, this must mean, firstly, that something must already have been identified as a brain process and, secondly and more interestingly, that something — supposedly the same thing — must already have been identified as an experience. With the Place/Smart version of the theory, there is an additional requirement that there should be no specifically mental properties to remain as an obstinate mental rump when the one entity has been successfully identified. Thus the manner in which sensations are individuated in mental language must be

directly transposable into the ascription of properties to physical processes.

It was for these reasons that I earlier spoke of the Identity Theory as a paradigm example of a descriptive theory of mind. In a very important way it is, of course, very far from typical of theories of mind, for it seeks to abolish mind as an independent entity. On the other hand one will scarcely find another theory with so clear a commitment to the claim that the language of mind functions in just the same manner as objective language. With a dualist theory, there might always be a slight doubt whether the use of descriptive linguistic forms did not have a rather different function in the separate context of mind. In the Identity Theory, however, there is no separate context. The need to establish a connection both in subject terms and in predicates between the mental and the physical languages demands that they should have strictly parallel forms and functions.

While therefore the Identity Theory does discriminate against mental language, it yet allows it a proper descriptive role. Unlike some coarser version of materialism, it does not deny that talk about mental events is well-founded. Mental states are perfectly good states - physical ones, in fact -, and mental terms do pick out genuine entities by means of genuine, though unperspicuous, characterizations. Having a sharp pain or having a green after-image, for example, are both well identified conditions, and only await further identification as physical conditions. For the purposes of that identification, there must be some translation into
physical terms not only of 'pain' and 'after-image' but also of 'sharp' and 'green'; though, as Smart was concerned to point out, there may have to be some juggling with what is to count as a subject term, and a corresponding revision of predicates, if the identification is to be at all plausible.

The proposed translation out of the mental language into the physical was almost certain to run into greater obstacles with respect to predicates than with respect to subject terms. In the descriptive scheme it is the predicates that are the principle receptacle of sense. The subject terms' indicating role is carried out through the assimilation of predicates, but abstracted from those predicates it would entirely fail to specify the nature of the reality indicated. If, then, one makes a sharp distinction between subject terms and predicates, or between particulars and their properties, the particular will lack defined character. In the present context, therefore, a descriptive analysis of mental language will, by distinguishing between subject terms and predicates, leave mental particulars without character: most importantly, without specifically mental character. From this point it is clear that the identification of the mental particular with a physical entity must pass off with few objections; for - to put it bluntly - no-one can have much of an idea of what is supposed to be happening. On the other hand, the mental predicates, as the bearers of whatever character may be specifically mental, will not submit so easily to translation but will insist on an independent role. The result of the descriptive analysis of mental language, therefore, is to produce
unequal resistance to the translation that the Identity Theory demands. If this pattern of resistance holds, the picture that then emerges is one in which there may very well be only one entity, but that entity must have not only physical properties but mental properties as well.

It was natural, therefore, that Smart should have recognized an objection based on mental properties as providing the strongest challenge that his version of the Identity Theory had to face. This objection he credited to Max Black. It claimed that "there must be some properties which are logically distinct from those in the physical story", if the entity is to have been picked out in the first place in the mental story. The objection thus fastens on what had appeared a strength in the theory, the ability of its contingent identity to cross the gap between two languages that were not on speaking terms. It allows the connection but, noting that the link is independent of the meaningful expressions that it hitches together, insists that these must retain independent roles in relation to the unified object. The next move is to objectify the senses of these independent expressions into properties. We then have the same picture as I mentioned above, of one entity with both physical and mental properties. The mental would thus live on as a range of properties and as a half-share of the nature of the basic entities which would not be specifically physical or mental.

---

1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Horst p. 59.
This objection is clearly not directed at the Identity Theory as such, but only at the Place/Smart version. It strikes in particular at the support that their version gains from Occam's razor; for, if mental properties have to be included in the final account, the identification of a single entity will have achieved little simplification. A single system of explanation will still be out of sight when the mental, in the form of properties as in the form of particulars, falls outside the scientific account.

Does the objection, though, establish its point? It is an attempt to make something of the apparent balance of the identity relation, by suggesting that an expression's competence to pick out an object does ensure its presence in the final account of that object. This claim would seem to gain support from the formal explication in Leibniz' Law of what is meant by the identity of the object. As J.T. Stevenson was the first to point out in this context, Leibniz' Law appears to draw all characterizations, from either side of the identity, into the final account of the identified entity. Unfortunately though, Leibniz' Law, as I presented it in section xii of my first chapter, is crucially ambiguous in this context. It may mean that \( x \) is identical with \( y \) if and only if every property of \( x \) is a property of \( y \) and conversely, which is the form in which Stevenson quotes it\(^2\); but

---

1 "Sensations and Brain Processes": A Reply to J.J.C. Smart'.
it can alternatively be taken to mean that \( x \) is identical with \( y \) if and only if every term correctly predicated of \( x \) may be correctly predicated of \( y \) and conversely.

It is possible to imagine a situation in which this ambiguity did not matter. In Leibniz' own vision of the world, for instance, language and reality were perfectly attuned. Reality was mapped out in subject and predicate, substances and their properties were displayed in logical order in the perfect language. With such a conception, it clearly would not matter whether one spoke in terms of properties or of predicates. Each set maps into the other, and the Law will clearly indicate the same identities in either case. The position is quite different, however, when we are concerned with two ranges of predicates that are unconnected with each other, and when the question at issue is whether they each correspond to a different set of properties or both to the same set. Then the predicate form of the Law will deny the identity if any predicates cannot be transferred from one side of it to the other; but the property form will confirm the identity if those particular predicates do not correspond to distinct properties.

The evidence that Stevenson can produce, in support of his claim that the identified entity must have specifically mental properties, consists of those mental predicates, whatever they may be, that, according to Smart's premise, prevent identity of sense between physical and mental descriptions.\(^1\) The version of Leibniz'  

Law that he is entitled to use, therefore, is the predicate form. He cannot justifiably employ the property form of the Law without the added assumption that every predicate corresponds to a distinct property; and that is the one form of the Law that would provide him with his conclusion. The predicate form of the Law would, on the same premises, deny the identity altogether rather than allow it with the proviso of separate mental properties.

The predicate form of Leibniz' Law seems of doubtful validity when it is allowed to range over a sufficiently wide range of predicates. The property formulation, on the other hand, seems entirely valid, but is at the same time of doubtful application. A single entity, referred to in both physical and mental language, would indeed have all the properties that it did have, whichever language these were specified in; but we cannot be certain that the twin lists of physical and mental predicates provide a single, consistent and non-repetitive catalogue of its properties. As I suggested in section ix of chapter 1, properties are not countable. In particular, there are no natural demarcations placing them in a one-to-one relation with predicates; therefore, predicates do not isolate properties that cannot be approached in any other way. Their very specificity prevents them from monopolizing any area of the property continuum. If, therefore, some predicates are not naturally attachable to some subject term, that subject term may yet indicate an object with a suitable property basis for those predicates. There may, indeed, be predicates that are naturally attachable to the subject term which reflect the same property basis.
Anyone arguing on behalf of distinct mental properties on lines similar to Stevenson's seems, therefore, to be faced with a dilemma. They may, on the one hand, decide to accept the interdependence of properties, the subordination of one predicate to another, and the possibility of a movement towards the basic property continuum that supports all these universals. In this case, the existence of a separate range of predicates, currently unconnected in meaning with any material predicates, cannot show that they do not share the same property basis with certain material predicates to which they might perhaps be subordinated. They may, on the other hand - and this is the more likely -, prefer to stick to the line that every predicate introduces a different property and that no subordination or progress towards a basic continuum is possible. In this case, the existence of a distinct range of predicates and their corresponding properties could have little bearing on the nature of the objects to which they were related. Properties would then be so language-dependent that they would be conceptual rather than objective. The impossibility of establishing any interrelationship between properties would not therefore demonstrate a difference in nature. It would show instead the impossibility of demonstrating by difference of properties that there was any such real difference. On this picture, mental language might be discarded, in response to other demands such as that of ontological simplicity, as merely another way of talking about the same, comparatively simple, particulars. If the possibility of the subordination of predicates is not recognized, they lose their role as ontological determinants.
These criticisms apply, however, only to attempts to establish the actuality and distinct character of mental properties through the application of Leibniz' Law. They leave open the possibility of establishing the same conclusion by different methods. Provided an account of properties similar to my own is accepted, it is possible to argue for the indispensability of mental predicates on two levels. Firstly, there is the quite comprehensible claim that mental predicates correspond to an entirely different property basis from those which support physical predicates. Secondly, an interesting case could still be made out for the mental as an independent aspect of reality, even if it were allowed that the ultimate property basis was the same as for physical predicates. This case would have to rest on the correspondence of mental predicates to a sufficiently distinct and important set of higher-level properties.

To say of the first suggestion that it is comprehensible is not to say that it is easy to find arguments in support of it. The assumption of an identity of particulars suggests success in the scientific programme; but that would depend on the discovery of some sort of law-like association between mental and physical properties. It would not then be plausible to suggest that saying 'everything mental is physical' was comparable to saying 'everything coloured is extended'. Green does not pair exclusively with triangles or red with circles, but the same freedom of distribution relative to each other could not be the lot of mental and physical
properties. This would strongly suggest, therefore, that the two types of properties were not independent of each other. Of three possibilities, two would be plausible: that mental universals were founded in physical universals, or that both shared a common property basis.

The second suggestion is probably the more hopeful, therefore, if one wishes to establish a distinct class of descriptive properties as mental. An illustration of what is intended may be provided by the example of brittleness, already touched on in chapter 1. That dispositional universal is related to a more basic universal defined in terms of molecular bonding; but 'brittle' possesses, none the less, a distinct role in our conception of reality, along with other dispositional terms. In a similar way, mental terms could have a distinct well-founded role despite the subsidiary status of their corresponding universals.

This view of mental properties as subordinate, but as sufficiently differentiated to retain the mental as a distinct preserve, might well find expression in a double aspect theory: that is, one that treats the mental and the physical as reality identified through different modes of inspection. Within such a theory, mental language becomes our means of expressing our

---

1 The conceptual feasibility of a theory that did place mental and physical properties in such free relationship is discussed by Jaegwon Kim, who introduces the colour/shape example ('Psycho-physical Laws and Theories of Mind', pp. 204-206).

2 It could be argued that a dispositional term such as 'brittle', despite its subordination to here-and-now structure terms, does introduce a completely different primitive property basis related to potentiality for change. A similar power might be credited to mental terms, and their subordination might thus be regarded as only partial.
acquaintance with reality through internal self-awareness. Mental predicates would have, therefore, a distinctive enough role. Even if the universals to which they corresponded were subsidiary to certain physical universals - as brittleness to molecular bonding -, the mental would be preserved as an important aspect of reality. It is true that this double aspect theory would form another version of the Identity Theory, and, as I have presented it, a materialist version. It would, however, allow much more independence to the mental than Smart's version does, and retain at least something of what mentalists hold dear.

V

All such speculation would be unnecessary, however, if a more direct way could be found of relating mental and physical predicates. Smart originally believed that he had such a way: the proposal that all characterizations of sensations were essentially 'topic-neutral'. He introduced this counter to the separate-mental-properties objection with the following suggestion: "When a person says 'I see a yellowish-orange after-image', he is saying something like this: 'There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an

1 The same proposal had already been made unobtrusively by Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', Borst p. 50.
orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange'. The words underlined here are those said to be topic-neutral. What is going on is not specified, and is therefore, in Smart's view, free to be identified as a physical occurrence in the brain.

The contextual placement of what is going on, that Smart has provided here, is clearly intended to cope with the yellowish-orange aspect of the experience. Further similes would be required to cover its distinctive after-image character. One can imagine something on the lines of 'like what is going on after I have stared fixedly at a bright light', given Smart's intention that the likeness mentioned should not exclude something being like itself. Can the formula that Smart provides be thought adequate, though, to cover even the yellowish-orange aspect of the experience?

One feature of the formula which was commented on by critics was the particularity of the orange as a reference point. It was pointed out, for instance, that oranges do not only have a typical colour; they also have a typical shape. Therefore the formula does not distinguish what goes on when I am visually confronted with a yellowish-orange object from what goes on when I am similarly confronted with a roughly spherical object. For reasons to be mentioned later, Smart might run into difficulties if he tried to avoid this problem by speaking directly of 'yellowish-orange objects'; but he could introduce a list of objects of that colour.

1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 60.
that were sufficiently varied in shape and in every other range of properties to single out yellowish-orange as their common factor. He might then have seemed to have achieved the required specificity; but, envisaging this move, Cornman objected that 'what is going on' is still insufficiently precise because there is more than one thing that typically occurs when I am confronted with a yellowish-orange object; there are, for example, events in the retina.¹

This objection makes an assumption about what is asserted in the original sensation statement. 'There is something going on . . .' will be an unsatisfactory translation for the reason given only if the original statement specified one rather than another of the typical occurrences. It is true that a slight emendation of Smart's formula is required, but that is only the substitution of 'something' for 'what is', to remove the suggestion that through 'what is going on' we are referring to all that typically occurs. Given that emendation, however, the question is whether 'experience' or 'sensation' are any more specific than the inserted 'something'. To sustain the objection against the topic-neutral translation, it would be necessary to show that 'experience' or 'sensation' are used with such a sense as enables them to indicate a particular occurrence. If, however, their sense is exhausted by their attached predicates, 'of yellowish-orange' for example, the

¹ I think this is Cornman's objection. He has published the argument three times (Op. cit., 'Metaphysics, Reference, and Language', p. 43, 'Materialism and Sensations', p. 44), but since he has not made any significant alteration in the wording, it has not become any clearer.
objection would fail. Further specification of the occurrence could then depend on neurological study of what happened if and only if an experience was reported.

The significance of this way of discounting the imprecision of the topic-neutral formula can be expanded by showing how it also counters an objection developed by M.C. Bradley against the formula. Bradley argued that, in the over-all pattern of Smart's strategy, his topic-neutral formula had to be offered as a strict analysis of the sensation statement. Now, I agree that it had in the circumstances to be offered as a translation (even if an incomplete one) and as expressing just what the sensation statement means. Thus Smart was wrong to suggest that it was offered only as giving "in an informal way what a sensation report purports to be about" or as vaguely "showing what sorts of things sensation reports are". This need for equivalence of meaning does not demand, however, that there must be mutual implication between the topic-neutral formula and the original sensation statement as Bradley suggests. If the sensation statement is in itself sufficiently vague, a true translation of it will not imply it.

'I am having a sensation of yellowish-orange' would be vague in the required manner, if we could only find out which of various types of occurrence it referred to by noting when it was spoken rather than by understanding its meaning. 'A sensation of yellowish-

1 'Sensations, Brain-Processes, and Colours', pp. 386-91
2 'Philosophy and Scientific Realism', p. 96.
orange' could then be taken to mean 'something ...', even though there were more somethings so specified than were identifiable as such experiences.

It would then be true that 'a sensation of yellowish-orange' would have failed to specify an occurrence; but it would have characterized one sufficiently to allow the identification as a physical occurrence still to go through. The correlational scientific methods do not, after all, require that the occurrence should be uniquely determined by the original description. What they do require is that a particular type of occurrence should be found on every occasion when that description is applicable, but never when it is not. The type of occurrence must be fully compatible with the description, but it does not have to be picked out by it. Other happenings which could be identical with what it indicates, given the latitude of the description, can be excluded by non-occurrence when needed or occurrence when not. The identity of mental and physical occurrences could still be established, therefore, even though our mental language lacks means of specifying the event which is intended out of all those occurring in, for example, a perceptual situation.

I consider, therefore, that Smart was mistaken in his inclination to abandon the topic-neutral formula on account of this criticism by Bradley. His retreat was reinforced by his failure to take to heart some earlier strictures by Jerome Shaffer on his

1 'The Identity Theory of Mind: Comments on the papers', p. 91.
confusing the meanings of terms with the ways in which those meanings are learnt. He still speaks, therefore, of a child's learning 'yellow' without having first learnt 'lemon' as providing evidence against a topic-neutral formula expressed in terms of a lemon (replacing an orange in the original formulation), a criticism that could be extended to all items on one's own list of yellow objects. Ask the child what he means by 'an experience of yellow', however, and he may say that it is the sort of experience he has when he sees nomels, etc., etc., naming further unknown objects. At this point, if the topic-neutral formula is accepted, 'an experience of yellow' has a different sense for the child from the one it has for oneself. We may suppose, however, that confirmation that it refers to the same sort of occurrence in each case may be obtained through the mutual introduction of objects unknown to the other. If all these objects are agreed to be yellow, not only will the reference of the expression be identical but its sense will be so henceforth; since the classes of reference objects will have expanded into equivalence. At any point in the story, however, the identification of 'an experience of yellow' with a brain process could be made by any scientist who understood what objects were being referred to; for the occurrence could be picked out just as well in relation to nomels, etc., as to lemons, etc. The topic-neutral formula still seems, therefore, to provide

1 'Mental Events and the Brain', Borst p. 136.
a coherent comprehensible account, even if one may have some doubts about the child's meaning something different by 'an experience of yellow'.

VI

Bradley later brought a further criticism to bear against Smart's topic-neutral translation of sensation statements. This attack concentrated entirely on experiences of colour, setting the topic-neutral account against Smart's avowed theory of colour in objects. What Bradley argued was that, considered together, the two accounts of colour experiences and of coloured objects formed a closed circle in which no starting point could be found as a basis for the introduction of colours. Just as sensation statements gained their meaning by reference to objects of particular colours, so apparently did objective colour statements gain their meaning by reference to sensations of particular colours.

As summarized by Bradley, the theory of colours that Smart held at this time proposed that the colour of an object was "the power of the object to produce colour discriminations in normal percipients". A red object was thus conceived to be an object

that a normal percipient could, given suitable lighting, discriminate easily from green, blue or yellow objects, but less easily from other red objects.¹

Against this theory, C.B. Martin advanced an objection based on the conceptual experiment of imagining that everything changed colour systematically.² It was to be supposed, for example, that all red things became green, all blue things yellow, and so on with all colours changing into their complementaries. After this change, which seems impossible only from a practical point of view, it would be the same things which would be hard to discriminate from each other and easy from all others. On Smart's theory, therefore, there would be no good reason for saying that they had changed colour. We are agreed, however, that this change that passes unnoticed on Smart's account was a change in colour; so the objection naturally concludes that Smart has failed to explain the meaning of colour.

Smart produced two replies to this objection. He first suggested that it could be discovered scientifically that the surfaces of the objects had changed so that they now reflected light of different wave-lengths.³ Bradley rightly protested, however, that such a discovery was not recognized as relevant in Smart's explanation of what colour meant.⁴ Smart's second reply

¹ J.J.C. Smart, 'Philosophy and Scientific Realism', pp. 76-81.
² Quoted by Smart, op. cit., p. 81.
³ Smart, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
⁴ Bradley, op. cit., p. 264.
then, was that experiences of colour when the perceiver was faced with the same objects would be different after the change.¹ This is a reply that Bradley would be happy to accept, but again he doubts that Smart has any right to it. Indeed his objection to the first reply would again be relevant; but he suggests instead that it is Smart's topic-neutral account of sensation statements that debars him from using it.²

According to the topic-neutral account, a sensation of red is one that is typically caused by red objects. Smart is now telling us, however, that a red object is one that produces certain behaviour and also experiences of red. This has every appearance of circularity. In Bradley's words, we are first "to eliminate the mention of colour experiences in favour of ascriptions of colours to stimulus objects. Given the analysis of 'colour', we are then to eliminate the colour expressions in favour of the terms of the analysis ('behaviour' and 'colour experiences'). But then 'colour experiences' is what was at the outset to be eliminated as repugnant; so we must again eliminate it, in favour of ascriptions of colours to stimulus objects ... And so forth."³

What will happen, though, if we try to break out of this circle by listing red objects? 'An experience of red' will then mean 'something that typically occurs in the presence of raw meat, etc., etc.,'. At first sight this might seem to place us in even

1 Smart, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
greater difficulty; for we might suppose that we would be compelled to call objects such as raw meat 'red' even after they had turned green in the general change. This would not be the case, however, The result of the colouristic cataclysm would rather be that we were forced to change what we meant by 'an experience of red'. We would come to learn that this now meant 'something that typically occurs in the presence of grass, etc., etc.'. Correspondingly, it would be grass and other previously green objects that we would now call 'red', as the imagined change demands we should.

This account of the change may well seem implausible. Bradley could be expected to argue that words do not change their meaning in this way. In particular he might suggest that the changed application of the word 'red', must surely be due to our having kept its meaning constant. This, however, we would have done. A red object would still be understood to be one that gave us experiences of red. It is only the meaning of 'an experience of red' that would have changed; and that we can ascribe, on Smart's behalf, to the short-comings of mental language. According to his identity theory, we are able to recognize likenesses between occurrences that we call sensations and which are in fact brain processes. In so far as the grounds for these likenesses are reflected in mental language, however, they are referred to the objects in the presence of which they typically occur. There is no reason why we should not continue to recognize likenesses between the brain processes across the time of the colour change; but the

---

1 'Materialism', Borst pp. 162-164.
language in which we spoke of those processes would be thrown into disarray. Processes recognized as like would be linked with previously untypical objects, and therefore a change would be forced on a language that lacked sufficient comprehension of the realities with which it attempted to cope.¹

VII

Given my acceptance of a listing of objects in the mental specification of an experience, I cannot uphold Bradley's objection on the grounds of circularity. None the less, I think that Smart was probably right to move, under its influence, towards an objectivist theory of colours. To suggest that a colour is a power is less than plausible. When we say, for example, that an object is red, we are surely, in intention, ascribing some property to it. Since any power of an object is based on some property, or group of properties, there would have to be some property or properties supporting the colour if it were a power. It therefore seems very odd that the property or properties should go unmentioned, even though we imagined we were speaking about a property. All that we may know about a colour as a property may

¹ It goes without saying that over the period of the colour change the attempt to establish an identity between mind and matter would be thrown into abeyance; but it could begin again as soon as the mental concepts had adjusted to the new scene.
be that objects possessing it have the power to produce experiences of red in us; but this does not make it any less a property rather than a power.

Smart now believes that "colours are properties of the surfaces of objects which explain the colour-discriminating behaviour of normal human perceptors".\(^1\) He considers that these properties can be scientifically identified with certain physical properties. Due to the complexity of the perceptual process, however, these properties are "highly disjunctive and idiosyncratic".\(^2\) They are not such as a scientist would ever identify, except under the peculiar demand of explaining human behaviour.

As we have noted, however, talking of the identity of properties raises problems. To say that one property is identical with another, on grounds other than the meaning-equivalence of their names, can be understood only as a loose abbreviation. On my interpretation, it can only mean that both properties correspond to the same fundamental property basis. At the same time, however, one universal can be subordinated to another as approximating the one less and the other more closely, to the same basis. In this case, then, one may suppose that the universal of redness, for example, can be regarded as subordinate to some complex physical universal which approximates more closely to the property basis to which both properties correspond.

---

1 'Critical notice: 'Content and Consciousness', p. 623. We might add that this explanation must be filled out by reference to certain experiences or brain processes.

The property of redness cannot, therefore, be said in any strict sense to be identical with some complex physical property. In consequence there is comparatively little difference between Smart’s account and that of Dennett, which he criticizes for its failure to permit this same identity.¹ Dennett thinks quite correctly that colours are functional properties and that they are therefore not to be identified with non-functional physical properties.² Like Smart, however, he misses the relevance of the general point about the identification of properties. He therefore offers some quite mistaken particular reasons for the non-identity of colours and physical properties. It is not the messiness of the required physical property that, as Dennett thinks, prevents the identification.³ However tidy or scientifically interesting it was, it could not be identical with the functional colour. Nor is Dennett correct in thinking that the colour, because functional, must be ‘unreal’.⁴ It is no more made unreal, by its dependence on perceivers than brittleness is made unreal by its dependence on the causes of breakages.

Colours provide, of course, the ideal illustration for a view of objects, such as I have proposed, that regards them as Kantian appearances of reality. As objects are presented to us in natural perception, they are coloured; but they are thus classified in a way which is not fully borne out by any other description of them.

2 ‘Content and Consciousness’, p. 146.
No appearances are without foundation in reality, but colours are particularly idiosyncratic in terms of that reality as it is conceived in more serious ontologies. If they can only be subordinated to a long disjunctive list of properties in the language of physical science, it becomes quite exceptionally evident that the specific character of these properties is a product of an interaction between the perceiver and perceived reality. It would be a mistake, however, to single out colours as essentially different from other properties of objects because of their apperntial character. One might say that objects can be coloured only because they too are appearances with all their properties, however they are conceived. Colours are, therefore, only the most obvious exemplars of properties as pertaining to appearances, differing from other properties in degree rather than in kind.

VIII

I have given Smart and his identity theory a good run. Indeed, I have tried to show one part of his theory, the topic-neutral translation, to be good for a longer distance than Smart himself thought it to be. The time has now come, however, to question the whole endeavour.

What I shall aim to achieve is very close to the intended
purpose of the argument by Bradley that I discussed in section vi. In trying to show that Smart's accounts of sensation statements and of colours bit each others' tails in a fruitless circle, he was suggesting that our experiences of colour must be accepted as data in any discussion of colour; that they cannot be conjured out of behaviour, brain processes and the physical properties of object surfaces. It is my intention, also, to argue that experiences must be accepted as existing outside the range of these materials or of anything that can be constructed from them. In doing so, I can take a lesson from the failure, as I suppose, of Bradley's approach. He attempted to fault the system on its own terms; but it may well be generally unprofitable to try to pin down an error in the materialist programme by showing that it is inconsistent or incomplete in itself. One can, after all, imagine a machine that could produce appropriately distinct responses to all colours. Within that machine there would be states mediating between input and output. Someone might choose to call those states, or a selection of them, 'sensations'. If, then, the process can be materialized in this fashion, it seems unprofitable to argue that a materialist account of the process is incomprehensible. What can be denied, however, is that the 'sensations' located in the machine belong to the same category of being as sensations as we know them in human life. That denial needs support, not from a critique of materialism, but from a presentation of the positive claims that can be made for experiences.

This is a brave assertion; for, as every philosopher knows,
sensations may well seem to 'speak' loudly for themselves, but to put their case into words is the hardest of tasks. As Deutscher says, "The feeling is that we know without any sort of argument or inference that physicalism is false. For one thing we know this by our immediate acquaintance with the richness of our sensory experience. However, when I try to catch this feeling by the throat and make it speak, all I get are bad arguments." Philosophers dislike bad arguments, so it is not surprising that they may sometimes be driven apparently into an apparently reckless attitude of dismissal towards the natural evidences. It is such an attitude that gains expression in Smart's defiant remark: "Raw feels, in my view, are colourless for the very same reason that something is colourless." When Smart uses the word 'colourless' here, I am not sure whether he is making the point that sensations are not coloured, not red, yellow or blue that is, or the rather different point that sensations are not "colourful" in the sense of being vivid and interesting. Probably he does mean the former; but, within his argument as a whole, that can feature only as an exemplar of the more general point. It is the latter that he requires to sustain his thesis that, while sensations - as brain processes - do have properties, all those properties are no more mentioned in speaking of sensations than the properties of an object are in speaking of

1 'Mental and Physical Properties', p. 79.
2 They really do deserve more sympathy than was shown by William Kneale's kindly eschewing psycho-analytic explanations of why an intelligent man should philosophize in this fashion. ('Critical Notice: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind', p. 299.)
3 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 61.
'something'. Pains as well as experiences of colour must lack specifically mental properties, and experiences of colour must lack all such properties, not just colours. One might, too, let the restricted point pass; sensations cannot be red in the same sense as that in which raw meat is red. It is the general denial of "colourfulness" that seems to deny our fond presuppositions.

It is "colourfulness", then, that we wish to accommodate: that is, whatever it is that might make us feel sorry for a colour-blind person quite apart from his comparative inefficiency in discriminating between objects, or that might make us envious of those people who feel no pain despite their liability to injuries. Can the difficulty of putting this "colourfulness" into words be overcome; and might it be possible at the same time to explain just why it is so difficult to express?

Let us return to the earliest exposition of the Identity Theory. In the course of his article, Place suggested that a major stumbling block to the identification of sensations with brain processes had been what he called 'the Phenomenological Fallacy'. That fallacy consisted in supposing that "when the subject describes his experience, . . . he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen." It leads, Place suggests, to the supposition that when a subject reports a green after-image there

1 U.T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?'.
2 Op. cit., Borst p. 49. That this was a fallacy was not an original point; but Place sets it in the same context as I have been using.
is an object that is literally green. It is based, however, on the assumption that "because we recognize things in our environment by their look, sound, smell, taste, and feel, we begin by describing their phenomenal properties, i.e. the properties of the looks, sounds, smells, tastes, and feels which they produce in us, and infer their real properties from their phenomenal properties." On the contrary, Place claims, "we describe our conscious experience not in terms of the mythological 'phenomenal properties' . . ., but by reference to the actual physical properties of the concrete physical objects, events, and processes which normally . . . give rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to describe."  

We are here on the verge of the topic-neutral account of sensation statements. What has led us to this point is a rejection of the perceptual approach to sensations: the notion that I am aware of my experiences as internal objects. A colour experience is not something that I am aware of as being coloured. This last statement can, however, express two points, between which Place's presentation is in fact equivocal. He cannot decide whether the fallacy is supposed to say that sensations are literally green, like grass, or that they are phenomenologically green. He should perhaps have said that there were two fallacies. The first is fairly obviously nonsensical, but the second is a more interesting

mistake. It is this fallacy that is rejected by pointing to
the way in which we learn to speak of our experiences. It is
countered by the claim that, while experiences are not objectively
coloured, the colour words which are used in connection with them
do retain their commonplace objective meanings. They cannot,
therefore, refer to an entirely different range of properties.

We say, therefore, not that we have a green experience but
that we have an experience of green. To make the intention of
that expression quite clear, we might imagine it expanded into
'an experience of green grass'. This is not, perhaps, an altogether
natural expression, but it has a clear purpose and does not offend
our linguistic susceptibilities. It does, however, raise problems
with experiences such as those of after-images. We can, it is
ture, say that we have an experience of a green after-image; but
we are agreed that, in this case unlike that of grass, there is
nothing that is objectively green. How then can it be an experience
of green, if 'green' is meant objectively? Do we have an illusion
of green?

This problem has been touched on by Don Locke, who regards it
as the one impediment to materialism. He considers the after-image
situation and the similar one where a neurologist causes an
experience of red by direct stimulation of the brain. In both
cases he feels that he must insist that he is seeing something red,
"even though there is no red object to be seen". This position,

1 'Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetized?', pp. 229-231.
as it stands, is clearly incoherent; but he rejects the way out which would be provided by saying: "it is as if I were seeing it, but I am not seeing it".\(^1\) None the less, this was pounced upon by Antony Flew, who pointed out that we can deal with cases where we think we see an object but do not, by saying that we "see" the object. Why should we not, therefore, say that we "see" something red in the cases discussed by Locke?\(^2\) In reply, Locke plunged into worse confusion by suggesting that "seeing", introduced as it is to cover cases where there is no object, must nevertheless stand for a process, like seeing, which has its own object.\(^3\)

The way to avoid such muddles is to remove from the account of such experiences all suggestions of perception. An experience of having an after-image, when we have an experience of green but are not aware of any green object, is not an occasion for speaking of "seeing", unless the experience has deluded us into thinking that we are aware of a green object. In that case to say that we "see" only refers to the delusion; it does not give the experience a perceptual object.

To understand how the experience can be divorced from perception while remaining an experience of green, let us remember our natural confidence that experiences are "colourful". The demand that all experiences of colour must involve the existence of something coloured stemmed from an insistent belief that those

---

2 'Unanaesthetized Materialism', p. 54.
3 'Can a Materialist see What isn't There?', p. 55.
of the experiences that occur without the perception of a coloured object can be quite as "colourful" as those that occur in the paradigm situations. We want to say, further, that the "colourfulness" of a perceptual experience of a green object is in some way similar to the "colourfulness" of a mere experience of green, in the case of an after-image for example.

A solution to our problem may therefore open up before us if we transfer our attention from colour to "colourfulness" in the sense already explained. We can meet our natural demands, while avoiding the mislocation of colours, by saying that what is common to experiences of a specific colour is not the presence of that colour but a common "colourfulness". What is vivid in each experience, and what we really want to say is common between two experiences, does really belong to the experience and is not an objective property even when the experience is of an objective property. This we express by speaking, for example, of an experience of green rather than of a green experience. It is the words 'of green' that convey the nature of the experience as it is lived through as one of many of like value, whether of green grass or of green after-images.

One thing that I must stress at this point is that "colourfulness" has no special connection with colours. As I have said, pains too can be highly "colourful" in this sense. I am not, therefore, trying to smuggle colour into experiences of colour under the disguise of "colourfulness". To say that an experience is of green is not, in any sense, to say that it is
coloured. Nor is it to say that there is something else in the conceptual vicinity to provide a greenness that it cannot supply itself but that it none the less needs. Colours belong to objects, but this is no loss to experiences; for their richness is expressed in terms such as 'of green'.

IX

The recognition that I accord here to this "colourfulness", which we are naturally so concerned to give proper allowance to in any interpretation of experiences, should give my account a strong advantage over the topic-neutral one. Recognition of this "colourfulness" is precisely what Smart refused; and yet his system can still be seen as self-contained and coherent. It has to be faulted, therefore, for that original refusal and for its consequent failure to represent experience as we know it. This criticism must go forward despite the long-standing uncertainty of how the richness of experience can possibly be explained in words. If one is going to characterize experiences by ascribing properties to them, it will not do to suggest that their character, as we are aware of it, is so indistinct that all we can do is to note similarities and dissimilarities between experiences, without any positive awareness of the properties that justify these comparisons.

A convenient illustration of what is felt to be lacking can
be taken from D.M. Armstrong, whose theory is open to the same complaint. Armstrong has been criticized for having modelled his whole account of perceptual discrimination on the case of the chickensexer who manages to distinguish male and female chicks without having any idea how he does it. The criticism, as made, is not altogether fair, for Armstrong does introduce the case as an example of an atypical unconscious perception; but it does express a well-founded disquiet that the experiences that we know as so vivid have been accorded only a "colourless" existence. One may justifiably feel that there would be no real loss, on Armstrong's account, if perceptions of red objects did pass unnoticed.

It should be clear that my account, apart from giving due weight to "colourfulness", is intended to avoid both forms of the fallacy that Place was concerned to expose. Firstly, it does not suggest that there is a literally green object involved in the experience of a green after-image. Secondly, it does not suggest that 'green' is used in a special phenomenological sense when speaking of experiences. It accepts that, when we say 'an experience of green', we intend 'green' to have just the same meaning as it has in 'green grass'. By stressing the use of the words 'of green', it allows 'green' to retain that commonplace meaning without contaminating the experience. It might be thought, however, that the account does not, by this move, really avoid the second

form of Place's fallacy. Phenomenological properties may not be banished by preferring 'of green' to 'green'; for what is "colourfulness" if it does not consist in phenomenological properties? Far from ridding experiences of phenomenological properties, have I not stressed their importance and made 'of green' the name of one such property?

A further doubt might arise as to whether I have ever banished the literally green object from the green after-image situation. Although it might pass unquestioned that the experience itself is not green, it might still be thought that there must be some other green object in the vicinity; for how can the experience truly be said to be 'of green', if there is not some genuine green object to which it is related?

I do not intend to give full replies to these questions here; for proper answers require a wider development of my argument than I have provided so far. Some of the materials have, however, already been assembled. I have, for instance, denied that experiences are objects of any internal perception, though this is a point that deserves further argument. If established, it would link up with a point for which I have already argued at some length in the first chapter: that description as a mode of language is closely associated with perception. These two contentions would together constitute an argument that experience can be disassociated from description; and this would prepare the ground for a denial that, in speaking of experiences, we are picking out any objects or ascribing properties to any. This denial can only be given sub-
stance, however, if a new positive account can be given of the way that language is being used here. What is needed, therefore, is the presentation of another mode of language as a convincing alternative to description; and that I shall start upon only in the next chapter.

This, then, is the ongoing argument in the context of which I must for the moment just affirm the non-property nature of "colourfulness" and the non-property-indicating function of expressions such as 'of green'. If these claims can be taken partly on trust, it should be clear how my account, while accepting Place's demands, does not follow him in supposing that those points, once accepted, lead straight into a topic-neutral treatment of sensation statements. My account does agree that there are no specifically mental properties; but that is as a corollary to the general denial that experiences have any properties at all. It disagrees, therefore, that experiences have properties, defined in mental language by reference to typical causes, which are open to identification with properties of brain processes.

I am not, therefore, merely making an appeal to our prejudices in favour of our experiences. It will not do just to say, as Kneale does, that Armstrong - or Smart - 'ignores sentience'. That notion has to be explained, and the greatest conviction of its relevance will not serve, if sentience continues to be regarded as an area in which descriptive particulars and properties can be found. 'Of green', for example, can be of no use as the name of a

property, for, given the commonplace meaning of 'green', this could only be a relational property. It follows that its valid application would be dependent on the context of the experience, and it could not be truly applied to an experience if there was no green for the experience to be of. We do, however, want to speak of an experience of green in a case such as that of the green afterimage. Therefore, the expression 'of green' is clearly intentional; it points to a greenness beyond the experience and yet is applicable to the experience whether that greenness is there or not. I have, however, suggested that 'of green' is the linguistic expression of the real nature of the experience. I must claim, therefore, that the experience is what it is - that is, of green¹ - even in the absence of anything green.

What I am suggesting here is that experiences themselves are generally intentional.² It is not, then, just a manner of talking about experiences that is to be spoken of as intentional, but the actual vivid occurrences that we live through. It will be recalled that, when Feigl introduced his version of the Identity Theory, he intended that, out of all mental phenomena, it should cope only with raw feels. Those, he believed, were descriptive entities;

---

¹ The words 'of green' could with advantage appear in quotation marks; but since the desirability of that would not be understood at this point, I preferred to stress that the experience is not just called 'of green'.

² This is what Brentano, the introducer of 'intentionality' in its modern use, would have advocated ('The distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena', p. 51); but his more recent followers have linked intentionality more with developed psychological attitudes (e.g., R.M. Chisholm, 'Perceiving', p. 169) and have often spoken as if intentionality was a characteristic of mental language rather than of actual mental occurrences (e.g., Chisholm, op. cit., pp. 170-171).
and, on that premise, I consider that he was right to try to find identities for them in the objective scheme. All the other subject matter of mental language Feigl considered to be intentional, semantical and, hence, "logical" rather than psychological.¹ He declared that it would be "a category mistake of the most glaring sort to attempt a neurophysiological identification of this aspect of 'mind'."¹ This I can gratefully accept; but, unlike Feigl, I do not make the distinction which, singling out raw feels, placed them alone in the field of description. Raw feels I believe to be generally intentional and never descriptive. By the same standards, therefore, it would be mistaken to attempt their neurophysiological identification.

In the wider perspective of my whole account, it is the non-descriptive character of mental language that I wish to stress, rather than the intentionality of mental occurrences. That non-descriptive character ties in more, perhaps, with what might be called the basic intensionality of mental language: its insistence on specific terms rather than the intersubstitutable terms that, in the descriptive scheme, are permitted providing they refer to the same object. For instance, if we have a colour-term for the specific green of a green object, we can correctly redescribe the object using that term; but there is a limit to the degree to which we might recharacterize a person's experience of the object by means of that colour-term, if he did not know the term himself. Nevertheless, intensionality is, of course, associated with

¹ 'The "Mental" and the "Physical", p. 76.
intentionality by more than the inconvenient similarity of their names. Substitutivity fails in the intentional context when there is no object to determine whether two terms do have the same reference. Arguing for the intentionality of experiences can, therefore, play a contributory role in my general strategy, and may provide, perhaps, a particularly perspicuous counter to identity theories.

I am not here accepting Brentano's claim that intentionality provides an exclusive and comprehensive criterion of the mental. I do claim, however, that mental life, as it in fact originates and develops in men, is overwhelmingly intentional. Our experiences do, on the whole, have the function of informing us about features of our own body and of features of the external world. It is important to stress that this is not an altogether passive process. If I am right in regarding objects as Kantian-type appearances, both particulars and their properties are interpretations of reality. What might, therefore, be regarded as the creativity of experience, the objectivization of reality with both its indicating and characterizing aspects, suggests an outward gesture, a pointing to an other. This applies not only to the perception of objects but also to the associated awareness of objective properties. The natural form of a primitive experience, such as one which we might later know as an experience of green, is thus to point to a property of an external object. It is this

---

1 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena', p. 50.
perceptual characterization of the perceptually indicated that underlies the linguistic characterization of the linguistically indicated.

It is in the context of the general intentional force of experience that one can understand how our concept of colour comes to place weight in what seems the wrong place relative to the realities of colour discrimination. If my account of colour experiences is correct, then the genuine basis for the whole structure lies in "colourfulness" rather than in colours; and yet the varieties of "colourfulness", as we express them, are clearly dependent conceptually on colours. That colours might be truly subordinate was, however, foreshadowed in section vii, where the views I expressed about colours did prepare the way for their being assigned to a comparatively minor role.

When we say that an object is green, that remark cannot easily be expanded. We may explain that when we see the object we have experiences of green; and we may say that we mean that the object reflects green light. As I have suggested, we therefore think of greenness as a property of objects which is such that those objects which have it produce experiences of green in us. Further investigation of these objects may reveal that there is a range of physical properties that in one or other case provide a more basic interpretation of this feature that in natural perception we know as greenness. Something that cannot fail to strike us, however, is

---

1 This is what someone is likely to mean, even if it is only an approximation to the truth.
that, while objects are coloured, this seems quite adventitious to their nature. The vivid difference that we find between a red object and a yellow object is of no weight in a serious comparative account of the objects; \(^1\) even less, perhaps, the still vivid difference that we find between two objects of only slightly different colour. There seem good grounds, therefore, for thinking of the actual colours as supplying only the occasions of the occurrences that provide an entirely different dimension in which the exciting differences are displayed. Green, red and yellow are thus only the comparatively unexciting causes of experiences of green, of red and of yellow.

Given the intentionality of experience, however, it should not be at all unexpected that our basic conception is of green, red and yellow objects, even though this is a poorly founded classification of objects. The genuine point of the distinction does lie in the experiences, in the differences expressible by 'of green', 'of red' and 'of yellow'. These are differences, however, in intentional force, and therefore find first expression in classification of objects rather than in classification of experiences; hence, the evident conceptual dependence that 'of green' bears to 'green', even though it expresses the real grounds for the distinction.

---

\(^1\) Think, for example, of comparing an object painted cadmium yellow with a pair of objects: one painted cadmium red and the other chrome yellow.
There are various ways of reacting to the double phenomenon of intensionality and intentionality. One is to suppose, as Feigl did, that it can be set aside from the real problem of the relation between the mental and the physical, a view which was neatly expressed when Smart wrote "let the world be as spooky as you like and the problems of referential opacity are still there to be solved, or perhaps somehow by-passed". This assumes, in accord with the Identity Theory, that, as it exists, the mental must be describable even if non-physical. This would be the view, too, of the theory that I sketched out in section iv, according to which the mental consists of a separate range of properties. One can, on the other hand, accept, as I have done, that mental language is irretrievably intensional and committed to the intentional. This alternative path splits, however, into two widely diverging branches. One leads to the acceptance of the mental as a distinct non-descriptive mode of being; and it is this one that I have begun to advance along with the aid of the notion of "colourfulness". The other shows so great a commitment to descriptive reality that, embarrassed by intensionality and faced with the irreduceability of the intentional to the describable, it turns right away from the mental. What it arrives at is a version of the so-called Disappearance Theory of mind.

It is, indeed, probably the best justified route to that theory.

---

1 'Critical Notice: 'Content and Consciousness'", p. 620.
which contends that the mental is merely the intended subject-
matter of a language which has in fact no bearing on what really
exists. Mental language is therefore regarded as, in some
sense, discardable, though upholders of the theory differ widely
on the possibility and desirability of that move.\(^1\) In its early
presentations, it was arrived at as an alternative to the Identity
Theory through rejection of the value of the attempt to carry over
mental identifications into the scientific scheme. Both Paul
Feyerabend and Richard Rorty regarded this attempt as a source of
conceptual confusion, Feyerabend because he believes that all new
theories should be given a clear run uncluttered by old concepts,
and both because they feared, in this particular case, philosophical
problems about the relation of mental and physical properties
such as were raised by Stevenson.\(^2\) Both were rejecting, therefore,
the retention of what they conceived to be the incompetently
described objects of mental language.

D.C. Dennett, on the other hand, does not regard mental
language as descriptive. Starting from the premise that it is
intentional, he can see no way of reducing it to an extensional
form. He finds greater success, however, in approaching the problem
from the other end. While mental language cannot be rendered

---

1 Feyerabend seems to favour it in the cause of enlightenment
(‘Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem’, Borst p. 156), Dennett
to deplore it in the cause of human society (‘Content and Con-
sciouness’, p. 190.). Rorty seems to think its practical
impossibility a permanent block to the enlightening acceptance
of the non-existence of the mental (‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy,
and Categories’, Borst pp. 196-199.).

2 Feyerabend, ‘Comment: ‘Mental Events and the Brain’’, Borst
pp. 140-141; Rorty, op. cit., Borst pp. 188-191.
descriptive, it seems as if some extensionally conceived objects may be such that it is convenient, if not altogether perspicuous, to speak of them in an intentional language. Dennett devotes some effort to showing how happenings in organisms can have gained functional values through the evolutionary process, and how this development can be continued for brain processes in the life of the individual. \(^1\) Whether the details of his account are correct does not seem to matter so much as the general persuasiveness of the case that the development of a complex, apparently intentional system is possible by natural means from the basic objective origins of life. Dennett believes that he is thus enabled to explain both the way in which mental language is at present so successful and the way in which it is ultimately discardable in our account of what really is. \(^2\) An intentional language is well designed to express the way an event such as an occurrence in the brain is appropriate to the life of a creature; but how that event gained its function and how it now achieves it can be accounted for descriptively. The final inventory can therefore be purely extensional.

For whatever reason a disappearance theory is adopted, it is obviously even more subject than the topic-neutral identity theory to the criticism that it entirely ignores the "colourfulness" of our experiences. Rorty may say that he suspects that topic-neutral translations can never be shown to be adequate, but, in

\(^1\) 'Content and Consciousness', pp. 47-71.
\(^3\) 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Borst pp. 190-191.
this sense, no translation at all can scarcely be adequate either. It should be clear, however, that apart from this very important difference, my account has much in common with Dennett's version of this theory.

Dennett views mental language, as I do, as a self-contained system operating according to standards different from those of the descriptive physical language; and he sees that this rules out the existence of any entities that are descriptively identified by it. At one point he puts the question whether "pain is something (some thing) in addition to the physical operations of the pain-network."¹ My answer to this question, like his, is 'No!'; but, whereas for Dennett the non-existence of a thing marks the end of the matter, for me it means only that reality is not being treated descriptively when we speak of pain. If we can only get away from the notion that description is the only genuine way in which language can represent reality, admitting that pain is not an object will not lead us to admit that pain, as such, does not really exist. The sort of thing that I want to say is this: pain is one form of what it is like to be this reality which, from a perceptual point of view, is this human body. This other mode of reality, that I here speak of as 'being' a particular reality, is what gains non-descriptive representation in the language of mind.

At this point I should recall the theory that I sketched out in section iv, which suggested that the mental might be a

further range of properties of the one basic reality that also possessed physical properties. I am, of course, rejecting that theory now; for I believe no more that there are mental properties than that there are mental objects. The theory does, however, provide the sort of structure that I am considering now; for, despite its being expressed in terms of properties, it does formulate a double linguistic representation of the one reality.

To say that mental language represents reality in a different way from physical language is not to say that it represents a different reality, but rather the converse. One great advantage that such an account has over a descriptive theory of mind is, indeed, that it does not seem to posit a distinct range of entities. It is not in competition with physical language to provide a catalogue of entities or of properties. Physical language deals with reality as it is revealed through perception, and it is from that angle that reality appears as objects and their properties. Mental language, on the other hand, deals with reality as it is revealed through self-consciousness. From that angle reality might be said to appear (though here the word 'appear' must be rid of all its perceptual connotations) as experiences in their varied "colourfulness". It is what it is like to be this reality, as opposed to what that reality is like as perceived. I am therefore speaking of one reality when I speak of myself in the two languages, the mental and the physical, as I would have been according to the theory in section iv. The theory which I am now proposing differs from that previous one because the representation
of reality in mental language is not based on some form of internal perception and, therefore, is not descriptive and does not introduce any further properties.

When we study a person objectively, what we might say about him in mental language, for instance that he is in pain, is to some degree irrelevant. Dennett says "when we abandon mental process talk for physical process talk we cannot say that the mental process analysis of pain is wrong, for our alternative analysis cannot be an analysis of pain at all". I am not proposing that we should abandon mental language, but, if one does turn away from it to a descriptive account, its representations are placed at one remove. The same reality may found both a person's pain and some objective condition of his body, but when we speak of the objective condition we are taking a different route to that reality from the one that the pain and the pain talk are on. The two representations cannot collide, therefore. It may be difficult, however, always to keep the two approaches apart in one's mind. Dennett himself is inconsistent; thus, on the same page from which I took the last quotation he asks the rhetorical question, "Could any sense be made of the supposition that a person might hit his thumb with a hammer and be suddenly and overwhelmingly compelled to drop the hammer, suck the thumb, dance about, shriek, moan, cry, etc., and yet still not be experiencing pain?", and expects the answer 'No!' If, however, we are looking at

---

this happening objectively, the idea of 'pain' should not enter our heads. It should, therefore, be quite possible at a higher level to set the descriptive account against the avowal of pain, and to recognize that the former is quite independent of the latter because it carries no conceptual relation to it.¹

This is not to deny the valuable point that Dennett is making here, that the descriptive account is, in theory, fully capable of providing an account of all human behaviour. In my own account this point follows from the independence from each other of two approaches to reality. The presence of some feature in the appearance that some reality presents to one approach cannot introduce into the appearance that is presented to the other approach anything that breaks the principles of that other approach. In particular, the applicability of mental language to a reality which has a perceptual appearance as a human body cannot introduce any objective feature to that human body which cannot be accounted for in physical language as much as any other physical feature can.

I must reject, therefore, all the arguments that have been put forward, by Norman Malcolm, for example, in an attempt to show that our acceptance of mental language commits us to the view that human behaviour is not physically determined. Malcolm has

¹ This may well identify an inconsistency in Dennett's position, for, if he did not answer 'No!' to his own question, the mental occurrence would seem to be independent of the physical occurrence. He is arguing, therefore, both for the independence of the languages and for the capacity of one of them, the physical, to keep track of anything that the other speaks of.
suggested, for instance, that, in a certain situation, it is
someone's intention to retrieve his hat that causes him to climb
a ladder. If this is so, Malcolm argues, his physical condition
cannot be sufficient to cause his climbing the ladder; for there
cannot be two sufficient causes, the intention and the physical
condition.\footnote{1} There is a mistake, however, in the original
attribution of causal effectiveness to the intention as such.\footnote{2}
Malcolm's error there was to mix the two languages, mental and
physical. Climbing the ladder is clearly taken objectively and
it is as such that it can be causally explained. If, however,
one thinks of this behaviour as what the man did, one will not be
nearly so inclined to say that the intention caused the action.
One would rather say that his intention led him to do what he did.
The relation here is much more a conceptual one than a causal one.
It corresponds rather to the reasoning, 'I want to retrieve my
hat; I can retrieve my hat by climbing the ladder; I must climb
the ladder', than to any causal determination. In the same
spirit one might say that the intention informed his action, that
he climbed the ladder intending to retrieve his hat. This
suggests, not that there was a persistent force pushing him further
and further up the ladder, but that climbing the ladder had a
certain meaning for him.

I am not suggesting here that no causal connection could be

\footnote{1} "The Conceivability of Mechanism", p. 52-53.

\footnote{2} I can, therefore, ignore the ingenious arguments of Alvin
Goldman that it is quite possible for one event to have two
independently sufficient causes ('The Compatibility of
Mechanism and Purpose').
found between his having the intention and his climbing the ladder. If one reflects that one must change from one language to another in passing from intention to movement, it will be evident, though, that the connection can only be indirect. Certainly, however, we can take it that the reality which was represented mentally by the intention was in its objective appearance a bodily occurrence, probably a brain process, causally related to his movement up the ladder. On the other hand, that movement would involve the objective appearance of a reality that would be represented mentally by a conscious awareness and intentional "control" of the movement. While, therefore, the causal development belongs strictly to the physical appearances, it is not unrelated to the mental occurrences which are after all different appearances of some of the same realities.

XI

I should, at this stage, indicate what relationship I take my theory to bear to Central State Materialism. The Central State theory, as Armstrong expresses it, is the theory that "the concept of a mental state is primarily the concept of a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour", while some mental states are secondarily "states of the person apt for being brought about by a certain sort of stimulus". This theory is

---

1 'A Materialist Theory of the Mind', p. 82.
converted into Central State Materialism by the added expectation that these variously apt states of the person will be empirically discovered to be in fact conditions of the central nervous system.¹

The general intention of Central State Materialism is similar to that of the Place/Smart Identity Theory, though it differs from that theory in bringing all mental phenomena, and not just sensations, under the same formula. Further points of difference are that the topic-neutral translations are expressed in terms of causal relations rather than of merely concurrent occurrences, and that the position of the external observer is firmly adopted in contrast to the Identity Theory's genuine, though somewhat fragile, respect for the first-person point of view. It is indeed derived to a far greater extent from behaviourist psychology, though it differs from that in positing an internal occurrence as the location of the mental.

Against Central State Materialism I must add, to the reasons I have for rejecting the Identity Theory, an objection to its definition of mental concepts in terms of causes.² As the other main proponent of the theory, David Lewis, realises, mental occurrences are not, as they are expressed in mental language, suitable candidates for a causal relationship expressed in standard terms. He says that Central State Materialism "inherits the behaviourist discovery that the (ostensibly) causal connections between an experience and its typical occasions and manifestations

² 'Cause' is represented in Armstrong's definition, quoted above, by 'brought about'. 
somehow contain a component of analytic necessity". The way that the theory proposes to cope with this analyticity is through the words 'apt' and 'typical'; for, when these are inserted into the causal statement, the apparently necessary connection, expressed by the intended names of cause and effect, does not have to hold on all occasions, and the contingency of the actual causal relation is therefore preserved.

This way of expressing the relationship between certain important internal occurrences and the behaviour they are related to is indeed valuable; but it does not explicate our conventional mental concepts. Experiences of green do typically occur in the presence of green objects and experiences of pain in the presence of damage to, or malfunction of, the body; but experiences of green or pains are experiences that have the conceptual status of indicators of green or of bodily harm, before ever they could be considered to be caused by them. They are, that is, the experiences that directly lead us to respond appropriately to their object, to say 'green' or to rub the relevant limb, etc. The conceptual tie between experience and typical circumstance is, therefore, the intentional relation, by which the one points to or means the other. This is the role that experiences have for each one of us, and which we credit their having for others through our general sense of human community. Experiences also lead to fairly predictable behaviour; but, as I argued in the last section, the way that

1 'An Argument for the Identity Theory', p. 21.
mental occurrences lead on to actions, also, cannot be regarded as a purely causal process. The personal action is derived from the experience as a development in the understanding of the situation rather than as a determined result.

To say that experiences are caused by certain objects or certain stimuli is therefore to hazard an explanation of the occurrence of experiences rather than to unpack the original meaning of avowals of experience; and to say that experiences cause certain behaviour is equally inventive. I have argued that these are false explanations because they try to apply to experiences a developed form of the descriptive scheme which is totally foreign to them. Of course, a causal explanation can take us a long way in either case to establishing the connection, but it does not finally latch on to the experience. That the causal account can take us so far does, however, make the states posited by Central State Materialism of considerable importance to my theory.

One position that I certainly wish to avoid is the suggestion that mental events are a curious epiphenomenon, faint existences on the fringes of reality. This is what Lewis, however, considers to be the fate of all experiences conceived of as non-physical and causally inefficacious. He writes: "It is true that such phenomena can never be refuted by any amount of scientific theory and evidence. The trouble with them is rather that they cannot be what we call experiences. They can only be the non-physical epiphenomena or correlates of physical states which are experiences. . . Such things may be - but they are of no consequence."^ Experiences, non-physical

and causally ineffectacious, are, however, of considerable consequence to us who live through them. They are what we mean by 'experiences', even if they are not what behavioural scientists mean; for what we, in general, mean is shown by the logic of our talk about experiences - not by whether we can be enticed into agreeing that, of course, experiences are causally related to stimuli and behaviour.

Our experiences are, too, of more genuine ontological significance than a defence in terms of human interest would suggest. I have argued that mental language represents one and the same basic reality as is represented by physical language. If either of these representations is more directly related to the basic reality than the other, it must surely be the mental, for that does not involve the distancing of reality as other, which is natural to perception. We should not, therefore, be too impressed by causal efficacy, for that is only how the same reality is articulated in its objective appearance. The causal ineffectiveness of experiences does not, therefore, render them ontologically frivolous as Lewis suspects. They introduce the same realities (more directly too, perhaps) as appear as his causally efficacious entities.

Central State Materialism is not to be congratulated, therefore, for specifying entities that provide the true identities of mental occurrences; for that it does not achieve. The entities that it introduces are of interest, however, for their strong claim to be regarded as the objective appearances of the underlying realities of mental life. This claim has two bases, empirical and
conceptual. The empirical one is provided by the expected temporal correlation between these observable conditions of the central nervous system and avowed mental occurrences. The plausibility and meaningfulness of this correlation are dependent, however, on the conceptual basis by which the physical condition is naturally tied to contexts of stimuli and behaviour which are also suitable to the mental occurrence. This tie is a causal one; but, since the relation is expressed through such words as 'apt' and 'typical', the causal conditions need not always be satisfied. The relation is thus flexible enough to permit the condition to occur on some occasions without the defining context. The physical condition is thus able, in its occurrences, to mimic the intentionality of the mental, though it does not of itself point to anything beyond it. From the descriptive point of view, any one manifestation of the physical condition just occurs, and occurs with just the context that it has in that manifestation. Whether it is sometimes preceded by a certain stimulus or followed by certain behaviour is not marked in the physical condition. These are purely relational properties, in descriptive terms, which either do or do not hold.

While the physical condition is thus indifferent to the context in which it occurs, the same is not true of the mental occurrence. If there was not the typical causal connection with stimulus or behaviour, then the mental occurrence would not have the meaning it has, it would not point to what it is understood to point to. The mental occurrence is only able to develop meaning, therefore, by means of that nature of its underlying reality that
is reflected in objective causal relations within the physical context of stimuli and behaviour. It does, however, retain that meaning through repetitions of the reality, whatever causal context it may have in its objective appearance.

XII

It may be asked how a particular physical condition can be precisely identified as the objective appearance of the reality that an experience is based upon. Temporal correlation with the experience and causal relations with suitable stimuli and suitable behaviour have already been mentioned. These, however, may well provide only a rough indication of the area in which the appearance might be located. An anterior limit could, one might think, be established by direct stimulation of the brain to reproduce, at different stages, the causal nexus between stimulus and behaviour.¹ For the posterior limit one would have to look, presumably, to the point of divergence for the causal production of different effects related to the experience, such as bodily movement and the subject's spoken report. Should we, however, ask for anything better than this? The possibility of strict descriptive identification would seem to depend on the existence of clear descriptive rules of

¹ In intention, the latest stage to produce all the typical effects, including a report of the experience, would define the limit; but the difficulty here is to know whether one has produced the reality itself or only its typical effects.
discovery. The absence of such rules might be an embarrassment to the Identity Theory, but must be expected on my theory, according to which we are searching for a reality specified as underlying a non-descriptive mental occurrence. It is sufficient, therefore, to establish that some physical condition satisfies the comparatively loose requirements of correlation and causal suitability. Whether that particular condition, as it is descriptively specified, represents the required reality is a further question which cannot be answered.

Another problem facing us relates to the degree to which the objective appearances of the realities, which in mental terms have the same meaning in each case, must be descriptively similar to each other. This is a question of how far the common nature of the realities underlying the mental occurrences must be represented in their objective appearances. If one was thinking in terms of properties, as in the theory of section iv, this would be to ask whether the mental properties were independent of the physical properties, as redness from roundness, etc. It might be thought that the distinct nature of the mental approach, as I conceive it, would permit even greater independence than can be imagined in terms of properties. I feel, however, that the reverse is true, for the mental approach cannot add further to the same range - of properties, for instance - but must represent the reality in its one nature that is also reflected in its objective appearance. I am inclined to say, therefore, that there must be some descriptive similarity, at least, among events correlated with a particular type of experience.
A sharp distinction should be drawn between this problem and the question whether mental events are generally predictable through a causal explanation of their objective correlates. One who has run these two problems together is Donald Davidson. Arguing for what he calls the "anomalism of the mental", the absence of any laws by which types of mental event can be predicted or explained, he locates the break-down of prediction and explanation in the psychophysical relation. Now, I am quite ready to accept that no psychophysical laws can be established, and I am generally sympathetic with the type of reason that Davidson gives for this in terms of the independence of the mental and physical languages. This barrier applies, though, to particular mental events as well as to general types, whereas Davidson wishes to say that particular mental events are explicable. The point where this distinction can really be drawn is in relation to the objective correlates of the mental events. There is no reason to suppose that physical events corresponding to a type of mental event do themselves form a class which can be mentioned in any general causal law. Even if, as we may suppose, they form a descriptively definable class, they may occur in many combinations of circumstances. Each event would then be causally determined and the occurrence of each could be lawfully explained, but, as a class, they could not be subsumed under one general explanation.

The general inexplicability of mental events by types can be

1 'Mental Events', p. 81.
dealt with, therefore, outside the scope of the question of similarity among the objective correlates for one type of mental event. In relation to that question, the next requirement is to distinguish the level of mental classification at which it is reasonable to look for a corresponding physical similarity. The independence of the mental from specifiable physical manifestations is sometimes argued for on the basis of high-level examples such as 'thinking of Spain'.\(^1\) It must be admitted at once, however, that it would be absurd to suppose that, on every occasion when anyone, or even when a particular person, thought of Spain, this must be represented physically by an occurrence of a single recognizable kind. This sort of example is not relevant to our problem because 'thinking of Spain' does not specify a single type of occurrence even in mental terms. To think of Spain may be to have an image of Barcelona, to have an image of Granada, or to think quite abstractly about that country's weather or its Civil War. It should be noted, therefore, in general terms, that the higher classification of mental occurrences, that of their developed meanings, does not correspond to a higher descriptive classification of objective occurrences; at most, all physical correlates would share a relational property corresponding to the shared implication of all the mental occurrences. More specifically, there is no reason why a thought of Spain (image of Barcelona) should be like a thought of Spain (fact about weather) in either its lived-through character or its physical correlates, except, in the first case,

\(^1\) Quoted from Putnam by Dennett ('Content and Consciousness', p. 17).
through its understood implication of 'Spain' and, in the second case, through its potential causal relation with the objective correlate of that idea.

Our problem of descriptive similarity arises therefore at the level of the basic "colourfulness" of experiences. An appropriate example would be provided by experiences of a particular shade of green. Could a particular person have such an experience on two occasions without the objective correlate falling on both occasions within the same descriptive class? I am inclined to think that the need for a coherent notion of the reality underlying both the mental and the physical demands the expectation – it would be rash to put the point more strongly – that there would be two similar physical occurrences.

I have spoken here in terms of a single person because there do seem to be convincing reasons for supposing that experiences could develop different meanings for different people even at this most basic level. One familiar imagined case is that where the visual system of an individual is so disorganized that the occurrences in his brain caused by green light striking his retina are just like those which occur in the brain of any normal perceiver when his retina is struck by red light. If I am right in suggesting that the basic "colourfulness" of experience must be related to types of objective occurrence through their common ground, we would seem to have evidence that this individual's experiences of green must be for him as our experiences of red are for us. This would not mean, however, that he did not really have an experience of
green at all but an experience of red; for 'of green' does not provide a descriptive characterization of the experience. His experience would be one of green: that is, an experience of the colour of green objects, of grass and of unripe apples, for instance. The basic "colourfulness" of the experience would have come to mean for him 'grass' and 'unripe apples' among other things. Once informed of his curious visual organization, he might say that his experience of green was like others' experience of red; but that would not give it the meaning of an experience of red. It would, instead, take on the rather complicated character that he attributes to it. The experience can be both 'of green' and "like" others' experiences of red', because its character is given by the further meaning that is taken on by its basic "colourfulness" and not by some progressively corrected description of it.

XIII

To turn from Central State Materialism to Functionalism, as I now wish to do, may seem to involve only a small change in direction. A Central State theory, such as is summarized in the definition of mental states that I quoted from Armstrong in section xi, comes very close to proposing that mental language is concerned exclusively with states in their functional character. The use of the word 'apt' indicates that the state is not conceived of as merely
causing the behaviour, as it so happens, but as forming a natural foundation for the behaviour. It is true that 'apt' does suggest that the state is one which someone might put to the use of producing the behaviour; but this is clearly a connotation that has to be discounted. Armstrong's definition does not, therefore, include a positive recognition of the functional status that these states have within the organism, through having evolved along with the behaviour as enabling conditions for it. The definition would only need to be filled out in this way, however, to take on the character of a functionalist theory, even if it would not share some important features of Functionalism as it was developed by Putnam.

It might be thought that one difference between Central State Materialism and Functionalism emerges through the functionalist use of such examples as that of 'thinking of Spain' which I mentioned in the last section. The intended point of such examples is to show that types of mental event can be instantiated in descriptively different physical states, and accordingly that the type of mental event cannot be given any descriptive characterization. This is not an argument against Central State Materialism as defined by Armstrong, however, unless that were developed in such a way as to insist on descriptive specifications of types of state apt for the production of set types of behaviour. As it stands, the theory sets no limits to the number of descriptively characterized states that might be apt for the production of the same type of behaviour. If behavioural function is what is common to all cases of thinking of Spain, then Armstrong's definition could surely
group them into the one class.

Unfortunately for this brand of Functionalism, however, there seems to be scarcely any more reason to suppose that all cases of thinking of Spain share the same function than to suppose that they all share the same physical instantiation. Consider, for example, thinking of Spain as a place to go to on holiday, and remembering an incident that took place during that holiday. Both would commonly be recognized as cases of thinking of Spain, but they seem to lack any common function. It is true that the production of the word 'Spain' which is prominent in the first may be somewhere in the offing in the second, but that does not seem sufficient to give them the same function. It seems doubtful, therefore, whether Functionalism, or Central State Materialism in so far as it overlaps with it, can produce a classification of states which corresponds to that of mental language.

There is another aspect to Functionalism, however, than this straightforward insistence on the functional role rather than the descriptive character of states as what is spoken of in mental language. Although it is not altogether explicit in most expositions of Functionalism, an approach to the language of mind can be detected, quite different from any that a functionalist theory on the level of Central State Materialism would suggest. This approach is revealed indirectly through the theory's frequent emphasis on the simulation

---

1 Armstrong is in a better position than Putnam to avoid this criticism because 'apt' allows the production of the word 'Spain' to be a quite superficial, not to say merely potential, effect of thinking of Spain, while Putnam may have to insist that it is the state's essential function. Armstrong will, however, merely fail to offend the mental language classification; no more than Putnam will he have independently reproduced that classification.
of human mental processes in machines. The possibility of such
a simulation is a natural implication of the view that the same
function may be instantiated in many different physical forms.
Once, however, machine simulation is introduced, it soon becomes
apparent that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the
language in which the machine processes are interpreted as
comparable to human mental processes, and the language in which
the physical manifestation of those processes is descriptively
characterized. This difference can be seen more clearly than
in the case of mental language and the physical description of
brain processes, because the machine language has to be set up
from scratch and can therefore be seen for what it is.

Putnam introduced machine simulation with the proposal that
the mind could be regarded as analogous to a Turing machine, a
device which is in principle capable of carrying out any operation
than can be performed by any sort of digital computer.1 Any
Turing machine can be described by a table of "instructions", in
which each "logical" state of the machine is defined, in relation
to any input, in terms of output, location of next input, and
successor state.2 This one "machine table" can fit many different
Turing machines, the one requirement being that their states should
conform to the pattern prescribed. The states expressed in the
machine table will then be the same logical states as in a similar
Turing machine, even though the physical states through which they

1 'Minds and Machines', pp. 138-142.
are realised may differ widely.¹

This wide-spread applicability of a single machine table has led to what I take to be an interesting misinterpretation of Putnam's proposals. In his original paper, Putnam spoke of Turing machines as actual physical devices which were described by machine tables.² At one point, however, he did say that "a given "Turing machine" is an abstract machine which may be physically realized in an almost infinite number of different ways".³ Ignoring the inverted commas about the words 'Turing machine',⁴ William Lycan has jumped to the conclusion that Putnam must have been advocating what he calls "ATM (abstract Turing machine)-Functionalism", the theory that a person's mind is analogous to a universal corresponding abstractly to a machine table. This theory naturally puzzles him: "On this view", he writes, "a 'mental state' is not a state at all, but a universal instantiated by states."⁵ He finds it a mystery, therefore, how mental "states" could be found in people, and argues, reasonably enough, that an abstract Turing machine could not change from one state to another. Not surprisingly, he then turns gratefully to PTM (physical Turing machine)-Functionalism,⁶ which is,

4 It is true that Putnam did later drop the inverted commas in speaking of a "physically realized Turing machine" (op. cit., pp. 147, 149.).
5 'Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis', p. 54.
of course, the theory that Putnam had actually put forward.

Lycan's longer-term purpose is to argue that logical states of a physical Turing machine can, after all, be identified with structural physical states of that machine, and hence that mental states can, upon this analogy, be identified with structural states of the brain. His reason, derived from his distinction between ATM- and PTM-Functionalism, is that, when instantiated, a logical state is no longer an abstract universal that can apply to many different objects. It must then be, he thinks, the structural state that instantiates its universal form.¹

From one point of view, this argument can be seen as raising the old problem whether one property can be the same as another. Once the notion that the so-called 'universal logical state' actually is some sort of state is removed, the universal can be seen as corresponding — after the usual manner of universals — to a linguistic description. A column of "instructions" in a machine table would then stand for a logical state of a physical Turing machine in the same way as a description in technical language stands for a structural state of the same machine. This would, indeed, seem to be Putnam's own view, even if he puts the word 'describes' into italics when speaking of a machine table as describing an actual Turing machine.² The machine table can therefore be seen as introducing a different range of properties which, it would be reasonable to suggest, are not identical with

any introduced by a description of the particular machine's structural properties. This rejoinder is at least strong enough to show that Lycan has not established his case. One may well wonder, however, whether it is really on the right lines and whether it makes as much as it should of the abstract/physical distinction.

Why is it more plausible to think of an abstract Turing machine than of an abstract turf-cutting machine? The notion of the former does not seem to require an ascent into a Flatonic heaven such as the notion of the latter seems inevitably to demand. We seem to be led to this distinction by the way in which 'turf-cutting' simply describes an operation that might be performed by a machine. The idea of an abstract turf-cutting machine would therefore produce a universal out of purely objective particular. On the other hand, a machine table must be seen as interpreting rather than describing an actual Turing machine. At first sight, a list of states defined in terms of precedents and effects might seem to be purely descriptive; but, if the analogy between minds and Turing machines is to be at all plausible, this impression must be removed. It was not for nothing, presumably, that Putnam spoke of the "logical" states of Turing machines. He did not explain the choice of this expression, but it does carry the clear suggestion that the interrelations of these states are verbal rather than causal.

1 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', O'Connor p. 274.
2 'Minds and Machines', p. 147.
The attractiveness of the Turing-machine analogy is based in large part on the facility with which it seems to model those features of mental language that appear in utterances such as avowals of pain. Putnam suggests the case of a logical state, $A$, the definition of which includes the print-out of 'I am in state $A$' among the output of the state. This print-out then follows as a natural result, or even as a concluding part, of state $A$. It follows from this that there is no need for the machine to "determine" - by some internal recording device - that it is in state $A$ in order to produce the print-out. Putnam contrasts this case with that of the structural state described by 'vacuum tube 312 has failed', where it is obvious that some recording device is required to produce that print-out. It is then clear that the logical-state print-out corresponds neatly to an avowal of pain with its apparent immediacy and independence of recognitional error. The structural description, on the other hand, corresponds to a statement that there is, for example, a cut in one's finger. The reports of damage to one's finger or of vacuum tube condition can be at fault through perceptual or quasi-perceptual failure to ascertain the truth. The avowal of pain or the print-out 'I am in state $A$', on the other hand, can only go wrong through something like a "verbal slip".

It is important to recognize, however, - not that Putnam did - that this contrast, in its machine version, does not demand that the machine should necessarily include a different sort of part

in order to produce the true print-out 'vacuum tube 312 is in
descriptive state X'. The logical-state print-out could depend
on the physical presence of the same device. Indeed, it is
possible that the same print-out should be read alternatively as
'I am in logical state A' or as 'vacuum tube 312 is in descriptive
state X'. In the first case, however, it would be a logical
conclusion of state A, whereas in the second it would be quite
distinct from state X. In other words, the recording device
could form part of the physical instantiation of state A, and its
break-down would then constitute a verbal slip rather than a
perceptual failure. The difference, therefore, is not essentially
one of physical constitution, but consists in a difference in
understanding of what is taking place; in particular, how a break-
down is interpreted depends on the over-all context provided by a
logical or structural account of the whole. It is an interesting
question whether this is a feature for which the analogy with mental
reports would hold.

The intimate connection between logical states and their
defined output may suggest that the relation between such output as
'I am in state A' and the state that it belongs to cannot be a
descriptive one; and, hence, that the relation between a machine
table - which can fill out the meaning of 'state A' - and its
corresponding Turing machines also cannot be a descriptive one. We
would therefore have to reject the proposal that machine tables
merely introduce a different range of descriptive properties from

---

1 Statements printed out by a Turing machine are single symbols
which have to be translated into English (Putnam, op. cit.,
note 10, p. 162.).
any mentioned in a structural account. Considerations of this kind have led James Tomberlin to suggest that Putnam's theory provides new grounds for arguing that we are not referring to anything when we speak of mental states.¹ This is in accord with the view that I have been expressing in this chapter; and, on very much the same lines, he goes on to say, "my utterance is not a description". Unfortunately he interprets this as meaning "I say nothing about myself, just because I am not saying anything".¹ His views clearly fall within the scope, therefore, of those theories which suppose that without description one is left with mere expression. I am in strong disagreement with him, therefore, on account of my belief that mental utterances, while non-descriptive, nevertheless do represent genuine modifications of the basic "colourfulness" of experiences. I cannot accept his conclusion that an utterance such as 'I am in pain' essentially "shows something about my condition, and what it shows is that my "physically realized" nature is in this or that structural state".²

Tomberlin has been criticized by R.H. Kane on the grounds that mental reports can be false to the facts, as when someone says that he is in pain when he knows that he is not.³ According to Kane, this shows that mental reports must have descriptive reference.⁴ Falsity can appear, however, in other contexts than that of

---

1 'About the Identity Theory', p. 298.
3 'Turing Machines and Mental Reports', pp. 347-348.
4 He therefore puts forward an account that forestalls Lycan's in suggesting that instantiated logical states are identical with structural states.
linguistic description. The person is mimicking a genuine pain avowal, but this does not mean that he must be making an untrue descriptive statement. We would do well to think of a case such as that of a bird pretending to have a broken wing. That, no doubt, is not exactly like a false verbal avowal of pain; but it does suggest one end of a continuum on which the avowal of pain might be placed. At the other end would be a genuinely descriptive untrue statement; but the pain avowal need not tend altogether to that.

Why is it, though, that Putnam's theory cannot be accepted as the descriptive one that he appears to think it to be? It might be supposed that the machine table describes the input, the output and the location of the next input; and these are the only points at which a mode other than description might intrude, for the last element of the definition is expressed in terms of a further state and therefore in the terms established by the first three. The crucial element here is output. It is true that the output might be described, but then the analogy with minds and mental language would be lost. The analogy is only convincing because the output is understood to be, for example, 'I am in state A'. This is not the description of a symbol, but a reading. If it were a description, it would fail completely to refer back, or reflexively, to state A. As it is, the output, as a defined element of the state, not only has meaning in itself but contributes meaning to the state as a whole. When we say of

---

1 The describability of the other elements might also be questioned in view of the variety of instantiations that one Turing machine may have.
the machine that it is in state A, we are not describing the machine, therefore, but "understanding" it. Hence the attractiveness of the analogy; for, when we say of someone that he is in pain, we are understanding his condition, a condition he might make explicit by saying 'I am in pain'. This condition is, of course, informed with an awareness of bodily damage as its intentional sense, and this is conveyed by the utterance that emerges from it. Similarly, the machine state, as interpreted, does comprehend its functional role, though only within the limited horizon of its immediate context and immediate result. All this is true, however, only of the state conceived of as something that may be understood rather than as something that may be described. We are prepared to think of an abstract Turing machine because, unlike a turf-cutting machine, it resembles a book which we can read in whatever edition it is instantiated.

XIV

Putnam himself did not suggest that minds were actually to be regarded as Turing machines; ¹ therefore, criticisms intended to

¹ Still less did he suggest that brains were Turing machines, as Dreyfus' criticism - that the brain functions more like an analogue computer - would require. ('Phenomenology and Mechanism', pp. 90-92.). Putnam was trying to reproduce the sense of mental language, not that of some ultimately satisfying explanatory account of the human organism. This fact also undermines William Kalke's criticism that, if one studied the
show that mental states cannot in fact be logical states of Turing machines are not altogether to the point. One interesting criticism of this sort, however, suggested that mental states might correspond more closely to the computational states of such machines: that is, to the process by which they pass from one logical state to another. The partial validity of this criticism can be seen from Putnam's own example of a machine table. This table is intended to represent a machine that adds unary numbers together. Adding is achieved by the machine passing through a sequence of logical states, and the total is readable on the machine's input/output tape when this has received the output of all the states in the sequence. Adding seems, in itself, to consist in the intervening sequence of processes which lead on from one logical state to another, including the final state of rest when the calculation has been completed. One might suggest tentatively, however, that the computational states correspond most closely to unconscious mental processes - in this case, whatever carries us to the answer -, while the logical states correspond

1 /Cont'd

functional processes closely enough, these would be shown to be dependent on structural variations in different instantiations, even if there was surface uniformity; for mental language does not itself probe deeply ('What is Wrong with Fodor and Putnam's Functionalism', pp. 91-92.).

1 This objection is similar to one introduced, with several others of interest, by Block and Fodor in their article 'What Psychological States Are Not'; but they mean something rather different by "computational state" (pp. 176-177.).

2 'Minds and Machines', p. 141.
roughly to the conscious states during the process - the intermediate stages which gain expression in what we say to ourselves as we perform the calculation. The state of pain, also, is obviously more closely analogous to a logical state than to a computational state.

In speaking of computational states in this way we are again placing an interpretation on a machine table, but now on the whole rather on a part which defines just a single machine state. This placing of an interpretation needs to be stressed, for it may indicate an important disanalogy between minds and any sort of machine simulation of them. I am of course thinking of the common objection that men mean what they say but machines do not mean anything by their output; they only operate in ways that have meaning in the minds of their makers or users. Is it possible to elucidate this objection by attention to Putnam's argument?

Let us consider his example of a machine table. As I have already mentioned, he stated that its purpose was to represent a machine that would add unary numbers. He may, however, have blundered on a gadget designed as an aid to factory farming, an adjunct to a mechanized version of Armstrong's chicken-sexer. Its input might be provided by a sensory mechanism developed, like its human counterpart, by reinforcement, with '1' indicating a female chick and '+' a male. What Putnam innocently supposed was the cancelling of a plus sign would then be the extermination of a male chick, and what he saw as the rearrangement of units might be an adjustment of the cage to take account of the reduced population.
This fanciful adaptation is intended to show that the meaning of the machine states is essentially a meaning that is read into them. One rejoinder that Putnam might make would be that the meaning is given by the context, whether by the factory farm or by some context that he could provide to show that the machine was adding numbers. With this emphasis on context, however, the analogy would cease to capture our general notion of experiences. Think of the advantage that accrued to Armstrong by the use of a word such as 'apt'. Putnam, by contrast, would be unable to give meaning to an event divorced from its usual context. The machine might be tampered with, as the brain might be by a neuro-physiologist, in such a way that its normal input was effectively reproduced. Supposing that it had previously been used for both purposes, would it then imagine that it was adding unary numbers or that it was killing chicks?

Faced with this problem, Putnam would be likely to insist on the introduction of a more sophisticated robot in which the roles were better distinguished. This robot might provide reports of its "experiences" so that its behaviour would seem fully equivalent to that of a hallucinated human chicken-sexer. Does this change to a more complicated machine really help, however? The objection against crediting the simpler machine with consciousness was not that it could not show what it was imagining, but that it seemed inconceivable that it was imagining anything, even though something was occurring which was the functional equivalent of objective occasions for human imaginings. Should not Putnam's manoeuvre be seen, therefore, as an attempt to hide the lack of consciousness
in his machines by perfect mimicry of those who do possess it?

In line with his variously stated beliefs that crediting consciousness is a matter for decision or for rational inference from behaviour, Putnam would say that there was nothing to be hidden as there is nothing to be revealed in humans. His view is rather that machines only have to pass an examination in behaviour to have as much right to be admitted to consciousness as any human being. Fodor, on the other hand, expressed doubt at the end of his 'Psychological Explanation' whether the functional account he had given of mind really got to the root of the matter, and his words are very apposite here. "What one wants to know is not whether some machine processes might be functional equivalents of some organic psychological processes. Nor is it whether it could ever be rational or linguistically correct to say that a machine feels pain, or thinks, or has gotten confused, or whatever. Rather it is whether, in very fact, the machine hurts, or cogitates, or finds itself bewildered."³

Fodor confesses that this question, if it is left over "when the linguistic proprieties have been attended to", is too hard for him; understandably, because, on the one hand, it seems a genuine question demanding a 'yes' or 'no' answer and, on the other, what seems the only relevant evidence has been discounted. Putnam

---

1 'Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?', O'Connor, p. 263.

2 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', O'Connor p. 281.

3 Ibid., pp. 151-152.

may well be right, then, in thinking that a decision is called for. If the language of mind is non-descriptive, the principle of finding descriptive evidence for a descriptive conclusion is not appropriate. We are therefore faced with a choice, whether or not to admit these machines to community with us; and this is a choice which we must make on less than rational grounds. If, however, I am right in claiming that mental language does have ontological force, it will either be applicable or not applicable to the reality underlying these descriptive entities. Putnam would be mistaken, therefore, in suggesting that this decision ratifies itself, that there is no ultimate sense in which it can be correct or incorrect.

XV

Though I believe that Fodor's difficult question must have an answer with respect to any descriptive entity, I cannot provide a method for determining it. I do hope, however, to provide a wider context of understanding in which the impossibility of reaching a firm conclusion will seem less mysterious. What materials do we have that might contribute to that context? We would do well to start with that aspect of mental language that Putnam came close to capturing in the analogy of the machine printout 'I am in state A'. That did indeed seem to mirror the immediacy of 'I am in pain', and it is of considerable interest for what it has to tell us about the relation between language and the
mental. Putnam's success was hollow, however, for we remain unconvinced that the relation between 'I am in state A' and state A does anything but mimic the genuine emanation of 'I am in pain' from a state of pain. What may be lacking here, in the first place, is what I have called the "colourfulness" of experience. 'State A' seems to be no more than our name for the machine's functional state, however often the machine may print it out on appropriate occasions. 'Pain', on the other hand, is our own word which becomes integrated with, and the natural expression for, those of our experiences which provide us with one range of "colourfulness".

The merely attributed character of particular states is not the only reason, though, why 'I am in state A' may fail to match 'I am in pain'. The particular mental event in its vivid lived-through character is represented by 'in pain', but the word 'I' represents an equally distinctive aspect of the mental. We can doubt not only whether there is any "colourfulness" in the machine but also, following upon this, whether the machine is present in such a way that it should be treated like a person. It is, of course, present as a descriptive object that we may perceive; but we are now concerned with its existence in such a mode as is represented in mental language. Just as the "colourfulness" of particular experiences does not consist in any descriptive properties, so it can be argued that 'I' does not primarily indicate a descriptive entity. The uses of 'I' which are to be counted as genuine occur in the utterances of those beings whom we are prepared to admit into community with us, through our choosing in
their case a positive answer to Fodor's question (generalized to cover other human beings as well as machines).

Why should Putnam's machine print out 'I am in state A' rather than 'This machine is in state A'? Clearly it does provide a closer analogy with the human utterance 'I am in pain', and that was Putnam's purpose; but does not his programming the machine in this way beg the question? The use of 'I' strongly suggests that the machine has a conscious mental life, but it scarcely seems justified by the mere fact of the machine state called 'A' printing out 'A'. It carries, too, the suggestion that the machine must possess some form of unity by virtue of that mental life which might be contrasted with its unity as a descriptive object. There is perhaps just a suggestion of such a unity in the Turing machine. The way in which each state, once an input is given, is understood to refer forward to its successor state does offer some slight analogy with the continuity of human thought, if not with memory. Once again, however, the objection must be that this continuity is to all appearances read into the machine rather than inherent in it. The possibility that the logical states of some machines could be so defined that they provided a fuller resemblance to the human condition should not convince us, therefore, that these machines would be genuine mental unities.

It does seem possible, then, to read into an artefact some unity, probably artificial, on the lines of the mental unity of a man. This can be achieved, however, only by verbalizing its states so that these seem to represent some of their fellow states, just as Putnam's state A might be interpreted as "saying" that
state B is its successor. If, on the other hand, an object is merely treated descriptively, it cannot be seen to possess any such unity. To see this clearly we would do well to return to the Identity Theory to consider its failure to come to terms with the self.

I remarked earlier that Smart had to do some juggling with mental language in order to reduce it to a manageable shape. 'My after-image is yellowy-orange' is a sentence, for instance, that he would refuse to translate directly into the material language. He would have to change it first into 'My experience is of a yellowy-orange after-image', where 'a yellowy-orange after-image' can be taken to be fused into 'My experience' to form a single referring expression. This expression can then be treated as a unit when translation is attempted. Smart did not take the process of fusion beyond this stage, but its interest in this context comes from its further extension by those who have modified his theory.

The piecemeal conversion of sensations into brain states may well seem of doubtful value on various grounds, including the consequent fragmentation of mental life. It may be tempting, therefore, to carry the process of fusion further. For this purpose it must be applied to an avowal such as 'I am having an experience of a yellowy-orange after-image'. The result is that the whole sentence is fused in 'I' as the single referring expression. The identity theorist will then contend that this

---

1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 61.
entity, I, is to be identified with my body. He will suppose that evidence to this effect can be supplied by correlating the mental modifications of I with alterations in my body. Thus Thomas Nagel proposes the identification of "a person's having (a) sensation with his body's being in a physical state or undergoing a physical process".¹

Can the body provide a unity such as is suggested by 'I'? The first point to note is the apparent conventionality of the specification of the whole body in relation to particular occurrences. Any supposed material identification for one mental event will be located in some area of the body, which may be more or less extended. Take, for instance, the sensation produced by direct experimental interference with the brain. The objective correlate of this experience would be fairly precisely located. It is true that it would be an event in the body just as it would be an event in the brain; but why should it be specified in relation to the one rather than to the other? The best that one might hope for, seemingly, would be that the body should be, as it were, approximately the smallest container in which all the relevant events take place; but this would clearly not be sufficient to provide a necessary connection between the body and each separate experience. The descriptive scheme is therefore indifferent to whether we allocate every event to the whole body

¹ 'Physicalism', Borst p. 216. Dennett puts forward a similar view ('Content and Consciousness', pp. 16-19) in the context of a disappearance theory of mind. He has been suspected by Smart of denying referentiality even to the subject terms ('Critical Notice', p. 618), but it seems more likely that he regards these as not specifically mental.
or each to its particular physical location. It does not, therefore, capture our sense of the unity of a person.

This possibility of redescription with respect to different subject terms seems a fundamental component of the descriptive scheme. It reappears in the failure of description to bestow anything more than a conventional unity over time on the entities that it distinguishes. I have already gone into this problem at length in section xii of my first chapter. If my conclusions there are accepted, they show clearly how the unity of the self over time - if it is not entirely illusory or conventional - cannot be accounted for in descriptive terms. If the reality underlying this constantly changing object, my body, is to have some principle of unity, this must be primarily revealed to us through the continuity of mind rather than through any perceptual categorization. This unity may also be reflected in the organization of the living body; but it is not that which gives us such assurance as we have.

The process of fusion does not, therefore, reach a satisfactory conclusion when interpreted in a materialist fashion. There is some truth in it, for the terms which would be fused such as 'after-image' and 'experience' are, as it suggests, non-referential. The same, however, is true of the subject terms into which all else was to be fused. The word 'I', and such words as 'you' and 'he' when used as its counterparts, do not descriptively indicate any entity. The feeling that fusion is appropriate can therefore be seen as reflecting the general cohesion of a form of language that is entirely non-descriptive. It is my intention in the next chapter to provide some clarification of that language.
In my first chapter I argued that descriptive language is essentially connected with perception, and hence that the language of mind must be non-descriptive, because there is no internal analogue to perception such as the notion of introspection presupposes. Wishing to preserve the ontological force of mental language, I have, in my second chapter, prepared the way for the presentation of a genuine alternative to description. In criticizing the Identity Theory, I have tried to show that our lived-through experiences do have a representable character though this does not consist in descriptive properties. They therefore escape the unified objective scheme of science not by being irregular or unassociated descriptive entities but by falling outside the scope of material language as a form of language. This would imply that nothing that can be described need be left out by an account of man in purely objective terms, and I suggested that Central State Materialism provides the required sort of linguistic formula. In so doing it must completely fail to capture the notion of mind, while Putnam's version of Functionalism does come close to achieving this, providing it is not thought of as a descriptive theory and providing the possible limitations of computer simulation are recognized. Its recognition of the linguistic content of mental states is valuable, but the language it introduces has to be genuinely used by the being to represent his own condition. What that language, alternative to description, may be, I must now consider.
As the title of this chapter suggests, I intend to base my account of the language of mind on the notion of quotation. The first thing that I should make clear, therefore, is that I do not mean to suggest that the language of mind is to be identified with quotation as we ordinarily understand it. Quotation is the comparatively limited procedure by which we report what others have spoken or written, and as such it has several fairly obvious differences from the language in which we speak of our own and others' mental life. What I do want to suggest, however, is that quotation forms the most superficial part of a much wider form of language that includes nearly all of what would naturally be taken to fall within the language of mind. Dealing, as it does, with matters which lie on the surface in contrast with those that mental language deals with, quotation is much more easily comprehended. This has not prevented its being misinterpreted, for even quotation has fallen within the influence of the general movement to conceive of all language as descriptive. Properly understood, however, it provides a model of a non-descriptive language which can be extended to take in the language of mind. Certainly that language does have complexities which do not arise with quotation, just as quotation has features that are peculiar to itself; but these need not prevent us from recognizing a common organization that is inherent in all, from the most evident to the most obscure. In view of the elucidatory role that quotation can therefore play, it seems fair to speak of this wider form of language as "quotation", using scare quotes to indicate that a much greater linguistic complex is being spoken of. By the time a proper study of "quotation"
in all its roles had been carried out, quotation itself might appear in a different light, as just a small part of the system to which it gave the clue. We must start, however, with what we are familiar with and our current understanding of it.

II

Quotation generally takes either of two distinct forms, and is accordingly called 'direct' or 'indirect'. These two forms are distinguished by the linguistic constructions employed, oratio recta in the case of direct quotation and oratio obliqua in the case of indirect quotation. In the former case, an exact replication of what someone has said or written is placed within quotation marks, as thus:

A: The cat is dreaming of fish.

B: A said 'The cat is dreaming of fish'.

The oratio obliqua form does not, however, employ quotation marks, but prefaces the replication, which in this case is typically not exact, with the word 'that', as thus:

B: A said that the cat was dreaming of fish

or, to show an example of the free variation that is possible:

B: A said that Possum was dreaming of fish

where 'Possum' is the name of the cat that B takes A to have been referring to.

It is oratio obliqua that provides the first foothold for the
notion that quotation might be assimilated with the language of
mind in a wider "quotation", for it is an obvious fact that this
construction is commonly used in speaking of mental states. Thus,
in the place of 'A said that x', we may have 'A thought that x',
'A hoped that x' and so on through a long list of psychological
verbs. It is my contention, though, that the connection between
quotation and mental language extends well beyond this use of the
oratio obliqua construction to speak of the so-called "propositional
attitudes". Direct quotation may be quite as relevant as indirect
quotation is, and indeed may have some priority in relation to the
language of mind as it seems to have in quotation itself.

Let us begin, therefore, with direct quotation as the simpler
of the two forms. I have said that this involves the replication
of the words that someone has spoken or written. Thus, in my
example, B does to all appearance repeat A's words; that is, produce
further tokens of the type words of which A uttered tokens. It
has not always been accepted, however, that this is what is taking
place. Even in my formulation, it is not obvious that the word
'replicate' must be used with this sense; for 'replica' does rather
suggest a derivative copy with a status different from that of the
original. Let us look, therefore, at the features of the situation
which have led some to place a different interpretation on it.

B seems to repeat A's words; but, if he does, it appears as
if these must suffer a change of function in many, if not all,
cases of the repetition. We may take it that, in his original
utterance, A spoke of a cat and spoke of it as dreaming of fish.
The function of B's utterance is not nearly so obvious, however.
It may be a straight report of what A said, but with a different inflection B might make it clear that he scorned A's assertion. 'How could anyone know what the cat is dreaming about?' he might seem to be saying or, going further, 'A is raving; there's no cat about'. In this latter case, B is clearly not referring to any cat and in neither case does he refer to a cat as one that is dreaming of fish. If, then, he is not speaking of some cat or its dreams, what is he referring to when he utters the words which, in my example, are enclosed in quotation marks? One possible answer to this question is 'nothing'; but it is understandable how one might be drawn into saying that B is here speaking descriptively of A or of A's utterance. A is, after all, what the subject term of B's statement indicates, and A or his utterance is what B is scornful of. Why should we not interpret B's utterance, including the part within quotation marks, as a description of A?

This could, of course, be a most embarrassing suggestion; for what would become of my planned exposition of a non-descriptive language of mind if my chosen model could itself be shown to be reducible to description? We must therefore give this proposal careful attention to determine whether there is any truth in it or whether it is, as my earlier discussion would suggest it might be, just a symptom of an unreasonable desire to assimilate all statements to description.
Quine is one writer who has strongly urged that quotation should be treated as reducible to description, and he represents well the tendency to deny the quoted words their normal meaning and to involve them entirely in a characterization of the original speaker. For Quine, indeed, any quotation is not made up of what are apparently its component words but has, in its entirety, the status of a single word. This contrasts with the more widely held view, typified by Frege's account, in which particular words within a quotation designate their counterparts in the quoted utterance. In Quine's view, however, quotation marks enclosing any expression produce a singular term "naming, as it happens, the expression inside". Thus B's remark, in my example, would have the form 'A said x', where x is a name for the words 'The cat is dreaming of fish'.

This procedure should recall the close of my last chapter. The elimination of words within quotes, one would say, is surely analogous to the process of fusion by which Identity Theorists and others seek to disarm unwanted mental terms. Probably, however, the former inspired the latter, a debt to Quine being explicitly acknowledged in at least one case. Quine's target is quotation

1 'On Sense and Reference', p. 58.
2 'Word and Object', p. 143. In taking Quine as a representative of those who would assimilate quotation to description, I do recognize that he wishes eventually to expurgate description itself from his system; but that is at a further stage with which I am not concerned.
3 Dennett, 'Content and Consciousness', p. 7.
and theirs is mental language, but both see the weakness that is
to be eradicated as an apparent, but inauthentic, referentiality.
The policy in both cases is to amalgamate the offending terms into
meaningfully indivisible blocks, and the criterion of success is
that these blocks are sufficiently well-behaved to function
descriptively.

It is not only a general model for materialism that can be
found in Quine's treatment of quotation, for in its different
aspects it parallels the varied degrees of fusion which have been
employed in relation to mental language. In his treatment of
direct quotation there is a resemblance to Smart and all those
who accept that identification can be carried out after limited
fusion. A statement such as 'I have an experience of a yellow-
orange after-image' reduces, in their view, to 'I have X', just as
the quotation reduces, in Quine's view, to 'A said x'. Quine is
quite prepared to accept direct quotation into his ideal descriptive
language once the expression within quotes has been reduced to a
single word, just as Smart is prepared to accept particular
experiences into the material scheme once they are recognized as
single entities. It is a different matter, however, with indirect
quotation. In this case Quine is to be compared with the theorist
who, unsatisfied with the immediate results of fusion, is driven on
to limit referentiality to the subject term only. Thus Quine thinks
that a three-term analysis of 'A said that . . .' is undesirable,
but he is prepared to consider the form 'A y', where 'y' is a general
term representing what A did;1 while Nagel considers that Smart's

'I have X' should be further reduced to 'I Y', where 'Y' is again a general term. Quine despairs, however, of incorporating indirect quotation into his descriptive scheme even through this austere reformulation. He thus allows us to extend the analogy still further, for this surely parallels the tendency, exemplified by Dennett, to reject mental language out of hand when once it has been fused into its subject terms.

This parallel between Quine's treatment of quotation and various reductions of mental language is of obvious interest, suggesting as it does that there must be some strong degree of resemblance between quotation and mental language. This will not help me, however, if there proves to be justification for Quine's coalescing everything that appears between quotation marks into singular descriptive terms. What, then, are his reasons for this move? It can most easily be understood as a result of his logician's desire to constrain a particular linguistic form within a single set of rules. There is, in this case, a feature of indicative sentences containing singular terms which has a key role in his intended systematization of such sentences; and the authenticity of any apparent exceptions has therefore, justifiably it is hoped, to be impugned.

The feature that Quine wishes to regard as essential to such a sentence is the preservation of its truth or falsity when a singular term is replaced in it by another that designates the same object.2

That this is a genuine feature of descriptive sentences cannot be denied. Let us suppose, for instance, that the name of the cat to which A referred really was 'Possum'. Then the truth or falsity of 'Possum is dreaming of fish' would vary in accord with the truth or falsity of A's original assertion, 'The cat is dreaming of fish'. 'Possum' is thus substitutable for 'The cat' with preservation of truth value; but this substitutability does not carry over into quotation. Were B to remark "A said 'Possum is dreaming of fish'", this would not be acceptable because A did not in fact use the word 'Possum'.

The generally permissible substitution therefore fails; but Quine regards its success as the criterion for the genuine presence of a singular term. He has, therefore, to contend that, all appearances to the contrary, the singular term, 'The cat', does not really occur in "A said 'The cat is dreaming of fish'". From this point there is then only a short step to the denial that any of the words appearing between the quotation marks are present in anything but their graphical shape. Thus 'cat' is, in his view, no more a distinct word in this context than 'can' is as it appears in 'canary'; the whole quotation is an opaque whole, which is to count as a single term.

There is something strange, however, about this demand that substitution must be possible if something is to count as a singular term that indicates an object. Let us agree that substitution is essential to the notion of linguistic indication, in contrast to the

notion of linguistic characterization. One sign can pick out an object only on the principle that the same object can in theory be picked out by another sign. Once, however, we possess such signs as have an established capacity to pick out objects, why should we not employ them in contexts that demand one of these terms rather than another?

Strangely enough, Quine employs a terminology that seems to confirm this very picture. Wishing to express conditions for the genuine occurrence of singular terms, he speaks of "a purely referential position" where "substitutivity of identity" holds.¹ This pure referentiality coincides happily with the basic use of singular terms through which they gain their indicating role; and the insistence on the purity of their role in this context would apparently allow, by contrast, a use of these terms elsewhere that was not purely referential, and yet still referential. Not purely referential positions would be those where the terms were used under more selective conditions, and hence where they were used for additional purposes without surrendering their original indicating function.² The expression "not purely referential" makes, however, only a brief and ineffectual appearance in 'Word and Object'. Quine explains that he will omit the adverb in future for the sake of brevity.³ Unfortunately, "non-referential", which then takes the place of "not purely referential", is apparently

² This point is made by David Holdcroft ('Asserting and Referring', p. 112).
used to mean precisely what it says; terms do not keep their reference in non-referential position.¹

Certainly there are cases where indicating words are quoted in such a way that they lose their original function. This occurs when the quotational form is used merely to report which words a speaker or writer used, without any concern for what he meant by them or whether he meant anything by them at all. If he did in fact intentionally and successfully refer to some object, the words will have lost this function in the quotation, in no longer being used to indicate that object. This is, however, a degenerate form of quotation, for there is no reason to suppose that the mere repetition of words as words is any more typical of quotation than the mere production of words as words is typical of original utterances. One might suggest, indeed, that the only words that can correctly be quoted as inert examples are those that have

¹ Op. cit., p. 143. It is perhaps worth quoting Quine's explanation of 'not purely referential' in full: "Example (2) ('The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board' - but not for the dean, though he is the same man), even if taken in the not purely referential way, differs from (1) ('Tully was a Roman' is trochaic') in that it still seems to have far more bearing on the chairman of the hospital board, dean though he be, than (1) has on Tully. Hence my cautious phrase 'not purely referential', designed to apply to all such cases and to affirm no distinction among them. If I omit the adverb, the motive will be brevity." (Op. cit., p. 142). What the first of Quine's sentences seems to say is that the chairman of the hospital board is referred to but that Tully is not. It does at least assert that there is some difference between the two cases, but this is apparently denied in the next sentence (through Quine's use of 'to affirm no' rather than the better justified 'not to affirm any'). If there is no difference, all cases must presumably tend either to the case of the chairman or to the case of Tully. Quine's third sentence effectively decides this question in favour of Tully. The resultant gains to Quine's system, if not to understanding, are such as to make one doubt the professed motive.
originally been produced as such examples. If the words were originally functional, this must be conveyed by a genuine quotation of them. Consider, for example, B's quotation of A's utterance when he thought there had been no cat for A to refer to. However scornful B may have been, he did allow that the utterance at least purported to indicate a dreaming cat. Indeed his scorn would be incomprehensible if the quotation did not convey this.

This sort of case seems to suggest that quoted terms retain their original sense even when the new speaker does not intend to refer to anything by means of them; but, interesting as this is, altogether too much weight has generally been placed on the fact that someone who quotes a statement need not believe in it. He need not, but he may; and, if he does, there does not seem to be any good reason why he should not use the quotation to make the same statement. Suppose, for instance, that B is speaking to someone who is rather deaf. "A said 'The cat is dreaming of fish!"", he says, loudly and with emphasis. Does not the quotation in this case serve the same purpose as A's original utterance, though possibly more effectively?

The way in which quotation may retain the original force of the words is made particularly clear, perhaps, by the case of commands. Consider, for instance, a father saying to a child, "Your mother said 'Go to bed!'". If we imagine the tone of voice, we shall surely not doubt that this too is a command; and who would deny the propriety of one of the parents adding, rather later, 'You've been told twice!'? If commands can survive in quotation as commands, this should encourage us to think that assertions
about cats can survive in quotation as assertions about cats. It seems evident that B's quotation, if it serves the purpose of A's assertion, must itself involve a reference to the cat. It is surely implausible to suggest that our hard-of-hearing individual must cope not only with deafness but also with working out that, if A spoke the words mentioned by B, A must have been referring to the cat. He understands the words in the same sense whether spoken by A or by B. Words in quotation are therefore capable of indicating directly the same objects as were indicated by the words that are quoted.

Words that appear in quotations can with advantage, therefore, be regarded as the same words as those that are quoted, rather than as an entirely new set of words which function only as names of the original words. This point constitutes a criticism of the negative side of Frege's position and, by implication, of Quine's single term theory; that is, of their denials that words within a quotation have their usual, or any, referential power. It does not of itself, however, constitute a strong criticism of the positive side to their views, that these words singly, or yoked together to form a single unit, designate the original words. All that it affords is a puzzle as to how words can point referentially in two directions at once, to both the quoted words and their indicated objects. Apart from this one slight doubt, the criticism offers nothing that might affect the central question whether quotation

---

1 Even this doubt would not apply to Quine's account, if we suppose that suitably modified to meet the criticism above; for then the unified whole would point to the quoted words and individual words to their indicated objects.
should itself be regarded as descriptive. Any indicating function which words possess in both the original utterance and in quotation is clearly independent of the distinctive function of quotation. That, seemingly, is to report the words that someone has uttered. Why then should a quotation, consisting of the same words though it does, not be used to name the original utterance?

Accounts of direct quotation can be found that correspond well to what one would imagine Frege's and Quine's theories would look like if modified to meet the criticism that the same words appear in quotations as in what is quoted. Corresponding to Frege's, for instance, is the account that Geach gives in 'Mental Acts'. He argues that the mention and use of expressions are not mutually exclusive, and therefore that the same (type) expression can be used in the quotation as it mentions in the original utterance. He suggests that a quotation should consequently be read word by word "as describing the quoted expression in terms of the expressions it contains and their order". There is much, though, that is puzzling, even in this brief expression of his theory. Certainly one does want to agree that the word tokens that are used in the quotation are of the same types as the word tokens that are "mentioned" - and perhaps this can be guaranteed by their being used also in their normal sense, though Geach does not mention that; but what is to count as a token of the same word type? Are we to accept that one word type can both descriptively

---

1 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
2 Op. cit., pp. 82-83. 'Describing' is a word that I might well wish to emphasize in disagreement, but the italics are Geach's own.
indicate a cat and "describe" another word token of the same type? The real difficulty here arises from Geach's use of the word "describing". Clearly he does not mean by it the same as I mean by 'describing'. What then can he intend? The best indicator of this is probably his inclusion of the words' order as part of what is described. Since this order cannot be included in the meanings of the separate words out of which he insists the quotation is built, it seems that Geach must have in mind a form of picturing: the arrangement of the words in the quotation pictorially representing the arrangement of the words in the original. 1 Now, whatever one may think of this as an account of the way that quotation functions, it is clear that it does not make of quotation a form of description such as we have been concerned with. Geach's account does not, therefore, constitute a threat to my contention that quotation is - in my sense of 'description' - essentially non-descriptive.

If Geach's account can be seen as a modification of Frege's, one presented by Goddard and Routley offers a parallel modification of Quine's. They are, like Geach, strongly critical of the notion that words within a quotation are not being used. Unlike him, however, they make the point, which I have stressed, that in this use the words are understood in their ordinary sense. 2 Goddard and

---

1 This interpretation fails to make a coherent whole of Geach's account, particularly when he wishes to apply quotation to thoughts; but I cannot see what other interpretation is possible.

2 'Use, Mention and Quotation', pp. 14-23.

Routley completely reject, therefore, Quine's notion that a quotation forms an indissoluble whole in which particular words cannot be read. They do, however, provide as close an approximation to his theory as could well be possible once this sizable part of it had been set aside. Despite their recognition of separate words within a quotation, they see a quotation functioning as a quotation through groups of words rather than word by word, as Geach would have it. It is true that they do not go so far as Quine in extending these groups to whatever falls between a pair of quotation marks. They consider, instead, that quotation operates on whole sentences or rather on whole statements, but this - in its first version at least - is probably something that Quine could accept.\(^1\)

What Quine could not accept would be Goddard and Routley's notion of "semantical mention". This they contrast with "syntactical mention", within which they would include the repetition of words as mere verbal examples without concern for their meaning.\(^2\)

Semantical mention, on the other hand, is concerned with the mentioned expressions in so far as those are meaningful. Goddard and Routley regard the genuine quotation of someone's meaningful utterance as a case of semantical mention; for, to understand such a quotation, "it is essential to read inside the quote marks and to take into account the meaning of the quoted expression".\(^3\) Since the meaning

---

1 A singular term could as well be lost within a sentence as between a pair of quotation marks.


of an utterance belongs to it as a whole, rather than being scattered among the separate words that make up the utterance, their belief that quotation operates on whole statements then follows immediately.

The difficulty with Goddard and Routley, as with Geach, is to know just what they mean by the crucial expression they use to cover the relation between the quotation and what is quoted. They argue that semantical mention is to be distinguished from syntactical mention as not approximating in function to a naming; and they therefore insist that a quotation is not a name for what is mentioned. On the other hand, however, they make use of the same invented system of species-names to express both syntactical and semantical mention. In this system the class of tokens of the English word 'red', for example, is referred to by the species-name 'd.e.r.'. They then translate "It is red" implies "it is coloured" by 'D.e.r-s.i-t. is imply d.e.r.u.o.l.o.c-s.i-t. is'; but the only possible interpretation of this, in direct contradiction to the view of theirs I mentioned above, is surely that quotations are names after all. One would generally gather from the article, however, that this is not Goddard and Routley's real intention, but that they mean to confirm their earlier assertion.

We should take them, therefore, to be suggesting that quotations "mention" statements, and that there is nothing of description or

---

naming in this mentioning. How could we determine whether it is true that quotations as wholes do not name anything, whether statements or expressions? The answer is provided by Quine, with his insistence that genuine names must be intersubstitutable if they stand for the same object. Let us, therefore, see how well Quine's contention that quotations are singular terms stands up to his own criterion. Is it possible to produce an alternative expression that will single out the same object in the same way as it is singled out by a quotation?

Some would say that nothing could be easier. We may write, for example, 'A said George', where 'George' is introduced as a name for the words 'The cat is dreaming of fish'. More elaborately, we can use a device such as Goddard and Routley's reversed spelling or Quine's own version of spelling: 'tee aitch ee space see ay tee space . . .'.1 There can be no doubt in the first case that we have been presented with a name, even if we may need Quine's assurance in the second that he has presented us with the names of letters rather than the letters themselves in an unconventional graphical form. Setting this misgiving aside, however, it is certainly not to be contested in either case that a reader could gain from these expressions all that he might gather from a normally expressed quotation; he only needs to know what 'George' stands for, or to understand Quine's convention. Can there be any grounds, then, for denying that quotation operates in the same way - or ways?

1 'Word and Object', p. 143.
A first suspicion should arise from the fact that the two illustrations, though they both provide names, do in detail function quite differently from each other; so their seemingly achieving the same purpose as quotation should not unduly impress us as a reason for saying that quotation must function in the same general way. In fact, they do not achieve the same purpose as a quotation; for, in gathering from them what he might gather from a quotation, the reader has first to convert them into a quotation. What is happening here may be most clearly apparent in terms of Quine's spelling device. This provides a way of reconstituting the words contained in the original utterance. When we understand the convention, we can combine the named letters into the words 'The cat...'. These words can then be read; but it is only this second process that makes us conversant with what A said. The first move, when we reconstitute the words by use of the names of their letters, does not carry us that far; for we might carry it out knowing Quine's convention but not one word of English. We must not be misled, therefore, by any psychological merging of the two operations, for logically they are quite independent.

It should be obvious that the same considerations apply to the name 'George'. In its naming of the sentence 'The cat is dreaming of fish', it does not carry out the purpose of quotation. It merely enables us, if we know its meaning, to produce the words that do constitute a quotation. 'George' is thus a name both for

---

1 If we do not believe Quine's assurance that he has provided us with the names of letters, we can leave out this stage and - with practice - read the words directly.
the originally uttered sentence and for the sentence that appears within quotes; for each is a token of the same sentence type, consisting of words of the same word types. These words have to be read as themselves; it is impossible, therefore, to replace them with names of themselves. The only possible replacement is by functionally equivalent words through translation into another language; but this clearly does not produce a further set of names for the original English words.

Here the insistence of direct quotation on exact reproduction of the original words may make us hesitate over allowing its translation. Such hesitation is unnecessary, however, for this insistence, while it potentially makes the verbal repetition very clear, can also be misleading. It can be taken, as we have seen, to point to the words in their original physical manifestations. The purpose of quotation, is, however, to convey a person's meaning rather than to indicate the actual words that he used. The distinctive value of direct quotation, acquired by the restriction it imposes, is that it cannot itself distort the person's original meaning. The use of exactly the same words excludes the distortion that can arise from the use of different words which are more or less synonymous with the original ones. That some reservation should be felt at the translation of direct quotation is therefore correct, for translation inevitably introduces just this sort of distortion. There is no justification, however, for lamenting the failure of translated direct quotation to describe the original utterance, for that was never its purpose as quotation.
By Quine's own criterion, therefore, the role of a quotation has been shown not to be that of a unitary name; for possible substitutes for it are restricted to verbal expressions already having equivalent functions. We can consequently recognize the error in Quine's notion that what he calls "picture writing" - the reproduction of the original in the quotation - is a merely incidental feature of the way that quotation conventionally achieves its purpose.¹ The reproduction is not just a picturing, one way out of many of indicating the original expression, but a fully functional replication of it.

There is, however, a fruitful analogy to be drawn between quotation and representational pictures; only the relevant pictures are not originals but reproductions of originals. A picture that is a replica of another represents the same objects as does the original. Further, each object is represented by the part of the replica that corresponds to the part that represents it in the original. In just such a way, I have argued, particular words in a quotation indicate the same objects as the corresponding words in the original utterance. At the same time, however, it is the role of the replica to represent the original picture; but this must be a different form of representation from that by which it represents the objects. Those are indicated by two-dimensional projections of their surfaces; the original picture, on the other hand, is re-embodied in its replica. The analogy is therefore completed, for both the quotation and the reproduction represent

their originals by being further tokens of the same type rather than by satisfying certain conventions, whether descriptive in the case of the quotation or pictorial in the case of the reproduction.

There is a further feature of quotation, however, for which no satisfactory analogue can be found in the case of pictures. This arises from the double manifestation of language in speech and writing. In the same way as an original utterance, a quotation can be spoken or written; and there is the added complication that speech can be quoted in writing, or writing in speech. This does provide considerable additional problems for a descriptive theory of quotation; but, if quotation is taken to involve the production of a functional equivalent of the original, no problem arises — for writing is a functional equivalent for speech, and speech for writing (now that the latter is so well established).

The original dependence of writing on speech may indeed suggest the idea that writing itself may not be altogether unlike a system of quotation. Whether or not the original writers always spoke the words, or had them dictated, before writing them down seems unimportant in comparison with the general principle that these marks were intended as a substitute for what they had, or might have, spoken. Now that the practice is established we can, of course, express ourselves in writing as directly as in speech; but the

---

1 Unless it is hinted, mysteriously, that quotation is descriptive of words independently of their physical manifestation, quotations would have entirely different senses according to whether they referred to speech or to writing. Suppose, however, that I am informed, "A tells me 'The cat is dreaming of fish'". If I take it that A spoke (when, in fact, he wrote) this information, I surely do not misunderstand the actual quotation, even if I do in some small degree misunderstand the word 'tells'.

functional equivalence and the substitutivity remain. The relation of writing to speech is certainly not that of description. It might also be said that this relation is not that of quotation either; but this should not be expressed with the same degree of conviction. Certainly writing has lost, if it ever had, the element of repetition, and more specifically the element of repetition of others' words, which may seem essential to quotation. On the other hand, it does bear this relation of functional equivalence to speech in conveying meaning; and this may well make it seem proper that writing, in its relation to speech, should be brought with quotation under some wider, unifying concept. We may have here an outlier of that wider notion of "quotation" that I propose should be built up to cover the language of mind.

These speculations take us too far, however, from our present purpose. I have argued in this section that direct quotation cannot be regarded as a naming, whatever the object of that naming might be. I have also begun to indicate what I take to be the actual mode of operation for quotation; but unfinished business includes Goddard and Routley's not altogether clear notion that a direct quotation mentions an original meaningful statement, without this mentioning resting on any naming. Their stress on meaning brings us very close, however, to what has generally been regarded as the province of indirect quotation. I shall now, therefore, turn to that, before attempting to draw all the threads together in a discussion of quotation in general.
Indirect quotation does not use quotation marks, but introduces (though not invariably) the word 'that' between the verb and the words reflecting the original utterance. As I have already remarked, these words may take another form than the original utterance, either in accordance with certain regular transformations or in a fairly free translation of the original. What these changes seem to contribute to is a take-over by the new speaker, who makes the words in some degree his own. The free translation is clearly arranged to suit his purpose, but the regular alterations are also designed to make the expression appropriate to his context rather than the original speaker's. Thus, in a report of a past utterance that was then in the present tense, the verb is conventionally changed into the past tense which is appropriate to express the new temporal relation with what the utterance was about, as in 'A said that the cat was dreaming of fish'; or, the implication of futurity is removed from an utterance originally in the future tense, as in 'A said that the cat would be dreaming of fish tonight'. Similar considerations apply to the standard changes in pronouns. Indeed, the change from 'I' in the original to 'he' in the quotation displays with particular clarity the words' adoption by the new speaker and their alienation from their original utterer.

These changes, and the freer type of variation as in 'A says that Possum is dreaming of fish', have always rendered implausible the suggestion that indirect quotation names the actual words that
were originally uttered. Those, therefore, who have adopted the view that direct quotation does perform such a naming find themselves under a requirement to provide an account of indirect quotation quite different from the one they had provided for direct quotation. They may be so attached, however, to the ideas of naming and of reference that they will feel that the relation of the words in an indirect quotation to whatever they represent in the original cannot be essentially different in kind. They are therefore obliged, if they are to make any sense of indirect quotation at all, to find an alternative object for these words to name.

The area in which such an object might be sought is defined by what the indirect quotation is thought to convey of the original. It does not preserve the original words, but it should preserve the meaning of the original. The changes I mentioned above are designed to achieve the same meaning in the new context, and the main standard for a satisfactory indirect quotation is that it should have succeeded in this preservation of meaning. We therefore find Frege, for instance, proposing that in indirect speech "words do not have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense". This designation, which he calls the words' "indirect reference", clearly brings the function of indirect quotation into line with that of direct quotation as he conceives it to be, but only at the cost of introducing a new kind of object: the sense of an expression.

This is not the only way, however, of reacting to this problem.

1 'On Sense and Reference', p. 59.
within a general approach that relies on names and reference. The sense of an expression or its alternative, a proposition, seems a highly artificial object called into being to satisfy the needs of the descriptive scheme, rather than an independently existing one that must be fitted into any account. We may well sympathize with Quine, therefore, in his rejecting any such objects. Since he has the same general attitude, however, this means his functionally discarding the words that were the potential names of those objects. As I have already mentioned, he feels compelled to fuse any indirect quotation into the word indicating the original speaker as the only genuine referring expression, and even then he despairs of fitting it into his ultimate scheme.

These approaches share a common view of direct quotation, which makes its purpose quite distinct from that of indirect quotation. This supposed difference is conveniently expressed by Austin. Having distinguished between "phatic" and "rhetic" acts - the one the production of words as belonging to a certain vocabulary and conforming to a certain grammar, the other the use of those words with a certain sense and reference -, he suggested that direct quotations report phatic acts and that indirect quotations report rhetic acts. I have argued, however, that direct quotation does succeed in reporting what he calls a "rhetic act", if that is what has provided its occasion. The distinction that Austin wished to draw has to be limited therefore to direct quotation's suitability and

1 'Word and Object', pp. 206-9.
3 'How To Do Things with Words', p. 95.
indirect quotation's unsuitability to report a phatic act.

Indirect quotation is therefore to be distinguished from direct quotation rather for its obvious dependence on the meaning of the original utterance than for its bearing some relation to that meaning that direct quotation does not achieve. With direct quotation, it is true, what is reported might, for all that appears on the surface, be a merely phatic act; but an original assertion equally fails to bear on its surface any indication that it is other than phatic. Indirect quotation is unusual, therefore, in that it brings to our attention the meaningfulness of the words that it reports. As I have said, the new speaker adopts the words as his own. This does not involve him in a commitment to their truth or even to the existence of what they purport to indicate, but it does engage him in a commitment to their sense. Even if he disagrees with the original speaker, he must have grasped what his meaning was and must convey this, however different the words he uses may be, if it is to be a successful quotation.

The need for the new speaker to understand the original is a demand placed on him by his freedom to use other words, rather than by his trying to achieve an end that could not be achieved by direct quotation. It is true that he may succeed, through indirect quotation, in explaining to an audience the meaning of an utterance which was incomprehensible to them in the original speaker's words. It is clear that, in this situation, direct quotation would not help them. This does not show, however, that direct quotation is not a way of conveying meaning. The audience, it must be stressed, does not understand the direct quotation; therefore, the quotation's failure
does not display any limitation in its natural function, but rather stresses a function that it possesses but which this audience is unable to make use of.

If, then, indirect quotation has essentially the same function as the direct quotation of a rhetoric act, these cannot be distinguished by the one referring to a meaning whereas the other does not. The complete implausibility of the suggestion that a direct quotation might refer to a meaning indicates that it is indirect quotation's claims to such a reference that must give way. The absence of a meaning to be referred to cannot explain, therefore, indirect quotation's unsuitability for the reporting of phatic acts. Certainly phatic acts do lack meaning, and this lack is, moreover, crucial to the inapplicability of indirect quotation. This lack is displayed, however, not in the absence of an object to be referred to but in the impossibility of providing any substitutes for the original expression according to the customary standards of indirect quotation. Nothing will count as a satisfactory translation of that expression. The new speaker cannot adopt the words and adapt them to a new context, because the original speaker never made them his own by using them with some particular meaning. Unlike direct quotation, indirect quotation does not offer a possible setting for the indifferent display of words that have not been put to work.
Several writers have been exercised by the problem of whether the word 'that', as it appears in indirect quotation, should be seen as going with the verb or with the words that follow it. The idea that 'that' forms a unit with the words which follow was associated by Arthur Prior with the idea that this unit then names the original proposition. ¹ His dislike for the latter idea then led him to avoid it by rejecting the former. He suggested instead that 'that' goes with the preceding verb to form an expression "which is like a predicate at one end (because at that end it hitches on to a name) and like a sentential connective at the other end (because at that end it hitches on to a sentence)." ²

Donald Davidson is equally keen on linking 'that' with the preceding verb, but sets about it without introducing so curious a hybrid expression. Davidson regards 'that' as a simple demonstrative. He pays for this simplicity, however, by dividing the statement into two separate utterances so that 'that', as a demonstrative, can point on to the second. ³ Thus 'A said that the cat was dreaming of fish' would become on his interpretation, first, 'A said that: ' which is supposed to suggest the question 'What?' to be answered by, second, 'the cat was dreaming of fish'. The purpose of the latter utterance, he says, is to convey the content of what was originally said. ⁴

1 'Oratio Obliqua', p. 116.
3 'On Saying That', pp. 142-3.
In favour of this suggestion by Davidson, curious as it may seem at first sight, is the accredited theory of how the oratio obliqua form actually developed. According to this, 'that', as it appears now in indirect quotation, did at least start life as a demonstrative pointing to some clause that had been, or was to be, introduced.\(^1\) Interesting as origins may be, however, they do not determine present organization or function. What one would expect from this history would be an expanded form of direct quotation with 'that' inserted between the verb and the expression within quotes. The latter would, too, exactly reproduce the original; but what in fact we have are the variations on the original that are both permitted and demanded by the oratio obliqua form. These variations can also provide some embarrassment for Prior's theory for, as Bede Rundle has pointed out, the results do not always look like self-sufficient sentences.\(^2\)

We can discover exactly what is wrong with Davidson's theory, however, if we consider the possibility of transposing the parts of certain oratio obliqua expressions. 'He admitted that he was guilty' can, for example, be rearranged in the form 'That he was guilty, he admitted'. In itself this inversion seems to attach the 'that' firmly to the following expression rather than to the verb; but I think we should allow Davidson to argue at this point that this rearrangement, which is after all neither common nor all that comfortable, may have arisen only through a lack of understanding

---


2 'Transitivity and Indirect Speech', p. 189.
of the actual demonstrative role of 'that'. He should therefore be allowed to make a different rearrangement to create a form which seems to suit his theory better: 'He was guilty: that he admitted'. Unfortunately for Davidson, this does not seem to have quite the same meaning as the previous form. This difference is confirmed if we ask what the man had admitted, what in fact the 'that' is now pointing to; for the answer is not, as Davidson would have it, 'He was guilty' but 'That he was guilty'. It seems evident, therefore, that the conventionally placed oratio obliqua 'that' cannot be a demonstrative because, if it were, the expression it introduces would start with a suppressed 'that' of another kind: the very kind that we had always taken the expressed 'that' to be.

Davidson cannot escape this criticism by restricting his theory to 'saying that' as against the oratio obliqua construction in general. Admittedly, 'That he was guilty, he said' is not allowable; but the criticism does not depend on that. Much more importantly, 'He was guilty: that he said' is allowable; and the answer to the question 'What did he say?' is again 'That he was guilty'. Another possible answer could be 'I am guilty', but that moves firmly into the area of oratio recta and is thus irrelevant. My criticism does apply directly, therefore, to 'say' as well as to 'admit' and other verbs.

It does seem, therefore, that the oratio obliqua 'that' does attach itself naturally to what follows. This does not mean however, as Prior feared, that together they then form a name. 'That' does introduce a transformation of the original utterance according to the rules and freedoms of oratio obliqua. It therefore
seems to indicate to us that this expression, in which we
instinctively include the 'that', conveys the meaning of the
original. As I have already argued, though, this does not show
that it names the meaning, or any vehicle for the meaning such as
a proposition. The meaning might equally well have been conveyed
in oratio recta. The apparently greater concentration on meaning
in the oratio obliqua case is indeed an effect of our not having
the exact words, but it is not a case of our having the meaning
instead of those words. The answer to the question of what the
'that' attaches itself to is therefore far less important than
Prior thought.

About one thing, however, Prior is right. The verb in the
oratio obliqua construction is not transitive in the conventional
sense; nor, I might add, is the verb in the oratio recta con-
struction. Neither introduces a noun or a noun-substitute. They
may both be ranged alongside a case such as Searle's 'The sound
made by a Californian Jay is ...' where "what completes the
sentence is a sound, not a proper name of a sound". If that
example's verb is to be regarded as transitive in a sense wider
than the conventional grammatical definition, then so are they;
but this is an unimportant decision. They do not introduce mere

1 'Speech Acts', p. 76.

2 Rundle has suggested that verbs introducing oratio obliqua
can be placed on a continuum from transitive to intransitive. ('Transitivity and Indirect Speech', p. 206.). He instances
'confirm' as a transitive verb because we can say, for
example, 'She confirmed his statement that he was guilty'
(Op. cit., p. 202). 'That he was guilty' is not, however, a
name for his statement but appears as an exemplification of it.
'Confirm' is not conventionally transitive, therefore, in 'She
confirmed that he was guilty'.


sounds, of course, but meaningful words. These are inserted as repetitions, however, in just the same way as the imitation of the bird song. As direct quotation includes a meaningful repetition of an original sentence, so indirect quotation includes, if not a sentence as Prior suggests, a substitute for a sentence. This substitute carries out the same function as the sentence might have done, but, as I have said, it is adapted to the new context and possibly in addition to the understanding of its audience.

An attractive reformulation of 'said that' is provided by Geach's 'said something tantamount to'. We should be suspicious, however, of the material implications of 'something', and of the same word's seeming to make 'said' into a conventionally transitive verb after all. The latter reason may have weighed with Anthony Kenny in his substituting the translation 'uttered a form of words tantamount to', in which 'a form of words' may be taken to be internal to the translation of 'said'. Kenny's rewording reinforces, however, the suggestion, implicit in 'something' in the original, that material word tokens must be intended. His version seems to be hauled up on to the quotational level only by the words 'tantamount to', with their clear implication that the equivalence intended is in terms of meaning. It would be best, therefore, to

---
1 We might think it 'a sign of grace in Quine for him to say that "when we quote a man's utterance directly we report it almost as we do a bird call" ('Word and Object', p. 219); but he says it for the wrong reason, stressing the emptiness of meaning rather than the repetition.

2 'Mental Acts', p. 87.

3 'Oratio Obliqua', p. 145.
remain with Geach's original formulation. In its favour we may remember that one can also be said to 'mean something' even when the talk is of sense rather than of reference. If we adopt this explication of 'said that', however, we must take 'something' not as an objective indicator but as a place-holder. The place it holds could be filled by the meaningful direct quotation of the original utterance. Thus "A said that Possum was dreaming of fish" might be interpreted first as "A said something tantamount to 'Possum was dreaming of fish'", and then as "A said 'the cat is dreaming of fish' (which is) tantamount to 'Possum was dreaming of fish'". This latter interpretation is, however, one which imports more information. It fills in what the 'something' quite properly failed to specify because it was not actually exemplified in the original indirect quotation.

VI

Quotation, direct or indirect, reproduces original meaningful utterances either in the same or in a modified form. In neither case does it include names of the original words, of the original statements or of propositions expressed in the original statements. So much I have argued; but quotation does also refer the utterances back to their original utterers. This is something that is not made evident by meaningful reproduction, for that does not itself include an indication of the source. However much I may mistrust
Goddard and Routley's use of the word 'mention', therefore, in speaking of a quotation mentioning an original statement, I have to offer some explanation of how quotation connects the reproduction with the source of its original.

My attention has been directed heretofore mainly to what follows the verb, whether in direct or indirect quotation. It is necessary now, however, to concentrate on the subject term and the verb itself. It might seem that the subject-term in particular should raise no particular difficulty. When B said 'A said that the cat was dreaming of fish', did he not simply refer to the person indicated by 'A'? That he did refer, I must agree; but I am not so sure about the 'simply'. A features here, after all, not as an object for description but as a subject for quotation.

If there any significance in this implied distinction, or is 'subject' only a fancy term for an object? If A's words are sounds emitted from one particular physical body, then it is surely that body, or some rather more complicated object of which we see the physical aspect, that we must be referring to when we say 'A said . . .' Certainly; but recall my insistence that quoted words still indicate what they were originally used to refer to. It is possible, therefore, for words both to indicate and to function in some other mode at one and the same time. Indeed, I suggested cases where quoted words are at the same time used to refer. I need not deny, therefore, that 'A' is being used to refer to A's body - or to A as a body -, if I wish to suggest that it is also being used for some other purpose.

What I am here working my way towards is the suggestion that,
when someone is quoted, his name also is used in a manner close to quotation; and further, that this use is, in that context, his name's primary use, and that its function of indicating the person as an object is only subsidiarily involved. We would move even further away from Davidson's attempt to split quotation into two safely descriptive parts, not because the truth conditions of the first part are fatally infected by the synonymy requirements of the second\(^1\), but on the stronger grounds that the first part is itself inherently "quotational" rather than descriptive. The effect of this would be, of course, that we could justifiably understand the full expression of the quotation as a well integrated whole. We would avoid the abrupt conjunction of descriptive reference and quotational repetition, such as produced the syntactical monstrosity in Prior's account of indirect quotation.

I can understand that an immediate reaction might well be that this would be a small return for so implausible a theory. Think, therefore, of the analogy that I drew between quotation and the reproduction of pictures. Suppose that a picture of which we have a replica was signed by the artist, Paul Klee. When he wrote "Klee", he formed the characters in the same way as he painted the picture. What that way is I do not now propose to analyse, but words such as 'conscious' and 'intentional' will naturally come to mind. The important point, though, is that both the painting and the signing are activities that are the artist's own, activities

that he originates and to which he would give his own name, as
by the signing he has in fact to the painting. He bears no such
relation of responsibility, however, to the reproduction of his name
in the replica. That still serves, though, as a sign that the
original picture was created by him. It is a quotation of his
attestation, parallel to the replica's near-quotational status
in relation to the original.

What is the point, though, of this analogy? It will be
objected that people do not sign their utterances and that, even if
they did, this would not be relevant to the ascription to them of
quoted utterances. If A said 'A says: the cat is dreaming of
fish', then A could be quoted as saying in part 'A says'; but the
use of 'A' that we are interested in is the one in which it occurs
outside the quotation marks, as when B says "A said ". . .".
Imagine, though, that we have a reproduction of another picture
that was not signed. In this case the words 'Paul Klee' are printed
beneath the replica in a way which corresponds much more closely
to the apposition of the speaker's name to his quoted words in a
conventional quotation. How different, though, is the function of
these printed words from the replicated 'Klee' in the first
reproduction? Of course, there are differences; but these do
not necessarily stretch to a reinterpretation of the relation
between the man and his work. Reproducing his signature seemed
to allow that Klee had both created the work and, out of the same
being, had avowed it to be his own creation. With the other
picture we lack the avowal; but being able only to print the
artist's name does not force us to abandon the concept of the artist
as one who bears such a relation to his work. The name is still
the name for himself of the artist who created the painting. It
does not introduce a complete change in conceptual register, so
that we would have to think in terms of the body, called Paul
Klee, operating with paints and paint-brushes in such a way that
this pattern of colours resulted. The printed words 'Paul Klee'
are a poor substitute for the reproduction of a signature, but they
still seek to acknowledge the creator.

According to my analogy, therefore, when we say "A said '...'",
we are using 'A' rather as if we were quoting A's utterance of his
own name. For the A that we are speaking of is the A who is the
source of his own utterance. A, the speaker, would normally
introduce himself with the word 'I'; but that is quite naturally
transformed, according to the procedure which we are acquainted with
from indirect quotation, into a term appropriate to the new context,
into 'he' or into some name by which A is known. This substitution
does not change the representation from a quotational to a descriptive
one. We are accepting A as someone who has spoken to us, just as
we accept his words as meaningful and meant. We display this
acceptance of his utterance, by reproducing it either exactly or
in a modified form. Similarly we display our recognition of his
being as a speaker by reproducing, in a modified form, his
verbalization of himself. This we do whether or not he has preface
the utterance we are quoting with the word 'I'; for it is not that
which determines whether we treat him and his utterance as fit
subjects for quotation.
If the subject term of a quotation has now joined the words that actually appear between quotes under a wider concept of "quotation", that leaves only the verb to be brought within the same system. What would be required to achieve this? Anything that is to count as a quotation from someone should reproduce his intended meaning. One need only mention this condition, though, to see how easily the verbs of direct and indirect quotation satisfy it.

A speaker does utter his words as a meaningful communication. In other words, he knows he is saying something and intentionally does so. Thus, when we introduce a quotation with 'said', we do not impose an external category on what occurred, but re-employ a concept that was inherent in the original. The same is true of verbs such as 'deny' or 'explain', for again these manners of speech are merely understood as they are conceived by the original speaker; and it can be further applied to those oratio obliqua introducing verbs which are not so directly connected with utterances, like 'think' and 'believe'. In their dependence on the occurrence or condition they represent, these verbs all display the essential feature that differentiates "quotation" from description; they borrow their meaning from an active original rather than imposing it on a passive entity.

It might be thought that failure of substitutivity, that familiar feature of quotation, would not apply to these words that

---

1 Clearly a child does not have to understand the word 'say' before we can credit it with saying anything. The problem of extending "quotation" to those who do not provide a proper basis for it is one that I must leave to the sequel of this work.
precede quotations proper. But consider "Hominoid 102 said 'The cat is dreaming of fish'". Now, 'Hominoid 102' may be offered as a name for the creature referred to (our old friend A, we may suppose) to use as his own; but its tone suggests that it is intended entirely for the classifying purposes of the speaker. In the latter case, though, the classifier's continuation in terms of 'said' is quite out of key. He may properly characterize the descriptive entity, Hominoid 102, as emitting certain sounds; but he cannot, without inconsistency, suggest that these sounds have meaning for it. That suggestion is carried by the use of 'said' and by the accompanying use of quotation marks. Therefore, 'Hominoid 102', as a mere descriptive referring term, cannot be substituted for the name 'A' in this context. Similarly, a descriptive term for the speaking process cannot be substituted for 'said'. To quote someone is to make ourselves, in Davidson's phrase, "a samesayer" with him. It involves an imaginative acceptance of him and his utterance as equally creative of meaning with one's own being and one's own speech.

1 This is not the case of the machine simulation enthusiast. If he regards the computer's output as meant by the computer, he treats the computer, as well as its output, as worthy of quotation.

2 'On Saying That', p. 140.
Much of the previous section might seem high-flown in relation to that poorly regarded activity, quotation. It should have been evident, though, that my arguments there were converging on those that I presented in the previous chapter. The extension of the role of quotation to take in the speaker and his activity opens the way to a general amalgamation of quotation with the language of mind. If that should take place, quotation would no longer deserve its lowly reputation. The self that is not a descriptive entity, the "colourfulness" of experiences that does not consist in descriptive properties, the processes and conditions that are expressed in further uses of oratio obliqua, offer a rich field for a non-descriptive language. I have argued that quotation itself already contains a full recognition of this self as a source of meaning that can be shared. It is this shared meaning that it is the purpose of the language of mind to convey. That language is far wider than quotation; but quotation provides its most convenient exemplar, as being the part of it concerned with the reproduction of that meaning as it appears in open communication.

I have been highly critical of Quine; but it must be recognized that he is thoroughly consistent. He does wish to banish indirect quotation along with mention of the "propositional attitudes" from the ultimate account of reality. My interpretation of direct quotation would bring it, too, under his ban.
We share, therefore, in a general division of language and in a high estimate of its importance. The great difference between Quine and myself lies in our assessments of reality and the demands it places on language. In contrast with his contention that what exists is what satisfies the language that supersedes description, I have argued that there are aspects of reality that can be represented in language but not in any descriptive language. The words that express the multifarious character of our lived-through experiences cannot be fused in descriptively referential terms. There is a genuine ontological role therefore for a language that does not function by indicating entities and characterizing them.

What is needed, therefore, is an account of this language that is as consistent in eschewing description as Quine is in eschewing anything that does not fit into his linguistic scheme. It is not enough, as Danto has done,¹ to play with quotation as a model for one small part of mental language. It must be amalgamated with mental language as a whole, for any move in this direction is only justified if it corresponds to a general theory of mind as reality apprehended in a manner other than perceptual and therefore to be represented linguistically by some other method than description.

It is therefore a double account, of mind as non-objective reality and of the language of mind as "quotation", for which this work prepares the ground.

¹ Danto argues ('Analytic Philosophy of Knowledge', pp. 86-97) that beliefs are quotable sentential states. His purpose, however, is to contrast belief with knowledge, which may merely involve a sentential state. He also claims that his theory is empirical; and his use of the word 'state' is not just incautious, for he thinks that sentential states can be discovered through scientific investigation.
As explained in the preface, this bibliography mentions only those works which are referred to in the rest of the thesis.

**Abbreviations: Journals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.J.P.</td>
<td>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.P.Q.</td>
<td>American Philosophical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.J.P.</td>
<td>British Journal of Psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.P.</td>
<td>The Journal of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.</td>
<td>Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.</td>
<td>Noûs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A.S.</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A.S.S.</td>
<td>Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Q.</td>
<td>The Philosophical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.</td>
<td>The Philosophical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S.</td>
<td>Philosophical Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.P.</td>
<td>Revue Internationale de Philosophie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.M.</td>
<td>Review of Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.</td>
<td>Synthese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.</td>
<td>Theoria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations: Collections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Block, N.J. & Fodor, J.A.  'What Psychological States Are Not', P.R., LXXIX, 1972, pp. 159-81.

Boer, S.E.  'Reference and Identifying Descriptions', P.R., LXXIX, 1972, pp. 266-268.


Chappell, V.C.  'Particulars Re-clothed', P.S., XV, 1964, pp. 60-64.


Church, A.  'Ontological Commitment', J.P., LV, 1958, pp. 1008-1014.


'The Individuation of Events', Rescher, pp. 216-34.


'Mental Events', Foster, pp. 79-101.


Deutscher, M.  'Mental and Physical Properties', Presley, pp. 65-83.


Feigl, H.  

Feldman, F.  

Feyerabend, P.  

Flew, A.G.N.  

Fodor, J.A.  

Frege, G.  

Geach, P.T.  


Goddard, L. & Routley, R.  

Goldman, A.I.  
'The Compatibility of Mechanism and Purpose', P.R., LXXVIII, 1969, pp. 468-82.

Haack, R.J.  

Hall, E.W.  

Hanson, N.R.  

Hart, H.L.A.  
Hochberg, H.  
'Universals, Particulars and Predication',  

Holdcroft, D.  

Hume, D.  

Kalke, W.  
'What is Wrong with Fodor and Putnam's Functionalism',  

Kane, R.H.  

Kant, I.  
Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith (Trans.),  

Kenny, A.  

Kim, J.  
'On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory',  
'Psychophysical Laws and Theories of Mind',  
'Events and their Descriptions: Some Considerations',  
Rescher, pp. 198-215.

Kneale, W.  
'Critical Notice: A Materialist Theory of Mind by D.M. Armstrong',  

Laycock, H.  
'Some Questions of Ontology', P.R., LXXXI, 1972, pp. 3-42.

Lewis, D.K.  

Locke, D.  
'Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetized?',  


Putnam, H. 'Minds and Machines', Hook, pp. 138-64.

'Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?', J.P., LXI, 1964, pp. 662-91; in O'Connor, pp. 236-52.

'The Mental Life of Some Machines', Castaneda, pp. 177-200; in O'Connor, pp. 267-81.


Ramsey, F.P. 'Universals', K., XXXIV, 1925, pp. 401-17; in Landesman, pp. 64-97.


Smart, J.J.C. 'Sensations and Brain Processes', P.R., LXVIII, 1959, pp. 141-56; revised in Chappell, pp. 161-72; in Borst, pp. 52-66.


Stevenson, J.T.  'Sensations and Brain Processes': A Reply to J.J.C. Smart', P.R., LXIX, 1960, pp. 505-10; in Borst, pp. 87-92.


