THE PHENOMENON OF FRIENDSHIP

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Ph.D. University of Edinburgh 1978
"Friendship is a partnership, and as man is to himself, so he is to his friend: now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being."

Aristotle
This thesis is intended as an illustrated corollary to certain abstract arguments about the nature of social psychology as a science.

The particular arguments concern the value of the suggestions made by Heidegger as to the nature of the scientific enterprise. The illustration consists of a set of studies of friendship, particularly as exemplified in later adolescence.

It is intended that these studies should be of value in themselves. However, they were also designed to demonstrate the type of contribution to our understandings made by three different forms of psychological investigation, namely the experimental, the humanistic and the philosophical. It is argued that if we espouse only one of these methods we may fail to investigate the social lives of persons in a scientific manner. It is suggested that for a Heideggerian psychologist these would form vital and interdependent aspects of one investigation.
This thesis has not been composed by me alone. I have acted as agent for my mentors, supervisors, friends and assistants. Most notably Karl Britton, Peter Sheldrake, Albert Pilliner, Chris Toon, Sue Aylwin, Donald McPhail, Tom Frank and James McGuire (who also, with assistance, piloted the divergence test).

Cathie McIntosh put my thoughts into 'English' and presented them on these pages so elegantly. Robin Grey and his peers let a stranger into their personal lives. Many pupils, workers and staff kindly tolerated my private affair.

I hope what is good in this thesis stands as thanks to them all.

Thus only insofar as it has a conventional meaning in this context do "I declare that this thesis was composed by myself".
THE PHENOMENON OF FRIENDSHIP

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CHAPTER ONE

THE THESIS

PHENOMENOLOGY AND FRIENDSHIP

The aim of this short introductory chapter is to orientate the reader to a thesis which is not entirely orthodox either in content or form. Because of this unorthodoxy I wish to elaborate in this chapter on some of the implications of the title; to indicate what this thesis does not try to attempt; and finally, to outline the order and type of material presented in the chapters that follow.

The title is designed to convey an apparent ambivalence between, on the one hand, the idea of the phenomenon of friendship as an experience that few, if any, of us have not had; and on the other, the idea that what follows will not draw on the conventional assumptions of Anglo-American psychologists, but be more dependent for its principles on the phenomenological movement.

I call the ambivalence apparent. This is to emphasise from the start my belief that we can gain much in our investigations of human beings if we do not accept the traditional assumptions as necessarily sufficient for our needs. For me the best way to investigate a topic such as friendship, as it occurs naturally, is with the help of a set of phenomenological assumptions, and so I feel the ambivalence does not run deep.
This thesis is not, however, a phenomenological investigation of friendship. (To attempt such within the limitations of one thesis would be foolhardy.) Rather it is part of such an investigation limited both in its definition of the principle terms and in its mode of presenting the investigation.

The two main terms, phenomenological and friendship, are limited in the following respects. No attempt is made to define the adjective phenomenological, it can be applied to a great range of major writings from authors as diverse as Brentano and Sartre. My knowledge is restricted to two of these, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. My thesis is principally intended to illustrate ideas derived from these two writers rather than to examine principles which might be attributed to the whole of the phenomenological movement (if any such exist).

The investigation is also limited in the aspects of friendship with which it deals. My own knowledge and interest is that of a psychologist and so only passing reference will be made to sociological and social anthropological investigations. In these last two areas far more work has been done than in social psychology, indeed there is only a handful of studies on the intrapersonal aspects of friendship. Within the broad definition of a phenomenological investigation of friendship this thesis is concerned with a Heideggerian approach to intrapersonal aspects. Even within this
definition the thesis is limited. It is not a straightforward example of the work of a Heideggerian psychologist. Rather it has been my intention to leave exposed many of the raw bones and false starts that have been part of my work in order to show, to other British psychologists, the sorts of problems I have encountered and the solutions adopted. I believe this provides a more useful form to my arguments about the virtue of a Heideggerian psychology than to have simply presented a polished illustration of a Heideggerian psychologist's work.

There have been many arguments in recent years about the nature of social psychology. It is not my intention to add to these, but rather to present an illustrated corollary to such arguments - arguments which have generally been couched in an air of abstraction, examples, if any, being drawn from the past. Because I am partly concerned with general philosophical arguments, some space is inevitably lost to them, and so at the concrete level this thesis is again limited. It does not seek to systematically examine all the material relevant to the three central illustrative chapters but rather presents samples of such material.

The point about the degree of abstraction of this thesis is an important one to establish from the outset. If it is not clear, the thesis will quite rightly be open to the criticism that it is neither thorough enough in its philosophical arguments, nor extensive enough in
its empirical investigations. It is not the intention here to cover the ground of either traditional philosophy or social psychology but rather to illustrate that the results of philosophical arguments are relevant to social psychology. This is intended as an interdisciplinary thesis, not a multidisciplinary one.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The three central ones each illustrate one group of methodologies open to the psychologist interested in friendship. These three are preceded by a general chapter on assumptions, and succeeded by a concluding chapter which seeks to demonstrate how, given a Heideggerian account of social science, the illustrating investigations can be seen as aspects of one investigation. The chapters are each divided into two parts, the first of which contains more general material, the second taking up one theme in more depth and detail.

Chapter Two, on presuppositions, attempts to show the reader some of the arguments that I have found important in carrying out the investigations that this thesis recounts. The idea is to lay bare the sort of assumptions I have made; it would be the work of many volumes to examine rigorously these assumptions, and indeed many volumes have been written on them. The teasing out of such assumptions is followed by a more positive account of scientific activity, an account based on the comments Heidegger makes in Being and Time.

The three central chapters start with consideration of material that could well belong to a conventional social
psychologist's account of friendship in later adolescence. Sixth formers in Scotland and England were given extensive questionnaires about the age, sex, interests and closeness of their friends. The interactions of certain of these variables are considered and some simple sociometric and judgemental data presented.

The main difficulty with this type of data is that the researcher has no way of knowing how the categories and definitions that he offers to his subjects relate to their views of the world. The Humanistic approach seeks to obviate this difficulty. It is concerned with establishing how individuals see their friendships, the importance of friendship in their lives, and its context within their other social relationships. To gather this humanistic material two sets of sixth formers who had been involved with the questionnaire studies were also interviewed at length. The information gathered in this way is presented in Chapter Four. The second part of the chapter concentrates on a particular aspect of friendship; the understanding of the other person as another person.

The final illustrative chapter takes one stage further the argument that the researcher is likely to impose his own definitions and ways of seeing things. In this chapter it is argued that it is essential to be explicit about what has already been established in the discipline with which we are concerned, before we start the process of investigation and experimentation.
Care about such preliminary definitions has traditionally belonged to the realm of philosophical psychology. In this chapter the concept of friendship is examined more directly, and this examination leads to a crucial element in friendships - empathy. The second part of the chapter provides an analysis of the concept of empathy based on the work of Stein. This study also provides an example of a phenomenological analysis and so implicitly tries to demonstrate the value of such analyses to the psychologist.

The three illustrative chapters present material which has normally originated from rather different authors. It is a central argument of this thesis that if we take a Heideggerian viewpoint we can see how these differences do not form the basis for rival camps, but address various facets of the topic being investigated, facets which are interdependent and all equally necessary to our understanding of their central issue.

In this way the content of what follows is somewhat unorthodox. So too is the form. It is customary and sensible practice to structure the argument of a thesis in a linear manner. In that way the reader has a central theme on which to hold as he or she progresses through the work. I wish, respectfully, to set aside this convention as I believe my arguments must await the readers being in possession of the material presented in the illustrative chapters. Thus few conclusions can be drawn until the end, and the chapters may seem only tentatively to lead from one to another.
This unorthodoxy of form needs further justification. I referred above (p. 3) to the fact that I was not seeking to give a simple illustration of the work of a Heideggerian psychologist. To do so would be to pretend that I had seen the full relevance of his writings before I started my empirical work, which was not the case. As my research developed so did my philosophical beliefs. What is of importance is that this changing of beliefs is exactly one of the aspects of science that Heidegger draws attention to. Such points as these are at a different level of abstraction from the ones made in the illustrating chapters. For this reason it is difficult to make them before or during these chapters.

In the conclusion it is possible to reflect on the whole of what has gone before, and it is with that very wholeness that I am concerned, for it shows how the illustrative chapters form aspects of one investigation and in this way the Heideggerian psychologist is introduced.
CHAPTER TWO

PRESUPPOSITIONS
ASSUMPTIONS IN SCIENCE

Part One - Assumptions

It has become customary to precede any investigation in the social sciences with a discussion of the author's assumptions. I believe that such discussions have great merit, but often seem unsatisfactory. The reason for their unsatisfactoriness is that they are apt to parade themselves as arguments for a particular viewpoint. They may then become tedious, for either we agree with the position being advocated, and are conversant with the arguments, or we disagree, and the small space that can be devoted to them, in the context of a thesis on another matter, is unlikely to be sufficient to persuade us to adopt a new view.

The point of this chapter is neither to persuade the reader to rethink his view of social psychology - sound works with this aim already exist, notably Harré and Secord (1972) and Armistead (1974) - nor is it to point out the value of non-Empiricist approaches. Here also much has been written, e.g: Merleau-Ponty (1942 & 1945), Needleman (1963), Spiegelberg (1972) and, at a more introductory level, Wann (1964), and Misiak and Sexton (1973). The brief summarising of such arguments is what
contributes to making chapters, on the author's assumptions, unsatisfactory.

The merit of beginning with the author's assumptions lies not so much in the matter of persuasion, as in allowing the reader to understand more easily the course of the following investigation. Also, and maybe more importantly, starting by making assumptions clear facilitates objections and discussions rather than pretending that these are unnecessary. In 1948, while writing about the status of certain abstractions in psychology, MacCorquodale and Meeheh claimed that all they wished to be was metaphysically neutral. In metaphysics there is no neutrality, only a greater or lesser degree of awareness.

The aim of this chapter is to make as explicit as possible my assumptions. To avoid the tedium I have noted, I wish to set about this task in an unusual manner. In this part of the chapter I wish to consider the sort of assumptions we make and what the implications are of asking a question like "What is Friendship?". I wish to use this question in the same way as we use the one "Have you stopped beating your wife?". Hidden within it are presuppositions which must be dealt with before it is possible to give any answer.

I would claim that there are five main areas in which we make assumptions when we ask a question such as "What is friendship?". These might be labelled logical, semantic, political, ethical and 'metaphysical'. My
special concern is with the last of these. This is not because the first four are unimportant, far from it, but rather that to say anything new or constructive about them is beyond my competence. I wish to note them briefly and then turn to what I call for convenience the metaphysical assumptions.

The logical assumptions in the question are similar to those in the question about your wife. If there are no examples of friendship then any empirical investigation cannot really get off the ground. Thus it is an assumption of the question, in any ordinary sense, that at least some examples of friendship are to be found. Related to this assumption of logicality is one concerning semantics. It is necessary that the question makes semantic sense in the way that the question "Do colourless green ideas sleep furiously?" has been held not to make sense. If I were to follow the matter further I would seek to argue that there can be doubts about semantic sense in all our utterances and that it is not obvious as it was to Chomsky (1957, p. 15) at one time, that semantic and syntactic sense can be clearly distinguished. Maybe it should be added that I am here assuming syntactic sense. In the question "What is friendship?" the meaning seems simple. The point stands more as a warning that problems can occur.

The political assumptions are those which dictate the sort of questions which can, as a matter of fact, be asked. It might be argued that questions about friend-
ship belong not to the academy, but to our social, personal or even clinical lives. It is here assumed that this is not the case. There is a second and subtler political assumption, one which in Capitalist societies might be called philosophic, and that is that the question can stand on its own apart from considerations of the socio-economic background of the questioner. It has been argued that answers to such questions are trivial; for they cannot stand sufficiently independently to make the exercise more than easily predictable if my own relationship to my society were known by the reader. It is not clear to me that this assumption is justified - that questions can stand alone in the way that is believed in Western academic culture. It remains for me a tenuous assumption that this thesis is not rendered void by such arguments.

The last of these four sets of assumptions I have called ethical. Two people in my sample challenged these when they refused to be interviewed - about some things 'we should not ask'. It is not an uncommon belief that all things are open to investigation and that we fear no such investigations ourselves. It is not an easy matter to show in general that we all have hidden fears of our own: matters into which we would not permit others to probe. Even if it should be the case that we were free of such reservations it would be hard to see how we could justify overruling the fears of others and dismissing them as unimportant. I think it is not an
insignificant assumption to presume that it is morally acceptable to ask such questions as "What is friendship?".

These are four sets of assumptions to which I could contribute little. I have assumed that the question "What is friendship?", makes semantic sense and has content, I have also assumed that it is possible and not immoral to ask it. This leaves the assumptions I rather vaguely called metaphysical. I do not mean this phrase as a catch-all for any other assumptions; there may be some which fall into none of the five categories that I have proposed. What I mean by metaphysical assumptions are those which would lead us to say what type of question it is and what would count as an answer to it.

As I indicated, some authors have believed that it is possible not to make metaphysical assumptions, or that is what MacCorquodale and Meeheh appear to imply by remaining 'metaphysically neutral': that they are not committed one way or the other before their empirical investigations and that these investigations will determine where the author's commitments should lie. It might be noted that such authors often claim a neutrality over matters of logic and ethics. With such a belief in neutrality I profoundly disagree.

This chapter as a whole makes the point in a major way. For would it not be a sorry thing if I held both the beliefs that I claim here and their opposites?
A simple example can make the point. I might believe that a certain experiment could show that Broadbent's filter theory of attention is incapable of accounting for all the data it claims to account for; or I might believe that the theory can be shown to be untenable for reasons of internal inconsistency and that experimentation is unnecessary; or I might believe that deciding between such questions is beneath the dignity of man's estate. If I were to remain neutral would I conduct the experiment or would I not? What possible meaning can we give to the term neutrality in such cases? The dilemma is the same with metaphysical matters.

I wish to deal with the following questions. Can 'What is friendship?' be classed as a social psychological question? Are there 'scientific' answers to social psychological questions? Do such answers constitute human knowledge? How is such human knowledge bound up with the descriptions we offer of our relationships to the world? In being prepared to accept some answers to the question 'What is friendship?' and to reject others we must, at least implicitly, give our opinion on all the assumptions that the question makes.

Let us start with the type of question that is being asked. It would seem that we must be able to say something about this before we can turn our attention to the sort of things that would count as answers. Is it for example a philosophical question, an anthropological one, a psychological one, or is it a purely personal
human one? Here the assumption to be made is rather
different from those made so far. For there is nothing
in the question itself which implies that it belongs to
one of these areas rather than another. On the other
hand whichever area we do ascribe it to has waiting
within it more assumptions.

The last paragraph was somewhat tentative. The
full reason for this will not emerge until the end of
this chapter. In the meantime I will proceed as though
accepting this distinction between types of question.
I have claimed that I am writing this thesis primarily
as a psychologist so the first assumption to be examined
is whether the question is of a type which can be asked
by social psychologists. If it is then it concerns
the place friendship has in the individual's life and
its meaning and value to the individual. Besides this
it must be open to investigation in a way appropriate to
the social sciences.

It might be felt that there could be few
objections to the idea of examining the individual
aspects of friendship in a social psychological framework.
But objections have certainly been made and they are
important here for they lead us on to consider what
we are assuming when we say we can give the question a
'scientific' answer.

Objections to the study of friendship in a
psychological context stem from beliefs about the nature
of science and what is necessary to constitute a scientific enquiry. It has been held that the base for any scientific investigation is an agreement about observations and descriptions. These are said to be of prime importance, the foundations on which we build up the laws and theories of science. Because they are so important we must be very sure of them. In turn this need for certainty leads to an emphasis on replication. If other people can produce the same results or make the same observations, then there is hope that the matter we are considering is free from subjective distortions and the whim of the experimenter.

The trouble with a topic like 'Friendship', it is suggested, is that there is very little that we can agree on or observe. Much of what is important about friendship happens inside people's heads and reports of what goes on there are thought to be untrustworthy - not allowing the rigour that a 'scientific' frame of mind demands. Thus it might be considered permissible to observe the amount people talk to one another, or the number of people who are addressed or even the sex of the people that are approached, but not permissible to comment directly on friendship or indeed the link between such observations and friendship itself.

If we follow this line of argument then we are forbidden to allow my question "What is friendship?" as a direct social psychological one. To a certain extent it has been so forbidden: it is only in this decade
that Psychological Abstracts has listed friendship under a separate heading; previously the entry read 'see interpersonal attraction and interpersonal processes'. My assumption that I could decide to treat the question as a social psychological one was not as straightforward as it seemed.

The fact that particular topics were, for such theoretical reasons, debarred from study never dimmed the ardour of social psychologists. They were soon able to take up suggestions being made in philosophical circles. By the 1930's the extreme forms of Empiricism in scientific method were being tempered: two ways in which 'psychological' material would be admissible were being advocated. The more formal of these (and less influential in psychology) came from writers such as Carnap, e.g. (1937) and Hempel, e.g. (1954). They argued that there was no reason why observations about mental states should not be allowed to join other observations on an equal footing: they were to become part of the 'observational language'.

The alternative was in fact proposed in argument against Carnap's suggestion, and allowed any subject to be studied, but only indirectly. This 'Operationalism' was given its classical explanation by Bridgman (1927, 1945). He suggested that sciences in general (he was originally a physicist himself) do use and should use terms which have no direct reference to observations.
Instead the term concerned is defined by a set of operations which the scientist carries out. These operations may themselves be a set of observations; the operation being to observe 'such and such'. (These terms in fact corresponded to Carnap's Dispositional concepts.) Operational terms had the virtue, for psychology, that there was no need for direct observation of every element that was to go to the building of a body of scientific knowledge.

It was suggested that a concept such as friendship should be defined by a set of behaviour that could be observed, thus to be friends might be: to spend time with the person, to consult them on matters said to be of importance, to talk to them more often than other people and so on. A new term might be coined in place of the word from natural language to show that the re-definition had occurred; although at the same time the new term must retain a clear relationship with the natural one or the matter under investigation would not be known. The classical example of this type of definition is the one sometimes cynically used of intelligence; that which is measured by intelligence tests. Such Operationalism is still common in psychology, for with its help the apparent subject matter of psychology again becomes a legitimate scientific concern.

I started my consideration of metaphysical assumptions with the suggestion that friendship might be regarded as a topic which could be investigated in a
manner appropriate to social psychology. However, it appeared that there were objections to this assumption. These objections concerned the sorts of things that will count as answers in any science. It was proposed that an essential requirement of science was an agreement on observations and that certain topics such as friendship were not directly open to this type of agreement. Instead psychologists have been willing to approach such topics by indirect methods.

I am not happy with these solutions, nor with the supposed problem that they are offered as solutions to. My dissatisfaction can most easily be illustrated by returning to the above example of intelligence. In applied psychology there are many occasions when an operational definition is perfectly satisfactory and the use of the word intelligence for the processes being described is unobjectionable. What is objectionable is to think that we have thereby exhausted the concept in a scientific manner. Indeed I would argue that in such cases we have not even begun to tackle a scientific definition of the concept. For surely such must include an understanding of why one activity rather than another demonstrates intelligence, of how intelligent behaviour develops and of what all intelligent behaviour has in common. In short it would be an odd concept of science if notions of generality and causality were simply set aside. In the case of intelligence the lie is at once uncovered; for while later writers may have been content
to define intelligence in terms of co-relationships between tests and other behavioural measures, the originators of such tests had very complex views of the constitution of intelligence, far removed from operationalism.

Let me summarise the matter again in rather a different way. It was felt at the end of last century, that psychology, being a young science, and still unsteady on its feet, could learn by imitating the early stages of the 'successful' sciences such as physics. It was held that physics managed to make great strides by being scrupulous in its observations, usually employing numerical measurement and taking special care to avoid errors due to subjective opinion.

The first result of such a belief, that psychology should not be merely analogous to physics in its scientific method, but actually homologous with it, was a simple paradox. The very events and processes in our worlds which we might call psychic and would therefore expect psychology to deal with are ruled out of the scientific court. Psychology ceases to be about psychic phenomena, a rather odd way for a young science to get started.

The second result is a further paradox, for an effort was soon made to restore some of the phenomena that psychology, on the face of it, should be concerned with. In this restoration definitions were offered which made the 'mental objects' into 'physical' ones. These physical
objects were then treated in the way that physical scientists were supposed to treat their objects. Psychology became, not like physics in principle, but simply physics as it was thought to have been.

It will be seen that to hold such views the distinction between the mental and physical must be no more than an artifact of natural language - and hence the many arguments about 'Reductionism' in the literature of recent years (e.g. Koestler, 1969). My present theme is not particularly anti-Reductionist, it is more general than that. It is that we can hold a Reductionist view if we wish, but to do so presumably rules out holding the opposite view. In this case we must assume that it makes sense to reduce all mental phenomenon to physical ones. Now this is quite a big assumption; it may be right or wrong or more likely confused. But whatever else it is, it is not neutral.

I said earlier (p. 18 above) that I was happy with neither the solutions nor indeed with the problems themselves. The reasons for my disquiet are due to the assumptions that go into the accounts I have been giving. I wish now to turn to a consideration of these assumptions, as the aim of this chapter is to lay bare my own beliefs. On this path there is still some way to go and so I have had to take certain things as 'read'. This applies especially to the influence that Empiricist philosophers have had in psychology. These
influences can be seen clearly in such collected essays as Feigl (1956) and Brody (1970).

I think the best way of approaching the assumptions I wish to question is by considering further what is meant by observation. It has been held that by closely and scrupulously observing what is out there, in the real world, we can arrive at true knowledge. Scientific knowledge is often proposed as a paradigm of such knowledge. Observation holds the key for how else can we get to know about the world but through our senses? And so writers like Carnap demand, as a first principle of scientific investigation, agreement on observations about the world.

There is, however, a problem about these observations. They are held to be very simple, not the sort of thing over which there could be mistakes, so the 'elegance' of his walk is ruled out, the 'hospitality' I was offered is out and the 'friendship' that we once had is most certainly ruled out. Authors are reluctant to offer examples of what can be observed. Achinstein (1965) bravely suggests "..red, left off, floats and cell nucleus". Over red we can get the kind of certainty science demands. We make no assumptions about it and we cannot be badly mistaken. It was Hume who thought the matter deserved little debate: "Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other." (Treatise p.2).
Kant repudiated this assumption showing the contradictions it leads to. But at this point the Kantian sledgehammer is unnecessary for such a small nut. James (1890) puts it with delightful simplicity: he noticed that we never receive the same sensation twice "What is got twice is the same OBJECT." (I p. 231). The point is as simple as that. Without a recognition of the apple we could not recognise the 'same' redness or taste or smell. We are all subjects of myriad sensations, a flux of 'minima sensibilia' over which there can lie no hope of agreement, no possible base for any enterprise, let alone a rational science. How am I to tell if I have agreement with you over the colour of the fourth brick in the wall without the brick itself. We must first have agreement on what is to count as a brick and that agreement is at least a hard won product of many social and cultural processes, far from the realms of simple observability in the way that some Empiricists have claimed.

Agreement on objects is a complex matter and primary to any agreement on sensations. There seems no obvious reason why it should be more or less difficult to agree on bricks than on friendships. The difference we tend to be drawn towards is that between physical objects and social or mental objects, but the wedge between these was driven in by philosophers and often the same philosophers who led us to believe in the simplicity of observations.
This concern with observation reflects a fundamental problem in philosophy: how we arrive at, and what constitutes, true knowledge of the world we live in. Probably more has been written on this topic than on any other non-theological matter. Here I wish to try to show the context in which my more particular criticisms of observations are placed. I wish to do this both to underline the importance of these points and also to introduce the framework within which Heidegger's revolutionary suggestions were made. For this purpose the following paragraph sketches the type of assumptions which psychologists seem to make. This hypothetical set of views is presented for the lessons which can be drawn from such an account and not because I believe any particular person has propounded them.

All that we know about the world in which we live comes to us through our senses. These present 'atoms' of information to us. It is the work of our minds to piece together these atoms. The result of such piecing, together is a picture of the world. It is our own personal picture of a general external and independent world of which we all have individual pictures. The ultimate judgement of the quality of our own pictures is how faithfully they reflect the independent world. Such faithfulness is usually held to be a form of correspondence; a correspondence between my picture and the way the actual world is. Science is seen as continuously extending our pictures and trying to make
our individual pictures as like one another as possible. Because the mode of discovering the world is atomistic, the accumulation of knowledge is seen also as atomistic.

Such a view seems untenable. Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason pointed out, simply, that if all our thoughts are due to sensation, and we know nothing of the origin of these sensations, as Hume had suggested ("As to these impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause, is in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason..." (Treatise, p. 84)), one side of the correspondence is not open to us. We can never know if there is an independent world out there of which we have a good or a bad picture. The only world we have access to is the one created in our heads. As there are not two worlds credibility cannot rest on correspondence and as sensations are not the vital link with another world, there is no particular reason for believing knowledge to be atomistic.

These are the kind of views which surround the proposal that there is a world independent of man. It is a very old debate. Plato (Sophist - 264 ff) is concerned with just this type of problem. What is it about the statement "Theaetetus sits" that made it true and what is it about the statement "Theaetetus flies" that makes it false. Plato did not consider that either of these sentences referred directly to an independent world but rather that their truth was governed by some form of correspondence to 'the facts'. This sort of
correspondence is very like that proposed by Hume who seems to suggest that there is a correspondence between impressions and ideas. The difference is that Plato did not think there was a direct correspondence between the terms of his statement and the terms of his facts: that the meaning of 'sits' was solely bound up with the physical disposition of Theaetetus and other people.

The reader may wonder why I have set up and shot down such a straw man. If writers such as Plato, Hume and Kant have seen problems of postulating an independent world, would anybody after them hold a view anything like the one I presented above? The answer would seem to be yes, for certain writers in the twentieth century have been more influential on psychologists than their illustrious predecessors. Specifically members and followers of the Vienna Circle have contributed much to current writings on the philosophy of science, examples of this influence are contained in the two collections referred to above (p. 21). Two of the most important influences on the Vienna Circle were Russell and Wittgenstein.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had suggested, not simply a correspondence theory of truth rather like Hume's and Plato's but also a correspondence theory of meaning. It was proposed that sentences reflected the matters they referred to - the 'facts'.

Russell provides us with an easier example than the one noted in the last paragraph, Wittgenstein was later to
suggest that one end of the correspondence consisted of facts. While it is not clear what he meant by such facts, it is clear that he does not regard facts as wholly independent of man. Russell, however, had opted for a more dramatic form of correspondence. He stoutly maintains "The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe." (1912, p. 56). The truth of the statement about Edinburgh's position is based on a world which is totally independent of man.

The problem with Russell's statement is that the crux of the matter is what sense we can in fact make of a world where there are 'no minds at all'. Of course, we can imagine a world as a matter of fact unperceived, but this cannot be what Russell is after for that still leaves behind 'our world', the world we conceived, the world we constituted, and this will not serve his purpose of providing an independent element by which to judge the truth of statements about our world. If he means us to abstract from our conceptions of Edinburgh's relation to London those parts which mental activity put into them then he fails to provide us with any guidance as to what exactly it is that minds supply and without this guidance we seem to be back with the main problem: can we make sense of a world independent of man? The perceiving of relative positions of places is a human activity. Take
away man and we take away the perceptions. How are we to consider what is left behind without those perceptions? How can this consideration of what cannot be considered help us judge the truth of a statement? In this example we can see Russell reaching out for a world which eludes him.

This same feeling of grasping for the unreachable is apparent in the related topic of reference. Russell, like Plato and Wittgenstein, is also concerned with substantiating the elements of his statements. He sought a reference for these elements to ensure that they have meaning. Like Wittgenstein, he proposed a form of correspondence, but in Russell's case the elements again refer to an independent world. This leads to the coining of logically proper names; names which refer directly to an independent world in much the same way that Carnap's observational terms have been held to refer.

The point of these last five paragraphs was to show that the straw man was not only a convenient vehicle to relay my beliefs, but was also substantial enough to have influenced the assumptions psychologists make.

I have now arrived at questions which are clearly concerned with basic metaphysics. I have come here from considering the assumption that a question such as "What is friendship?" can be a social psychological one. When I assumed that it was such, I found there were certain objections. I have said that I disagree with these
objections as I believe they rest on false premises; premises which writers such as Kant saw were problematic. Contained within Kantian Idealism, however, is another objection to questions about friendship being suitable matter for social psychology.

The objection I am referring to is that of Solipsism. Writers as diverse as Kant and Russell have been accused of this type of isolation. The objection might run as follows: Yes, I have plenty of evidence about my own mental activity and possibly plenty about a world in some sense separate from me, be it physical, in my head or as a part of some malicious demon. But I have rather poor evidence about the mental activity of other persons. I can claim by analogy, as Mill does, that there is such activity, but it remains as a belief and of a different status from my own mental activity. Social psychology would no longer be a study of interactions among ontological equals, and on such shaky foundations might well be condemned before it started.

I wish to draw two points from this type of argument. The first I have already made. It concerns a preparedness to question all our assumptions as scientists. Here it would seem that while the writings of both Hume and Kant lead equally to difficulties over Solipsism, it has tended to remain, among psychologists, a simple article of faith that the doctrine of Solipsism is false. There does not seem to be a serious worry about it, but if the faith should prove ill-founded what are the
implications of a Solipsistic social psychology?

The second point I wish to draw is a metaphysical one and takes us back to the main course of my account. This is roughly the assumption that Hume and Kant appear to share; that I am an experiencing subject of a world. Kant commences his Critique of Pure Reason "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience", (p. 41). The problems that are then dealt with are about the relationship between this subject and object (I and the World); how it is that we gain knowledge of the world, how knowledge is related to experience, and later to the particular type of knowledge which concerns other persons.

This assumption of an 'I' as a subject of experience is curiously tenacious, and has remained virtually unquestioned until this century. What is being assumed is that there are two radically different sorts of things at the foundations of our world. The sorts (or sort) of things which can be the subjects of experiences and the sorts (or sort) of things which can be experiences for subjects. A great divide is imposed by such assumptions which philosophers then appear to spend much time trying to bridge. The divide is an understandable one. Western languages have in common a subject predicate structure which leads us into a particular way of thought. It is not, however, a difficult matter to see that in other cultures the philosophical debates are rather different. Chinese
philosophers are not concerned with the problems of knowledge about the world or other minds, and in linguistics the debate is whether or not it is ever possible to identify a predicate or a subject structure in the Chinese languages.

The point of this digression is by way of introduction to Heidegger. *Being and Time* is not a lucid book. It defies rather than leads the reader. As Speigelberg (1960) puts it "...we find mostly the bare pronouncement of a 'truth' which if it does not ask to be accepted on the writer's say-so, makes high demands on the reader's sympathetic efforts at understanding and verification". I believe there is an important reason for this difficulty of style. One of Heidegger's main contributions to Western philosophy is to point up the way that language presses unwarranted assumptions upon us. To escape these pressures Heidegger frequently feels the need to develop his own vocabulary. The classic example of this development is with the concept of Being-in-the-World. The point of the hyphens is not to link together separate constituents: it is to show that we are not starting with the assumption that they can be taken apart.

The first assumption of many Western philosophers had been that there are two types of thing at the foundation of our world. I referred to them as subject and experience (objects). Heidegger suggests that we should try our metaphysics without that assumption. He
suggests a more primitive assumption, which on the face of it seems more intuitively acceptable. This is that man starts off already in a world, as part of a world. That before we can ask what is man's relation to the world we must have shown how to separate man from that world. The first task of philosophers becomes not to account for the possibility of knowledge, but to account for the possibility of separating a subject: for "It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world' - a world with which he provides himself occasionally". (Heidegger, p. 84 - references are to the English text.) It is to this possibility of separation that Heidegger's attention is directed; how can we characterise subjects? What distinguishes them? What sort of being does being-in-the-world have? These are the questions that Being and Time seeks to uncover. Heidegger's whole monumental work stands before Kant's opening sentence.

The first part of this chapter may have seemed somewhat negative. I have been mainly concerned with questioning certain assumptions that we seem to need to make as social psychologists. I have questioned the 'scientific-ness' of such investigations, the primacy of observation, the usefulness of Operationalism and the assumption that we cannot deal directly with mental phenomena. More fundamentally I questioned the value of correspondence theories of truth in science and of the concept of there being two worlds - mine and the one
it is a poor image of. Finally I wished to question Kant's assumption of a subject/predicate world and pointed out that Heidegger seeks to offer a systematic alternative.

In the second part of this chapter I wish to add to those four original sets of beliefs my own 'metaphysical' beliefs. These are avowedly Heideggerian: most of the part chapter being concerned with his account of science.

Before turning to this positive account there is a distinction that I made earlier that I now wish to return to. I do not share the assumption that man can stand separately from his world in any useful philosophical sense of the phrase: that he can be either a subject of a world or a subject of knowledge, (subject in the grammatical sense). I do not believe in an independent body of knowledge which we can add to at our pleasure: whether this adding be by uncovering a hidden external world or unravelling an internal one. Knowledge is more akin to the way that we are, and not something that we have. These, I think, are important points for psychologists. In the physical sciences it does not matter so immediately how the subjects and objects of knowledge are related.

In the social sciences it matters at once.

The examination of a topic, such as friendship, immediately changes something in the examiner, this change in turn changes the examination and so on. This flux does not render any investigation 'unscientific'. What it does do is show us a unique aspect of the social sciences.
It is because I believe the social sciences are reflexive and dynamic, and because I do not believe in an abstracted body of knowledge, that a distinction I made earlier was misleading. I proposed that the question, "What is friendship?" might belong to one of at least four types of question, i.e. commonsensical, anthropological, psychological or philosophical. I do not believe that it is possible to separate philosophical questions from psychological or anthropological ones. In answering one type of question we either implicitly or explicitly answer parts of others. (I also believe that it is a principle of scientific enquiry to be explicit.)

The psychological account is an account of the common sense - what else could it be an account of? Common sense no more consists of questions than psychology of answers. We have always been presented with complex and largely coherent accounts of our psychic lives. Psychology cannot hope to stand in contradistinction to these accounts. It must extend them and add to their coherence, for only by so doing can we be sure we have constructed a psychology of and for human beings.

Part Two - Heideggerian Science

This part chapter is concerned with the account of science that Heidegger gives in Being and Time. I
wish to outline this account in some detail for several reasons. I feel it is an account which is particularly illuminating and appropriate to the work of social psychologists, it is also relevant to many of the debates surrounding the value of phenomenological and humanistic approaches to psychology and lastly, and importantly, it provides the theoretical framework within which I wish to present my particular illustration on friendship.

The following account has considerable limitations. Most importantly I have approached Heidegger for the value he can be to me as a psychologist and not for the sake of a study in its own right. I may, therefore, sometimes have sacrificed an exegesis of Heidegger for the sake of presenting other ideas which I feel to be of value in social psychology. I make no claims to any understanding of Heidegger's work as a whole and in fact I have become ever more impressed by the power and complexity of his thoughts from which I have picked some very minor asides, for Heidegger himself is not particularly concerned with discussing our modern social sciences. I have pieced together my account from scattered comments and taken the liberty of ordering them in such a way as to begin with his general remarks and work towards the specific.

For introductory purposes the theme of *Being and Time* might be summarised as "...the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'?". This is Heidegger's starting point, and it forms the question that lies
behind much of his writing in this the first and only volume of his proposed trilogy. His introduction continues "But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'?". Much of what he has to say is aimed at reviving this perplexity. Thus anything I say about 'Being' is likely to be misleading. It is not uncommon to deny that we can use being as a predicate, but Heidegger goes considerably further than this. It is the first thing in any consideration of man; it is in every consideration of man's state. "In every understanding of the world existence is understood with it and vice versa." (P. 193)

Science has to do with this very general understanding of the world. As beings we do not have to be interested in science, but part of being human is to be interested in this Being. Being therefore deals with any possibility of science and comes before any science whatsoever. Provided this is remembered, then indeed, various areas of Being are open to scientific investigation. If however, we forget, the whole scientific exercise can become vacuous and irrelevant.

What then is science? In its most general form it is akin to philosophy. Heidegger translates Aristotle as saying "...Philosophy itself is defined as...'the science of the "truth"'. That is not too helpful: truth tends to be an elusive commodity. Twice Heidegger gives pat definitions of science. "Science in general may be defined as the totality established through an
interconnection of true propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it reach the meaning of science." (p. 32). Later this definition is elaborated to separate the logical from the existential aspects of science. The logical conception is that "...which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as something established on an interconnection of true propositions - that is propositions counted as valid", while the existential conception "...understands science as a way of existence and thus a mode of Being-in-the-World which discovers or discloses either entities or Being." (p. 408).

Thus science is not simply an abstracted body of knowledge, it is also the way people who produce such knowledge conduct their intellectual lives. There is nothing transcendental about science; it is not separate from man. Rather it is a function of what man chooses to do with his life. In this context Heidegger uses the term existential, a word which has very special connotations for him. Here he seems to be pointing to the way science contributes to man's understanding, which is an essential part of being human. This is, however, in a very broad sense of understanding as can be seen from the phrase "a way of existing and thus a mode of Being-in-the-World". It is a whole 'frame of mind', indeed a very way of life, it is with this interpretation, or what might be called a 'realisation'
of Heidegger's more abstract conception that I am concerned. He himself points out that we can only come to the more abstracted ideas through their everyday counterparts. "The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself." (p.33).

Here I am concerned with the particular fact that I am a scientist - the way in which I conduct my rational life as opposed to the body of knowledge which scientists believe. For this way of life as a scientist I wish to use the term the 'secular' to emphasise that part of science which stands in contradistinction to the more formal beliefs.

If man choses to be a scientist, many things will follow about his way of life. "...The basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belong to it, the ways in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated - all these will be Determined." (p.414). It is part of being a scientist to know the assumptions being made, to know what are the appropriate methods and why they are appropriate, what will count as success and what is to be done with the results of any work.

It is the way that we go about our sciences and the way in which the subject matter can be said to
already exist which defines science rather than any "...exactitude or the...fact that it is binding on 'Everyman'". (p. 414).

An important point about this scientific being is that it is not just theoretical. In its processes it involves practical tasks which are intimately bound up with the whole scientific activity. "...Even in the 'most abstract' way of working out problems and establishing what has been obtained, one manipulates equipment for writing, for example." (p. 409.) Scientific behaviour is not a pure intellectual activity: it involves the whole man using all his capacities.

The starting point of scientific research is our ordinary language: the way we normally describe and deal with our worlds. "Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and the initial fixing of the areas of subject matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of subject matter is itself confined." (p. 29). Science builds out of what we already know: taking and shaping up the matters common sense presents.

This preliminary analysis and growth from what is already known is exactly what Plato and Aristotle accomplished with such success. Such an analysis of what is already to hand is very different from any kind
of "...'logic' which limps along after" (p.30). Rather such analysis makes the way clear for 'experimentation'. Any area that can be designated in natural language can be scrutinised with the scientific eye, the ordinary every-day events and processes provide as good material as the less personal ones. (p. 413).

Here I think we can see the seeds of Heidegger's dissatisfaction with science. In defining an area of study and outlining its common sense structure, in harmony with the way that it already is, we may pre-empt further investigation: "...any interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted...But if interpretation must in any case already operate in that which is understood, and if it must draw its nurture from this, how is it to being any scientific results to maturity without moving in a circle..." (p. 194). "In a scientific proof, we must not presuppose what it is our task to prove grounds for." (p. 194).

Nevertheless, Heidegger felt that the circle was not vicious. But rather led us to examine again these "...fore-structures in terms of the things themselves" - that is our investigation can lead us to pass judgement on the original common sense contribution. Thus at the time he regarded science as moving in a spiral enlightening its own findings, and in no way constructing the entities that it sought (p. 490). Rather scientific activity was
what 'demonstrates', 'grounds', discovers and discloses them (p. 30). Such circles in more fundamental meta-physics, he, like Kant, saw as being of vital importance (p. 363).

The concern with what we do import into our investigations is of great significance, for no matter how long and hard we look at the data, it can never tell us what we put into it. (Again a point made in more general terms by Kant, and taken up by the Phenomenological movement.) Heidegger puts it in this way:— "...these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypothesis derived from empirical material, but are always 'there' already." (p. 75). He adds an important rider; "but to disclose the a priori is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction". (p. 75, note x).

I have so far outlined some of Heidegger's general points about science: what it is and what its basis is. The whole scientific process of investigation and 'discovery' are covered in Being and Time by three words. They are Projection, Thematizing and Objectifying. These words are used by Heidegger very broadly and in many contexts. My concern is only with their use in helping to elucidate scientific investigations, thus when they occur in this thesis they should always be treated as though qualified by the adjective scientific. There is a further qualification in the use of these terms. Heidegger appears to include as part of Thematization the idea of projection. "...the totality of this
projection;...we call 'thematizing'.” (p.414). I have interpreted Heidegger here, at my level of an illustration, in such a way that Projection is used for the start of the scientific process and Thematization for the more traditional aspects of the process of scientific investigation. That is I have emphasised the forward-looking nature of Projection, and the way that the word Thematization draws our attention to the fact that the scientific investigation discloses the peculiar themes of its subject matter.

Thus Projection is the term used to cover what we bring to any topic we wish to investigate as scientists. The connotations of the word concern the way we conceive projects which can be worked out in detail later, we throw out ideas or possible plans. For psychologists I think the word plans is particularly useful; Heidegger was emphasising the forward-looking nature of man's understanding in the same way that Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) were concerned with our strategies for dealing with events before they happened.

Heidegger's term Projection however, was specifically designed to convey a flavour of unrealised potential, whereas the later authors' plans were very concrete. He was pointing out the fact that in the early stages of our investigations although many of the factors which will dictate its course are already present, as yet we have no tight grasp of them, our investigations
are still full of 'possibilities' (p. 185). We do however, begin to see the range of such possibilities: those things which belong to the area. "The scientific Projection of any entities which we have somehow encountered already lets their kind of Being be understood explicitly and in such a manner that it thus becomes manifest what ways are possible for the pure discovery of entities within-the-world". (p. 414).

This explicitness is of a general kind. It is made more particular in the process of Thematizing. This consists in making the understanding of the possibilities of an area of investigation clearer, and using this understanding to inform a definite delimitation of the area of subject matter. It adds to the exactness with which the entities, that are appropriate to the area, can be conceived. The end product of this process of Thematization is the 'releasing' of Objects in such a way that they can become a coherent part of our worlds. This he calls Objectification.

"Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character 'Objectively'." (p. 414). This is a crucial element in Heidegger's theory. Here we can see his premise of a unitary undivided world, from which scientific activities, along with other activities, draw out new aspects: bring into focus parts which were blurred or too far off to be distinct before. In philosophy this process lets me
see distinctions such as that between me and my world. We are able to tease ideas apart into separate 'objects'; scientific activity allows us to see new natural and human Objects. The process of Objectification has its counterpart in psychological theory. The combined processes of differentiation and hierarchical integration as proposed by Werner (1940) achieve a similar end. Such processes do not add to the stock of what is already 'there' - nothing is 'posited' - but more things are made available to us.

The key stage in the threefold processes of scientific investigation is Thematizing for "Every science is constituted primarily by Thematizing." (p. 445). Methodology is concerned with "ways of access" to the areas that Thematizing presents. Such methodology is not rigid. It is dependent on its matter. It is not a blind set of rules or devices. "The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out...the further is it removed from what we call 'technical devices', though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines." (p. 50).

Such methodology does not lead us to 'facts', "...researchers understood that in principle there are no 'bare facts'." (p. 414). "...Real progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in 'manuals' as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted - an
inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just such an increase in information." (p. 29).

More profound changes also occur, and indeed the best way of judging the maturity of a science may be by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In 1926 mathematics, with the Formalist versus Intuitionist controversy, and Physics, with the challenge of absorbing Relativity Theory, had reached such a stage.

At the time of writing Heidegger regarded Phenomenology as a paradigm of science and gives important reasons for this. "...It is opposed to accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conception which only seems to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems', often for generations at a time." (p. 50). It is concerned to get at things in themselves which is indeed the "...underlying principle of any scientific knowledge whatsoever." (p. 50).

These are some of the thoughts on science that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. I think it is of importance to note that two modern Anglo-American writers have produced related ideas. Quine (1953) claims that "The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science." (p. 42). The significance of a particular empirical result rests with the whole of what is being done in the name of the science it claims to
be part of. Over a rather different matter Strawson (1950) turns round Wittgenstien's famous paragraph: "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." and says "The world is the totality of things, not of facts". Strawsonian 'things' and Heideggerian 'objects' seem very alike.

These suggestions by contemporary writers show a harmony with Heidegger's point of view, and he for his part is not denying the importance of the production of generalities, such as the laws and theories that the 'established' sciences have produced. Such generalities as these are vital to the ways we understand the world we live in.

The distinction between Heidegger's view and those of such writers as Strawson and Quine is at a different level. The differences can be seen in the way that Heidegger proposes that man the scientist (a way of human life) is part of science. His stress of the importance of adding new Objects to our world shows how he is not only concerned with laws and theories but also with sets of criteria, definitions and meanings. These additional elements become especially important in the human sciences.

Science is not a question of exactitude and methodology: there is nothing laid down by some infallible source which guarantees that if we follow certain rules and methods then we shall obtain omniscience. The
'Experimental Method' can tempt us away from the very path of science. The mark of science is that it makes no assumptions, that it is continuously questioning; continually prepared to change. It seeks thoroughness in all directions.

For Heidegger social psychology has a special place. This is because he believes that "Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasien" (p. 160). The most fundamental problem for psychologists is to show how my consciousness becomes separated from that of others. How I can have experiences that are mine rather than ours. This is the point of departure for social psychology. One of the implications is that my own experience will take on a new and greater importance. Any investigation must openly acknowledge the relevance of our personal lives and how we make sense of these.

It is because social psychology is concerned with my perception of my social life and because we as human beings have always tried to make sense of our social lives that social psychology is not a young science. Its foundations stem from the time of authors such as Plato and Aristotle, but it is certainly older than that. Indeed we would expect it to be the oldest of the sciences. It seems unlikely that man ventured on explanations of the movement of the stars before he had started to deal with his own neighbours. Whatever the case may be concerning pre-classical thought, there is no question that
since Greek times psychological matters have been steadily investigated; as Scriven (1964) has pointed out. What was new in the latter half of the nineteenth century was the adoption of the 'Experimental' method. But this method has no monopoly on science. Indeed I have in effect been arguing that certain assumptions in this method lack rigour and make it less suitable as the method than other approaches.

The popularity of the new experimental method is held to be partly due to the 'success' of physics which was claimed to have used such a method. This success was contrasted with a lack of success in the area of philosophical psychology; that while physics forged ahead, philosophy stood still. I would argue that this worry was largely ill-founded. The strides that philosophers have made in the last two and a half thousand years are enormous, psychology's great advances were probably well underway before classical times and the complexity of extending our understanding of matters psychological since that time, has been such that it is a highly technical matter to see the advances that have been made. In the same way the physical sciences are beginning to reach a stage where it becomes a somewhat esoteric matter to understand their advances and where the implications of these advances will take many years to filter through to our lives.

Our progress will indeed be slow, for the magnitude of the task in front of us is great. There
is nothing surprising in this. Because it is slow we should not throw away our heritage any more than we should blindly accept it. The psychologist's first job is to make sense of what is already at hand; for him this is often a Herculean task. His main problem will usually be the disentangling of the complex assumptions and attitudes that are inherent in his material. This is not a difference in principle from other sciences. It is just that with human matters we are at once brought up against the extraordinary complexity of our subject. Added to this is the fact that the examples we seek are probably near to hand and so need not be sought through experimentation.

The three-fold process of science, which Heidegger suggests underlies all investigations, is apparent, in my study of friendship in the following way. I decide that I wish to add to our understandings of friendship. There are reasons for me deciding to do this and there is my own experience of friendship. Together these mean that I already have the potential for ideas, thoughts, definitions and explanations of friendship. These potentialities dictate the possible ways that I can set about my research and to that extent the investigation is already underway. This is the first part of the three fold process - Projection. From this I move on to Thematization the drawing together and the ordering of my thoughts on the matter, the absorbing into these of writings on the subject and discussion with others
which together enlarge and cohere what is already known about friendship. From this enlarged understanding new questions arise and with them new ways in which they may be answered. At the same time our understanding of the methodologies that are appropriate to the questions grows. Gaps and contradictions occur which may be closed by material already available or if necessary by experimentation.

The outcome of this is Objectification: a crystallizing out of a new idea which adds a little more to the understanding of the public world in which we all live. In the case of the present thesis the aim is to add to the public world of knowledge about friendship.

The logical order described above is not reflected in the following chapters. In the introduction I said that I hoped this thesis would be more than an illustration; that it would stand as an argument. To this end the illustrative chapters are presented in an order to facilitate the argument.

The experimental chapter illustrates the application of a particular method. In this case questionnaires concerning matters thought to relate to friendship. Such questionnaires, however, are not sensitive to the respondents' view of the questions being asked. The Humanistic approach seeks to avoid this shortcoming by challenging people directly on their friendships and the meaning that these have for the individual concerned.
Here also there are objections: for example the objection that as questioner I cannot hope to consider impartially and sensitively the answers that I receive unless I am already familiar with what I bring to the questions and the sorts of distinctions that can be made. This worry leads to the last illustration - a philosophical analysis; an analysis which, some have held, logically precedes any empirical inquiry.

Thus three areas of Thematization in Heideggerian science are illustrated; a methodology appropriate to an investigation of friendship, a clarification and demarcation of friendship with the help of other people, and an initial fixing of the boundaries of the area of investigation by philosophical analysis.

In this way three aspects of an investigation into friendship, which traditionally might have been seen as belonging to three opposed camps (experimental, humanistic and philosophical) are shown, in a Heideggerian context, to be but three faces of the multifaceted process we call scientific investigation.

In the concluding chapter of the thesis I will return to the way in which the examples presented illustrate the Heideggerian terms I have introduced. Finally, by way of conclusion, I will very briefly revert to the unity of the central investigation and the particularity of psychological science.
CHAPTER THREE

THE EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGIST:
PATTERNS OF FRIENDSHIP

Part One: Cognitive, Academic and Social Patterns

Section One: Introduction

There is ample testimony to the fact that experimental social psychology has had little to say directly about friendships. In 1970 Derek Wright noted that "...the two-person friendship has been most persistently neglected by social psychologists". Again in 1973 Weiss writes, "The exploration and analysis of friendships as a unique and distinctive type of personal social relationship has been a relatively neglected area of systematic study". It is not that it is considered to be unimportant. Sadler (1970) writes, "Surprisingly enough there has been little study of it (friendship) ... One would suppose anything so valuable would have been thoroughly examined".

This importance has been especially emphasised with regard to young people. Button (1974) commenting on his group work with adolescents, writes "We have been increasingly impressed by the central and critical position that friendship-formation takes in the lives of young people". But here again little is known. Bigelow (1975) points out how "...little is known about children's
friendships", and again J.C. Coleman (1974) while writing on relationships in adolescence remarks: "To the subject of friendship...much less attention has been paid and as a result of this there is relatively little in the literature...".

The investigations reported in this chapter centre on one main theme - do the number of friends that people have in later adolescence vary from individual to individual, and if so is the variation significant?

We are all aware of such variations between ourselves and others. They may be for obvious reasons: a new town, a move abroad, or a radical change in lifestyle, or to more personal events: a feeling of isolation from the people known, or a failure to see the worth of friends that do exist. For the present purpose I am simply arguing that such feelings are not entirely subjective; that the number of friends that a person claims to have will vary from time to time as will the number a person is seen to have. The following investigations are concerned with what can be said about such variations in later adolescence.

Section Two: The Field Investigations

Three main sets of research were undertaken. An intensive study, a large sample study and an investigation into responses to photographs of subjects in the intensive sample. The first of these studies was based on pilot
work carried out in Edinburgh and Newcastle. This work had originated with interviews with young people between the ages of 16 and 22, concerning their friendships. All such interviewees were members of some educational institute: school, college or university. The interviews established the types of topics and themes within friendship that people of this age were interested in and able to talk about. A pilot questionnaire was compiled and administered to sixth form pupils in one large Newcastle comprehensive school. From the responses to this and with the help of further interviews on problems encountered while filling in the questionnaire, a final version was prepared. Further details of this pilot work are given in Appendix One.

The resulting questionnaire (Q1) enabled information about a number of aspects of pupils' lives to be gathered. Two Edinburgh co-educational sixth forms giving a total of 66 subjects completed Q1. One sixth form was from a 300 year old grammar school which had become comprehensive during the period of these sixth formers' attendance. The other school was a purpose built comprehensive on a large housing estate.

At the same session as the questionnaire was administered, pupils were also given two psychological tests. Later in the term each person was interviewed, so providing the material on which Chapter Four is based. At the time of the interview photographs of the pupils were taken.
Because of the large amount of data gathered in the intensive study, the number of subjects had to be restricted. One of the aims of the extensive, or large sample, study was to make up for this deficiency. The elements which seemed of most importance in the first questionnaire (Q1) were used together with material drawn from the interviews. The resulting questionnaire (Q2) was taken to 18 schools. Two in central London, three in outer London, two in the Oxford area, three in Newcastle, three in Edinburgh and five in Moray and Nairn. These ranged in size from 9 to 150 pupils in each sixth form, and between them represented a wide range of the types of state school found in England and Scotland. Further details of these schools and of the questionnaire are given in Appendix Four.

The third set of field research concerned the photographs taken of the pupils interviewed. There were a number of speculations about physical attractiveness, stereotypes and friendships. Given the detailed information available on the subjects of the intensive study, it seemed a valuable opportunity to investigate how such factors interact with actual friendship patterns. The photographs were taken to an outer London co-educational school and shown to 15 boys and 15 girls in the sixth form. Each pupil was asked to make six judgements about each photograph. Further details of the subjects and procedure involved are given in Appendix Seven.
This part chapter presents three investigations which show some of the strategies available to the experimental social psychologist. They are by no means representative of all the methods available, and by presenting these particular studies I am not arguing that they have any sort of precedence in the field of social psychology. Laboratory work, group observation, participant observation, and structured interviewing all have their place in the gamut of methods available.

My aim in this chapter is to illustrate one of these methods in reasonable detail and to this end the questionnaire field-work has been introduced. The particular results of this type of work do not make interesting reading. I have therefore confined much of the matter to the relevant appendices.

The three studies used as illustrations in this chapter are drawn from different areas of the pupils' lives. The first concerns the interaction between the cognitive style known as divergence and the number of friends that pupils are seen to have by their peers. It thus shows something of the cognitive aspects of friendship. The second study examines some differences between scientists and artists and their attitudes to friendship and so provides an illustration of the relevance of academic patterns to friendship. The final, and brief, example introduces the descriptive study of social patterns found in the two Edinburgh sixth forms.
The scoring and preliminary analysis of Q1 are dealt with in Appendix Three. The results of the two questionnaire studies are given in Appendices Five and Six. The former is concerned with background variables and the latter with variables directly involving friendship. The results of the photographic study are given in Appendix Eight.

Section Three: Fluent in Friendship?

This section examines the relationship between divergence and number of friends. The importance of differences in friendships during adolescence has already been pointed out. Attempts have been made to give psychological accounts of the differences between the more gregarious student and the relative isolate, e.g. J.S. Coleman (1965), and Erickson, (1968).

Along with such accounts are those of the 1960's which sought to link descriptions of personality with the cognitive style known as divergence, (e.g. Getzels and Jackson (1962); Torrance (1962); Wallach and Kogan (1965)). These descriptions appear to have implications for the nature of individual friendship patterns. Hudson found that his divergent adolescent "...moves naturally to the human aspects of his culture...he takes refuge from things in people" (1968, p. 109) and later, he introduces the diverger who held "...unconventional attitudes; had interests which were connected one way or another with people; and, emotionally speaking, was uninhibited." (1970, p. 11). Does this imply that the person who is fluent
at the open-ended tests (Ideational Fluency) would also be the person with many friends: that is be 'fluent in friendship'?

Ideational Fluency is simply the measure of the number of responses given to such questions as 'how many uses can you think of for a comb?'. There are many tests of this type, only two were used with the Edinburgh (Q1) sample. The first measure was a verbal one; 'Uses of Objects' (Guilford, 1959) and the second a non-verbal measure; 'Pattern meanings' (Wallach and Kogan, 1965). The Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1962) were used to measure intelligence (APM).

From these three tests seven scores were computed. (1) The total number of uses on the 'Uses of Objects' (USES). (2) The total number of meanings on the 'Pattern Meanings' (PATTERNS). (3) The sum of the last two (FLUENCY). (4) The APM score was ranked and each person's rank subtracted from their rank on FLUENCY, thus giving a version of Hudson's bias measure of divergence (CONDI). (5 - 7) A score for the most original suggestion (defined statistically, see Appendix Three) on each of the two parts of the test and the sum of these two scores (ORG-I, ORG-II and ORG-TOT respectively).

The measure of the number of friends was the 'Length of the List' produced, see Appendix Six. The question being asked is simply, are the scores described above and
Length of these Lists related: that is, are the people who are fluent in putting names on the list also fluent in the open-ended tests?

It was found that the Length of the List and the various measures described had a significant tendency to be correlated, but that there was no such relations for intelligence. The values of Spearman's Rho between List Length and the measures discussed are given in Table One.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table One</th>
<th>Spearman's correlation between List Length and the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM USES PATTERNS</td>
<td>FLUENCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels * = P < .01 ** = P < .001

The relationship between the two measures of Ideational Fluency seemed strong enough to justify the use of the total scores. (Rho between USES and PATTERNS = .36) and between ORG-I and ORG-II = .49). That they were acceptable measures of divergence is supported by the lack of correlation between the APM and FLUENCY (Rho = .06) and between APM and ORG-TOT (Rho = .02).

It will be seen that the magnitude of the correlations between the divergent test and between these and the List Length is similar. By using the word Fluent for friendship as well as divergence, it has been implied
that all that has been produced is another divergence test: that people who are fluent on one exercise with their pens will be fluent on another. There is indeed some evidence with younger children that this is so (Hargreaves and Bolton, 1972).

In Appendix Six, Section Four it can be seen that the Length of the Lists produced by the individual pupils had some public counterpart: that those who felt they had more friends were seen as having more friends. Table Two below puts these three variables together. It shows List Length against fluency on the open-ended test with those named as having most friends against those not named in each cell. The Table clearly shows that consideration of both Fluency and List Length allows those people thought to have more friends to be more easily identified.

**TABLE TWO:**

List Length, Fluency and Nomination

(Not Named: Named)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of List of Friends</th>
<th>Short List Length (32%)</th>
<th>Medium List Length (35%)</th>
<th>Long List Length (33%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Fluency (32%)</td>
<td>10:2</td>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>1:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Fluency (33%)</td>
<td>3:3</td>
<td>5:1</td>
<td>2:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fluency (35%)</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>4:6</td>
<td>2:9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It seems reasonable to conclude that the patterning of adolescent friendships is related to the cognitive style known as divergent thinking. There are three obvious objections that might be made to this claim. Firstly the measure of List Length is not indicative of the individual's pattern of friendship. The evidence here, however, is that those who are prepared to name more people as friends are also seen by their peers as having more friends. Could there be by any better evidence than this?

Secondly, it might be objected that all that is being uncovered are the sociometric preferences found in the past (e.g. Haddon and Lytton, 1968). But as there was no link between intelligence and fluency nor any between intelligence and List Length, this would not seem to be the case.

The third objection might be that the extroverts in the class are chosen by others as having more friends and that such people would also be more fluent on the tests. This possibility was not examined. Past research has only found complex relationships at best between extraversion and divergence (Di Scipio, 1971; Leith, 1972) and more usually no relationship (Hudson, 1970; Smithers and Child, 1974). From these results it would seem that the following proposition needs further exploration: those who feel most free from constraints in certain intellectual tasks are the people who feel most free from constraints in certain social situations.
Section Four: The Myth of the Un-Social Scientist

This section considers the evidence that was obtained from the large sample questionnaire (Q2) about the relationship between an interest in science subjects at school and 'sociability'. The reason for this examination is because there is said to be an image of the scientist as a cold, hard-working and rather 'clinical' person: someone removed from the intimate and more personal aspects of the human lot - scientists are disdainful of the world of people and lack interest in them. So strongly has this image taken root that Hudson (1968) has granted it the status of an unwritten myth: the myth of the un-social scientist.

Beardslee and O'Dowd (1962) write of the scientist "...there is a clear lack of interest in people...(he/she is) self-sufficient, rational, persevering, and emotionally stable...competent in organising the world of things, but disdainful of the world of people...The personal life of the scientist is thought to be quite shallow...a masculine figure in a desexualised way." Hudson (1967) has shown that the stereotype of the scientist that holds in the States is also true in this country.

Such research, however, centres on other people's beliefs about scientists. This section is concerned with whether there are grounds for such beliefs. The myth makes two predictions which are relevant to the present investigation - that scientists are hard working and that
they are cold in their relationships. In turn this would seem to imply that less time is devoted to personal involvements and that there is less likelihood of involvement when the time is available.

With the help of the large scale questionnaire it might be possible to test these predictions. Two main elements are involved; a classification of respondents into scientists and non-scientists and some indication of the respondents' attitude to their social lives. The classification was based on the question: "Which school subject do you enjoy the most?" Alternatives were offered as shown in Appendix Four. One of the following four groups was chosen by 516 people. (1) physics, chemistry or biology, (2) maths, economics or geography, (3) modern languages, (4) classics, history or literature. The remainder of the sample either had no preferences between two or more subjects, chose a subject outside these groups or did not respond to the question. For the purposes of the following investigation, the first two groups of respondents were considered to be scientists and the second two groups were used as the contrasting artists.

The other element in the prediction concerns the social life of the respondents. This material is introduced in Appendix Six. The simplest question about the social lives of scientists is whether or not they claim fewer friends than the artists. If the total number of people claimed as friends and acquaintances is considered, then
there are no differences between the scientists and the artists.

This total, however, included acquaintances where the maximum number that could be claimed was 99. This limit had imposed a 'ceiling effect'. Again with the close friends most people had claimed between 2 and 5 leaving little leeway for discrimination. If the intermediate group of 'friends' is considered there is a small positive correlation in the predicted direction. Artists claim more friends (rho=.06, just significant at the 5% level).

In considering the differences between artists and scientists a number of confounding variables need to be disentangled. The most obvious difference between scientists and artists is that the former tend to be boys. Table Three shows the sex distributions for the four main subject groupings.

**TABLE THREE:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Geography &amp; Co.</th>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>Arts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi**$^2$ = 69.2 (Df = 3) One tailed significance beyond .001

With such a difference in the composition of the two populations and with differences in the friendship
patterns of the boys and girls, it would seem important to examine them separately. There is a further factor which is not easily separated and that is the claimed examination performance of these two subject groups. The correlation between claiming to have passed more 'O' levels and preferring a science subject had a rho value of .15 (N=510) significant beyond .001. This effect was stronger when considering the number of "A" levels to be taken later that year. Here the rho value reached .23 (N=396) significant beyond .001.

If these relationships are considered together with the fact that boys claim to know more people than girls (rho = .16 (N=770) significant beyond .001) and also that more 'O' levels are claimed by those who say they know most people (rho=.15 (N=762) significant beyond .001) then the naive examination of the correlation between artists and number of claimed friends can be seen to be misleading.

There are two ways of circumventing these interactions. Either by literally controlling for the variables being considered or by use of a partial correlation technique. The latter method makes considerable assumptions about the data and sometimes appears to allow the rejection of any null hypothesis, if there are sufficient numbers left in the groups a literal control is preferable.

Above, a small positive correlation was reported between naming a larger number of friends and being an artist. If the sexes are separated and the same comparison
made, it can be seen that this small correlation was due to the differences between the girls. Table Four shows two by two tables for the two sexes.

**TABLE FOUR:**

*Subject by Number of Friends by Sex*

*(Df. = 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scientists</td>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>Scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer Friends</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Friends</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{Chi}^2 = 20.9 \text{ Sig. beyond .001} \]

\[ \text{Chi}^2 = .003 \text{ N.S.} \]

There were a number of the quotations contained at the end of the Q2 questionnaire which seemed relevant to testing the myth. These quotations were taken from interviews conducted with the Edinburgh sample and are presented in Table Five below. Three of the variables quoted do not reach the 5% level of significance, but all are in the predicted direction. In no instances did these variables reach significance for the boys. In the table the left hand column names the two poles of the variable. In each case responses have been dichotomised. Further discussion of these responses and the Q2 questionnaire are contained in Appendix Four and the second part of this chapter.
Under the headings scientist and artist the two figures represent the two named poles respectively. These are followed by the \( \chi^2 \) value for the two ratios, and finally the significance level of that value. (All calculations had one degree of freedom.)

**TABLE FIVE:**

Other Variables Concerning Girl Scientists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scientists</th>
<th>Artists</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many close friends: few close friends</td>
<td>40:70</td>
<td>79:98</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many acquaintances: few acquaintances</td>
<td>41:72</td>
<td>90:91</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;My school work must be more important than my friends because it determines what I'm going to do for the rest of my life&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>51:58</td>
<td>59:120</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;You shouldn't tell people your personal problems&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>28:82</td>
<td>24:155</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;I wouldn't want to make any distinction between more general friends and close friends&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>40:70</td>
<td>43:133</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;I think you should always sort things out in your own head before you start to tell anyone else about them&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>75:37</td>
<td>100:78</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;Everyone needs someone to lean on&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>78:26</td>
<td>157:18</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing with &quot;I think that everyone would like to have more close friends&quot;: Disagreement</td>
<td>61:46</td>
<td>87:89</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: * = \( P < .05 \), ** = \( P < .005 \)
It would seem from these figures that the myth has some substance, but that now this substance is found in the responses of girls, whereas the work of Hudson was concerned with boys.

These results cannot be held to be of great moment. There are too many problems with this type of sampled response to questionnaires. But the concern was with substantiation of a myth. It would appear that this myth in some ways lingers on. Girls from Lambeth to Elgin who prefer science subjects have a tendency to claim relatively fewer friends than their artist counterparts. Further, they rate the friends they do have as less important to them than their work and have a stronger tendency to disclaim the need to have people to rely on. If this is the case it is not surprising that there are myths about the sociability of scientists.

The interest here is the differences between the sexes. Hudson's work was concerned with boys; and rather privileged boys at that; mostly attending public or established grammar schools. Here no hint of differences between the boys was found. It would seem that there might be grounds for asking, do girls now hold a similar position vis-a-vis science as boys did in certain schools in the 1960's?
Section Five: Patterns of Friendship

This last section of the part chapter is concerned with a purely descriptive aspect of the interpersonal data. In fact, the following descriptions more usually belong to sociological analysis. They are presented here for two reasons. Firstly, to aid the reader to better visualise the two classes used in the Edinburgh study and secondly, to highlight the positions of certain individuals who will be referred to again later in this thesis.

The three Figures - One, Two and Three - summarise the relationships that the question, "Who do you know best in the form?" sought to uncover. The type of line connecting the individuals shows the first, second and third choices. The circles representing the individual members of the form have been grouped primarily to reflect closer connection and secondly to avoid overlap of lines. See Appendix Three, Part Three.

Figure One shows all the sixth formers in the smaller of the two schools. Here, for a number of purposes, the fifth and sixth forms worked together and so a number of the choices lay outside the group involved in the investigation. This is notable with the girls who stand as two separate pairs; their other connections were with the fifth formers. The boys do interlink and show two basic groups. Five to the left of the diagram and four to the right with one 'floating' person. The three main pairs of friends stand out. These particular friendships
FIGURE ONE

Sociogram from 'Who do you know best?'
(Small Sixth form)
will receive further comment in the next chapter. The two boys who received no nominations were new to the school. It can also be seen that although '37' was nominated by six people he was not nominated as a closest friend.

Figures Two and Three concern respectively the girls and boys of the older school. Here there were no complications about friends being in a different form, although two members of the form were absent when the questionnaire was completed. If the two diagrams are taken together, three groups emerge. A boys' group, a girls' group and a mixed group. The weaker link being between the mixed group and the boys, rather than between the girls and the mixed group. This latter appears rather loose in the diagram - an impression which was dispelled in terms of those people's actual interactions.

Among the girls' group, two sub-groups clearly emerge, the larger one of six members and the smaller one of three. This leaves three girls out of the groupings. One named a member of each of the three groups on the figure, another missed out the smaller girls' group and the third was the only girl not named by anyone.

The structure of the boys' group is remarkably simple considering the numbers involved. Essentially it is two sub-groups with a chain between with a lump in the chain. This leaves seven boys out. Of these, two lie between the parts of the chain and two others neither
FIGURE TWO

Sociogram from 'Who do you know best?'

(Large Sixth form - girls)
FIGURE THREE

Sociogram from 'Who do you know best?'
(Large sixth form - boys)
named anyone on their questionnaires nor were they named by anyone.

The upper group on the figure is very tightly formed, especially at the tail-end, where all members name one another. Even the looser middle part of the figure has remarkably few connections running out of it. The left-hand boys' group is largely formed on the basis of the many connections with its central member - 23 - who was nominated no fewer than nine times.

The plain circles represent people who had symmetrical relationships, that is for each of their nominations there was a returned nomination - although not necessarily at the same level. The hatched circles represent people who were not nominated by anyone. The three people who were still at school at the time of the interviews and refused to be interviewed all belong to this last group of people who were not nominated by any of their peers.

The first part of this chapter has presented three small studies of a type which can be based on the data gathered in the two main field investigations. As can be seen from Appendices Five, Six and Eight, a number of similar studies could be constructed. The point here, however, is not to thoroughly examine all this data but to illustrate one set of ways of approaching questions about friendship and to provide material which can be employed in my conclusion.
The second part of this chapter presents a rather different method of investigation, but one which makes use of the same questionnaires and has therefore been included under the heading of experimental psychology.

Part Two: A Questionnaire of Quotations

This part chapter has two aims. The first of these is to see how peculiar the views expressed by the Edinburgh sixth formers were, and the second is to begin some examination of whether particular sub-groups of pupils emphasised different view-points from others.

To help establish these points the large sample questionnaire contained three pages of quotations gathered from the interviews I had conducted with the Edinburgh sixth formers. A copy of this questionnaire and details of its administration appear in Appendix Four. The 48 quotations were chosen before the transcriptions could be thoroughly examined. They are not exactly the set I would now choose. They do, however, convey something of the flavour of the material gathered as can be seen from the extensive quotations given in the next chapter.

The larger sample were asked for their reactions to these quotations to be expressed in the form of a number on a five-point-scale from agreement (1) with the statement through to disagreement (5) with it. There was
considerable variation in the responses to these statements, but every statement received every possible response. The mean values for the statements for the whole sample ranged from 1.4 (almost total agreement with) "Everybody needs to have friends", through to almost total disagreement with "I haven't made any new friends in the last couple of years", where the overall mean was 4.8. While there was a wide range of mean values for the individual statements, the mean for all statements taken together was 2.97. That is there was only a very small positive bias. These and the following figures are based on the 845 questionnaires returned. Of these 807 had responses to all 48 quotations, the remainder for the most part having missed single items, mostly at the tops and bottoms of questionnaire pages.

During the instructions it was emphasised that the mid category should be used freely. (In distinction from the normal instruction to avoid its use.) This category was defined as not knowing, being undecided or as not applying to the respondent. I would argue that if the statements are related to the sorts of constructs that sixth formers in general have about friendships then there will be fairly clear tendency for the responses to be polarised. On the other hand when the statement is meaningless, of little interest or relevance, the mid category will be used.

Among the 48 quotations were five which contained references to such matters as sibling relationships and
marriage of siblings. These quotations would be irrelevant to some respondents. The remaining 43 statements produced a range of mid-point responses - occasions on which the respondent put a '3' against the quotation. The extremes of this range were, on the one hand, the quotation "everybody needs to have friends" to which only 2.8% of respondents replied with a '3' and, on the other, the statement: "My school work must be more important than my friends. It determines what I am going to do for the rest of my life," to which 17.7% of the sample responded with a '3'.

The mean percentage of '3' responses over the 43 quotations and all subjects was 11.6% - a figure well below a random response of 20%. From this I would argue that, in spite of direct encouragement to use the indecisive category, these pupils made good sense of the quotations.

It is not a substantial part of this thesis to examine differences in the views sixth formers have about friendship. Nevertheless given the apparent grounds for believing that the quotations presented were of significance to many of the respondents it would seem of value to present some of the differences that were observed.

In the following pages ten sets of variables are considered. The interaction of these variables with the quotations are summarised in the three figures presented in this chapter. The quotations are numbered with the code number that appears below the boxes in the questionnaire
(see Appendix Four) and are grouped under headings in the order of the groupings used in Chapter Four.

The numbers in the figures are the chi\(^2\) values derived from tables based on three values for the quotations (i.e. agreement, indeterminate and disagreement), and on different numbers of values for the ten different variables. The degrees of freedom are shown under the variable heading.

The first set of quotations are associated with Section Three in Chapter Four (page 91 below); they concern the general need for friends. In Figure Four, section (a), it can be seen that none of the variables had a significant relation with these quotations. One recurrent theme in the interviews which was directly connected with the need for friends was the effect of leaving the home area. Section (b) of the Figure concerns the single quotation "I'm really looking forward to getting away from this area". Two variables from the ten showed a marked relationship with this quotation. The area of the country that respondents came from, and the percentage of friends in the respondents' own age group. In Moray and Nairn 65\% of pupils expressed agreement with the statement. In Edinburgh this number was down to 23\%. London, Oxford and Newcastle were ranged between these two extremes. The second relationship was less marked. It was to the effect that people who claimed a higher proportion of all their friends from
FIGURE FOUR
Interactions Between Quotations and Ten Main Variables - I
(Chi\(^2\) Values and Significance Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotations concerned with</th>
<th>Quotation number</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. of 'O' level passes</th>
<th>Area of country</th>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>% of friends of own age</th>
<th>No. of close friends</th>
<th>Total no. of friends</th>
<th>No. of friends of the opposite sex</th>
<th>Contact with partner if any</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) The general need for friends</td>
<td>/24/</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/69/</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/34/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Wanting to leave home area</td>
<td>/12/</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Satisfaction with present numbers of friends</td>
<td>/30/</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/52/</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>/60/</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) The need to be alone some of the time</td>
<td>/46/</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/48/</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) The need for friends to share interests with and be able to go out with them</td>
<td>/16/</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/39/</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/67/</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/20/</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels: * = P<.05, ** = P<.005, *** = P<.0005
their own age group were more likely to deny the statement.

The third set of quotations on Figure Four concern satisfaction with friendships, these correspond to Section Four in Chapter Four. There are no particular striking clusters of relationships here. Quotations numbered /30/ and /52/ showed some connection with total claimed number of friends and contact with partners. In the case of the first quotation, those who had partners or who claimed a larger total number of friends were more likely to agree with the proposition that they could not remember a time when they did not have friends. The other statement referred to already having too many friends at the present time. Those people who claimed either more or less friends than the medium third of the population were more likely to agree and less likely to disagree with the proposition than the medium third. This U-shaped relationship was reversed with the partnership variable. Here those who claimed to see partners often or did not have one were more likely to disagree and less likely to agree with the statement /52/ than the medium third who had partners but did not see so much of them.

The number of 'O' level passes that respondents claimed was linked with the quotations about being alone (section (d) of Figure Four). The third of the population which claimed the fewest 'O' levels were more likely to want to be with other people in a depressed mood and be on their own in a contented mood than the other two-thirds of the population.
The set of statements contained in the final section of Figure Four showed little in the way of relationships. Out of forty possibilities only three reached the 5% level of significance.

The first set of quotations on Figure Five concerned the more internal aspects of friendship; the ability to talk to people and the increased importance of such talking. One variable showed a definite link with the three quotations; this was the different areas that respondents came from. These differences were complex but the main difference was one between the Scots and the English parts of the sample. The Scots were more likely to affirm /70/ and /35/ and to deny /63/ than their English counterparts: relatively the Scots stressed the value of being able to talk more seriously to their friends.

The second section (b) of Figure Five concerns sharing problems and matters of importance. Although all five quotations appear to have a similar theme, the responses to them were different. Only one variable showed consistent interaction with three of these five quotations. The more '0' levels claimed the more likely it was that the respondent would feel that problems and matters of importance could be shared with friends.

Section (c) on Figure Five concerned the quotation about being unable to tell friends of actions which were disliked. Those respondents with a higher proportion of friends drawn from the opposite sex were more likely to deny that they had this feeling.
**FIGURE FIVE**

Interactions Between Quotations and Ten Main Variables—II

(Chi$^2$ Values and Significance Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotations concerned with</th>
<th>Quotation number</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. 'O' level passes</th>
<th>Area of country</th>
<th>% of friends of own age</th>
<th>No. of close friends</th>
<th>Total no. of friends of the opposite sex if any</th>
<th>Contact with partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) The need to be able to talk to people seriously</td>
<td>/70/</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/35/</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/63/</td>
<td>15.1 28.3 23.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Sharing problems and other matters of importance with friends</td>
<td>/66/</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/32/</td>
<td>10.3 20.1 37.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/19/</td>
<td>16.7 22.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/38/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Being able to give and take criticism</td>
<td>/40/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Characteristics of close friends</td>
<td>/28/</td>
<td>6.9 14.0 30.3 43.6 16.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/36/</td>
<td>15.1 15.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/38/</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Trusting people</td>
<td>/51/</td>
<td>46.3 12.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0 10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/8/</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels:  *= P<.05,  ** = P<.005,  *** = P<.0005
The three quotations in section (d) of Figure Five concern close friends. Three variables had significant relationships with the first two of these quotations. The chi² values in this section of the figure represent complex cell distributions which are difficult to interpret without further analysis.

The final section of Figure Five concerns trusting friends: that the important feature of a close friend is that you can trust them /8/ and that certain things cannot be told to friends as they might not take them in the right spirit. For both these quotations there was a definite sex difference in the same direction - girls stress the importance of trust and do not feel that there are things which should be withheld from their friends.

Understandably, some of the strongest effects discovered were shown in connection with the quotations concerning partnerships. Here two of the variables were of direct relevance. Section (a) of Figure Six shows these relationships. Two of the quotations, /50/ and /56/, are closely linked and are to the effect that a partner has become the most important of friends. Naturally those people with partners were the ones that felt this to be true. One interesting point about the pattern of responses to these quotations was that the most disagreements with the idea that the partner had taken the place of friends did not come from those with no partners or indeed those who saw their partners most, but from the middle group.
**FIGURE SIX**

Interactions Between Quotations and Ten Main Variables - III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotations concerned with</th>
<th>Quotation number</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. of 'O' level passes</th>
<th>Area of Country</th>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>% of friends of own age</th>
<th>No. of close friends</th>
<th>Total No. of friends of opposite sex</th>
<th>Contact with partner if any</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) The importance of partnerships</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Pressure of partnerships</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Friends family &amp; school work</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Developments in friendships over recent years</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels: * = P<.05, ** = P<.005, *** = P<.0005
The number of 'O' level passes claimed also interacted with three of the quotations in the same direction and manner as the variable concerning partnership although to a lesser effect. Again with the variable which concerned the percentage of friends from the opposite sex there was a tendency for those with more such friends to respond in a similar manner to those with partners, except in the instance of quotation /50/ where those with more friends of the opposite sex were more likely to deny that their partners were taking the place of their friends than were the other groups.

The section concerning the pressures that people felt about having partnerships was confined to the two quotations /18/ and /64/: (respectively having to put on a show in front of a partner and whether or not having a partner could wait until school was finished). Hardly surprisingly those who had partners did not feel it could wait! Those pupils who claimed more 'O' level passes were also inclined to feel it should not wait, compared with those who had fewer such passes. There was considerable variation between the different areas in their responses to these two statements. It was, however, clear that the pupils in London were more willing to wait till they left school for a partnership, while those in the country areas, particularly Moray and Nairn were not so willing to wait.

Section (c) of Figure Six concerns the relative importance of families and school work to friends.
Quotation /15/ affirms that school work must be more important than friends. Those pupils who claimed more 'O' levels were more likely to deny this statement than those who claimed fewer. Again, the Scots were more likely to deny this proposition and the Londoners to affirm it. Probably this is due in part to the interactive effect of the area and 'O' level variables. For among the third of the population claiming the least 'O' level passes only some six Scots out of 220 were found. This is primarily the result of selective entry sixth forms in Scotland. Among the other relationships indicated in this section of the Figure the strongest was between having a partner and not seeing much of parents, a hardly surprising interaction.

The final section of quotations concerned changes in friendships. There were five statements that referred to such changes. The obvious variable with which there might be some connection is that of age. As can be seen from the figure, three of the interactions reached the 5% level. In the case of statements /22/ and /7/ it was the younger pupils who affirmed the statement and this affirmation declined with age. With statement /10/ the effect was opposite. The older pupils felt it to be true rather than the younger ones. Although quotations /26/ did not produce a significant level of difference between the cells there was a steady decline in agreement with the statement from 72% of 16 year olds to 52% of 19 year olds. The area of the country from which respondents came showed
considerable and varying interaction. It might be of interest to note that in response to quotation /22/ (not having made new friends in the previous two years) it was the pupils from the largest towns who were most likely to affirm it, i.e. those from London and Newcastle. Other interactions in this section were complex.

The relationships that have been described in this part chapter were presented purely for descriptive and suggestive purposes. There appeared to be systematic differences between groups in the original intensive sample, but the numbers involved were small. It appears from the results reviewed here that such differences could be substantiated with the help of a general questionnaire of the type that formed the basis of the large sample survey. Such a questionnaire would, however, have to have a narrower scope than the present one. It might, for example, concentrate on the notion of trust in friendship and present a more extensive range of quotations on this one theme. More particular piloting of such quotations would be necessary to disentangle some of the complex interactions.

The main point of this part chapter is to show that there are techniques available to the experimental social psychologist which will allow him to manipulate the type of material which humanistic psychologists might produce.
It is part of my present thesis that distinctions which are used to separate differing traditions in psychology are misleading and to that extent may be harmful. Thus I am not offering any systematic definitions of the headings used in these chapters. Nevertheless, as humanistic psychology is the youngest of the three traditions that I wish to illustrate, the nature of the material which follows may be less obvious to the reader and so it may be helpful to offer some general comments on humanistic psychology.

Misiak and Sexton (1973) claim that "There is no conclusive definition of humanistic psychology". (p. 115). They do, however, offer certain guide lines. Humanistic psychology, they claim, is characterised by its attention to the uniqueness of the human experience, by a concentration on an understanding and grasping of those aspects of being human which are important to people themselves. Studies which are undertaken in the name of humanistic psychology must be 'meaningful' to all concerned. It is also common for humanistic writers to pay particular attention to those
assumptions which I earlier referred to as 'ethical'. They add that there is little in the way of a unified philosophical foundation to the humanistic approach, although it pays more lip service to Continental writers than to Anglo-American writers.

*Within these broad guide lines it would appear that a topic such as friendship would be appropriate to the humanistic psychologist's frame of mind. But while the experimental psychologist has at least reached a state of awareness of his neglect of the study of friendship, the humanistic psychologist is still at a stage in which particular areas cannot be seen as neglected. The reason for the paucity is a general lack of humanistic writings. Indeed there are few works which can with safety be referred to as humanistic. Maslow (e.g. 1968), the most prominent figure in the movement, has devoted most of his energies to the principles and ideology of humanistic psychology rather than with exhibiting its value in practical examples. Carl Rogers (1969) presents a humanistic examination of learning, but most of his other writings are concerned with matters which are either relatively new to psychology, such as encounter groups (e.g. 1970) or are of more general interest (e.g. 1965). Rollo May has produced substantial works on matters of central importance to psychology (1969, 1972), but he is not usually regarded as a humanistic psychologist, although Misiak and Sexton note his contribution to the movement.*
The investigation presented in this chapter attempts to convey the meaning and importance of friendship for members of the two sixth forms involved with the Edinburgh experimental study. Essentially the account is a series of quotations taken from the interviews conducted with these pupils.

The quotations are organised round a series of recurrent themes. These themes were not part of the original structuring of the interviews, but emerged from reading and endeavouring to order the transcripts. The interviews had been structured only insofar as a set number of questions were asked of every interviewee (see Appendix Nine). For the most part, no exact question order was imposed. In those cases where an imposition of a question became necessary due to a lack of spontaneous leads, the order adopted was from the most general and open-ended to the more particular and suggestive. No response is included unless that response had also been produced by a pupil spontaneously; although the actual quote given may have been elicited by direct questioning. Quotations have been translated into middle class Southern English, and in a number of cases words have been added in brackets to show the meaning that was originally given by the context. Dots are used to indicate silences and pauses. Dashes show that words or sentences have been left out in the quotations presented. Quotations are all indented and each new quote starts with a capital letter and ends with the respondent's code number,
except in those cases where the quotation contains material that would allow others to identify the speaker.

The aim of the following account is not to show the ways groups of individuals differ but rather to present the whole range of views that were voiced. Thus, for example, I have deliberately made no direct reference to differences between the sexes or the schools. In the second part of this chapter the central themes of understanding and of trust are examined.

Section Two: Reactions to the Topic

Not unnaturally puzzlement was one of the commonest responses to the discovery, by the sixth formers, that I wished to ask about friendships. The idea that there is anything that can be asked about such a universal and simple concept as this was strange to many of them. Even the most fluent and subtle pupils had something of an air of slight indignation:

I've just never thought about friends really (31) 
You just don't think about friends...you just have them and enjoy yourself and that's all there is to it (48)

This indignation is understandable for if there is nothing in general that an interviewer can sensibly ask, then he may be seen as wishing to probe particular relationships with the possibility of ensuing embarrassment. In many cases it was necessary to make it explicit that no names
need be used. However, not all pupils were surprised by the topic. For one or two it was a matter with which they were conversant:

I've thought about it quite a lot (6)
Yes I've often thought about this sort of thing but don't talk about it (4)

Whether or not friendship is a common topic of thought or conversation, the 300,000 words of transcription that were gathered from 62 people on the subject testifies to a potential ability to talk if the need arises.

Section Three: The General Need for Friends

The most common and general affirmation about friendship was its universality and necessity:

It would be a hell of an empty life if it wasn't for friends...they are very important the most important thing a person has (16)
I think we all need friends to get along (22)
It wouldn't be worth living if you didn't have friends...what would you do all on your own (50)
There's nobody who hasn't got any friends (18)

The opposite view to this last was expressed by one pupil, and a number of people felt that their friendships were not all that they could be:

I haven't got a close friend or a girl friend...
I don't think I'm in a minority (in that respect) in this school (6)
I seem to have been doing pretty well without any close friends for a long time (3)
It's only about once a week that I go out with (my friends) so I suppose I could do without that...I would manage without them (13) Since I was thirteen I've not really had any close friends for the sake of my career and I don't want any close friends I don't want anything to tie me down (38)

The large majority of people didn't agree with this last sentiment. But of course it all depended on what was meant by 'close friend'. It seems probable that those who felt they lacked such a relationship were also those who had thought more about the matter and were using the term in a somewhat idealised way: a way that implied the relationship could not be faulted. In this ideal sense it seems doubtful if anyone was claiming to have a close friendship. At the other extreme no one claimed that they had no friends whatsoever, although one pupil seemed to come close to this position:

I suppose I don't see many people...no I don't know anyone apart from at school -- -- I don't mind my life being how it is (in this respect) I really don't care how it is...if I could (change it in any way) I would have done something else rather than physics (7)

This person had left school a few weeks previously and by the time of the interview, the only people with which there appeared to be any contact was the immediate family. A more common reaction to the idea of not having any friends was to mind about it and want to do something to rectify the situation. Some people expressed this
more poetically than others, but many could remember such a time:

If you lost your friends you would miss them you'd be lost for things to do you would have to start building up new friends (12)
If you lost all your friends a big part of you would be hacked out you would start again but you wouldn't forget (55)
You knew that you couldn't go out because you didn't actually have a friend to go out with although you saw other people out in the streets playing football you just sort of stayed in...you felt...I wouldn't say depressed...but kind of like I used to get fed up and monly (17)

Most people expressed an awareness of the balance to be struck between an attachment to friends and other demands of life - such as the need to move elsewhere for work: friends would be missed but not to such an extent as to prevent the move.

I would miss my friends but it wouldn't be a terrible blow to me I would recover from it because I do spend quite a bit of time on my own (13)
I'll miss 36 when I go down there but then I'll make new friends there (48)
I could do without my friends but I probably wouldn't be very happy (39)
They are alright (friends) ... you really couldn't do without them...well actually maybe I could...if I go away I'll make new friends easily enough... I would try to keep in touch with the old friends and make new ones as quickly as possible (56)
Most people I know have more friends than I do if I
moved away I would miss the ones that I have but I would do it anyway (53) (It's) not so much that I want to get away from home more from the area it would be depressing to think that you lived in one area all your life (8) It would be a sort of adventure to go abroad and live on my own its hard to say (what it would be like) without trying it...I'd like to try it (52)

In this last section I have presented a selection of views on the general need for friends. The next section is more specifically concerned with people's satisfaction with the friendships that they did have at the time of the interviews.

Section Four: Satisfaction with Existing Friendships

As far as satisfaction with present friendships was concerned three types of opinion were expressed in the interviews. The first of these came from people who felt that they already had enough friends, if not too many:

I'm quite happy at the moment with the way things are in fact I quite often seem to have too many friends (22)
I couldn't cope with any more friends (25)
I like the group I'm with more friends would cause more problems (46)
My friends are O.K. well balanced I've got enough (42)
Enough close friends is enough too many and they aren't close any more (40)
In contrast to the last group were those who felt that more friends would not go amiss, or at least being more certain of the friends known already would be an advantage:

It would be nice to know certain people better... nice to have lots of friends I think everyone would like to have more friends (10) I suppose I would like to have more friends I know I would be crowded but that's nice (60) I would like to have more friends they wouldn't all be such a happy lot there would be some that I could really have a good argument with (37) I think I would like to have one or two closer friends (56) I suppose more friends wouldn't come amiss it would make things more interesting, introduce new ideas, I'm not really bothered about girl friends (39)

The third set of opinions were held by those respondents who knew that to some extent their friendships were not all that they might be (or who were aware of the differences between themselves and others) but who felt that this was not an unsatisfactory state of affairs:

A lot of people have a wide circle of friends but I just stick to one person (32) I put few people (on the list of friends) because I don't see many I don't mind (7) Over the years I've not had a great number of friends a few close ones not a crowd...two close friends is enough I don't bother about going around in a crowd (12) It's O.K. the way it is I wouldn't want to have more friends or a girl friend at the moment (45)
While some people expressed the feeling that they did not want a boy or girl friend just at that time, or were not bothered about it, others felt that it was an important matter:

Maybe a better girl-friend would be more like me in sense of humour (40)
Wouldn't mind a different girl-friend or more close friends (54)
It would be good if I had a boy friend because then I could go out with my girl friend without sort of being in the way like I am at the moment (33)
I wouldn't mind a boy friend at the moment but I've got quite sufficient other friends (17)

Section Five: Making New Friends

For people who are not satisfied with their present friendships the obvious next question is what can be done about it. For some it is a relatively easy matter to make new friends, for some it is difficult, while for others it is simply not worth the effort:

I find I can't be bothered to make friends you get to know someone and they go away and you never see them again (8)
This isn't a good time to (be going) out and making friends (6)
It would take me a long time to make friends a lot of people make friends easier than I (13)
From working in the hotel I can adjust to anything talk to anybody (38)
When I do go away I'll make new friends (57)
Some respondents were able to offer details of how new friendships came about or the circumstances of the first meetings:

It was as if - - had been sent by god this other bloke left and within a week his place had been taken by somebody else I talked to him and found he was an Aberdeen supporter too and we flung our arms around each other - - - I started smoking with my sister and I've met a lot of people through that friendship just sort of developed (- -) I got to know him because he asked me to play volleyball and the friendship got stronger (36)
Our old friendships interests (seem to) diverge but I have new friends now mostly through sports (27)
One of them lived just up the street and I got to know him and he went around with the others so I got to know them (19)
To tell you the truth I've only started to make friends since I joined the karate club (54)

Section Six: The Need to be Alone

Naturally there is a clear distinction between being alone due to a lack of friends and a normal need to be alone some of the time. Most people expressed such a need, either because it was fulfilled or because it was not met:

I like to sit down when I get in and think things out (30)
You have to have some time to yourself to just sit down and think (38)
I like to be on my own as much as I can... it's just I never get the time (57)

In contrast to these commoner sentiments stood those expressing no such need; indeed some pupils were emphatic that wanting to be alone was an odd sort of desire:

No I never want to be on my own I think that would be crazy (21)
I don't think there are times I want to be alone I would rather be with people than be on my own (34)
I don't like being on my own much I get bored easily (44)
I don't really like being on my own a long time I'm used to a lot of people around (6)

Commonly the desire to be alone was linked with going out for a walk or a cycle. My impression from the earlier work with the Newcastle pupils was that the majority of the sixth form girls spent many hours every night wandering the local woods - a night activity not yet confirmed by any observation. Some pupils, however, have more money than others:

When I haven't got anything to do I sometimes just like driving around on my own (55)
I take the dog out and find myself wandering for miles just to be on my own is quite good sometimes... or if something coming up that I'm looking forward to you can have a good think about it and what you are going to do (22)
I like walking home on my own at night sometimes its sort of peaceful my brother has a dog which I take out at night sometimes too (48)
The above quotations concern times when people's primary desire is simply to be alone. There are other times when this desire is due to the way the person feels or the mood that they are in. Some people seek the company of others when they are in a bad mood, while other people shun such company:

If I'm in a bad mood I prefer to find someone to take it out on (2)
I like to be on my own in a good mood and with people when I'm in a bad mood as it stops me thinking about things (40)
If you are with other people you've got more chance of them cheering you up...on your own you'd be getting worse and worse thinking everything was worse (60)
If I'm in a bad mood I don't want to take it out on other people...if you are feeling really depressed I don't think that someone else is going to help (12)
If I'm in a bad mood I prefer to be by myself quite a lot (47)

There are times of more severe stress when the individual's feelings about being alone may not be the same as usual. Eleven of the sixty-six subjects of the Edinburgh sample had lost one or other parent through separation or death within a time that they could remember. The problem, with which we are all familiar, of when to leave someone alone in distressing circumstances, was raised:

When my father died everyone avoided me they didn't want to say anything well that doesn't work with me I just want someone to talk to (51)
I think it's nice to relax on your own and do nothing at all if you are deeply upset I would prefer to just be left alone (49)
Section Seven: What is a Friend?

The first few pages of this chapter have skirted round the question of what counts as a friend, what is it that is needed or missed, what is it that is of such importance? The following sub-sections present some of the answers given to the question, "What is a friend?" These are crudely classified here into two groups; those answers which emphasise the benefits of activities and possible experiences that can only be had with friends, and those which emphasise the more internal aspects of friendship, the personal interactions, talking and trusting. This separation is an artificial one simply to help the reader digest the following material more easily. Respondents usually suggested ideas which belong to both categories. Pupils made many specific points about friendship and why friends are needed, before turning to these, however, the following quotations illustrate more general comments. These are of interest for the obvious way in which they beg the question that was being asked:

Makes life easier to have friends (10)
People like to be in groups its a tribal thing I don't think folk like to be on their own all that much (62)
You need friends because you need friends (34)
I don't know why people have friends but it would be an awfully dull world without them (60)

Usually people started their responses to the question of what friendship was with very general statements and were
encouraged to expand these further. Such encouragement was given in all cases as this was felt to be one of the most important areas of questioning in the interview. Before considering these detailed responses here is a selection of the more usual initial statements:

I would feel lost without friends (40)
You need people to discuss things with and do things with (45)
Wouldn't have much to do or talk about and you would probably think people were against you if you had no friends (14)
If I didn't have anyone to talk to I would feel out of place (1)
You need friends for the company to talk to to do things with it would be very lonely to go through life with no friends it must be miserable to be lonely (49)
Everybody needs company needs someone to talk to people who haven't are a right dull set (55)
You have friends so that you don't get lonely don't get depressed...stops suicide (48)

(a) External Criteria for Friendship

On being pressed to elaborate from the sort of generalisations illustrated above, most respondents started with suggestions that concerned their interests and activities, or the general need to be able to be active:

Without friends would be sitting at home doing nothing (59)
Unless you like sitting in the house all the time you've got to have friends to go out with (41)
Common interests that's the reason for friendship...
to go out to dances and things (6)
Someone that's got the same interests likes doing
what I do has a good time (15)
I suppose the friendships that I have evolved around
our common interests (13)
Music plays a big part in all my friends' lives (16)
Close friends have the same interests as you like
war-gaming and playing football (47)
You do things if you've got friends more than you
do on your own (53)
You need someone so that you can get out of the house
you have a good laugh (29)
If there was no one I would miss going out and the
daft things my pals do (42)

(b) Relaxation and Stimulation The theme of 'a good
laugh' was a recurrent one. It seems to be closely
associated with elements of relaxation and enjoyment -
'letting your hair down':

People I muck about with are daft (55)
I suppose I could call all my friends idiots (44)
You're guaranteed a laugh with your friends I would
crack up without them (42)
One friend is particularly funny it helps you when
you are tired...you need friends to relieve the
atmosphere (40)
I would miss their company some of the conversations
are really stupid - - (we) share the same kind
of sense of humour (39)

In some cases the theme of relaxation was mentioned
explicitly for its own sake. This is illustrated below,
firstly with a case where one pupil had noticed a change
in another, a change which the second pupil was aware of
himself:
Maybe 48 has more friends now because he has been hanging around with me...before he was rather serious never cracking jokes and that but now he's getting like that too (36)  
(There are more) people I know now in the school than I've ever known before... you're closer in the sixth form you talk to everybody...you get a good laugh with your friends there would be hardly any enjoyment if you hadn't got them (48)  
(I was working last summer) when I did see one or two of them it was really good because you could relax (4)  
It's relaxing to have friends to go out and enjoy yourself with (46)  

A counterpart to the relaxation, that comes with company, is its stimulative value; a distraction from the monotony or hard work of the day, and also a source of stimulation when lethargy is felt to be taking over:

Sometimes I'm on my own...I would like to meet people...I feel lazy and need someone to encourage you...push you...sometimes you tend to go and sit down (61)  
I don't like being on my own at all...but I can't be bothered...I sit and watch T.V... I don't like being left out...I'm a bit mixed up I think (19)  
You need people to learn things and discuss things books can't do it all (34)  

(c) The Need to Talk  Part of the socialisation that was considered in the last paragraphs was desire to have people to talk to, a need which in itself seems fairly universal and borders on a need that is more specifically
associated with friendship, to have people who are seen as safe to talk to. There follows a range of illustrations of the more general views that were expressed on talking to people:

It's nice to be able to sit down and talk to people...sort of relaxing (11)
Less important things can be talked about jokingly (30)
When we were younger we couldn't get a decent argument going (12)
Now we sometimes want to have an intellectual argument (3)
Lots of people don't have any views they are so apathetic about politics and religion they just sit there -- -- I don't like arguing you lose a lot of friends discussing politics (15) (!)
A friend is someone to talk to to share interests with (5)
You need friends to talk about specific subjects (40)

In some cases a more direct awareness of the need was expressed. This awareness led to a realisation that there may be limits and difficulties about what may and what may not be talked about safely and that these limits are relative to the second party of the conversation:

Small things build up if you've got no one to talk to (40)
I think talking to people has become more important I enjoy it (6)
You go out with your friends you hear about the things which have happened in the day...the funny things and the serious things...if you don't talk to them things get bottled up in you (48)
You need other people to compare what they think with what you think (10)
It's important to find out what other people think about a matter -- I suppose it's better to talk to someone you know as it's reassuring...but it depends what you are talking about (44)
I know I could talk to anyone about football but it's a matter of (knowing you have the) same sorts of views as them for example they don't ask me about my relations with a girl and I don't ask them (13)
People don't talk about such things (girl-friends) just make stupid jokes (39)
You need people to talk to about things that are to do with people of your own age group (59)

The most characteristic type of response was couched in terms of the trust that could be placed in a friend and hence the freedom with which confidences could be shared. These aspects of friendship point us towards the central part of my illustration and are therefore dealt with in the second part of this chapter

**Section Eight: Friends, Close Friends and Partners**

This section is concerned with the distinctions that pupils made between the types of friends that they had. So far there have been some references to the characteristics of close friends but little reference to boy or girl friends. Below are set out the distinctions that were offered firstly between friends and close friends, and secondly between friends and partners.
The thoughts expressed by pupils on the first set of distinctions are complex and do not readily categorise. In the following extracts these views have been divided into two sets which are distributed along two dimensions. The first of these dimensions concerns the distinction between closer and not so close friends: the characteristics of one versus the characteristics of the other, for example, close friends are the ones known longest and in whom most can be confided. The second dimension is based on the confidence that the individual is prepared to place in his or her friends. People known less well are unpredictable in their reactions, those known better may be trusted. This element of trust appears as one of the crucial characteristics of close friendship.

(a) Close Friends Versus Friends The first point about term 'close friends' is whether or not it is one which people use. It was such a common element in the pilot interviews that the phrase was suggested early on in the schedule used with the intensive sample. There were, however, at least two people who were not happy about the distinction:

There's not any real difference between general and close friends (55)
I don't really distinguish between close friends and more general friends (31)

Even in these two cases it seems likely that the point being
made is not that the term close friend has no use, but that they do not wish to treat, or behave towards one group differently from another. Many people made general points about distinguishing close friends from others. There follows a selection of these general views:

Your close friends like doing the same things as you and have the same tastes as you (10)
If my best friend wants to keep something quiet then I keep it quiet and the other way round...we've got very little in common except supporting the same football team...otherwise there are vast differences between us (55)
A close friend you would go out with a lot like for example a girl friend and you would know their family (6)
It's not easy to have close friends it's pretty hard to find them (18)
I suppose a close friend is someone you can rely on if you want to go someplace (37)
You can be more open with a close friend than with an ordinary (one) freer to go and see them (32)
Close friends help you if you are in trouble (21)

One of the commonest ways of characterising a close friend was in terms of some positive comparative quality. Knowing more about them, having known them for a longer period or seeing them more often than other friends. The following quotes illustrate these three characteristics in turn:

It would seem prying if you asked people who weren't close friends about what they had been doing because you don't know that much about their lives (62)
Longer lasting friendships I suppose are deeper (25)
Since primary (school) we've got even closer because we've known one another longer (12)
To know longer is to know deeper (30)
Close friends are the ones you see more often and have probably been your friends for longer (53)
Close friends I've been brought up with since primary and you can tell them things that you can't tell anyone else...you see more of them (58)
I spend more time with the closer ones and talk more to them (45)
It's just I don't see so much of the general friends... they might be great friends if they lived next door to me (16)
The more you see a person the more you talk to them (3)
Close friends you are with a lot of the time...the more you see a person the better you get to know them (59)

Against these views are the ones expressed by a minority of respondents. For these people it was not simply a matter of knowing people longer or seeing them more often:

Friends don't have to be my age they can be any age... like a man I see on holiday...I only see him occasionally but (we) are really good friends (4)
I've not known him long but I'm really good friends with him (36)
There are some folk at the club that I think I know better than the people that I've known years at school (54)

In the last section quotations were presented to show how being able to talk to people was regarded as being of importance for friendship, page 103 above. In fact in some of those quotations close friendship was specifically mentioned. The following quotations show how common the view was that being able to talk easily and openly is a
A close friend is someone you can share your feelings with...someone you can really talk to and will listen (23)
Closer friends talk about less general more personal things (16)
Close friends are the people that you confide in other people you talk to but you don't really say anything that means anything (51)
There's not much difference between close friends and the others except that I wouldn't tell the others (certain things) (52)
I suppose a close friend is someone you can tell all your problems to and things like that (41)
A close friend knows more about what you are talking about...if you had a problem it's somebody you can talk it out with...there is more between you than just playing football around the streets...you know that you are going to do something better...make something constructive out of it (46)
With your close friends you can discuss your problems but with friends...well I feel it doesn't go very deep (26)

Often implicit in the idea that close friends are easier to talk to is the notion that they can be better trusted, that they are safe to talk to. This point was made by a number of respondents:

Can't get too personal with friends they might go away and tell someone else...people you don't know so well you don't know how discreet they would be...you don't know how sympathetic they would be towards you...someone you know well you know you could trust them with what you said (11)
One or two of my friends I know very well and can trust a lot...(you) can't talk to a stranger in this
way (you) don't know what their reaction is going to be for example when you talk about sex (40)
If you have a very close friend it's a good thing to be able to talk about personal things but otherwise you might get an absurd answer you can't start blabbing your problems to anyone it must be someone that can understand and react properly (4)
If you know the person it's easy to speak with them you don't feel on edge or end up in a brawl (47)
You can talk openly with close friends and have a good laugh with new friends you have to be careful until you find out their ideas (54)
Close friends will forget if you say something wrong...others might come out with it later on (14)
You talk to closer friends but other people you haven't got the same trust in them (50)
A closer friend you know more...you know why they do things...you know they'll not take the micky...close friends you can really tell things to that you can't tell anyone else (8)

Some pupils specifically used the word 'trust' as a characteristic of close friendship. Not simply because it allowed less inhibited discussion but as something of value in itself:

Trust I suppose you trust your friends more than anyone else (37)
You can trust your close friends (49)
I suppose you have an awful lot of trust in a close friend that you wouldn't have in another friend (22)
Someone you know well you would know if they were sympathetic towards you you know you could trust them (11)
(b) Partners versus Friends  This sub-section is concerned with the distinctions, if any, made between a boy or girl friend and other friends. For ease of reading boy and girl friends are referred to as partners. The first group of quotations concerns those people who did not wish to express any views on the matter. Mostly they felt they hadn't had or did not yet want the relevant personal experience:

I haven't got a girl friend so it's hard to say (54)
Don't really talk to girls much (14)
None of my close friends have girl friends (45)
I haven't got one for two reasons I have to work for the exams and I'm rather a shy person anyway (13)

In the majority of instances people were prepared to talk about either their own experiences or those of people that they knew. One of the main dimensions along which the quotations about partners are presented is by contrasting partners with other friends. For some the contrast was marked, for others hardly detectable. This first set of quotations concerns the latter group:

I don't think there is much difference I would share a lot with a special friend boy or girl (23)
I suppose there wouldn't be anything really different about a girl friend...obviously you would only go about with someone you really liked anyway (22)
I can't really distinguish between a boy friend and a close friend (25)
A long standing girl friend it's just an ordinary close relationship though it's always a bit different from a close male friend...I think the relationship is very much the same (12)
In contrast to this last group of views stand those expressed by people who felt that there were definite differences:

It's a different sort of relationship (49)
A girl friend would be definitely different...you probably have a closer relationship with a girl (37)
There is something different about it going out with a boy feeling wanted I suppose (57)
There is a difference between close friends and girl friends I feel strongly about a girl I know now but I don't feel like that about 36 (48)
A relationship with a girl friend is completely different (28)

If the relationship is thought to be quite different in what way does this difference show itself. A not uncommon response to this was that it was obvious;

There's no difference between a girl friend and a close friend apart from the obvious...you can talk to a girl just the same it's almost the same sort of thing (15)
The main difference is sex (apart from that) I wouldn't say there was all that difference between a girl and boy friend (35)
Sex is the most important difference it's very...well pretty...important (12)
I don't think there is any real difference apart from kissing and cuddling on a Friday evening (4)

Some people were prepared to go further with spelling out the obvious than others:

The obvious difference between (them) is that I don't go to bed with him (close friend)...apart
from that I don't think there is much difference... funny isn't it (16) I wouldn't go around kissing my close friend there's only so much of a relationship with a close friend (8) There's more body contact with a girl (32) A boy friend's a more intimate sort of relationship... you don't go around kissing everybody you meet... with your boy friend it's quite natural (25) Obviously you can't love your close friend if he's a boy (54) I'd be attracted to a beautiful girl. I'm not attracted to a boy (23) With a girl it might be her personality or looks... a friend it wouldn't be for his looks...although it might be for his personality (63) These good looks are seen as important both because of their inherent attraction, and also as a source of pride to be seen by others in such company:

Obviously you sometimes think of them as objects of sex but you have to cope with that (4) It was her looks when I first saw her...I just sat in my seat (16) I don't think you look at someone...love at first sight...wow (8) You have to be attracted to a boy you don't have to be attracted to a close friend (42) Having a boy friend will make you feel sort of attractive to the opposite sex (17) You want to impress other people having a girl friend... sort of like showing off I suppose (37) If you go out with your boy friend and he shows you off to all his friends...that's great...it doesn't happen with a friend (58) You like to go out with a nice looking girl that's part of human nature you like to have something the
Janeses can't have...a nice looking girl everyone will notice and you will feel proud of yourself. (36)

The 'part of human nature' argument was invoked by some pupils more especially in the context of the future of such relationships and ensuing marriage:

It seems natural as you get older to want to think about a family (55)
I suppose it's the natural thing to want to have a partner...to think of marriage...everyone wants to be loved by someone...this is the sort of thing that doesn't come out with an ordinary friend (11)
I don't fancy living on my own...you get married because everyone does it (29)
If you've been going out with a boy for a while he must mean a lot to you and you think that it might be the person you might settle down with (58)
Your friends are just for company but a girl friend if you are lucky you may end up marrying (45)
Obviously you have to be in love with a girl friend and it's a...might be a...permanent friend for the rest of your life apart from marriage it's just the permanence thing that's different (36)
With a girl friend there's a chance you might be together for a long time (47)

Sometimes specific interests or activities were mentioned as distinguishing friends from partners, although here as usual views on such matters sometimes stood in sharp contrast to one another:

There are things you do with (other) boys like football drinking and swearing (19)
A girl friend is someone to go out with a close friend you rely on in times of trouble (38)
You can't take a girl to play football (3)
With a boy friend you share interests...nearly everything in common...I mean I wouldn't sit at home every Saturday while he goes to a match (25)

The general theme of friends as confidants is taken up in the second part of this chapter. It was also sometimes used to distinguish close friends from partners. Often it was a close friend who could be trusted rather than a partner:

I wouldn't talk to my (partner) so much about things as I would to my girl friend (33)
I can talk about boys things with 5 I can't with her...I'm not so open with her...I can't talk about sex and things...wrote her a letter once...told her that most of the class think that me and 5 are over sexed...she wrote back saying she was sorry to hear that because it made her a bit cautious (32)
It's not that I don't feel that I can trust my boy friend...it's just that I feel I can tell her anything I've known her since second year (49)
I wouldn't say the relationships were the same your close friend you tell your secrets and that...I've never told my boy friends any secrets really (60)
You can tell your close friend different things from your boy friend...you can tell her about being out with him (62)
You might still feel a bit inhibited with a girl especially with the things boys talk about (22)
When I'm with a close friend telling dirty jokes and talking about things like that...I never seem to talk about things like that with her (16)

There were some cases where the partner was seen as a better recipient of confidentialities than other friends:
You can always talk to a (partner) regardless... your closer to (them) you get to know them more personally (51)
Close friends tend to be male and harder to talk to a girl friend would be easier (56)
I can talk to her easier now something I wouldn't want them to know about I would talk to her about... you have a close friendship to a girl you feel closer to her than you would to the other lads (46)
There isn't much difference I used to tell my best friend my problems now I tell my boy friend (2)

A number of people characterised the difference in relationship with a partner as being a matter of 'closeness'.
In time a partner would be the closest person:

My cousin is like a brother to me I've known him all my life...I can trust him...I'm closer to him than to my boyfriend...but that's possible to change and perhaps come closer to my boyfriend (49)
I suppose there would be a greater affection with a girl friend...it's closer than a close friend (5)
You probably have a closer relationship with a girl friend than with a boy... a close friend wouldn't be on your thoughts all the time (37)

Another key word for a number of people in the distinction between partners and friends was 'depth' - a partnership is a deeper thing than a friendship:

You have a deeper closer relationship with a girl your mates are just good mates (52)
Your relation with a girl friend is a lot deeper than with a friend...you love your girl friend more deeply than other friends and I think you are more open with (her) (47)
You have to be really involved with someone to be able to be a partner (4) You get deeper with a boy friend than with a close friend I think it depends how much you like the boy you can be closer to him than you ever can to a close friend (62)

A rather different characteristic of partnerships, which a number of people pointed out, was the way that they end. This is in sharp contrast to the way that friendships end or rather fade away:

You can't suddenly stop seeing your close friends but you can stop seeing your girl friend (16) It's coming up for Christmas and there are loads of parties and who wants to be going about with somebody at Christmas so I packed him in (9) I suppose when you break up with a girl friend the hurt is deeper...with a friend there is a certain amount of sorrow but...(11) If anything happened to me she would go off her chump whereas for the others...just feel sorry (4) A close friend...you sort of drift apart...but a partner it hurts (8)

There is a way in which friends are there permanently: a secure set of people to which to return after the emotional upsets that partnerships can bring:

If you lose a girl friend that's it...but with friends there are others there (13) With my girl friend I might meet a woman I liked better...but with blokes it's different you can have as many close male friends as you want (36) Maybe it's the difference from friends I get tired of my boy friends I never get tired of friends (60)
Sometimes another aspect of this permanence is emphasised, for having a partner may entail seeing less of well established friends and this may cause a feeling of estrangement from them. For some this is a source of difficulty or implies a parting with friends:

My main friend has got a boy friend and she's more interested in him than in me...she's less willing to do things...it's a job to persuade her to do anything (1)
When I had a girl friend I used to go out with her and not with my friends (21)
I had a friend who's always going out with her boy friend she's never got time for us (18)
If your friends have got a girl friend and you haven't you get left out (44)
People break appointments to go with girl friends (39)
You would leave your mates to go out with a girl you would never leave a girl to go out with your mates (52)

Other pupils were aware of the difficulty but managed to try to deal with it and not neglect their friends:

I think it's important to try and see your friends you always have your friends but one day your boy friend might just walk away from you (9)
No having girl friends doesn't split us we just ask each other along when 48 was with -- -- he asked me up...thought they would want to be on their own...but he said she would like to meet me (36)
For a couple of weeks when I was going out with -- 5 wouldn't talk to me as much he never called into the house...he seemed to think that because I was going out with a girl I wouldn't want to see him (32)

One type of difference between partners and other friends
was mentioned by several people. This concerns the 'show' that must be put on in certain circumstances:

You can act normal with your friends but with a boy friend you have to act grown up (42)
With a boy friend you wouldn't be able to do anything stupid you have to act more lady like (17)
You show off a bit more with a girl friend a close friend you can say anything to (20)
With a girl friend you are always trying to impress her you're not trying to impress your male friends (12)

Usually this was in front of members of the opposite sex but not invariably so:

You can be sillier with girls...just be daft...but with (friends) you don't muck about all the time (23)
A girl friend you can be natural with you don't have to be in a good mood (40)

The type of social pressure which leads to putting on a show in front of a girl friend or other friends was also referred to in another guise: the pressure from peers or parents for pupils to become involved in partnerships.
The former of these received little acknowledgement directly, although it would seem that pupils were aware of such pressures as these two quotations imply:

Sometimes sort of feel inferior when you hear people talking all the time about their girl friends but if there was pressure from my friends to have a girl friend I would but none of them have one (13)
Having a girl friend makes you learn about life... you see these blokes who never even talk to girls... I'd rather be anything than like that (48)
With this sample of sixth formers it seemed to be parents who were more responsible for encouraging their children to form partnerships:

My mum thinks I should (have a boy friend)...she tries to get me paired up with boys that she knows (17) My mother and grandmother are always encouraging me to get a certain girl friend...it annoys me...I wouldn't put it past them encouraging me to sleep with a girl it's tricky my grandmother isn't married...my mother (wouldn't mind) she used to go around with boys and that when she was young (56)

The final set of quotations on the theme of differences between friends and partners was raised only by a couple of people. It concerns arguments:

You wouldn't hit a girl whereas with a fellow you let yourself go (39) Girls can cause you a lot of arguments (19) I was going out with 52 for six months he's right nice...he never says a wrong word against anybody and he gets on with everybody...he used to do everything I asked and I would say why don't you stand up to me and when he stood up to me I would fall out with him (9)

He for his part was succinct:

You can't argue with a girl (52)

Section Nine: Friends and Families

Besides the direct questions on friendships considered
so far in this chapter, the interviews also tried to elicit information on the relative importance in the pupils' lives, of their friends, their academic work, and their households. As would be expected the full range of feelings were expressed on these subjects: the range is briefly illustrated in the following quotations:

Your household and school work must be more important (than friends) at this age (59)
My school and (family) are more important than friends (3)
A family is the closest you can get...a close friend... a close relationship becomes more like that...you can confide anything in your family (12)
It's obvious that the household must be more important than anything (22)
Some of my friends go ma's great she doesn't bother about me but I wouldn't like that (58)
We are happy alright at home wouldn't leave to go off on my own sort of thing (32)

For others relationships with their families were not so certain or at least were undergoing changes:

I've found that she is really interested if I tell her things...I just haven't been telling her things that have been going on (57)
My parents are quite understanding in certain respects although there are things I wouldn't tell them for instance about girls (8)
I'm right close with my twin brother he's in borstal now...the others get on my nerves (42)

For some the family had assumed second place to friends or partners:
I would rather tell my problems to my friends than to my family (26)
My boy friend is more or less part of the family and I take all my problems to him whereas before I would have taken them to my mother (1)

For others relationships with the family were either felt to be not all that they might be or had reached a stage from which they were unlikely to recover:

I wish I had a better relationship with my parents
I don't get on very well just now it's mostly because of my Christianity...none of them are Christians (18)
I don't want to live at home I want to get away from home my parents don't understand my feelings (56)
We were thinking of getting a flat together we are all rather separate from our families...one (friend) has been told to come and sleep there and that's about it (46)
I don't think (my father) can understand anybody he gets on great with dogs babies and stupid people I just eat in the house that's all (24)

Section Ten: Developments in Friendship

The final section of this part of the chapter concerns the notion of development of adolescent social life as commented upon by the pupils. Changes which they had noticed in themselves. There were, of course, those people who felt that little or nothing had changed in their friends or friendships over the previous couple of years:

The way that we are friends has not really changed (40)
There isn't much change in the things that we do (30)
Things haven't changed much (31)
I don't think that the way that I know people has changed (44)

More commonly changes were noticed. Sometimes these were minor or subtle. In other instances they were of major importance:

I suppose there isn't much that has changed...
it's your attitude that has changed...you feel more inhibited about yourself...how people view you...
little things have changed...we view things differently and exchange ideas (25)
I think both I and they have changed a lot (4)
What we do has changed completely in the last couple of years and if you ask me in another two they will have changed again (16)

Two main themes were recurrent among the elaborations on changes that had taken place in recent years. The first of these concerns the gang-like groups which had been an important aspect of the social lives of a number of the pupils when they were younger. The second concerned the more intimate closer nature of the relationships that were now being experienced compared with previous ones. A number of people referred to ways they had simply hung around the streets in the past:

Used to go out more used to hang around in gangs (6)
We used to hang about the streets now we go to discos and dances (2)
We used to just stand on street corners now we go to play snooker or pubs (52)
We used to muck about the streets more than we do now (53)
I don't find that I am bored and have to go wandering around the streets now (13)
Now we are more intellectual and don't play in the streets (11)

One of the commonest activities remembered from previous years was playing football. A past activity which some pupils regretted losing:

We used to just go out for a game of football now the only times are when it is organised (59)
We used to go out and play football...now we hardly ever play no one seems to be interested they don't go out and just kick a ball around (12)
When I was younger I was a right tomboy played football climbed walls things like that...my mother stopped me in fourth year...don't do anything now... when we were younger we thought older people stuffy sitting in reading books but I do that sort of thing now as well (26)

This 'stuffiness' was commented on by other pupils usually more favourably than in the last quotation:

I suppose we talk about more serious things than we used to used to sort of muck around and that (34)
Things have got more complicated more serious more like adult life (25)
We do the same things but maybe don't act as stupid as we did (35)

Contrasts were also noted in the numbers of friends that people felt themselves to have, in some cases more, in other cases fewer than in the past:

Now have fewer and better friends (30)
Not so many friends now but I know them better (31)
In primary everybody was friends now it's just a few (53)
I would like to get back to where I was in the fourth year with more close friends (54)
Used to be friends that I could talk to now more (just) acquaintances (19)
The type of friends I had changed...didn't used to bother me if they were good or not...not that it worried me now...but I know more people (28)
I used to keep myself to myself a lot more...I didn't have so many friends...really just one (1)
Before you didn't know so many people (58)
I seem to get on better with friends now than I did a few years ago (10)

It was not surprising that a number of people commented on the way that their relations with boy or girl friends had changed in the recent past:

Your attitude to boys in the fourth year...a boy's got to be really nice looking, it's looks that count...but when you get older it's more the personality...that has changed (60)
Two years ago I would have said that girls were important just for a bit of hanky panky (4)
He came the next day and said he shouldn't have lost temper...it was both our faults...we've grown up a lot since then he still comes round to my house to see me at least once a week (9)

The other major recurring theme, besides the passing of the gang-like grouping, was that of the closer more understanding nature of recent relationships compared with past ones.
This was sometimes expressed in terms of listening to other people or seeing their point of view:
We used to just be pals now we take an interest in each other we listen to other views (42)
We view things differently and exchange ideas...we discuss problems when we were younger there just weren't any problems (25)
Now people are more understanding...if someone does something instead of saying blooming stupid you understand it first and then say blooming stupid (51)
Talking has become more important because there are more things you want to ask people than before (58)
When you get older 17 to 25 I think you talk about things more than at any other time in your life before it was just football and things like that now you express your ideas and opinions more (16)

In other cases this closeness was referred to either directly or for the benefits it gave to life:

Before they were just school mates now they are closer friends (12)
I suppose all friendships tend to get more personal as they get older (3)
Your friends were just people to talk to they couldn't really help you in any way there was nothing very important about them now they really share things with you and can tell them things you can't tell your brother and parents (18)
I think I've grown closer with maturing and I think we all understand one another better now (22)
Now you know more about your friends and they know more about you before they never knew nothing about you -- when I've got a problem or anything I can go and talk to them (46)
When we were younger it was more selfish we used to play one off against the other now it's more friendly like I've got one or two really good friends and a lot of people that I know...I think more about my
friends... I think now that they are quite important to me whereas before they were just somebody you were with (17)

In the first part of this chapter I have introduced quotations which illustrate the context and comparative importance of the pupils' friendships. Also some material was presented on the definition and conception of friendship. The second part of this chapter concerns these central characteristics of trust, confidence and understanding.

Part Two: Trust, Confidence and Understanding

In the first part of this chapter some of the essential elements of friendships, as seen by the Edinburgh sixth formers, were introduced. These included the pleasure of friends' company for both relaxation and stimulation, and the need to have people to talk to. This need was often associated with a trust which allowed others to be treated as confidants. This part chapter illustrates various aspects of this confidence in the other person as another person, a theme to which I will return later in the thesis.

One of the commonest points made about the value or definition of a friend was that they were available as a confidant. There were, however, some notable exceptions who felt that the sharing of problems or matters of importance was not what characterised their friendships. The following quotations concern these people who did not see their friends
as confidants. In the first example it was suggested that the matter was simple. In the other examples people offer various reasons for not wanting to share certain things:

I don't have any problems if I did I would probably ask (what) my friends would do (54)
Don't really share anything very personal with friends just problems at school (35)
I don't like boring other people with my problems...
I don't pour them out to friends especially if they are important (59)
If you have a severe problem you try to work it out for yourself -- -- I try to think things out for myself...I don't really share them with anybody (20)
I don't discuss my problems with anybody I keep them to myself (15)
I don't talk to people about anything that is me personally deep down...I just keep it to myself...I feel I know better than anyone else about myself (38)
Don't really talk that much about things that I'm thinking about to people it can be a bit embarrassing confiding in people...especially if you can't get help there isn't much point in telling people (12)
When I want to think about something I want to think about it by myself someone else's angle might put me off, -- -- I never share my problems with friends (3)

There was a small group of people who were aware of the function of friends as confidants but for one reason or another could not, or did not, make use of their friends in this respect:

There are people who need to share problems...who its better for...but not me...I don't look down on people who come to me with some problem I'm quite happy to help I just think they are different from me (15)
I don't usually want to (share problems) if it's just a problem I just usually keep it to myself that's just the kind of person I am (34)

Other pupils were more definite that it was a good thing to share their problems and important ideas, but felt that they personally could not manage such sharing either as much as they would like or as much as other people:

It is a good thing to talk about things if you just keep things inside you all the time there must be something wrong with you...I hardly share my problems with my friends...I would rather sort things out myself first...because you shouldn't impose yourself too much if you kept doing that they might get a bit bored and you'd lose your mate (37)

I don't share problems with people if they are important...if a thing's just important to me...I wasn't sure what I was doing...I would rather keep it to myself without other people knowing...I think it is a good thing to talk to people...it stops an awful lot of worry if you are able to talk to people...I suppose it would be better if I could...but then again I don't know how much other people do (53)

We don't really share problems very much...I think it is a good thing to talk to people to relieve the pressure...but I tend to sort out anything myself...it is a bad thing...bottling up like Lady McBeth (13)

Probably the commonest suggestion on the idea of friend as confidant was that such sharing was an important aspect of friendship although there were certain limits on its extent:

It's good to talk about problems...some problems I'll share but not personal ones (28)

(I'm) reluctant to share really personal things but
things about the family come out in conversation (11)
I think it's best to work things out on your own...
certain things you share...things like if parents got
a divorce I don't think we would talk about it (4)
It's better to talk to people than to bottle things
up...I don't really share intimate problems like
family with people (23)
I can tell my friends a lot of things...there are
things that I think everybody keeps to themselves
that they don't tell anybody (49)
Things that are really important to them but not
so important to me we talk about (45)

While many people expressed this type of reservation, there
was a substantial group of pupils who set no such limits on
their confidences; for these people a crucial aspect of
their friendships was the unreserved way that they could
discuss matters of importance:

It's better to tell your pals and get some sympathy
otherwise you are keeping it all to yourself and
getting more and more neurotic...sometimes you can't
see the wood for the trees (62)
Usually the types of things which matter to you are
the types of things that matter to your friends as
well (41)
I've got more problems now the older you get the more
responsibility you get...I share things with people
quite a lot...it eases problems...it's a good thing
to talk to people about things it gets them off your
mind...you don't get a one-sided view with someone
looking at it from the outside (51)
You can talk more now...if there is something wrong
you can tell them...they might put you right ...if you
don't tell them you don't find out (52)
If you keep things to yourself it gets bottled up...
you feel better if you tell someone else (50)
Now I think that you find that you need friends more... you need someone like your friends to be grown up with you... its someone you can turn to and they will listen to you... every problem that has come up you always speak to your friend who more than likely has come up against it -- if you tell other people you get back a different side of it from them... it is important to get two sides of the conversation (17)

There follow three longer sets of quotations from three pairs of friends who specifically refer to one another, in spite of my pointing out that they need not do so. Together I think they illustrate well the points made in the last paragraph:

I would say that I do talk about the things that are really important to me... I share my problems to quite a large extent... but it's usually me that's sorting out other people's problems... now 48 has a lot of problems with -- and he's been coming to me and telling me all the problems so I've got loaded down (36) 36 is a good person to talk to everyone talks to him he gives you good advice -- -- I can tell him absolutely anything (48)

Another pair of friends were particularly aware of this aspect of acting as confidant and that they differed from one another in this respect:

I don't really talk about my problems (5) I share my problems quite a lot... it depends on the problem... if it's something outside the house I talk to 5 about it... if it's something to do with the house I talk to my mother... my young cousin tells me a lot... but I don't think 5 tells me things that are really important... I would talk to him more about my problems...
More than he would talk to me...he keeps it all to himself...I don't think he has that good a relationship with his -- -- he keeps it to himself most of it anyway (32)

The final of these three pairs of friends provided an illustration of considerable length and coherence. It is very similar to the last but in this case it is the non-sharer that is giving his viewpoint:

A close friend knows what you are talking about...
if you had a problem it's somebody that you talk
it out with...we share things as a group 56 is
different like that he doesn't say much about personal
problems and things like that (46)
My relationship with my sister is about the same as
with my friends...I don't tell everybody everything
I keep a lot to myself...I just seem to think a lot and
I keep it to myself...sometimes I do talk when we are
sitting round together and start talking...that's
usually when I start spilling everything out...I
think this is a good thing...people can understand you
better...then I think friendships develop through that
way...I think everybody keeps a certain amount to them¬
selves...if they didn't you would be able to understand
them...even with a close friend you never come to a
complete understanding...well there's quite a few
friends I've known all my life but I can't understand
them completely so there must be quite a bit to them¬
selves -- -- recently I find everything seems to be
going out to people I can't really keep it to myself...
it seems to be helping me I feel a lot better...
maybe if I could find a friend it would take a lot off
my mind...someone you could rely on...sometimes it's
difficult to explain just something that's going
through my mind that's difficult to get out (56)
This feeling of a personal difficulty in expressing feelings that were essentially acceptable to others was voiced by another two pupils:

It's sometimes difficult to find the right words... it's alright when I get started...sometimes I get stuck halfway through...I know what I mean but I can't put it into words (52)
It's just sort of telling her in the first place you say um er well you see...I suppose most people have the same problem (57)

A more specific point was made about the confidences that friends enter into, this was the way that criticism can be given and taken without spelling the end of the relationship:

A close friend's got to be able to give you criticism and you not take it the wrong way (26)
There's another thing a close friend can criticise you...you can tell them if it bothers you...it won't bother them...whereas someone else will take it as a personal insult (8)

Finally some general comments on the way that enjoyments and dissatisfactions can be shared with good friends and the way that this sharing is itself important:

If you were on your own you wouldn't have anyone to talk things over with...it's great sharing the things that have happened to them (57)
I enjoy my friends' enjoyment if something good happens to them I feel good about it if it's something upsetting I get upset myself (25)
(Without friends) I would miss someone to turn to tell my problems...and I would miss them telling me their
problems...I would miss being able to go out with them...but obviously I would miss different things from different people -- the reason I would miss telling people is because then I would have to keep them all to myself and they might be able to help... although that doesn't really matter...it's more someone to actually tell (16)

This part chapter illustrates some of the most important features of friendship amongst sixth form pupils and as such stands as an example of the work of the humanistic social psychologist. As I have already indicated, there are further reasons for wishing to include such material in this thesis. In the final chapter I will return to the most important of these: the fact that the interviews can be regarded as part of the elucidation of the themes of the topic being investigated. In the next chapter another reason for their presentation will emerge for I will consider a classical text on the subject of friendship and in so doing show how relevant such 'philosophical' material can be to the sentiments of contemporary adolescents.
Part One: Friendship

This illustrative chapter stands in contrast to the previous two. Firstly because, although there might have been some argument as to whether the content of those chapters belongs to the main stream of psychology, there could be little doubt but that the matter belongs to psychology rather than another social science. The matter of this chapter on the other hand might be regarded by some as the province of philosophers and not that of psychologists at all. And secondly this chapter bears a less convoluted relationship to the main theme of the thesis than did the last two chapters. They stood both as examples of work in different schools of psychology, and at the same time, possibly less comfortably, as examples of work which can form an integrated part of Heideggerian social psychology. The discomfort was due to what in the Heideggerian context is an artificial separation of different types of data. In this chapter the illustration is of material which would need no apology to stand as an introduction to a psychological thesis, or as a contribution to the Thematization of the Heideggerian scientific process.

Heidegger himself refers to the way that Plato and Aristotle conducted the necessary preliminary analysis
of scientific investigation in many fields (see page 38 above). And so in this chapter Aristotle's two books on friendship form a paradigm illustration, for they clearly represent the type of philosophical psychology which was established in Greek times.

The way in which the following material knits into the fabric of the scientific process is a matter taken up in the concluding chapter. Here, as in the last two chapters, the primary concern is to illustrate the contribution a particular approach can make to the psychological topic of friendship. In this case the approach being illustrated is that of the philosophical psychologist. As this thesis is intended for an audience of psychologists, it is probably sensible to indicate the reasons for including material which might be dismissed by some as no more than armchair psychology.

People who would be likely to so dismiss the following, would probably argue that there is a clear distinction between the experimentalist and the non-experimentalist. The former goes out into the world in search of new material (at least as far as his department or laboratory), he is concerned with the empirical and not with the a priori and he does not get bogged down in trivial matters of semantics. The experimentalist believes in exactness, care and rigour and often that the small steps he takes in his research are building up into a greater whole.
For the philosophical psychologist the distinction between experimental investigations and non-experimental ones is probably less clear. For he too may feel that he is concerned with consideration of new material, with the piecing together of observations of the things we do and say, and he too is concerned with so called 'crucial' test cases when new facts are adduced to see if they fit the 'models' that have been proposed. The philosophical psychologist is certainly concerned with semantics in as far as he does not wish the end product of his work to be meaningless or trivial simply because it rested on assumptions which were false, contradictory or nonsensical.

It seems probable that the experimentalist's distinction rests ultimately more on matters of methodology and the paradigm of the laboratory setting than on differences in the essence of the respective investigations. It is the way in which the new material is collected and the sort of thing that is to count as 'new' that marks the distinction.

The main argument for the importance of what follows is very simple. The human sciences, and chiefly psychology, distinguish themselves from the 'established' branches of experimental science by a crucial fact. We are already endowed with an overwhelming amount of psychological information: everyone of us enters the discipline of psychology with an awesome burden of vital and relevant material. Physics and chemistry also started their lives as scientific disciplines with material which was similarly ready to hand. In their case, however, the problem of
organising and making sense of this 'old' material was not so enormous. It was soon possible to try out explanations which appeared to accommodate all known facts by the process of adding to these facts, and then seeing if the explanations devised were powerful enough to include the 'new' material.

The complexity of the social psychologist's work would make it surprising if we had already devised dramatic explanations of sufficient power to encompass our social lives. At present the main value of experimentation in psychology is as an aid to thinking more clearly about what we do already know. The suggestion that an experiment could help us decide between two theories, both of which account for all the data already available to an equally satisfactory extent, simply shows how divorced from our ordinary psychic lives the data of such experimentation is.

This divorce between the data of our experimentations and the data of our lives is well illustrated in the topic of friendship. Social psychologists move from general considerations of friendships and other human relationships to an examination of the Acquaintance Process (Newcomb, 1961), or 'Interpersonal Attraction' (Black, 1974). Such accounts offer no link between my experience of supposedly related phenomena and the new concepts presented. Thus they tend to add to the already large store of ideas awaiting a time when they can be integrated into a coherent account.
Philosophers and anthropologists are usually more concerned than psychologists to ensure that we already have a firm grasp of what is known before we start increasing our store of knowledge. Also in contrast to psychologists these writers have been prolific on the topic of friendship. Indeed Rake (1970) writes of such authors that they have made a "...vast amount of literature available on friendship..." and presents what he feels is a very small selection from this literature. I wish to be even more selective as it is in no way the aim of this chapter to review the philosophical literature, but rather to present an illustration of the approach. To this end I wish to consider the classical account of friendship given by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, and also, as an example of a more recent discussion, that by Telfer (1971) in her comments on Aristotle's writing.

Before examining these two philosophical works I think it may be helpful to make some philological points about friendship. I regard such points in general as being of value, but in this particular instance there are two additional reasons for wishing to make them. Firstly, Aristotle's account is based on a rather different set of concepts from our own, it may thus be helpful to first be clear about the definition of our own word. Secondly, and rather curiously, Sadler (1970, p. 181), while discussing what we mean by friendship, dismisses dictionary definitions as unreliable and unhelpful, and then proceeds to quote obtuse examples to prove his point. I hope the following will demonstrate that he is mistaken.
The equivalent Greek word for friendship is much broader than our own modern word. It places an emphasis on affection: a mental or spiritual closeness. Our own word originally also had a broader meaning, but with the emphasis on physical closeness. The stem of the word friend appears to belong to a group of words associated with the Gothic word *frijon* - to love. Also belonging to this group are the words meaning to caress or woo. More recently Webster's dictionary notes its use for a relative or kinsman; a use still current in Shakespeare's English.

Our modern usage seems to lie between the Greek and the Medieval. Friendship for us is not the rather abstract regard which we might show for most of humanity; it is more concrete and belongs nearer home, although not so near home as to imply our families and partners. This last point is made specifically by the Oxford dictionary which defines a friend as "One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy; not ordinarily applied to lovers or relatives".

Webster offers a fuller definition. "One who, entertaining for another sentiments of esteem, respect, and affection from personal predilection, seeks his society and welfare, a well-wisher, an intimate associate, sometimes an attendant." I would not wish to claim that these philological points take us very far, only that they are not unhelpful, and that there have probably been misunderstandings of Aristotle's text through simply failing to consider them.
I referred just now to the fact that Aristotle deals with a rather different concept from our own in his two books headed 'Friendship' in the English translation. Ross (1923) himself warns that the Greek word ἀγάπη "...has a wider meaning than the English (word friendship); it can stand for any mutual attraction between two human beings." (p. 230). The Oxford Greek-English dictionary gives "affectionate regard" as the primary meaning of ἀγάπη and Rackham (1926), in his translation, comments "...sometimes rises to the meaning of affection or love, but also includes any sort of kindly feeling, even that existing between business associates or fellow citizens." (p. 450).

We are, of course, familiar with a broad meaning of the word in English, not least in philosophy itself. Although such derivatives have come to have a different meaning from that used by Aristotle, they do help to remind us why such a topic as friendship occurs in the Ethics and also that the whole discussion must be treated with caution. If Aristotle's concept is so different why do I wish to examine it here? The answer is that Aristotle's writing still stands as the classic discussion of friendship to which most recent authors in philosophy, anthropology and psychology refer. The points Aristotle makes are the points being debated today.

Another possible objection to using Aristotle's text is that many of his themes are drawn directly from Plato's dialogues. The Lysis claims to concern itself
primarily with friendship and the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* are closely associated. The reasons for not presenting one of these texts are twofold. Firstly, there are profound difficulties of interpretation, for Plato is, at least in the latter two works, touching on matters of a more transcendental nature than friendship or human love; indeed, Jowett (1875), in his introduction to the *Phaedrus*, comments "No one can duly appreciate (these) dialogues of Plato...who has not a sympathy with mysticism." (II p.102). The second problem with the Platonic dialogues is the marked discrepancy in the use of the terms lover and friend from our own use - a discrepancy which requires a systematic reinterpretation rather beyond my abilities.

This problem of the reinterpretation of these terms is still present with Aristotle's writing. It is partly due to the breadth of meaning of the word and partly due to the rather different way in which friend and lover were construed in classical times. It would probably be helpful to comment further on this last point; for it is connected with what might be described as Aristotle's rather blatant sexism. The difficulty stems from the fact that for both Plato and Aristotle women are not intellectual equals. Because of this there is a recurrent theme in their writings around the separation of intellectual and sexual love. The choice for them lay between sexual love of women, intellectual love of men, and sexual and intellectual love of men. It is important to see Plato's affirmation of the virtues of
intellectual or 'Platonic' love (e.g. Phaedrus 256) against this background.

If these points about the rather different connotations of the words used by the Greeks are borne in mind, Aristotle's account of friendship reads with an extraordinary freshness and relevance to our own lives. We are presented with a substantial and easily accessible account of the marks of friendship, its definition and distinction from related concepts such as good will, friendly feeling and unanimity, and with a taxonomy of types of friendships and the place in friendships of moral values.

This last point, the ethical aspect of our friendships, is, on the fact of it, Aristotle's main theme, for the two books on friendship have been placed among his other books on ethics. Ross (1925, p. xx), however, suspects that their occurrence in this position may be a matter of faulty editing at some later stage in the history of the text. Indeed there would seem to be direct evidence for this argument. The closing sentence of Book VII and the opening sentence of Book VIII are both somewhat abrupt and contrived in the way they introduce the topic of friendship as though it was a natural part of the discussion, when in fact the topic is used more for the points that can be drawn from it.

The whole opening section of the first of the two books on friendship is, by Aristotle's normally careful and
well qualified standard, somewhat clumsy. For example, we are told that friendship is necessary for without friends no one would choose to live: an odd sort of necessity in which we choose. Again, a list of the advantages of friendship trails off into points about its universality and this universality seems to be identified with necessity. Also at the start of this chapter he claims that it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends, while later he writes "Those who have many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one's friend...and such people are also called obsequious."

(1171a - pagination refers to Greek text).

Such problems with the opening sentences might be accounted for in terms of a provocative introduction, and by reading for the word friend our more general word love. Thus, it would become a good thing to love many people and good people are those who love others. I would suggest however that these opening lines are unlikely to be the work of Aristotle for they stand in contrast to the subtlety and liveliness of the later discussion.

It is possible, although I do not think so, that Ross is also implying that these two books have been edited into the present work from an intended work on a different subject. This would not seem very likely. The discussion throughout the two books is continuously brought back to such matters as how we ought to behave to our friends (1171a/b), of what we should do when there are inequalities between friends (1158b, 1163a/b),
of the nature of the goodness that we show to our friends and to ourselves (1166a, 1168a/b) and of the relative merit of loving and being loved and of giving and being given (1159a, and 1167a). It is not that these books form part of a direct argument on moral matters, but rather that friendship is being used as an example of a human process in which moral elements are clearly exhibited. He draws from the account of friendship the moral points he wishes, and it is for these that the account seems to exist.

While for the most part Aristotle's writing is a model of common sense and pertinent insight, it is not by our standards a particularly well ordered or systematic study: there is little in the way of a train of thought that we can hold onto through the two books and there are many repetitions. Further he does not make the distinctions we make between moral philosophy, psychology and politics. And so in the following pages I have attempted to gather together some of the psychologically oriented ideas.

'Aristotle's intent is a moral one, so I will start with some of the points he makes about the moral nature of friendship. Three types of friendship are distinguished. The first two are so called because they are reflections or analogies of the third. These analogous friendships are based on the use we can be to one another and on the pleasure the parties get from one another's company (for example, the pleasure of a ready wit). The ideal or model of friendship is where those concerned are friends
for the regard they have for one another's personalities or characters.

Because we usually identify what we like with what we consider good, it is not surprising that true friends are seen as good. "Now those who wish well to their friends for their own sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good - and goodness is an enduring thing." (1156b). This goodness is self perpetuating for the association of good people tends to make them better. "...the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other..." (1172a).

The point about loving our true friends for their own sake is made several times. Again in the second of the two books, he writes "...we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend...who wishes his friend to exist and live for his (own) sake..." (1166a). In this way it is like a commendable form of self-love for we should wish our friends what we would wish ourselves (1166a). As we wish well to ourselves as we do to our friends. "To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognised as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other..." (1156a). The emphasis is on the activity of loving the other person rather than on the passive receiving of such love. He holds that the exemplar of such love is that shown by
mothers to their children: they love them and look after them but expect nothing in return, indeed they will leave them to someone else's care if they believe that they will be well looked after (1159a).

Throughout the two books he makes a number of observations on characteristic features of friendships. He notes, for example, that to be friends is to do more than wish our friends well. We take active trouble over them and we do things with them. (1167a). And that on those occasions when our friends need help we go eagerly to their aid, but we should not go with quite the same keenness to join them when they are prosperous and we would receive things from them; although neither should our reluctance be so great that we spoil their enjoyment and act as 'kill-joys' (1171b). The other side of the coin is that we should be reluctant to ask services of any sort from our friends, and eager to get them to join us in our good fortune. There are, however, services we should not offer or perform, for they may be wrong in themselves. This in fact is part of a more general truth "...good men neither go wrong in themselves nor...let their friends do so." (1159b).

It might be said that these last points concern a type of moral 'need' for friends, they support and encourage particular sets of values in our lives. Although he does not make the distinction Aristotle also notes more psychological needs that friends fulfil. When we are impoverished or infirm we need them for the
aid they give. When we are rich or able we need them to enhance our lives (1155a). Such enhancement comes in a number of ways. We trust our friends in the face of slanders from other people we know less well (1157a). More generally he points out that "...no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others." At the very least we need other people to keep us active "...for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier." (1170a).

Besides such needs Aristotle makes a number of points of psychological interest about friendship. He notices "...two things that contribute greatly to friendship are common upbringing and a similarity of age..." (1161b). This he believed was because such factors led to an 'equality' in the relationship, and such equality was "...certainly held to be characteristic of friendship." (1158b). This equality may be simple: both parties contributing the same type of thing to the relationship, or it may be of a more complex nature. "...the friends get the same things from one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility..." (1158b).

Other differences might be where one party is of different status from the other. In such cases, all of which differ, a balance is often struck: one person will make up for the difference in status by his affection, "...the better should be more loved than he loves, so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases." (1158b).
While status and age may be important predisposing factors the crucial element in the establishment of a relationship is familiarity. "...such (true) friendship requires time and familiarity...a wish for friendship may arise quickly but friendship does not." (1156b). In the same way that friendships evolve slowly so too they are slow to end, for a distance between people only stops the expression of the friendship although "...if the absence is lasting it seems actually to make men forget their friendship..." (1157b). In some cases the ending of a friendship is not so much a matter of spacial distance as a change in one or both of the parties. They may change to such an extent that they can no longer be counted as the same people. In these cases Aristotle can see no reason for the friendship to continue: "...a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend..." If, however, there is any hope of one friend being instrumental in changing the other friend, in such a way that they can still be associates, then the friends should maintain their involvement. (1165b).

A point of recurrent interest to Aristotle, is the number of friends that people have. I noted above that there was some ambivalence in the text on this matter. Having drawn the distinction between true, useful and pleasant friends, he suggests that while it may be possible to have many friends of the last two categories it is not possible to have many true friends, for it is necessary to
to have some experience of people who become good friends and "...that is very hard." (1158a). Later on, in the second book, he argues that even in the case of utility and pleasure we should not have too many friends; for on the one hand it would become laborious to return many services, and on the other friends of pleasure should not be too many for "...a little seasoning in food is enough." (1170b). (Although in the first of the two books he had written "But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time." (1158a).) As for true friends, he concludes, they are scarce and we "...must be content if we find even a few such." (1171a).

Another repeated theme in Aristotle's two books is the essential characteristic of true friendships; what distinguishes them from other relationships. His most frequent proposal is that true friends seek to spend their time together and therefore also seek to live together; "...there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together...but people cannot live together if they...do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do." (1157b). Again friends "...spend their days together and delight in each other and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship." (1158a). And again we regard as friends "...one who lives with and has the same tastes as another." (1166a). This living together is not just occupying the same building, it is the active sharing of ideas. For friends are characterised
for "...living together and sharing in discussions and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place." (1170b). It is this element of living together that is used by Aristotle for his conclusion on the essence of friendship: "...so for friends the most desirable thing is living together...For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so he is to his friend: now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this." (1171b).

This desire to share our lives with our friends arises from an interest in them as separate but known persons. We saw earlier that friends are held to want one another to live for their own sakes; so that they can best be what they themselves are. It is a delight in what they are in themselves that makes us want to be with them; that makes us want to spend our time with them and if possible live with them, in order to be able to share our thoughts, pleasures and interests with them. The things we most enjoy doing are the things we most wish to do with our friends, and so "...some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life..." (1172a). This sharing, of course, goes
Beyond activities and discussions for a friend is "...one who grieves and rejoices with his friend..." (1166a).

These are some of the thoughts Aristotle presents on the subject of friendship. They have been chosen for their relevance to the rest of this thesis, thus many points about the relationship between egoism and altruism, and the analogy between justice and political institutions and friendship have not been included. I hope the points presented suffice to demonstrate how sensible and relevant his writings are. Indeed the closeness of some of his ideas to those expressed by the sixth formers I interviewed is striking. This parallelism well illustrates Heidegger's point on the soundness of the Aristotelian analysis.

Before turning to a brief consideration of more recent authors there are two reservations I have about Aristotle's account of friendship. Aristotle emphasises that aspect of true friendship which makes friends wish to live together. This must be seen in the context of a society in which women were not admitted as equals. In our society, it might be argued, it is normal to see spouses living out these roles. We might counter this by suggesting that even in our society two people living along are too few to gain from their friendship the advantages Aristotle is describing.

The second reservation, I think, is more important. The account given seems to apply to the friendships made among aristocrats: a leisured class who are able to spend
their days together. While some of us no doubt choose to remain perpetual students or to earn less money in favour of having more free time for our social lives, the number who do so cannot be great. I think Aristotle's reply might be as follows. Certainly our modern society is rather differently structured and is less willing for some of its members to spend all their time in economically unproductive roles: roles based on the subservience or indeed slavery of other classes. But it is also a fault of modern society that it places too little emphasis on the importance of relationships such as friendships. And it would be a fault for Aristotle in the sense that we would very simply be happier if we placed a greater emphasis on our social lives. As Aristotle remarks "...no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone...". Cicero noted that people of his generation seemed to forget this importance (Laelius p. 198), it seems we are not so different from the Romans in this respect.

Aristotle's account is classical not just in the sense that it is one of the first discussions of the subject, but also in the sense that no one since has produced such a sensible, thorough and accessible description of friendship. Below I wish to consider briefly one modern paper. Before doing so, however, there are a few points which can be drawn from other recent authors. Some of them by way of warning rather than information.
An example of this later point is presented by Derek Wright (1970) who says "...the essential meaning of the term 'friendship' is a relationship between two people of equal status that serves no ulterior motives such as economic, political or sexual gain and which is felt by the participants to be the result of free choice." It is a pity that this far it could as well be the beginning of a definition of enemy. It is assumed that the relationship is a non-hostile one, but is it not exactly the nature of this non-hostility that we wish to know about?

Bell (1975) has accepted Wright's definition but added two further elements which go some way to correcting the above shortcoming. He adds that there must be some form of commitment to the future. And secondly, that there is a predominance of what he calls, after Strawson, reactive rather than objective attitudes. This presumably supplies the emotional content that is missing in Wright's definition, but there is still a hesitation to say directly that these emotional elements are positive or good. The reactive attitudes could still be attitudes of hostility and such are not of the essence of friendship. The problem seems to be quite simply that to characterise friendship we must use certain positive value terms in the way that Aristotle does. We may wish not to be embroiled in arguments about the nature of the goodness found in friendship, but if we fail to mention it we may fail to catch hold of the concept of friendship altogether.
Certain modern authors have attempted to lay hold of the value aspect of friendship. Steffen (1974) picks out involvement and empathetic understanding as the two key elements in his programme for training people to become more skillful at making friends. These sound like more positive elements, but need they be? Something is still missing. Becker (1973) is one of the few authors who is prepared to commit herself to a positive value. She writes of friendship that it is "...a loving relationship between two subjects which takes place in the context of their experientially shared world. It is an evolving non-exclusive dialogue of relative mutuality in essential, inter-related constituents of care, sharing, commitment, freedom, respect, trust and equality which calls each friend to be more fully present to herself, the other and the world." This definition would seem to be superior to Derek Wright's. She stresses the necessary personal commitment, involvement and understanding. His definition specifically excluded any ulterior motive for the friendship: this Becker omits, possibly rightly, for there may be few friendships which have no such ulterior elements.

There is another point in her definition which others have missed, and that is the dynamic or process nature of friendship; as Aristotle pointed out, the happiness of friendship depends on the activity (1169b). Davis (1970) is primarily concerned with this process aspect and offers a description of the unfolding nature of the relationship, the initial appraisal of the
possibilities by the parties, the endeavours to spend time together, getting to know one another better, talking in an increasingly personal way, helping one another and finally coming to a better understanding of one another. The merit of his work is that it arrests the tendency to think that we can come to a full understanding of friendship through a series of rather abstract generalities about all friendships at all times.

Two modern writers take up Aristotle's division of friends into three groups, viz. those of utility, pleasure and true friends. Paul Wright (1969) uses the categories utility, stimulation value and ego support value in his analysis of, and experimentation on, friendships. The modern author to whom I wish to devote more attention, Telfer (1971), also takes up these three categories.

Her paper is specifically concerned with Aristotle's two books on friendship and she takes as her starting point the reasons for having friends when we adopt them voluntarily. The first of these reasons corresponds to Aristotle's friendships of utility, the friends who render us services which make life easier. Next come those who give us direct pleasure besides what they do for us. She points out, however, that such friends can also give us distress: the sorrow of not being in their company, or the disillusion of finding that they are not all that they appeared to be. Against this distress must be set the pleasure of doing things with them and of turning
uninteresting tasks into enjoyable ones. The positive aspects, she feels, win out.

The third reason for having friends, seems to be equivalent to Aristotle's true friendship, she calls this the 'life enhancing' aspects of friendship. Our stake in the world is increased: with such friends we have a greater emotional commitment to our activities and an enlarged knowledge and understanding of the world. Telfer writes:

"Through friendship we can know what it is like to feel or think or do certain things which we do not think, feel or do ourselves. And our knowledge is not merely knowledge by description, but knowledge by acquaintance derived from our sympathetic sharing of (our friends) experience. We might compare this effect of friendship with that of reading a great work of literature. C.S. Lewis trying to answer the question 'What is the good of literature?', says 'We want to be more than ourselves...we want to see with other eyes, to imagine with other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as with our own.' ...this empathy with the authors of literature is exactly like the empathy with friends which I have tried to describe..."

The second part of this chapter examines this idea of empathy in more detail. Here I wish to concentrate on the definition of friendship that is being offered.

Telfer treats the third reason for friendship as a necessary condition for the application of the word friend. She considers the case of two elderly people. He runs
messages. She knits him socks. They visit one another as they are lonely and they occasionally go to the cinema together if they both want to see the same film. Telfer argues that they need not be friends, although they would easily meet some definitions of friendship, for example that given by Paul Wright of 'voluntary interdependence'. Telfer claims there are certain necessary conditions for friendship. The example of the old couple illustrates two of these conditions - a reciprocal giving of services and a sharing of activities (Aristotle's utility and pleasure) - but a third is lacking. This is the reason for which the things are being done. Friendship, she claims, must be characterised by a particular affection: a concern for the welfare and happiness of the other person. This is not a general concern for people's welfare, such a concern would be benevolence and leads to befriending and being a friend to, both of which are rather different from the concept of friendship. Bell (1975) has pointed this out in relation to the Samaritan concept of befriending.

The particular affection of friendship is what leads to our sharing in our friends' joys and sorrows. "This special concern for friends also gives rise to reactions of special pleasure at their good fortune, pain at their misfortune, anger with those who injure them and so on." She notes that this concern is not rational. We will continue in friendship after we have come to feel that we do not like or respect someone. Our choice of that particular person as a friend, however, was not
irrational, we chose them for their own sake, for what they were and not simply to escape our loneliness.

Even with these added points, Telfer feels that we have not uncovered a sufficient set of conditions for friendship. She agrees with Aristotle that two men might by accident bear one another the appropriate good will and still not be friends. Both parties must also realise what is happening and consent to it. This she feels gives us sufficient grounds for saying that people are friends.

Telfer's account is one of the most thorough ones of recent years. As an account of friendship there are certain minor problems. She holds that it is a necessary condition that services are rendered. This needs qualification. Aristotle implies that in the ideal state of friendship no such services would be rendered. In such cases the parties would not be in need; even in other cases we might object that as a matter of fact two friends never have rendered one another any services and indeed may never do so. This in itself would not stop us calling them friends. Rather it is the propensity to give services that is important. Only if two people said they would never give any service to the other might we wish to withhold the term friend. This last argument also applies to sharing activities. Unless Telfer means this in the trivial sense of having to share something - for example talking together. Again, it is the potential for sharing activities that is important.
Another difficulty with the account given so far is that it allows in lovers and siblings as friends. For Aristotle they were indeed friends due to the wide meaning of the Greek word, but Telfer does not make this point and does not offer us a way of excluding these relationships. The dictionary and Derek Wright were at pains to exclude them directly, an unsatisfactory state of affairs for what we need to know is how to distinguish lovers, who are also friends, from those who are lovers and no more.

I would suggest that the best solution to this last problem has been offered by Davis (1970); we need some account of the process of friendship. With such an account we would see whether the lovers are also friends or whether they came to meet and only meet for the purposes of their love.

If we amend Telfer's account in the ways I have just suggested I think we can offer a somewhat better set of conditions. Friends will in principle be willing to help one another and to accompany one another in activities; they will feel an affection for one another and choose to be in one another's company for the sake of the other person themselves. There will be vicarious pleasures and pains and those involved will recognise what is happening and consent to it. Finally we must be able to add to this an account of the relationship which tells us some thing of the way it develops in the manner suggested by
Davis (1970). Taken together these points would seem to give us sufficient grounds for judging a relationship to be a friendship.

If Telfer were to accept the above account I feel there is still one major criticism that has not been discussed. The above account of a set of sufficient conditions for friendship is too rational, too intellectual and too ideal. If the above are sufficient conditions for friendship, then I, and I suspect many of the people I have known, have been without friends for most, if not all, of our lives. Aristotle does warn that we must be content if we can only find a few friends, but he also points out that "...men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility...and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure...Therefore we too ought perhaps to call such people friends..." (1157a). We might say of Telfer, that is simply not how we use the word.

The problem seems to be relatively simple. The sufficient conditions suggested are the sufficient conditions of the ideal. To some extent they are concerned with a Platonic ideal to which Aristotle's common sense approach stands in sharp contrast. This ideal has an important role in our lives, it is a templet of which we are often aware and against which we offer up our actual relationships. For our friendships, however, there are no necessary and many sufficient sets of conditions.

A number of the characteristics of friendship have been introduced. I propose to select just one for further
examination. That is the close and special understanding that can evolve between friends; the characteristic Steffen called 'empathetic understanding' and Telfer referred to simply as empathy. I wish to examine this concept somewhat further for two reasons. Firstly, because it appears to be an important part of the idea and ideal of friendship, but a part which has been almost totally neglected in the psychological literature. And secondly because I wish to propose in the final chapter of this thesis that it is exactly this element which emerges for the first time in the friendships of later adolescence.

Part Two: Empathy

This part chapter is concerned with empathy; with its definition and the place it has in our friendships. It is a word which has been employed to such an extent in the psychological literature, that its meaning has become diffuse and its use questionable. Indeed, the literature on empathy has been described by Hurst (1974) as "massive", and has had at least three thorough reviews recently - Marcus (1971); Deutsch (1975); and Gavrilova (1975). It is not the aim of this account of empathy to distil from the literature a common denominator, but rather to show the use the word once had, and the relevance of this use to the present quest for a better understanding
of friendship. The reason for seeking an older and more particular definition is that the word empathy has come to be used for a number of related phenomena for some of which we already have perfectly sound words. The word empathy was originally introduced to perform an exact function, but as it has become more general in meaning this specific function has again been lost.

Whereas with friendship, anthropologists such as Paine (1970) testify to its universality in man, and the classical writers testify to its antiquity, with empathy the origins are definite and modern. In 1907 Lipps described *Einflußlung* (feeling together with), this was rendered into English by borrowing the Greek word εὐπαθεία which meant a physical affection, partiality, state of emotion or passion. At the time that he introduced the word Lipps was not really concerned with persons, but with objects. Observers were asked to relate their feelings about abstract pictures.

In 1917 Stein published her doctrinal thesis as a book entitled *On the Problem of Empathy*, this work is of prime importance to this thesis for two reasons. It remains the most coherent, fundamental and exhaustive account of empathy, and also stands as a classic example of an accessible phenomenological analysis which, to a limited extent, tackles the roots of the problem of being-in-the-world before Heidegger's text appeared. While Stein's work is a model of clear analysis and avoids the
specialised language of other phenomenological writers, it is nevertheless no light matter to read. Appendix Ten provides a summary of her main arguments as far as they are relevant to this thesis.

Her initial definition of empathy is based on the fact that we all experience the phenomenon of foreign psychic life. Acts in which we 'grasp' this life are designated empathy for the purposes of starting the analysis. She then claims that such empathetic acts are analogous to acts of memory; that they involve a similar rather complex structuring of their subjects. I remember things which happen to me, the subject of the sentence appears first in the role as having a memory, and then again in what would normally be the object of the act. I remember a joy I had. Empathy, Stein claims, has a similar double subject structure: I empathise with his joy. The difference from memory is that here the second subject is a different person. Thus the structure of the two types of act are analogous at least. There is a second, and important way that the two types of act are the same. In memory the present act is an irreducible experience. I experience a memory and I can't be wrong or doubt that experience (although of course I could be wrong about the experience being a memory experience). However, the object of the memory act is of quite a different status. Over that I can be, and often am, wrong; it is non-primordial.
This pattern is the same for empathy. Over the experience of the other person I cannot be wrong, although over what is empathised I can indeed be mistaken. Thus empathy like memory is an "...act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content". "Empathy in our strictly defined sense as the experience of foreign consciousness can only be non-primordial experience which announces a primordial one." That is, the content of the act of empathy points to an event which was itself unquestionable. In a model case of an act of empathy there is my experience of the other person, which I cannot doubt. There is the relation between that experience and what is actually happening to him, over which indeed there may be mistakes, and there is that person's actual experience which for them cannot be doubted. The essential pattern is one of primordiality - non-primordiality - primordiality.

Stein makes several distinctions between empathy and other closely related concepts. The first distinction is that of 'assuming' an experience. This is where I put myself in another's place and try to understand whatever it is that he feels. By doing this I may hope to gain knowledge of how he feels. But this is not empathy. This is something I can do when empathy fails. In assuming his experience I am separating him from it. I first consider the experience and then how it relates to him. Stein has defined empathy as the case when I grasp that person and his experience together.
Similar to the assuming process is 'self forgetfulness'. Watching the acrobat, I may become so taken up with what is happening that I do not notice that I have dropped, and picked up, my programme. Some people have described this state as empathy. But it seems clearly different. I can understand another person's joy whether or not I forget myself; and I can forget myself whether or not I am considering other people. Indeed, for Stein the matter is simpler for it is part of the concept of either my memory or my empathy that there is an awareness of the separate subjects.

Two concepts which both involve empathy, but are distinct from it are "fellow-feeling" and "feeling of oneness". The first of these she uses for the state in which, at the same time as empathising with a person's experience, I gain a similar experience from whatever event has caused his. The passing of his exam allows us to go away on holiday together. Here my joy and my realisation of his joy are both present.

Another and distinct feeling is where experiences are believed to be the same, she uses the term "feeling of oneness". For example the feeling that I get from a piece of impersonal news which I find is shared by my companions and we realise that we are having the same feeling about the news.

Many of Stein's remarks are directed at the work of Lipps, who had explained empathy in terms of imitation
of another's actions. Stein points out that what he is describing is indeed a common phenomenon, but she calls it transference. I meet someone with a long sad face and I become sad. I enter a cheerful bubbling crowd and I too feel lighter. But this she argues happens all the time and we simply do not consider the foreign nature of such events. We are not particularly aware of other people having those feelings. We simply take over or take on the feeling ourselves. So with Lipps' imitation there is no particular awareness of another person qua person being involved.

A number of authors have failed to make such distinctions. For example, Stotland et al (1971) and Feshbach (1968) who treat empathy as something that can be recorded in the empathiser's body. In such cases there is usually no discussion of the possible relationship between such bodily changes and any understanding of what is happening to another person, let alone any evidence about the nature of that relationship. However limited the dictionary's definition may be in this instance, it is clear about one thing, empathy is concerned with events outside the empathiser. "The power of entering into the experience of or understanding objects or emotions outside ourselves." (My emphasis.)

Another example of failing to heed the distinctions presented above is offered by Shantz (1975). She maintains that 'cognitive' definitions of empathy are the commonest, (those which are framed in terms of one person's
understanding of another's situation) as opposed to those suggested by authors such as Sherman (1971) which relay on a bodily imitation or affect. The experimentation she reports is concerned with asking children to say how another person feels, usually from looking at a picture. A delightfully simple procedure, but which leaves the researcher not one wit the wiser about which of several processes are being investigated.

Stein's book appeared in English in 1970, since then a number of writers have defined empathy far more clumsily and unsuccessfully than she did. Because of their failure, either to produce a better definition, or to use Stein's, they have conducted research which contains such ambiguities as to make whole projects of very little value. The concept with which Stein was dealing remains of great importance and deserves and demands further research. I am not suggesting that Stein's treatment is the last word on the matter. There are particular difficulties with her account (see Appendix Ten) and, I think, one of these is of importance. This last difficulty however does not affect the usefulness of the analysis she offers. It concerns her premise, which she shares with other phenomenologists, especially Husserl, that we can use the notion of a pure 'I' as a recipient of phenomena. It is the 'I' of experience, and over experiences we cannot be mistaken, although, of course, we are often mistaken as to what they are experiences of. This 'I' and its experiences give us the sound foundations out of which we
can build our worlds. Stein is raising an old and profound problem. What does it mean to say this 'I' experiences foreign psychic life? In Chapter Two I indicated that I believe such problems to be a function of certain sets of assumptions, assumptions which met with no systematic examination until 1928, when Being and Time was published. It would be a little hard to accuse Stein of failing to be ahead of her time.

We can, however, see that she did not credit some of the questions raised with the importance that Heidegger was later to reveal in them. She recounts Scheler's analysis of sympathy (Scheler, 1913) and notes that he says: "Initially there is 'a neutral stream of experience' and 'our own' and 'foreign' experiences are first gradually crystalised out of it". This she claims is an untenable position, for the process can never get underway. But the reason why it cannot get under way is only because such great importance has been laid on the primacy of the 'I'. If the 'I' is no longer primary, but instead primacy is given to the neutral stream of experience, difficulty about an 'I' and 'thou' being separated is no greater than for any other form of psychological differentiation. At least if there is special difficulty we are not told about it.

It is interesting to compare this idea of Scheler's with some of Heidegger's thoughts:

"Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein". (p. 160)
"Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is... 'Empathy' does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible: it gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with... Our analysis has shown that Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world... So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being... But the fact that 'empathy' is not a primordial existential phenomenon, any more than is knowing in general, does not mean that there is nothing problematic about it." (p. 162/3 my ordering.)

Here Heidegger, although as usual he does not say so, is clearly making his point about Stein's work. As her assumptions are wrong about the relationship of the 'I' to experience there is no particular interest in 'empathy' as a way of helping our understandings of the relationship between mental beings. On the other hand, as he adds, there is still a great interest in empathy itself as an important possibility of our beings.

I wish to propose that empathy as defined and distinguished above, is a key concept in our understandings of friendship. That is not to say that it is part of a necessary or sufficient condition for friendship, but rather that it is at least a component in our ideals, and is indeed common to many of those friendships we most value. At the end of her book Stein writes:
"...through empathy with 'related natures', i.e. persons of our own type, what is 'sleeping' in us is developed. By empathy with differently composed personal structures we become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others...when we empathetically run into ranges of value locked in us, we become conscious of our own deficiency or disvalue." (p. 105)

Empathy is that element in friendship which allows us to become something more than we would have been without the friends. As Becker (1973) puts it "...be more fully present to..." ourselves, or as Paul Wright (1969) suggests provides us with necessary "ego support" or again as Derek Wright (1970) claims, it is the element in friendship which gives most of us the self-confidence to keep off the analyst's couch.

Three other writers have directly mentioned empathy in the context of friendships. Lemineur (1972) examined the relationship between empathy and sociometric status. Unfortunately his 9 subjects were patients in a psychiatric hospital and the sociometric choices were thus somewhat unnatural. Further, empathy was defined as a similarity of neural activity between a person watching a subject receive an electric shock and the subject receiving the shock. Apart from any technical doubts about this procedure, as we saw, Stein pointed out (page 167 above) that such processes examine only another experience of our own, there is no evidence of foreign experience. This is not the type of empathy which I believe is involved in friendship.
As was noted above (page 155), Steffen also uses the term empathy in his definition of friendship. But the concept is conflated with understanding and the tasks developed to increase friendship emphasise understanding another's viewpoint rather than empathising with it. Stein (page 165 above) distinguishes from empathy the intellectual activity that can take its place if empathy has failed. This she calls 'assumption' and is brought about by 'understanding' the other's position.

The most relevant of the writers who have used the term empathy while writing on friendship is Begelow (1975). He adopts a similar, if broader, use than the Steinian definition. He is concerned with essays written by children on the topic of friendship. Themes from these were categorised. These categories were then ordered according to their occurrence in different age groups. The set of categories which concerned the oldest group were labelled empathy and included trusting, sharing and similarity of views. The eldest children were 14 years old, amongst whom the percentage of such empathetic material was still small, below the age of 12 years it was non-existent.

The last author provides the most relevant points to my own theme, but his definition of empathy is too wide. Quite young children could be said to trust their parents, share things with their siblings and hold views in common with other children. Stein's definition requires the other person in the relationship to have taken on a full
role as individual. As so often no one seems to have summed up the matter better than Aristotle, who, in a quotation already presented above, puts his finger on what is surely the essence of empathy in friendship.

"Friendship is a partnership, and as man is to himself, so he is to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his own being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being..." (1171b)
CONCLUSION: THE HEIDEGGERIAN PSYCHOLOGIST

Part One: The Birth of Empathy

I claimed in the introductory chapter that there had been many arguments about the nature of explanations in social psychology and that it was my aim not to repeat these but to present an illustrated corollary to them. I have now presented the illustration and it remains to be shown more explicitly how they relate to the arguments.

In this first part of the conclusion I wish to point out the way in which some of the terms used by Heidegger apply to aspects of the investigation of friendship reported in the previous three chapters. In the second part of the conclusion I will briefly try to show the type of account of friendship that I believe a Heideggerian psychologist might produce.

I argued in the second chapter that the criteria for scientific investigations that have been in common circulation amongst psychologists are not the most coherent set available. I proposed that Heidegger's criteria were more coherent; and further that they were particularly relevant to the science of social psychology. The outline of scientific activity that I attributed to Heidegger was roughly as follows.
There are two main aspects of science, the 'logical' and the 'secular'. The secular aspect concerns the fact that being a scientist is part of being human. It is not, for example, only a belief in an abstracted body of knowledge and method. This implies that the way we become scientists and the lives we live as scientists are as much part of science as the topics being investigated.

The logical aspects of science are the more familiar. These concern the establishment of a set of logically interconnected propositions, propositions which cohere and are counted as true because of their coherence. Heidegger offers three broad descriptive terms for the way new propositions are added to the set. I suggested that we could usefully separate the concepts of Projection and Thematization and use them for different stages in the process. The first of these stages is Projection. This word I used to convey the way that we bring certain things to any investigation, and that among these things are the 'possibilities' for the development of the investigation. Also we must already have a view of the matter to be investigated. This view may be rejected, accepted, or partially accepted, but it is necessary that there is something that is accepted/rejected, we cannot start our investigations with blank minds.

The word Thematization conveys the central activity of the scientific investigation, the drawing out from our subject matter of the appropriate concepts - its
themes. This stage is characterised by defining and negotiating, and leads us from our naive conception of the topic to a clearer and informed restatement. Sometimes these themes are drawn out with the help of particular methods: we employ rituals which have been shown to be of value in the past. The aim of Thematization is to produce 'new' Objects - to Objectify. Objectification adds to the stock of publically accessible ideas. Our clarifications, definitions and negotiations enlarge the objective world.

These are the crucial terms of the Heideggerian scientific investigation. They do not lead to a radical new view of science, but rather emphasise that we must be equally careful in all we do as scientists. I wish now to point out briefly the way in which my investigation illustrates these terms. Firstly and importantly it was my investigation. Here I am asserting the contribution the particular scientist makes to his work. It is not the case that the ends of my work could have been achieved indifferently by any worker. At the same time the contribution I make must be publically accessible. It is just that public accessibility is not based exclusively on the way I conduct the formal aspects of my work. In the phrase 'my contribution to the publically accessible' are contained the two fundamental elements of science which I have called the secular (my contribution) and the logical (publically accessible).
I have so far made very little overt reference to the secular, but one major point has been made covertly. This implicit argument was in the form of the ordering of the chapters. There are there sets of reasons for this ordering. Firstly, a point which I will return to in the second part of the chapter, to help underline the fact that I do not regard any of the methods illustrated as having any logical precedence over any of the others. Secondly, to illustrate the way that I became acquainted with the differing psychologies. And thirdly, a related point, that by giving an order which has personal significance I may appeal to other psychologists who possibly have followed similar courses to my own.

The second of these points illustrates the secular aspects of the scientific process. When I was introduced to the subject there was little room to challenge the dogma that experimental psychology was the whole of psychology. Later I began to understand that this view had severe conceptual shortcomings; that it ruled out of court exactly those faculties which are most particularly human, processes such as lending meaning, interpreting and understanding. The experimentalist does not seek to uncover the meaning people give to their friendships. Later I found that people who were prepared to tackle the human subject on its merits were still unprepared to come to terms with what they had themselves put into the investigation. The same people were also often ready to reject all the matter of experimental psychology without due
consideration. The philosophical psychologist seemed more thorough: but was disinclined to make use of his thoroughness and apt to insist on the logical primacy of what he contributed.

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty seemed to me to offer the most systematic alternative to such partisanship. The temporal order of my investigation was dictated by my changing beliefs. My own particular history is not significant for its peculiarities (although in this particular case the movement away from Empiricist assumptions is important). What is important here is that there is such a history for each and every scientist and that the having of such a history is one of the marks of science.

The secular aspects of science are always present, but we normally remove them from our writings. We present the whole of an investigation as though it had been conceived, executed and written up on one day of our lives. Heidegger is asking only that we are as scrupulous in declaring our personal interests as we are rigorous in examining the 'facts' of our investigations. There are many such secular aspects to any investigation. I have illustrated only one of them.

Having illustrated the point Heidegger was making about the secular element in scientific investigation I now wish to recap briefly the more conventional logical aspects of my investigation. Projection was illustrated
by the examination of the assumptions which went into my work but the term also covers matters which have not been presented; for example, the way in which I chose the subject of friendship and the reasons for doing so. Further, at the time of this choice, there were concepts that I thought I was examining, areas I believed I wished to investigate, meanings that I gave to friendship and the definitions I would have offered of empathy. Although they were not, all these could have been made explicit, see page 41 above. This is how any investigation starts and the start lays out certain possibilities.

Thematization was illustrated a number of times in the central chapters, for example, by the negotiations I had with the sixth formers about their friendships. I tried to become clearer about the concepts they were using and fit together the views they offered me. These views were necessarily in the context of their particular lives. Pupils presented their friendships in contr-distinction to their relationships at home and the importance they attached to their non-social lives.

Another aspect of Thematization is the examination of our definitions of the relevant terms; we clear the ground for negotiations about particular friendships by considering general points and the writings of others. Here we seek definitions which portray the uniqueness of the term we are concerned with. For example empathy is distinguished from other associated terms and so our
stock of terms is increased. In turn the subtlety and accuracy of our descriptions are greater. The examination of empathy represented one of the technical methods that govern our ways of access to the themes of our investigations. More conventional psychological methods were also employed. Questionnaires allowed us to begin to see what special account we must take of the views expressed by the sixth formers.

With Heidegger's description of scientific investigation we can see the restricted contribution experimental method has to make; it is simply concerned with one of a number of methods used in Thematization. Philosophical analysis is able to contribute both to these methods and to the preliminary Projection. The humanistic psychologist contributes more broadly to Thematization than his experimentalist counterpart.

The borderlines between the three terms Projection, Thematization and Objectification are not sharp. For example when we separate and define a term such as empathy we begin to Objectify it; to a limited extent we do provide a new Object. However, in this case it was Stein who Objectified empathy, for me it has been a matter of Thematization.

It is easier to see the concept of Objectification when it is on a grand scale: the idea of gravity or the suggestion of the gene are examples of the production of new scientific Objects. They enter our public worlds
and are as much part of them as trees, tundra or trust. These Objects knit into the interconnection of propositions. They hold together other propositions and in some sense add to what there is. As this process continues the new Objects in turn must be accounted for and are themselves knit in. In this way our understandings of the world are increased. I have said rather little about Objectification which Heidegger claims is the aim of the scientific investigation and so before presenting my own Object it may help to elaborate on the concept a little further.

These Objects seem to be for Heidegger a species of phenomenon. Phenomena are all the concepts and ideas that we can make public. The word phenomenon, Heidegger claims, comes from the Greek for the action of bringing into the light of day, putting into the light. From this comes the idea of "that which shows itself in itself" - makes itself manifest. (Being and Time, page 51) Not all phenomena are Objects, but all Objects are phenomena - that is, they are publically accessible. Scientific Objects are the phenomena which belong to the logical interconnection of propositions. The levitation of the dome of pleasure in Kubla Khan may be a phenomenon, but not an Object. It is available to us all, but it is not easy to tie it in with all other psychic events.

We can view the production of scientific objects as a sub-group of the production of literary concepts.
The difference is that in the former we are fast-bound as to what is admissible, and we must give exact details of the origin of any new object; in the latter there are fewer restrictions. The actual process of production is the same and an emphasis on its creative non-mechanical nature would appear to be one of the merits of the Heideggerian account. Virginia Woolf (1929) offers the following description:—

"...you know the little tug - the sudden conglomeration of an idea at the end of one's line: and then the cautious hauling of it in, and the careful laying of it out? Alas, laid on the grass how small, how insignificant this thought of mine looked; the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts back in the water so that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating".

Such fish are the stuff of science. Most are not able to be passed on: when we try to make them public they become trivial, or mistaken, or vaporise entirely from between our fingers. Others of our ideas struggle on sufficiently to be shown to our friends who are kind about them - and we realise they are being kind. A few reach the next stage of a public hearing where detached eyes spot their poverty. Those that survive all this may enter the broader realm of public discourse. In such an inelegant manner are the Objects of science produced.

Alywin (1972) offers a concrete example of this process. Imagine driving down a country road, we notice
the trees stretching away to one side, suddenly we come into line with the end of a row and see that in fact it is an orchard of neatly planted fruit trees. After this the trees retain their order, although when we pass on we may not be able to see the rows as such. A new 'object' has emerged - the orderliness of the trees - and once it has emerged we do not lose it again, it has become public and we can describe it and introduce others to it.

What is important about these descriptions is the way that they catch a vital element in our intellectual lives: an element which occurs crucially in science. In one of the most fundamental parts of the scientific process there are no rules and there is no method. The finding of objects is not like the decoding of some strange map. It is arbitrary, and it is inelegant and these are important features of the scientific process. It is important in the Heideggerian description for a more abstract reason; in the production of new Objects we see the logical and secular aspects of science meet.

It now remains in this part of the chapter to illustrate the production of Objects with my own Object. I wish to do this by putting together two sets of ideas. The first set was introduced at the end of Chapter Five. There I proposed using the Steinian concept of empathy to encapsulate an important aspect of friendship, one which Aristotle expressed in the following way:
"...as man is to himself so he is to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his own being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being...". I suggested that in this form the idea was original, important and of considerable value in our understandings of friendship.

Secondly, I wish the reader to consider this expression of empathy in friendship in the lives of the pupils I talked with. Aristotle was insistent that true friendship, as opposed to the friendships of utility and pleasure, was a relationship gained in adulthood. "...men apply the name of friends...to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends" (1157a). The implication is that if we accept empathy as a characteristic of adult friendships, we would expect it to appear between childhood and adulthood. Bigelow (1975) claimed a small percentage of written material from 14 year olds exhibited signs of empathy (see page 172 above). No such signs were discernable in younger children.

If we consider the pupils I talked to and use the same broad definition of empathy we can see that it has become a major theme by their age. The commonest response to being asked for the central feature of friendship was couched in terms of trust: the psychic self-confidence which allows us to approach others without fear of damage from the encounter. The damage we fear is not physical, we are now treating the other as a full
psychic being. This emergence of regard for the other as a person in their own right and not just a body, was illustrated by the references pupils made to the way their friendships had changed. Past friendships were referred to in terms of standing on street corners, playing football or somebody to be seen with; these were in the past. No one proposed that trust or the sharing of important matters were things of the past; these characterised current friendships.

I would suggest that the broad sense of empathy might well describe a characteristic which develops between the ages of 14 and 18, but it is with the narrower sense that I am particularly concerned. In the restricted sense the full individuality of the other person is overtly acknowledged. Among the sixth formers I interviewed examples of this Steinian empathy were sparse. From about one in five pupils I received ideas which would clearly belong to the section on understanding in Part Two of Chapter Four. I wish to propose that amongst these sixth formers we see the birth of empathy.

This birth of empathy illustrates the way new Objects accrue in the Heideggerian scientific process. Here the emergence depended equally on philosophic, humanistic and experimental methods. All have contributed to this example. But the way that we see the birth of empathy as true of adolescent social development does not depend in any rigorous or formal manner on these methods; it emerges rather in accordance with
the description given by Woolf and we see it in a sense analogous to the way that Aylwin sees her rows of trees.

In this part chapter I have indicated how the investigations reported in this thesis illustrate the main terms Heidegger uses in describing science. But the illustrations so far have only been accidentally part of social pscyhology. I claimed that for Heidegger psychology has a special place. I do not wish to argue systematically that this is the case, but I do wish to present an example which shows something of the uniqueness of the Heideggerian psychological science. The second part of the conclusion is concerned with this final illustration.

Part Two: The Person

I have claimed that my illustrations of methodologies can be viewed in quite a different way. They can be seen not as rivals but as aspects of one investigation. In the first part of this chapter I pointed out the way in which they contribute to the process of Thematization and so lead to the production of new scientific Objects - as an example I described the birth of empathy. While this showed that the various psychological enterprises have an equal importance in a Heideggerian science it does not show that such methodologies have any special relationship, in
particular that they belong in some essential way together.

To this extent the points made in the first half of this chapter were more generally concerned with Heideggerian science, it was only a matter of accident that the content of the illustrations was of a psychological nature. The concern of this part chapter is with the particularities of psychological science.

In the following pages I wish to illustrate the way that the separate strands of the methodologies presented combine in Heideggerian psychology. To bring about this metamorphosis, an important element which has been missing from the illustrations must be introduced. It is the element that makes psychological science particular among sciences. It is the element that is normally missing from psychological investigations without any apology being made. It is simply the consideration of persons. I will shortly introduce only one person to make this point. I will call him Robin Grey.

The short biography of Robin Grey is intended to be a self explanatory illustration, but it will probably be easier to understand if I first make some general comments on it.

First of all some of the things it is not. The particulars of an individual's biography may mislead the reader as to the level of abstraction of the point I am
making. A person with quite different thoughts and background would be equally pertinent to my argument.

I need to present one person to make an abstract point. It is important that it is a particular person. There were biographies of similar substance for 62 people and each of these is exceptional in some way. Thus if I chose a pupil with much to say on friendship, his or her fluency would draw our attention to the content of what was being said and why he or she was more fluent than others. Or again if the pupil chosen had demonstrated some academic achievement, the school context might attract us into speculating on the effect of such contexts on people's view of friendship. Having rejected a number of pupils for such reasons, I chose Robin Grey as at first his file seemed acceptably 'average'. It turned out that he was markedly unique in two respects; he was most often nominated as being known the best, and his photograph proved in some sense to be the most 'attractive'. These were not the grounds for choosing him nor were they grounds for rejecting him as an illustration of my point. There would be similar grounds for each of the pupils.

Having said this I hope it is clear that there are three types of thing I might be doing with the portrait, but which I am not doing. Firstly, it is not uncommon to illustrate psychological phenomenon with particular cases. This is normal practice in the clinical literature and is a valuable exercise -
one that is essential and follows from the more general argument that is being put forward in this thesis. Such an illustration of a case could be the illustration of a person claiming many friends, or of a person with the most to say about friendship, or of the person whose categories were closest to those used by Aristotle. To make such points with an illustration would only be to offer what has been offered in the past.

A different sort of use of an individual case might be made. By considering an individual we could see how certain aspects of people's lives, that had been introduced earlier, belong together. We might see what the diverger has to say about his or her friendships, or we might see if those who expressed satisfaction with their sibling relationships also expressed satisfaction with their friendships. Again such enterprises seem perfectly legitimate. And again they follow from the more general point that I would like to make.

There is a third and rather different type of account for which we might present such a biographical study. This would be the presentation not of a particular person but of a generalised psycho-biography of a universal ego. Such an account would be a distillation from particular biographies and would make more explicit the contradictions normally covered up by the individual's desire for consistency. Thus the person described would have both many friends and few friends, would feel them to be important and yet not important. The dimensions would be laid bare but the biography would not be specific
about where on the dimensions the general subject lay. (It would seem that investigators probably collude with their subjects in covering up such individual ambivalence.) Again an enterprise like this might be valuable and would not contradict my argument. But it is, however, important at this point that Robin Grey's biography is that of a particular person and only contains material concerning that particular person. These misunderstandings are misunderstandings of the level at which the example is given.

There is another and important way that the portrait of Robin Grey could be misunderstood, and that is to see the following as an advocation of biography as the psychological method. I would not wish to deny the importance of particular biographies in psychology. Nor would I wish to deny that the way that the following portrait is intended to help our understandings has much in common with the way that biographies illuminate our perceptions of our fellow men.

This biography, however, is presented to show something of the way we reach general understandings of social phenomena, through realisations of the particulars, but this does not imply that we consider only those particulars. The following example receives its wholeness from a number of sources - experimental, humanistic and philosophical. Biographical studies do not seek to place their subjects in the web of our psychological visions, they concentrate on describing particulars.
The following portrait is offered as the completion of a circle; we draw from individuals generalities about various aspects of our lives and this is where the experimental and philosophical methods alike are inclined to leave the matter. My argument is that it is not until we again review the individual in the context of these generalities that our scientific psychology can take a step forward. When we return in this circle to the individual we are forced to dispense with the artificial distinctions we set up between the different psychologies.

On the following pages the particular description of Robin Grey appears against the left-hand margin and can be read as a continuous separate text if the reader so wishes. The comments set to the right of the page link the biography to the relevant matter presented elsewhere in the thesis and in so doing illustrate the unity and interaction of material which was initially presented under different headings.

When I interviewed Robin he was 17½ years old, tall, but of surprisingly slight build considering his enjoyment of rugby, with an oval and gentle face surrounded by ample fair hair. There were 59 files as complete as Robin's. In addition there were 3 files as complete except that they did not contain a photograph. The remaining 4 files of the 66 subjects did not contain interviews. The mean age of the 66
subjects at the time that I interviewed Robin was 17 years 8 months (s.d. 3½ months). Of the 47 boys in the sample 10 played rugby for their school. On being presented with Robin's photograph and being asked how attractive he was as a member of the opposite sex, the girls in the London sixth form gave him an average rating of 2.47. (The mean score for all the boys' photographs in the sample was 3.68, s.d. .72.) In response to the question "Would you like to look like him?" the London boys gave him an average score of 3.2. (The mean score for all the boys' photographs was 3.95, s.d. .41.) In both cases his was the most favourably rated photograph. There was no significant relationship found between these ratings on the photographs and any of the measures of actual peer popularity amongst the people photographed. Of the 66 pupils in the Edinburgh study, 37

He lived near the school lived in the same postal
with his mother, father and district as their school.
younger brother, who was Amongst the pupils 48 came
then 13 years old. from households comprised

one or more children. The mean household size, not including the subject, but including siblings who had recently left home, was 4.03 persons, s.d. 1.81. There were 7 other people in the sample who came from the same sized households as Robin. The Registrar General classifies
Mr. Grey worked as a shunter for British Rail and his wife had a part-time job helping with the meals in the school that Robin attended. Shunters as belonging to Social Class III, as there was no indication that Mr. Grey had promoted status at work, his S.E.G. would be 9 (skilled manual workers).

The modal group of the sample was Social Class III, to which 31 of 62 members belonged. This is on the basis of classification by occupation of the head of the household. There were 6 other members of the sample who belonged to S.E.G. 9. Section Nine of Chapter Four (page 120 above) presented some of the views expressed by the pupils on their relationships with the members of their households.

Robin's relationships with his parents and siblings seemed to be amiable and probably easier than for many of his contemporaries. He felt he spent a fair amount of time in the house and enjoyed being there. He claimed that he got on "pretty well" with his parents and siblings; relative to his friends he rated his household as being more important. This importance was illustrated by what he was prepared to talk about. "(I) don't think I would share family problems with my friends...(I) talk to people in the family about them...I think I would say really personal things to my parents...as compared to my friends". Over such sharing he claimed to have no hesitation. Part Two of Chapter Four
"I think it helps if you (page 127 above) concerned can talk to people about the way pupils treat their things rather than bottle them up". His mother emerged as the dominant figure in his household; he felt this was because his father was "...not such an open person as my mother". Again he noted that "I would talk to my mother about really personal things". There is somewhat of an hypothetical air about this. It is not clear if he regarded himself as having any such "really personal things". Again, over the common problem of staying out late at night, it was primarily to his mother that he referred. "If I came (in) at something like three o'clock in the morning I think they would blow their tops because my mum would probably be up anyway she would have stayed up unless I said you know if they know where I am it's O.K...if I say well I'll be in about 12 she's be up..."

Another example of his mother's dominance was over the matter of his future career. "I think they would like me to be an academic success...I suppose most parents do...they would much rather I would go to college or university than join the navy...no...they wouldn't stop me because...well about a year ago I was almost certain I was going to join the marines...they didn't stop me...I went to the interviews and all that...they left the choice up to me...although my mother wasn't very pleased...I think she...tried to persuade me against
...well no not really persuade me against...but she said she wouldn't like me to go...I think maybe she was getting more personal...your leaving me if you went... but I don't think she would stop me going". Earlier he had summarised his present position. "I was thinking of joining the navy but och I've been discouraged from that line by my parents they think I'll end up in Northern Ireland or something." The line between discouragement and not allowing is thin. His relationship with his sisters had improved since they no longer lived in the same house, a not uncommon phenomenon. "I get on with them fairly well...I think even more when they are away I get on with them fine when they are here but I tend to miss them now they are away." Even his relationship with his younger brother seemed relatively easy. "He's a bit of a stirrer at times but I like him apart from that." And indeed Robin's apparent ambivalence about his future was shared by 16 other members of the sample. This was the second largest category of career intentions, the largest comprised the 25 people who definitely wanted to go to university or college. Robin was one of 6 members of the sample who were eldest males but with elder sisters. Although "If it's early in the morning I just
get up and go on my own." While he didn't mind being on his own on such occasions, unlike many of his contemporaries, he didn't actively seek to be alone; unless it was a matter of needing quiet to work or listen to records. Apart from the solitary interests of fishing, listening to music and learning to drive, Robin's expressed preferences on people's need to be alone. In fact even the fishing and driving derived much of their pleasure from their context in a recent holiday. The enjoyment was "...more because of the place I go to...it's my mother's house on Lewis". His out of school interests included football, snooker and badminton. Among Robin's interests 30% were of an individual rather than group nature. The sample mean was 26%. If these figures are weighted for preference they become respectively 45% and 27%. Thus the holiday context of Robin's expressed preferences can be seen to be of importance in correcting the impression given by the bare figures.

He was also one of the remaining members of the boys' brigade in his sixth form; a number of other pupils had been members at some time in the past. Over the football there was an air of regret that it was no longer as common a past-time
as it had been, a view which others shared. Now he felt he was limited to "...one game a week on Thursday nights I used to play quite a lot after school but not any more." This was while rating football as the most important of his non-holiday interests. Within the school he played rugby, badminton and squash. These interests were reflected in his list of 26 people known; 15 were both from school and also involved with him in one of these three school based sports.

Robin expressed a general desire to have some form of travelling job. "I really wouldn't fancy working in an office I know guys who are working in offices now and they are really bored stiff." This desire had been tempored by an interview for the marines, where he had been advised to remain at school and obtain further highers. He was toying with the idea of going to college, but with no great enthusiasm. "I've no sort of real plans...if I get a few more highers it's always something to lean on and I could always do some sort of job for a year to give me time to think."
Whether or not he would get the required highers had become a matter of doubt "...because of the strikes... I think really I would be feeling fairly confident if we had been having a full year." The teachers' strike should not have affected him too badly; "I should be able to do that work by myself (but) I think maybe I'm a bit lazy."

The staff responsible for Robin's sixth year regarded them, academically, as rather a poor bunch. He had passed 7 'O' levels and 2 highers at the time that I saw him. He was able to manage 25 correct solutions in 40 minutes on the Advanced Progressive Matrices and had no record of poor attendance or disturbed educational background. His range of 'O' levels showed a scientific emphasis and included chemistry, physics, applied maths, engineering science and mechanics, although his expressed preference was for geography, English and economics.

On a 1 to 6 scale for science/arts bias, Robin scored 2. The mean for the sample was 2.84 (s.d. 0.5). That is, on a raw scale, Robin was 1.7 standard deviations towards the science end.
of the distribution. If the figures are weighted
for preference they become, respectively, 3 and 2.93.
His test scores made it clear that he would count
as a converger and this together with his interests in sports
might lead to a prediction of his being relatively in-
active socially; apart from his sporting interests.

On a straight measure of fluency he had produced only 16 suggestions compared with an average of 25 (s.d. 10). On the measure for originality he came 59th out of 66, that is near the least original pole. As his intelligence test score was near average if a bias measure of convergence/divergence is used he would be one of the most convergent pupils.

And indeed as far as his peers' perceptions were concerned this seemed to be the case, for he was among the half of the sample who were not nominated by anyone as having the most friends. Figure Fifteen (page 306 below) referred to in Appendix Six shows the distributions of responses in answer to the three questions. Robin was one of the 32 people not nominated in response to the question about who had the most friends. He was the single person to have a derived score of over 16 in response to the question
about who was known best, and he was one of the
16 people who scored between 6 and 10 on the
question about who
I wish to conclude this sketch with some of his
comments on his friend-
ships, but first some details of one particular type of
relationship - girl friends. His experiences in this
field were probably limited.
At neither the time of the interview nor of the
questionnaire did he claim to have a girl friend,
and among the list of known to him only 16%
were female. It seemed likely that he had had no
direct heterosexual experience. While talking about parents'
attitude to his sleeping with a girl there was again an
hypothetical air: it seemed clear that the problem had
not arisen. "Well...I don't know I don't think I would
tell them I don't think they would be very pleased I
think it would hurt them a lot if they knew it...I
suppose just because it's morally wrong or to them it
is anyway so...I don't think I would tell them."
On being asked about the characteristics which distinguished his relationships with girls from those with boys, he suggested that "...you can be sillier with girls. I think just have a laugh and just be daft but with blokes you don't muck about all the time". This seemed to be a comment about girls in general; over specific girl friends he had little to say. He felt that he didn't 'share secrets' with the last girl friend he had had to the extent that he did with his male friends.

The main point of a girl friend was to 'enjoy her company'. On being pressed for what this meant he continued "attraction that's about the main thing that there would be well I'd be attracted to a beautiful girl but I'm not attracted to a boy obviously."

A number of pupils, besides Robin, expressed the idea of being attracted to the opposite sex by appearance, but that appearances were unimportant in the formation of friendships with one's own sex. It is interesting to compare these statements with the judgements on the photographs. The London boy judges ordered the girls' photographs according to attractiveness as members of the opposite sex and
also for potential friendship. The correlation was positive and high; the overall mean for 15 judges of 14 photographs was \( \rho = .98 \). In the case of the boys' photographs, the boy judges were asked, "Would you like to look like him?" The correlation between the responses to this question and the one about becoming friends with the depicted person for 43 photographs had a \( \rho \) value of .81. A statistically closer relationship. This is not to suggest that the two questions about attraction and wanting to look alike are the same, but only that physical appearances may not be as irrelevant to friendship formation as some pupils claimed.

Cavior (1975) has found a similar effect with direct judgements rather than photographs. Blos (1962) has given a psychoanalytically oriented account of processes that may lie behind adolescents' views of the appearances of their own sex. The attraction he was referring to was not something that he felt made much difference to the relationships between himself and girls or boys. "I don't think there are many differences...if it's a casual girl friend I don't think I would share too much...whereas maybe I would with a special friend boy or girl." Later on, when asked about ways he thought he might have answered the questions differently two years earlier, he replied: "Well I think I'm a bit more mature now I would hope so..."
anyway two years ago I don't think I had any real girl friends." But what is a real girl friend? "Somebody that you take out places as opposed to somebody that you just talk with."

Certainly in this respect not one of the most sophisticated sets of answers. Although a number of pupils had left the difference between friends and partners in the hands of "attraction" and felt that little more could be said, there was usually indication that such attraction was no longer simply attributed to a stereotype of physical appearance.

If he was not particularly active in making girl friends Robin did seem to have gathered a number of other friends, if the sociometric analysis is any indication of such matters. How had these friendships arisen? About half were directly from school, a number were from the boys' brigade and a couple lived near his house. "There's not many boys my age live round about me there's a few of them there's one guy well he's in my year and he lives round the

Robin's code number in Figure Three is 23.

Section Five of Chapter Four illustrates some of the ways that friendships arose. (Page 96 above.) Robin spontaneously mentions friends as being people of his own age. Of the people he listed, 80% were contemporaries. The mean for the whole sample was 67%.
corner there's another bloke who lives next door to him." The friend round the corner "...he came four years ago I think it was...when he moved then we just got friendly".

The theme of propinquity was initiated by Aristotle (page 148 above). It has been taken up by recent authors such as Athanasiou (1973).

As far as I was able to gather this was Robin's main friend apart from people he only saw in school. He seemed not to have made many new friends recently and noticed that while on the evenings of the weekdays there was enough to do some Saturdays he was "...just in the house...because I haven't really got anywhere to go".

In fact with his general contentment with being at home he gave me the impression that he might feel he had few friends. This, however, he denied. On being asked if he would like more friends, he answered: "I don't think it would be harmful in any way to have more friends...I wouldn't mind having more close friends...I wouldn't mind having more girl friends (but) I wouldn't specially wish for them".

The need to have people for such activity is introduced in Section Seven (a) of Chapter Four (page 101 above).

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The range of feelings of contentment or otherwise with existing friendships
was illustrated in Section Four of Chapter Four (page 94 above).

When asked about how he would feel if he were to be separated from his friends, he replied "I don't know...I would look forward to sort of moving eventually but I would feel a bit lost at first when I didn't know anybody".

In such circumstances, Robin was clear about one thing: "I made friends easily at school...I made friends easily in clubs and things like that". Such sentiments stand in sharp contrast to those expressed by many pupils who were only too aware that they did not make friends easily. The possibility of moving and having no friends raises the question of what it is that would be missed in such circumstances. Without any general friends sports become problematic. "If I lost all the people that I know in the boys' brigade (I) couldn't play football on a Saturday and things like that, just sort of sporting things I couldn't do on my own."

The question of making new friends on moving is raised in Section Three of Chapter Four (page 91 above).

Again, Section Five of Chapter Four illustrates some of the ways that friendships arose. (Page 96 above.)

It is interesting that Robin makes no mention of Aristotle's friendship of
utility. His specific examples are of friendships for pleasure. Aristotle noted how these latter were a feature of youth and that the former arose in old age. "...the friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure." (1156a). Friendship "...which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like (true) friendship, where both parties get the same things, as in the friendships of the young." (1158a). The term friendship is used for "...those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends," (1157a).

He was clear that the loss of all his friends wouldn't mean the end of the world. "I wouldn't break my heart over it if they all just suddenly disappeared (I would miss) being able to go out unless I (went) out on my own all the time...I don't think it would affect me that much...I couldn't really say it's never happened to me...if you took them all away it would matter to me they are important in that way." Again what is this importance? Is it anything beyond having people to complete a team, We get to like people: the affectionate regard of the Greek word ἀγάπη (Page 141 above).
or for company on a Saturday night out? Robin's responses were far from fluent relative to others, but the points he covers in a few words are telling. "Well because we get to like people I think a lot of people just have to sometimes share problems with other people so...they'll tell them to people that they like I suppose it just builds up from there...(till they become) somebody that you could sort of share feelings with or anything like that or somebody that you can really talk to and somebody that will listen to you without just (saying) oh yes and walk(ing) away."

"Somebody you could sort of share feelings with." A quotation which almost exactly fits Stein's definition of Empathy (Chapter Five, Part Two, page 164 above). The ability to comprehend the feelings of another individual qua individual. Compare this with Aristotle's "...one who grieves and rejoices with his friend...". (1166a, page 162 above.) "Someone that you can really talk to." Aristotle "...sharing in discussions and thought." (1170b).
This is the totality of substantive comments Robin had on the subject of friendship. The reader may feel that they are slight, especially embedded as they are, in considerable contextual matter. I think, however, that this imbalance is not crucial for the description of Robin Grey is only partly given to help our understandings of friendship; if the thesis had been written as a model of the work of a Heideggerian psychologist this biography would have been one of several similar, but fuller, essays. As it is the thesis has tried to show the relationship between traditional methodologies and a Heideggerian approach.

The illustrative chapters have been presented in such a way as to draw attention to their order. The idea being to suggest that they might have been the other way around. For example Aristotle presents us with categories which could be used as a preliminary structure for an interview schedule. We might then trace out the variations in responses with the guidance of various socio/psychological measurements. Thus the order of the central three chapters would be reversed.

Now essentially I believe that that reversed order is a valuable order for social psychological investigations. But if I had presented them in that way the reader would have been induced to go no further in his justification of the arrangement. He might have been tempted to accept the case for that order on purely eclectic grounds. He would see the usefulness of com-
bining these methodologies and he would see how the parts of the investigation can belong together. In this way he might have been lulled into believing that the philosophical aspects, as primary questioning, had some form of logical priority. But my argument is that neither the empirical nor the a priori has logical priority, that neither the experimental nor the philosophical investigation has priority and that neither the physical nor the mental attributes of persons have priority.

I believe that such eclectism is valuable in psychology, but it is not the approach being advocated here. This is partly because there is a more general argument being advanced and partly because such eclecticism is unsound. It tempts us to build a person from the parts. Such building can only mistakenly be regarded as an understanding. For we would then be fitting together the bits of a jigsaw and congratulating ourselves on the beauty of the fit of the parts: parts we had ourselves just cut out. Examples given just now, of how we might look at the views of divergers on friendship, or the expression of Aristotelian sentiments by the pupils, illustrate this point. The separation of the parts and dealing with them as parts distracts us from the psychological enterprise.

The point I wish to make can be made with different degrees of abstraction. It is at its more
abstract levels that it begins to bring together the strands of this thesis, but it is probably helpful to introduce it first at the psychological level. Here the point is as embarrassingly simple as the biography itself was. Each of the methodologies illustrated would claim that it seeks to help our understandings of our fellow men. But none of them would be content to rest with such an odd entity. We are forced to go further and suggest that such understanding must ultimately reflect on particulars, otherwise what would our psychology be a psychology of? Robin Grey is such a particular. We have the beginnings of a scanty understanding of his friendships. The elements of this understanding are drawn from three chapters. Supposing we remove from the portrait, not the contribution of just one of the chapters, but of two of them. What do we have left? In terms of our understandings very much less than one third. But that is the implication of philosophers, 'humanists', and experimentalists defending their contributions. The whole is very much greater than the sum of the parts.

I hope the idea of building up persons from parts reminds the reader of the more abstract point made in the second chapter. We are apt, in philosophy, to introduce distinctions which we then spend a great deal of time trying to extricate ourselves from. Strawson (1959) has made just such a point in saying that persons are logically primary. Analogously, at the psychological
level, Robin Grey is logically primary to the investigations illustrated in the three central chapters. We must start with him and finish with him.

The argument in the phenomenological context, and here it is not restricted to Heidegger, is again very simple. In so far as psychology is concerned with human beings we must guard against irrational and arbitrary analysis of our subject. For example, if we are interested in friendship, we must carefully justify any moves which would lead us to study patterns of personal interaction without any reference being made to the meaning given to those interactions by the participating individuals. At its weakest the argument is that we are not forbidden to examine such patterns alone, but if we are the open-minded and rigorous empiricists we claim to be, we must justify such an apparently curious divorce. In the case of studying patterns of interactions rather than friendship the separation seems ultimately unjustifiable, but as I noted above (page 138) we meet such strange divorces and are offered no help in reconciling the resulting concepts. Without such reconciliation the account of the new matter tells us virtually nothing. More importantly, how strange to have to seek a rational reconciliation for a divorce that was never a rational matter. We do not need to justify the presentation of matters concerning Robin Grey's friendships if we are interested in human friendship. The justification becomes necessary when
we seek to dispense with him and use in his place average friendships, abstract processes, or purely physical relationships. These all have their necessary place in any account but as adjuncts, not new primitive terms.

I claimed earlier that the illustrative chapters were both illustrations of various methodologies and illustrations of aspects of a single investigation. They are aspects of the investigation of persons. Our methodologies aid these investigations, or as Heidegger put it, govern our ways of access to the matter that Thematization presents. The matter that Thematization has presented us with in this thesis is the way that human being is being-with-others: the social nature of persons. If we keep this fact in our minds, we can prevent ourselves from slipping back into the belief that one of the methods of access could ever be the method of access. Once we have espoused such a belief we lose all sense of direction in the investigation. We lose sight of our context and see only the method and at that point we can indeed only produce what we put into the investigation ourselves.

As social psychologists our area of investigation is so near at hand that we often forget it. It is to understand better the social life of Robin Grey. In that respect the sketch I have presented may be hopelessly inadequate, but even in such a state it is uniquely and
importantly his. He is not ordinary or extraordinary, he is not exceptional or average, he is not an exemplar or a paradigm example. He is uniquely and particularly Robin Grey and only as such can he instruct us about human being.
APPENDIX ONE

PILOT STUDIES
INTERVIEWS, GRIDS AND QUESTIONNAIRES

Although these appendices account for half the bulk of the thesis there is a considerable amount of material for which there is only room to make passing reference; this is particularly true of the matter covered in this first appendix. It seems important to justify these omissions. The main text has made direct use of very little of the field work conducted; probably less than one per cent of the data has been presented. I have chosen from the material I collected those pieces which I felt best served my purpose as illustrations. The temptation is to try to provide a set of appendices which cover the rest of the material in such a way that the reader can decide for his or herself whether the illustrations were well chosen. If these appendices allowed the reader to make such a decision they would run to several volumes, and no one would read them.

The following is therefore a compromise. I have indicated most of the relevant work I carried out in the field for this thesis and given some further details where these directly pertain to the main text. However, it has not been possible to give the reader enough information to judge properly the wisdom of the selection of my illustrations.

The pilot studies were composed of three main sets of work. The first of these consisted of unstructured interviews with students
and pupils. The second was conducted as part of a larger study of variations in cognitive style amongst fifth and sixth form secondary pupils which was conducted by the Centre for Research in the Educational Sciences in the summer of 1973. The third set of work was the piloting of the questionnaire and interview schedule that was to be used in the main Edinburgh study.

The preliminary unstructured interviews involved eight pupils or students from each of four age groups: fourth and sixth year of secondary school and first and last year at university or college. The establishments involved were a protestant and a catholic secondary school, Edinburgh University and Napier College. From each of these groups interviewees were chosen from both arts and science courses.

The main purpose of the interviews was not so much to gather information about the people interviewed, but rather to help me develop my own skills as an interviewer and to become familiar with the discussion of topics which I wished to investigate. I assessed my own ability to take notes in such interviews, and also the ability of respondents of that age to ignore the tape recorder I wished to use. These interviews were extensive, lasting two to three hours, and ranged over many aspects of the interviewee's life.

Attempts to analyse the type of verbal data gathered consisted of simple content analysis and word counts. These failed to lead to any systematic conclusions. Partly as a result of this I became interested in the Repertory Grid Technique and the fact that it offered both a flexibility to
the respondent and a form of systematic analysis. This interest led to my participation in the larger study that was being conducted on Cognitive Style.

This study by the Centre involved 130 pupils in Lothian secondary schools. They were given four tests each. These tests were for intelligence (AH5), divergence (uses of objects and pattern meanings), impulsivity (matching familiar figures) and field dependence (embedded figures test). I helped with the testing and then gave 66 of the pupils a self administering form of Repertory Grid which provided a fourteen by fourteen matrix. This grid had been piloted with students who had taken two to two and a half hours to complete it. Fifth and sixth formers were usually faster, completing it in one to one and a half hours.

The constructs for the grid were half supplied and half elicited. The elicitation was on the basis of how school peers had changed in the previous two years. The elements were exemplified but not supplied. Each pupil was given a set of nine sheets of paper and instructed to work through from sheet one to nine at their own speed. The sheets of paper reduced the task of element and construct selection to simple steps. These were followed by the attribution of certain of the constructs to all of the elements. The task proved to be easy enough for most pupils to manage unaided or with minimal reassurance. I felt, however, that it was not an easy matter and that pupils might need to feel that assistance was readily available. Thus pupils were seen in groups of not more than six.
The following months were spent in converting a programme, devised by my supervisor, Peter Sheldrake, into one which was powerful enough to handle the grids in the way I desired. The main problem I wished to counter was that standard grid analysis forced the respondent to make a dichotomous choice. All constructs are applied to all elements, thus the distinction between being inapplicable and being untrue is lost. The grids I used were specifically constructed to allow the respondent a three-way choice; true, false and not appropriate. The programme was first required to delete cells which represented the inappropriate response. This resulted in matrices becoming irregular in shape and of differing overall sizes.

The programme was then required to analyse the resulting grids for the normal correlations and for the total intercorrelation; this latter giving a measure of cognitive complexity which was regarded as one of, and compared with the other, cognitive styles. The interrelation between these various cognitive styles was then examined. In addition to this purely statistical work the elicited constructs were categorised and related to other known variables, in particular, age differences.

The work on the content analysis proved the most edifying. Three recurrent dimensions were found. The first was whether or not the respondent had ignored the format for the constructs which made it unnecessary for the first person to be mentioned; (the format was similar to that which appears in the questionnaire contained in Appendix Three, page 255 below). The second dimension concerned the complexity of expression used in the
construct, pupils seemed either to use simple unclaued sentences, or to use rather complex sentences with two or more clauses. The third dimension concerned the persistent way that pupils expressed either antagonism or friendliness towards their peers. The theme of friendship had not in any way been made explicit, indeed my general introduction had been concerned with the way that people change in their intellectual capacities. Friendship or its lack, however, proved to be one of the most dominant preoccupations.

Taken together the content of these constructs, the experience of interviewing, the compilation of questionnaires in other contexts and part of the testing tradition used in the cognitive styles study led to devising the pilot study which was conducted in Newcastle as a preliminary to the main Edinburgh study. A large comprehensive school on the outskirts of Newcastle was asked to administer the questionnaire (a copy of which appears as a supplement to this appendix, page 220 below) to its sixth formers (the equivalent of the fifth and sixth forms in Scotland). The questionnaire was completed by 75 pupils and 43 of these were interviewed on the basis of the schedule which also appears at the end of this appendix (page 230 below). The differences between this study and the main one conducted in Edinburgh are mostly a matter of detail as can be seen from the two sets of documents. The major difference lay in the fact the pilot questionnaire was administered by the school while in Edinburgh it was made as clear as possible to the pupils that the study had nothing to do with the school. Also, less tangibly, the pilot study was introduced as a pilot and inevitably had the
air of uncertainty which accompanies such exercises. A careful front of efficiency and competence was presented to the Edinburgh schools to enhance the prestige of the project in which the pupils were engaged.

On the basis of the problems and results of the Newcastle study the questionnaire and schedule were revised. The analyses carried out on the pilot study were rather different from those reported below on the main study; mostly the concern was with the groups of people the respondent felt to be most important and the age of these groups.

I have indicated the three studies I carried out before starting on the work reported in this thesis so that the reader can see the strands which are recurrent. The following appendices are concerned with details of this later work.
"As Others See Us".

School:

Form:

Name:

CONFIDENTIAL
This rather fat booklet asks a number of questions some of which may seem a little impertinent, so I think it is only fair to give you some idea of what it is all about at the start.

A lot of research has been done on the way that people pass exams, do intelligence tests, behave in school, etc, etc, but little has been done on things that most people regard as being more important. For example my own interest is in how people get along in school and how this compares with their friendships and activities out of school. One aspect of this is how we see other groups in the school, and how we think people have changed; another aspect is the discrepancy between what people actually do and what other people think they do. Hence I have called it "As others see us".

I would like you, if you will, to do two things. The first is to answer the questions below as carefully as possible; I'm afraid this involves you in a bit of writing; but later on I should like to see you individually to ask some more questions, and that just involves talking.

Do not let other people see what you write, unless you want them to. What you do write will NOT be seen by anybody who knows who you are. It may form part of the information for a book in which case there will be fictitious names and a fictitious place. If you feel unable to answer a question can you indicate why on the left-hand page opposite the appropriate question; you can also use this space if you run out of room on the right-hand pages. Seal the booklet with the sticky paper provided when you have finished.

Date of Birth: Sex:

School subjects that you are doing at the moment:
2.

Preferred subjects. Would you write in order of preference the three subjects that you like the most. This might include ones that were not in the last list, for example because you have finished them. If you cannot decide between two put them against one number.

1) 2) 3)

School activities. Can you make a list of the other things that you do in school? Put the number 1 against the activity you like the most at the present time, 2 against the next, and so on. If you can't decide between two use the same number for both items.

Out of school activities. A similar list for those things that you do out of school numbering them as before.

I wonder if you have thought of going to college, university or art school. Could you indicate your thoughts about this and what you would like to do as you feel about it at the moment.
I am interested in the size of the family that you were brought up in. Would you list below each member and their approximate age. If the person is younger than you or up to fifteen years older can you fill in the two right-hand columns. If they are of the older generation can you indicate, in that space, what their relationship is to you, e.g. mother, sister-in-law.

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<tr>
<th>Male or Female</th>
<th>Year of birth</th>
<th>Age at joining the family (leave blank if born into it)</th>
<th>Age at leaving the family (leave blank if still at home)</th>
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How they have changed. Below I would like you to try to make up seven phrases or short sentences each of which describes something that is now true of yourself or a friend, but was not the case a year or so ago, or you might put down something that you feel just does happen to people as they get older, although you can't think offhand of anyone that it applies to. Just write down how he or she is now, without worrying about how exactly this is different from the way they used to be. Maybe you can think of more than seven things, in which case just use those that you feel are the most important. I have started each sentence for you with the word 'they'.

1) They

2) They

3) They

4) They

5) They

6) They

7) They
Networks. If you find any of the remaining questions a 'bit much' come and have a talk about it.

Under each of the headings I want you to name three people from the lower sixth in the order indicated.

The person you know best:
next best:
and next again:

The person you know least:
next least:
next again:

The person you think is most popular, that is who you think most people would like to know:
next most:
and the next:

The person you think least popular:
next least:
and next again:

Would you indicate below an estimate of the number of days a month when you don't see anyone more than in passing, apart from people in your own home or at school.
This final part asks quite a lot. I would like you to make a list in the space provided below of all the people you have spent some time with out of normal school hours in the last month. This may be just a few people or it may be many: the number doesn't matter at all. The list should include all sorts of people you have talked to, but that you know well enough to be able to remember their names. I don't want to know what these names are, so if in the list you prefer to use initials or a false name, that's fine. It should include people whom you know at school but also see outside; it should also include older people who, for example, are friends of your parents, but to whom you also talk. Again if there are people whom you normally see but just do not happen to have seen over the last month, include them as well. If you are a member of a team or group you can probably list these people together, You will then be able to give one set of answers for the whole group.

For each person there are six columns to be filled in. In the first put the name or initials; the others are labelled A to E; fill them in in the following way:

A  The age of the person, or an estimate if you don't know it.

B  Put an S here if you first met them at school.

C  Put a P here if you know them primarily because of some activity you are both involved in, e.g. if you see them only because you are both members of the same team.

D  Can you indicate the degree of your friendship to them in the following way:

Put a 1 if they are a partner or an intimate friend.

a 2 for a close friend.

a 3 for a friend.

a 4 for someone you know.

a 5 for other people whose names you know and you see occasionally.
If you feel that none of these fit can you explain on the opposite page.

E If the reason that you see the person is because of some particular activity or interest can you indicate what it is. If there is no reason of this sort can you give an estimate of the number of days in a month on which you see them outside school. If both these are true to some extent can you indicate both.

Fill in all columns for each person.

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<tr>
<th>Person</th>
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<th>C</th>
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To be used for continuation of the last page or for any other extras that you may need, or comments that you would like to make.

Thank You
Centre for Research in the Educational Sciences.


Interview Schedule.

School:

Form:

Name:

CONFIDENTIAL
1. How does your present class compare with other classes you've been in

2. Are people more friendly or less so than before

3. Have the sorts of friends that you now have changed

4. And in what way

5. Tell me something about what is important in a friend.

6. What are the characteristics of a close friend

7. How is this different from a not-so-close friend

8. Is there anything more, apart from the obvious, that you would expect from a wife/husband/partner than from a close friend
9. How important is it to have:
   a) acquaintances
   b) friends
   c) close friends
   d) partner

10. Would you mind (or do you) not having anyone whom you could call a friend

11. What would you mind about it

12. Do you feel that there are groups and cliques in your form

13. Do you think you are a member of such a group

14. Do you want to be

15. Do you actually feel the need for better friends

16. At what sort of time do you forget about being alone or needing friends
The intensive questionnaire (a copy of which appears after Appendix Three) was compiled in the summer of 1974 and was based on the work in Newcastle described in Appendix One. The intention was to administer the questionnaire at the beginning of the autumn term so that the ensuing interviews would be finished by Christmas. As I realised that the questionnaire and the interviews together would produce large amounts of data, requiring considerable time for analysis, it was decided that no more than 70 pupils could be involved. Consequently I selected only two sixth forms for the study; these were chosen to try to reflect the type of state schooling found in Edinburgh.

All schools by that date were comprehensive in intake, although two schools were still offering a catholic education: these two were excluded from consideration. The others fell into three broad categories: old established grammar schools (by then comprehensive), post war purpose built comprehensives (mostly serving housing schemes which had been completed between the wars), and senior secondary schools (usually serving areas of predominantly older housing). It was felt that the best selection of two schools would be an ex-grammar school and a new comprehensive. The former to have a moderate reputation, amongst parents, neither particularly desirable nor undesirable, and the latter to reflect some of the problems that schools on large housing estates face.
Two schools were approached at the beginning of the summer holiday to see if they would be willing to devote one session from their time-table at which all their sixth form could be present, and then later release individual members for interview. At the time both schools agreed. Later it became apparent that the staff of the newer school felt that they had enough problems without the additional burden of academic research. The second new school approached did not have such reservations.

Sessions were arranged in the two schools for the beginning of the autumn term at the earliest date that the staff felt the pupils to have settled into their routine. The session in the older school was started at 9 a.m. on the 11th September and in the newer school at the same time the following day. The first school assembled 37 boys and 15 girls, the second 10 boys and 4 girls. In both schools some pupils were absent. Two boys were away from school on the morning of the 11th and three pupils who were "usually" in school were not there on the 12th.

In the old Grammar school I was assisted by two other members of the Centre as the number of pupils was large. The school was able to provide us with two prefabricated adjoining classrooms which stood quite separately from the main buildings. With the small numbers in the newer school I was able to administer the tests and questionnaire on my own and had been given the use of the school hall for the purpose. This latter arrangement was not as ideal as that in the other school; bells were rung and there were noises from people passing outside the hall doors.
Pupils had been told beforehand by the staff that they would be participating in a research project being conducted by Edinburgh university and that the tasks involved would not be too unpleasant. I had up to that point, and indeed later, been careful not to be seen in the company of the staff and particular efforts were made to underline the fact that we had nothing to do with any part of the education service.

In the older school pupils took their places in the two rooms as they wished. One of my colleagues stayed in each room and I moved between the two. In the other school pupils collected round two tables in a way that would have made filling in the questionnaire difficult. I invited them to space themselves out so that they had room to do the writing I hoped they would do. The positions taken up by the pupils are shown in the upper part of Figures Seven, Eight and Nine; the lower part of these figures shows the seating adopted later in the morning for the two tests.

Each session was started with introductory remarks about people's friendships and how these relate to subjects chosen for the study in school and to the decisions pupils have to make about their further education. The confidentiality of the questionnaires was stressed, as was the independence of the study from the education authority and especially the staff of the school. This was done in a way which implied that the study was on quite a large scale and that being part of it was of some prestige value. For similar reasons the questionnaires were of high quality and three names appeared on the cover. In fact these were the names of my supervisor and one of the people who helped in the larger school.
FIGURE SEVEN

Pupils Class Positions:
Old School First Room
(Individual desks)

Front of Class

1st session
(Questionnaire)

2nd session
(Test)

Code numbers show direction faced by pupils
FIGURE EIGHT

Pupils Class Positions:
Old School Second Room
(Individual desks)

Front of Class

1st Session
(Questionnaire)

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2nd Session
(Tests)

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Code numbers show direction faced by pupils
FIGURE NINE

Pupils Class Positions:
New School
(Six Foot Tables)

1st session
(Questionnaire)

2nd Session
(Tests)

Code numbers show direction faced by pupils.
During these remarks pupils had been asked to restrain their desire to complete the questionnaire as I wished them to work through it together page by page. I explained its contents and the two tests that would be given after a break and then asked them to complete the first page of the questionnaire. It was pointed out that there was no need to consult neighbouring pupils as we would be delighted to assist. At the same time we did not want pupils to work on through the questionnaire on their own and therefore they were not discouraged from engaging in casual conversation. The aim in the first part of the session was to keep as relaxed an atmosphere as was possible while still ensuring that questionnaires were completed individually.

To encourage pupils to fill in the questionnaire seriously I told them that I wished to see each person later in the term to discuss the questionnaire and their thoughts on it; for this purpose I asked them to list the periods of the week they would most like to miss in order to be interviewed. Pupils were invited to use pseudonyms provided they would be prepared later to answer requests for interview by that name. Only four pupils took advantage of this offer; one person's supposed false name turned out to be his real name.

I worked through the questionnaire page by page with the pupils in the following hour and a half. In the larger school I repeated everything I said in the first room to the sixth formers who were in the second room. The time taken was dictated by the slowest pupils, those who completed sections faster were asked to add any comments they had about the questionnaire, its administration,
or the subject matter on the blank left hand pages. All pupils were asked to do this at the end of the period and they were also asked to record the hand they normally wrote with. Only a few of the pupils made any comments on the questionnaire. Two people produced drawings of fair quality on the back page.

Pupils were then given a twenty minute break. All returned after the break for the two tests; the word "test" had in fact been avoided. As can be seen from Figures Seven, Eight and Nine the seating was adjusted to some extent, particularly in the second school. It was emphasised that this was to discourage people from sharing their good ideas with others and that pupils should let their neighbours do their own thinking. The combination of this and the rearranged seating introduced the rather more formal air necessary for the silence that was maintained during the actual tests.

Part one of Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices was distributed. We ensured that every pupil understood why the correct solution was the correct one. After this the second part was given out - verbal instructions from the guide being followed. These include the information that the time is limited to 40 minutes. In the case of the larger sixth form I repeated these instructions in the second room about three minutes after the first room. At the end of the test pupils were encouraged to relax and chat for five minutes. We endeavoured to lighten the atmosphere after the rather intense silence of the test by moving around less carefully and talking in a normal informal manner to one another and the pupils.
After this period of rest the divergence test was introduced by reading the words from the first page. No other information was given with this test. Pupils' questions were met with "as you wish" and if asked how long a time was available, as vague an answer as possible was given, e.g. "there's no hurry". As there was approximately 45 minutes to the end of the morning session in both schools the assumption would be that this would be the maximum time. These are the conventions which had been followed when the test was piloted in the cognitive styles study (see Appendix One). A copy of the test appears in Appendix Three together with details of the method of scoring. There is often a discrepancy in the physical quality of intelligence and divergent tests. The former are usually well printed and on high quality paper. The latter are often duplicated and have the appearance of being less important. The booklet used was deliberately designed to appear to be of similar quality to the Matrices and to AH5.

It is necessary to try to prevent pupils pressuring one another at the end of the test. Those that have finished have to be discouraged from showing the fact, but cannot be allowed to leave as this again might be interpreted as a reward for speed. After 35 minutes in the larger group and 25 minutes in the smaller, when it was apparent that pupils had nearly all finished, they were asked to state roughly the number of suggestions they would be able to make if they had as much time as they wanted. A few pupils thought they would manage one or two more items, but most felt that they had recorded all they could think of. After this pupils left for their lunch break. In both schools the
questionnaires and test materials were packed into bags in front of the pupils and taken directly from where they had been administered away from the school premises. Normal courtesies to the staff were made at a later date.

The sessions in the two schools lasted different lengths of time. This seemed entirely due to the different numbers of pupils. The speed with which the questionnaire and the divergent test were completed was dictated by the slowest pupil. The larger group naturally included the slowest and the fastest pupils. Also the administration to two larger groups inevitably took longer. Thus the session at the older school lasted 3½ hours, while this was reduced to 3 hours in the second school.

Details of the scoring of the divergent test and the preliminary analysis of the questionnaire are given in the next appendix. The main results are contained in Appendices Four and Five. The associated interviews are discussed in Appendix Nine.
APPENDIX THREE

EDINBURGH STUDY
SCORING AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

This appendix is concerned with the way the data gathered in the group sessions were scored, and also with some of the preliminary analysis conducted on that scored data. The first section discusses the questionnaire (Q1) part by part. The second section describes the method used to score the test of divergence. Copies of the questionnaire and the divergence test are included as supplements at the end of this appendix.

Section One: The Questionnaire (Q1)

The questionnaire contains an introductory cover which continues on to the first inside page and includes the first four questions. The remainder is divided into six parts, The introductory questions asked for the name and sex of the respondent. These were used to provide a code number for each of the 66 pupils which showed their school and sex. The age of each respondent was recorded together with their month of birth. The fourth question asked about the possibility of continued education. Responses to this were divided into nine categories: university, polytechnic, art college, education college, professional training, in service training, work, other and a mixture or indeterminate combination of the other categories. The 'other' category was used to include those who had no ideas on the subject.
This part concerned pupils' school studies. Each of the 31 different subjects being studied by the 66 pupils was given a position on two six point scales. The first of these scales distinguished the arts from the sciences. Point one on this scale represented science and comprised the subjects physics and chemistry; the opposite pole included English, History and Latin. The second dimension on which each subject was placed concerned the degree to which it included practical work. For this purpose maths, history and physics (at 'O' grade with no practical work) were regarded as being at point one, the theoretical pole of the scale, while subjects such as woodwork and dressmaking were at point six.

From this two dimensional base six scores were derived. The first of these were the two raw scores for each respondent. These were formed by adding together the numeric value of each of that respondent's subjects and dividing by the number of subjects. This was done on the practical and the arts/science scales.

The second pair of scores was derived by weighting the scores in accordance with the level attained in the subject by the pupil. If a 'higher' had been passed the basic subject value was multiplied by two. If a SYS was being attempted the number was multiplied by three. Again the mean was calculated for each of the two scales for each pupil, although in this case the divisor was increased by the total additional weightings.

The third pair of scores was similar to the last in the way it was devised. In this case the weighting was in accordance
with the expressed preferences of the respondents. The first preference was multiplied by four, the second by three and the third by two, other subjects being unweighted. Again two scores were calculated by adding the resulting subject values and dividing by the number of subjects plus six for the weightings.

PART II

This part concerned the households pupils lived in. For each household two sets of social class classifications were recorded: the class/grouping of the head of the household and the highest class/grouping in the household. In the majority of cases the father appeared to be the main earner and his occupation, or his last occupation if he had retired, was used to determine the social class and grouping. In the remaining cases the mother's occupation was used. There were three exceptions where another adult appeared to fill the role of household head. No pupils claimed to live alone or entirely with people of their own age. The second set of classifications, based on the highest class in the household was often the same as that of the head of the household. The most common exception was where an elder sibling lived at home and held an occupation which ranked more 'highly' in the classification. For example if Robin Grey's sisters had still lived at home their occupations as nurses would have put the household in social class two rather than social class three which is appropriate to shunters. The class distributions are given in Appendix Five below.

Closely associated with the categorisation of social class is the degree of education received by members of the household.
The number of persons in the household who were of an age to be having, or have had, education beyond the sixth form was recorded, as was the number receiving, or having received, such education; the latter was also expressed as a percentage of the former. Also recorded was the percentage of people in the household who were more than 15 years senior to the respondent. A further categorisation of households divided them into three groups: those consisting only of two parents and one or more children, those with additional members and those who lacked one or both parents.

Pupils were classified for birth order on a scale which ran as follows: - first born males with rival male siblings, first born females with younger siblings (and first born males with only female younger siblings), only children, later females with elder siblings (and later males with elder sisters only), and finally later males with elder male rivals. Pupils with no siblings within six years of their age were classified as only children. Long term fostered or adopted children were counted together with children born into the family.

**PART THREE**

This part was used as the basis for the sociometric networks and also as the best external criterion for a measure of 'popularity' of the individual. Three scores were attributed to each pupil; one for each question. Three points were given for a first nomination, two for a second and one for a third. The totals of these scores on each of the three questions formed the three variables.
PART FOUR

The fourth part of the questionnaire concerned the interests and activities of the pupils. Respondents were asked to divide their interests into two sets, those 'connected' with school and those carried on independently. These interests were categorised in five ways and each category given a raw and a weighted score. The weighted score was derived from the order of preference given to the interests by the pupils. They were asked to rank the items in their lists in order of importance. The least important was given a score of one, the next two, and so on. The result was divided by the total ranking value for each person to allow comparison of individuals.

The five categories constructed were as follows. Firstly the percentage of interests which were school based. Secondly the percentage of interests which were considered by the respondent to be of an individual nature, that is they were 'normally' done alone, e.g. reading. Thirdly the percentage of activities that were engaged in for the people, rather than because of the activity itself. Fourthly, the converse of the last - the percentage of items in which the interest rather than the people were of prime importance. And fifthly the percentage of interests which involved 'leadership', e.g. taking a cub pack. This last category had been common in the Newcastle sample but proved to count for less than one per cent of the activities in Edinburgh.
PART FIVE

This part of the questionnaire was included to confirm and extend the work carried out earlier on construct elicitation. (See Appendix One.) The format here was different. Previously pupils had been presented with seven small pieces of paper and an instruction sheet. Placing the construct elicitation in a questionnaire was a technique which had not been properly piloted, it did not seem to be successful. Many pupils completed less than seven suggestions, making comparison with the previous study unsound. The constructs gathered are not used in any part of the thesis.

PART SIX

This part of the questionnaire sought information about the people that the pupils knew. It consists of a list of "the people you see out of school, including those you know from school". Respondents were asked to enter these names or initials on the pages provided and then to answer seven questions about each person named.

For computational purposes the data was coded as a set of 66 files corresponding to the 66 respondents. Each of these files could hold a different number of 'cases', each case represented one of the people listed by the respondent whose file it was. Thus each case contained seven pieces of information corresponding to the seven questions the respondents were asked about each of the people they had put on their lists. These seven variables were as follows:-
(1) The reason for seeing the person. This was coded into five groups: for the person themselves, for the group of people they were members of, for the activities engaged in, because they were relatives, and for 'accidental' reasons such as being neighbours.

(2) People listed were recorded as belonging to one of the four age groups suggested.

(3) The sex of the person was recorded.

(4) Whether or not the person was known from school was recorded.

(5) The groups suggested by me in the questionnaire were recorded and treated as equivalent between pupils for the purposes of analysing the questionnaire, although later in the interviews the theme of these definitions was pursued.

(6) Three categories of further education were used; thinking of having education beyond the sixth form, having or having had such education, and others.

(7) The number of days out of ten, on average, that the person was seen. (This was found to be a difficult calculation and on the final large sample questionnaire it was rephrased to the number of days each week.) All amounts of less than one day per ten (e.g. two weeks per year) were coded as one day in ten.

From the above data a number of variables were calculated for each of the 66 respondents. There were eight groups of such variables as follows:-

(1) The mean number of days on which the respondent saw people listed.
(2) The percentage of people on the lists having or having had further education and the percentage of people thinking of further education.

(3) The percentage of people in each of the four age categories.

(4) Whether or not the person had a boy/girl friend and if so the number of days out of ten on which they were seen.

(5) The percentage of people known from school.

(6) The percentage of people of the opposite sex.

(7) The percentage of people in each of the different groupings that I had suggested.

(8) The percentage of people in each of the five different 'reason' categories.

These eight sets of variables also formed the basis of calculations of three sets of compound variables:

(1) The mean age of each of the five different groups was calculated.

(2) The mean number of days on which persons from each of the five different groups were seen was calculated.

(3) The mean number of days on which people were seen from each of the four age groups was calculated.

The above set of calculations were done including all people listed, including only the females listed and including only the males listed. These last calculations were done for all people in those categories and then again including only those who were listed as being known for themselves, i.e. reason 1. Thus 36 further variables were computed for each respondent. These variables corresponded to the
analysis carried out on the pilot study with the Newcastle questionnaire and were not employed in this thesis.

The codings described so far in this appendix produced a set of entirely numerical data. This data and that gathered from the large sample questionnaire, which was ready coded, were therefore suitable for analysis by the SPSS package available on the Edinburgh University IBM 360/70.

**Section Two: The Divergence Test**

This section is concerned with the scoring of the test of divergence: a copy of the booklet used for the test is included as a supplement to this appendix. Two sets of scores are referred to in this thesis. The simple measure of fluency and a measure of originality.

The fluency measure is straightforward. In about 95% of cases respondents list items separately, often punctuating them or starting a fresh line for each. In such cases it is normal to accept the respondent's 'count' of the number of items. In the remaining cases where a number of items are strung together or at least not clearly separated, it is usual to count one response for every suggestion that has been separated by some other respondent and finally for any items not so covered to treat them as separate if they seem as separate as any two other suggestions which have been treated as separate: in doubtful cases the larger number is taken.

It is possible to discount common items, for example with the item 'a comb' combing hair and musical instrument would not be
allowed. However, in the studies I have been involved in, all items have been counted. The important point is that it is clear which procedure was followed. A number of people had been involved with the original compilation and piloting of the booklet used. Two of these people confirmed the counts that I made on this test and checked the scoring of the Raven's Progressive Matrices.

The originality score was devised for, and only used with, this one sample of 66 pupils. The procedure for this score was as follows:

(1) Each of the eight items was considered separately. All suggestions for an item were recorded. Where a suggestion was made by more than one respondent the number of times it was suggested was recorded. Items produced 30 to 90 different suggestions each. For each item there were one or two very common suggestions and several fairly common ones. The majority of suggestions in each case only occurred once.

(2) Thus for each item there was a list of suggestions which could be ranked from the most common to the least common. Accordingly each of the eight items were ranked.

(3) Each respondent was then considered on each item. In each case, by consulting the ranked lists of all suggestions, his or her least common suggestion was selected. The selected item was associated with a rank number.
The 66 respondents were then ranked on the first of the eight items on the basis of the number selected at (3). This process was repeated for the remaining seven items. Thus every respondent had eight rank order scores. Theoretically each of these scores could be between 1 and 66, although as there were never 66 suggestions made more than once there were many ties for each item.

Each individual's eight ranks were summed. The 66 sums were then ranked. The resulting rank was treated as the originality score.

This system of obtaining a rank order score may seem cumbersome. It is used to overcome the two main defects of originality scores that have been suggested in the past. Firstly it is necessary to use a rank order measure as each item on this type of test produces a different distribution of repeated suggestions and a different number of suggestions for each item. That is a respondent who produces the third most common suggestion on one item may be being much more original, in statistical terms, than if he produces the third most common suggestion on another item. This incomparability is overcome by ranking the position of each respondent on each item and then comparing the ranks.

The second problem with such scores is that the more suggestions that are made the more likely it is that the respondent will produce original ideas. While it seems clear that originality and fluency are conceptually linked and that there will therefore be consistent correlations between them, it would also seem desirable that the originality measure be made as distinct as possible from the fluency measure if it is to be of any value. For this reason
only the single most original suggestion on each item is considered. As nearly all respondents made suggestions on all items, this involves the minimum direct penalty for not being fluent.

These are the scorings and preliminary analysis carried out on the data gathered in the two morning sessions in Edinburgh. Appendix Five introduces simple one-way distributional descriptions of this data and Appendix Six presents some of the more complex analysis based on it.
This questionnaire forms part of a study which is concerned with patterns of interests and friendships in sixth forms. We are trying to see how these vary between schools and between people who do different subjects within schools.

Because it is the first study of its sort there is a lot of material to be covered and so we are asking you for a good deal of help. We hope you feel that you can give it, not simply because we will produce information of interest to yourselves, but also because of its contribution to ideas on how to help future sixth formers.

Colin Brydon,
Peter Sheldrake,
James McGuire.

EDINBURGH. AUTUMN 1974.
The questions on the following pages are divided into six parts; would you answer each part in turn as fully as you feel able to. Later this term each person will be interviewed individually, we hope this will give you the opportunity to express any feelings about the contents of the questionnaire or things which you feel should have been included in it.

Because there are three parts to the study it is necessary to have a name on each part, if you prefer not to use your real name please use the same fictitious name on each part!

We wish to stress that the material you supply will be kept completely confidential. No one from the school or education authority will be allowed to see these booklets, only I and my assistants at the university will ever have access to them.

Finally if you have any problems at all please let us know at the time. Put any extra comments you wish to make on the left hand pages.

Name:

Date of Birth: Sex:

I wonder if you have ever thought of going on to any form of further education (beyond the sixth form). Could you indicate your thoughts about this and what you would like to do as you see it at the moment:
PART I

This section is concerned with your school subjects. Could you make a list below of those that you have been, or are hoping to be, examined in and the level of such examinations.

For the ones you have already passed can you indicate your grade, if you know it.

Whether or not you have taken the exams can you show which three subjects you like the best in the following way. Put 1 against your first choice, 2 against your second and 3 against your third in the column headed 'Preference'.

If you can't decide between two of them put the same number against both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject.</th>
<th>Level of exam.</th>
<th>Grade of exams passed.</th>
<th>Preference.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>
PART II

In this part can you tell us something about the household you were brought up in. Firstly those people who are more than fifteen years older than you, their relationship to you and their occupation. eg. Mother - Housewife, Brother-in-law - Manager.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th><strong>Occupation.</strong></th>
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</table>

Secondly the other members of the household. Here can you fill in the additional three columns. Indicate attendance at school with an S in the Occupation column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th><strong>Occupation.</strong></th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Age at joining the family. (Leave blank if born into it.)</th>
<th>Age at leaving the family. (Leave blank if still in it.)</th>
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</table>

**In both the above sections would you place a cross in the Occupation column for anyone who has had or is having education beyond sixth form level.**
PART III

Under each of the three headings below can you select the three people from your present sixth form who you think are most appropriate and place them in the order indicated.

The person that you feel you know the best:
next best:
and next:

The person you think has the most friends:
next most:
and next:

Apart from the ones you have already mentioned the three people that you would most like to get to know better in the coming year, first:
second:
third:

PART IV

This section is concerned with your non-academic interests and activities. Can you split a list of these into two parts. On the next page place those interests connected with school in the upper half and those not so connected in the lower.

In the column headed 'Preference' can you show the order of importance to you of the things named by putting 1 against the first, 2 against the second and so on. For this purpose treat all your interests, both in and out of school, as one group.

Continued Over.
Continuation.

In the 'Individual' column can you place a cross if it is something you **normally** do on your own.

In the column marked 'Group' can you place a cross if the activity is something you do primarily because of the people involved rather than for the activity itself. For example if your interest in playing football is because you and your friends want something to do, rather than because you go out somewhere to play with a specific team, put a cross in the Group column. In the cases where you have not put such a cross can you say-on average-how many days out of ten you spend time on this interest or activity.

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**Not Connected with School.**

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</table>
This part concerns the way you think you and your peers have changed in the last couple of years. Below would you make up seven phrases or short sentences each of which describes something that is now true of yourself or a friend, but was not true a year or so ago; or you might put down something that you feel just does happen to people as they get older, although you can't think off-hand of anyone that it applies to. Just write down how they are now, without worrying about how exactly this is different from the way they used to be. Maybe you can think of more than seven things, in which case just use those that you feel are the most important. Each sentence has been started for you with the word "They ".

1) They

2) They

3) They

4) They

5) They

6) They

7) They
PART VI

This final part is, I'm afraid, rather complex. What I would like you to do is to make a list of the people you see out of school including those you know from school. Just use their initials if you don't want me to know who they are. Then for each person there are seven columns labelled (A) to (G); these are explained below.

(A) Your usual Reason for seeing them. eg. youth club, girl-friend, neighbour, parents' friend, disco's, etc.

(B) Can you indicate their Age in the following way:
   1 = More than three years younger than you.
   2 = Between three years younger and two years older than you.
   3 = Between two and ten years older than you.
   4 = Over ten years older than you.

(C) Which Sex are they?

(D) If you know them from School put a cross in this column.

(E) Can you divide them into the following five Groups and put the appropriate number against each person as follows:
   1 = Girl or boy friend.
   2 = Special friends with whom you share a great deal.
   3 = The people who you know well apart from the last two groups.
   4 = Other friends.
   5 = People you know well enough to know their names and pass the time of day with, but no more than that.

(F) If you think they have already or at the moment are having any form of Education beyond the sixth form can you put a cross in this column. If at present you think they intend to have such would you put a tick in it.

Continued Over.
Continuation.

(G) In the final column can you indicate the number of days out of the last ten when you have seen them. If these last ten have not been typical for some reason can you put a number that you feel represents the average. If this just doesn't apply - maybe because they have moved away and you only see them in the summer - would you write eg ' 2 wks/yr.'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>A. Reason</th>
<th>B. Age</th>
<th>C. Sex</th>
<th>D. School</th>
<th>E. Groups</th>
<th>F. Education</th>
<th>G. Days</th>
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<th>C. Sex</th>
<th>D. School</th>
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Please use this page if you wish to continue from the last, or if there are any comments you would like to make or suggestions you can offer on ways to improve this questionnaire and the way it is being administered.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.
THE
OBJECT-PATTERN
BOOK
This booklet is divided into two parts.

In part I, each page contains the name of a familiar, everyday object. All you have to do is to think of as many uses as you can for that object, and write them down in the space provided.

Part 2 is similar but involves patterns instead of objects. Here, we should like you to write down as many things as possible that you think the pattern could represent. You can turn the pattern round in any way you like.
Tube of toothpaste.
Pane of glass.
Plastic comb.
Chewing-gum.
This appendix concerns the questionnaire (Q2) given to
the larger sample of sixth formers; a copy appears at the end of
this appendix. Although it was based on preliminary analysis of
the Edinburgh study it was specifically designed to be self
administering. While I intended to be present on all occasions,
I also realised that with the larger numbers of pupils that were
to be involved inevitably some pupils would complete the
questionnaire before they had received full verbal instructions.
Thus the questionnaire was designed to be self-explanatory; it
was also designed to be self-coding with the one exception of
occupation of the head of the household. This piece of data I
coded myself. The questionnaire was then able to be directly
punched onto cards for the machine without any further intervention
on my part.

It was proposed to gather 1,000 respondents from 20
schools of varying types. The aim was not to gather a proportionate-
ly representative sample, but to try to include as wide a range of
educational establishments as possible. The main distinguishing
features that were sought were as follows: rural and urban areas,
multi-racial and non-multi-racial areas, provincial and capital
cities, selective and non-selective sixth forms, single sex and co-
educational schools, schools of varying sizes, and schools serving
working-class and mixed catchment areas.
Six education authorities were approached for their assistance. These were Lambeth, Brent, Oxford, Newcastle, Edinburgh, and Moray and Nairn. Each was asked to recommend schools which together gave a cross-section of the type of education to be found in that area. It was also pointed out that I had no wish to give any further work to schools which had already been the recent recipients of academic researchers. This was a problem encountered particularly in London.

In response to these requests 25 schools were nominated by their authorities, in some cases with the knowledge of the head teacher, in other cases not. I approached 22 of these schools. A number of factors dictated that the study was conducted with some haste and four of the schools were unable to arrange a visit in the short space of time available. The remaining 18 schools are listed in Figure Ten together with the date of the visit, the size of the sixth form, the number of respondents and some details of the type of school.

The range of schools visited was extensive. Three of the Moray and Nairn schools had never personally received visits from researchers. The remotest of these schools had 290 pupils in total, and was over 40 miles from the nearest community of more than 4,000 people. In this case 100% of the sixth formers participated and interest in the project was considerable. At the other extreme, one of the inner London schools visited was the first to experiment with continuously isolating disruptive pupils in a specially prepared room. In the case of this school only a small proportion of the sixth form pupils were considered, by the head
**FIGURE TEN**

**Schools Participating in Large Sample Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area in which school was situated</th>
<th>Date of visit to School</th>
<th>Number of pupils in sixth form</th>
<th>Number of pupils responding</th>
<th>Co-educational purpose built grammar school</th>
<th>Multiracial pupils</th>
<th>Bourgeois catchment area</th>
<th>Selective entry sixth form</th>
<th>Urban catchment area</th>
<th>Size of school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>10.1.75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>11.1.75</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>11.1.75</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>12.1.75</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>21.1.75</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>24.1.75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>14.1.75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>17.1.75</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>17.1.75</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inner London</td>
<td>19.1.75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inner London</td>
<td>19.1.75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>13.1.75</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>20.1.75</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray &amp; Nairn</td>
<td>25.1.75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray &amp; Nairn</td>
<td>25.1.75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray &amp; Nairn</td>
<td>26.1.75</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray &amp; Nairn</td>
<td>26.1.75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray &amp; Nairn</td>
<td>27.1.75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y = Yes, N = No.

Size of Schools: 1 = less than 1,000, 2 = 1,000 to 1,800
3 = over 1,800
teacher, to be able to cope with the questionnaire. Such extremes are as great as to be found in the British Isles and so it is hardly surprising that differences between the local authorities were detected in the data.

The largest sixth form was dispersed into four rooms, all the others were seen together in one room or hall. In that exceptional case I moved from room to room repeating instructions or comments four times. On all occasions when there were more than 36 pupils I was assisted by one or more members of staff. These teachers had received a briefing session immediately prior to my seeing the pupils. In this session I introduced the research being carried out and ran through the questionnaire page by page, pointing out the main difficulties that had been experienced to date.

Instructions to the pupils were relatively brief, particularly with the larger forms; it is hard to win the interest and enthusiasm of several scores of adolescents who have been gathered together to fill in forms. With the smaller forms, in particular the ones with selective entry, it was possible to win some interest. In all cases I explained how the material which formed the basis of the questionnaire was collected, and stressed the fact that pupils should not put identifying marks on the paper. In spite of this last instruction, a number of pupils questioned the degree of confidentiality. This was usually because the concept of interest in the interaction of variables within a population had not been grasped. Such pupils believed that for the information to be of any value it must be attached to them personally, and if I was not asking for their names, this just
demonstrated the devious subtlety of my techniques for tracing the authorship of questionnaires. In such cases I tried to illustrate the possible interest of numerical interactions.

Questions 11 and 12 proved the most problematic. The first of these had two mistakes in it. I asked pupils to point these out. The first was a proof-reading error; after the second "I am the..." the word brother appears twice. The second mistake was conceptual and few pupils spotted it. People who are members of twins would also belong to one of the other categories, thus they would belong to two of the categories presented and not one as claimed in the question.

Question 12, as was anticipated, met with some resistance. Naturally some pupils felt that information about other members of their families could not be given as freely as information about themselves. If such feelings were apparent I encouraged them, although at the same time I pointed out that there was no way in which anyone could discover what they had written.

From the whole sample of 846 pupils 845 questionnaires were gathered intact. In 74% of these pupils had made no detectable errors and left no question unanswered. Detectable errors were mostly inconsistencies in the arithmetic of page three. Less than 6% of the pupils had made a total of more than two errors and omissions. Details of the findings from the first part of the questionnaire are given in Appendix Five and Six. The second part of Chapter Three deals briefly with the quotations that were presented.
This questionnaire forms the final part of a study which has been concerned with relationships between friendships, how people get on in school and what they choose to do in the future. The questions are all based on things that we have found to be of importance to other sixth formers.

On the pages that follow there are a number of statements, some purely factual, others representing people's views; for each of these will you place the appropriate number in the box in the right hand margin. Each question will be explained to you in turn, but please do not hesitate to ask if there is anything you do not fully understand or if there is anything we can tell you about our work.

The material you supply is confidential; do not put your name or anything which would tell anyone who you are on this form.

Colin Brydon,
Peter Sheldrake,
James McGuire.
Please write one number only in each and every box.

Where there are pairs of boxes, (to allow for numbers greater than 10) place a zero in the left hand box if you wish to use a number below 10.

This questionnaire is the same for both sexes so you will find some statements with alternatives in brackets; read whichever is appropriate to you!

1) Could you indicate your sex by placing a 1 in the box if you are female or a 2 in the box if you are male..............

Could you give your age in years and months:

2) Put the number of years here........................................

3) And the number of months here...................................

4) Below are some statements about the future. Can you put the number of the one that you most agree with here........

"I want to go to university" (Put a 1.)
"I wouldn't mind going to university" (Put a 2).
"I would like to go on to some other form of full time education" eg Art or Education college (Put a 3).
"I would like to start a career that will involve further part time training" (Put a 4).
"I want to get on with the work that I am going to be doing" (Put a 5).
"I don't know what I am going to do" (Put a 6).
"I don't want to do anything" (Put a 7).

For anything else put an 8.

5) Altogether how many 'A' levels (or SYSs) have you taken or are you about to take?? Enter the total number here..................

(Similarly for the following questions).

6) How many 'Highers' have you already passed?...................

7) How many 'O' levels have you already passed?...................

8) How many people are there normally in your household including yourself? Can you put the total number here..........

9) How many of these have had or are having some form of full time education beyond the sixth form?.......................
10) Which of your school subjects do you enjoy the most?
   If you prefer science subjects put a 1.
   If you prefer Maths or Economics put a 2.
   If you prefer languages put a 3.
   If you prefer English or History put a 4.
   If you prefer practical subjects put a 5.
   If you prefer some other class of subjects put a 6.
   If you have no preference between some of these put a 7.

11) This question may seem strange, but you will see that you must belong to one and only one of the groups below. Can you put the number of the group to which you belong.
   For this purpose anyone of your generation who lived, or is living in your house, for a number of years counts as a brother or sister. If you are in any doubt about which group you belong to please ask about it.

   I am the eldest child and have a younger brother born before I was six. (1).

   I am the eldest and although I don't have such a brother I do have a sister born before I was six. (2).

   I am an only child/or I have no brothers or sisters born within either six years before me or six years after me. (3)

   I have a brother born less than six years before I was. (4)

   I do not have such a brother but I do have a sister born less than six years before I was. (5).

   I am a member of twins, triplets etc. (6).

12) Could you give us some idea of what the head of your household does?
   By head of the household we mean the person who normally earns most of the money for the household.
   If they have recently stopped their work or left the household for any reason can you say what they did when they were last earning?
   It would be helpful if you could give a little more detail than just "manager" or "engineer". (eg, television engineer, ship's engineer.)
This page asks some questions about your friends. By friends we mean those close friends, friends and acquaintances whom you see out of school and who do not belong to your household.

13) If you have a boy (or girl) friend at the moment can you indicate the number of times that you see him (or her) on average each week.

For the rest of the people that you know can you divide them into the three groups we indicated, viz: close friends, friends and acquaintances.

Then for each of these three groups can you answer the seven questions labelled A to G below.

QUESTION.

A Altogether how many people are there in this group?

B Of these how many did you first meet at school?

C From the whole of this group how many are thinking of having, are having, or have had education beyond the sixth form?

D Altogether in the whole group how many are within two years of your age?

E How many are more than 10 years older than you?

F How many were born more than two years after you?

G How many are male?
On this and the following pages are a number of things that sixth formers have said to us. Imagine you are being interviewed today; how likely are you to have said some of the things that follow?

If you feel that it is very much the sort of thing that you might say put a 1 in the box beside the statement.

If you feel sure that you wouldn't say that sort of thing put a 5 in the box.

If you can't decide, or don't know or it doesn't apply to you put a 3 in the box.

If you feel that you lie somewhere in between these use the numbers 2 and 4.

My interests and activities are just ways of relaxing, they are not important to me.

I tend to like to be with people now; I didn't always, I always thought I could exist alone.

The important thing about a close friend is that you can trust them.

The way that we spend our time out of school hasn't changed in the last couple of years.

I feel that school is strangling me in a sense but you have to put up with that.

I'm really looking forward to getting away from this area.

I suppose looking back on it in general each year in school has got better than the one before.

My school work must be more important than my friends because it determines what I'm going to do for the rest of my life.

I really rather like just being at home.

You have to sort of put on a show in front of a boy (or girl) friend; you don't have to with a close friend.

You shouldn't tell people your personal problems.

The most important thing about a close friend is that they are there to go out with or just to go and see whenever you want to.

I haven't made any new friends in the last couple of years.
Everybody needs to have friends.
The sorts of relationships I have with my friends have been changing quite a lot recently.
This school really seems to have gone downhill in the last few years.
I wouldn't want to make any distinction between general friends and close friends.
I can't ever remember a time when there haven't been friends of mine around.
A partnership is quite a different sort of thing from a close friendship.
I think you should always sort things out in your own head before you start to tell anyone else about them.
I could live easily enough without my friends as long as there were other people around.
I especially like those quiet times, just two or three people sitting around talking.
Close friends really listen to what you say, they don't just say "Oh yes" and walk away.
The important thing about a close friend is that you can share your problems with them.
I sometimes find myself just stuck in the house with nowhere to go.
Sometimes I would like to tell my friends what I dislike them doing but I just can't get around to it.
The household where you live must be the most important thing to you at this age.
A boy (or girl) friend is a close friend plus sexual attraction.
If I do talk about something that is important to me it's normally to my family first rather than to my friends.
I like to be with other people when I'm depressed or in a bad mood, it makes me forget about it.
Since my brother (or sister) got married I get on much better with him (or her).
I like to be on my own when I'm in a contented mood.
My girl (or boy) friend seems to be taking the place of my friends now; I talk to her (or him) rather than to them.

I suppose you shouldn't tell your friends some things because they might laugh or say you're stupid.

I've really got too many friends already, I don't see as much of them as I want to.

Now that I am older I get on better with my brother(s) and/or sister(s).

I think that you should talk about things that are important to you to your close friends.

At the moment my boy (or girl) friend seems to be the most important friend that I have.

I remember them trying to be kind by not interfering; that's not my idea of being a friend, I wanted to be able to talk to someone about it.

What used to be the important thing about a good friend was having a good laugh but I don't think that that's true now.

I think that everyone would like to have more close friends.

I don't see much of my parents these days - either they are out or I am out.

When we are together in a large group, like at school, we often have good discussions about really important things; when you're out with friends that doesn't really seem to happen.

Having a girl (or boy) friend can wait until I've finished at school.

You shouldn't keep things to yourself, it's like bottling things up inside you, isn't it?

At the moment the most important group of people to me are those close friends who share my interests.

Everyone needs someone to lean on.

You can really talk seriously to your friends now - before we used to just muck about, we never really talked.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.
APPENDIX FIVE

QUESTIONNAIRE STUDIES

BACKGROUND RESULTS

This appendix presents data gathered from pupils, both in the Edinburgh sample (Q1) and in the larger sample (Q2), which does not directly concern their friendships. Details of the procedures, subjects and preliminary analysis are given in Appendices Two, Three and Four. This appendix is confined to the bare presentation of one-way distributions and simple descriptive statistics.

Both Q1 and Q2 gathered information about the backgrounds of respondents. This information concerned sex, age, future educational intentions, examination performance, household size, number of persons in the household having had further education, social class and birth order. On the first questionnaire it had also been possible to gather information on intelligence scores, divergence scores, and pupils' interests and activities.

Section One: Sample Size, Sex and Age

Table Six shows the sample sizes, sex distributions and ages of respondents for Q1 and for Q2. The marked difference in the sex ratios of the two samples should be noted. Figure Eleven shows, separately, the age distributions for both samples.
FIGURE ELEVEN

Age Distributions

Numbers of Subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Subjects</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE SIX: Sex and Age of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>19 (29%)</td>
<td>502 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>47 (71%)</td>
<td>339 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>17 years 4 months</td>
<td>17 years 6 months*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Age</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>15 years 8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Age</td>
<td>18 years 10 months</td>
<td>19 years 10 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Q2 was conducted 6 months later than Q1

Section Two: Future Educational Intentions of Subjects

Sex and age variables could be investigated in a similar manner by both questionnaires. With other variables there were certain differences in the format between Q1 and Q2. For example it was possible to offer the smaller sample an open-ended question on what they wished to do after their time in the sixth form, but for the larger sample it was necessary to offer fixed choices. These were based on quotations from the first sample. In order to compare the two samples, the responses for both were categorised into four groups, namely: wanting to go to university, wanting to continue with some form of full-time education, wanting to start work with or without some form of training, or having some other desire (e.g. "do nothing", "don't know"). Table Seven shows the percentage of each of the samples which fall into the four groups. For later correlational purposes the first two of those categories are contrasted with the last two.
TABLE SEVEN: Future Educational Intentions of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Education</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work and/or Training</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Probably the marked difference in the 'other' category between these two sets of figures is due to the second having been gathered in the March, six months after the first. By that time it might be expected that more people would have made up their minds about the possible course of their future education.

Section Three: Examination Performance

Another set of comparison difficulties is raised by examination performance in the two samples. The structure of examination systems is different in the two countries: 'O' grades and 'O' levels are not intended to be strictly comparable. This, together with the more selective entry to Scottish sixth forms, makes direct comparison questionable. Furthermore the Q1 pupils were aware that they would be seeing the researcher again: exaggerated claims might be later discovered. This was not the case with the larger sample.

Bearing these points in mind, the mean number of 'O' grade passes in the Q1 sample was 6.49, while in the Q2 sample, the average was 5.14 'O' grade or 'O' level passes. It was also possible to compare the number of 'Highers' claimed as passed by the Q1 sample
with the number claimed by the Scottish part of the Q2 sample. In this case the respective numbers were 1.97 and 2.9. At the time that the Q1 subjects were seen they had not selected their Sixth Year Study courses (SYS), thus no figures are available. With the second questionnaire the overall average number of SYS or 'A' levels expected to be entered was 1.63.

Section Four: Households of Respondents

From both samples three pieces of information were gathered which relate to respondents' households. The number of members who had had, or were having, full-time education beyond the sixth form, the social class of the household as determined by the occupation of the head of the household, and the birth order of the respondent.

Table Eight shows the sizes of the households of respondents, and the percentage of these households which have members who had received some form of further education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE EIGHT: Household Size and Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number of persons normally in the household, including the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of households in which one or more persons had received post sixth form education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among this last group the average percentage of people who had received such education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average household size is as might be expected, given that each household must have at least one child. Closely related to these variables is the matter of social class. King and
Easthope (1973) found that social class did not appear to be an important factor in friendship choice among British secondary school children. However, their simple dichotomous division between working and middle classes, and the use of the father's occupation might indicate that this study would not replicate their results.

Both the samples were asked for details of the occupations of the heads of their households. Table Nine shows the simple five-fold class division according to the Registrar General's (1966) classification. Details of the highest socioeconomic groupings found in each of the households of the Q1 sample are given in Table Ten.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE NINE: Social Class According to Head of Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE TEN: Highest Socio-economic Grouping Found in Households of Q1 Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic group</th>
<th>Numbers of households</th>
<th>Percentage of households (62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers and managers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate non-manual workers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior non-manual workers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal service workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman - manual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual workers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled manual workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own account workers (non-professional)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 62 99.9%

Section Five: Birth Order

In recent years there has been a considerable literature produced on the subject of birth order. This has included some work on the interaction between friendship and birth order. Miller and Maruyama (1976) predicted that the relatively poor power position of later born children might make them develop more effective interpersonal skills; if so they might be better liked. These authors found that their prediction appeared to be supported with children of junior school age. However, the measures were more of interpersonal skills, rather than friendship, and the study curiously failed to confirm previous findings concerning the connection between ordinal family position and achievement and intelligence measures.
Miki and Takahashi (1969) found that twins seemed to have less intimate friendships than non-twins, but only small numbers of subjects were available for this part of their study. Tomeh (1970) conducted a larger scale study (523 subjects) of birth order and friendship with female undergraduates in the Middle East. Later born children were found to visit their friends more frequently, but there was some evidence that the 'intensity of inter-action' with friends was different between later and first born daughters.

The two investigations reported here included an attempt to designate respondents' birth order. In the first questionnaire this was done by simply asking for a list of family members which was later converted to membership of one of the categories shown in Table Eleven. For the second questionnaire respondents were asked to code themselves, a not altogether easy task, and some errors may well have been included. The dimension on which people were being placed by this process runs from first born male children, who have a male rival, through other first born children, only children (or those with considerable age gaps), younger children and finally younger males who have an elder male brother. (Schooler (1972), Altus (1966)). The distributions from the two questionnaires are shown in Table Eleven.
TABLE ELEVEN: Birth Order Distributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eldest son with rival male</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other eldest</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only child</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other youngest</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male with older male sibling</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section Six: Hobbies and Interests

These two final sections concern information which was only gathered from the Q1 sample as the data required considerable individual coding. Firstly, the material on interests and activities. Respondents provided a simple list of these together with a ranking of their relative importance. They also indicated whether the interest was school-based or not, and, further, whether it was undertaken primarily for the interest in itself or for the people with whom it was shared. From this information four dichotomous dimensions were set up.

Table Twelve concerns these dimensions. One pole of the dimension is listed down the left-hand side of the table. The figures under each heading are mean percentages for the whole population of appropriate responses. The percentage shown indicates the proportion of interests which fall into the category listed on the left: the residue does not fall into that category. Thus on average 44.7% of all the girls' interests were school-based, whereas for the
boys the figure was 36.2%. The second pair of columns show similar information, but with a weighting for the respondents' preferences. Thus school-based interests produced lower means for both boys and girls if their preferences are taken into account.

**TABLE TWELVE: Interests of the Q1 Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GIRLS (Raw)</th>
<th>GIRLS (Preferred)</th>
<th>BOYS (Raw)</th>
<th>BOYS (Preferred)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Percentage of Interests which were:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School based</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily for the people concerned</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership oriented</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(34.9% of the sample reported no important individual activities.)

The five categories used in the above table were as follows.

1. Those interests which were 'connected with' school (e.g. school-based sports).
2. Those interests which were primarily of a solitary nature, not involving other people (e.g. reading).
3. Those interests where the respondent felt that their main concern was for the people that they were engaged with (e.g. going out to meet friends at a park which might then involve a game of football).
4. Those interests where the activity itself was of paramount importance and the other people concerned were not of particular significance (e.g. Going to a specific place to play in a team for the sake of the football).
5. Those interests which seemed to involve a major element of leadership (e.g. Cub mistress).
Section Seven: Intelligence and Divergence

The other two variables which were investigated only with the small sample concerned Intelligence and Divergence. For the former Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (1962) were used as a convenient group test from which subjects also seem to derive some enjoyment. The Set II Matrices were given with a 40 minute time limit. The overall mean number of correct solutions was 23.9 with a standard deviation of 3.9. (A minimum of 14 and a maximum of 33). The girls had a mean of 21.9 and the boys of 24.7. A t-Test between these two groups produced a value of 2.76. Boys traditionally do better at such tests and so a one-tailed significance test with 64 degrees of freedom was applied. The boys did significantly better than the girls (P<0.005).

The test of Divergence had been piloted in Edinburgh the previous year with other fifth and sixth form pupils. Details of this pilot and the method of analysis are given in Appendix One and Three respectively. Two measures were taken from the test. The first was simply the number of suggestions made by each subject. The mean number of suggested uses for the four objects in part I of the test was 13.38 (with a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 29). There was no significant difference between the boys (who had a mean score of 13.05) and the girls (who had a mean score of 13.51). On part II of the test the average number of suggestions was 11.97, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 43. The girls' mean was 11.37 and the boys' 12.21.

The second measure taken from this test concerned the more complex question of originality. Various methods have been
suggested for scoring originality. Here a purely statistical one was used as described in Appendix Three. This method simply produces a rank ordering of the subjects so there are no scores to report. The measure was specifically designed to separate originality from fluency, but in spite of these efforts and because the two concepts are closely linked, the rank order correlation coefficient between the two remained as high as .69.

This appendix has been concerned with what I have called background results; results which in traditional experimental terms would become the independent variables to those measures which seek directly to examine friendship patterns. The next appendix concerns these direct variables.
APPENDIX SIX

QUESTIONNAIRE STUDIES

VARIABLES DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH FRIENDSHIP

This appendix presents some details of the data on the pupils' friendships. The first three sections continue the simple descriptive statistics used in the last appendix to include these new variables. The final three sections present some basic interactions between the variables.

Section One: Numbers of Friends

One of the main aims of the Edinburgh questionnaire (Q1) and its pilot predecessor was to establish norms about the numbers and basic characteristics of friends that sixth formers have. Two articles in recent years have referred to the number of friends people claim to have. Athanasiou and Yoshioka (1973), while considering the physical distance between the houses of friends, interviewed 300 housewives with a mean age of 29 years. In answer to a question about the number of close friends ("...people they see almost every day and enjoy being with") they found that the average number was 3.67 with a range of 0 to 13.

Derek Wright (1970) asked a group of 60 male and female undergraduates about the number of close friends that they had. He does not explain how 'close friend' was defined but he does provide figures for friends as well as close friends, and states that the third category - acquaintances - seemed to produce such wild guesses
as to be of no use. He found that the average number of close friends claimed was 5 and the smallest number 3. And that the average number of friends claimed was 35 with a minimum of 12.

To try to gather similar information Q1 contained questions which involved pupils in making a list of the people that they knew (see Appendix Three). Having made up such a list, seven questions were asked about each person. The simple length of this list seemed to be a potentially important variable. However, it was not practical to gather the same information with the larger sample, instead, estimates of the numbers of people in different groups were requested. (See Appendix Four.)

Figure Twelve shows the length of the lists people provided on the first questionnaire. The shortest list contained 2 names, the longest had 54 and the median length was 23.7. The corresponding numbers, derived from the respondents' estimates, for the second questionnaire are all higher. Table Thirteen shows the median numbers for the three categories of friends (close friends, friends and acquaintances) and the total for both questionnaires, while Figure Thirteen shows the distributions of close friends for both samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE THIRTEEN: Numbers of Friends Listed (Q1)/Claimed (Q2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median number of close friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median number of friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median number of acquaintances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Total Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE TWELVE

Length of List of People Known (Q1)

Numbers of People Named on Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers of People Named on Lists</th>
<th>0-14</th>
<th>10-14</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>30-34</th>
<th>40-44</th>
<th>50-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of Subjects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE THIRTEEN

Numbers of Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers of Subjects</th>
<th>Q1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers of Close Friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>255, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 5, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 1, 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most striking feature of the above table is the low number of acquaintances in Ql. It is easy to acknowledge a large number of people if nothing further is asked about them, but if each must be listed and a number of questions answered individually, the effort is probably not worthwhile for people who are relatively unimportant in the lives of the respondents.

The first questionnaire was able to provide two further useful pieces of information relevant to the numbers of friends. Firstly, the number of days on which friends were seen, apart from at school. For each person listed this was expressed as a number out of ten. The distribution for the number of days on which friends were seen is shown in Figure Fourteen. From this data an average number of days per week on which people were seen was calculated. The overall average for the Ql sample was 2.66 days per week. This mean was slightly higher for boys at 2.79 and lower for girls at 2.32.

The other type of information that it was possible to gather with the small sample concerned particular friendships. Three questions had been asked: Who do you know best? Who has most friends? and, Who do you want to know better? The responses to these questions were scored. (See Appendix Three.) The resulting distributions of scores are shown in Figure Fifteen. It will be seen that in reply to the question 'Who do you know best?' all but 11 people were named at least once. In reply to 'Who has the most friends?', 33 people were named, and in reply to 'Who do you want to get to know better?' all but 16 people were named at least once.
FIGURE FOURTEEN

Average Number of Days on which Friends were seen

Numbers of Subjects

22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2

1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8

Average Number of Days out of Ten.
FIGURE FIFTEEN

Distributions from Scores for Sociometric Choice Questions

Q1
"The person that you feel you know the best"
N = 65

Q2
"The person you think has the most friends"
N = 65

Q3
"The people you would most like to get to know better in the coming year"
N = 64

Scores derived from nominations
Section Two: Friends of Both Sexes

One of the least ambiguous pieces of information that a questionnaire can deal with is the sex of the people referred to. Both questionnaires had asked about the sex of the respondents' friends. In Q1 this was done by asking the sex of each individual listed, and in Q2 by asking the number of males included in each of the groupings. Thus it was possible to compare the two samples in terms of the percentage of friends who belonged to the opposite sex from the respondents. It can be seen from Table Fourteen that the two sexes and the two questionnaires show a remarkable consistency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of boys known to girls</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of girls known to boys</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having friends of the opposite sex is of course independent of the question of having a specific boy or girl friend. Both questionnaires asked about partners. With the large sample this was phrased in terms of "If you have a boy (or girl) friend at the moment can you indicate the number of times that you see him (or her) on average each week". In the Edinburgh questionnaire it had been included as part of the list of people known. Table Fifteen shows firstly the percentage of the two samples who claimed to have any partner, and secondly, in the cases of those who claimed one, the number of days per week that they were seen.
TABLE FIFTEEN: Percentage of Pupils Having Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage claiming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partners:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>days/week seen:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be seen that there is considerably more variation in these percentages. It will be remembered that the Q2 sample were a few months older than the Q1 sample when they responded, and months are probably important in such matters at this age. Further, the second questionnaire was completed in the March, well into the school year and not in the first two weeks of the first term as it had been in Edinburgh; March is after all the beginning of Spring. This does not explain the change in the sex ratios, probably the small sample of 19 girls was simply untypical in this respect, unless, of course, it is the case that in the Spring it is more a young woman's fancy which turns...than a young man's.

Section Three: Age, Education and Origin of Friends

The pilot study had indicated that there were marked differences in the ages of the friends that were listed. In the two questionnaires being considered here, respondents were asked to place their friends in one of four age groups. These were:-(a) people more than three years the junior of the respondent, (b) those of the same
age, (c) those between two and ten years senior, (d) those more than ten years older. In Q1 subjects were asked to place each person on their list into one of these four groups. In the second questionnaire subjects were asked for an estimate of the number of people in each group. For each subject that percentage of his/her friends which fell into each of the four groups was calculated. Table Sixteen shows the mean percentages for each of these age groups for the two questionnaires.

**TABLE SIXTEEN: Ages of Friends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seemed likely that there would be some interaction between whether the respondents themselves were thinking of continuing their education beyond the sixth form and whether friends had similar desires. Both these pieces of information were available from both questionnaires. Table Seventeen shows the percentages of friends (or an estimate of the number in the case of Q2) who, were continuing, were thinking of continuing, or had continued their education beyond the sixth form.

**TABLE SEVENTEEN: Percentage of Friends Continuing Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Girls</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Boys</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The pilot work indicated that it might be of importance whether or not the friends listed by the respondents were made in school or away from it. In the first questionnaire this distinction was investigated by asking whether or not each individual listed was known primarily from school or from outside it. Respondents had in any case been asked only to enter those people on the lists who they saw at some other time than during school hours. In the second questionnaire this information was based on estimates of numbers given by respondents. In both cases the averages for the individuals were calculated and then the means for the two samples. These are given separately for the two sexes in Table Eighteen.

**TABLE EIGHTEEN: Friends made at School**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends of girls made at school</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of boys made at school</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section Four: Interactions with Numbers of Friends

The results from the questionnaires so far considered have only involved one-way distributions. It is obvious from the variables described that interactions were anticipated. These three sections report three clusters of simple two-way interaction, those associated with: numbers of friends, ages of friends and the further education of friends. The following convention is used to indicate significance levels: * = P<.05, ** = P<.005, *** = P<.001.
The simple length of the list of friends seemed to be of importance. This was not so much the absolute numbers reported as their relative value. Two sets of data from the Q1 sample directly relate to the numbers of friends: the individuals' own lists of friends and the variables compiled by considering the selections made in response to the questions about friends within the class.

If the length of the lists that people produce is indicative of anything beyond a variation in Cognitive Style, it would be expected that there would be some relationship between these two sets of data. That is people producing longer lists would be more often named as having more friends. It would also be expected that people who were named more often as being the friends of others would themselves produce longer lists. Here, however, the effect might not be so strong as the lists specifically related to people seen out of school hours, whereas the question about who was known best in the class had no rider about extra-school contacts.

A Spearman's correlation between the length of the list and the number of points scored from the question "Who in the class has the most friends?" produced a rho value of 0.42 (N=65)***. If it is felt that the 32 zero-ties make Spearman's rho too easy a test, then the distribution of list length can be divided at the quartiles and a chi² test performed on being named versus not being named against the four groups of list length. This distribution is shown in Table Nineteen.
### TABLE NINETEEN: List Length by People Named as Having Most Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Short (24%)</th>
<th>Short to Medium (24%)</th>
<th>Medium to Long (28%)</th>
<th>Long (24%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Named</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not named</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{Chi}^2 = 10.73 \text{ Direction Predicted (df = 3)**} \]

There was also a small positive correlation between the list length and being named as a person known best in the form. Here the rho value was 0.27*.

Thus it would seem that there are grounds for believing that the lists that people produce do reflect something that is apparent to other members of the form. While it may be the case that the production of such lists of friends is related to Cognitive Style, a point explored further in Section Four of Chapter Three, it would seem that this is not the whole of the explanation, and that there is some element of a more specifically social nature involved.

The principle variable which interacted with the numbers of claimed friends was that of sex. While these figures reach reasonable levels of significance it should be noted that the actual variation accounted for is minute. The four main correlations found with the larger sample are given in Table Twenty. All are in the same direction, boys claim more people than do girls.
TABLE TWENTY: Interactions with Sex of Respondent in Q2 Sample

Variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>rho</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of people claimed as known</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of close friends claimed</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of friends claimed</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of acquaintances claimed</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section Five: Interactions with Ages of Friends

Both here and in the following section a number of complex interacting variables are involved. No attempt is made to disentangle these: to say which appear to be primary or causal and which dependent. Rather they are reported in pairs for purely descriptive purposes.

One direct relationship was found between the numbers of people claimed as friends and the age of these friends. With the larger sample, for the 755 respondents whose questionnaires seemed consistent, there was a substantial positive correlation between the numbers of friends claimed and a higher proportion of those friends coming from the oldest age group; rho=0.30 (N=755)***.

It was speculated that this relationship might be due to a class difference: that middle class parents would be more likely to introduce their children to a wide range of their own friends. There was, however, no tendency for number of people named to be related to social class.
One reason why the age of friends was investigated was that it might be expected that pupils with a higher proportion of older friends would have more information and feedback about further education than those with relatively less contact, and that such increased information would be likely to result in a desire to continue education. A low positive correlation to this effect was found, \( \rho = 0.17 \) (N=757)***.

Such a finding, however, cannot be separated from the school records of the respondents. Those pupils claiming more '0' passes also appeared to have a higher proportion of friends in the oldest age group. Here the correlation was 0.12 (N=750)***. Again it should be stressed that there were no class effects.

Section Six: Interactions with Further Education

As would be expected, the correlation which completes the triangle with the last two was also found. That is, those people who claimed more '0' passes were also more likely to want to continue their education beyond the sixth form. Here the relationship was more substantial, \( \rho = 0.42 \) (N=825)***.

The other relationship which might be expected is between the respondent's desire to continue his/her own education and expectations about friends' desires to continue theirs. Between those thinking of themselves as likely to continue their education and those having a higher proportion of friends seen as also likely to want to continue there was a moderate relationship, \( \rho = 0.24 \) (N=745)***.
Having a higher proportion of friends thinking of further education has definite class implications, as further education is one of the bases of the Registrar General's classification. Thus the rho value of 0.18 (N=710)*** for the respondents who gave the head of their household's occupation between social class and percentage of friends thinking of further education, is hardly surprising. Again, almost by definition, people whose households contained a higher percentage of individuals who were having or had had further education, tended to belong to the middle classes, rho=0.31 (N=712)***.

Finally, two sets of results that relate only to the small sample. No direct relation was found between the number of friends claimed and the individuals' exam performance or future educational intentions. With the small sample, however, where the average number of days on which friends were seen was recorded, a relationship did emerge. There was a positive correlation between not wanting to go to university and spending a higher average period of time with the friends listed, rho=0.45 (N=66)***. It might be tempting to draw the simple conclusion that either people are busy at home working or they are out with their friends. If that were the case, it might be expected that there would be a similar relationship with exam results, but no such relationship appeared in this data.

Finally, with the small sample it was possible to establish that there was the expected positive correlation between the number of 'O' grade exam passes and the score on the Raven's Progressive Matrices, rho=0.39 (N=63)***.
This appendix is concerned with the procedure and administration of the study that was based on the photographs taken of the Edinburgh pupils who were interviewed. The aim of this study was to see if there were any physical cues which certain sixth formers gave that made them seem like the type of person with whom others could be friendly. The idea being that it might be possible to detect interactions between such cues and the actual friendships of the sixth formers interviewed. Appendix Eight presents some of the results of this study.

At the end of each interview (see Appendix Nine) the interviewee was asked if he or she minded me taking their photograph. Of the 62 pupils interviewed 60 agreed to the request. The two exceptions were girls from the older school, their code numbers were 60 and 62. One of the photographs failed to appear on the film. The resulting 59 colour transparencies (43 of boys and 16 of girls) had originally been intended for projecting in front of another class of sixth formers, so that they could make certain judgements about them. However, some of the transparencies were too opaque to be projected. Further, the size of the person on each varied. It was therefore decided that they should be printed.
The university had no facilities for colour printing and so the photographs were converted to monochrome. Each print was 3½ by 4½ inches with the seated figure, from the waist up, occupying nearly the full height of the photograph. A small white margin was retained and each photograph mounted on 1/12th inch black card measuring 6 by 6½ inches. The prints were mounted centrally ½ inch from the top. Each of them was given a number between 1 and 59, which was printed in white ink digits ¼ inch high centrally under the photograph. These numbers were assigned randomly with one overriding restriction; this was that photographs always occurred in pairs of the same sex. There were of course more boys' pairs than girls' pairs. The point of this pairing was to facilitate the compilation of the booklets used for recording the judgements of the photographs.

I approached one of the Greater London schools which had been involved in the large sample study the previous March, and asked them if I could again make use of their sixth formers. They kindly agreed and on 10th July 1975 I visited the school for a morning session. On my first visit 60 pupils had been present. On my second visit to the school, with the examinations completed and the summer holiday imminent, this number was down to 30; 15 boys and 15 girls.

To record their judgements of the photographs, two types of booklet had been prepared, one for the boys and one for the girls. Each booklet contained 30 sheets of A5 paper printed on both sides and stapled at the left hand and shorter side. On each side of paper appeared a heading and six questions, each with a rating scale.
There were two types of page for each sex; those that related to photographs of pupils of the same sex as the judge and those that related to the opposite sex. These four types of page are illustrated in Figures Sixteen and Seventeen. Each booklet was compiled with the numbers 1 to 59 in natural order at the top right of the first 59 pages, page 60 was blank.

Pupils were requested to sit themselves in a circle of which I was part. The arrangement is shown in Figure Eighteen. I explained something further of the research with which they were familiar from the Q2 study. They seemed interested in making judgements about other sixth formers and suggested that they would like others to make judgements about themselves - if they could know the results. I told them that the individuals photographed would not hear particular results. I explained the six questions that were to be answered of each photograph, and promised that I would give them some indication of the accuracy of their guesses afterwards. Some pupils were engaged in a course of 'A' level photography and so a particular warning was given about the poor quality of some of the prints.

I distributed the ordered photographs in such a way that number one was given to the pupil to my right, number two to the pupil on his right, and so on. I retained the residue. Pupils were instructed to start on the page of the booklet which had the number of the photograph in front of them on it, and then to work through the booklet a page at a time as each photograph reached them. All except the pupil to my right would then have to turn back to the front of the book at some point.
FIGURE SIXTEEN
The Two Types of Page Used in Boy Judges' Booklets

CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH QUESTION.  Photograph Number 26

1) Is it a good quality photograph?
   Good - 1  2  3  4  5 - Poor.

2) Do you find her attractive as a member of the opposite sex?
   Yes - 1  2  3  4  5 - No.

3) Do you think she likes science subjects?
   Likes science - 1  2  3  4  5 - Does not like science.

4) Does she look like a person you would become friends with?
   She does - 1  2  3  4  5 - She does not.

5) Do you think she did well on the intelligence test?
   Did well - 1  2  3  4  5 - Did not do well.

6) Do you think she has many friends?
   Many - 1  2  3  4  5 - Few.

CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH QUESTION.  Photograph Number 24

1) Is it a good quality photograph?
   Good - 1  2  3  4  5 - Poor.

2) Would you like to look like him?
   Yes - 1  2  3  4  5 - No.

3) Do you think he likes science subjects?
   Likes science - 1  2  3  4  5 - Does not like science.

4) Does he look like a person you would become friends with?
   He does - 1  2  3  4  5 - He does not.

5) Do you think he did well on the intelligence test?
   Did well - 1  2  3  4  5 - Did not do well.

6) Do you think he has many friends?
   Many - 1  2  3  4  5 - Few.
FIGURE SEVENTEEN

The Two Types of Page Used in Girl Judges' Booklets

CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH QUESTION.  Photograph Number 26

1) Is it a good quality photograph?
   Good - 1 2 3 4 5 - Poor.

2) Would you like to look like her?
   Yes - 1 2 3 4 5 - No.

3) Do you think she likes science subjects?
   Likes science - 1 2 3 4 5 - Does not like science.

4) Does she look like a person you would become friends with?
   She does - 1 2 3 4 5 - She does not.

5) Do you think she did well on the intelligence test?
   Did well - 1 2 3 4 5 - Did not do well.

6) Do you think she has many friends?
   Many - 1 2 3 4 5 - Few.

CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH QUESTION.  Photograph Number 24

1) Is it a good quality photograph?
   Good - 1 2 3 4 5 - Poor.

2) Do you find him attractive as a member of the opposite sex?
   Yes - 1 2 3 4 5 - No.

3) Do you think he likes science subjects?
   Likes science - 1 2 3 4 5 - Does not like science.

4) Does he look like a person you would become friends with?
   He does - 1 2 3 4 5 - He does not.

5) Do you think he did well on the intelligence test?
   Did well - 1 2 3 4 5 - Did not do well.

6) Do you think he has many friends?
   Many - 1 2 3 4 5 - Few.
FIGURE EIGHTEEN

Seating of Judges for Photographic Study

Female

Male

C Caucasian

Non-Caucasian
As pupils completed their judgements they passed the print to the left. I received photographs from my right and put them to the bottom of the pile and gave out, to my left, one from the top of the pile. Two types of intervention proved necessary. Firstly, to stop pupils passing on a second print before the person on their left had had time to pick up the first one. This was to avoid mismatching pages and prints. Secondly, to dissuade pupils from comparing judgements until they had finished.

During the period that the photographs were being passed round I noted the apparent race of each judge. While only three of the photographs were of non-caucasians, half the judges were. I thought it important to record the difference at the time, although it proved to produce no significant effects.

Although by the end of the period it was clear that most pupils had made enough judgements for their pleasure, they were still interested enough to want to see the photographs together and enquire about the individuals depicted. No objections were voiced about having to make such judgements from photographs: if they were made with great cynicism it was not apparent.
This appendix presents some of the results of the study of the way other sixth formers judged the photographs of the people who were interviewed in Edinburgh. The previous appendix gave details of the relevant subjects and procedure.

There were two reasons for undertaking this part of the investigation. Firstly, there would seem to be certain stereotypes which come into play when people meet one another and these stereotypes presumably influence the possibilities of future relationships. Some of these stereotypes concern physical appearance and hence the investigation of other pupils' reactions to the photographs of the main sample seemed relevant to the investigation of friendships. Secondly, if such stereotypes are at work, we might expect to see some interaction between judgements of photographs, and the actual relationships of people photographed.

The following results are divided into two sets which correspond to the two reasons for the investigation. Firstly, the results which are only concerned with the interaction of the judgements; that is with the relationship between stereotypes. Secondly, with the relationship between these judgements and the data that were gathered on the people photographed.

A number of studies have examined the effects of physical attractiveness under experimental conditions, e.g. Sigall (1973),
Black (1974), Kollar (1974) and Mims (1975). Boor and Zeis (1975) looked at the interaction between intelligence estimation and whether or not the fellow student was portrayed as attractive or unattractive. They found no relationship between these variables or between the sex of the persons concerned and the estimations of intelligence. A more naturalistic study conducted with senior school pupils (Cavior, 1975) found reasonably strong positive correlations between 'physical attractiveness' and 'interpersonal attraction'.

A number of 'myths' can be explored with the help of the six questions that the judges were asked. For example, are those who are seen as scientists also seen as having fewer friends, as might be expected from the literature? (See Section Five of Chapter Three.) Are the people that others would seek to know also judged to be more able on an intelligence test? Are scientists expected to do better on intelligence tests than artists?

The London judges were asked six questions about each photograph. These can be seen in Figures Sixteen and Seventeen in Appendix Seven. This means that there were 15 sets of interactions which could be investigated. There are, however, four sets of judgements in each case, the boys' judgements of boys and girls, and the girls' judgements of boys and girls.

From these fifteen possible sets of interactions, 6 seemed of particular interest. These are summarised in Table Twenty-One below, and explained in paragraphs A to F below the table. Each row consists of the four judgements resulting from the two sexes of judge and photograph. The rho values were derived in the following
manner. For each photograph and for each question the mean of the fifteen boys' responses and the mean of the fifteen girls' responses was calculated. The rho value is for the ordering of the two sets of means that relate to the two questions being considered and the photographs of the sex being judged, 43 in the boys' case and 16 in the girls'. That is, the rho values relate to the ordering of the photographs and that ordering is based on the overall mean score for either the boy or girl judges.

**TABLE TWENTY-ONE: rho Values Between Mean Question Scores**
(See above text for explanation.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Photographs of:</th>
<th>Judgements by:</th>
<th>Boys (N=43)</th>
<th>Girls (N=16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraphs</td>
<td>Questions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2 &amp; 4</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>2 &amp; 6</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.88***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>4 &amp; 6</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3 &amp; not 6</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>3 &amp; 5</td>
<td>0.91***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*=P<0.05, ***=P<0.001.)

(A) The first pair of judgements considered is whether or not the people that are seen as likely friends are also seen as physically more attractive. In all four sets of judgements the answer would appear to be yes; possible friends do appear to be perceived as more attractive.
(B) It might be speculated that those people who are seen as attractive will also be thought to have more friends than others; that attractiveness to some extent actually attracts. This appears to be the case as can be seen from the table above.

(C) It seemed a not unlikely prediction that those people who would be seen as possible friends would also be seen as having more friends than others. Again this proved to be substantiated by reasonable rho values.

(D) Section Five of Chapter Three deals in more detail with the myth of the unsocial scientist; that the scientist tends to be seen as less socially active. From this it might be predicted that he or she would also be seen as having fewer friends. Only a low correlation to this effect was found and this did not extend to the boys' judgements of the girls' photographs.

(E) It might also be expected as a part of the myth that the scientist, if seen as hard working and 'bookish', would also be likely to be seen as doing better on intelligence tests. The fairly substantial correlations indicate support for this stereotype.

(F) It might be expected that there would be some kind of relationship between the judged quality of the photographs and the following question about the attractiveness of the person depicted. No such relationship was found with the photographs of girls, but a reasonably substantial one appeared to exist over the boys' photographs.

Finally, on the subject of these relationships where the girls were judging, or where girls' photographs were being judged,
there was no relationship between predicted intelligence test success and a desire to know the person. But where the boys were judging boys’ photographs, it was found that estimated ability on the intelligence test was related to wanting to look like the person (\(\rho=0.39^{**}\)) and also with wanting to be friends with them (\(\rho=0.36^*\)).

The final part of this appendix is short. It was suggested earlier that if the stereotypes are apparently at work within the judgements that people make of photographs, there also would be some related effects detectable in the actual lives of the people who were judged. Would, for example, the person who is most often judged as a desirable friend not be likely to have more friends than others? The answer to all such questions is that no relationships were found between the guesses of the London sixth formers and the relevant variables in the Edinburgh sixth formers whose photographs were judged.

This may not be surprising. The stereotypes may hold in London, but not in Edinburgh. The differences between schools may be great. The individual variations may be so great as to make nonsense of such comparisons. The quality of the photographs may have been such, or it may be in their nature, that such judgements are not relevant to the people portrayed. Or again, would we seriously expect the number of friends a person has to be visible in their faces?

Nevertheless, doubts remain. The question of why we do become friends with some people and not others must surely involve to some extent, and at some stage, our assessment of their appearance. The investigation that was undertaken was doubtless too crude to begin to tackle the contribution that appearances make to the way we become friends.
This appendix concerns the interviews which form the basis of Chapter Four. Interviewing is one of the most important and complex methods of investigation open to the psychologist, but little was said about it in the main text. It may therefore be useful, before turning to the particular interviews I conducted, to make some general remarks about interviewing.

In interviews there are no simple rules which can be followed and no mechanical methods of replication or analysis. This leads many workers to be suspicious of interviewing as a method. It will be apparent from the main text that I regard the concern with replication as largely illusory and that it is as illusory in experimentation as it is in interviewing.

For theoretical purposes, that is as contribution to our understandings of psychic phenomena, the test can only be the coherence with which the new findings fit together with what we already know; to ask if they are true in any other sense, (for example because they are immutable and therefore can be found to be the same by others, or because they are reflections of something which is the same for everyone) is to make assumptions for which I can see no base.

Thus I do not believe there is any special case to be made in defence of interviewing vis-a-vis other methodologies. This does not mean that the process of interviewing is arbitrary; that all interviews and all interviewers are as good as one another. The
rules are subtle and complex. All I wish to do here is to indicate two of the main principles of 'good' interviewing.

Before considering these there is an important distinction to be made, one which is sometimes forgotten, which I have alluded to above. I referred to the theoretical purposes of our methodologies. We may also have practical purposes. It is this distinction which separates tests from investigatory questionnaires. The former are designed to serve particular practical purposes and do not aim to help our more general understandings. Rather they follow from and depend on what we have already established. The latter, on the other hand, are often intended to establish new concepts and are seeking definitions and exact terms for these concepts. For this last purpose all things are relevant until they have been shown to be otherwise. Tests are concerned with what we already know. If questionnaires are treated in the same way they too can only show us what we already know. The categories and definitions are set up; respondents cannot move outside them.

The point of this aside is that when questionnaires are treated as tests then, indeed, they are very different from interviews. But to treat them in this way is to lose any value they might have had for extending our understanding. Interviews have the advantage that they immediately draw our attention to the uniqueness of the encounter. We cannot fall into the inappropriate 'testing' frame of mind.

Nevertheless, there is a sharp contrast between interviews and any questionnaire. This lies, not in their credibility, but in the simple fact that one produces written material and the other oral.
Written material is susceptible to easy manipulation at a latter stage; verbal matter is superior in subtlety and brings much greater involvement and cooperation from respondents. The problem with interviewing is the complexity of the method itself and the enormity of the data produced. These problems are great but not insoluble; and we are surely right to be suspicious of simple solutions to problems as complex as those investigated by social psychologists.

These distinctions made above between tests, questionnaires and interviews, point to the two main sets of rules for the conduct of interviews. These might be headed sensitivity and flexibility. Sensitivity is a two-sided affair. Firstly, listening to what the respondent is actually trying to say, and not substituting for this what others have said, or jumping to hasty conclusions about what is going to be said. Secondly, a sensitivity to one's own questions: being clear enough about exactly what is being asked from this particular person on this particular occasion; and checking the point the respondent has picked up and how near it is to the one intended.

Flexibility concerns the way that the interviewer is able to cover the material he wishes; to probe the areas he has mapped out for himself, without disrupting the natural flow of the conversation. Flexibility to pick up useful leads and to ignore ones which will mean that important matters are bypassed. The chief aim is to avoid interjections. The interviewer guides the respondent to where he wishes, but this guidance must not obtrude. Such flexibility depends on an intimate knowledge of the area being investigated. At first it may be necessary to use a schedule of questions. As the interviews get better this schedule will be used less until it
forms no more than a check list, and finally is dispensed with.

The rest of this appendix concerns the particulars of the interviews which I conducted with those pupils involved in the Edinburgh study. All those who had been at the morning sessions were invited for interview. Before the invitations reached them, one boy from the newer school and two from the older school had left. One boy from each school was, however, contacted and interviewed. One boy and one girl from the older school came in person to tell me that they would not be coming for interview. One further boy from that school managed to elude all my efforts of three months to make an appointment with him. It was noted at the end of the first part of Chapter Three that these last three pupils all went unnominated by their peers. This can be seen on Figures Two and Three. Their code numbers are 64, 65 and 66.

Both schools set a room aside for my use, which was available most of the time; I never had to shorten an interview to vacate the room. My interview programme, however, coincided with the teachers' industrial action. This resulted in the schools being closed for two to three days each week and so I arranged for 20 of the pupils to be interviewed in my room at the university. Even with this arrangement, the period over which the interviews were conducted extended from mid-November 1974 to mid-February 1975.

The only interruptions that the interviews suffered was in the older school, which seemed to have, stalking its corridors, an extraordinary number of disembodied heads of staff members that could be thrust round the door of the room I was using, and withdrawn again,
with apologies. In the university the only interruption was my offer of coffee. Pupils who came to the university for interview were offered 50p to cover their fares for the 6 to 10 mile round trip. Many declined this offer.

Interviews were recorded on a cassette tape recorder, which had one hour's playing time on each side of tape. The recorder was placed on a table which I sat next to. The respondent's chair was at 90° to my own, also facing the table. The microphone was left on the table when the respondent had agreed to my recording what was said. People were found, as they had been in the past, to be remarkably tolerant of the tape recorder. This might have been due to the fact that many of the questions being asked were taxing and probably those being interviewed had little mental energy left to be too worried about such things.

If I took any notes I did so on a board on my lap, rather than adding to the noises on the tape by leaning on the table. Such notes were made where I felt it encouraged the respondent. Some people find it flattering to think that what they say is important enough for it to be written down; others find it inhibiting. Such judgements must be made at the time of the interview.

Interviews were normally started by looking over the Questionnaire and noting any omissions or ambiguities. This afforded an opportunity to lead into such questions as the categorisation of friends and the differences, if any, between closer and less close friends. More commonly, it allowed us to take up the theme of the respondent's plans for the future, as these had matured in many cases since the previous September. Discussions of change were often
openings for discussions of other changes that had occurred, such as those in people's friendships.

At first in the early interviews I used the schedule, a copy of which appears as a supplement to this appendix. As I became more familiar with the material I was exploring, it became unnecessary and distracting. Thus, the recodings of the interviewee's state of relaxation and responsiveness that are catered for on the schedule were soon ignored. Over half the interviews were conducted without reference to this schedule, although the general course of the discussion retained the same outline in many cases.

The interview was terminated with a request for a photograph and for the pupil's home address. It was explained that the photograph would be used to get other sixth formers to make judgements about the two Edinburgh sixth forms on matters that we knew about, such as the person's ability on the intelligence test, and whether or not they liked science subjects. Usually judgements about friendships were not specifically mentioned. The address was requested so that the pupil could be contacted later to see what in fact they had ended up doing. This facility was never used. One person refused to give their address and two girls from the older school refused to allow me to take their photographs.

During this period at the end of the interview, when photographs and addresses were being taken, I tried to encourage pupils to ask any questions about the research, or indeed anything else I might be able to help with. Most restricted themselves to general questions of the "What is it all about" format, in spite of the general answers they had already been given. A few made use of
the fact that I could get particular information about university
entrance, or had some knowledge of subjects that could be studied.

Interviews varied in length from 45 minutes to 2½ hours. The longest interviews were with those pupils who talked most freely
on their own. One or two respondents needed a little help to be
more succinct. Five respondents seemed too reserved, shy or dis-
interested to ever really be at ease.

All interviews were transcribed as literally as possible. Non-verbal sounds were included, as were repetitions and 'you know's'.
Pauses were indicated by a stop for each second. Transcriptions
ranged in length from 800 to 10,000 words. These literal transcrip-
tions are extremely hard to read. Thus considerable liberties have
been taken with what has been presented in the text. Pauses have
been simplified and non-verbal utterances removed. Further, the
Edinburgh dialect, (far removed from Morningside) used by the majority
of respondents, has been rendered into middle-class Southern English.
There seemed no objection to this last translation, as presumably
my ability to translate into my own idiom would anyway govern my
ability to understand what was being said.

My final comments on the interviews take up a theme that was
introduced in Chapter Two. It seems to me of great importance that
the investigations that we undertake as psychologists are comprehensible
to all those involved. The test of any piece of research must
involve the question, 'Does what I am investigating mean anything to
those with whom I am investigating it?' Obviously, it all depends
on what you mean by mean. I can only offer a little evidence in this
particular case, but hope that this is better than no evidence. At a later date all those interviewed were invited to a party. Approximately half of them came. Four of the respondents also payed a further visit to the university to find out more about the work we were doing. At the end of the summer term I made myself available in each school for an afternoon should anyone wish to talk further; no one availed themselves of this opportunity.

At the interviews, 12 pupils specifically asked for copies of any material that was published. A majority of the others expressed their interest in the project. Pupils seen in the last three years have all asked about the work and what has come out of it. Four of these people now hover on the brink of moving from acquaintances to friends of mine.
Interviews for Q1

Interviewee Number _____

Time ______

Date ______
1) Introductory. 
Ease: 1 2 3 4 5

2) Tape? 
Attention: 1 2 3 4 5
Relaxed: 1 2 3 4 5

3) Photograph?

4) Contact Address.

5) Clarify Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
Other: 

6) First of all I want to elaborate some of the things that I asked about in the questionnaire that you did earlier this term.

7) To start with I wish you could tell me how clear you feel about what you intend to do in the future?

What?

Why?

3) How far do you think what your friends are going to do influences what you decide to do?

Does Influence
1 2 3 4 5

4) Are any of your interests or activities of special importance to you?

How Important?

How much time does it/they involve?

Yes 1 2 3 4 5 No

- se = Talking flently/silent: Attention = Listening
- Wondering = Relaxed/Tense, Threatened.
2.

10) Have you always been at this school?

Yes. No.

Came from: _____________ Years.

How does it compare with your last school?

11) How do you like this school?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

Positive

1 2 3 4 5

Has Changed.

1 2 3 4 5

12) Now I would like to ask a few things about your friends. Firstly have the sorts of things that you spend your time doing in the company of your friends changed at all in the last couple of years?

Used to

Whereas Now

3) Do you think that the way that you are friends has changed, that is the sort of relationships or friendships are these different from how they used to be?

Different. Same.

1 2 3 4 5

4) Are your new friends, if any, different from your old ones?

Different

1 2 3 4 5
15) Now thinking of your more general friends, rather than those closer to you, what is it that you would miss if they were all to disappear?

16) Why do you think most people have friends, and how do you compare in your friendships to them?

17) How do these more general friends we've just referred to differ from your closer friends?

18) If you were to lose all your close friends overnight what is it you would miss about not having them?

- E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
- A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
- R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

What is the importance of your close friends to you?

How much would you mind if they were all to disappear in this way?

19) How does your relationship with a boy/girl friend differ from that with a close friend?

- Sex.
- Don't Know.
- Doesn't differ.
- Just Closer.

20) What's in a partnership, what do you see as the point of it?

As 19.
(21) Are there things you get from a partnership but not from a friendship. And are there things you get from friendships but not from partnerships?

Yes  No

(22) How much do you find that your friends decisions affect yours?

Boy/Girl friends decisions?

A Lot.

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

(23) Supposing I were to have asked you these questions a couple of years ago how differently do you think you would have answered them?

Quite Differently

1 2 3 4 5

(24) Do you find that having a boy/girl friend or your friends having one tends to separate you from your friends?

Yes

1 2 3 4 5

(25) Considering these three groups: friends, close friends, and partners, which do you find most important to you and which least?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.

A. = 1 2 3 4 5.

R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

1st.

2nd.

3rd.

(26) Have you ever talked about or thought about the sort of things I've been asking you?

Yes  No

Can you remember anything of what was said?
27) Do your friends make your life seem richer or fuller in any way, can you think of any examples?

28) How much do you share your problems with your friends?

Do you think you do so more or less than you used to?

29) Can you think of anything your most important group of friends have in common? For example are they people you have grown up with?

People you have met at school?

People you share interests with?

Other?

30) I wonder if you can consider your friends as a group and compare them in importance to you with the following:

Firstly which do you think is more important to you your friends or your household?

" " " School work?

" " " Interests?

Is there anything else you can suggest?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
R. = 1 2 3 4 5.
1) When was the last time that you really felt that you hadn't got any friends, did you mind or was it alright?

   What was it you missed?

   How do you think it would be now if the same thing were to happen?

2) How much would you mind being on your own in this way now?

3) If we were to reorganise your friendships what would you like to do? For example:

   E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
   A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
   R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

4) What is it like in your household?

   Do you spend much time there?

   How well do you get on with your parents?

   Do they help you with your HWK?

   " " " your interests etc?

   Do they let you come and go as you please?

   When:

   A Lot
   1 2 3 4 5

   More Friends.

   Less Friends.

   Closer " .

   Less Close ".

   Different Type of friend.

   Partner.

   Different Type of partner.

   Other:

   Very
   1 2 3 4 5.

   Often
   1 2 3 4 5.

   Always
   1 2 3 4 5.
35) Do you always feel quite free to bring any of your friends to your home?
   Yes 1 2 3 4 5.
   Your Partner?
   1 2 3 4 5.
   Could your partner sleep there?
   1 2 3 4 5.

36) How do you get on with your brothers and sisters, (if any).
   Well
   1 2 3 4 5.
   Different with each.
   

37) Do you like to be on your own sometimes?
   About how often?
   Daily.
   Three times a week.
   Weekly.
   Occasionally.
   
   What do you like doing on your own
   

8) Do you find that there are times when you would like to be left to yourself, but are not?
   Yes No
   Conversely are there times when you would like to be with friends but are not?
   Yes No
   Why are you on your own on such occasions?
   

9) Do you feel that you really belong to this sixth form or do you feel out of it in any way?
   Belong 1 2 3 4 5.
8.

0) When you have a problem or difficulty who do you usually first talk to? 
Who do you feel in general that you can most easily talk to?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

1) Why will the following not do as well?
Parents?
Siblings?
Friends?
Partners?
Strangers?

2) Do you find it difficult to talk to people about things that are really important to you?

3) Do you think you could think of any examples of such things?

4) Do you think that it is a good thing to be able to talk about such things?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

5) Do you find that other people tell you things that are obviously important to them? 
Do you mind them doing this or is it irritating? 
Can you think of any examples of where you like being told or don't like it?

Yes. No.
Sometimes.
6) Are there some sorts of things that you talk to one person about but not to another and other things that you feel that others talk to you about while they may not discuss certain things at all with you?

7) Do you find that there are times or places when you really get on with people, really get into what is being said or is happening?

3) Has being able to talk to people become more or less important to you recently? More.

Any questions?

E. = 1 2 3 4 5.
A. = 1 2 3 4 5.
R. = 1 2 3 4 5.

Tired 1 2 3 4 5
Bored 1 2 3 4 5
Tense 1 2 3 4 5
This appendix offers some further details of Edith Stein's thesis On The Problem of Empathy. While her text is of great assistance in clarifying concepts which are of importance in psychology, it is couched in a language which psychologists maybe find less easy than Aristotle's. Here the aim is to present an account which helps to bridge the gap between the too brief outline of her argument in the main text and some of the problems of reading the original.

Stein starts her investigation by introducing the idea of the 'phenomenological reduction'; the removal from the thing being considered of all that is doubtful and the resulting clearer understanding of what is being examined. Her starting point is the fact that "...the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is indubitably there..." (p.5 references to English pagination). Over the phenomenon we cannot be mistaken. Her investigation is concerned with what is involved with 'grasping' this foreign life and this grasping she designates as empathy irrespective, at this stage, of previous use. She is concerned not with "...how I arrive at this awareness, but what it itself is..." (p.7). It is left to the psychologist, not the phenomenologist, to investigate the process and its realisation.

She gives us a simple example of an act of empathy. "A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain." (p.7) By definition this awareness is not one I have directly; it is part of the concept that it is mediated through someone else. The objects of empathy, she argues, are not primordial in the way that the objects of my sensations are. Some inner events
can be primordial, for example, insight into a geometric axiom. However, many of my inner acts are non-primordial in their content. "Memory, expectation and fancy do not have their objects bodily present before them." (p.8) Is empathy like memory?

She then examines the complex case of memory. To some extent she lets her argument rest on the fact that there is a close analogy here rather than showing directly that empathy is not a matter of inner primordiality: that it is not like grasping a geometric axiom. I said that memory was a complex case. This is because in any one act of memory there are a number of subjects. The effect is reminiscent of Buber's ghosts (1957); the presences which float between two people who wish to 'seem' to be what they are not to each other.

In the case of memory there is the "I" engaged in the act of remembering. The object of the act - the memory - is present to "I" here and now and in this sense it is primordial. But another "I" lurks within the memory: I remember a time when I was joyful. There is a consciousness of sameness about I and I', but they remain distinct. For while the object of I is primordial (the memory is present), the object of I is not (the joy is dead, although it has once been alive). "The present 'I' and the past 'I' face each other as subject and object. They do not coincide." (p.9)

A third "I" somewhat dimly shows itself. There was a time when indeed the joy was primordial: the "I" was joyful' points back to a time when the "I" was not seen but was itself acting. She also notes here that we may be more or less aware of "I" at any particular time. We may, for example, lose ourselves back into a continuous stream of experience; this may be deliberate or it may
be passive, as though we were "living in the remembered experience instead of turning to it as an object." (p.9) In spite of being able to do this the non-primordality of the experience remains.

Fancy is also characterised by non-primordial experience, but here there is no temporal distance filled with continuous experience lying between the fancying and the fancied "I". Again, as with memory "the 'I' producing the fancied world is primordial; the 'I' living in it is non-primordial." (p.10) The difference is that memory represents past experiences, whereas fancy gives a non-primordial present. She notes that it seems possible to meet oneself in fancy; "To meet an 'I' which I recognise as myself though there is no linking continuity of experience to establish unity." (p.10) This seems to be more of an analogy with empathy, and can be better understood after we have come to understand empathy itself.

Empathy, she declares, is like memory and fantasy. It is an "...act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content". (p.10) Also, like memory I may absorb myself totally in it and to that extent forget "I" and so be "at" the subject of the content in the original subject's place (in the 'I' position. Later, if this happens, I am likely to stand back again into the 'I' position). The key point about the empathetic act as opposed to those of memory or fancy is the relation between the I and the I of the memory example. It was stressed how in memory there was a consciousness of sameness between these two subjects. With empathy there is no such sameness. The subjects in the empathetic act are different. Thus, the joy in 'I am empathising with his joy' is not primordial joy issuing live from my "I", nor is it dead like
remembered joy, nor, again, is it without actual life like fancied joy. There is a primordial experience happening which leads to my non-primordial one. "This is how man grasps the psychic life of his fellow men". (p.11)

Before continuing to follow her analysis, it is probably helpful to note two areas of difficulty in her argument. Firstly, the only example up to this point of an empathetic act involved a rather complex object itself. Namely, the pain one feels at the loss of a close relative. Surely this is both an inner pain and an outer pain and a primordial and non-primordial event. It is hard to disentangle the primordial part to see what is happening in the empathetic act. More importantly than this however, is the word primordial itself. This is first used of experiences which are simple and inescapable ones which thrust themselves upon us and are not mediated. It is then said to include all our present experiences "What could be more primordial than experience itself?". (p.8) Soon afterwards the 'primordially remembering "I"' is introduced and later "The 'I' producing the fancied world is primordial". (p.10) Now it seems that both experiences and the subjects of experience can be primordial. She offers little help with the word primordial and we are left with the impression that she has started by using it in its ordinary sense: not derivative, fundamental. I noted how certain acts are not mediated and this can be seen as synonymous with not being derivative. This is fine for the objects of "I_2" in the memory example. These are, indeed, at one stage removed from us, but the implication of her comments on fancy is that this "I_2" itself is derivative, while it seems clear that it is distinct from "I_1" and also that its objects are mediated. How could we have been conscious of
that sameness if it too were mediated? The one thing about this same-
ness is that both $I_1$ and $I_2$ are fundamental: the centres of their
individuals. I am not suggesting that her concept of primordality
is untenable rather that we need to know more before such extensive
use can be made of it in the ensuing explanation.

To return to Stein's analysis. She next uses some theories
about empathy that others have propounded to show the errors in their
assumptions and help elaborate her own exposition. Lipps originally
described empathy as a form of 'inner perception' and to that extent
she agrees. However, he goes on to talk of fully experiencing the
"I" that is the content of the empathy or memory. (What I have
called "$I_2".) That this is not properly an object is fine, but we
are nevertheless aware of the difference between the foreign 'I' and
our own 'I'; they do not become one as he suggests. What he
describes is a feeling of oneness. "Lipps confuses the following
two acts. (1) Being drawn into the experience at first given
objectively and fulfilling its implied tendencies with (2) the
transition from non-primordial to primordial experience." (p.13)

We can live out a memory fully, but however fully it never becomes
primordial again - if it did it would not be a memory. I remember
an embarrassing situation and now see it as funny. The memory can
be as complete as my view in the situation was, but there remains a
difference.

There are occasions when this non-primordality does turn
to primordality. I remember some past joy and become so involved
with the event that I am again happy at it. As well as this I might
also be happy at the fact of this past joy: the past and the present
joy would be able to stand next to one another.
She offers an example in empathy. A friend tells me he has passed his examinations. The following events might occur.

I grasp his joy empathically. I then grasp the joyfulness of the event and am joyful over the event myself. This might happen directly without the empathetic stage. (I could also stand back and be joyful at the fact that he is joyful, or indeed be joyful at the fact that I was made joyful by the event.)

If I failed to grasp his joy empathetically, I could still put myself in his place over the event and then endow him with whatever I felt in that place. By so doing, I would gain knowledge of his experience. This process of gaining 'knowledge' Stein calls an "assumption". Empathy is neither the primordial experience nor the 'assumed' one.

The next distinction she makes concerns 'fellow-feeling'. If there is both empathy with his joy (non-primordial) and also joy at the event, possibly for some further reason, e.g. that it allows us both to go away together (a primordial joy) this dual state she calls fellow-feeling. It is also pointed out at this stage that there are many factors at work in any particular occasion which determine whether or not I do empathise with someone.

The difference between empathy and feeling of oneness has already been pointed out. For Lipps this was empathy - being in the place of the other subject. If this were really so I could not distinguish what my body did to my body and what his did to his.

"I am not one with the acrobat but only 'at' him." (p.16) My inner movements do not correspond to his. Mine remain primordial, his non-primordial. The watcher may indeed pick up his dropped
programme without knowing it, but if he reflects on the performance in front of him or on the programme he dropped, the difference is always clear. If he does not so reflect he is in a state of self forgetfulness, but that is clearly a different state of mind from an empathetic one.

Stein is not denying that there can be a feeling of oneness. A piece of impersonal news we receive together may make us all jubilant. We all have the same feeling. This is, however, dependent on empathy in that it is by empathy that I realise that the other joys are like mine, and from this comes the fact that we are jubilant. "The feeling of oneness and the enrichment of our own experience become possible through empathy." (p.17) She notes that there is an extension to the concept of empathy in the form of 'reflexive sympathy'. I can empathise another person's empathy and of course that person may be empathising with me. This may be of importance in social interactions, but is beyond the scope of the present analysis. She also deals briefly with the question of whether empathy can be classified as an 'actuality' or an 'idea'. Here it seems clear that some phenomena are neither and empathy is one of these.

Next she turns to the relationship between the phenomenological investigation of empathy and its psychological counterpart. Until we know what we are looking for how can we describe it and its origins? A phenomenology must precede any empirical investigation. In this case it is necessary to know what the experience of foreign mental life 'looks like' ("Liberated from all accidents of appearance" p.20) before it makes sense to ask how this experience occurs. We cannot answer how it looks by seeking its causes because there would be no way of determining which were the right set of causes. If we
set out to 'explain' empathy in a psychological manner without having first defined it, we must have assumed a certain definition without having given the matter rational consideration. Such an irrational trust that we have by luck given it the right definition can hardly be a part of a scientific procedure however it is defined. If we have not become clear what we are investigating first we may be investigating a concept which has little relevance to human psychic life.

"...psychology is entirely bound to the results of phenomenology...psychology, presupposing the phenomenon of empathy, investigates the process of this realisation and must be led back to the phenomenon when the task is completed. If, at the end of the process of origination it delineates, a genetic theory finds something other than that whose origin it wanted to discover, it is condemned." (p.21)

Accordingly, we can use the distinctions that have already been made relating to empathy to see if some accounts are in fact accounts of empathy. Lipps offers the first explanation. He suggests that we come to experience foreign psychic life by imitating what we see. We have a wish to imitate everything in this manner. It is clear that this account is problematic, for my experience of imitation is an experience of something in myself; the imitating act is in my own body. We acknowledge this to be different from events in another body, but what we wanted was an explanation of how we came to comprehend those foreign acts; not my own acts. Lipps has in mind what Stein calls 'transference'. If a member of the family is walking around with a long face it may upset me
and I will seek cheerful company to cheer me up. We find such transferences everywhere, but we do not consider the foreignness of the experiences in these cases. The very ubiquitousness of such transferences prevents us submerging ourselves in the way that empathy demands. Here we are simply taking over or taking on a feeling.

A rival theory to that of imitation is association. In this it is suggested that we reproduce foreign gestures and come to know the feelings linked to such reproductions. But we realise that this feeling is foreign as it is not derived from our personal experiences and comes to us like an object. Might this be empathy? It would appear not for here we are concluding that the experience is foreign and no such drawing of a conclusion is necessary in empathy. "The mental life is given as foreign in the character of experience." (p.23)

Not all associationists take such a linear view of the process. For some writers the unity of the whole process is important. We may see that such feelings are foreign at one stroke. But this unity cannot include everything, there must be parts (e.g. the unity of objects within my unified field of view). Thus we need a further elaboration of association. If this unity holds my perception of my feeling together with the foreign subject, we must have experienced them together previously and that experience could only have come through empathy.

Another theory is the classical one which held that we came to know other persons by analogy (e.g. J.S. Mill). It was this that Lipps wished to challenge. It was argued that as we always
find ourselves having experiences associated with dispositions of our bodies, so the disposition of other bodies reflects their experiences. The premise here was that we see bodies around with no life in them. This seems to be plainly a false premise. Only philosophers of a solipsistic disposition find themselves so marooned. In any case it is hard to see this as a psychological explanation of what happens. It is more concerned with establishing the validity of our knowledge of foreign consciousness.

A more complex theory is propounded by Scheler. He proposes that we perceive the foreign "I" and our own "I" in the same inner manner. From 'a neutral stream of experience' crystallise out our 'own' and 'foreign' experiences. We find ourselves placed in a world of psychic experiences. What, she asks, is this inner manner? I find it hard to follow her explanation of Scheler's ideas. It seems probable that inner perception is what is given by our psychic acts and outer perception by other acts. It is not the objects that are different in this case. Scheler has also given an explanation in terms of which the objects are different; different objects have different modes of givenness. In this case an object of the psyche is both a different object and is given differently from an outer object - for example a sensation. An account which makes this sort of distinction between inner and outer objects she feels incompatible with her own.

Nevertheless, it is hard to make sense of a differentiation of a stream of consciousness. How would it ever get underway? 
"...for every experience is by nature an "I's" experience" (p.27/8) and cannot be separated from that "I". It is because Scheler takes "I"
to mean a psychic individual and not the pure 'phenomenologically reduced" "I" that he is able to propose this stream: in the phenomenological sphere it cannot make sense. In this investigation the "I" is the subject of all experience. There is no question of an experience being mine or another. It can only be mine (this, of course, says nothing about how it originates, or its place in the sum total of experience). If Scheler is talking about the experience of others, then he is transcending the phenomenal world. It seems he may be talking about the totality of our "I" when he talks of inner perception and the counterpart - outer perception - is the totality of nature. Thus the unities of inner perception are very different from the unities of having an experience. We can possibly see this more clearly if we think of mistakes. If I find that I am involved in an act of love, nothing can take it away. I have that experience and that is that. This seems to be what Scheler calls an act of reflection. In contrast to this stands inner perception which includes more than my central awareness; it includes my self-deception, things at the edge of my cognition and borrowed attitudes. These are not central to my experience, but they are primordial and will be adduced if I wish to answer the question whether or not I was actually in love.

In this way Stein tries to draw a distinction between inner perception and reflection, but both of these involve primordiality and her main thesis about empathy is that it is non-primordial. It will be apparent that I am not happy with her account of Scheler. Firstly, because I find it hard to make coherent, and secondly, because she does not seem to pick up the potential of the idea of a
a stream of experience from which we later differentiate myself from others; an idea which is the psychological counterpart to one that Heidegger was to make great use of. However, it would take us far from the present subject of empathy in friendship to examine Scheler's account at first-hand. The interest here is in whether or not Stein has disposed satisfactorily of the idea that empathy may be a primordial experience. It is worth noting in passing that Spiegelberg (1972) seems to agree with Stein's interpretation "Scheler made an impressive case for the possibility of the direct perception of other selves contrary to any theories basing our knowledge on inference or on empathy". (P.17) I have already made the point that Stein's case seems to rest on the argument that empathy is homologous with memory and therefore has the same indirectness. She seems at least in danger of arguing that empathy is like memory because of this indirectness, and that, because it is like memory, it is indirect.

The central section of her book concerns the more general philosophical questions about the individual at the centre of these arguments, "The constitution of the psycho-physical individual". This part of her work makes many points of considerable importance to the development of phenomenological philosophy and as such is rather beyond the present author's field and capacities. In the final part of her work she returns to some of the general arguments that surround the problem of empathy.

The problem of empathy has shown us how mind is both discovered in nature and at the same time can be caught constituting that very nature. The psycho-physical individual was described in terms of a
body at the centre of a spacial world together with a constituting consciousness. Physical nature is constituted by perceptual acts. The world of 'values' is constituted in 'feeling'. "In joy the subject has something joyous facing him..." (p.83) We can see these feelings effecting the physical world: reaching into the physical world. "For him who is cheerful, the world is baptised in a rosy glow, for him who is depressed in black." (p.83) This interaction is especially true of willing where what is willed may be given 'reality'.

The "whole 'cultural world'," all that "the hand of man" has formed, all utilitarian objects, all works of handicraft, applied science, and art, are reality". (p.84) They are constituted by the mind. Natural science on the other hand describes natural objects and this may include empirical psychology; thus the 'cultural sciences' describe the products of the mind. Sometimes they do so in an historical manner which forms rather a different basis from that of either the natural or cultural sciences. Indeed, if a historical explanation lapses into a different type, it loses its value.

"It is necessary for me to explain psychologically when I can no longer comprehend. But when I do this, I am proceeding as a natural scientist and not as an historian. If I ascertain that an historical personality showed certain psychic disturbances as a result of an illness, for example, a loss of memory, I am establishing a natural event of the past. This is an historical occurrence as much as the eruption of Vesuvius." (P.85)
The only historical significance of such events is their place as motives. "If historians take their task to be the determination and explanation of the psychological facts of the past, there is no longer any historical science." (p. 86)

Dilthey was one of the first people to try to tackle these difficulties and seek a sound basis for the cultural sciences. In particular he wished to establish a 'descriptive and analytic psychology' in place of an explanatory one. Stein's interest in this argument is that this description comes near to being a 'science of the soul as nature'. And, to avoid this slip back into natural science, we need empathy to construct the psycho-physical individual. This must be distinguished from mere mental comprehension. Empathy may be how we come to grasp historical personalities in the same way that natural experience is the basis of our knowledge of nature.

After these comments on the cultural sciences and the importance of empathy to them she returns to a consideration of the 'mental subject'. This is the "I" which constitutes a world and each "I" does so in a different way. These constructions are linked together in each "I", or by each "I". This she calls "motivation" which gives the "lawfulness of mental life".

However, there is more to a 'person' than these parts of the object world; there is also the emotional world. We can distinguish 'theoretical acts' such as perception or imagination from emotional acts where we feel the emotion coming from within and cannot ignore it. In order to see more clearly what is involved in a person she surveys a whole range of
experiences: sensations, personal feelings towards others, love, hate, thankfulness, values we place on things, moods, the will and volition, theoretical acts, including knowledge and cognitive acts in general. After this, she concludes:

"Thus we have sketched the constitution of personality in outline. We have found it to be a unity entirely based in experience and further distinguished by its subordination to rational laws. Person and world (more exactly, value world) were found to be completely correlated." (p.98)

I distinguish myself by being constituted in primordial mental acts; foreign persons are experienced in empathically experienced acts. There is a categorical structure, an unchangeable kernel in people. I can think of Caesar in a village in the 20th century. "The personal structure marks off a range of possibilities of variations." (p.100) This range is given empathically. The range so given may be to a greater or lesser extent potential. It may not unfold, but it is important that such 'non-unfolding' is not like non-existence. The person as nature is subject to the laws of causality, and as mind to the laws of meaning. Actions bid for comprehension. We do not empathise single experiences and leave them at that, but experience them as "...proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person". (p.101)

"The mere ordering of facts makes a meaningful occurrence into a blind occurrence causally ruled. It neglects the world of the mind...Because man belongs to both realms, the history of mankind must take both into consideration." (p.102)
She notes the similarity of her view to that of Dilthey. For both there is a "rational lawfulness of mental life" and the general law looks something like "He who feels a value and can realise it, does so". (p.103) A further similarity is that they both argue that empirical persons are realisations of possible types of person and that such types can be established \textit{a priori}.

Understanding other people is bound up with understanding ourselves. "Our own experiential structure limits the range of what is for us intelligible." (p.103) In principle I can empathically grasp structures which have not unfolded in me yet. There are parts of others not so accessible to me and these I may understand although they will always remain unfulfilled for me.

"I can experience values empathically and discover correlative levels of my person, even though my primordial experience has not yet presented an opportunity for their exposure. He who has never looked a danger in the face himself can still experience himself as brave or cowardly in the empathic representation of another's situation." (p.104)

It is because our experiences are like this that Dilthey can say "the interpretive faculty operating in the cultural sciences is the whole man". (p.105) Only when we experience ourselves as whole people can we understand others. And so empathy helps us to develop.

"...through empathy with 'related natures', i.e. persons of our type, what is 'sleeping' in us is developed. By empathy with differently composed personal structures we
become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others...when we empathically run into ranges of value locked to us, we become conscious of our own deficiency or disvalue." (p.105)

Stein's final comments are directed to her future work. We came to the mental person through the psycho-physical individual. Is it essentially necessary that mind can only enter into exchange with mind through the medium of corporeality?" (p.106) We feel a communion with contemporary minds and with tradition without the need for body, but this seems to presuppose that they are given. But there do seem to be those for who such commerce is conceivable. This, however, seems to be a religious matter and must be left for a later religious discussion.


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