THE TRANSITION FROM GHAZNAVID TO SELJUC RULE IN
THE ISLAMIC EAST

by

Clifford Edmund Bosworth

Thesis presented to the University of Edinburgh
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1961
# Table of contents

Preface  iv  

Note on transliteration  v  

Abbreviations employed  vi  

Bibliographical introduction  1  
  Primary sources  4  
  Secondary sources  53  
  Notes  64  

Part I  The administrative system of the Ghaznavids  71  
  Chapter 1  Introductory  72  
  Chapter 2  The Seljuk foundations  74  
  Chapter 3  The establishment of Sebûtigin in Ghazna  88  
  Chapter 4  The succession of Mahmûd  103  
  Chapter 5  The cultural background of the early Sultans, and the Ghaznavid court and bureaucracy's continuity with their predecessors in structure and personnel  107  
  Chapter 6  The attitude to power  123  
  Chapter 7  The Sultan and his servants  135  
  Chapter 8  The intelligence system  144  
  Chapter 9  The financing of the empire  155  
  Chapter 10  Building construction and labour services  188  
  Notes  193
Part II  The Ghaznavid army  222
Chapter 1  The ghulāms  223
Chapter 2  The racial contingents within the army and their fighting rôles  237
Chapter 3  The elephants and other elements comprising the army's train  250
Chapter 4  The troops' personal arms  257
Chapter 5  The Ġārid's department  261
Chapter 6  The numbers of the army  269
Notes  273

Part III  Nishapur and its Khurasanian setting  287
Chapter 1  Introductory: the position of Khurasan in early Islamic history  288
Chapter 2  The agricultural and commercial bases of Nishapur's prosperity  295
Chapter 3  The topography and demography of Nishapur  309
Chapter 4  The Ṣaṣabiyya of Khurasan: religious sectarianism and social ferment  318
Chapter 5  The aṣyām and orthodox ulema of Nishapur  330
Chapter 6  The Karbāmīyya  353
Chapter 7  The Ṣūfīs  360
Chapter 8  The Sayyids  369
Chapter 9  The Ḍhimmiyya  378
Notes  382

Part IV  The appearance of the Seljuqs  398
Chapter 1  Introductory: the early connections of the Turks with the Islamic world  399
Chapter 2  The early history of the Oghuz  408
Chapter 3  The culture of the early Oghuz  418
Chapter 4  The migrations into Transoxania and Khurasan of the Seljuqs and other Oghuz groups  426
Notes  438
Part V The ascendancy of the Turkmens in Khurasan

Chapter 1 Introductory

Chapter 2 Sultan Masʿūd: the man

Chapter 3 Threats to the stability of Masʿūd's empire

Chapter 4 The vendetta against the Mahmūdiyān

Chapter 5 The struggle in Khurasan with the Turkmens: political, military and strategic considerations

Chapter 6 Bāhāqī's account of the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur 1038-1039

Chapter 7 The attitude of the aḵyān of Nishapur towards the incoming Seljuqs

Chapter 8 The Seljuqs' attitude to power at this time

Notes

Bibliography

Primary sources

Secondary sources
This thesis deals primarily with the eastern Islamic world during the period 1000–40. It attempts to delineate the structure of the Ghaznavid empire, its personal and administrative aspect (Part I) and its military aspect (Part II). The material used in Part II has already appeared in substantially similar form as "Ghaznevid military organisation" in Der Islam, XXXVI, 1960, 37–77. Against this background, the province of Khurasan under Ghaznavid rule, and in particular, the city of Nishapur, are described (Part III). The irruption of the Seljuqs is treated in Part V. However, a survey of what is known of the Oghuz before these migrations is prefixed to this (Part IV). It summarises presently-held views, attempting to synthesise the work of Central Asian specialists, Turcologists, historians and archaeologists, who alone are competent to investigate at first hand this difficult subject.

The scope of the thesis is therefore that of the decline of Ghaznavid power in the west, and it is this aspect which has been concentrated upon, for the early years of the Great Seljuq dynasty have already been extensively covered by such scholars as Cl.
Cahen, I. Kafesoğlu and M.A. Kıyımen, and the administrative system of the Seljuqs has been examined by A.K.S. Lambton in her London University thesis on Seljuq institutions.

This thesis has been prepared under the joint supervision of the Rev. Dr. W. Montgomery Watt and Mr. J.R. Walsh, to whom I am greatly indebted for help and encouragement; from the latter, in particular, I have enjoyed much stimulating conversation and judicious guidance through the literature of the period.

Note on transliteration

The system employed for the transliteration of Arabic is that recommended by the Royal Asiatic Society. In regard to Persian, \( w\tilde{m}w \) is rendered by \( w \) or \( v \) and the majhūl vowels are ignored. The transliteration of Turkish names presents some difficulty. An attempt has been made to render a close equivalent of the true form, where this is determinable, and the vowel-system of modern romanised Turkish orthography has been used. However, the Arabic orthography of the texts has often been indicated in brackets after the first occurrence of the name; thus, Toghan (Tughān), Būritigīn (Būritigīn), Sūbashī (Sūbāshī).
Abbreviations employed

(a) Books and authors

Baih. Baihaqi, Ta'rikh-i Mas'udi
Bal. al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan
Card. Cardini, Zain al-akhbâr
Hud. Hudud al-Salam
IA Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi't-ta'rikh
I Batt. Ibn Battuta, Ribla
I Haq. Ibn Haqal, Kitab Qurat al-Card
I Khall. Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-sâyâân
Qa. Iqta'ahkri, Kitab masâlik al-namâlik
Jurb. Jurbâdha'ni, Tarjuma-yi ta'rikh-i Yamini
Mirkh. Mirkhând, Raudat as-safa'
Misk. Miskawâ'ih, Tajârib al-umam
Muntagam. Ibn al-Jauzi, al-Muntagam
Muruj. al-Mas'udi, Muruj adh-dhahab
Narsh. Narshahkhi, Ta'rikh-i Bukhârî
ON. Kâ'bi, Kâ'bi, Gubâ'-nâma
Râw. Râwandî, Râhat as-qudâr
SN. Nizâm al-Mulk, Siyasat-nâma
TB. Ibn Funduc, Ta'rikh-i Baihaq
TN. Jûzjâni, Tabaqat-i Hâsebî
TS. Ta'rikh-i Siistân
Qur. al-Hussainî, al-Qurda'î-1-hikayat as-Saljûciyya
Utbi. al-Utbi, at-Ta'rikh al-Yamini

(b) Periodicals, encyclopaedias, series, etc.

AbhPAW Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Berlin)
AO Acta Orientalia (Leiden, Copenhagen)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGA</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Geographicorum Arabicorum (Leiden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJRL</td>
<td>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library (Manchester)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAL</td>
<td>Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur (Leiden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJ</td>
<td>Geographical Journal (London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>Cibb Memorial Series (London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>İslam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Islamic Culture (Hyderabad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Islamic Quarterly (London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Journal Asiatique (Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAOS</td>
<td>Journal of the American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASB</td>
<td>Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JESHO</td>
<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (Leiden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNES</td>
<td>Journal of Near Eastern Studies (Chicago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRAAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KgsA</td>
<td>Körösi Gána Archivuma (Budapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Muslim World (Hartford, Conn.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLZ</td>
<td>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung (Leipzig, Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REI</td>
<td>Revue des Études Islamiques (Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Rocznik Orientalistyczny (Cracow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWAV</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (Vienna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM</td>
<td>Türkîyat Mecmuası (Istanbul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>T'oung-Pao (Leiden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAJb</td>
<td>Ural-Altatische Jahrbücher (Wiesbaden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WZKM</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</td>
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<td>Code</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie</em> (Weimar, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</em> (Leipzig, Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVOIRAO</td>
<td><em>Zapiski Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva</em> (St. Petersbourg)</td>
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Bibliographical Introduction
Note

The bibliographical survey which follows is a selective one. It deals only with the principal works on early Ghaznavid history and on Khurasan at the time of the Seljuq invasions, and concentrates on contemporary and near-contemporary primary sources and on some recent important secondary ones. These are, however, treated in some detail. A useful survey of the sources for early Ghaznavid history will be found in Nazim's *The life and times of Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna*, 1-17; Nazim is almost exhaustive in his list, dealing with works no longer extant and with later, derivatory sources as well as with the earlier ones, although he does not give a detailed consideration to all the authorities mentioned.

Barthold treated of the sources bearing on the history and geography of eastern Persia and Central Asia in the Introduction to his *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, 1-63. This exhaustive treatment will for ever remain a model of its kind in its great bibliographical detail, attesting to Barthold's unrivalled knowledge of the field, and in the acuteness of its critical estimates. It may be supplemented and brought up to date by the excellent bibliography in Spuler's *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, 532-94. The list contains
a few critical annotations, and Spuler has also prefixed to his book a brief, critical analysis of the sources for the early history of Muslim Persia (XV-XXXII). Many useful references, especially to recent Russian works, will be found in Frye's notes to his translation of Narshakhi's History of Bukhārā.

No attempt has been made to give an analysis of sources on the early Seljuqs. V.A. Hamdani devoted an Oxford D.Phil. thesis to the sources for early Seljuq history (see O.U. Abstract of dissertations, 1939), and more recently, A.K.S. Lambton has examined the sources which bear on Seljuq administration in her London Ph.D. thesis, Contribution to the history of Seljuq institutions.

Mention should, however, be made of Cl. Cohen's important article, "Le Malik-NAMEH et l'histoire des origines Seljukides", Oriens, II, 1949, 31-65, where he examines the dependence of later sources on the lost Malik-nameh and utilises this information; and of the recently-published (Tehran 1332/1953) Seljuq-nameh of Zahīr ad-Dīn Nishāpūrī (d. c.582/1186-7), the basis of Rāwandī's Rāhat as-sudūr and of many other later authors.
Primary Sources

The importance of the Ta’rīkh al-Yamīnī of Abū Naqr Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-ʿUṭbī has been recognised in Europe since the end of the 18th century when de Sacy analysed its contents, using the Persian version of Jurbādhqānī (see below) (Notices et Extraits, IV, 1798, 325–411). The Arabic original was not widely known until the middle of the 19th century, when Sprenger published a lithographed text (Delhi, 1847) and Nöldeke used four Vienna Ms. to examine the relationship between the Arabic and Persian versions (SBWAW, XXIII, 1857, 15–102).

The exact date of ʿU.’s birth is not known, but he came from an Arab family settled in Ray. The connections of the ʿUṭbī family with Khurasan and Transoxania and the opportunities for employment in the Sāmānid empire, attracted him eastwards. He entered the Sāmānid bureaucracy, where his relatives were well entrenched, becoming Ṣibāb-Barīd of Nishapur; then he served as secretary to first Abū ʿAlī Simjūrī and then to Qābūs b. Washagīr. When the Sāmānids were patently in decline, he transferred to the service of Sebūktīgin, where he worked alongside Abūl-Fatḥ Būstī and enjoyed the patronage of Maimandī. He became Ṣibāb-Barīd for Maḥmūd of Ganj Rustāq in Bāḏghīs, but was dismissed through intrigues by the local governor. He remained in retirement till his death in the latter half of
Mas'ud's reign. Thus like Baihaqi,GU. brought with him into the Ghaznavid empire a rich background of administrative experience in Khurasan and the old Samanid lands.

The Yamini covers the reign of Sebuktigin and that of Mahmud up to 411/1020. For the remainder of the reign, we have to rely on GardizI, supplemented by backward glances from Baihaqi's Tarikh-i Mas'udi. GU. used Arabic for his book, at the request of Prince Muhammad and so that Mahmud's exploits might be publicised in the Arab-speaking lands of the Caliphate. It will be remembered, too, that the Vizier Maimandi was at this time promoting the official use of Arabic rather than Persian. The florid (according to Storey, "turgid") style of the Yamini is freely interspersed with verses from the Arabic poets and by GU. himself. The style of historians of the preceding two generations, such as Miskawaih, al-JahshiYarI and as-Suli, had still been comparatively simple, but GU. used for his book the epistolary style favoured by writers like the Shihb Ismahil b. Abbad and Abul-Fath Busti. He says explicitly that Hilal as-Shabi's Taj (properly, K. at-taj fi daulat ad-Dailam), which had been written in an exaggerated style for Taj al-Milla Aqqud ad-Daula, was his model, but GU. carried this style to a new peak. His book was as much admired in the eastern Islamic world for its style as for its subject-matter, and he must be considered as a pioneer user of the inshe' style which became all but universal by official chancellaries and by writers outside them in Seljuq times and after.

The Yamini is a panegyric, yet as Barthold noted (Turkestan, 19), GU. does not gloss over the darker sides of Ghaznavid rule: the exact-
ions in Khurasan by the Vizier Isfarā'īnī; the ravages there of fam-
ine, which were aggravated by fiscal oppression; the reign of terror
set up in Nishapur by the Sultan's protégé and head of the Karāmiyya
sect, Abū Bakr Muḥammad. It is not therefore true, as Nazim asserts
(Sultan Mahmūd, 5) that CU, tells us nothing of the "dumb million" of
subjects, but his information here must be integrated with scattered
items from other sources. The greatest handicap in using the Yamīnī
lies not in any bias, which can be detected and controlled, but in
the inexplicitness arising from the author's aim at literary effect
rather than at the conveyance of information. CU, is very sparing
with dates and with geographical and other details of Mḥmūd's wars.

The accounts of the Indian campaigns are especially vague. He does
not seem ever to have visited India himself, and the freshness of
first-hand experience which we find in Baihaqī is quite absent,
that Nöldeke pointed out/CU, is more interested in events in the western
parts of the empire than in those on the other side and that later
historians like Mīrkhwānd and Fīrishta are often fuller on the Indian
campaigns.

The literary excellence of the Yamīnī ensured a wide diffusion
of the work, and Mss. are numerous. There are also several comment-
aries on it, all dealing with the text from a linguistic rather than
a historical point of view. A Persian version was made as early as
c. 1206 by Abū'sh-Sharaf Nāqī Jurbādhqānī (Persian, "Gulpāyagānī"),
probably for one of the Atabegs of Azerbaijan. J.'s simplified
version retains some of the florid metaphor of the original, includ-
ing the Arabic poetry quoted therein, but he omitted the autobio-
graphy which appended to the original work. The Yamūnī was used extensively for Maḥmūd's reign by later historians such as Ibn al-
Athīr, Mīrkhwānd and Khwāndamīr; Rashīd ad-Dīn's section on the Ghaznavids is lifted almost verbatim from Jurbādīnī's translation.

The Zain al-akhbār of Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Ḥayy b. ʿAd-Daḥḥāk b. Maḥmūd Gardīzī, a general history of Persia from legendary times onwards, is a valuable authority for the history of Khurasan down to the 11th century and for the history of the early Ghaznavids. The author must have been connected with the Ghaznavid court or administration (see below), although the extant portion of Baihaqī makes no mention of him. His dates are unknown: all that can be said is that he was a native of the Ghazna-Gardīz area, as his nisba and perhaps his name "Ibn/Daḥḥāk" show; that during Maḥmūd's reign he was usually close to the Sultan; and that he dedicated his history, being probably an old man at this time, to Sultan Zain al-Milla ʿAbd ar-Rashīd (1049-53).

Only part of the Zain al-akhbār is extant - the work seems to have had little influence upon later historiography, and citations from it in later writers are infrequent - but we do possess, in addition to the historical narrative, chapters on the festivals and eras of various peoples, on classical scientists and philosophers, and on the sciences, customs and beliefs of the Turks, Greeks and Indians. The sources used by G. for pre-Ghaznavid history and for his accounts of non-Muslim practices and cultures have attracted the attention of scholars, in particular of Barthold (cf. Turkestan, 20-1; "Zur Gesch-
ichter der Şaffāriden", Nuldeke-Festschrift, Giessen 1906, I, 171-6; EI Art. "Gardīzī") and of Minorsky (cf. Marvazī on China, the Turks and India, London 1942, introd.; "Gardīzī on India", BSOAS, XII, 1948, 625-7). Most important is his use of the lost Ta‘rīkh wulūt Khurāsān of Abū ʿAlī al-Jusayn b. ʿAḥmad as-Sallāmī, a historian and poet of Bāḥrāq who flourished in the middle years of the 10th century and whose fortunes were connected with those of the governors of Khurāsān Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Muḥtiy Chaghānī and his son Abū ʿAlī. G. also refers to the work of the Sāmīnid Vizier Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad Jaihānī (flourished early 10th century), whose lost Kitāb al-masālik wa‘l-qamālik has been extensively quoted by later writers. According to Minorsky, G.'s chapter on the sciences and customs of the Indians has Jaihānī as its source; G. refers to his work as the Kitāb-i tawārīxh of Jaihānī. Furthermore, G. knew Bīrūnī personally, and his chapter on the festivals of the Indians is demonstrably based on Bīrūnī's India ("Gardīzī on India", 626-7).

G.'s account of the Ghaznavids goes down to Maudūd's seizure of the throne from Muḥammad (1042). His information on the origins of Ghaznavid rule in Ghazna is very sketchy; observations on the rise of Alptāgīn and Sebūktāgīn (the intervening governors are not mentioned) occur in the narrative of the history of the later Sāmīnids. His connected account of the Ghaznavids begins only with Maḥmūd's investiture in 999 with the governorship of Khurāsān by the Caliph al-ʿOṣūdir. (Nazim's text, 62). In his preface to the account of Maḥmūd's reign, G. describes his qualifications for the task, in
that he had been a first-hand observer of many of the events involved. "I propose", he says, "to begin now on the history of Yamîn ad-Daula, may God have mercy on him, in a brief and concise manner. For, in comparison with all the other reports I have read about, a new factor comes into consideration when I treat of his reign. I have derived knowledge about the previous events either by hearsay or by reading books; and it may well be that the authors and relaters of these compositions and accounts have made commissions or have inserted extra matter. They may have been out to secure an unusual effect by their words or to make the book sought after. But in regard to the greater part of these events which I am about to relate, I can say that I witnessed them personally - what Amir Mahmûd did in India, how he conquered fortresses in Sîstân, Khurasan and Iraq, what fearsome deserts, mountains and passes he traversed, what battles he fought, what mighty rulers he humbled. No-one has ever witnessed or heard about the like of these campaigns and stratagems, for indeed they were superhuman feats .... Out of all the reports about the rule of this dynasty, may God establish it for ever, I have selected the most attractive and memorable parts and set them down here. So far as possible, I have condensed them; if I had explained them at length, the work would have grown too big" (61-2).

We are not therefore surprised that the account of the Ghaznavids is a chronicle of bare events, without the analyses of motive and the critical comments on events which we find in Baihaqî; nowhere does the author's personality or attitude to events come through. However, the narrative is often quite detailed. It supplements
Utbī, who does not deal with the last decade of Ḥasanūd’s reign. His accounts of the two short reigns of Muḥammad are the only contemporary ones we have, and the only other source with substantially new material here is Shabān Khara’ī’s Majmūʿ al-ansāb (see below, 19-22). G. is careful to give dates for the events he records (not always accurately, however; cf. 108, where the date 430 given for Ḥasanūd’s winter stay in Nishapur should be 431). He writes dispassionately, without fulsome praise of the Sultans and without savage condemnation of the Seljuqs and the ravages. The Persian style is usually simple, though not without some difficulties, in part caused by the lacunae of the Mss. As an example of straightforward historical style of the 11th century, the Zain al-akhbār has an honoured place.

The Ta’rīkh-i Maṣūdi of Abū’l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Ṣūsain Baihaqī (385-470/995-1077) gives us a unique insight into the working of the Persian bureaucracy which ran the Ghaznavid empire. None of the compilers of biographical dictionaries deal with Baihaqī, for he spent most of his working life on the periphery of the Islamic world in Ghazna, but considerable biographical details can be gleaned from his own writings. Moreover, since he came from the oasis of Baihaq (modern Sabzawār), Ibn Funduq in his Ta’rīkh-i Baihaq devotes some space to this illustrious son of his home town.

After an education in Nishapur, B. entered the Ghaznavid administration during Ḥasanūd’s reign. He began in the Correspondence Department (Pis̄ṭ-i Risālat) and remained there, first as assistant to the Chief Secretary, Abū Naʿf-i Mishkān, and then after his death in 1039, to the new head of the department, Abū Sahl Zauzanī.
Finally, in 'Abd ar-Rashtīd's reign (1049-53), he himself became head of the Diwan. Soon afterwards he fell from grace, and in the end retired after some forty years of active service. B. was thus one of the many Khurasanian civil servants whom the Ghaznavids attracted to their capital and who gave the administration there such a strong Khurasanian and Sāmānid imprint.

B. put together his experiences and memories in a series of volumes called collectively the Muğalladšt. According to Ibn Funduq, there were originally over thirty volumes. During the course of his career, B. took copious notes and often made copies of official and diplomatic documents for his own purposes. These papers went back as far as 409/1018-19, and he began in his retirement to put them in order and write them out properly. B.'s own, original work in the Muğalladšt thus covers forty-two years, down to 451/1059. Events down to the year 409 had been dealt with by another historian in Ghazna contemporary with B., Maḥmūd Warrāq, whom he calls "trustworthy and authoritative", but on Maḥmūd Warrāq's death, his sons prevented B. from using their father's work more extensively, on the pretext that it had not yet been copied and made widely known enough. Whether this work of dissemination was ever done seems dubious, for the history has been lost without trace.

Nevertheless, B.'s intention was to produce a history of the whole Ghaznavid dynasty down to the accession in 1059 of Ibrāhīm b. Maṣūd, as the general title Ta'rīkh-i Ṣl-i Sebūktigin implies; so he borrowed from Maḥmūd Warrāq for the reign of Sebūktigin and for the earlier part of Maḥmūd's reign. The divisions dealing with the
various reigns seem to have had separate names, e.g. Ta’rikh-i Nāṣirī, T.-i Yamīnī (cf. Baih., 26), T.-i Masgūdī. Only the section dealing with the reign of Masgūd, i.e. part of vol. 6, vols. 7-9 and part of vol. 10 (so Morley in the title of his edn., Calcutta 1862, Barthold, Turkestan, 22, and Storey, 253; according to Sa’d Nafīsī, El 2 Art. "Bayhaqī", vols. 5-10 complete) are extant. The last year of Masgūd’s life is not treated in them, and there is a lacuna covering several months in the years 424-5. At least twenty-five volumes of the Mujalladat have thus been lost. This probably happened fairly quickly. Ibn Funduq, loc. cit., saw various volumes in a library at Sarakhs, in the library of the Khātūn Mahdī Qirāq madrasa in Mishāpur and in private libraries, but not a complete set. The lack of incentives for copying such a gigantic work, whose subject-matter was in any case of comparatively local interest, and the destruction of books in Khurasan and Afghanistan by such vandals as the Ghuzz of Sanjar’s reign, the Ghūrids and the Khwārizmshāhs, amply explain this regrettable loss.

B. was also the author of a work on the secretary’s craft, the Zīnat al-kuttāb. Ibn Funduq is the sole author who mentions it, and it is probably from this work that he quotes in his biographical notice of B. (TB, 176-7, cf. below, Part I, 141-3). C.A. A. Fayyāq mentions some leaves of a majmū’a in a private library in Tehran, giving definitions of terms of kitāba, and attributed to Baihaqī; these leaves may have come from the Zīnat al-kuttāb. B. seems also to have been the author of the Maqāmāt-i Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, a collection of reminiscences and episodes which he took
down from his old master in the Nizān-i Risālat. These Magāmāt are explicitly quoted by later writers such as Qaff and Saif ad-Dīn Faḍlī (see below, 37, 48). It is perhaps this work which B. refers to in his Ta'rikh-i Mas'ūdī as the Magāmāt-i Mahmūdī. 17

The uniqueness of B.'s work has been rightly insisted on by earlier authorities like Elliot and Dowson (History of India, II, 56-7) and Barthold (Turkestan, 22-3); a comparison of its style and structure with that of the other contemporary sources, Qutbī's inflated periods and Gardīzī's jejune chronicle, immediately displays this. B. wrote with an eye on posterity. He anticipates criticism of the work's excessive size by asserting the paramount claims of completeness and of justice to all concerned in the events: "I want to bring this history to a satisfactory conclusion and to bring out all the curious and obscure points, so that no aspect of events may remain hidden. If this book becomes long, and my readers grow weary, then I crave their indulgence not to consider me as a tiresome person" (11). The freshness of his ideas on historiography is seen in the contempt which he expresses for the arid chronicles which are, in Collingwood's phrase, mere "scissors-and-paste history", where "so-and-so king sent so-and-so general to some war or other; on a certain day they gave battle or made peace; this one beat that one or that one this; they proceeded there" (354).

B.'s work is a dynastic history because the Ghaznavid Sultans and their empire provided him with a satisfactory chronological and territorial framework; it is not a panegyric. When he wrote, he was a retired civil servant, enjoying his old age and without material
reasons for writing exaggerated praises of his old masters. Hence in the Ta'rikh-i Mas'udī he states that his aim is not to praise the greatness and courage of Amir Mas'ud, since these are well-known and contemporaries have been able to witness it for themselves; instead, "my aim is to write a history which will be of permanent value, and to raise up a mighty monument, whose fame will endure till the end of time" (96). He does not fail to record Mas'ud's obstinacy and errors of judgement in dealing with the Seljuqs in Khurasan. He knows that the story of the Sultan's avarice at Amul in 1035 is very unflattering: "It comes very hard for me to let my pen set down such words, but what can I do? One must not show partiality in writing history" (462). It was alien to B.'s nature to be unfair, even to his opponents. Although he had suffered personally at the hands of Abū Sahl Zauzanī and his partisans, and says that "evil and malevolence were engrained in his nature", he wanted to be fair to him and avoid charges of prejudice and parti-pris (taqasub u tarabbud) from readers who might think him a vindictive and cantankerous old man (154, 178-9, cf. 109).

In laying down his principles of historiography, B. shows an insight into historical method and Quellenkritik; his attitude testifies to the high level of Khurasanian Persian culture at the time, in that it produced so judicious a scholar. B. enunciates these principles at the beginning of the tenth volume of the Mujalladāt.

The thirst for historical knowledge, knowledge about the past, is a universal one, he says. But this knowledge can only be acquired by personal effort, entailing much travel fi talab al-ilm, or else
by reading it in books. Man's wisdom and critical faculties are therefore most important: "Your informant must be a trustworthy and veracious person, but your own wisdom must also testify that the statement is true and must give sanction to that saying of God's which they speak about, 'Give no credence to any reports which offend against your judgement'. A book should be such that the reader's intelligence does not reject the reports set forth in it; that anyone who hears it credits it; and that wise men, when they hear it, should accept it". Unfortunately, he continues, the majority of common people are stupid, and instead of the truth, prefer incredible nonsense, stories about demons, fairies, evil spirits of the desert, hills and seas, fishes as big as islands and the turning of men into animals: "The number of people who can distinguish the truth and reject the false is very small .... In undertaking to write this history, I have laid down for myself as a guiding principle that whatever I write shall be based either on personal observation or on man reliable informants known to me personally (ya az muqayyana-yi / ya az samāc-i durust az mardi thiqal)" (666-7).

B. was a personal witness of many of the Sultan's campaigns, for the DIwāns were peripatetic and accompanied the court. Where he had no first-hand knowledge, he could often find someone else in the bureaucracy with the requisite information; thus he got an eye-witness account of Prince Mas′ūd's youthful bravery in Ghūr from the dabīr ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, fifty years after the event (109-10). In the course of his duties, B. had frequently to make copies of official documents
and communications to outside powers, and was thus well-placed for giving the exact texts of these in his history. His work is, indeed, most valuable as a source for Ghaznavid external relations, in particular, with the Qarakhanids, Ziyarids and the Baghdad Caliphs. Unfortunately, when B. fell from favour during the reign of ʿAbd ar-Rashīd, he was deprived of his official records, so that in some cases he was unable later to quote texts verbatim. If he had been able to keep his own exact copies of state papers, his history, so he says, would have had a different complexion. He had to spend years searching for the text of ʿMasʿūd's baʿṣat-nama to the new Caliph al-Qā'im (422-67/1031-75) before he came across it in the hands of Abū Nagr-i Mishkān's children (287, 294). When he was dealing with regions of which he had no direct knowledge, he was careful to go to the best sources; the account of Khwārizm in vol. 10 of the Mujalladat is taken from Bīrūnī's history of his native province (667).

The style of the Mujalladat is difficult. Syntax and word-order are rambling and complicated, with frequent ellipses and parentheses. Sometimes the word-order and even the grammar is reminiscent of Arabic. It gives an impression of being the technical and erudite Persian of the diwan-personnel, a language which was becoming affected by the increasing Arabic influences in the Ghaznavid state. B. often adorns his narrative with verses or anecdotes from the pre-Islamic or Muslim Persian past, and these contribute to the prolixity of his style. But the Mujalladat are an interesting example of what Bahār calls the second great period of New Persian prose writing, in which
the works of B. and his master Abū Naqīr-i Mishkān, the Qābūs-nāma
and the Siyāsat-nāma are outstanding, 18

Barthold complained in 1900 that B.'s work had been insufficient-
ly appreciated and used by scholars working on the history of the
powers adjoining the Ghaznavid empire, e.g. the Qarakhanids. 19 His
criticism has still some force. For instance, neither of the two
scholars who have written on the Ziyārids in recent decades, Cl.
Huart ("Les Ziyārides", Mémo. de l'Acad. des Insors, et Belles-
lettres, XLII, 1922, 357-436, and EI 1 Art. s.v.) and E. Denison
Ross ("On three Muhammadan dynasties in northern Persia in the tenth
and eleventh centuries", Asia Major, II, 1925, 205-25) have used B.
at all; nor does H. L. Rabino include him in the bibliography to his
Mazandarān and Astarābād, CMS, London 1928. Yet B. has much valuable
information on the Ghaznavids' relations with their kinsmen the
Ziyārids and on the topography of the regions where Mascūd campaigned
in 1035; moreover, the section of B. relating to this last episode
was printed as far back as 1858 by Born in Vol. IV of his Muhammadan-
ische Quellen zur Geschichte der südlichen Küstenländer des Kas-pischen
Meeres.

Abū Raḥfīn Muḥammad b. Ṭahmāb al-Bīrūnī (362-c.442/973-c.1050)
was the most distinguished scholar of the early Ghaznavid period, in
Barthold's opinion, perhaps the greatest Muslim scholar ever. He
came from Khwārizm and was born in the environs (rābaq, bīrūn) of
its ancient capital Bāš. Despite modern Turkish attempts to claim
him as a Turk, he was almost certainly an Iranian. His early life
was unsettled. He seems to have been first connected with the ancient Afrîghid dynasty of Khwârizmshâhs. When they were overthrown, he moved to Gurgân for a while, and there wrote his al-Āthâr al-bâqîya for Qâbûs b. Washmgîr. Returning to his homeland, he served the Ma’mûnids in several diplomatic missions. After Maḥmûd of Ghazna in 1017 dispossessed this dynasty, Bîrûnî was carried off by the acquisitive Sultan to his capital. According to Yâqût’s biography of him, he was saved from death at Maḥmûd’s hands as a suspected heretic by his great knowledge of astronomy, and it was probably as court astrologer that he spent the remaining thirty odd years of his life at Ghazna.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Bîrûnî was no sycophant. His dedications to Mas’ûd and Maudûd are couched in what for the age are reasonable terms. Maḥmûd’s role as the great Ghâzî does not seem to have impressed him; no doubt he had seen enough of the wastefulness of militarism. Of the Sultan in India, he says, "Maḥmûd utterly ruined the prosperity of the country, and performed there wonderful exploits, by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions and like a tale of old in the mouth of the people."

The Āthâr al-bâqîya Ǧan al-qurûn al-khâliya, "Chronology of ancient nations" as Sachau called it, was written before Bîrûnî came into contact with the Ghaznavids; its information on the eastern Iranian world relates chiefly to his native Khwârizm. The Tabûqî महल मलिया 111 Hind was the outcome of his visits to India in the wake of Maḥmûd’s armies. Its section on the Hindūshâh rulers of Kabul (tr.
II, 10-14) is a precious source on the history of this area before it was annexed by the first Ghaznavids, and has been much used by historians to elucidate the history of this important Indian dynasty. We would very much like to have in our hands today two other works by Biruni listed by Yaqût, Irshâd, VI, 311, the Ta'rikh ayyûm as-Sultân Mâh mùd wa akhâr abîhi, and the Kitâb al-musümara fî akhâr Khwârizm. The latter is the history of Khwârizm which Bâhqî used extensively for his account of Mâh mùd's conquest of Khwârizm (Ta'rikh-i Masûdî, 665-80).

Minhâj ad-Dîn Abu ʿUmar ʿUthmân b. Sirâj Jûzjânî (b. c.589/1185, d. in the second half of the 13th century) came from a family which had been connected by marriage to the Ghaznavid royal house and which had later served the Ghûrids. In 1226 he followed in the path of the Ghûrids and their successors, the Slave kings of Delhi, by transferring to India. He attained high legal office there under the Sultans, and in 1259-60 dedicated his Tabelqût-i Mâshîrî to Sultan Mâshîr ad-Dîn Mâh mùd b. İltutmush. In form this is a general history, dealing with pre-Islamic and Islamic dynasties by "tables", but a disproportionate part of the book is not unnaturally devoted to the Ghûrids and their successors in India. The irruption of the Mongols, which J. witnessed personally, is graphically described. From J.'s close connections with the Shansabânîs, his book may be considered as a special history of that house, all the more precious in that it is the only detailed work devoted to them.

However, the section on the "Yamînî" dynasty is also of value. As an historical narrative, it is here sketchy and unbalanced, even
for the reigns of the key figures Maḥmūd and Masʿūd; the author
seems to have been more interested in the miracles and portents which
accompanied the Sultans' campaigns than in anything else. What is
valuable is the account of the early Turkish ghulām governors of
Ghazna and of Sebūktigin's Turkish origins. J. quotes here from the
part of Baihaqī which dealt with Sebūktigin, the Ta'rīkh-i Nāṣirī, in
which Baihaqī claimed to have been given information by Maḥmūd him-
self on his father's steppe origins, and from the Ta'rīkh-i mūjadwāl
of the Imām Abū'l-Qāsim Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ṭāmād; both these
works are now lost (tr. I, 67-9). When dealing with the succession
to the Sultanate on Maḥmūd's death, J. quotes Abū Naṣr-i Mīshkān,
presumably via his Maqāmāt (tr. I, 92). 23

Muḥammad b. Ṭāmād b. Muḥammad Shabānīrāʾ (d. 759/1358) was a
poet and lītārātūr of Kurdish origin. He wrote under the patronage
of Ghiyāth ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Rashīd ad-Dīn, Vizier to the Īl-Khānid
Sultan Abū Saʿīd, and in 733/1332-3 dedicated to him the first version
of his Majmāʾ al-ansāb fiʾt-tawārīkh. This is a general history in
Persian, beginning with the Creation; the author prefixes to it (ff.
15a-18b of Yeni Cami 909) a "description of the various human races",
including the Chinese, Turks, Indians, Ḫabasha and Zanj. He gives
especial prominence to the history of his native region, southern
Persia, with sections on the rulers of Kirmān, Hormuz and Yezd, the
rulers of the Shabānīrāʾi Kurds and the Atabegs of Fārs (ff. 20a,
212b-239a). It is thus to some extent a special history of this
region. 24

Morley considered the work of little value, except where the
author dealt with events near his own time (Catalogue of the R.A.S. Arabic and Persian Mss., 29), but the section on the Ghaznavids is certainly of importance. ( = ff. 164a-189a). It begins with Alptigin and ends with the deposition of Khusrau-Shah by Al' ad-Dîn Chûrî, after which comes an appendix on the Slave Kings of Delhi. Sh. is especially important for giving the fullest account which we possess of the period between the governorships of Alptigin and Sebûktigin in Ghazna. Jûzjânî has a certain amount on the Turkish governors in Ghazna in this period, but many sources jump directly from Alptigin to Sebûktigin without mentioning the three governors who came in between (see below, Part I, 203 n. 61).

Sh. also gives the only text in extenso which we possess of Sebûktigin's Pand-nâma. (ff. 167a-169a). This is a brief example of the "Mirrors for Princes" genre, in which Sebûktigin tells of his steppe origin and early life and then passes on to giving advice for his son Maḥmûd on the business of kingship. It was allegedly written for Maḥmûd when, at the age of seven, he was appointed governor of Ghazna whilst his father was away attacking Bust. That a Turkish barbarian could have put together this sophisticated little epistle, which contains so many of the aphorisms and counsels of the longer and more elaborate Persian "Mirrors for Princes", is most unlikely. Either the Pand-nâma was composed for Sebûktigin by one of his Persian advisers, or, more probably, it was composed after his death, perhaps during the course of the 11th century, and retrospectively attributed to him. This process has frequently happened where the counsels or opinions of a prominent figure are involved; the
Siyāsat-nāma was, at the very least, "edited" after the great Vizier's death (see below, 44), and the so-called Waqīya or Nasī'īh of Niqūm al-Mulk are clearly not from his own mouth and were only compiled in the 9th/15th century, although the subject-matter seems to come from genuine family tradition and near-contemporary written materials. The elaboration of the Fand-nāma may thus be part of the growth of the legend of Māhmūd as the great Ghūstā and of his father as the Amīr-i ʿAdil, showing that their comportment as rulers accorded with the ideal of Perso-Islamic kingship.

Sh. further describes such interesting episodes as Sebūktigin's regulation and reform of the iqtad-system among the Turks in Zabul-istān (see below, Part I, 98-9). He gives accounts of the campaigns of Sebūktigin and Māhmūd in Khurasan, Transoxania, Sīstān and western Persia, but India is given little attention; the author is not interested in the Ghaznavids as an Indian power. Particularly noteworthy is the long section on Muḥammad's short Sultanate of 1030, the intrigues leading up to it and the vengeance later taken by Masʿūd on those involved in it. The motives of the generals and courtiers who manipulated events at this time are skilfully analysed (ff. 181b-185a). Apart from a brief account of the Seljuq irruption into Khurasan, the reigns of Masʿūd and his successors are only cursorily treated.

Sh. does not in this section name any sources, but the detail on the succession dispute after Māhmūd's death, the analyses of the rival sides' motives and the descriptions of correspondence which passed between them all show that Sh. was using a source well
based on official records and on first-hand knowledge of bureaucratic circles. It could be from the lost part of the *Mujalladat* which dealt with the end of Mâhîmûd’s reign and that of Mâhîmâm. The hostile attitude towards the Masâdiyân, those who gained ascendancy in the state after Masâd’s accession, and the friendly one towards the old, trusted counsellors like the Khwârizmshâh Altuntâsh, reflect very clearly the sympathies of the established bureaucracy as we know them through Baihâqî and his master Abû Naqr-i Mishkân. The account of Sebûktâgin and his predecessors may be from Mâhîmûd Warrâq’s history or from the Ta’rikh-i mujâdwal of ‘Imâdî which Jûzînî used for his much briefer account of Ghaznavid origins. (see above, 19).

As centres for scholarship of all kinds, the Khurasanian cities produced several local histories. These are frequently woven around the lives of the eminent scholars, ascetics or literary men produced by the city in question, and partake of the nature of biographical dictionaries. They aim at preserving the names and memories of these great men, and illustrate the strength of local pride in past achievements and in the lineage of prominent families. Ibn Funduq, himself the eminent author of a local history of Baihâq (see below, 27–9) devotes a section to the local historians of Khurasan and Transoxania (TR, 20–1). For Nishapur he mentions the history of Abû’l-Qâsim al-Kâchî al-Balkhî, the original of which, he says, was destroyed when the Uqail mosque in Nishapur was burnt down; and the famous biographical dictionary of the ulema of Nishapur by al-Ḥâkim al-Bayyî. Since the originals of both of these works have been lost, we cannot but agree with Ritter that we are less
well-provided for in regard to Nishapur than in regard to other Persian cities (Oriens, III, 1950, 71).

Al-Jā'ākim Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamdūya an-Nihāyātī, known as "al-Bayyīq" or "Ibn al-Bayyīq" (thus with "ibn" in Samʿānī and Subkī) lived from 321/933 to 405/1014. He was a famous traditionist who travelled as far as Iraq and the Hijaz in search of knowledge. In 970, under the Vizierate of Abū Jaʿfar ʿUtbi, he was appointed ʿādi of Narāsā and then of Gurgān. Later he returned to Nishapur and administered the Dār as-sunna madrasa of the Imām Abū Bakr Ahmad al-Dabāsī. During his lifetime he was accused of Shiʿī sympathies, but Subkī is at pains to defend him from this charge, pointing out that Shiʿism was rare among the muḥaddithūn and that his biographies of Sunnī divines are invariably sympathetic. Al-Bayyīq's work included a collection of hadīths supplemental to those of Bukhārī and Muslim, the Mustadrak ṣaḥīḥ as-Shāfiʿī, and a book on the merits of ash-Shāfiʿī. But his magnum opus was the Taʿrīkh Nihāyāt, which ran to eight volumes (according to Samʿānī, s.v. "an-Nihāyātī", f. 574a) or twelve (according to Ibn Funduq, TB, 21). It gave the biographies of the local ulema down to 380/990 and ended with a section on the history and topography of the city. Subkī praises it as "the most oft-consulted and profitable work on the fuqahā'" which he had by him. The praises of Ḥajjī Khalifā, who apparently himself possessed a copy of the book, are well-known (given in Barthold, Turkestan, 16). But during the three centuries since his death, the work has alas disappeared.
Fortunately, it has not disappeared without trace. Later authors like Sam'ānī, Ya'qūbī, Ibn al-Jauzī and Subki quote it incessantly when dealing with the scholars of Khurasan. Furthermore, we have extant in mss. three continuations and/or abridgements. Ibn Funduq, loc. cit., mentions two continuations of the Ta'rikh-i Niṣḥūr: one, in Persian and in two volumes, by Aḥmad al-Ghāzī (not otherwise known), and the other, in Arabic, by Abūl-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī. Al-Fārisī (d. 529/1135) continued his Siyāṣa li-ta'rikh Niṣḥūr down to 518/1124. The second volume of this work, covering the names from "al-Ḥasan" onwards, is extant in an Ankara Ms. An epitome of al-Fārisī's work was made in Arabic by Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. al-Azhara as-Sūrīfī (581-641/1185-1243), and this Muntakhab is known in the unique Istanbul Ms., Köprülü 1152, which has been used in this thesis. From al-Bayyān's original, an epitome was also made by one Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn, known as "al-Khalīfat an-Niṣḥūrī", who must have lived in the 7th/13th century or thereafter. He reduced the biographical part to a mere list of names, keeping Arabic for this section, but he translated the topographical section into Persian. The unique Ms. of this is in Bursa, Hüseyin Çelebi, Tarih 18; efforts to procure a microfilm of this for use in this thesis have failed, but it has been cited from Frye's analysis of the topographical section in his article in Köprülü armaganî (see note). 30

An unknown author wrote the Ta'rikh-i Sīstān, apparently in the reign of the Seljuq Tughrī Beg (429-55/1038-63). It is uncertain whether it was first written in Arabic and then translated
into Persian or whether the Persian version which we now possess was what the author originally wrote. The author's own work seems seven to end on p. 382, where a break of 16 years, 448-65/1056-73, occurs. A continuator then takes over who carries events down to the end of the 13th century, but the narrative here is very sketchy and little more than a series of chapter-headings.

The Ta'rikh-i Sistan is a most valuable local history, in which the personal viewpoint of the author, his pride in his homeland and its achievements, comes over plainly. He begins with an account of the merits and blessings of Sistan. Then comes an analysis of its revenues and the items of expenditure therefrom. Since he speaks of the share of the "Sultan", this budget may relate to the author's own day, the Ghaznavid or early Seljuq period. The coming of Islam and the Arabs is described, and we learn that the localarihans and Zoroastrians led resistance to the invaders (93). There is a detailed account of the Safavids' rise to power (192 ff.). As a patriotic Sagasti, the author's attitude to Yaqub and Amr is very favourable, and he praises their rule as just and firm. We discern clearly what the majority of Muslim historians, viewing events through the eyes of the Baghdad Caliphate or from a Sunni or Shi' state point, conceal: that the SafavidS were a popular dynasty in Sistan, and in later times expressed local feeling against attempts at control from outside. The author notes how Yaqub, impatient of poets who eulogised him in Arabic, a language he could not understand, encouraged vernacular Persian poetry, and several examples of these verses in New Persian are given (e.g. 211-12, 253, 260, 286-7).
The author's local patriotism further emerges when he describes the beginnings of Ghaznavid influence in Sīstān and the Sultans' attempts to reduce the local Ṣaffārids to the position of governors for the Ghaznavids. He regards the Turks' coming as the beginning of all the province's misfortunes, whereas it had previously been as prosperous a part of Islam as any:

"The day that they pronounced the khutba from the minbars of Islam in the name of the Turks was the beginning of Sīstān's tribulations. Until then, no calamity had come upon Sīstān. From the time of Yaqūb and Qāmūr, there was no region in the whole world more prosperous than it. They used to consider Nimruz the centre of their rule (dīr ad-daula). [This happy state lasted] till they carried Amīr Khalaf away from Sīstān as a result of the unrest which the people had stirred up against him; and then they experienced what they experienced, and are still experiencing now. God Most High only knows what fortune will eventually bring round" (354).

In the succeeding pages he describes how the activities of the Ṣayyābs in Sīstān formed the spearhead of local resistance first to the Ghaznavids and then to the Seljuqs.

The prose style of the Ta'rikh-i Sīstān has many archaisms in wording and in orthography; these peculiarities are noted by Bahār in his glossary of unusual words and technical terms (يو - ك of the introd., to his edn.). In his Sabk-shināsī, he compares the archaic style to that of the Sāmānid writers Balqamī and Abū'ī-Mu'ayyad Balkhī. The author's use in one place (375) of dating by the Persian numerals and months and the Yezdegirdī era seems to show that he took some of his source-material from dihqān and peasant circles where this system was still in day-to-day use.
Zahîr ad-Dîn Abû'l-Hasan Ğalî b. Zaid al-Baihaqî, called Ibn Funduq, was born at Baihaq in 490/1097 (so according to Gazwînî, introd. to Bahmanyâr's edn. of the Ta'rifkh-i Baihaq, يأ ب - يب, pace Yaqût's date of 499/1106, repeated by Storey, 353) and died in 565/1169-70. He came from prominent local families, the Ǧâkimiyyân or Funduqiyyân on his father's side, and the Baihaqiyyân on his mother's, and traced his descent back to the Companion Khuzaima b. Thâbit Dhû'sh-Shahâdatain. His forebears had been traditionists, scholars and officials in the service of dynasties like the Salmânis and Ghaznâvids. He himself served as a qâlig in Khurasan and then as an official in Ray during Sanjar's captivity by the Ghuzz. In his time, I.F. was famed as a scholar, with interests embracing tradition, history, astronomy, mathematics and philosophy. This wide range is reflected in the long list of his books given by Yaqût; they include works on kitâba, Arabic proverbs, poisons, the special foods given to sick people, etc., and most of them were written in Arabic. Only four or five of his works are, however, now extant. 33

One of I.F.'s historical works was a dhail to the Yâmînî called the Mashârib at-tajârib wa ghawârât al-qarîb, which included histories of the Ghaznâvids, Seljuqs and the early Khwârizmshâhs of AtâTz's line. It is cited by Yaqût, Ibn al-Athîr (s.v. 568 A.H. on the history of the Khwârizmshâhs), Ibn Abî Uqâibîqa, Juwainî and Ǧâmâlîdîn Mustâuffî. The Ta'rifkh-i Baihaq was completed in 1168 under the rule in Khurasan of Sanjar's former ghulam Mu'ayyid ad-Dîn Ğây Ğaba. It has been edited by A. Bahmanyâr, Tehran 1317/1938,
from the three extant MSS. (cf. Storey, 353-4, 1295-6). I.F. uses a simple and straightforward style of Persian, but for clearness' sake, gives dates and genealogies in Arabic.

He proclaims his interest in history at the outset: it is "the treasury of the secrets of events", and is not only a useful science but also brings pleasure to its students (7-8). The book has sections on the towns of Khurasan and Transoxania in general. The topography, climate, demography and faqā'il of the Baihaq oasis are described. Then I.F. deals with its history, from its foundation by the Sassanids through the Arab conquest down to the author's own day. There are several interesting passages on local Khurasanian history during the Islamic period which are not given elsewhere by the general historians. The accounts of attacks on the oasis by sayyārs, ruffians from nearby towns and Ismā'īlīs, help us to realise how disturbed social conditions in the Khurasanian countryside often were. The core of the book, however, is a series of biographical accounts of the prominent families of Baihaq. Noteworthy are those on the family of Niẓām al-Mulk, whose grandfather was a dihqān of the Baihaq district (73-83), and on the sayyids of Baihaq and their Naqībs (54-65, 253-5). The author describes the arrival from Nishapur of the ʿAlids and repeats the genealogies of the Naqībs which he had already given in his genealogical work, the Lubāb al-ṣaḥāb. I.F. himself was a ʿHanafi, although there was in his day a strong Shīʿī element in Baihaq, and in later times it acted as a diffusion-centre for Shīʿism in Khurasan. He was unable to pass over the social power and prestige of the ʿAlid families, with which he probab-
ly himself had marriage connections; and in the space he allots to them we have an illustration of the important rôle they were already playing in Khurasanian society at this time. 34

The historian of Islam is often confronted with a defect of his sources: their impersonalness. In part, determinist theological attitudes were to blame for this comparative lack of interest in human character and its development. Much of Islamic biographical material falls within two divisions. On the one hand we have the biographical dictionary, which often gives a curriculum vitae of the subject, quotes a few anecdotes or verses and then lists his literary or theological output. The technique is descriptive and not analytic. On the other hand we have eulogistic or hagiographical treatment, whether the subject be a religious figure or a warrior who can be depicted as a fighter for the faith. Here, the real man is frequently hidden by extravagant praise or by the incredible feats of valour or charismatic power attributed to him.

QutbI's Yamin springs to mind as an example of the second type of approach, and regarding it as a purely biographical work, we are left with a negative and unsatisfactory picture of Ma'sum. There is a much more satisfying account of an important personage of Ghaznavid Khurasan in the Astār at-tauhid it maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Sa'id. The author of this work in Persian, Muhammad b. al-Munawwar, was a Khurāsānī whose life spanned much of the 6th/12th century. He composed a work on "the mystical states and sayings" of his great-great grandfather, the Šif Shaikh Abū Sa'id b. Abī'1-Khair al-
Maihanî (357-440/967-1049), and then later incorporated most of this into the much longer Asrîr at-tauḥîd. Khurasan early became a flourishing home of Ṣūfism as well as of Sunni orthodoxy (cf. the glowing praises of the shaikhs of Khurasan by al-Ṣujwîrî, below, Part III, 360-1), and in the early Ghaznavid period contained two outstanding Ṣūfî leaders in Shaikh Abû Saʿîd and Shaikh Abû'l-Qâsim al-Qushairî (376-465/986-1073). The Asrîr at-tauḥîd is in effect a contemporary document, for it is based on family traditions and stories handed down by the participants in the events. For a work of family piety, designed to exhibit the Shaikh's saintliness and telepathic power (fîrâsat), the tone is not too extravagant, although naturally, the Shaikh always comes out best in his many clashes with orthodoxy and usually converts his opponents to his own views. The Shaikh lived in Nishapur for a decade, and we derive much information on the social classes there, on the attractions for many of the common people which the Shaikh's teaching and example had and on the opposition to him from the established religious institution, both Sunni and Shi`î. 35

The biographical dictionaries on Muslim scholars and literary men are vast repositories of erudition. The work of systematisation here had a particular appeal to scholars who conceived of their work as the proper arrangement and elucidation of known materials rather than the production of original work. Sometimes the compiler limited himself to a particular geographical region or place, usually his home province or town; al-Ḥekim al-Bayyîc's Taʾrîkh Nishâbûr
are examples of this type. Sometimes the compiler treated of a
particular group of scholars like the Shafi'is or Hanbalis, as did
as-Subki and Ibn al-Jauzi. Only the most outstanding scholars,
such as Yaqut, attempted to deal with scholars in general.

Certain works whose scope is general in conception nevertheless
have a particular interest for the area and age which we are study¬
ing. One of these is the Yatimmat ad-dahr fi ma`asir ahl al-Qaasr of
Abu Manjur Muhammad ath-Thahabib an-Nishapur (350-429/961-1038), a
survey of the poets of his own and the preceding generation arranged
under geographical regions. The fourth section of this anthology is
devoted to the poets of Khurasan and Transoxania. As in earlier
times, poetry under the Samanids and Ghaznavids was a mirror of the
age and poets would express themselves on social and political topics.
Amongst the satires and complaints of the poets with whom ath-Thahabib
deals are references to the iniquities of tax-collectors, the vices
of ministers and the merits and demerits of various cities of the
east. There is also much valuable biographical material. There is
a section on the poet and historian as-Sallami, author of the "Hist¬
ory of the governors of Khurasan" (see above, 8 ), and many
of the notables of Ghaznavid Khurasan and Nishapur, including several
members of the influential Mikali family (see below, Part III,
are mentioned in the Yatima and in the continuation which ath-
-Thahabib wrote of it, the Tatimmat al-yatima. 36

One of the most impressive works of Muslim scholarship, and
one which is especially significant for Khurasanian and Transoxanian
affairs, is the Kitab al-ansab of Tāj ad-Dīn Abū Sa‘d (or Sa`īd) as-Samānī (506-62/1112-66). Samānī was a Shafi'i ‘Alim whose family had long been settled at Merv. The titles of forty-nine of his works are known, including a local history of Merv; the originals of these probably perished with the Samāniyya family library when the Mongols sacked Merv in 1221. His Ansāb is a dictionary in Arabic of nisbas and in each article he carefully establishes the correct vocalisation of the name, explains its origin and mentions the famous ulema who bore it. Since the majority of the nisbas are geographical in origin, the work is of importance for topographical research, and was much used by Yaqūt for his Muṣlam al-buldān. Samānī’s prime interest was in traditionists and theologians, but there are entries for names of political interest, such as that of Simjūrī, and there is much information on leading families of the scyũn of Nishapur, like the Ĺāhidīs (s.v. "al-Ustuwā‘ī"), Šāhūnīs, Ḍikālīs and Karāmīs; the main sources here used by Samānī are al-‘Iṣkīn al-Bayyī and his continuator al-Fārisī. Because of its great bulk, the Ansāb does not seem to have been copied much or to have circulated far beyond Merv; later Muslim scholars made much more use of Ibn al-Aṭhir’s abridgement, the Lubāb al-ansāb, and as-Suyūṭī made an epitome of this last, the Lubb al-lubāb fī tahrīr al-ansāb.

Abū ʿAbdallāh Yaḥyū al-Ḥamawī, called Yaqūt ar-Rūmī (575-626/1179-1229) was, as the latter names suggest, a Greek by birth who had been enslaved. After manumission, he continued his former work as a trader, and then as a scholar, travelling about the Islamic world. He fled from Khurasan and the east as the Mongols advanced,
and died in Aleppo. As a man who spent much of the latter part of his life browsing in libraries and copying manuscripts, he had the mind of a cataloguer and bibliographer, and two encyclopaedic compilations stand to his credit. His **Muqjam al-buldān**, finished in 1228, has been described by Kramers as "the most complete compilation of the descriptive, astronomical, philological and travellers' geographical material collected by the previous generation" ([EI Supplement, Art. "Dżughrāfiyyā"]). It is a dictionary of place-names in the Islamic world, and the author took particular care to set down the correct forms of names, so far as was possible in the Arabic script. The entries on places in *Transoxania*, Khurasan and Khwārizm which Y. had himself visited are of particular value, and he was able to give a personal account of the siege of Nishapur and its capitulation in 1221 to Chinggiz Khan (IV, 858-9). Often he appenda a list of the famous ulema produced by a town; for the Khurasanian ulema he depends frequently on al-Makki al-Bayyici and his continuator. However, where he had no personal experience to draw on, he followed the traditional path of Muslim geographers and used the work of previous authorities without regard to the outdatedness of their information; in his entry on Ṣīstān (III, 42) he describes the Khwārij as still flourishing there.

Y.'s other great work is a biographical dictionary of Muslim scholars, theologians, poets, literary men, etc., the **Irshād al-arīb ilā maqrifat al-adīb**, which we now possess in its entirety. It contains valuable biographies of Khurasanians who were prominent during the Ghaznavid period, such as members of the Mikālī and
§SbQnI families of Nishapur, and a long section on al-BTrûnI, with a list of his compositions.

Abû’l-‘Abbâs Ahmad al-Irbîlî, called Ibn Khallîkân (608-81/1211-82), came from the Jazîra and was, like as-Samînî and Yaqût, a Shâfi‘î in madhhab. He acted as a qâdi in Cairo and Damascus and taught in various Cairo madrasas till his death. He wrote his biographical dictionary, the Wafayât al-aCyan, over a period of twenty years, 1256-74. He cast his net wider than earlier compilers and included rulers, statesmen and soldiers as well as scholars and literary men. The Fâtimids and Seljuq Sultans, the Atabegs and the Ayyûbids, are exhaustively treated. I.Kh. was most interested in events and people of the heartland of the Caliphate, stretching from Egypt through Syria and Iraq to western Persia, although he does not exclude outstanding figures from the extremities of the Islamic world. Of the Ghaznavids, only Maḥmûd is dealt with (tr. de Slane, III, 337-44). In this article, Sebûktîgîn’s origins and the succession struggle on his death are touched on, and the text of Maḥmûd’s fath-nâma to the Caliph after the Somnâth campaign is given; but especial place is given to Maḥmûd’s alleged change from the Ḥanafî to the Shâfi‘î rite (see below, Part III, n. 94). I.Kh. is one of the most satisfying of Muslim biographers to study, for the anecdotes he retails and the information from earlier sources which he brings in often give life to his subjects. He usually names his sources, and some of these are important ones which are now lost; in a long and valuable article on Yaqûb and ḤAmr b. Leith (tr. IV, 303-33) he quotes Abû ʿAbdallâh Muḥammad al-Azhâr, whom de Slane
identified with the Ibn Abi'l-Azhar al-Fushanjî (b. 283/896) of the 
Fihrist, and also as-Sallâmî's Ta'rikh wulêt Khurân. 40

Tâj ad-Dîn Abû Naqr 8Abd al-Wahhâb as-Subki (727-71/1327-70) 
was Cairene by birth, but his father subsequently moved to Damascus, 
and he spent most of his life there teaching in madrasas and acting 
as a khatîb and as a qâdi. Amongst his works is the Tabagât ash-
Shâfi'îyyat al-kubrâ, a biographical dictionary of scholars and 
traditionists of his own madhhab arranged in "classes" according to 
the century of their deaths. The work is extant in three rescessions, 
the fullest of which was the basis for the not very satisfactory 
Cairo edn. of 1323-4/1905-6. The work is valuable for the lives of 
the Khurasanian scholars of the late 10th and early 11th centuries, 
many of whom were Shâfi'îs and who by their intellectual eminence 
helped establish orthodox Sunní learning in the madrasas there.

In the second Tabagât there is an important biography of the founder 
of the Karâmiyya sect, Muḥammad b. Karâm, inserted in the entry 
nominally dealing with Uthmân b. Saqîd ad-Derimî (II, 53-4); and 
there is a long section on Niẓâm al-Mulk, on the ground that "he was 
the most famous of those who built madrasas for them [sc. the ulema]
" (III, 135-45). There is also a section on the "Virtues of Sultan 
Maḥmûd", perhaps because of the Sultan's reputed change to the Shâfi'î 
rite which Ibn Khallikân mentions. It gives prominence to the 
episode of the Fâtimid detî at-THartî, who came to Maḥmûd's domin-
ions in 1013, and the source here is named as the "History of Herat" 
of Qâdi Abû Naqr. 42
It is convenient to consider together two Persian biographical works on the lives of Viziers, the anonymous Ṣnā'īn al-aṣḥāb and the better-known Āthār al-wuzarā' of Saif ad-Dīn Ṣājī b. Mīzān al-Faḍlī. The first of these bears the sub-title Kitāb al-ṣūb al-aṣghar al-wuzarā'. It was written in 725/1325 and is known in the unique Ms. of Istanbul, Aya Sofya 3467, where it is bound together with a Kitāb fī'l-mawāṣṣa and forms ff. 54a-111a of the whole volume (20 x 14.5 cms.; black ink with red headings; spidery naskhī with sparing consonant points; 15 ll. per page). After an introduction of generalities on the Vizierate, the biographies proper begin with those of the Viziers of the Orthodox Caliphs (sic). The Viziers of the Abbasids end on f. 71b (where nearly three blank pages follow) with the Vizier Mu'ayyid ad-Dīn b. al-Qasīb, who held office in the period 590-2/1194-6 under an-Fāṣir. Then come the Viziers of other dynasties, beginning with those of the Sāmānids (f. 73b ff.). The section on the Sāmānīd Viziers deals with the last years of the dynasty, the Qarakhanid invasion and the rise of Sebūkhtīn's power in Khurasan (ff. 73b-75a). That on the Ghaznavid Viziers treats at some length of Iṣfarīnī, Maimandī and Ḥasanak, with shorter notices on the Viziers after Māhmūd's death (ff. 75b-79b). No sources are mentioned in this section, but the account of the arguments set forth when Ḥasanak was chosen to succeed Maimandī is very similar, in parts word-for-word, to that in Baihaqī, 366-7, and must be taken from there or from a common source.

We have more explicit information in the Āthār al-wuzarā' about a connection with first-hand Ghaznavid sources. Saif ad-Dīn al-
Faqīḥī was an official of the Timūrids in Khurasan during the latter half of the 15th century; for one period he acted as Vizier to Sultan Abū'l-Chāzī Ḥusain Bāyar. His work is conceived on a larger scale than that of the Nasā'īm al-ashūr, with a long section on the Ghaznavid Viziers (ff. 87b-115a). He begins with Abū'l-Fatḥ Bustī and ends with the minister of Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd I and his son Masʿūd III, ʿAbd al-Majīd b. ʿAbbād b. ʿAbd al-ʿQāmid. The fullest treatments are those given to the great Maimandi (ff. 89b-111a) and to Ḥasanak (ff. 111a-114a). In the section on Maimandi, the author quotes specifically from the Magāmat-i Abū Naṣr-i Mishkan on the Vizier's disgrace and dismissal, and the language, style and treatment are similar to those of Baihaqī. As in the Nasā'īm, the story of Ḥasanak's rise to office is related at length. Al-Faqīḥī gives it on Abū Naṣr-i Mishkan's authority, but his version is fuller than that of the Nasā'ī or Baihaqī (ff. 112a-113b).

V.A. Hamdani has pointed out the close dependence of the Āthūr as a whole on the Nasā'īm, extending at times to verbatim quotation. This may clearly be seen by comparing the respective sections on the Samnīd Viziers (Āthūr, ff. 85b-87b) where al-Faqīḥī is the briefer of the two; but in his section on the Ghaznavid Viziers he has added much fresh material, apparently from contemporary sources which were still available to him at the time. It may also be noted that Khwāndamīr (d. 1342/1535-6) drew heavily on the Nasā'īm for his own book on the lives of Viziers, the Bustūr al-muzārā'; judging by the extracts on the Ghaznavid Viziers translated in Elliot and Dowson,
History of India, IV, 148-53, the borrowing was verbatim.

The genre of adab-literature has still a didactic value for the modern orientalist, for it indicates to us the ethics and norms of behaviour then prevalent amongst educated Muslims. With the increasing complexity under the Abbasids of social and governmental institutions, an education in adab, which for the educated Muslim completed necessary qīla, became especially for the secretaries in the chancellies of Islamic rulers. From this time dates the quest for kafa'a, omniscience, the sum of qualities which the perfect secretary or minister needed, and in the 10th century appear laudatory designations like "Kaktiv 'l-kufāt" (given to the Šāhib Ismā'īl b. ǦAbbād) and "Shams al-kufāt" (given to Maimandī). The demand for polite education gave rise to numerous manuals. These often contained anecdotes, proverbs, maxims and curiosities of all kinds, and, in those works intended particularly for the kuttāb, accounts of administrative procedures, forms of address, specimens of epistolary style, etc. The "Mirrors for Princes" are a special class of adab-literature, comprising manuals of guidance for rulers in which are set forth the personal and intellectual qualities necessary for wise government. The 5th/11th century sees a flowering of this genre, producing such works as the Qābūs-nāma, the Siyāsāt-nāma and the Qutadghu-bīlig, and it noteworthy that this development was in the eastern regions of Islam, where Iranian influence was strongest. The reproach is often levelled at works of this type that they do not relate to actual conditions and are impossibly idealistic. Yet we must surely concede that they were intelligible to people of that
time and had a practical value. The gap which then existed between theory and practice seems impossibly wide to us, but to many Muslim the approaching reign of justice and equity was always a real hope and one had to strive after it. Moreover, the texts of these "Mirrors for Princes" are often liberally interspersed with anecdotes, many of historical value.

The Mafāṭīḥ al-Ṣūlūm of Abū Ṣabdallāh Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Khwārizmī, who lived in the second half of the 4th/10th century, is justly famed as the first encyclopaedia in Arabic of the Muslim sciences. He was probably born in Balkh and worked as a civil servant for the Sāmānids; his book is dedicated to Abū'1-Ḥasan Ubaid-Allāh b. Ahmad al-ʿUtbi, who became Vizier to Nūḥ b. Mansūr in 977.

It is a survey of the basic principles of the Ṣūlūm and qināyat and of the technical terms used in them. In the section on kitāba (53-79 of van Vloten's edition, Liber Mafāṭīḥ al-Ṣūlūm, Leiden 1895), al-Khwārizmī explains many of the practices of the diwān, including those of finance, the Barīd and the army. His model is the Sāmānīd administration in which he worked, and many of the techniques which he describes were later taken over by the Ghurids.

A work typical of that branch of ṣadāb-literature which aimed at giving the reader a stock of interesting stories and snippets of information, nawādir and sharā'ib, is the Ṣaḥīf al-ṣaḥīf of ath-Thaʾlībī (see above, 31). It was dedicated to the great Buyid Vizier, the Ṣāḥib Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbdād, and has been edited by P. de Jong, Leiden 1867. Its tenth chapter is a survey of the lands of Islam, especially those of the eastern half, and has information on
the towns of Khurasan and the articles of trade and industry handled there.

In 1062 the Ziyārid ruler of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān Kai Kha'ūs wrote the Qābus-nāma for his son Gīlān-Shah. It was written in the author's mature old age, and in R. Levy's words, "combines the functions of popular educator, manual of political conduct and text-book of ethics, with expediency as its motto". The book's name harks back to the author's grandfather Qābus b. Washmgūr, the greatest ruler which the dynasty produced; in Kai Kha'ūs' day the Ziyārids' power had been much restricted by the Seljuqs and they were soon to disappear. They had close contacts with the Ghaznavids; until the Sultans lost Khurasan, their territories were contiguous and the Sultans treated them as dependents and tributaries. Manūchīhr b. Qābus (d. 420/1029) married one of Maḥmūd's daughters, and Mas'ūd took as wife the daughter of a later ruler in Gurgān, Abū Kālijār (his exact relationship to the Ziyārid dynasty is not clear). Kai Kha'ūs frequently mentions the Ghaznavids as his kinsmen and states that he had spent eight years in Ghazna as a boon-companion of Sultan Maudūd.

Consequently, the early Ghaznavids are the subjects of some of the anecdotes in the Qābus-nāma. Like the author of the Siyāsat-nāma, Kai Kha'ūs quotes the Sultans and their policies with approval. The fact that he had kept up close relations with Maudūd at a time when the domains of the two rulers were separated from each other by the territories conquered by the Seljuqs attests to the authority and respect which the Ghaznavids were still able to inspire. It is
also likely that the example of the Ghaznavid state system was exercising a powerful influence on the structures of smaller, neighbouring states, whose rulers welcomed the access of power which the Ghaznavid system gave to the head of state.

The Siyāsat-nāma of Niẓām al-Mulk has been called by Barthold (Turkestan, 25) "incontestably the chief source for the study of the political structure of the Eastern Muslim states". Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Tūsī (408-85/1018-92) was a product of the keen intellectual and orthodox religious atmosphere of Ghaznavid Khurasan. His forebears were dihqāns and typical members of the aṣyān class; his father had been Ḥāmil or tax-collector for Masʿūd of Ghazna's civil governor in Khurasan, Sūfī. The young N. al-M. grew up fully conversant with the traditions and practices of the Ghaznavid governmental system, and this background coloured much of his later behaviour and attitude. After the Seljuq conquest of Khurasan, he accompanied his father to Ghazna and worked for a time in the Diwāne there; but the pull of his Khurasanian homeland drew him back, and he entered the service of the Seljuqs, first at Balkh and then directly under Chaghīf Beg. Thereafter he rose high in the counsels of Alp Arslan and his son Malikshāh, achieving the Vizierate in 1064 in succession to Kundurī. During the remainder of his life, until his assassination in 1092, he worked to bring peace and unity to the vast but disparate empire of the Great Seljuqs; he was a conservator rather than an innovator and aimed at stability through centralising the administration and through reforming the īṭān system, the territorial basis of the standing army.
As its alternative title Siyar al-mulūk indicates, the Siyāsāt-nāma is a treatise on government and kingship. It is concerned with the broad principles of government and royal conduct rather than with the day-to-day conduct of affairs in the Diwāns. N. al-M.'s aim was to impress upon his politically naive and inexperienced Turkish masters how complex royal policy had to be and how the qualities of vigilance, suspicion and ruthlessness ought to be their watchword. The regimes he holds up as models are those of the Būyid ʿAṣṣud ad-Daula and above all, of Maḥmūd of Ghazna. He places himself in the line of succession of Persian Viziers like the Ṣāḥib Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbbād and ʿAbd b. ʿAbd Allāh Maimānī, who sought to turn their Dailami or Turkish masters, previously tribal leaders or military slaves, into the subtler mould of Persian despots. Hence anecdotes of which ʿAṣṣud ad-Daula and Maḥmūd are the heroes abound in the Siyāsāt-nāma; and the author often quotes approvingly the administrative and military practices of "former kings" (sc. dynasties like the Sāmānids, Būyids and Ghaznavids) which the Seljuq Sultans had regrettably allowed to lapse. N. al-M.'s formative years had been spent under Ghaznavid rule, and the type of state he advocates for the Seljuqs is simply the "power-state" of Maḥmūd and his Persian officials: a state where the monarch is absolute, and whilst theoretically responsible to God, in practice restrained only by self-interest; where the division of people into ʿaskarīs and raʾīsīs is upheld and a large, multi-national standing army maintained; where the ruler is kept informed of everything which happens in his realm by means of a network of spies and informers; where religious
orthodoxy is equated with loyalty to the dynasty and the orthodox institution upheld as a conservative force. Harold Bowen has written that the *Siyāsat-nāma* is "in a sense, a survey of what he [sc. N. al-M.] failed to accomplish" (*EI* Art. s.v.), but the Vizier was nevertheless the greatest statesman of his age and he made the empire of Malikshāh one of the most powerful ones in Islam since the Abbasid Caliphate in its heyday. The Great Seljuqs never became sophisticated enough fully to absorb the Persian monarchical tradition, but not all his influence died with him; his descendants continued to act as Viziers and officials for the Seljuqs for several decades, a striking example of administrative continuity upheld by a single family (cf. Zambaur, *Manual de généalogie et de chronologie*, 223; Bowen, *EI*).

The *Siyāsat-nāma* is a valuable document for the student of Ghaznavid history, above all for one interested in administrative and military organisation. We learn, for instance, about the rôle within the Ghaznavid empire of the *ḥib-Barids* and *Mushrifs*, about the army's composition from many different nationalities and about the strict insistence on the auditing of provincial governors' accounts (chs. IX, X, XIII, XXIV, XLIX). It is true that N. al-M.'s text is full of historical errors and anachronisms, and scholars have wondered how so erudite and capable a figure as the Vizier clearly was could have set down such patently inaccurate historical information. Möldeke's sceptical outlook made him doubt the work's value as an historical source (review of Schefer's edition, *ZDMG*, XLVI, 1892, 766-7); but Barthold, whose critical faculties were of
the keenest, accepted as authentic such an episode in it as the account of Naṣr b. ʿAbd al-Mulk's conversion to Islam (Turkestan, 242–5; against accepting this, Qazwīnī, edn. of SN, 220 n. ff.).

Recently, doubts on Niẓām al-Mulk's authorship have been expressed. Spuler writes of it, "angesichts seiner Plattheiten und seiner geringen historischen Zuverlässigkeit doch wohl kaum von Niẓām al-Mulk?"; Qazwīnī, too, was sceptical about the attribution. It is likely that N. al-M.'s ms. was edited after his death, probably in the reigns of Malikshāh II b. Barkiyārūq (1104) and Ghıyāth ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Malikshāh I (1104–17) by Malikshāh's old copyist, Muḥammad Maghrībī, to whom N. al-M. had in any case entrusted the final chapters of the work shortly before his death. Even so, the whole ethos of the book, with its advocacy of the Persian monarchical system and its exaltation of Sunni orthodoxy against the heresies which might rend the fabric of the state, accords well with what we know of the Vizier's beliefs and aims, and may be accepted as substantially his work.

ʿAbd al-M. b. Qūmar b. ʿAlī as-Samargandi, known as Niẓāmī-ʿArūḍī, was born somewhere near the beginning of the 12th century, and spent his early years wandering about Khurasan and Transoxania in search of knowledge. His fortunes rose after his verses had attracted the approbation of Sanjar's court poet Muʿizzī. The rest of his life seems largely to have been spent in the service of the Ghūrides, or "Kings of the mountains", as he calls them; when, during the reign of ʿAlī ad-Dīn Jahān-Sūz, he wrote his Chahār maqāla, probably c. 1156–8, he had been in their service forty-five years. The Four
discourses cover the arts of the secretary, poet, astrologer and physician, and each of them is largely composed of anecdotes. Herein lies the value of the book: the anecdotes treat of most of the important dynasties of eastern Islam, from the Ṣaffārids to the Qarakhanids, and give us historical information not found elsewhere. Sometimes he quotes lost works like that of as-Sallāmī. Much of what we know about the lives of the Ghaznavid poets Fīrūzābādī and Fārūkhlī derives from Nizāmī-Ārūgī, and in the second discourse he gives a list of the poets who extolled the Ghaznavid dynasty.

Little is known about Abū'l-ʿAbbās ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās al-ʿAbbāsī, except that he wrote his book in Arabic, the K̲it̲b̲ r̲a̲ʾs m̲ā̲l̲ an-n̲a̲d̲ī̲m̲, "the boon companion's stock-in-trade", during the reign of the Caliph al-Muqtadir (530-555/1136-60). Yaqūt, Irshād, I, 230-2, has an entry on him, calling him a grammarian (lughawī) and saying that he was known as Lawah or Ibn Lawah (? l.w.h.); but he knows nothing about him except a few of his verses and an anecdote of his quoted at third-hand. Ibn Bāba seems to have been more a nadīm himself than a grammarian pure and simple. V.A. Hamdani says: "It seems that the author belonged to the class of professional entertainers in ʿIrāq, whence he travelled to Khurāsān where he had cause to deplore the prostitution of his profession".

As might be expected from its title, the Raʾs māl an-nadīm is a work containing material for nūdamāʾ and musāmīrūn: the names of famous horses and swords, people who were buried alive but escaped, men who in the Jāhiliyya had the name "Muḥammad", the lives of famous grammarians, etc. The last part of the book, however, is
a history of the Caliphate and the provincial dynasties of Islam down to the 5th/11th century. He closes by saying that he has decided to devote a special work to his contemporaries, the Seljuqs, "which will describe how their power originated, how their followers (suliyā'ī) conquered Khurasan, Iraq, Rûm, Syria, the land of Fārs and the Hijaz, and how their dominions expanded stage by stage and year by year. Because of this intention, we have not mentioned it [sc. the Seljuq dynasty] here" (f. 210a).

The section on the Ghaznavids (ff. 203a-210a) goes up to the reign of Mas'ūd III b. İbrāhīm (492-508/1099-1114). The only authority for the Ghaznavids which he mentions here (specifically, for Maḥmūd's birth-date) is Baihaqī, Šahīb ta'rīkhīhim (f. 204b). He gives a succinct account of Sebūktigin's origin and of the Turkish governors who preceded him in Ghazna, with the dates of their death or deposition. He is the only authority who corroborates the Pand-nāma concerning Sebūktigin's origin from the Barskhān region of the Semirechye. This account of the Turkish governors is the earliest we possess. Ibn Bāba seems to have been especially interested in political and constitutional aspects; he deals especially with the relations of the early Sultans with the Abbasid Caliphs; the succession disputes on the deaths of Sebūktigin and Maḥmūd; and the murder of ʿAbd ar-Rashīd and the usurpation of power by the slave Tughrīl (444/1053). His mention of the legitimist feeling in Ghazna for the Ghaznavid dynasty which this last episode provoked is interesting (f. 209a). It seems unlikely that Ibn Bāba, who
was probably an Iraqi, could have had access to the originals of Baihaqi's *Mujalladat*. It is possible that he took his information from an intermediate work which had utilised Baihaqi and which could also provide some material on the Sultans of the latter half of the 11th century. The *Ta'rikh-i mujadwal* of Imadi must be considered a likely source here, especially as the *Mujmal at-tawarih wa'l-qisaq* quotes as an authority in its section on the Ghaznavids "the Amir Mahmud Imadi b. al-Imam as-Sanjari al-Ghaznavi", and its anonymous author came from Jibal, the part of Persia adjoining Iraq, Ibn Babas's homeland.

Sadid ad-Din Muhammed "Auf lived for some sixty years between approximately 1176 and 1232. He was born in Bukhara and spent his early life there, being also for a while in the service of the Qarakhnaids of Samarqand. He wandered through Khwarizm, Khurasan and Sistan seeking a suitable patron, but the troubled political conditions there, the wars of the Ghurids and Khwarizmshahs and the impending shadow of the Mongol invasions, drove him to seek his fortunes in India, first with the Turkish slave ruler of Sind, Multan and Uchh, Nasir ad-Din Qubacha, and then after the latter's overthrow in 625/1228, with Shams ad-Din Iltutmush of Delhi.

It was in India that he composed what is the first example which we have in Persian of the *Tadhkirat ash-shu'ara* genre, his *Lube al-alam*. When he passed into Iltutmush's service, he dedicated to him the work he had been engaged on for five years, the *Jawami'a l-bikhuyt*, a collection in Persian of over 2000 anecdotes drawn from ninety-three named sources and no doubt many more unnamed ones.
CAufl’s work is a vast repository of extracts from earlier books on a wide range of subjects, including such topics as Ṣūfīsm and tafsīr as well as the expected history and adab. There are eighty-one anecdotes concerning the Ghaznavids. Several of these are from the lost parts of Baihaqī’s Mujalladāt, and there is also a reference to a manual written for Viziers, the Dastūr al-wuzarā’ of Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd; this work is not mentioned in any other contemporary or near-contemporary source, but that ruler’s known interest in administration and just rule make his authorship of it not unlikely. Several of CAufl’s anecdotes are concerned with the establishment of Ghaznavid power in Zābulistān and with Sebuṭtīgīn’s wars in Sīstān and against the Hindūshāhīs of Kabul.

Fakhr ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Qurashi Mubārakshāh, known as Fakhr-i Mudabbir, was the author of a treatise on the art of war and the conduct of kingship in general called the Ādāb al-mulūk wa kifāyat al-mamlūk (also called, in the B.M. and R.A.S. Bengal’s copies, Ādāb al-ḥarb wa’sh-shajēca). Fakhr-i Mudabbir claimed descent on his father’s side from Abū Bakr and on his mother’s, from Amīr Bīlghūṭtīgīn, one of Sebuṭtīgīn’s predecessors in the governorship of Ghazna and father-in-law of Maḥmūd. He could thus claim a personal connection with the Ghaznavid dynasty, and it is probable that his family’s ancestral home was Ghazna, but that the family was driven to Lahore and Multān by the Ghūrid invasions. He nevertheless earned the commendation and patronage of Muḥammad b. Sām and of Quṭb ad-Dīn Aibak for his famous genealogical tables of the prophets and the Muslim dynasties.
The ʿAdab al-muluk was written when the author was already an old man and was dedicated to Sultan Iltutmush of Delhi (607-33/1211-60). The work contains forty chapters (thus in the I.0. Ms.; in the B.M. one, thirty-four) on the duties of kings, the appointment of officials, the organisation of armies, weapons and tactics. It is in part a "Mirror for Princes" with a strongly military emphasis. Illustrative anecdotes are very prominent, and amongst these, there are many relating to the Ghaznavids; there is, on the other hand, little reference to the Samanids or the Seljuqs. Episodes of interest in them include Bilgätigin's siege of Gardīz during his governorship of Ghasna; Maḥmūd's campaigns against the Qarakhanids and against Qanauj; the revolt, which took place shortly after the killing of Masūd and the accession of Maudūd, of the Ismāʿīlīs of Multān (not otherwise known except from this mention); and Ibrāhīm b. Masūd's relations with Malikshāh.

Besides historical information, the work gives detailed descriptions of the weapons and tactics used by the Ghaznavid Sultans. Bearing in mind the author's family background and the fact that he wrote only two generations after the end of the Ghaznavid dynasty, it seems reasonable to regard him as giving the common Islamic stock of precepts for the ideal military commander against a specifically Ghaznavid and Ghūrid background, and to use his information where it accords with the specifically historical sources. According to Nazim, Sultan Maḥmūd, 9, the anecdotes relating to Maḥmūd seem to have been taken from Baihaqī or a similar contemporary source; but the military nature of these seems to point to an origin
outside the civilian Baihaqi's work.

In the *History of India* as told by its own historians, eight vols., London 1867-77, by Sir H.M. Elliot, edited from his posthumous papers by J. Dowson, the author gathered together Arabic and Persian material on the history of Muslim power in India. Vol. II, "The Muhammadan period" covers the Ghaznavids, the Ghurids and the Slave Kings of Delhi. Roughly half of this volume is devoted to the first of these dynasties; it deals essentially with the Ghaznavids' relationship to India, but also touches upon the dynasty in general terms.

E. gives translations from the sources which deal originally or significantly with the period and which were known in his day:

- *Biruni's India*, *Utbi* (from the Arabic original), Baihaqi, *A'Ufi's Jawami al-hikayat*, Ibn al-Athir and the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*. In appendices he gives extracts from *adab*-works and collection of anecdotes relating to the Ghaznavid Sultans, from the *Wagaya-yi Nigar* of al-Mulk, the *Nigaristan* of Ahmad al-Ghaffari and the *Zinat al-majalis* of Majdi. He also quotes from the *Mir'at-i Mas'udi*, a 16th century historical romance built around the Indian campaigns of the hero and martyr Salar Mas'udi Ghazi, allegedly a nephew of Sultan Mahmud.

The author, *Abd ar-Rahman Chishti*, professes to base the work on the *Tawarikh-i Mahmudi* of one Mulla Muhammad Ghaznavi, a contemporary of Sultans Mahmud and Mas'udi, but it is in fact largely based on later compilations (see Storey, 1006-7).

All Elliot's translations were made from *Mas*., he had collected, and for some of the work he employed *munshis*. The translations vary in accuracy from the indifferent to the downright wretched. Those
from Utbi have been shorn in part of their rich verbal ornamentation. It is true that E.'s death supervened before he could check all the munshi's translations. The work of translation in general and, in particular, the inability to make sense of many of the personal and place names, demonstrates the handicap under which British orientalism in India at that time laboured: its isolation from and, frequently, lack of awareness of the results of continental scholarship. Turkish names suffer especially badly. Nevertheless, the undertaking was an ambitious one for the time. E. spent forty years on it and Dowson another twenty editing his papers. It has been an almost inexhaustible quarry in which later writers on Indian history have dug, either from inability to read the original texts or else from sheer laziness. For the serious scholar today, the work's value is limited. For all the texts which E. used, we now know of an increased number of Mss. (for geographical reasons E. was cut off from the continental collections), and for such sources as the Arabic geographers, Btrūnī's India, Bhaiqī and Ibn al-Athīr, we now possess critical editions. S.H. Hodivala has endeavoured in his Studies in Indo-Muslim history: a critical commentary on Elliot and Dowson's 'History of India', I, Bombay 1939, II, 1957, to correct and annotate it, "to undertake a systematic and exhaustive review of its contents and rectify its errors of interpretation, as well as transliteration." (I, v). He has brought to this task a vast store of information on Indian history and topography, and his work is most valuable; but as with many Indian scholars, his weak point is his comparative unawareness of the results of contin-
ental scholarship in his field.

E. introduces each of his sources with some comments on the author and his work, but his judgements are sometimes aberrant. He states that a knowledge of the Yamini was at one time considered a great desideratum in Europe, "but it is now found to contain but little which is not accessible through other channels". Later Muslim historians have extracted all the meat from it, although he concedes that "it must continue a work of authority and an object of curiosity, as the original source from which later writers have drawn much of their information respecting Mahmud's campaigns" (15). His judgement of Baihaqi is rather patronising: "although tedious, the work is eminently original, and it presents such a reflex of the doings and manners of the time that its minutiae and trifles frequently constitute its chief merit. The writer may not inaptly be described as an oriental Mr. Pepys" (57). But E. did realise the great value of the Mujalladat and the judiciousness of Baihaqi as a historian.

In addition to these comments, E. devotes a special appendix to the historians of the Ghaznavids, concentrating on the later, derivatory writers like Rashid ad-Din, Mirkhwand, Khwandamir, the author of the Ta'rikh-i Alf, Firishta, etc. (429-33). Then in a further appendix he lists the Indian campaigns of Mahmud, numbering seventeen, and cites earlier European writers on the Sultan from d'Herbelot to Reinaud (434-78). This appendix has been used as a basis by many later writers on Mahmud, and E.'s list is a useful piece of classification. Nowhere in his book does he try to describe
the internal working of the Ghaznavid empire, but this does not come within the scope of the book. Nor does he venture any judgement on the doings of the Sultans in India, beyond such occasional references to Mahmūd as "that ferocious and insatiable conqueror" (434), and his attitude is on the whole a dispassionate one.

Secondary sources

Every student of Central Asian history must acknowledge a debt to W. Barthold and his works, above all, to his Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion (original Russian edn., 1900, accompanied by a volume of texts, revised English edn., GMS, London, 1928; the reprint of 1958 has a very few additions and corrections). The book's value is increased by the fact that Barthold knew at first hand much of the terrain he was dealing with, its topography, vegetation and climate. From the end of the 19th century onwards he made regular journeys into what were then the Khanates of Bukhārā and Khokand and are now the Uzbek, Tajik and Kazakh S.S.R.s, and the information which he gained was used in a masterly fashion to elucidate the ancient texts in his geographical survey of Transoxania in Turkestan, 64-179.

B. does not in his book deal with the Ghaznavid empire as a
whole, nor, in any detail, with the origins of the Seljuqs and their conquest of Khurasan, but he does deal extensively with the relations between the early Sultans and the rulers of Transoxania and Khwārizm, the Šāmīnīds, Qarakhanīds and Ma'mūnid Khwārizmshāhs. He stresses the importance of Maḥmūd's reign in the development of the governmental tradition in the eastern Islamic world, and how the centralised Ghaznavid administration became a model for many subsequent rulers and statesmen. He further notes the division in the empire of the ruling institution, Sultan, army and bureaucracy on one side, and the masses of subjects on the other. B. was the first person to evaluate the achievements of Maḥmūd in terms beyond those of pure military conquest, and his verdict was a severe one, that the Ghaznavid régime weighed on the subjects very severely (cf. 286-93). His lack of sympathy with its authoritarianism led him to regard its supplanters in Khurasan, the early Seljuq Sultans, much more favourably (305 ff.). In estimating the social and human aspects of Ghaznavid power, the sources are rarely explicit for us; yet the general conclusion set forth below in Part I of this thesis accords substantially with Barthold's view.

As a vehicle for conveying historical information, Mohammad Habib's Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin, Aligarh 1927 (2nd edn., Delhi 1952) has little to recommend it, for he brings few new facts to light and relies heavily on Elliot and Dowson. Yet the book has some interest because the author reveals himself as a Muslim anti-clerical and rationalist.
His interpretation of the age of Mahmūd is that it was a time when Islamic religion preserved its outward forms apparently intact, but when the earlier, inner fire of the Arab conquests had burnt out (2-3, cf. 62-5). Hence H. combats the view, which must have been almost sacrosanct in Muslim India when he wrote, that Mahmūd was the model warrior for the faith: "Far from being a missionary, he was not even a fanatic .... [and] fought with Hindus and Mussalmans alike", and "His outlook on life was essentially secular" (18-21). It follows that his Indian campaigns "were not crusades but secular exploits waged for the greed of glory and gold" (81), and the progress of Islam in India was retarded, not forwarded by his campaigns there: "The plundered people were not likely to think well of Islam when it came to them in the shape of the Ghaznavide conqueror. .... As a faith, Islam had been morally disgraced, not elevated, by the Ghaznavide's achievement" (44, cf. 85-6). H.'s attitude is thus in sharp contrast to that of Nazim (see below), and unlike Nazim, he indulges in reflections on the spirit of the age and the rôle of the Ghaznavid empire within it.

In considering the Ghaznavid administrative system, H. attributes to Mahmūd a lack of interest in these affairs which led him to leave them to his officials, a competent body of men, but one devoid of idealism. H. is conscious of the debit side here of the Sultan's achievements: "An extensive empire had been established over the ruins of many governments. What for? We are not told that Mahmūd's administration was better than what had existed before, while the collection of revenue was certainly more strict.... No laws, good
or bad, stand to his name” (73-4). With his critical spirit, H.'s approach is in one way superior to that of Nazim, although he shows nothing like the latter's industry and grasp of the sources. His secularist attitude did not apparently commend itself to Nazim, who quotes his book in his bibliography, but only mentions it in his text to correct its errors.

N. Nazim's book, *The life and times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, Cambridge 1931, deals with the Sultan against the background of military conquest in which he spent his life. This is the author's main concern, but he has also endeavoured to do justice to Mahmud as an administrator, as a pious Muslim, as a patron of the arts and as the head of a family.

N. has used a wide range of Arabic and Persian literary sources, and he surveys these in a bibliographical introduction (1-17). As well as contemporary and near-contemporary sources, he has used extensively the products of later Indian historiography. Much of this is derivative and repetitive, but a careful gleaning occasionally yields new facts. N.'s use of the *diwans* of *Ungurī* and *Farrukhī*, with their tedious floridities, is enterprising and to some extent rewarding, although the value of these *diwans* to the historian lies less in the facts which they reveal than in the picture of the court and cultured life and the insight into contemporary tastes and ways of thought which they open out for us. N. might, however, have used *Manuchihri* who first came to the Ghaznavid court during Mahmud's reign (see R. Levy, *EI* Art. "*Minūchihri*"), and whose *diwan* is available in both a Tehran lithograph and in the European edition
of A. de Biberstein-Kazimirsky. But N. takes little cognisance of work by earlier European orientalists, except that he uses Barthold's Turkestan for Central Asian events. He could have profited from the works of scholars who have worked on the periphery of his field: thus the works of Tomaszek and Marquart would have amplified his knowledge of the historical geography of Afghanistan and neighbouring lands (Barthold's text of the Ḫudūd al-Ḡalam was not published in time for him to have used it).

In common with other writers on the Ghaznavids like Elliot and Dowson, M. Longworth Dames and Sir Wolseley Haig, N. appears to have no knowledge of Turkish. As a result, N. repeats the familiar perversions of transliteration practised by Arabic and Persian authors when faced with Turkish names and terms (e.g. "Bilkātītīn", rectius Bilgātīgin; "Chaghartītīn", rectius Chaghfrtīgin). His use of the terms "Turkistān" and "Türkoman" (127, 131 n.3) is vague and imprecise; contemporary sources use the second term at least with a specific meaning. This criticism is not captious, for O. Pritsak's researches on the Qarakhanids have shown the importance of a good acquaintanceship with Turkish onomastic in throwing light on the ramifications within Turkish dynasties and families. Moreover, anyone who deals with a Turkish dynasty and has no background knowledge of Turkish steppe life, culture and customs, is handicapped.

Certainly, the Ghaznavid Sultans themselves were quickly Persianised, and the sources — all non-Turkish — do not allow us to see clearly how much the Turkish ethnic origins of Maḥmūd and Masʿūd counted for. But these cannot have been altogether negligible; only one
generation separated .Maḥmūd from the Central Asian steppes; the Sultans remained Turkish speaking; and a considerable part of the army and most of the top commanders, who were always close to the Sultan, were Turks (see below, Part I, 109-10, Part II, 239 ff.).

When we come to non-literary sources, N. is much weaker. As Minorsky has pointed out in his review (BSOS, VI, 1930-2, 1025), N. has given little attention to .Maḥmūd's monuments and inscriptions, even though S. Flury did much careful work on these (see his articles in Der Islam, VIII, 1918, and Syria, VI, 1925). Equally lacking is the use by N. of numismatic evidence, although he gives it a cursory mention (16). In coins we have a physical link with the Sultans' power in the period under study. Not only were they in part propagandist documents, proclaiming the extent of the Sultans' claims to obedience, but they still indicate to us today the Sultans' financial standing. The issue of a good-quality coinage was especially important within the Ghaznavid empire, spanning as it did the Muslim, Central Asian and Indian worlds. The Indian plunder enabled trustworthy coinage to be minted, and the movements of treasure and slaves across the empire must have stimulated the circulation of money within it.

Nearly half of Sultān  Maḥmūd is devoted to the Sultan's wars, and here N. has combed the sources and thrown much new light on the campaigns (42-122). The military nature of the dynasty is thus rightly stressed. N.'s work on plotting routes and battle-campaigns is most useful, for the Muslim geographers fail us in dealing with northern India, and personal knowledge of its topography is a
desideratum. A guiding principle of N. in this section is "to exonerate him [sc. Maḥmūd] from the charge of fanaticism so often levelled against him, and to show that his wars in India were not the haphazard movements of a predatory warrior but were the results of a well-considered programme of conquest and annexation" (xiii-xiv). He is however, torn between the two views, firstly of buttressing the orthodox Muslim view of Maḥmūd as the propagator of the faith, and secondly, of showing that his hero was not, pace Barthold, a bigot in religion (161 ff.). But it is irrefutable that the Ghaznavid armies in India left behind trails of destruction, and there is little trace here of a "well-considered programme". The Hindus inevitably recoiled from the Islamic faith, and the real spread of Islam came later and was effected by more peaceful means combined with the Indians' own desires to escape from the rigidities of the caste system (cf. Arnold's classic study, The preaching of Islam).

N. then surveys the administrative system of Maḥmūd, stressing the personal nature of his rule and the empire's dependence on his own energies (126-50). N.'s picture of the administration has been painstakingly built up from the fragmentary information of sources like Baihaqī, the Siyāsat-nāma, the Āthār al-wuzūrā' and the Majmā al-ansāb, but it could have been longer. Five pages on the Ghaznavid army are quite inadequate in view of the military nature of the empire, the rôle of the Sultan as war-leader and the importance of the slave institution within the state (137-42). An attempt has
been made in Part II of this thesis to fill the gap.

A deeper criticism of this section is that it is superficial, in that the information cited has not been properly evaluated. It could have been related to the administrative systems of other dynasties, whose practices might be expected to have been copied at Ghazna (e.g. those of Bukhārā). Further, the system's points of contact with the subjects have not been brought out; to quote Minorsky, "we learn nothing on such important questions as revenues, assessment, situation of the civil population, especially the peasants, to say nothing of the conquered races" (op. cit., 1024). Apart from the military one, we do not know what the dynamics of the empire were. The military one was certainly very important, but there were also those of the administrative tradition, inherited from the Sūmānids and ultimately from Baghdad, and kept alive by the Persian secretary class, and of the Turkish strand coming from the Sultans' personal entourages. Difficult to evaluate, but undoubtedly of importance, was the dynamic of local life inside the empire, whose resilience in the face of repeated acts of oppression and natural disasters was indeed remarkable. Here, in particular, the sources have little direct information, but some picture can be built up by inference.

The book's text ends with an assessment of Mahmūd's work and personal character (151-70). He ascribes to him a rôle as a Maecenas and encourager of learning (156-9), with a genuine interest in this. He absolves him from direct responsibility for Firdausī's
shabby treatment. But Maḥmūd's patronage was not disinterested, for if it had been, scholars of all shades of belief would have been welcomed at Ghazna. As it was, Avicenna, with his family's Ismā'īlī antecedents and personal reputation as a faīlasūf, fled from Khwār-izm to avoid capture by Maḥmūd and preferred to end his days at the court of a kindred spirit (stigmatised by Ibn al-Athīr, IX, 310, as fāsid al-īctiqād), the Kākūyid 'Alā' ad-Daula. It is not difficult to make out a case that the local Dailamī dynasties of central Persia and the Caspian coastlands, many of which exhibited heterodox and Shiʿī tendencies, were more genuinely interested in encouraging the revival of Iranian culture than were the rigidly Sunnī Sultans (see further on this topic, below, Part I, Chapter 5).

B. Spuler's Iran in frühr-islamischer Zeit, Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung und öffentliches Leben zwischen der arabischen und der Seldschukischen Eroberung 633 bis 1055, Wiesbaden 1952, represents the only large-scale conspectus of the history of Persia in this period which we possess. Three-quarters of the book are devoted to a kulturgeschichtlich survey (133-518), to which is prefixed a survey of the sources (XV-XXXII) and a concise historical survey of the period (3-129). The concentration on social, economic and cultural history is thus most welcome.

In the historical section, S.'s central thesis is Iran's "immer gleichbleibende Bedürfnissen zu konzentrieren" (VIII), and this historical process is seen in the gradual assimilation in this period of Islam in its orthodox, Sunnī form, and in the attempts of Iranian dynasties like the Taḥirids and Sāmānids or "kulturell
iranisiert" dynasties like the Ghaznavids and Seljuqs to unite the Iranian world and impose uniformity over it. S.'s attitude is essentially that of the Sunnite historians who extol these dynasties for their aristocratic nature and their orthodox piety. The limitations of this view for the modern scholar have been pointed out by Minorsky in his review of S.'s book (JRAS, 1953, 161-3; cf. also, Hrbek and Rypka, OLZ, LI, 1956, 249): in particular, that it fails to appreciate the parts of the Buyids and lesser Dailamite dynasties, many of which played significant parts in the encouragement of Iranian culture. In this period, Shi'ism began to take firm root, but S. has little sympathy for the non-Sunni sects and describes the Dailamites as "a series of Iranian tribes who had remained backwards till that time" (88).

Thirteen pages (111-24) are devoted to Mahmud and Mas'ud of Ghazna, and these deal exclusively with warfare in Transoxania and Khurasan, latterly, that with the Seljuqs. Mahmud, hero of the Sunni historians, is also S.'s hero: "he must undoubtedly be considered as the most outstanding champion of the faith of his age". His supreme achievement lay in his Indian policy: "the permanent establishment of Islam in India, and with it the creation of a point d'appui for a further expansion of the numbers of the Muslims there, is the historical achievement of Mahmud" (112). But the truth, as we have seen, is nearer to Habib's view, that Mahmud was rather the calculating, unfanatical exploiter of the riches of India, with no burning desire to win souls for Islam; and the legacy his armies left behind was one of hatred.
The kulturgeschichtlich part of the book has been stigmatised by Minorsky, loc. cit., as little more than a vast, undigested card-index of information, but this is too sweeping a condemnation; it is very useful to have information on these topics conveniently gathered together, and with so many valuable references. The bibliography, listing over 600 works, is of outstanding value (532-94). S. has perhaps attempted too much, but his book makes a useful starting point for more specific researches.
Notes to Bibliographical Introduction

1. the editions used in this thesis are: for the Arabic original, the edition with the commentary of Shaikh Mani, al-Fath al-wahbi Qal`a ta'rikh Abi Nasr al-Cutbi, Cairo 1286/1869; and for Jurbadhjan's Persian version, that of Ali Qawim, Tehran 1334/1955.

2. thus in Storey, 250; according to as-Safadi, in GAL, Suppl. I, 547, Ou. died in 413/1022.

3. we depend for knowledge of Ou.'s life largely on his autobiography at the end of the Yami (II, 356 ff.); see also the section on him in ath-Tha`ilibi, Yatimat ad-dahr, IV, 397-406, and Nazim, El Art. "al-Cutbi".

4. the scholarly interests and attainments of Muhammad are emphasized by Ou., II, 233-7.

5. cf. GAL, I, 382-3, Suppl. I, 547.

6. see the introd. by Ahmad Ateq to his edn. of the section on the Ghaznavids of the Jami at-tawarikh, Ankara 1957; the borrowing ends on 211 of this edn.

7. on the popularity of the name "Agha" ( < Azhi-Dahak) in Zabulistan, see Minorsky, "Garida on India", 625.

8. the partial edition of M. Nazim, Berlin 1928, has been used, although it is in many ways unsatisfactory. See Storey, 65-7.

9. Yatimat ad-dahr, IV, 95, tr. Barbier de Meynard, JA, 1853, 212 (cf. also, ath-Tha`ilibi, Tatimmat al-yatima, II, 108-9); Ibn Funduq, Ta'rikh-i Baihaq, 154. Fragments of Sallam's work have been found in Mani's commentary on the Yami; cf. O.B.


11. 20, 175-8.

12. on the evidence of the Tatimmat al-yatima, II, 62-5, "Mishkān" or "Mushkān" was the name of Abu Naqr's father.


14. on the exact extent of this lacuna, see two differing views in S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim history (see above, 51), 161-2, and Sā'id Naifīsī's edn. of Baihaqī, I, 512.

15. the surviving Mss. of the Ta'rīkh-i Mas'ūdī are almost all of Indian provenance, and many of them seem to come from a common original. Cf. Sā'id Naifīsī in EI²; Storey, 252-4; and the introds. of Fayyāq and Naifīsī to their edns. of the text.

16. introd., j.

17. 154. On the fragments of Baihaqī extant in later works, see EI².


20. on Bīrūnī's life, see Yāqūt, Irshād, VI, 308-14; S.P. Tolstov, Auf den Spuren der altchinesischen Kultur, 253, 287-91; D.J. Beaujot, EI² Art. s.v.

21. Alberuni's India, tr. Sachau, I, 22; see also his introd., viii-xvi.

22. on Ḥimādī, see Barthold, Turkestan, 24.

23. see on Jūzjānī, Storey, 68-70; Turkestan, 31, 39, 60-1; Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 259-66. The partial edition of the text by W. Nassau Lees, Calcutta 1863, and the partial
translation by Major H.G. Raverty, London 1881-99, have been used here.

24. there is an analysis of the subject-matter in Rieu's Catalogue of the B.M. Persian Ms., I, 83-4, but the Ms. he is describing is a very confused and chaotic one.


26. the Ms. used here is that of Istanbul, Yeni Cami 909 (analysis in F. Tauer, "Les manuscrits persans historiques des bibliothèques de Stamboul", Archiv Orientální, III, 1931, 95-5). Several of the extant Ms., which are not very numerous, are defective, and in particular, lack the section on the Ghaznavids (see Storey, 64-5; Nazim, Sultan Mahmud, 11). For his book, Nazim consulted the Paris Ms., but complained that its defectiveness and confusedness made it impossible to use extensively; the Istanbul Ms., which dates from the 15th century, is however, an excellent one and probably the best of those in existence.

27. cf. Cahen, Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen Âge, Leiden 1959, 76-7, who sees in the flourishing genre of local histories in the Islamic world a sign of the towns' vitality and independent life.


29. this is bound together with an epitome of a Kitâb as-sab'âiyât (on both of them, see W. Weisweiler, Istanbuler Handschriften-Studien zur arabischen Traditionsliteratur, Bibl. Islamica 10, Istanbul 1937, nos. 79, 81, 113-16).

30. this Bursa Ms. was first analysed by K. Süssheim, "Aus Anatolischen Bibliotheken", Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients, VII, Halle, 1909, and "re-discovered" by V.A. Hamdani, "Some rare manuscripts in Istanbul", JRAS, 1938, 561-2. The editions of
the Köprüllü and Bursa Ms. promised here by Hamdani do not seem to have appeared. For general surveys of the local histories of Nishapur, see R. Ritter, "Philologika XIII, Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul - Fortsetzung", Oriens, III, 1950, 71-6; R.N. Frye, "City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The Ta'rikh-i Nişāpur", 50 doğum yılını münasebetiyle Zeki Validi Togan'a armağan, Istanbul 1955, 405-20, giving excerpts from the Bursa Ms.

31. the work was edited by Malik ash-Shu'arā' Bahār, Tehran 1314/1935; see Storey, 364.


34. another of Ibn Fundūq's works mentioned in Irshād, V, 213, is a book in praise of the Zabbāra family, descendants of the Ḥasanid Muḥammad az-Zabbāra b. Ṭubbāt al-Mafqūd, who had settled in Nishapur during the 10th century; a Tuhfat as-sūde of his (Irshād, V, 211) may also have dealt with the Sayyids.

35. the text was published by V.A. Zhukovsky, St. Petersburg 1899. See further, R.A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic mysticism, Cambridge 1921, 1-76; Browne, Literary history of Persia, II, 261-9; Storey, 928-30.

36. see GAL, I, 337-8, Suppl. I, 499-500; Brockelmann, EI1, s.v.; Barthold, Turkestan, 9-10; Browne, Literary history, I, 445-7. The edition used here of the Yatima is that of Cairo, 1375-7/1956-8, and of the Tatimma, that of ʿAbbās Iqṭūl, Tehran 1353/1934. Extracts from the fourth section of the former were

37. see Margoliouth's introd. to the GMS facs, edn., London 1912; Barthold, Turkestan, 34-5; GAL, I, 401-2, Suppl. I, 565.

38. edited by F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig 1866-73, as Jacuta geographisches Wörterbuch.

39. on Yeqūt, see GAL, I, 630-2, Suppl. I, 880, and F. Blachère in EI. The Irshād has been edited by Margoliouth, GMS, London 1907-31.

40. see GAL, I, 398-400, Suppl. I, 561; Brockelmann, EI s.v. As-Safadi (d. 764/1363) wrote a very full supplement to Ibn Khallikān in about thirty volumes, the Merī bil-nafayīt.

41. see GAL, II, 106-10, Suppl. II, 105-7.

42. this author must be either Abū Naṣīr ʿAbd ar-Rahmān al-Fihlī (472-546/1079-1151) or else Abū Naṣīr ʿAbd ar-Rahmān al-Qaisī, both of whom wrote a Taʾrīkh Herāt, according to Hejji Khalifa, ed. Flügel, II, 157-9; both these works are lost (cf. M.Z. Siddiqi, introd. to his edn. of Saif al-Narawī's Taʾrīkh-nāma-yi Herāt, Calcutta 1944).

43. the Ms. was briefly noted by P. Horn, "Persische Handschriften in Constantinopel", ZDMG, LIV, 1900, 505, No. 991, but without analysis.

44. "Some rare manuscripts in Istanbul", 563.

45. for the Nasāʾīm and Āṭārī, see Storey, 1090, and on the latter of the two, Nazim, Sultān Mūhammad, II-12. The Ms. of the Āṭārī used in this thesis is India Office Persian Ms. 1569 (= Ethē 621, cols. 252-3).

46. see GAL, I, 283, Suppl. I, 434-5, and E. Wiedemann, EI Art. s.v. for al-Khwārizmī's life.

47. see for descriptions of the Gōbi-nūma, Browne, op. cit., II,
276-87; Bahār, Sabk-shināsī, II, 113-22; Rypka, op. cit.,
been used in this thesis.

48. for his career and family background, see the biographies in
TB, 73-83; I Khall., tr. I, 413-15; Subkī, Tabaqāt, III, 135-45;
also, H. Bowen, EI1 Art. s.v.

49. cf. Lambton, Landlord and peasant in Persia, 59 ff.; and Cahen,
"L'évolution de l'Iqtad du IXe au XIIIe siècle", Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, VIII, 1953, 38ff., showing the
essential conservatism of his changes in the iqtad system.

50. chs. X, XVI, XXVII, XXXIX.

51. for this aspect, see Browne, Literary history, II, 214-17.

52. Spuler, Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit, XXVII; Qazwīnī and Chahārdīhī's edn. of the SN, 159 n. 1. On the other hand, Kafesoglu,
TM, XII, 1955, 234 (see below, n. 54) has no doubts that it was
N. al-M. himself who wrote it.


54. the edition used here is that of Qazwīnī and Chahārdīhī, Tehran
who give Schefere's text (Paris 1891) with notes and corrections
of their own. It is regrettable that we still lack a good
critical edn. of this important text, although several translations
have been made (into French, Russian, Turkish, and now (1960)
English and German). See on the printed edns., I. Kafesoglu, in
TM, XII, 1955, 231-56, also commenting on the Turkish tr. of
M. Ş. Candaroğlu. On the style of the SN, see Bahār, Sabk-shināsī,
II, 96-106.

55. see Browne, op. cit., II, 336-40. The text used has been that
of Qazwīnī and Muṭīn, Tehran 1333/1954.

56. see GAL, I, 420, Suppl. I, 586; Brockelmann calls him "Ibn Bābū"
in the first entry and "Ibn Banī" in the second.

58. Mujmal at-tawāriḥ, 405; see the editor Bahār's introd., and Barthold, Turkestan, 24. The Ms. of the Rā's māl an-nadīm used here is the autograph one of Istanbul, Turhan Valide 234 (a brief analysis in Hamdani, op. cit., 562); two other Ms. are known.

59. see M. Nizamu'd-Din's very exhaustive Introduction to the Jawāmi' al-jīhāyāt, GMS, London 1929.

60. see Storey, 1164-5, and Shafi (see n. 61 below), 190-6, for the life of Fakhr-i Mudabbir.

61. the Ms. used here is India Office Persian Ms. 647 (Ethē 2767, cols. 1493-6). Miss I. M. Shafi has translated the anecdotes relating to the Ghaznavids in "Fresh light on the Ghaznavids", IC, XII, 1938, 189-234, using the B.M. Ms. (Rieu, Pers. Cat., II, 487-8). There appear to be some differences between the two Mss. The I.O. one lacks Shafi's anecdote No. 17 (231 = B.M. Ms. f. 184b), but elsewhere has additional sections, and on ff. 30a-31a an anecdote absent from the B.M. text on the Sharīf Abū'l-Faraj Siddīqī, minister to Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Masūd and the author's great-grandfather on his father's side.

62. N. is misreading Barthold when he says that B. called Maḥmūd a fanatic; on the page in question (Turkestan, 287), B. is quoting August Müller. His own views are given on 291: "There are no grounds for regarding them [sc. Maḥmūd's religious wars] as due to religious fanaticism".

63. A. Dietrich in his review in Oriens, VI, 1953, 378-86, has set forth several corrections to Spuler's book.
Part I

The administrative system of the Ghaznavids
Chapter One

Introductory

It must be said at the outset that the term "state" is used here for convenience rather than as an exact description of the Ghaznavid dynasty and the territories and peoples over which it ruled, for the "state" of European political theory has little meaning in 11th century Islam. Most Islamic dynasties have in the last resort been founded on military force, whether exercised by a ruling dynasty with a centralised administration and a professional army (e.g. Abbasid Caliphate, the Fatimids, the Samanids, the Ghaznavids and the Ottomans) or by a chieftain controlling tribal or nomadic bands (e.g. the DailamI dynasties and the many Central Asian Turkish and Mongol peoples who irrupted into the Near East and eastern Europe). In both cases, the directing genius of the leader is most important; but in few Islamic dynasties was the personality of the ruler so crucial as amongst the Ghaznavids. Only the military skill and the untiring activity of Sabuktigin (Sabuktigin) and Mahmud enabled these Turkish adventurers to become rulers of an empire which at the latter's death was the most extensive known since the dismemberment of the Abbasid Caliphate.
In considering the Ghaznavid administrative system, two questions will be born in mind. Firstly, did the Sultans regard their subjects as anything more than docile tax-payers, and did the subjects in their turn expect anything more than internal peace and defence from outside enemies? Secondly, was the administrative structure of the empire such that the sovereign's will could speedily be enforced in all parts of the empire, and how much administrative continuity was there in such crises as the death of the sovereign and in succession disputes? It is hoped to elucidate these points by particular reference to Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan and to the structure of the Ghaznavid civil administration and military machine.
Chapter Two

The Samanid Foundations

An important strand in the theory of government in the Islamic world of the 11th century derived from the Persian governmental tradition. This stretched back to Achaemenid times, and included an aristocratic and feudal element, in which the importance of agriculture and the land, and the duties of the ruling classes in keeping them prosperous, were stressed. It also included an element from the concept of the Divine Ruler, familiar all over the Ancient Near East. Here, the emperor was regarded as descended from the gods and as being the Cosmic Ruler, haft kishvar khvateh or gehin khvateh. With his divine status reflected in court ceremonial and the insignia of royalty and his priestly education qualifying him as sacrificer and fire-priest, the emperor's rule took on a theocratic nature. In purely Islamic thinking, disobedience to a ruler, even to one who had flagrantly disregarded the sharica, was not to be undertaken lightly. But in the theocratic Persian view, no right of resistance was possible at all, for there could be no motive in defying the Divine Ruler. (In practice, as Widengren has pointed out, the strength of aristocratic and feudal forces in Persia,
dominant in the Parthian period, meant that, whilst the Persian emperor's secular authority was very great, it was not unrestricted and despotic).

When these Persian concepts were brought into an Islamic context, the divinity of the ruler could no longer be put forward as such; only extremists like the Dalami Mardawij b. Ziyar and other exponents of extravagant Iranian nationalism, whose own Islam was a very dubious quantity, openly claimed divine attributes. But by the 11th century, the Persian governmental ethos had leavened most political thinking in the Islamic east. A Turkish dynasty like the Ghaznavids rapidly left their steppe origins behind and adopted the Perso-Islamic political attitude. A theologian like al-Ghazzali, whom one might expect to uphold the older, more purely Islamic views on kingship, was strongly influenced by the prevalent Persian ideas; in his Baghrat al-muluk his general conception of a ruler is not that of a patriarch, but of a despotic monarch. From the later Umayyad period, when the Caliph Hisham began to show an interest in Persian history and Sassanid court procedure, the Persianisation of the Eastern Caliphate continued apace, showing itself especially in administrative and financial practice and in the manners and morals of polite society. The dominance of adab in education; the influence of the secretaries in the diwan, who used Sassanid techniques for coping with the growing complexity of the work of ruling; the reliance of the early Abbasids on their Khurasanian guards; all these combined to fuse Persian monarchical ideas with the original Arab basis. The Abbasid
Caliph-Imāms and many of the lesser rulers, from the Arab Ḥamānid to the Dailamī Būyids and the Turkish Ghaznavids, now became raised high above their peoples; the gap between ruler and ruled widened and the terms raqiyya or raqiyūn, "herd, flock of beasts", became generally applied to the subjects.

Yet in one region, that of Khurasan and Transoxania, the process had not in the 10th century gone so far. Here the Sāmānīds, a dynasty which seems to have been of local, Soghdian origin, ruled from Bukhārā. The historians are very favourable to the Sāmānīds and to their predecessors and patrons, the Tūhirids. Thus Ibn al-Athīr, whilst he is eulogising the Sāmānīd Ismā'īl b. Ahmad, also takes the opportunity to contrast the justice of the Tūhirids with the evil conduct of one of their predecessors in Nishapur, the governor Mu'ādh b. Muslim (160-3/777-80), and their successors, the Saffārids. Barthold pointed out that this favourable bias is attributable to the fact that the Tūhirids and Sāmānīds both stood for law and order, orthodoxy in religion and the preservation of the traditional, hierarchical society, whereas the Saffārids were regarded - on the whole, rightly - as base-born brigands. 4 The same bias is visible in the accounts of the geographers; but as contemporary travellers within the Sāmānid empire, they did see things for themselves, and the general prosperity and feeling of euphoria which they record as prevailing there rings true. Ibn Ja'qal visited Transoxania in the reign of Manṣūr b. Nuh (350-66/961-76) and wrote:

"The rulers over this region and over the rest of Khurasan are of the Sāmānīd dynasty. They are descended from Bahram Choban, 5
whose bravery and nobility are well-known among the Persians. In all the eastern lands there is no kingdom whose borders are better-defended, whose population is more numerous, whose material possessions are more extensive, whose internal affairs are better-regulated, whose resources are more plentiful, where foodstuffs are more easily obtainable and where official salaries are more regularly paid. All this despite the mildness of taxation there, the lightness of their imposts and the small reserves they maintain in their treasuries”.

Maqdisi wrote a few years later:

"They come from a village in the environs of Samarqand called Sâmân, and trace their descent back to Bahrâm Gûr. God has given them success and dominion. They are amongst the most praiseworthy and exemplary of monarchs in their conduct and outlook and in the respect they give to learning and scholars. If a tree were to rise up against the Sâmânid dynasty, it would surely wither! Have you not considered the case of Qâd ad-Daula, with his despotic power, his firm grip on affairs, the perfection of his power and his noble personal qualities? He was hailed as ruler in the whole of the Yemen, and he achieved this authority without warfare and intrigue, but merely by writing an ultimatum and sending an envoy. He was hailed in Sind, too, and he conquered Qumân and gained possession of many other territories. But when he launched himself against the Sâmânids and tried to take Khurasan, God caused him to perish, shattered his assembled might and gave his enemies dominion over his own lands. So perdition to whoever tries to attack the Sâmânids!

Amongst their [laudable] practices is that they do not compel men of learning to kiss the ground before them. Also, in the weeks of Ramâṣân they hold evening meetings for disputation, and these are held in the ruler’s presence. He himself introduces a topic and then they all discuss it. They belong to the law-school of Abû Ḫanîfa. Severity towards their subjects is never part of their
policy. The Vizier merely puts their ideas into execution [i.e. does not act in his own arbitrary way]. Indeed, when they want to honour a man, they sit him down at the table with themselves. They did exactly this with Shaikh Abū'1-Abbās al-Yazdādī. When important affairs crop up, they frequently interview envoys personally, just as they spoke directly with Shaikh Abū Ṣāliḥ when they despatched him to the commander of the army, Abū'1-Ḥasan [Muḥammad Sīnjūrī]. They always select the most learned and pious of the Bukhārī scholars, treat him with great respect, act upon his counsel, supply his material needs and nominate people to offices on his advice, as was the case with the exalted Shaikh and Imām Muḥammad b. al-Ḥaḍrī, until people began to talk amongst themselves about this. So now they resort for advice to his successor.

Have you not observed how they now consult al-Ḥakīm al-Imām Muḥammad b. Yūsuf because he is the most learned and most ascetic of men?  

It seems from this passage that the gap between ruler and ruled had not yet become so wide as it did under the Ghaznavids. The Amīrs cultivated the ulema and showed them great respect, exempting them from the humiliation of the taqabīl and constantly associating them with their executive decisions. Indeed, the royal ghulāms who in 301/914 murdered Abū'1-Ḥaḍrī are said to have become alienated from him by his excessive frequenting of scholars and theologians. Nūḥ b. Ḥaqr (331–43/943–54) employed the Imām of the Ḥanafīs Abū'1- Ḥaḍrī Muḥammad as-Sulamī, "the most learned faqīḥ of his age", as his Vizier.  

Both the Amīrs and the ulema had a common interest in checking the progress in Khurasan and Transoxania of Ismaʿīlī Shiʿism, which was attracted many converts there in the 10th century. When the Sāmānid empire was being established, the moral support of the Abbasid Caliphate was valuable against enemies like the Ṣaffārids.
and the various Dailami adventurers who coveted Khurasan; so when Narshakhi praises Ismā'īl b. Ahmad, the vanquisher of ʿAmr b. Laith, for his faithfulness to the Caliph's commands, the element of self-interest must be remembered. Later, the Abbasid Caliphate fell under the tutelage of the Ṣamānids' enemies, the Buyids, and towards the end of the 10th century the Amirs found themselves at odds with Baghdad when they refused to recognise the succession in 381/991 of al-Qadir, but continued to recognise his deposed predecessor, ʿIsmāʿīl. After his great victory in 389/999 over the combined forces of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʾUthmān and his generals Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Muqtadir, Fāʾiq and Begtuzun (Begtūzūn), Maḥmūd b. Sebūktagin became master of Khurasan, and in his faṭḥ-nāma to the Caliph claimed that it had been only the Ṣamānids' refusal to recognise al-Qadir that had caused the war in the first place. Nevertheless, the Ṣamānids contented themselves with the modest designation of "Amīr", and did not arrogate to themselves Caliphal titles, as some dynasties in the western Islamic world had done by the end of the 10th century.

Naṣr b. Ahmad (301-31/913-43) built himself a fine palace in Bukhārā, together with an adjacent building to house the various government departments. He could thereby keep in touch with day-to-day affairs. Ten diwāns were located there: those of the Vizier, of the Treasurer (Mūṣtaṭfī), of the chief of the Correspondence Department (ʿAmīd al-Mulk), of the Captain of Police (ṣib-Shuraṭ), of the Postmaster (ṣib-Bard), of the internal espionage system (Sharaf, probably to be read as Ishrāf), of the Amirs' personal domains (mamlaka-yi khwāqa), of the Muḥtasib and of the Qādī. This
proliferation of offices, and their nomenclature, is clearly based on the system at Baghdad, with the Vizier as chief executive officer.

Already under the Sāmānids there were local families, like those of Bahrainī and ʿUtbi, who were professional bureaucrats and who held the Vizierate for long periods, just as the Abbasids had their Barmaḵīs, Naubakhtīs and Furātīs. Al-Khwārizmī's encyclopaedia, the Mafath al-Culun, was written in the Sāmānid dominions and dedicated to Nūh b. Manṣūr's Vizier Abūʾl-Ḥasan ʿUbaidallāḥ ʿUtbi (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 39). In his section on kitāba, it is Sāmānid practice upon which he draws for his explanations of administrative organisation and techniques. We can deduce from this section the complexity and advanced state of their bureaucracy, in particular, of the Diwan al-kharaj (taxation) and the Diwan al-jaish (military affairs); al-Khwārizmī states that the Sāmānids had twenty-six different types of daftar, official registers, for recording financial and military transactions.

The Sāmānid administration's sphere of operation was essentially Transoxania itself, the valleys of the Zerafšān and the middle Oxus, with Khurasan in close dependence. However, Khurasan tended latterly to fall under the control of powerful military leaders, whether of Turkish slave origin, like Tash (Ṭaḥ), Begtuzun and the eunuch Fā'iq, or drawn from local landowning families, like Abū ʿAlī Chaghānī and the Šimjūrīs, who had extensive estates in Gūhistān. Their ascendancy in the second half of the 10th century was symptomatic of the enfeeblement of the Sāmānids. The Sāmānids also regarded as their tributaries adjacent rulers like the Ǧaffārides in Sīstān, the
Farīghūnids in Gūzgān, the Khwārizmshāhs and the rulers of Iranian or Arab origin in the upper Oxus principalities of Chaghāniyān and Khuttal. On none of these was the Sāmānīd hand a heavy one.

As a centre for controlling Soghd and for speedy access to the Oxus crossing at Āmul-i Shāţ; the Sāmānīd capital Bukhārā was well sited. Iṣṭakhrī stresses this strategic aspect: "The Sāmānīd governors of Khurasan established themselves at Bukhārā because it was the nearest of the Transoxanian cities to Khurasan. When someone fixes himself there, he has Khurasan in front of him and Transoxania behind him. Their [sc. the people of Bukhārā's] good behaviour towards their governors and the infrequency of their rebelling brought about the Sāmānīdes' decision to settle among them". The Arab governors of Mū warā' an-Nahr had established themselves further up the Zarafshān valley at Samargand, but Bukhārā also had ancient traditions as a capital; Naqr b. Ahmad's new palace and government building in the Rīgistān of Bukhārā were on the site of the pre-Islamic Bukhār-Khudāh's' palace. Before the Sāmānīdes, Transoxania had always been a politically fragmented region. Its broken topography of mountain ranges, fertile valleys and irrigated oases had encouraged the growth there, from at least Hellenistic times onwards, of city-states; these had often been involved in internecine warfare. Into this region, the Sāmānīdes - whose early fortunes had owed something to the patronage of the Caliph al-Ḥāʾimun - placed an administration modelled on that of Baghdad and thereby introduced a new element of centralisation there.

On the other hand, the social system of Transoxania and Khurasan
was in many respects different from that prevailing in the heart of the Caliphate. This region formed the north-eastern bastion of the Iranian world against the barbarians of Central Asia, and the historic rôle of defending it was taken over by the Šamānids. It was also the transition area connecting the Islamic Near East with the Euranian steppes and the routes to the Far East, and played an important part in conveying trans-Asiatic commerce. The landed and trading interests of the region demanded a well-protected frontier against the Turks and a political and military authority which could command respect inside the steppes and so secure the safe passage of caravans. In their heyday, the Šamānids provided this authority, but when eventually they weakened, the local landed and commercial interests were obliged to come to terms with the Qarakhanid (Qarākhānid) invaders.

In general, Šamānīd policy in Central Asia was not an aggressive one; in the 10th century, especially, the possession of Khurasan and Ray, rather than of bare steppeland, was a more lucrative prize. Normally, activity along the northern frontiers of Transoxania was the minimum consonant with defence needs and the maintenance of the dynasty's prestige within the steppes. Slaves were the chief reward which warfare there could bring, and without this compensation — admittedly a considerable one in the economy of Transoxania (see below, Part IV, 405-6) — all raids would have been unremunerative; the nomad has no towns or valuables to pillage and can quickly send his herds back into the deep steppe. Only in their earlier, expansionist stage did the Amīrs adopt a forward policy. Farghāna was
definitely conquered for Islam in the middle of the 9th century, possibly by Nūh b. Asad; more certainly, he conquered Isfījāb in 840 and in the next century it was ruled by a tributary Turkish dynasty. In 893 Ismā'īl b. ʿĀḥmad dethroned the local dynasty of Afshīns in Ushrūsana, brought the area under direct rule and then pushed on to capture Talas. Besides military campaigns like these, there was continuous activity on the frontiers by the ghūṣūs of the ribāṭs. In the Isfījāb province, towns like Binkūth and Saurān bristled with ribāṭs against the Oghuz and Kīmāk (Kīmāk); the 1700 or so ribāṭs of Isfījāb were manned in part by volunteers from Nakhshab, Bukhārā and Samarqand. In Iṣṭakhrī's time, Isfījāb paid no kharāj because of its frontier position. Ushrūsana is likewise described as having many ribāṭs; those at Dīzak were manned by ghūṣūs from Samarqand, and the famous ribāṭ of Khudaisir had been built by the Afshīn Ḥāṣīdar and endowed by him with augāf. The defence of Baikand, a vital point on the Bukhārā–Āmul road, which guarded the communications with Khurasan against the Oghuz of the Qara Qum, was the special responsibility of the Bukhārāns. Life in these frontier regions bred tough, self-reliant communities lacking the graces of more settled existence; Maqdisī describes the inhabitants of the town of Isfījāb as wild beasts, churlish, violent and self-satisfied.

This fundamental fact of the frontier meant that in Transoxania the landed, military class was notable in the social hierarchy, whilst in Khurasan the dihqān class of small landowners was numerous and influential to an extent unknown in parts of the Islamic world further west, where rulers had often succeeded in curbing the power
of local, feudal elements and reducing them to the general level of subjects below the throne. In the north-eastern part of the Persian world, the survival of the agrarian, feudal society of earlier Iran was combined with the keen, mercantile spirit of the urban traders and manufacturers, both of these elements enjoying equal importance there. This situation may be in part ascribed to geographical and economic reasons, as was suggested above; but also to the fact that Transoxania and Khwārizm escaped the Sassanid social reaction in which an attempt was made to model the state on the pre-Parthian past. Sassanid political, and above all cultural and religious, influence was certainly strong beyond the Oxus. Local rulers in Soghd and Ch̄och (but not in Khwārizm, which had its own independent cultural tradition) minted coins on the Sassanid pattern. However, direct political control by the Sassanids ended not far beyond Merv. The landowning and dihqān classes were longer-lived and socially more powerful here than in Persia proper; large personal retinues were kept up and the heroic virtues of hospitality and entertaining practised on a scale which drew enthusiastic praise from travellers. Maqdisī calls the people of Khwārizm ahl diyāfa wa nahma il-akl. Īṣṭakhrī expatiates on the intense hospitality of the people of Transoxania, and mentions the house of a landowner of Soghd whose door had not been closed for a century or more and who fed and lodged a hundred or two hundred travellers each night. Four hundred years later Ibn Batṭūta declared in similar vein that he had never met a people who had nobler and more praiseworthy characters or who were more pleased to receive strangers than the people of Khwārizm. At
the very end of the Sāmānid period, the common people in the towns retained their personal arms, and were ready to defend their homes or to sally forth as ghāzīs. The Sālime of the Bukhārān ghāzīs was an important military figure at this time; and Mahmūd of Ghazna was able to attract thousands of the Transoxanian ghāzīs for his Indian campaigns. 26

Such were the social and military conditions within which the Sāmānids had to work. Their administrative model was essentially that of the Caliphate in Baghdad, and it can hardly be doubted that they aimed at increasing the element of centralisation in their dominions and at raising their own status as rulers. In the event, the counter-balancing elements of the landowners and merchants frustrated these trends; it must be remembered that any increase in the central power meant fresh taxation. Moreover, from the reign of Nūr b. Naqr onwards, the cost of dealing with rebellious governors in Khurasan began to cause periodic deficits. Attempts to tap new sources of revenue, such as the inheritance tax introduced in the Baihaq district in the last years of the Sāmānids by the local governor, the Amīr Abū'1-Faql Ziyād, were felt to be tyrannical; even the Ghaznavids did not retain this particular tax. 27 The landed class was also that of the military leaders and cavalrymen. Many Transoxanian dihqāns found their way to Baghdad as soldiers of fortune and were made officers in the Turkish slave armies of the Caliphs. 28

The Sāmānid Amīrs had to rely heavily on this class for their own armies, but tried to break away from over-dependence on them by recruiting Turkish slave ghulāms; here again, the Abbasid Caliphate
was the model. Moreover, Turks already settled within the borders of Transoxania had already been employed by local Soghdian rulers. From the Sümänid ghulums arose great commanders like Alptigin and Sebük'tigin, and in this way, the idea of the slave army passed from Baghdad via the Sümänids to the Ghaznavids on the easternmost borders of Islam. Unfortunately for the Sümänid Amîrs, their hope that the Turks would be a counterbalance to the military power of the Iranian landed classes proved false; the royal ghulums were often turbulent and acted as king-makers in succession disputes.

Following the Abbasids, the Sümänids aimed to make their court a centre of culture and graceful living, and the Amîrs' part in encouraging the renaissance of New Persian literature was appreciable. There is a fine description of the splendour of Naṣr b. Aḥmad's court in one of Rûdaki's poems. Nevertheless, because of the social and military factors outlined above, the Sümänids' absorption of Abbasid ideas on administration and court ceremonial could not proceed beyond a certain point, and the Amîrs could never make themselves into absolute rulers. In the first half of the 10th century at least the Amîr was not permanently resident in the administrative capital of Bukhârâ; Naṣr b. Aḥmad used to take his army and spend the summer in Samarqand, Herat or some other of the cities of Khurasan. The passage quoted from Maqdisî (above, 77-8) shows that the Amîrs were by no means withdrawn from immediate contact with their subjects and that they could receive them without undue ceremony.

Finally, the failure of the Sümänids' attempts to conciliate the
religious classes and to draw them to their own side may be noted. Indeed, in the increasingly frequent succession troubles the religious elements often aligned themselves with the anti-dynastic forces of the landowners and military leaders. *Hilal al-Šafi’i* gives the account of a merchant, one Abū‘l-Ḥasan b. Ilyasa‘ al-Fārisī, who witnessed the entry of the Ilīg Naqr into Bukhārā in 389/999. The *khatīb* of Bukhārā, who were of course salaried servants of the Šāmānids, tried to raise the population on behalf of the Amīrs, saying: "You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial have been the relations between us. The enemy now menaces us, and it is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our behalf. So ask God's grace in succouring our cause". But the people consulted the representatives of popular religious feeling, the *faqīhs*, who dissuaded the people from taking up their arms and risking their lives against other good Muslims, as were the Qarakhanids (Qarākhānids): *ḥizb al-fitna aulā*.
Chapter Three

The establishment of Sebūktigin in Ghazna

The town of Ghazna, which became the centre of Sebūktigin's empire, had been in theory a possession of the Sāmānids, but in practice, control from Bukhārā had been tenuous. Although the Arabic geographers of the 10th century describe Ghazna as one of the entrepôts (furāq) of the transit trade connecting Khurasan and Transoxania, its economic rôle was never as important in this respect as that of Kabul. It was really the Ghaznavid Sultans who erected Ghazna, previously a small town on the margin of the Indian political and cultural world, into the centre of an empire, and Bābur, visiting it when it was again insignificant, wondered at this: "Ghazna is a very humble place; strange indeed it is that rulers in whose hands were Hindustan and Khurasan should have chosen it for their capital!"

The Ghaznavids used the town as a spring-board for their winter campaigns into India, and their empire inevitably acquired a bias towards India; in Sultan Mas'ud's time this was to prove a source of strategic weakness in dealing with the Turkmen and other threats in the west (see below, Part V). On the other hand, despite territorial losses in the west to the Seljuqs, the Ghaznavids were able to
survive as a considerable power in eastern Afghanistan and northern India for another 130 years.

The most important of the former S̄mānīd provinces to pass into Ghaznavid hands was Khurasan, with its rich economic resources, its fertile agricultural oases and its populous towns. It was the taxative potentialities of the province which appealed to the Ghaznavids, with their insatiable demands for treasure, the sinews of war. Solidarity of race and culture and comparatively restrained exercise of power by the Amīrs had knit the two main province of the S̄mānīds' empire, Transoxania and Khurasan, into a fairly organic whole; whereas under the Ghaznavids, when the prosperity of Khurasan was threatened by the Turkmens, the people of Khurasan became conscious of the remoteness of the capital Ghazna and of the pull of India for the Sultans.

The outlying dynasties in loose tributary status to the S̄mānīds, such as those in Khwārizm, Sīstān, Gūşgān, Charchistān, Chaghānīyān and Khuttal, also passed under Ghaznavid suzerainty, and a systematic policy of bringing them under closer control was pursued by Maḩmūd. By a combination of ruthless diplomacy and military force, the local Maʿmūnīd dynasty of Khwārizm was in 408/1017 overthrown and the province brought under direct control; for the next twenty-four years or so it was ruled by the ghulām general Altuntash (Altūntāš) and his sons. The upper Oxus principalities were strategically important as outposts against the Turks who lived to the north, and these were left in the hands of their old rulers; but where considerations such as this were absent, the Sultan did not hesitate to intervene.
The Shēr of Gharchistān, Muḥammad b. Abī Naqr Muḥammad, may have encouraged the Ilīg Naqr's ambitions in Khurasan; be that as it may, in 403/1012 Maḥmūd invaded the province, deposed its dynasty and annexed their lands. When in 401/1010-11 the Faṛīghūnīd of Gūzān failed to provide an heir of suitable age, Maḥmūd stepped in and installed his son Muḥammad as governor. In Sīstān, the Saftārid Amīr Khalaf b. Ahmad was deposed in 393/1002, and the Sultan's brother, Abū'1-Muṣaffar Naqr, eventually installed as governor; but scions of the Saftārid family continued to head cayyār bands and lead them against the Ghaznavids, and up to the time when the Seljuqs reached Sīstān, the land was rarely quiet.

Before Sebūktīgin achieved power in Ghazna and Zābulistān, a series of Turkish governors, ghulāms of the Sāmūnīd, had ruled there. The commander-in-chief of the Sāmūnīd forces in Khurasan, Alptīgin, together with the Vizier Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad Bālamī, had staged a putsch on the death in 961 of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Malik b. Nūh. They failed to place their candidate on the throne, and the triumph of the rival party made Alptīgin's position uneasy. So he decided to withdraw to the eastern fringes of the empire. The sources state that he made for India to avoid his enemies at court and to earn divine merit by raiding the Hindus; he had no intention of capturing Ghazna, and was only forced to take it when the local ruler denied him transit. In reality, Alptīgin was probably influenced by the example of a group of Turkish ghulāms of the Sāmūnīd who had already become largely independent on the southern borders of the empire. The general Qarāṭīgin (Qarāṭīgin) of Iṣfājūb had established himself at Bust and
ar-Rukkhkaj before his death in 929; and a line of his own ghulūms succeeded him at Bust as governors. They were frequently involved in the affairs of their Šaffārid neighbours. It was a dispute between two of these ghulūms, Toghan (Tughēn) and Baytuz (Baytūz), which in 367/977-8 gave Sebūktigin a pretext to intervene and add Bust to his existing territories.38

Alptigin proceeded with a small force of his own ghulūms and of ghūzls, subduing en route the Iranian Shēr of Bāmiyān and the Hindū-Shāhī king of Kabul.39 After besieging the citadel of Ghazna for four months, Alptigin wrested the town from its ruler, Abū al-Ḥāfīf or Abū Bakr Lawīk or Anūk. Despite the Islamic kunyas, and pace Marquart, Ernāshahr, 298, who considered him to be certainly a Muslim and perhaps a descendant of the Zunbīl whom Yaḥyā b. Laith took prisoner (see below), this Lawīk was not necessarily a Muslim; the whole form of his name is very dubious, and he is described as the brother-in-law of the ruler of Kabul's son. It was from Kabul that Lawīk sought aid in an attempt to regain Ghazna during the governorship of one of Alptigin's successors.40

The regions of Bust, ar-Rukkhkaj, Zābulistān, Ghazna and Kabul had been invaded at the end of the 9th century by Yaḥyā b. Ṭaʿlabūb and ǦĀmr b. Laith.41 On his first expedition, Yaḥyā captured the Zunbīl of Zābulistān, identified by Marquart with the ruler of an extensive kingdom in the Helmand basin, the Fīruz b. Kabīk mentioned by Maṣūdī and Ibn Khallikān, who was probably subordinate to the Kābulshāhs. On a second expedition, this time in 870, the two brothers reached Bāmiyān and Kabul and again captured the Zunbīl, who had fled to Kabul.42 In 900 Khurasan, Sijastān and these regions of eastern Afghan-
istan passed to Isma'īl b. ʿAbdāl and henceforth became part of the Sāmānid empire. In practice, these last regions were too distant to be controlled from Bukhārā. Probably they reverted to their original, local rulers, who may have received some form of investiture from the Sāmānids and who may have paid some tribute, although even this is doubtful. The Shērs of Bāmiyān were Iranian rulers, but Kabul was ruled first by the Hinduised Turk-Shāhs and then after c.850 by the purely Indian Hindū-Shāhs. The racial origins of the Zunbīls and the mysterious Lawīk are unknown, but their close links with Kabul point, at the least, to strong Indian influences.  

The Turkish ghulāms of the Sāmānids came to a land where some Turkish ethnic elements had been known in earlier centuries. Marquart visualised the whole of eastern Afghanistan as once held by first the Kushans and then by the Ephthalites or White Huns, the Sveta Hūga of the Hindus and the Haiṭal (rectius, *Habṭal, cf. A. Herrmann, "Die Hephthaliten und ihre Beziehungen zu China", Asia Major, II, 1925, 571-2) or Hayāṭīla of the Arab historians, and as retaining in the early Islamic period a strong ethnic flavour of the Ephthalites. He connects the very name "Ẓābulistān" with an Ephthalite tribe, Jaḏvīla, Jabūla, Jabuvelah, known from northern Indian inscriptions. The Oghuz and Khalaj Turks, who in the early Islamic period roamed from Ṭukhāristān and Badakhshān down to Buṣt, would thus be the remnants of Turkish peoples brought from north of the Oxus as part of the Ephthalite confederation and left behind there. Marquart's theory is by no means certain, although Frie and Sayīf have recently followed him. Yet there is no doubt about their existence there in pre-
Ghaznavid times. At the opening of the 9th century, the Khulshāh had to send an annual tribute of 2000 Oghuz slaves to the governor of Khurasan, ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣāḥib. In the Caliphate of al-Manṣūr, Maḥmūd b. ʿAlī as-Sulamī was governor of Sīstān, and he received from the Zunbīl at his winter capital of ar-Rukkhaj the customary tribute of camels and Turkish felt tents and slaves (qibīḥ Turkiyya wa raqīq). The Zunbīl is said to have had a bodyguard from the local Turks, at-Turk ad-Dawr. Iṣṭakhrī says that up to his own time, the Khalaj of Zamīndawar had kept their Turkish custom, external appearance and (?) language. The Khalaj survived as an ethnic unity for several more centuries; they were subdued and recruited into his army by Sebuktigin; they formed an important element in the armies of the Ghaznavids, Ghurids and Khwārizmshāhs; they were the progenitors of the Lodī kings of Delhi (1451–1526); and their name probably survives today in that of the modern Ghilzāī Afghans. Some form of authority was exercised over these nomads in the 10th century by the Samānīd central government; the youthful Sebuktigin was once sent by his master Alptigin in a military force to collect the customary taxes from the "Khalaj and Turkmens".

Alptigin had his position in Ghazna regularised by a patent of investiture (manshūr) from the Amīr Manṣūr b. Mūḥ. On his death in 352/963, he designated in his waṣb his son Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm (or perhaps, Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm) as his successor; for the next three years Abū Ishāq held the governorship of Ghazna, travelling to Bukhārā, apologising for his father's errors and securing investiture from the Amīr. It was to Bukhārā that he fled for the year 964–5 when Lawīk
temporarily re-occupied Ghazna, bringing back military aid from the Sāmānid capital. On his death in 355/966, the Turkish troops in Ghazna chose one of their commanders, Bilgetigin (Bīlītīgīn), a former ghulām of Alptigin's, as their leader; like his predecessor he sent to Bukhārā offering his allegiance and explaining that he had been elected by the Turks' popular acclamation. Shabānḵāra'ī records that in Bukhārā the Ḥajīb Fā'iq was bitterly opposed to the "Turkish rabble" (muṣṭī Ḥaṭūk) being left in Ghazna in virtual independence and that he sent an army to assert direct authority over them. Bilgetigin defeated it, and no army was ever sent out from Bukhārā again. After governing Ghazna for ten years, Bilgetigin died in 364/975, and another of Alptigin's ghulāms, Fīrī or Fīrītīgīn (? Bōrī, Būritīgīn), held power for two years. He too regarded himself as governor for the Sāmānids, for as insignia of office he had the pointed hat (kulāh), cloak (qabā) and girdle (kamar) which were to be the standard outfit of a governor under the Ghaznavids (cf. Baihaqī, 50, 430, 492 and passim) and which are clearly Persian in origin.51 Indeed, after Alptigin's son Abū Ishāq had had to apply to Bukhārā for help to recover Ghazna, the money coined at Ghazna began to include the name of the Sāmānid Amīr as well as that of the local governor.52 It may be assumed that the name of the Amīrs was also in the khutba.

Būritīgīn's misrule caused the people of Ghazna to invite Lawīk back again, and it was by Sebūktīgīn's skill that he was repulsed. In 366/977 the Turkish soldiery in Ghazna deposed Būritīgīn, and Sebūktīgīn took his place and began a twenty years' reign. Already
during Būritigen's governorship he had had the substance of power, and was thus able to impose his own terms upon the soldiery. During his reign, the main lines of Ghaznavid expansion, which Mahmūd was later to follow, were laid down: south-westwards to Bust and Qusadār; eastwards into India, against the Hindū-Shāhī Rājās of Waihānd; and latterly, Sebūktigen intervened decisively in Khurasanian affairs. Sebūktigen was again one of Alptigen's ghulāms. His Turkish origins and early life are known from three main sources. Firstly, there is the preface to Sebūktigen's own Pand-nemā (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 20-1). Secondly, there is Jūzjānī, who in his Tabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, 6-8, tr. 67-75, quotes a lost part of Baihaqī's history which dealt with Sebūktigen's reign under the title Ta'rikh-i Nāṣirī, and also a general history, now lost, the Ta'rikh-i mubādval of Abūl-Qāsim Muḥammad b. Ṣalmān Imāmī (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 19). Thirdly, there is the not very reliable account of Sebūktigen's rise as Alptigen's ghulām in the Šāmānid service, given in the Siyāsat-nemā of Nīṣām al-Mulk, ch. XXVII, 111-26, written at least a century after most of the events described there.

According to the Pand-nemā, Sebūktigen (Sabuktigen) came from the Barskhān, or as Ḥāshghārī spells it, Baraghān tribe of Turks. The main settlement of the Barskhān people, which bore the same name, was on the southern shore of the Issiiq-Gūl; the father of Ḥāshghārī, author of the Dwān lughat at-Turk, came from there. Since the Barskhān were part of the Qarluq confederation, it is a curious point that both the Ghaznavids and their great rivals the Qarakhanids may have sprung from the same tribal grouping. Obsequious genealogists
of the Ghaznavids were unable to get round this fact of Sebükttigin’s pagan Turkish birth, but did later succeed in connecting his tribe with Yezdegird III, the last Sassanid emperor. It is noteworthy that the Persian culture which the Sultans acquired eventually led their court genealogists to attach them to the Iranian past, as had the genealogists of the Šāmānids, Būyids and Ziyārīds, and not to some ancient princely family of the Turks, which would have been just as easy and more plausible. This alleged Persian connection of the Barskhān tribe is inserted in the Pand-nama’s preface, and may have been elaborated during the 11th century. A complete genealogy connecting Sebükttigin with Yezdegird appeared in the Ta’rikh-i mujaddwal, whose date is, however, unknown; Barthold found an indication that its author might have flourished in the early 12th century. On the other hand, we know definitely that Maḥmūd was praised for his Turkish lineage. Cūtbī quotes verses in which the poet Badī’ az-Zamān Abū’l-Faṣl al-Hamadhānī says that “The house of Bahrām [sc. the Šāmānids] has become subject to the son of the Khāqān". This emphasis on the Sultan’s Turkishness comes, of course, from the early years of the Ghaznavid dynasty.

Sebükttigin’s enslavement was typical of what often happened in the internecine warfare of Turkish peoples in Central Asia. He was captured by a neighbouring tribe, the Bakhtiyān (read "Tukhsiyān" = Tukhs). The Tukhs are described by Marvazī as one of the divisions of the Qarluq confederation; they lived in the Chu valley to the north-west of the Issiq Göl. Sebükttigin was sold to a slave-dealer of Chāch, who took him with other captives to a slave-depot at Nakhshab.
After a period of training in the military and equestrian arts, he was bought at Nishapur by the Ḥājīb Alptigin for service in his guard. Thereafter, according to Niẓām al-Mulk's narrative, he climbed rapidly under Alptigin's patronage and at a rate much quicker than the normal cursus honorum for Sāmānīd ghulāms allowed, for Alptigin had early discerned in him the marks of future greatness. At the age of eighteen, he already commanded 200 ghulāms. On Alptigin's withdrawal to Ghazna, he accompanied his master and played a prominent part in defeating in Tukhartān the pursuing Sāmānīd army. On Alptigin's death, he passed to Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm as part of his father's bequest to him. Outāl, and following him Ibn al-Athīr, begin Sebuktigin's career only as a ghulām of Abū Isḥāq, whom Ibn al-Athīr calls "Commander of the army of Ghazna for the Sāmānīds"; he accompanied Abū Isḥāq to Bukhārā when he was temporarily expelled by Lawāk, and became known at court for his intelligence, judgement and piety. The Pand-nāma, ed. Nazīm, 613–14, tr. 623, merely records briefly Sebuktigin's passing into Alptigin's hands and subsequent rise to favour. It is likely that Niẓām al-Mulk's elaborate story of his gradual rise in his master's esteem is largely invention, and that Sebuktigin, although originally bought by Alptigin, did not achieve prominence until Alptigin and his son settled at Ghazna.

During the governorships in Ghazna of Bilgetīn and Būritīn, Sebuktigin's prestige grew among the Turkish troops, and on Būritīn's deposition, he was chosen by the army as their head. Whilst in Ghazna, Sebuktigin had for some time been winning over other army chiefs to
his side by lavish twice-weekly feasts for them, and this work of *ta'ilif qulūbihim* now bore fruit. He also acquired local connections outside the ranks of his Turkish fellow-soldiers; the future Sultan Maḥmūd was born in 971 of the daughter of a chief (ra'Is) of Zabulīstān, whom Sebūktigin had married. Like his immediate predecessors in Ghazna, Sebūktigin continued to regard himself as governor there for the Zmānīds. The names of the Amīrs appear on his coins before his own one, and the title on his tomb at Ghazna, al-Ḥājib al-Ajall, shows that he clung to this status till his death. Hence in 993 the Amīr Mūḥ b. Naqr, faced with the generals Fūʾiq and Abū ʿAlī Shāzūrī united against him in rebellion, summoned Sebūktigin to Transoxania. His oath of allegiance to the Amīr was renewed, and for the next few years, the attentions of Sebūktigin and his son Maḥmūd were focussed on Khurasan. As Zmānīd power weakened, they found themselves well-placed to share in the spoils and, in the end, to partition the Zmānīd dominions with the Qarakhanīds.

When Sebūktigin became governor of Ghazna and Zabulīstān, the Turkish soldiery who had originally accompanied Alptiggin thither had been established there some fifteen years. They had implanted a system of fiefs, and later in the Ghaznavīd period four agricultural areas around Ghazna, (?) Nūgh, (?) Khimār, Lamghān and Shāh-Bahār, are mentioned as fiefs of the Turks and their descendants. The system of military fiefs was already well-known in the Zmānīd empire. Alptiggin himself had accumulated an immense number of estates and properties all over Khurasan and Transoxania: 500 villages in outright ownership (*dhār-i milk*); palaces, gardens, caravanserais and baths in every town of note; revenues assigned to him from estates
(mustaghall); a million sheep and 100,000 horses, mules and camels. By the time Sebuktigin came to power, the system in Zabulistan had got into disorder. Apparently mustaghall-type fiefs were being converted into outright ownership (tamlik) and the warriors were settling down as cultivators, with a consequent disinclination from taking up their arms. On the other hand, the central administration in Ghazna was tending to appropriate lands allotted to the soldiers and turn them into state lands (dihhā-yi diwanī). At some point early in his reign Sebuktigin reformed the system, insisting that all fiefs should be of the mustaghall-type, that the revenues from these should be paid out to the army by the central diwan, and that those soldiers whose incomes had declined through appropriation of fiefs should have them made up to the amount originally allotted.

At an early date, if this had not been already done by his predecessors, Sebuktigin must have had to set up government offices. Basically, three diwāns were necessary: one to administer and tax the territories which gradually became added to the nucleus around Ghazna; a second to deal with correspondence and diplomatic relations with Bukhārā; and a third to see to the mustering, payment and provisioning of the army, which was already assuming a dominant rôle. Thus emerged the three administrative branches, later to be formally organised as the diwan-i Wazīr, the diwan-i Rasā'il and the diwan-i Ārāf; under the Vizier, the Chief Secretary and the Ārāf respectively. The personnel of these offices would be wholly Persian. The contacts which Alptigīn and his successors had kept up with the Bukhāran court must have entailed some coming-and-going of financial
and administrative personnel, with the resultant transfer of Sāmānid practices to Ghazna. There may have been a few representatives of Sāmānid authority in Ẕbulistān before Alptigin's arrival. We cannot trace a definite series of Viziers of Sebuktigin, as can be done for later Sultans, but there seems to have been a nucleus of Persian secretaries in Ghazna whom Sebuktigin could call upon for duty. When in 367/977-8 he left for his Bust expedition (see above, 91), he appointed the boy Mahmūd as his lieutenant in Ghazna, and left as his Vizier the official Abū ʿAlī Kirmānī, whose niṣba suggests the possibility that he had once been in the Būyid service. Through the Bust expedition Sebuktigin acquired the services of the noted scholar and rhetorician, Abūʾl-Fatḥ Bustī, a fact which Qutbī accounts one of the chief results of the campaign. Abūʾl-Fatḥ had been secretary to the Turkish ghulām ruler of Bust, Baytuz. Now he became chief of Sebuktigin’s Mwān-i Rasāʾil, with the duty, among other things, of composing his master’s fath-nāma, and remained in this post until early in Mahmūd's reign.

The last paragraph has suggested that Sebuktigin must have drawn on the relatively advanced Sāmānid model in setting up his administration in Ghazna. It must be remembered, however, that institutions and practices can rarely be transplanted en bloc from their homeland to a strange environment, and Ghazna and Ẕbulistān were on the far periphery of the Sāmānid empire. The Ghazna region itself had no strong local traditions of governmental procedure, but it is likely that there were influences from the adjacent Indian world, especially from the Kabul valley, where a Hindu dynasty ruled until Alptigin began his campaigns there (see above, 91-2). The chief innovation
which the Turkish ghulām commanders introduced into the village organisation of the Ghazna region lay in the system of military fiefs for their followers; but beyond this, there cannot have been any question of imposing from outside a completely new system in local affairs.

In one direction, the early Ghaznavids did in part adapt themselves to local conditions: their system of minting coins. No attempt was made to set up a uniform, centralised system here. Their coins show the distinctive traits of various local mints. Sebūktigin's main minting-place was at Parwān; these coins from the Bāmiyān-Kabul area vary considerably from those of his Sāmānīd suzerains, but approximate in size and weight to those of the Hindū-Shāhī kings of Kabul. 70 (Comparatively speaking, the silver coinage of the Ghaznavids was considered by E. Thomas to be heavier than that of the Sāmānīds (average of 50-55 grains compared with 45 grains) and nearer to that of the Indian Kabul kings (average 50 grains). On the other hand, Ghaznavid gold coinage seems to be modelled on that minted by Maḥmūd at Nishapur when he was governor there). 71 The silver coins minted by Maḥmūd at Ghazna differ perceptibly from those he minted at Nishapur. The products of mints in Balkh and Sīstān can likewise be distinguished from those of elsewhere. Thus the policy was to retain existing provincial patterns and to change them as little as possible. 72 This applied especially to the conquered territories of India, which had their own patterns of economic and social life entirely different from those of the Islamic world. Sebūktigin struck coins for Indian circulation, and in Maḥmūd's
reign are first attested the well-known bilingual coins with legends in both Arabic and Devanāgarī characters; Thomas mentions one from 412/1023 and Lane Poole catalogues two minted at Mahānādpūr in 418/1027. On these coins, the Ghaznavids combined Islamic titles and professions of faith with Hindu motifs, the recumbent Bull of Siva, Nandī, and the Sanskrit superscription "Srī Samanta Deva". Outside the sphere of numismatics, it is difficult to estimate what the fabric of the Ghaznavid empire in its full florescence owed to local foundations; but if the highly-developed superstructure was Persian and Sāmānīd in inspiration, there must nevertheless have been a certain substratum of local practices to build upon.
Chapter Four

The succession of Maḥmūd

By 998 Maḥmūd had successfully set aside the succession claims of his brother Ismā'īl and had made himself ruler of all the lands his father had held. By 1001 he had expelled from Khurasan all his rivals from amongst the Turkish generals of the Ṣamānids, and had secured that province against the last, fugitive Amīr, Ismā'īl al-Muntasīr. All Maḥmūd's earlier life had been spent aiding his father, and Sebūktīgin had always acted as a faithful vassal of the Ṣamānids. Maḥmūd felt this connection less strongly, but the idea of making himself completely independent did not occur immediately on his father's death. In accordance with Sebūktīgin's wishes, his son Ismā'īl received the provinces of Ghazna and Balkh in 387/997. Straightway, he came to Balkh, the nearest point in his newly-acquired dominions to Bukhārā, and did homage to the Amīr Abū'l-Ḥārīth Manṣūr b. Nūḥ. Likewise, when in the next year Maḥmūd had deposed his brother, he came from Ghazna to Balkh and did homage to the Amīr, who confirmed him in the provinces of Ghazna, Balkh, Bust, Herat and Tirmidh.

As has been seen, the Ṣamānīd Amīr had invited Sebūktīgin to intervene in Khurasan against Abū Calī and Fā'īq. After his victory
in 994, Sebük Tigin had been rewarded with the governorship of Balkh, Ţukharistan, Bāmiyān, Ghur and Ghardistān, and Maḥmūd with Abū ʿAlī's old job as commander of the army in Khurasan. Maḥmūd had made Nishapur his headquarters, the first taste Khurasan had of Ghaznavid rule. Because of the pressure on the ʿṢāmānidids from the Qarakhanids, then in possession of the whole upper and middle Syr Darya basin, Maḥmūd had been able to strengthen his hold in Khurasan. But the death of Sebük Tigin and the succession struggle in Ghazna had forced him to leave Khurasan, and in the interim, the ʿṢāmānid government had sent out the ghulām general Begtuzun as commander there. Maḥmūd felt that he had prior claim on the province, and when he was able to attend to the west once more, asserted his claim by force.

After 999, a weakening of Maḥmūd's respect for the Āmīrs is discernible. His stay in Nishapur had given him knowledge of the richness and desirability of Khurasan, and theoretical loyalty towards an increasingly impotent overlord now yielded to personal ambition. In the event, circumstances saved him from unambiguous hostility to Bukhārā. In 999 Fāʾiq and Begtuzun deposed the Āmīr Abūʾl-Jārīḥīth and set up his brother Abūʾl-Fawāris ʿAbd al-Malik b. Nūḥ. Maḥmūd was able to pose as avenger of the blinded Āmīr, even though he had previously taken up arms to seize Khurasan whilst Abūʾl-Jārīḥīth had been still on the throne, and clear all his rivals from Khurasan. 74

Judging by Sebük Tigin's last wishes, he did not envisage that his family should set up as an independent dynasty, despite the evident decay of the ʿṢāmānidids. He did not leave his territories as
an undivided inheritance, but as governorships to be held by various members of his family, continuing the practice prevalent during the last years of his life. His brother Bughrachuq (Bughrėjüq) was to remain as governor of Herat and Fāshang. Of his sons, Maḥmūd was to command the army in Khurasan; Sebdktitin did not claim any right to nominate the governor there. Another son, Abū'l-Muṣaffar Naqr, was to remain at Bust; and the younger son Ismaīl was to have Ghażna and Balkh. In allotting Ghażna to Ismaīl, he was probably influenced by the fact that Ismaīl was his son by a daughter of Ḍalptigitin's, and so felt it more fitting that a descendant of Ḍalptigitin should rule there; the apparent preference of Ismaīl over Maḥmūd, who was much the more experienced in statecraft and war, puzzled Muslim historians of the Ghaznavids. In fact, no specific overlordship was given to Ismaīl. The possession of the ancestral lands in eastern Afghanistan perhaps implied this, but it is arguable that Maḥmūd's hold over the rich province of Khurasan was a more desirable inheritance than Ghażna, whose chief value was as a springboard for Indian conquests.

Just as Sebdktitin divided up his territories and gave an apparent preference to the young Ismaīl, so did Maḥmūd in his last days nominate as his successor in Ghažna his son Muḥammad, governor of Ghānān, excluding the other brother, Masʿūd, who had much greater fame as a military commander and was the obvious choice. Although Maḥmūd's declining powers of judgement should be taken into account, there is a certain parallel here with Sebdktitin's testatory wishes. If any consistent principle is to be sought here, it might be found in the early Ghaznavids' Turkish background rather than in their
acquired Perso-Islamic culture. In the system of inheritance of ancient Mongolian customary law, ultimogeniture prevailed: the major part of the paternal inheritance went to the youngest son, who was guardian of the domestic hearth, the otchigin, "prince of the fire", and the elder sons were entitled to indemnities during their father's lifetime. This institution seems to have been carried over into Turkish life; Kotwicz suggested that the Turkish name "Kăltigin", familiar from the Orkhon inscriptions and from later usage, is not a personal name but a title, and he connects it with kdl "ashes", giving the complete meaning "prince of the ashes" = "guardian of the hearth in the Qaghan's family, the younger son". Certainly, the transmission of an inheritance undivided to the eldest son was little familiar to Central Asian peoples; chiefs often took the view that leadership should come through personal merit and not birthright, and that all children should have a chance to achieve success. It is just possible that some memory of steppe custom may have remained in the minds of Sebutkťigin and Maḥmūd. The sources provide no direct evidence for this surmise, but the reasons they give for Maḥmūd's designation of Muḥammad as his heir are unconvincing.
Chapter Five

The cultural background of the early Sultans, and the
Ghaznavid court and bureaucracy's continuity with their
predecessors in structure and personnel

Maḥmūd's education and training was a two-fold one. The
practical, military side came from accompanying his father into battle,
and boyish exploits of his are recorded against the pagans of Ghūr
and the Hindū Shāhī Rājā Jaipāl at Lamghān. Later, his favourite
weapons were the spear and long sword (qalāschūrī), the weapons of
the champion who goes out for single combat. Doubtless Sebūktigin
passed on to him all his distilled experience and expertise. The
academic side of his education came from a leading Ḥanafī scholar,
the father of the Qudī Abū Naqr Ṣīnī, who also acted as prayer-
leader for Sebūktigin; from him Maḥmūd learnt the Qur'ān and later
derived much benefit from his counsel. Because of Maḥmūd's early
involvement at his father's side in the business of warfare and
ruling, his academic education in the Muslim sciences and literatures
may have been somewhat broken. He is said to have known Arabic well,
although he disliked the language. But clearly, his knowledge of
Persian was adequate for him to work with his Persian secretaries
and ministers; exactly how much he appreciated the florid panegyrics,
both Arabic and Persian, which his poets dedicated to him, is more dubious. \(^{82}\) AufT quotes in his *Lubāb al-αllbāb* some fragments of verse said to be by Maḥmūd. The verdict of Ethē, Browne and Rypka has been against the authenticity of this attribution, even though it is true that most persons literate in Persian could at that time have turned out tolerably competent verses. \(^{83}\)

From Baihaqī, we have a few details about the Islamic education which Maḥmūd gave to his own children. Maḥmūd had his two sons Masqūd and Muḥammad and his young brother Yūsuf, only three years older than the two princes, educated together. Already by the age of fourteen, Masqūd had a good knowledge of adab and was able to teach a few of al-Mutanabbi's odes and the Muʿallāqa of Imruʿul-Qais to another boy. Their tutor at this time was a eunuch, Raiḥān Khādīm. Afterwards, when Maḥmūd nominated Masqūd to the governorship of Herat, Raiḥān Khādīm accompanied him there as a tutor, with a strict commission to watch over Masqūd's moral welfare; in Seljuq times, Raiḥān Khādīm would have been described as an Atabeg. \(^{84}\) As Sultan, Masqūd was a competent Persian stylist. As well as affixing his *taqātīc* to the documents prepared for him by the *Duwān-i Risālat*, he sometimes added sections in his own hand. The draft of a treaty which Masqūd was making secretly just before his father's death with the Ziyārid Manūchīhr b. Qābūs was written in his own excellent hand "such as the masters among secretaries would have been impotent to indite". Baihaqī retained in his possession many documents, drafts and notes by Masqūd which he utilised in putting together his *Mujalladāt*. \(^{85}\) From his knowledge of adab, Masqūd was certainly able
109.

to read Arabic and apparently able to understand it when spoken. The Caliph al-Qadir's envoy brought a diploma of recognition to the Sultan on his accession, and addressed him and his court in Arabic. Mas'ud acknowledged the greetings, and then a Persian abridgement of the manshur was read out for the benefit of those present who could not understand Arabic. The expressions Mas'ud used occasionally reveal his intellectual processes as thoroughly Islamic. Writing to the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan Sulaiman b. Qadir Khan after his defeat at DandEQan by the Seljuqs, the Sultan minimised the disaster and compared it with the Prophet's setback at Uqud against Quraish; on one occasion the Chief Secretary, Abü Naṣr-i Mishkan, described the Turkmen pillagers in Khurasan to his master as "Khavārij". The knowledge of classical Islamic learning which the Ghaznavid Sultans early acquired is in striking contrast to the untutoredness which seems to have characterised the Great Seljuq Sultans down to a late date in that dynasty's history. It was nevertheless necessary for the Ghaznavid Sultans to stay attuned to the needs and aspirations of their Turkish ghulams, upon whose military prowess much of the dynasty's success depended. Some of the ghulams who had been in the Sultans' service for a long period no doubt acquired some knowledge of Persian, especially those in positions of high command and thus in contact with the civilian administration; but the ranks of the ghulams were frequently replenished by recruits from Central Asia (see below, Part II, 228) and Turkish was their normal language. Certainly Mas'ud, and a fortiori Mahmud, retained their ancestral Turkish tongue and always used it when speaking informally to their
ghulâms and to other Turks.

The sincerity of the Ghaznavid Sultans as patrons of learning has provoked speculation. To consider the topic in detail would not be in place here, but it cannot be altogether neglected, for it helps us to assess the barbarian, Turkish elements in the early Sultans versus the cultured, Persian ones. Undoubtedly, Mahmûd's and Masûd's courts at Ghazna became brilliant cultural centres; according to Daulatabdî, 400 poets were regularly in attendance on Mahmûd, presided over by the laureate, amîr ash-shu'â'î, Qûnsuri, who was continuously busy commemorating in verse his master's exploits and campaigns. The polymath of his age, al-Bûrûnî, finished his days at Ghazna, and dedicated his great astronomical treatise, al-‘ânûn al-Masûdî, to Mahmûd's son, and his book on mineralogy, the Kitâb al-jamâhîr fi maqrîfât al-jawâhir, to Masûd's son Maudûd in turn. Inasmuch as it was Mahmûd who brought him to Ghazna, the gateway to India, it was he who made possible al-Bûrûnî's Tabqaq mûli'l-Hind, although Sachau has pointed out that al-Bûrûnî's mentions of the Sultan's name are curt and unenthusiastic, and has added that during the thirteen years spent under his Sultanate, al-Bûrûnî "had no official inducement or encouragement for this study [sc. his India], nor any hope of royal reward".

In the evaluation of the culture of the early Ghaznavids, two opposing views have been adopted. Many of Mahmûd's admirers, especially those among Indian Muslim scholars, have stressed his rôle as a munificent patron of the arts and as the creator of a Muslim culture on the eastern fringe of the Islamic world, by whose influence
Muslim religion and civilisation passed to the Indian plain. Mahmūd has thus become the first hero of Indian Islam. At the other extreme, some European scholars have condemned this culture as insincere and derivative. The Samanid court at Bukhārā, which had nurtured authors like Rūdakī, the Vizier Abū ʿAlī Baḥramī and Daqīqī, presented Mahmūd with a striking model, and scholars like August Müller, Barthold, Browne and recently Rypka have asserted with justice that Mahmūd's encouragement of culture did not spring from a disinterested love of learning. In the course of his conquests, the Sultan brought back whole libraries to Ghazna (e.g. from Isfāhān and Ray), and he seems to have had an acquisitive love of collecting around himself poets and scholars, if need were, by force. In Browne's words, "Sultan Mahmūd has often been described as a great patron of letters, but he was in fact rather a great kidnapper of literary men, whom ... he often treated in the end scurvily enough".

In telling how the Tabānī family of Ḥanafī faqīhs passed in Mahmūd's time from Nishapur to Ghazna (see below, Part III, 339-41), Baihaqī remarks that "whenever he came across a man or woman who was an expert in any skill, he deported them thither [sc. to Ghazna]".

The Sultan's intentions were perfectly blunt when he sent an ultimatum to the Khwārizmshāh Abū'1-ʿAbbās Maʿmūn b. Maʿmūn: "I have heard that there are at the Khwārizmshāh's court several men of learning, each peerless in his science, such as so-and-so and so-and-so. You must send them to our court, so that they may have the honour of being presented there and that we may derive prestige (mustaḥbir shavīm) from their knowledge and capabilities. We request this favour of
Barthold's strictures are also based on the political and social background of this culture: the narrowness of the circle involved, and the ruthless fiscal exploitation and war misery which alone enabled Mas'ūd, for instance, to dispense at Mihrgān celebrations 1000 dinārs to ʿ Ungurī, an elephant's load of 50,000 dirhams to Zainabī ʿ Alawī and 20,000 dirhams to poets not regularly of the court circle (bigāna-tar). These points are valid ones, and our verdict must on the whole lie with Barthold's strictures rather than with Nazim's defence.95

But three qualifications must be made. Firstly, all highly-developed Islamic cultures were at this period élite ones, resting not on popular but on royal or aristocratic bases. Although patronage inevitably brought the attendant vices of hyperbole, effusiveness and insincerity, it was the sole foundation upon which such a culture could then rest. Al-Bīrūnī pointed out the necessity of the system when he said that "to do this [sc. to honour learning and its representatives] is .... the duty of those who rule over them, of kings and princes. For they alone can free the minds of scholars from the daily anxieties for the necessities of life, and stimulate their energies to earn more fame and favour, the yearning for which is the pith and marrow of human nature".96 Moreover, the financial basis of patronage was that upon which the whole dynasty and state rested; the one cannot be condemned without the other, but such a judgement would not be in order here.

Secondly, poets and writers were the publicity men of their age. Rulers bathed in the echoed splendour of their eulogists and retained
them with a practical purpose in mind. Both sides benefited: "For just as a patron becomes famous by the verse of a good poet, so do poets likewise achieve renown by receiving a great reward from the king, these two things being interdependent". 97

Thirdly, the culture of the early Ghaznavids did begin to show individual traits of its own. Originally, there was no significant literary tradition in Ghazna and Zâbulistan upon which to build. It is noteworthy that the great poets of the Ghazna court all came from outside: Cünqarl from Balkh; Asjadî from Merv or Herat; Farrukhî from Sîstân; and Manûchihîrî from Dâmphân. The latter two were attracted to Ghazna from the service of the Muhtâji Amîrs of Chaghâniyân and the Ziyaârids respectively. Arberry has drawn attention to the greater receptiveness of the cultures of Mahmûd and Masûd, with their strongly Sunní policy and cultivation of links with the Abbasid Caliphate (see below, 132-4), to Arabic influences in learning and literature. These brought an increased elaboration and euphuism in literary style, and set the pattern for the ornate poetry and prose which became increasingly popular in later Ghaznavid and Seljuq times, and Arberry concludes that "Ghazna developed into a greater centre of Arabic learning than Bukhârâ had ever been". 98 According to Bahâr, the penetration of Arabic influences into Persian literature marks the opening of the second great period of New Persian prose, whose style differs clearly from that of the Seljûnid period; and in the sphere of poetry Rypka notes the appearance of the "romantic epic", whereas the Shâh-nâmâ had been the climax of the "feudal epic" inspired by the Seljûnid milieu. 99 It is also notable that during
Mahmūd's reign, Turkish poetry seems to have been known and recited in literary circles, although this poetry was probably popular in origin and not the product of cultured circles. A certain growth of individuality is also visible in architecture and the plastic arts. Under Mahmūd, a great influx of treasure flowed into Ghazna, and there can be little doubt but that the Sultan imported artisans and craftsmen from the conquered lands to beautify his capital, just as he imported scholars and literary men. When Mahmūd began his work, there was no strong local tradition to guide him. But during his reign and that of his successor, a certain tradition did grow up, with the sumptuous, Indian use of marble for building, and with carved decoration grafted on to the more sober, Persian technique of fired brick construction and moulded brick decoration.

The literacy of the Sultans, their Muslim educations, their encouragement of scholars, all these have been sketched out; it remains to adduce further evidence from the court surroundings in which they lived to demonstrate that the Ghaznavids were, in Spuler's phrase, "kulturell iranisiert". The Sultans were lovers of splendour and luxury, to which their zeal in building palaces and laying out gardens attests (see below, 189-90). The lavish furnishings and decorations of these palaces show that the way of life there fell within the Iranian tradition. Mas'ūd acquired luxurious tastes at an early age. When he was the youthful governor of Herat, he built a house for his afternoon siesta in the garden of the Qādīnū palace. This house was cooled by water dripping down the hangings within it, and its walls were adorned with lascivious paintings of
nude men and women in various convivial scenes (qurt-ha-yi ulfiyya).

The splendour of court life in Ghazna itself shows how far the Sultans now were from the frugal ways of Turkish steppe life. The description of a celebration there in 1038 is worth quoting at length:

"The golden throne and the hall for audiences and merry-making, which the AmIr had ordered to be constructed, and on which they had been busy for over three years, was now ready. They informed the AmIr, and he ordered that they should install and set it down [sc. the throne] on the great dais of the new palace, and put the building in order. Everyone who on that day saw that adornment never saw anything after that which could compare with it. I was one of them at that time, and I have never known anything like it. The throne was constructed entirely of red gold, overlaid with shapes and patterns of branches and plant-fronds. It was set with a large number of precious jewels, and over it was stretched lattice-work, again all encrusted with jewels. The throne itself was overlaid with covers of Rumi brocade. It had four well-filled cushions, made of silk and sewn with gold thread, laid down for the feet; a cushion for the back; and four other cushions, two for each side. A golden-plated chain hung from the ceiling of the chamber containing the dais, and came down over the dais where the crown and throne were. The crown was attached to this chain, and there were four bronze figures fashioned in the shape of human beings and mounted on columns which were secured to the throne itself, so that their hands were outstretched and thus held the crown safely. In this way, the crown did not hurt the head since the chains and the columns supported it, and the Sultan's cap could go underneath it. They draped this dais with rugs, gold-woven Rumi brocade and gold-woven parti-coloured carpets. Three hundred and eighty golden dishes were set out in the hall, each a gaz long and a khushktar (?) gaz wide. On these were placed cakes of camphor, vesicles of musk, fragments of sandal-wood and amber. Before the high throne
were fixed fifteen settings of pomegranate-coloured and Badakhshānī rubies, emeralds, pearls and turquoises. Within that opulently-appointed hall they had set out a table, and in the middle of it, stretching towards the ceiling, was a pavilion made out of halvā, and there was ample other food.

On Tuesday, the 21st of Shabēn, the Amīr came back from the Mahmūdī garden to this new palace and seated himself in his new golden throne on the dais. The crown was suspended above his cap and he wore a cloak of crimson brocade so heavily ornamented with gold that only a little of the material underneath could be seen. All around the hall, standing against the panels, were the household ḡulāms (ḡulām-i khāṣṣat), with robes of Saqlāwī, Baghdadī and Isfahānī cloth, two-pointed caps, gold-mounted waist sashes, weapon belts and golden maces in their hands. On the dais itself, to both left and right of the throne, were ten ḡulāms, with four-sectioned caps on their heads, heavy, bejewelled waist sashes and bejewelled sword belts. In the middle of the hall were two lines of ḡulāms; one line was standing against the wall, with four-sectioned caps. In their hands they held arrows and swords and they had quivers and bow-cases. There was another line positioned down the centre of the hall, with two-pointed caps, heavy, silver-mounted waist sashes, weapon belts and silver maces in their hands. The ḡulāms of both these lines all wore cloaks of Shush-tari brocade. As for the horses, ten had bejewelled accoutrements and twenty had plain, golden ones. There were fifty Dīlamīs with golden shields, ten of which were ornamented with jewels. The high-ranking servants of the state stood by, and outside the portico of the palace there were many palace attendants and a crowd of infantrymen (ḥhashar), all armed.

The court celebrations then took place. The great men of state and the holders of high rank came forward. Enormous quantities of largesse were distributed. The prominent people, governors and great men were invited to sit on that dais, and the Amīr held court, seated on his throne, till morning, when the nadīms came in,
greeted the Amir and distributed largesses. Then the Amir rose, mounted and made off to the garden. He changed his robes, rode back and sat down to feast in the splendidly-adorned hall. The nobles and great men of state came forward to the table too. Other tablecloths were spread outside the hall, to one side of the palace, and the sarhangān, khaillāshān and other groups of the army sat down there and began to eat. The musicians struck up and wine flowed like water, so that gradually, those who had become drunk left the tables. The Amir rose up from the table in a mood of great joy, mounted and rode off to the garden. They organised a splendid majlis there, similar to the first. The nadīms came along and they all settled down to drink wine till the evening prayer. Then they went back". 104

For supplying the opulent clothes, carpets and hangings mentioned here, the Sultan depended in part on the customary presents brought by governors and tributary rulers at Naurūz and Mihrgān and in part on taxation levied in kind, for most cities of the empire produced textiles and rugs in some form or other. But we know that in Bahrāmshāh's time (512-47/1118-52), and doubtless before then, there were also royal workshops, kūr-khānahā, supervised by a Mihtar and a Mushrif, where the rich embroidery of the ṭarāz was sewn on to the robes. 105

The running of the palace and its ancillary departments was organised on lines reminiscent of earlier Islamic courts and, ultimately, of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. At court, the Sultan was withdrawn from contact with the masses, except when he held majālim sessions. 106 Normally, his entourage consisted of his nadīms, the bureaucracy officials and the leading military commanders. Access to the royal presence came only through the intermediacy of
the Court Chamberlain, a eunuch (the Āghāchī-khāqān khādīm), who also performed such personal services as waking up the Sultan, and was in charge of the inner living quarters of the palace. At court, strict protocol was observed; Maḥmūd once hit a well-known traditionist on the head for speaking without permission and made him deaf for life. For the Sultans' majlis-i nashīt u sharāb, poets, musicians and clowns were brought in, and to wait on the topers there were the sāqās, of whom Ayān was chief in Maḥmūd's time. The smooth functioning of the palace service and its needs, (in particular, provisioning and financial expenditure) was the responsibility of the Wakil-i khāqān (see below, 159 ) and of the Āghāchī (domestic affairs and staffing). An office of Katkhudā, overseer of the chambers of the harem and of the royal princes, is mentioned in Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd's reign (451–92/1059–99). The Āghāchī had a staff of eunuchs and pages. The pages were often younger members of the royal family, sons of tributary princes or hostages taken from the families of the Sultan's commanders. Most of the eunuchs were probably castrated in the slave-markets of Transoxania or India, but ghulāms were also castrated at the Ghaznavid court itself. It is not known whether black eunuchs were used; they were certainly used as harem attendants by Maḥmūd's neighbour in Sīstān, Khalaf b. Aḥmad. 111 The eunuchs had special charge of the Sultan's harem. The harem and its attendants usually accompanied the Sultan, the army and the Dīwānī on their peregrinations, and they were then housed in special tents. On the death of a Sultan,
it is likely that the new ruler took over those of the wives and concubines whom he desired. When Māhmūd died, the Sultan's women were looked after by his sister, Ḫurra-yi Khuttalī, and those who were no longer wanted were assigned estates on whose revenues they could live. When Muḥammad was deposed after his brief reign, he had to make over his harem, together with other possessions, to Masūd. Hence, far from the comparative freedom of women in Turkish steppe life, the Ghaznavids immured their women in the confines of a harem system, with all the traditional concomitants such as eunuchs; and this system became so tightly knit that Bahramshāh is said to have been reluctant to allow even a physician to treat a slave girl in the harem.

Because the Ghaznavids inherited much of the former Sāmānīd empire, they acquired a considerable proportion of the Sāmānīd bureaucracy personnel. Some of these merely remained at their posts in the Dīwān of Khurasan when Māhmūd took over there, others were attracted to Ghazna when the Qarakhanids took over Transoxania. Such trained men as these were welcomed in the Ghaznavid bureaucracy, for the expansion of the empire under Māhmūd enlarged its sphere of operation and the volume of work which it had to cope with. These former Sāmānīd officials strengthened the continuity in traditions and techniques between the Sāmānīd and Ghaznavid administrations.

Māhmūd's first Vizier, Abū'l-ʿAbdīs Faql b. Aḥmad Isfārā'īnī, was a Ḫurrašānī. Shabānkhāra'ī errs in describing him as a former Vizier of the Sāmānīds, but he had been a secretary in Fāʾiq's employ. On the defeat of Fāʾiq and Abū ʿAlī Sīmjūrī, he went over
to Sebük Tigin, and when Maḥmūd gained the throne, became the new Sultan's Vizier. From the evidence of his nisba, the family of Maṣūd's Vizier ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAbd al-Rūz was originally from Fārs, but according to ʿUtbī, his father ʿAbū Ṭahir had served the Ṣāmānid ghulām general Ḥusayn ad-Daula ʿAbūʾl-ʿAbbās Tash as his confidential secretary (Ṣalāt al-dīwān asrāʿīri). ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz himself began his career as katkhudā of the Khwārizmshāh Altūntash, and ended up as Maṣūd's Vizier (see below, 138). The Ghaznavīd official ʿAbūʾl-ʿAsim-i Kāthīr, whose name appears frequently in Bāihāqī and who had been head of the Dīwān of Khurasan, came from a family which had long served successive masters of Khurasan; his grandfather Kāthīr had been such a talented katkhudā of ʿAbūʾl-Ḥasan Ṣīmūrī that the Ṣāmānīd Amīrs had frequently tried to get him directly into their own service. An experienced treasury official (dāʾīr-i khisāna) of the Ghaznavīds, ʿAbūʾl-Ḥasan Quraishī, had been formerly a secretary in the Ṣāmānīd treasury at Būkhārā, but had been brought back to Ghazna by the Vizier ʿIsfandīrī. The Amīr ʿAbūʾl-Faḍl Ziyād b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, who came from the prominent Bāihāq family of the Ziyādīs, had been governor of Bāihāq under the Ṣīmūrīs, and although he suffered temporary imprisonment when they fell, he soon found favour with Maḥmūd and was appointed his deputy in Khurasan when Maḥmūd had to hurry eastwards and deal with his brother ʿIsmāʿīl. The Sultan was less successful with another civil servant from Bāihāq, ʿAbūʾl-ʿAbbās ʿIsmāʿīl ʿAnbarī; ʿAbūʾl-ʿAbbās had acted as Vizier for the Ilīg Naqr, but refused to accept the same office from the Ghaznavīds, and was imprisoned for his recalcitrance and died.
Shortly before his death, Maḥmūd annexed Ray and Jibīl and so became the possessor of lands formerly ruled by branches of the Būyids. Hence there is, perhaps, a subordinate strand in the formative factors shaping the Ghaznavid administrative system, the influence of Būyid practice, but this contribution can only have been small compared with that from the Sāmānids, for Ghaznavid control over central Persia lasted less than a decade. We learn from Miskawaih that the administration of the Būyid territories was based on the procedures of the Abbasid Caliphate, although the Dailamī origins of the Būyids and their dependence to a considerable extent on a tribal following brought about changes in the systems of land tenure and taxation in western and central Persia. Any borrowings from Būyid practice would supplement the more important ones from the Sāmānids, for the ultimate parent of both these administrative systems was Baghdad. In an anecdote of the Siyāsat-nāma, ch. XLII, a group of unemployed Būyid dabīrs and mutaqarrīfs in Ray contemplate emigration to Khurasan, where they believe that Maḥmūd’s well-known munificence to scholars and appreciation of talent will surely bring them recognition and employment. As Qazwīnī notes, the anachronisms in this tale make its authenticity doubtful, but we do hear of instances where men passed from Būyid to Ghaznavid employment. Bihāqī mentions a Ghaznavid commander who had previously been a sipahsūr-i Shāhshahshāh, and the Dailamī element in the Ghaznavid army was an important one (see below, Part II, 243-4). The Qūfī Shīrāzī, to whom Maḥmūd gave an important post in India (see below, 168-9), came into the Sultan’s service from that of
the Buyids. When Mahmūd dethroned Majd ad-Daula of Ray, the Buyid administration there continued to function as a provincial diwān of the Ghaznavids, with a sphere of operation embracing Ray and Jibāl. As with the take-over in Khurasan, much of the old personnel must have stayed on. This was the case with Abū'l-Qalā'ī Muhammad b. Hasūl, who later became known as the author of a propaganda tract for the Seljuqs, the Tafdīl al-Atrāk ṣā'ir al-ajnād. He had previously been Vizier to Majd ad-Daula, and then after the capture of Ray, was given a secretarial job by Mahmūd; by the time of the Seljuq invasions he was heading the Diwān-i Rasā'il at Ray, and finally he passed into the service of yet another master, Tughrīl Beg. 120
Chapter Six

The attitude to power

In Part III of his book Sultan Mahmūd, 126-50, Nazim surveys the administrative system of Mahmūd of Ghazna. From a patient winnowing of Baihaqī's history and of the excerpts from the Maqāmāt of his master Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān incorporated in the Āthār al-wuzarā' (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 12-13, 37), together with details from the later source of the Siyāsat-nāma, he has built up a straightforward account of the Sultan presiding over his administration, with its diwāns and its officials. It is not the intention here substantially to add to what Minorsky has called "a valuable reconstruction of the administrative machinery under Mahmūd" (BSOS, VI, 1930-2, 1024). Unfortunately, Nazim's reconstruction only takes us to a certain point; we know what the bare bones are, but we are still ignorant about what made the system really work. What ethos guided the Sultan and his chief officials and what was their attitude towards the subjects? In what ways did the subjects, townsmen and peasants alike, feel the hand of the state? How did the state exact the taxes and services due to it, and what limits, if any, were recognised to these demands? Nazim is silent here, and the imperfect
state of the sources does not allow us to fill out the whole of the picture; but there is enough information for us to assess in broad outline what principles and assumptions guided the men who ran the empire and, to a much less extent, how the subjects themselves reacted. Such questions are relevant in considering why the Seljuqs were able to conquer Khurasan, for the purely military and strategic factors (described below in Part V, "The ascendancy of the Turkmens in Khurasan") are insufficient to explain the total failure of Ghaznavid power there. We must look further back into the forty years or so of Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan; and if our specific material on that province under the Ghaznavids is not so abundant as could be desired, we can tentatively apply the more general deductions which can be made from conditions in the Ghaznavid empire as a whole.

Some of the formative factors which moulded Sultan Maḥmūd have been mentioned: his education in the Perso-Islamic tradition, and his inheritance of a large part of the former Sāmānid empire, together with much of its personnel and many of its techniques. The Perso-Islamic bias to his upbringing was undoubtedly the predominant influence in his attitude towards the exercise of power. The Turkish steppe background, into which his father had been born, was overshadowed by the influence of the Islamic milieu in which he had to rule and the Persian officials with whom he had to work. Such men as Alptigin and Sebūktigin are classic examples of the transformation of the Turkish military slave, brought into the Islamic world at a young and impressionable age, plunged into the sophisticated environ-
ment of Muslim civilisation, rising to high command within it and having to deal with the complexities of political and administrative life there. Very soon, religion as well as culture became a barrier between such men and the steppe past. Although Islam was spreading through the steppes in the 10th century, there was still much paganism there, and in any case, it is not to be supposed that there was much in common between the subtle Ḥanafī mutakallimūn, whose company Mahmūd affected to enjoy, such as the Tabānīs, the Ṣāfīidīs and the Nāṣīḥīs, and the Ṣūfīs and itinerant preachers who carried the faith from Transoxania and Khwārizm into the steppes. Men like Alptigin and Sebūktigin were initially déracinés in the Sāmānīd empire, but speedily integrated themselves into the Persian world around them.

The great stronghold of Turkish nationality and feeling in the Ghaznavid empire was of course the army, a considerable proportion of which was Turkish. Those who had passed into the Ghaznavid empire via the Sāmānīd service had had some opportunity to adapt themselves to the Perso-Islamic world; but there were always fresh elements arriving from the steppes with only a brief transit through the Islamic lands along the Oxus. The inability of two Turks, AsīghtIGIN (spelt in BaihaqI "ĀṣaftIGIN") GhāzĪ and Eryaruq (Aryāruq), whose fighting qualities had raised them to high military rank, to find their way about in the complexities of life in the capital Ghazna, is remarked upon by BaihaqI:

".... these two prominent men, Eryaruq and Ghāzī, had no reliable person to advise them. These two generals lacked a pair of katkhudās who were efficient, competent in official procedure and with wide
experience of the world. Obviously, what could one expect from Sa'did the Money-changer and other lackeys like him, of obscure position and little worth? The Turks just acted according to the guidance of men like these, without regard to what the final outcome and disastrous effect might be. They had no experience, and although they were perfectly ready to expend their efforts and their lives, and possessed extensive wealth and belongings, they lacked judgement and had no familiarity with official routine (dabīrī). They lacked any foresight [lit. "could not distinguish between today and tomorrow"], so were inevitably powerless against misfortunes.\(^{121}\)

It must be noted, however, that until the annexation of Khwārizm, the Ghaznavids did not have direct access to the Central Asian steppes for recruiting Turkish troops; often they acquired them through the Transoxanian slave markets, and after the fall of the Šāmānids, Ghaznavid access to the north had been partially blocked by their rivals the Qarakhanids.\(^{122}\)

It was mentioned at the outset (above, 74-5) how in the eastern Islamic world, the Persian administrative tradition had become prominent by the 11th century, and as a result of this, we have the rise of what E.I.J. Rosenthal has called the "power state". It was noted, too, that the spread of this form of political organisation was connected with the orientalisation of the Arab Caliphate. Especially noticeable in this process was the dependence of the Abbasids first of all on their Khurasanian guards, the abnā' ad-daula, and then, from the 9th century onwards, on a mercenary and slave army recruited from all parts of the Caliphate and beyond. Whilever
a ruler had to depend on the *levée en masse* of his free subjects, as the early Caliphs depended on the Arab *mugātila*, or on a tribal following, as many Central Asian dynasties of Turkish or Mongol origin did at a later period, he could not hope to free himself from dependence on his subjects and to demand unfettered obedience. When he acquired a slave or mercenary army which had no ethnic or territorial links with the rest of his subjects, he might find it turbulent at times, but he could be sure that there would be no bond of sympathy between it and his subjects. Hence he could be sure of its ruthlessness in dealing with unruly subjects (see further, below, Part II, 224 ff.).

This may be considered as the military aspect of the process. The social aspect was the rigid division of society within the state. This differed from the hierarchisation of social groups in earlier Middle Eastern cultures. In the early Caliphate, the community of freemen (we must always remember the substratum of slaves and *mawāli*) had its aristocracy of noble Arab blood, but there was also at the side of this a feeling that moral and intellectual factors in part determined whether one belonged to the *šayṭān* or *khawārīyī*. In ancient Iran, as in ancient India, class divisions were rigid and were determined by birth; the Avesta divided society into three classes, to which a fourth was added in the Sassanid period. But in the Islamic power state, there was only one dividing line, that between rulers and ruled (in the later terminology of the Ottomans, that between *Askers*, comprising both military and civil ruling elements,
and Re'ayg). In the 10th and 11th centuries there was nothing predestined about which of the two divisions a man might belong to. The Mirrors for Princes might expatiate on how God designates certain outstanding men to be kings (cf. the opening words of the Siyāsat-nāma), but in practice kingly power was often gained through military force, political shrewdness or merely through favourable circumstances, as the maxim ad-da'ula ittifaqīt hasana implies. Whatever exalted genealogies might be later supplied, most Islamic dynasties of this period arose from lowly or even slave status (Ṣaffārids, Ghaznavids, Khwārizmshāhs of Atšz's line); from invading tribal groups (Seljuqs, Qarakhanids); or from local chieftains or dihqāns of middling status (Ṣamānids, Būyids, Ziyārids, Ma'mūnid Khwārizmshāhs). Dynasties that could genuinely trace their ancestry back to a long line of kings, like the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs, were very much the exception.

The political theorists of the power state were always concerned with laying down moral bases for kingship, for Ibn Khaldun's wāzir, the institution which curbs the individualist and anarchic instincts of mankind and which guarantees an ordered form of society. Our concern here, however, is with the practical effect of this concept in the Ghaznavid dominions, i.e. the gratitude and obedience which the subjects must always show towards the Sultan who stands between them and chaos. Three passages are quoted here from authors of the 11th century, each of them touching on the relationship of kings and subjects.

Mīqān al-Mulk says:
Concerning subjects, God Most High has created kings to be over all mankind; all mankind are beneath their sway and derive their means of life and their degree in society from them. Hence they [sc. the kings] must always keep them [sc. the subjects] in such a position that they know their stations and never remove the ring of servitude from their ears. 125

Baihaqi's views on this topic, representing as he does the kātib class who put the commands of the Ghaznavid Sultans into action, are of special interest. He employs the analogy, familiar from the political theory of so many cultures, of the human body. In the body he distinguishes three forces: (1) that of the guiding intellect and the faculties which serve it (khirad u sukhan, nafs-i ġuyanda); (2) that of anger, revenge and self-defence (nafs-i khashm-i ġīranda); and (3) that of passion and desire (nafs-i ārā). These he compares with the ruler, his army and his subjects:

"You must realise very clearly that the nafs-i ġuyanda is the king - commanding, masterful and overbearing. He must administer justice and punishment as whole-heartedly and firmly as possible, and not in an ineffective manner; and when he shows kindness, it must not be so as leave an impression of weakness. Furthermore, khashm is the army of this king, by means of which he uncovers [the enemy's] weak points, makes secure [his own] vital points, frustrates the enemy and protects the people (raqiyyat). The army must be fully-prepared; when it is thus ready, it is able to carry out the ruler's command. The nafs-i ārā is the subject population of this king; it is vital that they should be in complete fear and trembling of the king and the army, and give [him] obedience". 126

Thirdly, we return to the Siyāsat-nāma for the credo attributed there to Bahrām Ğūr's Vizier Rāst Ravish. Here, the relationship of ruler
and ruled is conceived of as being always in tension; any latitude
given to subjects diminishes the majesty of the ruler and will lead
inevitably to rebelliousness, for if they are given an inch, they
will always take a mile. The Vizier is made to say:

"The subjects have grown insolent because of our extremely
equitable rule and have become impudent. If they are not punished,
I fear ruin will appear [in the state] .... Be severe on them,
before ruin becomes visible. For know that severity is of two
kinds: destroying evil-doers and confiscating the wealth of the
good". 127

In the Ghaznavid empire under Maḥmūd and Masʿūd we see these
attitudes of mind on the part of the ruler made the mainspring of
political action. The darker side to the rule of these Sultans
was well brought out by Barthold, Turkestan, 291-3, and must constant¬
ly be born in mind as the background to Nazim’s biography of Maḥmūd.
Especially noticeable is the discouragement of what we might call
local solidarity and self-help. The words in use today in the
Middle East for "patriotism" (waṭaniyya, waṭanparastī, vatanperverlik)
are neologisms, and the concepts of both "patriotism" and "national
feeling" are very recent ones in the Islamic world. Certainly,
these terms could not be used with reference to the 11th century
without serious qualification. What we can speak of are regional
and local solidarities of feeling and interest, and the Ḳasabiyyāt
of one province or town against another. For most people at this
time, the rural district in which the peasant worked or the town in
which the artisan or shopkeeper lived was the limit of their world.
Protection of their homes and freedom to pursue their avocations in peace were what these people essentially expected from the government to which they paid taxes.

It would have been an abdication of this responsibility if the ruler had left the subjects to defend themselves. Yet the Ghaznavid Sultans denied their subjects a limited right of self-defence, even when the Sultan was unable to bring help in time against external attackers; arms which were used to repel attackers might be turned against the Sultan himself. As the Sultans saw it, the great cleavage was between all rulers on one side and all subjects on the other, not between the ruler and the ruled of one kingdom as against the ruler and ruled of another. This is especially clear in Maḥmūd's reprimand to the people of Balkh when in 1006 they resisted the Qarakhanid general Ja'far Tigin. In a determined resistance against the attacker, royal property was damaged, and this attracted the Sultan's wrath. He told the townspeople that they had no right to resist the enemy and so place his own property in jeopardy; subjects must resign themselves to whichever ruler shows himself the strongest. There was some logic in the Sultan's words. The army alone did the fighting, and subjects should not arrogate this function to themselves; on the other hand, if the ruler was impotent to protect them, they should not let any feelings of loyalty prevent them from getting the best possible terms from the incoming power. This explains Maḥmūd's attitude when, towards the end of his reign, the Seljuqs were thought to be aiming at Ghazna itself. He resolved to leave for India, but
gave his officials full permission to stay behind in Ghazna and make terms with the Seljuqs, in whose service they could expect to find employment.

Lastly, we turn to what might be termed an ideological aspect of the Sultans' power, the buttressing of secular authority by the cachet of Sunni orthodoxy, achieved by the establishment of cordial relations with the Abbasid Caliphs.

In 389/999 Maḥmūd received the titles Yamīn ad-Daula wa Aṃīn al-Milla for his recognition of the Caliph al-Qādir in the khūṭba in Khurasan (the Samarānids had continued to recognise the deposed Caliph at-Tāʾī; see above, 79). During his reign, Maḥmūd felt the need for legal and moral confirmation by the Caliph of the accomplished fact of his empire; and Caliphal approval was also valuable against enemies like the Imāmīs of Māultan and the Shīʿī Būyids. He was always careful to include the Caliph's name on his coins; to send presents to Baghdad from captured spoils; and to depict himself in his fath-nāmas as a warrior for the faith, justifying the title of Ghāzi Amīr al-Muʾāminin which appears on the "Tower of Maḥmūd" near his tomb. The role of defender of orthodoxy against the Būyids was especially useful to him in justifying what was an act of pure aggression, the deposition of Majd ad-Daula of Ray in 1029. Whereas the Sultan had latterly grown dilatory in sending fath-nāmas to the Caliph after his Indian campaigns, one now came straight from the army camp outside Ray. In it, Maḥmūd boasted that through him, "God has swept away from this region the hands of the tyrants, and
has cleansed it from the daʿwa of the infidel Būtiniyya and the evil-doing innovators", and went on to justify his action by detailing Majd ad-Daula's uncanonical practices and the ascendency of heretics within his territories.

In his turn, the Caliph found the support of the greatest military power of the age useful against both the tutelage of the Būyids and the pressure of the rival Fāṭimid Caliphate, whose wealth and splendour completely overshadowed the impotent and poverty-stricken Abbasids. In support of the Caliph, Maḥmūd harried the Ismāʿīlīs within the boundaries of his empire; ostentatiously had daʿīs who strayed into his territories, such as the luckless at-Ṭhāhartī (see below, Part III, 356 ), executed; and satisfied the Caliph over his Vizier Ḥasanak's dealings with the Fāṭimids (see below, Part III, 348 ). Actions like these all contributed to the picture which grew up in later ages of Maḥmūd as the fanatic for religious orthodoxy, so that Shabīnkaʿī can say in the Sultan's praise that he was said to have executed over 50,000 heretics and dissidents.

Under Maṣūd, loyalty to the dynasty continued to be identified with religious orthodoxy. Early in his reign, he proclaimed his imperialist ambitions in the west, embracing the freeing of the Caliph from Būyid constraint in Iraq and the opening-up of the Pilgrimage route; attacks on the Būyids of Kirmān; an invasion of Qūmān from Makrān and dislodgement of the Qarāmītā from there; ghazw against Rūm; and attacks on the Fāṭimid Caliphate. On gaining the throne from his brother and rival Muḥammad, Maṣūd was careful
to secure a Caliphal patent of investiture for his territories, and
this was renewed when in 422/1031 al-Qadir died and al-Qasim succeed-
ed in Baghdad. Rich presents of indigo, cloth, jewels and aromatics
were sent for the Caliph and his retinue. When the new Caliph's
envoy came to Nishapur in 424/1033, bringing a fresh string of
laqsabs for the Sultan, Mas'ud again swore to act as the hammer of
heretics:

"They brought forward the turban and sword, and the Sultan
declared, 'This turban which I am about to put on with my hand,
must be wound on by the hand of the Supporter of Religion'. He
put it on his head after the crown. He drew the sword and said,
'The Zanadiqa and Qaramiya must be uprooted, and the sunnat of my
father Yamin ad-Daula wa'd-Din thereby observed; moreover, other
regions which are in the hands of enemies must be seized by the
might of this sword". 137

There emerges from all this that the Ghaznavids were very
conscious of the moral benefits to be derived from Caliphal support
and that religious orthodoxy was regarded as a cement for the fabric
of the empire.
Chapter Seven

The Sultan and his servants

The Ghaznavid Sultans were despots who held their empire together by fear. Nazim mentions as an institution of the administrative system the so-called Council of civil and military leaders which the Sultan convened for opinions and advice on important issues. But as he admits, "... the council was nothing more than a deliberative and consultative body at best, and the Sultan was not bound either to ask or accept its advice." A body so nebulous and gelded of real power hardly deserves to be accorded an independent existence.

In current monarchical theory, to acknowledge the circumscribing influence of ministers could only be viewed as an encroachment on kingly power. Mahmud could only be made to accept advice indirectly. The quotation from Baihaqi given below, Part V, 458, shows how he was enraged by any contradiction; but on mature reflection, he might well quietly heed the advice. By this means, the appearance of total personal control of decisions was kept. Mas'ud was amenable
to the suggestions of certain of his ministers, but this was usually when the ministers in question were his own creatures and personal favourites, i.e. those who gave the advice which the Sultan wanted to hear anyway.

This explains the ascendancy in the early part of Mas'ud's reign of the Āriḍ Abū Sahl Zauzanī, whom Baihaqī (admittedly Abū Sahl's enemy) regards as the evil genius of much of the Sultan's reign. It was he who instigated Mas'ud to bring to trial and execute the former Vizier Ḥasanak on pretext of his being an Ismā'īlī. This course of action accorded with the Sultan's desire to uproot the men of the old regime, the Mahmūdiyān, who had either offended him in the past or who had supported his brother Muḥammad's bid for the throne (see below, Part V, chapter 4); but Abū Sahl was actuated by the motive of revenge for a slight he had once received from one of Ḥasanak's servants. He so ill-treated the captive Ḥasanak that the people began to murmur against him for his cruelty. Similarly, it was Abū Sahl's stimulation of the Sultan's avarice which led the latter to attempt in 1031 to recover the māl-i baţīat, the seventy to eighty million dirhams which Muḥammad had paid out to the military leaders, officials and courtiers on his accession in an effort to secure their loyalty. Mas'ud even hoped to recover the presents given to the court poets, musicians and buffoons. The Vizier Maimandī and the Chief Secretary considered the scheme unprecedented in the annals of the kings of Ḍaţjam and Islam; the attempt to collect the money failed in the end and served only to show up the Sultan's
avarice and arbitrary behaviour. 142

At last Abū Sahl overreached himself. In 1031 he tried to procure the assassination of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash, but the plot was revealed by one of Abū Sahl's enemies at court and so mis-fired. Unfortunately, the Sultan himself had been privy to the scheme, although his ministers Maimandī and Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān had known nothing about it. The revelation of the plot meant that all the officials' tact and diplomacy had to be employed to cover up their master's blunder; Altuntash's strategic position as a shield against the Qarakhanids and the Turkmen made him too important a personage to be alienated. The Vizier feared that the Khwārizmshāh might ally with the Qarakhanid ʿAlī Itīgin against the Sultan. Hence he insisted that Abū Sahl should be sacrificed, and he was dismissed from the ʿArd, imprisoned in the citadel of Ghazna and stripped of his estates and properties in Merv, Zauzan, Nishapur, Ghūr, Herat, Bāḏghīs and Ghazna. Masʿūd avowed that henceforth he would do nothing behind the Vizier's back or without his advice:

"Let the Khwāja know that after this, whatever is done in regard to matters of kingly power, finance or statesmanship, it shall always be done on the advice of and after consultation with him". 143 Abū Sahl was restored to favour in 1034, and after Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān's death, was appointed in 1039 to head the Diwan-i Bistālat; but his influence was never again allowed to become preponderant in the state. 144 Whether, if Maimandī had lived, the Sultan would have followed his judgement more closely, we cannot know. The probability is
that Mas'ud's high opinion of his kingly office, his arbitrariness and obstinacy, would not long have allowed him to work in complete harmony with the wise old Vizier. Certainly, he was soon on bad terms with his new Vizier, Aḥmad b. Ṣāḥib aṣ-Ṣamad. The latter had been katkhudā of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash. The Sultan had been so impressed at his skill in extricating the Ghaznavid forces after the Battle of Dabūsiyya, in which Altuntash had been fatally wounded fighting against AlīTigin, that he made him Maimandā's successor. He thus exchanged a quasi-military post for a civilian one. Despite the new Vizier's excellent conduct and reliable advice, Mas'ud soon grew suspicious, to such a point that he automatically opposed whatever good counsels the Vizier put forward. Thus when in 1037 a council was summoned to discuss where the Sultan should campaign next, the Vizier and the Chief Secretary were the only ones to oppose the projected Indian expedition; they both held that the threatening situation in Khurasan demanded the concentration of effort there, but their opinion was unheeded. After this, the Sultan and his Vizier remained on cold terms. Like the rest of the civilian officials, the Vizier complained of his master's capriciousness, his growing immersion in drinking and his neglect of personal attention to the menace of the Turkmens.

The Sultan was well aware that he could ill afford to dispense with an experienced man like the Vizier, and Aḥmad b. Ṣāḥib aṣ-Ṣamad survived Mas'ud and after his murder served the new Sultan Mas'udūd for two years. The uneasy relationship between the Sultan and his Vizier is seen in the care with which the latter secured specific
conditions of duty when in the autumn of 1040 Ḥasan appointed him to accompany the Prince Ḥasan to Balkh and Ṭukhāristān. It was usual for an official to have a contract or *muwāda* explaining the conditions under which he was taking office. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamad had doubtless secured a *muwāda* when he had accepted the Vizierate, but this was a new, additional one. It shows that the Vizier was especially anxious to maintain his rights vis-à-vis the Department of the Ġārid. Clauses of this contract deal with his relationship to the palace ghulāms and their commander and to the Commander-in-chief of the army and other generals. He also claimed some control over the army's pay arrangements and the right to appoint and dismiss the Ġārid's deputy. The text of Maimandi's *muwāda*, made when in 1031 the Sultan brought him out from imprisonment in India and restored him to the Vizierate, is known from the *Aṭḥār al-wuzarāʾ*, ff. 107a-110a (summarised in Nazim, Sultan Ḥasan, 130-1; for the *Aṭḥār al-wuzarāʾ* see above, Bibliographical introduction, 36-7). It was clearly advisable for officials to have a statement of their duties in black-and-white, in order to avert criticism for omissions and shortcomings and to avoid encroachments by other departments. The importance attached to this *muwāda* of 1040 between the Sultan and ʿAlī b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamad is shown by Ḥasan's order that the copies for each party should be engrossed in code, a procedure reserved only for documents of prime importance.

The atmosphere generally prevailing between the Sultan and his ministers may be inferred from what has been said above. We have
the explicit words of Abu Nasr-i Mishkan that "Kings often harbour fancies (khiyāls), and no-one can be sure, as he ought to be able, of what is in their minds or their hearts, nor can he discern what they really intend". Elsewhere he warns against the immediate execution of an order for someone's being put to death, for kings often change their minds and repent of their decisions. The institution of the muwāda shows that something with greater legal sanction than the undefined, paternal relationship of master and servant was felt as necessary by the bureaucracy.

As a typical representative of the Persian secretarial class and the author of a work on the secretary's craft, the ZInat al-kuttab, it is unlikely that Baihaqī's views on kingship and the divine ordering of events were much different from the accepted Perso-Islamic tradition. In his own words,

"Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets and another power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God".

However, there are some indications that the education in the Muslim religious sciences undergone by all literate persons at this time had made Baihaqī and his fellow-officials conscious of the claims of justice and morality in official life and had disinclined them from wholly accepting the most ruthless aspects of the theory of the power state. The all-presence within the Ghaznavid empire of spies and informers will be discussed below. Baihaqī is very disapproving of the fact that the mushrif whom Sultan Mas'ud secretly set over
his uncle ʿAṣṣad ad-Daula Yūsuf b. Sebūktigin was one of Yūsuf's own ghulūms, a ghulūm whom Yūsuf had cared for and treated as his own son; to Baihaqī, this was the ultimate in cynicism and ingratitude. Likewise, when Abū Naqr-i Mishkān was eventually told by the Sultan that during Muḥammad's lifetime, when his son Marūd had been governor of Herat, the latter had employed one of the officials in Abū Naqr's own Diwān-i Risālat as a spy for his own interests, he was deeply shocked at this deceit. He expostulated that, had he known, he would have thrown the official in question out of the Diwān, for "a treacherous dabīr is no use". 153

These attitudes seem to be evidence of a feeling amongst the Diwān officials that there were moral limits to the application of the internal spy system and that the atmosphere of mistrust which it engendered would, if unchecked, make honest administration impossible. As might be expected from a man who served several Sultans in turn, who recorded events carefully and who had much occasion to observe the harsh effects of government on the Sultan's subjects, Baihaqī seems to have made some reflections on the position of his class, that of the secretaries, and their position as intermediaries between the ruler and the ruled. These philosophisings have a rather more practical cast than much of the material in the "Mirrors for Princes". Ibn Funduq gives them in his biography of Abū'l-Fadl Baihaqī, without stating from which of his works they are taken. It is possible that they came not from the Mujalladat, the complete thirty volumes of which were not apparently extant in Khurasan even by Ibn Funduq's time, 154 but from the Zināt al-kuttāb; if this surmise is true, it
is unfortunate that a work of this interest has not survived.

Baihaqī says:

"The Sultan's officials should not accumulate treasure hoards, since this would mean attempting to share in the Sultan's power; for the accumulation of wealth and treasures is one of the prerogatives and procedures of kings. Nor should they pile up estates and mansions, for that is what subjects (raṣahā) do. The Sultan's officials have a rank and position midway between that of the subjects and the Sultan, superior to the one but inferior to the other; they must not try to emulate the Sultan in accumulating treasure hoards, nor the subjects in acquiring estates and incomes from landed property. They should be content with their official salaries. From this income, they can enjoy affluence, esteem and influence. They should not desire greedily a higher salary than this moderate one which they derive from the service of rulers. Purely temporal benefits should not be sought through the exercise of this rank in the state; for if they seek after rank, and work for purely temporal ends, both rank and wealth will slip through their fingers and they will lay themselves open to bringing down perdition on their souls".

Then he passes on to consider some of the moral obligations which the Sultan's servants ought to observe towards the subjects. Baihaqī himself had noted the trail of deprivation which the Sultan's court and accompanying forces not infrequently left behind. When the commissariat, which was organised by the Āriq, was inadequate to feed and house all the Sultan's train, living off the land or the imposition of irregular levies on the population was often resorted to. Baihaqī goes on to say:

"Wherever the royal court (dīr al-mulk) may be, it is necessary that this person [sc. the official] should have properly equipped
quarters (sarāy-i maʿāmūr) so that it is unnecessary for him to be billeted on the subjects. It is preferable for the ruler to take with him herds of sheep, wherever he establishes himself, because otherwise it means that someone without herds, who comes to greet the ruler, is unable to show the virtues of hospitality and liberalty. If the official is able, he arranges it so that his [sc. the host's] expenditure comes out of supplementary official funds (az marsūm-i ziyādat ēyad; or perhaps, "so that his expenditure is made up out of official funds", az marsūm ziyādat ēyad); this is only just and it avoids a [financial] catastrophe [for the host]. Also, it gives him [sc. the official] security from punishment or dismissal in whatever he says or writes. And if he uses his high position to succour the distressed and needy, he will have built for himself one of the pillars of felicity in the next world. In this way, he will avoid calamity in this world, and will secure for himself an abundant entitlement to God Most High's mercy in the next world". 155
Chapter Eight

The intelligence system

The day-to-day running of the empire was the work of the 
Diwāns, which, together with the royal treasury, wardrobe and harem, normally accompanied the Sultan on his progresses round the realm. The official papers and registers were loaded on pack animals, and when the court halted for a period, tents were set up to accommodate the government departments and their clerks. (Nazim's survey of Maḥmūd's administrative system does not clearly bring out the peripatetic nature of the central administration, but it emerges clearly enough from Baihaqi's pages, cf. 93, 256, 287, 452 and passim).

The Diwāns were continuously fed by reports and despatches from all parts of the empire and brought in by couriers, askudārān, munhiyān. These reports covered such matters as the conduct of local officials; famines, gluts and the prices of provisions; natural catastrophes; incursions by external enemies; and activities by bandits and questions of law and order in general. The gathering of all this information was done by a network of local intelligence officers and spies, and
their reports were conveyed to the centre by the couriers of the Barīd or postal-relay service. The service was, it goes without saying, organised for the benefit of the state and not for the use of private individuals. It was also used for the conveyance of important people, such as diplomatic and Caliphal envoys, to the capital. Occasionally, rare or perishable goods and foodstuffs were conveyed by it to the court. The etymology of the term Barīd has been traced back (in the first place, it seems, by Quatremère) to the Late Latin veredus "post-horse" and veredarius "courier", words used in Byzantine administrative terminology. The use of a communications network and of envoys to carry messages, however, dates back in the Near East far beyond Byzantine times. Herodotus and Xenophon admired the Achaemenid postal system, and this system was perpetuated by the Sassanids. The Arab Caliphs inherited the institution and found it equally useful, although they relied more on swift mounts than on well-constructed roads for speedy movement.

We may therefore view the Ghaznavid use of a Barīd and Ishrāfī system as deriving from the practice of the Sassanids and early Caliphs, spread eastwards by the successor states in Persia of the Caliphate, such as those of the Ṭabarids, the Šāmīnids and the Būyids. Such a system was a governmental necessity for dynasties which had territories disparate from each other in nature and geographically distant from the capital, as had the Caliphs and many of their successors. The Ghaznavids had the problems of great distances and mountainous terrain to cope with, so it was not surprising that military commanders on the periphery of the empire should be tempted
to rebel or that tax-collectors should divert more to their own pockets of the local revenues than convention of the time allowed. It was taken as axiomatic that the pride and arrogance of local governors made them insubordinate and that 

The Mushrifs and Şehib-Barıds were the sole means by which misdeeds could be reported and the vengeance of the Sultan made to fall on the miscreants. Thus to a certain extent, they acted as checks on oppression and arbitrary behaviour.

Karl Wittfogel has drawn attention to the care with which rulers in his "hydraulic" and "agro-managerial" societies devoted to the question of rapid communication and the conveyance of information. However dubious the value of his thesis to Middle Eastern conditions at the time we are considering, it is true that an effective spy system and a network of communications buttressed a ruler's power and enabled him to exert more pressure on the periphery of his territories. In the Islamic power state, the division of ruler and ruled was maintained largely by fear, and the ruler's life was often dominated by fear of plots against him from within his own court circle and family, of rebellious generals in the provinces, of peasant jacqueries, in short, fear of almost anything. The resultant atmosphere was, in Wittfogel's terse summary, "total terror, total submission, total loneliness".

The value of an efficient espionage system is stressed in the "Mirrors for Princes" literature. The Pand-nâma of Sebüktegin recommends:

"You should always keep spies to bring you news of foreign
kings, and armies, and of distant cities. In your own kingdoms and cities, you should keep honest Shih-Barids so that they may keep you acquainted with the condition of the people and of the justice and righteousness of your 'Amils'.

Nizām al-Mulk devotes four chapters to the topic maintaining internal and external security by means of spies and secret observers (chs. VII, IX, X, XIII). The aim of the system of post-masters, he says, is to keep subjects in a state of obedience and fear of punishment and so discourage revolts. Spies must travel continually up and down the roads of the kingdom, disguised as merchants, travellers, Śūfis, quacks and dervishes, reporting everything of note, for governors, fief-holders, officials and military commanders have a propensity towards rebelling.

The Pand-nāma cautions the ruler about his officials:

"Do not be unmindful of those who have been 'Amils for several years. They will spend the money which they have been saving for years to influence the governors and your servants, so that you may renew their appointment. Hence it is necessary that you should keep yourself acquainted with the condition of every revenue collector who has been in a village, town or city for two or three years, and get his accounts checked".

Nizām al-Mulk advises similar caution on the ruler's part:

"It is necessary continually to enquire about the affairs of 'Amils; if the 'Amil acts in the way we have just mentioned [sc. with compassion and justice towards the people], he may keep his office; but if not, he [sc. the king] must give it to someone more worthy .... It is likewise necessary to enquire about the affairs of Viziers and whether they are carrying out their duties properly or not, since the good or evil state of the king and the kingdom
is bound up with this official. When the honest Vizier is of
good conduct and sound judgement, the kingdom is prosperous, both
army and subjects are happy, contented and well-supplied, and the
king is relieved of worry. But when the Vizier is of evil conduct,
indescribable injury is generated within the kingdom; the king's
head is always spinning round, his heart is distressed and the land
is disturbed".161

Nizam al-Mulk also deals with the two men who were the mainstay of
the system of internal control, the Mushrif and the Sāhib-Khabar or
Sāhib-Barīd. The use of salaried officials such as these is clearly
a more practical procedure than the other suggestion he makes, that
the ruler should seek out the most virtuous citizen in each town and
make him his private eye/the local officials and the subjects. But
the great Vizier stresses throughout the Siyāsat-nāma that all offic¬
ials, and not merely spies and post-masters, should be paid adequate
and regular salaries which will put them above being bought or cor¬up ted. Any economies in this direction are false ones; the advan¬
tage of having trusty Mushrif is compensates ten or a hundred-fold for
the expenditure on their salaries. The pay of Mushrif and Sāhib¬
Barīds should, moreover, come from the central treasury, and not
from provincial funds or from levies on the people; in this way
their direct dependence on the ruler will be maintained.162 The
Ghaznavids made extensive use of these two officials for policing
their empire, but the Seljuqs let the internal espionage systems
lapse in the lands which they took over. Hence it is probable that
Nizām al-Mulk is here drawing upon Ghaznavid practice in his advocacy
of the system.
The Ādāb al-mulūk (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 48-50) devotes chapters to the Mushrif dar umūr-i mamlakat and to the Ṣāhib-Barīd respectively. From this first chapter, the Mushrif emerges as an official with a very varied number of inspec-torial duties, mainly in connection with the smooth running of the Sultan's household and the administration of his private property. Fakhr-i Mudabbir echoes Niẓām al-Mulk in advising that the Mushrif should be of good birth as well as cautious and discreet. His duties included the inspection of all royal workshops (karkhānas), where the tarkhāns and other items like cordials, herbs and aromatics were manufactured or processed for the Sultan's consumption or bestowal, and the planting of agents in the royal kitchens to watch that the food was properly prepared and that none of it was stolen. He looked after the supply of fodder for the royal stables and saw that the falcons and hounds were being cared for. Especially important was his oversight of the Sultan's herds of camels, cattle, sheep and buffaloes; he had to check that new births were recorded, that the beasts were branded with the Sultan's tamgahā and that the herdsmen were fulfilling their tasks properly. Finally, the Mushrif had to be present in battle with the army to take the Sultan's fifth of the spoil. Fakhr-i Mudabbir's emphasis on the Mushrif's inspec-torial and regulating duties reflects perhaps the development of the office in the later Ghaznavid period rather than the position in the first half of the 11th century.

However, there is some evidence that in the earlier period too
the Ghaznavid Mushrifs did have certain inspectiveal and executive functions. Possibly this secondary aspect of the Mushrif’s duties grew to primary importance after the Ghaznavid territories in the west were lost to the Seljuqs and the empire shrank in size, making an extensive internal spy system less necessary. In Baihaqi, the Mushrif is essentially a member of the internal espionage system, but Mushrifs also had some duties concerning enforcement of the Sultan’s decisions and other legal processes. When an official fell from grace, Mushrifs carried out his arrest and the sequestration of his property. On one occasion, Baihaqi himself, though at that time a secretary in the Diwan-i Risalat, was temporarily appointed a Mushrif. He accompanied an envoy conveying messages to two generals who had incurred Mas'ud’s displeasure and saw that the message was properly delivered. An office of Mushrif-i Khizana existed in Mas'ud’s reign; he was probably charged with keeping an eye on the activities of the officials and guards of the treasury.

The essential function of the Mushrifs, that of police and espionage work, was organised from a special government department, the Diwan-i Shughl-i Isrāf-i Maalakat. Its importance to the ruler of an authoritarian state in preserving his power is attested by the words of Sultan Mas'ud himself, who regarded it as more important than the Diwan-i 'Ard; and at the outset of his reign, he appointed as Chief Mushrif the man who had held the supreme office of Vizier in Muhammad’s reign. It was the ideal of the Sultans that the tentacles of the Isrāf system should stretch out and connect him with every important official and commander within the empire.
Because of their turbulence, the palace ghulāms (see below, Part II, chapter 1) were a source of potential danger. During Mas'ūd's reign we learn that the Sultan had a special mushrif planted among them. This man hung about the ghulāms' living quarters and gathered gossip and intelligence from their victuallers and suppliers (ḥawā'ij-kashān-i wūṭāchā); then he made a personal report to the Sultan. It was felt as especially necessary to have someone to report on the great military commanders. Usually, someone close to their hearts and particularly cognisant of their ambitions and intentions was chosen. Thus the katkhudās of the two Turkish generals Eryaruq and Asīghtigin Chāsī were suborned to act as spies over their masters; these two men were Persian secretaries who acted as the advisers of the slower-witted Turks. The Sultan often had spies over the higher civilian officials too. Being sharper and wiser than the Turkish soldiery usually was and being in the heart of the bureaucracy, of which the Department of the Ishrāf was itself a part, these officials were less likely to be taken in. Towards the end of his reign, Sultan Mas'ūd was on bad terms with his Vizier, Ahmad b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamad, and when the latter went out with an army to Balkh, Tūkhāristān and Khuttal, the Sultan secretly appointed one of the officers to be a muwakkal over the Vizier. Ahmad was quite aware of this, but did not let it interfere with his work for his master. The royal family itself was not exempt from the working of spies within it. Mas'ūd was intensely jealous and suspicious of his uncle Yūsuf b. Sebūktigin, who was an experienced soldier and a former governor of Khurasan. Fortunately for the Sultan's designs,
Yūsuf had a weakness for boys. He therefore commissioned Yūsuf's favourite slave to act as a spy over him, despite the fact that this ghulām owed his career and fortune entirely to Yūsuf. In this way, MasCjid was soon able to catch his uncle out in a doubtful move and lead him openly to confess his disloyalty. Spies were even planted in the heart of the bureaucracy and at court by rival members of the royal family. When Maḥmūd appointed his son MasCjid to be governor in Herat, he did not rely only on his tutor Rāhīn Khādīm's reports, but further employed ghulāms, valets, old women and musicians as spies there. Conversely, MasCjid received news of events at court through the intermediacy of a Turkish ghulām commander, Ḥanūṣaṭīgīn Khāṣṣa, and of his own aunt, Ḥizr-i Khuttalī, who was a fervent partisan in MasCjid's interests. More daringly, MasCjid succeeded in planting two spies in the Divān-i Risālat itself, unknown to the Chief Secretary; their presence was only revealed to Abū Naqr-i Mishkān when MasCjid became Sultan and decided to reward these two men with the offices of the Barīd of Sarakhs and the Ishrāf of Balkh and Tukhāristān respectively.

It need hardly be added that the spy system also covered external enemies. In the early Ghānāvīd period, the Sultans were anxious to know what was going on amongst the Qarakhanids and Turkmen in Transoxania, and spies were employed in the courts and military encampments there. Something approaching modern psychological warfare was practised at times. Sultan Ḫizr-i b. MasCjid used his official Mihtar Rashīd to create an atmosphere of mistrust and
treachery in the camp of the Seljuq Sultan Malikshah. Mihtar Rashid promised substantial payments to the Seljuq Amirs and other officers if they would betray their master. Incriminating documents from this correspondence were then left in a sack ostentatiously dropped near Malikshah's own tent in the encampment, with the aim of undermining his confidence in his troops.

It was noted above that the postal system depended on mounted couriers conveying reports from the sbib-Barids in the provinces. For extra safety, messages were often concealed on the courier's person or on his mount, especially when the envoy had to pass along the edge of hostile territory, as did an envoy coming from Khwârizm; we hear of messages being concealed in hollow staffs, in hollowed-out shoemakers' tools, in the lining of boots, in the lining of water-bottle holders and in saddle-cloths. Furthermore, messages were often written in code (muçammâ); at court, the secretaries of the Correspondence Department deciphered them, whilst when messages were sent out to military commanders in the provinces, the commanders' katkhudâs did the decoding.

The Sultan appointed the chief sbib-Barids and Mushriks himself. They had to be thoroughly trustworthy, for the central government depended on them exclusively for news of happenings in the extremities of the empire such as Ray and Khwârizm, and had to form its policy on the basis of their reports. The office of sbib-Barid was not infrequently a stepping-stone to offices as high as that of the Vizierate; and according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, sbib-Barids were as a
profession always scholars and learned men, writing many books. We hear of a Abīl-Ḥāṣid Abūl-Fadl Ahmad al-Abīwardī, being appointed Shib-Bari of Nishapur by Mahmūd. The line between Shib-Bari and Mushrif was not always a hard and fast one; the man who in 1033 was appointed by the Sultan as Shib-Bari of Nishapur was also secretly charged by the Vizier to act as his personal spy over the Qāmīd (Civil governor) of Khurasan, Sūrī. To complete the police and communications network, the Sultan had watchmen, talā'īc, along all important roads within the kingdom, and he had at his disposal pursuivants and bailiffs, muwakkalān, who made arrests and carried out distraints on goods and property. Finally, the local officials and notables, sāyān, who acted as wakīls of crown property in the provinces, could be alerted to apprehend fugitives.
Chapter Nine

The financing of the empire

The Ghaznavid rulers required immense amounts of treasure to run their administration and to keep the momentum of expansion going. With regard to this requirement, there are three points to note.

Firstly, the Ghaznavid state had a strongly military and imperialist bias. As will be described later (below, Part II), the military machine of the Ghaznavids combined features from earlier military practice. In particular, it had a nucleus of slave soldiers, ghulāms, who gave personal loyalty to the Sultans and who came from several nationalities. The purchase or hire of soldiers for professional armies such as this entailed great expenditure. Previously, armies of free citizens or tribesmen had usually had the obligation to equip and feed themselves, and when the campaign for which they had been summoned out was over, they had returned to their peace-time callings. The evolution in human society of armies from a feudal or tribal basis to a paid, professional basis has generally
meant an increase in state expenditure. Fresh taxation and a larger administration to collect it have then been required, so that the power of the ruler and the state vis-à-vis the subjects has grown. This process can be seen at work amongst the Ghaznavids, but they were fortunate in the financial resources which they could tap, i.e. the rich provinces over which they ruled in the west and the plunder obtained from the Indian campaigns. A corollary of this was that the Sultans could pay their armies mainly in cash and did not, like the Buyids and Seljuqs, have to resort generally to a system of military feudalism and landgrants (see below, Part II).

Secondly, the immediate needs of cash for the Sultans' campaigns were great. Mahmud's campaigns have been carefully elucidated and classified by Nazim, Sultân Mahmûd, 42-122; see also, Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 434-78, Sir Wolseley Haig in Cambridge History of India, III, ch. II, and M. Habib, Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznî, 23-59. Those of Mas'ûd were equally far-ranging, even though the peak of expansion had passed when he assumed power, and he made no significant territorial additions to the empire left by his father. In the latter part of his reign, the fabric of the empire began to crack under the Turkmen's attacks, but even then, the liquidation of the Ghaznavid assets in the west was an expensive business. The warfare between the less mobile Ghaznavid professional forces and the Turkmen skirmishers, often indecisive, swallowed up whole armies. There was no compensatory booty to be taken from these miserably-equipped nomads; moreover, their depredations were ruining the
Thirdly, there was the luxurious court life and the heavy superstructure of the bureaucracy, which was not flexible enough to be cut back as the momentum of the empire ground to a standstill and then began to go back. The Sultans lived opulently; and habits of extravagance contracted in times of affluence cannot easily be curbed in times of ill fortune, when there is always the hope that prosperity is once more around the corner if only one can hold on long enough. The administrative network had grown in complexity as the empire expanded; the members of the bureaucracy had acquired a corporate feeling of interest, and the machinery of state now went forward under its own momentum. 182

The sources of the revenue which fed the Ghaznavid state, and the methods by which it was collected, will now be examined. In particular, we would like to know how oppressive was the burden of taxation, for there are many indications that taxes were often collected brutally. These sources of revenue will be considered under five headings:

1. crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans;
2. escheats to the Sultans and confiscations by them;
3. tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, etc.;
4. war plunder;
5. normal taxation, the kharraj, and extraordinary levies.

Firstly, crown lands and private possessions of the Sultans. In the Islamic world at this time, there was little distinction in practice with regard to the ultimate disposal of the monies a ruler
had, i.e. there was no water-tight division between his Privy Purse and the Public Treasury. Certainly, within the Abbasid Caliphate there were two separate financial organs, the Bait al-mūl and the Bait mūl al-khāṣṣa, and in his survey of financial practice as it was in the last days of the Baghdad Caliphate, Nādir ad-Dīn Tūsī distinguishes very carefully between the mūl-i maqālih-i pādīshāhī and the khāṣṣa; but as Mez pointed out, the Caliph could draw on either of the two without having to account to anybody. Often, when the Public Treasury was exhausted, the Private one was used. This procedure resembles that which Nīzām al-Mulk recommends: that the ruler should have a khāzīna-yi kharj for everyday expenses and payments and a khāzīna-yi asl for capital deposits. The latter should only be tapped in emergencies, and money taken from it regarded as a loan therefrom.

In the Ghaznavid state, there was some duality of organisation in that there was a Diwān-i Wikālat which administered the crown lands and supervised the financial side of the running of the Royal Household. However, its operations did not extend outside this limited sphere, and in this respect, the Ghaznavid system was not so developed as that of the Abbasids. Under the Sultans, the Diwān-i Wazīr was the premier financial department. It received and disbursed the monies, whilst its ancillary, the accounts office (Diwān-i İstifā'), registered the transactions in its ledgers and accounted for them. Income from the Sultans' private possessions, apart from that specifically expended on the Household, seems to have been utilised through the departments of the Vizier and Mustauff.
It was the Wākīl-i khamq who normally administered the personal
estates of the Ghaznavid family, the dīwān-i khamq, but at times,
some of the lands seem to have been given to other officials. One
Bū Sa`īd-i Sahl, an old retainer of Maḥmūd's brother Naṣr b. Sēbūktīgin,
held the overseership of the crown lands at Ghazna until he
further acquired the Dīwān-i Ghaznī, when he combined the two posts.
(The Dīwān-i Ghaznī was the local administrative office there,
permanently located in the capital, whereas the chief Dīwāns of state
were peregrinatory. The supervision of the Ghazna estates required
their overseer to be permanently resident there.)¹⁸⁵ The royal
family's lands were especially concentrated in the Ghazna area, where
the ihtimās originally granted to Sēbūktīgin formed their nucleus
(see above, 98-9). But they had other, lucrative properties,
estates and markets scattered all over the empire, such as the Būzār-i
Ēshīqīn in Balkh (see below, 190). It is likely that the
Ghaznavids succeeded to ownership of the former Sīmānid crown lands
in Khurasan, which, towards the end of the latter dynasty's rule,
had been appropriated by the Sīmjūrs. For the Ghaznavid family
Aqūfī there was a special kakhudā. As well as lands and properties,
the Sultans' private possessions also included herds of horses, sheep,
camels, cattle and buffaloes, whose tending required numerous
herdsmen and attendants. It was the practice in the spring of each
year to put the royal horses to graze in lush meadows, whilst the
camels were sent to the rich pastures at Ribāt-i Karwān, on the
borders of Gūsān and Ghūr. During his father's lifetime, Maṣūd
had his own flocks of sheep at Herat, where he was governor. Their numbers may be gauged from the fact that soon after his accession, Mas'ud was able to bestow 16,000 sheep from his personal flocks on someone whose faithful service had pleased him. There were appreciable opportunities for personal profit for the custodians of these flocks. When after fifteen years' oversight of the Ghazna flocks, the accounts of the Bu Sa'id-i Sahl mentioned above were investigated, it was found that in this period he had made seventeen million dirhams pure profit (ṣāqil-i maḥq), even though his personal income (tankhwāḥ) was only one million per annum. 188 Lastly, the Sultans' private possessions included their own treasure hoard, and this normally accompanied them in their journeyings. It came from such sources as paternal inheritance, personal savings and confiscations among the royal family; Mas'ud was very careful to see that the treasure of his deposed brother Muhammad came safely into his own hands. 189

Secondly, escheats to the crown and confiscations. The Sultan was ultimus haeres to those whose heirs could not be found, to those who were his personal slaves and to his eunuchs. 190 From the property and possessions thus gained, the Sultan often distributed movables and personal slaves among the royal family and granted out estates and military slaves to other commanders. When the Sultan freed any of his slaves, these freedmen still remained tied to their manumitter, according to the latter's right of wale', and the Sultan was heir to their property. It was normal on the death of a high
official that his accounts and personal affairs should be investig¬
tigated by one of the Sultan's officials. When Baihaqi's master in
the Correspondence Department, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, died in 1039,
the Sultan took over the only possessions he left, his personal
slaves and herds of beasts; these must have been originally granted
out as emoluments of his office, reverting to the grantor on Abū
Naṣr's death, for he certainly left children of his own. 191

The office of Vizier was traditionally a precarious one. The
Vizier's far-reaching control over affairs and the sources of profit
open to him, often aroused the ruler's jealousy over encroachments
on his own sovereign power and his cupidity at the Vizier's personal
gains. Similar temptations and dangers beset other high officials,
and many aphorisms were current in the Islamic world which contrasted
the perils of office with the joys of a life free from responsibility.
Hence men who thought the joys of power a poor exchange for the
dangers inherent in high rank, refused offices like the Vizierate. 192

The Abbasids had brought to a fine art the practice of muṣādara,
the process by which officials retiring from their posts were made
to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, and had set up a special depart-
ment for this, the Diwān al-muṣādara. 193 In their greed for money,
the Ghaznavids in no way fell behind the Caliphs, although they
lacked the refinements of torture which the muṣādirūn of Baghdad
had developed over the years. 194 Even so, the Ghaznavid "extractor
of information" (mustakhrij; often called, in Abbasid parlance, the
muṣlib) had at his disposal the rods, the lash and the rack, and
behind him stood the executioner as ultimate compeller. When
Māhmūd's Vizier Maimandī was being divested of his wealth, one of his
bitterest enemies was specially brought from Sarakhs to Ghazna and
Gardīz to act as mustakhrij. 195

Of the six men who acted as chief minister during the reigns of
Māhmūd, Muḥammad and Māmüd, three were dismissed and died violently
and another of them suffered disgrace and prolonged imprisonment.
Isfarīnī acted as Māhmūd's Vizier for ten years, extorting large
sums for his master from the luckless subjects. Yet the Sultan's
avarice was insatiable, and when the Vizier could squeeze the people
of Herat no further and he refused to make up the deficiency in the
revenue from his own pocket, Māhmūd tortured him to death. 196 The
next Vizier, Maimandī, eventually fell from favour, suffered various
torments and confiscations, escaped death very narrowly and was
imprisoned in India. He nevertheless survived the Sultan and died a
peaceful and honoured death as his son Māmüd's Vizier. 197 Māhmūd's
last Vizier, Ṣasanak, was executed by Māmüd shortly after his accessi-
on after he had "voluntarily" sold all his possessions to the Sultan;
in this way, an illusion of legality was preserved. 198 Surprisingly,
Muḥammad's Vizier, Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī, escaped Māmüd's vengeance and
was honoured with further important offices. 199 Māmūd's first chief
minister (it is not clear whether he was ever formally invested with
the Vizierate) was Abū Sahl Zauzanī; he was moved to another office
and was later dismissed under a cloud (see above, 136-7 ). The
new Vizier, Aḥmad b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamad, remained Vizier till the follow-
ing reign, but after two years of service to Maudūd, his enemies at
court procured his downfall, and he was jailed, dying of ill-treatment. Other high officials were liable to suffer musādara on leaving any office which could have given opportunities for private gain, and they frequently suffered rough handling in the process.

It was the Vizier who was finally responsible for safe collection of the taxes. Consequently, he kept a continuous watch by means of the Barīd system over the collectors, sumnāl, and the forwarding of the sum assessed for each collector's district was strictly required. If the sum fell short, either the ūmil had to make up the sum from his own pocket or else the money which he was withholding was wrung from him by force. It was Isfarā'īnī's reluctance or inability to make up the sum demanded by the Sultan which led to his downfall. In one of his qaṣīdas, Farrukhī describes what must have been a common occurrence: "Tomorrow when he [sc. the Vizier] demands an account from the Sultan's ūmils, their extortions will become manifest. The money which they have embezzled, he will recover from them to the last dīng, and will send them to prison". It was because of considerations like these that Maimandi, when he became Vizier once more, insisted in his muwāda with Masʿūd that the traditional practice in the appointment of the deputies of the Ṣibīl-Barīds and the Mushrīfs should continue to be observed. Whereas the Sultan personally appointed the chief officers in these police and espionage services, the Vizier had the right to appoint their deputies. The relevant clause of the contract explains that the Vizier must be assured of the subordinate officials' probity and
must be able to prevent any collusion between them and the Śamīls; otherwise, there will arise irregularities in the collection of taxes and officials will take from the taxes a greater share than their salary (mushāhara) allows. The recalcitrant Śamīl could expect at the least the bastinado, and if he still held out, the rack or mutilation of the hands and feet. At the end was death; trampling by elephants was one of the methods of execution used.

Maimándī's father had been nā'īb and Āmil of Bust, but because of his defalcations and confiscations of property, he had been denounced to Sebūiktīgin and crucified on a tree. A further method of control over Āmils was to take hostages from their families. In Māhūd's reign, the Āmil of Sīstān, Muḥammad-i Bī Ḥafṣ, had to send one of his four sons in turn to Ghazna each year, where they were kept as sureties for his honest behaviour.

Finally, in this section on escheats and confiscations, we may note income from extraordinary acts of expropriation, such as Māhūd's attempt to recover the māl-i baiqat which his brother Muḥammad had paid out (see above, 136-7, and below, Part II, 267), and a lesser but more constant stream of payments of pecuniary multls and fines for ordinary criminal offences.

Thirdly, tribute and presents from dependent rulers, governors, etc. Many lands were annexed outright; but in other cases rulers had to recognise the suzerainty of Ghazna, but it was not possible to bring their territories under direct rule. To have held down the Indian native rulers would have required enormous forces in closely-
spaced garrisons. The Caspian provinces were too unhealthy for troops accustomed to the bracing plateaux of Khurasan and Afghanistan to endure for long. Sometimes it was politically expedient to leave local rulers in possession; those of the trans-Oxus principalities of Khuttal and Chaghānīyān were left to hold their provinces as buffers against the Qarakhanids, Kumījīs and other marauders from Central Asia. (see below, Part V, 464, 468 ). Above all, there was the question of distance: it was administratively impossible for the bureaucracy in Ghazna to keep a regular control over such distant regions as western Persia or Khwārizm. In the outlying areas ruled by tributary rulers, the Sultan had to be content with the precedence of his own name after that of the Abbasid Caliph in the local minbars, the occasional requiring of contingents for his armies and the exaction of an annual tribute. This is called in contemporary sources māl-i ẓamān or māl-i muwāqqa, "tribute stipulated according to a covenant, muwāqqa*. 

Maljmud's conquests in western Persia in the last year of his life brought him into contact with the Būyids and with several minor Dailamī and Kurdish dynasties. He forced the Musūfīrat and Rawwādīd rulers at this time to pay tribute, but the region of Tārum, Sēwa and Āba did not remain subject to the Ghaznavids for long. A Dailamī rebellion at Qazwīn and Qum was suppressed in 1033, but Ghaznavid influence here was hampered by the great distance from Ghazna involved and by Turkmen pressure on the line of communication through northern Persia. The Khōyīds of Isfahan were also overawed as a result of Maljmud's Ray expedition. The Khōyīds were another
Dailami dynasty who, although they falsely claimed descent from the Bahwardid Ispahbads of Tabaristan, really rose to power under Buyid patronage. However, the son of the founder of the dynasty, 'Ali ad-Daula Muhammad b. Dushmanziyar, known as Ibn Kākūya (reigned 398-433/1008-42), cannot be classed as just another barbarian from the backwards Caspian highlands. The possession of such rich towns as Isfahān, Hamadān, Dinawar and Shūpūr-Khwāst enabled him to buy Turkish mercenaries and to make himself a power in central Persia. His court was a flourishing centre for the arts and sciences, and Avicenna eventually found refuge there from Ghaznavid pursuit, acting as 'Ali ad-Daula's Vizier until his death in 1037. Mascūd always regarded "Pisar-i Kākū" as a powerful and dangerous opponent. At the outset of his reign, he had to content himself with exacting tribute; on the Caliph's intercession, 'Ali ad-Daula promised to pay each year 20,000 dinars and 10,000 pieces of cloth from the local workshops, besides sending the usual Nawrūz and Mīhrgān presents. But in the succeeding years, Ghaznavid armies had frequently to march against him, and the tribute remained generally in arrears (see further, below, Part V, 460).

The Ghaznavids had especially close relations with the Ziyārids of Gurgān and Tabaristan. In the last decades of Sāmānid rule Qābūs b. Washmūr had intervened in Khurasanian affairs and taken part in the warfare between the rival Sāmānid governors and commanders. His son Manūchihr became Maḥmūd's son-in-law, but derived no special privileges from this. The Sultan's financial demands on him were exorbitant and continuous. He had to buy off Maḥmūd's support of a
rival to the succession, his own brother Mūrū, by an annual tribute of 50,000 dinars. When Maḥmūd marched against Mūrdān in India shortly afterwards in 1013-14, Manūchihr had to send a contingent of Dailamī troops. When the Sultan marched westwards to Ray, he was compelled to give a subvention of 400,000 dinars and supply provisions to the army. Manūchihr then feared that the Sultan might direct this army against his own kingdom, and assumed a hostile attitude; for this, he had to pay a further 500,000 dinars. When he died a few months later, his son Anūshirwān had to pay another levy of 500,000 dinars in order to secure recognition from Ghazna.

For much of Mas'ūd's reign, the effective ruler in Gurgān and Šabar-istān was one Abū Kālījār (on him, see below, Part II, 246). The Sultan tried to attach him to himself by a marriage alliance, but was nevertheless most careful that the māl-i damān should still be forwarded to the provincial diwān at Nishapur. Even so, Abū Kālījār was by 1035 two years behind with his tribute, and this was one of the reasons behind the Sultan's decision then to take a punitive expedition to the Caspian shores.

In dealing with India, it is not easy to distinguish regular tribute payments by the Indian princes from plunder brought back by expeditions. Since for most of the early Ghaznavid period there was no special diwān or permanent civil administration in northern India, income came in irregularly. Military force was often the only means of collecting tribute. The payment of tribute was usually stipulated in the peace treaties between the Sultan and the princes;
sometimes part of it was payable in elephants. Thus at some time after 1009, the Rājā of Narāyanpur (in modern Alwar state) made peace on the basis of an annual tribute, which included fifty elephants, and promised to send a contingent of 200 men for the Ghaznavid army. After the winter campaign of 1022–3, Ganda, the Rājā of Khezinar (near the modern Allahabad), promised a spot payment of 300 elephants and an annual tribute. The city of Multan had been since the early Arab invasions of Sind an outpost of Islam in India, but during the course of the 10th century had been won over by Ismāʿīlī Assassins. MaḤmūd, the hammer of heretics, captured Multan in 1006, and the inhabitants are said to have been forced to pay a fine of twenty million dirhams to keep the city from being sacked. Multan remained quiet for over thirty years, and it is probable that the Sultans were able to collect regular tribute from it, since it lay closer to Ghazna than did much of northern India. One valuable commodity taken from India as tribute was the dyestuff indigo (nilū). The Sultans reserved part of this for their own usage, and often sent it as presents for the Caliph or for other rulers.

Towards the end of his reign, MaḤmūd tried to establish a more permanent form of control over the Punjab, with a division of responsibility there. The military command remained in the hands of Turkish ghulām generals, based on Lahore, centre of the Muslim ghūzūs in India; but at their side was set up a civil administration under a Persian official, the Q̲̄̈̄rī Būʿl-Ḥasan ʿAlī Shīrāzī, of whom the Sultan though so highly that he had considered him for the Vizierate.
A Ṣḥib-Barīḍ was deputed to watch over both the military and civil heads. The intended division of functions is clearly laid down in the instructions sent out early in Mas'ūd's reign from Ghazna to the Qāqī: "Your job is management of the finances there (katkhudhūʾī māli) and you have nothing to do with the military command or the army. [The new Commander-in-chief] Aḥmad Inaltigin will himself carry out the duties required of him; he will exact the stipulated taxation and tribute from the native princes (māḥā-yī takkurūn basitānād az kharāj u muwādaqat) and then go out on plunder raids and bring back large sums to the treasury". It seems that this was an attempt to set up a civil administration in the Punjab with a regular system of taxation, as was the normal arrangement in the heartlands of the Ghaznavid empire. In the event, northern India was not pacified enough for this to work, nor were there adequate means of controlling officials there. Personal animosity poisoned the relations of the Qāqī Shīrāzī and Aḥmad Inaltigin, for they were unable to agree about the demarcation of their respective spheres. In the time of the previous Commander-in-chief, the Qāqī had gone round in military dress and had claimed to give orders to him; but Aḥmad Inaltigin had the backing of the Vizier Maimandī in Ghazna and, above all, of the troops and ghāzīs of Lahore. He used these forces and the money which he had kept back from the princes' tribute and from the plunder of his raid on Benares to rebel against the Sultan in 1033. The rebellion was suppressed, but northern India remained in a turbulent state, and the experiment of dual administration seems to have been
dropped.

Provincial governors and tributary rulers brought presents to the Sultan’s court on the traditional Iranian festivals of Naurūz in the spring and Mihrgān in the autumn, and in return, the Sultan dispensed hospitality on a munificent scale. At the Mihrgān celebrations of 422/1031, presents were received from the civil governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, from the Khwārismshāh Altuntash, from the Amīrs of Chaghānīyān and Gurgān; from the governors (wulāt) of Qusdār and Mākrān, etc. On another occasion, the ruler of Chaghānīyān brought to Masūd specialities of his country – powerfully-built horses, Turkish slaves, hawks, panthers for hunting, etc. Diplomatic relations with outside powers like the Caliphate or the Qarakhanids, with whom the Sultans had to treat on an equal footing, normally entailed an exchange of presents. Those exchanged in 1025 between Maḥmūd and Qadīr Khan Yusuf were especially luxurious; they are described in detail by Gardīzī. Many of the fresh Turkish slaves for the Ghaznavid armies came in the form of tribute or presents from the Turkish lands to the north (see below, Part II, 228). At the local level, the Sultans benefited from presents given by their subjects; it was the annual custom of one rich landowner of Ghazna to present the Sultan with pickles, savouries, dried meats and fine clothes.

Fourthly, war plunder. The rich spoils of regions like the northern Indian plain and western Persia were an important factor in making the Ghaznavid empire the most dynamic power known in eastern Islam since the Arab conquests. The Ghaznavids' professional
army was a salaried one that had to be kept permanently in existence and could not be stood down. In paying it, the regular income from taxation was most important, but the spoils of war supplemented this. Moreover, specific articles like weapons, valuables or slaves could be divided up amongst the soldiers in addition to their regular pay. Hopes of booty and religious zeal made ghazis flock to the Sultans' standards from all parts of eastern Islam; these irregulars did not qualify for regular pay, but could rely on rich pickings from the Indian campaigns. The ghazis also performed much of the work of garrisoning Lahore and other Ghaznavid strong points in India.

It is unnecessary to cite more than two or three sets of figures to show the extent of booty falling to the Ghaznavid armies; despite Muslim historians' penchant for round numbers and tendencies to exaggerate, its great size is apparent. From the temple in the fort of Nagarok in the upper Indus valley, Mahmūd is alleged to have taken in 1008–9 seventy million dirhams in coined money, 70,000 mānas of gold and silver ingots and rich clothing, a folding house made of silver and a richly-decorated throne. From the temple of Somnāth, he is said to have got over twenty million dinars' worth of spoil.

When Ray was captured in 1029, the army carried off about 500,000 dinars' worth of jewels, 260,000 dinars in coined money, over 30,000 dinars' worth of gold and silver vessels, 5,300 garments, suits of woven and Khusrāwī (?) clothes valued at 20,000 dinars and fifty loads of books, excluding those of the Mu'tazila, philosophers and Shi'īs, which were burnt forthwith.
Part of the bullion and precious stones taken from the temple treasures of India was converted into negotiable form by skilled valuers and assayers (nuqād) at Ghazna. Another part of it was used for ornamenting and enriching the Sultan’s palaces and their furnishings, in which precious metals and jewels were lavishly used (see above, 115-16). A further part of it was given away as āmil for the Sultan’s favourites, courtiers, poets, etc. To the pious, wealth brought back from pagan India was mel-i hālel, lawfully gained from the idolaters; it was very likely that money from taxation on the Muslim subjects had on it the taint of violence and oppression.

Perhaps the most important use of all for the bullion was for minting purposes. The Ghaznavids’ gold coinage maintained a high standard. Their early dinars, modelled on those minted at Nishapur by Maḥmūd when he was governor there, were probably of an average of 65–66 grains, but a considerable number of specimens are known which reach 76 or 77 grains. It has been noted (above, 101) that the silver coinage of the early Ghaznavids seems to be of a higher standard than that of the Samānids. There are extant dirhams of Muḥammad and Masūd (in both cases with mint and date illegible) with weights as high as 60 and 66 grains respectively, and one large silver coin from Maḥmūd (? Nishapur, 399/1008-9) of 76 grains. With the strong treasury backing such as they had, the Ghaznavids could have issued a trustworthy copper currency; in practice, there seems to have been so much silver available for minting that copper
currency was little necessary. The exception was that in the Punjab a mixed silver-copper currency continued to be minted on the old Hindu models. 228 There are some signs of a decline in quality of the silver coinage in the second half of the 11th century in the reign of Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd; on the other hand, there are some heavy silver coins known from the reigns of Bahrāmshāh and Khusrau Malik in the next century. 229 The high standard of the coinage in the reigns of Maḥmūd and Masʿūd facilitated trade between the Islamic east and India and across the Ghaznavid empire. Whereas for centuries India had swallowed up precious metals, from the mineral resources of Tibet and Central Asia and from trade with the Islamic world and the Turkish steppes, this process was now for a time halted and the terms of trade for the first time favoured the lands to the west and north-west of India. The flow of bullion stimulated trade and industry within eastern Islam; and it was partly because of this that provinces like Khurasan and Transoxania, though racked by warfare and other disturbances, were highly prosperous in the 11th century. Finally, the Indian campaigns yielded large numbers of slaves and the influx of slave labour into Ghazna and its economic hinterland drew slave traders and further stimulated trade. (see below, Part II, 229).

Fifthly, regular taxation and extraordinary levies. Here one realises how heavily the Ghaznavid state machinery bore at times on the population. Some general remarks have been made (above, 146 ff.) about the tyranny of Ḫānīlīs and the measures taken by rulers to
control their activities, but there are two further points to consider. The first concerns the harshness of the Qāmilis towards the subjects. Whilst many of them regarded their tenure of office as an opportunity for lining their own pockets, it is clear that others were forced into oppressive measures by the relentless pressure of the Sultan, for he showed no mercy towards Qāmilis whose quotas fell short of the stipulated amounts. The second point concerns the attitude of the subjects themselves towards their masters and towards authority in general. Gibb and Bowen have commented on this in regard to the Arab world in the 18th century, but their judgement has validity for other places and periods in Islam:

"The conception of authority implied in the minds of the subjects themselves an assertion of power accompanied by a certain measure of harshness and violence .... The prevalence of such a conception of authority may, at first sight, be put to the account of long centuries of misrule and oppression, supplemented by the tradition of quietism which was inculcated by the religious authorities and by an acquired habit of stoicism, passing into fatalism. But this explanation by no means covers all the facts. It seems rather to be a development of the basic idea that authority confers privilege .... Yet public opinion recognized certain limits to tyranny and exploitation. One may even speak of 'permissible extortions' or 'recognized abuses' as we shall see later, in the sense that they had become traditional usages". 230

Nevertheless, the exhortations of the "Mirrors for Princes" show that theorists of the 11th century often felt that exploitation went too far. Niẓẓām al-Mulk warns against pressing the peasants too far and against demanding taxes before the harvest is ready, so that
peasants are driven into debt or have to sell their possessions to find the money. Such a policy, he says, drives peasants away from the land and into foreign parts. In practice, the timing of tax collecting must have presented considerable problems, for the different crops on which taxation in cash or kind was to be levied ripened at different times of the year. Flight to the city or to another province gave the peasant an ultimate weapon if conditions grew intolerable. Before the Great Seljuq period, Khurasan and the east were as yet little familiar with the *iqṭāḥ* system as developed in western Persia, Mesopotamia, the Jazīrā and Syria by the Ḥamdānids and Būyids, and the peasants there were not yet *adscripti glebae*. In the 1030's the people of Khurasan were being heavily taxed by the Ghaznavids, but were not being properly defended against the Turkmen raiders. Hence peasants fled to the comparative safety of the towns, rural depopulation took place and there was a catastrophic fall in land values (see below, Part V, 504-5). Another frequent reaction of exasperated peasants was to break out in jacqueries against the authorities; in the course of these, *cāmils* might be murdered and tax registers destroyed.

The land-tax, *kharāj*, was collected by the *cāmils*, who brought in their yields to the provincial *diwāns*, where their accounts were audited. The collected revenues, whether in cash or in kind, were often temporarily stored in local strongholds and castles. When in 1038 the Turkmen were threatening Nishapur, the cash part of the revenues of Nishapur and other light and transportable items were
removed for safety to a castle belonging to the MIkâli family on the Nishapur-Sîstân road. It appears from the anecdote about the Khwârizmshâh Altuntâsh's allowance in ch. XLIX of the Siyâsat-nâma that the Vizier Maimândî always insisted that the revenues of the more outlying provinces, where central control was weakest, should go through the central DIwân at Ghazna. Only after they had been accounted for there was a part of the revenue to be sent back to the province for local salaries and expenses. Otherwise, the central administration had no idea of what a distant province was actually yielding, nor could it determine how much a local governor might be diverting to his own pocket. However, in the provinces which were not too distant from the centre, the regional DIwân normally deducted the expenses and salaries of the local administration before forwarding the surplus to Ghazna (see above, 164).

Collection of the revenues by local Qâmilû under the direction of the Qâmil or civil governor applied to those provinces under regular, civil government, such as Zâbulistân, Sîstân, Tûkhuristân, Khurasan and, for a brief period, Ray and Jîbêl. In a less pacified area like northern India, where a civil administration did not normally function (see above, 167 ff.), the military collected taxes. Since the collecting methods of the army were more violent than those of the civilian Qâmilû, the Sultan occasionally resorted to the issue of berâts, assignments of revenue to be collected personally by the troops in lieu of salaries paid by the DIwân, as a punitive measure in the lands of settled government. Masûd did this at
Amul in Gurg̣a in 1035 (see below, 186) and four years later against the people of Herat and the surrounding regions of Ganj Rustaq and Bādghīs, on the pretext that they had been helping the Turkmen invaders (see below, Part V, 512). Where the revenues of one region were insufficient to maintain the administration or army required there, supplementary assignments might be made on the revenues of another province geographically quite distant from the first one. In the above-mentioned anecdote of the Siȳa sat-nāma, Altuntash comes to the Diwan in Ghazna a year after he has been appointed ruler of Khwārizm (oc, in 1018) and demands his allowance (jamāt) of 120,000 dinars. The revenues of Khwārizm only cover half of this, so the Vizier Māimandī assigns him the rest from the yield of Sīstān and Bust. On receiving authorisations (berâts) from the Diwan, Altuntash's representatives proceed to Sīstān and Bust, collect the amount allowed and take it back to Khwārizm. The story also says that these taxes were levied in kind, comprising cotton, pomegranate husks, oak-galls, etc. Another source mentions that eggs and straw were taken in taxation during Maḥmūd's reign. In cases like these, either the Āamil converted them into cash locally, or else the professional valuers in the Diwan at Ghazna appraised them and produced a cash equivalent. The crops and other products collected as taxes in kind were then placed in granaries and storehouses, whilst beasts were kept in special enclosures or added to the Sultans' personal flocks.

The Persian provinces of Khurasan, and after 1029, of Ray and
Jibāl, were distant from Ghazna and were governed by local Divāns at Nishapur and Ray respectively. Each was presided over by a civilian Amīd, a Persian secretary, and at his side was the commander of the army of the province, usually a Turkish ghulām general. The civilian and military heads were equal in status and independent of each other, although they had naturally to work in co-operation. Liaison had to be particularly close in Khurasan during Mas'ūd's reign when military forces were operating there continuously against the Turkmens. Along the projected routes of the Sultan's armies, the Amīd of Khurasan, Sūrī, and the local ru'sasā and summāl were required to prepare provisions and fodder. Taxation collected in kind was also used for eventualities like this; not all of it was forwarded to Ghazna, but part of it was laid up in local warehouses, ribāts and castles for the army to use. The Siyāsat-nāma recommends the general adoption of this system: since requisitions on the peasantry by passing armies are both unlawful and impolitic, the ruler should have storehouses, filled up by local officials, in each village or ribāt. Dumps of provisions and stores such as these were further used in times of natural disaster such as famine, when seeds and foods were dispensed from them.

Mahmūd had handed over the governorship of Ray, Jibāl and the west to his son Mas'ūd. On his father's death, Mas'ūd had to rush eastwards and claim the throne, so it was necessary to leave there a strong army and administration for fear of a revanche by the Būyids or an attack by Ibn Kākūya of Isfahān. The city of Ray was a great
prize; its industrial position and commercial position along the highway connecting Iraq with Khurasan and Transoxania made it the richest city of northern Persia. In 422/1031 the Sultan sent a ghulām general, Tash (Tāsh)–Farrāsh, to Ray. His force of ghulāms and Turkmen auxiliaries were to accompany him, and these were to be provisioned and paid in the first place by the Diwan in Nishapur. Eight months later a secretary, Abū Tayyib Tāhir, was sent to take charge of civil affairs, but with the designation of katkhudā to Tash–Farrāsh, i.e. in a subordinate status to the military. A treasurer and a Ṣāhib-Barid were also sent out. This arrangement lasted till the beginning of 424/1033, but was not satisfactory, so Muḥammad's old Vizier, Abū Sahl ʿIlhamawi, was sent out with full powers as civil governor and with the title ash–Shaikh al–Qāmid, and a completely-equipped civil Diwan set up in Ray.

But Ghaznavid rule in Ray was now approaching its term. During their few years there, the Ghaznavids failed to keep local support. At the outset, their entry into Ray in 1029 had been welcomed by some sections of the population, exasperated by the turbulence and excesses of the undisciplined Dailami troops of Sayyida and Majd ad-Daula. ʿAlamād made an initial effort to win over the notables by giving robes of honour to prominent personages like the ʿAdī, the Raʾīs, the Khaṭīb, the Naqīb of the ʿAlids and the ʿAlūr of the Ghūzīs, and they in their turn expressed gratitude at deliverance from "the oppression and tyranny of the Qarāmīṭa [sc. the Shiʿī Dailamīs]". This fund of goodwill was based on the hope of firm, just government from the Ghaznavids, and shortly afterwards, when an attempt to
restrain Ray was made by Abū Kālibjār Fanāb Khusrāu b. Majd ad-Daula, the local people turned out in force with their own arms to help the Ghaznavids defend the city. Unfortunately for the ṭāṣṣīs, their new masters turned out to be as intolerable as the old. Financial demands were at the bottom of this revulsion. On arriving in Ray, Abū Sahl Ḫamdawī had to abolish the illegal levies and exactions (al-aqsāt wa'l-muṣdarāt) which Tash-Farrāsh and Tāhir had practised and which had reached such a pitch that many ṭāṣṣīs had fled the city: "Tash-Farrāsh had filled the land with injustice and tyranny, until the people prayed for deliverance from them and their rule [sc. of the Ghaznavids]. The land became ruined and the population dispersed".

Likewise, financial exploitation was the root of the Ghaznavids' inability to secure for their rule in Khurasan the loyalty of the people during the forty years which they had there. Although officials and governors were to some extent active there in the public works and charities conventionally expected of them, the Sultans regarded Khurasan, with its rich resources, as a milk-cow, and their interests in it extended little beyond this. It was distant from Ghazna and India was always a counterattractive influence. In their lack of any disinterested concern for Khurasan's well-being and defence, the Ghaznavids differed from the earlier Iranian rulers of the province, such as the Tāhirids and S麻mīnids, who had more fully identified themselves with its interests.

In the first part of Makhmūd's Sultanate, Khurasan suffered much from the financial policies of the Vizier Isfarā'īnī, who, it must
be admitted, was driven on by the insistent demands of his master (see above, 162). Of the Visier's Raubwirtschaft policy, 'Ubdi records that he extracted continuously and put nothing back: "[Affairs in Khurasan] were characterised by nothing but tax-levies, sucking dry (istidrār) and the lust for increased revenue, without any constructive measures (isti°aSr)". After some years of this, there was nothing to be got, "since in Khurasan, after water had been thrown on her udders, not a trickle of milk could be extracted, nor any traces of fat". Land went out of cultivation, peasants fled and the Emirs were unable to collect the required amount of taxation. During the Ilīg Nāqr's invasion of Khurasan in 1006, Nishapur remained quite passive, and a large group among the arqān of the province actively supported the Qarakhanids. Natural disaster added to the ravages of armies and tax collectors. Earthquakes occurred periodically. Khurasan was badly hit by the famine of 1011, when the corn failed to ripen because of early frosts and people were reduced to cannibalism. Pestilence followed, and spread all over Persia, so that at Fā furn in the west the Kurdish ruler Abū'l-Fath Muhammed b. 'Annāz died of it.

When Iṣfarā'īnī was arrested and jailed, Māhmūd appointed Maimandī, then heading the Department of the Ġard, to act temporarily as civil governor and collector of revenue in Khurasan. It is recorded that he paid such attention to affairs that nothing was ever in disorder there, and when the Sultan returned from his Indian campaign, Maimandī brought him "extensive quantities of cash and numerous
presents", "whilst the ra‘a‘yā of Khurasan were universally enthusiastic for him and attached to him, and their tongues were united in thanks and praise towards him". 247 If Maimandī really could please both Sultan and subjects at one and the same time, his short spell in Khurasan must have stood out from a generally unhappy picture.

During Mas'ūd's reign, the Qāmīd of Khurasan was Abū'ī-Faql Sūrī b. al-Mu‘izz. Just as Mahmūd had allowed Isfarā‘īnī a free hand in Khurasan provided the money came in, so did Mas'ūd leave Sūrī to drain the province dry. In 1031 Sūrī's Mihrān presents were "limitless"; two years later he sent a magnificent array of presents valued at four million dirhams, comprising cloth, gold and silver vessels, slave boys and girls, musk, camphor, rare fruits, pearls, striped carpets and fine linen. Baihaqī records that the Sultan exclaimed in delight, "What an excellent servant is this Sūrī! If I had a few more like him, it would be extremely profitable!", but the Chief Secretary, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, denounced Sūrī as a tyrant, who only sent the Sultan half of what he took from the people. The aqyān in Khurasan, he said, were being destroyed and were sending envoys and letters to "the leaders of the Turke" (sc. the Qarakhanids) in Transoxania inviting them to direct the Turkmen into Khurasan. Baihaqī himself voices the opinion of the high officials in Ghazna when he insists that Sūrī's policies were a direct cause of Khurasan's loss. The Vizier Aḥmād b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamad distrusted Sūrī intensely and employed the Qāhīb Barīd of Nishapur as his personal Mushrif over Sūrī. 249 This official, Abū'ī-Muẓaffar ʿAbd al-Jabbār Jumāhī, came from a prominent Baihaq family, and his class of notables and landown-
ers was suffering particularly from Sūrī's exactions. Abū'1-Muẓaffar was a fine poet and wrote many savage satires in both Arabic and Persian against Sūrī, which the Vizier passed on to the Sultan in an attempt to rouse him against Sūrī. Scraps of these verses are extant, including the following:

"Mas'ud's power collapsed through Sūrī's tyranny and misdeeds; he alighted on the people for hospitality, and left not one timber on another in their houses"

and

"Amīr! Pay heed to Khurasan, for Sūrī is denuding it of wealth and possessions;
If his tyrannical hand is allowed to stay extended, your interests there will be badly affected;
For that flock which you have entrusted to Sūrī, he will bring back to you like a shepherd who is clumsy at branding". 250

Nizām al-Mulk's father had Sūrī as his taskmaster and suffered under him. This man, Abū'1-Hasan, was ṣāmil and bundār (sc. tax-collector) at Tūs for many years, but as Seljuq depredations grew, the land suffered, the processes of agriculture were interrupted, beasts were carried off and the ṣamal of Tūs decreased. Finally, Abū'1-Hasan was unable to find the 50,000 dirhams demanded of him, so Sūrī confiscated his property and valuables to the amount of 30,000 dirhams, and took out a bond for the rest. 251 When the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in August 1038 was imminent, Sūrī fled with the local garrison, the movable part of the state treasury and his own money to a nearby stronghold and then to Qurğan, Thus to the people of Nishapur, the appearance of the Seljuqs was in
one sense a liberation. By now, Maçûd must have realised how Sûri's unpopularity had contributed to his difficulties in Khurasan; when in January 1040 Nishapur was re-occupied, he decided not to re-appoint Sûri, but to appoint his brother instead. After the battle of Dandînqûn, Sûri retired to Ghazna; later, he became Maçûd's Şahîb-Dîwan, but returned to his old ways of extortion, fell from favour and died in the fortress of Ghazna. He had tried to salve his conscience by public works and charities in Khurasan. He added to the improvements made by Fî'aq's old master, Abû Bakr Şâhmard, at the shrine of Calî ar-Rîqî in Mashhad, building a minaret and giving a village in waqf for its upkeep; he built a fine musallâ at Nishapur and embanked a stream which flowed through the Nishapur oasis with a stone and brick barrage against the floods caused by melting snows, again endowing them with waqf; and did other things at Farâwa and Naseb. But it was the humane Baihaqî's opinion that these benefactions in no way compensated for the misery he had caused.

The province of Sîstân passed into Ghaznavid hands after Maçmûd had invaded it in 393/1002 and dethroned the Şaffârid ruling there, Khalâf b. Abûmad. After the suppression of a revolt in the next year, during which Maçmûd's pagan Hindu troops behaved extremely savagely, sacking the Friday mosque of Zarang and killing the Muslims in it and killing the Christians in their church, an administration was set up in Sîstân with the Amir Naqîr b. Şebûktigin as governor and a civilian qâmil to collect the taxes. The first of these qâmîls, Muhammâd-i Bû Hafl, made the province ruinous by his exactions, and
as in Khurasan, the distress caused by financial exploitation was consummated by the famine and plague of 1010-11. Because the Sagazīs hated the Ghaznavid yoke so much, the province was never at peace whereler they ruled there. Khwāja Bū Maṣūr-i Khwāfī became ḫāmil in 1010, and "during his term of office there were always a thousand men in Sīstān engaged in revolt". In Mas'ūd's reign, the ḫāmil had to take draconian measures against the ṣayyāras (see below, Part III, 325) and to levy heavy fines (muṣādarahā) on the urban leaders and rural gentry (ṣarhan-e qaṣaba u mihtarān-i rūstā). When the Turkmen began to appear in Sīstān, local leaders gladly used them to throw off Ghaznavid control. 255

It is clear from what has been said about Ghaznavid financial methods in the provinces of Ray, Khurasan and Sīstān that they were often very harsh. Hence it is not surprising that the rulers and peoples of neighbouring lands, although they might have to pay tribute to the Sultans, were anxious to keep their financial agents from direct interference in internal administration. We have seen how the people of Ray speedily became disillusioned with Ghaznavid rule. The experience of another province of the Būyids, Kirmān, was similar. Early in his reign, Mas'ūd sent an army there and conquered it from Abū Ḳālijūr Ṣīmād ad-Dīn of Fārs's representatives. The Ghaznavids set up a civil administration there and began to collect taxes, but the exactions of the governor Abū'īr-Paraj Fārisī were so intolerable that the aṣyān of Kirmān sent secretly to Ṣīmād ad-Dīn's Vizier Ibn Māfinna and in 1034 a Būyid force ignominiously ejected the Ghaznavids.
The Ziyārid kingdom of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān was tributary to the Ghaznavids (above, 166-7). By the winter of 1034-5 its ruler Abū Kālījār was two years behind with his tribute. Masʿūd decided on a punitive expedition to the Caspian shores, hoping to give his army a break from the climatic rigours of the Khurasanian plateau, where provisions and fodder were in short supply. Moreover, the cost of the warfare against the Turkmens was causing serious financial difficulties, and the Sultan aimed at getting the two years' arrears of tribute from Abū Kālījār and at levying a dinar per head on the population of Āmul, whose numbers, he believed, amounted to a million. Abū Kālījār and his retinue withdrew westwards into the unhealthy and impenetrable jangal of Ṭabaristān and Rūyān. The Sultan vented his disappointment on the unfortunate people of Āmul. Whereas on arrival in Gurgān he had forgiven them a year's taxes, he now decided to mulct them to the tune of a million Nishapūrī dinars, 1000 sets of Rūmī and other clothes, 1000 carpets and rugs and 5000 pieces of linen. He threatened that if this were not paid promptly, it would be extracted forcibly by a mustakhrij and by the army, to whom berāts would be assigned for collecting the taxes. The Vizier exclaimed that the whole of Khurasan would not yield such a sum, but nevertheless he had to pass on the Sultan's commands to the aṣyān of Āmul and their head, an Ālid. "Know", he began, "that your master the Sultan has incurred great expense in sending and army here and in clearing out these oppressors. These provinces must give him a fitting subsidy (nathār)". The aṣyān pointed out that the traditional rate, the "permissible extortion" from Gurgān
and Tabaristān had always been 100,000 dirhams and some carpets and cloth.

Faced with the Sultan's demands, a large number of the citizens fled. These fugitives were rounded up from the surrounding countryside by the military. A Diwan for extracting the money was set up and the soldiers got to work. After four days' sacking, when 160,000 dinars had been collected, Āmul was set on fire. Baihaqī expresses his shame at having to record the affair; the Ghaznavids had made the paradise of Āmul into a hell. They brought much discredit down on themselves; from Āmul, a stream of people went to Baghdad to complain of the Sultan's tyranny, and the news travelled as far as Mecca. Mas'ūd now realised that, by a process of revulsion from the Ghaznavids, Abū Kālijār's position among his people would be stronger than ever.
Chapter Ten

Building construction and labour services

Something has been said on the splendour of court life under the early Ghaznavids, their many palaces and gardens and the assimilation of their way of life to the typical luxury and conspicuous consumption of Persian monarchy (above, 114 ff.). The heavy expenditure which the upkeep of these buildings and gardens and the maintenance of this opulent standard of living entailed has also been noted (above, 157). Because of drains on resources similar to this, one can often discern at various places and times in Islamic history much popular feeling against the constructional extravagances of rulers; it was a clear factor in the unpopularity of the later Umayyads. 261

Maḥmūd and Masʿūd were both great builders, although little of their work has survived today. The effects of an extreme climate; natural catastrophes like earthquakes and floods; the ravages of war; the use of comparatively perishable materials like sun-dried brick,
since stone and even fired brick were infrequently used; the theft of building materials by local people; all these combined to make much building work, however splendid and imposing at the time it was put up, impermanent and transient. How often in the sources does an author note that an edifice was put up only a few decades before the time of writing, but is now ruinous or totally disappeared! Nazim mentions some of Maḥmūd's public works, which included bridges, aqueducts and irrigation channels; of these, the Band-i Maḥmūdī, just north of Ghazna, has survived and has been still used in recent times. 262 Ghazna itself was sometimes exposed to inundations caused by sudden rainstorms or melting snows rushing down the bed of the river which ran through Ghazna. Baihaqī records a particularly disastrous flood in 1031 which wrecked most of the markets and caravanserais of the town and necessitated Sultan Masʿūd's building a new bridge across the river. Irrigation works by the "Kings of Zābul" are mentioned in the Herat and Bādghīs area. 263

Of architectural works, the tombs of Sebūktigin and Maḥmūd are still in existence (the contemporaneity of the latter one - at least in its extant form - with the Sultan's death is, however, dubious). The well-known brick minaret or tower of Maḥmūd stands today on the old site of Ghazna. 264 The work of the French Archaeological Delegation in Afghanistan brought to light in 1949-51 the shell of the great Ghaznavid palace of Lashkar-i Bāzār at Bust, the modern Qal‘at-i Bist. 265 Since Maqdisī mentions the gaskar there, it seems probable that it was Sebūktigin who first began this.
Baihaqi connects this lashkar-gāh "at the Polo-Field at Bust" with Maḥmūd, and states that Masʿūd made additions to it which were still in part intact when he wrote thirty years later. Although only Lashkar-i Bāzār seems to have survived at all, we learn from Baihaqi that the Sultans possessed palaces and gardens in every important city of the realm. In Herat there was the cAdnānī palace, which was reconstructed and added to by Masʿūd (see above, 114-15). In Balkh, Maḥmūd possessed a lucrative market, the Bāzār-i ʿA-shiqīn, and a splendid garden, the upkeep of which was a distressing burden on the local people. It was probably in this garden that there was constructed the ʿAbd al-ʿĀl palace. In the Nishapur suburb of Shādyukh, Masʿūd built to his own design a palace with pavilions and courtyards, since there had not previously been an official residence there for the Ghaznavids. In Ghazna itself, Maḥmūd had a palace at Afghān-Shāl, and there was a ʿAd-Dārā garden with the White and ʿAbulī pavilions in it and a ʿĀrūsī garden where the Sultan was eventually buried; but Masʿūd decided to design and build a new palace for himself at Ghazna (see below).

Such buildings were erected by the time-honoured oriental way, described by Wittfogel as especially characteristic of his "hydraulic" societies, of corvées. We have evidence for the organisation of these labour services in the Islamic East both before and after the coming of Islam. Like so many others of the cities of Persia, the foundation of Nishapur was attributed to the Sassanid Emperor Shāpūr, who imposed corvées on the local people. Such was his frenzy to get
the construction finished, so the story goes, that the masons had
to be there before dawn each day, and those of the subjects not there
by sunrise were thrown alive into the mortar and plaster of the
walls. 272 When Abū'L-Abbās al-Faḍl b. Sulaimān at-Tūsī was
governor of Khurāsan (166-71/783-8), he ordered the Arab Amīr of
Bukhārā to construct a fortified enceinte around the city to protect
it from the Turks. The wall was completed by 830, but later Amīrs
added to it and large sums of money and corvées on the local popul¬
ation were required to maintain it, until the Šemānid Ismāʿīl b.
Ahmad relieved the people of this burden. 273 The first story may
not be historical, but the two instances do demonstrate how normal
was the use of corvée labour for large-scale constructional works.

Although the Sassanids had used bodies of peasant infantrymen
in their armies as cannon-fodder, this usage was not followed to any
appreciable extent by the Islamic rulers who relied on professional,
often slave, armies (see below, Part II, chs. 1, 2). The Ghaznav¬
ids relied on their professional soldiers and ghulāms, although
we hear that their opponent Calitigin supplemented his forces with
Turkmens, including the Seljuqs, and peasant levies (ḥasbar) at the
battle of Dabūsiyya in 1032. 274 But the Ghaznavids did make use of
peasant levies (ḥasbar, mard-bīlān) for their building operations.
Baihaqī more than once stresses Mascūd’s passion for building and
his skill as the architect and planner of his own works. The new
palace which he built at Ghazna took four years to complete, cost
seven million dirhams and was erected by corvée labour. In this
case, the workers may have been paid. But Baihaqi says that the
building was already dilapidated when he wrote. He also mentions
corvées for other purposes. When the Sultan wanted to hunt, a
peasant *hashar* was assembled by officers of the army after consult-
ation of the registers kept for this purpose; it seems that there
was some kind of a rota. Another *hashar* was organised to clear snow
from the roads into Ghazna when the Sultan's army was due to return.

This use of forced labour was undoubtedly a burden on the shoulders
of the population, who not only paid taxes on the products of their
own hands, but had also to provide labour service. However, the
practice has lasted in Persia and Afghanistan down to the present
day.
Notes to Part I

Chapter 2


2. Mardâwîj's forerunner, the Gâfînî Asfâr b. Shîrûya, was not a Muslim, and at Qâzîmîn threw down a muezzin from his own minaret; Mardâwîj asserted that he was the rûh of Sulaimân b. Dâ'îd, and openly celebrated the Zoroastrian feast of Sadhak (Masûdî, Murûj, IX, 10, 19 ff.; Misk., I, 162, tr. IV, 182; IA, VIII, 222 ff.).


4. Turkestan, 212-13, 225-6. There is a revealing anecdote on the relative characters of the Thâhirîds, Saffârids and Sâmânidîs in Ta'rîkh-i gazîda, 380 = Ch. Schefer, Description .... de Boukhara par Mohammed Merchakhy, Paris 1892, 101. The most penetrating account of the Sâmânidî dynasty is still Barthold's, op. cit., 209-70, but many problems in the elucidation of their history remain. See further, idem, Four studies, I, 12-17; Spuler, Iran, 76-90, 99-100, 107-11; Nazim, Sultan Mahmûd, 180-3; a brief survey by R.N. Frye, "The Samanids: a little-known dynasty", MW, XXXIV, 1944, 40-5; E.E. Oliver, "The decline of the Sâmanîs and the rise of the Ghaznavîs in Máwara-un-Nahr and part of Khurasan (With some unpublished coins)", JASB, LV/2, 1886, 91-106 (from translations only).

5. the alleged descent from Bahrâm Chôbên and not from Bahrâm Gûr
is confirmed by Narshakhî, Bîrûnî and the M{i}jma al-tawârikh, and by later authorities like Yâqût, Ibn al-Athîr, Jâzîrî and Mîrkhwând. It is difficult to see why a tradition ascribing to the Sîmânîs a Turkish origin should have grown up (given by Rashid ad-Dîn, quoted by Togan, Girî, 55 n. 2).

6. I Hauq. 2, 468-9 (the first half only of this passage in Isût, 292); Maqd., 338-9. In reality, taxation in the Sîmânid dominions was not always so idyllically light, especially latterly (see above, 85). With regard to the small reserves, Baihaqi records that when in 999 Bughra (Bughrî) Khan entered Bukhârâ, he found "limitless wealth and rich treasuries" (Ta'rîkh-i Masûdî, 199). Frye, History of Bukhara, 127 n. 145, gives the geographers' statistics of the tax yield of Transoxania under the Sîmânîs, and notes that it was a large sum in comparison with the yield of other parts of the eastern Caliphate.

7. Mîrkhwând, IV, 16; Samâ'îlî, f. 341b; cf. Barthold, Turkestan, 246. According to an anecdote from Abû'l-Faql Balîsamî in IA, VII, 194, Ismâ'îl b. Ahmad himself set a standard for his successors by his cultivation of the ulema; but this may be a later touch from the time when the picture of Sîmânî orthodoxy and piety had taken shape.

8. Naṣr b. Ahmad's conversion by the extreme Shî'î fiqh is given at length in the Siyâsat-nâma, ch. XLVIII, and in the Fihrist of Ibn an-Nadîm, Cairo 1348/1929-30, 266, but not in any of the historians. Hence whilst Barthold accepted it as historical (op. cit., 242-5), Qazwînî ridiculed it (Siyâsat-nâma, 220-2, n.) and considered it to be one of the tales which grew up in Nîzîm al-Mulk's time when the Ismîllîs were much in the public eye and their exploits magnified. If it did take place, then Naṣr's adhesion to the Shî'a was an exception to the staunchly Sunnî and Hanafî opinions of the other Amîrs.

9. Ta'rîkh-i Bukhârâ, 109, tr. Frye, 93, and 153 n. 313.
10. **Hilāl as-Sābi', in** Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate, III, 340-5, tr. VI, 365-70. In fact, the Sāmānids' attitude here seems merely to have reflected the general feeling in Khurasan for ʿAbd ʿAl-ʿUzzā. Ibn ʿAbī Šaibah says: "They did not pronounce the khutba in Khurasan for al-Qādir-Billāh until the year [3]89 when Maḥmūd b. Sebūkhtīn conquered the regions of Khurasan. Previously, the people of Khurasan had remained faithful to their allegiance to ʿAbd ʿAl-ʿUzzā and had said, 'Whilever ʿAbd ʿAl-ʿUzzā remains alive, his rights shall not be contested, and mention of his name shall not be stopped from the pulpits" (Kitāb raʾaʾ māl an-nādīm, f. 187a, cf. 205a). Despite Maḥmūd's arguments in the fath-nāma to al-Qādir, he had in fact been quite content to follow the lead of the Sāmānids in acknowledging ʿAbd ʿAl-ʿUzzā and not al-Qādir; the coins minted by him at Nishapur before 389 all bear ʿAbd ʿAl-ʿUzzā's name at the side of his own and that of the Sāmānid Amīr (F. Thomas, "On the coins of the Kings of Ghaznī", JRAS, IX, 1848, 271-2, 307; S. Lane Poole, Catalogue of oriental coins in the British Museum, 1875-90, II, 131; Oliver, "The decline of the Sāmānids ... ", 134.

11. the Sāmānids' coins often have the titles "al-Amīr as-Sayyid", but sometimes these are absent and the ruler's name, alone and without prefix, appears (Lane Poole, Catalogue, II, 103-6, 116 and passim).

12. Narsh., 31-2, tr. 25-7 (Rīḍawī's text, like Schefer's, 24-6, is corrupt here; see Barthold, Turkestan, 229 and n. 7); cf. Spuler, Iran, 337-8. For the general organisation of the dīwāns at Baghdad, see A. Mez, Renaissance of Islam, Eng. tr. 76-88, and R. Levy, Social structure of Islam, 325 ff.; for the financial departments there, see al-Khwārizmī, Maḥfīth al-Culīm, ed. Van Vloten, 54-8 (= Spuler, Iran, 338 n. 1).

13. Maḥfīth al-Culīm, 53-79. The Department of the Army is not mentioned in Narshakhi's list; it is probable that it was not fixed, but accompanied the army wherever it campaigned.
14. the founder of the Simjûri line, Abû ʿImrân Simjûr, was actually a Turkish ghulân of the Sâmanîds, and governed Sîstân for them; but his son ʿIbrāhîm already held Qūhistân, and the family became hereditary lords of this region; cf. Samânî, f. 323a.

15. see Turkestan, 233-4, for a survey of the Sâmanîd dominions, to which should be added E. Sachau, "Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwârîzma", SBWAV, LXXIV, 1873, 286-8, for Khwârizm's relationship to the Sâmanîds.

16. Iṣṭ. 315 = I Ḥaq. 2, 491, with slight variations of wording. According to Marsh., 110, tr. 94, Isâmî b. ʿĀhmâd first made Bukhârâ the capital, whereas none of the earlier Amîrs of Khurasan had ever lived there before.

17. Marsh., 31, tr. 25. On the fall of the Sâmanîds, Bukhârâ lost much of its political (though not cultural and religious) importance, and did not again become the capital of a kingdom till the time of the ūzbega five centuries later (Barthold and Frye, EI2 Art. "Bukhârâ").


19. Gardîzî, 25-6, has an interesting passage about Naṣr b. ʿĀhmâd's Vizier Abû ʿAbdallâh Muḥammad b. ʿĀhmâd Jâhînî and his interest in the comparative study of institutions. According to this, he sought information about the palace organisations and diwânî in a number of places as far apart as the land of the Ūnî and China, and introduced the best elements from these at Bukhara. If the tale has any element of truth in it, it reflects Jâhînî's questing mind but does not affect the pre-eminence of Baghdad as the model for the Sâmanîd administration.
20. Barthold, Turkestan, 210-12; idem, Zur Geschichte des Christ- 
tums in Mittel-Asien, Tübingen-Leipzig, 1901, 31-2. The Talas 
raid involved the sacking of the capital of the Qarluq, and 
yielded an immense booty of prisoners and beasts (Muruğ, VIII, 
144-5; IA, VII, 322; an anecdote relating to this raid in 
Yaqūt, Muqājam, I, 841-2, s.v. "Turkistān"). In opposition to 
the view expressed here that Sāmānid policy in Central Asia was 
not essentially aggressive, see Frye, History of Bukhara, 118 
n. 92.


22. Iṣṭ., 327-8; I Ḥauq.², 489, 504-5; Ḥuddūd, 113; Marsh., 22, tr. 
18. The latter source states that Baikand was said to have more 
than a thousand ribāts, corresponding to the number of villages 
of the Bukhara oasis, which were manned in winter when the 
attacks of the infidels were intensified, and whose upkeep 
was an organised, communal obligation of the oasis. Similarly, 
the upkeep of the great ribāt at Parāwa on the northern rim of 
Khurasan was done partly by the local population and partly by 
people who came from outside and took turns there (Iṣṭ., 273; 
I Ḥauq.², 445; cf. Maqd., 320).


24. cf. E. Benveniste, "Les classes sociales dans la tradition 
avestique", JA, CCXCI, 1932, 131-4; S.P. Tolstov, Auf den Spuren 
der altchoresischen Kultur, Berlin 1953, 178, 226; Marquart, 
Ernährung, 66-7.

25. Iṣṭ., 289; I Ḥauq.², 465-6; Maqd., 285; I Baṭṭ., III, 4. On 
the dihqān classes in Sāmānid Transoxania, see Barthold, Hist. 
des Turc., 67-8, and in pre- and early Islamic Khwarizm, 
Tolstov, op. cit., 210-16, 241-2, 252, where, however, the 
Marxist element in his explanation of social conditions should 
be taken into account.

26. Hilal aq-Sābi', in Eclipse of the Abbāsid Caliphate, III,
373, tr. VI, 400; Gard., 48; below, Part II.

27. Ibn Funduq, Ta'rikh-i Baihaq, 130; cf. Turkestan, 259. A continuator of Narshakhi, in Ta'rikh-i Bukhara, 39-40, tr. 33, says concerning the kharaj of Bukhara that after the Sasmânis it was everywhere lightened. This fall in taxation reflects the changed political situation of Transoxania; the Sasmânid administration there collapsed and the incoming Turks did not replace it by anything so complex and costly to run.


29. see R.N. Frye and A.M. Sayîfî, "Turks in the Middle East before the Seljuqs", JAOS, LXIII, 1943, 194-207, for early infiltrations by the Turks.


31. Hijâri 12 Ramân Samarqandi, Châhîr naqala, 49 ff., Browne's Revised Tr. 33 ff.

32. Hilal as-Samî'i, op. cit., III, 373-4, tr. VI, 400-1.

Chapter 3


34. Sachau, "Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwârama", SBWAW, LXXIV, 1873, 292-311; Turkestan, 275-9; Nazim, Sultan Mahmûd, 56-60.

35. ibid., 61-2, 177-8.

36. ibid., 67-70, to whose references should be added TS, 346 ff.

37. Gard., 43-4; SN, ch. XXVII, 116; Shabânkâra'î, Majma' al-ansâb,
ff. 164a-b; cf. Turkestan, 250-1, and Nazim, op. cit., 24-5. As Barthold has pointed out, (Turkestan, 251 n.1), Niẓām al-Mulk's account of Alptigin's career is very favourable to him: he is always the aggrieved party; he is the faithful servant maligned by slanderers; his army is always perfectly disciplined; and the people of Zābulistān desert Lawīk and rally to him when they see his justice.

36. Cîtbî, I, 64-72; Jurb., 33-5; Gard., 54; TS, 326-7, 333; IA, VIII, 157, 359, 503; TN, tr. I, 74 (Nasau Lee's text, 7, has an omission here); Majmac al-ansāb, f. 166b; Mîrkhwâ, IV, 36.

39. according to the SN, 119, with 200 ghulāms and 800 ghāzīs; according to the Majmac al-ansāb, f. 164a, with 700 ghulāms and 2500 Tājīk followers.

40. SN, 122-3; TN, 7, tr. I, 71-2; Majmac al-ansāb, f. 164b.

41. nevertheless, the Ṣaffārid campaigns here were not the first made by the Muslims; as early as 33/653-4 the governor of Siṭān, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Samura, invaded ar-Rukhkaj and Zamindwar. Cf. Bâlādhrî, Futūb al-buldān, Cairo 1959, 386; Yaḥyâ al-Ṣâbī, Historiae, ed. Houtsma, Leiden 1883, II, 258, 333-4; Murūj, V, 302; TS, 105-6.

42. cf. Marquart, Erānsâb, 248-54, 291-8, and Marquart and J.J.M. de Groot, "Das Reich Zābul und der Gott Žūn vom 6.-9. Jahrhundert", Festschrift Eduard Sachau, Berlin 1915, 272-6, with references to the sources (Bâlādhrî, Yaḥyâ al-Ṣâbī, Masqûdî, IA, to which should be added Gard., 11, cf. Barthold, "Zur Geschichte der Ṣaffāriden", Nûldeke-Festschrift, Giessen 1906, I, 187-8, and TS, 204-6, 215). In Erānsâb, 298, Marquart plausibly suggested that the Lawīk whom Alptigin displaced was a successor in Zābulistān of the Zunbîl captured by Yaḥyâ b. Laith; long-established local ties would explain the appeal of the people of Ghazna to Lawīk against one of Alptigin's Turkish successors.
43. cf. Iqt., 280, and ʿIṣq. 2, 450, on the Indian influences at Kabul; and Bīrūnī, India, tr. Sachau, II, 10-14, and H.C. Ray, The dynastic history of Northern India, Calcutta 1931-6, I, 55-106, on the Shāhīs of Afghanistan and the Punjab. The Kabul valley and the Ghurband region had been strongly Buddhist and had been cultural outposts of India; the Buddhist pilgrim Hiran Chuang described the area round Ghazna as thickly dotted with monasteries teaching Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Marquart, "Das Reich Zābul", 288 n.2, suggested that the temple of the Sun-God Zān in Zābulistān might be connected with the shrine of the Sun-God Āditya at Multan.


45. Ibn Khurdābdihī, ed. de Goeje, BGA, VI, 37; Balkūshī, Futūḥ, 392.

46. I Khali., ed. Wiedenfeld, no. 838, tr. de Slane, IV, 302, on the authority of Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. al-Azhār. The text has at-Turk ḥadīṯ, which led Marquart into extravagant etymological speculation; he finally interpreted the last element of the expression as Turkish ʿoldūr-ārī, "man-killer" (Ernšahr, 252-3; "Das Reich Zabul", 275.

47. Iqt., 244-5, with lisānīhim; I Ḫauq., 1, ed. de Goeje, 302, 2nd edn. by Kramers, 419, and Yaqūt, Muṣjam, IV, 220, with libāsīhim. Marquart, Ernšahr, 251, thought that lisānīhim was the original which I Ḫauq. changed.

48. M. Longworth Dames, EI 1 Art. "Ghalzai", was against the direct identification of the Ghilzē'īs with the Khalaj; Barthold, Hist. des Turcs, 79, seemed to favour it.

49. SN, ch. XXVII, 112.
50. **TN**, tr. I, 43. Alone of the sources, the **SN**, ch. XXVII, 123, says that a second army was sent against Alptigin from Bukhārā under one Abū Ja'far; he reached the gates of Ghazna, but was defeated by Alptigin.

51. Ibn Bība, *Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm*, ff. 203b-204a; **TN**, 7, tr. I, 71-3; Majma` al-ansāb, ff. 164a-165b; cf. Nazim, Sultan Mahmūd, 26-7. It seems to be the Sāmānīd expedition against Bilgetigin which is the subject of an anecdote by *Cauf* in Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II, 180, where the credit for repelling it is given to Sebuktigin. However, *Cauf*’s anecdotes on the early rule of the Turks in Ghazna, as given in op. cit., II, 178-82, are very confused and inaccurate.

52. this is what Barthold says, *Turkestan*, 251. It is true that two coins struck by Bilgetigin during his governorship (the mint of only one of them—Ghazna—is legible) acknowledge the Amir Manṣūr b. Nūḥ (E. Thomas, "Supplementary contributions to the series of the coins of the Kings of Ghazni", *JRAS*, XVII, 1860, 142-3, 184; Oliver, "The decline of the Sāmānīs ...", 130). No coins by Būritigin seem to be extant. But Barthold’s implication, that Alptigin did not mention the Amīrs on his coins, appears to be ill-founded. Two coins minted by him at Parwan near Kabul clearly state the issuer’s authority from the Sūmānīds, but in an indirect way; this may reflect Alptigin’s semi-rebel status and consequent inability to claim full legal rights to mint (Thomas, *JRAS*, 1848, 295-302; Lane Poole, B.M. Catalogue, II, 128).

53. although the traditional spelling of western orientalism has been "Sabuktigin", an etymology from Persian sabuk "light (not heavy)" gives no sense. Togan, Ibn Fadlāns Reisebericht, 141-2, and Giriq, 145, derives it from sf-bag "army commander", and in the second citation says that it is vocalised thus in some old manuscripts; he does not say which. Barthold seemed to prefer
this explanation (Turkestan, 261 n.1). On the other hand, Le Coq and Pelliot favoured the vocalisations səftəṭk and səftəṭk/səfṭṭk < √ \text{sey} - "love, like" = "amiable, beloved", a name found in the oldest Turkish onomastic (A. von Le Coq, "Türkische Namen und Titel in Indien", Aus Indiens Kultur, Festgabe R. von Gerbe, Erlangen 1927, 1; P. Pelliot, "Notes sur le 'Turkestan' de M. W. Barthold", TP, XXVII, 1930, 16); names from the root səy are also common in Uighur Turkish (L. Rásonyi, "Sur quelques catégories de noms de personnes en turc", Acta Linguistica (Academia Scientarum Hungarica), III, 1953, 325-7). The latter interpretation has been preferred here. Also, the spelling tətin has been followed throughout, as in Marquart, Erzinsahr, 211 n.5, but tətin may be equally correct.

54. Ḫudūd, 98, 292-3; Kāshgharī, Dīwān lughat at-Turk, ed. Kilišli Rıfat Bey, III, 312; Barthold, Hist. des Turcs, 75. Ibn Bāba confirms Səbəktīgin's origin from the Barskhān (K. ra's māl an-nadīm, f. 203b).


57. Minorsky, Marvazi on China, the Turks and India, London 1942, 31, n19; Ḫudūd, 99, 300-4.


60. ʻUtbi, I, 56-7; Jurb., 31; IA, VIII, 503, under the year 366. Mīrkhw., IV, 35-6, derives from IA, but with an added confusion between Alptīgin and his son Abū Ishāq.
61. TH, 7, tr. I, 73-4; Majma' al-ansāb, f. 166a; cf. Nazim, Sultan Mahmūd, 28-9. The account of the SN, ch. XXVII, 125-6, followed by the Ta'rikh-i guzīda, 384 ff., contains no mention of Abū İshāq, Bilgetigin or Būritigin, but makes Sebākitigin succeed immediately after the death of a sonless Alptigin, chosen by the acclamation of the army leaders as the most suitable war chief and the man most able to strike fear into the hearts of the Indians.


63. Thomas, JRAS, 1848, 268, 303-6; Lane Poole, B.M. Catalogue, II, 128-30; S. Flury, "Le décor épigraphique des monuments de Ghazna", Syria, VI, 1925, 62-3.


65. ʿAdīb al-mulūk, f. 49a, tr. I.M. Shafi, "Fresh light on the Ghaznavids", IC, XII, 1938, 208. The topography, climate and agricultural products of these areas are described in the Bābur-nāma, tr. Beveridge, 218 ff.

66. SN, 118. On the mustaghall or iqtād al-istighlāl, an assignment of revenue, theoretically for life only, and its distinction from the iqtād at-tamālik, an assignment of the land itself, see Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 29-30; Cl. Cahen, "L'évolution de l'Iqtā du IXe au XIIIe siècle", Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, VIII, 1953, 26-34. For further comments on iqtād in the Ghaznavid empire, see below, Part II, 265-7.

67. Majma' al-ansāb, ff. 166a-b; the passage is translated in full, below, Part II, 266. Mīrkhw., IV, 36, seems to allude vaguely to this: "He allotted to every one of them [sc. the soldiers who had acclaimed him as their leader] a fief (iqtād) according to his rank".
68. cAulf, quoted in Nazim, "Pand-Namah", 605-7, cf. idem, Introduction to the Jawāmi′u 'l-Hikayāt, GMS, London 1929, 62, 222, 
ath-θ-Thaqalī, Yatīmat ad-dahr, IV, 302-4; 
69. cUbūl, I, 67-72; Jurb., 33-5/Athār al-wuzara′, f. 88a and 
margins of ff. 87b-88a; Mīrkhw., IV, 36-7; cf. SamcEnī, f. 80b, 
I Khall., tr. II, 314-15 (where Abū'1-Fath appears only as the 
Sāhib at-tajmīs, with nothing on his political and secretarial 
career), III, 337, Browne, Literary history of Persia, II, 
98-100, and J.W. Fučk, EI2 Art. "al-Bustī".

70. Thomas, JRAS, 1848, 275; idem, "On the coins of the dynasty of 
the Hindū Kings of Kābul", JRAS, IX, 1848, 189-90; Lane Poole, 
Additions to the oriental collection in the British Museum, I, 
185-9. The mint-cities of the Ghaznavids are listed by Thomas, 
JRAS, 1860, 184-5. He also surmised (JRAS, 1848, 299 n.1) that 
Sāmānid coins did not circulate to any great extent in Zābul-
istan and south-eastern Afghanistan before Alptigin's conquests 
there. His 1848 articles are based on an examination of the 
Masson collection of coins, brought from the Kabul-Ghazna 
region after the First Afghan War of 1839-42; of several thou-
sand coins, less than ten are of the Sāmānids proper, whereas it 
is well-known that Sāmānid coins circulated across western Asia 
and into Europe on a wide scale.

71. Thomas, JRAS, 1848, 287-90. Against this, Lane Poole opined 
that the Ghaznavid silver coinage was often of a low standard, 
with much copper alloy in it (B.M. Catalogue, II, 136 n.); it 
is possible that this generalisation is based on later Ghazna-
vid coinage rather than on the earlier one. In the later period, 
the/ had lost much of its dynamic, and the Indians no longer left 
their treasures in vulnerable places. We would expect these 
facts to be reflected in a poorer quality coinage. The economic 
interpretation of the standard of coinage does not concern us 
here, but it is, of course, a most significant indication of the 
economic health of a country.
Chapter 4

74. this account has been abstracted from Turkestan, 261-6, and Naẓīm, Sultān Māhīmūd, 38-45, supplemented by Naṣīḥīm al-āshār, ff. 74b-75a.

75. Utbi, Lahore 1300/1683, 110ff.; Jurb., 119; K. ra's māḥ an-nādīm, f. 204b. Of Sebūktīgīn's four sons, Naqr and Māhīmūd were by a different mother from that of Ismā'īl. The fourth son, Yūsuf, was only a child when his father died and was brought up by Maḥīmūd. Thus in effect, Ismā'īl was the youngest adult son (Majmāʾ al-ansāb, f. 170b).

76. see below, Part V, 454-5.


Chapter 5

79. Nazim, op. cit., 35-6; Ādīb al-mulūk, f. 80a, tr. Shafi 215, whose ms. adds the bow and arrow to the list of Ḍahmūd's favourite weapons.

80. Baih., 491. His son, the Qāṭī Bū Naqr, was used by Masʿūd as a diplomatic envoy to the Seljuqs (ibid., 490-3; al-Ḥusainī, Akhbār ad-daulat as-Saljūqiyya, ed. M. Iqbal, Lahore 1933, 5, giving the nisba as "Ṭabbī".

81. Togan, Giris, 146, quoting Bīrūnī, Kitāb as-qaidana.


84. Baih., 112, 121.

85. ibid., 51, 136.

86. ibid., 47.

87. ibid., 448, 634; Turkestan, 308 (Sanjar's illiteracy).

88. in Baih., 163, 166, the Sultan speaks Turkish to one of his ghulām generals in the presence of some Tājīk miscreants who are ignorant of Turkish, in order to frighten them.


90. Sachau, Alberuni's India, London 1888, I, x-xvi; D.J. Boilot, EI, Art. "al-Bīrūnī".


93. Baih., 208. Artisans and craftsmen were often sought out by rulers, though few went to the extremes of Muḥammad b. Musāfir, the Dailamī ruler of Tārūm, of whom Abū Dulaf says: "When he saw some fine piece of furniture or some solid work, he would enquire after the maker, and having learnt his whereabouts, send him money, such as would attract such a man, and guarantee to him the double of that sum if he came to him. But when he arrived, the king would prevent him from leaving the castle [of SamIrān] for the duration of his life". His sons later released 500 captive craftsmen (Minorsky, Abū-Dulāf Misʿar ibn Muḥalhil's travels in Iran, circa A.D. 950, Cairo 1955, 34, given also in Yaqūt, Maqāmāt, III, 148-9, s.v. "SamIrān").

94. Niẓāmī ʿArūḍī, Chahār maqāla, 118, Revised tr. Browne, 86, cf. Literary history of Persia, II, 96 ff. In his GMS edition of the text (London 1910), Qazwīnī doubted the authenticity of this story, and certainly, the contemporary sources on Maḥmūd's annexation of Khwārizm (Gerd., Baih.) do not mention this.

95. Baih., 274; Turkestan, 289; Nazim, loc. cit.

96. India, tr. Sachau, I, 152.

97. Chahār maqāla, 75, tr. 53.

98. Classical Persian literature, 54. Minorsky had already pointed out that feelings of the Persian renaissance passed by Ghazna; the smaller courts like those of Gūzgān, Sīstān and Ray were greater centres of Persian learning, but these were either swept away or weakened by Maḥmūd (review of Nazim, Sultān Maḥmūd, in BSOS, VI, 1930-2, 1022).


102. Iran, III.

103. Baih., 121. These pictures, together with the murals in the palace of Lashkar-i Bāzār at Bust (see below, Part II, 275 n. 30) and the mention in Hudūd, 108, of murals on the walls of the palaces at Balkh, form interesting evidence for the survival of the ancient artistic traditions of Bactria and Afghanistan into the Islamic period.


105. Ādāb al-mulūk, ff. 15a, 28b, tr. Shafi, 199-201. For the embroidering of the tarāz, the Ghaznavids had Sāmānid precedents; Nasr-shahrākī describes the bait at-tarāz of Bakhshārī, which supplied the Abbasid Caliphate, as "still in existence" (Ta'rikh-i Bakhshārī, 24, tr. 19-20; cf. Minorsky, "Geographical factors in Persian art", BSOS, IX, 1937-9, 627).

106. Baih., 39, 159; Gard., 95.


108. TB, 185-6.


110. Ādāb al-mulūk, f. 28b, tr. 201.

111. Baih., 270, 375, 464; TS, 346.


113. Ādāb al-mulūk, ff. 13a-14a, tr. 197-9.

114. Majmāʿ al-ansāb, f. 173b; Nasā'īm al-ashār, f. 75b; Āthār al-wuzarā', f. 88a.

115. Outōf, II, 61 ff.; Nasā'īm al-ashār, f. 78b; Āthār al-wuzarā'.
Chapter 6

121. Baih., 221, badly tr. in Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 101.

122. on the sources from which the Ghaznavids recruited their ghulams, see below, Part II, 228-9.


125. SN, ch. XLIII, 191.


127. SN, ch. IV, 21-2.
128. on the گاگابیوْت of some of the regions and cities of Persia, see below, Part III, chapter 4.

129. the passage is translated in full, below, Part V, 494-5.

130. Baih., 664.

131. ۳۱۷; Jurb., 138; Gard., 62; Hillel as-Šebi', in Eclipse of the گاباسد Caliphate, III, 340-1, tr. VI, 365-6. Sebūktigin and یاهمود had previously been given honorifics by the گاماند (۳۱۷; Jurb., 93; Gard., 56; TH, tr. I, 75; Thomas, JRAS, 1848, 268; Lane Poole, B.M. Catalogue, II, 131); on the یاقبب of Sebūktigin, see J.H. Kramers, "Les noms musulmans composés avec ین", AO, V, 1927, 59. On the general topic of یاهمود's relations with the Caliphate, see Nazim, Sultān یاهمود, 164-5.

132. Thomas, JRAS, 1860, 161, giving Rawlinson's transcription of the legend. Unfortunately, this cannot be checked, as the relevant part of the inscription has perished since 1839; cf. Flury, "Le décor épigraphique", 65-6.


136. the new یاقبب comprised the titles "نَاجِر ین یاه‌" "ذَیفِیـ یِلـد یاه‌" and "ال‌میتاقیم مین یِد۹ یاه‌" (Baih., 370); the first two of these, together with an additional one "یازیر یِلِیفَ یاه‌", appear on یاسعُد's coins (Thomas, JRAS, 1860, 167).

137. Baih., 371.
Chapter 7


139. Baihaqi wrote of him, "evil and malignity were engrained in his nature .... and this evil was accompanied by the absence of any compassion" (179). The beginning of his influence with Nasūd seems to date from the time when he was the prince's katkhudā in Herat (Gard., 74).

140. see below, Part III, 348-50.

141. Baih., 180 = E. and D., History of India, II, 90.

142. Baih., 257-60; Āthār al-wuzarā', f. 114a; cf. further, below, Part II, 267.

143. Baih., 316-28; Āthār al-wuzarā', loc. cit.; cf. further, below, Part V, 466, 473.

144. Baih., 435, 600-1.

145. on the exact form of his name (IA, IX, 294, has "Abū Naṣr Āḥmad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd as-Samad") see Sachau, SBWAW, LXXIV, 1873, 301 n.l.

146. Baih., 366-8. For this military campaign, see Sachau, op. cit., 301-3, and Turkestan, 295-6, both of which accounts are based on Baih., 342 ff.

147. Baih., 477, 530-1.

148. Āthār al-wuzarā', f. 114b; IA, IX, 334.

149. Baih., 654-5.

150. Ibid., 435, 477.

151. Ibn Funduq, TB, 175, calls it "unparalleled of its kind"; see also above, Bibliographical introduction, 12.
152. Baih, 99; see also above, 129.

153. ibid., 69-70, 145, 322.

154. TB, 175.

155. ibid., 176-7.

Chapter 8


157. Nīgām al-Dulk quite rightly traces the Barīd back to pre-Islamic times (SN, ch. X, 66-7). The Caliphal Barīd-network already covered Transoxania in the reign of al-Maḥdi (775-85) (Narsh., 10, tr. 10-11), and when Sebilktigin was in Khurasan he used a Shīb-Khabar to spy on the Shīrūrs (Gard., 55).


160. SN, ch. XIII, 79.


162. SN, ch. VII, 49-50, chs. IX, X, 66 ff., ch. XLII, 168-73; cf. ON, ch. XL, 126-7, tr. 215-16 (poor and obscure men not to be given offices, but only those of ample personal means),

164. Baih., 326, 646; the same duty, accompaniment of a messenger, mentioned in *Āthār al-wuzarāʾ*, f. 101a.

165. *Nasr* im al-ṣahār, f. 79a.

166. *Nasr*, Sultan Mahmūd, 144-6, has dealt with this *Dīwan* and with the *Barīd* during Mahmūd's reign.


168. *ibid.*, 272.

169. *ibid.*, 139, 221; see also, above, 125-6.


171. *ibid.*, 69-70, 250, 252-5.

172. *ibid.*, 121-2, 145-6, 322.


174. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, ff. 50b-51a, tr. 211.

175. Baih., 27, 323, 398, 421, 528.

176. *ibid.*, 332, 655, 684.

177. cf. *ibid.*, 361, 387, 397, 421.

178. *Ādāb al-mulūk*, f. 42b. The Vizier Ḥasanak was once *Ṣāhib-Barīd* of Sīstān (Baih., 146), and *ʿUṯbī* of Ganj-Rūstāq (Yamīnī, II, 356-7). Masūd's *Ṣāhib-Barīd* in Nishapur, Abū'ī-Muẓaffar Jumāḥī, was highly praised as a poet by Thaʿālibī (TB, 178-9).

179. *al-Fārisī, as-Siyāq li-taʾrīkh Nišābūr*, ff. 27a-b.

180. Baih., 413.

Chapter 9

182. at the opening of Mas'ud's reign the monthly wage bill for the secretaries of the Diwan came to 70,000 dirhams, and there were other, newly-recruited ones who were unpaid during their training period (Baih., 146).


184. Baih., 256, 499; cf. Nazim, Sultan Mahmu'd, 147. The model for the Ghaznavid wakil was doubtless the Samanid wakil-i dar (cf. Nasir'lm al-ash'ir, f. 74b), and the term itself was used in Ghaznavid terminology. (Baih., 273).


186. Gard., 53.

187. Adab al-muluk, f. 28b (tr. 201), f. 41a; Baih., 356.

188. Ibid., 128–31; Majma' al-ansab, f. 187a.

189. Baih., 72–3, 83, 93; Gard., 96. In the case of Muhammad's treasure, legality was preserved by his writing a formal bond for the transfer of the money to his brother Mas'ud.

190. we do not know whether the Ghaznavid administration had a special term for these escheats; Maqir ad-Din TusI includes them under the heading of tayyaret, "casual items of revenue" ("Maqir ad-Din TusI on finance", 774).

191. see further, below, Part II, 235.

Athar al-wazarā', f. 94a, Mahmūd asserts that Viziers are necessarily the enemies of kings, and his Chief Secretary agrees that the Vizier inevitably shares in his master's power and this becomes resented; hence only the stupid and foolish seek to be Viziers.


194. on these, see, for example, Murūj, VII, 194-5, VIII, 115-16.


196. oUtbi, II, 156-65 (cf. Turkestan, 288); Waṣṣāyā-yi Nizām al-Mulk, in E. and D., History of India, II, 486-8. The Nasī'im al-ṣahār, ff. 75b-76a, and Athar al-wazarā', ff. 88a-89b, adduce as an additional reason for Mahmūd's vindictiveness a quarrel with Isfārā'inī over a Turkish slave boy belonging to the Vizier, for whom the Sultan had become empassioned.

197. Baih., 362-5; Gard., 98-9; IA, IX, 294; Nasī'im al-ṣahār, ff. 76b-77b; Athar al-wazarā', ff. 101b-111a; Nazim, EI Art. "al-Maimandī".


200. Nasī'im al-ṣahār, f. 78b; Athar al-wazarā', f. 114b.

201. the rough treatment which Mahmūd's former treasurer, Ahmād Inaltīgin, suffered on giving up that office is said to have been a contributory cause of his later rebellion in India (Gard., 97; Baih., 267).

202. quoted by Nazim, Sultan Mahmūd, 133 n.4.
203. Āthār al-wuzarā', f. 110a.
204. Baih., 130; TS, 358.
205. Nasīrīm al-ašār, f. 76a; Āthār al-wuzarā', f. 89b.
206. TS, loc. cit.
207. cf. Baih., 163, where a flogging is commuted into a payment to the royal treasury.
209. on this dynasty, see Muṣnal at-tawārīkh, 402 ff.; Huart, EI 1 Art. "Kūkāyids". On the meaning of "Kūkā" see H.L. Rabino di Borgomale, "Les dynasties locales du Gīlān et du Daylam", JA, CCXXXVII, 1949, 313-14, pace the traditional explanation accepted by Justi, Huart and Spuler.
213. Baih., 340, 376, 444; Marqāšī, 143.
214. ʿUtbī and Gardīzī, quoted by Nazim, Sultan Mahmūd, 102, 114.


216. ʿUtbī and Gardīzī, quoted by Nazim, op. cit., 97. IA, IX, 132 = E. and D., History of India, II, 249 has the more feasible figure of 20,000 dirhams.


222. on the distribution of the spoils of war and on the ghāzīs, see below, Part II, 249, 268.

223. ʿUtbī, quoted in Nazim, op. cit., 90.

224. IA, IX, 243 (wrongly quoted by Nazim, op. cit., 118).

225. Muntagam, VIII, 40, giving the text of Mahmūd's fath-nāma to the Caliph; a different set of figures in IA, IX, 261.

226. Thomas, JRAS, 1848, 289, 307, 311, 335, 350; idem, JRAS, 1860, 156. It is regrettable that Lane Poole in his B.M. Catalogue does not give the assays and weights of the Ghaznavid coins listed by him, for this information is most significant to the economic historian.
231. SN, ch. IV, 20.
232. cf. Lambton, *Landlord and peasant*, 306 ff., on the different treatment of *q reaffi* and *shatwi* crops in their apportionment and taxation.
234. cf. TE, 272-3.
236. SN, 244-5.
238. SN, loc. cit., and in Khalkhālī's text, Tehran 1310/1931, 179; *Chahār magāla*, 30, Browne's Revised tr. 20.
239. Baih., 36, 444, 512.
240. SN, ch. XXII, 105; *Adib al-nulūk*, f. 29b, tr. Shafi, 203; *Utbi*, II, 128; Jurba, 202. The distribution of seeds and tools by the ruler is often advocated in the *Mirrors for Princes* (e.g. the SN, ch. IV, 20), and it is recorded that Sebüktigin did it (*Majma al-ansāb*, f. 166b).
243. Baih., 19-24, 42-3; IA, IX, 284 (first page of this numbering).
Ath-Thacṣibi, however, praises Isfahānī as the builder of Ṣṭāḥmūd’s kingdom’s stability (Yatīmat ad-dahr, IV, 437).

244. IA, IX, 287 (second page of this numbering), 292.

245. al-Qutbī, II, 77, 158-9; Jurb., 182, 215-16; Mīrkhw., IV, 40.

246. al-Qutbī, II, 125-8; Jurb., 200-2; TB, 176; IA, IX, 158; TS, 358; Turkestan, 287-8; below, Part III, 315-16.


248. TB, 78 and passim, Ẓahr ad-Dīn Nishāpurī, Seljūqnāma, 14; Raw. 94, and Qurāda, 31, all have “al-Muʿtazz” for Baḥṣaqī’s “Muʿizz.” Samʻānī, f. 317a, derives the nisba “Ṣūrī” from Sūr, a place in Baghdad, but has nothing of interest about this Sūrī.


250. TB, 178-9; the second fragment in Baḥṣaq., 414.

251. TB, 78-83. The term bundar-i kharāj occurs in the TS; the editor Bahṣaq considers it likely that the term came from pre-Islamic Persian terminology (TS, 303 n.2).

252. Baḥṣaq., 542, 545, 611.

253. Ibid., 412-13; Seljūqnāma, 14; Raw. 94; Qurāda, 31. Al-Fārisī mentions a madrasa of Sūrī’s in Nishapur (ṣ-Siyāq li-taʿrīkh Nishahbūr, f. 30a).

254. TS, 346-57; Nazim, Sultān Ṣṭāḥmūd, 66-70, giving the other sources for the campaigns there.

255. TS, 358, 360, 363 ff.

256. Baḥṣaq., 423, 429-32; IA, IX, 282 (second page of this numbering) under the year 422/1031.

257. clearly a gross over-estimate, even though Āmul was certainly a populous and prosperous city, attracting the commerce of the Volga basin and Khazaria to its port, a few miles down-river from Āmul itself (cf. Ibn Ṣafandīyār, tr. Browne, 33-4; Rabino
di Borgome, Mazandaran and Astarabad, CMS, London 1928; 
Qudud, 134-5; L. Lockhart, EI² Art. "Amul".

260. Baih., 456, 460-2, 468; Mashqi, Ta’rikh-i Tabaristan u Ruyan 
u Mazandaran, 143.

Chapter 10

261. cf. Ibn Tqtaqa, al-Fakhri, Cairo 1317/1899, 120 (accession 
promises of Yazid b. al-Walid b. Abd al-Malik); Wellhausen, 

262. Sultán Maḥmūd, 166-7; cf. Majnac al-ansāb, f. 181b. The Ḫūbur- 
-nāma, tr. 219, mentions three or four dams in the Ghazna area 
constructed by Maḥmūd.

263. Baih., 260-2 = E. and D., History of India, II, 114-16, quoting 
Maḥmūd Warrāq (see above, Bibliographical introduction, 11 ); 
Maṣin ad-Dīn Zamchi, Raudḥat al-jannāt fī aṣṣūf Harūt, ff. 32a-b.

264. Flury, "Le décor épigraphique des monuments de Ghazna", Syria, 
VI, 1925, 61-90. Flury shows, op. cit., 75-8, that the second 
minaret or tower there, generally attributed to Maṣūd I b. 
Maḥmūd, is really to be linked with Maṣūd III b. Ibrāhīm (1099-
1114); Rawlinson misread and misinterpreted the Kufic inscrip-
tion on it (JASB, XII, 1843, 77-8), and Nazim, op. cit., 167, 
has repeated the error.

265. see D. Schlumberger, "Le palais ghaznévide de Lashkari Bazar", 
Syria, XXIX, 1952, 251-70; J. Sourdel-Thomine, EI² Art. "Bust".

266. Baih., 149.
267. Baih., 56, 121.

268. ibid., 186, 551; Turkestan, 288-9, quoting a lost part of Baihaqī in Ḥāfiẓ-i Ābrū.

269. Baih., 95, 149, 287.

270. ibid., 149.

271. ibid., 13, 252, 360, 499-500 and passim; Ḥaymaṣ al-ansāb, f. 180a.


273. Narsh., 41, tr. 34.

274. Baih., 343. On the use of ḥashar = "militia, troop levies, reserve of an army", see Quatremère, Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, 204-5 n. 54; Spuler, Iran, 496.

275. for these terms, see Lambton, Landlord and peasant, glossary, and on the latter one, Minorsky, "A Soyūrghāl of Qāsim b. Jahāngīr Aq-qoyunlu (903/1476)", BSOS, IX, 1937-9, 950, who points to the corresponding Ottoman term, angariye (< Grk. argaria).

276. Baih., 499-500. The indifferent workmanship often used for Islamic buildings like palaces and their consequent impermanence, are stressed by G. Marçais in his Эn2 Art. "Binā".


278. for later instances, see Juwainī, tr. Boyle, I, 31, bīgār-i naṭāsī (Mongol period); Tadhkirat al-mulūk, tr. Minorsky, GMS; (Ṣafavid corvées for palace building); and A. Hottinger in Middle East Forum, Dec. 1959, 9-10, on corvées in modern Afghanistan.
Part II

The Ghaznavid army
Chapter One

The ghulāms

In general, the Ghaznavid army developed within the eastern Islamic military tradition, exemplified before the Ghaznavids in the armies of dynasties like the Sūmānids and Būyids. Certain features of this tradition were, however, modified by the unique nature of the Ghaznavid empire—its strong militarist bias and its ethnic diversity, providing a wide range of races from which soldiers could be drawn.

The core of the Ghaznavid army was the slave force (ghilmān, mamālik), and more than anything else, this institution marks off the armies of the Islamic Persian dynasties from those of pre-Islamic Persia. It is true that in both Achaemenid and Sassanid times there was an imperial bodyguard, the pushtīgbān, and a corps of cavalry, probably of 10,000, the "corps of immortals"; such elite bodies grow up naturally around a ruler. But the Sassanid court service was largely hereditary in a few great families; and all the cavalry, the only part of the army which counted, was drawn from the nobles, vuzurgān, and gentry, ḡazīdūn. Apart from this fact, there are certain parallels between the Sassanid and Ghaznavid
armies, e.g., military reviews resembling the Islamic card, the tactical use of elephants and a continuity in the personal arms used, which will be noted later.

The value of slave troops lay in their lack of roots and local connections. Brought in at an early age from the lands outside the Dar al-Islām, their minds could be moulded by their masters and their bodies trained for warfare. Attached to the ruler by a personal bond of fealty, they could give single-minded loyalty; owing everything to their master, they were untrammelled by the material and personal interests which locally-raised troops inevitably had. Well might a poet say, "An obedient slave is better than a hundred children; the latter desire their father's death, the former his long life". It was the ideal that all parts of the army should be bound to the ruler by a personal bond - in Kāf Kā'īns' words, "It is a matter of necessity that your troops should at all times be under an oath, sworn by your life and head, of loyalty to you" - but the relationship could be closest where a slave was concerned. 2

The development of a slave institution within the Caliphate dates back to the time when the early Abbasids first reduced the pay of the free Arab muqātīla and then let their summonse lapse, using the money saved on their pensions for buying Turkish slaves. Al-Muqtasim on his accession in 833 struck off the Arabs from the Dhimān in Egypt and bought ghulāms instead. 3 Provincial dynasties, some of which, like the Tūlūnids and Ikhshīdids, were themselves of servile origin, followed suit. Yaqūb b. Laith had a corps of
over 2000 ghulâms as his pages and bodyguard, fitted out with weapons captured from Muḥammad b. Ṭabir's treasury at Nishapur, and he also employed a contingent of Indian soldiers in his army. His brother ʿAmr used to buy slaves at an early age, rear them, and give them to his commanders, where they acted as spies on the Amīr's behalf, an anticipation of what became regular practice under the Ghaznavids. The Dailamī leaders, from Mardāwīj b. Ziyār onwards, all stiffened their Dailamī followings with Turkish ghulâms. This was in part a necessity of military organisation, for the Dailamī mountaineers were primarily infantrymen, and for their thrusts across the plains and steppes of central Iran, these Dailamī condottieri needed cavalry. This need was filled by Turkish horsemen, with the handling of whom those Dailamī leaders who had served in the Sāmānid armies were already familiar, and soon the Turkish element became as important as that of the Dailamīs themselves. The majority of the ghulâms of the Buḥyid Muḥammad ad-Daula (d. 356/967) were Turks, and in pay and the granting of iqtâs were preferred above the Dailamīs. The Sāmānids could draw directly on the steppes beyond the Syr Darya for Turkish slaves. Already in the reign of Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd (279-95/892-907) the Commander-in-chief of the army was a slave. It was the hope of the Amīrs that their palace ghulâms would form a counterbalance to the indigenous military element of the Iranian dihqāns, who opposed their centralising policy. As early incidents like the murder by his ghulâms in 914 of ʿAbd b. Ismāʿīl and the growing inability of the later Amīrs to depend on them showed, this hope
was not realised. But whilst the Amīrs were strong and able to control their troops properly, an observer like Iṣṭakhri could praise the Sāmānid slave army for its discipline and boldness in battle. Naqr b. Āḥmad (301-31/914-43) is said at one time to have had 10,000 ghulāms, his own together with his father’s, as well as the rest of the army. 7 The Fāṭimid army included a force of what Naqīr-i Khusrav calls Sarāiyān, "palace guards", 10,000 infantrymen drawn from all countries. 8 Even Turkish rulers like the Qarakhan-īds, who ruled over a loose, semi-nomadic confederation rather than a unified state, early acquired military slaves. For his war against Māhmūd of Ghazna in 1007-8, the Iltīg Naqr had a force of some 1000 personal ghulāms which he placed on one occasion in the centre of his battle-line. 9

Thus by the 11th century most Islamic armies were built round a nucleus of slaves. Turkish ghulāms were preferred for their loyalty and martial virtues, but even when a ruler disliked Turks, as did the Caliph al-Muqtaṣīf (530-55/1136-60), the necessity for a slave guard was not questioned; the Caliph merely recruited Greeks and Armenians instead. 10 That any of the nations customarily supplying slaves were conspicuously superior to the rest is problematical; the criterion was that they should come from some region remote from the ruler’s own seat of power. When ghulāms proved treacherous, it was usually either because they had acquired local, vested interests or else had been treated unduly harshly by their masters. 11
The career of the Sāmānīd general Alptigin, Sebūktigin’s master, illustrates the potential dangers of an uncontrolled slave institution. Although legally a slave, he had amassed great possessions within the Sāmānīd dominions (see above, Part I, 98-9); as governor of Khurasan he had 2700 Turkish slaves of his own. Since under the Sāmānīds the mount, equipment and property of a dead ghulām reverted to his military superior and not necessarily to the Amīr, a man like Alptigin had ample resources and opportunity to attach men to himself. Private armies such as this easily became abstracted from the ruler’s control, and a nexus of intermediate loyalties arose which might on occasion be turned against the ruler himself. The growth of private empires within the state was symptomatic of the later Sāmānīds’ enfeeblement; earlier, one of their generals, Qaratigin (d. 317/929), had deliberately avoided acquiring estates lest they tie him down and interfere with his mobility. Profiting from the history of the last Sāmānīds, the early Ghaznavids kept strict watch on the followings of their generals.

The slave element of the early Ghaznavid army was commanded by the Sālār-i Ghulāmān, whose office ranked next in importance only to that of the Commander-in-chief, the Ḥājjī Buzurg. Bāhāqī also mentions a Sālār-i Ghulāmān-i Sarāy, but in Mas‘ūd’s reign at least, this officer was the same as the Sālār-i Ghulāmān, and the two names seem to be different titles for the one office. The slaves comprised Turks, Indians and some Tējīks, probably Khurāsānīs. The former predominated, and normally held the highest commands in
the army as a whole. Nevertheless, when in 1033 the Turkish commander of the army in India rebelled, Mas'ud gave Ahmad Inaltigin's post to a Hindu ghulam, one Tilak, who had formerly been an official translator in the administration; the appointment aroused considerable resentment at court. Within the general body of ghulams there was a special group, the Sultan's personal bodyguard, the ghulam-i saray, ghulam-i khas or ghulam-i sultan. The proportion of these to the whole is uncertain, but their numbers were appreciable (see below).

Turkish slaves came mainly from the traditional Central Asian sources, either by purchase or by gift. In Mahmud's reign it was the custom of the wife of the Qarakhanid Arslan Khan Manqur b. Cali (406-15/1015-24) to send the Sultan each year a male and female slave as a present. During his Transoxanian campaign against Calitigin in 1025, the Sultan reached Samarqand and exacted from it a tribute of 1000 ghulams; at the same time he received from his ally Qadifr Khan Yusuf of Kashgpar and Khotan presents of Turkish horses and slaves.

Some slaves were taken over by Mahmud from his father. When he first established himself in Ghazna, Sebuktigin spent the greater part of his official income in building up a following and attaching them to himself through twice-weekly feasts. On the other hand, the accession of a new ruler often meant a clean sweep of officers in the higher positions. The feud between the Mahmudiyan or Pidariyan on the one hand, and the parvenu Masuddyan or Nau-khwastagyn on the other, runs through Baihaqi's pages very clearly (see below,
Part V, chapter 4). It was even considered wise before one campaign of Mas'ūd's against the Turkmens to appoint both Mahmūdiyān and Bar-kashiḍagān-i khudāyand to the top commands lest jealousy and dissension arise. 19 Sometimes ghulāms who had become masterless or who had deserted a previous, less successful leader, would enter the Sultan's service. The Indian ghulāms were continually replenished from the campaigns there; on one occasion, the return from the Qanauj expedition in 1018, 53,000 captives were carried off, merchants converged on Ghazna from all parts of eastern Islam and slaves could be bought for two to ten dirhams. 20

A well-known passage in the Siyāsāt-nāma on the education and training of the Sāmānid palace ghulāms has been accepted at its face value by such an authority as Barthold. According to this, there was a definite training programme spread over seven years and a cursus honorum, so that a youngster began as a foot-groom and at the age of thirty-five became eligible for the rank of amīr. 21 If we could accept this account, we would expect to find at least traces of such a system amongst the Ghaznavids, themselves arisen from it. In reality, Niẓām al-Mulk is probably describing an ideal rather than an actuality and is influenced here by the favourable attitude towards the Sāmānids adopted by so many of the historians. The Sāmānids cannot have possessed the administrative experience and skill to organise a training curriculum like this. The Ottoman Palace School, of which we are reminded, came into being through the
peculiar position of the Sultans as rulers of a large Christian subject population in the Balkans, and more doubtfully, by earlier Byzantine traditions of palace service. The account of Sebūktigin's early training given in his Pand-nāma is of a general one in weapons and the equestrian art, not of a specific course. The most we can be sure of is that there was some hierarchy of offices among the Sūmūnids, although the grades may not have been clear-cut; Alptigin reacted vigorously when in 960 the Amīr Abūl-Fawāris ʿAbd al-Malik b. Mūḥ tried to appoint him Ṣamīl of Balkh, for he had previously held the supreme military dignity of Ḥājib al-Suṣjūd. 22

Amongst the Ghaznavids, the ghulūms' training came mainly from actual experience in the field, and we have no information about a specific training programme. Its existence would imply an army with fixed grades and ranks for the trainees to pass out into, and here again, the evidence is doubtful. Nazim, Sultan Mahmuḏ, 141-2, has tentatively sketched the chain of command in the Ghaznavid army by inference from the sources. Whilst the relative positions he ascribes to the various officers ring true enough, there are difficulties. For instance, the term khailtāsh; Nazim suggests that this was an officer who commanded ten cavalrymen, but it seems to be a function as much as a rank. A naqīb-i khailtāshān is mentioned. When in 1039 the army of Khurasan left Merv for its last effort against the Seljuqs, 500 khailtāshān formed the vanguard, and at Dandānqān they fought as a group on one of the wings. In one passage, Baihaqī calls them one of the constituent groups, agnāf, of the army. 23
But if there was no specific training programme, promising lads might be taken into the Sultan's entourage for education, often with the Sultan's own children. In Mas'ud's reign, the ruler of Gurgan, Abu Kelifjar, had a son at the court of Ghazna. In this case, as often happened, there was a political motive; the child served as a pledge for his father's good behaviour. On appointing Ahmad Inaltigin as commander of the Indian army, Mas'ud required that his son should be left at court as a hostage, where he would be brought up in the saray-i ghulaman-i khass; India's rich resources and the numbers of turbulent troops there gave especial temptations to rebellion. For the sons of great commanders and courtiers thus to be admitted to the Sultan's household for education gave an excellent start in life, but in considering the general question of how ghulams achieved favour and promotion, the personal element should also be taken into account. In the strongly masculine world which Islam brings about, the beauty of "moon-faced ones" was no small asset. Turkish youths were prized for their good physique and light colouring, and it was no accident that "Ibn Khagin" became a synonym for "catamite". Later Muslim writers have often played down the physical aspect of Mahmud's relationship to his favourite, the Yimak slave Ayaz, but the ethical climate of the time hardly frowned on such connections. Kai Kajus soberly recommends lying with boys in summer and women in winter, and Hijam al-Mulk exhorts alert rulers to discover which of the two sexes neighbouring princes prefer; neither condemns unnatural tastes. Baihaqi relates an
episode where a palace ghulāms's beauty saved him from execution for murder and set him on the road to becoming the Sultan's dawat-dār. Even after his master's death, Aybāz was still able to play a political rôle in the setting up and then the deposition of Mahmūd's son Muḥammad. 27

The palace ghulāms usually fought as a body, although groups of them might be detached for service on expeditions with the ordinary troops. In battle they usually had the key position of the centre. As a crack force, they could be despatched to retrieve a campaign where the regular troops had failed. When they were part of a larger military force, orders were not given directly to them by the commander of the army, but only through a liaison officer, one of their own hājibs, specially appointed to the force. 28 They had their own set of officers, such as the sarhangān-i saray. Domestically, their corporate organisation was directed by a major-domo, the mihtar-i saray, and for their needs there was a special secretary, the dabīr-i saray or dabīr-i ghulāmān, who kept a nominal roll of the ghulāms (it is not clear whether this roll was merely of the palace ghulāms or of the ghulāms as a whole). 29 They had their own standards with a lion device, and when they were dismounted for ceremonial occasions, the special weapons of the short spear (tirād, mitrad), bow and mace (gūrā, gamūd). The ceremonial occasions when they lined the Sultan’s audience chamber and surrounded the monarch enthroned on his dais, were an integral part of their duties. At these times, they wore splendid robes of the finest brocades of
Isfahan, Baghdad and Shushtar, and their weapons were heavily bejewelled and had gold and silver mountings. It is easy to gauge from the descriptions we have of these levées, how important was the department of the Sultan’s wardrobe and the office of its keeper, the jama-dar, who was normally a slave, and how serious the loss of the wardrobe in battle was regarded. Besides this last office, there were certain other highly-regarded offices to which ghulâms high in the Sultan’s favour might attain, such as that of armour-bearer (silin-dar) to the Sultan, bearer of the Sultan’s ceremonial parasol (chatr-dar) and standard-bearer (calam-dar). Each palace ghulâm had his own personal servant, khâdim, and two were only allowed as a special concession. As regards numbers, Baihaqi records that in 1037 at the annual military review, the palace ghulâms amounted to 4000 odd, and this tallies with the number he gives for them five years previously. But two years later, in 1039, 6000 are mentioned as employed in northern Khurasan against the Oghuz, and it is possible that this increase represents a fuller awareness then of the Turkmen menace and a supreme attempt to master them.

The process whereby great commanders imitated the ruler in assembling a slave retinue round themselves does not seem to have gone so far under the Ghaznavids as under the later Sūmānids. The Sultans’ keen supervision and their extensive spy system, organised from the central Dīwān-i Shughl-i Ishrâf (see above, Part I, ch. 8) helped to curb such a development. Only in the peripheral province of Khwārizm was Mas'ud powerless to prevent his governor there,
the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash’s son Nārūn, from collecting a force of 2000 ghulāms and asserting his independence. Normally, the Sultans felt strong enough to give out ghulāms to their commanders when these were detailed for governorships or for campaigns where strong support was necessary. On Ahmad Inaltigin’s appointment in 1031 to India, the Sultan gave him 130 of his own palace ghulāms. The general Tash Farrāš was sent off to Ray two months later, and the Sultan added 100 to Tash’s own 150. When in 1033 Abū Sahl ʿAsadawi was sent as governor of Ray and Jibēl with troops to reinforce the army already there, Masʿūd gave him 200 ghulāms and their officers. (For the backgrounds to these appointments to India and Persia, see above, Part I, 168-9, 178-80.) In all these cases the ghulāms were released from their personal bond to the Sultan, and this was transferred to their new master. Notwithstanding this, ghulāms thus transferred would often be expected to act as mushrifs over their superiors (see above, Part I, 151-2). In fact, Ahmad Inaltigin endeavoured to circumvent royal control and to gather a really trustworthy personal guard. He sent agents to buy ghulāms for him in Turkestan, and over seventy of these were secretly transported to India via the upper Oxus and Panjhir before his preparations for revolt were delated to the Sultan.

Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Masʿūd bestowed 400 Turkish ghulāms on his trusted chief minister, the Sharīf Abūʾl-Faraj ʿṢiddīqī, including a special group of seventy with golden belts like those of the palace
ghulams; but he continued himself to pay allowances to them all in 
cash and kind, and so kept up his personal bond with them. The 
ghulams and livestock left by Baihaqi’s master in the Dīwān-i Risālat, 
Abū Naqr-i Mishkān, were on his death all taken over by Masūd. It 
is likely in this case that the use them had been granted to the 
Chief Secretary for life, who was of course a free Persian and not a 
slave, for use within his lifetime, and on his death they reverted 
to the Sultan. Where a ghulam commander was involved, the 
Sultan was the ultimate beneficiary as maula al-aqila. When such a 
man died, his personal following of ghulams was broken up. Anūsh-
tigin Khāqā, an old and trusted eunuch commander and military 
governor of Merv when he died in 1037, left an extensive household 
with its own intendant and secretary, property and estates, and a 
body of personal ghulams. Anūshārīn requested and got his freedom 
just before he died, and expressed a desire that his ghulams should 
not be split up. Masūd agreed to this, and ordered that the civil 
governor of Merv should meanwhile pay their salaries and allowances 
from government funds; later, the ghulams were taken into the royal 
household, the Sultan keeping the thirty best ones and distributing 
the remainder among his four sons. Thus the act of manumission does 
not seem to have affected the Sultan’s position as beneficiary, for 
he still retained a right of wa’il over his freedman. The same 
process whereby retinues were broken up is observable when in 1031 
the generals Khurraq and Asīghtīn Ghūsī were removed from their
posts of commander of the Indian army and Commander-in-chief respectively. Their personal ghulâms were confiscated and divided up; the Sultan took the best and gave the rest to his courtiers. 38

Aging and superannuated ghulâms were probably found jobs around the palace or in the lower ranks of the administration; some may have retired to ribâts for less exacting defence duties. 39
Chapter Two

The racial contingents within the army and their fighting roles

In his article in *SI*¹ on the Ghaznavids, M. Longworth Dames considered it a weakness that the Sultans had no strong nucleus of native troops for their armies. Such a view has little validity in the context of the age. Rulers who rose to power with the backing of troops from their own people or tribe had frequently to kick this ladder away. The Būyids soon found Turkish troops more reliable than their Dailamī fellow-tribesmen, and indeed, discriminated against the latter (see above, 225); latterly, the Būyids depended almost wholly on Turkish troops. ⁴⁰ That the Turkmen nomads would be an unstable element in the Seljuq state was shown to Tughrīl Beg as early as Ibrāhīm Inal's rebellion in 1059. Most Muslim rulers would have recoiled from arming their own subjects, and in contemporary eyes, the racial diversity of armies like those of the Ghaznavids and Fatimids was a source of strength. Moreover, the absence of a strong native backing meant that the Ghaznavids were not faced with the Seljuqs' problem, that of keeping occupied or absorbing a large nomadic following.
The two great 11th century Fürstenspiegel both quote with approval Mahmūd's policy of diversity within the army; they ascribe it to his great percipience rather than to the mere fact that troops from so many races could conveniently be obtained. Kāi Kā'ūs praises his kinsman's use of Turks and Indians as palace guards whereby "he constantly overawed the Hindus by means of the Turks and the Turks by means of the Hindus, with the result that both nations submitted to him through the fear of each for the other". Whereas, "if a prince's bodyguard is all from one race, he is ever the prisoner of his bodyguard and tamely submissive, for the reason that the members of one race will be in alliance together, making it impossible to use them in holding each other in check". The variety of nationalities within the Ghaznavid army is praised in ch. XXIV of the Siyāsat-nāma, "The army should be composed of troops of all races". Mahmūd's army was always organised by nationalities, and these encamped separately under their own guards. A spirit of emulation in battle was thereby engendered. Consequently, Niẓām al-Mulk concludes, a mono-national army should be avoided as leading only to plots and émeutes; there should always be 2000 Dailamīs and Khurāsānīs at the ruler's court together with an admixture of Shabānkāra'ī Kurds and Georgians, both of which races were famed for their valour.

The great Vizier's historical fact is here correct, although the Ghaznavid army was by no means the only multi-national one of its age. The Būyids had Dailamīs, Turks and Arabs in their service; the soldiers of the Fāṭimid Caliph al-ʿMustaʿṣir (427-87/1036-94)
ranged from Berbers and Negroes to Bedouins and Turks; and contingents from tributary states, symmachoi, and regiments of foreign mercenaries had long been a feature of Byzantine military policy. 

Whilever there was a strong ruler on the throne, national diversities were indeed a source of strength, especially as different races often had their own particular skills to bring to the common military pool; and from the organisational point of view, it was easier to deal with the separate national contingents when they each retained their unity under one commander from amongst themselves. We do not know whether the Ghaznavids themselves had any consciously-formulated views on the virtues or otherwise of the multi-racial structure of their army, apart from odd pointers in two anecdotes of Fakhr-i Mudabbir. In the first one, the homogeneity of the Qarakhanids' Turkish army when they invaded Khurasan, seems to be favourably contrasted to Mahmūd's mixed army of Turks, Indians and irregulars. But in the second, Sultan Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd's envoy boasts to Malikshāh that the Ghaznavid army is of ten sorts compared with the Seljuqs' one only (ṭarā yak nauq-i lashkar ast, mārā dah nauq) — in fact, an inaccurate assertion, for the Seljuq forces also included troops of several races — and so advises Malikshāh to give up his design of attacking Ghazna.

The Sultans' own Turkish co-nationals inevitably formed a substantial element of the army, and from them most of the top commanders were drawn. Contemporary Islamic opinion characterised the Turks as a hardy race from the steppes divinely endowed with the qualities of
bravery and loyalty, if not of intelligence (see below, Part IV, 406-7). The Ghaznavids gave the Turks this prominence because of these virtues, because of personal ties forged by comradeship in arms and because war was the only field in which the Turks in their retinue could be employed. The administration was a Persian preserve, and instances where a Turk held high office in it were exceptional; they tended to be in functions connected with the Sultan's household and person rather than in the bureaucracy proper. Aḥmad Inaltigin had been Maḥmūd's treasurer, and it was personal ties - Aḥmad claimed to be a son of Maḥmūd's and was physically very like him - and not military experience which prompted Masʿūd to give him the Indian command. The fact that Masʿūd also appointed a Persian dābir, Abūl-Ḥasan ʿIrāqī, over the Arab and Kurdish troops in Khurasan shows that the military and civil institutions were not always rigidly separated and that administrative capability might be used in the military field too. On one occasion, the links of racial fellow-feeling were appealed to on a question of policy; in 1040, to dissuade the Sultan from what the Vizier considered a disastrous decision, he brought forward a simple, loyal Turkish general to reason with his master, hoping that he would succeed where the more sophisticated Persian advisers had failed.

There was probably a steady stream of mercenaries from the north coming to swell the Ghaznavid armies. The 10th and 11th centuries were troubled ones within the steppes, and the migrations of peoples like the Oghuz and Qipchaq caused pressure on the northern
frontiers of the Ghaznavid empire. A section of the Oghuz, called
by contemporaries the "QirǵqI" Turkmens to distinguish them from
the bands who irrupted into Islam under the leadership of the Seljuq
family, were admitted in 1025 to Khurasan by Maḩmūd, and enrolled
under their own leaders as auxiliaries (see below, Part IV, 434-6).
At the outset of his reign, Masād used them as part of an expedition
to Mākran, but under one of his own Turkish generals, and again in
1032-3 under the same general against a local rebel in Qazwīn. 46

Provincial governors on their own initiative recruited tribesmen
for local defence. The governor of Khwārizm, Altuntash, employed
Kujjūt and Chaghirūt Turks, probably of Qipchaq stock, to help
defend the frontiers of his province against other nomads; these
auxiliaries were later used by his rebellious son Maṛūn to throw
off Ghaznavid control. 47 It is likely, however, that many of the Turks
in the Ghaznavid armies were recruited from within the empire's
borders, in particular, from nomads who had filtered into the upper
Oxus region and across the Hindu Kush into eastern Afghanistan in
earlier centuries (see above, Part I, 92-3). When Maḩmūd
hurried back from Multan to repulse the Iliq Nasr's invasion of Khur-
asan, he recruited Khalaj Turks, so that in 1008 he faced the Qara-
khanids with a mixed army of Indians, Afghans, Oghuz, Khalaj and
local troops from Ghazna. Although at this date Oghuz tribesmen
from the lower Syr Darya were entering the service of the Qarakhanids,
these Oghuz in Maḩmūd's service may well have been much earlier
settlers from eastern Afghanistan.
The Indians in the army resembled the Turks in their lack of home ties and of distracting interests which might affect their loyalty. Below the Bālā Buzurg, the Indians had, like the Arabs and Kurds, their own commander, the Sipahsālār-i Hindūyān, and they had their own quarter in Ghazna. Often they were more reliable than the Turks, to whom they formed a counterweight. When the brief régime of Muḥammad b. Māhmūd (421/1030) was collapsing through the defection of many of his troops, including the palace ghulāms, to his brother Masʿūd, it was Muḥammad's Indian troops under their commander Suvendhrēy who remained loyal. The Turkish Bālā Buzurg, Ḍalī Qārīb, went over to the new Sultan, but was doubtful of his reception. So he set out from Tigānībād to Herat, sending on the main body of troops to Masʿūd, but preferring himself to travel the next day with the more reliable Indians. As part of the vendetta against the Māhmūdiyān, representatives of the old régime, the two Turkish generals Sīyarūq and Asīghṭīgin Ghāzī were in 1031 overthrown (see above, Part I, 125–6, and Part II, 235–6). After an unsuccessful attempt to flee to Khwārizm, the second of these was to be sent back to Ghazna. The Sultan stipulated that he was to have three Indian ghulāms as personal servants and that his escort to the capital was to comprise 300 Indian cavalry and 200 Indian infantrymen. Obviously, Indians were preferred here where the fallen general's plight might have aroused the active sympathies of his fellow-Turks. Likewise, Masʿūd never forgave his uncle Yūsuf b. Sebūktīgin for supporting his brother Muḥammad, and in 1031 arrested
him on his return from an expedition against Qu[qdêr. Yusuf was
sent away to a fortress with an Indian escort of three muqaddams,
three naqîbas and 500 cavalry, together with a body of infantry of
unspecified nationality. Indian troops were of good quality;
the Ghaznavids always found the Rajput princes tenacious opponents,
and the poor showing of an Indian contingent sent in 1034 against
the Bûyids of Kirmân seems to have been an isolated occurrence.
Furthermore, religion was no bar to their employment, and the anon¬
ymous historian of Sîstân complains bitterly of the slaughter and
violence done to the Muslims and Christians of Zarang in 1003 by
Maḥmûd's pagan Indian troops.

The Dailamîs, sturdy mountaineers from the backwards and inac¬
cessible Caspian provinces, were familiar over many parts of the
Islamic world after their upsurge in the 10th century. It is possi¬
ble that the poverty of their homeland forced them to seek military
employment outside, much as it forced another mountain people, the
Swiss, to do so in medieval and Reformation Europe. Thus in the
11th century there was a corps of Dailamî infantry in Fâtimid
service; Nâṣîr-i Khusrau saw them escorting the Caliph as he made
his ceremonial progress to the Nile, and the Dailamîs had a special
quarter in Cairo. In the previous century, the Bûyids had found
their tough and frugal Dailamî troops superior in the field to the
Sâmînids' Khurâsanîs and the Musâfirîs' Bedouins. Abû ʿAlî
Sînju[rî] had used Dailamîs in Khurasan against Maḥmûd; it was probably
here that the victorious Maḥmûd became aware of their calibre and
enrolled them in his forces. The Siyāsat-nāma recommends that Dailamīs should form half of the ruler's crack guard of Mufradān, together with Khurāsfānīs. The original fame of the Dailamīs was as infantrymen, and their characteristic weapon the short, two-pronged spear (zhūpin) which could be thrown at the enemy, and it was as infantrymen that the Seljuqs of Kirmān were still using them in the 12th century. It is uncertain whether the Ghaznavids' Dailamīs fought mounted or on foot; but we know that amongst them was an elite group of some fifty or sixty who acted as foot guards, carrying golden or jewelled shields, when the Sultan held full ceremonial court. The Dailamīs were undoubtedly an important element and their amīrs were highly favoured.

The Kurds and Arabs were often, though not always, grouped under a single commander, and as such were given prominent military roles; when in 1040 Mas'ūd's army left Merv for Dandānqān, they formed the bulk of the key vanguard force. Successive Persian rulers, from the Sassanids to the Qājārs, have taken the pastoralist, mountain-dwelling Kurds from their homes in Kurdistan and Luristan and planted them in Khurasan to defend the north-eastern frontier. Because of dispersions like these they came to be found as mercenaries in the armies of many Islamic dynasties. The Sāmānīdes used them, although their experience with them was not always happy; moreover, a battle fought outside Ray in 1036 between the Ghaznavids and the "Qirāqī" Turkmens was lost by the former because of the treachery of the commander of the Kurds in their army.
The Arabs formed some of the finest cavalry in the army, the so-called diyusvārān, "dare-devil riders". In Maḥmūd's reign, the commander of the Arabs was ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm at-Taʾī al-Abābī. Together with the Sultan's brother Naṣr, his troops held the central position in the great battle of 1098 with the Qarakhanids. Again under Muḥammad at-Taʾī, the Arabs were chosen as advance guard when Khorāsān was invaded in 1017. It seems that the swiftness and dashing qualities of the Arab cavalry made them especially favoured for advance and raiding parties. In Khorāsān and the east, the Arab tribal colonisations in the first century or so of Islam had left many groups of them. Some, like the Arabs who made Wadhīr in the Samarkand oasis famous for textiles, fitted themselves into the settled economy of the land; but others remained semi-nomads, for whom the strategic position of Khorāsān as a cockpit gave frequent employment in war. The author of the Hudūd al-ʾAlam mentions as many as 20,000 Arabs in his home province of Gurgān who lived off their extensive herds of sheep and camels and were richer than all the other Arabs scattered about Khorāsān. Ismāʿīl al-Muntaqir, the last of the Sūmānids, was killed by a group of Arab nomads who lived in the Qara Qum steppe. Some of these communities may have retained their tribal organisation and distinctive Arab dress. Just before Maḥmūd's death, the Ziyārid Manū-chihr b. Qābūs sent envoys to Masʿūd; these were disguised as Arabs, so it seems that Arab dress cannot at that time have been an unusual sight in Gurgān and Khorāsān. The later Ziyārids themselves
relied substantially on Kurds and Arabs for defence. The obscurity surrounding the antecedents of the man who ruled Gurgan and Tabaristan for much of Mas'ud's reign, Abu Kultujr, has been remarked upon (above, Part I, 167), but Ibn al-Athir makes him Commander-in-chief of the forces and a Kurd of the Quhiyya tribe. During Mas'ud's expedition of 1035 against this rebellious vassal, the entire defence force of Gurgan, 4000 Arab cavalrymen, came over to the Sultan, then at the peak of his fame, and enrolled in his army as musta'mina; the remnants of them were still living at Ghazna when Baihaqi was putting together his memoirs (1058–9).

An extensive supply of mounts was necessary for the cavalry, especially as a considerable proportion of it was of two-horse troopers, the second horse providing a fresh mount or carrying equipment and food. In the campaign which ended at Dandangan, however, lack of fodder reduced many of these troopers to a single mount.

The officer in charge of the royal stables, the Akhur-Selur or Amr-i Akhur, was a high-ranking commander; in an important battle against the Qarakhanids, Mahmud chose this officer to lead the palace ghulams in the main charge. The army's mounts were all branded with the royal mark, as were the camels and other beasts of burden. It was a duty of the Department of the Ishraf periodically to send out inspectors to the royal horse and elephant stables and ensure that the animals were being properly fed and cared for. They also visited the royal herds left out to pasture to see that they had been branded as a precaution against fraud (see above, Part I, 149).
form of the tamgha is not known.

Many of the most famous breeding grounds for horses in eastern Islam fell within the Ghaznavid sphere of influence. The Sulaiman Mts. to the west of the Indus have a very long history as a horse-breeding area, and the name "Afghan" has been linked with the Ashvaka, "horse people", of Gandhara in the Mahābhārata. On the upper Oxus, the lush valleys and upland pastures of Gūzgān, Gharchistān, Tukhāristān, Khuttal and Chaghāniyān were famous for their horses; these were coveted in the Arab Caliphate as far back as Hishān’s reign and exported as far east as China in the Mongol and Timurid periods. In the Šāfānid and Ghaznavid empires, the men of Khuttal were known for their skill in veterinary science, and their province produced high-quality bridles, straps and other pieces of equipment for horses. All these regions were either for most of the time under direct Ghaznavid rule, or in the case of the provinces beyond the Oxus, held by tributary princes. In times of peace the Oghuz of the Kara Qum and beyond supplied Khurasan with livestock such as sheep and goats, and doubtless some of their horses in this way were acquired by the Ghaznavids. The 3000 horses sent in 1017 by the Khwārizmshāh Abū’l-Qabbās Ma’mūn to his brother-in-law Maḥmūd, and the further 4000 promised by Abū’l-Qabbās’s killers as an indemnity, must have been obtained from Oghuz and Qipchaq nomads around the borders of Khwārizm. On one occasion, the incoming Seljuqs offered the Ghaznavid Āmīd of Khurasan Khuttallī horses, Bactrian camels and sheep as presents. Camels were reared in
most parts of northern Khurasan and in the Baluchistan and Makrān deserts by Baluchi and Brahui nomads, but in the Ghaznavid army they were used mainly as beasts of burden. Only at the time of Dandānqān, when the army’s endurance had been sapped by famine and exhaustion, were the palace ghulāms reduced to camels for mounts, whilst, however, protesting their inability to fight on such beasts.

In the Sassanid armies, the infantry was an ill-organised rabble of conscripted peasants who served without pay and were of dubious fighting value. In the Ghaznavid army, the cavalry was tactically the more important arm from its mobility, ability to charge the enemy and usefulness in skirmishing, but the infantry was valuable in pitched battles and at sieges. The Sultans had a permanent force of infantry, the piyādagān-i dargāhī, who were esteemed enough to be mounted on swift camels for distant campaigns, dismounting to fight. Indians were a prominent element in this infantry, but probably Dailamīs and other races were to be found in it. As well as this permanent core, it was often convenient to recruit infantry locally for specific expeditions, as near to the theatre of war as possible. Here, the indigenous populations of Afghanistan and Khurasan were drawn upon. The army sent from Balkh in 1031 against the Būyid Qāsim ad-Dīn Abū Khlīfīr’s outlying province of Kirmān was to travel via Sīstān and there pick up 2000 Sagazī infantry provided by the local, tributary Šaffārid ruler. In the same year, the infantry mustered at Ghazna comprised Marvāzī heavy infantry with shields and 3000 others from Sīstān, Ghazna,
Herat, Balkh and Sarkhs; and in 1039 a force of 2000 infantry was again raised in Afghanistan, from Sistān, Ghazna, Ghūr and Balkh, to reinforce the army of Khurasan against the Oghuz. 71

Finally, there was the volunteer element of the army, the ghāzīs or mutātawwīs. As with all successful commanders, the armies of the early Ghaznavids attracted plunder-seeking adventurers, above all for the Indian campaigns. Their predecessor Alptigin had come to Ghazna with only 200 personal ghulāms and 800 ghāzīs, but his successes in India attracted so many warriors from Khurasan, both Turk and Tājik, that he ended up with 15,000 cavalry and 5000 infantry. Ten thousand ghāzīs accompanied Māhmūd in 1001 to Peshawar and Waihind against Jaipāl, and 20,000 from Transoxania for the Qanauj campaign of 1018. The concentration of Turkish ghāzīs in places like Lahore was a potent factor in the turbulence of the Indian garrisons. 72 The ghāzīs were not registered in the Ḫwān-i ʿĀrq as regular soldiers entitled to a salary, bīstagānī, but some attempt was made to control their exuberance and to make better tactical use of them. For the Somnāth expedition of 1025–6 Māhmūd took with him 30,000 regular cavalry plus the volunteers, and these latter were allotted 50,000 dinars from the state treasury for weapons and equipment. 73 There was in Māsūd’s reign a special ʿSālār-i Ghāziyān, normally stationed at Lahore, but he was also present in Khurasan at Bandānqān; this office was held by a Turkish ghulām, ʿAbdallāh Qaratigin. 74
Chapter Three

The elephants and other elements comprising the army's train

Amongst the Indian princes, possession of elephants gave great prestige and a visible proof of power; in Hodivala's words, "the number of elephants which an Indian Rājā could command in those days provides a fairly reliable criterion, if not absolutely crucial test, of the extent and magnitude of his power". It was from India that the Ghaznavids learnt the use of elephants, not merely for ceremonial purposes, but also as an important part of the army's matériel. They used them in conditions very different from humid, tropical India. They used them in the steppes and plateaux of Afghanistan and Khurasan and even in Central Asia. During the Dandāngān campaign, when the army suffered terribly from lack of water, provisions and fodder, Mas'ūd was still able to field twelve elephants for the actual battle. They could even survive in
the hot, dry deserts of south-eastern Persia; some "unbelievers", Qu'fichis or Baluchis, used them against Mahmud in 1010-11.

The numbers of the Ghaznavids' elephants were kept up by presents from tributary Hindu princes and by plunder from campaigns, and the sources usually list the number of beasts a victorious army brought back. These might amount to hundreds at a time, e.g. 350 from Qanauj and 185 from Mahbun in 1018-19, and 580 from the ruler Ganda in 1019-20. Utbi records that the Thanesar expedition of 1014-15 was provoked by Mahmud's desire to get some of the special breed of Sailamuni elephants, excellent in war. On another occasion, the Sultan so coveted an elephant belonging to Chandar RAY, ruler of Sharma, a beast whose excellence had become proverbial in India, that he offered fifty ordinary ones in exchange. When in Mas'ud's reign the appointment of a new governor was being discussed, the duty of procuring elephants was specifically linked with those of carrying on ghazw and collecting taxes.

The numbers of elephants in the Ghaznavid army must therefore have been great. At the army review of Shabahar in 1023-4 Mahmud reviewed 1300 of them, each with equipment and armour; Mas'ud in 1031 reviewed 1670 at Kabul, "all plump and ready for action". A pilkhana to accommodate 1000 elephants was built at Ghazna, but one would imagine that Kabul was more suitable to be the main depot for them. The expenses of upkeep and the amount of fodder required by these beasts must have been prodigious, and the fertile, irrigated
Kabul River valley, part of which Bābur distinguishes as a "garmār," would seem to be more suitable than the colder uplands of Ghazna. The elephants were tended by a staff of Hindus under a Muqaddam-i 78 Pīlbanān, who had the high rank of āljib; from the name of one holder of it in Masṣūd's reign, he was not necessarily an Indian himself. The price of an elephant appears from Baihaqi as 100,000 dirhams. 79

Having so many elephants, the Sultans could afford to dispense them as gifts to other princes. In 1001 Māḥmūd sent the Ilīg Nāqr female elephants; in 1023 the fath-nīma to the Caliph al-Qādir announcing successes in India was accompanied by presents of elephants; and ten female ones were given to QadIr Khan Yūsuf in an exchange of gifts in 1025. 80 Elephants were indeed essentially royal beasts at this time and for many centuries later, among both Hindu and eastern Muslim rulers, and possession of them jealously guarded. The unpermitted assumption of this privilege by a private individual was tantamount to rebellion. Rulers bestowed elephants on their amīrs and nobles only as a great favour or when they were being fitted out for particularly responsible posts. Thus Ahmad b. ʿAlī Anūshūtigin was given five elephants together with the usual outfit of a governor - girdle, two-pointed hat, drum and standard - when he assumed command of the Kirmān expedition of 1034. When plunder from the Indian campaigns was being divided out, the elephants automatically fell within the Sultan's fifth. 81
One of the reasons why the Caliph al-Mansūr had collected elephants was that they were "the most comfortable and smooth-moving beasts for transporting monarchs". Similarly, the Ghaznavid Sultans rode them on state occasions such as reviews of the army; and in 1011-12, when Mahmūd specially wished to impress the envoys from the Ilīg Naṣr and his brother and rival Toghan Khan, he had forty richly-caparisoned elephants drawn up facing the assembly, with a row of 700 war elephants behind. The elephant became Mas'ūd's favourite mount for hunting; iron plating was placed over the beast's head and face to protect it. Mas'ūd also had an elephant held ready for his use at any time, and it was a daring stroke of Chaghrī Beg's Turkmens to steal this "big elephant kept at the door of the Sultan's palace".

Among Islamic dynasties, it was the Ghaznavids who first used elephants for battle in large numbers and who assigned them a definite place in their tactical theory; they had of course been much used in Persia and Iraq by the Sassanids, including at the battle of Ḫūdisiyya. Tactically, they provided excellent vantage-points for commanders in confused fighting, and when in 1035 an army was sent to Nasīr against the Oghuz, the commanders were all given elephants specifically for this purpose. The Turkish peoples of Central Asia were by no means unfamiliar with elephants, as the totemistic title (onghun) Yīghantigin "elephant-prince", found among the Qarakhanids, shows. But their use in battle against nomad horsemen could be demoralising, especially as they were norm-
ally placed in front of the battle line, enraged, and then used to lead a charge. As Christensen says of their use in an earlier age, "leur mugissements, leur odeur et leur aspect terrible faisaient peur aux chevaux des ennemis". Sebûktîgin had used 200 elephants captured in India against the rebel Sûnûnid generals Fâ'iq and Abû ʿAlî Sîmîjûrî, and Maḥmûd took a force of them with him when he went off to repel the Ilîg Naṣr's invasion; the Qarakhanid troops protested that "it was impossible for anyone to withstand these elephants, weapons, equipment and arms". In 1025, 400 elephants were used against ʿAlîtîgin; before battle, drums and other instruments were beaten in the Sultan's camp, and the elephants' dangling ornaments and accoutrements shaken and jangled to excite them and to shatter the enemy's nerve. An anecdote of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's mentions Malikshâh's alarm when he saw his first elephant, a present from the Ghaznavid Sultan; and as late as 1116-17, during the battle outside Ghazna between Sanjâr and Arslanshâh b. Masûd b. Ibrâhîm (509-12/1115-18), the Seljuq horses were initially thrown into a panic by the fifty Ghaznavid elephants, each having four mailed spearmen and archers mounted and fastened down on the tops of them, which were facing their front line. However, the Seljuq troops were able to stampede them into retreat by attacking the leading beast in the only part not covered by armour, the vulnerable under-belly.

The Ghaznavid Sultans applied the administrative talents of their Persian bureaucracy to problems of logistics, the mobilisation, orderly movement and supplying of their armies. Like other profess-
ional Islamic armies, the Ghaznavid army carried in its wake auxiliary equipment such as armouries (zarrādkhānas) and, where necessary, siege machinery. The elephants were useful both for hauling this equipment and also in the sieges themselves. In 1033 reinforcements were sent to defend Ray and to mount an offensive against the Kākūyids; among these were five elephants fitted with rams and battering equipment for use against walls and buildings (dīvār afgān u darvāza shikān). For the Gurgān and Ṭabaristān expedition of 1035, Maḥmūd took several elephants to the Caspian shore jangal, where they would find the hot, humid conditions there very congenial and where they could be used for breaking through the dense vegetation. In India and the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, where stone for building was plentiful, the reduction of a fortified town or strong-point, rather than a pitched battle, was often the crux of a campaign. Here, specialists like engineers, sappers and pioneers were dafted in to work ballistas and catapults and to mine beneath walls. In 1020 Maḥmūd attacked the pagan Afghans of the Nūr and Gīrīt valleys to the east of Kabul (the later Kafiristan), taking with him blacksmiths, carpenters and stonebreakers for making roads, felling trees and clearing away other obstructions in this difficult terrain. The campaigns of Maḥmūd and Maʿṣūd in Ghūr were merely strings of sieges, for this backwards region had no large towns but was essentially a land of local strongholds and derebeys.
Other impedimenta taken along when the Sultans went to war included the royal treasury and wardrobe, the kitchens and their provisions and the harem with its ladies. There were other hangers-on such as nadīms, physicians, astrologers, etc. The Diwan of the administration were peripatetic and their personnel and official records and documents had to be housed. Thus the amount of tented accommodation required was considerable, and Gardīzī records that when Māhūd met Qādir Khān Yūsuf near Samarqand, he had one tent big enough to hold 10,000 riders and another tent for his personal use of crimson Shushtarī brocade. 91 When it was a question of moving an army to reduce a rebellious town or to engage another army in pitched battle, the whole of this train had to accompany the army; nevertheless, Māhūd had a reputation for being a dashing commander. Food and supplies could be taken in en route. Niẓām al-Mulk recommends the establishment of granaries and storehouses all over the provinces so that unjust levies on the people are avoided; furthermore, the ruler should be able to draw on the resources of the iqṭās in the provinces. The camp-followings of Islamic armies normally included traders who supplied the troops, the bāzār-i lashkar. Then when the campaign was over, the army returned to base or to garrisons in the provinces to rest and refit before it was next required. 92
Chapter Four

The troops' personal arms

The personal weapons of the Ghaznavid soldiers were basically those which had always been used in the Persian world. The regular infantry carried bows, but for close fighting had maces, short swords and spears. They wore mailed coats and carried leather-covered or metal shields, so that, in the Ādab al-mulūk's phrase, they could form a solid line in battle "like a fortress". The cavalry carried bows, battleaxes, maces, lances, sabres and long, curved swords (qalāchūra). As the Shāhnāma shows, these weapons used by the Ghaznavid troopers were the traditional ones used by Iranian cavalry-men. In particular, the mace is the special weapon in the Shāhnāma of heroes and princes; Bahrām Gūr is said to have excelled in its use. The murals of Lashkar-i Bāzār seem to depict the palace guards with maces on their shoulders, although the heads of the weapons are unfortunately not discernible. The Ghaznavids do
not seem to have used horse-armour, but their elephants were
certainly armoured, as the Sassanid ones had been (see above, 253-5).

Fakhr-i Mudabbir has an interesting section on the favoured
personal weapons of the Ghaznavid Sultans. Sebktigin fought with
the spear, bow and galochur; Mahmud excelled in the use of the spear
and bow; Muhammad used the spear; Mas'ud favoured the mace, and
fought with this and with a sword and poison-tipped short spear at
Danandgdn; Maudud was a fine archer and is said to have invented a
new kind of arrow-head; Farrukh-zad used a battle-axe; IbrAhim a
spear and bow; etc. According to Shabankara'I, Mahmud had a mace
of 60 mans weight which he could whirl round his head and throw 20
gaz, whilst Mas'ud also excelled in fighting with the mace (chumag,
gurz). Fakhr-i Mudabbir makes the galochur the weapon par excellence
of the Turks, but it is perhaps the bow which is most typical
of nomads. The bow probably came to the ancient Iranians from the
north, and in their use of it, the Turkish soldiers of the Ghaznavids
were drawing on both Iranian and Turkish traditional practice.
Similarly, the lasso, characteristically used by pastoral herdsmen,
had been used in Persian armies as far back as Xerxes' time; Mah-
mud's troops used it against the Indians, and Mas'ud's troops against
the Turkmens in Khurasan. It has been noted that some groups in
the Ghaznavid army specialised in the use of certain weapons, e.g.
the Dailami's two-pronged spear (above, 243).

We have little direct information on where the weapons and
armaments of the Ghaznavid troops were made. The Indian booty
often yielded weapons; like elephants, they fell within the Sultan's fifth (see below, 268), and India had long been famous for its steel cuirasses and sword blades, the sharpest and finest-damascened of all blades, according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir. But local centres within the Ghaznavid borders must have provided many of these weapons and protective coats. Some areas had their own specialities, e.g. Khwarizm produced swords and a very strong type of bow. The mountain massif of the Hindu Kush and the adjacent ranges are geologically new and are all metalliferous; Kabul was known for its iron mines, and Ghur had both iron and timber to supply the forges. Hence Ghur was noted for its arms production, supplying the nearby provinces; the Ḫudūd al-Ṣam records that "from this province come slaves [it was still a pagan enclave in early Ghaznavid times], armour, coats of mail and good arms". The name of one of its chief settlements or strong points on the upper Hari Rud was Āhangarān, also called Pul-i Āhangarān, "blacksmiths' boundary". Mas'ūd, at the time governor of Khurasan, campaigned in Ghur in 1020-1; one of the local chiefs came to join him and brought a tribute of arms, shields and cuirasses, and when the main stronghold was captured, a tribute of arms was levied there. Mas'ūd was later able to utilise Ghūrī officers in his service as specialists in siege warfare. Two of them directed the defence of Tirmidh in 1035 against the troops of CalTigin's sons, for which the defenders had a ballista (carrēda) operated by a Ghūrī soldier and firing stones
weighing five or six mams. In the 12th century, the local ruler of Ghūr, ʿIzz ad-Dīn Ḫusain (493-540/1100-46) used to send to Sanjar as annual tribute armour, coats of mail, steel caps and other war material, together with some of the fierce dogs bred in Ghūr.
Chapter Five

The Cārid's department

The army's internal organisation, mustering, commissariat and pay arrangements were directed from the Diwān-i Cārid, and the office of Cārid was accounted second only to the Vizier's. As well as the chief Cārid at the centre, there were subordinate Cārids and katkhudās, quartermasters, appointed for armies in the provinces and for the forces of great men like Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Naṣr. Since administrative rather than military experience was the desideratum here, it was usually Persians of the bureaucracy, and not Turkish soldiers, who held these offices.

The functions of the Cārid have been concisely described by Nazim, Sulṭān Maḥmūd, 137-8. To this survey may be added something on the annual review of the army (Cārid) and on the army's pay arrangements. When the Sultan was at Ghazna, his forces (excluding, of course, those in provincial garrisons) were paraded on the plain of Shēbahār, described as "a green place", carpeted with anemones,
half-a-farsakh outside the capital; the fertile region around it produced a famous variety of pears. This convenient site was probably utilised at an early date; Mas'ūd built a new palace there to replace an old one of his father's. The Mujmal at-tawārīkh considers the Card to be a Sassanid institution, in which the mūbedh acted as Cārid and inspected everyone from the Emperor downwards, passing them as fit for service. It is true that amongst the Sassanids, it was customary to hold a review of the army before battles, when the troops filed past the Emperor, and in the institution of the Card we see one of the elements of continuity between the Ghaznavid army and the Iranian past. The inclusion of the Amīr himself as the first person to be inspected and approved before payment at the Naurūz Card is a detail recorded of ʿAmr b. Laith's procedure. As among the Šāmānids, with the Ghaznavids it was frequently the Sultan himself who performed the inspection. The troops filed past him and were counted by his whip-end. They had their names checked against the general nominal roll, jarīda-yi Card, of which the Cārid had one copy and the other was kept in the Diwān-i Risālat; there was a separate roll for the ghulāms. The immediate origin of this general nominal roll was probably the special register of the Šāmānids, al-jarīdat as-saudā, wherein the names and duties of all their soldiers had been recorded.

The evidence from the historical sources gives a ring of truth to the extended section in the Adūb al-mulūk on the correct procedure for the Card, where it claims to reflect the practice of
the "kings of Islam". According to this, the ġārid stood on an eminence. The order of inspection was first the army's left (maisara), then the centre (qalb) and then the right (maimana). Cavalry and infantry filed past to have their weapons and kit inspected and their names and descriptions recorded in a document, a copy of which was given to the Naqīb of the army so that on the day of battle he could set out the forces in the same order. Then, beginning with the most senior, the commanders and officers were inspected and their names recorded. It was thus possible to bring detachments up to their required strength of officers before setting out for battle. At the end of the ġārid, commanders returned to their detachments, got the men and horses in order, and made speeches of encouragement to the men. Then the ġārid discreetly reported to the Sultan or Commander-in-chief, taking care that no hostile spies were lurking nearby to overhear information on the state of the army. Indeed, it is recommended that the ġārid should arrange previously with cavalry commanders that after being inspected, their troops should slip back and quietly mingle with the uninspected ones, so as to confuse enemy spies about the army's numbers.

The annual ġārid was also the occasion for general festivities at the Sultan's expense. The ġārid at Shābahār in 1037 took place at the end of Ramaḍān, coinciding with the Tād al-Fīr, and it ended with a feast in which large tables were laid out, the Sultan, his family, the commanders and the courtiers being at the top one, and poets and musicians entertained the concourse. Such munificence
was in the tradition of Turkish nomadic life, where patriarchal hospitality was an important factor in a tribal chief's holding together his following. We have seen (above, 228) that Sebeküttigin gave feasts as part of his policy to build up his forces, and they were expected too of the Seljuq Sultans. 106

Lastly, the Cari was one of the occasions for the payment of the bıstagın (Arabic, al-Qishrīniyya), cash allowances to the troops. These were normally paid out in advance so that soldiers could equip themselves and their mounts for a forthcoming campaign (Fakhr-i Mudabhir nevertheless advises that a special issue of two days' rations should be made to all combatants on the morning of battle). Among the Shāmaddānīs, official salaries, both military and civil, had been paid quarterly, and according to Naṣīm al-Mulk, the Ghaznavids continued this practice. 107 However, it is clear from several citations in Baihaqi (e.g. 146, 611) that allowances to civilians in the bureaucracy and pensions awarded to people who had attracted the Sultan's favour were paid monthly (mushāharat). But it was no doubt preferable to pay the army at longer intervals than this, if only from the point of view of convenience; unlike the officials and courtiers, the troops were not often long in one place. Often it was necessary for the Cari or his deputies to pay armies in the field with cash drawn from provincial treasuries; the armies campaigning against the Turkmena had often to be paid from Nishapur by the Camīd of Khurasan. It was an exception to the usual practice of advance payment, that the forces for the
Kirmān expedition (see above, Part II, 243) were to be paid from the revenues of Kirmān after they had occupied it.

Where distant provinces were concerned, the duty of paying and equipping local troops was often left to the governor or commander there. It was, for instance, difficult for the central Dīwān at Ghazna to pay the army of Khwārizm, especially as the tenuous line of communication along the Oxus was vulnerable to Qara-khanid attack; nevertheless, it appears from the anecdote in ch. XLIX of the Siyāsat-nāma that the Vizier Maimandī insisted that the monies for paying the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash and his army should go through the Dīwān at Ghazna. There was, indeed, a danger in letting a local governor have full control over his army's salaries, for the army/loyalties to him and not to the Sultan at the centre were by this means strengthened. Whilst Altuntash lived, the Sultans could count on his loyalty, but the close links of the army in Khwārizm with its leaders facilitated his sons' assertions of independence.

Nizām al-Mulk also asserts that "previous kings", i.e. the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids, did not pay their officials and soldiers in land grants, iqṭās, but gave allowances of cash, food and clothing. Barthold has already pointed out (Turkestan, 238-9) that the hereditary lands of the Salmāsīs in Gīhistān were in fact something like feudal franchises; moreover, great men like Alptigin had amassed large estates and properties all over the Sāmānid empire.
Moreover, the Turkish ghulām governors in Ghazna and Ḡūbelistān seem to have introduced a system of fiefs there for their soldiers. By Sebūktigin's time, these fiefs had been in existence some time, so that he had to reform abuses which had crept in (see above, Part I, loc. cit.). Shābūn-kāra'ī describes his action thus:

"The second affair which he attended to was that he regulated the army's organisation and their fiefs (iqṭā'-ishān). One day he gathered together the army and said: 'I perceive that the disordered state of the country has arisen from the army's fiefs being converted into state lands (dīhā-yi dīwān). Consequently, the countryside has suffered and the army has lost its source of sustenance. The proper task of the army is warfare and wielding its weapons; when it turns to cultivation and agriculture, things come to no good'. Then he issued his decision. He resumed all those agricultural lands which were in the hands of the army, and said, 'I will pay the fiefs out as a cash payment from the treasury at the beginning of each year. Each soldier must have his fighting equipment in battle order then'. Next, he made some calculations; each person who had acquired something in excess of his allotted fief had to give it back, and those who had less than the allotted fief had the amount made up. In this way he set the army's affairs in order'.

It is clear from this passage that Sebūktigin's rule ended the period of weak government by Alptigin's successors, and that the central power in Ghazna was now strong enough to resume the fiefs and substitute cash payments. In general, his successors for the next two or three generations at least maintained the system of paying the troops in cash, but it is possible that a type of fief..."
more closely supervised than the hereditary iqtad continued to exist under the early Ghaznavids in the form of the tuqma or property assigned for life to an office-holder.

The early Ghaznavids had an advantage over their rivals, the Buyids, in having the wealth of Khurasan and India to tap. They could therefore pay their troops regularly, whereas Miskawaih's narrative shows that the pay of the Buyid troops was frequently in arrears, making them tumultuous and unreliable. The practice of issuing authorisations, berâtas, to troops for them to collect their salaries - and anything else they could get - from hapless civilian populations was often the last resort of bankrupt rulers, but Mas'ud resorted to this practice with political as well as financial reasons in mind (see above, Part I, 176-7). Normally, the Sultans were in firm control of their forces; it was only after Mas'ud's demoralising defeat at Dandânqân and the loss of Khurasan, followed by the decision to abandon the west for India, that he lost control of the army and was deposed by it. At the opening of his reign he had been strong enough to dispense with the accession largesses and pay increases with which weak rulers like the Abbasid Caliphs and the Buyids had to win their armies' homage, the so-called māl-i baqârat, corresponding to the jultas aqchesi of the Ottoman troops; indeed, he had been strong enough to try and get back the money which his weaker brother Muhammed had paid out to soldiers and courtiers (see above, Part I, 136-7).

On top of the allowances which a soldier received there was
his share in the plunder. Immediately after a victory, the 
Orid or his representative supervised the valuing of the spoils.
If the Sultan was not personally present, his rights would be watch-
ed over by an agent from the Department of the Ishraf. The Sultan
took a fifth from the slaves, animals and general booty, reserving
to himself within this fifth all precious metals, arms and eleph-
ants; and he had a right of first pick, safiyya, from other choice
articles. The remaining four-fifths went to the troops in propor-
tion to their ranks and with cavalrmen getting two shares to the
infantrymen's one. When the Sultan had had his pick from the arms
and precious metals, he would often turn the rest over to be
divided amongst the army. 114 There were also special bonuses,
sillet, awarded in the field for outstanding valour or for a partic-
ularly striking achievement; Fakhr-i Mudabbir advises a definite
scale of rewards proportionate to such feats as capturing horses
or elephants or carrying off the enemy's standard or chatr. 115
Chapter Six

The numbers of the army

There remains to see whether we can make any estimate of the total numbers of the Ghaznavid army. Nazim, Sulṭān Maḥmūd, 140, estimated that in peace-time Maḥmūd's army probably amounted to 100,000 cavalry and infantry, a figure which would be swollen in war-time by volunteers, tributary contingents, etc. This is perhaps a generous estimate. An examination of the numbers of men used in certain campaigns suggests that in Maṣūd's day the total was less than this.

The sections in the Akhbār ad-daulat as-Saljuqiyya, Ibn al-Āthīr, Barhebraeus and Mīrkhwānd on the Ghaznavid–Seljuq warfare in Khurasan all draw to a considerable extent on the Malik-nāma, which was probably written for Alp Arslan, i.e. it dates from within a generation or so of the events which it describes. The Akhbār is the oldest of the later sources, and the figures it gives
for armies and combattants are generally reasonable. On the other hand, many of Ibn al-Athīr’s figures need drastic pruning. The figure of 30,000 for an army sent in 1038 against Tughrīl Beg is on the large side; that of 100,000 cavalrymen plus a train of followers taken from Balkh against Chaghī Beg shortly afterwards is certainly to be rejected. More acceptable are the figures given for a battle outside Ray between the local Ghaznavid army of 3000 and 5000 of the "cIrSqI" Turkmens. 117 ṫubī is normally vague about figures, but certainly Baihaqī, and no doubt Gardīzī, accompanied armies in the field, and their estimates of numbers seem to be on the whole sensible ones.

According to Gardīzī, there were 54,000 cavalry and 1300 elephants at the Shābahār Garq of 1023, excluding those in the provinces and on garrison duty. This may represent a peak for Māhmūd’s reign. Baihaqī’s figures for individual expeditions in Māsūd’s reign are often quite modest. To place his protege Abū’l-Mu’āsakar on the throne of Mākrān, the Sultan sent 4000 cavalry, 3000 infantry and a force of "cIrSqI" Turkmens. Also at the beginning of his reign, his uncle Yusuf b. Sebūktigin was sent to Quḍār in Baluchistan with 500 cavalry and his own ghulāms. The 4000 cavalry, 2500 infantry and five elephants sent in 1034 to Kirmān were beaten by a Būyid relieving force of 10,000. For the Gurgān and Tabaristan expedition of the following year, Māsūd took 3000 cavalry, but this figure was raised to 8000 when he reached Amul and saw the difficulties of the terrain. 119 These were all expeditions to peri-
pheral regions, but the forces sent were deemed adequate, and the Sultan's prestige was in the early part of his reign at its height. Moreover, Maḥmūd just before his death had considered 8000 cavalry-men sufficient for the task of dethroning Majd ad-Ḍaula at Ray. After 1035, however, the problem of Khurasan and the Oghuz incursions became central. The army of 15,000 cavalry and 2000 palace ghulāms sent in 1035 to Nasr was defeated by the Turkmen. At the end of 426/1035, the Hindu general Tilak returned from suppressing ʿAbd al-Ṭālib's rebellion, and at Merv ar-Rūdī handed over to the Sultan his force of Indian cavalry and infantry together with fifty-five elephants taken in tribute from the Indian princes. Masūd was at this time able to leave an army at Sarakhs, to send 1000 cavalry (Akbār ad-ḍaulat as-Saljuqīyya, 5: 3000) to supplement the governor of Khurasan's force at Nishapur, and to leave garrisons in Herat and Qā'in. There must have been something over 20,000 Ghaznavid troops in Khurasan at this time, and the events of the next year, 1036, strengthen this impression. The Sultan's advisers then estimated that a strong army of 10,000 cavalry and 5000 infantry should be sent forward against the Oghuz, whilst the whole of the Arab and Kurdish element should stand at Herat as a second line of defence. There was also at this time an army of 3000 at Ray. At the end of 1038, Baihaqī, following the estimate of "trustworthy people", says that there were some 40,000 infantry and cavalry reviewed at Shībahār; clearly, nobody was very certain how many there were, and the figure seems quite a high one.
What is certain is that Mas'ud was never able to take to Khurasan the army of 50,000 men and 300 elephants which at this time he promised to the notables of Nishapur; and eighteen months later he was only able to scrape together at the most 100 elephants for the final effort at Dandānqūn in 1040. For this battle, the Turkmen fielded 16,000 riders, having sent 2000 of the youths and those with poor mounts back to guard baggage and families. Baihaqi does not mention how many troops Mas'ud had to oppose them, but his troops were starved and demoralised and the news of the Turkmen's numbers depressed him intensely. Hence it is unlikely that his forces equalled his opponents' ones, and probably they were less.

During this period there were garrisons and an army in India, but with the exception of the Hānsāl campaign in the winter of 1037-8, major offensive operations were not undertaken; the cream of the Sultan's troops were in Khurasan. Even allowing for the troops in India, it seems unlikely that the strength of the regular army in Mas'ud's reign approached that of his father's; a total of 30,000 - 40,000 might be a fair estimate.
Notes to Part II

Chapter I


2. SN, ch. XXVII, 127; SN, ch. XLI, 129-30, tr. Levy, 221.


11. harsh treatment was the cause of Mardāwi's murder by his ghulams (Mūrij, IX, 29-30; Misk., op. cit., I, 162-3, 312-15, tr. IV, 182-4, 353-6) and of Zangū's (Bundārī, 208-9); cf. ibid., 271, on Sanjar's attitude to his ghulams.

12. SN, ch. XXVII, 111, 119.

13. IA, VIII, 157: kīna yaqūlu yanbaghī li'l-jundī an yāṣhabahu kullu ma malaka aina sāra ḥattā lī yaṣṭaqilahu shālī. The effect of domestic ties on an army's mobility is seen in an anecdote in Niẓāmī Ḍūrūqī's Chahār maqāla, 51-3, Browne's Revised tr., 34-6, where Naṣr b. Ahmad's troops grumble at being kept away from their wives and families.

14. cf. Baih., 1, 482.

15. ibid., 624.

16. ibid., 404 ff. = F. and D., History of India, II, 125-9; Gard., 102. In volunteering for the post, Tilak claimed that he would be better able to withstand the summer heat than a Turk (the Indian campaigns being normally winter ones).

17. Baih., 252; Gard., 84; Muntakaṣam, VIII, 53.


20. Othūbī, II, 290–1; Jurb., 247; Gard., 76.


23. Baih., 568, 603, 615, 624 and passim.

24. ibid., 464; Gard., 100.

25. Baih., 267, 270; cf. the Vizier Maimāndī's instructions to Ahmad on how a commander should behave in the special conditions obtaining in India, ibid., 269-70 = E. and D., History of India, II, 120-1. Niẓām al-Mulk advises as a general precept that the sons of great commanders should be kept, according to a rota, at court (SN, ch. XXV, 108).


27. Baih., I, 374-5; Gard., 93-5; GN, ch. XV, 49, tr. 78; SN, ch. XXI, 102.


29. ibid., 271, 394, 410, 651.

30. ibid., 37, 271, 623. The lion device is a traditional Persian one, as appears from the Shāhname; cf. Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, 210-12. For a detailed description of Mas'ūd's court in full splendour, see above, Part I, 115-17, and further, Baih., 288, and Tā'īr, 10–11, tr. I, 83–4. In the years 1949–51 the French Archaeological Delegation in Afghanistan discovered and examined a remarkable series of mural paintings in the audience hall of the Ghaznavid palace of Lashkar-i Bāzār at Bust (see above, Part I, 189–90). In these murals some forty-four of the Sultan's guards are depicted in three-quarter face views, and it seems probable that they
date from the early Ghaznavid period. The full evaluation of these discoveries will throw valuable light on the costumes and external appearance of the palace guards, for which so far only literary evidence has been available. See D. Schlumberger, "Le palais ghaznévide de Lashkari Bazar", Syria, XXIX, 1952, 251-70, and Ahmad Ali Kohzad, "Uniformes et armes des gardes des Sultans de Ghazna", Afghanistan, Kabul, VI/1, 1951, 48-53.

31. the Ghaznavid royal chatr were black, and in the time of Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd the chatr was surmounted by the bejewelled image of a falcon (Bahī, 639; Aḥb al-muluk, f. 15b, tr. Shafi, 200). The Ghaznavid banners and chatrs are discussed by Gulam Mustafa Khan, "A history of Bahram Shah of Ghaznin", IC, XXIII, 1949, 80-3. Spuler, Iran, 345 n.7, quotes Köprülü, IA Art. "Bayrak", that the Ghaznavids had a moon and phoenix device on their flags. Unfortunately, Köprülü merely says that this "is to be understood from contemporary literary sources"; the writer has not yet found any such supporting evidence. It has been pointed out (e.g. in Brockelmann's review of Thomsen's Turcica, Keleti Szemle, XVII, 1916-17, 187-90) that Wirkhwānd's mention of the māhīcha-yī rūyat of Sebuktigin is not to be relied on.

32. Bahī, 410.

33. ibid., 268, 524, 568; TH, 10-11, tr. I, 83-4. In discussing the question, Nazim, Sultan Mahmūd, 140, puts the total number of slaves at 4000, on the basis of Bahī, 524 (= Morley's edn., 652) and the Jūzjānī reference. In fact, it is explicitly said in all these places that this is the number of the ghulāmn-i sarī; the total of slaves in general must therefore have been greater than this.

34. Bahī, 680 ff.; Sachau, SBWAW, LXXIV, 1873, 303-10.

35. Bahī, 271, 281-2, 394, 402. The SN considers it safe for a
ruler who is master in his own house to keep back only 1000
picked men from the recommended guard of 4000 infantrymen and
distribute the rest to his amirs and nobles (ch. XIX, 99-100).

36. Ādēb al-mulūk, f. 20a, tr. Shafi 202 = B.M. Ms. f. 43a with a
slightly different text and figures; Baih., 600.

37. *ibid.*, 517, 524.

38. *ibid.*, 230, 237.

39. cf., an Āriq’s contemptuous advice to an old soldier in the
Samānid forces, Gard., 23.

40. cf. Cahen, EI² Art. "Buwayhids".

41. *QZ*, ch. XLII, 134, tr. 230; *SN*, 107 (not 2000 each of Dailamīs
and Khurāsānīs, as Schefer translated, *Le Siasset Nameh*, Paris
1893, 135).

42. *IA*, VIII, 366; Nāqir-i Khusrāw, *Safar-nama*, 58-60; W. Ensslin
in *Byzantium*, ed. N.H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss, Oxford 1946,
296-7, 301.

43. Ādēb al-mulūk, ff. 37b-38a, 50b, tr. 204, 210. Shafi’s suggest-
ion, 204 n.4, that Bā Saqīd = "irregular" is confirmed by Bāiha-
qī’s use of the term Bā Saqīdān, 283, where he links them with
the "men of Transoxania", i.e. ghāzīs.

44. concerning the slow-wittedness of the Turks, the common phrase
Turk-i ablah should be noted, e.g. in Baih., 250, and Muḥammad

45. Baih., 267, 401-2 (cf. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India*, II,
122-3), 497, 615.


On these two Turkish tribes, see Barthold, EI¹ Art. "Turks. I
Historical and geographical survey.

48. Cūtbī, II, 84; Jurb., 184; IA, IX, 135; Mīrkhw., IV, 41, who also mentions that Mahmūd already had Gīlānī (sc. Dailamī) troops in Khurasan.

49. Baig., 497; Gard., 94; Nazim, Sulṭān Mahmūd, 140 n.7.


51. ibid., 237, 251–2.

52. ibid., 429–32; IA, IX, 282 (the second page of this numbering); TS, 355, 357; cf. E. and D., History of India, II, 59–60, 130–1.

53. Safar-nāma, 61, 63. The Caspian mountain folk had been used as auxiliary troops in Sassanid times (Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, 209–10).

54. IA, VIII, 310, 367; Baig., 207.

55. SN, ch. XIX, 99–100; Continuators of Misk., Eclipse of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, III, 196, 218, 356; tr. VI, 207, 230, 383; Gard., 91 (zhūʿīndārān in the Dailamī bodyguard of Majd ad-Daula of Ray), cf. Minorsky, Domination des Dailamites, 20; Muḥammad b. Ibrahim, Seljoukides du Kermān, 2, 49. On the term mufrad, which does not seem to occur in Ghaznavid terminology, see Quatremère, Hist. des Sultans Mamlouks, I, i, 187.

56. Baig., 288, 541. At the review of the army at Shēbāhār in 1037, the Dailamī leaders sat at the higher table with the Vizier, royal princes, amīrs and nobles (Baig., 524).

57. ibid., 497, 518, 603.

58. IA, VIII, 333, IX, 268; Spuler, Iran, 242.

59. Baig., 51, 369; the editors implausibly suggest a connection with dīv-sar, "like a devil". In any case, this name for daring troops is clearly of the same type as that of the Sassanid Cyēnavspār, "those who sacrifice their lives" (in the Arabic of
ad-Dīnawarī, al-Mustamīta, "those who seek death": Nöldeke, Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden, Leiden 1879, 365 n.2; Christensen, op. cit., 208) and the Ottoman Divānegān and Jambāzān.

60. Gultbī, II, 83-4; Jurb., 183; Mīrkhw., IV, 41; Gard., 73, 101; Baih., 678.


63. IA, IX, 301, 340, cf. 316; Ẓahr ad-Dīn Marqashtī, Taʾrīkh-i Tabaristān u Rūyān u Māzandarān, 137-8; Baih., 451-2.

64. ibid., 258, 452, 481, 614, 617; ʿAdīb al-mulūk, f. 38b, tr. 205; Gard., 68.

65. Baih., 600; ʿAdīb al-mulūk, f. 41a.

66. K. de B. Codrington, "A geographical introduction to the history of Central Asia", GJ, CV, 1944, 39. Biruni's mention of the Afghans as living in the western frontier mountains of India, i.e. the Sulaimans, points to these as their earliest known home (India, tr. Sachau, I, 1, 208, cf. 199, quoted by G. Morgenstierne, SI² Art. "Afghān"). However, Minorsky has suggested that the name "Afghan" may have a Far Eastern origin and have been brought by a conquering aristocracy ("Addenda to the Ḫudūd al-ʿĀlam", BSOAS, XVII, 1955, 255).

67. Murūj, V, 478-9; E. Bretschneider, Mediaeval researches from eastern Asiatic sources, London 1910, I, 140, II, 258, 263-4; ʿAdīb al-mulūk, ff. 65a-66a, 72b. The material on horse-breeding in these regions is considerable, though scattered; see, for example, Maqd., 324; I Ḫauq.², 449; Chahār Maqāla, 59-65, Browne's Revised tr. 39-44; Togān, Gīrāṣ, 157; Spuler, Iran, 392.
Chapter 3

75. S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim history, Bombay 1939, 146; Baih., 622; IA, IX, 156.

76. Gard., 75-6, 78.

77. Utbi, II, 153-6; Jurb., 213; IA, IX, 172-3; Gard., 76; Baih., 268. Hodivala, op. cit., suggests that the obvious meaning of "Sa'alamân", "Ceylon", may not in fact be meant here, although Ceylon elephants were certainly renowned for their courage (cf. Minorsky, Marvazi on China, the Turks and India, London 1942, 46-7), but that the reference is rather to the wild elephants found in the Siwalik Range near Thanesar, on the borders of
the former U.P. and the Panjab.

78. Gard., 80; Baih., 284; oUtbi, II, 300; Jurb., 250; Yaqût, Muqaddam, IV, 220-1 (muruj kabira at Kabul); Bâbur-nâma, tr. 208. Jûzjâni puts the total of Maḥmûd's elephants at 2500 (TN, 10, tr. I, 83). The fineness and plumpness of Maḥmûd's elephants became proverbial in Islam. Evliya Chelebi mentions that the Kagîthane meadows on the outskirts of Istanbul were so lush that a lean horse pastured there for ten days would come out as fat as one of Sultan Maḥmûd's elephants (Seyrâhat-nâma, tr. von Hammer-Purgstall, London 1846-50, II, 85).

79. Baîh., 567.


81. Baîh., 430, cf. also 501 and Âdâb al-mulûk, f. 30a, tr. 203; Nazim, Sultan Maḥmûd, 138, quoting Farrukhî. On a passage in oUtbi where captured elephants are called the hâjz as-Sultan and on the general topic of elephants as royal beasts, see Hodivala, op. cit., 139-40; on the rôle of elephants among the Indians, B.P. Sinha, "The art of war in ancient India 600 BC - 300 AD", Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, IV, 1957, 132-6.

82. Mas'ûdî, Murûj, III, 18-19; oUtbi, II, 129ff.; Jurb., 203; Baîh., 126-7, 270.

83. ibid., 567 = E. and D., Hist. of India, II, 142-3; IA, IX, 230. The stationing of an elephant for the Sultan's personal use is a Ghaznavid version of the well-known institution of the faras an-nauba; cf. Quatremère, Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks, I, ii, 165, II, i, 12-13.

84. Murûj, II, 230-2; Spuler, Iran, 492-3; Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, 208; Baîh., 483; IA, IX, 268. According to TS, 206, Yaqûb b. Laith refused to use elephants in warfare, even
though he had captured several at ar-Rukkhaj from the Zambil, on the grounds that the fate of the Aṣḥāb al-Fīl in the Qurʾān showed that they were inauspicious beasts. Clearly, the Ṣaffārids' contacts with the fringe of the Indian world in Zābulistan were too transient for them to re-introduce this military usage into the Persian world. Among the Būyids, Ḥāṣid ad-Daula had a number of war elephants, ṣuyūl muqātila, which were used, for instance, against his cousin Bakhtiyār b. Muṣīz ad-Daula in 977; but it is not recorded that they played any appreciable rôle in the fighting (Misk., Eclipse of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate, II, 368, tr. V, 402).


86. Christensen, loc. cit.; ʿUtbī, I, 184; Jurb., 91; Gard., 69, 82; Muntazam, VIII, 53; Mīrkhw., IV, 41; cf. Turkestan, 273.

87. Ḥāṣid al-mulūk, f. 50a, tr. 210; Bundārī, 263; al-Ḥussainī, Akhbār, 91; IA, X, 354-5, who has much the fullest account of the battle, numbers Arslanshāh's elephants at 120. Cf. TH, 55, tr. I, 351, where the same method was used by Ghurid soldiers against Bahrāmshāh's armoured elephants.

88. cf. Bāih., 8, 456, and Gard., 82, where in deploying his forces, Mahmūd places an armoury behind each of the sections of his front line.

89. Bāih., 394, 456.

90. Gard., 78; cf. Nazim, Sultān Mahmūd, 74-5, and also Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim history, 234-5, on the strategic importance of this area.

91. Ḥāṣid al-mulūk, ff. 94a-b; Gard., 82.

92. SN, chs. XXII, XXIII, 105-6; Nazim, op. cit., 138 n. 4.
Chapter 4

93. ʿĀdūb al-mulūk, f. 94a; Nüleke, Geschichte der Perser und Araber, 96; Schlumberger, "Le palais ghânzâvi'de Lashkari Bazar", 262 and PIs. XXXI, 2-3, XXXII, 1; Kohzad, "Uniformes et armes des gardes des Sultans de Ghazna", 51. On the qalâshūrī/sârâshūrī, see Vullers and the Burhān-i qâti', s.v., and the Farhang-i nīzām of Āghā Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAlī, IV, 108. The etymology of the word is uncertain, but it is likely that Ṯ̱kish. q̱ḻḻṯ̱ch "sword" underlies the first element.

94. ʿĀdūb al-mulūk, ff. 80a-b, 81b, tr. 215-16; Baih., 624; Gard., 118; Th., 13, tr. I, 91; Majmāʾ al-ansāb, ff. 181a, 186b.

95. ʿĀdūb al-mulūk, f. 78a; ibid., tr. Shafi, 231 (this anecdote not in the I.O. Ms.); Nüleke, Das iranische Nationalepos, Berlin and Leipzig, 1920, 53. The present writer has not found any specific reference to the use of cross-bows and similar weapons by the Ghaznavids, but the cross-bow (nāwak) is mentioned by Firdausī and there seem to have been nāwakiyān amongst the bands of gāyārīs who infested Khurasan and Sistān at this period. See Th., 51, 267, and a discussion by Cahen in JA, CCXXXVI, 1948, 169.

96. ʿĀdūb al-mulūk, f. 77b.


100. Baih., 466, Th., 47, tr. I, 336-7; for the Ghūrī dogs, see also
Chapter 5

102. ibid., 524; Ṭālib al-mulūk, f. 49a, tr. 208.
103. Mīrāmī at-tawārīkh, 74; Ṭabarī, in Nöldeke, Geschichte der Perser und Araber, 247-9, giving a detailed account of a Sassanid Sarq, which Nöldeke considered "leider zu anecdotenhaft" to be relied on, but which may at least be accepted as evidence of this institution in some form amongst the Sassanids; Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, 213-14; Gard., 16, cf. Turkestan, 221.
104. IA, VIII, 300; Baih., 430, 482 (cf. SN, ch. III, 17), 651; al-Khwārizmī, Mafātīh al-sulūm, 64-6.
105. Ṭālib al-mulūk, ff. 81b-82b.
107. Ṭālib al-mulūk, f. 95a; I ḥauq. 2, 469; SN, ch. XXIII, 106; cf.
Mafātīh al-ʿulūm, 64-6, on the Ṣāmīnid pay system.


109. SN, 244-5; a slightly fuller text in Khālkhālī’s edn., Tehran 1310/1932, 179.

110. SN, ch. XXIII, 106; Mīrkhwān, IV, 36, uses the term iqṭāʾ for Alptigin’s estates.

111. Majmāʿ al-ansāb, ff. 166a-b.

112. the word muqtāʾ appears in Baih., 556; if it were read as muqtāʾ, as the editors tentatively suggest, then it might be adducible as evidence for the existence of the iqṭāʾ under that very name. But Baih. does not otherwise use the term, although as the definitions in the Mafātīh al-ʿulūm, 59-60, show, the terminology for both the hereditary and life fief was well-known at that time.

113. Gard., 93; Baih., 59, 257-60.

114. Adāb al-mulūk, ff. 41b, 111b, 113a; Baih., 119; Nazim, Sulṭān Māḥmūd, 138, quoting Farrukhī.

115. Baih., 483, cf. 466; Adāb al-mulūk, ff. 126b-127b. The SN, ch. XLI, 130, tr. 220, also recommends handsome gilāt to encourage the troops.

Chapter 6


117. IA, IX, 268, 311, 328. Mīrkhwān’s figure for the army sent against Chaghrī Beg, 17,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, is
less fantastic but still too high (IV, 103).

118. Gard., 80.


120. Gard., 90.

121. Baih., 481, 493-4, reading with the editors, takkuren for Makhzan; al-Hasaini, Akhbar, 4-5.

122. Baih., 498, 556; Akhbar, 5-6.

123. Baih., 554, 603 (where the Sultan takes with him to Khurasan for the final effort, fifty "from the choicest elephants"), 619; Akhbar, 10.
Part III

Nishapur and its Khurasanian setting
Chapter One

Introductory: the position of Khurasan in early Islamic history

The rôle of north-eastern Persia in the development of Iranian civilisation has been a long-standing one; in as much as Zoroastrianism may have arisen in this corner of the Iranian world, this rôle is almost coeval with the appearance of the Iranian race in western and central Asia. During the Achaemenid and Sassanid periods the centre of Persia's gravity lay in the west, and for much of this time the capital of the empire lay in Semitic Mesopotamia and not in Persia at all. Even so, Khurasan and the east retained its own vitality, fertilised by contacts with the Buddhist worlds of India and Chinese Turkestan and by successive waves of incoming Indo-European, Turkish and perhaps Mongolian peoples from the steppes. ¹

Hence in the 9th century, when the Abbasid Caliphs were integr-
ating Persia with the Arab world, Khurasan was ready to assume a
creative part in the Islamic community. It was in the east that
the first Persian dynasties grew up in the 9th and 10th centuries,
independent of Baghdad. Merv and Nishapur began to rival the cities
of central Persia like Ray and Isfahan as centres of industry and
trade. The New Persian language and the Persian national epic
arose in the east, as did a Perso-Islamic style of architecture and
painting. Although Khurasan and Transoxania were in this period
predominantly Sunni in outlook — the real home of revolutionary,
political Shi'ism lies in the Caspian provinces — one district of
Khurasan, that of Baihaq or Sabzawar, later played a decisive part
in the dissemination of Shi'ism in eastern Persia, and Isma'ili had
strong Khurasanian connections (see below, ch. 8). These
factors, combined with Khurasan's position adjoining the Dār al-kufr,
gave the province a remarkable intellectual vitality. It was the
starting point for the orthodox reaction of the 11th century onwards,
and its theologians like al-Juwaini and al-Ghazzali and its statesmen
like Niẓām al-Mulk gave the movement intellectual leadership.
Missionaries and faqīhs streamed from Khurasan and Transoxania to
the lands beyond the Syr Darya. The interest in evangelism and the
atmosphere of polemic in this north-eastern corner of the Islamic
world explain in part the persistence there beyond the Mongol inva-
sions of the Maṣṭazila, a sect which had originally arisen to combat
dualist and other threats to orthodox Islamic teaching.
Geographically, Khurasan is part of the mountain and plateau zone which stretches from Anatolia through the Elburz to Afghanistan and the Pamirs. In the west, Khurasan began to the east of Gurgân and Qūmis; in the east, the Ḫudūd al-Ḡālam considers that Qūhistān, Gurgân, Behgīs and Ṭūkhāristān are part of it, but that Ghūr, Sīstān and beyond are only the marches of Khurasan. In the south, the uninhabitable Dasht-i Kavir and Dasht-i Lut salt deserts provide one of the strongest of natural frontiers; in the north, Khurasan spills over the Iranian plateau towards the Oxus. The mass of brown shading or hatching which a relief map displays to us, the lifeless salt deserts, the land-locked river basins, the indeterminate rivers which peter out in lakes and swamps and permit no navigation or access to the sea; all these betray an erratic water-supply, a harsh climate, an arid terrain and introspective and closed human communities. Life in Khurasan did present a challenge to the inhabitants. Localism was always a feature of life there, but it expressed zeal and industriousness rather than retardation.

The strategic position of Khurasan shows us one reason why the niggardliness of nature did not inhibit progress there. The historic trade route from the Near East to Central Asia and beyond passed along the southern edge of the Elburz through Ray and Māmphīn and then through the heart of Khurasan to the Oxus crossings at Amul-ī Shāṭṭ or Tirmīdḥ, or else through Balkh and the upper Qundus valley and the Ghorband to Kabul and India. Khurasan was the
springboard for the Arab conquests of Central Asia, and its importance in the first two centuries of Islam was essentially military, as a colonial frontier area for the Arab tribesmen. Similarly, Nādir Shāh made his Afghan and Indian conquests from here and stored up his armaments and plunder in the natural stronghold of the Qal’at-i Nādirī in the mountains of Khurasan.

But equally often, military movements have been in the reverse direction. Khurasan was the bastion first of Toynbee’s Irano-Semitic “Syriac” society, and then of Islam, against Central Asiatic Turkish and Mongol peoples. Here, the mountains rise steeply from the steppes to over 10,000 feet, and the nomad has to leave the Eurasian plain and ascend the Iranian plateau. Here the armies of the civilised Near East have often chosen to stand against incoming barbarians, and here took place the fighting between the Ghaznavids and the Turkmens. The failure of the Ghaznavids to stem the invaders should warn us that the abrupt change of terrain and habitat only checked the nomads temporarily; the Central Asian peoples were only in part composed of horse-rearing plainsmen, and in any case, the balance of a pastoral economy requires herds to be driven up each summer to vailaqs in the hills. In the event, the Turkmens found excellent pasture for their beasts in the oases of Khurasan and in the valleys of Azerbaijan and Armenia further west. Because of such movements of peoples, Khurasan inevitably became a cockpit. Yaqūbī contrasted its open position to Baghdad’s sheltered one, and said that it “stretches out like a salient into the east, surr-
ounded on all sides by fierce enemies and warlike aggressors"; and Curzon was probably right when he said that "more people have died a violent death in Khurasan than in any other territory of equal size in Asia".  

However, the penalty of being a frontier area may be cultural impoverishment or lack of material progress, because the constant insecurity inhibits urban life and agricultural and commercial prosperity. There was always a danger for Khurasan here. It flourished during the Greco-Bactrian period, when urban life was stimulated by Alexander the Great's activities in the east; his foundation of Merv and Herat is historically attested in Pliny. This prosperity continued under the Arssacids, as the etymology of the older name for Nishapur, Abar-shahr (older form, ̀Aparnak-
-shahr), "country of the Aparnak", one of the three tribes of the Dahae who founded the Parthian empire, shows. But Khurasan became comparatively poor and backwards under the Sassanids, who never held the more easterly part of Khurasan; many of the province's connections at this time were with the Buddhist east rather than with Zoroastrian Persia. The list of Persian towns mentioned in sources on the Sassanids and listed by Herzfeld is instructive: out of a hundred listed, eighty-two are in western Persia. Khurasan in its widest sense has only eleven, and of these, only Damghan, Nishapur, Merv ar-Rūd and Pushang are really certain. In the period of the early Caliphate, Khurasan was racked by Arab tribal and Persian sectarian strife, whilst western Persia and Iraq were
enjoying great prosperity under the Caliphs. It was the appearance of vigorous local dynasties in the 9th century which gave Khurasan a greater measure of protection and stability; in the 11th century it was probably the most flourishing region of Islam after Fātimid Egypt, even though violence and insecurity were never far away.

The rise of native Persian dynasties like the Šīrīds and Šāmānids coincided with a revival of interest in the nation’s past, stimulated in the first place by the Persian secretarial class in the early Abbasid Caliphate. These native dynasties attempted to create a community of interest with the dihqāns and urban merchant classes. The Šaffārid occupation of Khurasan was only an interlude. The Šaffarids were essentially military adventurers, who gloried in their plebeian origins; some of the earliest recorded building in Nishapur, of mosques and of the Dār al-Ibāra, is attributed to cAmr b. Leith, but his brother Ya‘qūb had plundered houses and burnt down palaces when he had captured the city. Under the Šāmānids, Khurasan became a centre of the Persian cultural renaissance. The ambitions of the emergent Dailamī adventurers, such as Lailī b. Nu’mān, who temporarily occupied Nishapur in 921, were deflected by Šāmānid firmness towards western and southern Persia. Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan was short-lived, and though it gave political stability initially, failed to protect the province ultimately from the Turkmens.

The Seljuq Sultans rapidly assimilated their rule to the Persian
administrative tradition. The fact that a direct line of the Seljuq family, running from Chaghri Beg through Alp Arslan to Sanjar, ruled Khurasan proper for over a century (the eastern fringes like Herat and Balkh were often granted out to other members of the family) gave the province some continuity of administration. Moreover, from the time when Tughrîl took with him westwards from Nishapur the Imam Muwaffaq (see below, Part V, 510-11), Khurasan provided the Seljuqs with a corps of efficient administrators, distinguished in the eyes of contemporary historians from the oppressive and heretical dabârs of Iraq and western Persia by their orthodoxy and just conduct. Unfortunately, the capture of Sanjar by the Ghuzz showed that the Seljuqs had failed to master the anarchically-inclined Turkmen bands who roamed the Khurasanian countryside with their flocks and who were to be henceforth a permanent element there. The Mongol ravages in Khurasan were grievous, but were repaired, and the province probably benefited commercially from the internationalist attitude of the Mongols and the continuous traffic between Persia and Central Asia in the Ilkhanid period. The real end of Khurasan's vitality comes only after the disappearance of the Timûrids, for the Şafavids, a Kurdish dynasty from Azerbaijan, had little interest in the east and were unable properly to protect it from the Üzbegs.
Chapter Two

The agricultural and commercial bases of Nishapur's prosperity

The modicum of political stability which Khurasan's strategic position allowed favoured the province's economic prosperity in the period from the 9th to the 13th centuries. Lying as they did on the caravan route connecting Iraq and Baghdad, the supreme centres of consumption in the Near East, with Central Asia and beyond, the Khurasanian towns were transit points for this traffic. To the north of Khurasan lay Khwarizm, which tapped the resources of the steppes and forests of Siberia and the middle Volga, some of which were luxuries like furs or musk, but others materials of everyday use or consumption like leather and hides, wax and tallow, and honey. These products came to Khurasan and were distributed from there to other regions of Islam. Above all, there was the slave trade from across the Oxus (see below, Part IV, 405-7).
The products of China and the Far East had to be either small in bulk or luxurious in nature to make the journey across Asia worthwhile, but even fine porcelain from China could survive the trip: among the presents which Ḍālī b. Ḍīsā b. Ḍawḥān, the tyrannical governor of Khurasan (796–807), sent to Ḥrūn ar-Rashīd were twenty pieces of *chīnī faghlūrī*, dishes, cups, etc., and 2000 other pieces of china.  

The historic caravan route through Central Asia has often been known as the "Silk route", and imports of Far Eastern silks supplemented the locally produced ones of Khurasan and the Caspian provinces. The growing ease of life in Baghdad and other urban centres during the Abbasid Caliphate stimulated the demand for luxury merchandise and raised up a class of entrepreneurs who organised the required long-distance caravans and created a mechanism of distribution. In the early 11th century a Nishapur merchant could have a business partner as far away as Bulghār; doubtless it was commercial contacts such as this which in 1024 stimulated the King of Bulghār, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Iltābir, to send a substantial sum for the repair of the Friday mosques of Sabzawār and Khusrūjird in the Baihaq oasis. Hence the economic and cultural renaissance of Khurasan from the 9th century onwards was in part a reflection of the prosperity of the Caliphate in general at this time.  

As well as this east–west axis of trade, a secondary commercial route ran southwards from Khurasan to Kirmān, Fārs and the Persian
Gulf. The Kirmānīs had a bazaar of their own in Nishapur, and the town of Kirmān or Jīruft was a prosperous entrepôt, especially under its local Seljuq dynasty of the late 11th and the 12th centuries, when the settlements of foreigners there included Greeks and Indians. By this route, the commercial and financial influence of Khurasan spread across the Persian Gulf to Cūmān and Arabia. Nāṣir-i Khusraw came home from the Pilgrimage in 1051 via Falaj in Yamāma, and found that commercial transactions there were done in Nīshāpūrī dinars. Maqdisī noted the trade connections of Khurasan and Arabia, and of Qā'īn in Qūhistān said that ismuhā bi-qūmān kabīr. In this age when a money economy was becoming dominant in trading, the prestige of Nishapur currency was high. Thus when in 1036 the Caliph al-Qā'im tried to strike against the superior economic power of the Fāṭimids, he ordered that commercial transactions should no longer be made in Maghribī (i.e. Fāṭimid) dinars, but in Qādirī (i.e. those of the previous Caliph al-Qādir), Qāshānī or Nīshāpūrī ones, and notaries and legal attesters were not to entertain any legal or commercial documents relating to the former currency. The geographers describe Nishapur at the end of the 10th century as an international trade centre, the resort of merchants from Iraq and Egypt, the depôt (mātrak) for Khwārizm, Ray and Gurgān, and the entrepôt (furqā) for Fāra, Sind and Kirmān, and with inhabitants who were the richest in Khurasan.  

Khurasan was also a manufacturing centre. This industry was
organised on a local, small-scale basis, the work of craftsmen and artisans in their own houses and shops. Nishapur's artisans produced, among other things, ironware, needles, knives and other articles of metalware. The mountains of northern Khurasan yielded copper, lead, antimony, iron and silver (and, it seems, gold, but not in economic quantities); but on the whole, mineral exploitation was more highly developed in regions further east, such as Kabul and Badakhshan, where there were better supplies of timber for smelting purposes. The mountains of Khurasan were generally bare, and there was only deciduous woodland in any quantity in the valleys which ran down to the Caspian, like the Dinur-Sari defile which carried the Nishapur-Isfarain-Gurgan road. Coal, of an indifferent quality, has been noted on the hills around Nishapur in recent times, but has never been in general use there as a fuel. The mountains of Khurasan were most valuable for the luxury building material of marble and for the famous Nishapur turquoises. The turquoise mines, still worked today, lie to the north-east of the city on the Mashhad road; Curzon estimated that the workings covered forty square miles. The fame of these turquoises reached China; a 14th century glossary of the jewels of the Muslims mentions ni-she-bu-di turquoises.

Above all, Nishapur produced textiles. The cloth industry was always an important one in the Islamic world. As the number of terms like "muslin", "tabby", "damask", "fustian", etc. which have passed into European languages shows, there were few Middle Eastern towns
which did not produce cloth in some shape or other. Cloth and

clothing played a far greater part in the lives of mediaeval Muslims

than in our own today. Then, clothes were a mark of social class

or religion or the uniform for an office or profession. House

furniture comprised essentially carpets and hangings. Investing

money in a store of clothing or bales of cloth was one way of keeping

wealth in a fairly liquid form. Often cloth was taken for taxation

(see above, Part I, 186). It is not therefore surprising that

the New Testament makes moths and rust the great enemies of the

hoarder. The workshops of Nishapur produced cloth of all grades.

At the lower end were the utilitarian cottons and felts, produced

for the masses of the people. At the upper end were the brocades

and silks, for the demands of court ceremonial, official uniforms

and robes of honour and the needs of harem women, always kept pro-

duction here at a brisk level. The materials for these cloths

were readily available. Raw silk came especially from the mulberry

groves of the Caspian coastlands (Merv, rather than Nishapur, was

foremost among the Khurasanian towns in the production of silks);

wool and hair came from local herds or from the Turkish steppes

(see below, 304); and cotton, whose use had spread from India,

was either grown locally in irrigated oases or else imported from

the garmsīra of southern Persia and Makrān. Because of the imp-

ortance of the textile industry, the cloth merchants of Khurasan

were foremost among the bourgeoisie, and it seems to be they who
amassed the biggest fortunes in trade. 22

A mixture of both urban and rural life was characteristic of Khurasan. The fundamental unit in Khuraskanian demography was the rūstā or rūstāq (Arabic pl. rasātīq), and the geographers enumerate four "territories" (tassūj, khān) and thirteen districts (rasātīq) in the old province of Abarshahr. The rūstāq comprised a central market town, not necessarily very big, with a hinterland of villages around it. Often it was coincident with an oasis. Each rūstāq was an entity of its own, and frequently had its own distinctive dialect. Even the weights and measures used in Khurasan varied from one rūstāq to another. 23 The agricultural rūstāqas and their market towns, and the bigger cities like Nishapur and Merv, were interdependent from both the human and the economic points of view (see below, 302-3). But the dominantly urban nature of Islam as an institution caused the townspeople frequently to regard the rūstāqa as places where the good Muslim life could not easily be lived and their inhabitants as hayseeds. The description rūstā-ya tabī was a contemptuous one. Towards the end of his life the famous ŠūfīShaikh Abū Sa‘īd b. Abī‘l-Khair decided to leave Nishapur for his home town of Maihana, a small town in the rūstāq of Khāwarīn between Sarakhs and Merv, but two of the most eminent religious leaders of Nishapur, Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and Isma‘īl Šābūnī, tried to dissuade him from burying himself in this obscure place: sukhan-Ishān bī shāikh-i mā In būd ki ay shāikh az har gnā ki hast Maihana rūstā-ya ist mārē darīgh mīyad ki tū dar Maihana
After Abū Saʿīd was established at Maihana, the news of his saintliness reached the community of Şūfis at Sarakhs, but they were sceptical that anyone of note could be living out in a rusteq. Similarly, the Seljuq Vizier Kundurī lamented that Ibn Funduq's grandfather, the Raʾīs Abūl-Qāsim Baḥaqq, a fine scholar and poet, should chose to bury his talents in a rusteq. Nevertheless, city, village and countryside in Khurasan formed an integrated social and economic whole; each required the others for its own prosperity.

Nishapur and its villages lie in a plain bounded on the north-west by the fairly low Kūh-i Chaghatai and on the north-east by a rather higher mountain chain, the modern Binālūd-Kūh, which separates Nishapur from Ṭūs and Mashhad. This is comparatively steep on the Nishapur side, rising to over 11,000 feet, but to the east it rolls downwards as a wide plateau at four to five thousand feet, dotted with villages and orchards. This was a very attractive region for townspeople to visit. The village of Bushtaḵān or Būshangān was a favoured pleasure-resort (tamāshāqān) of the Nishapurians; it was here that Shaikh Abū Saʿīd once gave a sumptuous feast for 2000 of the people of Nishapur. Mustauṟī mentions a delightful spring on the Ṭūs side popular for holiday excursions. From the mountain ridges many streams run down through the Nishapur oasis and lose themselves in the salt desert to the west. One of them, the Saghāwar river, was especially important for irrigating the city itself.

The soil of the oasis was very fertile. Its "black earth"
turba calika, indicates a loamy nature, and nearly a century and a half ago, J.B. Fraser found a good proportion of loam to sand in it. He also mentions a thick carpeting of grass over much of the oasis; this has resulted from the conversion of the mixed arable—pastoral farming of pre-Seljuq times into the predominance of pastoralism under the Turkmen and Kurdish nomads. On his mission to Timur, Clavijo saw the herds of sheep, cattle and camels of the Kurds who wandered here as tributaries of Timur. Yet the district still supported a dense agricultural population; the decisive event in its transformation was the ascendancy of the Õzbekgs on the borders of Khurasan. 26

Thus Nishapur in the 11th century was the market centre for a rich agricultural region. It was also, as we have seen, a centre for industry and commerce, but the artisan and trading population of the city could not have been maintained without the imports of food and the human replacements of healthy peasants from the rustâgs, for the cities were insalubrious and mortality there high. The bulk of agricultural produce in the Nishapur oasis was consumed locally, although certain luxury foodstuffs like truffles and that curious spécialité du pays of eastern Persia and of the district of Zauzan in particular, edible earth, were exported as far as Egypt and the Turkish lands. 27 In the 10th century, Nishapur had to import a considerable proportion of its foodstuffs from the rustâq of Ustuwâ, which lay a fair distance away, towards Nasir and on the head-waters of the Atrek; Khabûshân, the modern Kuchan, was
its urban centre. As the name Ustūwā implies, it was an elevated plateau, and had corn fields watered by rain (mabākhis) as well as artificially irrigated ones. Sarakhs was less well-favoured for water, but it too was a cereal-growing area and supplier (maghūtha) of Nishapur; Maqdisī compares the amount of grain exported each week from Sarakhs to that sent from Old Cairo to Qulzūm and the Hijaz. It is clear that the resources of the Nishapur oasis alone did not suffice for the city's alimentary needs, and that the agricultural production of more distant regions was to some extent geared to the city's needs, just as the provisioning of another great city of Khurasan, Herat, depended on the province of Bādghīs.

Concerning agricultural techniques, it is unfortunate that a "precious" book on agriculture (dihqānī) by a scholar of Baihaq, Abū Dujāna, has not survived, for its information on agriculture in Khurasan seems to have been valuable. Ibn Funduq quotes from it a passage on the cultivation of almond trees, and another on the fact that the niluphar would not grow in the Nishapur region; its fruit had to be imported from Balkh.

The villages and hamlets of the oases of Khurasan were thickly sprinkled in the fertile valleys and on the stretches of plain. Maqdisī counted 6000 villages and 120 Friday mosques with minbars in the twelve rasātīq of northern Khurasan, and this survey excluded the regions of Tūs, Nasī and Abīward. Iṣṭakhrī contrasts this density with the more scattered distribution of nucleated villages in upland Qūhistān, each separated from the other by stretches of
steppe ranged over by Kurdish nomads. Much of the land in the Nishapur oasis was laid out as orchard and garden, as well as in tillage, and there were extensive estates, (qiyaṣ) to be found.

Stock-rearing was also important in Khurasan, providing food, means of transport and raw materials for local industry. Camels, used as beasts of burden, were reared mainly on the northern fringes adjoining the steppes. Sarakhs in particular was the "depôt for pack animals, supplying both Transoxania and the Khurasanian towns"; in the early 19th century it was still a great mart for horses and camels, and animals from the steppes were sold there. Sheep came mainly from outside Khurasan, although there were within the province stretches of excellent pasture, some of which, like the Ulung-i Bādkān between Mashhad and Khabūshān, have played significant parts in history as the camping and grazing grounds of armies. Sheep were imported from Ghūr and from the Khalaj Turk nomads of eastern Afghanistan, and above all, from the Oghuz of the Qara Qum and beyond. Indeed, we see here an illustration of the interdependence of agricultural and pastoral economies in this part of Asia.

Azerbaijan is the only province of Persia where dry-farming can be practised at all extensively. In Khurasan, artificial irrigation was the norm, and where fields were watered by rain alone, the geographers mention the fact. As in much of Persia, the qanāt or khārāz was a feature of the Nishapur oasis, and their shafts and mounds dotted the landscape, forming hazards for night travellers.
The qanāt was often a small masterpiece of hydraulic construction, and the profession of qanāt-digger (muqannī, qanna) highly-skilled and often hereditary. In Nishapur itself, use was made of the streams which ran swiftly down from the mountains to the north-east and which provided cold water in the hottest weather. The Saghāwar one ran towards the city across the oasis for two farsakhs. It passed through the village of Bushtaqān, and turned seventy water mills and filled many tanks and cisterns en route. In Mustaʿfī's time (sc. the 14th century), many qanāts had become ruinous, but there were still forty water mills where the rapid current ground down the grain with amazing speed. When it neared the city, the water was canalised into qanāts. Some of the shafts down to the water level in these qanāts were a hundred steps deep. They gave individual water supplies to the houses and gardens within the city and cooled the sardābs beneath the houses. Amongst the qanāts of Nishapur are mentioned those supplying the quarters of al-Ḥiya, (?Balfāwā and Būb Maʿmar and the Street of the Perfumers, the qanāts of Abū ʿAmr al-Khaṣfī, Ḡādīyākh, Suwār, Sahl-ṭahān, Ḥamra-yi ʿulā and of Jāhm from the village of Dastjird and the upper qanāt from the village of Jūrī. The water came up again at the other side of the city and was led off to irrigate fields and agricultural estates.

We do not have such detailed information on the irrigation system of Nishapur as we do, for instance, on the systems of Qum and Merv, but it was no doubt equally intricate.
at Qum resembled what is known of the Nishapur one; water was channelled to cultivated fields and estates outside the town, and was run off inside the town (largely in surface channels, though in places through underground pipes) for domestic uses and for gardens and orchards. Consequently, there was ample water for the land, for the ḫammāms and for the private houses. The shares in the water at Qum were registered and minutely regulated; a Diwan-i Āb supervised affairs, at least, before the incoming Ziyārids and Ḍūyids introduced changes in administration and property-rights. The water at Merv was regulated by a department called the Diwan al-Kastabzūd, a name derived from the Persian kast-afzūd "decrease-increase"; the reference is to the repartition of the kharāj of the proprietors of the channels, where assessment was according to the waters over which rights were held. At Nishapur, we know of a group of officials concerned with the irrigation system, called quwwām wa ḫafasa, whose functions corresponded to those of the Muqassim al-Mā' and his staff at Merv, i.e. they repartitioned the water and kept the qanāts and channels in good repair. Doubtless too, as at Qum, fish from the qanāts formed a useful addition to the Nishapurians' diet; Fraser noticed how full of fish the qanāts of Nishapur were.

Both surface irrigation works and underground qanāts are expensive to lay out and to maintain. Sudden spates of water after storms and after the melting of snows stretched and burst banks and made
the tunnels of qanāts collapse, necessitating major salvage work. Agriculture by irrigation requires high-level direction and considerable capital resources, and it is these points which have led Wittfogel to discern a common social and political pattern in the irrigated areas of Asia, America and Africa, the "agro-managerial hydraulic society". Even today, in a Persian province like Kirmān the upkeep of the qanāts is very expensive, because of the soft, sandy ground, and large landownership is the norm; the peasants are poor, peasant proprietorship is almost non-existent and the landlord's share in crop-sharing agreements is high.

Because of these considerations, the lead in irrigation construction had often to come from local rulers, landowners or notables. At Qazwīn, the construction of qanāts replaced earlier dependence on deep wells, and Mustaufl mentions various governors of his home town as active in this work; amongst them was the governor whom Mahmūd of Ghazna installed soon after he had conquered the city, Ḥamza b. Ilyasā who kāris was still in use in Mustaufl's own day. At Qum, the qanāts of Sassanid times had fallen into ruin, and the digging of over twenty new ones was the work of the Arab colonists who came there from Kūfah, amongst whom the Ashārī family were especially prominent. We do not know whether the initiative in developing the irrigation system of Nishapur came from Arab or Iranian elements. Nishapur was never so predominantly an Arab military colony as Qazwīn and Qum were, but it is recorded that
*Abdallāh b. Tāhir, when he was governor of Khurasan, expended a million dirhams of his own fortune on "qanāts" at Nishapur, and his interest in irrigation questions is shown by his commissioning jurists from Khurasan and Iraq to compile an authoritative textbook on the legal aspects of "qanāts" and the allocation of water. According to Gardīzī, this *Kitāb al-qanāt* was still the basis of current practice two centuries later. 41 The ʿasyān of Nishapur dominated the life of the city in Samānid and Ghaznavid times, and their work as public benefactors touched many aspects of Khurasanian life. For instance, Abūl-ʿasim ʿAlī al-Muṭṭawwir (d. 376/986), a member of one of the most outstanding of Nishapur families, the Mīkāli, was a great benefactor of Farāwa, building there riḍāts and endowing them with *aɔqāf*, and constructing "qanāts" in many villages of the region. 42 Such men felt that charitable works like these were part of the social responsibilities of their class, but they also furthered their personal interests as landowners.
Chapter Three

The topography and demography of Nishapur

Nishapur was of some importance in Sassanid times, but in the early Islamic period it was eclipsed by Merv, the capital of Khurasan and the bastion of Muslim arms in the north-east. Nishapur was a "spontaneous" and not a "created" town, as the Arab garrison towns were. It had a garrison, as the name of one of the quarters of the city, al-Ṭira, shows, but it was not a key defence point as Qazwīn or Merv were. The city's political rise in Islam seems to be connected with the success of the Abbasid da'wa in Khurasan. Abū Muslim built a Friday mosque and a Dār al-Imāra with a cupola and four basilican iwāns in the style employed by al-Ṭājjāj at Ṭāṣiṭ. But Nishapur did not begin to overtake Merv in political and administrative importance till ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir made it his capital. Its comparatively dry and healthy climate, compared with the damp and febrile one of Merv, probably favoured its rise.
During the Ṣaffarid occupation, some public building was done:

ʿAmr b. Laith enlarged Abū Muslim’s wooden mosque into a splendid structure with columns of fired brick, gilded tiles as ornaments, eleven doors with marble columns and a roof formed of three compartments each with its dome.

In the 10th century, Nishapur assumed the lay-out of a typical eastern Islamic city, with a tripartite formation. It had a citadel (guhandiz, ḫisn), from which a road ran into the adjacent city proper (shahrastān, madīna). There were gates from the citadel into the city proper and into the suburb (bīrūn, rabāq) which surrounded them both. The markets were situated in the suburb or outer city. Around the Great Square and the Lesser Square were market halls (khānābārd) where commercial transactions were done, and warehouses (fanādīq) where the various wares were stored and where the great merchants were to be found. Below these were humbler warehouses, caravanserais, workshops and booths, filled with such artisans as hat-makers, shoemakers, cordwainers and ropemakers. Highest in wealth and prestige were the clothiers, whose market halls and warehouses accommodated merchants from almost every region of the Islamic world.

These commercial and industrial quarters of the city were teeming and chaotic and this aspect of the place displeased the fastidious Maqdisī, otherwise favourably impressed by its prosperity. In a critical passage he adverts to its unclean streets, jumbled-up khāns, foul baths, sordid shops and dilapidated
city walls. This uncontrolled development seems to have affected the local people. Maqdisī alleges that boorishness (jīfā') was their salient characteristic; turbulence and faction were engrained in them so that they had no respect for authority, for the muḥtasib, khatīb, imām or mudhakkir.

Surrounding the city were its walls. In such a rich province as Khurasan, walls were an important factor in security. They did not hold up a determined invader – Curzon remarked that Nishapur "has certainly been destroyed and rebuilt more than any other city in the world" – but they did give protection against lesser marauders like brigands and āyyārs and against long-ranging nomadic bands. Hence if a town rebelled, it was often punished afterwards by the razing of its walls, so that it might better feel its dependence on its master.

When Fraser crossed the Nishapur plain, he saw that all the villages dotted over it were in the form of square forts with towers at the corners; these may have been built to keep off Īzbeg raiders, but were more probably a feature of the region from much earlier times. The walls of Nishapur itself are mentioned at several points in the city's history. As re-founded in Sassanid times by Shāpūr I, Nishapur is said to have been laid out on a chess-board pattern with walls 15,000 paces round, and after the transference of the city's population from the suburb of Shādyākh back to the old site in 1232, the new city again had walls 15,000 paces round. However, these walls were not necessarily massive stone ramparts.
The number of times in which the city fell into the hands of conquerors shows that the walls were far from impassable. In the 19th century Nishapur had merely a mud wall and ditch around it, and at many periods before this its defences can have been little more elaborate. When in 1038 a single band of Turkmens appeared, the aṣyān immediately wrote off the town as indefensible (see below, Part V, 494, 505). Likewise, the walls around the town of Baizãq or Sabzawār consisted at this time of a wall which, though strong and provided with platforms from which the defenders could fight, only reached the height of two men. Spears could easily reach the top and cavalrymen could use their swords there. Hence in 1071-2 Nīqām al-Mulk had it raised. After the Ghuzz devastations in 1153 and after the move to Shādyākh, the new area of settlement at Nishapur was enclosed in a wall, but because of population losses consequent on the Ghuzz' disruption of Khurasan's economy, the wall was of a reduced circumference. When Shādyākh was rebuilt after an earthquake in 1208, the wall's circuit was only 6900 paces. When a Ghūrid army under Ghiyāth ad-Dīn appeared at Nishapur in 597/1200-1, the walls seem to have been fairly substantial, for the Sultan thought that he would have to use battering-rams against the garrison holding it for the Seljuqs. But in the event, two of the towers collapsed of their own accord from the weight of the defenders on them, "in such wise that not one brick remained upon another, and Nishapur was taken".

The zone of Persia where clay was the basic building material
extended eastwards through Khurasan until the rocky core of Afghanistan was reached and stone could be procured. The initial offensive of the Seljuqs against the Ghaznavids came to a halt in the region where this geological change occurs, and Balkh, in the mountain zone, remained in Ghaznavid hands till 1059, twenty years later. The lack of a cheap, substantial building material has always been one of the bottlenecks of Khurasanian life. The traditional materials in Khurasan have always been clay and sun-dried brick. Even fired brick only came into use gradually during the Islamic period, and timberwork was only generally to be found in areas like the well-wooded Caspian provinces. These limitations of material have given a distinctive bias to the architectural development of eastern Persia, see for example, in the absence of large doming. It is not surprising that questions of building materials and fortification interested Khurasanians. We see this clearly in Nūṣir-i Khusrau’s account of his travels. He always shows an intense interest in walls and defences, especially when they are of stout stone. He describes the splendid fortifications of places like Mayyāfriqīn and ʿĀmid before dealing with anything else there, and shows especial interest in their gates, which were wholly of iron and not wooden. As he progresses through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Diyarbakr, Syria and Palestine, his interest in the defences of their towns is sustained. Clearly, this pre-occupation represents the interest and envy of a man coming from a land where stone is a luxury material.
In assessing the size and population of Nishapur, we must proceed by inference. We need not assume that because of their richness, the towns of Khurasan were vast agglomerations of population; importance was not correlative with sheer size. The towns derived their importance from their being centres of trade, industry and agricultural marketing, and did not need to be large for this. In the oases of Khurasan, town and countryside were interdependent and the boundaries between the two ways of life often fluid. The ayyan of Nishapur held estates and gardens in the countryside outside the city. The Seljuk Vizier Abū'l-Muẓaffar Barghashī had a garden in the village of Muḥammadābād outside the city, a village which was so popular for residences that land-values there were very high (see below, Part V, 505), and Baihaqī's master, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, had a house and garden there. This village adjoined Shādyāk, the suburb to the south-west of the city and to the south of the modern town of Nishapur, and in Seljuk and Ghaznavid times it was the seat of the liwān of Khurasan, away from the insalubrious city. Here Mas'ūd of Ghazna built a palace with courts and kiosques, and here Maḥmūd's minister Ḫasanak (see below, 347-51) had a palace which Mas'ūd appropriated for use as a residence for official guests after Ḫasanak's fall. Shādyāk, already a popular residential area in the time of ʿAbdallāh b. Tahir, who had built a palace and stationed his troops there, took the place of the old city of Nishapur after the Ghuzz attack of 1153, until in 1232 to people moved back to the old site.
A limiting factor in the growth of the Khuraskanian towns was the problem of provisioning. Although much food came from local gardens and orchards, we have seen that Nishapur had to import meat and grain from outside the Nishapur oasis (above, 302-3). We do not know how this traffic was organised. Grain could be born on the backs of beast of burden and cattle and sheep could be driven in and slaughtered on the hoof. But for other, more perishable commodities, a system of transport and distribution would have been required. Inadequate communications, the endemicness of banditry and the arbitrary behaviour of the political authorities, all these discouraged potential entrepreneurs from putting their abilities and capital into such channels. The small-scale traffic in such luxury foodstuffs as the melons of Khwarizm and Transoxania, which, according to al-Tha‘mil (Latf if al-ma‘arif, 129), were in the 9th century exported to Iraq, does not invalidate this point. Moreover, rural cultivators did not generally look further than the main town of their rustaq or oasis as a market for their surplus produce or for any cash crops which they might grow; and here again, the fiscal demands of the political authorities often discouraged farming at too high a level above subsistence.

This comparative inelasticity of supply and distribution, together with the exactions of governments, helps explain the grievous famines which attacked both town and countryside in Khurasan whenever adverse physical conditions arose. CutbI portrays graphically the horrors of famine in Khurasan when in 1011 the crops failed
after an exceptionally heavy winter. In Nishapur alone (OtbI probably means the whole oasis) 100,000 people are said to have died. People ate plants from the fields and boiled down old bones; newly-buried corpses were exhumed, and human flesh sold openly on the streets; parents ate their own children; and men were enticed away and killed and their fat melted down, so that people were afraid to stray outside the central part of the city unless armed and in groups. Ibn Funduq says that the famine arose less from a dearth of provisions than from a disease which caused voracious hunger (Cillat-i ja-i kalbI), so that the more people ate, the less they were satisfied. Yet there were at one time in this crisis considerable quantities of unsold corn stored away in Nishapur; and we have other instances of the curious localness of many famines, where places suffered tragic dearths whilst adjacent regions were enjoying plenty. 58

In inferring the size and population of Nishapur, we can get some indirect help from Nasir-i Khusrau again. He was a native of Khurasan and a typical member of the Persian secretarial class. He served first the Ghaznavids and then the Seljuqs, working for Chaghri Beg as a financial official at Merv. 59 From his official experience, we may regard him as a judicious and accurate observer, and his interest in questions of topography, population and economic life is manifest throughout the Safar-nama. During his travels, his standards of comparison were always with his Khurasanian homeland.
Thus Jerusalem, with 20,000 inhabitants, was a "great city". The Qarmathian capital of Lāhē in Bahrain, which could field 20,000 armed men, and had also its women and children and 30,000 slaves, had "all that constitutes a great city". The towns within the Fātimid empire of Egypt, Palestine and Syria all impressed him tremendously, and it is not likely that his well-known Shi‘I sympathies influenced him here unduly, for he shows in general a spirit of fairness and tolerance. He estimated the population of Tripoli at 20,000, and even Askelon impressed him as a great city. New Cairo, al-‘Ushira, dazzled him, and he estimated the population of Old Cairo, Migr, at five times that of Nishapur. Khusrau's observations confirm what has just been emphasised, that the cities of Khurasan did not need to be greatly populous to be economically important. Perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 would be a fair estimate for the population of Nishapur in the early 11th century.
Chapter Four

The Ḍaġabīyyāt of Khurasan: religious sectarianism and social ferment

The localism of Khurasanian life has already been stressed in connection with economic affairs. The same localism operated in the sphere of ideas and personal relations. Frequently it expressed itself in extreme opinions in religion and politics - the two being closely connected in Islam - which contemporaries designated as taqāṣṣub or ḍaġabīyyāt.

We may begin by noting Maqdisī's information on the ḍaġabīyyāt of Khurasan. One of Maqdisī's claims to be the greatest Muslim geographer of his age lies in the element of sociological observation he gives, marking his work off from the jejune cataloguing of place-names, local products, roads and stages which characterised the earlier, road-book type of geography. Some of his dicta, e.g. that ports and towns on rivers are centres of vice, zinā' and lawātā,
or that regions surrounded by rivers and waters have turbulent and rebellious populations, seem curious to our ears; but the sections which he consecrates to the religious opinions and fanaticisms of the various provinces are of outstanding value.

Maqdisi stresses that in general, Khurasan was orthodox in religion (mustaqīm). He excepts from the Ahl al-jamāḥa only the pockets of Khawārij in Sīstān and the districts around Herat and "the people who wear white" in the rural parts of Haital, i.e. the provinces along the upper Oxus, "whose beliefs approach sandaqa". These must be counted under a heading he has previously given of "rural sectaries", allātī fīṭr-rasāṭliq, amongst whom he names the Zafrāniyya, Khurramdnīyya, Abysiyya and Sarakhsiyya. Of the latter, followers of ʿAbdallāh as-Sarakhsi, he speaks with respect, that they are people who practise asceticism and seek God's presence. The Zafrāniyya must be the followers of az-Zafrānī, whom al-Baghdādī describes as a man of Ray and whose teachings stressed the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān. It is interesting to see the other two sects, descendents of two of the most powerful movements of Iranian national protest, al-Muqanna's Mubayyīda and Bībak's Khurramdīnīyya, identified with the peasantry and the countryside. The first of these two sects had arisen in 775 in the Zarafshān basin, and had united Iranian discontent with the Abbasids, Turkish restiveness under Arab political control and al-Muqanna's own religious claims to be an incarnation of God's Spirit which had
passed through Abū Muslim to himself. Bābak's movement of "the people in red", Muḥammira, was really a rebellion in Azerbaijan against the Caliphate, which continued for several years and eventually spread to many other parts of Persia before Bābak was caught and executed in 838. Bābak himself was militantly anti-Muslim and his movement included dualist and neo-Mazdakist elements. Other Iranian religious movements were more specifically Khurasanian: Bihāfarīd was born at Zauzan; Sonpādīh seems to have come from Nishapur; and Ustādhsīs' movement arose in Būdghīs.

These episodes illustrate the long history of disturbance and ferment in the Persian countryside, for orthodox, institutional Islam affected the urban populations and the landowning classes more than the peasantry. The towns were more open to new influences than the countryside. Moreover, the urban and mercantile ethos of Islam gave the merchant and artisan classes certain advantages, where Zoroastrianism, with its taboos and its elevation of the land and natural elements over the artificiality of commercial life, had constricted them. The landowners had a political and social motive for adopting Sunni Islam, for by doing this they preserved their social and tenurial privileges. The peasants, with their minds turned inwards by the agricultural round and the struggle against natural conditions, were least touched by these considerations. Superficially Islamised, their social discontent and hatred against authority often erupted in the form of heterodox Muslim movements, in which extreme Shiʿī and messianic ideas mingled with older
Iranian beliefs; Zoroastrian currents are often discernible, although none of the uprisings seems to have been led by an orthodox Zoroastrian. It is not therefore surprising that remnants of these movements and sects should linger on in the rural and mountainous parts of Khurasan. They had little specific intellectual or doctrinal content, a fact which made it easy in the 10th century for Isma'ili dā'īs to work among them. It also made it easy for any ambitious adventurer, like the Ḥādi who arose in Chaghāniyān in 934. This false prophet attracted to his side large numbers of the "ignorant masses" (Fāmā-ye juhhāl), before the local ruler, Abū ʿAlī ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Chaghāniyān, suppressed it on behalf of the Ṣāmānid government; but his supporters lingered on long after his death, awaiting their leader's return. In the 11th century, these only vaguely-articulate voices of protest come only occasionally within the purview of contemporary writers, but it is hard to believe that there were no religious elements in the peasant jacqueries we so frequently read about.

Thus Maqdisī, when he describes divisions within the Islamic jamaʿa in Khurasan, is thinking primarily of the town populations, which were largely Sunni in outlook but had fierce sectarian divisions within this wider unity. The Ḥanafī law school already predominated in his time and was to continue gaining ground under the patronage of Turkish dynasties in Khurasan and Transoxania. But Shīffism was still very influential. In the 10th century it made much progress in Transoxania through the teaching of Muḥammad
b. Cālī al-Qaffāl ash-Shāshī (d. 365/975-6), called by al-Ḥākim al-Bayyī the greatest Shāfi‘ī scholar of his age there. 66 Maqdisī names several towns on the northern edge of Khurasan and in the Syr Darya basin where it was dominant: Shāsh, İliq, Tūs, Ābīward, Ṭarāz, Ṣanğhāj, the environs of Bukhārā, Sinj, Dandānqān, Isfārāīn and Juyān. In the 13th century, Khīva remained Shāfi‘ī when the rest of Khwārizm had become Ḥanafī. 67 It seems that in Maqdisī's time Shāfi‘īsm was receding in a northwards direction, but substantial portions of the peoples of Herat, Sīstān, Sarakhs, Merv and Merv ar-Rūd were still Shāfi‘ī. Furthermore, the khatībs at Nishapur and in one of the two Merv jāmīcs were Shāfi‘īs, and in the Merv jāmīcs the sālāt was performed according to both the Ḥanafī and the Shāfi‘ī rites. The third main Sunnī element in the Khurasanian towns was that of the Karāmiyya sect, who are described as having a strong party (jalāba) in Herat and Gharchistān and several khānqāhs in Merv, the upper Oxus provinces and Transoxania. We know from both the historians and the heresiologists that the Karāmiyya were a vociferous and pushing group in Nishapur for at least two centuries (see below, ch. 6). Maqdisī mentions that there was a sizeable minority of Mu'tazila in Nishapur; eastern Islam was to be an enduring stronghold of the sect. He also mentions the Shi‘a as a minority in the city, and the community of CAlids there was accorded the respect normally given to descendants of the Ahl al-Bait (see below, ch. 8). But it is clear that at this time (sc. c. 980)
moderate, Twelver Shi'ism was not yet a major factor in the Sunni towns of Khurasan. Finally, Maqdisi mentions odd reminiscences of earlier Islamic sects. The Jahmiyya predominated amongst the people of Tirmidh and the Qadariyya amongst the people of Kundur; and the ruler of Gharchistan, the Shār, followed the practice of Ibn Mas'ūd in certain matters of ritual.

Maqdisi then passes to the Csabiyat of Khurasan, commenting that there were very few places without them. In Mshapur, unity existed between the western side of the town, where it rose up to Manishak, and the other side of the town, by the quarter of al-Ḫūra; originally, there had been no religious element here, but latterly it had become a Shiʿī-Karāmi struggle, an illustration of how a purely secular division easily acquired a sectarian religious tinge. In Sistān, the Īṣaʿī Samakiyya opposed the Shīʿī Ṣadaqiyya, and the ruler had to intervene to stop the resultant bloodshed. At Sarakhs, the Ārūsiyya were Ḥanafī and the Ahliyya Shīʿī. In Herat there were the Karāmiyya and the Āmaliyya (these last presumably received this name from their opposition to that section of the Karāmiyya which denied the efficacy of good works; cf. Maqdisi, 38). At Merv, the people of the town proper, the Madaniyya, opposed the people of the Old Market. At Nasī, the people of the Khanah quarter opposed those who lived at the top end of the market; at Abīward, the Kardāri group opposed the people of the upper part of the town. Thus whilst some of these factions were grouped around
a religious watchword, others were purely geographical, between
different parts of the town, and we can only guess at the social
issues involved here. It is very likely that many of them had no
rational basis, but arose from an ingrained love of faction and
partisanship.

The local *Fasabiyayt* of Khurasan fell within what seems to
have been a wider feeling of dislike between eastern and western
Persia; on at least two occasions in Bāb-i Mūsā, Sultan Mas'ūd stresses
the dislike of the people of Ray and Jibāl for the Khurasanians.
A reason for this may lie in the different political fortunes of
the two halves of Persia after the 9th century, the identification
of the west with the Būyids and the east with the more orthodox
Samānids and Ghaznavids, and in the different economic and commer-
cial pulls of the west and Khurasan. But perhaps we should not stress
this rivalry too much; the threat of Ghaznavid imperialism was
enough to make the west suspicious of anything coming from the east.

A further element of unrest in Khurasan was the bands of
vagabonds and irregular troops, *gāvāgūn, gāškīk*, who infested
town and country alike. Complaints about them in the historians
are perennial. Their ubiquity and their continued existence over
the centuries suggests that these bands were continually being
replenished, by desperadoes who loved a lawless life, by peasants
forced out of agriculture though lack of land or through fiscal
oppression, by discharged and unemployed soldiers, etc. In the
early 10th century we hear of one Muḥammad b. Hormuz, called Maulā
Randall, who was discharged from the Samanid army as being too old, so went off and stirred up "all the people and riff-raff of Sistan" against the local Samanid governor. The disturbance in Persia caused by the Oghuz invasions favoured the spread of brigand activity; in the west, Basarir had to march into Ahwaz against Kurdish and Arab robbers who had taken advantage of the Turkmen depredations to cloak their own spoliations. Sometimes cayyar bands arose from lawful vigilante groups of citizens which got out of hand. In 11th century Iraq, the citizens of Baghdad went out against the predatory Bedouins infesting the neighbourhood, "and that was one of the causes for the increase of cayyarun and the spread of evil-doers". In Sistan, bands of mutatawwqa were formed against the Khawarij, and out of one of these arose the Safarids. The Ta'rikh-i Sistan shows that for two or three centuries after this the cayyars remained a powerful element in the province. They seem to have been organised there with a definite chain of military commands. The later Safarids were often dependent on their support, and when the Samanids and Ghaznavids intervened in Sistan, the cayyars were the core of local resistance. As a result, to the author of the Ta'rikh-i Sistan, cayyar is a term of praise, to be equated with muruwwa. In most Islamic towns there was an unruly core of mobsters who could be stirred up on any pretext, religious or lay, out of sheer love of violence; in Baghdad in the early 11th century, it was often the cayyarun, who took advantage of Sunni-Shi'i hostility, and not the Buyid Amirs or the Caliph, who were
the real masters of the city.

We have detailed information about a sharp outbreak of violence in 1034 between the two Khurasanian cities of Nishapur and Tus, in which the Tusis were joined by a contingent from AbIward and by other mischief-makers. During an absence at the Sultan's court in Ghazna of the governor of Khurasan, Suri (see above, Part I, 182-4), the people of Tus and AbIward rose, under the leadership of a man who had been an official (mudabbir) in the administration of the Ghaznavid Amir CAbd ar-Razzaq at Tus. They marched over the mountain range separating Nishapur from Tus, down through the village of Bushtaqan, intent on plundering Nishapur: "making an uproar, tumult and din, they came running and hurrying along, just as if all the gates of the caravanserais in Nishapur had been flung open". Fortunately for the Nishapurians, the Sultan's general Ahmad b. CAli Nushtigin was at hand, having just arrived from Kirmân with part of his defeated army (see above, Part I, 185). He organised the townspeople, over 20,000 of them, who were armed with weapons, clubs and stones, and instructed them to make a frightening clamour against the Tusis with their shouting, drums and trumpets, "like the pandemonium on the Day of Resurrection". In the morning, the Tusis poured in "like ants and locusts", having 300 mounted men as well as five or six thousand armed men on foot. Ahmad b. CAli had 2000 infantry and several hundred cavalry, and his tactical skill and training as a professional soldier enabled him to draw the Tusis into an ambush and then rout them. He pursued them for
three farsakhs as far as the village of Khālanjūy. Gallows were set up in Nishapur and captured Tūsīs hanged and gibbeted. Ahmad b. ʿAlī also took members from the families of prominent men (ṣawāmaʾ) of the Tūs district as hostages for future good behaviour.

Spuler treats this as a rising of ʿayyārs, "unsventiedener .... Schichten". He suggests that Turkmen ravages may have deprived them of their livelihood, and this may well be true. 78 More detailed is the Marxian analysis of the Soviet scholar B. Zakhoder, who has no doubts that we have here a class-struggle, a rising of the proletariat. 79 He states that these events took place at the end of July or the beginning of August, 1034, when the harvest had been reaped and the cultivators were required to hand over a portion of their produce as taxation. In fact, the rising must have been in July rather than early August. The first news that the attack of the Tūsīs and Abīwardīs was taking place and that Ahmad b. ʿAlī was resisting it reached Ghazna some time in the second half of Ramaḍān = first half of August, although a full report did not come till late in Shawwāl = early September. 80 The swiftest and most direct route between Nishapur and Ghazna, that up the Heri Rud and through Ghūr, took fifteen days, but because of the difficult terrain it was only used when exceptional haste was needed; the more usual and longer routes were through northern Afghanistan or through Sīstān and Bust. 81 In any case, this seems an early date for the crops to have been gathered in. But Zakhoder is right in
drawing attention to the relative statuses of Nishapur and Tus and 
to the fact that since the early 9th century Nishapur had eclipsed 
the other city in importance. By the 11th century Nishapur, the 
administrative capital of the province, stood as the seat of a 
hated fiscal system. So the TusIs took advantage of the absence 
from Khurasan of the head of this system, the civil governor Sufi. 
This administrative jealousy seems to have been alluded to by 
Ahmad b. Ali in his letter to Mas'ud as taqaggub ... az qadim 
ad-dahr, but there may well have been elements of irrational hatred 
as well. Tus, like so many of the Khurasanian towns, was a factious 
and turbulent place. Maqdisi calls it "a house of bandits and a nest 
of rebels" and Ibn Funduq singles out the Caryeras of Tus as the 
distinguishing element of the population there. Sectarian divisions within it were exacerbated by the existence of two great 
symbols of Shi'ism and orthodoxy in the nearby village of San'abad, 
the tombs of the Eighth Imam Ali ar-Ridha and of the Caliph Harun 
ar-Rashid. Nishapur suffered too from Caryera, and all these internal disruptive forces could in each case be focussed on the nearby, 
rival city. 82

That violence like this was not exceptional in Khurasan at this 
time may further be shown from the vicissitudes of Baihaq as record-
ed by its historian, Ibn Funduq. In 998 the Sabzawar region was 
attacked by raiders from Tus, Isfarain and Juwain, who had banded 
together to devastate the oasis and to block up the qanats; these
marauders were routed by stout warriors summoned from the nearby villages. The contingent from one of these, Dāvrah, was led by the local Sālār of the Ghūzīs. There was in Baihaq itself a family, the Sālāriyān, descendants of one Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Muḥsin b. ʿAlī al-Muṭṭawwī, a former Baʿ is of the town. Ghūzīs were a prominent element in the local defence forces of the Khurasanian towns at this time; they were recruited from old soldiers, enthusiasts for the faith, etc., and at times, ṣayyārs might be incorporated in their numbers. Hence the Sālār of the Ghūzīs was an important member of the ayyān of his town. That of Nishapūr played a significant part when the city surrendered to the Seljuqs (see below, Part V).

Such a local force could not always stand against a professional army in the field, but was valuable for warding off nomads or bandits, as here at Baihaq. Baihaq suffered again in 1006 when one Ḥumad Tuvāngar besieged the town for a month before he was killed. The Turkmen invasions unsettled the whole of the Khurasanian countryside, but at the opening of the 12th century the peasantry of the Baihaq oasis suffered also from the depredations of the aṣḥāb-i qilī; it is not clear whether these were rural ṣayyārs or perhaps Ismāʿīlīs. What peace there was in Khurasan in the second half of the 11th century came from the strength and unity of the Seljuq Sultanate; after the death of Malikshāh in 1092 and the beginning of succession disputes within his family, the ṣayyārs got the upper hand at Baihaq until a police force of armed citizens and their slaves suppressed them.
Chapter Five

The acyên and orthodox ulema of Nishapur

We turn now to examine some aspects of the social structure of the city. Our material concerns primarily the classes of landowners, acyên and bourgeoisie, from which came most of the religious leaders and teachers and the local administrators of the city. The ulema and Sûfîs of Nishapur included many scholars and mystics whose reputations and influence spread far beyond Khurasan, so that the materials for their lives are plentiful. However, the biographers treat their subjects primarily as men of religion, for this was the aspect of their lives which they regarded as being of eternal value. Matters of everyday life and of local, secular affairs were considered to be of only transient interest, and the authors of the biographical collections and tabaqât are only marginally interested in them. But the historians of the
period are frequently concerned with the intrusion of religious questions into political and secular affairs, and in their treatment of events we get a certain corrective to the more narrowly theological interests of the biographers.

The ulema were by birth and social status closely linked with the class of town notables who filled civil offices in the city, often as semi-hereditary charges. For although in some ways Islam made the modern catch-phrase "equality of opportunity" a reality, there was always a counter-feeling that the arcana of many offices and professions were best handed down within one group or family. So just as rulers sought their aides from Vizieral or secretarial families, so municipal charges like the offices of ra’īs or qādī were often kept within a restricted group. 86 There was a common bond between the ulema and the lay notables in that many of them had landowning or property interests. These might be private interests or else might come from offices held. The state allotted salaries to officials like ṣādiq and khāṭīb, but sometimes these were augmented by private munificence in the form of assignations of lands to go with the office. Thus the Faqīh Abū Muḥammad al-Muṣallā b. Abū Ḥamīd, who was for a while Ra’īs of Nishapur during the Ghaznavid period, endowed estates and property for successive holders of the qādī of Nishapur to enjoy; some of these endowments were still left in Ibn Funduq's time. 87 Where there was some divergence of outlook was in their respective attitudes to the external secular power, i.e. the Ghaznavid overlords of Khurasan. The viewpoint of
the lay elements was an immediate one: how best could the social and economic interests of the city be furthered and protected? The religious classes had a deeper consciousness of being members of the whole Islamic community as well as of a particular city in Khurasan. Furthermore, they regarded the sovereign as the protector of orthodoxy and of the established order, and these considerations had to be reconciled with the local interests of Nishapur.

Of the lower classes, the shopkeepers, artisans, labourers, gardeners, domestic slaves, etc., we know little. The sources echo the usual attitude of the Muslim literate classes and lump them altogether as the turbulent and unstable qaughā or mob. The prevalence of the ṣayyārs has been mentioned above. A further element of violence in Nishapur seems to have been the Turks employed in domestic service and perhaps too in domestic industry; we hear of robberies and assaults committed by drunken Turkish slaves. Indeed, there seems to have been an appreciable Turkish element in the Khurasanian towns before the Seljuq invasions, not all of whom were from the servile or labouring classes. Ibn Funduq has a section on the Aulād at-Turk of Nishapur and Bāihaq, whom he describes as once numerous and as including faqīhs and imāms. Names like "at-TurkI", "ṭarkhān", "khāqān", etc. occur in biographies of the Nishapur ulema, and al-Farīsī mentions a Dār at-Turk in Nishapur (ـ here, a Turkish quarter). Nevertheless, despite the contempt of the upper for the lower classes, there are no signs of any real class
hatred or jealousy between the ruling strata and the democracy. Religion was always there to bridge the gap - not the systematised theology of the ulema, but the less inhibited piety of the dervish communities, not yet formally organised into ṭariqas, but exercising their power through the personal saintliness of the local leader and his convent or khānegāh. We shall see such influence well displayed in the person of Shaikh Abū Saʿīd.

We have noted Maqdisī's information on the madhāhib of Khurasan (above, 318 ff.). If it is true that over the course of centuries the Ḥanafī rite gradually became dominant in the north-east, in the 11th century the intellectual appeal of Shāficism was commending it to some of the keenest minds among the ulema. At this time, the Ashʿarīs were making orthodox kalāma an incisive weapon against the Muʿtazila. Al-Ashʿarī's own legal affiliations are dubious, although most authorities attach him to the Shāficīs after his conversion from the Muʿtazila; certainly, in the 11th century his theology came to be specially identified with Shāficism. That Nishāpūrī scholars of such eminence as Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and his son Abū'1-Maṣḥīlī, the Imām al-Ḥaramain, should fervently teach Shāficism and should pass on their learning to al-Ghazzīlī, increased the attraction of Shāficism for the learned classes. After the blast of official disapproval under the later Būyids and early Seljuqs had quietened down, the patronage of men like Niẓām al-Mulk and the promotion of Ashʿarī and Shāficī teaching in the madrasas enabled these teachings to achieve full toleration and respect in
the east. It seems that in the east Shafi'i purism in emphasising traditions from the Prophet and in rejecting accretions to the corpus of Hadith recommended it to many pious minds, although from the numerical point of view, the Hanafi rite was probably more popular with the masses.

Nevertheless, the attractions of Shafi'ism were by no means wholly intellectual. In the early 11th century it was widely adopted by many Khurasanian Sufis. Shaikh Abū Ya'qūb Ishāq Ṣ̄ubūnī, who was the brother of one of the most prominent Nishapur Shafi'is, Ismā'īl Ṣ̄ubūnī (see below, 342-3) and who frequently acted as his brother's deputy in preaching, was himself a Sufi. A certain Ja'far b. Ḥaidar Harawi (d. 481/1088) is described as "Shaikh of the Ash'arī Sufis". In his youth Shaikh Abū Sa'id b. Abī'l-Khair imbibed Ash'arism from several eminent Khurasanian scholars. His teachers at Merv were Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥuqrī, himself a pupil at two removes of ash-Shafi'i, and Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl. Then he passed on to the Imām Abū ʿAlī Zahr b. Abīmad at Sarakhs. Abū ʿAlī had been active in promoting the Shafi'i rite in Sarakhs, and was one of several Imāms, including ʿUmar Zanjūya in Shahrestāna, Farāwa and Nasā; Abū ʿUmar Farābī in Ustuwā and Khābahīn; Abū Lubāba Maihanī in Abīward and Khābarān; and himself, Abū ʿAlī Faqīh, in Sarakhs, who had been spreading Shafi'ism and combating the Mustazila in these regions. Shaikh Abū Sa'id therefore became a Shafi'i, and in this period, asserts the Shaikh's biographer
Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, many Ṣūfīs previously following other rites went over to Shāficīsm. A few decades later, al-Ghazzūlī was able to unite Shāficīsm with a deep respect for and insight into the Ṣūfī path.

Hanafism was the other great orthodox madhhab of the east, where it became linked with the Māturīdī kalēm, whose founder, a Samarqandī contemporary of al-Ashʿarī, had been a firm follower of Abū ʿUṯma Ḥanīfa. It is often assumed that the Ḥanafī school was the most liberal of the madhhabīs and as such, commended itself to the Turks and Mongols when they came into the Islamic world. The Ḥanafī attitude in law did tend to be less strict than the Shāficī one, permitting as it did a freer use of raʿy and qiyās to supplement a narrow reliance on traditions from the Prophet, but the differences should not be pushed too far. Both the Māturīdīs and Ashʿarīs were at one in their opposition to Muʿtazīlī rationalism. Shaikh Abū Saʿīd's biographer is at pains to combat allegations that the Ḥanafī rite is too easy and the Shāficī one too rigid; the points of variance are only on secondary matters, and not on basic principles, he says. He frequently mentions opposition to the Shaikh and the Ṣūfīs in Nishapur by the ʿAshab ar-Raʿy. Although this term became a popular one for the Ḥanafīs, its original application to them was, as Schacht has remarked (Art, "Abū Ḥanīfa"), largely adventitious; and there is no reason to suppose that the Ḥanafīs were at this time any more or less opposed in general to Ṣūfism than the
Shāfīʿīs were. Indeed, ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān al-Hujwīrī, author of the pioneer treatise in Persian on Ṣūfism, the Kashf al-mahjūb, was a keen Ḥanafī. 93

In Nishapur, the Ḥanafī party was headed by such prominent families as the ʿṢiddīqs and Tabānīs. The rite benefited from the patronage of Maḥmūd and Masʿūd of Ghazna; in Bābāqī, Maḥmūd speaks of it as the madhhab-i rūst. 94 The Sultans often chose members of the great Ḥanafī families for diplomatic and other official missions (see below, 341). Royal patronage may have favoured the progress of the Ṣunni revival in the east in its aspect of madrasa-building; even in a remote corner like Khuttal, there were already by 1012 over twenty madrasas, each fully endowed with auqāf. 95 It is clear that, whilst Niẓām al-Mulk’s backing may have given the madrasa-building movement an impetus, it had begun well before his time.

For the first forty years or so of the 11th century the Qādī Abū l-ʿAlāʾ ʿṢiddīq b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh Ustuwāʾī led the Ḥanafīs of Nishapur. His wisdom made him a universally-regarded figure there, and in al-Farīsī’s biographical dictionary (see Bibliographical introduction, 24 ) he is often simply called al-Qādī, the Qādī par excellence. 96 He was born in 343/954 in the rustān of Ustuwā. First his father taught him and then he was sent to learn adab from Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Khwārizmī, fiqh from the Qādī Abū Ḍagr b. Sahl and tradition from several authorities. Soon the fame of his learning spread beyond Khurasan; al-Farīsī describes
him as Imam al-Muslimin Calh 'l-Itlāq, and Ibn al-Jauzi, who does not normally concern himself with scholars unconnected with Iraq and Baghdad, accords him an obituary notice as head of the Ḥanafiyya in Khurasan. The QadI Še CID made the Pilgrimage in 985, and was summoned to the Abbasid court in Baghdad to explain why in a fatwā he had refused to allow a covering (qundūq) to be erected over the tomb of the Caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd near Tūs. The QadI's good sense and desire to keep down sectarian passions is shown in the reason he gave, that to have given a favourable reply would have inflamed the local Shi'a.

During Maḥmūd's reign, he was in high favour as the leader of orthodoxy and the mainstay of social stability in Nishapur. He was famed as a scholar, and his personal handsomeness gained him the name of the "Moon of Nishapur". Maḥmūd made him tutor to the young princes Mas'ūd and Muḥammad. For many years, Maḥmūd's brother the Amīr Abū'l-Muẓaffar Naqr was military governor of Nishapur and Khurasan. He was an enthusiastic Ḥanafi, and founded a madrasea in Nishapur for the QadI and endowed it with aqāf. An important episode in the QadI's life was his protracted struggle for power in the city with the Karāmiyya and their leader Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ishāq (see below, 357-8). This eventually ended in a victory for the QadI and orthodoxy, with a congenial layman appointed ṭa'īs of the city instead of the Karāmiyya leader.

The QadI had close connections with the powerful Nakhī family.
(see below, 343-51), from whose patronage he had benefited when still a young scholar. He was thus glad to intercede for two members of the family, Abū'1-Faql and Abū Ibrāhīm, when in 1030 Sultan Masʿūd came to Nishapur and heard magālim. The two brothers had been deprived of their hereditary property and the revenues of the family aqāf had been diverted from the beneficiaries by a distant cousin of theirs, Ḫasanak, and by other Ghaznavid officials, during the period when Ḫasanak was raʿīs of Nishapur for Sultan Maḥmūd. Thanks to the qādī's influence with his former pupil, the new Sultan, this intercession was successful. Moreover, Masʿūd appointed the qādī's son Abū'1-Ḥasan qādī of Ray. Three years later, the Sultan again remembered his connections with the qādī and appointed one of the latter's pupils to a diplomatic mission to Gurgān. The qādī's relations with the Tabānī family of Nishapur were also cordial; Baihaqī used his Mukhtasār-i qādī for information on the Tabānī faqīhs and their links with the Imām Abū Ḥanīfa.

During Masʿūd's reign, the qādī's advanced age and prestige made him the Grand Old Man of Nishapur. When in 1038 the Seljuqs first appeared before Nishapur, he was the first person the aṣyān went to for advice, and in the previous year, the military commander in Khurasan, Sbāshī, had consulted him on military and strategic topics. By now he was no longer acting as day-to-day qādī of the city, but had been succeeded at some time before the beginning of Masʿūd's reign by a man whom Samānī names as Abū'1-Haitham.
Nevertheless, the Șâhidî family retained a grip on legal and religious offices in the city for many decades afterwards. Sam șnî says that the qâdî of the city was still in his own day (mid-12th century) held by a Șâhidî. The family had many marriage connections with the ulema of Baihaq, and later came to fill the offices of qâdî and khatîb there. The Șâhid Șâhid died in Nishapur at the age of eighty-six in the summer of 1040, when the city was under Seljuq occupation.

The careers of three members of the Tabânî family of Nishapur show how the Ghaznavid Sultans exerted themselves to win over prominent members of the religious and legal classes in Khurasan and to draw them into their service. The Sultans took pains to identify their imperialist political and military policies with the cause of Sunni orthodoxy and with the combatting of religious extremism (see above, Part I, 132-4). Hence there was a pressing need for reliable, orthodox scholars to serve in the Sultans' entourage as advisers and diplomatic envoys and to fill religious and legal posts throughout the empire. In this way it was hoped to consolidate religious orthodoxy and political stability within the empire.

The reputation of the Tabânî family as Șânî scholars and their links with the founder of that rite especially commended them to Sultan Maḥmûd, although he was not averse to employing good men from other rites; in 1001, for instance, he sent the well-known Shâfi ș Imâm Abû șayyâb aṣ-șâlihî on a mission to the Ilîg Naṣîr at Uzkend. Abû ș-Abbs Tabânî had been a pupil in Baghdad of Hârûn's Chief Șâhid.
Abū Yusuf, himself the disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa, and the Tabānī family was always thereafter proud of this affiliation to the great Imām. The family prospered under the Sāmānids, and it was when Mahmūd was a commander in Nishapur for the Sāmānids that he first became aware of their reputation as Ḥanafī divines. So in 995 he invited the Faqīh Abū Ṣāliḥ Tabānī to Ghazna, where he became head of the Ḥanafīs there and taught in a madrasa. One member of the family, Hasan Tabānī, entered Mahmūd's service as a soldier, not as a civilian; he fought against Abū ʿAlī Simjūrī and against the Qarakhanids when in 1006–8 they invaded Khurasan, passing into Masʿūd's service and being present at his ally Shīh Malik's victory in 1041 over the Khwārizmians. But in the main, the Tabānīs used their talents in the peaceful paths of religion and scholarship.

In 402/1011–12 Mahmūd was negotiating a marriage alliance with the Ziyārid Manūchihr, whose father Qābūs had just been killed. Khwāja ʿAlī Mīkālī was in charge. The Sultan recalled to mind the fame of the Tabānīs, and instructed Khwāja ʿAlī that as he passed through Nishapur on his way to Gurgān he should "enquire whether there are any of the Tabānīs left, and whether any of them can come to Ghazna and our court. Win these people over, and convey from us promises of favour, reward and benevolence". Although Khwāja ʿAlī made much of both Abū Ṣādiq Tabānī, Abū Ṣāliḥ's nephew, and Abū ʿThāhir Tabānī, no positive action yet resulted. But in 1023 Hasanak returned from the Pilgrimage which in the end was to prove so inauspicious for him (see below, 348). He brought Abū
§ādiq and several others of the Nishapur ulema back to the Sultan at Balkh, where Maḥmūd was preparing to meet his ally Qadfir Khan Yūsuf. Abū §ādiq returned to Nishapur and was established by Ḫasanak in a madrasa in the Street of the Basket Weavers, but received a promise that the Sultan would summon him to Ghazna when he had finished with Qadfir Khan and with the Somnath expedition. This was fulfilled; Abū §ādiq was awarded a monthly pension and was shortly afterwards appointed Qaẓī of Khuttal. 107

Abū Ẓahir was appointed Qaẓī of Tūs and Nasā by Maḥmūd. Masʿūd continued this favour. He inherited from his father the policy of alliance with Qadfr Khan and the eastern branch of the Qarakhanids against their rival Qalītigin of Bukhārā. In 1031 Masʿūd proposed a double marriage alliance with the court of Keshghar, and Qaẓī Abū Ẓahir was one of the two envoys chosen to arrange this. His judicial duties in Tūs and Nasā were to be exercised by deputies, and as a reward, he was to add to his existing offices the Qaẓī of Nishapur. The negotiations in Keshghar dragged on for nearly four years. In 1034 the envoys returned, but Abū Ẓahir died on the journey home through Badakhshān. Masʿūd's relations with the heir and second son of Qadfr Khan, Bughra Khan of Tālas and Isfījūb, did not run smoothly, and in 1037 another embassy was sent to restore amity. Qaẓī Abū §ādiq Tabānī was commissioned to undertake this again with promise of the Qaẓī of Nishapur as reward. His stay of eighteen months among the Qarakhanids was a great success, who delighted in his disputational skill as a Ḥanafi scholar. 108
The Șebünİs were a prominent Shafi'i family in Nishapur. The nisba "soap-maker" suggests that the family arose from humble origins, but SamC15.nl mentions nothing of their prehistory. By the Ghaznavid period they had become renowned for their learning and piety. CÜtbı mentions a Şebũniyya madrasa in Nishapur where a copy of the famous hundred-volume compendium of Qur'anic sciences made for the Amir Khalaf b. Ahmad of Sıstān was kept; this madrasa was destroyed in Sanjar's time by the Ghuzz. The Khaṭīb Abū CÜthmān Iṣmā'ıll ȘebünI (373-449/983-1057) belonged to the generation after the Qadı Şaycid. He was well-versed in the religious and legal sciences, and it is recorded that while studying in the west he visited Abū'l-Qalā' at Maccarrat an-Nuʾmān. The Sunnİs of Khurasan called him the "Shaikh of Islam" and his polemical fervour brought him the titles "Sword of the Sunna" and "Discomfiter of the Innovators". From his compositions, several of which were extant in Yaqūt's day, a Kitāb al-mi'atain, a collection of a hundred selected traditions and a hundred stories about them (see GAL, I, 446, Suppl. I, 618), is alone extant. It was as a preacher and orator that he was best known to the people of Nishapur; Baihaqı says of his preaching that "all the eloquent ones threw up the sponge (literally, "threw down their shields") in comparison with him". When he was still a youth, great scholars like Ibn Fūrak and Abū Ishāq Isfarā'ıni used to come and hear him discoursing. Consequently, in 1035 Sultan MasCūd appointed him to succeed his father in the official charge of khaṭīb of Nishapur, an office which he held for some twenty years. He
was buried in a Nishapur madrasa; Samānī often visited his tomb, and his prayers there were invariably answered.

Although the Qayd Qutb is frequently mentioned as an enemy of the Sufis, Ismai'īl Ṣābūnī always appears in Shaikh Abū Ša'id's biography as a warm admirer of the Shaikh. It seems that we have here an instance of a certain sympathy existing at this time between many Shi'iTs and Sufis. Both men had in early life studied tradition from Abū ʿAlī Zāhir at Merv, and their friendship may have dated from then. We find Ismai'īl Ṣābūnī among the ulema of Nishapur who pleaded with the Shaikh not to return to Maihana. During the Shaikh's stay in Nishapur he had frequently attended his dhikra and had, it is said, been at times drawn into religious ecstasy by the Shaikh's eloquence, so that he neither felt nor expressed any disquiet when the Shaikh finally exclaimed "there is no-one within this shirt except God" (laīsa fī'l-jubba siwā Allāh). It is not easy to discern from the hagiographical nature of Shaikh Abū Ša'id's biography whether Ismai'īl Ṣābūnī's enthusiasm for the Shaikh and his practices was really as unbounded as this, but it is likely that he was more sympathetic than others of the orthodox ulema. Certainly, his brother Abū Ya'qūb Ṣābūnī was himself a follower of the Sufī path (see above, 334) and he may have influenced favourably his brother Ismai'īl.

The most influential of the Nishapur families, that of the Mīkālīs, has yet to be mentioned. This family produced many theologians, traditionists, poets and literary men, although in the
Ghaznavid period they were more prominent as administrators, officials and sometimes soldiers than as pure scholars or divines. Their fame in the eastern Islamic world dated from the early Abbasid period. Sam’ani traces their genealogy back to Yezdegird II and Bahrām Gūr, but it seems that Soghdia and not Persia was their original home. Among their ancestors was a Shūr Divāstī, one of the local lords of Sughd who was killed in 104/722–3 fighting the Arab invaders of Transoxania. The family now became Muslim, for Islamic names now begin to appear in their genealogy. The early Abbasids encouraged Persians to migrate to the capital Baghdad, and the Mīkālīs were in this way drawn into the cosmopolitan sphere of the Caliphate. Shāh b. Mīkāl (d. 302/914–15) was a protégé of the Tāhirīs and was eulogised by al-Buhṭurī. His nephew ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad was governor of Ahwāz in the early 10th century, after starting out in the service of the Šaffīrīs. His son Abū’l-ʿAbbās Ismāʿīl was educated by Ibn Duraid. Ibn Duraid wrote for him his Jamharat al-lugha and dedicated to him his qāṣīda in alif maqṣura, which spread the fame of the Mīkālīs in the Islamic world as far as Aden and earned its author 10,000 dinars from them. Under Abū’l-ʿAbbās the family settled in Nishapur. In 958 the Sāmānid Vizier Abū Jaʿfar ʿUtbi gave him charge of the Dhwān ar-Rasūl, a post which he held till his death in 362/973.

It was apparently Abū’l-ʿAbbās who became the first Mīkālī ra’īs of Nishapur, an office which his son Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ismāʿīl later took over. Ismāʿīl was well-known as an authority on
poetry and law, and especially on the science of shurūṭ. When Maqdisī came to Nishapur, he stayed with him. Although in 364/974–5 he refused to head the  çevi ar-Rasūlīl he nevertheless was, like his father, drawn into the Samānid administration. His son Abū Ja'far became ra‘īs of Nishapur, and with the latter's grandson Abū'l-Qāsim  Ali we find the family fully involved in the circle of Ghaznavid officialdom.

Khwāja  Ali appears frequently in Baihaqī's pages. Ḥājmūd drew him to Ghazna, and he settled down there and became ra‘īs. The Sultan employed him in 1011–12 to escort his daughter to her future husband, Manūchīhr b. Qābuš (see above, 340). On Ḥājmūd's death he opportunistly transferred his allegiance to the right man and was among those who sent to Ray encouraging Masqūd to come eastwards and assume the throne. Shortly afterwards, at the end of 1031, Khwāja  Ali organised the grand reception at Balkh for the envoy from Baghdad who came to announce the death of the Caliph al-Qādir and to get the Sultan's homage to his successor. For this ceremony Khwāja  Ali was directly ordered by the Sultan to marshal all the ulema, qādīs, faqīhs, ḍālids, etc. to meet the envoy; to erect stands and booths along the route of the procession to the mosque where the khutba in the new Caliph's name was to be pronounced; and to see that the population did not become disorderly.

His success here as an organiser and negotiator made him in 1032 the Sultan's natural choice as leader of the Pilgrimage of Khurasan and Transoxania. The Caliph had just announced that he
had got the Bûyid Amîrs to put the route in order and to guarantee free access, and Masûd himself had sent 2000 dinars for repair work along the route. Khwâja ʿAli was given a robe of honour, a ceremonial litter with gold fittings, a canopy (ghâshiyya) and the title of "Khwâja" (at that time a prized one, notes Baihaqī; and not yet so debased as it had become by the time he was writing). During his absences from Ghazna, his son Abîl-ʿMuṣaffâr normally acted as deputy raʾīs. 118

A line of the Mîkîlî family parallel to that of Abî Muḥammad Ismâʿîl was that of his elder brother Abîl-ʿQâsim ʿAli (d. 376/986-7), known as "al-Muṭṭawwir" from his love of jiḥâd, although he was also a scholar and traditionist and a patron of the ulema. He fought against the Greeks at Tarsus, and then returned to Khurasan and settled at Farâwa, adjoining the Qara Qum where roamed the Oghuz nomads. He was a great benefactor to Farâwa; he built two ribâts there with stores of arms and equipment and aqââf to maintain them, and improved cultivation and irrigation by digging qanâts and wells. 119

Of Abîl-ʿQâsim ʿAli's sons, ʿAbdallâh Ḫusain followed his father's ways and combined the callings of warrior and administrator. Gardîzî gives him the title of raʾīs, so he may at some time have held this position in Mîshapur or some other town of Khurasan. He became katkhudâ of the Ghaznavid general Begtûghî's army in 1035, but when that army was disastrously defeated by the Turkmens, he was unable to exchange his elephant for a horse and so flee. His Turkmen captors were about to kill him but were restrained by Chaghri
Beg. Thenceforth he remained with the Seljuqs and cast in his lot with them; Ibn al-Athîr lists him as Tughrîl's second Vizier, with the title Ra'îṣ ar-ṣu'āṣâ'.

Abdallâh ʿUsain's brother Abû Naqr Abûmad served for a time as raʿîṣ of Nishapur. ʿUtbî praises his learning and quotes some of his verse and a specimen of an epistle of his addressed to ʿAbûs b. Washmgîr. He also praises the attainments of his two sons Abû'1-Fâqî ʿUbaidallâh and Abû Ibrâhîm Ismâ'îl. The former was a fine prose and poetic stylist and a prolific author (Ibn Funduq gives the titles of two of his books); he was also an authority on tradition and from 1031 until his death in 436/1044-5 gave lectures in Nishapur which were widely attended by scholars. It was Abû'1-Fâqî and Abû Ibrâhîm who suffered dispossessment from their lands and rights in Nishapur when Ḥasanak became raʿîṣ (see above, 338). Early in Masûd's reign they regained their inheritance, and the Vizier Abûmad b. ʿAbd as-Ṣamâd stayed at Abû'1-Fâqî's house when in 1033 he passed through Nishapur.

A further collateral branch of the Ḥâlâlis gave birth to the famous Ḥasanak, whose proper name was Abû ʿAlî Ḥasan b. Muḥammad and whose fate is recorded in detail by Baḥaqî. His father had supported Maḥmûd's interests in Nishapur during the last years of the Sêmânisâ. When his father died prematurely, the boy Ḥasan entered Maḥmûd's service, where his handsomeness and frankness made such an impression that the Sultan called him by the hypochoristic "Ḥasanak", and this name stuck to him all his life. At one time
he was Şēhib-Barīd of Sīstān. Court favour and family traditions gained him the rivāsa of Nishapur; later, he exercised this office by a deputy, his kinsman Abū Naṣr Maṣūr b. Rāmish, whilst he himself remained at court. Hence it is possible that some of the tyrannies attributed to him in Nishapur were done by his minions rather than by himself directly. From his closeness to the Sultan, Ḥasanak was a candidate for the Vizierate after Maimandi's dismissal in 1024. Because of his lineage and personal wealth, and despite his youth and lack of experience in the central administration, he was chosen Vizier. According to the Chief Secretary Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān, Maḥmūd repented of his choice soon afterwards, but Ḥasanak retained the Vizierate for the rest of the reign.

The year before he was invested as Vizier, Ḥasanak had gone on the Pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and because of the unsettled and dangerous state of the routes across Nejd, had returned through the Fāṭimid territories of Palestine and Syria. Whilst there he was incautious enough to accept a khilāfat from the Fāṭimid Caliph aṣ-ṣ̄Hiram and to convey letters of friendship to Maḥmūd. The possibility of any intercourse between the Chaznavids and his Fāṭimid enemies alarmed the Abbasid Caliph al-Qādir, and he accused Ḥasanak of Qarmathian, i.e. Ismāʿīlī, sympathies. The Sultan regarded the charge as ridiculous and called the Caliph a doting old fool, but to appease him, the offending khilāfat was sent back to Baghdad for burning. Ḥasanak kept the Sultan's favour, but his high-handedness was
making him dangerous enemies. He espoused the cause of Prince Muhammad, whom Mahmūd had designated as his heir, and went out of his way to offend Prince Masūd. So when Muhammad's short-lived Sultanate collapsed, Ḫasanak was arrested at Bust. The prime mover in his condemnation on the old charge of being a Cαρmαθiαn was Masūd's new Vizier and confidant, Abū Sahl Zauzani (see above, Part I, 136-7), who hated Ḫasanak for the humiliating treatment he had received from him in the past. His promptings coincided with the Sultan's own desire to make a clean sweep of the Mahmūdiyān, men of the old régime, so his fate was doubly sealed, and in 1031 he was executed at Balkh.

Saqīd Nafisi pictures Ḫasanak as a symbol of Iranian nationalism, the member of a family of pure Iranian ancestry hounded to death by the Arab Caliphs. Ḫasanak was certainly a great patron of Persian literature, and there are six qaṣidas dedicated to him in the diwān of Farrukhī. But the main factor in his fall was the Sultan's hostility; Masūd could have shielded Ḫasanak from the wrath of the Caliph, just as his father had done. It is, however, true, as Saqīd Nafisi points out, that the actual execution was done in the face of popular disapproval; the crowd mourned deeply at the sight, especially the Nishapurians present, and refused to stone Ḫasanak when ordered to do so by the authorities. A poet of Nishapur wrote a moving elegy on him, including the verses:

"They cut off his head, he who was the head of heads, the adornment of the age and the diadem of the land;
Whether he was a Carmathian, a Jew or an infidel, to be hurled down from the throne to the gallows was a dreadful thing. ¹²⁷

Yaṣanak probably resembled other officials in that he did not hesitate to line his own pockets, and the rich presents which he brought back for the Sultan from his Pilgrimage may have been in part financed by his exactions. He had considerable property in Nishapur, including a fine palace at Shādyākh, which was confiscated on his death by the Sultan and used to lodge distinguished travellers.

The scale on which he lived and the size of his retinue are shown by the existence around this palace of booths (withēqāb) which accommodated the five or six hundred personal ghulāms he had.

Comparatively distant branches of the Mikālī family benefited from his influence in the state; one notable of Baihaq had a Mikālī mother, and Yaṣanak secured him exemption from the kharāj on his property in the village of Zamīj. Yet the sources do not attribute to him exactions and tyrannies on the scale such as the Vizier Isfārā'īnī or the Qāmīd Sūrī were guilty of in Khurasan.

He was already by birth a rich man. The sympathetic attitude towards him shown by the common people at his execution indicates perhaps that it was the rich, who could afford to be squeezed, who had suffered most from Yaṣanak. The confiscation by Yaṣanak of the property of Abū Naqr ʿAlī’s sons in Nishapur was doubtless in pursuance of some feud between the two branches of the Mikālī family. A certain Mikālī savagely abused Yaṣanak just before his execution, bringing down on himself the execration of the crowd.
Cutbī stresses the many benevolent works in Nishapur done by Ḥasanak when he was ra'īs; he covered over the streets of the bazaar as a protection against wind and snow, the first time this had ever been done, and expended 100,000 dinars out of his own pocket.

We see from this story of the various branches of the Mīkālī family how adaptable its members were and how tenacious they were of their powers and privileges. They retained a grip on the riyyāsā of Nishapur which, though not continuous, embraced the last decades of Samānid rule and most of the period of Ghaznavid rule in Khurasan. The office of ra'īs or zaqīm was a key one in Khurasan at this time, for the dynasties controlling the province had their administrative capitals outside Khurasan at Bukhārā and Ghazna, and were accordingly compelled to leave the province with a considerable amount of local autonomy. The central government nominated the ra'īs and installed him with an official robe of honour, ta'īlāsān and durrāsā, a horse and the title of "Khwāja-yi buzurg". He then became the channel between sovereign and subject, and was responsible to the central government for the internal security of the city. Whenever the sovereign visited the city, he marked him out from the rest of the aṣyān by special honours. The ra'īs was expected to organise official festivities or receptions for distinguished visitors. If the Sultan's army appeared in the neighbourhood, he and the local representatives of the administration had to arrange supplies for the army. If he was especially trusted by the ruler, he might be used for a diplomatic mission. Furthermore, once nominated to
the rivasa, there was a good chance of acquiring for one's descend-
ants an hereditary grip on the office.

The ra'Is had to be a man of social status and accumulated wealth. Leadership in the organisation of public works and charities was expected of him. He had to patronise the ulema and keep open house for travellers and for the needy. So his personal means had to be considerable. Moreover, he had to be persona grata to the rest of the acyān, for his leadership of them was more by persuasion and counsel than by coercive power. It was therefore natural that the ra'Is should be chosen from the haute bourgeoisie of the city. These various conditions were in Nishapur well filled by the Mīkālis, who had accumulated wealth from their estates and aqāf, and also, it seems, from trading and manufacturing interests; one Mīkāli courtier at Ghazna had the name "Bazzāz", and Baihaqī mentions Mīkāli boots. Yet we have seen that, although their social position and wealth was bound up with Khurasan and in particular, with Nishapur, they were not restrictedly provincial in outlook. Members of the family served various dynasties in turn, from the Tūhirids to the Ghaznavids, and at least one Mīkāli adapted himself to the new Seljuq regime. All in all, the Mīkālis are a striking example of the qualities which gave Khurasanian life much of its characteristic resilience and energy.
Chapter Six

The Karāmiyya

The early 11th century marked the zenith of fortune and power for a religious sect which flourished in Khurasan and especially in Nishapur, that is, the Karāmiyya. Barthold described the sect as "pietistic", but in practice it was extremely activist and distinguished by its intolerance and persecuting zeal; in Nishapur, at least, it caused a great amount of social and political commotion. Its founder was Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Karām as-Sagāzī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 255/869), who was born in Sīstān of Arab descent, but studied and spent much of his life in Nishapur. He was an ascetic and hell-fire preacher, and held the doctrine of anthropomorphism to an extreme degree, if the allegations of his opponents are to be believed; his tenets were summed up in a treatise, Adhāb al-qabr, which is no longer extant but which in its day achieved considerable fame in Islam. He preached his doctrines
in Ghūr, Gharchīstān and the countryside of Khurāsan, denouncing both Sunnīs and Shīʿīs alike, and appealing especially to the peasants and riff-raff of those regions. Finally, Muḥammad b. Karām arrived in Nishapur with a group of adherents from Gharchīstān, where he had been working, comprising weavers and others from depressed classes. Thus it was perhaps the social and political implications of his activities, as much as the theological ones, which drew upon him the wrath of the governor Muḥammad b. Țāḥir, who imprisoned him for some time; at this time, the countryside of Khurāsan was much disturbed by sectaries and the Arab ruling classes were understandably suspicious of any new movement which seemed to attract a large following from the lower classes. 136

Nevertheless, the sect became established in Nishapur and put down strong roots there. At the same time, its adherents spread to other parts of Islam. In the 10th century there were Karāmī groups and khānqāhs in Baghdad, Jerusalem and Fustāṭ, where they even had their own quarter. But Khurāsan remained the nucleus of the sect, which had considerable strength in the lands along the upper Oxus, where Muḥammad b. Karām had first begun his propaganda; in the 10th century their khānqāhs were to be found in Guzgān, Khuttal and Farghāna, as well as at Merv and Samarqand. It was suggested by J. Ribera y Tarragó that these khānqāhs, together with the madrasas of the Karāmiyya which are later heard of, were educational institutions, and that their existence in Nishapur was a stimulus to the growth of the orthodox madrasa movement there, but this is unlikely.
In the latter half of the 10th century, the Karāmiyya in Nishapur were led by Abū Yaḥyā Ishāq b. Maḥmashād (d. 383/993), famed for his preaching and evangelistic fervour; he is said to have converted over 5000 People of the Book and Zoroastrians in Nishapur. 138 Abū Yaḥyā's son Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ishāq succeeded to leadership of the sect after his father's death. The piety and asceticism of Abū Yaḥyā had made a deep impression on Sebūktīgin when he was in Khurasan, and had actually converted him to the sect's beliefs. Consequently his secretary Abūl-Fatḥ Bustī penned the lines:

"The only true legal system (fiqh) is Abū Ḥanīfa's, just as the only true religious system (din) is Muḥammad b. Karām's; Those who, as I observe, disbelieve in Muḥammad b. Karām's system are a vile lot indeed (ghair kirām)". 139

Maḥmūd inherited this sympathetic attitude towards the Karāmiyya, and in the earlier part of his reign supported them as a conservative force and as a weapon against Muḥtazīlī or Ismāʿīlī religious radicalism. 140

For his part, Abū Bakr Muḥammad used this favour to further his plans and to establish a temporal ascendancy within Nishapur over the aṣyān and over other members of the religious classes. Already when the Qarakhanid invaders occupied Nishapur in 1006, they feared the strength of his party in the city so much that they carried him off with them. He escaped when the Sultan's army approached, and became even more favoured in Maḥmūd's eyes. Under pretext of ferreting out Muḥtīnī heretics, he set up a reign of terror in
Nishapur, so that "people saw that his saliva was deadly poison and his delation meant ruin". A favourite practice of his was to extort money as the price of silence about alleged heretical proclivities. He played a prominent part in the trial and execution in 403/1012-13 of the Fatimid dā'ī at-Tāharnī. This man had come on an open and peaceful mission to Mahmūd from the Caliph al-Ḥakīm. When he had reached Herat he had been arrested, sent back to Nishapur and interrogated by Abū Bakr Muḥammad, who pronounced his doctrines baseless but dangerous. Abū Bakr Muḥammad’s pursuit of anything smacking of unorthodoxy also brought him up against the Shi’īs of his city (nār-Raywāfī), whose new mosque he had razed, and against the Shi’īs, in particular, against Shaikh Abū Sacīd. Even famous scholars like the Ash’arī divine Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak, who had come to Nishapur to teach and who was the fierce opponent of the Karāmiyya, was harried by the sect. They accused him of heresy and had him summoned before the Sultan at Ghazna. Ibn Fūrak vindicated his orthodoxy, but it was allegedly they who had him poisoned on his way back from the capital in 406/1015-16. Likewise, the biographer of the ulema of Nishapur, al-Ḥakīm al-Bayyīc, fell foul of the Karāmiyya; they smashed his minbar and prevented him leaving his house for the mosque.

The peak of Abū Bakr Muḥammad’s power came when Mahmūd, reversing the normal policy of giving the riyāsā of the city to a leading member of the lay aṭyāq, made him rā‘īs. He continued to parade hypocritically in the woollen cloak of an ascetic, but he had a well-
disciplined following to attend him and to execute his commands, headed by a personal adjutant (חָצִיב). In harrying the Batinis and the Sufis he had the support of the Qadi Sidd and others of the orthodox ulema, but events now moved towards a breach between these two strong-minded personalities. Although the ensuing struggle was fought out on the theological plane, the real question at issue was over the temporal power in Nishapur.

After returning from his Pilgrimage of 402/1011-12, the Qadi Sidd came to Mahmud's court at Ghazna. In a theological discussion there, the Qadi brought up the unorthodox ideas held by the Karamiyya, their anthropomorphism and consequent attribution to God of what did not befit Him. When summoned to reply, Abu Bakr Muhammad denied all the allegations and thus saved his skin, but the Sultan ordered local governors in Khurasan to investigate members of the sect and to purge the madrasas and minbars of them. The next stage was that Abu Bakr Muhammad again tried to clear himself by bringing a host of witnesses to testify for him, so the Sultan appointed the Chief Qadi of Ghazna, Abu Muhammad Nasir, to preside over a court of enquiry. At this, Abu Bakr Muhammad and the Qadi Sidd accused each other of anthropomorphist and Mustazili beliefs respectively. But the governor of Khurasan, Mahmud's brother Abu'l-Muzaffar Naqr, testified to the Qadi's pure Fanafi faith and the Sultan refused to believe that he could have become a Mustazili.

Finally, Mahmud dismissed Abu Bakr Muhammad from the riyasa, and to please the Qadi, reappointed a layman. With the appointment
of Ḷasanak (see above, 347-51) the office returned to the class of the ʿayān and to the Mikāli family in particular. Ḷasanak took draconian measures, with a severity, according to ʿUtbī, surpassing that of Ziyād b. AbīThī, against the Karūmiyya in Nishapur. The most tyrannical of them were jailed in fortresses. Abū Bakr Muḥammad's spoliations were recovered from him and he was enjoined to fade away into a life of seclusion and contemplation. Ḷasanak then warned other members of the religious classes, especially the ʿAlīds, that their favoured position and the respect they were accorded depended wholly on their obedience to the secular power. They for their part agreed with this, recognising that the Sultan was the Shadow of God on earth and that nothing would avail them except obedience and extreme circumspection (al-maʾīl ilā ʿl-ghulūw liʿl-iqtisād). 146

This was the end of the Karūmi bīd for power in Nishapur, and they were never allowed a second chance. The sect continued to be strong in Nishapur. It is unlikely, pace Barthold (Turkestan, 290 n.2), that the Qāḍī ʿAbīl-Qāsim and Abū Bakr Muḥammad ever became friends again. On the contrary, we know that enmity between the two families persisted eighty years later. Ibn al-Athīr records under 458/1095 civil strife in Nishapur between the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs on one side, led respectively by the Qāḍī Abū Saʿīd Muḥammad b. Abīmad b. ʿAbīl-Qāsim and Abūl-Qāsim, son of the Imām al-Ḥaramain Juwainī, and the Karūmiyya on the other, led by Mahmashīd, which ended in the
killing of many of the latter and the razing of their madrasa.

The Karāmiyya persisted as a sect in Khurasan and Transoxania well into the 13th century.
Chapter Seven

The Sufis

The community of Sufis in Nishapur, and in particular, that grouped around the famous Shaikh Abū Sa‘īd b. Abī’l-Khair Maihanī, has been mentioned in passing. In the development of Islamic mysticism, the Sufis of Khurasan played an outstanding part. It is not necessary to posit for Sufism an origin in the East, say in Indian Vedanta, in the transmission of which Khurasan would certainly have played a mediating rôle. But it found a congenial home on Persian soil, and at an early date produced one of the best-known Sufi pantheists, Abū Yazīd Taifūr Bīshmī (d. 261/874 or 264/877-8). Al-Hujwīrī attributes the spread of Sufism in Nishapur and Khurasan to Abū ʿUṯmān Sa‘īd b. Ismāʿīl al-Qīrī, whose preaching was very popular in Nishapur; and by the 11th century, he says,

"It would be difficult to mention all the Shaykhs of Khurāsān. I have met three hundred in that province alone who had such
mystical endowments that a single man of them would have been enough for the whole world. This is due to the fact that the sun of love and the fortune of the Šūfī path is in the ascendant in Khurāsān". 149

The career of Shaikh Abū Saʿīd, who lived in Nishapur for roughly the decade 1024–34, is known in detail through his biography, the Āsrār at-tauḥīd Ŧī maqāmāt ash-Šaikh Abī Saʿīd (see Bibliographical introduction, 29–30 ). His career shows Šūfism in the stage before it became institutionalised into formal tarīqas, but when great shaikhs were already the foci of devotion and spiritual enthusiasm, with large bands of murīds dwelling in the shadow of their baraka. It also illustrates the tensions which were generated in a city like Nishapur where the ruling stratum was prosperous, conservative, orthodox in religion and jealous to preserve the political status quo within the city. Into all this, the Shaikh brought a new way of life and behaviour. His spiritual gifts drew many followers to his side from the Ghaznavid official class, the city astān, the merchants, shopkeepers and master craftsmen, but the ruling stratum was suspicious of the Shaikh's powers of leadership and his attractiveness to the lower classes, and fears of social disturbance are explicitly mentioned in his biography.

There are also signs that Abū Saʿīd's personal philosophy of life struck a discordant note in the busy, commercial atmosphere of Nishapur. For as head of his khānsāḥīb, he followed the Šūfī doctrine of tawakkul to the extreme, relying on benefactions and presents from
sympathisers, which were, however, not infrequently extorted by methods approaching spiritual blackmail. Often his right-hand man and major-domo in the khanqah, Ḥasan-i Mu‘addib, was at his wits' end to make ends meet and to find where the next meal was coming from. Yet the Shaikh would lavish money on entertainments and luxurious living while ever the money lasted. This fecklessness drew censure from the more staid members of the community; amongst the bourgeoisie of 11th century Nishapur the virtues of circumspection and carefulness (iqtiṣād, islāh) were as cultivated as amongst the bourgeoisie of Merv and Khurasan in the 9th century as described by al-Jāḥiẓ in his Kitāb al-bukhālā. On two occasions the Shaikh was specifically accused of the vice denounced in the Qur’ān of isrāf, profligacy or extravagance, on one of these occasions by the muhtasib of Nishapur; but then, al-Hujwiri noted, he was never one of those shaikhs who vaunt the superiority of poverty over wealth.

For Abu Sa‘īd lived like a great prince of the Church. The local qādī at Kharraqān was not the only person to find a gap between what he expected of a Ṣūfī and ascetic, and the way of life which he found the Shaikh actually enjoying:

"The Qādī came in and gave a greeting. Then he saw the Shaikh, lolling back asleep on four cushions like a sultan, and with a dervish sitting by his feet massaging them. The Qādī said, 'I thought to myself, what sort of poverty is this? How can this man, living in such luxury as this, be considered poor? This man is a king, not a Ṣūfī or dervish'."

We hear of Abu Sa‘īd giving a banquet for the Ṣūfīs of Nishapur, 300
of them all told, of roast lamb and almond confectionery; and of a
feast on a far grander scale held at the village of Būshangān (see
above, 301 ). An open invitation was proclaimed, and 2000
people, of both high and low estates, came to the celebration, at
which aromatic sandalwood and 1000 candles were burnt, even though
it was daytime. When he rode out across the countryside, it was
not on the ass, traditionally associated in the east with holy men,
but on horseback, with his faithful steward holding the stirrup.
In the streets of the city, his retainers would carry him in state,
since he attracted considerable numbers of novices, murīds, who
always provided him with an escort. The offerings of these murīds
formed a fair proportion of the Shaikh's income, although he also
drew contributions from such varied classes as the rich merchants
and, after he had left Nishapur for Maihana, from members of the
administration installed by the Seljuqs. As well as the murīds,
there were the muḥibbūn or qażīūn, sympathisers who pledged them-
selves to follow the Ṣūfī way as far as possible in their everyday
callings (thus corresponding roughly to the tertiaries or lay brothers
of the mediaeval European religious orders and to the Ḍashqūn of
later Muslim dervish orders like the Bektāshīs). These came from
the ordinary people, artisans, shopkeepers, etc., and when added to
the professed murīds, swelled the number of potential retainers
which the Shaikh could call on.

The Shaikh's popularity with the masses in Nishapur aroused
the suspicions of the aṭrūn and ulema. The ulema were from the
doctrinal point of view mistrustful of Sufism in general, and they noted the gap between the conventional picture of a Sufi ascetic and the pomp of the Shaikh's household. This conservative opposition embraced all sects and rites. The leaders of the orthodox legal schools were prominent, led by the Qadi Shahid, and the Imam al-
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-Haramain's father, Abu Muhammad Juwaini, was so strongly opposed to Shaikh Abu Sa'id when the latter first came to Nishapur that no-one dared mention his name in his presence. The Qalids and Shi'iks of Nishapur were another element of the conservative religious establishment (see below, 369-71 ), and were as keen against the Shaikh as any Sunnis, even cursing him openly in the streets as he passed. Above all, the Karimiyya hated him, and from the mention of Abu Bakr Muhammad in this connection, it seems that the latter still remained influential in the city. Finally, not all the Sufis were solidly behind the Shaikh. There was in Nishapur a moderate party of Sufis, led by Abu'l-Qasim Qushairi, who were concerned to vindicate Sufism's right to a lawful place within the community of Islam, and who therefore deprecated any extremism which might prejudice this. Qushairi was both an Ash'ari in theology and a Sufi, and he composed his His料fat al-Qushairiya fi Gilm at-tasawwuf to show how Sufism accorded with orthodox beliefs and practices. Qushairi seems in particular to have been dubious about the orthodoxy of some of the Shaikh's mystical poetry, about the hearing of music in his dhikra or majlis-i samad and about the propriety of dancing (raga) to induce ecstasy.
According to Abū Sa'īd's biography, all the currents of opposition came to a head when the Qadī Ǧamʿī and Abū Bakr Muḥammad drew up a written indictment of the Shaikh's misdeeds and sent it off to the Sultan at Ghazna. In it, the Shaikh's sybaritic life and his concentration on music and dancing rather than the teaching of orthodox doctrine were mentioned. But his accusers made a further charge, that public security was being threatened, that the majority of the Qawām had joined the Shaikh and that a general fitna was imminent in the city. The Sultan's reply gave the Ḥanafī and Shāfīī imāms a free hand to inflict the ultimate penalty demanded by the Shariʿa, and it was resolved to hang the Shaikh and his followers.

The episode ends, as do all similar ones in the biography, with the frustration of their knavish tricks by the Shaikh's spiritual powers, and his accusers turn about and become his supporters. 160

Nicholson believed that this story might not be entirely fictitious, and it undoubtedly reflects the tension which must have existed between the Shaikh and the orthodox ulema. As Nicholson observes, their charges were substantially true and the Shaikh made no effort to deny them. If there was a reconciliation of the two sides, it cannot have been all that cordial, even though Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, the Shaikh's biographer and descendant, mentions several joint meetings of the spiritual leaders of Nishapur for discussion and disputation, at which such great figures as Shaikh Abū Sa'īd, Qushairī, Abū Muḥammad Juwainī and his son, the Qadī Ǧamʿī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad the Karāmī leader, Isḥāqī Ǧābūnī, etc.,
were present. Possibly some sort of respectful *modus vivendi* had been reached.

The appeal of the Nishapur ulama to the central government implied that they expected the dynasty's attitude to the Sufis to accord with their own. The policy of the Ghaznavids was to encourage any form of orthodox religion which could play a part in securing political and social stability. They were not insensible to the appeal of saintly men, as the visits of the Nishapur sheikh Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad Khargūshī (d. 406/1015-16) to Maḥmūd's court show. According to Shaikh Abū Sa'īd Maihanī's biography, when in 1049 the Shaikh died, one of his disciples obeyed his dying master's injunction and went to the court of Gha'ūn to beg the 3000 dinars for a debt outstanding on the Shaikh's khānqāh. The Sultan paid up immediately, and added 1000 dinars to erect a canopy over the tomb and another 1000 for the envoy's travelling expenses. However, in one place in Bāisẖī, Sultan Mas'ūd refers to the Sufis as "long-moustached ones" (*ṣuḥḥī-sablat*: literally, "with moustaches like a file") and expresses his general opinion of them thus: "He would always joke, when he saw a dervish who was a notorious hypocrite and who wore a dervish cloak, "His heart is blacker than his cloak!". Whilst he was ra'īs in Nishapur, Ḥasanak was also a great opponent of the Sufis. Perhaps we might formulate the dynasty's attitude in these terms: it regarded individual holy men with respect, whilst recognising that among the Sufis were many tricksters. It was suspicious of Sufi sheikhs who collected great bands of followers.
around themselves, thereby creating a nexus of loyalties which could not directly be controlled by the central government or its local agents. The orthodox religious leaders, on the other hand, were frequently employed in state offices like the qa'ī or the khitāba, and were thus amenable to pressure and control.

B. Zakhoder has suggested that at this time, Sufism in Khurasan was really a religious cloak for political activity secretly directed against Ghaznavid rule there. He is right in pointing out that Abu Sa'id had many links with the class of merchants, traders and shopkeepers; his own father had been a perfume-seller and grocer (cattār) in Maimana, and for supporting his khānqāh he depended much on the generosity of this class. Yet this class was not by its nature anti-Ghaznavid; the Shaikh's own father, Bābā Bū'1-Khair, had been such a warm admirer of Sultan Mahmūd that he had frescoes painted on the walls and ceiling of his house at Maimana depicting the Sultan, his name and titles, his retainers and his panoply of war.

But Zakhoder goes on to assert that Sufism and the tariqas were the agents of the nobles and ruling classes in Khurasan. He quotes the appeals of the aṣyān of Khurasan to the Qarakhanids against Ghaznavid oppression, and the resulting stimulus to the Turkmens' invasions (cf. Baihaqī, 412), and suggests close relations between the aṣyān and Sufis of Khurasan on one side and the Oghuz on the other. These assumptions have no solid evidence behind them. The Turkmens were received in Khurasan with resignation rather than
with positive joy. We know nothing of a Ṣūfī conspiracy against the state in Khurasan. Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar tells a story of how when they were overrunning Khurasan, the two brothers Tughrl and Chaghrl Beg came to the Shaikh at Maihana for his blessing. The latter told them that their successes were being dictated by the Divine Will, and went on to say, to Chaghrl, "We have given you rule over Khurasan", and to Tughrl, "We have given you rule over Iraq". It is not necessary to take this story seriously; the type of anecdote where the wise man meets with and encourages someone who is to achieve future greatness is a common enough one, and in another part of his biography, the Shaikh allegedly meets the young Niẓẓam al-Mulk and prophesies his coming rise to power. Nor does it seem that the Ṣūfīs were direct agents of the ruling classes' ambitions; although Abū Saʿīd had supporters in all ranks of society, most of his fiercest enemies in Nishapur were from the ruling classes of the acyūṣ, the local officials and the ulema. Where unrestrained Ṣūfī activities seemed to threaten the established social or religious order, those classes were at one with the central government in Ghazna.
Chapter Eight

The Sayyids

The Sayyids or ĀAlids were in the first part of the 11th century a class enjoying considerable respect and prestige in Khurasan, as in many other parts of the eastern Islamic world. This respect accorded to them was independent of political factors, for the progress of political Shi‘ism was now being checked by a Sunnī revival. The Sayyids themselves were a small minority in Khurasan. Outside the ranks of the Ismā‘īlīs, who had achieved forms of organisation such as that of the Fatimid da‘wa, Shi‘ism was still a diffused body of unsystematised beliefs rather than a closely-knit sect. Within it, the moderate, Twelver, Ja‘fari Shī‘a were a conservative rather than a revolutionary force. Such an attitude was forced on them in Khurasan by the political environment. The successive dynasties which reigned there – the Ṣafavidīs, the Shankids, and the
Ghaznavids - were all orthodox Sunni powers (in so far as the Ṣaffārids showed any religious feelings, their sympathies lay with the Khawārij, but their dominion in Khurasan was brief). Both the extravagances of Shiʿism in western Persia and the Caspian provinces, and the expansionist policies of the Dailamī tribesmen there, who had adopted Shiʿism as an expression of their own particularism and of Iranian national feeling, stimulated the rulers of Khurasan to make it a bulwark of orthodoxy.

Within these circumstances, the moderate ShiʿIs could nevertheless exist peacefully in Khurasan. The price for this tolerance was that they should engage in no political activity and should subordinate themselves strictly to the temporal power. Although the Ghaznavid Sultans were themselves strictly orthodox, they were prepared to leave them in peace; this point was clearly explained to the Nishapur ʿAlīds after the episode of the Karāmī bid for power (see above, 358). During the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur in 1038-9, the Naqī of the ʿAlīds showed himself as one of the most faithful of the local leaders to the Ghaznavid connection (see below, Part V, 509). When the Fātimid ʿAlī at-Tāhirt ī was arrested and brought to the court at Ghazna, it was a Shiʿī divine, ʿHasan b. ʿThīr b. Muslim, who took the lead in the interrogation. As an ʿAlīd, the descendant of al-Ḥusain, he was able to demonstrate the falsity of at-Tāhirt ī's claim to be an envoy of the true Caliph-Imām, and so recommended his execution. The Sayyids of Khurasan integrated themselves into the social structures of the
towns and into the ranks of the landowning and mercantile classes, and were little inclined to pursue revolutionary policies. There is no evidence to show that they encouraged or approved of the various Ziyārid and Bu'yid attacks on the Sāmānids in Khurasan, and the victory of untutored Dailamī adventurers would have been inimical to their material interests.

Ibn Funduq describes the coming of the Alids to Khurasan and Nishapur in the latter half of the 9th century:

"Muḥammad Zabbērā b. ʿAbdallāh al-Mafqūd was Amīr of Medina, and his son Abū Jaʿfar Abīḥmad was a mighty commander. Now there was in the land of Ṭabaristān the One who Summons to God, one of the Imāms of the Zaidīs, and the people of Ṭabaristān gave their allegiance to him. There arose a contention between him and the Fāṭimids, so he departed to Nishapur and settled there. His son, the Sayyid al-Ajall Abīl-ʿUsāin Muḥammad b. Abīḥmad b. Muḥammad az-Zabbērā, was born and brought up in Nishapur. An extensive following of people gathered round him and did allegiance to him as Caliph. ʿAbdallāh al-Fāḍīq records in his Taʾrīkh Nishābūr that for a while they pronounced the khutba in his name as Caliph. Then the Amīr ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbīḥhir, governor of Khurasan, gave him his niece, the daughter of his brother ʿAlī b. ʿAbīḥhir, in marriage. The Sayyid al-Ajall Abū Muḥammad Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad was born of them, and became the influential Naqīb and Ḥaʾīs in Nishapur; they used to call him "Sayyid of the House of the Messenger of God". His son was the Sayyid al-Ajall Abūl-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, who was Naqīb and Ḥaʾīs in Nishapur and highly respected. They placed him too in the khutba as Caliph, and a group of people gathered round him. This Abūl-Ḥusain Yaḥyā was a highly-cultivated man; he knew the Qurʾān by heart, was a ṭāwī for poetry, was a traditionist, was able to relate
history, was skilled in genealogies and was eloquent. They gave allegiance to him at the time when the Fortunate Amīr Abū’l-Ḥasan Naṣr b. Āḥmad [301-31/914-43] ruled. He was carried off to Bukhārā and kept there some time. Then they set him free, gave him a robe of honour and assigned him a regular pension. He was the first Khurasanian Ālids to be given a pension from the royal treasury; they called him, therefore, ʿĀlib al-arz. Abū’l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā lived over a hundred years. His son Sayyid-i Ajall Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad was the most noble of sayyids, was Naqīb and Raʾīs and was a great preacher and deliverer of homilies. There were always large concourses of people in his house. He had a brother, Sayyid Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain, known as Jauharak. He was an impetuous youth, and a quarrel arose between him and the sons of Sayyid Imām Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain b. ʿAbū ʿAbdullāh the traditionist. The followers of the Imām Muṭṭalibī Shāfiʿī, May God be pleased with him, considered it advisable to help the sons of the Sayyid Abū ʿAbdallāh, and the nigāba passed from this line to the other one, and the sons of the Sayyid-i Ajall Abū ʿAlī became dispersed”.

Ibn Funduq then goes on to say that the Sayyid-i Ajall Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad was Naqīb and Raʾīs of Mashhad-i Tūs for a time, that he himself possessed the patent from Sultan Masʿūd appointing him and that Thaqīfī praised him in his poetry.

Thus we see from this passage, and from others in the Taʾrikh-i Bāihāq, how the Ālids came first to Nishapur and then spread to other towns of Khurasan like Bāihāq, and how they established their right to such important positions as the custodianship of the shrine of the Eighth Imām ar-Riḍā at Mashhad. That many of the Khurasanian Ālids came there from the Caspian provinces, where Shiʿism had had a powerful hold since the end of the 8th century, is confirmed by
several entries in al-Fārisī's Siyāq li-ta'rīkh Nīshābūr (see Bibliographical introduction, 23-4). In particular, several came to Nishapur from Gurgān, as the nisbaq "Gurgānī" and "Astarābādī" show. He mentions, among others, Sayyid Dāʾūd b. Mahdī, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar as-Ṣūfī al-Astarābādī, who died at Bābāq in 405/1014; and Abū l-Qāsim Ḥamza b. ʿUṣuf as-Sahābī al-Gurgānī, who came to Nishapur in 406/1015-16 in a delegation from Manṣūchīr b. Qāhūs to Sultan Maḥmūd. 170

In general, the Sunnī authorities did not interfere with the ʿAlīdīs so long as their political interests were not menaced by Shīʿī activity. The ʿAlīdīs seem to have been on good terms with the Tāhirīds; it is true that latterly, the Tāhirīds let their connections with the Abbasid Caliphate grow weaker. The family of Sayyid Abū Jaʿfar ʿAbd Allāh, the first of the line to settle in Nishapur, acquired marriage links with the Tāhirīds. His own mother was a daughter of Tāhir b. al-ʿUsayn Dhū l-Yamīnī, the first Tāhirīd governor of Khurasan (205-7/820-2), and later, a daughter and grand-daughter of Amīr ʿAlī b. Tāhir b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Tāhir were given in marriage to the family. In the next century, it seems from the passage quoted that the ʿAbānīd government at first viewed Sayyids of Nishapur as a potential danger to political stability there, but eventually came to regard them with tolerance.

Once established in Nishapur, Abū Jaʿfar ʿAbd Allāh's family assumed the nīqaḥā as a natural right. The Naqīb was marshal of the ʿAlīdīs in each town, and within its social structure, ranked as one
of the foremost of its acyân. It was he who kept the registers of the CAlids, ansêb al-ashrâf, in each community. The birth of each child and the death of each person was carefully recorded here in order that purity of lineage might be verifiable, for CAlid birth always gave prestige and often gave entitlement to useful fiscal privileges. 172 The office was a prize, and the citation above describes how a prolonged dispute arose among the sayyids of Nishapur and how the niqêba was diverted from one brother to another. In the course of the dispute, the ShSfici ulema lent their weight to one side, and in 1005 the disposessed claimant transferred to Baihaq. At Baihaq, too, a quarrel began among the sayyids over a question of precedence and was ultimately referred to the Sultan in Ghazna. 173

Where a considerable portion of a town's population was ShIÇT, the Naqîb was the natural leader and spokesman for the whole town, with a position corresponding to that of the Ra'îs. 174 Like him, the Naqîb was in a semi-official position vis-à-vis the central government, as surety for the good behaviour of the ShIÇT community. The Sultan for their part treated the Naqîbs with some deference. When at the outset of his reign, Masqîld was at Ray, he was concerned to win over the notables of the city, newly conquered from the Bûyids. He gave robes of honour to several of the acyân, but it was the âqâlî, the Ra'îs and the Naqîb of the CAlids who got more expensive ones than the rest, and the importance accorded here to the religious leaders, both orthodox and ShIÇT, is notable. 175

Because they came generally from the educated classes and
perhaps because of their prestige as descendants of the Prophet, the Sultans sometimes used sayyids as diplomatic envoys. The social standing of the sayyids of Khurasan in the 11th century is shown by their marriage connections with the highest families. A branch of the famous Arab family of Muhallabīs which had settled in Nishapur in the middle of the 10th century and had subsequently become frequent holders of the riyyasa at Baihaq, gave a daughter in the early years of the 11th century to the local sayyids. In the next century a collateral branch of Niẓām al-Mulk's family became allied to the sayyids of Baihaq. In numbers and material strength, the sayyids were a growing influence. In 1095 we hear of the sayyids of Sabzawār collecting a military force of their own, marching to a neighbouring settlement in the Baihaq oasis, Khusrūjird, breaking down its gate and burning down one of its quarters in revenge for an insult to one of the leading sayyids of Sabzawār. Sayyids were among the richest men in Khurasan in this century; one Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, who taught in the two Friday mosques of Nishapur in Majlis al-imām, had great estates, property, merchandise and trading capital in Samarkand. Several centuries later, under the Safavids, the sayyids were to become dominant in Persia; though still very much a minority in our period, the bases for this triumph were quietly being laid.

It has been remarked that the Ghaznavids were prepared to leave the moderate Shi'īs in peace, provided that the latter eschewed all
interference in politics. Towards Shi'I extremists, however, the Sultans were implacably hostile. The Isma'Ils were suspect because of their religious and social radicalism, their wide intellectual appeal, and above all, for their political linkage with the Fatimid da'wa. In Persia and Transoxania the Isma'Ils seem to have aimed especially at converting the ruling classes to their doctrines. The Ghaznavid Sultans were anxious to demonstrate their orthodoxy and their support for the Abbasids; the happy outcome of the execution of the dâ'â'î at-Tâhârî was that "when the news of the execution of the envoy from Egypt reached Baghdad and the firmness of the Sultan's faith became known, the tongues of calumniators and the reproofs of censorious ones were silenced, and his name was always mentioned with praise and honoured at the court of the Commander of the Faithful".

The Isma'Ils seem to have begun work in Khurasan around the opening of the 10th century, after it had already been active for some fifty years previously in Ray and Jibâl. The succession of the Khurasanian dâ'â'îs in the first half of the 10th century is known from a list in Maqrîzî's history of the Fatimid Caliphate, the Itti'âq al-bunâ'â'î. The succession after 943 is obscure, but at least one later dâ'â'î is mentioned, and the well-known dâ'â'î Abû Ya'qub Sîjistânî worked in Sîstân till he was executed by the Amîr Khalaf b. Aḩmad (reigned 964-1003). We have little explicit detail about Isma'Ilism activity in Nishapur during the Ghaznavid period, but Isma'Ilism retained adherents there as it did in many
of the cities of Transoxania and of Būyid Persia. Ismāʿīlīs
were always — and had to be — expert practitioners of ṭaḥḥaṣ.
The Karbāmīš leader Abū Bakr Muḥammad was active in Mshapur persecut¬
ing Ismāʿīlīs, who had become bold enough openly to build their
own mosque (see above, 356 ). Sultan Maḥmūd himself harried
the so-called Qarmathians of Multan; Sind was the one region of the
eastern Islamic world where the Ismāʿīlīs for a while secured
temporal power. Furthermore, he celebrated the conquest of Ray from
Majd ad-Daula by massacring the Būṭiniyya there and burning their
books. 183
Chapter Nine

The Dhimmitas

The Dhimmitas were not so prominent in Khurasan in this period as they were in Iraq and western Persia. Maqdisi attributes to the province "many Jews, few Christians and various classes of Zoroastrians". On the eastern fringes of Khurasan, Buddhism had been the major cultural influence of pre-Islamic times, with the monastery (vihāra) of Balkh achieving special fame. There had been a famous fire-temple near Nishapur, and the mountainous parts of Khurasan were some of the typical refuge-areas where Zoroastrianism long persisted. Ibn Funduq mentions two ancient, sacred trees in the Baihaq oasis, which were venerated by the Zoroastrians; one of them was cut down by order of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil, but the other remained standing till 537/1142-3. 185

In the Sassanid period, Nestorian Christianity spread widely
within the Persian empire, and its Patriarchal seat was in the capital, Ctesiphon. Most of the chief cities of Khurasan and the east, and to a lesser extent, those of Transoxania and Khwarizm, had by the end of the Sassanid period their own Christian communities, often with a bishop over them. These Christian communities in the Sassanid lands never enjoyed anything more than bare tolerance, for the Zoroastrian state church was a fiercely persecuting one. However, away from the direct surveillance of the Emperors in the west of Persia, the Christians of the eastern Iranian world enjoyed somewhat more freedom and tolerance. The Nestorian church had metropolitan sees of Parthia (so. the Nishapur area), Margiana (Merv), Herat, Sistān and the Caspian provinces, the first two of which achieved metropolitan status by the 6th century. In the province of Parthia, the diocese of Abarshahr (= Nishapur) is shown as united with that of Tūs in the records of the Synod of 497. In the early years of the 11th century, the Metropolitan of Merv was the most important Christian dignitary of Khurasan, but a Bishop of Tūs is still mentioned as late as 1279. Nevertheless, the numbers of the Christians can never have been great, and they must always have been a diminishing band in Khurasan.

Jewish communities in Khurasan, such as those at Merv and Balkh, begin to be mentioned in the Islamic period from the late 9th century onwards, when their financial contributions for the support of the Mesopotamian academy of Pumbeditha are recorded. Not only was the Rabbanite-Karaite division present among the Jews there, but
both the Rabbanite and Karaite Jews of Khurasan developed their own peculiarities of ritual and law which distinguished them from their Mesopotamian co-religionists. The Jews in Persia seem to have been more numerous than the Christians, and towns of the Jews with the name "Yahūdiyya" were found at Isfahān and in Gūzān, at the later Maimana.

The religious and intellectual strength of the eastern Persian Dhimmī communities was by the 11th century weak, and they made no contributions to the cultural life of the Islamic world comparable with those of the more numerous Iraqi or Syrian or Egyptian communities. This may be in large part ascribed to their remoteness from the centres of spiritual life and enthusiasm in the west. The Nestorians spent much of their energy on the work of evangelising parts of Central Asia and the Far East, but the laxness of ecclesiastical life and the waning of faith in the eastern Iranian congregations was shown by several causes célèbres and scandals amongst their hierarchy. We must also compare the brilliance and superiority of Muslim scholarship in Khurasan, which led many Dhimmīs to desert their own faiths for that of Islam.

Shaikh Abū Saʿīd’s biography makes a few references to the non-Muslim communities of Nishapur in his day. The Shaikh’s spiritual powers were shown on various occasions by the conversion of large numbers of Jews and Christians there; a similar achievement was recorded of the Karāmī leader Abū Yaʿqūb fifty years before (see above, 355). The Shaikh also converted Zoroastrians
there. His conversion of forty of the Christians of Nishapur is described in detail. He was outside the church of the Christians (kiliṣiyē'yi Tarsēyān). He called to the pictures of Christ and Mary hanging from a platform erected in front of the church to fall down if they acknowledged Muḥammad and his religion as true; the pictures fell down with their faces towards the Ka'ba, and because of this miracle, several of the onlooking congregation were converted.

The profession with which the Dhimmīs were frequently associated in Islam, that of medicine, was still practised by them in the east during the Ghaznavid period. A Zoroastrian physician attended Shaikh Abū Saʿīd when he was ill, and was converted by his baraka. Although the Ghaznavid Sultans were such staunchly orthodox Sunnīs, they did not scorn the use of Dhimmī physicians; Mas'ūd had a Jewish one called Yaṣqūb-i Danyāl, and Bahrāmshāh a Christian one, Abū Saʿīd Mauqīlī.
Notes to Part III

Chapter 1

1. the respective rôles of the eastern and western halves of the country in the development of Persian culture have been the subject of much argument among archaeologists and art historians: Sarre and Herzfeld have attributed the dominant rôle to the west, whereas Hartmann, Strzygowski and Diez have championed the east. Barthold attempted to harmonise the two views. See the discussion in Minorsky, "Geographical factors in Persian art", BSOS, IX, 1937-9, 647-52.

2. Ibn Battûta, III, 7-8, describes crypto-Mu'tazila as a majority of the ulama of the Khwarizmian town of Zamakhshar, a century after the Mongol invasions; cf. also, Spuler, Iran, 155-7.

3. Hudûd, 102-12; Le Strange, Eastern lands of the Caliphate, 382ff.


5. Markwart, A catalogue of the provincial capitals of Erfânah, ed. G. Messina, Rome 1931, 45–7, 52-3; idem, Erfânah, 74-8. The interpretation of "Abar-shahr" from "cloud-city" or "upper-city" is based on Volksäymologie.


9. this feeling against officials from the old Būyid lands can be traced clearly in the sources. The "SN", ch. X, 69, puts into Mahmūd of Ghazna's mouth, as justification for his attack on Ray, that 'Iraqī dabīrs are malevolent Būtini and Khārījī sectaries, and that he is coming with an army of sincere, Muslim, Ḥanafī Turks. A ra'īs of Isfahān denounced to Barkiyārūq how 'Iraqīs with Ismā'īlī sympathies had infiltrated into the diwān, so the Sultan began deliberately to favour Khurāsānīs at the expense of 'Iraqīs (Anūshirvān b. Khālid, in "Bundūrī", 95-6). Rāwandī complains volubly that with the Khwārizmshāhs' occupation of Persia, tyrannical 'Iraqī "Ashārī and Rāfiqī" officials have insinuated themselves into the administration, whereas the Seljuqs maintained the pure faith (Rāhat as-sudūr, 30-2). In all these cases, by "Iraq" is meant, of course, 'Iraq Ǧājānī, western Persia, as Rāwandī specifies.

Chapter 2

10. cf. the list in "Maqūl", 323 ff., of the products of Bulghār imported through Khwārizm and those from the land of the Turks imported through Chāch.


12. Muḥammad b. al-Munawwar, Asrūr at-tauhīd fī maqāmāt ash-Šaiḵ
Abü Sa'īd, ed. V. A. Zhukovsky, St. Petersburg, 1899, 140; TB, 53.


16. Ḥudūd, 103; 1 Ḥaqq. 2, 434. On the inhibiting factor of fuel shortage, causing the abandonment of silver mining in Bāḏghīs, see Ḥudūd, 104. There is a good modern description of the Dīmār-Sūrī defile in C.E. Yate, Khurasan and Sistan, Edinburgh 1900, 212-15, and an early one in Bāḥ., 448-9.

17. Yate, op. cit., 357.


20. Von Kremer, Culturgeschichte des Orients, II, 291. The Cattābī and saṅgātūnī brocades of Nishapur were comparable with those of Baghdad and Isfahān, and the city produced an especially fine and this cloth named after itself, Sābūrī cloth (Latīf al-maṣūrīf, 116).

21. Maqd., 323; Iṣṭ., 255; 1 Ḥaqq. 2, 452; Ḥudūd, 102, 105; 1 Batt.,

22. thus in Bāḥaq in the early 12th century, it was a cloth-merchant, Muḥammad Bāzīz, who was accorded the title Fakhr at-Tuǧjār (TB, 126).


26. Maqd., 315; J. B. Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khurasan in the years 1821 and 1822, London 1825, 391; Clavijo, Embassy to Tamerlane, tr. Le Strange, London 1928, 181-3.


28. Maqd., 313, 319; Samānī, Kitāb al-ansāb, CMS facs., London 1912, f. 3i; Yate, Khurasan and Sistan, 180.

29. Muḥīn ad-Dīn Zamchī, Raudāt al-jannāt fi 'usūf Harāt, f. 36b.

30. Tr., 146-7.

31. Maqd., 300; Iṣṭ., 274; I Ḥauq., 446.

32. Maqd., 313, 325; Iṣṭ., 281; I Ḥauq., 445, 452; Fraser, op. cit., Appx. B, [41]; Yate, op. cit., 362-3, and also, 183-4, on the importance of the chamans of Khurasan at the end of the last century.

33. on the qanāt, see Quatremère, Histoire des Sultans Mongols de la Perse, Paris 1836, 183 n. 50, with further references to European travellers; Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, I, 115 n. 1; Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 217 ff.; A. Smith, Blind white fish in Persia, London 1953, passim. In early
Islamic times the people of Ray were famed for their skill at tunneling (Minorsky, Abū Dulaf Mīsār ibn Muhalhil's travels in Iran (c. 950 A.D.), 53).

34. Maqd., 329; Iḥṣ., 255; I Ḥauq. 2, 433; Yaqut, Muqājam, IV, 857; Nuzhat al-qulūb, tr. 147; Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 414-15; Frye, "City chronicles of Central Asia and Khurasan. The Ta'rif-i Niẓāpūr", Togan armagan, 413.

35. the Merv system was dealt with by Barthold, "K istorii Merva", ZVOIARO, XIX, 1909, 115-38; for Qum see Ḥasan al-Qumī, Ta'rif-i Qum, ed. Sayyid Jalal ad-Din, Tehran 1313/1935, 40-56; and for Qazwīn, Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, Ta'rif-i Qazwīnā, CMS facs., London 1910, abridged tr. Browne, London 1913, 228-9.

36. Ta'rif-i Qum, 40-53; Iḥṣ., 255; I Ḥauq. 2, 433; Mafāṭīb al-Sulūm, 68-9; Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khurasan, 406; cf. Mez, op. cit., 449 ff. The technical terminology of the Diwan al-μāʾ explained in the Mafāṭīb al-Sulūm, 68-72, relates primarily to the irrigation system of Merv.

37. elaborated in his Oriental despotism; but his whole thesis has been trenchantly criticised by E. Pulleyblank in JESHQ, 1/3, 1958.

38. Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 269, 275, 311-12.

39. Ta'rif-i Guzīda, loc. cit.


41. Raudāt al-jannāt fi asāṣf Harāt, ff. 66a-b; Gard., 8.

42. Maqd., 320 n. s, 333-4. For the Mīkālis, see below, Ch. 5.
Chapter 3


44. cf. Herzfeld, "Khurasan: Denkmalsgeographische Studien ....", 172.


49. Curzon, Persia and the Persian question, I, 262.

50. Fraser, Narrative of a journey into Khurasan, 388.

51. Mustaṭṭfī, Nushat al-qulūb, tr. 147.

52. TB, 53.

53. TN, 75, tr. I, 380-1.

54. cf. Herzfeld, op. cit., 160-3, with a list of information on building materials in Persia compiled from the Arab geographer, and A. Godard, "Khūrasān", Āthār-ē Īrān, Annales du service archéologique de l'Iran, IV, 1949, 7-150.

55. Safar-nāma, 4, 5, 8-9, 12, 14-17, 63.


57. ibid., 38, 149, 395. Material on Shāhīkh has been assembled by Saqīd Naqīfī in the notes to his edition of Baihaqī, II, 897-914.
58. ʿUtbi, II, 125-8; Jurb., 200-2; TB, 175-6; IA, IX, 158; cf. Turkestan, 287-8.
59. Safar-nāma, 1-2, 70.
60. ibid., 25, 109.
61. ibid., 14-15, 45, 54-5, 69.

Chapter 4

63. ibid., 37, 323. I Ṣauq.², 439, 441, mentions pockets of Khawārij in the countryside of Bāḏghīs. On the Zaifulāniyya, see al-Baghdādi, al-Faq bain al-firaq, tr. A.S. Halkin, Tel-Aviv 1935, 11-12.
65. Gard., 37-8; IA, VIII, 216.
67. Yaqūt, Muqjam, II, 512.
68. Maqd., 323.
69. It is noteworthy that this division was originally introduced by the Arabs, according to the Taʿrīḵ-i Sīstān, 336. This same source mentions another taʿṣasub there which arose in the town of ʿUq in 341/952-3 between the Shanguliyan and the (?) Zutūruqiyān; its basis is unknown, but it was still of significance a century later (ibid., 325, cf. 364-5, 367).
70. Maqd., 336. The question of the ғазабийят of the towns of Iran has recently been examined by Cahen, with particular reference to Maqdisi's information; see his Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen âge, Leiden 1959 (originally in Arabica, V–VI, 1958–9), [27]–[30].

71. cf. Spuler, Iran, 437, and Cahen, op. cit., [36] ff., who distinguishes the ғайъан as essentially rural and the ғайъарун as urban groups.

72. Gard., 23–4; TS, 297 ff.; IA, VIII, 52–3, under 300 A.H.

73. IA, IX, 409, under 445 A.H.

74. IA, X, 17, under 455 A.H.

75. Gard., 11; TS, 192 ff. and passim, esp. 328 and 363, where officers of the ғайъа, ғархан and ғайъарун, are mentioned; Nöldeke, Sketches from eastern history, tr. J.S. Black, Edinburgh 1892, 177–9; Barthold, "Zur Geschichte der .SEVERiden", Nöldeke–Festschrift, Giessen 1906, 1/177–87; Cahen, op. cit., [47]–[48].

76. cf. IA, IX, 126 (393 A.H.), 246 (416 A.H.), and passim

77. Baih., 423, 426–9; IA, IX, 296; cf. Minorsky, EI 1 Art. "Tus".

78. Spuler, Iran, 121.


80. Baih., 423, 426.

81. ibid., 536. According to Ahmad Ali Kohzad, "Along the Koh-i Baba and Hari Rud", Afghanistan, Kabul, VI/7, 1951, 2–4, the northern route via Mazar-i Sharif from Kabul to Herat is 830 miles, the southern one via Systam 726 miles but the central route through Ghur only 540, or by an alternative route, 628 miles.

82. Maqd., 316, 319 n. c; TR, 28; cf. IA, X, 366, under 510 A.H., where long years of friction culminated in the razing of the Mashhad ғали by the Sunnís of Iς. 

84. At Samarqand in 1004, when the head of the local Cenyaars brought 3000 men to the Samníd al-Muntaqir's side against the Ilig Khan Naqîr (Gard., 64; Ūtbi, I, 341; Jurb., 147).


Chapter 5

86. That rulers should choose their ministers, secretaries, etc. from families which specialised in those professions is a common recommendation of the Mirrors for Princes; see for example, Āḏāb al-mulūk, ff. 36b (Vizier), 39b (Mustauifi), 43b (Chief Ḥājib), and SN, ch. XLII, 176 ff. (Vizier).

87. *TB*, 172.


92. See for example, Spuler, *Die goldene Horde, die Mongolen in Russland 1223-1502*, Leipzig 1943, 219.

the Shafi'i
Haramain's father, Abū Muḥammad Juwainī, was equally violently opposed to the Shafi'i when he first came to Nishapur.

94. Baih., 209. It is probable that MAHmidd gave his allegiance to the Ḥanafi rite, after perhaps an early flirtation with the Karāmiyya (see below, Ch. 6). There does not seem to be any support in the historical sources for the anecdote in I Khall., tr. III, 342-3, which is given on the authority of the Imām al-
Haramain's Muḥidd al-khalq fi ikhtiyār al-ahāqīq, of the Sultan's changing from Ḥanafism to Shafi‘ism, although it may have been tales like this which led Subkī to include a section on MAHmidd and his father in his Tābaqāt, IV, 14 ff.


96. as-Siyāṣ li-ta’rīkh Nishābūr, ff. 41b, 42a, etc.

97. op. cit., ff. 74a-b; al-Muntagam, VIII, 106.

98. Asfār at-tauflīd, 91; Baih., 38, 198; Cūtbi, II, 330-1; Jurb., 260.

99. Baih., 40-1 (cf. Lambton, Landlord and peasant, 51 n.3), 211.

100. Baih., 198, 376.

101. ibid., 536.

102. ibid., 49; Samʿāni, Ansāb, f. 31a, cf. Baih., 359; al-Muntagam, loc. cit.

103. Samʿāni, f. 31b; al-Farisi, as-Siyāṣ li-ta’rīkh Nishābūr, f. 74b; al-Muntagam, loc. cit. Various other members of the family are mentioned by al-Farisi and in the Tā.

104. Cūtbi, II, 28; Jurb., 172. Samʿāni, f. 352a, makes Abū Ṭayyib and his father Abū Sahl Muḥammad Ḥanafīs, but I Khall., tr. I, 606-7, correctly makes him a Shafi‘ī, as also appears from Subkī's article on the father (Tābaqāt, II, 161-3). Confusion seems to have arisen from the fact that the Saḥlūkī family was originally Ḥanafī, but many members adopted Shafi‘ism (cf. ibid., II, 98, where Abū Ṭayyib's paternal uncle, Abū Ṭayyib
Ahmad, is described as al-Ḥanāfī nasab an as-Shāfiʿī madhhab an).

105. Baih., 196-9. "Tabūnī" is the spelling given by Samīnī, f. 103a, who derives this nisba from a place at Wasiṭ.

106. Baih., 689.

107. ibid., 208-10.

108. ibid., 83-4, 197-8, 211, 425, 528-9; cf. Turkestan, 294-5, 299-300.


110. al-Fārisī, ff. 38a-39b; Samīnī, ff. 346b-347a; Yaqūt, Irshād, II, 348-9; Subki, Tabaqāt, III, 117-29 (deriving from al-Fārisī). Al-Fārisī also considered Ismāʿīl Ṣabūnī's brother Abū Yaḥyā Ishāq, the former's son and his two daughters, as worthy of mention as scholars (ff. 39a-b, 46b, 63a, 66b).


112. Samīnī, f. 543b.

113. TS, 237, 273.

114. Yaqūt, Irshād, VI, 490; I Khall., tr. III, 40; Subki, Tabaqāt, II, 145.

115. Samīnī, ff. 548b-549b. A large amount of material on the Mikāli family has been assembled by Saʿīd Naftisī in the notes to his edition of Baihaqī, III, 969-1009, with a genealogical table on p. 1008. On the orthography of the name Mikāli, see Saʿīd Naftisī, op. cit., III, 969.

116. Maqd., 186; Samīnī, f. 548b-549a. There is also a notice of him in

117. Baih., 18, 286-7, 290 ff.

119. SamciHI, f. 549a; Maqd., 320 n. s., 333-4.

120. Baih., 481, 484; Gard., 100-2; IA, IX, 359.

121. cUbtî, II, 34-5; Jurb., 173-4; Baih., 373; al-Fârisî, f. 85b; TB, 117 (Ibn Funduq mentions the Mîkâliyân only briefly; they were not essentially a Baihaq family). There is a long section on Abû'l-Faql's literary works in Yatîmat ad-dahr, IV, 354-61.

122. cUbtî, II, 321; Jurb., 257; Âthâr al-wuzarah', f. 111a.

123. Baih., 366-8, Nasîim al-ashâr, ff. 77b-78a, Âthâr al-wuzarah', ff. 111b, 113b.

124. Baih., 366-8, Nasîim al-ashâr, ff. 77b-78a, Âthâr al-wuzarah', ff. 112a-114a, describing in detail the process by which Hasanak was chosen.

125. Baih., 181-3 = Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 91-3; Gard., 96-7; IA, IX, 239; al-Hunataxam, VIII, 16; Âthâr al-wuzarah', f. 111b, according to which the khilat was torn into four pieces and burnt at Ghazna.

126. Baih., 52, 64, 178-89 = Elliot and Dowson, op. cit., II, 88-100; Gard., loc. cit.


130. Baih., 610.

131. ibid., 23, 36, 247.

132. thus at Mâzinân in the Baihaq oasis, Sultan Mahmûd appointed a man as ra'îs and deputy of the civil governor of Khurasan, and the man's descendants continued to be rulers of the district (TB, 169).

133. cf. SN, ch. IV, 26; Zakhoder, "Selçuklu devletinin kuruluğu birinde Horasan", 510; Turkestan, 234.

Chapter 6

135. This chapter is based on Bosworth, "The rise of the Karâmiyyah in Khurâsan", MW, L, 1960, 5-14. For further references to the sect, see ibid., 5 n. 1, to which should be added L. Massignon, Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, Paris 1922, 230-42.

136. References in Bosworth, op. cit., 6 n. 2. The persistence of the sect in Ghûr down to the end of the 12th century is attested to in several sources; see further, Bosworth, "The early Islamic history of Ghûr", to appear shortly in the Central Asiatic Journal.

137. References in Bosworth, "The rise of the Karâmiyyah in Khurâsan", 7-8 ns. 6, 8, 10.


139. Ts, 339;  outbî, II, 310; Jurb., 254.

140. According to an anecdote in the Āthâr al-wuzarâ', ff. 111b-112a, Maḥmûd was originally a great admirer of the sect and its holy men; but see Bosworth, op. cit., 9 n. 13.


142. outbî, II, 311-2; Jurb., 254. Maḥmûd himself followed this ugly practice of extorting money from citizens in return for a certificate attesting to sound belief; cf. IA, IX, 283 (the first page of this numbering).

143. outbî, II, 237-50; Jurb., 237-9; Gard., 71; Samâînî, f. 102b;
Subki, IV, 16, quoting the lost history of Herat by Qāqī Abū Naṣr Fārī.

144. al-Fārisī, f. 3b (this passage translated in Bosworth, op. cit., 13-14); Aṣrār at-tauḥīd, 84 ff., cf. 119, 163; Subki, III, 52-4, 68.

145. Cuthī, II, 311; Jurb., 254; Aṣrār at-tauḥīd, 89.

146. Cuthī, II, 311-25; Jurb., 254-8; cf. Turkestan, 289-90. Although this period in Nishapur, when the riyażī was in religious hands, proved to be exceptional there, this became the norm in other parts of eastern Islam. In particular, Bukhārā had several lines of local religious leaders who wielded very great authority within the city. For the most famous of these, the Sudūr of the Āl-i Burhān, see Turkestan, 326-7, 353-5, and O. Fritsak, "Āl-i Burhān", Der Islam, XXX, 1952, 81-96.

147. IA, X, 171; TB, 268-9, recording this fitna as occurring in Safar 489.

148. see Saʿīd Nafṣī, notes to his edition of Baihaqī, II, 964-7.

Chapter 7

149. Kashf al-mahjūb, tr. 134, 174. Elsewhere in his book, Hujwīrī laments the decline of Sufism in "his own country", but as V. A. Zhukovsky has pointed out, this can only mean the Ghazna region ("Persian Sufism", BSOS, V, 1928-30 [ = a tr. of the literary parts of the preface to his edition of Hujwīrī's text, Lenin-grad 1926], 481-7.


152. ibid., 104, 126-7, 161.

153. ibid., 151, 159, 194, 208.

154. ibid., 84, 113-5, 147-8, 419, 435.

155. ibid., 211, where muḥibbān are described as coming from the ahl-i dūnyā u bāzāriyān.

156. ibid., 110.

157. ibid., 120, 131-2.

158. ibid., 84, 119, 163.


161. Asrār at-tauḥīd, 275-8, 294.

162. IA, IX, 247; Asrār at-tauḥīd, 453-7. The reigning Sultan in 1049 was ʿAbd ar-Ｒashīd b. Māḥmūd.

163. Bah Ir., 513. Köprülü Zade Mehmed Fuad observes that clipped beards and long, drooping moustaches were also a feature of Central Asian shamans (Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans, Istanbul 1929, 19).


165. Asrār at-tauḥīd, 14.

166. ibid., 205-6; Zakhoder, op. cit., 516.
Chapter 8

167. according to Maqd., 323, "the children of 'Ali are held in the highest esteem there [sc. in Khurasan]."


169. TB, 254-5, cf. 54 ff. Al-Fārisī mentions the family under the biography of Sayyid Abū Ma'nūr Ẓafar b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Muḥammad b. Ẓubayr (d. 410/1019) (ṣ-Siyāṣa li-ta'rīkh Nīshābūr, ff. 77b-78a).

170. ibid., ff. 59b-60a, 63b, cf. also, 61b, 78a, 79a.

171. TB, 55.


173. TB, 55-6, 255.

174. at Āzul in Gurgān, the Naqīb was the town's spokesman against Sultan Mas'ūd's claims (Baih., 460 ff.; see above, Part I,

175. Baih., 23.

176. ibid., 17; it is also recorded that Mas'ūd's enemy ʿAlītigin employed them (ibid., 349).

177. TB, 57-8, 77, 92.

178. ibid., 269; the Seljuq Ars Ārghun demolished the main wall and citadel of Sabzawār as a punishment for this.

179. al-Fārisī, f. 14b.

Chapter 9

184. Maqd., 323.


188. Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 37; Nudüd, 107, 131; Le Strange, Eastern lands of the Caliphate, 203-4, 424-5.

189. Mez, op. cit., 33 n.

190. Aṣrār at-tauḥīd, 120-1, 143, 168-70.

191. Ibid., 145-6; Baih., 235; Aḥḥāb al-mulūk, ff. 13a-b, tr. 197-8.
Part IV

The appearance of the Seljugs
Chapter One

Introductory: the early connections of the Turks with the Islamic world

From the 11th century onwards, the Islamic world became increasingly ruled by Turkish dynasties. Although this meant changes in the direction of supreme political power, the Islamic world did not in the Great Seljuq period become significantly more orientalised; the Mongol invasions were more notable in this respect. But the coming of the Turks did bring changes in the economic and social sphere, in particular, with regard to land tenure and land utilisation. Relative to the existing population, the numbers of the incoming nomads were not large, and for long the Seljuqs felt themselves to be a small band among a potentially hostile non-Turkish majority. But pastoral nomadism is an extensive and in many ways wasteful way of life, and the Turkmens' beasts did considerable damage to the existing rural economies of many parts of the Middle East (see...
below, Part V, 502-4 ). On the other hand, many of the changes in land tenure in the Persian world had already begun under the Būyids, and the Turkish and Mongol invasions merely speeded up processes already in movement.

European orientalists have often viewed the decline of the Sāmānids and their replacement by Turkish dynasties with a certain sadness as marking the final victory of Tūrān in its long struggle with Irān. The Shāh-nāma is given an autumnal, elegiac quality and made the swan-song of old Iran. It is true that over the last two millenia the frontiers of the Indo-Iranian world have gradually shrunk southwards; whereas in classical times Indo-European peoples like the Massagetae, Scyths, Alans and Sakae roamed the steppes from the Ukraine to the Tien-Shan, almost all the lands north of the Atrek and the upper Oxus are today Turkish. It is also true that Firdausī considered that there was a natural antipathy between the two racial groups, "two elements, fire and water, which rage against each other in the depths of the heart". Yet it seems unlikely that Firdausī meant to write an allegorised account of the fall of the Sāmānīd empire; the work of turning the exploits of the old Iranian heroes into poetic form had already been begun by Daqīqī at a time when the Sāmānīds were at their apogee.

Although Firdausī makes the Oxus the traditional boundary between Irān and Tūrān, and although the defence of the north-eastern frontier against pressure from Central Asia has always been one of Persia's historic rôles, there was never in practice a hard-and-fast division
between the two racial groups. Turkish peoples had long been familiar to the Iranians, for the successive invasions of steppe peoples had brought them into the Iranian world and had often left pockets of them behind when the tide of invasion had receded. Some of these incomers seem to have been Indo-European, at least in leadership, e.g. the Sakae and Kushans, but others, like the Ephthalites or White Huns, were Turkish or Mongol in origin. Moreover, we are speaking here of confederations of peoples, which often comprised many differing racial elements.

The valleys and upland pastures of the upper Oxus lands were especially attractive to Central Asian peoples. Several of the empires founded by these peoples centred on this region, from which armies could be sent out into Persia or into the Indian plain; the Ephthalites, whose rulers bore the Turkish princely title of "Tigin", ruled from Bamiyan. In the early Islamic period there were Turkish elements in much of what is now Afghanistan, and in Ghaznavid times Khalaj and Oghus Turks nomadised on the plateau between Kabul, Ghazna and Bust (see further, above, Part I, 92-3). Thus the eastern margins of Khurasan had admixtures of Turkish peoples from an early date, and it is likely that by the time Firdausi wrote, the stark antithesis of Irân and Tûrân was more a literary and historical preconception of the Persian national consciousness than an exact description of the state of affairs. Jâhîz, a sympathetic observer of the Shu'ûbiyya movement but an Arab himself, seems to have seen this. He recognised that there was a difference between Turk and
Khurāsānī, but did not place a rigid barrier between the two:

"The difference between the Turk and Khurāsānī is not like the difference between the Persian and the Arab, or between Rūmī and Saqullabī or Zanjī and Ḣabashī, let alone what is even more disparate in constitution and in the difference separating it; on the contrary, it is like the difference between the Meccan and Medinan, or Bedouin and sedentary, or plainsman and mountaineer, or like the difference between the mountain-dwelling Ṭayyī tribe of the plains-dwelling Ṭayyī".

Transoxania and Khwārizm were in intimate geographical and economic contact with the Turkish steppes. At the time of the Arab conquest Transoxania was a politically decentralised region of city-states, and its dominant social classes those of the feudal landowners or dihqāns and the merchants. These Iranian governing classes always resisted heavy-handed and unintelligent control from outside, for their trade interests demanded that the caravan routes across Asia be kept open, and this meant skill and conciliation in dealing with the peoples who controlled these routes.

When there was internal disturbance, or when aggression from outside was threatened, the Transoxanian leaders not infrequently called in Turks as a counterbalancing force, either Turks from outside or else from those already settled within the region's borders. Narshakhlī relates how the first settlers of the Bukhārā oasis came from "Turkestan", i.e. the east. Later, a group of dihqāns and rich merchants fled from the tyranny of the Amīr of the oasis, Abru'y, to the Tarāz area and founded there the city of Jamūkat. Meanwhile, at Bukhārā itself, other dihqāns and nobles called in the Turkish
Yabghu, Qara Jürín Türk (identified by Marquart as Istāmi, ruler of
the western Tiu-kiiu, thus placing these events in the second half of
the 6th century), against the oppressor Abrūy. On the latter's
defeat, Qara Jürín Türk's son Shīr-i Kishvar (sc. Il-Arsalan) founded
the city of Bukhārā proper and reigned there for twenty years. 7

In this case, Turks were called in from outside, but on other
occasions, locally-resident ones were used. The rulers of Soghd
used Turks from Īlāq, Chāch, Farḵāna and Ťukhāristān against the
Arab invaders, and these may have been residents of long standing
or even aboriginals in Transoxania. Bīrūnī and Bālqamī speak of
the ancient border of Īrān and Tūrān as being at Mezdurān (which
they explain as marz-i Tūrān) between Mashhad and Sarakhs. The
legends centred round Afrāsīyāb localise his exploits in Transoxania
and his tomb at Rūmitīn near Bukhārā. According to Maḥmūd Kāsh-
ghārī, all Transoxania was once a Turkish land, "but when the Iran-
ians (al-Fūra) became numerous, it became just like Persian territ-
ory". 8 We are left with a general picture of Transoxania which
was not only familiar with Turks as mercenaries, slaves and traders,
but also with them as local settlers and landowners.

A further factor was the economic and commercial links of Khwār-
izm and Transoxania with the Eurasian steppe. They received the
products of the Volga lands, of Arctic Siberia or of China, and
distributed them to the Islamic lands further south. For at this
time, despite the distances involved, Khwārizm and Transoxania had
direct links with the heartlands of the Caliphate. Already in the
9th century commerce was sufficiently organised for the melons of Khwarizm (over which Ibn Battuta was later to become very rhapsodical) to be sent in snow-packed containers to Baghdad; and the Abbasid Caliphs and their Viziers held valuable estates in Transoxania and Khwarizm. The northern frontiers of Transoxania, such as the province of Isfījāb, bristled with ribāts against the pagan Oghuz, Kimšik and Gipchaq, and ghūsi warfare was endemic there. Nevertheless, there were long periods of peace during which normal life went on; despite its frontier position, the town of Isfījāb was a populous agricultural and commercial centre which dealt with the products of the steppes. Khwarizm was especially dependent on commerce for its prosperity and had connections with the Volga and Urals region. As early as Qutaiba b. Muslim's time there was an influential Jewish colony there with its own rabbis, and in the 10th century Khwarizmian traders used the Muslim kingdom of Bulghar as a base for their activities in western Siberia and in eastern Europe, where numerous place names attest to their trading colonies.

In a region like Central Asia, the nomad and the sedentary cultivator are often in a symbiosis, each dependent on the other for certain basic products. The settled area supplies the nomads with flour and the finer cereals like wheat and barley, which they cannot easily grow themselves, with luxuries like sugar and spices and with manufactures like arms and textiles. Transoxania was especially fertile and had an industrious population of merchants.
and artisans, and so was normally able to supply the nomads with these goods. On their side, the nomads at this time fulfilled a rôle similar to that of the Bedouin of the Near East and North Africa and the Turkish and Persian nomads and transhumants of Persia in more recent centuries. They drove their herds to the frontier towns, selling there livestock, hides, wool and dairy products like clarified butter, cheese and ayran. Stock-rearing in Khurasan was replenished from sheep bought from the Oghuz, the Khalaj of Afghanistan and the people of Ghur; but the tenderest mutton came from the Oghuz' beasts. In Transoxania and Khwarizm, the Oghuz and Qarluq supplied horses, sheep, asses, mules and camels. As well as supplying goods, the nomads also provided escort service for the caravans crossing the steppes, the equivalent of the Bedouins' khifāra. From such contacts as these, a spirit of tolerance and trust often grew up. Under a bond resembling the Arabs' jiwār, Ibn Faqlān's caravan received shelter and hospitality from the Oghuz; according to Togan, relations like these were still kept up in the 19th century between Muslim traders and the Kirghiz. In the latter period, there were never any religious qualms about liaisons with pagans, and money would be deposited with them or fresh mounts obtained. Finally, the trade in human beings linked steppe and settled zone and made Turkish mercenaries and slaves familiar in almost every part of the Islamic world. Turkish slaves began appearing in it during the Umayyad period when Arab armies raided through the
Caucasus to the Volga mouth and into Central Asia. Soon the slave-traffic became a large-scale commercial enterprise which the civil powers endeavoured to control and draw profit therefrom. The farm (muqāṭa) of a customs post in Azerbaijan on the road from the Caucasus sometimes fetched a million dirhams. In Transoxania the Samanid government issued licences (ajwizā) for the transit of slaves. The governors of the eastern provinces regularly sent slaves as presents to the Caliphate. The father of Ahmad b. Ūlūn (ruled Egypt 866–83) had been presented to al-Ma'mūn by the Samanid governor of Bukhara and was of Toghuq-Oghus origin. Concerning the price of these slaves, Barthold concluded from the evidence of Ibn Khurdadhbih that the average price of a Turkish slave in the 9th century was 300 dirhams. For the next century we have the words of Ibn Hauqal, although it is true that his information relates primarily to the outstandingly valuable slaves:

"The most valuable slaves are those which come from the land of the Turks. Among all the slaves in the world, the Turks are incomparable and none approach them in value and beauty. I have not infrequently seen a slave boy sold in Khurasan for 3000 dinars; and Turkish slave girls fetch up to 3000 dinars. In all the regions of the earth I have never seen slave boys or girls which are as valuable as this, neither Greek nor one born in slave status."

Some of the Turks to be found in Baghdad and other big cities were traders or artisans who had been attracted and chose to settle there; in Baghdad they fulfilled lowly tasks like baking, selling vegetables and stoking baths. But it was as soldiers that the Turks chiefly impressed people, and it is as a bullying and brutalised
soldiery that the Arab folk-consciousness has perpetuated them in the "Arabian Nights". For the Turks were prized as soldiers rather than as domestic slaves, since their hardy steppe background gave them stamina and courage. Ibn Ḥassūl praises the Turkish race for its pride; they are not content to be inferior to their masters in respect of mounts, food and drink and equipment, but demand equality of treatment; nor will they perform menial household tasks like cleaning, nor tend animals as domestic and agricultural slaves do. Furthermore, the nostalgia often felt by long-established, rather blase societies for the fresh, unspoilt barbarian credited the Turks with some of the qualities of the noble savage:

"The Turks know not how to flatter and coax, they know not how to practise hypocrisy or backbiting, pretence or slander, dishonesty or haughtiness on their acquaintance, or mischief on those that associate with them. They are strangers to heresy and not spoiled by caprice; and they do not make property lawful by quibbles."

To summarise. By the time of the Seljuq invasions, the Turkish peoples had become familiar to the Muslims as traders and as military slaves. Some of them were beginning to acquire estates and possessions inside the Islamic frontiers. On the eastern fringes, such as Transoxania and Afghanistan, the two worlds of Ḥūrūn and Turān had long been intermingled and the peaceful settlement of Turkish peoples was proceeding. So in some ways, the irruption of the Seljuq nomads merely speeded up processes which were already in operation.
The early history of the Oghuz

The Oghuz appear in history as a group of nine tribes, the Toghuq-Oghuz, who formed an important part of the Eastern Tiukiu confederation; they are amongst the Turkish peoples apostrophised in the Orkhon inscriptions of the 8th century. The prominence of this group within the Tiukiu empire is reflected in the words of the author of the Hudud al-Elam when he says that "the kings of the whole of Turkistan in the days of old were from the Toghuq-ghuz", and the Oghuz-Qaghan, grandson of Yafith, progenitor of the Turkish race, plays a large part in the legends retailed by Rashid ad-Din and Abul-Ghazi. The Toghuq-Oghuz were closely connected with another component people of the Eastern Tiukiu empire, the Uighur, if, indeed, the two are not identical. The names "Oghuz" and "Uighur" seem to have a common origin in a root meaning "people", "population"; an intermediate, rhotacised form of "Oghuz", Ogor, is
found in early Byzantine sources.

The Eastern Tiu-kiu kingdom collapsed in 744 from internal attack by a coalition of the Turkish Uighur, Basmfl and Qarluq peoples. The Uighur Iltähbir eventually succeeded to the Qaghanate, and it is likely that the head of the Oghuz now took over the office of military leader (Yabghu) for the horde's right wing, an office formerly held by the Uighur chief. 22 The Oghus now became less and less a homogeneous ethnic group. The incorporation of defeated elements of a people into the victors' tribe was a common process in Central Asia. Moreover, weak groups would attach themselves to a strong leader and his following, and slaves would be acquired from conquered lands. As a result, famous names of the Eurasian steppe such as the Gepids in Pannonia and the Basmfl in Mongolia disappear suddenly from history, not because these peoples had been exterminated, but because the defeated remnants had been incorporated in another grouping. 23 Among the twenty-two component tribes of the Oghus listed in the 11th century by Kâshghârî (DIwân lughat at-Turk, ed. Besim Atalay, I, 55-6) are several which seem to be non-Turkish.

During the course of the 8th century, the Oghuz confederation moved from the heartland of the Eastern Tiu-kiu empire, the Orkhon and Selenga valleys in Mongolia, westwards to the Irtysh, the Aral Sea and the Syr Darya. Stray elements of the Oghuz had already found their way two centuries or so before this into the upper Oxus lands and into the Qara Qum and Dehistân steppes, but it was
this major migration across Siberia which brought the Oghuz people as a whole into the field of vision of Muslim writers. Ibn al-Athîr refers to it when discussing the origin of the Ghuzz who ravaged Khurasan during Sanjar's reign; he gives their original home as Khitāb, and then quotes "some historians of Khurasan" that they came in the first place from the remotest of the Turkish lands, the region of the Toghuq-oghuz, during the reign of al-Mahdi (158-69/775-85). Tabârî mentions an attack of the Toghuq-oghuz on Ushrusana in 205/820-1, and the Ghuzz appear in Baladhurî, apparently for the first time in Muslim literature. 25

In the writers of the 10th century there are several references to this migration of the Oghuz and to their new position in the Siberian steppes. Abû Dulaf Mas'ûd b. Muhalhil accompanied an embassy from the Šāmânids to the western borders of China in 331/941 and later wrote an account of the lands and peoples through which it passed. His information has to be handled with caution, for it is unlikely that he witnessed personally all the things which he describes, and he had a reputation among contemporaries for exaggeration and fancifulness; but he places the Oghuz to the east of the Kimâk of the Irtysh and before the Toghuq-oghuz, who may be placed either at Kau-chang in the Turfan basin or on the Orkhon around Qara Balghasun. 26 Mas'ûdî places the encampments of the Oghuz on the Irtysh, where their pastures bordered on those of the Kimâk and Garluq, but adds that they were already driving their flocks in winter as far as the Volga and crossing the frozen ice to attack
the Khazar lands and the Azov or Black Sea coasts. The existing Turkish peoples of the Aral Sea and Syr Darya region, like the Pechenegs and Bajghird, were being forced to move westwards to the Urals and South Russia, and the wars between the Patzinakitai and the Ouzoi now become known to us from Byzantine sources. 27

According to Mas'udī and Ibn Hauqal, the Turks had a town on the lower Syr Darya, the "new town" of Yangi-kānt (al-qaryat al-ḥaditha, dih-i nau; modern Jānkānt-kala), where there were Muslims living. Most of these Turks were Oghuz, including both nomads and sedentaries (bawḏī wa ḥadār). They were divided into three hordes (aqnaĪ), an Upper, Middle and Lower, and were pre-eminent among the Turks for their bravery, their short stature and their small eyes. Yangi-kānt was the largest of three towns lying to the east of the Aral Sea, the others being Jand and Khuvāra. The pagan king of the Oghuz used Yangi-kānt as his winter capital and exercised political dominion over the Muslim settlers there. 28 Barthold surmised that these three towns had been founded by emigrants from Sāmānid Transoxania with the assent of the indigenous Turks and that they formed a bridgehead into the steppes for the trade with the Siberian forests and with the Kimāk and Qīrgīz. 29 Yet there is no reason why these towns should not be purely Turkish creations; there were traditions of sedentary life among the Turks stretching as far back at least as the Tiū-kiu empire on the Orkhon. 30 Towns a little further up the Syr Darya, such as Saurān and Sīghnāq, were Turkish ones; the whole of the middle stretch of the river was profoundly
Turkish and the expanse between Jand and Uṭrār was held by pagan Qıpchaq and considered Dmr al-kufr by the Muslims till the end of the 12th century. 31

As a centre for the Oghuz and a spring-board for the expansion of the Seljuq family, the lower Syr Darya area merits our attention. We have very little literary evidence to help us here; the region had cultural and commercial connections with Khwārizm, but there was also frequent hostility between them. However, much light on these questions has recently been thrown by the researches of Soviet archaeologists, above all, by those of V.V. Struve and S.P. Tolstov. They have shown that this region, known to have been the home of peoples like the Massagetes and Sakae in pre-Christian times, had a rich barbarian culture in the first millenium of our era. The peoples living there were not pure nomads, but were also cattle-raisers, fishermen and agriculturists. The Ephthalites lived here before moving southwards into the eastern Iranian and Indian worlds, and the information of the Byzantine authors Procopius and Menander Protector that the Ephthalites were essentially dwellers in settlements is thus confirmed. According to Tolstov, there is no break in the cultural history of the towns of the Syr Darya basin between the Ephthalite and Oghuz periods; the Oghuz culture of the 10th century is a direct development of that of the Ephthalites in the 5th and 6th centuries. No doubt there was an ethnic continuity, with the incoming Oghuz imposing themselves as a new set of leaders but gradually integrating themselves into the existing population. So
by the opening of the 11th century the Oghuz had in part taken over
the old sedentary traditions of the area and had become cattle-raisers
and agriculturists as well as pastoral nomads, just as the Khazars
had done in the similar conditions of the lower Volga. Idrīṣī
(drawing on 10th century sources, including the geographical work of
the Sūmānid minister Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad Jaiḥānī) and Kāshghārī
describe the towns of the Oghuz as numerous, and on his map, Kāsh-
ghārī shows the lower Syr Darya as the "land of the Oghuz cities".
During the 10th century, the old Hunno-Turkish settlement of Yāngī-
kānt in the delta was re-fortified and rebuilt, hence its name "new
town"; today, archaeology and air photography have disclosed there a
rich complex of irrigation canals, citadels, walls and caravanserais.

The Oghuz of the lower Syr Darya thus succeeded to a cultural
and social heritage which had some fairly advanced elements in it.
The region was particularly susceptible to fertilising currents from
Muslim Khwārizm and Transoxania, and it was their connections with
these two provinces which gave the Seljuqs their opportunity to ex¬
pand into the Islamic world. The Oghuz who remained in the surround-
ing steppes as pure nomads remained at a lower level of culture and
social organisation, although those of them who nomadised in the
vicinity of the trade route connecting Khwārizm with the Bulghār
and Khazar lands on the Volga were not entirely isolated from
outside influences.

The condition of those Oghuz who wandered from the Dehistān
steppes in the south through the Üst Urt plateau to the mouths of
the Ural and Emba rivers and the Bashkir lands is known to us from
the illuminating narrative of the Muslim traveller Ibn Faḍlān,
concerning the value of which Togan has written, "Jede kleine Einzel-
heit in den Berichten Ibn Faḍlāns verdient jedenfalls entschieden die
Beachtung und Aufmerksamkeit des Forscher". The account of his
journey from Gurgānj in Khwārizm to the land of the Bulghārs on the
middle Volga in 921–2 was previously only known from extensive passages
given in Yaqūt’s article "Bulghār" in the Muqaddimah, but A.Z.V.
Togan discovered a largely-complete manuscript of the original at
Mashhad. Whilst traversing the Ust Urt plateau, his embassy met
an Oghuz tribe who were wandering "like wild asses" and living in a
wretched state. Their women never veiled themselves and had little
compunction about displaying their genitalia in public. Sick people
were either left to recover as best they could or else turned out
into the desert to die. Their personal habits were filthy: "they
do not make ablutions after performing their natural functions, they
do not wash themselves after sexual contamination or anything like
that, nor do they have any contact with water, especially in winter".
However, the chastity of their womenfolk and their abhorrence of
pederasty are favourably commented on.

As far as Ibn Faḍlān could see, these Oghuz were quite irreligious.
One of their military commanders, the "Lesser Yīnāl", had been a
Muslim, but had had to renounce the faith when the people had told
him that he could not be one of their leaders unless he did that.
What vague religion they had, consisted of the formal acknowledgement
of the existence of "the One God", Bir Tēŋri, and the recognition of some kind of after-life for their great warriors. Slaughtered horses were thrown on warriors' tombs and effigies of men to attend them in the next life were erected on them (balbals). These sketchy beliefs attest to little more than a primitive animism. The reverence for water, and especially for running water and springs, which was displayed by Ibn Faqlān's Oghuz, was widespread among Turkish and Mongol peoples. The Orkhon inscriptions refer to "the Turks' auspicious Earth-Water" (Türk Tduq yiri sūrī) as a religious principle co-existent with "the Turks' Heaven" (Türk Tēŋrisi).

Reverence for water was written into the Yasa or fundamental law of the Mongols: in Jūzjānī's words, "Whosoever should enter a piece of water, whether large or small, they were to kill him also, and likewise anyone who should wash his face at the edge of any water, so that the water from the washed face of such person should enter that water". Ibn Faqlān mentions that these Oghuz had their gams or shamans, who took part in the burial rites of their great men, and he seems also to refer to the rites of shamans among the Bulghārs, still only in part Islamised. The Hudūd al-Ǧamāl says that the Oghuz held their medicine-men (ṭabībān, pijishkān) in great veneration and allowed them a power of life and death. In the old Turkish tradition it was Oghuz, the grandson of Yāfīth, who held the magical rain-stone (yada-tash) which could bring victory in battle through control of the elements. The early Seljuq tribal leaders seem to have set some store by soothsaying and magic to guide them in their movements...
and campaigns; no doubt their soothsayers fulfilled a rôle similar to that of the Carrif of the ancient Arabs. At the battle of Dandamyen in 1040, the victorious Seljuqs had their munajjim, and after the battle, when Tughril proclaimed himself ruler of Khurasan, the astrologer was rewarded, presumably for his correct prognostications. Among the Seljuq family itself, Qutlumush b. Arslan Isr'Il, Tughril's cousin, was very skilled in astrological lore; according to Ibn al-Athîr, this was thought remarkable, but as his rebellion later showed, Qutlumush represented conservative Turkmen feeling, and may have retained the beliefs and lore of older tribal life particularly tenaciously.

Ibn Faqlân also gives us information about the political and tribal organisation of these Oghuz whom he met. Their ruler, he says, is called the Yabghu, a title of military origin which goes back, as we have seen (above, 409), to the time of the Eastern Tu-kiu empire. His deputy was called the Kûdârkin, apparently the Kul-ârkin of Mahmûd Keshgharî. These two had the moral authority of tribal chiefs, and were perhaps descended from the ruling families of the Turks in the steppes. However, the actual direction of military and political affairs was done by the man called by Ibn Faqlân Şabib al-jaish, sc. Sîbashî or Şibegi. It was to this leader, and not to the Yabghu, that Ibn Faqlân presented his credentials, handing over letters from the Abbasid court and giving special presents. Under the Sîbashî were several subordinate military commanders with the titles Târkhân (Târkan), Yinal and (?) Y.şh.1.z.
On the whole, the Oghuz were in a less advanced state than other Turkish peoples like the Khazars on the lower Volga or the Garluq in the Semirechye, who in the 10th century were constituting themselves as the nucleus of the later Qarakhanid confederation. Politically, they were disunited. They had no Qaghan of their own, but only the Yabghu as their head. The title of Qaghan and the theoretical dominion of the steppes passed to the Uighur and the Qarakhanids, but the Seljuqs were never to assume it. Turbulence and fragmentation were characteristics of the Oghuz people which early appeared. In the Orkhon inscriptions, the rebelliousness of the Toghuz-Oghuz is frequently mentioned. According to the Hudūd al-Ḡlām, "each of their tribes [sc. of the Oghuz] has a (separate) chief on account of their discords with each other", and in the 10th century we hear of an important split which led to a section of the Oghuz taking over pastures in the previously-uninhabited Manghishlaq peninsula to the east of the Caspian. One of the reasons adduced by the Oghuz who in 1025 approached Maḥmūd of Ghazna with a request that they be allowed to settle in Khurasan, was the oppression of their own amīrs. Even after the Seljuq Sultans had become rulers of a mighty empire in the Middle East, they never succeeded in exacting full obedience from their own Turkmen followers, and the débâcle of Sanjar and the Ghuzz in Khurasan signalised the final failure of the Seljuq family to secure recognition amongst their own people for their supreme authority.
The kingdom of the Oghuz Yabghu on the lower Syr Darya was the springboard from which the Seljuqs launched themselves upon the Islamic world, and we propose now to look at the state of the Oghuz peoples at the end of the 10th century. At this time, the Oghuz were still pagan, and those of them who were steppe nomads were in a more backwards condition than the Turkish peoples along the northern and eastern frontiers of Transoxania, where Muslim missionary activity was making much headway.

Central Asia has always been receptive of the higher cultures and religions outside its borders. At various times, the peoples of the Eurasian steppes have adopted almost all the universal religions of Asia and Europe, such as Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and some which are now extinct or nearly so, such as Manichaeanism and Zoroastrianism. Not surprisingly, this eclecticism
has given the region a tolerant outlook. It has always been content to receive rather than to give, but Sinor has justly remarked that "in one sense it is perhaps an achievement in itself that it [sc. Central Asia] gave birth to none of the conquering religions". 43 Certainly, episodes like the persecution of the Transoxanian Muslims by the sinicised Qara Khitny or the more recent rivalry in the steppes between the Buddhist Kalmucks and the Muslim Kazakhs have been exceptional.

Manichaeanism and Nestorian Christianity expanded into Central Asia and made converts of whole peoples like the Uighurs of Chinese Turkestan in the latter part of the 8th century and the Keraits of Mongolia in the 12th century. Judaism flourished among at least the rulers and nobility of the Khazars. But Islam and Buddhism have made the most lasting impressions. Islam has been successful among the majority of Turkic peoples - the Yakuts being the main exception - even though much of Central Asia has lain outside the framework of institutional Islam. It was not easy to fit Central Asian peoples into the framework of orthodox Islam; often they were nomads or forest dwellers who could not easily come together for congregational worship, and whose tribal ways of life were often little compatible with Islamic law. Only where there was some urban life and civilised tradition did centres of Muslim orthodoxy and scholarship, such as Kashghar and Kazan, arise.

It follows that it was not the orthodox theologians, the ulema, who evangelised Central Asia, but rather the itinerant Sufis and
mullahs. It is likely that a certain Nishāpūrī missionary, Abū l-
-Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Kalamātī, who passed from the service of the
Sūmānids at Bukhārā to that of the Qarakhanids and died amongst them
some time before 961, played a part in the conversion of the Qarakhanid
prince Satuq Bughra Khan, who assumed the Muslim name of ʿAbd al-Karīm. 

In Maqdisī's time, there were several khāngāhs of the Karāmīyya in
Farghāna (see above, Part III, 354 ), and from them evangelism
into the surrounding areas was done. Evangelisation by dervishes
and mullahs has continued in the steppes until almost the present
day, and it has only been slowed down by the counter-efforts of the
Russian Orthodox Church after 1700. Islamisation has not always
been total; syncretism has been an inevitable corollary of the toler¬
ance and receptiveness of the steppes. There must have been cases
where the shamans of the Turks became Muslim dervishes and thus kept
their old prestige; Muslim evangelists must have been constrained to
stress the miraculous and charismatic elements in their own practice
which resembled those of the old shamans. 45 The social and cultural
prestige of Islam was in itself a powerful attraction. It could be
felt from the merchants who came from the Muslim lands to trade, even
though the merchants rarely functioned as direct proselytisers. 46

As has been noted, the Ṣūfī preachers and the faqīhs who went
forth from the towns and rībāts of the Sūmānids' northern frontier
scored important successes among the Qarluq peoples who made up the
Qarakhanid confederation, such as the Chigil, Ṭukhsī and Yaghmā.
The Oghuz and the kindred people of the Ḍıpchaq, who were moving
westwards from central Siberia to South Russia, were less affected by Muslim missionary efforts at this time. If the Oghuz had been affected by Manichaean or Buddhist influences, as were the Uighur, before their migration westwards in the second half of the 8th century (see above, 409-10), no trace of such beliefs is discernible in the 10th century; all that Abū Dulaf vaguely mentions is that the Oghuz had a "house of prayer" which contained no idols. Significant of the Oghuz' low level of culture is the fact that they were complete strangers to writing. The old Turkish script, used in earlier times in the Orkhon and Yenissei inscriptions, by the Türgesh in the Semirechye and by the Manichaens of Turfan, left no traces among these western Turks. On the other hand, the Turks further east remained to some extent literate through the adoption of the Uighur alphabet, which we find in full use among the Qarakhanids, where it was only later and gradually replaced by the Arabic one. From being illiterate, the Oghuz on the other hand adopted the Arabic alphabet straight away, probably in the early 11th century.

The Oghuz of the Syr Darya and the western steppes were more open to influences from Khwārizm and south Russia than from the Muslim lands further east. Khwārizm juts out into the steppes like an island of fertility and civilisation, connected with the lands to the south only by the Oxus and the narrow strip of cultivable land along its banks. The commercial links between Khwārizm and south Russia have always been close. A caravan route connected Gurgānj
with the Khazar capital of Atil on the Volga delta. Ibn Faqlan travelled along this way in a caravan of 5000 men and 3000 horses; the trip was made every spring, returning to Khwarizm in the autumn. In 1946 Tolstov found, with the aid of aerial photographs, the clearly-defined traces of the route between Gurgan and the lower Emba. On it were still standing splendid stone caravanserais and wells with stone covers, attesting to the importance which the Khwarizmians attached to this route. There were also maritime links. Masoudi says that large ships sailed up the Volga with merchandise from Khwarizm; this must have been sent over the Ust Urt plateau to Manghishlaq for shipment, for it does not seem that there was ever in historic times a navigable channel connecting the lower Oxus and the Caspian.

The 10th century witnessed an increase in the volume of trade between Khwarizm and Bulghar and Khazaria, bringing about the political as well as the economic rise of Gurganj, which led eventually to the triumph in 995 of the local Ma'munid family over the ancient Afrighid Khwarizmshahs of Keth. In the 10th century, the Oghuz peoples formed a very loose, barbarian empire of vast expanse, from Talas and Chach in the east to the Bashkir and Khazar lands in the west and the Dehistan steppes in the south-west. Hence relations with the Oghuz loomed large in Khwarizmian political and commercial diplomacy. Diplomacy was often extended to military action. Ibn Hauqal speaks of regular campaigns against the Oghuz, and Biruni speaks of the Khwarizmian Faghbaruinya festival, "of the king's expedition", held each autumn before the ruler set off on his annual expedition against the Oghuz.
The cultural and religious connections of the two regions were potentially of significance for the Turkish peoples living along the connecting route. The Greek Black Sea colonies and Orthodox Christian Kiev Russia adjoined Khazaria, and there are traditions that both Biruni and al-Farabi were able to learn Greek language and philosophy in their native land of Khwarizm. Byzantine missionaries made Christianity one of the religions of the Khazars, and the Khazars' Judaism seems to contain influences from Byzantine Judaism. The Christianity of Khwarizm seems to have been Orthodox or Jacobite in complexion and not Nestorian, i.e. its connections were with the west and not the east. Biruni describes the Christians of Khwarizm as observing certain western festivals, and in the 14th century the Armenian King Haithon observed whilst passing through that the local Christians acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch.

Yet despite these influences and despite some evangelistic activity by the Muslims of Khwarizm and Bulghar, the Oghuz seem in the 10th century to have been totally unaffected by the higher religions. Zakariya Qazwini's Cosmography, written during the 13th century but drawing on an earlier sources, describes Christianity as being widespread among the Oghuz, but Togan has rightly discounted this report, for which no definite evidence exists and which is in itself unlikely. The names of the four sons of Seljuq, Musa, Mikail, Israil and Yunes, have been traced to Jewish influences stemming from the Khazar court, but all we can really deduce from this is that these Biblical names had a certain cachet among the
steppe peoples. The successes of Christianity in the western steppes came later and affected primarily the Qipchaq, successors there of the Oghuz; the Codex Cumanicus, a Gospel text and some western hymns in a carefully-latinised transcription of Turkish, is an enduring monument to Qipchaq Christianity.

From the early 11th century, the term "Türkmen" comes into use as a synonym for the south-western Turks, the Oghuz and Qipchaq. Kāshgharī extends its use to the Qarluq, but this was not an accepted usage, and the term "Türkmen" is never used in contemporary histories for the Qarakhanids or their followers. In the 10th century Maqdīsī speaks of thagraṁ gālā 't-Turkmāniyyīn in northern Transoxania. Gardīzī and Baihaqī almost invariably call the Oghuz who harried the Ghaznavid frontiers "Turkmen", and Nizām al-Wulk refers to the Seljuq tribesmen by this name, although the term Oghuz/Ghuzz continued in popular and official usage down to the Mongol period. The name "Türkmen" has been discerned in the transcription T'ūkmand of an 8th century Chinese encyclopaedia. By Kāshgharī's time the popular etymology from Persian Tārk-mānand, "resembling the Turks" was the accepted one. The most favoured modern view is that -mand is an augmentative suffix with intensifying force, so that the meaning would be "Turk pur sang" (Deny, Minorsky), but Kotwicz saw in -man an Iranian translation of the Turkish suffix -gāsh of "Tārgāsh", and Pritsak takes -man/man to be a collective suffix.

The distinction of "Türk" and "Türkmen" was a real one in the early 11th century and had a linguistic as well as an ethnic aspect.
Already we can distinguish a south-western Turkish dialect, that of the Oghuz and Qipchaq. The distinction of "Turkî" and "Ghuzzî" language was known to the Persian poet of Mas'ûd of Ghazna's court, Manûchihrî (d. c. 432/1040-1); he says that poetry in both dialects existed at this time. It has just been mentioned that Kâshghari linked the Oghuz and Qarluq politically as "Turkmens", but he was careful to attach the speech of the Oghuz to that of the Qipchaq, distinguishing it from that of the Qarluq and the eastern Turks, his own dialect. He says that the Oghuz change the true Turkish (sc. eastern Turkish) $m > b$, $t > d$, $d > t$, $y > w$, $dh > y$ ($> z$ amongst the Qipchaq) and that both the Oghuz and the Qipchaq omit intervocalic $-gh-$. 
The migrations into Transoxania and Khurasan of the

Seljuqs and other Oghuz groups

Kâshgharî (ed. Besim Atalay, I, 55-9) lists twenty-two tribes of the Ughuz, and says that the Qınfıq are the leading one, the tribe of the princes of the Oghuz. The Seljuq family - it does not seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this - belonged to the Qınfıq. Our principal source for Seljuq beginnings is the anonymous Malik-nāma, probably written for the young prince Alp Aralan shortly after the death of his father Chaghri Beg in 451/1059. Thus it dates from within a generation of the events which it describes. It is known to us from extracts in later historians like Ibn al-Athîr, al-Husainî, Barhebraeus and Mirkhwând. The information given here has been thoroughly examined by Cahen, who has combined it with the evidence of other sources (such as the Ghaznavid ones, the Khurasanian one of Ibn Funduq's Mashârib at-tajârib and
the Buyid one of Hālāl aṣ-Ṣābi' 's son and continuator, Chars an-Nīma) to produce a critical account of the appearance of the Seljuqs down to their victory at Dandāngān in 1040. O. Pritsak has also dealt with Seljuq origins, but from the point of view of the Turcologist as well as that of the Islamic historian. The two scholars have differed on several points, with Cahen tending to uphold the older, traditional views against Pritsak's more speculative ones.

The ancestor of the Seljuq dynasty, Duvāq or Tuqāq, was called Ṭūmair-yalīgh "iron-bow" from his bravery and strength. He served the "King of the Turks", the Yabghu of the Oghuz (often spelt B.y.ghū or P.y.ghū in the sources). In Mīrkhwānd, the Yabghu is called "King of the Khasars". Relations between the Yabghu and his servant became strained; according to the Akhbār ad-daulat as-Saljuqiyya, Duvāq had opposed the Yabghu's plan to raid Islamic territory, but this is clearly a later touch to show that the Seljuq family were already moved by the divine light before their formal adhesion to Islam. Duvāq's son Seljuq was also in the Yabghu's service and held the important military office of Sūbashī (interpreted in the Arabic and Persian sources as Qā'īd al-jaish, Muqaddam al-jaish). However, the Yabghu's wife grew alarmed at the power and prestige of Seljuq and poisoned her husband's mind against him. Seljuq fled before the blow could fall, taking with him a hundred men from his family and retainers, 1500 camels and 50,000 sheep. He reached Jand near the mouth of the Syr Darya, where "God Most High flooded his heart with
His most holy light", and he sought instruction on Islam and the Qur'ān from the local faqīhs and ulama. Seljuq and his band then settled in the steppes near Jand, gathered together a band of Turkish ghāzīs and freed the local Muslim population from the exactions of the "envoy of the pagans" who came each year to collect taxes. Although Seljuq may have become nominally a Muslim, al-Jussainī's account records that when he had a dream in which he found himself urinating fire, whose sparks spread all over the world, it was a muḥaddīr (sc. one of the Turks' shamans) whom he asked to interpret this portent of universal dominion for his descendants.

The locale of these events is the steppes stretching from the lower Syr Darya to the Volga, the expanse over which the Oghuz Yabghu ruled, with his winter capital at Yəngi-kānt. The connections of the Yabghu, Duqaq and Seljuq with the Khazars of the Volga have recently attracted the attention of scholars, especially as Abū' l-ʿAlā' b. ʿAssul, the Ghaznavid official of Ray who went over to the Seljuqs and wrote a book for Tughrīl extolling the Seljuqs and attacking the Būyids, mentions a curious episode involving Seljuq (here spelt S.r.j.k.) b. Duqāq. According to this, Seljuq struck the King of the Khazars with his sword, and this is cited to show the nobility and daring of Tughrīl's forebears. Barhebraeus says that Duqāq was in the Khazar service and his son reared at their court. D.M. Dunlop has therefore assumed a connection between the Seljuqs and the Khazars and has suggested that the cause of Seljuq's flight to Jand may have been a final rupture with the Khazars. This is
unlikely. The mention of the Khazars in the sources may be a recollection of earlier connections between the Oghuz and the Khazars, but their relation in the second half of the 10th century were very hostile: the Khazars were now a declining political and military force, and in dealing with Vladimir of Kiev's Volga expedition of 985, the Russian Primary Chronicle speaks expressly of a Russo-Oghuz alliance against the Khazars. 68

In the whole episode we have an instance of the political disunity and divisiveness of the Oghuz. The power of the Yabghu, nominal head of the people, was being challenged by the Subashif Seljuq, an over-mighty subject, and we have here the story of this dissident's expulsion. When Seljuq reached Jand he in turn expelled the Yabghu's representatives from there. Thus began the bitter hostility between the older, ruling line of the Oghuz, that of the Yabghu and his nephew Abū'1-Fawāris Shāh Malik b. ʿAlī, and the Seljuqs, who could only be regarded as rebels. Seljuq's assumption of Islam gave what was potentially an additional motive for hostility, that of religion. In practice, it can have made little difference. The conversion of the Yabghu and his circle at Yangi-kent must have followed in the early years of the 11th century; Shāh Malik had a full complement of Islamic names and his father had assumed the name ʿAlī. In any case, it is far from certain that all the Turkmens who followed the Seljuq leaders southwards into Transoxania and Khurasan were Muslims, and perhaps only a minority were; their violent behaviour was not conspicuously Muslim.
The terminus ad quem for the conversion of Seljuq and his family may be fixed at 992, for in that year Arslan Isrâ'îl b. Seljuq was aiding the Sûmûnids against the Qarakhanid Bughra Khan, who conquered Bukhãrã in that year. 69 The three sons of Seljuq, Arslan Isrâ'îl, Miikâ'îl and Mûsâ (the fourth, Yunus, died young) moved towards Transoxania and entered the service first of the Sûmûnids and then of various Qarakhanid princes. Gardîzî records under 1003 the conversion of the Oghuz Yabghu and his alliance with the last of the Sûmûnids, Ismâ'îl b. Nuḥ al- Müntasîr; and the Oghuz again joined the latter the next year against the Ilig Khan Naqr. 70 Cahen and Pritsak have differed over the identity of this Yabghu, whether the original holder of the title is intended or whether Arslan Isrâ'îl b. Seljuq, who is later found with the title, is intended. Cahen inclines to the traditional view, held, for example, by Barthold, that this Yabghu = Arslan Isrâ'îl, who had assumed this title in rivalry to the Yabghu proper and as an assertion of the Seljuqs' independence of his control. On the other hand, Pritsak denies that Arslan Isrâ'îl could have assumed the title so early and asserts that it must have been the Yabghu of Yângi-kânt and Jand who aided the Sûmûnids. His stress on dating is a valid point, and it is also significant that Shâh-Malik's kunya "Abû'l-Fawaris" points to Sûmûnid connections, for this was a favourite name of the later Amîrs. 71 At whatever date the assumption by Arslan Isrâ'îl of the old Turkish title may have taken place, it was an act of defiance towards the original Yabghu, for it implied headship of the whole
Oghuz people. It is possible that the Qarakhanids prompted this act as an display of hostility towards the Sāmānids' ally, the Oghuz Yabghu, especially as the Oghuz rulers of Yāngi-kānt and Jand continued to be bitter enemies of the Qarakhanids as well as/the Seljuqs, and after the fall of the Sāmānids, they transferred their alliance to the Qarakhanids' enemies, the Ghaznavids.

What impelled the Seljuqs and their followers to move southwards from Jand and seek pastures in the neighbourhood of Bukhārā? The region was, of course, politically troubled: two old-established dynasties, the Sāmānids and the Afrīghid Khwārizmshāhs, had recently collapsed and two new ones, the Qarakhanids and the Ghaznavids, had arisen to fill the vacuum of power. There were numerous opportunities for Turkish tribesmen to find employment as military auxiliaries or as frontier guards. Economic factors may also have been involved. Several sources on the history of Central Asia speak of lack of pastures there and overcrowding among its populations. ŠAuffī, and following him, Murvazī, say that the Qūn, who seem to have been a Turkish people living with the Qayyī tribe (not to be confused with the Qayyīgh tribe of the Oghuz) in Mongolia, came westwards because of pressure on pasture grounds. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī, and following him, Rāwandī, specifically say of the Seljuqs that "these noble ones left Turkestan for the province of Transoxania on account of the large number of families and the shortage of pastures", and Jamāl Qarshī confirms that this took place because of overpopulation (li-tazāhūmihim ashāliyāhā).
It may well be that this was one of the motives impelling the Seljuqs to move southwards. Disputes over living-space were not infrequent in the steppes; these often ended either with a bloody struggle, after which the winners took over the losers' pastures, or else with an irruption into the settled lands which thereby served as a safety-valve. We know that the Seljuqs and their followers were in a wretched physical and material condition whilst they were spreading into Ghaznavid Khurasan. But the arguments of climatic change, increased dessication, overpopulation and economic pressure have often been put forward as facile explanations for complex population movements, and it is safest to treat the economic motive behind the Seljuq invasions as only one amongst several.

One probable factor in the migrations of the Oghuz people at this time was pressure from the Qipchaq and the associated tribe of the Qanghīf. The Qipchaq were an old people who arose from the Kimšk of the Irtysh basin. Gardīzī describes them as one of the seven constituent tribes of the Kimšk, but his information must have been quite old, for Ibn Khurdādbeh in the 9th century gives them as a separate people, the Khifshākh. On the other hand, the Hudūd al-Ṣulam says that although the Khifshākh had separated from the Kimšk, their ruler (malik) still acted as deputy for the Kimšk. 73 The geographers of the 10th century mention that the Oghuz and Kimšk harried the northern frontiers of Transoxania; by the next century, the name "Kimšk" has disappeared from use, but Baihaqī says that the Qipchaq were harrying the confines of Khwārizm at Masqūd of Ghazna's accession (1030). 74 Undoubtedly, important
ethnic movements were taking place at this time in the western steppes, leading to the occupation of South Russia by the Polovtsi or Comans and transforming the name of these western steppes from the older title "Oghuz steppe" to that of "Qipchaq steppe". Pritsak plausibly conjectures that since "Shāh Malik fled after the Seljuq occupation of Khwārizm in 1044 southwards into eastern Persia and not back to Yūngi-kānt, the lower Syr Darya had by then passed out of Oghuz into Qipchaq hands. 75

In the first three decades of the 11th century, the Seljuq family lived as condottieri on the Islamic frontiers, giving their services to whoever would promise them plunder and pastureland for their followers. Arslan Isrā'īl married a daughter of the Qarakhanid ruler of Bukhārā, ʿAlītigin b. Bughra Khan Hārūn, and eventually, the sons of Mīkāʾīl, Abū Tālib Tughrī Beg Muḥammad and Abū Suleimān Chaghri Beg Dāʿūd, joined him in ʿAlītigin's service and settled on pastures at Nūr-Bukhārā or Nakhsbāb. 76 Towards the end of the second decade of the century, in 1018 or 1021, a long-distance foray of the Turkmens under Chaghri Beg into Armenia and Azerbaijan is recorded by the historians (Mīrkhwānī amongst the Islamic ones and Barhebræus, Matthew of Edessa and Vartan amongst the Syrian and Armenian ones). Kafesoğlu has devoted a special study to this expedition and has asserted its historicity as an exploratory, preparatory raid; but Cahen thinks that the historians' reports must refer to the raids made some ten years later and that some chronological confusion has occurred. 77
There was no unified direction amongst the Turkmens as a whole, and no coherent policy; sections of them now alternated between the service of the Qarakhanids and of the Ghaznavids. When in 1025 Mahmūd allied with the eastern Qarakhanid ruler Qādir Khan Yūsuf of Kūshghar against the latter's brother and rival ʿAlītīgin, ʿAlītīgin was temporarily driven out of Soghḍā and his Turkmen auxiliaries were also compelled to move. The Sultan felt that these Turkmens were a potential danger, so Arslan Isrāʾīl was captured and jailed in India for the rest of his life. His nephews Tughrī and Chaghī did not at this stage have sufficient prestige – their titles of "Beg" imply no special primacy – further to impose the rule of their family over the Turkmens. Arslan Isrāʾīl's former followers then asked Mahmūd for permission to settle on the northern borders of Khurasan and act as guards there, saying that they were suffering from the oppression of their Amīrs. The Sultan hoped to imitate ʿAlītīgin and use them as auxiliaries, and he allowed 4000 families of them, together with their baggage, sheep, camels, horses and mules, to cross the Oxus and settle near Farāwa, Sarakhs and Abīward.

Deprived of Arslan Isrāʾīl's leadership, they degenerated into a complete rabble. Various minor chieftains led sections of them, but there was no unified direction. They plundered the settled lands of northern Khurasan and their flocks were a menace to agriculture there (see below, Part V, 502-5). In 1027 the people of Nasrā and Abīward complained of these depredations to the Sultan, and punitive measures were taken, first by the governor of Tūs, the
A crushing defeat was inflicted on the Turkmens, who now scattered far and wide, some back into the Dehistan steppe and the Balkhān-Kūh hills, others westwards into Persia, where some of them found employment with local rulers. It was these whom Ibn Kākūya of Isfahān (see above, Part I, 166) on more than one occasion enrolled into his service. They now became a cause of chronic unrest in the Ray and Jībīl provinces. Mas'ūd enlisted some of them under their leader Yaghmur at Ray in 1029 and brought them eastwards with him. They were then placed under one of his own slave commanders and used for an expedition to Mākran, but they were never a reliable element. Yaghmur's followers continued to raid Khurasan from the Balkhān-Kūh hills; and in 1033 the Ghaznavid commander Tāq-Farrāsh executed fifty of their chiefs, including Yaghmur. He hoped thereby to clip their wings, but in fact he merely added the motive of vengeance to the violence of the remaining Turkmens.

These Turkmens are the "Qārāqī" ones familiar from Baihaqī and Ibn al-Athīr, so-called because of this penetration of theirs into western Persia or "Qārāqī Ajamī. From Baihaqī and Ibn al-Athīr we learn the names of some of their leaders: Yaghmur (who seems to have held a certain primacy), Būqā (Bogha), Gōktash, Qızīl, Mangūr and (?) Būq-oğlulu (Mūkrimin Halil Yīn aç, Anadolu' nun fetih, Istanbul 1944, 37, reads "Anasf-oğlulu"). But it is clear that the "Qārāqī" Turkmens were composed largely of independent bands. In general, they remained separate from those bands which the Seljuq family led.
and there was hostility rather than solidarity between the two groups. The amirs of whose tyranny the "Cîrâqîs" complained may have been members of the Seljuq family attempting to impose their authority. In their letter of 1035 to the governor of Khurasan Sûrî, the Seljuq leaders Mûsâ Yabghu, Tughrîl and Chaghîrî promised that if the Sultan would let them settle at Nasî and Farâwa, they would act as guards against fresh Turkmen incursions from Balkhân- Kûh, Dehîstân and Khwârizm, and would inflict punishment on the "Cîrâqî" Turkmen.

Meanwhile, there remained in the Bukhârâ area Tughrîl, Chaghîrî and Mûsâ Yabghu (this title, and the nominal headship of the Seljuq family, seems to have passed to Mûsâ by seniority after Arslan and the killing of Yusuf b. Mûsâ b. Seljuq by CAlîtîgîn Isrâ'îl's death in imprisonment). In practice, Tughrîl and Chaghîrî were the directing brains behind the Seljuq bands' military adventures. Concerning the composition of these bands, it is likely that the Seljuq leaders' successes attracted additional groups of Oghuz, and probably elements of other tribes, from the surrounding steppes. The Qınıq begin to drop out of mention, but other Oghuz tribes come into prominence: the İvâ, the Dûgâr, the Salghur and the Avshar. All four of these appear in Kâshghârî's list of the tribes of the Oghuz (as İvâ, Tugar, Salghur and Afsâr), and they were to play important rôles in the later history of the Seljuqs and their Atabegs: the Artuqids arose from the Dûgâr tribe, the leaders of the Salghur founded during the 12th century a dynasty of their own in Fârs and the Qaramanoghullar of central Anatolia probably arose from
the Avshar. 82

A group within the Turkmen following of Tughrīl, Chaghrī and Mūsā Yabghu which has recently attracted the attention of Minorsky and Cahen was that of the Yānāliyān/Ināliyān. The three leaders crossed the Oxus in 1035 with 10,000 riders and with another group of Turkmens from Khwārizm who had no mounts and who had to go on foot, and made for Merv and Nasrā. According to Baihaqī, the riders comprised both Seljūqīyān and Yānāliyān. 83 The latter group were led by Ibrāhīm Īnāl, whom the sources all take to be Tughrīl's uterine half-brother, but whom Cahen thinks was probably a son of the Yabghu Yūsuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq. What is certain is that these Yānāliyān were not a separate tribal group; no such tribe is given in Kāshgharī. But there is the well-known Turkish title of Īnāl/yīnāl, which is found as far back as the Ṭonyuquq inscription. The Mafṣūḥ al-Culum interprets yīnāl as "the wali-Qahd of the Yabghu or of any Turkish ruler", and Kāshgharī defines it as "son of a princess or vassal". We know that it was used among the Oghuz, for Ibn Faqlān met the Yīnāl es-qāghīr, who was one of their military commanders. 84 Minorsky concludes that among the Seljuqs, the family of the Yīnāl had a special place and retained hereditary rights, so that their retinue and following had a separate, semi-independent existence; possibly the Qīnīf had been ruled by Yīnāls. In this way, the later pretensions of Ibrāhīm Īnāl, which were to lead in 1052 to his execution, become more explicable as the attempted assertion of old tribal rights. 85
Notes to Part IV

Chapter 1

1. cf. the words attributed to Alp Aralán: "I have often pointed out that we are in this land strangers, and have conquered this country by force [alone]" (SN, ch. XLII, 163).

2. see for example, Nöldeke, Das iranische Nationalepos², 40-1, and O.E. von Grunebaum, "Firdausí's concept of history", in Islam, Essays in the nature and growth of a cultural tradition, 168-84.


5. Iqṭ., 245; I Hauq.,² 419; Masqūdī, Murūj, III, 254, V, 302; Budūd, 111.


8. Marsh., 19-20, tr. 16-17; Frye and Sayīf, "Turks in the Middle East before the Saljuqs", 202; Kāshgharī, quoted in Togan, Biruq, 20.


11. cf. M.C. Inostrancev, "Note sur un point de l'histoire ancienne du Khārezm", JA, 10th Ser., XV, 1910, 141-5; Togan, Reisebericht, Exc. § 76a, 217-20; idem, The Khorezmians and their civilisation, preface to facsimile edn. of Zamakhsharī's Muqaddimāt al-adab, Istanbul 1951, 21-2. Among other things, Togan notes the Muslim colonists called Khwāliq amongst the Pechenegs on the Danube, mentioned by al-Bakīrī; Muslim/Jewish colonists in Hungary called Ḫāzīya; and the name Busurman or Musurman applied to Khwārizmian colonists among the Volga Bulghars, which has left traces in some eastern Russian place-names.

12. the goods appreciated by the nomads are illustrated by the presents which Ibn Faḍlān's embassy gave to the Oghuz through whose territory they passed: pepper, nuts, millet, raisins, robes of honour and leather slippers, with a special present for their military leader, the Šūbashī, which included three mithqāls of musk (Reisebericht, § 34, text 15-16, tr. 28-30.


Chapter 2

19. V. Thomsen, "Alttürkische Inschriften aus der Mongolei", *ZDMG*, LXXVII, 1924, 140, etc. For general surveys, see Barthold's articles in EI 1 "Ghuzz", "Toghuşghuz" and "Turks. A. 1. Historical and ethnographical survey".

20. Hudūd, 94.

21. whether the Toghuş-Oghuz are to be identified with the Uighur or not has much exercised scholars; for a résumé of views, see Grousset, *L'empire des steppes*, 162–3, n. 2. On the connection of the names of the two peoples, see Marquart, *Über das Volkstum der Komanen*, 37, 200–1; he proposes an etymology for "Oghuz" from ʿog "arrow", and this has recently been re-affirmed by Pritsak, "Titulaturen und Stammesnamen der Alttürkischen Völker", *UAJP*, XXIV, 1952, 59, but cf. J. Benzing in *ZDMG*, CII, 1952, 410.

22. Grousset, *op. cit.*, 161–2; Pritsak, "Von den Karluk zu den Kara-chaniden", *ZDMG*, CI, 1951, 274; idem, "Der Untergang des Reiches des Öğuzischen Yabgu", Fuad Köprülü *armaganı*, Istanbul 1953,
403. Al-Khwārizmi, ʿUṣūl al-Balqūs, 120, says that only the two "kings" of the Oghuz and Qarluq held the title al-jabbūya, i.e. the two commanders of the wings of the army.

23. Pritsak, "Titulaturen und Stammeshamen", 51-5, notes that old tribal names sometimes reappear in humbler circumstances and remote from their original homes, as names transferred to other groups or else as place-names where sections of a formerly-united tribe have settled, and quotes examples of historic names like "Qītay", "Qīpchaq" and "Tatar" appearing amongst sections of modern Altaic peoples.

24. cf. S.P. Tolstov, Auf den Spuren der altchoresmisichen Kultur, Berlin 1953, 264-5; he considers the Dūgār and Yazghīr from Kāshghari's list to be splinters of Indo-European peoples of the Syr Darya and Aral basins, and the Bayat, Bāyundur and Qaiqah to be of Mongol origin, brought westwards by the Huns and Turks.

25. Tabari, III, 1044; Balādhurī, Cairo 1959, 420; IA, XI, 116-117, under 548 A.H.

26. Marquart, Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge, 80-1 (who here accepts the equation of the Toghuq-Oghuz with the Uighur); G. Ferrand, Relations de voyages et textes géographiques relatifs à l'Extrême-Orient, Paris 1913-14, I, 213-14. On Abū Dulaf's reputation for romancing, see Minorsky, Abū Dulaf Mas'ar ibn Muhallih's travels in Iran (c. 950 A.D.), introd.

27. Masʿūdī, Tanbih, ed. de Goeje, 60-2, 180-1, tr. de Vaux, 90, 92-3, 245, and Marqūṭ, Streifzüge, 337-41, cf. 63; idem, Komanen, 25-7; Barthold, Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale, 81-2; Togan, Girig, 137.

28. Marqūṭ, I, 212; I Ḫauq, 512; Ḫudūd, 122; Marquart, Streifzüge, 339. Abū Dulaf says that the Oghuz had a town built from stone, wood and reeds; such materials would be readily available on the
lower Syr Darya, and it must be Yängi-kêt which is meant (Ferrand, op. cit., I, 213).


32. Tolstov, Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur, 60-9, 228-30, 264-6. Tolstov has also written a special article on the cities of the Oghuz in Sovetskaya Etnografiya, 1947, III, 55-102.

33. it should not, however, be assumed from this that in every age and in every place pastoral nomadism must be placed lower in the scale of social evolution than agriculture and sedentary life; at certain times in Central Asia there have been nomadic cultures clearly superior to contemporary settled ones. The flaws in several of the accepted views about nomadism in Central Asia are shown up by Lattimore, op. cit., 1-20; see also Toynbee's remarks on nomadism, A study of history, III, 7-22.

34. this has been edited, translated and annotated by Togan as Ibn Faqlän's Reisebericht, and also by I.Y. Kratchkovsky, Moscow 1939.

35. Togan, op. cit., §§ 20-4, 27, 30, text 10-14; tr. 19-27.

36. ibid., §§ 20, 28, 31, text 10, 13-15; tr. 20, 25-3. Ibn Faqlän does not actually use the term balbal, but he is clearly referring to this kind of funerary monument, on which see Kotwicz, "Les tombaux dits « kereksur » en Mongolie", RO, VI, 1928, 1-11, and idem, "Contributions à l'histoire d'Asie Centrale. IV Origine du mot bal-bal", RO, XV, 1939-49, 190-3.

37. Thomsen, ZDG, 1924, 131, 146, cf. Barthold, Histoire des Turcs, 12; TH, tr. II, 1107-9. For instances of these beliefs among modern Turkic peoples, see Abdulkadir İnan, "Türklerde su

39. *Baḥrān*, 628; IA, X, 24. This astrologer of the Seljuqs may, however, have been an Iranian who had attached himself to the Turkmen. He is further mentioned in IA, IX, 328, as having given the word for the engagement which led to the defeat of the Ghaznavid general Sūbashī near Sarakhs in 1037: "[Chaghri Beg] Dāʾūd had an astrologer called as-Šaumaʾī. He ordered Dāʾūd to give battle, guaranteeing him the victory and swearing that if he were mistaken, his life could be forfeit".

40. *Reisebericht*, § 33, text 15, tr. 28. On the title Yābgū, which Keshgārī says belongs to the leader just below the Qaghan and which the *Mujmal at-tawārīkh*, 421, gives as the title of the ruler of the Oghuz, see Marquart, *Wehrot und Arang*, 143 n. 3, 147 n. 3; Togan, *Reisebericht*, Exc. § 33a, 140-1; Pritsak, "Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden", 273-4, 277; Narsb., tr. Frye 107-3, with further references. On the name Kūltūrkin and the element kūl in Turkish onomastic, see Kotwicz, "Contributions à l'histoire d’Asie Centrale", II: La signification du titre Kūltūrkin, III: Titres Ėrkin et Ŗgin, 185-90; Pritsak, op. cit.; 284; Frye, op. cit., 114.

for the title **Yughrush**, which Keshghari says equals wazir (cf. M.F. Köprülü, "Zur Kenntnis der alttürkischen Titulatur", KCSA, Ergänzungsband, 1938, 337-41)?.


**Chapter 3**


45. there seem to be clear traces of shamanistic practices in certain early Sūfī orders, especially that one founded by Aḥmad Yasevī, a shaikh from Sairam, in the 12th century; it was the earliest Turkish order, and played a prominent rôle in evangelising the Turks beyond the Syr Darya (Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, *Turk edebiyatında ilk mutasavvflar*, Istanbul 1919, Fr. résumé by L. Bouvat, **REI**, XLIII, 1921, 239 ff.; *idem*, *Influence du shamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans*, Istanbul 1929, 6 ff.; Fahir iz, EI² Art. "Aḥmad Yasawi".

46. the turbaned merchant became particularly identified in Central Asia with Islamic religion and culture; see the anecdote about Chinggis Khan and the turban in **Jūjānī**, TN, tr. II, 973-5.

48. Togan's conjecture that the Volga Bulghars retained a form of the old Turkish script (*Reisebericht*, Exc. § 72a, 193-6) is unlikely ever to be proved unless by the findings of archaeology.

49. the Oghuz' ignorance of the Uighur alphabet is said by Barthold (*Histoire des Turcs*, 85-6) to be the cause of many of the differences between the western and eastern Turkish orthographies of the Arabic script.


52. Mas'ūdī, *Tabībīh*, 62, tr. 97; on the problem of the Usboi channel, see Tolstov, *op. cit.*, 318 ff., and Spuler, EI 2 Art. "Amū-Daryā"


55. cf. Togan, *Reisebericht*, Exc. § 28a, 135-6. He notes that Ibn Faqlān has nothing to say about Christianity among the Oghuz, and connects Qazwīnī's report with a line of verse in which the Balkhān Kūh Turkmens expelled from Fārāb by the Ghaznavids are called al-Quzz an-Nāṣīrī. This must be contemptuous, or at best, refer only to a small section of the Oghuz.

56. Dunlop, *op. cit.*, 260-1, favours Jewish influences here. But Biblical names had long been popular in Central Asia. Cf. the names of the four sons of Asad, founder of the Sāmānid dynasty's fortunes at the beginning of the 9th century: they were called Nūh, Ahmad, Yaḥyā and Ilyās. Ahmad's seven sons were in turn called Naqr, Abū Yūsuf Yaḥyā, Abū Zakariyā', Yaḥyā, Abū'l-Ashāṭh Asad, Ismā'īl, Isḥāq and Abū Ghānim Ḥumāid (IA, VII, 192-3).

58. for an explanation of this designation of the Qerluq as "Turkmens", see Barthold, Histoire des Turcs, 62.

59. idem, EI¹ Art. "Turkomans".


Chapter 4

63. Ẓahr ad-Dīn Nīshāpurī, Seljūq-nāma, 10, 16; al-Ḥusainī, Akhbār ad-dawlāt as-Seljūqiyya, 3. The Qūnīq are also listed by Rashīd ad-Dīn as one of the twenty-four clans of the Oghuz (Houtsma, "Die Chuzussenstämme", W2KM, II, 1888, 226); on this clan see Cahen, "Les tribus turques d'Asie occidentale pendant la période Seljukide", W2KM, LI, 1948-52, 179-80, and Barthold, EI¹ Art. "Turks. A. 1. Historical and ethnographical survey". The transcription "Seljuq" has been adopted as being the con-
ventional one of European orientalism from the traditional Islamic spelling سلجق . This is in fact the earliest Islamic spelling, contemporaneous with the appearance of the Seljuqs in the Middle East, e.g. by Gard., Bih. and the Ts. But controversy has raged about the quality of the vowels in "Seljuq". By the conventions which later arose, a spelling should give سلجق or Salchuq. Barthold objected that the form "Seljuq" violated the rules of vowel harmony (Turkestan, 257 n. 1; Histoire des Turcs, 80). He suggested سلجک on the basis of Kāshgharī's entry: سلجک: اسم словيد السلايين وكان يسمى سلجک سويدي (ed. Kilisli Rif'at Bey, I, 397), and on the basis of the spelling سلجق in the Kitāb-i Dede Qorqu (transcribed by R. Rossi in his edn., 122, 144-5, etc. as سلجک). Pelliot followed Barthold, and wrote, "Si je donnerais une transcription scientifique, je parlerais des سلجک" (Œuvres posthumes, II, 176-7). L. Rásonyi has devoted an article to the question ("Selqu adInf mengeine dair"? Belleten, III, 1939, 377-84). He too concludes that, because of his known care for phonetic differences, Kāshgharī's inclusion of the word in the class of palatalised words, i.e. with front vowels, is significant, and quotes examples of the use of the form سلجک by the early Ottomans. Nevertheless, the spelling سلجق is by far the most-attested in the Islamic world, and it seems dangerous wholly to dismiss it. The crucial factor is the derivation of the name, as yet unexplained. Rásonyi suggests an origin in perhaps a common noun or a place name. A likely possibility is an origin from the verb salmak (صلماك) "attack, charge forward" > salchuq "dashing, charging"; K.H. Menges has come down in favour of this, attributing the varying spellings in Arabic script to variable eastern Turkish orthography (JNES, X, 1951, 268 n. 2).

65. the interpretation of the letters سـعـو has caused comment. The vocalisation "Bîghû" or "Paighû" is so frequent in Muslim sources that several scholars have suggested, rightly, it seems, that we have here a name quite distinct from that of the title Yabghu, that of Bîghu, "falcon", a totemistic personal name (Marquart, Komaneı, 42-3 n. 5; Palliot, "Notes sur le 'Turkestan' de M. W. Barthold", TP, XXVII, 1930, 16; Pritsak, op. cit., 406-7.

66. al-’Usainî, Akhbâr, 1-2; IA, IX, 321-2, tr. in Marquart, Komaneı, 42-4; Barhebr., tr. 195-6; Mîrkhw., IV, 96-7; Cahen, "Le Malik-Nameh", 42-4; Pritsak, op. cit., 405.

67. Ibn Yassûl, Târîf al-Atrak, Arabic text 49, Turkish tr. 265; Barhebr., 195.


69. Utbi, I, 176; IA, IX, 322; Turkestan, 260.

70. Gard., 64, cf. Utbi, I, 335-6, who says that the Oghuz had a traditional bias towards the Sâmînids: lahun sâghw’iîd-daulat as-Sâmîniyya.


72. Aufl, Jawâmic al-hikâyât, text and tr. of relevant part in Marquart, Komaneı, 40-1; Marvazi on China, the Turks and India, text 18, tr. 29-30; Zahîr ad-Dîn Mîshâpirî, Seljûq-nâme, 10; Rûwandî, 86; Jamâl Qarshî, Bulhagät as-gurîh, in Barthold,


75. The forms "Tughrāl" and "Chaghārā" have been used as approximating to the spellings Tūghrāl and Chāghārā commonly found in the sources, but the correct forms may well be Tukhrul and Chaghur/Chaqlr (al-Tabari always spells J.c.r = Chaqlr). Both words are names of falcons.

76. I. Kafesoglu, "Doğu Anadolu'ya ilk Selçuklu akının (1015-21) ve tarihi önemiyeti", Koprülü armaganı, 259-74; Cahen, "Le Malik-Nameh", 50-1; idem, "À propos de quelques articles", 275-9.

77. Gard., 64-5; Bundārī, 5; Zahir ad-Dīn Mīshāpūrī, 13-14; Rūwandī, 88-9; Sūrđa, 19-30; al-Ṭusānī, 3-4; IA, IX, 266, 323; TN, tr. I, 85-7, 118-30; Shadīndkā, Haṣma al-ansāṭ, ff. 176b-177a (an especially full account of Arsalan Iṣrā'īl's capture); Mīrḵw., IV, 99, 104; Nazim, Sultan Māhmūd, 63-4.

78. Gard., 89-90; Baih., 68-9, 244, 266, 372, 397, 399, 445, 448, 521; IA, IX, 266 ff., 324; Cahen, "Le Malik-Nameh", 56-7; Nazim, op. cit., 64-6.

79. Baish., 68, 244, 266, 445, 521; IA, IX, 267.

80. Baish., 470-1. Joint action of Selçüqīyān and Cīrāqīyān is, however, mentioned in 1036 (Baish., 497).

83. Bali., 470.

84. Thomsen, KDAG, 1924, 167; Mafātiḥ al-Sulūm, 120; Brockelmann, Mitteltürkischer Wortschatz nach Mahmūd al-Kāšgharī, Budapest-Leipzig 1928, quoted by Sauvaget, "Noms et surnoms de Mamelouks", 40; Togan, Reisebericht, § 28, text 13, tr. 25-6. The Mujmal at-tawārīkh, 421, says that Niyalitigīn (sc. Inaltigīn) is the title of the king of ٣٠٨ا٣٠٨١, but clearly, this name is hopelessly corrupt.

Part V

The ascendency of the Turkmens in Khurasan
Chapter One

Introductory

The gradual ascendancy of the Turkmens falls within the reign of Mas'ud b. Ma'bud (421-32/1030-40). The military machine with which the Sultan attempted to stem the Seljuk advance has been described in Part II. Some of the strategic considerations involved will now be considered. It is not the aim here to construct a detailed narrative of military events in Khurasan, although there is ample material for it in the Ghaznavid sources of Gardizi and Baihaqi on one side and the pro-Seljuk sources which draw on the Malik-nama on the other. Baihaqi's account can conveniently be read in A. de Biberstein-Kazimirsky's résumé appended to his edition of the Divan of Manuchihr. The actual events will only be dealt with here in as much as they form a necessary background to the strategies and policies of the two sides. Finally, the first Seljuk occupation of Nishapur in 1038-9 will be analysed in detail.
Chapter Two

Sultan Mas'ud: the man

The military machine described in Part II was founded by Sebük Tegin and perfected by Maḥmūd during an active career of over forty years. ¹ Maḥmūd inherited this machine, with a reputation of his own already forged in many battles. Maḥmūd took the two brothers Mas'ud and Muḥammad on his campaign of 1011 against the Ghurī chieftain Muḥammad b. Sūrī when they were both fourteen years old. He again took Mas'ud with him in 1015 when Ghūr was invaded from Bust and Zamīndāwar and the region of Khwābīn attacked. The "lion-hearted youth" distinguished himself as an intrepid cavalryman and archer; a single arrow of his killed the commander of a tower whose defenders had been causing the Muslims much trouble, thereby demoralising the pagan Ghūrīs and driving them to surrender. Because of this and similar deeds, Maḥmūd next year made him wali-ṣahd, "for he saw and realised that when he departed from this
mansion of false reality, this mighty house - may it always endure - would not be able to stand without him". At the same time, the Sultan made Masqūd governor of Herat, although he did not take up this post till 408/1017-18. Since Herat was one of the great cities of Khurasan and a key defence point, the office was commensurate with his position as heir. It was whilst he was governor of Herat that his father in 1020 deputed him to invade Ghūr from the north-western side.

The close of Maḥmūd's life found Masqūd in the far west of the empire. On the conquest of Ray and Jībīl from Majd ad-Daula in 1029, the Sultan left the further pacification of this region to his son. Masqūd campaigned vigorously against the Musāfirids in Qaswīn and Dailam and against Ibn Kākūya in Isfahān and Hamadān, and later asserted that but for his father's death, he would have carved a way through to Syria and Egypt.

Already there had been one rift between Maḥmūd and his son, when Masqūd had fallen from grace and had been temporarily exiled from Herat to Multan. He had remained wāli-jahd, but had never regained his father's full trust. Now, at the end of the Sultan's life, relations again deteriorated. Prince Muḥammad's partisans were active at court pushing his interests and slandering Masqūd, and Maḥmūd's powers of judgement were beginning to fail; advancing age, illness and the effects of a lifetime of furious activity were now telling. Maḥmūd accordingly transferred the succession to Muḥammad. Masqūd was at this point in distant Ray, and he later
alleged that he had been deliberately left there with a weak force so that he would not be able to achieve any spectacular successes (in reality, it seems unlikely that Mahmūd would have hazarded his recent conquests merely to spite his son). It seems that the Sultan was aware of the disparity in military experience and skill between his sons, and realised that in a struggle for power, Mas'ūd's hand would be the stronger one. According to Jūzjānī, Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān showed bewilderment at his master's preferring Muḥammad, but Mahmūd had replied, "I am aware that in every respect Mas'ūd excels Muḥammad, and that after my time the sovereignty will fall into the possession of Mas'ūd; and I use so much ceremony now that this poor Muḥammad may during my lifetime experience a little honour and gratification, which, after I am gone, will not be left to him".

When the Sultan died, Muḥammad succeeded in Ghazna according to his father's will. He rejected the idea of a division of power with his brother, himself to have Khurasan, Ghazna and India, and Mas'ūd to have the new conquests in the west and the title of Sultan. But Mas'ūd progressed triumphally eastwards to Nishapur, and at the end of Ramaḍān 421/1030, the army of Ghazna deposed Muḥammad at Tīgīn-Ūbūd when news arrived that the army of Khurasan had proclaimed Mas'ūd Sultan. Even before this, a part of the army of Ghazna had been inclined towards Mas'ūd because of his military reputation.

It has been necessary to sketch Mas'ūd's early career and training, for, despite the fact that Mahmūd was fortunate in coming forward when there was a power vacuum in eastern Islam through the
collapse of the Samanids and the weakening of the Buyids, the empire was basically dependent on the military leadership of its Sultan. The empire as Mahmud left it could only be kept going by a military genius of equal vigour, for it lacked as yet an adequate infrastructure of civilian administration to ensure continuity and stability. Muhammad's first Sultanate (he was again briefly raised to the throne by the rebels who in 432/1041 murdered Mas'ud) broke down because the other members of the Ghaznavid family, such as the Amir Yusuf b. Sebuktigin and Mahmud's sister Hurra-yi Khuttalif, and the great Turkish slave commanders realised that Muhammad would never be able to hold the empire together. They feared that the army would become run down and that there would be no steady flow of booty for the state treasury and for the soldiers themselves. These factors overrode Mahmud's dying wishes.

Whilever Mahmud directed the Ghaznavid war machine, it went almost of its own momentum, but after his death, the political and military situation became more difficult than it had ever been in his own lifetime. Mas'ud took over the empire at its apogee, and had to hold together territories stretching from the Ganges to the Aral Sea and western Persia which had no unifying bond but the personal one. Since therefore the personal factor is so important here, we must now consider how Mas'ud's own character and capabilities affected the running of the empire and its defence. Barthold's verdict on Mas'ud is severe:

"He inherited only his father's faults. Mas'ud held the same
high opinion of his power as Maḥmūd, and like him wished to decide everything according to his own judgement, but lacking his father's talents came to disastrous decisions, which he obstinately maintained, paying no heed to the advice of men of experience. The tales of Masʿūd's prowess in the chase and in battle show that he was distinguished by physical bravery, but all the more striking is his complete lack of moral courage; in the hour of misfortune he showed himself more pusillanimous than a woman. In cupidity he yielded nothing to Maḥmūd, and the overburdening of the inhabitants by forced levies was carried in his time to an extreme degree. That he was physically brave is undeniable. At Dandānqān he fought desperately with sword, lance and mace, when most of his retainers had fled: "if on that day a thousand choice cavalrymen had stood by him and aided him, he would have successfully finished that affair; but they did not aid him". Yet Barthold is right: the finer, moral element which raises bravado from the level of an instinct to true nobility of character, was lacking. Observers noted a decline in his character and resolution as his reign progressed. Earlier generosity gave way to avarice. Failing to weigh up correctly the relative claims on his attention of India and of Khurasan, he made several wrong strategic appraisals. As Turkmen pressure grew, we get the impression of a man harassed by circumstances and too small for his job. Baiḥaqī noticed a decided change in 1040 after the defeats at Dandānqān and Balkh, when the Sultan's melancholy grew deeper and his officials whispered to each other that he was "not the man he used to be". Masʿūd concealed his decision to abandon Ghazna for India, but it leaked out to his advisers, and he had to defend this
abdicating of responsibility by adding the unfavourable prognostications of his astrologers for a winter campaign in Afghanistan. 

It was fear of his master's growing capriciousness that made the Vizier Ahmad b. 'Abd as-Samad seek a special muwāda when he was appointed in 1049 to accompany Prince Maudūd's army (see above, Part I, 138-9). Masūd's advisers had for long grumbled about his istibdād, the obstinacy of weakness, and had made unfavourable comparisons between him and his father:

"This lord is the reverse of his father in firmness and strength [lit. "liver"]. His father was a man of resolution and perspicacity. If he adopted some unsound policy and said, 'I intend to do so-and-so', his despotic and kingly position made him speak out; and if anyone demonstrated the wise and unwise aspects of this, he flew into a rage and was voluble in insults and abuse. Then when he had reflected over the affair, he eventually came to the right decision. But this lord is of a different stamp; he acts irresponsibly and without reflection".

All this gives an unfavourable picture of Masūd, and we are also influenced by our hindsight, the fact that his father was successful and he was not. Moreover, the differences in personal character were not wholly decisive. It was rather the different circumstances which each of them faced which brought out varying traits of character, for Masūd was presented with problems such as his father had not had to tackle.
Chapter Three

Threats to the stability of Mas'ud's empire

Mahmūd's policy towards the Būyids had been generally one of non-intervention; he had been content with the old Šūrūnid lands in Khurasan and with an assertion of suzerainty over the Ziyārids in the Caspian provinces. He had been unable to resist meddling in a succession dispute among the Būyids of Kirmān in 407/1016-17, but this brought no permanent success, and when later in his reign troubles again arose within the Būyid family there, Mahmūd made no move to interfere. It was the Sultan's view that the weak rule of Majd ad-Daula and his mother Sayyida in Ray rendered that quarter innocuous; if a vigorous man had been ruler there, he used to say, he would have had to keep an army stationed at Nishapur. Sayyida died in 1028, and Majd ad-Daula's ineffectiveness drove him to invite the Sultan in against his own unruly Dīlāmī troops; but when Mahmūd arrived, he deposed the Būyid ruler. Ghaznavid arms then
penetrated into Bailam, Kurdistān and Fārs against other local rulers. Mas'ūd took over these conquests, and had in the city of Ray a fine base for watching western Persia, a rich fiscal source and a population which at least initially seems to have welcomed the prospect of stronger rule from the Ghaznavids (see above, Part I, 179-80).

However, it was not easy to control this region from remote Ghazna or even from Nishapur, and Ibn Kākūya, whom Mas'ūd had subdued in 1029-30 and left tributary in Isfahān, soon showed himself as a tenacious enemy. As soon as Mas'ūd left Ray to claim the throne, Ibn Kākūya threw off Ghaznavid suzerainty. During the next few years he even occupied Ray for a while, but the Ghaznavid governor, Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī, drove him out of his capital Isfahān for two years and seized his minister Avicenna's library of heretical books. 16 But Ibn Kākūya on more than one occasion recruited cavalrymen from the "Irāqī" Turkmens (see above, Part IV, 434-6), and when the Ghaznavids were finally compelled to abandon Ray, it was he who for a time held it. 17 Ibn Kākūya's dynamism and the increasing pressure of the Turkmens in Khurasan combined to squeeze the Ghaznavids out of western and central Persia; it is indeed remarkable that the Sultan's forces were able to defend this salient in the west till as late as the winter of 429/1037. 18

India had been the scene of some of Maḥmūd's greatest triumphs; events like the sack of Somnāth captured the imagination of the Islamic world as few others did. Maḥmūd did his work well in northern India. The great confederations of Indian princes which
had caused him so much trouble had been broken by the end of his reign. The dynasty of some of his most persistent enemies, that of the Hindúshāhī Rājās of Waihand, came to an end in 1026. After the campaigns early in his reign against the Qarmathians of Multan, these heretics did not rise again till Maudūd's reign.

Mahmūd's gains in the Doab and Ganges valley were all held by Mas'ūd, and one fresh success, the capture of the "Virgin Fortress" of Hānsī, some sixty miles north-west of Delhi, was achieved by the Sultan personally in 1037. It was not always easy to control the Ghaznavid forces left in India, for the Sultan could only be there in person sporadically and the concentration in the garrisons of unruly ghāzī elements made for turbulence. For some time after 1033 India was disturbed by the rebellion of the Commander-in-chief there, Ahmad Inaltigin, but this was quelled and the Sultan's authority restored. (see above, Part I, 169).

However, there is a general point to consider here. Mahmūd's successes in India gave the empire a bias in that direction; in some ways, the empire in his time was an institution geared to the exploitation of India. Some indication of the importance which the Ghaznavid family itself attached to this function may be gauged from a letter which Jurra-yī Khuttalī wrote to her nephew Mas'ūd on his father's death; in it she describes Ghazna, with its face towards India, as the heart (wašš) of the empire, Khurasan as next in importance and the rest as subsidiary. It was not surprising that Mas'ūd too should feel drawn towards India, so that he tended
to neglect Khurasan and to minimise the dangers there. His advisers realised fully that if Khurasan and the west were to be defended against the Turkmen, the Sultan would have to give his whole attention to the task, but they found it hard to persuade their obstinate master to agree to this. Without doubt, Mas'ud's refusal to concentrate sufficiently on the Turkmen threat in Khurasan allowed the situation there to get out of hand and enabled the intruders to secure a hold from which they could not in the end be dislodged.

The most serious threat to Mas'ud's empire came from the Turkmen of Central Asia, and here he faced a more difficult task than had his father. Maḥmūd made the Ghaznavids a major Central Asian power in the face of hostility from the Qarakhanids, with whom he had divided the old Sāmānid dominions. An initial entente with them had not lasted long, and in 1006-8 the Ilīg Abū'1-Ḥasan Naṣr b. ʿAlī (d. 403/1012-13) had invaded Khurasan. Thereafter, the Qarakhanid family had been rent by internal discords and the Sultan had been able to take advantage of these and ally first with Abū Naṣr Ṭhumād Toghan Khan (d. 408/1017-18), ruler of the Semirechye and, until the latter years of his life, of Kāshghar, and then with Qadfr Khan Yūsuf (d. 423/1032) of Kāshghar and Khotan.

The alliance with Qadfr Khan, in which a personal meeting at Samarqand and complicated marriage proposals played a part, was directed primarily at the brother of these two last Khans, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan, known as ʿAlī Itigin, who captured Bukhārā in 1020 and maintained himself there and in Samarqand till his death in 425/1034. Whichever he lived, ʿAlī Itigin was the most skilful and resolute of
of the Chaznavids' opponents in Central Asia. His speedy re-establishment in Bukhara and Samarkand after his defeat by the allies Mahmud and Qadfr Khan in 1025-6 probably shows that the mercantile classes of the Soghdian cities found his strong rule and connections with the Turkish steppes favourable to their interests. The riches of these cities enabled him to subsidise Turkish tribesmen like the Seljuq family and to enrol them as allies. Neither Mahmud nor Masud was able to make any decisive impression on Al'tigin's position. After his death, the power of his sons was only broken by a rival branch of the Qarakhanids, the two sons of the Ilig Naqr, Burtigin (the later Tanghach Khan Ibruhin, d. 462/1068) and Muhammed Cain ad-Daula of Uzkend, when Al'tigin's sons had been weakened by the loss of the Seljuqs as auxiliaries. But at Mahmud's death there was something like a state of equilibrium in Transoxania, and Barthold surmised (Turkestan, 285) that the Sultan was not displeased to see Al'tigin's kingdom as a counterpoise to Qadfr Khan's.

Mahmud himself had two footholds to the north of Khurasan, one in Khwarizm and the other on the upper Oxus, comprising the crossing-point of Tirmidh and the regions of Chaghaniyan, Guvadiyan, Wakhsh and Khuttal. He overthrew the native Khwarizmian dynasty of the Ma'munids in 1017 by sheer aggression: his ultimatum to the Khwarizmians caused the murder by his troops of Abul Abbâs Ma'mun and so gave the Sultan a final motive for interfering, for the murdered ruler's wife was Mahmud's own sister Hurra-yi Khuttalî or Hurra-yi Kalji. 27  
The Sultan thus gained Khwarizm proper, with its capitals
of Kath and Gurganj, its rich agriculture and its trade links with the Oghuz steppe, but also outposts along the southern edge of the Qara Qum, including Nasä and the ribat of Farawa (modern Qizil Arvat). These points were to figure prominently in the raids of the Turkmens across the desert. Furthermore, Mahmud could now turn the flank of the Qarakhanids; but in the event, the intervention of the Seljuqs and the generally conciliatory policy followed by Mahmud's governor Altuntash combined to preserve Qalitigin from serious harm.

The upper Oxus provinces had in the Samanid period been ruled by local dynasties, loosely tributary to Bukhara and descended either from the original Iranian lords or from Arab amirs, such as the Al-i Muhtaj in Chaghaniyan and the Abu Daudids in Khuttal. Local dynasties seem to have survived under Ghaznavid suzerainty, although their connections with earlier lines are not clear. According to the Chahar maqala, Fakhr ad-Daula Abu'l-Muqaffar Ahmad b. Muhammad, the patron of Farrukhi, was Amir of Chaghaniyan in Mahmud's time; he was apparently the last of the Al-i Muhtaj. In Mas'ud's time the Wil of Chaghaniyan was the Amir Abu'l-Qasim, a son-in-law of the Sultan. No separate dynasty is mentioned for Khuttal in the early Ghaznavid period, unless the name of Jurra-yi Khuttali be a reminiscence of some marriage connection with a local family there. The importance of these provinces to the Ghaznavids was primarily strategic; they served as footholds for attacks on the Qarakhanids, but they also had some economic and military value to the empire (see above, Part II, 247).
Thus Mas'ud inherited a strong position on the northern borders of his empire. But three new factors arose which combined to undermine this strength and to cause the collapse of the Ghaznavid hold on the Oxus valley and Khurasan. These were firstly, the loss of Khwarizm; secondly, the impact of the Turkmens; and thirdly, the pressure of Biritigin and the “Calid” branch of the Qarakhanids, to use Fritsak’s term.

After the annexation of Khwarizm, Mahmud had installed as governor there his slave general Altuntash, who assumed the traditional, pre-Islamic title of Khwarizmshah. Altuntash had begun his career with Seljuktigin, and throughout his stay in Khwarizm, i.e. until his death in battle in 1032 against Calitigin, remained perfectly loyal to the Sultans. It was really only his faithfulness which enabled them to keep some control over that quarter, for Khwarizm was remote from the core of the Ghaznavid empire and was virtually an island in the surrounding steppes, linked only to the south by the route along the Oxus. The strong-points of Amul-i Shaf and Tirmidh were important in maintaining communication with Khwarizm, and a convenient island at Tirmidh made it possible to bridge the Oxus with boats; but the stretch below Amul was vulnerable to the attacks of Calitigin and later of the Seljuqs, who crossed there and spread across the Kara Qum towards Khurasan.

Altuntash was always aware of his key position, and realised equally that he was a potential target for the Sultans’ jealousy. The steppes were at this time in some turmoil through the westward
movements of Oghuz and Qipchaq peoples (see above, Part IV, 432-3), and the frontiers of Khwārizm felt some pressure. Altuntash recruited Qipchaq, Kujāt and Chaghīrāq tribesmen to keep the rest out, and he also possessed as many as 1500 Turkish ghulūms of his own, a retinue of truly royal dimensions. Tolstov has pointed out that Altuntash, whilst remaining loyal, adopted a policy of his own, identifying himself with the traditional interests of the province, and has suggested that his relationship with the Sultans resembled that of Ma'mūn I b. Muḥammad with the Shāhīds. As soon as he became Sultan, Masʿūd's suspicious nature led him into direct action against the Khwārizmshāh once efforts to lure him back to court at Ghazna had failed. Egged on by his Qāriq, Abū Sahl Zauzanī (see above, Part I, 136-7), Masʿūd suborned the commander of the Kujāt, Manjūq, to assassinate Altuntash, but failed.

Altuntash's son Ḥurrūn took over his father's army when he succeeded him in 1032 as de facto ruler of Khwārizm, although Masʿūd refused to allow him the title of "Khwārizmshāh", and two years later successfully had him murdered by his ghulūms. Not unnaturally, Ḥurrūn's brother Ismāʿīl Khāndūn became the Ghaznavids' bitter foe, especially as during Ḥurrūn's brief reign, a third brother had been killed at the court of Ghazna in mysterious circumstances. The ease with which Khwārizm now fell away from the Ghaznavids showed that the connection of the two had had little firm basis; Khwārizm looked towards the steppes for its livelihood, and its true interests lay in being either an independent political unit or else being
linked with a powerful Central Asian Turkish dynasty which could control the steppes.

So Mas'ūd's policy in Khwarizm ended in total failure. Ismā'īl Khānūdân was eventually driven from his kingdom by the Sultan's ally, Shēh Malik of Jand, but Mas'ūd himself was by then (1041) dead. Even had the Sultan been still alive, his ally's victory would have been for him a hollow one, for the rivalry of Mas'ūd and the sons of Altuntash had allowed the Turkmens to pour southwards and effectively cut off Khwarizm from the rest of the Ghaznavid empire.

The appearance of the Seljuqs in Islamic history and their wrestling of Khurasan from the Ghaznavids are discussed above in Part IV.

Finally, there arose in Mas'ūd's reign threats along the upper Oxus, endangering Balkh, Tūkhāristān and Badakhshān. ʿAlītigin and his sons felt the Ghaznavid bridgehead of Tirmidh as a threat to their security. Moreover, when Mas'ūd came eastwards from Nishapur to claim the throne and expected a struggle with his brother, he foolishly promised Khuttal to ʿAlītigin in exchange for military help. Since Mas'ūd attained power peaceably, this help was not needed, but ʿAlītigin continued to claim his side of the bargain, and the Sultan's advisers soon saw that this encouragement to one of the dynasty's shrewdest enemies had been an error of judgement. In 1034 ʿAlītigin allied with the rebellious Ḥārūn b. Altuntash against Mas'ūd; Ḥārūn was to attack Merv and ʿAlītigin was to march from Samarqand, take Tirmidh and ravage Chaghāniyān. ʿAlītigin's sons
put the plan into effect after his death. A fierce but unsuccessful siege of Tirmidh followed and the Ghaznavid governor of Chaghāniyān, Abū l-Qāsim, was temporarily expelled, but Herūn's murder caused a suspension of hostilities.

A further cause of unrest here were the Kumājīs or Kumarīs, who dwelt in the Buttamān Mts. at the heads of the valleys running down through Chaghāniyān and Khuttal. It was probably ʿAlīTigin who in 1034 stirred up the Kumājīs against the Ghaznavids, when they raided Khuttal, and in 1038 Būritigin collected a force of 3000 from among them and devastated Khuttal and Wakhs. Contemporary sources usually call the Kumājīs "Turks", but they were almost certainly the remnants of some earlier Central Asian people like the Ephthalites or, more probably, the Saka, since Ptolemy mentions a Saka tribe of Kūmōdōi. ʿAlīTigin also stirred up the Turkmens, and as early as 1034 their raiders penetrated to Tirmidh, Quvādhiyān and Tukhār-istān. After Dandānqān, the Seljuqs were able to besiege Balkh for a while. The raiders were attracted into the upper Oxus valleys by the rich pastures there, where their own beasts could forage and where local livestock could be driven away. There was a danger of raids from this quarter reaching the very heart of the empire, for the routes from Tukhāristān through Baghlān, Bāmīyān and across the Chorbānd to the Kabul valley and Ghazna were not difficult. Whether the Turkmens could have held these regions permanently, however, is another matter; the subsequent course of Ghaznavid–Seljuq relations suggests that they could not have held them.
Chapter Four

The vendetta against the Mahmūdiyān

Mas'ūd deliberately deprived himself of a rich fund of wisdom and counsel by repudiating many of his father's experienced officials and commanders. Instead, he surrounded himself with his own partisans, some of whom, like the Ārid Abū Sahl Zanzani, had long supported Mas'ūd whilst his father was still alive, others of whom attached themselves to Mas'ūd when his brother's Sultanate collapsed. In Bajhaqī these are often called the Mas'ūdiyān or Nau-khwāstān, "parvenus", and contrasted with their rivals, the Mahmūdiyān or Pidariyān; the division between the two groups emerges very clearly from his pages.

Once established on the throne, Mas'ūd began systematically to get rid of all those who had opposed or slighted him during his father's lifetime: those who had, so he thought, persuaded Mahmūd to deprive him of the succession, and those who had been prominent in setting up Muhammad as Sultan. Shabānīkāra'I describes succinctly
the ascendancy of the Mas'ūdiyān which now began:

"When Sultan Mas'ūd had been in Herat for a while, a youthful group who knew nothing about the real management of affairs (gheur-i kārēh) and a gang of malevolent ones rose to power. Wherever there was some official or person who had been esteemed by Sultan Maḥmūd, they were unable to tolerate this state of affairs continuing, and succeeded in the end in either jailing them all or driving them away from the court" 42

Only one man, Ǧasānāk, was forthwith executed on a trumped-up charge of religious heresy (see above, Part III, 348-50 ). The assassination of the Khwārizmshāh Altuntash was attempted, but failed. (see above, 465-6 and below, 472-3 ). Several others were removed from their positions and jailed, and the early deaths of some of them shows that their captivity was by no means pleasant. 43

More than anyone else, Ǧasānāk had incurred Mas'ūd's hatred for the contemptuous way with which he had treated him as prince: he had accused him of squandering the wealth of Herat and Balkh when he was governor of Herat, and had set Mushrifs over him. 44

During Muḥammad’s Sultanate, Ǧasānāk had no longer kept the Vizierate, but had kept considerable influence in administrative affairs. On the military side, the chief agent in setting up Muḥammad had been the Chief Ḥājīb Ǧālī b. Il Aralan, called Qarīb or Khwāshāvand from his kin relationship to Sultan Maḥmūd. When the latter had died, Ǧālī Qarīb had secured an ascendency in civil as well as military affairs at Ghazna: "In this last period, all the Sultan's [sc. Muḥammad's] affairs were dealt with by him and he became a universal influence (nā'īb-i kull), so that Viziers, secretaries and deputy
officials were all under his direction”. Cali Qarib was on bad

terms with Hasanak, and soon decided to betray Muhammad and to bring

over the army to his brother’s side. But this switch did not save

him, and shortly afterwards he was arrested, deprived of his ghulams

and his wealth and jailed: Mas'ud assumed that one act of treachery

might well be followed by another.

Mas'ud’s uncle Cali ad-Daula Yusuf b. Sebuktigin had during

the latter years of his brother’s reign been military governor of

Khurasan. When Mahmud had died, he had joined Cali Qarib in pro-

claiming Muhammad Sultan, but had later deserted to Mas'ud. On

his accession, Mas'ud made much of his uncle and appointed him

commander of a punitive expedition to Quqdah, with further instruct-

ions to intervene, if necessary, in the adjacent territory of

Makran. But he also charged Yusuf’s officers to watch over their

master, and his chief deputy and favourite was secretly made a

Mushrif over him “so that he might count Yusuf’s very breaths”.

Mas'ud not only mistrusted his uncle for his former support of

Muhammad, but had also a grudge against him over a projected mar-

riage with one of Yusuf’s daughters which had never materialised.

The mission to Quqdah was largely a ruse to get him away from the

centre of power; when in 1031 Yusuf returned, he was arrested and

jailed, dying in captivity a year later.

These people had been directly involved in Muhammad’s Sultanate,

but Mas'ud’s suspicious nature led him to plot the fall of men who

had had no part in this and who had even promoted his own interests.

In 1031 two of his father’s Turkish generals, Eryaruq, Commander-in-
—chief of the army in India, and As‘ghütiqin Ghâzî, who had succeeded Arslân Jâdhib as commander in Khurasan, were arrested and imprisoned, the latter dying in jail three years later. It was not even that they were clearly of the Ḥā‰Å£u³i³yn and ipso facto suspect to the new Sultan; it was the Ḥâ‰Å£u³i³yn old guard, objecting to the two generals’ arrogance and disrespect, which largely engineered their fall. Eryaruq had been tempted by the resources to hand in India and had been suspected of disloyalty in Mâ‰µu³d’s reign, for he had refused to return from India when ordered to by the Sultan. But As‘ghütiqin had several claims on Mâ‰µu³d’s gratitude. As commander of the army in Khurasan, he had declared for Mâ‰µu³d on his father’s death and had brought over the people of Mî⁹u³apur and the army to his side. He had then become so high in the Sultan’s favour that Mâ‰µu³d had reportedly loved him “just like one of my own brothers”.

Nevertheless, relates Bâhaqi, the intrigues of the Ḥâ‰Å£u³i³yn, resenting As‘ghütiqin’s comparative youth and his overbearingness towards them, accorded with the Sultan’s fears of this over-mighty subject. Both Eryaruq and As‘ghütiqin had large retinues of their own ghulâms and could wield substantial military power, and this determined the Sultan’s decision to overthrow them.

Mâ‰µu³d was emboldened by these successes to move against the Khwâ‰³rîmshâH Altuntash, most powerful and experienced of the provincial governors, and one who had become — for the geographical and political reasons explained above — virtually independent. On Mâ‰µu³d’s death Altuntash had behaved with circumspection. Both
claimants regarded him as a figure embodying impartiality and reasonableness. Mascūd appealed to him for military aid, and Altuntash's advice was one of the factors which persuaded the leaders in Ghazna to go over to Mascūd. He came to attend Sultan Mascūd at Herat and addressed him on the need to cherish old and experienced counsellors. But despite the Sultan's welcome of him as "excellent commander, uncle", Altuntash's fears were aroused by the fall of ḌAli Qarīb and by the insinuations of evil-wishers in the Sultan's entourage, and he hurried back to Khwarizm on the plea that the threat there against the Qipchaq and other Turkmens could not be neglected. Mascūd was forced to hide his suspicions about the "wolf's offspring", as Altuntash's calumniators were calling him, and to blandish him, for his skill and advice in renewing the alliance with Qādir Khan Yusuf against ʿAlītūgin were necessary. Altuntash himself was never taken in by this outward show of friendliness and never returned to the Sultan's court. He was apprised of the Sultan's attempt to have him assassinated and struck first against the traitors involved. It was feared after this that Altuntash would be driven into an open declaration of independence and an alliance with ʿAlītūgin, but he did in fact remain loyal to the Ghaznavids and shortly afterwards died fighting for them. The full effects of the episode were not seen till Altuntash's two sons succeeded him in Khwarizm (see above, 466-7).

Although Mascūd freed Ḍāhir Ahmad b. ʿHasan Maimandi and restored him to his old office of Vizier, thereby being able to draw on Maimandi's
counsel for the remaining three years of Maimandi’s life, the removal of many other able and experienced servants deprived the Sultan of their services at a time when the empire was facing many serious problems. The Masudiyyan who rose to favour were often sycophantic and encouraged their master in dubious courses. Fortunately, an element of continuity and wisdom remained at the core of the bureaucracy in men like Abu Naqr-i Mishkan and the Viziers Maimandi and Ahmad b. Abd as-temps. Beyond the inner circle of officials and advisers, the fiction was always preserved that these plottings and dismissals were never the work of the Sultan himself but always of his “evil counsellors”; but since the Sultan’s word was law, the ultimate responsibility was clearly his. The resultant atmosphere of intrigue and insecurity affected the confidence of those officials and generals who had survived from Mahmud’s reign, so that the Sultan’s istibhad and inferiority to his father in judgement became axiomatic to them. The fall of their masters seems also to have affected the subsequent behaviour of the ghulams. These retainers were normally re-distributed among the Sultan, his family and his generals (see Part II, 235-6), but ghulams formerly belonging to the Amir Yusuf b. Sebuktigin, to Qali Qarib, to Bryarq and to Asignitigin Ghazi are specifically mentioned as being amongst those who deserted to the Seljuqs in Khurasan at an early date.
Chapter Five

The struggle in Khurasan with the Turkmens: political, military and strategic considerations

The Seljuqs and their Turkmen followers filled up the steppes adjoining northern Khurasan vacated by the "OIrāqī" Turkmens, but it was events in Transoxania and Khwārizm which stimulated their movement southwards. They had remained on their pastures near Bukhārā in the employment of ʿAlītīgin, who had attached them to himself "by promises and by subsidies" and who used them as military auxiliaries. The Malik-nāma (in Ibn al-Athīr and Mīr-khwānd) mentions that discords arose between ʿAlītīgin and the Seljuqs after 1029 and eventually caused the movement of the Turkmens from the Bukhārā district. The death in 1034 of ʿAlītīgin and the devolution of power to his two young and inexperienced sons and to their mentor the general Qūnush or Tūnush undoubtedly meant the end of the connection. At Hārūn b. Altuntash's invitation,
they moved into Khwarizm, but in 1035 Sultan Mas'ud procured Harun's murder, Khwarizm became disturbed and the Seljuqs' old enemy, Shah Malik of Jand, gained control of much of Khwarizm. The Seljuqs were of necessity driven southwards into Khurasan. It would be unfair to ascribe this combination of events to Mas'ud's poor diplomacy, but his treatment of Altuntash's sons in Khwarizm lost him that province and created favourable conditions for the expansion of the Seljuqs.

The Sultan was absent in Gurgan during the winter and spring of 1034-5 when in 1035 Shah Malik drove the Turkmens out of Khwarizm. Ten thousand of the Seljuqiyân and Injiliyan crossed the Oxus and made for Merv. Their leaders' intentions were not at this time openly bellicose. The governor of Khurasan, Surî, received a very humble letter from "the slaves the Yabghu, Tughrîl and Bâ'ud, Mawâli of the Commander of the Faithful", mentioning the tribulations which they had endured beyond the Oxus and throwing themselves on the Sultan's protection. They sought the grant of Farawa and Nasâ, promising to guard from there against any further incursions from the steppes and to send a hostage from among their leaders to the court at Ghazna.

The Sultan's civilian advisers suggested a pacific answer, at least until the Seljuqs had openly shown their bad faith - the Turkmens had specifically asked for the intercession of the Vizier Ahmad b. 'Abd as-Samad, with whom they had had previous dealings in Khwarizm - but the Sultan and his generals were bent on destroying
the Seljuqs at the earliest possible moment. The account in the *Malik-nāma*, which however puts the most favourable construction on the Seljuqs' actions, confirms Baihaqī that the Seljuqs had hoped to secure a foothold in Khurasan by peaceful infiltration, but had their proposals rejected by the Sultan: "When this news reached the leaders, they despaired of making a peaceful settlement with Mascūd or of entering his service as auxiliaries. They sent their dependents and wives back to a safe place, started a policy of spoliation against the local people and became busy preparing for warfare". 58

A Ghaznavid punitive expedition led by the general Begtughdī was heavily defeated on the road to Nasā in 1035. 59 So immense a haul of booty and military equipment fell into the nomads' hands that they were amazed at their own victory. The belief in Ghaznavid invincibility, in the inability of lightly-armed bands to defeat a trained, professional army, was still fixed in their minds. They ascribed their victory to God's Will and to their opponents' poor tactics rather than to their own ability: "We were poor, now we have become rich, but Sultan Mascūd is a great king and there is none other like him in Islam. If this has happened to his army on account of bad management and poor leadership, he has many [other] generals and armies, and we must not become over-confident by what has taken place". The Sultan had no option but to grant the Seljuqs Nasā, Farāwa and Dehistān; the pill of reality was only superficially sweetened by the submissive language which the leaders used
towards Mas'ūd. The Yabghu, Tughrī and Chaghri were given patents for these three places. They also received the insignia and dress of governors, a standard, a two-pointed hat, sewn garments in the Persian style, horses and bridles for them, a golden belt in the Turkish style and thirty pieces of uncut cloth, and were to be addressed as dihqāns. It is interesting to note that each one of the three leaders sent his own envoy for the negotiations and was to provide a hostage from his own circle; the Seljuq leaders did not regard themselves as a united body.

The Sultan attempted to divide the Seljuq leaders, in particular, by detaching Mūsā Yabghu, who now appears with the additional title of Inanj (Imānj) Beg, from his nephews Tughrī and Chaghri. Marriage alliances were proposed in an effort to secure some influence over the Seljuqs: a daughter of the Qāmid of Khurasan, Sūrī, for Mūsā Yabghu, a daughter of the Ghānāvīd amīr Ābdūs for Tughrī and another free-born wife for Chaghri. But only Mūsā Yabghu accepted Mas'ūd's presents and was inclined to accept the proffered alliance, for the Seljuqs had by now become suspicious of the Sultan's good faith.

Their deference towards the Sultan was wearing thin. Emboldened by their successes, they made fresh demands on him in the autumn of 1036. They had found the pastures allotted to them on the desert fringes inadequate and now asked for a grant of Merv, Abīward and Sarakhs. Administration was to remain in the hands of the Sultan's existing officials, the Shīb-Dīwān, the qādīs and the Shīb-Barīdās,
but the revenues were to be handed over to the Seljuqs. In return, the Turkmens were to be formally recognised as auxiliaries and promised to serve wherever the Sultan wished. It was impossible for the Sultan thus to hand over these important commercial and strategic centres. The continued possession of Merv enabled some watch to be kept on the approaches to Khwārijā and Transoxania, where Ismā'īl Khāndān b. Altuntash and the sons of Qālitigin constituted hostile elements. Moreover, these bases would bring the nomads within easy distance of the heart of Khurasan and the great cities of Nishapur, Tūs and Herat.

The last piece of evidence we have for the over-estimation of Ghaznavid power by the Turkmens comes from the autumn of 1039 when they were actually in possession of Nishapur and on the brink of gaining the whole province of Khurasan. The three leaders met for a conference at Sarakhs, Tughhrīl coming from Nishapur and Mūsā Yabghu from Merv, and were accompanied by a concentration of tribesmen estimated by Ghaznavid spies at 20,000. A difference of opinion arose. Tughhrīl and the Ināliyān suggested moving on to western Persia and the Byzantine marches, as the "Cūrūq" Turkmens had done, for there was no opposing power there comparable with Mas'ūd's, but only a series of local Dailamī and Kurdish rulers. Chaghhrīl conceded the Sultan's superior resources in wealth and manpower, but pointed out their own advantages in superior mobility; hence, he said, they should stay in Khurasan. The Seljuq leader had put his finger on a crucial point here: when the Ghaznavid armies were defeated,
the attendant losses of material were disastrous, whereas the Oghuz
did not usually take their baggage into battle with them, and if
defeated, could merely withdraw to the desert where they had left
their belongings (see further, below, 484 ff. )

The episode raises the question of leadership among the Seljuq family. Since the Malik-nāma was probably written for Alp Arslan,
we would expect it to be favourable towards his father Chaghri, and
this is generally so. According to the Malik-nāma, Alītigin event-
ually turned against the Seljuqs (see above, 475 ) and tried to
detach Yusuf b. Mūsā b. Seljuq from the other leaders; it was Chaghri
who restrained his brother Tughrifl from action against Yusuf, point-
ing out to him that to split the family was just what Alītigin
wanted. According to Baihaqī, whom we would expect to be impartial
here, the decision of 1039 to stay in Khurasan was Chaghri's, against
the views of Tughrifl and Mūsā Yabghu; on the other hand, Cahen has
concluded that he was a somewhat colourless and politically passive
individual as compared with his brother Tughrifl. The Malik-nāma
cites other instances of Chaghri's percipience and magnanimity:
that he restrained the Turkmens from pursuing the fleeing Ghaznavids
after Dandānqān lest the Seljuq forces be dispersed, and that he
released a thousand of the Ghaznavid officers and notables captured
in battle, providing them each with a horse, clothing and provisions
for a safe return to their own land.

The sources differ on the topic of the plundering of Nishapur
when the Seljuqs first occupied it in 1038–9. According to Baihaqī,
Tughrifl gave special orders to Chaghri and Ibrāhīm Ināl that they
should not oppress the local people. In the source or sources drawn
on by ʿImād ad-Dīn, Ibn al-Athīr and Barhebraeus, Tughrīl forbids
Chaghīrī to plunder the city, threatening to kill himself if his
brother does so, for he has promised the Caliph’s envoy that Nishapur
and the Muslims there would be spared. The problem of holding back
barbarian Turkmens when it was their natural instinct to despoil
everything within reach was an acute one for the Seljuq leaders, who
did not want totally to alienate the local populations; it was only
really soluble by deflecting them westwards to the borders of Byzant-
imum. 67 However, the Malik-nāma records that Chaghīrī had assured the
acyān of Merv, after the city had peaceably opened its gates to the
Seljuqs, that there would be no pillage and that measures for the
restoration of the devastated surrounding countryside would be taken.
Sultan Masūd seems to have regarded Mūsā Yabghu as nominal head of
the Seljuqs, as indeed his title implied among the Oghuz. Diplom-
atic contacts were made through him; in 429/1037–8 he took an oath
binding himself to restrain the destructive proclivities of his
followers and tribe (gau[m u qabila), and it was to him that Masūd
sent the severed heads of Turkmens whom he slew for violating the
agreement. 69 But in practice, Tughrīl and Chaghīrī seem to have been
the directing brains behind the Turkmens’ movements, in so far as
there was any central direction at all.

In the campaigns across northern Khurasan and the Qara Qum desert,
the advantages were at first sight all on one side. The Sultan had
a numerous, experienced and well-armed body of professional soldiers
who had been trained and tempered in the many battles of himself and his father. The Turkmen bands were not numerous; probably there was no overwhelming superiority on either side. The traditional skill of steppe peoples with the bow and arrow made the Turkmen fearsome in this respect, but their swords and other cutting weapons were of poor quality. For protective clothing, the nomads had usually only light jackets of skin and leather, although when Tughrīl entered Nishapur in 1038, a large proportion of his 3000 cavalrymen had cuirasses (zirīsh). This must have been exceptional, and the Turkmen may have acquired them in the booty left on battlefields by defeated Ghaznavid armies.

The Turkmen were often in a miserable state, affected by the drought and famine conditions in northern Khurasan and by the buffett- ings they received from the rulers of surrounding lands. Baihaqī describes the wretched condition of the Seljūqīyān and Ināliyān after their defeat on the borders of Khwarizm in 1034; the fugitives from this lost their wives, children, baggage, beasts and all. The group of 200 horsemen with which Ibrāhīm Ināl entered Nishapur in 1038 is described as being very ragged and battered in appearance. From evidence such as this we can detect some economic motive in the Turkmen's incursions, the search for easier conditions of life and for better pastures. In the history of nomadic incursions from Central Asia, there was always a clearly-discernible rhythm of intensity in pressure on the settled margins. The winter pastures of the nomads tended to be in better-favoured spots like the shores of the Oxus, Syr Darya, Zarafshān, Chu or Issiq-Göl, where conditions were
slightly less harsh than in the deep steppe. Altuntaş had allowed the Seljuqs and their herds to spend the winters on the borders of Khwārizm, and according to Narshakhi, it was in winter that the ghāzīs of Bukhārā went to man the ribāts of Paikānd against the hungry pagans.

That the Turkmens had only limited political horizons when first they attacked Khurāsan seems certain; only the total collapse of Ghaznavid arms there in 1040 and the defection of the Khurāsānian cities from their old allegiance brought into the minds of leaders like Tughrī and Chaghrī the possibility of establishing political dominion over the region. In the two decades before Dandāngān, the Turkmens were motivated primarily by economic considerations, the need to find additional pasture for their existing flocks and the desire to add to their wealth by increasing their flocks. They used the technique of sending small raiding bands deep into Ghaznavid territory which rounded up and drove off the flocks of the local population. Thus at the beginning of 1034 the regions of Tirmidh and Qubādhiyān were raided and the beasts there driven off, and in the following winter Farāh and Zīrgān in the Sīstān and Bust area were similarly stripped of their herds. As early as the summer of 1033 the far-sighted Abū Naṣr-i Mīshkān sold off the 10,000 sheep which he had in Gūrgān, fearing — rightly, as events showed — that the nomads would get them if they were left there. These swiftly-executed raids had an importance beyond their purely material consequences; they created within the Ghaznavid dominions an atmosphere of fear and of uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall, and
so a certain air of defeatism was current among the civilian elements of the bureaucracy.

The mobility and lightness of the Turkmen bands was their chief asset. Up to modern times, the nomads of the Eurasian steppes have had advantages over the professional armies of the civilised, settled powers. These latter have rarely been able to use in pitched battles their superior fire-power and knowledge of tactics. The raiders have snatched up their plunder and retreated back into the steppes before an engagement could be made; and pursuit of them has had little point, for the nomad has no possessions worth capturing. Slaves have been the only really valuable commodity which counter-attacks have brought back. A Chinese chronicler in 617 complained of his country's forces' disadvantages as compared with the Tiu-kiu:

"The Turks' superiority lies in their cavalrymen and archers. When they find themselves in an advantageous position, they charge forwards furiously; but if they spot any danger, they flee like the wind and disappear like lightning, without keeping any order. The bow and arrow are their teeth and claws, and the breastplate and helmet their normal dress. When on the move, their troops do not keep in any order; nor do they encamp in any fixed place, but anywhere they can find pasture and water. Mutton and horsemeat form their army's diet. If they are victorious, they halt and plunder the enemy's belongings; but if they are defeated, they flee unashamedly. They never bother to mount guards at night or to take any precautions during the day; they never waste their resources on constructing fortifications or procuring provisions and food. But when the Chinese troops set off on a campaign, they set about it quite differently. If they have a battle with the Turks, it is rare that they [sc. the Chinese] are victorious". 76
A raiding-party on the move was self-sufficient, provided that pasture could be found. Concentrated supplies from dried milk and dried meat were carried, and mares' milk was drunk in the form of qumās. For long-distance expeditions, herds were driven along with the party. After receiving news of the Utrūr massacre, Chinggis fitted out an army for Transoxania, and made plans for a three-months' journey thither. Every ten cavalrymen were allotted three tughlī sheep, which were to be killed and their mutton dried, a cauldron and a skin for water, and this was to be supplemented from the herds of mares they were to drive before them.

These considerations were valid for the Turkmen invasions of Khurasan. The more mobile and frugal nomads wore down in the end the Ghaznavid armies, despite the facts that the latter were led by Turkish professional soldiers and that they had also behind them the accumulated experience of the Iranian military tradition. One of Masʿūd’s courtiers said that "the steppe is father and mother to them, just as towns are to us", and Abū Naṣr-i Mishkān said,

"We have to encamp with our army in any rocky place or area of scrubby undergrowth we can find, whereas this crowd [i.e., the Turk¬men] merely encamp on tillage and green vegetation and the most suitable spots. They can find the cold and flowing waters, whereas we have to drink from waterholes and cannot find cold and flowing waters. Their camels can forage freely on herbage and find pasture over a wide distance, whereas we have to keep our camels in the encampment, tethered outside our tents, for they cannot be left to pasture outside the camp. That is the reason why they have no heavy baggage, so that they can come and go, whereas we have heavy baggage, and the need to look after it keeps
us from going off to do other things”.

Since the Turkmens travelled light and since each rider could operate as a self-sufficient fighting unit for quite a long period, they could afford to leave their baggage as much as thirty farsakhs from the main body. The Seljuqs realised this advantage. Baihaqi reports that Chaghri himself attributed the defeat in 1038 of the Ghaznavid generals Begtughr and Sbbashf to their being encumbered by their baggage and supply train. Although in 1039 the Sultan sent back to Ghazna for equipment suitable for steppe warfare (Slut-i jang-i biyabSn) and was then able to set off westwards from Herat with this lighter equipment, the Ghaznavid armies remained in this respect handicapped compared with the Turkmens.

Clearly, the Ghaznavid armies were hampered by their inferior mobility and their dependence on fixed bases where provisions, fodder and other war material was concentrated. They functioned essentially from the towns of Khurasan and from the strong points, each under a kitwEl or castellan appointed directly by the Sultan, where supplies were kept and valuables stored in times of danger. But the nomads deployed their raiding parties through the countryside and against the outlying agricultural villages of the oases. They did not waste time trying to reduce strong points or towns, a process for which they were ill-equipped both militarily and psychologically. Instead, they by-passed them and devastated the surrounding agricultural areas, thereby starving out the urban centres and fortresses. Furthermore, they interrupted and cut off the caravan traffic upon which the commercial economy of Khurasan depended to an appreciable
extent. It was only towards the end of the fourth decade of the 11th century that the Turkmen got possession of great cities like Tus, Nishapur and Merv, and then it was by peaceful surrender rather than by conquest.

The Ghaznavid armies were led by Turkish ghulām generals, such as Begtughdī and Subashī, until in 1038 the Sultan turned from his Indian concerns and took the field personally. It was the Turkmen's policy to avoid a pitched battle, for they realised that their advantage lay in hit-and-run tactics. They were reported to have said in their deliberations,

"It is unwise to seek a pitched battle (masūff) with this sovereign. Let us keep to our own way [of fighting] and not be burdened with baggage and impediments. In this way we will gain the preponderance. We will not disperse, unless some difficulty arises, so let him [sc. Masūd] go backwards or go forwards, just as he wishes (?). Winter has passed and summer has begun; we are steppe-dwellers and are well able to endure extremes of heat and cold, whereas he and his army cannot, and after suffering this distress for a while, will have to turn back"

When the nomads could be cornered and forced into a pitched battle, the superior weapons and training of the Ghaznavid soldiers often told in their favour. But these advantages were often negatived by such human factors as divided command and ill-advised interference from afar by the Sultan, resulting in confused directions to the soldiers. The pitched battle on the road to Nasrī in 1035 went first in Begtughdī's favour but later turned into a defeat. There had been an excessive number of voices in the command and a confusion of orders had followed; one commander had turned his men back for water,
and this had been interpreted as flight and had led to a final, successful onslaught by the enemy. 83 The general Šúbashf (Šúbashf seems here to be a personal name and not a military office) was next placed in command of the army of Khurasan. He remained there for three years, during which the Seljuqs "were dodging him like a fox" (yurūwashinahumurūwashhat ath-thaqālab). 84 Šúbashf's supposed dilatoriness led to allegations at court that he was spending his time in Khurasan drinking and womanising and that he was either a coward or else secretly in league with the Seljuqs. Eventually, the Sultan gave him a specific order to engage the enemy, although this was against Šúbashf's better judgement. He was in fact defeated near Sarakhs in 1038, and as a result, Tūs, Nishapur and much of Khurasan were temporarily lost and Herat threatened. In a later apologia before the Sultan at Ghazna, Šúbashf is reported by al-Ḥusainī to have said that he had been given an impossible task: "How can a physician restore an old man to his youth, or how can a traveller turn the mirage into water?". There is also the testimony of Bāhāqī, that Šúbashf had been a very skilful tactician in Khurasan, so much so that the Turkmens had named him "the magician" (jāmiḍī). But to the Sultan, it was always his servants who were at fault and never himself.

Apart from the elusiveness of the Turkmens, the most notable factor in the failure of the Ghaznavid armies was their having to operate in a land racked by famine. Much of the fighting was done on the northern fringes of Khurasan, where the cultivation grew sparser and the desert steppes of the Gara Gūm began and where the
limited amounts of forage and water available were inadequate to supply a large army. The provisioning of the large Ghaznavid armies, with their baggage trains, strings of elephants and camp followings as well as their fighting men, presented terrible problems for the Sultan and his advisers. In part because of supply difficulties, it was not usual for professional Muslim armies to remain in the field for years on end, but by 1040 many Ghaznavid soldiers had been continuously on active service with Surbash and Mas'ud for three years. The Turkmen regarded Khurasan as a foreign land and had no concern for its economy and its agriculture; they plundered indiscriminately and were quite prepared to let their flocks eat their way steadily across the agricultural oases. But to the Sultan, Khurasan was one of the richest jewels in his crown, and his armies could not afford to live off the land and denude it of wealth and supplies beyond a certain point.

The damage from the Turkmen's depredations was a factor in the increasing savageness of the warfare between the two sides. On seeing the ravages done early in Mas'ud's reign by the "Irāqī" Turkmen, the general Tash Farrāsh put to death over fifty of their leaders, including Yaghmur; their sons naturally treated subsequent struggles as wars of revenge. In 1035 the Sultan ordered that Turkmen prisoners should be trampled to death in the army camp by the elephants, in the hope that this would be a warning to the rest. Only towards the end of the decade, when the struggle for Khurasan became a life-and-death one for the Ghaznavids, did the Sultan's starving armies
throw off restraint and vie with the Turkmens in despoiling the province in the search for supplies. The rival forces rode and marched over the face of Khurasan, whose inhabitants were faced with the normal burden of taxation and food requisitions by the Sultan's armies on the one hand, and with the devastations of the nomads and their flocks on the other. Long-term planning, a necessity for highly organised agricultural and commercial communities, became impossible, food production declined, the value of land dropped catastrophically (see below, 502-5) and famine inevitably followed.

The strategy of the Ghasnavid commanders became increasingly dictated by considerations of food and water supply. As early as the winter of 1034-5, the army at its Nishapur base was suffering from the cold and from lack of provisions, and it was in part this which prompted Mas'ud's decision to move westwards to Dehistān, where he had heard that ten mans of wheat or fifteen mans of barley could be had for a dirham. The towns of northern Khurasan suffered especially badly. Sarakhs, once prosperous and populous, was ravaged and waterless when the exhausted army of the Sultan reached there in the summer of 1039. There was much skirmishing with the Turkmens over the possession of waterholes on the edges of the almost waterless Qara Qum. The army commanders protested at this time that their soldiers were discontented and too weak from lack of food and water to fight properly, and they blamed the Ārid for his inadequate budgeting for the supplies required. Shortly before this, it had also been alleged that Sūbashī had been cornering wheat and selling
it in the army bazaar at inflated prices.

Nishapur was re-occupied by the Sultan and his army at the end of 1039. Famine was raging in the city itself and in the surrounding ṭūstāq, with a man of bread fetching sixteen dirhams and with much mortality from starvation. Mas'ud was forced to send camels 250 miles westwards to Dāmghān in Qumis to fetch back food for the army. The following spring, the army was in the Tūs area, where bread and barley were quite unobtainable. The whole region had been denuded of crops and food. The governor of Khurasan, Sūrī, whose normal task it was to see that dumps of supplies were kept at various points for the use of the army, had so devastated and burnt the region that the local people and their beasts were dying of hunger. The army, now almost rebellious from lack of food, went on again to Sarakhs, but "the town was ruined and waterless, with not a blade of corn there. All the people had fled, and the plain and the mountain were just as if they had been scorched, being without a scrap of grass". Consequently, this army, of which it had been said when first it was fitted out, "if it had been hurled against the pillar of Fate, that pillar would have collapsed, or if the succession of Time had been affrighted by its soldiers, it would have fled", was in a sorry state for fighting at Dandānqān. On the journey across the desert from Sarakhs to Merv, the drought conditions were exceptional. Large watercourses were totally dry and no surface water was seen on the whole journey; after three days' march the army had to dig to find water. The army's mounts suffered worst of all,
especially the horses; the state of the one-horse troopers was parlous and the palace ghulams were reduced to fighting on camels. There were quarrels over the distribution of water from the meagre desert holes, inadequate even for the Sultan and his personal entourage, and this brawling contributed to the army's demoralisation. For their part, the Seljuqs were aware of these difficulties amongst their opponents and aggravated them by blocking up wells.
Chapter Six

Baihaqī's account of the first Seljuq occupation of Nishapur 1038-1039

The Seljuqs first appeared at Nishapur in Sha'ban 429/May 1038, and we have a detailed account of this, sent to the Sultan at Ghazna in the form of a despatch from his local intelligence officer. This is in Baihaqī, 550-4:

"A letter arrived from Abū'1-Muṣaffar Jumāḥī, the Sāhib-Barīd of Nishapur. He wrote that he was writing it in concealment and that it was only after much scheming that he had been able to despatch this messenger [the letter arrived between two and three months after the events described in it]. He explained that after the news arrived of Sūbashi's defeat, and twelve days after that event, Ibrāhīm Yīnāl had appeared on the outskirts of Nishapur with 200 men. He sent an envoy with a message which said, 'I am the advance guard for Tughril, Ḍūlūd and Bīghū. If you want war, I will go back and make [your choice] known; but if you do not want war, let me come into the city and have the khutba performed [in their name]. For there is a large army following behind me'.

They escorted the envoy into the city. A great clamour broke
out there, and all the 'ayan flocked to the house of the Qādi Ǧālid and said to him, 'You are our Imām and leader; what do you think about this message which has just arrived?' He replied, 'What do you yourselves think about it, and what course of action do you contemplate?' They said, 'You are quite well aware of this city's position and its lack of fortification; indeed, it is just like a grain of sand in the eye (?). Its people have no arms, and they [sc. the Seljuqs] defeated a powerful army like the one which the Ḥājib Sūbashī had. What power can we dispose of? This is our view'.

The Qādi Ǧālid said, 'You have reasoned very well. Organising warfare is not the business of subjects (raṣīyyat). You have a ruler, Amīr Mas‘ūd, who has adequate forces. If this province means anything to him at all, he must necessarily send someone and secure his rule here. But as for the present, a great conflagration has flared up and a horde eager to set their hands to bloodshed and pillage has appeared: there is no course open except submission'.

The Imām Muwaffaq, who was the Ǧāhib-Yadithān 95, and all the 'ayan agreed that 'there is no other reasonable course but this. If we do anything else, the city will be violently sacked. The Sultan is far away from us. We can justify our conduct to him later, and he will accept our explanation'.

The Qādi Ǧālid said, 'When the Ilij's forces under Sūbashītīgin came from Bukhārā, the men of Balkh resisted them until they set about massacring and plundering, but the men of Nishapur did the exactly what they are doing just now [sc. submitted]. When Amīr Maḥmūd, God's mercy be upon him, returned to Ghazna from Sultan, he spent some time there putting affairs in order and then set out for Khurasan. When he reached Balkh, he saw that the Bāzār-i Ǧāshiqān, which had been constructed under his orders, had been burnt down, and he castigated the people of Balkh, saying, 'What have subjects to do with war? It was natural that your town should be destroyed and that they should burn the property belonging to me [sc. the
market] which used to bring in such revenues. You should have been required to pay an indemnity for the losses, but we have pardoned you; [only] take care it does not happen again. If any ruler proves himself the stronger [at a given moment] and demands taxes from you and protects you, you must hand over the taxes and thus save yourselves. Why do you not consider the example of the men of Nishapur and of other cities, who submitted? They acted quite rightly in doing that, so that no plundering took place. Why do you not consider other cities, from whom no further taxes were demanded, since they had already been accounted for [by the previous masters]? They replied, "We are very sorry and will not pursue such erroneous courses in future". The problem today is exactly the same as it was then'. They all agreed that it was indeed exactly the same.

Then they summoned Ibrāhīm's envoy and gave him the reply, 'We are subjects, and have a lord; subjects do not fight. Your commanders should come, as the town is open before them. If the province is of any concern to the Sultan, he will come after it or else send someone. However, you must know that the people have become apprehensive of you because of what has happened in the past, so that with regard to this policy which you have pursued in other places of plundering, massacring, killing and execution, you must adopt another course; for beyond this world lies another one, and like yourselves, Nishapur has seen much. The people of this region have the weapon of prayer in dawn vigils, and if our Sultan is far away, the Lord, He is exalted and magnified, and His servant the Angel of Death are near'.

The envoy went back. When Ibrāhīm Yūnīl had perused the reply, he moved to a position one farasakh away from the city and sent an envoy back again with a message saying, 'You have appraised the situation sensibly and have spoken very wisely. I have written this instant to our leader Țughrīl and acquainted him of the position, so that he may rally Dā'ūd and Bīghū, who are at Sarakhs and Merv, and all the other numerous great men who are in other
places; and then Tughril himself, who is a just ruler, will come here with his retinue. Do not be downcast, for the plundering and unlawful behaviour which has taken place up to now happened inevitably because of the rabble who were at that time carrying on warfare. Today things are different; effective power (or, the province, wilāyat) has passed to us; there is no need for anyone to become agitated. Tomorrow I shall come to the city and install myself in the Khurramak Garden, so that [all these things] may be made known.*

When the aqyān of Nishapur heard these words, their peace of mind was restored, and a herald went round the markets and explained the situation so that the general public might be reassured. They laid out furnishings and carpets in the Khurramak Garden and prepared food and got ready to go out and meet [him]. The Šāhār of Būzgān, Abūl-Qāsim, a most capable and intelligent man, who had in the past been beaten and ill-treated by Sūrī, threw himself whole-heartedly into preparing the Turkmens* reception. The Šāhīb-Hadīthān the Imām Muwaffaq and the other aqyān of the city collected together and went out to meet Ibrāhīm Yīnāl, with the exception of the Qādī ʿAlī and Sayyid Zaid, Naqīb of the ʿAlīs, who did not go.

Half-a-farsakh from the city, Ibrāhīm appeared with two or three hundred horsemen, a banner, two beasts of burden, and with the whole group having a generally ragged and battered aspect. When the reception committee came up to him, [they saw that] he had a splendid horse; he had a pleasing face and manner of speaking which encouraged everyone. He rode on. An enormous crowd of people had turned out to watch; older men, who had only seen Māḥmūd's and Masʿūd's [well-turned out] forces, were secretly weeping, although outwardly smiling at that procession and concourse. Ibrāhīm dismounted at the Khurramak Garden and they brought him large quantities of the food and refreshment which they had prepared for him. Each day people came to greet him. On Friday,
Ibrâhîm went to the Congregational Mosque, being by now more smartly arrayed. The Sâlih of Bûzgân had brought three or four thousand of the armed men under his command, and had made an agreement (mukâtabat) with this group [sc. the Turkmens]; thus as a result of Sûrî's tyranny they became friends with each other, for the loss of Khurâsan was really to be laid at Sûrî's door. They had argued at great length with Ismâ'îl Șâbûnî the Khatûb to persuade him quietly to pronounce the khûtba. But when they pronounced the khûtba in Tughril's name, a fearful hubbub broke out among the crowd and there was danger of an outbreak until they calmed [them] down, finished the service and went back.

A week later some riders arrived and brought letters from Tughril to the Sâlih of Bûzgân and the Imâm Muwaffaq. He had written to Ibrâhîm Yûnîû that the aqyûn of the city were wise and praiseworthy in what they had done; they [sc. the Seljuqs] must take care to act equitably towards them and towards all the populace. He had sent round instructions to his brother Uâ'ûd and his uncle Bîghû and to all the military commanders and their forces, and he was coming along personally in the advance force with his personal entourage to take care that the people of that district should not be harmed, since they had shown themselves submissive and percipient of their own interests.

The people were reassured by these messages. They laid out furnishings and carpets in ʿAsanak's old garden at Shâdyâkh. Three days later Tughril arrived in the city, and all the aqyûn, with the exception of the Qâdî Șâcid, went out to meet him. Tughril was accompanied by 3000 horsemen, the majority of them wearing cuirasses. He himself had a strung bow over his arm, with three wooden arrows fastened at his waist, and was fully armed. He wore a mulham tunic, a head-dress of Tawwâzî cloth and felt boots. He installed himself in the garden at Shâdyâkh, as did as many as possible of his forces who could be contained there, the rest encamping round the perimeter of the garden. They brought there large quantities of food and refreshment which they had prepared.
and gave provisions to all the soldiers. As he went along, Tughril conversed continuously with Muwaffaq and the Sālār of Būṣgān, and the Sālār carried out all his wishes.

Next day the Qādi Ṣācid, accompanied by his sons, grandsons, pupils and a large group, went to pay his respects to Tughril, after people had reasoned with him the previous night. Also, the Naqīb of the Ālids and a group of Sayyids came along. The interview took place when it was still not yet light. A small, disorderly group of the mob had gathered round, and each one who got up spoke out boldly and addressed Tughril. Tughril had seated himself on the lord Sultan's throne at the front of the dais. He got up when the Qādi Ṣācid came in, and they placed a cushion for him at the foot of the throne. Then he sat down. The Qādi said, 'May the sovereign's life be long! This throne which you are sitting on is Sultan Masūd's. There are happenings like this [reversal of fortune] hidden in the Unseen, and no-one knows what further ones may be in store. Be circumspect, and fear God, His name is exalted. Render justice, and listen to those who have suffered tyranny and who are in wretched circumstances. Do not give free rein to this army of yours for them to wreak oppression, for an act of injustice is an inauspicious event. I am fulfilling my duty in coming to greet you, and I shall not come again because I am occupied in study, and apart from that, I do not give my attention to anything else. If you want to go back with a piece of wisdom, this advice of mine will be sufficient'.

Tughril replied, 'I do not want to incommode the Qādi by his coming again; any other communication necessary can be done by messages. I promise you I will take full account of what you have said. We [Seljuqs] are new and strange [to all this] and do not know the usages of the Perso-Islamic tradition (raṣmā-yi Tāzikān). The Qādi must not refuse sending advice to me in future [if only] by messages'. He replied, 'I will do that then'. He turned away and all the aṣyān who were with him returned too.

Next day he handed over administration of the city to the
Salār of Būzgān, who put on a robe of honour, a tunic and a woollen robe, arranging this outfit personally on himself, and he also received golden saddle accoutrements of the Turkish type. Then the Salār went back to his house and assumed the duties of his office. The people saw him in the black woollen robe, endowed with the majesty of office, giving him the insignia of being Tughril's Amīr.

At present I myself [sc. Abū'l-Mu'zaffār Jumahī] am with Sayyid Zaid the Naqīd of the ʿAlīds, who is showing himself very friendly and helpful. After [writing] this, my envoys are leaving, and through the good offices of this ʿAlīd I am able to complete this despatch.

The other sources do not add much to this remarkable eye-witness account, but they do give some information about the attitude of the Seljuq leaders. Cardīnī is wholly silent about the first Seljuq occupation. Most of the other sources are pro-Seljuq ones, and often they reflect the Malik-nāma (ʿImād ad-Dīn, al-Ḥussainī, Ibn al-Athīr, Barhebraeus, Mirkhwānd); we expect therefore to find a favourable construction placed on the Seljuq leaders' actions. According to ʿImād ad-Dīn, the Turkmen entered Nishapur in Ramaqān. Their natural instinct was to plunder, but Tughrīl restrained them because it was the sacred month: "Do not tear away its sanctity and do not gnaw at its inviolateness, for nothing is to be gained by plundering [then].... Control yourselves for the remainder of the month, but do what you will after the Fīrūr". Meanwhile, the Caliph's envoy arrived to restrain the Turkmen and to instil them with the fear of God. When the Fīrūr came round, Tughrīl in fact restrained his tribesmen, but he only deterred his brother Chaghīrī from pillaging
by threatening suicide and by promising the Turkmens 40,000 dinars, the greater part to be levied on the local people and the rest to come from Tughrîl's own pocket. Ibn al-Athîr gives most detail on the Seljuq occupation in his entry for the year 429. He says that in that year, Chaghîr entered the city, changing nothing there, and that Tughrîl followed later; then comes the episode about Chaghîr's intended pillaging. Mîrkhwând is brief: the people rejoiced at Tughrîl's coming, and the Sulamî, Ṭughalî, Ṣâ'yân, ru'ašî, wulît and umarî all sent presents and promised submission. Al-Ḥusainî only mentions in passing that Chaghîr came to Tûs and that the notables of Nishapur came to meet him. Ḥabîr ad-Dîn Nishâpurî also places Tughrîl's coming in Ramaqûn 429. He says that Tughrîl mounted Maqûd's throne at Shâdîyâkh, and that this caused unrest among the people until a herald went round proclaiming that no-one would be hurt by the incomers; these details accord with what Baihaqî says.
Chapter Seven

The attitude of the aṣyān of Nishapur towards the

incoming Seljuqs

To understand why the aṣyān of Nishapur and of other Khurasanian towns for the most part surrendered peacefully to the Turkmens, we must recall briefly what has been said about the economic and commercial interests of the province, the agriculture of its fertile oases, the manufactures of its urban craftsmen and the long-distance trade organised by its merchants and financiers. Its interest lay in stable, firm government. The Khurasanians expected to pay taxes, but required in return adequate defence. The Ghaznavid connection had not in the reign of Maḥmūd been wholly a matter of force majeure exerted from the outside by the Sultan, for at the outset, the régime had been supported by the landowners, merchants and notables of Khurasan as politically and economically useful.

However, Masʿūd was hard pressed by the Turkmens and was finding it difficult to govern Khurasan from Ghazna. His military prestige
was ceasing to counterbalance the disadvantage of geographical
distance. Since contemporary thinking placed a cleavage between
rulers and subjects, there was a tendency towards conditional obed-
dience which negatived the theological motive for obedience. Loyalty
suffered when the ruler could no longer provide protection.Towards
the end of Mas'ud's reign, the tacit contract with the people of
Khurasan crumbled. Instead, local forces reasserted themselves and
the cities salvaged what remained of their interests and came to
terms individually with the Seljuqs. A similar process of transfer
of allegiance may also be seen in Transoxanian history. The commer-
cial interests of the Soghdian cities necessitated their being on
good terms with the steppe peoples through whose territories the
Soghdian caravans passed; hence the comparatively smooth accessions
to power of dynasties like the Qarakhanids and the Qara Khitay.

When the Turkmens entered Khurasan, they brought with them the
only permanent wealth they possessed, their herds of horses, camels
and above all, sheep. The nomads' first demands on the settled
populations were for pastures. But the oasis plains around the great
cities like Nishapur, Merv and Herat were highly fertile and thickly
dotted with villages. Agriculture was intensive and there were
complex irrigation systems of canals and qan'ats. The irruption of
the nomads and their herds into such a highly-developed economy was
a tragedy. If the forest hunter is the most carefree of men —
those among the Mongols regarded their pastoralist brethren as tied
down to an intolerable life — the steppe pastoralist also has an
irresponsible attitude to nature and the land. Unlike the agriculturist who must conserve his seed and think of future years, the nomad is a true *ibn al-waqt*. This irresponsibility makes him the terror of settled peoples and his close-cropping sheep more feared than his arrows.

It is only rarely that the sources allude explicitly to the menace of the herds, but Baihaqi was not speaking figuratively when he said that the "Cirâqî" Turkmens had in the latter part of Mâhîmûd's reign "devoured Khurasan as if it were food laid out for hunting falcons". Mîrkhwând has a brief yet illuminating description of the distressed state of the Nishapur area early in 1038: "That region became ruinous, like the dishevelled tresses of the fair ones or the eyes of the loved ones, and became devastated by the pasturing of [the Turkmens'] flocks (ba-Celîq-i charpâyân furû mânda)". Bar-hebraeus seems also to allude to these facts when he says of the hordes following Tughrîl: "... and no one district ... is able to support them for more than one week because of their vast number. And from sheer necessity they are compelled to depart to another quarter in order to find food for themselves and their beasts". The Turkmens' herds caused economic disturbance in other parts of Persia. When Seljuq raiders first appeared in Shârûn "they devastated the land, seizing provisions and fodder and pasturing their herds". Muhammad b. Ibrâhîm records it as a virtue of Qâvurd b. Châghrî Beg Dâ'ûd that the immense numbers of beasts required to supply his kitchens were not a burden on the people of Kirmân but
were pastured well out in the steppes there.

The ravages of the flocks in Khurasan were aggravated by the trampling of rival forces across the land, interrupting agriculture, and commandeering crops as food for themselves or else destroying them lest they fall into the enemy's hands. We have already seen (above, 483, 489-91) how the Turkmens drove off the beasts they found and how both sides practised scorched-earth tactics. We may further cite the information given by Ibn Funduq on the state of affairs at Baihaq. This town suffered badly from a Ghaznavid commander sent there with an army in 1037. The army encamped in the oasis and started to plunder. Then the commander ordered the cutting-down of the pistachio-nut trees of the villages because their oily and resinous wood made them good fuel for the ovens, and finally ordered the whole lot to be felled and sent off to Ghazna. Hence the Khurasanians called him "the commander who makes a clean sweep, Hājib-i Pāk-rūb". This came on top of seven years of Oghuz raiding; in the seven years before 1038 no sowing had been possible outside the boundaries of the town of Baihaq, but only in the gardens and orchards protected by the outer wall. During this time, mutton had been unobtainable; only venison, veal and eggs had been procurable, and these had been scarce. 111

The position of the densely-populated towns thus became parlous. A city like Nishapur could not normally feed itself (see above, Part III, 302-3). The towns now found it difficult to draw food from the surrounding countryside. There followed general famine and depop-
ulation. Land fell out of cultivation and peasants took to flight, swelling the bands of sayyārs and other malcontents. When in 1037 Tughrī and Chaghī occupied Merv, Chaghī wrote letters and had proclamations read inviting those who had fled to return to their homes. In the Nishapur district, land values plummeted, and it is possible that this contributed to the decline of the dihqān and small landowner class into peasant status. In 1039-40 the small owners (katkhudāyān) of the city were reduced to selling the roofs of their houses to buy food, and a dāng of land could be had for a dirham. In the adjacent village of Muḥammadābād, where land having trees, tillage or vineyards had formerly fetched the high price of 3000 dirhams per jāftvār, it now fetched only 100 dirhams, and Bāiaqī heard that during famine conditions it was being offered at a jāftvār for a man of wheat. It is recorded by al-Fārisī that the fortunes and property of one ancient Nishapur family, the Muʿammālīs, declined do much from the ravages of famine and the Turkmens that they were obliged to move to Bāiaqī. 113

It was not surprising that the landowners and notables of Khurasan often decided that it was less damaging in the long run to come to terms with the Turkmens, even where resistance was feasible. If, as the sayyān stated to the dāi ʿAbd al-Malik, Nishapur's defences were at this time weak, other cities like Merv, Herat and Balkh were adequately protected, and the towns on the northern rim of Khurasan, such as Nasā, Abīward and Sarakhs, were heavily fortified against attack from the steppes. Within Nishapur, the šāhī of Dūzgān disposed of a large armed force (above, 497 ) which could perhaps have been
used for resistance. The mention of the Imam Muwaffaq as being the Sahib-Hadhithn is particularly interesting, for it seems to point to the existence in Nishapur of a body of local vigilantes, whose task no doubt was the preservation of internal order and the defence of the city against bandit and sayyar depredations. The factionalism and social disturbance endemic in Khurasan at this time have been mentioned (above, Part III, chapter 4), and we know that at this time of economic dislocation and shaky local administration, Nishapur was troubled with sayyars; one benefit which the Seljuqs are said to have brought when in 1040 they re-entered the city was relief from the sayyars.

The writer has not found other mentions of Hadithn (Arabic pl. Abdeth) in Nishapur or other Khurasanian cities at this time, although we know that vigilante bodies flourished in Sirstan (see above, Part III, 325). The term Abdeth was used in the 11th century for the para-military vigilante and police bands of citizens of the Syrian and Mesopotamian towns, but does not seem to have been current in Khurasan. In the latter region we have the ubiquitous sayyars; and Cahen has recently sought to discover whether the Persian sayyars are not in some way the counterparts of the Abdeth of further west, without however reaching any clear conclusions. Thus we can only conjecture what was the composition of these putative Hadithn of Nishapur and what were their duties. We do not know whether they were recruited from the bourgeoisie and upper classes, as were the later Fitydn of the Caliph an-Nasir's time, or whether they resembled more the Abdeth of Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, etc. and
the Anatolian Akhīs of Rûm Seljuq and early Ottoman times in being based on the urban craft and trade associations. Cities like Nishapur, Aleppo, Damascus and Qonya were all great industrial centres, and Cahen has in fact detected some early Persian traces in the latter Akhīs. In Nishapur, the leader of the Ḥadīthān, the Imām Abū Muḥammad Ḥabīb al-Dīn b. Muḥammad al-Ḥuwaffaq, was a Shāfiʿī Ġelīm, son of a qādī and grandson of the famous scholar Abūʿt-Tayyib Sahl b. Muḥammad Ṣaḥlūkī; al-Ṭāwīsī says that his family had been ruʾāsāʾ and imāms and leaders of the Ashāb al-Ḥadīth for 150 years. Massignon and B. Lewis have discerned a strong religious current in the early Islamic gilds, but they have suggested that this was often heterodox and even Ismāʿīlī-tinged rather than orthodox. Be this as it may, the Ḥadīthān of Nishapur could presumably have been used to defend the city against the Seljuqs if there had been any strong will to resist.

Instead of holding out in the uncertain hope of Ghaznavid help arriving, the aṣyān of Nishapur, in particular the lay elements, made terms with the Seljuqs. Ghazna was very distant, and their interests were primarily local, Khurasanian ones. In the previous year of 1037, Sultan Masmūd had been warned that the people of Khurasan had become resigned to giving allegiance to the Seljuqs, and in their fath-nāma to the Caliph after Dandānqān, the Seljuqs claimed that "the notables and prominent people" of the province had appealed to them for protection. This section of society had in the past suffered much from the tyranny of the Ghaznavid civil
governor Sūrī. Niẓām al-Mulk's father was harried by Sūrī for not squeezing enough taxation out of his zamal (see above, Part I, 183). His ill-treatment of the Shāh of Būrgān is specifically mentioned in Baiḥaqī's account (above, 496). But who exactly was this Shāh of Būrgān? al-Farīsī gives his full name as Abū'īl-Qāsim ʿAbd aq-Ṣamad b. ʿAlī al-Būṣjānī and describes his knowledge of tradition. He may have been a great property/landowner, and the title of "Shāh" may have come from some participation earlier in life in warfare or ghazw on the frontiers of Islam. In this case, the force of men which he headed may have been tenants from his estates whom he had armed or else former ghāzīs settled in the Nishapur area whom he had mobilised.

The interplay of local interests with vestigial loyalty to the Ghaznavids can be traced in Baiḥaqī's account. The record of Ghaznavid government over the past years had sapped the loyalty of the lay elements among the Nishapur aṣyān. The Imām Muwaffaq, although a member of the religious institution, was caught up with the Ḥadīthīn and other secular interests in the city, and threw his weight to the side of peace with the Seljuqs. But for the other religious leaders and scholars, there was something of a dilemma. They came from the leading families of Nishapur, were connected by birth and marriage with the lay aṣyān and shared with them interests in landowning and commerce. On the other hand, the ulema and scholars were the most cosmopolitan of scholars within Islam, and from the Ghaznavid Sultans' encouragement of Sunni orthodoxy and employment of learned
men as diplomats and officials, owed much to that dynasty. The
Sultans had always understood well how conservative religious inter-
esta could be a prop to the secular state.

Hence there must at this time have been a tug of loyalties among
some at least of the leading religious figures in the city, and the
reserved attitudes of the Qadi Shcid and Khatib Isma'ili Shabuni
reflect this. Whenever the Sultans had visited the city, the Qadi
and his sons had always been singled out for special honour. Offices
like the qadi and the khitaba were state-appointed and state-salaried.
Yet the Qadi could not be blind to the pressing threat to his native
city, and he contented himself with giving level-headed advice to
the other notables and with maintaining a correct but cool attitude
towards Tughril. Although the Ghaznavids were staunch Sunnis,
they had ranged the moderate, Twelver Shi'is on their side (see
above, Part III, 369-71). Here in Nishapur, the Sayyid Zaid
sheltered the chief intelligence officer of the Sultan and hung back
from welcoming the Seljuqs. In sending orders to theAlids that
they were to help his Shibbarid Abul-Mu'azzafir Junabi, Mas'ud
counted them among his most reliable supporters in the city, and
on his re-entry there, gave the Nadjib and the Alids robes of honour.

As a parallel to this attitude of the religious classes, we
may quote events in Situn a few years later, in Maudud b. Mas'ud's
reign. The local ruler, Abul-Faqil Nasr b. Ahmad, a scion of the
Saffarids, was attempting, latterly with Seljuq aid, to throw off
Ghaznavid control. As in Nishapur, it seems to have been the
religious classes who clung most strongly to the Ghaznavid connect-
Maudūd attempted to rally his own partisans in Ẓamān until the beginning of 1044 Abū’l-Faql swept down on them and jailed them, who comprised a qaḍī, two faqīhs and two amīrs. 

The interpretation given above of the ambivalent attitude of the religious classes in Nishapur differs from that put forward by Cahen, that the known Sunni orthodoxy of the Seljuq chiefs made them acceptable when they appeared before the city. It has been suggested here that material considerations were uppermost in the minds of most of the lay aṣyān, the preservation of their interests, and that the religious classes were to some extent still swayed by loyalty to the Ghaznavids. Neither group could look forward to the coming of the barbarian Turkmens with positive enthusiasm, for their Islam was at the most nominal only, and even their leaders were marginally affected by religious considerations (cf. the original attitudes of Tughrī and Chaghīrī over the question of sacking the city, above, 499-500).

The subsequent careers of the two leaders of the Nishapur notables who favoured surrender as the lesser of two evils, the Sālīr of Būgān and the Ṣāḥib Muwaffaq, shows that they realised from the outset that the Seljuqs’ star was now in the ascendant in Khurāsān. The former was appointed the Seljuqs’ administrative representative in the city (above, 498-9). Ṣāḥib ad-Dīn Nīshāpūrī describes him also as Tughrī’s first Vizier, and as being at the time of Dandāngān the Seljuqs’ "Vizier, helper, counsellor and executive"; the decision after the battle to write to the Caliph for confirmation of Tughrī’s kingship is attributed to him. The
Imām Muwaffaq left with the Seljuqs when they evacuated Nishapur in 1039, being too compromised with them to stay and face the returning Ghaznavids. He was later installed as administrator of the city for the Seljuqs, and it was during that period that he recommended to Tughrīl Abū Naṣr Kundūrī, one of the many former Ghaznavid officials who passed into Seljuq service. 125

When Mas'ūd temporarily re-occupied Nishapur in 1039, he appointed as Ra'ī not one of the local notables, whose loyalty had proved dubious, but one of his own permanent officials, and this man behaved harshly towards the āqāyān. 126 But Ghaznavid rule had little longer to run. The next year, the Seljuqs returned, this time for good. Both lay and religious elements found it easy to make their peace with the new rulers, and indeed, we find the Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd Allāh's eldest son in favour with Tughrīl and used by him for a diplomatic mission. 127

There are references to other towns of Khurasan making their own terms with the invaders whilst still nominally under Ghaznavid rule. Like Nishapur, the Merv oasis suffered from the attacks of the Turkmens and the ravages of their flocks, so that towards the end of 1037 the "prominent men of the ulema and the best-known of the worthies" surrendered the city on condition that the Turkmens did not harm the populace. Tughrīl and Chaghī entered, and amongst other things, gave orders for the restoration of devastated lands and estates. 128 Complaints were frequently made to the Sultan by local commanders that local populations were making agreements with
the Seljuqs. In 1039 the people of Abîward handed over the town's citadel to them. Shortly after his temporary re-establishment in Nishapur, Mas'ûd had to lead a punitive expedition against a group in the snow-covered mountains near Tûs, who had made an agreement with the Seljuqs and, it seems, joined them in their depredations. That allegiance was refused because the Ghaznavids were no longer able to provide protection is shown by what happened at Sarakhs; just before Dandânqûn, the people refused taxes to the Sultan, since they were already pressed by the Turkmens, and fortified themselves against his forces. 129

The cost of keeping the Sultan's armies in the field bore heavily on Khurasan, so that even the loyalty of the more eastern districts, of Bûdghîs, Gûzgân and Tûkhâristân, was strained, although the terrain there was mountainous and unsuitable for the nomads to operate in. Law and order broke down there and Qayyârs flourished. In a desperate effort to raise money, the Sultan in the summer of 1039 levied a tax on Herat and the nearby regions of Bûdghîs and Ganj Rustâq of a million dirhams. It was allotted to the army as batîts, and the troops collected it violently, on the pretext that the people had been in collusion with the Turkmens. Consequently, several of the sâyân fled. The rot spread to official employees of the dynasty. Amongst those jailed for collusion was the Nâ'ib-i Barîd of Herat, a nominee of the Chief Secretary Abû Naṣr-i Mishkân; the Qâmil Abû Tâlîb Shaibânî was sentenced to be skinned alive because after Sûbâshî's defeat and the appearance of the Seljuqs before Herat, he
had gone out to welcome and entertain them. The excesses of the Sultan's own armies alienated many people in this area. In the summer of 1040, an army travelling from Ghazna to Balkh started plundering en route; the exasperated local people informed Chaghri of the army's approach and gave the Seljuqs help in other ways. 131
Chapter Eight

The Seljuqs' attitude to power at this time

We conclude with some observations on the attitude to power of the Seljuqs at this time, in as much as this is determinable for us. It is necessary always to remember that the Seljuqs were barbarians; their supplanting of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan is a classic example of successful barbarian infiltration across the borders of civilisation. We have pointed out that the Turkmens' contacts with Perso-Islamic culture and religion had not been of long duration and had been only superficially accepted; moreover, the Oghuz were among the less advanced Turkish peoples of Central Asia (see above, Part IV, chapter 3). Hence it is not in order here to quote the past political achievements of Turkish peoples, such as the empires of the Huns, the Tiu-kiu or the Uighur, either on grounds of chronological continuity or on the grounds of identity of achievement; the formation of a nomadic steppe empire is a very different process from the formation of a settled, sedentary state.
Our information suggests that the Turkmens were impelled to overrun Khurasan by a combination of political and economic circumstances - the pressure of political enemies in Khwarizm and Transoxania and the necessity of finding food and pasture for their families and beasts. Certainly, the driving factor of pure hunger must not be neglected. The Seljuq leaders Tughril and Chaghri were men of skill and acumen, and during the course of the Turkmen invasions had additional responsibilities thrust upon them; as they took over more and more of Khurasan, they gradually assumed the rôle of protecting power there. But even for the leaders, this was a slow and novel process to embark upon, whilst for the rank-and-file of Turkmens it always remained an incomprehensible rôle; to them, the sole function of a chief was to lead his followers to plunder.

The Seljuqs led their tribesmen across the Oxus in 1035, and at this early date the three leaders Tughril, Chaghri and Musa Yabghu called themselves "Mawali of the Commander of the Faithful". However, Cahen is probably reading too much into this when he views this as a remarkable indication that the Seljuqs were already seeking the cachet of orthodoxy and Caliphal recognition; such phrases were stereotypes and the Seljuqs were at that time a band of desperadoes in whose activities few signs of future greatness were as yet discernible. 133 The Turkmens were for long overawed by Ghaznavid prestige, and as late as 1039 Tughril thought of moving to western Persia where there was no opposing power comparable to the Ghaznavids (see above, 479 ). But the occupation of Nishapur in 1038
was a turning point, for the Seljuqs then found themselves masters of Khurasan's administrative capital. It was natural that Tughrif, proud of his success, should seat himself upon Mas'ud's throne at Shādyāk as the successor there to the Sultan, and Ibrāhīm Inšl's first demand on entering the city had been for the khutba to be pronounced for the Seljuqs (above, 493). According to Ḥam̄ad ad-dīn, Tughrif behaved like a fully independent ruler: "He forbade, he gave orders, he made grants, he levied taxes, he administered efficiently, he abolished things, he ordered affairs correctly, he abrogated them and he presided every Sunday and Wednesday over the investigation of masālim". He also began calling himself as-Sultan al-muqaddam and Rukn ad-dunyā wa'd-dīn. Nevertheless, it is possible that these sources which depend on the Malik-nāma exaggerate the degree of Tughrif's political sophistication at this time. Ibn al-Athīr adds that the Seljuq leaders continued to pronounce the khutba in Khurasan for Sultan Mas'ud mistakenly (kalā sabīl al-mughālatā); possibly the Seljuqs at this time continued to place Mas'ud's name there after their own, as if some degree of his suzerainty in Khurasan were still recognised.

When in 1037 the Seljuqs entered Merv, Mīrkhwānd records that on Tughrif's advice, Chaghry nominated muwāb and Cumāl and gave orders for the restoration of agriculture and estates; here again, the Malik-nāma may be exaggerating the Seljuq leaders' sense of social responsibility at the time. Previous contacts with the Ghaznavids must have taught them something of prevalent administrat-
ive ways. When the three leaders were granted Nasr, Farāwa and Dehistan, they received the dress and insignia of Ghaznavid governors; at Nishapur, the Sāḥīr of Būzgān was invested as Tughrī's deputy with a similar outfit (above, 499). It is likely that those members of the Nishapur notables who went over to the Seljuqs guided Tughrī further into the regions of Islamic administrative and diplomatic procedure. Before this, the Seljuqs had some assistance from secretaries and faqīhs in their diplomatic exchanges with Sultan Mas'ūd. Bahaqī mentions that they had as an envoy "a dānishmand from Bukhārā, advanced in age and eloquent", and after Dandānqān, the Seljuqs' fath-nāma to the Caliph was taken by one Abū Ishaq al-Fuqqācī. However, the Seljuqs had not acquired anything approaching a chancery of their own, for on this occasion they used writing-materials salvaged from the Ghaznavid dawīt-khāna which had been left on the battlefield.

Against this evidence of nascent political consciousness must be set the plundering instincts which were innate in all the Turkmens, including at least at the outset, leaders like Chaghri and Tughrī. The Seljuqs were all unfamiliar with the usages and way of life of civilised existence. When in 1040 the Seljuqs entered Nishapur for the second time, Tughrī is said to have tasted almond confectionery (launjinj) and said that it was excellent qatmāch except that there was no garlic in it; other Turkmens tasted camphor but exclaimed "This is bitter salt!". In their desire for plunder, the masses of Turkmens were prepared to destroy the administrative capital of
the province which they were in process of taking over and to alienate
the classes which their leaders would have to depend on for guidance.
Apart from Tughhrî and Chaghî, it does not seem as if any other of
the leaders showed awareness of the new horizons opening up before
them; thus the division between the supreme ruler and his entourage
on one side, and the mass of tribesmen on the other, which was to
bedevil the Sultanate of the Great Seljuqs, existed already in
embryo.
1. it is recorded that Mahmūd fought with his father against the Rājā of Waihand at the age of fifteen in 376/986-7 (Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd, 29, 35-6).

2. Baih., 111-20, 216 ff.; Gard., 74. Baihaqi, 121 ff., gives an amusing account of Prince Mas'ūd's successful attempts at Herat to hoodwink his tutor Raiḥān Khādīm and to conceal his wine-drinking and luxurious living from his father.


5. Baihaqi, 80, says that towards the end of his life, "his constitution gave way and in the greatness of his nature, a weakening faculty of judgement was apparent". Shabānkārä'I says that at this time, Mahmūd even grew harsh and ill-tempered towards his favourite Ayāz (Majmūʿ al-ansāb, f.179a).


7. TN, 14, tr. I, 92-3. According to Ibn Bībī, Mahmūd used to envy brave people, and so he favoured Muḥammad, against whom he had no suspicions (Kitāb raʾs māl an-nadīm, f.205b). Shabānkārä'I says that Muḥammad himself was well aware of his inferiority to his brother in wisdom, experience and popularity with the army and was reluctant to accept the throne on his father's death,
but was persuaded by his ambitious counsellors, who hoped to appropriate much of the power for themselves (Majma' al-ansāb, ff. 162a-b).

8. Baih., 80 ff.; Gard., 92-5; Kitāb ra's māl an-nadīm, ff. 205b-206a; Th., 11-12, tr. I, 69-90; IA, IX, 281-3 (the first page of this numbering); Majma' al-ansāb, ff. 181b-184a, with an especially full account of Muḥammad's Sultanate.

9. the extent of the territories over which Mas'ūd claimed to rule are detailed in a sonorous list in Baih., 291.

10. Turkestan, 293.


13. ibid., 399-400.

Chapter 3

14. IA, IX, 207; Nazim, Sultan Muḥammad, 192-3; Spuler, Iran, 116-17.


16. IA, IX, 296-7; al-Ḥusainī, Akhḥār ad-daulat as-Saljūqiyya, 6. The books were sent to Ghazna and remained there till its sazi in 1173-4 by ʿAlī ad-Dīn Jahān-Sūs Ghūrī.

17. he recruited these Turkmen in 1029, when 2000 of them came to Kirmān and Isfahān (IA, IX, 266-7, 324), and against Abū Sahl Ḥamdawī in 1037, when 1500 of them led by Qīzīl came to Ibn Kākūya at Ray (Baih., 521, IA, IX, 269).

18. on the Ḳūkuyid dynasty, see above, Part I, 165-6. The coming
of the Seljuqs curbed the power of the Kākūyids in central Persia, but they were allowed to remain as tributaries. Ibn Kākūya's son Abū Maṣūr Farāmūrza was a prisoner with the Seljuqs at Dandānqān; probably, he had been carried off at the capture of Ray. After the battle, Tūghrīl granted him Ray and Isfahān in recognition of the vicissitudes he had suffered (Baih., 627-8; cf. Mujmal at-tawārīkh, 407).

21. Baih., 533-4 = Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 140.
23. see, for example, ibid., 282-4, 530-1.
25. Gard., 82-4; Baih., 214-15; cf. Turkestan, 282-4. In Majma al-ansāb, f. 176a, the Khan appeals at the meeting to the common Turkish origin of the two sovereigns as a basis for solidarity.
27. Cūṭbī, II, 251-9; Jurb., 240-1; Gard., 73-4; Baih., 668-79; Sachau, " Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārazm", SBBW, LXXIV, 1873, 297-300; Turkestan, 275-9; Nazim, op. cit., 56-60; Tolstov, Auf den Spuren der altchoresischen Kultur, 286-91.
28. in 992 Nūḥ b. Naqr had made over these two towns to the rival rulers of Khwārizm, Amīr Ma'mūn b. Muḥammad of Gurgūn and the Khwārizmshāh Abū ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbād respectively (Cūṭbī, I, 183-4; Jurb., 90; cf. Sachau, op. cit., 287, Turkestan, 261).

Literary history of Persia, II, 124-8. According to Qaswīnī's note in Revised tr., 122-3, Abū'1-Muẓaffar was probably the
son or grandson of Ābu ʿAlī ʻAlamād Muḥtājī (d. 344/955-6).


32. Maḥmūd crossed thus in 1025 and Maḥmūd in 1038 (Gard., 81, 105; Baih., 563, 566); according to Ibn al-Jauzī, Muntazam, VIII, 53, Maḥmūd was the first person to place a bridge over the Oxus.


34. Auf den Spuren der altchinesischen Kultur, 291.


37. Baih., 689-90; al-Hussainī, Akhbār, 6; IA, IX, 346. On Shāh Malik, see above, Part IV, 429, 433.


40. W. Tomaschek, "Centralasiatische Studien: I, Sogdiana", SBWAW, LXXXVII, 1877, 111-12; Marquart, Wehrot und Arang, 54-9, 93; Hudūd, 120, 361-3; Togon, Giris, 23.

41. Baih., 283, 343, 445, 643; IA, IX, 330-1; al-Hussainī, Akhbār, 12; Mīrkhw., IV, 105.
Chapter 4

42. Majma' al-ansāb, f. 185a.

43. thus Amīr Yūsuf died after a year in captivity and Asfīghtīgīn Ghāzī after three years (Baih., 252, 424).

44. Majma' al-ansāb, f. 182b. On Ḥasanak and his career, see above, Part III, 347-51.

45. Majma' al-ansāb, f. 182a; Gard., 93.

46. Baih., 13, 52-62, 94; Gard., 93, 96; IA, IX, 282-3 (the first pages of this numbering); Majma' al-ansāb, loc. cit., f. 184b.

47. Baih., 69-70, 244, 247-52; Gard., 93-5; IA, loc. cit.

48. Baih., 36-8, 82, 142-4.

49. ibid., 220-37 = Elliot and Dowson, History of India, II, 100-13.

50. Baih., 83; Majma' al-ansāb, f. 183a.


52. Baih., 84 ff., 316-33, 342-54.

53. ibid., 65; Gard., 96; IA, IX, 283 (the first page of this numbering); Anthār al-wuzarā', f. 106a; cf. Nazim, M1 Art. "Al-Maimandī".


55. ibid., 570.

Chapter 5

56. Baih., 343, 445; IA, IX, 324-5 (cf. Barthold, Turkestan, 297-8,
following given as passing through the Lake Urmia region in 1043-4 seems rather high (IA, IX, 276). See also for some figures of combatants, above, Part II, chapter 6.

71. Baih., 553.
72. ibid., 476-7, 552, 682.
73. ibid., 471; Neash., 16, tr. 18.
74. Baih., 399-400, 439, 497. The raid into Sistān seems to be the first irruption of the Turkmens into there recorded by the TS, 364, where it is placed in the joint governorship of Bu Sa'id JimurtI and Bu Sa'id Qūhistānī, which began in 427/1035-6.
75. cf. Baih., 506-7: panic was caused in the autumn of 1036 by a false rumour that Chaghīrī and 4000 cavalry had ridden through Ghūr to attack Ghazna.
77. TN, tr. II, 968-9.
78. Baih., 537, 581.
79. ibid., 542, 570, 578, 588.
80. ch. XXII of the SN, 105, "On the necessity of keeping stocks of provisions in storehouses", may be based on Ghaznavid precedent. The term kūtwāl/kūtāl was brought into the Islamic world by the Ghaznavids. Its origin is Indian, from Prakrits kothavāl "sheriff", and not Turkish, pace W. Bang, "Vom Kūk-türkischen zum Osmanischen", AbhPAW, 1919, No. 5, 60; Németh, "Le système des noms de peuples turcs", 70, and Spuler, Iran, 342 (cf. Erbek and Rypka, ORZ, I, 1956, 254); see also Sa'id Naft's note in his edn. of BaihaqI, II, 842.
81. cf. al-FusainI, Akhbār, 7, on the state of Khurasan in 1037: qad insaddat at-ṭurūq wa'naqatqat mawādd al-gawāfil li-tashwīsh
al-ṣatrūf waʾṣtīlaʾ al-ʿumārī al-Salāḥīyya al-ʿrāās al-Nawāfī; and Baih., 398, on the disturbed state of the Nishapur-Ray road as early as 1033.

82. ibid., 577.

83. ibid., 483-6, and see Begtughāfi’s comments on the dangers of contradictory commands and of responsible posts being given to young and inexperienced court favourites, ibid., 481-2.

84. IA, IX, 327.

85. Baih., 535-6, 536, 543-4; al-Ḥusainī, Akbār, 6-9; IA, IX, 328 (the correct date of the battle, Shaʿbān 429/May 1038, in Baih.; the other two have Shaʿbān 428).

86. IA, IX, 329.


88. Baih., 444. Unfortunately, Baihaqī, in company with many other Islamic historians, does not tell us the normal, as opposed to the exceptional, prices.

89. ibid., 535-6, 577-8.

90. ibid., 609.

91. ibid., 612, 631.

92. ibid., 616-18, 631-2; Šāhīr ad-Dīn Māḥṣūṣīra, Salāḥīyya, 16; Rewandī, 100; Ārāg, 34; al-Ḥusainī, Akbār, 9-10; IA, IX, 329.

Chapter 6

When the Seljuqs first appeared in Nishapur, he quite literally went underground, concealing himself in a subterranean vault, and during the occupation, he was helped by the local Qalids and was able to send out messages in code to the Vizier in Ghazna. Then when the Seljuqs left, he re-emerged to greet the returning Sultan.

94. on the Qadi Qadir, see above, Part III, 336-9.

95. see below, 506-8.

96. Büzgân or Būzghān is roughly half-way along the road from Nishapur to Herat, on the borders of Qūhistān and Bēdgīs (Hudūd, 103; Yaqút, Muqaddimā, I, 756, II, 909; Le Strange, Eastern lands of the Caliphate, 356-7).

97. perhaps the Sayyīd Zaid b. Muḥammad b. al-Muẓaffar of Bainaq (d. 440/1048-9) mentioned by al-Ṭūsī, as-Siyāsāt-ta’rīkh Nishābūr, f. 65a.

98. the colour of this banner is not specified, but at the battle of Talkh-Āb near Sarakhs in 1039 the three Seljuq commanders each had their own black banner planted on a sand-hill (Bahr., 575). Spuler, Iran, 349, is therefore incorrect in saying that the Seljuqs only adopted black banners after they entered Baghdad in 1055.

99. on the Sābūnīs, see above, Part III, 342-3.

100. see above, Part III, 350.

101. the bow and arrow, weapon par excellence of the steppe nomads, was the Oghuz symbol of authority, and the Seljuqs used it for their tamgas. A stylised bow and arrow appears on the coins of Tughrîl and his two successors and on the only known medal of Tughrîl's (J. Walker, "A unique medal of the Seljuk Tughrilbeg", Centennial vol. of the American Numismatic Society, New York, 691-5). When Tughrîl became Sultan, he used a bow and arrow on ceremonial occasions as an emblem of sovereignty (Barhebr., tr.

102. Dozy, Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes, II, 522, explains mulham as "une sorte d'étoffe dont la chaîne est de soie, mais non pas la trame" which was made especially at Merv. Tawasi or Tawwasi is explained by Freytag, Lexicon, I, 204, as "panni Persici (ab oppido ܢܘܘ ܢܘ/* dicto)". Tawwaj was a town in Fars famous for its linens woven with a gold-thread ornament (Le Strange, op. cit., 259-60, 293).

103. because of this profanation, Sūrī was later ordered by the Sultan to break up the throne and all the carpets spread on the dais and give the pieces to the poor; stables constructed by the Seljuqs were also pulled down (Baih., 607).

104. Tazik is used here, as elsewhere in Baihaqi, in the sense "Persian citizen or subject", the name used by the Persians to distinguish themselves from their Turkish rulers (Barthold, EI, 1 Art. "Tazik"). Cf. Biberstein-Kazimirski, Menoutchehri, 121 n. 2: "Tazikān civils, bourgeois", but he mistranslates, 115, rasūmā-yi Tazikān as "les usages modernes".

105. Bundārī, 7-8; a similar account in Barhebr., tr. 196, and a brief reference in Zahir ad-Dīn Ishāpūrī, Seljūqnāma, 17.

106. IA, IX, 312, cf. 328, where the date of Tughrīl's entry is wrongly given as Shābān 428.

107. IV, 102.

108. Akhbar, 9; Seljūqnāma, 15; Rāwandī, 97; Čürēda, 33.
Chapter 7


110. Ādēb al-mulūk, f. 104a; Histoire des Seljoucides du Kerman, 4.

111. TB, 266, 273. The Ghaznavid commander's demands are also mentioned in al-Ḥusainī, Akhīr, 8, where it is said that he "swept Khurasan clean with the broom of his exactions and did not leave anyone ten stalks of corn".

112. Mīrkhw., loc. cit.

113. Baih., 608–9; al-Fārisī, as-Siyāq li-ta'rikh Nīshābūr, f. 26b.

114. IA, IX, 330.

115. cf. his Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen âge, Leiden 1959, especially the second section.


117. al-Fārisī, op. cit., ff. 108a-b; TB, 219; some of his verses quoted by ašt-Ṭabāʿī, Tatimmat al-yatīma, II, 7–8; further refs. in H. Bowen, "The sar-gudhasht-i sayyidnā ....", JRAS, 1931, 778–9. Ref. to other members of Muwaffaq's family who were prominent during the 11th century in al-Fārisī, loc. cit., ff. 15a, 135a, 140b, and IA, X, 23.


119. Zāhir ad-Dīn Mīshāpurī, Seljūkūn, 17; Rāwandī, 103; Mīrkhw., IV, 54.

120. al-Fārisī, op. cit., ff. 101b–102a. Rāwandī, 98, gives him the nisba "al-Kūbānī", but this looks like a mistake for "al-
his passivity is also in part explicable by his advanced age; when Mas'ud re-entered the city the next year he was unable at first to go and meet him personally, and in 1040 he died at the age of eighty-six (Baikh., 607, 611; al-Fārisī, as-Siyāq li-ta'rikh Nishāpur, f. 74b).


124. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Nishāpurī, *Seljūqnāma*, 18; Rāwandī, 98, 104; Mustawfī, *Guzīda*, 437. In the fuller list of Tughrī's Viziers in IA, IX, 359, however, his first one is given as Abū'l-Qāsim Ǧali b. Ǧabdallāh al-Juwainī.


126. Baikh., 610.


128. Mirkhw., IV, 102. But when the Seljuqs came again to Merv in 1039, it resisted them in a seven months' siege (al-Ḥusainī, Akhbār, 11; IA, IX, 329).

129. Gard., 107; IA, IX, 315-16.

130. cf. Baikh., 560-2, and Gard., 105-6, on the activities at this time in Gūzgān of a notorious Sayyār, one Ǧali Qunduzī.

131. Baikh., 588-9, 650.
Chapter 8

132. as does Cahen when he speaks of the "splendid memories" left by the Tiuk-kiu empire in Central Asia, and deduces therefrom that "On their side the Turks were not, in the 11th century, novices in politics" (in Setton and Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 136-7).


134. Bundārī, 7-8.

135. IA, IX, 312; al-Ḥusainī, Akhbār, 9; Cahen, *op. cit.*, 62. Only al-Ḥusainī attributes to Tughrīl at this time the łaqāb Ṣuḥn ad-dunyā wa'd-dīn. The original form of the title was more probably Ṣuḥn ad-daula, following Būyid practice, and it was probably conferred on him by the Caliph after he had entered Baghdad (thus in Bundārī, 13-14; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Mīshāpurī, 19; Rāwandī, 105), even though łaqābs in -dīn became the most common among the Seljuqs (cf. Kramers, "Les noms musulmans composés avec Dīn", *AOS*, V, 1927, 62 ff.). The frequent interchanging of components like -daula, -dīn and -milla, etc., often makes the exact form of these honorifics hard to determine.


137. Baih., 490, 626; Bundārī, 8; Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Mīshāpurī, 18; Rāwandī, 104; Surāda, 37. It is not certain that the presence of the Buhārīan dīnīshmand proves a liaison with the indigenous religious classes (*pace* Cahen, *op. cit.*, 59); he may have accompanied the Seljuqs from Transoxania or else have been acquired as a captive.

138. IA, IX, 330. One is reminded of the Arab conquerors of Madī'īn who used the camphor found there as salt for cooking (Baldādhurī, Cairo 1959, 263, also in al-Fakhrī, Cairo 1317/1899, 74, tr.
Browne, _Literary History of Persia_, I, 199). *Qatmāch* must be from *qat-* "add" = a food composed of layers; cf. *tutmāch* in *Juwainī*, tr. Boyle, II, 505 n. 15, "fresh pastry cut in strips and stewed with meat".
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