A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF SEVILLE
UNDER BANÜ 'ABBĀD

presented by
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Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts,
University of Edinburgh.
June, 1978
To the memory of my father, who died for the independence of his nation, and to my mother, who has ever since faced the consequences with courage, patience and wisdom
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ABSTRACT

The great interest of hispanists in the more glamorous history of the Banū Umayya dynasty in al-Andalus has overshadowed the efforts of research on the Taifa period (eleventh century). Furthermore, many of the scholars who have so far studied the Taifa period are specialists in the history of the previous Banū Umayya period or periods which follow, such as that of the al-Murābiṭūn. Consequently, there is a demand for specialisation in the Taifa period.

The need for a political and social history of Seville under Banū ʿAbbād is significant because, as the most powerful and influential Taifa state, Seville has sharply marked Andalusian history not only if one considers the wide scope and magnitude of its relations with the other Taifas, but also in the context of its impact on the relations of al-Andalus with Castile on the one hand and the Maghrib on the other.

This thesis consists of a general introduction and survey of the primary sources, and four chapters, as follows:

CHAPTER ONE

Chapter One consists of an analysis of the rise and fall of the Banū ʿAbbād dynasty, with a concentration on the period of each ruler individually.
CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two studies Seville's political system, the army, and the judicial system. The political system is viewed in terms of similarities and differences with the Banū Umayya model, on which it was based. The dominant position of the ruler in the system is emphasised. The subsection on Justice is given particular importance as the approach to Mālikism in al-Andalus differs from the one generally adopted.

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter Three studies Sevillan society with a particular stress on aspects which have been overlooked in other works, such as social mobility and the Sevillan economy.

CHAPTER FOUR

In Chapter Four, Seville's foreign relations are evaluated at the theoretical and actual levels in terms of Seville's relations with the Taifas, the kingdom of Leon and Castile, and the Maghrib.
TRANSLITERATION

Transliteration is based on the system adopted by Edinburgh University. The determination of the pronunciation and transliteration of Arabic names has presented several problems, some of which have been solved only arbitrarily. For example, where the vocalisation is lacking, arbitrary choices have been adopted. Where the names of persons are too long, the general rule, where possible, has been to include the kunya, the first name, the father's name, the family name and the name by which the person has become commonly known. In cases where the family and common name are lacking, the rule has been to adopt the name of the last ancestor in the genealogical list.

* * * * * * * *

In conversions of the Hijri to Christian years, the first of the two Christian years will be adopted.
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INTRODUCTION

The Taifa period has generally been taken for granted by modern scholars, and the greater interest in the Banū Umayya period has to some extent been at the expense of the eleventh century. The Taifa period has been conceived either as a continuation of the Banū Umayya period preceding it or as a prelude to the period of the al-Murābiṭūn which followed. Although it is undeniably both, the Taifa period must, foremost and above all, be conceived within an independent context, with its own particular attributes. The temptation to approach eleventh-century al-Andalus as an extension of the Banū Umayya period should therefore be avoided, despite links between the two. This is difficult, because the Taifa period has mainly, almost exclusively, been studied by historians whose primary interest lies in the periods of Banū Umayya or the al-Murābiṭūn. What is therefore needed is an approach that places the Taifa period in the forefront but, at the same time, considers it within the more general context.

The eleventh century is a coherent entity not merely as a division of time into one hundred years, but as a period that is characterised by the disintegration of al-Andalus into Taifas. The forces which produced this phenomenon were above all contemporary and newly developed, even though inevitably retaining ingredients from the past. The setting during the Taifa period was, in many ways, similar to that of the Banū Umayya period. Geographical and climatic conditions
were identical. The social conditions were highly comparable ethnically and culturally and, in some respects, economically. Even the social structure was not altered in any essential manner. Yet the political climate was fundamentally and irreversibly changed. The political dimension was of a unique importance during the Taifa period. Because of the lack of a comprehensive political framework in al-Andalus during the eleventh century, the socio-economic scene was drastically affected. Consequently, any understanding of the socio-economic forces behind the mutations and perturbations characterising the Taifa period will remain incomplete without a full appreciation of the situation politically. Not only were the social forces cloaked in a political appearance, but the two frequently merged together to become virtually indistinguishable. The political disintegration of al-Andalus during the eleventh century implies that the newly developed socio-political entity of the Taifa state should be studied individually, in order to throw more light on the general history of eleventh-century al-Andalus. The Taifa period cannot be disregarded as a transitional phase or a passing phenomenon, because the same pattern was later repeated on two occasions in Andalusian history, and it is fully legitimate to ask whether the ingredients of the first Taifa period, during the eleventh century, did not affect the second and third Taifa periods which followed the rule of the al-Murābiṭūn and the al-Muwaḥḥidūn respectively. Consequently, a better understanding of the Taifa period during the eleventh century is indispensable.
The justification for writing a political and social history of Seville under Banū 'Abbad is hardly required.¹ Seville was the most influential and powerful Taifa state, and its political predominance in al-Andalus contributed decisively to the latter's historical evolution during the eleventh century. Seville's importance is also seen at other levels. For example, it was of significant commercial importance, and grew as an urban centre at a time when the other major Andalusian cities were declining. The importance of Seville increased during the eleventh century as a result of its expansion. Not only did Seville conquer the weaker Taifas, such as those in the Gharb (Western al-Andalus), and effectively confront almost every powerful Taifa state such as Badajoz, Toledo, etc., but it succeeded, during the reign of al-Mu'tamid, in annexing Cordoba with all its symbolic implications as the previous Caliphal capital. Educationally and culturally, Seville obtained an importance that increased consistently and continuously. In short, because of the scope and magnitude of its relations with other Taifas, Seville is of primary importance for the understanding of eleventh-century al-Andalus. Furthermore, whether in positive or negative terms, Seville's role in the development of the relations of eleventh-century al-Andalus with Castile and the Maghrib was significant.

¹. Originally a thesis presented at al-Azhar University, A. at-Tawd's Banū 'Abbād bi-Ishbiliya, Tetuan, 1946, is now outdated and deficient in several respects. M. Tayeb Touaybiya began a doctoral thesis entitled Le royaume Abbadide de Séville at the University of Aix-en-Provence in 1966 (see R.E.I., XXXIV (1966), p. 200), which has apparently been discontinued.
When studying the Taifa state of Seville, a central element of our approach is the consideration of al-Andalus within a broader context of space and time. Approaching the eleventh century as such is a convenient manner of referring to an abstract span of time. We therefore presuppose that the eleventh-century history of al-Andalus is a continuous process following the tenth century and itself followed by the succeeding century. In terms of space, the history of Seville under Banū 'Abbād is conceived within the more general context of al-Andalus, which is in turn considered as an interacting entity with other larger bodies such as the Northern Christian kingdoms or the Maghrib. In short, Seville under Banū ‘Abbād is simultaneously conceived as a product and an inherent part of eleventh-century al-Andalus. The stress is laid on the external influence on Seville, without neglecting its contribution to the general developments in al-Andalus. Our view of Seville as a Taifa state is extended to the Sevillan inhabitants and leaders who are considered within the general socio-economic context. Their role as a collective human force which contributed to the shaping of their destiny is not overlooked. Our goal is therefore to create a balanced and comprehensive approach to Seville under Banū ‘Abbād.

The political and social history of Seville may be perceived at various levels. While considering the specifically internal aspects of Seville's history, the latter is conceived within the more comprehensive context
of amalgamated Taifa states, and their relations with the Maghrib and the Christian kingdom of Castile and Leon. The effects of the internal developments on the external and vice versa is a constant preoccupation, as only by focusing on the multiple facets of Sevillan history can they be fitted into a general perspective as a complete and harmonious whole.

The stress on the political and social dimension in the present thesis is the result of several practical, rather than philosophical, reasons. Firstly, apart from the numerous poems which have survived from eleventh-century al-Andalus, most of the historical material pertaining to the period is essentially political and social. Secondly, this study, while concentrating on the political and social dimension, includes all those other elements, such as the economic or judicial, which affect or relate to the political and social history of eleventh-century Seville. Finally, it is hoped that the political and social study of Seville will be of some use to those studying Seville with a stress on other aspects.

Chapter One of this thesis outlines the rise and fall of the Banu ‘Abbād dynasty, analysing the internal causes underlying the establishment of al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād as ruler over Seville in 414/1023, the consolidation of power by al-Mu’taḍid b. ‘Abbād from 433/1041 to 461/1068, and the further expansion and final collapse and loss of power by al-Mu’tamid b. ‘Abbād in 484/1091. The main
internal events of Seville's history under Banū 'Abbād will also be evaluated.

Chapter Two studies the political system in Seville, as well as the army and the judicial system, which complemented the former. The main focus is on the political system, the different aspects of which are compared with the system under Banū Umayya, on which the Sevillan system was modelled. Having illustrated in Chapter One the extent of power enjoyed by the Banū 'Abbād rulers, we consider the ruler as a central element of the political system since, in practice, he constituted the ultimate source of power.

The subsection on Justice in Seville has been almost as fully elaborated as the one on the political system, for two reasons. (i) It provided the major force for counterbalancing or, at any rate, minimising the ruler's predominance in the system as a whole. (ii) Our approach to the nature and social implications of Malikism in eleventh-century al-Andalus differs from that commonly adopted by hispanists. The notion of Andalusian Malikism, commonly propagated by writers in French and Spanish, is not subscribed to by the present writer. The rite of Malik b. Anas was, in substance and form, almost identical to that adopted in the Maghrib and, indeed, in other parts of the Islamic world. The criterion that should be applied when comparing the rite of Malik in al-Andalus and the Maghrib is the extent to which they were similar in their fundamental and superficial traits. The problem is one of
selection, and the distinction between the rite of Malik in al-Andalus and the Maghrib only becomes significant if the superficial differences are placed in the forefront and given priority over the fundamental similarities.

Eleventh-century Andalusian and Sevillan society has been adequately treated in the context of its outstanding literary output, and our approach in Chapter Three is purely social and political. The basic problem in this chapter has been the attempt to exploit the limited sources available for approaching those aspects of Sevillan society which are of interest to the modern sociologist, such as social structure and social mobility.

Finally, Chapter Four studies Seville's external relations with the other Taifas, Castile, and the Maghrib. Unlike Chapter One, where the concentration has been on the period of each individual ruler, Seville's foreign policy is comprehensively treated as a coherent and evolving body. Seville's foreign policy is discussed theoretically, its actual development is analysed against the general Andalusian background, and it is evaluated in terms of its immediate-term objectives and success on the one hand and its long-term goals and eventual failure on the other.

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In the present thesis, we have relied upon the primary sources and used the secondary sources to a minimum extent in the footnotes of the text. The reason for this has been to avoid the pitfall of building hypotheses and unfounded conclusions based on other secondary sources. With almost exclusive reliance on primary material, it is hoped that the supporting evidence will be reliable. However, this choice has the disadvantage of not pointing out whatever material is available among the secondary sources with regard to particular problems, issues or theories. But the specialist will no doubt already be familiar with available material on the subject of this thesis, while the general reader may consult the selection of secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

The primary sources used for this work include a wide range, and they have therefore been employed in numerous ways. They include the following types:

1.) 'World' histories.
2.) General bio-bibliographical dictionaries.
3.) Biographical dictionaries of fuqahā’ and religious men.
4.) Literary anthologies.
5.) Muslim and Christian chronicles.
6.) Geographical works.
7.) Memoirs.
8.) Literary works.
9.) Treatises on law and the hisba.
10.) Other works which fall into a category of their own, such as collections of proverbs or comprehensive works.
11.) Collections of monumental and numismatic inscriptions, letters and other documents.
The primary sources for the Taifa period constitute a wide range of works covering different fields and employing various approaches; so, when using the materials, the historian is required to apply strict selectivity, based on commonsense, or scrupulous evaluation in order to separate what appears to be forged or superficial from what is likely to be authentic and important. The informative value of the combined available primary sources is significant, despite the vacuum left in particular areas. There are 'world' histories such as Ibn-al-Athīr's Al- nuova הם טקסט על תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA,他们是 תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAIFA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, sollen תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, sollen תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA, הם תקופת ה TAỊA,—they reproduce a wide selection of eleventh-century poetry but also for their portrayal of eminent literary figures whose activities were extended to the socio-political plane. Chronicles, such as Ibn-'Idhārī's Al-Bayān al-Mughrib and al-Marrākushī's Al-Muʿjib fī Talkhīṣ Akhābār al-Maghrib, contain detailed information on rulers, events, etc.
Geographical works include *Kitāb al-Masālik wa-l-Mamālik* by al-Bakrī, who lived during the eleventh century. The only memoir from the eleventh century is ‘Abd-Allāh b. Baluggīn’s *Kitāb at-Tibyān*, the historical value of which is incalculable. The most useful literary works are the *Divāns*, such as *Divān Ibn-Zaydūn* and *Divān Ibn-Ḥamdīs*, even though the historical application of poetry is restricted to particular areas. The unique historical value of eleventh-century poetry, however, is that it authentically reflects the general atmosphere and mentality of the more privileged section of society. Treatises on law and the *ḥisba*, particularly Ibn-‘Abdūn’s *Risāla fi l-Qadā' wa-l-Ḥisba*, are useful for reconstructing the state of Justice in Seville. Other works fall into a category of their own, such as az-Zajjālī’s *Ravy al-‘Awāmm wa-Mar‘a s-Sawām fī Nukat al-Khawass wa-l-‘Awāmm*, which portrays the mentality, attitudes and values of Andalusian society, and Ibn-Ḥazm’s *Naqṭ al-‘Arūs*, which furnishes specific information relating to the Andalusian rulers. Finally, we have inscriptions and coins, which are reproduced in such works as G. Miles’ *Coins of the Spanish Mulūk at-Tawā’if*, or E. Lévi-Provençal’s *Inscriptions Arabes d’Espagne*. We also have some useful letters which were written by rulers such as al-Muʿtamid b. ‘Abbād, Yusuf b. Tashufīn or Alfonso VI, and others by historians like Ibn-Ḥayyān. These letters are reproduced in a variety of works such as chronicles, literary anthologies or works on rhetoric.
The degree to which reliance can be placed on the primary sources in the eleventh century varies for numerous reasons. While some authors, such as ʿAbd-Allāh b. Buluggīn, al-Bakrī, Ibn-Ḥazm, Ibn-Zaydūn, al-Ḥusaynī and Ibn-Ḥayyān, were contemporary with the Taifa period, others lived shortly after or much later. For example, Ibn-ʿAbdūn, Ibn-Bashkuwāl and Ibn-Bassām wrote during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Works were also produced during the thirteenth century by writers like Ibn-Khallikān and Ibn-ʿIdhārī, and during the fourteenth century by others such as Ibn-al-Khaṭīb and Ibn-Khaldūn. As late as the sixteenth century, we have the indispensable and comprehensive ʿNaḥṭ at-Tīb by al-Maqsrī. Yet the date of the work is not by itself an indicator of its value. For example, the main reason for the value of ʿNaḥṭ at-Tīb for the eleventh century is that it quotes heavily from previous sources which are lost or incomplete. There is controversy over the dates of some of the anonymous works such as the Poema de Mio Cid. Yet anonymous undated works like Al-Ḥulal al-Mawshiyya, Kitāb al-Iktīfāʾ and the Poema de Mio Cid contain detailed information that is not to be found elsewhere on key events during the eleventh century such as the conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI and Valencia by the Cid.

Some of the sources we use were written by authors from the Mashriq with limited knowledge of Andalusian history and sources. Yet it is in the fourteenth-
century work on style and rhetoric, Ḫusn at-Tawassul by the Egyptian al-Ḥalabī, that Alfonso's letter to Yusuf b. Tāshufīn is most fully reproduced. Other writers, while being familiar with Andalusian history, wrote in the Mashriq where they had no access to the required sources of reference. This was the case of al-Marrākushī, which accounts for the many technical errors in his Al-Mu‘jib.

The historical value of many of the later sources is that they quote or borrow from earlier works, some of which have been lost. One such work is Al-Matīn, which is a history of the Taifa period by a contemporary author, Ibn-Ḩayyān. The sixty volumes which originally constituted the work seem to have been lost. However, extracts from it have been widely quoted. For example, although he concentrated on literary presentation and commentary in his Adh-Dakhīra, Ibn-Bassān frequently quotes Ibn-Ḩayyān for historical information, and extracts from Al-Matīn have been quoted by almost every later Muslim historian who studied eleventh-century al-Andalus. Although this is

1. Brockelmann mentions that the sixty volumes constituting Al-Matīn existed in the library of Tunis but have been lost (C. Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, vol. 1, p. 338).

2. Al-Matīn has been used or quoted in the following works, among others: Al-Hulla as-Siyarā, by Ibn-al-Abbār, Al-Bayān al-Mughrib, by Ibn-‘Idhārī, Al-Mughrib fi al-Fula al-Maghrib, by Ibn-Sa‘īd, and Naft at-Tīb by al-Maqqarī. This selection illustrates the enormous influence of Al-Matīn on a variety of authors over a period of almost five centuries.
not the place to analyse Ibn-Ḥayyān as a historian, it should be indicated that his unanimous recognition by hispanists as the greatest Andalusian historian is amply justified merely from the extracts of Al-Matīn available to us.

Of the sources consulted for the present thesis, two works stand out: the Dhakhīra by Ibn-Bassām, and Kitāb at-Tībān by Ābū-Allāh b. Buluggīn. The Dhakhīra is one of the most reliable sources for eleventh-century al-Andalus. Parts I and IV are of great value in that they contain illuminating sections on poets who played an important role in Sevillian history, such as Ābū-l-Walīd Ibn-Zaydūn. These parts also contain important accounts of the history of such Taifas as Cordoba, Toledo and Seville. However, it is Part II, which studies the literary figures of Western al-Andalus (which includes Seville) that is indispensable for Sevillian history. The following points indicate its importance for the historian of Seville:

1. Although its principal aims are literary, Part II of Adh-Dhakhīra furnishes us with the biography of the major political personalities of Western al-Andalus during the

1. The Dhakhīra has been critically studied in a doctoral thesis (B.E. Nassif, La Dajīra de Ibn Bassām al-Santarinī, estudio crítico de su contenido, unpublished doctoral thesis, Madrid, 1962). It should be noted that the stress of this thesis is primarily concerned with the literary nature of the Dhakhīra.
Taifa period such as the Banū 'Abbād rulers, Ibn-‘Ammār, al-Qāḍī Abū-l-Walīd al-Bājī, etc. From the biographical information on the different personalities studied in Part II of Adh-Dhakhīra, one gets a vivid impression of the mentality, temperament, values, attitudes and behaviour of the Andalusian statesmen of the period. While the large number of figures studied constitutes a positive contribution to our conception of the general background that characterised the political state of affairs in al-Andalus, the inclusion of the major personalities sheds light on problems of a more particular nature. The value of such information is increased when one considers the scarcity of reliable sources for a period that is nine centuries away, the historian of which is likely to welcome the smallest scrap of information provided he is convinced of its authenticity.

2. Part II also indirectly furnishes some very valuable information concerning key events in eleventh-century Western al-Andalus (al-Gharb) such as the fall of Seville or al-Mu‘taqīd's wars with al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afītas of Badajoz.

3. The fact that Ibn-Bassām was a contemporary figure who lived through many of the events treated in Part II and was personally acquainted with some of the characters he studies is of great significance for the modern historian. Finally, of even greater importance is Ibn-Bassām’s honesty as an objective scholar and his heavy reliance on the greatest Andalusian historian, Ibn-Ḥayyān.
It is widely accepted that Prince 'Abd-Allāh's memoirs entitled Kitāb at-Tībān constitute a unique source for eleventh-century al-Andalus.¹ Not only was Prince 'Abd-Allāh a contemporary figure, he actually participated in many of the historical events he discusses. 'Abd-Allāh wrote his work in the Maghrib after the Taifas had been conquered by Yūsuf b. Tashufīn. 'Abd-Allāh was therefore restricted in what he said about Yūsuf, but could freely discuss the history of Granada and its relations with the other Taifas such as Seville. The importance of the Kitāb at-Tībān is not limited to its value as an important source of information. 'Abd-Allāh also presents his thoughts and the motives behind his decisions. He even analyses the behaviour and mentality of his adversaries, such as al-Mu'tamid's minister, Ibn-‘Ammār, or Alfonso VI. He sometimes quotes the people he refers to, such as Alfonso's envoys Sisnando Davídiz, Alvar Fāmez, and Pedro Ansúrez. Finally, although 'Abd-Allāh is basically concerned with the history of Granada, he discusses some of the major events during the eleventh century such as the conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI in 478/1085 or the Battle of az-Zallāqa in 479/1086 in which he participated.

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The utility of Christian sources in complementing or contradicting Muslim works is great. Their outlook is often different, which enables the historian to assess the material and approach problems more objectively. Unfortunately, the Christian chronicles on the eleventh century are scarce, and those which exist can only be used to a limited extent. Uninterested in the Muslim societies themselves, the Christian chronicles only mention the Andalusians in terms of their relations with the Christian rulers like Alfonso VI or the Cid Campeador, Rodrigo Díaz. Two chronicles of particular interest are Historia Roderici and Primera crónica general de España. The first, an anonymous work in Latin, is the earliest chronicle (dated c. 12th century) dealing with the eleventh century; it is attributed to Archbishop Rodrigo. The Primera crónica, which is the first chronicle in Spanish, was compiled by the order of Alfonso X and Sancho IV, and is an informative chronicle which relies heavily on Historia Roderici. These two sources are important for studying Seville’s relations with the Christian states and furnish detailed accounts of the major eleventh-century events such as the conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI, the Battle of az-Zallâqa, and the conquest of Valencia by the Cid.


2. On this work see Alfonso X and Sancho IV, Primera crónica general de España, Madrid, 1955, vol. 1, pp. XV-LXXII, and vol. 2, pp. CXXXIX-CCVIII.
The *Cantar de Mío Cid* or *Poema de Mío Cid* is among the most reliable Christian sources for the eleventh century, despite the many criticisms that have been advanced to contest its historical authenticity.\(^1\)

Although, from the historian's point of view, the *Poema de Mío Cid* is subject to the limitations of an epic and must consequently be approached with suspicion, the work refers to several well-established historical figures of the period and reflects the spirit of eleventh-century Castile and the mentality of the contemporary Castilian with much vigour, colour and clarity, without contradicting the general impression derived from acceptable historical texts.

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1. Of the numerous original editions and available re-editions of the epic, Colin Smith's 1972 edition, *Poema de Mío Cid*, is among the best. However, direct familiarity with the basic Arabic sources would have enabled the author to adopt a more constructive approach when analysing the 'historicidad' of the epic in his introduction. For example subsection II, entitled *Epic and History*, does not consider the historical accounts of many of the characters found in the epic despite the unique historical value in this respect of some of the Arabic sources such as *Adh-Dhakhira*, *Kitāb at-Tībān* and *Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya*. The result is that Smith's evaluation and assessment of the epic's 'historicidad' is deficient and unbalanced.
In the Poema de Mio Cid, two intrinsic features of the eleventh-century Castilian are echoed throughout the epic and appear in the forefront: an excessive lust for material gain and an instinctive violence.\(^1\) A similar excessive degree of violence is reflected in the historical texts. Despite its idealistic dimension, the epic does not contradict the historical reality of the period, because a powerful lust for material gain, depicted in the epic, was a major stimulating factor for the dynamism of the Cid and his supporters.\(^2\)

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1. For example, strength is conceived as one of the Cid's admirable assets, and its full application against the Moors is considered as an ethical duty. Violence is omnipresent in the description of the Cid's conquest of such fortresses as Castejon, Alcocer, Ateca and Terrer (Poema, pp. 17-26). The high emotions of the participants in the trial of the Princes of Carrion are expressed in verbal violence (ibid., pp. 96-103). Even the swords carried by the Cid's men are described as 'espadas dulces e tajadores' (ibid., p. 94).

2. For example, the booty acquired from the Moors is generously divided by the Cid among his men on such occasions as the defence of Valencia against the Sevillan king (Poema, pp. 40-41). The Cid regained the king's favour by sending him presents on various occasions, such as the one hundred horses he sent the king after defending Valencia (ibid., pp. 41-42). When the Princes of Carrion were brought to trial, the Cid requested the two swords, Colada and Tizon, and the three thousand marks he had given them before, demanding justice for his daughters whom the two princes had wronged (ibid., pp. 96-97, 99).\]
However, far from being crudely presented in the epic, both violence and greed are legalised and sanctified by the support they received from King and Church. Hence although the king banished the Cid initially, he later not only admired, but welcomed and defended, the hero.¹

The Cid's deep-seated religious belief constituted an intimate source of inspiration during his most difficult moments. Furthermore, it was in the monastery of San Pedro de Cardesña under the care of the Abbot Don Sancho that the Cid left his wife and two daughters when exiled, while Jerome, possibly a Frenchman, who fought by his side, was made bishop of Valencia when the Cid conquered it.²

The Poema de Mio Cid is therefore indispensable for appreciating the fundamental socio-historical forces that lay behind the evolution of Castile, which after 478/1085 embarked upon a policy of annexing al-Andalus entirely. The transcendental role of the Church is present throughout the epic, but the authority of the king is the major unifying factor politically and even the hero bows before the might of his sovereign.

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1. For example, see the king's opening speech during the trial of the Carrion brothers (ibid., p. 95).
2. ibid., pp. 9-11, 42-43.
CHAPTER ONE

THE REIGN OF BANU ‘ABBĀD:
AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR RISE AND FALL FROM POWER

I. Al-Qāḍī Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abbād

(1023-1041)

I. The General Background and Situation in al-Andalus prior to Banū ‘Abbād

Never in history had a highly civilised nation broken down internally and systematically into as many politically autonomous sub-sections as did al-Andalus during the fifth century of the Hijra (11th A.D.). Rarely have so many independent political entities the size of the Andalusian Taifa states simultaneously guarded their autonomy for as long as the latter. The phenomenon is not sufficiently understood because much research for the period needs yet to be undertaken. Hence the urgent need for a fresh approach to the period of the Taifa states and a greater consideration of its implications in Andalusian history.

The general administrative and political system of eleventh-century al-Andalus was one of unprecedented decentralisation and separatism. With the fall of Banū Umayya, the pole of attraction which Cordoba had constituted until the early eleventh century was irrepeableably lost and the provinces of al-Andalus were transformed into semi-independent, semi-isolated spheres of influence, the Taifa
states. Regionalism was the end product that gradually demolished the decadent Cordoban Caliphate during the early eleventh century; this regionalism persisted, constituting the comprehensive framework for the political perturbations that shook al-Andalus throughout the century. Decentralisation, regionalism and disunity characterised and, in many phases, determined the historical period known for a unique phenomenon, the development of the Taifa states.

The complex intersecting and inter-reacting forces in al-Andalus imposed themselves variously in different circumstances throughout the eleventh century. Ideological factors were of the highest influence in moulding eleventh-century political developments in al-Andalus. Forces of an Islamic collective consciousness were released as a reaction whenever the Christian threat from the North attained perilous dimensions. The Islamic element seems to have shown two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the Taifa kings retained an Islamic appearance to legitimise their domination over ex-provinces of the Banū Umayya Caliphate, despite the separatist and hence anti-Islamic implications of their fragmentation. The most impressive example was the appeal for Yūsuf b. Tāshufīn's assistance, sought and justified by the Taifa kings on religious grounds (despite the non-religious long-term and immediate causes), in response to Alfonso VI's aggressive policy following 478/1085.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Alfonso VI's new policy towards the Taifas following his conquest of Toledo in 478/1085 will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter Four of the present thesis.
Islamic terminology characterised the Taifa kings' speech, letters, prose and poetry. For example, al-Mu'tamid's reply to Alfonso's letter resounds with religious overtones throughout, while it is clear in his Kitāb at-Tibyān that Prince 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn b. Zīrī of Granada includes Islamic justifications for almost every decision he makes. Furthermore, the Qur'ān is frequently quoted as supporting evidence. Another example of their religious tendencies is reflected in their adoption of such titles as al-Mu’tasid bi-Dīn Allāh, al-Mu’tamid ‘Alā-Allāh or al-Musta‘īn bi-Dīn Allāh. However, the Taifa kings' Islamic exterior contrasts with their numerous anti-Islamic actions, thus illustrating the former's superficiality.

It was by criticising these actions, while enjoying internal popular support and later the external help of Yūsuf, that a powerful intellectual movement contesting the right to rule of the Taifa kings in general developed, supporting its claims by Islamic principles of legality. This intellectual opposition included individuals of varying professions throughout al-Andalus who were united by their open denunciation of the Taifa kings and their subscription to the principle of reunifying al-Andalus under one banner. Unlike the Taifa kings who desired the maintenance of a status quo which would provide the stability required for their survival, the militant intellectual opposition sought the radical transformation of al-Andalus through the reintegration of its disintegrated regions. The
widespread discontent was expressed at various levels, ranging from al-Qāḍī Abū-l-Walīd al-Bājī’s visits to several eminent Taifa kings and his unheeded plea for peace and unity following his return from the Orient in 426/1034, the bitter condemnations of Ibn-Ḥayyān found in the widely quoted extracts from his al-Matīn, the piercing irony of Ibn-Ḥazm or the active militancy of such devoted supporters of Yūsuf b. Tashufīn as al-Qāḍī Ibn-Sahl, or the collaboration of Bādis b. Warwī or Ibn-al-Qilay‘ī. The popular condemnation of the Taifa kings is reflected in contemporary political poetry, which constituted an effective means of mass communication. Although this movement contributed to

2. Tib., pp. 117-18, 146.
3. Probably the most popular satirical poem condemning the artificiality of the Taifa kings included the following verses by Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Ḥashīq al-Qayrawānī:

'Mimmā yuzahhidun fī arqā’ Andalusīn
Simā’ Muqtadīrīn fīthā wa-Mu’tamidī
Alqābī mamlakātīn fī ghayrī mawḍī‘īhā
Ka l-hirrī yuhkī ntiṣfākhān ṣawlatā l-asadī!

(Mu‘jib, p. 70; Rayat, p. 101.)

('What makes me indifferent to the land of al-Andalus
Is the echoing of [the titles] Muqtadir and Mu’tamid,
Titles of a kingdom, used out of context,
Like an inflated cat imitating the aggression of a lion.')
the final collapse of the Taifa states, its lack of organisation, and the fact that each individual manifested his opposition for individual motives, implied that the better organised al-Murābiṭūn (Almoravids) would lead al-Andalus following their triumph over the Taifa kings. Furthermore, the intellectual opposition was an ethical rather than a politically organised movement.

Forces of ethnic awareness were displayed internally when different racial factions organised and clashed in al-Andalus. The ethnically composite Andalusian society, which included Arabs, Berbers, Slavs and Latins, was agitated and more sensitive during a turbulent eleventh century. With widespread social unrest, agitation and violence, ethnic groupings served as a limited means of seeking security and strengthening defence. Although the ethnic dimension is a necessary element for explaining inter-Taifa relations, the former must not be conceived as a consistent or a predominating factor. The vulnerability of the racial approach is demonstrable by examples of peaceful co-existence between Arab-Berber, Berber-Slavic and Slavic-Arab states. For example, under Banū 'Abbād, Seville temporarily enjoyed peaceful relations with the Berber leader of Carmona (Qarmūna), Muhammad al-Barzālī, while Prince 'Abd-Allāh expresses deep gratitude to al-Muṭamīd who assisted him during times of internal troubles and insecurity.¹ Inter-racial allegiances

¹ Prince 'Abd-Allāh compliments al-Muṭamīd almost every time the latter is mentioned, e.g. Tib., p. 82.
were further encouraged by mixed marriages, as is illustrated by al-Mu'taḍid's marriage to the daughter of Mujāhid al-'Āmirī, sister of ‘Ālī b. Mujāhid of Denia (Dānya). ¹ Examples are equally abundant of military confrontations between Taifa states of similar ethnical backgrounds, illustrating inter-Arab, inter-Berber and inter-Slavic strife. As examples of conflicting Taifa kings of identical ethnic backgrounds, one might cite the confrontation of al-Mu'tamid with Ibn-Jahwar, Prince 'Abd-Allāh's struggle with his brother Tamīm or Muḥammad al-Barzālī's alliance with al-Mu'taḍid against another Berber, Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd. ² Previously, al-Qāṣim b. Ḥammūd had had to confront his brother 'Ālī and later his nephew Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd. ³ Finally, the racial division of states, while ignoring the role of the original inhabitants of al-Andalus, is based on the racial origin of the Taifa leaders and underestimates the ethnic variety of local populations.

Individual greed, personal gain and self-interest sometimes overshadowed all other considerations in determining political developments within and between Taifa states. The eleventh century having been a period during which power was extensively abused to determine the outcome of differences at individual and state levels, personal ambitions found

1. Hulla, II, p. 43.
fertile breeding grounds. Even if the first generation of Taifa kings is not considered to have illegally imposed its authority on different regions of the Banū Umayya Caliphate, examples of adventurers who rose against the Taifa kings themselves abound. Prince ’Abd-Allāh’s Kitāb at-Tibyān illuminates this problem, furnishing detailed examples of rebels or potential rebels who threatened the unity of Granada. Prince ’Abd-Allāh’s own brother, Tamīm of Malaga, attempted to encroach upon Granadan territory and, militarily defeated, he continued pressing his claims upon Yūsuf b. Tāshufīn, following the Battle of az-Zallāqa.¹ Having defeated his rebelling commander, Ibn-Taqnawt, Prince ’Abd-Allāh had him executed with his supporters, while his commander over Arjona (Arjūna) and Antequera (Antaqayra), Kabbāb b. Tamīt, constantly kindled trouble between al-Mu‘tamid and Prince ’Abd-Allāh until the latter crushed him.² The heavily taxed Jewish community of Lucena (al-Yūssūna), led by Ibn-Maymūn, revolted and an agreement was finally reached through the pressures and intervention of Prince ’Abd-Allāh’s commander over Loja (Lawsha), Mu‘ammal, and friendly Jewish elders.³ Mu‘ammal himself led an unsuccessful revolt against Prince ’Abd-Allāh and, having failed to obtain Yūsuf’s support, fled.⁴ Nu‘mān, the

2. ibid., pp. 95-100.
3. ibid., pp. 130-32.
4. ibid., pp. 136-38.
commander who defeated Mu’ammal, joined Yūsuf’s ranks following az-Zallāqa, leading his victorious armies during the conquest of Lucena and other fortresses of Western Granada. The revolt of Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s Zanāta commanders was only averted by the former’s resolute and timely action. Most revealing is Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s obsessive suspicion of almost every highly ranking functionary and commander in Granada and his constant adoption of preventive measures. For example he abolished the post of minister, holding each individual official directly responsible to him.

Rebels against al-Mu‘tamid included Ibn-Rashīq and the former’s life-long companion and friend, Ibn-‘Ammār. Rebellions against the Taifa kings were the rule rather than the exception and it is probably impossible to find a Taifa ruler who remained unchallenged. More common than rebels, however, were the regional commanders who effectively controlled their fortresses while retaining a merely nominal allegiance to their Taifa kings. Finally, the individual self-interest of the rebels is deduced from the non-existence of other serious ideological motives for their actions, as may be that of the Taifa kings from their petty squabbles and

1. ibid., pp. 138-39, 144, 148.
2. ibid., pp. 133-35.
3. ibid., p. 86.
attempts at mutual destruction, added to their oppressive internal policies of over-taxation.¹

The geographic factors were of minimal significance in determining military confrontations in al-Andalus, unlike the Christian North where cold temperatures, forests and mountains combined to form discouraging natural barriers for Muslim military expeditions such as those of al-Manṣūr b. Abī-‘Āmir. However, purely political, social or economic conditions greatly influenced the general course of events in eleventh-century al-Andalus, as did the deliberate intervention of men. The latent existence of a combination of interacting forces which co-existed harmoniously at times and conflicted at others, changed in a variety of patterns in which some were imposed more sharply in accordance with varying circumstances. Hence the contradictions which constituted the essential pattern of Taifa state political struggles.

However, the conflict between contradictory forces and their political expression during the eleventh century is not indicative of any natural social disintegration of the Andalusian society, the latter having previously proved the solidity of its cohesion despite a unique and continuous multi-cultural interaction. The intolerance of the Banū Abī-‘Āmir dictatorship effectively inflamed different underground reactions promoting the defence of narrow group interests. The Banū Abī-‘Āmir usurpation of power prevented

¹ ibid., p. 109.
any constructive replacement of the decadent political structures of Banū Umayya. The brutal suppression of legitimate political activity in what had long been a tolerant, highly-politicised society had the inevitable long-term result of violent explosions and the final division of al-Andalus into a multiplicity of Taifa states. During the transitory period of Banū Abī-‘Āmir domination, their apparently unifying role of leadership in al-Andalus was outweighed by the long-effect negative implications which resulted from their suffocation of all existing political forces. During the period of Banū Abī-‘Āmir, al-Andalus' outward expansion and pseudo-imperial appearance concealed its internal weakness and decaying elements.

Although the beginning of the rule of Banū Abī-‘Āmir marked the effective end of the Banū Umayya dynasty, the latter's legal and spiritual status was recognised throughout the rule of Banū Abī-‘Āmir, and after it. In fact, Banū Abī-‘Āmir administered their Cordoban Caliphate in the name of Banū Umayya. With the fall of an-Nāṣir Sulaymān b. al-Ḥakam in 407/1016, Hishām II vanished from the political scene and, with his disappearance, the role of Banū Umayya as a major force of centralisation and cohesion ceased to exist forever. Its credibility as a political force had vanished and its past grandeur was only echoed by a handful of Taifa leaders who falsely claimed the rediscovery of Hishām II.

The death of al-Ḥakam al-Mustanṣir bi-Allāh on the 2 Ṣafar 366/30 September 976 was followed by the engagement
of different factions in a power struggle which stimulated the numerous factors eventually promoting the final collapse of the Banū Umayya Caliphate in al-Andalus. In the words of Prince 'Abd-Allāh, Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Āmir gradually ... reduced to obscurity the men who had been prominent during the Caliphate of al-Ḥakam and ... ruthlessly eliminated them. As a result of the assassination of al-Mughīra b. ‘Abd-Allāh an-Nāṣir, which followed immediately upon the death of his brother al-Ḥakam, opposition from the supporters of the saqāliba leaders, Fā’iq and Jawdhar, was weakened and later crushed. Al-Ḥakam's ten-year-old heir, Hishām al-Mu‘ayyad, also known as Hishām II, was rapidly proclaimed Caliph on the 3 Ṣafar 366/1 October 976 and received widespread recognition throughout al-Andalus. The plotters of the assassination, the Ḥājib Ja‘far b. ‘Uthmān al-Muṣḥafī and Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Abī-‘Āmir, then assumed power as guardians of Hishām II. They further benefited from the support of Hishām's mother Ṣubḥ, who exercised much influence through her nomination of high officials and determination of policies. Eventually, ‘Uthmān al-Muṣḥafī's and Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Āmir's mutual distrust and personal ambitions resulted in the former's elimination and the latter's monopolisation of power.

1. Tib., p. 15.
3. A’mal, pp. 48-57; Muʿjib, p. 25.
Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir was able to achieve his objective by exploiting his position of increasing influence while gradually reducing al-Muṣḥafī’s powers by competing with him in the latter’s areas of authority. Administratively, Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir rose from his initial post of minister to that of supreme commander of the army and civil administrator of Cordoba. The increase in Christian attacks from the North became a potential threat until Ibn-Abī-ʿĀmir assumed the army’s leadership. He directed his first military expedition inside Galicia in Rajab 366/February-March 977 and returned triumphant fifty-three days later with captives and booty. His popularity increased following his second success when he joined forces with the commander Ghālib b. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān of Sālim and commanded a military expedition into Castile on ‘Īd al-Fiṭr 366/May 977. In Ṣafar, his third expedition into Leon was a success that contributed even further to the increase of his influence in internal affairs. When Ghālib agreed to marry his daughter, Aṣmā’, to al-Muṣḥafī’s son, ‘Uthmān, Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir proposed his own candidacy instead and consummated the marriage, with ʿUbī’s blessings, on the 24 Muḥarram 367/12 September 977. Having prepared the way for al-Ḥājib al-Muṣḥafī’s downfall, Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir deposed the former from his

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position as Hajib on the 13 Sha'bân 367/27 March 978, imprisoned him and expropriated his belongings and finally had him killed.¹

Muḥammad b. Abī-'Āmir's reign, which lasted until his death on the 27 Ramadan 392/9 August 1002, was characterised by great military activity.² His military expeditions into the Northern kingdoms of Castile, Leon, Navarre and Galicia total about fifty-three. These incursions were unprecedented in their regularity, having become an annual venture, by their large scale, ranging over such extreme parts of Northern Spain as Santiago de Compostela, and by their success as the Christian states were constantly on the defensive. Their chief objective being economic, the riches acquired from these plunders contributed directly to the consolidation of Muḥammad b. Abī-'Āmir's internal position as ruler. Muḥammad b. Abī-'Āmir's military efforts were even extended to the Maghrib, where internal strife characterised the direct struggle between the Idrisīs on the one hand and the Zanāta Maghrāwa on the other, supported respectively by the Fāṭimīs of Egypt and Banū Umayya (followed by Banū Abī-'Āmir) of al-Andalus. The 'Āmirī armies therefore intervened repeatedly in the Maghrib.

Despite its significance, Muḥammad b. Abī-'Āmir's continuous military success following the elimination of al-'Hajib al-Muṣḥafī did not enable the former to crush all opposition. Having attained full control over the entire administrative

2. Tib., pp. 15-17.
and military apparatus, Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir became independent of Ṣubḥ's influence and constituted a threat to Hishām's position as the legal Caliph. Consequently, Ṣubḥ engaged in a discreet effort to stimulate Ghālib and later Zīrī b. ʿAtiyya to challenge the ʿĀmirī rule.

Ghālib's opposition to Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir took the form of a military confrontation which culminated in the former's death during a battle at San Vicente near Atienza on the 4 Muḥarram 381/2 April 991.\(^1\) Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir then directed incursions into Leon in revenge for Ramiro III's participation with Ghālib's armies, defeating him and his allies, Sancho of Navarre and Garcia Fernando of Castile.

Ṣubḥ's support of Zīrī was financial as she enjoyed free access to the state treasury. On the 3 Junādā 1, 386/24 May 996, Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir reacted to Zīrī's opposition by transferring the state reserves to his own palace with the blessings of ʿulamā', ministers, and the consent of Hishām II.\(^2\) To counter Banū Umayya propaganda against himself, he organised a grandiose procession, seating himself beside his son, ʿAbd-al-Mālik, and Hishām II who wore the Caliphal dress.\(^3\) Muḥammad b. Abī-ʿĀmir thus eliminated all serious opposition to his rule, which lasted until Ẓafar 392/December 1001-January 1002 when he died of sickness.

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during a military expedition inside Castilian territories.¹

Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Āmir's long reign had the unfortunate consequence of destroying the concept of legality of power among future contenders for the Caliphate. Having nullified Hishām II's role, Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Āmir was succeeded by his son ‘Abd-al- Málik, who was himself succeeded by his brother ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān.² However, others were to seek power as Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Āmir had, by resorting to violence. In Jumādā I or Jumādā II, 399/January-February 1009, Muḥammad b. Hishār b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār an-Nāṣir, known as al-Mahdī, overthrew ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Abī-‘Āmir, whom he crucified, and renounced his allegiance to Hishām II, although the latter was re-established in 400/1009.³ Al-Mahdī marked the commencement of the fitna (trouble) which led to the creation of the Taifa states, and symbolic of his plunders was his razing to the ground of the majestic Madīna az-Zahrā’.⁴ Cordoba's devastation followed when, after resisting for three years, the city was finally surrendered to Sulaymān b. al-Ḥakam b. Sulaymān who entered the capital in 403/1012 and Hishām II was apparently assassinated.⁵

2. Mu‘jib, p. 40; for a full account of the reigns of ‘Abd al- Malik and ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān, see Bayan, III, pp. 2-50.
4. Bayan, III, p. 64.
5. Mu‘jib, pp. 41, 43.
The exact period when Hishām II ruled was a controversy even among his contemporaries. Further, it is legitimate to demand whether he actually ruled at all. The sovereign Hishām al-Mu’ayyad had remained from the beginning of his nominal reign in an isolated atmosphere, surrounded by toys, musicians and concubines, without receiving any instruction in the administration of state affairs. However, despite his isolation, his image was promoted among the populace to gain widespread acceptance and esteem and to legitimise conflicting political claims and movements during a period of sixty years, to be revived again.

Hishām II was the figurehead throughout the ‘Āmirī rule. His symbolic status during the reign of al-Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Abī-‘Amīr continued during the succeeding reign of ‘Abd-al- Málik b. Abī-‘Amīr. Hishām II aroused widespread discontent and opposition to the ‘Āmirī ruler throughout al-Andalus when he designated ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Abī-‘Amīr as his legal heir and offered him the title of Wālī ‘Āḥd al-Muslimīn, thus officially preparing for the transfer of power from the Banū Umayyā dynasty. The violent uprising of al-Mahdī Muḥammad

1. The increased status of ‘Abd-al-Mālik is documented by a letter attributed to Hishām II in which the latter bestowed the title of al-Muṣaffar upon ‘Abd-al-Mālik and the office of Dhu-l-Wizaratayn upon ‘Abd-al-Mālik’s son, Muḥammad. For a full text of the letter, see Bayān, III, pp. 16-17.

b. Hishām accelerated the declining status of Hishām II as the latter was forced to abandon the Caliphate, proclaiming his resignation publicly. Although Hishām II was restored to power during the period 400/1009-403/1012, his assassination during Sulaymān b. al-Ḥakam’s march into Cordoba marked the definitive termination of the long-ailing Banū Umayya dynasty. In 407/1016-7 ʿAlī b. ʿ Hammūd led a movement against Cordoba, the alleged objective of which was the reinstatement of the resurrected Hishām II. When al-Qāḍī b. ʿ Abbād’s rule over Seville was threatened by Yaḥyā b. ʿ Hammūd, he proclaimed the rediscovery of Hishām al-Muʿayyad in 426/1034-5 and was supported by other leaders of Taifa states. Historically, apart from the certainty of his existence, the personality of Hishām II remains very much a mystery. The image of Hishām II as a motivating political force in al-Andalus was therefore the last remaining vestige of the long reign of Banū Umayya.

The bloody struggle over Cordoba finally led to the rule of Banū ʿ Hammūd over the capital. However, this triumph of Banū ʿ Hammūd was not accompanied by a reunification of al-Andalus and, throughout this period, some Taifa states enjoyed de facto sovereignty while others were in the process

1. ibid., pp. 59-62.
2. Bayan, III, p. 198; Aʿmal, p. 179; Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 122; Rabat, fol. 3r.; Bodl., fol. 3r.
of total disintegration from the central capital, Cordoba.  

In 404/1013-4 'Ali b. Ḥammūd, who then ruled over Ceuta (Sabta), received a letter allegedly from Hishām II pleading with the former to help him recover Cordoba, which was controlled by an-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, and promising him the right of succession to the Caliphate. The letter, which established 'Ali's position as a serious contender for the Cordoban Caliphate, won him the support of 'Amīr b. Fath of Malaga and Buluggīn b. Zīrī of Granada and led to his military occupation of Cordoba where Hishām II was said to have been found dead. 'Ali then declared himself Caliph on Dhū-l-Qa‘da 408/1017. 

Having initiated his reign by ruling justly and securing law and order, 'Ali reversed his policies after the first eight months when his suspicion of the local inhabitants grew as a result of their support for al-Murtāqā's claims to the Caliphate, leading to a reign of terror which culminated in 'Ali's assassination.

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1. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 161; examples of Taifa states which gained autonomy throughout the gradual collapse of the Cordoban Caliphate included the following: Saragossa (379/989), Ronda (383/993), Malaga (391/1000), Valencia (399/1008), Denia and Tortosa (400/1009), Almeria, Murcia, Moron (403/1012), Carmona (404/1013), Balearic Islands (405/1014), Toledo (418/1027).

2. Mu‘jīb, p. 44.

by three saqāliba eunuchs in his own palace bath. ¹ His brother al-Qāsim b. Ḥāmīd who ruled over Seville then came to Cordoba to succeed him and was proclaimed Caliph in Dhū-l-Qi‘da 408/March-April 1018.² His first reign ended when his nephew Yaḥyā b. Ḥāmīd of Malaga overthrew him in Rābi‘ 1 412/June-July 1021,³ but al-Qāsim re-entered Cordoba in Dhū-l-Qi‘da 413/October-November 1023 to be proclaimed Caliph.⁴ He was finally overthrown by the populace seven months later and, having failed to defeat the Cordobans, he fled to Seville, where his son Muḥammad had been ruling, in Sha‘bān 414/1023. However, the city gates were closed against him, and his sons Ḥasan and Muḥammad who had been besieged in their palace were released by local leaders under the new leadership of al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād.⁵ The impregnability of Seville is explained by its solid, recently-built wall.⁶ Al-Qāsim, most of whose

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¹ Dhakh., I, vol. i, pp. 80-1; ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd-Allāh b. an-Nāṣir al-Murtada of the Banū Umayyā family was declared as the rightful Caliph by Khayrān al-ʿAmīrī of Murcia in 407/1016, to contest ʿAlī b. Ḥāmīd's own claims (Bayan, III, p. 121).


⁴ Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 17; Bayan, III, p. 124; Muʿjib, p. 50; Nafh, II, p. 32.


⁶ Seville’s city wall was first solidly built in stone by ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. al-Ḥakam (206/821-248/862) when the city became exposed to attacks by the Vikings (Mamalik, p. 112)
troops had deserted him to join his nephew Yahyā b. Ḥammūd in Malaga, was then pursued by his nephew who defeated him at Jerez de la Frontera (Sharīsh) and took him prisoner to Malaga. Al-Qāsim was finally strangled in 427/1035, while in the prison of his nephew Idrīs, and buried in Algeciras by his son Muḥammad. At this point, Seville became master of its own destiny as Cordoba plunged into a series of assassinations of rulers and general revolts that eventually led to the establishment of a republic under Banū Jahwar.

(2) The Establishment of al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād in Seville

Seville, which had escaped central control from Cordoba when al-Qāsim had earlier established his rule over it, was for the first time ruled by a native with al-Qādī’s establishment in 414/1023. Following the latter’s acquisition of the reins of power, the Banū ‘Abbād dynasty was to determine the evolution of Seville’s politics within and beyond its constantly expanding frontiers. Seville’s history therefore assumed a new direction acquiring an unprecedented level of influence in Andalusian history.

The political awareness, skilful manoeuvres and diplomatically imposed leadership of al-Qādī Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abbād contributed as decisively to the establishment of Banū ‘Abbād in Seville as the general political situation in al-Andalus following the total disintegration

2. Jadwa, p. 80; Nafh, II, p. 32.
of the Caliphate of Banū Umayya. His discretion and subtlety as Qādī of Seville during the reign of al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd contrast with his determination, ruthlessness and systematic elimination of any contenders once his power was firmly established following the unanimous rejection of Ibn Ḥammūd's de facto sovereignty over Seville in 414/1023. The manoeuvres which enabled al-Qādī to achieve his unchallenged leadership over Seville indicate a deep sense of perception and determination to strive towards long-term ambitions. Al-Qādī b. 'Abbād established himself as the absolute ruler over Seville through a long-term strategy that only a highly-skilled tactician who planned and timed every move could succeed in transforming into a reality.

By 414/1023 al-Qādī Muḥammad b. 'Abbād had overcome several major obstacles and used various methods to achieve dominance over Seville. Having no legal foundations for his power, al-Qādī had to establish himself on a tacit principle of general acceptance by the Sevillans. Hereditary succession, which was an uncontested principle of popular acceptance, was incompatible both with the political realities in Seville following the overthrow of Banū Umayya and the personal condition of al-Qādī as a possible contender. However, the fact that nobody could claim power over Seville through this principle was to al-Qādī's advantage.

Al-Qādī's extreme pragmatism minimised the impact of his initial lack of theoretical justification for his rule and he was able to gradually secure the necessary power to actually
implement this rule. His gradual acquisition of a basis for power was therefore the product and not the cause of his actual condition as ruler. This handicap was overcome by two basic strategies. (i) Without renouncing his right to rule, he did not make any claims to power even when he actually ruled. For example he did not adopt any honorific titles and kept his previous title of al-Qādī. 1 (ii) He linked his position as actual ruler with the universally established position of Hishām II, when in 426/1034 he claimed to have rediscovered Hishām II. 2 Furthermore, al-Qādī adopted several measures to secure his position as ruler over Seville. The important factor that contributed to his increasing political power was his financial base, as he is said to have owned one third of Seville. 3 The high social status of his family had been established by his father al-Qādī Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbbād who attained widespread prestige when, as Qādī of Seville, he administered the city's affairs following the breakdown of the Cordoban Caliphate. 4 The religious implications of al-Qādī Muḥammad b. ʿAbbād's occupation added weight to his stature.

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2. Aʾmal, p. 179; Naqt, p. 25; Bayan, III, pp. 197-99; D̄̄hakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 222; Rabat, fol. 3r.; Bodl., fol. 3r.
3. Aʾmal, p. 177; Bayan, III, p. 195; ʿIbar, IV, p. 156; D̄̄hakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
Al-‘Qādī was able to assert his leadership and to increase his political influence by exploiting external threats, the power vacuum in Seville, and by keeping other local leaders under his control. These three basic factors enabled him to succeed Banū Ḥammūd. Al-‘Qāsim b. Ḥammūd’s reign was not solidly founded when he became the established ruler over Cordoba, and this led to his absence from Seville which remained under the unreliable command of his son Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd. Al-‘Qāsim’s arrogant attitude towards the inhabitants of Seville led to the latter’s decreasing support of the former which, in turn, contributed to the creation of a power vacuum. Al-‘Qāsim made his greatest political miscalculation when, preceding his flight from Cordoba in 414/1023, he sent the Sevillans a message ordering them to prepare their city for accommodating his army.¹ This threat to the city’s peace and security was effectively exploited by al-‘Qādī Muḥammad b. ‘Abbūd to kindle popular discontent and suspicions of al-‘Qāsim b. Ḥammūd and his son Muḥammad in Seville.² The elimination of Banū Ḥammūd culminated in al-‘Qādī’s monopoly of power and in crushing any possibility of power-sharing among other contenders. Threatened by al-‘Qādī’s army, the local leaders had remained unaware of al-‘Qādī’s increasing political strength until this was suddenly manifested to crush any local contestation of his position as the absolute ruler.³

The local Sevillan leaders were also outwitted by al-Qādī's manipulation of the oligarchy established to confront the Ḥammūdī threat. Being in a position of relative power, al-Qādī refused the local leaders' offer to accept full responsibility for Seville's affairs when the threat from al-Qāsim became imminent. This move expresses great political perception on al-Qādī's part because, had he been tempted by the offer, he would have had to assume full responsibility in confronting Banū Ḥammūd, while exposing himself to the intrigues of local contenders. Consequently, by agreeing to preside over a group of ministers nominated by local leaders, he assumed a directing position without being responsible for any negative consequences of their actions.

2. This group of ministers has been described in various ways by different historians. Ibn-al-'İdhārī describes the group as follows: 'A group which included [Abū-Bakr] az-Zaydi [an-Nahwī], Banū Marīm, Banū al-'Arabī and others...'

(Bayan, III, p. 51.) Ibn-Bassām names them as: 'A group including Ibn-Abī-Bakr az-Zubaydī an-Nahwī, Banū Yarīm... Ibn-‘Abbād and others...'

(Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.) Al-Marrākushī describes the group in the following terms: 'They appointed over themselves three of the country's greatest men, one of them al-Qādī Abū-1-Qāsim b. Ismā'īl b. ‘Abbād al-Lakhmī, Muḥammad b. Yarīm al-Allāhī and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Raydī...'

(Mu’jić, p. 37.) The group is described still differently in other works (e.g. Hullā, II, p. 37). Unlike Ibn-Bassām and Ibn-al-'İdhārī, al-Marrākushī describes the formation of the group of ministers as having taken place following Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd's defeat, which does not explain who forced him out of Seville. Furthermore, without the threat from Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd, al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād would have had no need to rule through a group of ministers. Finally, Ibn-Bassām being closest in time to the events, he should be the most reliable primary source, not to mention the fact that al-Marrākushī wrote his work while away from al-Andalus, thus lacking sources and depending on his memory alone (Mu’jić, p. 4).
His apparent reluctance to accept the reins of power must have promoted his credibility, because the local contenders were totally unprepared when al-Qādī unexpectedly dismissed his ministers and effectively assumed control of Seville after the elimination of Banū Ḥammūd.¹

Al-Qādī Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād's close affiliation with Banū Ḥammūd in Seville was deeply rooted. He established himself as Qādī of Seville during al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd's reign when the former's father al-Qādī Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abbād was no longer able to continue his function as Qādī.² He cooperated with al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd and his son Muḥammad, restricting himself to his official duties as Qādī. Although in no way directly related with politics before 414/1023, his position must have enabled him to familiarise himself with the rulers and to observe their weaknesses. His subtlety enabled him to remain unobserved and unsuspected.

Al-Qādī Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād established himself as ruler in 414/1023, through his acquaintance with Banū Ḥammūd and the support of the local leaders with whom he maintained a permanent contact. Having succeeded as the instrument through which the local leaders eliminated Banū Ḥammūd from Seville, he was able to impose himself as an uncontested leader. It was by opposing the forces of discontent, as portrayed by the populace and the local leaders, to the

suppressing forces of Banū Ḥammūd that al-Qādī was able to divert both from being directed against himself. Once the two threats had exhausted one another, al-Qādī was able to seize the reins of power for himself.¹

The army was instrumental in enabling al-Qādī to achieve his final objective. The threat of Banū Ḥammūd's army was eliminated when the Sevillans forced Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd's army out of their city and closed the city gates to al-Qāsim's army following his failure to recover Cordoba. Al-Qādī b. ‘Abbūd was then quick to establish an army directly under his control as a means for imposing himself. He later used his abundant wealth to attain this objective by buying slaves and recruiting mercenaries, creating one of the most powerful armies in al-Andalus.²

A significant contributor to al-Qādī's diplomatic excellence and credibility as a negotiator was his clear and comprehensive vision of his objectives. The progress or outcome of his negotiations with one party always contributed to the amelioration of his position vis-à-vis another party. His negotiations with Ḥbn-Ḥammūd, the army and local leaders constitute a case in point. The most pressing threat to al-Qādī was that of Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd who ruled through his minister Muḥammad b. Khālis.³

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Being in a position of superiority, al-Qādī demanded the unconditional departure of Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd from Seville and proved uncompromising. Realising the real dimension of Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd's threat to his own position, al-Qādī attacked the former through his own ministers, forcing the former out of Seville in 414/1023.¹ Having surrounded and attacked his palace, al-Qādī negotiated his release with his father, al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd, agreeing to allow his departure from Seville on condition that the Banū Ḥammūd renounce all claims over the city.² Having attained this double objective, al-Qādī managed to force the disordered army that had attacked Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd's palace out of Seville and to negotiate the release of their leader, Muḥammad b. Ẓīrī b. Dūnās, on condition that they leave the city indefinitely.³ An essential condition for his success was al-Qādī's ability to win the army to his side when confronting Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd, a condition which he achieved by promising Muḥammad b. Dūnās Seville's allegiance to him as ruler in exchange for his support.⁴

Al-Qādī again demonstrated his credibility as a subtle negotiator when Seville was besieged by Yahyā b. Ḥammūd's forces in 414/1023.⁵ Al-Qādī was able to persuade him to

4. ibid.
5. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 3v; Bodl., fol. 3r.
end the siege in return for recognition of the latter's sovereignty over Seville. He achieved this success by offering his son 'Abbād hostage as a gesture illustrating his sincerity. This was an ingenious decision that satisfied Yaḥyā b. Hammūd and increased al-Qādī's internal influence as he alone was able to make the necessary personal sacrifice that could divert the peril facing the city. Furthermore, al-Qādī's recognition of Yaḥyā's sovereignty was merely nominal and one which was later abandoned, leading to al-Qādī's battle against Yaḥyā in Muḥarram 427/November-December 1035 in Carmona, which resulted in the latter's defeat and death.  

(3) Al-Qādī b. 'Abbād's Consolidation of Power

Once established, the consolidation of al-Qādī's position as ruler over Seville proved to be permanent. Having eliminated all internal threats, he united Seville's political forces under one banner and was recognised throughout al-Andalus as one of the most privileged and powerful Taifa leaders. Three essential factors which greatly contributed to this condition were his declared allegiance to Hishām II, his ability to divert dangers and to win the allegiance of Taifa states and, finally, his military offensive against other Taifa states.

1. ibid.
2. ibid.
Following the wide circulation of popular rumours relating to the reappearance of Hishām II in Almeria (Al-Mariyya) in 426/1034, al-Qāḍī declared that he had rediscovered Hishām II himself.¹ Despite the claim’s appeal to the popular fantasy and its acceptance by several Taifa leaders, it was recognised by many for what it was, a fraud intended to unite forces against the growing threat of Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd through the proclamation of Khalaf al-Ḥaṣrā as Hishām II.² All primary sources agree on the forged nature of the claim as is attested by such authorities as Ibn-Ḥāzm, Ibn-Bassām and Ibn-Ḥayyān. The success of the claim can be explained by the general need for a central authority in al-Andalus. At a time when al-Andalus was a mosaic of party states, the attraction of a uniting force was more impressive to the popular minds of the masses than either its incredibility or the desire of particular Taifa leaders to disregard it as a force to contend with. The failure to reunite al-Andalus through the new claim was partially due to its rejection by some Taifa states which sent representatives to Seville who were shown the alleged Hishām II behind curtains in a dark room.³ Despite the potentiality of the claim to reunite al-Andalus, its intended objectives must be sought at a personal level. The claim

was consequently successful in realising al-Qādī's ambitions by diverting the threat posed by Yahyā b. Ḥammūd and consolidating his power at the internal and external levels. Al-Qādī's nominal allegiance to Hishām II furnished him with a degree of legality that he had always lacked, having had no theoretical basis for legitimising his power.

By the end of his reign in 433/1041, al-Qādī's rule over Seville was firmly established.\(^1\) Having enabled him to impose his power over Seville, his basic qualities as a shrewd leader and politician contributed to its preservation. During al-Qādī's reign, his power was legalised by his allegiance to Hishām II, his army well organised and on the offensive and his major enemy, Yahyā b. Ḥammūd, eliminated. If al-Qādī did not achieve all that he had desired, he had secured the necessary conditions for the succession of his son, al-Muʿtaḍid.

II. Al-Muʿtaḍid ʿAbbād b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbbād
(433/1041-461/1068)

(1) The Circumstances of al-Muʿtaḍid's Succession and his Methods for Maintaining Power

When al-Muʿtaḍid ʿAbbād b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbbād came to power in Jumādā II, 433/January-February 1042, the legitimisation of Banū ʿAbbād as rulers of Seville had been

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1. Hulla, II, p. 41; Al-Ḥumaydī, a contemporary, places his death as close to 430/1038 (Jaʿdwa, p. 81).
completed. Hence 'Abbād b. 'Abbād's adoption of the honorific titles Fajr ad-Dawla and later al-Mu'taḍid bi-Allāh.¹ Seville's acceptance of al-Mu'taḍid's legitimacy as ruler was complemented by the recognition of his leadership by other Taifa states, as attested by Ibn-Ḥayyān's reference to him as 'al-Mu'taḍid 'Abbād, leader of the Princes of al-Andalus...'.² Al-Mu'taḍid found it convenient to maintain the recognition of Hishām II as the Caliph of al-Andalus until this fabrication no longer served any useful purpose. Once solidly established, al-Mu'taḍid ended this recognition in 451/1059.³

Although al-Mu'taḍid's impact was greater through his violent methods than any theorisations for legitimising his rule, his image as the legitimate ruler was impressively propagated through the attraction of his pompous costumes, his luxurious entertainments, splendid palaces, etc.⁴ Exploited to conceal his crimes, the legitimacy of his position was consequently a factor that stimulated the enforcement of his decisions and policies.

Al-Mu'taḍid remained the undisputed ruler of Seville throughout his thirty-two-year reign. An absolute ruler of Seville, his policy was to exterminate anyone constituting

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1. Ḥakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 241; Rabat, fol. 5r.; Bodl., fol. 5r.
a danger to his position or even having the potential to develop into a threat. His behaviour towards friends and foes was usually instinctive rather than rational, religious, philosophical or emotional. Internally, and externally, al-Mu'tadid asserted himself as a tyrant who was obeyed and respected out of fear. He was as much dreaded by his terrorised ministers as he was by rival leaders of Taifa states, who could never predict his spontaneous outbursts of violence.

Unlike al-Qâdi b. 'Abbad who obtained power through competition with other contending factions, al-Mu'tadid's succession to his father was hereditary. Despite his young age of twenty-six when he occupied office as ruler over Seville, al-Mu'tadid had been fully conditioned for his new office. He had undergone his first dramatic experience when, at the age of seven, he was offered as hostage to Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd, following negotiations between the latter and al-Qâdi b. 'Abbad in 414/1023.¹ At such an early age, his captivity may have influenced him psychologically by hardening his later attitudes, partially explaining his

1. The incident of offering 'Abbad as hostage to Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd is described by Ibn-Rassām with the circumstances leading to al-Qâdi's establishment as ruler over Seville in 414/1023-4. Given that 'Abbad succeeded his father in 433/1041-2 at the age of 26, his age in 414/1023-4 must have been 7 years. This age is further deduced from his birth date of Safar 407/July-August 1016, according to Muhammad 'Abd-Allāh 'Inān (Duwal, p. 39).
continuous, determined and systematic extermination of
rivals. Having been raised in his father's palace, he
must have been able to enjoy close contact with the
mechanisms of government, while his participation in his
father's military campaigns furnished him with knowledge
of the essentials of securing and maintaining power. As
a ruler, he depended extensively on the army to confront
his opponents and to expand Seville's territorial bound-
aries.

Lacking tact and subtlety, al-Mu'taḍid relied on force
as his primary means for implementing policies. His in-
stinctive tendency to apply violence is testified by his
infamous garden of skulls belonging to his victims of war
or assassination plots. This most unusual garden was
attentively maintained and its skulls unearthed and returned
to the relatives of the victims for burial at the fall of
al-Mu'tamid in 484/1091. Among the numerous skulls in the
garden were those of Muḥammad b. 'Abd-Allāh al-Barzālī, al-
Ḥajjāb b. Khazrūn, Ibn-Nūḥ and Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd. Al-
Mu'ṭaḍid took much pride in this garden of skulls as a
symbol of his victories and superior strength, using it to
terrorise his subordinates and guests. The existence of
this infamous garden was common knowledge in Seville and
beyond its frontiers.


2. ibid.
When he became ruler over Seville, it took al-Muʿtaṣid little time to apply force in asserting his leadership. His first move was to exterminate all the powerful officials whom he inherited from his father’s reign, by banishment, expropriation and deprivation of their means of livelihood and by killing them.¹ This initial policy, which cleared away all opposition at an embryonic stage, was continued throughout al-Muʿtaṣid’s reign.

Being in a position of strength in relation to other leaders of Taifa states, al-Muʿtaṣid fully used his superiority to exploit and manoeuvre them. His motives for supporting particular leaders in accordance with changing circumstances were purely political, coinciding with his tactics for implementing a strategy designed to fortify his predominance. An illustrative example is how Banū ʿAbbād's traditional co-operation with and defence of Carmona (Qarmūna) was inexplicably transmuted to mutual hatred and designs to annihilate one another. In 427/1035 al-Qādī b. ʿAbbād had contributed to Muḥammad al-Barzālī's re-installation in Carmona when it was occupied by Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd. Conversely, al-Muʿtaṣid abruptly decided to occupy it for himself in 459/1066.² Having indirectly benefited from al-Barzālī's past services to his father in confronting such potential enemies as al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afṭas of Badajoz (Baṭalyaws) and Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd of Malaga, al-Muʿtaṣid no

¹. Muʿjib, p. 95.
². Bayān, III, p. 312.
longer found it profitable to continue his alliance with Carmona, a weaker Taifa state.

(2) **Al-Mu‘taṣid’s Use of Terror as a Political Weapon:**

*A Classification of his Assassinations*

Assassination as a means of eliminating contenders is an infamous feature of al-Mu‘taṣid’s reign that has been thoroughly recorded by his early biographers. This prevented all opponents from developing any degree of threatening potentiality. Al-Mu‘taṣid’s assassinations were minutely planned and executed for various reasons and in a variety of crude, if effective ways. Although most of his assassinations are to some extent related to his struggle to safeguard power, others can only be attributed to his traits of character and transformation of a means of protecting himself from political rivals into an objective per se.

The details of the circumstances of the assassination of several of al-Mu‘taṣid’s ministers are described by their biographers such as Ibn-Bassām. A close friend of al-Mu‘taṣid prior to the latter’s rule, ‘Umar b. al-Ḥasan al-Hawzī, left Seville out of fear in 440/1048 and returned in 458/1065 after much travel in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the Maghrib, to be assassinated by al-Mu‘taṣid personally in Rabī‘ 1, 460/January-February 1068.¹ Other examples were Abū-l-Walīd Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥabīb, whom al-Mu‘taṣid

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¹ *Hulla*, II, pp. 239-40.
killed at the age of twenty-nine, and Abū-l-Ḥasan Ghālib b. Ḥafṣ, whom Ibn-Zaydūn despised and intrigued against and who was assassinated by al-Muʿtaḍid.¹

While contributing to the maintenance of his rule, al-Muʿtaḍid's violent reactions are an expression of his egocentric and paranoiac states of mind. This conclusion is supported by examples in which his extreme state of violence served no apparent end, political or otherwise. The spontaneity of his decisions to suddenly resort to violence is indicative of mental imbalance. The most incredible example was his audacity in personally carrying out the act of murdering his own son, Ismāʿīl.² In Ibn-Ḥayyān's version,³ a controversy arose between al-Muʿtaḍid and his son, Ismāʿīl, when the latter refused to command an attack against Cordoba in 450/1058 because of the small size of the army. Leading a caravan carrying his riches and possessions, Ismāʿīl left Seville for Algeciras, and was refused entrance into several of his father's fortresses on the way, to be finally accepted by 'Alī Ḥiṣād in the fortress of Sedona (Shadhūna). Ḥiṣād then negotiated Ismāʿīl's return and al-Muʿtaḍid promised to forgive his son out of fear that the latter might join his enemies such as al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afṭas of Badajoz. Nonetheless, on his

1. ibid., p. 550-1.


arrival in Seville, Ismā‘īl was confined to a cell while his supporters, including the minister Abū-‘Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bizilyānī, who had organised his escape, were beheaded. This led Ismā‘īl to organise an attempt on his father’s life, which failed and led to the execution of his supporters and his own end.

This crime is documented in an unusual manner in an eloquent letter by al-Mu’tadid explaining the circumstances and justifying his murder of Ismā‘īl to other leaders of Taifa states.¹ His two basic premises for arriving at his decision are: (i) Ismā‘īl had attempted to have him killed. (ii) It was therefore his duty and fate to repay his son with the maximum punishment, having been forced into the difficult position by the latter. The letter expresses al-Mu’tadid’s dilemma in having to kill his own son, whom he had loved dearly and designated as his heir. He explains that Ismā‘īl had expressed such disobedience, disrespect and arrogance that it had become his duty to punish his son as he did. Resentment at being compelled to make this decision is powerfully expressed in overflowing emotions, but his conclusion was to confront the inevitable. The letter clearly demonstrates that the act was not an intentional, cold-blooded murder, but an over-emotional reaction to a serious provocation. Al-Mu’tadid’s psychological suffering as a result of this experience is reflected in his shock and isolation for a period of three days following the dramatic affair.

¹. ibid., pp. 254-56.
Complementary examples of this abnormal behaviour include al-Mu‘taḍid's assassination of his brother, uncle and the latter's son, reported by Ibn-Hazm.\(^1\)

His lust for revenge was sometimes the sole motive for al-Mu‘taḍid's assassinations. An exemplary illustration is that of a blind man from the rural areas of Seville who, having escaped from Seville to settle in Mecca, was pursued on the orders of al-Mu‘taḍid and poisoned.\(^2\)

The fact that this man had sought al-Mu‘taḍid's enmity was of more concern to the latter than the former's physical absence from Seville or his dissociation from politics through his retirement to a life of meditation and worship. A similar example was that of a Sevillan mu‘adhdhin who was tracked down in Toledo and whose head was brought to al-Mu‘taḍid.\(^3\)

If motivations for some of al-Mu‘taḍid's assassinations were psychological or personal, almost all had political implications that explicitly or implicitly contributed to the immediate stabilisation of his rule. Pragmatism and opportunism constituted an effective weapon for suppressing minimal political threats through assassinations. Although all of al-Mu‘taḍid's assassinations were partly politically motivated, some were totally political. One such example is that of Muḥammad b. Ẓāfir ad-Dammārī of Moron (Mawrūr),

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1. Naqt, pp. 167-68.
'Abdūn b. Khazrūn of Arcos (Arkush) and Abū-Nūr b. Abī-Qurra of Ronda who, following their refusal to join al-Mu'tadid's forces against his enemies, were suffocated in his palace bath. Only Abū-Nūr b. Abī-Qurra was successful in escaping alive, while the first two died in the bath. Despite their being guests and trusted allies, al-Mu'tadid did not hesitate to murder them with the objective of inheriting their Taifa states. On the other hand, for these leaders to have suffered such an unhappy fate through their incautious trust in al-Mu'tadid, the latter's deceitfulness must have been convincing.

III. Al-Mu'tamid Muḥammad b. 'Abbād b. 'Abbād

(461/1068-484/1091)

(1) Al-Mu'tamid's Succession

The outwardly flourishing reign of al-Mu'tamid Muḥammad b. 'Abbād b. 'Abbād terminated with the disappearance of the Banū 'Abbād dynasty, and Seville's incorporation into the Maghrib by the al-Murābiṭūn. Alongside the external causes (which will receive wider treatment in Chapter Four) and internal conditions and causes, al-Mu'tamid's personality and temperament failed him as a quasi-absolute ruler on whose shoulders lay the entire political system, and he was unable to impose his leadership within an inflexible political system. Al-Mu'tamid was further exposed to the increasingly heavy pressures of insurmountable external threats.

Al-Mu'tamid's accession to power following al-Mu'taḍid's death in 461/1068 had been made technically possible by the death of the former's eldest brother Ismā'īl in 450/1058. Muhammad b. 'Abbād's adoption of the pompous title al-Mu'tamid 'alā-Allāh is symbolic of his reign, which appeared to be more glorious than it was in actual fact. His establishment as ruler over Seville was solid enough to last for a period of twenty-two years, but his definitive defeat in Rajab 484/1091 meant the annexation of Seville to the Maghrib. The same internal and external forces which worked together to produce the fall of Seville determined the fate of other Taifa states which succumbed to the armies of the al-Murābīṭūn. However, the termination of al-Mu'tamid's reign was also the result of other specifically internal conflicting forces that clashed throughout the eleventh century and which al-Mu'tamid was incapable of directing or even containing.

At the time of al-Mu'tamid's accession to power, he enjoyed a general recognition and acceptance which were the fruit of his father's and grandfather's efforts to establish the permanent sovereignty of the Banū 'Abbād dynasty over Seville.

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Al-Mu'tamid was therefore never faced with the organised group opposition that threatened al-Qādī or the numerous individual intrigues against al-Mu'tadid which led to his recourse to violence and assassination. However, al-Mu'tamid ruled against essentially the same background as his two predecessors, which indicates that, since there existed opposition to al-Qādī and al-Mu'tadid, al-Mu'tamid would have been equally exposed to similar dangers as no fundamental alterations had been introduced to the system. However, opposition to al-Mu'tamid took a new form, characterised by more discretion and subtlety. Unlike his father, al-Mu'tamid did not adopt preventive policies as a means of maintaining his rule. This may partially explain why his minister Ibn-‘Ammār influenced Seville's policies to the point of being criticised by an outsider, Prince 'Abd-Allah of Granada.1

(2) **External and Internal Causes for al-Mu'tamid's Loss of Power**

The effects of the constant instability that disrupted Sevillian life during the reign of Banū 'Abbād constituted a fundamental contribution to its final breakdown. Constant warfare affected the development of the Sevillian socio-economic system in that the latter had to support costly military campaigns, which became unbearable by their continuity and increasingly large scale. Other

1. *Thb.*, pp. 78, 86.
causes which contributed to this instability included such long-term causes as paying tribute. Initially the result of the struggles over the Cordoban Caliphate, Seville's persistent instability became a cause of its decline when it prevented the latter from adopting an independent course to suit its needs. This instability is reflected in almost every aspect of Sevillan life. Some examples are the number of deaths in battle, including al-Mu'tamid's own sons Fath and Yazid, for whom he weeps in several verses.¹ The sudden collapse of Seville is perhaps the best indication of its weak foundations. The indirect causes must, however, have been at work throughout the century and the final collapse was only the natural culmination of the existing state of affairs.

Al-Mu'tamid's qualities of leadership were limited and below the required standards for meeting the internal and external dangers facing Seville, because he was not compelled to impress them upon his followers who unquestioningly consented to his authority. Acknowledged as a leader by birth, al-Mu'tamid found himself privileged as the highest authority in Seville by uncontestable general recognition. This indicates why he was rarely openly challenged and how he was inadequately prepared to face the threat of Yusuf, thus ending his reign.

His leadership lacked stimulus and vitality as it was not deployed to increase the scale and intensity of his support. Consequently he often found himself reacting to internal developments, rather than stimulating policies, not to mention inspiring them, as the charismatic element that dominates fervent believers, and mobilises followers on a mass scale, was lacking in him. The popular following for Banū Umayya was never fully exploited and diverted to any particular Taifa leader and al-Muʿtamid's popularity remained incapable of promoting the degree of enthusiasm that the legend of Hishâm II had stimulated. Internally, although al-Muʿtamid was highly esteemed for aesthetic and temperamental reasons, such as his poetic talent or benevolent rewards, he was rarely feared politically. Furthermore, the personal interest of al-Muʿtamid was not associated with that of his Sevillan subjects in that he was their master and their champion, while the notion of territory was not exploited to promote a common consciousness and the Taifa state never developed into anything resembling a nation.

Indicative of his weakness as a dynamic leader is al-Muʿtamid's unawareness of the plots, intrigues and injurious machinations of his subordinate officials and commanders, which were encouraged by his lack of initiative. An illustrative example is that of Ibn-Rashīq's forceful seizure of the fortress of Murcia (Mursiya), which he had been appointed to govern for al-Muʿtamid, a development
that could have been diverted if the latter had maintained stricter control over his commander.\(^1\) Instead, Ibn-Rashāq cultivated strong local support which resulted in the rejection of al-Muʿtamid's desire to designate his son, ar-Rādī, as governor over Murcia.\(^2\) The gravity of Ibn-Rashāq's revolt is reflected in his recourse to the arbitration of Yūsuf, which clearly illustrates that the failure of the plot was not so much due to al-Muʿtamid's initiative as to Yūsuf's refusal to offer him support.\(^3\) Further, al-Muʿtamid had never had recourse to punishment as an exemplary warning to potential rebels, assuming that his rule was unanimously accepted and unopposed.

Al-Muʿtamid's credulous dependence on his commanders during battles is a further indication of his weakness as a leader. Unlike his more successful contemporaries, Alfonso VI and Yūsuf, who usually led their armies personally, al-Muʿtamid preferred to rely on subordinate commanders and only participated when forced to, as was the case during the Battle of az-Zallaqa, when al-Andalus fought for its survival against Alfonso, or during al-Muʿtamid's defence of Seville in 484/1091 when Yūsuf's armies had reached his doorstep.\(^4\)

Al-Muʿtamid's lack of political perception and ability to determine Seville's future was an essential element that greatly contributed to its final fall. Al-Muʿtamid lacked

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2. ibid., p. 112.
3. ibid., p. 111.
the degree of political insight that seems to have characterised Prince 'Abd-Allāh of Granada, despite their common final failure to survive against the sweeping wave of Yusuf's armies.¹ Prince 'Abd-Allāh's actions were always approached from a theoretical angle and therefore rationalised, despite his repeated failures such as his refusal to offer Alfonso tribute money amounting to 20,000 mithqāls (dinars), only to be compelled to increase the sum by 10,000 dinars.² In this example, 'Abd-Allāh was being rational when he excluded the possibility of al-Mu'tamid's alliance against him, on the basis of their common Islamic faith.³ It was consequently al-Mu'tamid who failed to appreciate the long-term danger of supporting Alfonso, because his action lacked a rational basis and was instead influenced by his minister, Ibn-'Ammār.⁴

2. Comparing al-Mu’tamid's and Prince 'Abd-Allāh's qualities of political perception, one is presented with the disadvantage of generally having to rely upon indirect knowledge of al-Mu’tamid's political thinking, derived from other sources excluding his poetry, which is basically apolitical. On the other hand, Kitāb at-Tibyān furnishes us with Prince 'Abd-Allah's most intimate political motives in detail. However, both figures were contemporary Taifa leaders who faced similar problems and situations within a similar inter-related geo-political context.
3. Tib., pp. 69, 75.
4. This motive is explicitly expressed (Tib., pp. 69, 82).
While al-Mu‘tamid’s political decisions were often based on the flattering counsel of intriguing ministers and courtiers, including his beloved wife, I‘timād, Prince ‘Abd-Allah weighed every individual situation, calculating possible results or developments and arriving at conclusions that usually left room for manoeuvre.¹ In contradistinction to al-Mu‘tamid’s relative passivity to his subordinates, Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s possessive suspicion of all his immediate officials deprived him of more flexibility.²

His response to Yusuf’s open hostility to the Taifa states following the siege of Aledo (Liyiyīt) in 481/1088 is perhaps the best illustration of the political abilities and flexibility of ‘Abd-Allāh, as contrasted to al-Mu‘tamid. The latter’s strong resistance led to his imprisonment at Aghmāt, following his defeat, while Prince ‘Abd-Allāh foresaw the final outcome of any resistance to Yusuf and preferred to negotiate his submission while still in a negotiable position. Al-Mu‘tamid’s pride

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1. Although basically true, al-Mu‘tamid’s passion for I‘timād was romanticised and inflated by the minds of later historians. On the other hand, Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s approach to political situations was empirical, a fact that is explicitly stated in his elaboration of his political philosophy. His rationalisation of the decision to pay Alfonso tribute money is typical of the way his mind worked (Tib., pp. 122-27).

2. ibid., pp. 76-77.
overshadowed his reason; Prince ‘Abd-Allāh analysed every disadvantage, rationally concluding that he had little chance of resisting the internal and external forces working against him.¹ In contrast to ‘Abd-Allāh’s realism, al-Mu‘tamid was fully aware of the potential danger posed by Yūsuf, but decided to confront the worst, as he considered himself to be legally and morally a justifiable ruler.²

Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s realisation of the limitations imposed upon him by the general political context in which he operated contrasts with al-Mu‘tamid’s over-confidence and exaggerated conception of his actual potential. Hence Prince ‘Abd-Allah’s extreme caution in his political engagements, regardless of their magnitude, as distinguished from al-Mu‘tamid’s inflated confidence, clearly expressed on various occasions. The case of Prince ‘Abd-Allāh’s approach to the rebelling fortress of Lucena clearly illustrates his prudence. Openly challenged by the

1. Prince ‘Abd-Allāh defends himself against this charge (Tib., pp. 127-29), although he cannot be expected to have done otherwise considering that he wrote his memoirs as a political prisoner of Yūsuf.

2. Al-Mu‘tamid’s uncompromising attitude towards Yūsuf’s pressures, prior to the latter’s military campaign against Seville, clearly reflects a strong urge on the part of al-Mu‘tamid to defend his survival, despite the extraordinary odds against him. Even the involvement of Alfonso’s troops, who came to al-Mu‘tamid’s assistance, was incapable of preventing the al-Murābīṭūn army from forcing Seville to surrender.
overtaxed inhabitants of Lucena, 'Abd-Allāh's initial reaction was instinctive as he thought of forcefully crushing and punishing the leader, Ibn-Maymūn.1 However, when his commander, Mu'ammal, warned him of the probable reactions to any violent repression, he agreed to defuse the tension peacefully, despite his burning desire to do otherwise.2 A comparable example was his decision not to execute Ibn-al-Qulay'ī because of the latter's favoured position with Mūsuf.3 In both instances, Prince 'Abd-Allāh refrained from using power as a preventive measure of repression, fearing possible undesirable repercussions.

Unlike Prince 'Abd-Allāh, who calculated his personal relations with rebelling subordinates, or potential rebels, al-Mu'tamid directed his subordinate officials mechanically within the existing administrative framework or spontaneously as a reaction to personal offences. For example he reacted to rebels emotionally and at a level of personal feeling, without seriously considering the effects of his actions on potential rebels. The highly emotional character of his reaction to the Murcia affair, when Ibn-‘Ammār and, later, Mu’ammal revolted, indicates his lack of political realism.

1. Tib., p. 131.
2. ibid., p. 132.
3. ibid., p. 119.
Al-Mu‘tamid’s response to the challenge of the two revolts reveals his total lack of calculative thinking, because both Ibn-‘Ammār and Mu‘ammal were permitted to successfully mature as rebels and were not confronted until they had actually posed a serious challenge to al-Mu‘tamid’s sovereignty over his territories, a challenge which threatened to spread and this at a time when al-Mu‘tamid was exposed to unprecedented external pressures. Politically naive, al-Mu‘tamid underestimated the ambitions of his ministers and military commanders, presupposing their dedication and fidelity to his person to be more solid than in fact they were. By contrast, Prince ‘Abd-Allāh studied the probabilities of particular situations and tried to predict the outcome of every decision he made regarding rebels. For example, whereas he executed the rebel Ibn-Taqnawt in order to give other commanders a lesson, he sent his minister Simāja into exile, permitting him to carry his treasure with him, so as to foster his own image as a benevolent and forgiving ruler. Another example was his calculating manner of defusing the threat of his rebellious brother. Prince ‘Abd-Allāh raided the territories of Malaga as a punitive measure against his brother, Tamīm of Malaga, but suddenly decided to halt his military expedition and to retire to Granada, thus exploiting his limited military success politically, without risking military defeat.

1. ibid., pp. 88, 98.

2. This intention is explicitly stated (ibid., p. 94).
Negotiations are another criterion for contrasting al-Mu'tamid and Prince 'Abd-Allāh, who stressed how al-Mu'tamid unconsciously contributed to his own final collapse. Their mutual negotiations concerning the dominance over different fortresses, the common threat posed to them by rebels, and their peace treaties, reflect two contrasting temperaments and politicians. As a ruler, Prince 'Abd-Allāh always led his delegation personally, unless he had a political motive for doing otherwise. Hence his personal encounters with Sisnando Davídez (Shishnandū), Alfonso's Mozarab envoy, Alfonso VI himself or the latter's military commander and representative, Alvar Páñez (al-Barhanish), over tribute money. Although on the one hand Prince 'Abd-Allāh occasionally employed envoys during negotiations with Alfonso VI, al-Mu'tamid or Yūsuf, his instructions to them were usually followed, while al-Mu'tamid's envoy, Ibn-'Ammār, retained a semi-independence when negotiating with Alfonso. For example Prince 'Abd-Allāh blames Ibn-'Ammār for his own friction with al-Mu'tamid, and considers Ibn-'Ammār's negotiations with Alfonso as disregarding Seville's interests and motivated by his personal ambition. Further, al-Mu'tamid's impatience as a negotiator is clearly illustrated by his hasty response to Alfonso's pressures on him following the latter's reduction of Toledo in 478/1085. His anger at the rudeness of

1. These negotiations are respectively mentioned in ibid., pp. 73-75, 133-34.
Alfonso's Jewish tribute collector led al-Mu'tamid to execute him, an offence that would inevitably lead to repercussions which he was in no position to afford. Finally, al-Mu'tamid's reply to Alfonso's ultimatum that Seville be unconditionally surrendered to him not only illustrates al-Mu'tamid's inability to accept his weaker position vis-à-vis Alfonso and the absence of any attempt to persuade Alfonso to adopt a more lenient position, but reflects an abusive tone. On the other hand, it is only fair to mention that, at this stage, Alfonso had been determined to conquer al-Andalus entirely, regardless of the price.

The apolitical surroundings of al-Mu'tamid constituted an institutionalised element of his life-style that he inherited from his predecessor. For example, although al-Mu'tamid's artistic qualities were of primary importance in determining the pattern of his palace leisure activities, the latter were conditioned by many of his poet-ministers who had served under al-Mu'tadid (e.g. Ibn-Zaydûn) or experienced the influence of his ministers such as al-Bizîlînî. The influence of poetry on politics is clear from the role of Abû-Bakr Ibn-‘Ammâr's poetry as an immediate cause of al-Mu'tamid's final decision to kill his old friend and minister. As a ruler, al-Mu'tamid was

1. Mawsh., p. 29.
2. The full text of Alfonso's letter and al-Mu’tamid's reply is reproduced in Mawsh., pp. 25-28; Duwal, pp. 75-76.
therefore essentially a conformist, working within the existing conditions and system and performing his role as a ruler. For example he conducted military expeditions, because this was expected of a ruler as a sign of his authority.

This factor is illustrated by considering some fundamental aspects of al-Mu‘tamid's personality and character. He was foremost a poet, then a ruler. His immediate milieu was of the highest artistic standard and included such prominent names in Andalusian literature as Abū-Bakr b. 'Ammār, Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Labbāna and Abū-1-Walīd b. Zaydūn. His intimate life also carried a romantic dimension, as illustrated by the refined verses he exchanged with his beloved wife, I‘timād ar-Rumayqiyya, from whose name he derived his own title, al-Mu‘tamid. The wide circulation of al-Mu‘tamid's exquisite poetry, which extended beyond Seville's frontiers, contributed to his popularity while, to a limited extent, serving as an instrument for expressing his political position. Al-Mu‘tamid used this medium to express his political views and to describe political events and situations he had witnessed. Hence his demand for clemency from his father, following his defeat in Malaga, in the verses

'Sukhtuka qad zādanī saqāmān
fa-b‘ath ilayya r-ridā masīhā', ²

2. Qala‘id: Hist.Abb., I, p. 53. ('Your wrath has increased my suffering, so send me your approval to act as my cure.')
his lamentations following the death of his sons, al-Fath and Yazid, in the verses

' Hawā l-kawkabān¹ l-Fathu thumma shaqīquhu Yazidu
 fa-hal ba‘da al-kawkabān¹ (sic) mina ǧ-ṣabrī',¹

his celebration of his triumph over Cordoba in the verses

'Khaṭabtu Qurtubaṣa l-ḥasnā‘a idh mana‘at
 man jā‘a yakhtubuhu bi-l-bīdī wa-l-asa‘ī',²

or the response to the attempt by Abū-Yahyā Muḥammad b. Samādīh of Almeria to mar his relations with Yūsuf b. Tāshufīn, in the verse

'Yā man ta‘arraḍa lī yurīdu masā‘atī'.³

Although, judged by its end, al-Mu‘tamid’s reign was a failure, he was perhaps the most successful Taifa king. He was widely respected and gained widespread repute throughout al-Andalus, but his long-term survival as ruler over Seville would have required more than he possessed in the circumstances. The internal factors that led to political instability, and his own political temperament, might not in themselves have produced Seville’s downfall had the greater external threats, posed first by Alfonso and then by Yūsuf, not presented themselves.

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1. ibid., p. 48. ('The two stars, al-Fath and his brother Yazid, have set; can there be any endurance after?')

2. ibid., p. 46. ('I sought the hand of beautiful Cordoba as she refused those who demanded her with swords and spears.')

3. ibid., p. 51. ('Oh he who has come my way seeking to do me harm.')
CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN SEVILLE

I. The Sevillian Political System

(1) The Taifa State as a Political System

(a) A Definition

The difficulties which result from attempting to define the political system of the Taifa state of Seville arise from its unique characteristics and a rare combination of incompatible particularities. While resembling other political systems, that of the Sevillian Taifa state varies in many aspects and differs in its totality.

The fact that the Banū 'Abbād dynasty were the supreme law-enforcing authority illustrates their sovereignty within Seville's frontiers, which continued to expand until the final confrontation with Alfonso VI. Seville was therefore a state because its territories were legally defined and effectively controlled generally and its inhabitants integrated culturally. Led by the Banū 'Abbād rulers, the Sevillans conceived themselves as a political group out of a necessity for self-defence and had a political system of their own, the study of which is the object of this chapter. On the other hand, this political identification was not limited to natives by birth, as forced or peaceful immigration from one Taifa state to another was a by-product of the general instability characterising al-Andalus. Examples of
immigrants to Seville include one of the greatest ministers to serve under al-Muʿtaḍid, the Cordoban Ibn-Zaydūn, while al-Muʿtamid's court included the minister Ibn-ʿAmmār, originally from Silves, and Ibn-al-Labbāna from Denia.

The Taifa character of the Sevillian state indicates the human power base of the political system, as al-Qāḍī b. ʿAbbād was originally supported by and implemented his rule through a Taifa or party.¹ The creation of the Sevillian Taifa state was itself the political expression of a group integration and assimilation that sought to defend and organise itself following the final collapse of the Cordoban central authority. This group character of the Taifa state persisted when the Taifa kings either ruled through the support of groups or successively supported variously conflicting political factions. Finally, the royal dimension of the Taifa kings is superficial and reflects the self-deception implicit in their outlook.

The Taifa state existed in several varieties. One of the most powerful, Seville contrasted with many of the weaker Taifa states such as Carmona and Algeciras, both of which were subsequently integrated into Seville. While Seville's machinery of government constituted a system which at least to a minimum degree met the judicial, administrative and political needs of the inhabitants of Seville, who led a socially organised life in villages,

towns or cities, other Taifa states amounted to mere local military rulers imposing their authority over small fortresses and their surrounding areas.

Within the Andalusian context, the Sevillan system was inward-looking, constantly striving towards self-sufficiency. Its relations with other Taifa states were generally hostile and its relatively large size, vigour and power attracted talents from remote parts of al-Andalus. This explains its apparent cohesion and success. However, the Taifa was in essence a phenomenon that could not last, because of its isolationism and self-enclosure. When a Taifa state was not threatened, it was attacking another neighbouring Taifa state as was the case of Seville throughout the Banū ʿAbbād period. As the Taifa states were usually not powerful enough to impose themselves on the others definitively, their struggle to survive persisted until Yūsuf ended their moribund existence. Hence the total lack of co-operation between most of the Taifa states at the political level. However, communication between Taifa states was never interrupted completely and rebels in one Taifa state were often harboured by another, which they used as a base for launching attacks against the former. One such example was Ibn-Kabbāb, who was given command by Prince ʿAbd-Allāh of Arjona and Antequera, from which he carried on hostile activities against al-Muʿtamid.1 The effects of this state of affairs on the political and

1. Tib., pp. 95-96.
administrative apparatus were enormous, as the system became progressively less able to fulfil the needs which it had come into being to meet. The constant pressures on the ruler meant that his primary, and sometimes his only, objective was survival. Neither the ruler nor the system itself could endure indefinitely under such conditions, and this explains why the Taifa state was a passing phenomenon.

The basis of the Taifa state was therefore constantly on the verge of vanishing, and the history of the Taifa states is one of continuing limited rehabilitation and struggle for survival. It is within this context that the political system of Seville must be conceived if it is to be fully appreciated. Its sudden birth in 414/1023, its development over a relatively brief period of seventy years, its striking local character, despite its many features of a state, its fragility in growth, its constant subjection to internal instability and its inability to endure or respond to the external pressures of Alfonso VI or Yūsuf b. Tashufīn, combined to determine the fate and development of the political system of the Taifa state of Seville.

(b) The Place of the Taifa State in Andalusian History

A new political system developed in Seville under Banū 'Abbād which generally met the demands of the newly established dynasty and reflected the political orientation of Seville's role as a major Taifa state. Despite Seville's
considerable influence among the Taifa states, the relatively small size of its political administration could not compare with that of Banū Umayya, its prototype. The latter nevertheless remained an essential ideal having much influence on the structural mutations of Banū 'Abbād's expanding political system at various levels of its component and subordinate subsections. Although originally designed to perform functions for which Cordoba had previously been responsible, the Sevillan bureaucratic mechanism evolved in parallel with the material needs and political ends of the Banū 'Abbād dynasty.

The creation of Seville's political and administrative structure may be explained by particular historical circumstances: the disintegration of al-Andalus into a multiplicity of Taifa states. The fact that it was based on the model of that of Banū Umayya seems to imply the forcible imposition of a fully developed Caliphal system on a miniature state. Because of the incoherence of the Sevillan system, several contradictions resulted from the systematic application of the Banū Umayya model to the Sevillan Taifa state.

The first contrast was in their size. While the political system under Banū Umayya was developed for a state that exercised sovereignty over all of al-Andalus, Seville's territorial frontiers and limited population required a simpler political system. Indeed, Seville under the Banū Umayya Caliphate was only one province
among the many other regions that were included within the former's boundaries.

The second contrast was that of their needs. The complex problems arising from the larger territorial extent and population of the Banū Umayya Caliphate contrast with the lesser needs of the Sevillan population. Despite this, the list of officials given in Part II of Adh-Dhakhīra fī Maḥāsin Ahl al-Jazīra indicates that the number of ministers who served in Seville under the Banū ‘Abbād dynasty seems to have amounted to at least twenty-seven.1 The number of ministers was in fact certainly larger, as this list was formulated with the intention of studying these figures from the literary angle. Ibn-Zaydūn is an example of a minister who was excluded from the list, because he is studied in a special, rather lengthy, section by Ibn-Bassām.2 The large number of ministers seems to indicate that the number of civil servants was enormous, and such a huge bureaucratic mechanism could only have constituted a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Sevillans. The provincial needs of Seville as a province of the Banū Umayya Caliphate had become the responsibility of an internal autonomous bureaucratic administration whose administrative ideas were derived from external criteria.

1. See Dhakh., II, where these are variously described as al-kātib, al-wāzīr or dhū-l-wizaratayn.
2. Dhakh., I, vol. i, pp. 289-379; the greatest stress is naturally on Ibn-Zaydūn's poetry, but some useful biographical information is included.
The dependence of the Sevillan political system on the existence of the Banū 'Abbād dynasty was of great significance. A creation of the latter, the Sevillan political system could not outlive its creators. The relatively short period during which this political system lasted was insufficient to enable further mutations of the system and its final adaptation to Sevillan needs. Still weaker was its ability to resist the impact of external pressures. Hence the short-lived existence of the Sevillan system.

The governmental system alone can hardly be said to have determined Seville's role as a major Taifa state. At most, it may be admitted to have permitted the latter's development. It would be difficult to contend that the Banū 'Abbād rulers were the slaves of their system, the opposite being more likely to have been true. Rather than a determinant factor, the political system must therefore have furnished the setting and background, with the events being freely determined by other factors. The importance of the political system must therefore not be overstressed because of its fragility, its inflexibility as a result of its huge bureaucracy, its alien character to the Sevillan society and its inconsistency with Seville's political capacity and needs.
Power within the Political System: the Ruler and the Sevillans in the Context of the System

The political system's primary purpose was to protect, preserve and, to the extent possible, fortify the ruler. The status of the Sevillan leader was, like that of most recognised leaders in Islamic history, legalised through the *bay'a*. Although the acceptance of the ruler's establishment was in theory mutual as the consent of his subjects was voluntary and implied the ruler's recognition of his duties towards his subjects, the *bay'a* as applied to the Banū 'Abbad rulers was in fact the legalisation of al-Qādī's leadership through power and later the hereditary succession of al-Mu'taṣid followed by al-Mu'tamid. The ruler's place in the government combined the roles of supreme military command, foreign policy-making and appointment and replacement of all state employees, including ministers. In practice, the ruler's authority was such that he was not subject to Islamic law, as the latter prescribes. His extreme absolutism enabled him

1. For a definition and elaboration of the concept of *bay'a*, see Muqad., II, pp. 548-50.
2. At-Turtushi presents the problem of the ruler-subject relationship when he considers several different aspects of the ruler (*Siraj*, pp. 81-85, 88-101, 194-96, 207-9). As the problem is approached on an abstract plane, at-Turtushi conceives the ruler-subject relationship ideally, concluding that it was based on their mutual need for each other. The possibility of conflict between the two is left in the background. However, at one point, he does conceive the possibility of an unjust ruler, without advocating the right of the subjects to revolt (*ibid.*, pp. 194-95); see also *Tadhkira*, p. 39.
to actually execute any undesirable political or personal foe without previous judicial proceedings, another position not under the ruler's powers judicially.

Although theoretically in Islamic states a unity of all powers exists so that religion and politics are indivisible, it can be maintained that the degree of manifestation or usurpation of political power varied under different rulers. Practically, the Sevillan system maintained no form of checks for supervising and balancing the ruler's decisions and actions. His role as the supreme authority is partly explained by the system's total indivisibility and integration of powers. More significantly, the ruler's decisions were often legitimised by a legal body after the establishing of a fait accompli. This legalisation was sometimes sought prior to the actual implementation of a decision. For example, al-Ma‘ta‘mid sought the consent of the ‘ulamā‘ before his attempt to crush Ibn-Rashiq's revolt in Murcia.1 Ultimately, the ruler's degree of power determined his use or abuse of the system, depending on whether he manoeuvred it ably or over-extended its capacity.

The physical inability and failure of the Sevillans to challenge the powers enjoyed by the Banū ‘Abbād rulers lasted throughout the Taifa period. Backed by the army, al-Qādi annihilated all the Sevillan leaders with the

1. Tib., p. 112.
potential to threaten his position as ruler. Al-Mu'tadid's tactics of eliminating his opponents through assassination left the Sevillans with no leadership to oppose him. When al-Mu'tamid succeeded al-Mu'tadid as ruler over Seville, the Sevillans were no longer in a position to challenge one of the most powerful Taifa leaders in al-Andalus, who was further supported by an organised administrative bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Sevillans were not provoked by al-Mu'tamid, although his political insight was limited, while Seville's continued territorial expansion must have increased popular support for al-Mu'tamid.

In the chaotic conditions of continuous inter-Taifa strife, the Sevillans were restrained from revolting out of fear of being annihilated. For example, the external dangers to Seville during al-Qādī's rule included attacks by Yahyā b. Hammūd. To revolt against al-Qādī during Ibn-Hammūd's attack would have been to invite the latter's domination over Seville. Under such circumstances, the attention of the Sevillan inhabitants was partially diverted from internal issues in order to concentrate on external perils. Once al-Qādī's army began its organised campaigns against neighbouring Taifa states, which increased during the reigns of al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid, the Sevillan inhabitants were further absorbed by these military expeditions.

However, Seville's offensive campaigns furnished the population with a relative peace and internal security. Seville's relative peace becomes particularly significant considering the revolts, destruction and massacres which throughout the eleventh century befell the inhabitants of almost every other part of al-Andalus, including the largest cities such as Cordoba, Valencia and Toledo. Under Banū 'Abbād, the Sevillan population never experienced the massacres that befell Cordoba during the successive revolts of al-Mahdī, Sulaymān and 'Alī b. Ḥammūd.¹ The Sevillan city walls were never penetrated as were those of Malaga by al-Mu'tamid himself. Neither was the Sevillan administration weakened to the same degree as that of Granada which was continuously subjected to the attacks of al-Mu'tamid and Alfonso VI, enforced payment of annual tribute to Alfonso, or internal rebellions. Although Seville was forced to offer Castile tribute, and although Alfonso's army occasionally organised military expeditions into Sevillan territories, Seville remained one of the most secure Taifa states.

Finally, the Sevillans were obliged to accept their rulers for lack of a better choice. As there was no organised group that sought power for the implementation of a political programme, any alternative to al-Qādī,

¹ For the revolts of al-Mahdī, Sulaymān and 'Alī b. Ḥammūd, see for example: Mu'jib, pp. 40-1, 43, 49-50; Bayan, III, pp. 50-2, 59-60; Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 79, 82.
al-Mu‘taqid or al-Mu‘tamid would have implied their replacement by another authoritarian ruler who would only be able to maintain power through his extermination of all potential contenders. Within the Sevillian context, the possibility of the emergence of a champion of the rights of the people was unthinkable, as the ruler-subject relationship was conceived and applied in terms of master and ruled. The Banū 'Abbād rulers could therefore only have been overthrown by a contender with a stronger power base and sufficient physical support, or alternatively through the latter's political ability to win over elements of the power base of the Banū 'Abbād rulers such as the army or ministers. The Sevillans were also unable to find an external champion. Furthermore, they may have refrained from attempting to support another leader as a result of their experience with al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd, who left them to establish himself in Córdoba on two occasions prior to al-Qāḍī's establishment in Seville.¹

(3) The ḥājib and dhū-l-wizaratayn

The Sevillian bureaucratic hierarchy was of the type described by some sociologists as one of degradation, beginning with the ruler at the top and descending through progressively lower bureaucratic strata. The actual ruler excepted, the highest post in the echelons of the bureaucratic hierarchy of the Banū 'Abbād dynasty was

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dhū-l-wizaratayn, followed by the ministers. The ḥājib was originally an intermediary between the Caliph and the other ministers under the Banū Umayya dynasty. However, the title al-ḥājib implied great prestige under Banū ʿAbbād as is indicated by its adoption by al-Muʿtaqīd and al-Muʿtamīd for themselves and their sons. During the period of Banū Abī-ʿĀmir, the power enjoyed by the ḥājib amounted to that of an absolute ruler, which explains the new connotation of the term and its adoption by the Taifa leaders. With the honorific development of the term ḥājib, the function of intermediary between the ruler and the ministers came to be designated as dhū-l-wizaratayn.

Both the meaning of the term and the functions of the ḥājib varied during the Taifa period from what they had been during that of Banū Umayya, and the intermediary period of the Banū Abī-ʿĀmir is essential for explaining this change. The office of ḥājib as an intermediary between the Caliph and his ministers no longer existed during the Taifa period.

1. This post was absorbed by the ruler either officially or in practice. For example, al-Muʿtaqīd adopted the title and by implication the function of ḥājib. In a letter, Ibn-Hayyān uses this title to address him (Bukh., I, vol. ii, p. 90). The title of ḥājib seems to have been adopted by other Taifa leaders (Miqad., II, p. 609).

2. Jadwa, p. 80.

3. In Seville, Ibn-Zaydūn and Ibn-ʿAmmār are examples of ministers who were designated as dhū-l-wizaratayn. Al-Maqqarī confirms that the minister who represented the ruler during the Taifa period was known as dhū-l-wizaratayn (Nafh, I, p. 202).
because, in practice, the Caliph who had previously been recognised and accepted by all the parties in al-Andalus ceased to exist. The Taifa leader conceived himself as a Caliph within his limited territorial boundaries, but his limitations as a ruler prevented him from meeting the requirements of the Caliphate, basically because the Taifa leader's powers, authority and influence were limited in scale. Consequently, no Sevillan Taifa leader was recognised as a Caliph, nor did he conceive himself as such, a fact which is illustrated by the use of the title al-hājib. However, the Taifa leader did not conceive himself as a hājib alone, as is shown from his use of titles similar to those used by the Cordoban Caliphs. Must we then compare the Taifa leader to al-Mansūr b. Abī-‘Āmir who, while using the Caliphal title of al-Mansūr, retained that of al-hājib, which was his official office? One striking difference is that, unlike al-Mansūr, the Taifa leaders did not operate under the shadow of a living Caliph and the authority of the type of Caliphs temporarily recognised by some Taifa leaders, such as Hishām II and al-Murtadā, was a product of their own creation.

Was the Taifa leader given the title of hājib after he gained full control over his Taifa state? Given that al-Mu’taṣid ended his recognition of Hishām II as the rightful Caliph and that he is known to have adopted the title of hājib, did al-Mu’taṣid maintain the title after his renunciation of the supreme authority of Hishām II? He probably did, because Hishām II continued to be recognised by the
Sevillan ruler until the latter part of his reign. The contradiction which results from the simultaneous adoption of the title al-ḥājib with other Caliphal titles must therefore be explained by the appearance of the office of dhū-l-wizāratayn as a substitute for the previously known hijāba, but even here several questions are raised regarding the nature, functions and responsibilities of the dhū-l-wizāratayn.

The exact nature of the office of dhū-l-wizāratayn is not altogether clear, and the following suggestions may clarify the situation:

(i) The dhū-l-wizāratayn may have been bearer of a double office. This may have occurred in the following ways:

(a) Two different functions or branches of the office existed simultaneously. Could more than one official be called dhū-l-wizāratayn at the same time? For example, were Ibn-‘Ammār and Ibn-Zaydūn, both of whom served under al-Mu‘tamīd, called dhū-l-wizāratayn together or was Ibn-‘Ammār not given the title until Ibn-Zaydūn had died? In other words, was there a multiplicity of ministers denominated dhū-l-wizāratayn? What is certain is that Ibn-Zaydūn gained al-Mu‘tamīd’s disfavour as a result of Ibn-‘Ammār’s manoeuvres, something the latter would not have succeeded in doing without having at least equalled Ibn-Zaydūn in rank.

(b) The same functionary was entrusted with two different offices during two different periods of time under the same ruler. For example, an officer may have been
dismissed and then recalled to fill a new office or re-appointed to a new office, either of which would make him the bearer of two offices. For example, Ibn-Zaydün was imprisoned by Banū Jahwar and rejoined their service after his release. Alternatively the same official may have been charged with two or more offices of a different nature. For example, as a minister Ibn-‘Ammār performed purely administrative functions, but he was also charged with leading negotiations with Alfonso VI on various occasions and participated in military campaigns. Ibn-Zaydün served various Taifa leaders as a minister who was basically charged with administrative affairs, but he also led negotiations.

(c) The same functionary was charged with two different offices during two different periods of time under two different rulers. The example may be cited here of Ibn-Zaydün who worked as a minister under Banū Jahwar, and then under al-Mu‘taḍid and al-Mu‘tamid b. ‘Abbād.

(ii) The dḥū-l-wizaratayn may have been the bearer of one office whose role it was to be an intermediary between the ruler and the other ministers. The case of Ibn-‘Ammār and his unchallenged position under al-Mu‘tamid may again be cited here.

The same personages have been intentionally chosen for different possibilities to illustrate the difficulty of identifying the functions of the dḥū-l-wizaratayn. Any specification of the functions and delimitation of the
responsibilities of the dhū-l-wizāratayn during the Taifa period is difficult, given the contradictions one encounters. One can only conclude that the office of dhū-l-wizāratayn must be conceived within the context of the contradictions of the Taifa period generally. Our understanding of the meaning of dhū-l-wizāratayn therefore remains somewhat vague, as does that of the ḥājib.

(4) The wazīr

The multiplicity of the ministers (wuzāra’) in the political system of Banū ‘Abbād was possibly aimed more at associating the latter with the authoritative character of the Banū Umayya system than providing a response to local needs. However, this must not be interpreted as a general trend, as Prince ‘Abd-Allāh abolished the function of minister in Granada.¹ Specialisation within the political system of Banū ‘Abbād is clear from the assignment of ministers to separate offices such as that of al-mujālasa wa-l-mushāwara (counsel), at-tarsīl (official correspondence), hisāb al-māl (finance), etc.

To avoid attaching modern implications of the term to the minister as he existed under Banū ‘Abbād, the latter should be specifically conceived within his actual geopolitical context. The original term used to designate the minister in the Taifa states seems to have been kātib, which may have changed to wazīr as their autonomy became

¹ Tib., p. 86.
fully established. The two terms were often used synonymously. In Part II of Adh-Dhakhīra, which presents the biography and works of the major literary figures in Western al-Andalus, the latter are described as al-kātib, al-wazīr, al-adīb and dhū-l-wīzaratayn. Some are described by more than one of these terms. The simultaneous use of al-wazīr al-kātib implies either that the person who is thus described occupied two different offices, or that the same post was described variously by the two terms. Ibn-Bassām refers to the following, employing both terms:


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1. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 63v.-68r.; Bodl., fols. 49r.-53r.
2. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 103r.-14v.; Bodl., fols. 87r.-97v.
4. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 159r.-60r.; Bodl., fols. 179v.-83r.
6.) Al-Wazîr al-Kâtib Abû-l-Ḥusayn b. al-Jadd.¹
7.) Al-Wazîr al-Kâtib Abû-Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Majîd b. ‘Abdûn.²
9.) Al-Wazîr al-Kâtib Abû-Bakr b. Qûzmân.⁴
10.) Al-Wazîr al-Kâtib Abû-Bakr b. Sawwâr al-Ushbûnî.⁵

The duties and functions of the minister under Banû ‘Abbâd may consequently be defined as the administration of a specific branch of Seville's government and the implementation of the ruler's orders internally and externally.

It was not really possible for the minister to attain full professional efficiency, a fact which may be explained by several factors. The weakness of the Sevillan minister was basically the result of his limitations within the governmental structure. The conflict between the instructions he was given and the social demands on his particular department was often acute. Let us consider the case of the minister in charge of hisâb al-mâl. Although direct sources of information are not available, the consideration of a few aspects of

1. Bodl., fols. 153r.-54v.; passages missing from Rabat ms.
3. Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., III, p. 50; the passages on Ibn-al-Qâbtûrnu are missing from Rabat and Bodl. ms.
the general situation in Seville will indicate the precariousness of the situation of the 'minister of finance'. The continuous internal instability resulting from wars with other Taifa states, the maintenance of a relatively large army for defensive or offensive purposes, the tribute money imposed by the Christian kings and the luxurious life-styles of the Sevillan rulers were conditions that the minister was not in a position to control politically, despite their drastic financial consequences. The heavy weight of these pressures on the bayt al-mal left the minister with no alternative but to approach the Sevillan population primarily as a source of income through taxation. Thus sheer survival became the predominant concern of the department of hisāb al-māl, conceived as an integral part of the struggling government. As a result, the department of finance was in an inadequate position to fully respond to the social needs of Seville, much less to take positive steps to improve its financial situation.

Another fundamental governmental department was that of the diwān al-a‘māl wa-l-jibāyiṭ. Its functions included tax-collecting, maintaining a balance between the state input and output and maintaining the army financially. This department, which has sometimes been subdivided into several branches, was directed and sometimes co-ordinated by an officer known as an-nāẓir. The office of an-nāẓir was

2. ibid., pp. 613-14.
highly technical and specialised, but politically the nazir under Banū Umayya and the Taifa states enjoyed great power, because his office was administratively independent of the ruler. However, this power carried no direct political implications, although the diwân al-‘mâl wa-l-jibâyât supported the governmental system financially and constituted a financial basis for the ruler's political power. In Seville, this department was probably charged with tax collection which, along with booty, constituted a major source of income for the Sevillan government.

The consideration of the minister's role as a personal counsellor to the ruler during the mujâlasa leads to the same conclusion regarding the limitations on the minister as does an analysis of the structural composition of the Sevillan government. The mujâlasa seems to have been adopted as a formality in which the Sevillan ruler centred as the focal attraction to whom all attention was directed, and which generally included ministers whose task it was to advise the ruler. However, these sessions often consisted of poetic offerings and competitions, as the Banū ‘Abbâd rulers were poetically inclined. The ministers, many of whom were poets, attempted to entertain the ruler through their poetic excellence, with a particular stress on madh. Indeed, they

1. ibid., p. 616.

2. Almost all the poets of Seville have left madh on one or more of the Banū ‘Abbâd rulers, e.g. Ibn-‘Ammâr, Ibn-al-Labbâna and Ibn-Zaydûn.
were not even expected to offer political counsel unless this was explicitly demanded by the ruler, usually during periods of peril. The function of counsellor in Seville was therefore an anachronistic vestige of the Banū Umayya Caliphate. Moreover, the administration of the Taifa state of Seville did not require specialised advice as did the larger and more complex Banū Umayya Caliphate. The Banū 'Abbād rulers consequently did not need the mujālasa for administrative or technical reasons, but as a prestige-giving formality that contributed to the propagation of their image as rulers.

(5) The kātib

The minister in charge of the diwān ar-rasā’il, known as al-kātib, and the minister of kitāb, known as kātib az-zimām (two offices which were sometimes indistinguishable), were even more dependent on the ruler. Nor were these offices always distinguished from others. Firstly, the office of kātib was not essential for the functioning of government, which explains why it was not always adopted, particularly by what Ibn-Khaldūn describes as 'primitive' governments. The essential limitation of the kātib was his direct and total dependence on the ruler. Having no personal powers to initiate policies, he was generally restricted to the administrative role of implementing the ruler's orders. The kātib's allegiance and subordination to

the ruler were not only recognised, but recommended and advocated. Yet it was basically from his support of the ruler that the kātib derived his own strength. Ibn-Khaldūn quotes 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's Risālat al-Kātib, where the kātib's indispensability to the ruler is expressed when the latter is portrayed as the king's hearing, sight, tongue and arms. In Seville, this office was adopted by the Banū 'Abbād rulers as it is attested to by the fact that most of the ministers who served under Banū 'Abbād and whom Ibn-Bassām studies in Part II of ʿAdh-Dhakhīra, carried the title al-kātib. The excellent intellectual background of the kātib in Seville is reflected in the high literary quality of the letters of al-Muʿtadid and al-Muʿtamīd. In particular, Ibn-al-Bizilyānī, whom al-Muʿtadid designated as kātib in 443/1051, excelled in the literary field. Although in

1. ibid., II, p. 620.
2. ibid.
3. The number of ministers referred to as al-kātib by Ibn-Bassām reaches at least eleven (in Part II of ʿAdh-Dhakhīra).
4. See for example al-Muʿtadid's letter to other Taifa leaders explaining his motives for having decided to kill his son (Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, pp. 254-56; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.). See al-Muʿtamīd's answer to Alfonso's ultimatum (Mawsh., pp. 26-28).
terms of political power the kātib was only able to indirectly influence the ruler's decisions and policies, the prestige of his post was in some cases only superseded by that of the ruler himself. However, the kātib was liable to criticism when his weaknesses were publicly exposed, and even his association with the ruler proved incapable of protecting him from attacks.

The kātib az-zimām belonged to a category that was inferior to the kātib, while remaining among the top governmental officials. His position vis-à-vis the ruler was equally insecure.

The official in charge of awqāf was perhaps allowed more flexibility to fulfil his function than his colleagues. While directly aimed at the promotion of Seville's spiritual and social welfare, the administration of awqāf was an almost apolitical office which did not affect the ruler's policies. On the other hand, the promotion of social welfare indirectly contributed to the general propagation of the ruler's image. Despite his limited political power, the minister of awqāf enjoyed great prestige in al-Andalus because, socially, the office contributed to relieving the distress of the needy and, religiously, it was supported by the 'ulamā', judges and the pious generally. Because of the widespread support for this branch of government, the ruler found it politically advantageous to grant it his full

encouragement. Despite the lack of direct information regarding the exact nature and administration of awqāf in Seville, the political role of the Sevillan mosque, which was supported by the awqāf, was significant. Furthermore, the department of this specifically Islamic socio-religious institution is known to have existed throughout al-Andalus. For example, in Granada, Prince 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn refers to the ṣāhib al-aḥbās Ibn-Salmūn, and Ibn-Ḥayyūn refers to an unidentified corrupt official who abused the property of the awqāf, possibly in Cordoba.

The minister’s limitations were increased by a direct interference with his work. His vulnerability and the instability of his office reinforced his need to intrigue as a necessary condition for the preservation of his post. In Seville, where the ruler’s power was generally efficiently imposed on the ministers, the latter intrigued against one another, striving to secure the favour of some of their colleagues and to eliminate others. Examples of two ministers who plotted against a third were Ibn-‘Ammār and Ibn-Martīn, who were successful in manipulating al-Mu’tamīd into ending his favour to Ibn-Zaydūn and his son ar-Raqīb. On the other hand, Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ḥafṣ had been executed by al-Mu‘taqīd because of the intrigues of Abū-l-Walīd Ibn-Zaydūn. Intrigue against ministers was also

1. Tib., p. 117.
practised by members of the court, as is illustrated by Iʿtimād's plots to minimise the favour shown to Ibn-ʿAmmār by al-Muʿtamid.

In conclusion, the Sevillan minister was not provided with general guidelines, nor was he left to work out the details freely and imaginatively. Instead, he was subjected to the ruler's constant authority, to which he had to conform as a condition for survival. The minister's preoccupation with his superior's immediate satisfaction overshadowed his ability to fulfil his duties adequately. This was particularly true during the reign of al-Muʿtaddid when the ministers lived under terrible strain and witnessed the assassination of several of their colleagues. The terrified state of mind that characterised the minister under al-Muʿtaddid is exemplified by Ibn-Zaydūn's relief following the former's death.\(^1\) Under al-Muʿtamid, the minister enjoyed more security with the ruler, although some suffered from the disfavour of other ministers who were endowed with excessive powers, like Ibn-ʿAmmār.

Despite their handicaps and limitations, the ministers enjoyed widespread prestige under Banū ʿAbbād. Their relationship with the Sevillan masses was determined by their occupational role. Professionally, the minister constituted the essential link between the ruler and ruled. Although the people had no say in their appointment, the humble origins of some of the ministers may ultimately have benefited the merchants and lower echelons. On the other

\(^1\) Hulla, II, p. 43.
hand, the political alienation of the indigenous élite (al-khāṣṣa) is indicated by its disproportionately small share in the government. The Banū 'Abbād rulers found the ruling class to be reliable because of its non-Sevillian origin. This is particularly true of the ministers. For example, immediately upon his establishment as ruler, al-Qādī b. 'Abbād appointed an unknown Sevillian to head his government. An examination of names of ministers who served under Banū 'Abbād indicates that many originally came from various other parts of al-Andalus. The place of origin of several literary figures and ministers of Western al-Andalus was adopted as part of their names. Examples include the following:

1.) Al-Wazīr al-Kātib Abū-'Umar al-Bājī [from Baja].

2.) Al-Adīb Abū-Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jalīl al-Mursī [from Murcia].

3.) Al-Kātib Abū-l-Hasan Sāliḥ b. Sāliḥ ash-Shantamarī [from Santa María].

2. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 63v.-68r.; Bodl., fols. 49r.-53r.
4.) Ash-Shaykh al-Adib Abū-'Umar b. Fath al-Baṭalyawsī [from Badajoz].

5.) Al-Adib Abū-'Umar Yūsuf b. Kawthar ash-Shantarīnī [from Santarem].

6.) Al-Wazīr al-Kātib Abū-Bakr b. Sawwāq al-Ushbūnī [from Lisbon].

The author of the work which records the names and titles of the above-mentioned figures is himself universally known as 'Alī b. Bāṣam ash-Shantarīnī [from Santarem]. The adoption of a ḥaqab indicating the bearer's place of origin could only have served a practical purpose away from the person's place of origin, and this indicates a great mobility throughout eleventh-century al-Andalus. The ministers serving under Banū 'Abbad therefore generally had a sophisticated intellectual background, but were politically servile to the ruler. As many were originally from other parts of al-Andalus, their political contacts in Seville were perhaps limited and their security was ultimately dependent on the ruler. Hence the ministers, like the army, were a fundamental element supporting the ruler. The power of the latter was such that he was able to approach them individually, which discouraged the formation of

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1. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 206v.-7r.; passages missing from Bodl. ms.
3. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 208r.-17r.; Bodl., fols. 221r.-28r.
coalitions and revolts against him. The ruler and his ministers therefore thrived on each other's support and their attitude towards their Sevillan subjects was conceived less within the context of their duties towards the Sevillans than vice versa.

The contrast within the governmental structure between as-sayf and al-qalam was intended to distinguish between those functions which involved physical duties and others of a more intellectual and administrative nature. Certain functionaries in Seville such as al-kātib clearly fall under the category of al-qalam, while the army pertains to as-sayf. However, others such as the wazīr are more difficult to classify, since the term designated different functions, and Ibn-Khaldūn only confused the issue further by considering the wazīr on the same footing as ahl as-suyūf. Applying the dichotomy to the reign of Banū ʿAbbād, it is difficult to discern a neat pattern that illustrates the extent to which ahl as-suyūf and ahl al-qalam dominated the Sevillan political scene, as both were consistently active. It is nonetheless certain that, together, the two categories were superseded by the Banū ʿAbbād rulers, which confirms Ibn-Khaldūn's conception that '...as-sayf and al-qalam are both an instrument of the ruler (ṣāhib ad-dawla) on which he relies for the implementation of his affairs...'

2. ibid., p. 634.
3. ibid.
The police prefect, who was known as al-hākim in the Maghrib and al-wāli among the Turks, was officially designated as šāhib ash-shurṭa and commonly referred to as šāhib al-madīna or šāhib al-layl in al-Andalus.¹ Under the Banū Umayya dynasty, the functions of šāhib ash-shurṭa were subdivided into šāhib al-kubra and šāhib as-sughrā, specialising in the affairs of al-khaṣṣa and al-‘emma respectively.² Despite his unpopularity, the powers of šāhib ash-shurṭa in al-Andalus were such that he could order executions, although this was exceptional and usually fell under the responsibility of the qādi.³ Because of its influence and power, the post of šāhib ash-shurṭa in Seville was comparable to that of the minister. His responsibilities included the maintenance of the city’s internal security and assuming full command of the city during the ruler’s absence. An urban office, the duties of šāhib ash-shurṭa were limited to the Andalusian cities, particularly the larger ones, while the fortresses fell under the administration of governors. Although the sources do not contain much detail regarding this post in Seville, Labīb was designated as šāhib al-madīna by Prince ‘Abd-Allāh in Granada.⁴ As Seville was larger than Granada, the need for security must

3. ibid.; Nafh, I, p. 203.
have been even greater, thus requiring such an office. The existence of the office in Seville is confirmed by a reference to a šāhib ash-shurṭa who had served under al-Mu‘tamid and at whose house in Aghmāt the disgraced daughter of the imprisoned al-Mu‘tamid later used to beg.¹ The powers of the šāhib al-madīna were limited in Seville, sometimes to the extent that he was unable to pursue his duties successfully. An example of such a situation was the imprisonment by the šāhib al-madīna, ‘Abd-Allāh b. Sallām, of a Sevillan who created trouble in the market-place in 462/1069.² The explosive popular reaction to this arrest forced the šāhib al-madīna to request the assistance of al-Mu‘taqid, who was then in Cordoba, and the latter sent him his son Sirāj ad-Dawla accompanied by ‘ulamā’ and ministers.³ This incident clearly illustrates the unpopularity of the šāhib al-madīna in Seville and his subordination to the ruler.

The wāli or ʿāmil (governor) over fortresses was an important office in the government of Seville, because the city’s large territories contained numerous fortresses which constituted a co-ordinated network for the implementation of military control over different parts of the Taifa state. The number of ʿummāl increased with Seville’s acquisition of more fortresses, each of which required the

¹ Wafayat, V, p. 35.
³ ibid.
appointment of a 'amil to direct the affairs of the inhabitants of the fortress (ahl ath-thughūr) in the name of the Taifa ruler. The 'amil presented a delicate problem for the ruler, even though his powers and status were often less than those of the wazīr. Unlike the higher governmental officials who generally operated from within the palace, the 'amil was physically separated from the ruler by distances that were sometimes considerable. As the Sevillan Taifa state increased territorially to include Algeciras and Cordoba, the problem of an effective administrative and political control over the 'amil attained new dimensions. The threat of the transfer of the allegiance of the local inhabitants of the fortress to the 'amil through their day-to-day relationship with him threatened to erode the Taifa leader's authority over the fortress. The popularity of the 'amil within his fortress sometimes made it impossible for the ruler to interfere in the former's internal affairs. For example, in Granada, several of his 'ummāl, such as Mu'ammal who was in charge of Lucena and Kabbāb b. Tamīt who was in charge of Arjona and Antequera, not only disregarded the authority of Prince 'Abd-Allāh but incited their subjects to revolt.¹ Even the powerful Taifa state of Seville did not escape two successive revolts in Murcia.² However, Seville was comparatively safe from the disintegration of

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2. Ibid., pp. 100-2.
its fortresses. Besides their strength and wealth, one of the basic causes for the strong attachment of fortresses to the central authority was the 'family' policy adopted by the Banū 'Abbād rulers. That al-Mu‘tamid was incorporated into his father's service is indicated by the former's command over the Sevillan army during the siege of Malaga. However, it was during the rule of al-Mu‘tamid, when Seville attained the peak of its territorial expansion, that he extended the 'family' policy most. For example, a basic motive for al-Mu‘tamid's desire to depose Ibn-Rashīq, his ‘āmil over Murcia, was to replace him by his more reliable son, ar-Rādī. Al-Mu‘tamid charged his sons with highly responsible duties in important cities like Algeciras, Seville and Cordoba, as well as others of lesser importance. The general allegiance of the Sevillan ‘ummāl to the Banū ‘Abbād rulers is symbolised by the positive contribution of al-Mu‘taṣid's ‘āmil over Sedona, ‘Alī Ḥisād, in persuading the former's son, Ismāʿīl, to end his flight from Seville and to return home. However, the ‘āmil always remained a potential rebel in Seville as he did throughout the Andalusian Taifa states. The unreliability, spirit of independence and fragile ties of the ‘āmil with the central authority of the Taifa state were unveiled on an unprecedented scale when Yūsuf's armies swept away one Taifa

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2. Tib., p. 112.
3. Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, pp. 256-69; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
state after another. Fortresses throughout al-Andalus offered Yusuf little resistance, often joining his troops against their previous Taifa leader.¹

(7) The Nature and Role of Official Propaganda

Official propaganda and spying were both nourished during the Banū 'Abbād period, with the ultimate objective of protecting the ruler and promoting a personality cult. Religion was exploited as a means for propagating the ruler’s image, legitimising and almost sanctifying it. The titles al-Qāḍī, al-Mu‘taḍid bi-Allāh and al-Mu‘tamid ‘ala-Allāh all bear religious connotations. However, it was through the political manipulation of the socio-religious institution of the khutba that the Banū ‘Abbād rulers were able to entrench their image among the populace. The minbar became the official propaganda platform during al-Qāḍī b. ‘Abbād’s reign. This state of affairs persisted during the period of al-Mu‘taḍid, who in 451/1059 ordered the khutba to no longer be given in Hishām II’s name.²

The role of poetry as a means of political propaganda in Seville is undisputed, but the degree of its impact upon the common Sevillan is not certain. Politically, the

¹ For example, Nu‘mān, who had previously served as commander under Prince ‘Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn, joined Yūsuf b. Tāshuğīn’s ranks and conquered several fortresses in Granada (Tib., pp. 138-39, 144, 148).

² Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 250; Rabat, fol. 9r.; Bodl., fol. 8v.
madḥ (eulogy) of the ruler contributed to the poet's material or occupational advancement, and fulfilled a political role. While the highly developed literary quality of the poetry produced under Banū ʿAbbād was almost certainly too sophisticated and culturally alien for the taste of the majority of the Sevillans, there was an enormous poetical output by the numerous court poets in Seville, particularly under al-Muʿtamid. Poetry often served as an asset that indirectly contributed to the popularity of the Sevillan poet-minister. Poetry as a means of exalting al-Muʿtamid continued to be produced even after the latter's death, as is illustrated by the verses of Ibn-ʿAbd-as-Samad and others.

However, the political role of Sevillan poetry was perhaps most effective as a means of promoting the ruler's image among other Taifa leaders. The encouragement and promotion of poetry in the courts of the most powerful Taifa states such as Toledo, Badajoz and others, created platforms for literary expression which also served the political end of giving certain Taifa states a better reputation for their literary production than others, thus creating competition. For example, the reputation of Ibn-al-Aftas was promoted throughout al-Andalus through his exaltation in Ibn-ʿAbdūn's diwān. Considering that Seville was par excellence the haven for poets and considering, too, that al-Muʿtaḍid and al-Muʿtamid were among the most highly regarded Andalusian poets, the image of Seville as a producer of the best Andalusian poetry of
the century must have greatly impressed literary minds throughout al-Andalus, thus complementing the former's image as a leading Taifa state.

(8) Conclusion

The complex governmental system which existed during the Banū 'Abbād period weighed heavily on the Sevillans, because it constituted a machinery the huge size and over-extended branches of which rendered the administration of simple matters difficult. Rather than government being a means of administering Seville's affairs in their various dimensions, the government under Banū 'Abbād expanded to become a burden that the Sevillans were forced to bear politically and financially.

The question remains concerning the validity of the Sevillan governmental system, not only in size and form, but in essence. Was the system unworkable or was it badly applied? Any answer is likely to involve a certain degree of value-judgement, because the value of any particular political system is usually judged in comparison to another that is real or conceived. To minimise this dilemma, let us simply consider those aspects of the Sevillan political system which were actually dominant and those which had the potential for improving the system. As has been shown in this chapter, the ruler's dominance over the entire political system was excessive. However, other aspects of the system seem to have been abused. Had the bay'ā been based on merit
rather than heredity, had the socio-religious institutions of the khutba and the waqf been free from political manipulation, had the higher governmental officers had more contacts with the Sevillan population, and had the interests of the Sevillans been considered as an end of governmental policies rather than a condition for the system's survival, the government of the Taifa state of Seville would have been otherwise. However, the ultimate answer concerning the validity of the Sevillan system is inherent in the answer to whether the existence of the Taifa state, in which the political system developed, was itself justifiable.

The Sevillan governmental system resembled that of Banū Umayya and the al-Murābitūn in different ways, but remained unique in many respects. The parallel between the political and administrative structures of government under Banū 'Abbād and Banū Umayya may be extended to their substance, as the former possibly inherited much of the latter's actual human and technical resources. The Sevillan bureaucracy must have drawn a large proportion of its personnel from previous civil servants of the Cordoban Caliphate. The persistent tumult and indiscriminate massacres in Cordoba, following the fall of Banū Abī-‘Āmir and Banū Jahwar respectively, brought about a massive exodus of technical skills of which Seville (which enjoyed a relative peace under Banū 'Abbād) must have claimed a significant share. This recruitment of manpower that
Cordoba had once attracted is further discerned in the army, which constituted the backbone of the political regime of Banū Abbād. At a high administrative level, Cordoba furnished the courts of al-Mu'tāqīd and al-Mu'tāmid with an invaluable asset in the person of Ibn-Zaydūn, not to mention others.

If the administrative vestiges of Banū Umayya constituted essential elements in the political and administrative system of al-Qāḍī and al-Mu'tāqīd, the system matured to form that of al-Mu'tamid. The systematic administrative development under al-Mu'tamid had been so conditioned by the previous stages that he found himself unable to alter its general course. However, despite its fateful end, the administrative bureaucracy under al-Mu'tamid developed to support the largest and most powerful Taifa state in al-Andalus. It was perhaps the last vestige of an authentic Andalusian bureaucracy, because, following the fall of the Taifa states, the destiny of al-Andalus was determined from across the Strait. With the triumph of the al-Murābiṭūn, the administrative organisation in al-Andalus entered upon a new course, being gradually moulded on the Maghrabi pattern, as is expressed in the following text:

'Amma mamlakat al-Muslimīn fī al-Andalus fa-lā yakhfā annahā fī ma'nā bilād al-Maghrib. Wa fī kathīr min al-awqāt yamlikuhum mulūk al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā fa-bi-d-ḍarūra anna tartībahum jārī 'alā tartīb bilād al-Maghrib.'

1. Subh, V, p. 271, (‘As for the kingdom of the Muslims in al-Andalus, it is well known that it is in a sense [part of] the Maghrib. At many times the kings of Morocco rule them and it necessarily follows that their administration depends upon that of the Maghrib.’)
II. The Sevillian Army

(1) The Sevillian Army’s Composition and its Ethnic Elements

The ethnic variety in the composition of the army under Banū ‘Abbād is indicative of the objectives it was designed to fulfil. The basic and most striking feature of the Banū ‘Abbād army was its solid allegiance and support for the ruler and its total detachment from any other source of power. Although al-Mu‘tamid was generally acceptable to his Sevillian subjects, al-Mu‘taḍid had been insecure even with his own son, while al-Qāḍī had had to rely on his army almost entirely when confronting local Sevillian leaders. Hence, from the beginning of the Banū ‘Abbād dynasty, al-Qāḍī needed to rely on an army that was highly disciplined and unsympathetic to any local elements. Thus it would very probably need to be of foreign composition or, at any rate, largely so.

If the racial composition of the armies in other parts of al-Andalus led to the prevalence of a majority group and its leadership within the army, the ideological orientation and leadership of the Sevillian army under the Banū ‘Abbād were always determined by the ruler from the top. If a group allegiance of any kind existed within the Sevillian army, then it must have remained suppressed because material gain constituted the basic motivational factor for the army’s firm unity and coherence. Furthermore, the army’s morale was regularly high as Seville’s military record of success
lasted throughout the Banū 'Abbād period. There was no sign in the army of the type of atmosphere of fear and insecurity that reigned in the Sevillan court among the ministers. Nor are there any traces of intrigues or plots by the army, which was fully disciplined. The Sevillan army's unreserved loyalty to the Sevillan ruler was at no time threatened by tribal solidarity or an allegiance to external leaders or groups. Obedience to the Sevillan rulers was assured throughout by the pragmatic political decisions of the respective Banū 'Abbād rulers, and the army, on which they relied heavily, particularly for the promotion of foreign policy, remained active on a regular and progressive basis.

The ethnic variety in the army also served to prevent internal dissidence and to ensure the army's unity. Al-Manṣūr b. Abī-'Āmir had reorganised the Andalusian army which had been subdivided on a tribal basis into groups known as the junūd.¹ He did away with the strong allegiance of the junūd to their tribal leaders by introducing large

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1. The changes al-Manṣūr introduced to the Andalusian army described by Prince 'Abd-Allah are as follows: (i) An ethnic diversification of the army's composition was undertaken with the object of crushing any one rebellious group by the remaining groups acting together. (ii) Al-Manṣūr's army was further strengthened by the acquisition of more soldiers, particularly Berbers from the Maghrib. 'Abd-Allah states that the Berber leaders, including his grandfather, Badis, joined al-Manṣūr's ranks because of their strong faith and desire to combat the Christian king (Tīb., pp. 16-17). A regular tax that al-Manṣūr imposed on the local Andalusian population, whose members refused to participate in his battles, was used to maintain the Andalusian army (Tīb., pp. 16-18).
numbers of mercenaries, particularly Berber soldiers from the Maghrib, where he had previously served as commander during the reign of al-Ḥakam II. The Banū 'Abbad army was unlike that of Banū Umayya or al-Manṣūr in several respects. There is no sign in our sources of any tribal allegiance to the commanders, and if any one group predominated numerically in the Sevillan army there is no indication of repercussions resulting from this imbalance. The different racial factions within the army did not constitute tightly-knit groups. The ethnic mixture of the army, which is reflected not only in the recruitment of foreign mercenaries and slaves but in the composition of the Sevillan society, prevented any cohesive revolt by the army as a whole, making any attempts at revolt, by individual groups within the army, perilous and easy to crush.

The Berber element does not seem to have constituted an important part of the Banū 'Abbād army. The domination of the Taifa state of Seville by Banū 'Abbād was fundamentally dependent on ending the supremacy of the foreign rule of Banū Ḥammūd. The incorporation of the Berber troops into al-Qāḍī Muḥammad b. 'Abbād's army, following his success over Banū Ḥammūd, would therefore have presented him with several problems:

(i) Could the solidly-built allegiance of the Berber soldiers towards the Banū Ḥammūd rulers be diverted by al-Qāḍī b. 'Abbād? The military success of the Banū Ḥammūd rulers, in both Seville and Cordoba, suggests otherwise.
(ii) Could the ambitions of the Berber military commanders, which al-Qādī b. 'Abbād exploited to confront the leadership of Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd, be checked within the Banū 'Abbād army?

(iii) Could their ethnic-political ties with external Berber leaders in the Maghrib, or other parts of al-Andalus such as Malaga, be restrained from forming into a serious threat to the Banū 'Abbād rulers? In other words, could al-Qādī b. 'Abbād recruit the very soldiers who failed to prevent his establishment as ruler over Seville? It is well established that the Sevillans successfully resisted the Berber contingents of al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd following his expulsion from Cordoba. Furthermore, the Berber contingents under the command of his son, Muḥammad, were expelled from Seville by the Sevillans. The possibility that the Berber contingents might change their loyalty to another party is shown by the fact that, after al-Qāsim and his son Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd were defeated, al-Qāsim's troops joined Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd of Malaga.

(iv) Could the Berber troops be accepted by the Sevillan inhabitants as a part of the Banū 'Abbād army, having been rejected as the pillar of the Banū Ḥammūd regime? The record of the Berber troops as being partly

2. ibid.
responsible for the plundering of Cordoba doubtless gave the Sevillans sufficient reason to fear a similar fate.1

The Banû ‘Abbâd rulers strengthened their firm grip over the army by appointing their sons as military commanders. Al-Mu’taḍid's reliance on his sons for military purposes did not solve his problems relating to the leadership of the Sevillan army.2 However, al-Mu’tamid’s sons fulfilled this function more satisfactorily and he was able to rely on the military leadership of several of his sons more successfully, appointing them as both military commanders and governors.

What groups composed the army under Banû ‘Abbâd? Although it is impossible to determine the exact proportion of the ethnic composition in the Sevillan army, there are, nonetheless, indications of its multiracial composition. The Banû ‘Abbâd army seems to have drawn its strength from

1. The Banû Hammûd rulers were loathed by the Cordoban citizens, whom they ruled harshly. ‘Ali b. Hammûd's tyranny finally led to his assassination (Dhâkh., I, vol. i, pp. 80-81). His brother, al-Qâsim, was overthrown for the second time in 414/1023, and his army plundered the surrounding areas of Cordoba before heading for Seville (Dhâkh., I, vol. ii, pp. 16-17).

2. For example, the refusal of al-Mu’taḍid’s son, Ismâ’il, to command the Sevillan army in an attack against Cordoba led to the tragedy of the latter's assassination by his father. On the other hand, al-Mu’taḍid sent his son Muhammad, later al-Mu’tamid, at the head of the Sevillan army during a siege against Malaga and, having failed to capture it, Muhammad b. ‘Abbâd begged for his father's forgiveness in verse (Qala’id: Hist. Abb., I, p. 53).
two categories of emotionally, ideologically and politically uncommitted soldiers: mercenaries and slaves.¹

Alienated from the Sevillan inhabitants and highly insecure in a foreign land, the mercenaries and slaves thrived on the continued strength of the Banū ‘Abbād rulers on whose safety their very existence depended. Because the dependence of the ruler and the army was a mutual affair, the Banū ‘Abbād rulers offered their military commanders rewards such as the command over fortresses they had subjected, while soldiers were professional and received regular salaries, a state of affairs that was first introduced by al-Manṣūr b. Abī-‘Amīr.

If power and success explain the Sevillan army’s general unity and cohesion, there were nevertheless at least two examples of revolts during the reign of al-Mu’tamid: those of Ibn-‘Ammār and Ibn-Rashīq.² They were not, however,

1. Al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād is described as having lavishly used his enormous wealth to strengthen his army by purchasing slaves and mercenaries (Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 3r.; Bodl., fol. 3r.; Bayan, III, pp. 196-97; Hulla, II, p. 38; Amal, p. 178). This is the most direct reference to the Sevillan soldiers which enables us to assess their ethnic background. The Christian soldiers of Alfonso’s army also participated in battles along with the Sevillan army, but the proportion of Christian soldiers within the Sevillan army is uncertain.

2. Prince ‘Abd-Allāh b. Bulğīn presents a detailed account of the two revolts and analyses both the political ambitions and the psychological motivations (from his point of view, which is particularly hostile towards Ibn-‘Ammār) of the two rebels (Tāb., pp. 79-82, 110-2, 144-45).
caused by any feelings of 'asabiyya, but consisted of the doings of two privileged officials whose gains within the Sevillan political system aroused their ambitions which materialised in their attempts to break away from the Sevillan Taifa state and to lead Murcia as an autonomous region. Four factors explain the limited implications and failure of these revolts. Firstly, the distance between Murcia and Seville made it possible for Ibn-‘Ammār and, later, Ibn-Rashīq to attempt a break away from Seville, but despite the difficulties of transportation and communication the Sevillan army was successful in crushing the first revolt and containing the other. Secondly, these two attempts were organised outside the mainstream of the Sevillan army, which indicates that the latter remained strong, coherent and loyal to the Sevillan ruler even at times when factions of the army revolted. This forms a total contrast with Prince ‘Abd-Allāh's army, as many of his commanders at times behaved independently, retaining a merely nominal allegiance to him. Thirdly, Ibn-‘Ammār and Ibn-Rashīq were refused support by the only two armies that superseded and outmatched the Sevillan army. Alfonso refused Ibn-‘Ammār his support against a Taifa leader whom he had pledged to defend or, at any rate, not to harm, in return for his tribute money. Yusuf b. Tāshufīn also refused Ibn-Rashīq his assistance, considering such a revolt to be illegal and unjustified. Furthermore,

1. ibid., p. 70.
2. ibid., p. 111-12.
one of the factors that permitted Ibn-Fashîq to retain his control over Murcia at this point was his threat to join forces with Alfonso at a time when the disunity of the Taifa leaders was clearly expressed even as they besieged Aledo. Whether intentionally or not, Yusuf succeeded, through his position vis-à-vis Ibn-Fashîq, in temporarily deceiving the other Taifa leaders into believing that he did not intend to meddle in their internal affairs, much less to conquer them. Considered within the context of the ethnic groupings, we find that Yusuf, a Berber, refused to support a rebel against al-Mu'tamid, while Alfonso, a Christian, refused to support another rebel against his Muslim ally. These two cases can serve to stress the inter-racial and inter-religious alliances that existed in al-Andalus, even though Alfonso and, later, Yusuf turned against al-Mu'tamid for other reasons.

Finally, the loyalty of the Sevillan army to al-Mu'tamid, even towards the end of his reign, was clearly illustrated in its fierce stand against the attacks of Yusuf's commander, Amîr Sir.1 Al-Mu'tamid confronted Yusuf's army to the bitter end, unlike other Taifa leaders such as 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggîn, who negotiated his own surrender to the al-Murâbiṭûn.2 Al-Mu'tamid did not find himself in such a disadvantageous position, because he had engaged in a policy of favouring and promoting his sons as

1. ibid., p. 170.
2. ibid., pp. 151-59.
military commanders.¹ For example, Al-Ḥulal al-Mawshiyya presents him discussing with his son, ar-Rashīd Abū-l-Ḥasan ʿUbayd-Allāh, what policy to adopt vis-à-vis Alfonso VI, and the question of whether to seek the assistance of Yūsuf, when the Castilian king adopted an aggressive policy towards the Taifas generally following the fall of Toledo in 478/1085.² An even more striking illustration of the Sevillan army's determined resistance to the al-Murābiṭūn is that, even after his defeat and imprisonment in Aghmāt, al-Muʿtamid received news of the death of his son, ‘Abd-al-Jabbār, who was mortally wounded by an arrow while defending Arcos against the al-Murābiṭūn.³ ‘Abd-al-Jabbār's ministers continued the resistance until the entire fortress was starved into submission.⁴

(2) The Organisation of the Sevillan Army

The Sevillan army consisted of three types of soldiers, foot-soldiers, archers and cavalrymen, each of whom carried different types of weapons and fulfilled different but complementary functions during battles.⁵ The foot-soldiers

¹ For example, his son, ar-Raḍī, was sent to replace Ibn-Raḍīq as commander over Murcia, although he failed to do so (Tib., p. 112).
² Mawsh., pp. 31-32.
⁴ Ibid., p. 65.
⁵ At-Turtushī gives some insight into the organisation of the armies in al-Andalus and describes the role of the archers, cavalrymen and foot-soldiers as well as the manner in which attacks were organised using all categories (Siraj, pp. 308-9).
employed lances, shields and swords, the archers bows and arrows, and the cavalrymen rode horses and protected themselves with mail, using swords to fight. The cavalry formed the backbone of the army and was often decisive in determining the outcome of battles.

Seville, which was generally on the offensive, was faced with the problem of overcoming the type of obstacle created by the limited defensive warfare of other Taifa states. Only the area within the city walls or fortresses was defended effectively by the Taifa leaders, while the agricultural plantations and fields were exposed to the plundering of dissident governors, adventurers, other Taifa leaders or the Christian kings. Siege was laid to cities, following the classical pattern, and protective measures had to be overcome by the besieger.

Being limited in terms of its duration and the relatively small numbers of men involved (which could generally be counted in hundreds), warfare in eleventh-century al-Andalus was a slow if continuous process. For example, the period it took to carry through a siege differed, ranging from months to years. A variety of measures were adopted to protect cities or fortresses. Prince ‘Abd-Allah provides useful information on how fortresses were rendered self-sufficient and equipped to offer resistance over months or even years. Heavy walls and cisterns were constructed to protect cities and fortresses.

1. Tib., p. 120.
Flour mills were fitted and food stocks collected from villages in surrounding areas, enabling resistance for a period of more than a year. Different types of weapons and armament were used, such as swords, shields, bows, arrows and ballistas (ra‘‘ada).

The role of armies in al-Andalus varied. Although battles did occur on a classical model whereby two organised armies met in a battlefield, warfare was more commonly carried out in a disorganised, multifarious and inconsistent manner. No particular rules were followed, and deceit and surprise attacks almost constituted the rule rather than the exception. People who knew a city or a fortress from the inside were employed by the party laying siege to it. For example, Ibn-Aḍḥā informed the combined armies of al-Mu‘tamid and Alfonso VI of the vulnerable parts of Granada, when Ibn–‘Ammār reached an agreement with Alfonso regarding the city’s subordination. Alfonso’s success in annexing Toledo was also dependent on the knowledge of the city which he had obtained as a guest of Ibn-Dhīn-Nūn.

War in eleventh-century al-Andalus is full of examples of treason, deceit, and surprise attacks, whether during important battles or in the less significant day-to-day relations between enemies or even allies. Al-Mu‘tamid’s

1. ibid.
2. ibid.
3. ibid., p. 69.
assassination of two Taifa leaders in his palace bath has been mentioned previously. Alfonso's irregular attack against the Muslim forces during the Battle of az-Zallāqa is another illustration that indicates the use of deceit as a manner of dealing with the enemy.¹

However, for a better understanding of the Sevillan army's role and behaviour, it must be conceived within the context of the general military situation in al-Andalus. Unlike the warlike societies of the Christian North on the one hand and the Maghrib on the other, Andalusian society was not militarily oriented. We find for example that, during the period of al-Manṣūr b. Abī-‘Amir's military expeditions against the Christians, the Andalusian peasants refused to fight in his army and were instead required to offer a share of their harvest in return for protection.²

1. Alfonso had agreed with Yusuf not to initiate the battle until Monday. However, Yusuf did not trust the Castilian king and ordered the larger part of the Andalusian army to remain ready for any fighting on Friday. Alfonso in fact began his advance against the Andalusians on Friday at the time of mid-day prayer, thinking that the entire Andalusian army would be engaged in prayer. Yusuf's men then initiated a counter-attack from behind, and the Battle of az-Zallāqa commenced (Muʿjib, p. 134; Rawd, pp. 90-91).

2. Prince ‘Abd-Allāh describes the Andalusian peasants as claiming to be unable to participate in al-Manṣūr's battles on the pretext of having to work their lands, but according to ‘Abd-Allāh they were not a warlike people. They agreed, instead, to offer a regular tax or share of their harvest to support the army (Tib., p. 17).
In contrast, the Christian societies of Northern Spain were on a constant war footing during the eleventh century. The name of Castile is thought to be derived from the numerous castles in the area which were meant to defend their inhabitants against any attacks. The military aggression of the feudal Christian societies reached its peak during the last quarter of the eleventh century. Alfonso's increasing military aggression against the Taifa states was constantly supported and promoted by the nobles and knights in his court. Other Christian leaders, of whom the most renowned is the Cid, were militarily active against the Taifas. On the other hand, we have the al-Murābiṭūn whose nature as fierce fighters enabled them to rise from being desert-dwellers to become masters of the Maghrib and al-Andalus. However, this is not to state that the army had no place in Andalusian society. Although not as militarily inclined as the Christians and the Moroccans, the Andalusians were forced by the division of al-Andalus during the eleventh century to build and use their armies, either against the aggression of the Christian kings and knights, or against other Taifa leaders. Within al-Andalus, the army was used by the more powerful Taifa leaders to increase their territory and to acquire booty by attacking other weaker Taifas. The army's role in the Taifa states was not limited to the defence of the Taifa state's political system and society, but where confrontation with the increasingly menacing Castilian kingdom was
concerned the Taifa states were in no position to defend themselves individually, while their peaceful reunification was not even possible under the umbrella of Yusuf b. Tashufin. The place of the army in Andalusian society was limited, because of the role of agriculture and commerce which stimulated the economy. War was not necessary for the survival of the Taifa states, although it was fully exploited by the political and military leaders for their own benefit. The army in the Taifa states was in the final analysis unable to fulfil the function of protecting the Taifa economies from the effects of plunder by external forces. Consequently, as the plunders continued, and decreased the society's productivity, the army's demands increased and the result was that the burden of crippling taxes could no longer be supported by the societies of the Taifa states.

III. The Religious and Legal Establishment

(1) Malikism in al-Andalus

(a) The Socio-political Foundations of Malikism in al-Andalus

The Maliki rite of law was first introduced to al-Andalus by Malik b. Anas's direct disciples Ziyād b. 'Abd ar-Rahmān, Qarūs b. al-'Abbās and al-Ghāz b. Qays,

1. Prince 'Abd-Allāh, himself a participant in the siege of Aledo, describes how Yusuf found it impossible to reconcile the differences between the various Taifa leaders (such as al-Mu'tamid and al-Mu'tasim of Almeria, 'Abd-Allāh and his brother Tamīm, etc.). (Tib., p. 113.)
followed by others.\footnote{1} By the eleventh century, Mālikism, which had been declared the official rite in al-Andalus by the Caliph Hishām b. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya b. Hishām b. Mālik b. Marwān in 170/786, became firmly established,\footnote{2} despite the limited competition of other schools of fiqh such as Ḥanafism, Ḥanbalism and Dāwūdism.\footnote{3} Mālikism was therefore adopted in Seville during the eleventh century, as was the case throughout al-Andalus. The socio-political foundations of Mālikism in al-Andalus explain its ideological triumph best. Given the full support of the state, Mālikism became the privileged rite \textit{par excellence} from 170/786 and continued to enjoy this status throughout the Taifa period, to the point of arousing protest by those who adhered to other schools, for example 'Alī b. Ḥazm.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Tartīb, I, p. 26.
\item \textit{ibid.}, p. 27. During the third to the fifth centuries A.H., Mālikism flourished definitively or temporarily in Hijāz, Baṣra, Egypt, Ifrīqiyya, al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā (Morocco), al-Andalus, Sicily, the Sudān (West Africa), Persia, Yemen, Syria and parts of Khurāsān such as Qazwīn, Abhar and Naysābūr (\textit{ibid.}, p. 65).
\item \textit{ibid.}, p. 27. The rite of Abū Ḥanīfa reached the Maghrib and al-Andalus to a limited degree during its earlier phases of expansion (\textit{ibid.}, p. 65). Shāfiʿism was applied in al-Andalus from the third century of the Hijra to a limited extent (\textit{ibid.}, p. 66). Among the other rites of lesser importance which competed with Mālikism in al-Andalus was that of al-Anzāʿī, which was extinguished as early as the third century of the Hijra (\textit{ibid.}, p. 66). Dāwūdism or the Zāhirī school was also among the schools which appeared in al-Andalus. However, despite its revitalisation by 'Alī b. Ḥazm, Zāhirism was still in its formative period during the eleventh century. It may therefore be concluded that eleventh-century justice was monopolised by Mālikism during the period of the Taifa states, to be strengthened further under the shadow of the al-Murābiṭūn.
\end{enumerate}
While the role of the state in the propagation of Malikism in al-Andalus cannot be denied, this by itself was only one of a number of factors which together contributed to its success. The development of the ‘ulamā’ as a powerful class that defended and assured the general application of Malikism was significant. The elevated degree of political influence obtained by this class through its monopoly of justice was only made possible by a great popular support at the grassroot levels. That the judicial branch recruited its personnel from all social strata is indicated by the wide availability of free education in al-Andalus. The popular support for Malikism in al-Andalus is reflected in the unprecedented energy and dynamism that characterised its advocates throughout the Taifa period, thus expressing the type of popular enthusiasm for the Malikī rite that no political autocracy could realise alone.

Al-Qādī ‘Iyād (476/1083-544/1149) presents the following list of Andalusian authors who composed works relating to ‘the virtues of Malik, his merits and biography’:

1.) Al-Qādī Abū ‘Abd-Allāh at-Tustarī al-Malikī.
4.) Al-Qādī Abū-Bakr Ja‘far b. Muḥammad al-Faryābī.
5.) Abū-Bishr ad-Dawlābī.
6.) Abū-l-‘Arab at-Tamīmī.

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The superb quality and large number of Andalusian advocates of Mālikism are matched by the latter's consistent domination of Andalusian justice throughout the two centuries preceding the eleventh. From the list of Mālikī

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1. The full list of authors on Mālikism is given in *Tartīb*, I, pp. 9-12.
jurists and authors presented above, we find that whereas for example az-Zubayr b. Bakkār al-Qādi az-Zubayrī\(^1\) and Ibn-al-Imām at-Tuṭīlī\(^2\) died in 256/869 and 238/852 respectively, al-Qādi Abū-l-Walīd al-Bājī died two centuries later in 474/1081.

The abundance of Mālikī literature produced during the ninth and tenth centuries indicates that the eleventh-century Andalusian jurists, including those of Seville, must have benefited from a large number of sources, complemented by others produced in the Orient, Madīna, Yemen, Egypt and Africa.\(^3\) The output of Mālikī works by Andalusian and Maghribī jurists continued throughout the eleventh century, culminating in the twelfth with al-Qādi 'Iyād's monumental *Tartib al-Madīrīk wa Taqrīb al-Masālik li-Ma'rīfāt Allām Madhhab Mālik*, which furnishes a bi-bibliographical dictionary of Mālikī 'ulamā' and jurists to the twelfth century, when the puritanically inclined al-Muwaḥḥidūn began their suppression of Mālikism and

\(^1\) Tartib, I, p. 10; Wafayat, II, pp. 311-12; Dībaj, p. 116.
\(^2\) Tartib, I, p. 10; Dībaj, pp. 154-56.
\(^3\) In his Tartib, al-Qādi 'Iyād classifies the Mālikī 'ulamā he studies into classes (taqāṣīt) apparently in accordance with their intellectual capacities and judicial status. The figures within each class are in turn grouped together according to their place of origin under the headings: Ahl al-Madīna, Ahl al-Yaman, Ahl al-Maghrib, Ahl Miṣr, Ahl Ifrīqiyya and Ahl al-Andalus.
persecuted Mālikī jurists in the Maghrib and al-Andalus. Because al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ is known to have exhausted the major Mālikī works to the twelfth century for his Tartīb, the latter may be considered to implicitly reflect the influence of many of the sources used in eleventh-century al-Andalus. The first volume consists of an apologetic study of Mālik and Mālikīsm. Mālik’s belief in the priority of ahl al-Madīna is documented in a letter by Mālik to al-Layth b. Sa‘d. Al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ devotes several of his subsections to a defence of the priority that ought to be accorded to ahl al-Madīna, as this principle is an element that is specifically Mālikī.

The intellectual fertility of Mālikī scholars is further illustrated by the abundance of Mālikī literature that was produced or circulated in eleventh-century al-Andalus. The Muwatta’ of Mālik b. Anas and notes by his disciples known as the Mudawana (e.g. Mudawanat Ibn-al-Qāsim) were essential sources among the Mālikī jurists in al-Andalus and the Maghrib. There are also examples of Sevillans who produced studies on a variety of subjects such as the rite of Mālik, renowned Mālikī jurists or Mālik’s al-Muwatta’. Ibn-Bashkuwāl studies the following Sevillian authors:

1. The full text of the letter is reproduced (Tartīb, I, p. 43). As if to confirm the plausibility of Mālik’s contention regarding ahl al-Madīna, the text of al-Layth b. Sa‘d’s reply is also given (Tartīb, I, p. 44).
1. Abū-'Umar Ahmad al-Qādir al-Umawī (d. 420/1029).  


3. Abū-'Utma‘an Sa‘īd b. Yahyā at-Tanūkhī (b. 426/1034 - d. at c. 70).


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1. Al-Umawī is the author of At-Tahqīq fī Sifrāyn and Al-Muḥtawā (in 5 vols.) (Sila, I, p. 44).

2. Ibn-Ḥarīth is the author of Al-Intiqā‘ fī Arba‘at Asfār (ibid., p. 104).

3. Abū-Tanūkhī is the author of works on the girā‘at and other subjects (ibid., p. 214).

4. Ibid., p. 279.


7. Ibid., p. 495.
However, the Sevillan Mālikī fuqaḥā‘ probably relied most heavily on the works of other Andalusian scholars, which exceeded anything produced in Seville. The Cordobans were without doubt the most fertile and profound Andalusian authors, and their works had a great influence throughout al-Andalus and beyond.¹

(b) Mālikism: Its Basic Tenets and General Characteristics

Like the other Sunnī rites, the school of Mālik b. Anas is fundamentally based on the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth as its basic sources, although the Mālikī school is distinguished by its acceptance of other principles. These were created by Mālik as part of his school, and they were later applied by his disciples and followers. The following constitute the essential sources and principles in order of priority:

1. The Qurʾān.
2. The ḥadīth and sunna.

Mālikism is among the most conservative and traditional Sunnī rites. The rite is extremely strict and demands a rigid reliance on the Qurʾān and the sunna. However, the

¹ For the biography and enumeration of the works of some of the most prominent Cordoban jurists, see Sila, I, pp. 298-300, 309-11, and Sila, II, pp. 445, 494, 581-82, 640-42.
principle of a‘māl ahl al-Madīna is perhaps what makes Mālikism most particularly fundamentalist.

The adoption as a model of the actions, teachings, behaviour and examples of the inhabitants of Medina (ahl al-Madīna), who are presumed to have been closest in time and spirit to the Prophet, is a tenet in Mālikism that compares in importance with the role of ijtihād and ijmā‘ for Ḥanafism and Ḥanbalism respectively. This is not to state that ijmā‘ and ijtihād are rejected by Mālikism, but their application is more limited. Several polemical justifications for the importance of a‘māl ahl al-Madīna are presented by Mālik, such as the fact that ten thousand companions of the Prophet lived and died in Medina. The example of ahl al-Madīna is in some instances given priority over a ḥadīth. The enumeration by Mālikī jurists of several ḥadīths, collected by such prominent figures in the field as Mālik b. Anas, Abū-Hurayra and even the extremely meticulous and selective al-Bukhārī, has served to support and justify the premise regarding the particular attention that should be directed to a‘māl ahl al-Madīna. The following ḥadīth, collected by Mālik, is only one example of the type mentioned:

1. Tartīb, I, p. 46.
2. ibid., pp. 45-46.
3. For example, al-Qādī ‘Iyād cites several quotations to support the priority of a‘māl ahl al-Madīna (ibid.).
'Allāhumma bārik lanā fī thimārinā wa bārik lanā fī Madīnatinā wa bārik lanā fī ṣīnā 'inā wa muddinā. Allāhumma inna Ibrāhīm 'abdūk wa khalīluk wa nabiyyuk wa innī 'abdūk wa nabiyyuk wa innahu da 'āk li-Makka wa innī ad 'āk li-al-Madīna kāma da 'āk li-Makka.'

The various hadīths cited by al-Qādī 'Iynā to stress the privileged status of ahl al-Madīna are taken from Mālik's al-Muwatta' and other Oriental, Maghrībi and Andalusian sources that the Mālikī jurists of Seville probably utilised during the reign of Banū 'Abbād.

The concept of ijmā' (consensus) as understood by Mālikī scholars differs from the conception of other rites of fīqh in that the latter conceive it with a greater degree of independence. It is perhaps unfair to attempt to compare the closeness of the two positions to the two basic sources, the Qur'ān and the hadīth, because both groups have their particular arguments for illustrating that they conform most to the spirit of the basic sources. In the final analysis, the fundamental difference between the Mālikī scholars and other Sunnī schools is that the former

1. ibid., p. 32. ('May Allāh bless our fruits and bless our city [Medina] and all that is measurable. Oh Allāh, Ibrāhīm is your servant, Khalīl and prophet. And equally am I your servant and prophet. He had prayed for Mecca and I am praying for Medina as he did for Mecca and more.')

2. ibid., pp. 31-36.
relate their conception of *ijmāʿ* to the principle of ahl al-Madīnah, thereby relying on *naql* (transmission of ḥadīth), whereas the latter exercise *ijtihād* in its literal sense. Al-Qāḍī ‘Īyād defines *ijmāʿ* as '...idāfat an-naql wa-l-‘amal ilā al-jamīʿ min ḥayth lam yanqul aḥad minhum wa-lā ‘amil bi-mā yukhālifuh.'

Besides the *ijmāʿ* ahl al-Madīnah which is traced back directly to the Prophet, there is the *ijmāʿ* ahl al-Madīnah through *ijtihād* (free judgement) or *istidlāl* (demonstration). The first category has been unanimously accepted by Mālikī jurists and even by some adherents to other rites, but there has been much controversy over the second category.

The *ijmāʿ* ahl al-Madīnah which is traced back to the Prophet through *naql al-jamāʿa* an al-jamāʿa (the transmission from group to group) is itself classified into two types: (i) the direct transmission of legislation (*sharīʿ*) from the Prophet, (ii) the transmission of that practice which is recorded as having been witnessed by the Prophet without being either condemned or approved by him.

1. Tartīb, I, p. 57. ('The ascription of an-naql (tradition) or al-‘amal (action performed by the Prophet) to the community such that there is no agent who transmits or acts in a contrary manner.')
2. Ibid., pp. 47-59.
3. For specific examples of each type, see ibid., p. 48.
The consensus of *ahl al-Madīna* which is based on *ijtihād* (free judgement) presents the following three possibilities when the parallel is drawn with the *khabar al-aḥad* (one way transmitted tradition):

1. When *ijmāʿ* *ahl al-Madīna* conforms to a *khabar al-aḥad*, the *ijmāʿ* is strengthened as there is no collision between the two.

2. When *ijmāʿ* *ahl al-Madīna* conforms to one *khabar al-aḥad*, but contradicts another, the former is given priority.

3. When *ijmāʿ* *ahl al-Madīna* contradicts the *khabar al-aḥad* which is alone available for a specific case, priority is given to the former provided that it is based on a tradition of the Prophet. On the other hand, if *ijmāʿ* *ahl al-Madīna* is based on *ijtihād*, the *khabar al-aḥad* is preferred to *ijmāʿ* *ahl al-Madīna*. However, in the case of two contradictory samples of *khabar al-aḥad*, the one from Medina is given priority over any other.

1. The *khabar al-aḥad* is the weakest type of tradition. The second type is the *khabar al-mashhur* (a tradition with more than one transmission, but which is doubtful because of an interruption in the transmission). The third type is the *khabar al-mutawātir* (a tradition that is transmitted from one *jamaʿa* to another, without interruption).

2. ibid., p. 51.

3. ibid., p. 52.

4. ibid.
It is argued that the criterion of naql al-jamā‘a ‘an al-jamā‘a (transmission from group to group) is a determinative factor of the authenticity of particular cases and that the word of the majority should be given preference. The heavy reliance on naql al-jamā‘a ‘an al-jamā‘a arises from the consideration that the transmission of the Prophet's actions or teachings by a group is an assured means for determining the authenticity of the transmission, as groups are less likely to voluntarily introduce error or falsification than individuals are. Some Shafi‘is who opposed Mālikism contested the validity of the criterion of naql al-jamā‘a ‘an al-jamā‘a and, more particularly, they rejected its limited application to ahl al-Madīna, contending that the inhabitants of other regions such as Kūfa and Baṣra, where companions of the Prophet are known to have lived, are equally trustworthy. However, the defendants of Mālikism reply that only in Medina did a sufficient number of companions exist to guarantee the naql al-jamā‘a ‘an al-jamā‘a.

The domination of Mālikism in al-Andalus was, to a great extent, due to its ability to adapt to the changing Andalusian conditions and its success in confronting newly-developed problems that had not been known to

1. ibid., p. 49.
2. ibid., pp. 49-50.
Andalusian society. New methods were developed within the Qur’ānic sphere which made possible a technical treatment of problems specific to newly-developed social conditions. It is therefore by complementing the more basic sources and thus enabling the Mālikī rite to cover a more comprehensive area that the principle of al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala (priority for the public interest where the basic sources are silent) furnished Mālikism with sufficient realism and flexibility to survive as an active force.\(^1\) Although the principle of al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala was only applied after consideration of the more fundamental sources, the Mālikī jurists increased their recourse to the principle for newer types of cases. The principle of al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala has been subdivided into ḍarūra or ḫāja, taḥsīniyya and sadd adh-dharā’i’.

Avoiding theological matters, the impact of this principle was particularly felt in materialistic matters of daily life. The application of al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala ranged widely, from social affairs such as family organisation (e.g. marriage or divorce) to financial affairs in commerce or industry and to administrative problems relating to the organisation of civil or military personnel within the political system.

\(^1\) The principle of al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala is, for example, applied by Mālik himself to solve the problem relating to the exchange of ripe and green dates (see Mudaw., X, p. 90).
Justice in Seville under Banū 'Abbād

(a) The Origin of the fuqahā' and Judges in Seville

Sevillan justice does not compare with that of Cordoba either in the prestige and quality of its judges or in the production of judicial works. The achievements of the Cordoban judges during the tenth century ensured their continued leadership in al-Andalus during the eleventh century, a trend which is clearly reflected in the biographies of jurists and scholars reproduced in an-Nūbāḥī's Kitāb al-Marqāba al-‘Ulyā (known as Kitāb Qudāt Qurtuba) or Ibn-Bashkuwāl's Kitāb as-Sīla, where the numbers and excellence of the Cordoban jurists exceed those of any other Andalusian city. The proximity of Seville to Cordoba made contact between the two easy, so while Cordobans worked as judges in Seville, Sevillans sought their education with renowned Cordoban jurists. On the other hand, the status of Sevillan justice during the eleventh century was notably higher than that in most of the other Andalusian cities. Biographers of the Andalusian fuqahā' and judges cite a significant number of Sevillan figures, contrasting with a handful from other cities such as Malaga or Granada.

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1. For example, the Cordoban Abū-1-Muṭarrif ʿAbd-ar-Rahmān b. ʿĀhmād b. al-Kubaysh worked as gāqī in Seville (Sīla, I, p. 304). Examples of Sevillans who sought their education in Cordoba are numerous, and include Abū-1-Qāsim Ismāʿīl b. ʿĀhmād b. ʿĀrith (377/987-421/1030) (ibid., p. 104), and Abū-ʿUmar ʿĀhmād b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī (d. 428/1036) (ibid., p. 48). However, Sevillans did not limit themselves to Cordoba in seeking knowledge. For example, ʿAbd-Allāḥ b. Ismāʿīl b. al-ʿĀrith (407/1016-478/1085) studied under two hundred and sixty-five teachers in al-Andalus (ibid., p. 275).
The manner and extent of the Mālikī rite's actual application in Seville differed little from other parts of al-Andalus during the reign of Banū 'Abbad. When al-Qādi Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. 'Abbād assumed the function of ruler, it must be presumed that he appointed another administrator to occupy his previous post of qādī, for it would have been virtually impossible for him to carry out his political functions while retaining judicial obligations.

Every Andalusian qādī was also a faqīh, given the solid religious training and background in Islamic law that were required of every judge. The influence of the fuqahā' in Sevillan justice was therefore great, as was their role in determining the maintenance of its orientation towards Mālikism. The following are examples of fuqahā' (described as min ahl Ishbīliya or Ishbīlī or ašlūh min Ishbīliya) who were contemporary with Banū 'Abbād:

1.) Abū-1-'Abbās Abūmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj b. Yaḥyā (d. 415/1024).1
2.) Abū-'Umar Abūmad b. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Umawī (d. 420/1029).2
4.) Abū-'Umar Abūmad b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī (d. 428/1036).4

2. Ibid., p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 47.
4. Ibid., p. 48.
5.) Abū-Bakr Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Qaysī as-Sabtī (d. 429/1037).  
7.) Abū-‘Umar Ahmad b. Muḥallab al-Bahrānī (381/991-449/1057).  
10.) Abū-Ja‘far Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī (d. 533/1138).  
13.) Abū-Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Ayman (d. 460/1067).  
14.) Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad b. 'Abbād (d. 410/1019).  

1. ibid., p. 50.  
2. ibid., p. 54.  
3. ibid., p. 57.  
4. ibid., p. 76.  
5. ibid., pp. 80-81.  
6. ibid., pp. 82-83.  
7. ibid., pp. 92-93.  
8. ibid., pp. 93-94.  
9. ibid., p. 98.  
10. ibid., p. 103.
16.) Abū-l-Qāsim Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 429/1037).²
18.) Abū-Qāsim Aṣbagh b. Rāshid al-Lakhrī (d. 440/1048).⁴
19.) Abū-l-Ḥasan Aṣbagh b. Sayyid (d. c. 450/1058).⁵
22.) Abū-l-ʿAṣī Ḥakam b. ʿAbmād al-Ḥaṣrānī at-Ṭāʾliqī (355/965-426/1034).⁸
24.) Abū-l-Walīd Khālid b. Muḥammad al-Adīb (d. 436/1044).¹⁰

1. ibid., p. 104.
2. ibid.
3. ibid., p. 109.
5. ibid., p. 110.
6. ibid., p. 124.
7. ibid., p. 127.
8. ibid., p. 147.
9. ibid., p. 149.
10. ibid., pp. 176-77.
25.) Abū-'Uthmān b. Yaḥyā at-Tanūkhī
   (d. 426/1034). 1

26.) Abū-'Amr Sa‘īd b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Quḍā‘ī al-Mālikī
   (fl. c. 453/1061). 2

27.) Abū-'Uthmān Sa‘īd b. ‘Ubayda al-‘Absī
   (365/975-459/1066). 3

28.) Abū-'Umar Sayyid b. Abūn al-Khūlānī
   (d. 440/1048, at c. 87). 4

29.) Abū-l-Fāṭḥ Sa‘dīn b. Muḥammad az-Zuhrī
   (d. 440/1048, at c. 80). 5

30.) Abū-l-Ḥasan Shurayḥ b. Muḥammad ar-Ru‘aynī
   al-Muqri‘ (451/1059-559/1163). 6

31.) Abū-l-Ḥasan Ṭāhir b. ‘Abd-Allāh al-Qaysī
   (d. 450/1058). 7

32.) Abū-Muḥammad ‘Abd-Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī
   (d. 442/1050). 8

33.) ‘Abd-Allāh b. Ismā‘īl b. al-Ḥārith
   (407/1016-478/1085). 9

34.) Abū-Muḥammad ‘Abd-Allāh b. ‘Alī al-Bājī
   al-Lakhmī (d. 478/1085). 10

1. ibid., p. 214.
3. ibid., p. 218.
4. ibid., p. 223.
5. ibid., pp. 224-25.
7. ibid., p. 235.
8. ibid., p. 265.
9. ibid., p. 275.
10. ibid.

1. ibid., pp. 278-79.  
2. ibid., p. 279.  
3. ibid., pp. 282-83.  
4. ibid., pp. 311-12.  
5. ibid., pp. 312-13.  
6. ibid., p. 315.  
7. ibid., p. 342.  
9. ibid., p. 353.  
10. ibid., p. 377.
45.) Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī
(395/1004-456/1063).¹

46.) Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. 'Abd-ar-Rahmān at-Tanūkhī
Ibn-al-Akhdār (d. 514/1120).²

47.) Abū-l-Asbagh 'Īsā b. Aḥmad as-Sabbāh
(fl. c. 419/1028).³

48.) Abū-l-Qāsim 'Abbās b. Yaḥyā al-Lakhmī
(350/961-426/1034).⁴

49.) Abū-l-Hakam al-'Āsī b. Khalaf al-Muqri’
(d. 470/1077).⁵

50.) Abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Khazraj al-Lakhmī
(d. 419/1028).⁶

51.) Abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Sūlaymān al-Qāṭṭānī
(fl. c. 419/1028; d. in his 60’s).⁷

52.) Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. Marwān al-Ayādī
(d. 489/1095, at 86).⁸

53.) Abū-l-Qāsim Muḥammad b. ‘Ubayd-Allāh al-Bannānī
al-Mu‘āmmar (330/941-424/1032).⁹

54.) Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Ashʿarī
Ibn-Abī-Muqni’ (d. 426/1034).¹⁰

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2. ibid., p. 404.
3. ibid., p. 412.
4. ibid., p. 420.
5. ibid., p. 427.
6. ibid., pp. 484-85.
7. ibid., pp. 485-86.
9. ibid., p. 490.
10. ibid.
57. Muḥammad b. Thābit al-Umawī (d. 435/1043).³
59. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Umawī (d. 422/1030).⁵
62. Abū-‘Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Qaysī (d. 469/1076).⁸
63. Abū-Zayd Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥimyarī (fl. c. 484/1091).⁹
64. Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. ‘Umar az-Zubaydī (d. 501/1107).¹⁰

1. ibid., p. 495.
2. ibid., pp. 495-96.
3. ibid., p. 498.
4. ibid., p. 500.
5. ibid., p. 503.
6. ibid., p. 513.
7. ibid., p. 518.
9. ibid., p. 527.
10. ibid., pp. 536-37.


Abū-'Amr Muʿād b. 'Abd-Allāh al-Balawī (342/953-418/1027).

Abū-l-Faḍl Muhājīr b. Muḥammad al-Adīb (d. 454/1062, at 68).

Abū-Tammām Muwaffaq b. Saʿīd as-Sulami ash-Shaqqaq (d. 426/1034, in his 50's).

Abū-l-Ḥasan Mubārak Mawlāy Muḥammad b. 'Amr al-Bakrī (d. 419/1028, in his 50's).


1. ibid., p. 540.
2. ibid., p. 575.
3. ibid., p. 581.
4. ibid., pp. 582-83.
5. ibid., p. 591.
6. ibid., p. 594.
7. ibid., pp. 599-600.
8. ibid., p. 600.
9. ibid., p. 606.
10. ibid., p. 609.
Other fuqahā' and judges originally from other parts of al-Andalus lived in Seville under Banū ‘Abbād and presumably worked there. Seville furnished many with opportunities that were not to be found elsewhere, thus attracting equally well-established figures in the intellectual and judicial domains as in the political. This flow of human potential to Seville was accompanied by Sevillans visiting other parts of al-Andalus and the Orient. Ibn-Bashkuwāl presents the following list of fuqahā' and judges as having lived in Seville (sakana Ishbīliya) during or close to the period of Banū ‘Abbād:

1.) Abū-l-Qāsim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Adīb al-Faqī al-Tunayzī (d. 416/1025 or 417/1026).  
2.) Abū-Bakr Ahmad b. Adham (b. 357/967, fl. c. 425/1033).  
6.) Abū-l-Qāsim Khalaf b. Muhammad al-Qaysī al-Quṭrubī al-Warrāq (d. 437/1045; at c. 70).

2. ibid., p. 45.
3. ibid., p. 57.
4. ibid., p. 61.
5. ibid., p. 162.
6. ibid., p. 168.

8.) Abū-l-Qāsim Salma b. Umayya at-Tujībī al-Imām (365/975-442/1050).


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1. ibid., p. 216.
2. ibid., p. 220.
3. ibid., p. 225.
4. ibid., p. 267.
5. ibid., pp. 268-69.
8. ibid., p. 428.
9. ibid., pp. 431-32.
10. ibid., p. 450.
17.) Abū-ʿAbd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Khāṭṭāb al-Ayādī (fl. c. 419/1028).¹


22.) Abū-ʿAbd-Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd-Allāh al-Rūlānī (d. 448/1056, at 76).⁶

23.) Abū-ʿAbd-Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd-ar-Rahmān b. Shibrīn (d. 503/1109).⁷

24.) Abū-Bakr Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd-Allāh al-Fihrī (d. 507/1113).⁸

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1. ibid., p. 485.
2. ibid., p. 489.
3. ibid., p. 494.
4. ibid., p. 494.
5. ibid., pp. 504-5.
6. ibid., p. 507.
7. ibid., p. 538.
8. ibid., p. 635.
(b) The Administration of Justice: 
the qādī and his Subordinates

The multiplicity of qudat in Seville indicates that the jurisdiction of one qādī varied from that of another. For example, the qādī al-jamāʿa was perhaps the most influential. However, it is important to discuss the general nature of the qādī's jurisdiction in Seville, the limits of his powers and the extent of their application.

The extent of the qādī's jurisdiction in eleventh-century Seville was contained within the limits set by the Mālikī rite of law and was comparable with that in al-Andalus generally. The qādī was directly nominated by the ruler, but to what extent his authority was subject to the ruler's control is not a simple question to answer. The actual authority of the qādī varied tremendously at different periods and in different places, and depended upon the personalities of both the ruler and the qādī. Consequently, it is fruitless to attempt to determine the specific authority of the Sevillan qādī by drawing parallels with qudat belonging to other places or times. In theory, the authority of the qādī is the ultimate source of judicial power, but it is questionable whether the Sevillan qādī's position was superior to that of the Banū ʿAbbād rulers, given the magnitude of their political control. It is doubtful whether the Sevillan qādī was even in a position to challenge the ruler; even if he was, it is unlikely
that he exercised this right.¹ On the other hand, apart from the ruler, the jurisdiction of the qādī was unchallenged within the limits of the areas under his capacity. Both the strength and the weakness of the judicial branch were derived from its practical position as a part of the political system, within which it operated and the limits of which it did not exceed.

The declared object of the Sevillan qādī was to guarantee justice in the area under his jurisdiction, and to defend the wronged and the weak who sought his arbitration.² Despite the qādī’s declared impartiality, which was usually applied in practice, he was influenced by the human and social factors which limited his absolute independence. The qādī was, for example, subject to pressures from the ruler and other social groups such as the fuqaha’ or his assistants (a‘wān), which is possibly why the ideal qādī was advised to dissociate himself from them in order to maintain his impartiality.³ The qādī’s assistants in Seville seem to have numbered at least ten, but he relied on up to four other fuqaha’, two of whom constituted the majlis al-qādī and the majlis al-jāmi’, and occasionally on the advice of ministers.⁴

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1. Some Maliki jurists recommended that the qādī should act with restraint vis-à-vis the ruler, stressing the benefits of harmony and concord between the two (e.g. Risala, pp. 4-5).
2. ibid., p. 7.
3. ibid., p. 6.
4. ibid., p. 9.
assistants in other departments such as the that of șāhib al-madīna or al-ḥākim were indirectly under the qādī's authority.

The impartiality of the qādī towards the common Sevillan was subject to his human limitations, namely the qādī's distrust of the common man as a result of his class origin. The qādī was sometimes privileged socially and financially influential. For example, the Andalusian jurists recommended wealth as a condition for a successful qādī. This argument was based upon the questionable premise that the wealthy are automatically less likely to be tempted through greed than the needy.

Was al-Qādī Muḥammad b. 'Abbād's attitude towards Sevillan justice affected by his political interests as a ruler? In other words, did he interfere in affairs formally under the qādī's responsibility? Considering his previous record as a qādī who was acceptable to the Banū ʿArrūs rulers if not the Sevillans generally, and despite his experience in the field, the state of Sevillan justice is not clear following al-Qādī Muḥammad b. 'Abbād's establishment as ruler. Although his brutal elimination of political contenders reflects little consideration for justice, his sense of pragmatism would force him to guarantee justice to the extent of containing any internal social unrest with the potential of threatening his position as ruler. Considered within the context of its

1. ibid.
relationship with the ruler's security, the fate of Sevillan justice was similar under al-Qāḍī b. ‘Abbād, al-Muʿtaḍid and al-Muʿtamid.

Other officials besides al-Qāḍī Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād had occupied the post of qāḍī in Seville under Banū Ḥammūd,¹ but when the Banū ‘Abbād rulers came to power they invariably appointed officials to the post of qāḍī themselves. The terms used to describe the appointment of Sevillans to this post vary (e.g. ustūqdiya Ishbīliya, ustūqdiya bi baladīh, tawallā-l-qāḍī bi-Ishbīliya). The following Sevillans were appointed as qāḍī in Seville:

1.) Abū-l-Qāsim Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Qaysī (436/1044-520/1126).²

2.) Ismā'il b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād al-Lakhmī (d. 410/1019).³


4.) Abū-l-Qāsim Muḥammad b. Ismā'il b. ‘Abbād al-Lakhmī (d. 433/1041).⁵

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1. The Cordoban Abū-l-Muṭarrif ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān b. Ahmad Ibn-Kubaysh (d. 407/1018) was designated as qāḍī in Seville during the fitna (Sila, I, p. 104). Ibn-Kubaysh may have occupied the post of qāḍī at the same time as Ismā'il b. ‘Abbād who occupied the post until 410/1019.

2. ibid., p. 80.


4. ibid., pp. 229-30.

5.) Abū-l-Qasim b. Ahmad b. Mundhir (d. 520/1126).


7.) Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. al-‘Arbī (468/1075-543/1148).

It is probably the multiplicity of quṭāt in Seville which made it possible for non-Sevillans to occupy the post. This plurality is evidenced by the distinction from other quṭāt of qādī al-jamā‘a in Seville, as in other parts of al-Andalus. For example, Abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Abd-ar-Rahmān b. Shibrīn (d. 503/1109), originally from Murjiq in the Taifa state of Seville, was appointed qādī in Seville. On the other hand, Sevillans occupied the post of qādī in other parts of al-Andalus or the Maghrib. For example, Abū-Muḥammad ‘Abd-Allāh b. Ismā‘īl (d. 497/1103) worked as qādī in Aghmāt in Morocco, Abū-Marwān ‘Abd-al-Malik b. ‘Abd-al-'Azīz al-Lakhmī b. al-Ejī (447/1055-532/1137) was

2. Bughya, p. 357.
appointed qādi in Martin in the Gharb, while al-Mu'tamid appointed Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qaysī as qādi in Cordoba.

The relations between the Sevillan qādi and other fuqahā' were significant. For example, it was recommended that the qādi should have fuqahā' to assist him in supervising the bayt al-māl. The mushāwir fi l-ahkām was employed to offer the qādi counsel and assistance. The following fuqahā' are known to have occupied the post of mushāwir in Seville:

3.) Abū-Zayd Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Himyarī (fl. c. 484/1091).
4.) Abū-Bakr Yahyā b. ‘Abd-Allāh al-Fihrī (d. 507/1113).

5. ibid., p. 275.
7. ibid., p. 635.
It was possible for the same faqīḥ to occupy a purely religious office and a judicial one. Abū-1-Ḥasan Shurayḥ b. Muḥammad ar-Ru‘aynī al-Muqrī' (451/1059-559/1163) was charged with the Ḧuṭba and occupied the office of qāḍī in Seville,1 but it is not clear whether he was charged with the two functions simultaneously. Others in Seville were charged with leading prayers alone.2

The Ḧuṭṭat al-radd was a purely judicial office which Abū-1-Asbagh ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz b. ‘Ali al-Lakhmī al-Dājī (d. 473/1080) is known to have occupied in Seville.3 The functions of this office, which seems to have been particular to al-Andalus as it is not known to have existed in either the Maghrib or the Orient, are not very clear. However, it is not probable that this office was higher than that of the qāḍī, even though it appears to have been basically aimed at furnishing the citizens with a higher recourse if displeased with the qāḍī’s verdict.

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2. The following are described as having occupied the office of ṣāḥib as-salat in Seville: Abū-Īṣḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd-Allāh b. Abī-Qāṭūs (351/962-413/1022) (Sīla, I, pp. 93-94); Abū-‘Uthmān Sa‘īd b. ‘Ubayda al-‘Absī al-Muqrī (365/975-442/1050) (ibid., p. 218); Abū-‘Uthmān Sa‘īd b. Yaḥyā at-Tanūkhī (365/975-459/1066) is described as ‘...al-Imām bi-l-masjid bi-Ishbīliya...’ (ibid., p. 214).
3. ibid., p. 353.
The judicial system in eleventh-century Seville was generally healthy and fulfilled its basic functions despite the disruptive political conditions of the time. This conclusion on the state of justice in Seville should partly be attributed to the Mālikī rite of law which was adopted throughout al-Andalus. The Mālikī rite was rigorous, but it tolerated the existence of independent Christian and Jewish systems of law for the non-Muslim members of the Andalusian community. Although Mālikism in al-Andalus was by no means tolerant in an absolute sense, critics have perhaps exaggerated its intolerance, inflating the latter out of all context with the reality of the historical period concerned. The Mālikī rite has often been accused of intolerance and reaction, but some of the most prominent non-Mālikī jurists lived, wrote and worked under the shadow of Mālikism as the official rite in the Maghrib and al-Andalus. The burning of Ibn-Ḥazm's works has been indicated as an example of Mālikī intolerance.¹ Yet the real cause of the pressures exerted on the encyclopedic Zāhirī scholar was political and should, in the final analysis, be attributed to his uncompromising hostility to the Taifa system per se. During a period when political persecution

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1. Ibn-‘Abbād is described as having burned Ibn-Ḥazm's works (Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 143), and the event is further documented by Ibn-Ḥazm's verses expressing his indignation (ibid., p. 144). Given that Ibn-Ḥazm's death in 456/1063 preceded al-Mu'tamid's accession to power in 456/1070, the ruler in question was either al-Mu’tamid b. ‘Abbād or al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād.
was practised on a large scale by the Taifa leaders, the case of Ibn-Hazm does not stand out as being extraordinary. Furthermore, despite his fundamental disagreement with Mālikism, Ibn-Hazm was very much a part of the religious establishment by his background, as is indicated by his Mālikī teachers and his dedicated students. On the other hand, the great philosopher and jurist, Ibn-Rushd, who was a free thinker and did not conform strictly to the Mālikī dogma, was a product of the twelfth century, during which Mālikism was still dominant. Finally, the role of Mālikism as a unifying factor should not be underestimated, particularly during the eleventh century, a period when the combined political, economic and social forces of disintegration were totally released and the unity of the judicial system in al-Andalus was one of the few forces which contributed to social integration within the Taifas and the final political unity of al-Andalus under the banner of the al-Murābiṭūn.
CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE IN SEVILLE

I. The Economy of Seville

(1) Seville and the Resources of al-Andalus

The economic potential of eleventh-century al-Andalus, conceived as a complete entity, formed a sharp contrast with both the Northern Christian states and the Maghrib. Al-Andalus comprised the most fertile and productive areas of the Iberian peninsula, stretching along the Guadalquivir in the West and including areas of Valencia and Saragossa in the East, all of which were largely cultivated through irrigation.

Seville's abundant raw materials and the richness of its natural resources are a good indicator of the basic strength of its economic potential. The Andalusian society was basically agricultural and relied heavily on agriculture for its basic needs. The importance of the rural areas as producers of agricultural resources was therefore great. Despite the high degree of urbanisation in Seville, the countryside had an important role to play. The exploitation of the rural areas in the Sevillian Taifa state is indicated by the remarkably large number of its inhabitants. Although statistics are not available, the large number of villages in Seville was significant, even though the number of twelve
thousand indicated by al-Maqṣarī is doubtless an exaggeration.\footnote{Nafh, I, p. 210.} Following the general pattern in al-Andalus, the Sevillian rural areas were mainly based on an economy of subsistence, but given the commercial importance of cities like Seville, the rural-urban relationship was probably quite well developed. The rural areas were largely self-sufficient in wheat, which constituted an essential element of nourishment, while products like olive oil were derived from the abundant growth of olives. Contact with important cities like Seville was doubtless facilitated by the availability of a reasonable communications network and stimulated by the need for exchanging locally-produced agricultural commodities for other articles which were needed.\footnote{Transportation within all parts of the Taifa state of Seville was only a matter of days (Subh, V, p. 225).} However, the agricultural resources of Seville only attain their full significance when considered in relation to the general situation in al-Andalus. Al-Andalus was considered to be a major producer of olives, almonds, pomegranates, plums and bananas, while fruits which are typical of cold climates were grown in the North, not to mention fruits which were particularly plentiful in al-Andalus such as special varieties of figs which were grown in Seville alone, known as at-tīn al-Qūṭī and at-tīn as-sufrī.\footnote{Nafh, I, p. 186.} There were

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2. Transportation within all parts of the Taifa state of Seville was only a matter of days (Subh, V, p. 225).

products derived from plants - for example, scents, and spices like saffron.¹

Minerals were a major natural resource in al-Andalus, where different regions specialised in the production of particular minerals. Without being specific, Ibn-Saʿid mentions that 'the seven minerals' were available. Copper was found in different parts of al-Andalus, silver was extracted from the regions of Cordoba, and the sand of Toledo was transformed into glass in Niebla (Labla).² Marble, too, was extracted in various parts of al-Andalus. For example, white and reddish marble was available in Cordoba, and marble of lesser quality, such as black marble, existed in other parts.³ Even though gold was imported from the Orient and Africa through the Maghrib, some mining zones were to be found in the Iberian peninsula. Like agriculture, mining was more developed in al-Andalus than in the Maghrib; and, besides minerals, other materials and products such as wood and dyes, particularly red dyes, were plentiful.⁴

Industry flourished in many parts of al-Andalus, with each region specialising in particular products and complementing the needs of others. For example, Murcia

1. ibid., p. 185.
2. ibid., pp. 186-87.
3. ibid., p. 187.
4. ibid.
specialised in the production of golden embroidery, carpets, golden decorated beds, scissors, knives and arms; Almeria and Malaga specialised in golden embroidery, pottery and glassware; Granada produced a special colourful silk cloth known as al-muballad.¹ Shiny, colourful tiles known as az-zullayjî, which were made in al-Andalus, were exported to the Orient.² Bows, arrows, decorated saddles and reins and the ironware produced in Seville were particularly famous, as were those of the Christian North.³

This picture of the state of affairs in al-Andalus, which is based on a later source that quotes Ibn-Saʿīd heavily, also corresponds to the conditions during the eleventh century. Firstly, both the vegetation and the animals which inhabited al-Andalus during the eleventh century were generally the same as they were four centuries later, because the climatic conditions did not vary and no major natural phenomenon occurred. Secondly, the minerals and other industrial products described in our source were widely employed during the Taifa period and even previously, during the period of the Banū Umayya dynasty. By the eleventh century some of the most splendid Andalusian palaces and architectural wonders, such as the great mosque of Córdoba, had already been built, with a large consumption of gold, silver, etc. which served decorative purposes.

1. ibid.
2. ibid., pp. 187-88.
3. ibid., p. 188.
Considering more particularly whether Seville was as dynamic and developed, during the eleventh century, as is indicated by al-Maqqarî, one is inclined to arrive at a positive conclusion. The political and economic power of Seville in relation to the other Taifa states, the high standards of living in the palaces of Banû `Abbâd, the important role of the Guadalquivir in commerce, irrigation and entertainment, and the fame of Seville as one of the major Andalusian cities, were well established during the eleventh century.

However, despite the economic potential of al-Andalus, the political instability that characterised the Taifa period affected economic conditions disastrously in two ways. Firstly, the political divisions hindered economic co-operation. The acuteness and magnitude of this political conflict between the Taifas, which were often expressed militarily over a period of more than seventy years, were worsened by its persistence. Secondly, opposed to the political instability in al-Andalus was the stability of Alfonso VI's kingdom of Leon and Castile, which permitted the latter to reap the fruits of the economies of the Taifa states by pressuring them individually.

The economic progress of al-Andalus was a major material factor that stimulated the greed of Alfonso VI and, later, Yusuf b. Tâshufîn. The political stability of the kingdom of Leon and Castile and that of the Maghrib, which contrasted with the unprecedented instability of the
Taifas, together made the latter an easy prey. Consequently economic factors, as a major stimulating force, must be constantly borne in mind during our more detailed analysis of the political relations of eleventh-century Seville with other political entities.

(2) The Urban Economy of Seville

While the topography and local culture and history of Seville produced a unique identity that was unequivocally its own, Seville shared common features of social organisation with other Islamic cities. It was one of the most important Andalusian urban centres, and, given the scale of the development of cities in eleventh-century al-Andalus, it grew into one of the most important cities in the Mediterranean world, and has been described as such by medieval travellers. Its geographical and climatic conditions favoured its expansion and continuous growth. Its mild climate, its solid and beautiful buildings and its splendid river were the object of praise in both prose and verse. Its villages were not only numerous, but heavily-populated, with markets, beautiful houses and such facilities as public baths. The rich soil of the areas surrounding Seville was adequately cultivated and remained green through irrigation during all four seasons. The cultivation of olive groves

2. ibid., p. 149.
3. ibid., p. 151.
4. ibid., p. 150.
was so extensive in Seville that a traveller crossed an area of twenty-five miles under the shade of olive trees. With the facilities of the Guadalquivir as an important medium of commercial transportation, and with well-organised markets, the Sevillan merchants were enriched, largely through trade in the locally-produced olive oil.¹

The preponderance of Seville as an important urban centre during the period of Banū ‘Abbād increased continuously. This can be seen even more clearly when its status as a centre of great urban activity is considered before and after the rule of Banū ‘Abbād. Cordoba had been the undisputed capital of al-Andalus par excellence during the tenth century, and Seville, though an important urban centre, did not approach Cordoba in any way. However, by the end of the eleventh century, Cordoba had been ravaged repeatedly. Possibly no other Andalusian city suffered the kind of sackings that befell Cordoba either in the number of times they were repeated or in their magnitude. The armies of al-Mahdī, Sulaymān, ‘Alī b. Ḥammūd, al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd, Ibn-Dāi-n-Mūn and Ibn-‘Abbād all had a share in causing the gradual decline of Cordoba’s importance during the eleventh century. By contrast, the increasing military and political strength of Seville saved it from similar plunders, as did its formidable wall, which al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd failed to penetrate, and the Guadalquivir.

¹ ibid.
which flowed through the city, serving as a natural barrier. The other important Andalusian urban centres were unable to reach the magnitude and pace of growth reached by Seville, for a variety of causes. For example, although to a lesser extent than Cordoba, Toledo and Valencia suffered siege and occupation at the hands of Alfonso VI and the Cid respectively. Other cities like Granada, Malaga, Carmona or Algeciras did not have the potential to compete with Seville as important urban centres, and were further weakened by the attacks of the Sevillan armies. Saragossa was capable of defending its autonomy against its Christian neighbours and, unlike the other Taifa states, the armies of the al-Murābiṭūn, but its geographical location and topography were not as favourable, agriculturally and commercially, as those of Seville. Finally, Seville's predominance as one of the greatest Andalusian urban centres following the fall of Banū 'Abbād is demonstrated by its adoption by the al-Murābiṭūn as their capital in al-Andalus, while maintaining their original capital in the Maghrib, Marrakech. Seville's growth continued, reaching its peak under the al-Muwahhīdūn.

The greatest weakness of the Sevillan economy during the Banū 'Abbād period was that it operated in an atmosphere of stability that was artificial. Like most other Taifa states, Seville bought its peace from Alfonso VI by offering him an annual tribute. The disadvantages of this tribute were twofold: on the one hand, it was a permanent tribute and, on the other, the tribute money was usually paid on
Alfonso's terms. The effects of this burden on the Sevillan economy were various. It was weakened progressively as Alfonso's army became capable of causing increasingly greater damage, and taxes were increased to meet tribute demands, thus affecting the capacity of the Sevillan economy to operate at its maximum. In short, the economy was oriented towards insecurity and dependence. The amount of tribute money that was given to Alfonso to buy peace could have been used to secure peace by strengthening the army and rendering it capable of its defensive duties. Furthermore, the longer the period during which Alfonso received tribute, the more remote the possibility became of putting an end to it, because Alfonso's army was strengthened not only by Seville's tribute money but by that of other Taifa states such as Granada, Toledo and Valencia. In other words, the weakening of the Sevillan economy was in inverse proportion to the strengthening of Alfonso's economic capacity, which grew every year.

It is difficult to determine or even estimate the value of money during the Taifa period, because of the contradictions one encounters. We find, for example, that the rewards which al-Mu'tamid gave poets reached as much as 500 mithqāls. The 20,000 mithqāls Prince 'Abd-Allāh was

1. For example, 'Abd-Allāh complains of the dilemma of having had to pay Alfonso tribute (Tib., p. 76).
2. Qala'īd, pp. 9-10.
to pay Alfonso exceeded this by fifty times.\(^1\) The 30,000 mithqāls he finally offered were only sixty times greater.\(^2\) So either the tribute money was little, when compared with the rewards given to some poets, or the latter were paid out of all proportion to what they deserved.

The amount of the tribute money which Seville offered Alfonso is an indicator of the capacity of the Sevillan economy and the size of its total revenue. The amount of tribute money imposed on Seville increased every year, but the lavish palace spending continued. A continued increase in taxation, and booty derived from attacks against other Taifa states, were the way to meet the weight of Alfonso's increasing tribute. The portion of Seville's revenue which should have been reserved for the creation of a powerful army to face the permanent threat of Castile was instead given to the latter in the form of tribute money. Rather than removing the threat, the tribute contributed to it as Alfonso's army became increasingly more powerful, partly through the tribute money, and its demands became greater accordingly.

Was the amount of tribute money imposed on Seville by Alfonso VI more than it could bear? Certain cases of negotiations between al-Mu‘tamid’s minister Ibn-‘Amr and Alfonso VI seem to indicate the contrary. For example,

\[\text{\begin{tabular}{l}
1. \textit{Tib.}, p. 69. \\
2. ibid., p. 75.
\end{tabular}}\]
Ibn-‘Ammār promised Alfonso 50,000 mithqāls for his military assistance against Prince ‘Abd-Allāh of Granada. It was only because Alfonso was able to negotiate an annual tribute of 30,000 mithqāls with Prince ‘Abd-Allāh that he refused Ibn-‘Ammār’s offer. In his negotiations with Alfonso, Ibn-‘Ammār did not demand any money and his sole preoccupation seemed to be to gain control over Granada, as is indicated by his renunciation to Alfonso of all possible monetary and material booty. The prestige that accompanied any conquest, particularly of an important city like Granada, is clear, but it seems unlikely that Ibn-‘Ammār’s position was adopted because Seville was not in need of a greater income. If this was the case, the situation had changed by 478/1085, because the annual tribute had become such a heavy burden on the Sevillan economy that al-Mu‘tamid sent Alfonso debased money as tribute. This was bluntly refused by Alfonso’s Jewish envoy, Ibn-Shalāsh, which led to al-Mu‘tamid’s assassination of the latter and the beginning of his open conflict with Alfonso.

Money was debased during the Taifa period and revitalised following the conquest of al-Andalus by the al-Murābiṭūn, which makes any comparison of figures over the eleventh century difficult to sustain. The irregularity

1. Tib., p. 69.
2. ibid., p. 75.
3. ibid., p. 72.
of prices is astounding, for 500 dinārs was the price for participating in an attempt to overthrow a ruler or for composing a pleasing poem. Yet Tamīm of Malaga, Prince 'Abd-Allāh's brother, sent the Qadi b. Sahl only 50 mithqāls for his support in an attempt to discredit 'Abd-Allāh's favour in the eyes of Yusuf b. Tashufīn, and although the sum was returned to Tamīm the basic reason was not financial. However, the irregularity of prices is most bewildering in the case of the city of Guadix (Wādī Ash), second only to Granada in the Granadan Taifa state, which was administered by a commander, 'Alī, during the reign of Prince 'Abd-Allāh's father, Buluggīn, and produced an annual income of 15,000 dinārs. When the Jewish minister, Abū-Yūsuf b. Naghralla, was charged with its administration, the income increased by more than five times, attaining 100,000 dinārs. Given the significant

1. A Sanhāja shaykh named Firqān was offered a bribe of 500 dinārs in exchange for his participation in a plot by Yiddīr to overthrow Badis of Granada (Tīb., p. 32). Before surrendering Granada to Yusuf b. Tashufīn, Prince 'Abd-Allāh was exposed to the pressures of Yusuf's commander, Charūr, who forced him to pay occasional sums of money ranging from 500 to 1,000 dinārs (ibid., p. 115). Ironically, an equal sum of 500 mithqāls was the price of al-Mu‘tamid's reward for verses which pleased him (Qala‘id, pp. 9-10).


degree of political power that governors were given by the Sevillan rulers, it is possible that their control over the financial administration of fortresses was equally free from supervision and that they made corresponding profits. The large sum of 150,000 mithqāls, plus 500 bushels of grain for his soldiers, was the amount imposed by Alfonso VI on Ibn-Dhī-n-Nūn for the latter's reinstatement as ruler over Toledo.¹ Contrasting with this large sum was the gold amounting to 16,000 mithqāls which was what Prince ʿAbd-Allāh was allegedly left with following his surrender to Yūsuf's troops.²

II. The Social Structure

(1) Social Stratification and Mobility

The cosmopolitan features of the population of the Taifa state of Seville produced a variety of elements that were at times loosely and, at others, firmly held together, despite differences of geographic or ethnic origin such as lineage, clan or religion. Like that of other Andalusian cities, the Sevillan population comprised a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Many of the inhabitants of Visigothic Spain had accepted the new mode of existence under Muslim

1. Tib., p. 77.
2. Ibid., p. 156. However, Prince ʿAbd-Allāh may have minimised the amount he was left with, considering that he wrote his memoirs as a prisoner of Yūsuf b. Tashufīn.
rule, and a large number of the Sevillans had ancestors from the pre-Islamic period. There was also in Seville the Arab element, the influence of which was strongly felt politically and culturally. Finally, there was the Berber element, which was not as influential in Seville as in other Taifa states such as Granada, Malaga, Carmona or Algeciras. There seems to be no evidence of other groups such as the saqāliba, who were very influential in other parts of al-Andalus, for example Cordoba during the Banū Umayya period and Denia during the Taifa period. However, one must not overstate the variety of races in Seville, because these were fused together over the years. The saqāliba and Berbers were numerically insignificant in Seville, so the question of their conflict with the Arab-Hispanic group does not even present itself. Furthermore, intermarriage in Seville was common and there is no sign of conflict on a racial basis. On the contrary, tolerance was a general feature of Andalusian society. Not only was intermarriage common among Sevillan Muslims, regardless of their racial origin, but Christian and Jewish communities were tolerated and protected in accordance with the Islamic prescriptions. Racial differences were further minimised by the adoption of Arabic as an official language and a general attitude of openmindedness that was nourished by contact with the 'outside world' through commerce and education.

The racial approach has been used most widely for studies of Andalusian society, particularly during the
Banū Umayya period,¹ but without going into a criticism of this approach it must be stressed that its validity for analysing eleventh-century Sevillan society is nil, since there is no evidence of racial conflict as a dynamic social force. Economic and ideological factors affected the social structure of Seville most, and these are clearly reflected in it. Such criteria as wealth, occupation and prestige conditioned the social status of groups in Seville, but the latter were not permanent and static, as is indicated by the high degree of mobility that characterised Sevillan society under Banū 'Abbād.

The social structure of Sevillan society was horizontal, as wealth was unevenly distributed, but to determine the exact class division of society without imposing preconceived theories is a problem of an altogether different nature. It is difficult to specify the character of the hierarchical stratification, partly because of the numerous contradictions one encounters and partly because of the multiplicity of internal clashes, general instability and gradual social erosion in Seville, despite a healthy external appearance. The complexity of the issue increases when the question is presented

¹. See, for example, E. Lévi-Provençal's classic Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane (3 vols.), Paris-Leiden, 1950, or Pierre Guichard's more recent work Al-Andalus: estructura antropologica de una sociedad islamica en Occidente, tr. into Spanish by Nico Ancochea, Barcelona, 1973.
regarding the existence and nature of class frictions within Sevillan society. In other words, it is difficult to speak of class conflict when class consciousness did not exist on a wide scale.

The stratification of Sevillan society during the Taifa period reflects the latter's general social, economic and political evolution. Prior to the accession of Banû 'Abbâd to power, Sevillan society was similar to that in Cordoba and other Andalusian cities, where birth was an important factor in safeguarding the political and economic influence of the khâssa as a dominant urban social class. It was basically through the support of the most influential Sevillans that al-Qâdî b. 'Abbâd was able to establish himself as ruler over Seville. However, as has been shown in Chapter One of the present thesis, al-Qâdî b. 'Abbâd did not hesitate to eliminate his most influential partners immediately after he had overcome the dangers posed by Muhammad b. Ḥammûd and his army inside Seville and by al-Qâsim b. Ḥammûd and his army coming from Cordoba. The social effects of al-Qâdî's elimination of the most influential Sevillan figures were twofold. Firstly, the court was not challenged by a powerful competing group. In the case of the Banû 'Abbâd rulers, this also meant that their legitimacy as rulers would remain unchallenged and uncontested internally. Secondly, the Sevillan middle class was able to play a more constructive role. The term 'middle class' must be used with caution here, without carrying modern implications and more because of the lack
of a better term. The historians of the time did not think in terms of middle class and therefore gave it no name, but several factors indicate the existence of middle-class elements in Seville. The climate of instability during the Banū 'Abbād period was accompanied by a state of upward social mobility which could only occur in a state of social class permeability. Finally, taking occupation, income, wealth or birth as criteria, we find that a large social stratum does not fit neatly with either the most influential class (al-khāṣṣa) or the 'āmma, which included the workers and peasants. The 'āmma was, of course, conceived of by the Andalusians, and the word has been commonly employed. Finally, the scarcity of information on the middle and lower classes makes it impossible to satisfactorily answer many of the questions that sociologists would tend to present.

The rate of upward vertical social mobility in Sevillian society was apparently great, although the inherited traditional institutions and privileges remained, to a great extent, intact. The improvement of the social status of individuals was implemented through various channels. A basically religious educational system, which was both free and general, trained and prepared the personnel required for every branch of administration, thus preventing the development of a caste society with birth as the basic criterion for the division of social groups. The possibility of improving one's social status existed either by working
through the judicial branch, for example as qāḍī, through literary skills, by composing poetry for the ruler's court, or through purely political offices such as that of the wazīr. The numerous examples of non-Sevillans who obtained high offices in Seville and have been cited in other sections of the present work, such as the ministers, fuqahā' and quḍāt, are a good illustration. Their very situation as non-Sevillans nullified the possibility of their ameliorating their social status in Seville through heredity, while their adaptation to Sevillan conditions illustrates the fact that upward vertical mobility was common and that acquired skills constituted an important factor in the improvement of social status, in terms of both prestige and income. However, heredity was important, in that the political system was monarchical. Both heredity and consanguine status were influential factors in determining the privileges of the Banū ‘Abbād rulers and their subordinate officials. One such example was the minister, Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. Zaydūn, whose influential father, Dhū-l-Wizāratayn Abū-l-Walīd ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān b. Zaydūn, almost certainly had some influence in the nomination of his son to such a high office.¹

¹ Following in his father's footsteps, Abū-Bakr b. Zaydūn attained eminence in the Sevillan court, and was chosen by al-Muʿtamid as his envoy to accompany the group representing other Taifa leaders which was sent to officially demand ʿUṣuf b. Tāṣhufīn's assistance against Alfonso VI following the fall of Toledo (Hulla, II, p. 99).
Despite the upward mobility in Seville, the factors of insecurity and instability contributed to its limited ratio of downward vertical mobility. For example, al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād's political contenders, including the group of eminent Sevillan figures who supported his leadership against the Banū ʿHammūd rulers, lost their privileged social status after al-Qādī b. ‘Abbād's establishment. Al-Muʿtaḍid eliminated many a privileged Sevillan, and even al-Muʿtamid stripped his governor Ibn-ʿAmmār of all political power, with its social implications. In all these examples, the loss of social status was a by-product of political elimination. However, considering the net direction of vertical mobility in Seville (the ratio of those moving up to those moving down), the upward vertical mobility seems to have been greater, partly because of Seville's prosperous commerce and agriculture which were the backbone of its economy.

(2) The ḫāṣṣa

Given the minimal impact of the traditionally well established Sevillan families, and the sudden rise to power of the Banū ʿAbbād rulers, it could be concluded that the ruler came not only to attract but also to promote the newly influential members of society. It was therefore under the shadow of the ruler that the new élite developed. The ruler's court in Seville represented the ultimate in luxurious standards of living and exuberant life style. While it embodied and symbolised the centre of political
power, the court was an important ideal for society as a whole. Despite its isolation and total detachment from the reality of Sevillan society, and despite the parasitical character which was a fundamental condition of its existence, the court contributed to shaping the hopes of the ‘āmma for ameliorating their social status and position, and of the khāṣṣa for preserving and increasing theirs. Gaining access to and acceptance in the ruler's court was, for many, the only channel for attaining an income and power that their social status would normally not permit them to obtain through any other means. Two contradictory features predominated in the court: its distinction from normal life in Sevillan society, and its dependence on the latter for material support and human potential.

The ruler's court was a world of its own in more than one way. It was alienated from society in its practical aspects by its entertainment, prestige, utopianism and isolation. The contrast with the practical problems of society was sharp, and its distinction from society was characterised by several factors:

1.) The ruler was the central figure in the court, and the organisation of the court's activities was essentially directed towards pleasing and entertaining him. The ruler decided the dates, nature and magnitude of the celebrations or sessions he held in the court, and his presence and leadership were required.
2.) The court was alien to the social reality of Seville in its very essence. An unrealistic reproduction of the Cordoban court of Banū Umayya, the Sevillan court was meant to be associated with the latter's reputation and prestige.

3.) The ruler's court was physically isolated from society. The court's activities excluded the participation of society as a whole, as the court was considered to be above society.

4.) The court furnished society with an unrealistic ideal, nourishing the hopes of the 'Amma without providing concrete solutions.

However, the court maintained links with society superficially and to a limited extent. It was from society that its personnel was recruited. Recruitment of any interesting figure was not limited to Seville but extended to individuals from different parts of al-Andalus. Perhaps the most privileged officials in the court were poets. Not only were the latter duly paid for their poetical abilities, but they were also employed in political offices. The courtiers were not limited to a certain class, and were recruited from different social strata according to their abilities. Al-Qāḍī b. ‘Abbād and al-Mu‘taqīd had poets in their courts, but al-Mu‘tamid's court was particularly known as a centre for attracting poets. Examples are both numerous and varied. The poet Abū-l-Hasan b. al-Yasa‘, who composed verses on
Umm 'Ubayda, received five hundred dinārs from al-Mu'tamid and was designated governor of Lorca.\(^1\) Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Chanī al-Ḥuṣrī al-Qayrawānī visited al-Mu'tamid's court for a short period and composed poetry for him.\(^2\) Passing through Tangier on his way to Aghmāt as Yūsuf's prisoner, al-Mu'tamid offered Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī his last 30 mithqāls for verses he composed on that occasion.\(^3\) Abū-l-Muṣ'ab b. Muḥammad b. Abī-l-Furat al-Qurashī emigrated to Seville when the Christians conquered Sicily, and impressed al-Mu'tamid with a poem composed during their first meeting in 465/1072.\(^4\) Ibn-Ḥamdīs personally narrates the account of his first arrival in Seville where he remained unnoticed and became frustrated to the point of thinking of leaving. He suddenly received a message from al-Mu'tamid in which he was asked to see the ruler. He rode to al-Mu'tamid's court where he was seated beside the ruler and examined in his poetical capacity. Complementing al-Mu'tamid's verses satisfactorily, Ibn-Ḥamdīs had bestowed upon him his due reward (jā'iza saniyya).\(^5\) Al-As'ad b. Balīta's

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1. Qala'id, pp. 9-10.
verses praising al-Mu‘tamid are another testimony. The best-known poets in al-Mu‘tamid's court were perhaps Ibn-‘Ammār, Ibn-al-Labbāna and Ibn-Zaydūn. Although these poets received rewards for their poetry, the attachment of many of them to the Banū ‘Abbād dynasty was not basically motivated by material gain, as is illustrated by their eulogies (rithā‘) of the Banū ‘Abbād rulers. For example, upon the death of al-Mu‘tamid, several poets gave him his last farewell in verse. Abū-Bakr b. ‘Abd-ās-Samād is known to have chanted poetry over al-Mu‘tamid's grave in Aghmāt. Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Ḥaṣrī al-Qayrawānī is another poet who composed rithā‘ on the occasion of al-Mu‘tamid's death, as did Ibn-‘Abdūn and Abu-Muḥammad b. Ḥamdīs aṣ-Ṣiqillī. More than two hundred and fifty years after the death of the Sevillian king, the famous minister and poet, Ibn-al-Khaṭīb, visited al-Mu‘tamid's grave in 761/1359 and composed verses of eulogy in his honour.

2. The verses in question are referred to or reproduced in several sources (e.g. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 307; Rabat, fol. 15v.; Bodl., fol.14v.; Thata, II, p. 120; A‘mal, p. 192; Wafayat, V, p. 21). The verses are wrongly attributed to Ibn-al-Labbāna in Kamil, VIII, p. 177.
Poets were frequently sent as ambassadors on diplomatic missions. For example, Zuhayr of Almeria sent his wazīr Abū- Ja'far b. 'Abbūd to Córdoba, accompanied by his secretaries, the poets Ibn-Burd, Abū-Bakr al-Marwānī, Ibn-al-Ḥannāṣ and at-Ṭubnī. Al-Mu’tamid received a mission from al-Mu’tasim of Almeria which was headed by the poet Abū-l-Asbaq b. Arqam, accompanied by Abū-‘Ubayd al-Bakrī and Abū-Bakr b. Ṣāḥib al-Aḥbās. The missions of al-Mu’tamid himself were frequently headed by Ibn-‘Ammār, and Ibn-Zaydūn is also known to have headed diplomatic missions.

The description of the Sevillian palaces and life in the ruler’s court, as reproduced in contemporary poetry, clearly reflects the splendour and luxury of the former. It is equally clear from this poetry that this life style deeply impressed the courtiers, particularly the poets, thus stimulating their imagination and sensitivity. This court poetry has a particular significance for the historian, because it describes the psychological atmosphere that reigned in the court and the nature of human relations within the court. Most important, however, is its value as contemporary historical evidence, having formed an integral part of this life style.

2. Qala’id, p. 6.
The Banū 'Abbād rulers enjoyed life in several palaces, the names and description of which have been preserved in contemporary poetry. The wazīr Abu-Ja'far b. ʿĀḥmad composed verses personifying the two palaces when al-Muʿtamid left al-Mubārak for al-Mukarram. It was in al-Mukarram that al-Muʿtamid bid Ibn-ʿAmmār farewell as governor over Silves (Shilb). Al-Mukarram is believed to have been the more recent and, transformed, remains as the present Alcazar of Seville. The al-Wāḥid and az-Zāhī palaces, the latter with its dome, are personified in verse. Palaces such as az-Zāhir and az-Zāhī are described with their gardens, fountains, fertile land, etc.

The splendour of the palace halls was romanticised by the imagination of poets. Saʾd as-Saʿūd in the az-Zāhī palace was the name of one of the most attractive halls in Seville. Ibn-Zaydūn compares another hall, at-Ṭawriyya in the al-Mubārak palace, to the stars.

2. Qalaʾid, p. 5.
4. Qalaʾid, p. 25.
5. ibid.
6. Diwan I.Z., p. 158.
However, the entertainment of the Sevillan ruler and his courtiers was not limited to the palaces. The Guadalquivir was exploited not only for transportation and irrigation, but also for entertainment. It was this river that formed the setting for al-Mu‘tamid’s first encounter with I’timād ar-Rumayqiyya when they exchanged verses and started their romance.¹ The Manzalat al-Punt was a site near Seville that was covered with flowers in springtime.² The beauty of Seville was deeply engraved in the memory of many.³

(3) The ʿāmma: the Middle and Lower Classes

The ʿāmma is the Andalusian term used to designate the least privileged majority, as opposed to the khāṣṣa. The characteristics of the Sevillan ʿāmma during the Taifa period were similar to those in other parts of al-Andalus, even though conditions in Seville differed in certain respects. For example, life in eleventh-century Seville was generally more peaceful and stable, and the city was among the more prosperous. On the other hand, the firm control which the Banū ʿAbbad rulers exercised served to prevent any major popular recourse to violence as a means of expressing frustration. The basic meaning of the term

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3. See, for example, Ibn-ʿAmmār’s nostalgic lament for the city (Qalaʿid, p. 87).
'amma designates the underprivileged, but a fairly successful middle class flourished in Seville which was not given a name by the Andalusians. The middle class did not organise itself to promote its interests as a social force because of a lack of consciousness, which was overshadowed by an overall collective awareness of belonging to one community. The presence of the Sevillan middle class was, however, strongly felt at various levels. The interests of the middle class at times overlapped with those of the khāṣṣa, and differences between classes were minimised by social mobility. The actual existence of a Sevillan middle class is indicated by the overall superstructure of the political and administrative apparatus. The fairly complex administration needed to run affairs in Seville required the recruitment of a large personnel. Given Seville's political and commercial importance, a bureaucracy of some size was needed. The political bureaucracy which backed this highly organised system also required a trained staff, and the presence of the middle class was strongly felt in the ruler's court, as in the entire political and economic structure. Owners of large and small businesses and industrial enterprises, state officials, and small landowners combined to furnish the bulk of Seville's middle class, and this must therefore be constantly borne in mind when we consider social change and continuity in Seville.

The 'amma proper consisted of two types, the rural and the urban underprivileged social strata. It is
difficult to determine which of the two was better off, as both were underprivileged. However, rural conditions were perhaps worse than those in the cities where industrial and commercial prosperity benefited the ʿAmma to a limited extent. In the country, the governors enjoyed total power and the pinch of taxes was felt to a greater extent, which sometimes stimulated rebellion against the Taifa leaders.1 The political unreliability of the rural inhabitants of some Taifas such as Granada was an expression of their discontent with the general state of affairs. It was also the rural areas which, because they were not as well protected as the urban areas by the army and the city wall, experienced the greatest degree of suffering as a result of attacks by plundering expeditions. In Seville, however, the ʿAmma were passive and did not express their discontent by revolting, as was the case in eleventh-century Cordoba where the tumultuous masses exploded whenever the political climate made it possible.2

There was a strong contrast with the wealth the Taifa rulers enjoyed, and this must have sharpened the contrast

1. The major cause of the Lucena rebellion in the Taifa state of Granada was overtaxation (Tib., p. 131).

2. Cordoba suffered most from numerous confrontations between different groups. The violence began in 400/1009 after ʿAbd-ar-Rahmān b. Abī-ʿAmir was overthrown (Bayan, III, pp. 66-87), and continued until the establishment of Banū Jahwar in 422/1030, when peace was restored (Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 114-15).
in the distribution of wealth, thus creating a certain degree of awareness among the 'Amma of their miserable conditions. However, even though generally poor and exploited, the Sevillan 'Amma did not resort to massive violence. Apart from isolated incidents in the marketplace,¹ and cases of theft,² the Sevillan 'Amma accepted their fate. On the other hand, the welfare of the rulers and the khāṣṣa perhaps contributed to kindling the hopes of the 'Amma, some of whom were able to improve their living conditions. For example, the army was an attractive choice for some, especially when the Sevillan army's successful expeditions are remembered.

Within the 'Amma there were several groups. For example, the slaves may be included in this category. It is difficult to decide whether the condition of the slaves was better or worse than that of free men. In some cases, the slaves seem to have had a fair opportunity to manifest their skills and capabilities. For example, they formed part of the Banū 'Abbād army,³ in which case they enjoyed conditions similar to those of their fellow-soldiers. As in the case of İ'timād ar-Rumayqiyya, the concubine who was talented could

1. For example, see Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 291.
2. Houses in the urban areas of al-Andalus were often the object of attack by thieves, particularly at night (Nafḥ, I, p. 203).
3. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 3r.; Bodl., fol. 3r.
improve her condition. Al-Muʿtamid's daughter, Buthayna, was sold into slavery following his deposition, but she managed to marry her master, a Sevillan merchant's son, when she revealed her identity. However, these isolated cases do not reflect the general conditions of slaves, just as the rise of some poets like Ibn-ʿAmrār and Ibn-Wahbūn from total poverty to al-Muʿtamid's court is not a true reflection of the opportunities that the ʿAmma had to improve their conditions. It must also be asked whether the Christian and Jewish minorities formed part of the ʿAmma. Just as there were Christians and Jews who were well off, others were probably in the same state as the Muslim ʿAmma. Their chances were similar to those of the ʿAmma generally. For example, there was no religious condition for joining the army. Finally, despite the general state of the Sevillan ʿAmma, it was not worse than that of the ʿAmma in other parts of al-Andalus, because at least for some members of the Sevillan ʿAmma there was an opportunity for a limited improvement of their living conditions as a result of the general prosperity and power of the Sevillan Taifa state.

1. During the eleventh century, there have been cases of Muslims joining Christian armies as mercenaries and vice versa. This is not surprising, considering that entire Muslim armies sometimes joined forces with Christian armies against other Muslim armies, while Muslim armies supported Christian armies against other Christian armies. Examples include the Sevillan army's alliance with Alfonso VI against ʿAbd-Allāh of Granada (Tib., pp. 69-72) and Alfonso's efforts to restore Yahyā b. Dhī-n-Nūn to power (ibid., p. 77).
Although the Sevillan 'amma were the least privileged class, their impact as the basis of the entire socio-economic structure was significant. As an important centre, Seville relied heavily on the 'amma for manual work such as loading and unloading cargoes, and transportation. The 'amma perhaps participated in commerce at the lowest level, providing salesmen with privately-produced agricultural products or hand-made articles. It was also the 'amma who performed domestic duties for the more privileged members of the community. The ruler's court was served and maintained by the 'amma. The entire weight of the political system was supported by the 'amma, who constituted the bulk of the Sevillan army and the lowest ranks of the administrative apparatus. The equality of all members of the community before the law was guaranteed, even though members of the Sevillan 'amma were less privileged in the social system of which they constituted an integral part. The role of the 'amma was therefore of essential importance as the most solid column which supported Sevillan society, but, despite the contrast in living standards and conditions with the Sevillan khāṣṣa, their conditions were not worse than those of the 'amma in other parts of al-Andalus or the peasants in the Christian North.
III. Social Change and Continuity

(1) Family and Personal Relationships

In spite of the weak documentation, it is clear that the family unit constituted the central nucleus of social organisation in Seville. The role of the family in Sevillan society was of the greatest significance in shaping the beliefs, attitudes and values of the individual. Members of the Sevillan Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities were fully integrated in the family regardless of their income, social status or group affiliations. The Sevillan family was patriarchal, as the father was generally responsible for maintaining the other members. It was the father who made important decisions concerning the family as a whole, which explains the high degree of respect he received from the other members, although the implicit influence of women was often significant. In the case of an extended family, it was also the male members who enjoyed the greatest degree of prestige. However, if the role of the woman was limited in terms of her participation in politics or public administration, her place in the family was of utmost importance. Both the status and the responsibilities of the woman increased as she grew older and became more fully integrated socially. The role of women in the family was similar in eleventh-century Seville regardless of the denomination or racial background of its members. At the court level, women exceptionally had a great influence. Although not as powerful as ʿUbay,
Hishām II's mother, had been during the reign of al-Mansūr b. Abī-ʿĀmir, al-Muʿtamid's wife was quite influential. Much more of a public figure than any woman in the court of 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn, for example, Iʿtimād influenced al-Muʿtamid's relations with his minister Ibn-ʿAmmār, whom she disliked. Her participation in public life is evidenced by an inscription which commemorates the construction of a minaret in Seville in 472/1079 and bears her name.\(^1\) However, considered within a wider spectrum, the role of the woman in Sevillan society is badly documented, although her influence within the family is clear, since she ran the household.

As an agent of socialisation, the family had a strong influence on the individual psychologically, and its impact was lasting because it preceded that of other agents such as the educational system. After his formative period and maturity, the individual became involved in wider social activities, but ties with the family always remained strong. The individual's transition from the sphere of a protective family to society was therefore gradual, and varied in pattern and scope from one social stratum to another. To cite an extreme example, the upbringing of al-Muʿtamid in his father's palace was aimed at preparing him for the throne, while the child of a Sevillan peasant was obviously brought up in a much simpler environment. Given the fact

that our information on the family is limited, this being mainly due to the fact that it was a purely private concern, it is difficult to draw a parallel between the Sevillan's behaviour inside and outside his family circle. However, if the transition was sharp and abrupt for particular individuals, it was generally smooth, as the family was a basic unit of Sevillan society.

The nature of human relations in Seville was identical to that prevailing in other parts of al-Andalus, because the social forces that determined the latter's development were identical and because it was linked by powerful ties politically, educationally and socially. Human relations in Andalusian society were direct and complex, and personal ties were unusually close and highly developed. An intense social life was a striking feature of Andalusian society, which was a consequence of the existence of numerous channels of socialisation. The extended family, the mosque and the market-place were institutions that rendered human contact unavoidable and widespread. Furthermore, celebrations of an official, religious or purely social type together contributed to an increased group participation and mass socialisation. The individual was therefore fully integrated into society as a whole, while maintaining his specifically individual and group characteristics.

The clashes and contradictions of human relations in Andalusian society were both a stimulating force and a factor of stagnation. Personal relations were extremely
honest at times and unusually hostile at others. On the other hand, personal ties reached an extremely high level, not only because of purely material interest but also for purely emotional reasons. It was, for example, possible to find life-long fidelity. Passionate love sometimes took forms that were both extreme and totally irrational. We have other examples from Cordoba of individuals whose passionate love caused the deterioration of their physical appearance, to the point of presenting a pitiful sight.

Change of attitude in sentimental relations sometimes took the form of verbal aggression. However, most contradictory

1. A concubine belonging to a rich lady had an affair with the latter's relative and was flogged for it, without ever admitting her fault (Tawq, p. 139). The daughter of al-Qādī Muhammad b. 'Aḥmad b. Yahyā wept for the death of her husband until she died (ibid., p. 166). Even when beaten, a concubine in the house of a certain Muḥammad b. 'Aḥmad ar-Rakīz refused to sing, have sexual relations, etc., out of fidelity to her previous owner (ibid., p. 198).

2. 'Ammār b. Ziyād was enchanted by the beauty of a concubine he dreamed of, and it took Ibn-Ḥazm's rational arguments to convince him of the absurdity of an attachment to an imaginary figure (ibid., pp. 83-84). There is the example of a lover who expressed his passionate love by writing a letter to his beloved in blood (ibid., p. 111). Most extreme are the examples of Yahyā b. 'Aḥmad b. Abī-Ḥabīb and Muḥammad b. Yahyā b. Jādhr who became mad when the concubines they loved were sold (ibid., p. 240).

3. Ibn-Ḥazm cites an anonymous example (ibid., p. 68). On a social occasion the Jewish doctor, Ismā'īl b. Yūnus, detected a lover from his deteriorated facial expression (ibid., p. 81). A Cordoban woman loved a youth with such passion that she had to be 'cured' (ibid., p. 239).

4. Ibn-Ḥazm narrates the story of how he forgave an intimate friend who told others of the former's secrets when their relations deteriorated (ibid., pp. 196-97). Muḥammad b. Wālid b. Mūṣir al-Kāṭib, another close friend of Ibn-Ḥazm when his father was a wazīr, treated Ibn-Ḥazm indifferently when they met years later. Ibn-Ḥazm then criticised him for his attitude in a letter and received a similarly sharp reply (ibid., p. 197).
was the example of a pious woman who did not feel her personal integrity was affected when she helped a youth by arranging a secret meeting for him with a concubine or young girl.¹ There were also non-sentimental individuals of whom Ibn-Ḥazm cites an example.²

Romanticism was an aspect of the practical social life in Andalusian society. For example Abū-Ḥusayn b. Ḥarūn, known as ar-Rumādī, followed a girl from Bab al-ʿAṭṭārīn to a bridge where he expressed his love for her before she disappeared forever.³ Muṣʿab ʿAṣim b. ʿAmr was attracted by a woman who completely distracted him from writing a letter.⁴ Romanticism also existed in forms that, far from being chivalrous, were unpleasant to others.⁵

1. ibid., pp. 139-40.
2. ibid., p. 69.
3. ibid., pp. 89-90. Ibn-Ḥazm himself narrates his everlasting impression of a sixteen-year-old girl he saw in his father's house as a youth and with whom he was unable to talk (ibid., p. 248).
4. ibid., p. 122.
5. One such example was that of Muqaddam b. al-ʿAṣfar, who regularly attended prayers in a mosque and stared at a youth, arousing the latter's anger to the point of being beaten by him. Totally unoffended, Ibn al-ʿAṣfar found great pleasure in the affair (ibid., pp. 129-30).
Libertinism was in practice well-known, at least among the khâṣṣa, although at an unofficial level and often within the limits of secrecy. Ibn-Ḥazm cites a number of examples.¹ In Seville, libertinism was particularly common among the courtiers, and was exemplified in the behaviour of the rulers and ministers such as al-Muʿtaḍid, al-Muʿtamid, Ibn-ʿAmmâr and others.²

1. An anonymous son of a kâtib had a secret mistress of noble birth and high standing (ibid., p. 91). A young girl was attracted by the son of a leader and, failing to attract him, she kissed him, thus stimulating his love for her (ibid., p. 162). A lover, of noble birth, was abandoned by a woman with whom he had had an affair, which increased his passion for her (ibid., p. 196). Cases of homosexual libertinism are also recorded, as in the case of Ahmad b. Fath, son of a kâtib, whose ethics were highly praised until he fell in love with a certain Ibrâhîm b. Ahmad (ibid., p. 123).

2. The example of al-Muʿtamid is representative. Despite his passionate love for his official wife, Iʿtimâd, he continued to be attracted by other women. For example, he expressed his sentiments for a concubine named Wâdâ in verse (Mutrib, p. 18). He also bid farewell to a woman he loved in verse (ibid.)
(2) Social Institutions: the Mosque 
and the Market-Place

The social significance of religion in Seville was manifested at various levels and in numerous ways. The role of the mosque as an instrument of social organisation affected society in its near totality, with the exception of the Christian and Jewish minorities, who were in turn organised through their respective churches and synagogues.¹

The role of the mosque as a medium of educational instruction had, indirectly, a marked influence on the political system by moulding its personnel. Education was formal in the sense that it consisted of attendance at certain lectures by particular teachers who were recognised

¹ There is no evidence of Sevillan churches or synagogues that date back to the eleventh century, as is the case for other Spanish cities such as Cordoba where the synagogue is still the object of visits by tourists, but Christians and Jews did live in Seville. For example, during the reign of al-Mu'tadid we have the incident involving a fight with a Jew in the market-place (Dnakh., I, vol. i, p. 354). The Christian Count Sisnando Davídez is believed to have been employed in the court of al-Mu'tadid. However, unlike Granada, where the Jew, Abu-Ibrāhim Ismā'il b. an-Naghralla, and his son, Yusuf b. an-Naghralla, served as ministers under 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn's grandfather, Bādis (Tib., pp. 30-34, 36-42, 46-55; Dnakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 268-72), the role of the Christians and Jews was limited in Seville, which supports our contention that the mosque was the organisational forum for the near totality of the Sevillan population.
by the intellectual class. Yet lectures were open to all, and no restrictions were imposed on attendance. The mosque was unconditionally open, whether for worship or for education. Since the religious sciences were dominant in the curriculum, the Sevillan *fuqahāʾ* were representative of the type of scholar the system produced. The importance of education in Seville is reflected by the prominent teachers whose reputation attracted not only local disciples but others from different parts of al-Andalus. The reputation of the Sevillan masters was well established even prior to the Banū ‘Abbād period, and continued to flourish throughout the latter. Abū-Muḥammad al-Bāji, perhaps the most prominent Sevillan lecturer in the eleventh century, is symbolic of the high quality of the Sevillan educational heritage which stimulated the Sevillan *fuqahāʾ* of the

1. For example, as a sign of this recognition, Ibn-Bashkuwāl cites the teachers of many of the figures he studies, with the intention of evaluating their educational and intellectual capacity.

2. Although most of the non-Sevillan *fuqahāʾ* who lived in Seville acquired their education under non-Sevillan (mostly Cordoban) masters, Seville was sufficiently important educationally to attract students from abroad. For example, Abū-l-Muṭarrid ‘Abd-ar-Rahmān b. Manfūkh al-Qurashī (369/979-446/1054) attended the lectures of Abū-‘Umar al-Ishbīlī (*Sīla*, I, p. 320). Abū-Muḥammad al-Bāji attracted students even from Cordoba, two examples of whom are Abū-l-Qāsim Khalaf b. Saʿīd al-Azdī Ibn-Manfūkh (fl. c. 403/1012) (ibid., p. 162), and Abū-‘Abd-Allāh Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Mālikī al-Hāfīz (d. 419/1028) (*Sīla*, II, pp. 483–84).
Banū 'Abbād period. Abū-Muḥammad al-Bājī's intellectual influence was felt within his family circle, as his son, Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Bājī, succeeded his father as a famous lecturer and his students included Abū-l-Ḥasan Shurayḥ b. Muḥammad ar-Ruʿaynī al-Muqri' (451/1059-559/1163).1 Abū-Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Bājī was possibly the grandson of the famous faqīh.2

The list of Abū-Muḥammad al-Bājī's disciples, whose religious or literary achievements were sufficiently important for their biographies to be recorded, included the following Sevillans:

1.) Abū-'Umar Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Lākhmī (d. 428/1036).3
2.) Abū-Bakr Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Qaysī as-Sabṭī (d. 429/1037).4
3.) Abū-'Umar Ahmad b. Muhallab al-Bahrānī (381/991-449/1057).5

2. Ibid., p. 275.
3. Ibid., p. 48.
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. Ibid., p. 57.
7. Ibid., p. 124.
6.) Abū-Muḥammad Ḥajjāj b. Ṭūṣuf al-Lakhmī b. az-Zāhīd (d. 429/1037).1

7.) Abū-'Umar Sayyid b. Abūn al-Khūlānī (d. 440/1048, at c. 87).2

8.) ʿAbd-ar- Ṭāhī b. Ṭāḥī al-Ḥadrī Ibn-Shibrāq (d. 418/1027).3

9.) Abū-l-Muṭarrif ʿAbd-ar-Ṭāhī b. ʿAbd-al-Wāḥīd al-Judhāmī (d. 418/1027).4


11.) Abū-Bakr Muḥammad b. Marwān al-Ayādī (d. 489/1095, at 86).6


1. ibid., p. 149.

2. ibid., p. 223.

3. ibid., p. 311.

4. ibid., p. 313.

5. ibid., p. 347.

6. Sila, II, p. 487. Abū-Muḥammad al-Ṭājī is listed with the Cordoban masters. However, all other references to him describe him as having taught in Seville. Consequently, if this reference is correct, then the obvious conclusion is that Abū-Muḥammad al-Ṭājī taught in Seville and Cordoba.

7. ibid., p. 490.

8. ibid.
14.) Muhammad b. Thabit al-UmawI (d. 435/1043).  


16.) Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-UmawI (d. 422/1030).  


Thus the number of Sevillan lecturers was by no means small. In the list of fuqahā’ given in the section on Justice, we find that they all received their initial education in Seville, even though some sought their further education in Cordoba or the Orient. On the other hand, the fact that many Sevillan and non-Sevillan fuqahā’ taught in Seville indicates the internal promotion of educational activity and a certain degree of self-sufficiency in education. Sevillans who are explicitly known to have taught, or whose students are cited as having attended their lectures, include the following:

1. ibid., p. 498.  
2. ibid., p. 500.  
3. ibid., p. 503.  
4. ibid., p. 536.  
5. ibid., p. 581.
1.) Abū-'Umar Ahmad b. 'Abd-al-Qādir al-Umawi (d. 420/1029).1

2.) Abū-'Abd-Allāh Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Raḥlānī (418/1027-508/1114).2

3.) Abū-l-Qāsim Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Qaysī (436/1044-520/1126).3

4.) Abū-Ja'far Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī (d. 533/1138).4

5.) Abū-Ishāq Ibrahim b. 'Abd-Allāh b. Abl-Qabus (351/962-413/1022).5

6.) Abū-Ishāq Ibrahim b. Aymān (d. 460/1067).6

7.) Abū-l-Qāsim Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-Ḥāḏrī (d. 429/1037).7


1. Sila, I, p. 44.
2. ibid., p. 76.
3. ibid., p. 81.
4. ibid., p. 83.
5. ibid., p. 94.
6. ibid., p. 98.
7. ibid., p. 104.
8. ibid., p. 230.
9. ibid., p. 283.
11. ibid., p. 500.
The significance of the mosque as a medium of education is also reflected in the number of educated Sevillans who settled in other parts of the Islamic world. While Seville attracted talents from abroad, Sevillans were enriched by the experience of visiting different parts of al-Andalus, the Maghrib and the Orient for purposes of education, pilgrimage or commerce. Communication between Seville and other parts was developed to the degree that Sevillans emigrated abroad, where they familiarised themselves with new environments and settled temporarily or permanently. For example, the Sevillans Abū-l-Qāsim Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Majj b. Yaḥyā (d. 415/1024)1 and Abū-'Amr b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Quḍā‘ī al-Mālikī (fl. c. 453/1061) settled in Egypt.2 Abū-Bakr Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Qaysī as-Sabtī (d. 429/1037) settled in Ceuta where he acquired his kunya,3 while Abū-l-Fath Sa’dūn b. Muḥammad az-Zuhrī (d. 440/1048) settled and died in Mecca at the age of eighty.4 Finally, an example of a Sevillan who settled in the Maghrib was Abū-Muḥammad ‘Abd-Allāh b. Ismā‘īl (d. 497/1103) who settled in Aghmāt.5

2. ibid., p. 218.
3. ibid., p. 50.
4. ibid., p. 225.
5. ibid., p. 279.
It must not be forgotten that the weight of the ‘ulamā’ and fuqahā’ was significant in Seville, as in other parts of al-Andalus, because their contact with the people was more direct than that of the rulers. Furthermore, religious men were often of humble origin with deep popular grassroots. The fuqahā’ often voiced the complaints, desires and aspirations of the people, even though the nature and degree of the confidence the people had in the fuqahā’ varied in different places and periods in Andalusian history. However, their presence was always felt as a force either supporting or opposing the government.

The mosque was an important medium of unification in Seville, not only spiritually but socially. Added to the unifying aspects of the mosque as a gathering-place for common religious worship, and the psychological effects it had in increasing spiritual cohesion and integration, was the significance of the social aspect of the mosque as a forum for assembly. Educational and religious gathering in the mosque was complemented by a socio-political dimension. However, the latter seems to have been limited and controlled, because there is little evidence in Seville of totally free political expression through the mosque.

The general recognition and acceptance of the mosque as the basic organisational social institution, and its role as a means of politicisation and of transmitting
information and state propaganda, are factors that served the state by enabling it to exercise political control over the Sevillan population. However, it is not possible to specify the exact degree and nature of this influence. It is certain that the state and the mosque co-existed, but what influence did the mosque bring to bear on the state? Although the top political decisions were taken in the palace, and the market-place was where commercial activities were regulated, and although the executive power of the state was independent of the mosque, the latter seems to have been the basic medium of communication between the state and the people of Seville. Although information was simply transmitted and there were no mechanisms for permitting open discussion, the state doubtless had to consider the reaction to any decision it took and, consequently, to conform to the general existing social framework. The state had to work within the peripheral limits of the existing social norms and traditions, and to be careful not to commit grave violations of social conventions or religious belief.

Along with the mosque, the suq (market-place) can also be considered as a major social institution in Seville. The full appreciation of the role of the Sevillan suq during the eleventh century should be conceived in the context of Seville's background as an important commercial centre. Seville was the fastest-growing urban centre in eleventh-century al-Andalus, and although some of the causes of this development are negative, such as the decline of Cordoba and
other large cities, others are positive. Seville's agricultural productivity was basically maintained and improved through irrigation. Small-scale industry and mining also helped to boost its economy and commercial activities. Seville's political and military superiority, and its aggression against other Taifas, contributed towards increasing monetary circulation through the acquisition of booty. Its economic prosperity was hindered by the payment of tribute money imposed on it by Alfonso VI, but despite the extreme gravity of its financial subordination to Castile its economic survival and commercial prosperity were not dealt a deadly blow. The end of the Banū `Abbād dynasty, which resulted, was in certain ways a political solution to the economic crisis, and Seville's flourishing commerce was not affected fundamentally by this change, nor was it irreversibly paralysed. The most important factor and stimulating force behind Seville's unrivalled success as a commercial centre was its direct access to the Mediterranean through the Guadalquivir. Seville therefore attracted traders not only from other parts of al-Andalus, but also from the Middle East and particularly from Africa, through the Maghrib.

The fundamental characteristics of the Andalusian sūq have attracted the interest of modern scholars from the purely urban and economic points of view, but one dimension

1. See, for example, L. Torres Balbas, Plazas, zocos y tiendas de las ciudades hispano-musulmanas, A.A., XII (1947), pp. 437-76, especially 446-72, for the Andalusian sūq. For the wilāyat as-sūq in al-Andalus, see P. Chalmata, El señor del zoco en España, Madrid, 1973, pp. 357-494.
which has been neglected is its role as an agent of socialisation and political consciousness. Despite the scarcity of material on the eleventh-century Sevillan and Andalusian sūq, it can be reconstructed from the available material on the sūq during later periods.

The economisation of space constituted an essential element of the Andalusian urban centres, and this was amply reflected in the sūq. Business was conducted in narrow streets and small squares, often in the proximity of the mosque, that other important social institution of the Muslim city. Different areas specialised in the sale of particular products, and while some markets operated on a permanent basis others did so temporarily. The nature of the products for sale varied quantitatively and qualitatively, as did the size of markets and the scale of exchange.

The primary purpose of the sūq in eleventh-century Seville was to serve as a platform for commercial exchange, which was regulated by the muḥtasib or ʂahib ẓ-ṣūq. Socialisation was, consequently, a by-product of the sūq’s essential aim. There is no reason to deny the existence of the muḥtasib in Seville, but such an officer did not enjoy the degree of power he did in other places and periods. For example, the incident between a Jew and a Muslim in the Sevillan sūq in 462/1069 was resolved by the ʂahib ẓ-ḥadīnā and not the muḥtasib. It is not clear whether it was because of the limitation of the muḥtasib’s authority or the

nature of the incident that it was resolved by the ǧāhib al-madīna. However, as a commercial centre, Seville required the services of a muḥtasib. During the Banū Umayya period, the muḥtasib had been subordinate to the qādi, but the former gradually came to be designated by the ruler.¹ By the early twelfth century, the muḥtasib was designated by the qādi, but with the ruler's approval, as is indicated in Ibn-ʿAbdūn's opinion on the matter.² The muḥtasib's role was aimed at preventing fraud and regulating commercial activities, and included the examination of the sizes of cargoes, weights and measures.³ The muḥtasib's responsibilities may have overlapped the qādi's obligations, since the office of muḥtasib was intended to complement that of the qādi.⁴

The muḥtasib was therefore not an official who was likely to have been appreciated by the businessmen and salesmen, but his role was essential for maintaining fair commerce. Furthermore, the muḥtasib's office carried religious implications, as his major legal objective was: 'al-amr bi-l-maʿruf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar'.⁵ However, the extent to which this religious principle was applicable in the regulation of commerce in practical terms is more difficult to determine, particularly

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2. Risala, p. 20.
4. ibid.; Risala, p. 20.
5. Muqad., II, p. 776 ('Enjoining the good and prohibiting evil').
when we consider that, unlike the mosque, the market-place was a more worldly setting where self-interest was less rigorously subjected to moral values and considerations.

(3) **Social Disorder and Instability**

Consciousness of the disruption of social life in eleventh-century al-Andalus is illustrated by the protests of such eminent figures as Ibn-Ḥazm, Ibn-Zaydūn, Abū-l-Walīd al-Bājī and Ibn-Ḥayyān. As sharp and perceptive observers, they were critical of a state of affairs that characterised society as a whole, and they condemned the social trends of the Taifa period with which they were contemporary. However, although this criticism was sharp and penetrating, its effects were limited and incapable of reversing the general trend of Andalusian society. Ibn-Ḥazm's attitude was perhaps the most bitter, because he was convinced that the system of Taifa states was one that should be opposed since it was intrinsically self-destructive. His piercing criticism of both society and individuals resulted in attacks against him and his isolation from the groups that preponderated intellectually and politically.¹ By contrast, Ibn-Zaydūn was not opposed to the Taifa system as such, and although he was

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1. Ibn-Ḥazm, who was persecuted for his political attitude, expressed his isolation in verse (Dhakh. I, vol. i, pp. 144-45). For Ibn-Ḥazm's criticism of the Taifas for agreeing to pay tribute money, of fīlahā' who exploited religion for their own ends, and of the social ills resulting from unjust taxation by the army and the rulers, see the extracts in M. Asín Palacios, *Un código inexplorado del cordobés Ibn-Ḥazm*, A.A., II (1934), pp. 35-37.
critical of the Cordoban rulers and society he found himself a home in Seville where he settled and attained prominence. We also have the case of Abū-1-Walīd al-Bājī who, while remaining equally dissatisfied with the orientation of Andalusian society, sought to reform it by personally persuading different Taifa leaders to undertake more constructive reforming policies. Another critic of Andalusian society during the eleventh century and of the Taifa leaders generally was Ibn-Ḥayyān, whose al-Matin is a fairly critical history of the Taifa period. However, this protest was not extended to organised social opposition. We have cases of individuals who were aware of the deterioration of social conditions; they analysed and criticised it verbally, or in writing, but this did not serve as a basis for a political movement. On the other hand, it is through this consciousness that the modern historian can reconstruct some of the basic social features of the period.

As a result of the fragility of the existing social institutions during the Taifa period, corruption flourished, often remaining unchecked. To a certain degree, legality became a relative conception, because, despite a unified judicial system, where political interests were at stake, what was legal in one Taifa state was illegal in another

2. However, despite his criticism of many Taifa leaders, Ibn-Ḥayyān greatly admired Abū-1-Walīd Ibn-Jahwar of Cordoba, under whom he served (Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 117).
and what was legal under one ruler became illegal upon his replacement by another. The question of what was legal in a given Taifa state acquires meaning only when placed within the context of the legality of the Taifa state itself. So although corruption was not encouraged officially, the phenomenon persisted as a by-product of the system.

Corruption was expressed in several forms, of which the most serious was perhaps the political one. Due to the essentially frail basis of the Taifa state, spontaneous violent reactions were the common means of preserving political privileges and power. For example, those who opposed a particular Taifa leader often opposed him from 'abroad', by seeking the collaboration of another Taifa leader. Furthermore, the injustice of the systematic elimination of political contenders was reflected at a deeper level socially as corruption attained a serious level and became widespread in Andalusian society.

Other forms of corruption were bribery, abuse of public property and funds, and favouritism. Bribery seems to have been common, and several specific examples are cited in a series of letters by Ibn-Ḥayyān in which he describes the activities of personalities, some of whom he mentions by name.¹ Although most of these personalities were Cordoban, the comparable social conditions in Seville during the Taifa period suggest the existence of similar examples of fraud. Moreover, Seville and Cordoba enjoyed extensive cultural and economic ties as neighbouring Taifas, and Ibn-Ḥayyān’s acquaintance with Seville, particularly during

1. For example, see the anonymous cases described in Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 100, 102, 104.
the latter part of his life, leaves open the remote possibility that the personalities he refers to were Sevillan or lived in Seville.

Although there are indications that bribery and corruption existed in Seville, their magnitude was less than that prevailing in Cordoba. While, on the one hand, Seville's comparative political stability as a Taifa state contributed to the amelioration of the social standards of living, the transformation of Cordoba's status—from the central capital of al-Andalus to a Taifa state that was subject to the attacks of numerous adventurers and Taifa leaders—had adverse social effects.

1. Cordoba was plundered on various occasions during the fitna by the armies of 'Abd-al-Jabbār, known as al-Mahdī, who overthrew the last ruler of Banū-Abī-'Āmir, disposed of Hishām II and razed the Madīna az-Zahrā' (Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 244; Bayan, III, p. 64). An-Nāṣir Sulaymān b. al-Ḥakam overthrew al-Mahdī at the cost of great plunderers (Bayan, III, p. 112), and 'Alī b. Ḥammūd succeeded the former and imposed himself as a tyrant after acquiring a reputation as a just ruler (Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 78-79). Following the period of Banū-Abī-'Āmir, Cordoba was ruled by numerous competing adversaries none of whom was strong enough to impose his rule permanently. Even the temporarily successful rule of Banū Jahwar which was established by Abū-l-Hazm b. Jahwar in 423/1031 (Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 114-15) ended with al-Mu'tamid's conquest of Cordoba during the rule of 'Abd-al-Malik b. Jahwar in 463/1070 (ibid., pp. 124-25). In the context of this instability, the example of Ibn-Bāsha illustrates the abuse of political power by high-ranking officials to a degree that was never reached in Seville. Ibn-Bāsha ravaged the remaining Banū Umayya palaces and sold all the valuable materials he could lay his hands on, such as marble, wood, bronze, iron and steel (Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 111-12).
The material prosperity in the highly-developed Andalusian urban society aroused the greed of individuals who sought to improve their living conditions by resorting to illegal methods, and this phenomenon became more widespread in the conditions of political instability that reigned during the Taifa period. However, this did not pass unnoticed, and the attitude of Andalusians towards some of the contradictions and injustices within their society has been voiced by enlightened individuals who criticised the malpractices of influential officials and opportunists. For example, Ibn-Ḥayyān criticised two anonymous underqualified wazīrs, describing them as ignorant and undeserving of their posts.\(^1\) If Ibn-Zaydūn's critical attitude towards Banū Jahwar was caused by purely personal reasons, Ibn-Ḥayyān criticised the wazīr Ibn-Jahwar more objectively.\(^2\) An anonymous Cordoban or Sevillian figure, whose activities ranged from agriculture and commerce to the silk industry, was eloquently accused by Ibn-Ḥayyān of possessing exaggerated wealth, accompanied by extreme ignorance, of abusing the property of the awqāf and eating what belonged to orphans.\(^3\) He describes another anonymous figure who raised market prices

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2. For example, Ibn-Ḥayyān criticises Ibn-Jahwar for having unduly honoured a common woman by attending her funeral and allowing her grave to resemble that of great kings (*ibid.*, p. 107).

artificially to accumulate profit, a state of affairs that is blamed on the anarchy in Cordoba. Another reference is to a common man who was uncommonly enriched during the period of troubles in Cordoba, through fraud, injustice and speculation, despite his illiteracy. On the other hand, Ibn-Ḥayyān's criticism was not wholly defamatory. For example, he praised Abū-1-Qāsim Sawwār b. Ḥamd as having avoided political slander, specifying his name and identifying him as a Cordoban.

(4) Conclusion: Social Integration

Sevillan society was firmly integrated and succeeded in resisting the shocks resulting from the establishment of different systems. Having adapted itself to the Banū 'Abbād rulers, Sevillan society maintained its basic structural composition which continued to survive under the al-Murābiṭūn.

Determination of the social integration of Sevillan society requires the examination of the interrelationship of its units. The members of Sevillan society were, to some extent, loyal to one another and to their social system. One indication is the high ratio of non-Sevillans who poured into the city during this period. Although the

1. ibid., p. 103.
2. ibid., pp. 104-5.
3. ibid., p. 109.
basic factor in the social integration of Sevillian society was the fear of external threats, which explains its fragility, solidarity and morale were high enough to produce a general willingness among the Sevillans to unite in their common struggle for survival. Furthermore, the prosperity of Seville indicates that there was much to protect. Co-operative activities such as commerce and agriculture required decision-making and a hierarchy of authority, with a legitimised power to give orders, while regulative norms directed the highly-developed urban life in Seville. The integrity of the social system was maintained through social control or the standardisation of reaction to violations. Disputes concerning the interpretation of relational or regulative norms, or regarding factual aspects of conflicts of interest, were resolved by having recourse either to non-official arrangements such as traditional conventions, or to official institutions such as the police or the qāḍī.

The change in Seville was basically political and economic and, to a lesser extent, social. The significance of this political-economic transition must, however, be understood in terms of its social implications. Sevillian society was not transformed totally, but simply altered, as a consequence of the Banū 'Abbād regime. The political rulers previous to and during the period of Banū 'Abbād all ruled over the Sevillans and rarely through them, which indicates the political subordination to which Sevillian society was subjected. The evolution of Sevillian society
was regular, and its mutations progressed consistently. The depoliticisation of Sevillan society was partly compensated for by an active engagement in commercial or industrial activities, but the social tensions, conflict and occasional outbursts of violence were partly the result of this suppression or limitation of political activities.

The type of social change in Sevillan society was not a change in core-values. Any changes in Sevillan society during the period of Banū ‘Abbād must not be sought as a variation of its structure or fundamental social institutions and norms. Rather, change in Sevillan society must be conceived as a by-product of the interrelationship between the political system and society. The social implications of the triumph of the Banū ‘Abbād dynasty were produced by the political and economic autonomy of Sevillan society.

Gradual social change occurred consistently during the period of Banū ‘Abbād; but, rather than a structural change, it was a quasi-structural or distributional type of change, as the fundamental social structure of Seville remained intact despite the superficial outward changes that persisted throughout the period of Banū ‘Abbād. Newly-arrived elements, both individuals and groups, acquired privileged positions in the political and administrative system. However, despite the misfortunes that befell the few individuals whom al-Qādī Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād and al-Mu‘taqīd swept away when consolidating their
power, the traditional élite preserved their inherited privileges and continued to survive side by side with the newly-established Banū 'Abbād rulers. There was also no fundamental improvement in the conditions and life style of the 'āmma.
CHAPTER FOUR

SEVILLAN FOREIGN POLICY

I. Phases of the History of Seville under Banū 'Abbād

Many writers on the history of Seville under Banū 'Abbād have attempted to subdivide the period into several phases. The manner of these divisions and the reasons behind them have varied in accordance with the different features that various authors wished to stress. As early as the first part of the twelfth century, Ibn-Bassām devoted three separate sections in part two of his Adh-Dhakhīra to al-Qāḍī b. 'Abbād, al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid, and although their literary achievements constituted his primary concern he studied their historical background, relying exclusively on Ibn-Ḥayyān.¹ It is important to observe that Ibn-Bassām

¹ Dḥakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, pp. 220-25, 241-59, 296-324; Rabat, fols. 2r.-24v.; Bodl., fols. 2r.-21v. One observes that it is only the fact that Ibn-Bassām specifically recognises the importance of the historical aspect of the background of the figures he studies that permits us to isolate a historical dimension in his approach. However, in general terms, Ibn-Bassām’s approach is basically centred on the model of biographical dictionaries, and Adh-Dhakhīra is indeed foremost a biographical dictionary of Andalusian literary figures. On the other hand, other authors of biographical dictionaries differed by limiting themselves to the presentation of literary or descriptive information, thus lacking any historical dimension in their approach. Examples of biographers of this type who studied some of the major Sevillan personalities during the Banū ‘Abbād period include Ibn-Khallikān (Wafayāt al-A’yān), Ibn-Khāqān (Qalā’id al-‘Iqyān) and Ibn-Farḥūn (Kitāb ad-Dībāj).
surveyed the particular historical environment and main events of the periods during which al-Qādir, al-Mu‘taḍid and al-Mu‘tamid b. ‘Abbād and other Sevillan figures lived, focusing primarily on the general historical background of Seville. He therefore considered himself justified in including individual historical phases to illustrate and complement the literary aspects of each figure he studied. Other historians have described Seville’s history during the Banū ‘Abbād period chronologically, as a part of their general narrative and essentially descriptive approach to the study of al-Andalus.¹

More recently, Hussayn Monès suggested that the Taifa period be subdivided into three phases: 1009-1031, 1031-1040 or 1045, and 1045-1090. The following constitute the general features of the approach to eleventh-century al-Andalus suggested by H. Monès:²

1.) First phase: The first phase is that of the disintegration of the Cordoban Caliphate during which the would-be princes of the Taifas played a passive role, either watching the fratricidal strife that revolved around the struggle for the Caliphate or participating, to a limited degree, in support of different struggling factions.

1. Examples include Ibn-‘Idhārī (Bayan, III, pp. 193-216), al-Marrākushī (Mu‘jib, pp. 93-100, 135-61) and Ibn-al-Khatīb (A‘mal, pp. 177-97).

2. Consideraciones, pp. 319-22.
2.) Second phase: After the end of the Caliphate on the 20 November 1031, the formative period of the Taifas begins, with different governors, military commanders, or simple opportunists engaging in the task of attempting to transform their province, city or even castle into a principality. This was a period when the map of al-Andalus changed constantly as a result of the conflicts between the weaker and the more powerful Taifa leaders attaining an unprecedented level of fratricidal violence. By about 1040 or 1045, the constitution of the major Taifas attained its final form, one which remained essentially unaltered throughout the remaining part of the Taifa period.

3.) Third phase: The third and final phase is that of the maturity of the Taifas. The most important Taifas, namely Seville, Badajoz, Granada, Valencia, Denia and Saragossa, could be studied individually. The climax of the Taifa period is reached with the intervention of the al-Murābiṭūn and the reunification of al-Andalus. This subsection could be followed by a conclusion on the whole panorama of the eleventh century.

Although H. Monès is one of the few historians who have attempted to present an approach to the political history of eleventh-century al-Andalus in its totality, his previous interpretations and conclusions on the Banū Umayya period are partly reflected when considering
the Taifa period. The latter is indeed conceived as a prolongation of the period of Banū-Abī-ʿĀmir, and H. Monèse attempts to illustrate how the major founding leaders of the most prominent Taifas (e.g. Banū Ḥammūd of Malaga, Algeciras and Cordoba, Banū ʿAbbād of Sèville, Banū Sumādiḥ of Almeria, Banū al-Afṭas of Badajoz, Banū Razīn of Santa Maria of Albarrasín (Sahla) and Banū Dhī-n-Nūn of Toledo) were 'disciples' of al-Manṣūr [b. Abī-ʿĀmir].

H. Monèse's approach to the Taifa period is retroactive in that it devalues the original independent forces that were in evidence during the Taifa period. When studying the Taifa period, H. Monès is principally concerned with attempting to detect the causes of the collapse of the Banū Umayya dynasty. The collapse of the Banū Umayya dynasty having been an unusually rapid phenomenon, and for this reason alone extremely difficult to explain satisfactorily, the search for new causes, or the further elaboration of those already put forward, has been extended to the Taifa period. Consequently, the Taifa

1. Although the tendency to perceive the Taifa period from an angle that presumes the exclusive legality and legitimacy of the Banū Umayya dynasty is common among modern historians, a similar attitude was adopted by Andalusian figures as early as the eleventh century. For example, Ibn-Ḥazm is unable to accept or comprehend the actual disintegration of al-Andalus into Taifas when he expresses his indignation because the Friday khutba was simultaneously read in the name of four Caliphs: Khalaf al-Ḥuṣrī, impersonating Hishām II, in Sèville, Muhammad b. al-Qāsim b. ʿAlī b. Ḥammūd in Algeciras, Muhammad b. Idrīs b. ʿAlī b. Ḥammūd in Malaga and Idrīs b. Yahyā b. ʿAlī b. Ḥammūd in Ceuta (Naqt, p. 25).

period is only approached insofar as it is capable of throwing more light on the previous Banū Umayya period (or the following period of the al-Murābiṭūn) and not as an independent period of sufficient interest in itself.

The subdivision of the Banū ‘Abbād period implies that the latter was characterised by a certain degree of homogeneity, because one can obviously only divide something that already enjoys a certain level of unity. Socially, economically and politically, the Taifa state of Seville evolved along coherent lines, and its progress can be conceived in terms of infancy, maturity and senility, despite the limitations of this approach.

The three-phase approach to Seville’s history presents a number of advantages when considering its internal politics. For example, in Chapter One of the present thesis, the separate concentration on the periods of al-Qāḍī, al-Mu‘taḍid and al-Mu‘tamīd b. ‘Abbād has made possible a more profound analysis of the causes behind the rise and fall of the Banū ‘Abbād rulers, placing each in his own background with its specific characteristics and conditions, without of course neglecting the comprehensive framework. This division is practical because each ruler was basically concerned with a different, if related, phase of the internal evolution of the Taifa state of Seville. Where foreign policy is concerned, however, a division of the period into discrete phases seems less practical. It is more illuminating to trace the general outline of Seville’s foreign policy as a whole, analysing its long-
and short-term objectives, the methods applied to attain them, and concluding with a general evaluation of the foreign policy.

Just as the division of time into centuries is relative, the period of Banū 'Abbād can only be selected and isolated at an abstract level, as a matter of convenience, thus limiting the area of specialisation and making possible a deeper penetration and understanding of the period. However, in reality, the history of the Taifa state of Seville forms an integral part of eleventh-century al-Andalus, sharing its outstanding features and having been determined by identical internal causes and external pressures and influences. Without an understanding of the nature of Seville's contact with other political entities and the forces which stimulated their relations, a full appreciation of the various dimensions of Seville's foreign policy is impossible.

II. Foreign Policy Objectives

Seville's foreign policy during the Banū 'Abbād period must be placed within the wider spectrum of 'international' relations if its potential and limitations are to be properly evaluated in the context of the surrounding and neighbouring political entities. In its capacity as a Taifa state, Seville influenced the destiny of other political units, but the general course of its foreign policy was, in turn, progressively and, in the end, fatally
affected by external influences. The general pattern that resulted reflects Seville's ability to dominate the politically and economically weaker Taifas while being, in turn, economically and politically submissive to the larger states in a manner that appears extremely passive and at times almost wilful. This duality of Seville's foreign policy - that is, its aggression on the one hand and its submissive indifference on the other - is clearly reflected on the military plane. The immediate effects of this contradiction were positive inasmuch as Seville gained the appearance of a healthy and powerful Taifa state. However, the contradiction and duality in Seville's foreign policy perpetuated the internal imbalance within this policy. The conflict which resulted from this contradiction ensured that the growth of the influences and pressures exerted on Seville by the larger political entities remained unchecked, attaining such uncontrollable proportions that Seville could no longer confront or even contain them.

A major strand in Seville's foreign policy was its political isolationism. Even though Seville signed treaties of peace and formed alliances with both the smaller and the larger states with which it maintained relations, its ties with them remained marginal. Alliances and coalitions were only decided on as a temporary measure to obtain particular objectives. Seville's foreign policy was based on the presumed hostility of all other
political units. Although Seville was initially threatened by the Taifa leaders of Cordoba, Malaga and Badajoz, its hostile reaction to the initial threats of certain Taifa leaders during the early Taifa period seems to have been extended to the Taifa states generally and adopted as an integral part of its foreign policy. Seville's continued aggression against the weaker Taifa states clearly reflects its hostility, while all agreement or collaboration with the larger states was stimulated by purely pragmatic motives. Seville's foreign policy was ideologically either antagonistic or indifferent to the smaller Taifa states. The ties which had previously linked the different regions of al-Andalus politically, economically, socially and culturally, were forgotten totally, and the maintenance of Seville's autonomy and its military and territorial expansion were the central consideration in the formulation of its foreign policy. One important reason for this was, of course, the false assumption of the Sevillans that their military superiority, limited though it was, over the other Taifa states would enable them to overpower and swallow up the latter one by one.\(^1\) As a result, Seville never attempted to peacefully attract the other Taifas into its sphere of influence, a policy which might have enabled

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1. Other Taifa leaders, however, were fully aware of the stalemate that resulted from the finely balanced power among the Taifas. For example, Prince 'Abd-Allāh was fully conscious of how this situation was exploited by Alfonso VI ( Tib., p. 69).
Seville to lead the other Taifas in unison. Instead, Seville consistently wielded its political and military power with the intention of annihilating the other Taifa states. This produced a strong reaction by the Taifa leaders who were forced to struggle for their very survival and to regard Seville with suspicion, fear and hatred. The negative long-term effects of Seville’s foreign policy must therefore be placed in the context of the total interdependence of its fate with that of other Taifa states and the relationship between the common security of the Taifa states as a whole, vis-à-vis the Christian North and the Maghrib. This Seville, like other Taifa states, failed to grasp, and the final price for this shortsightedness was no less than the end of the political and economic existence of all the Taifa states, with the exception of Saragossa.

Though fluctuating at times, the general course of Seville’s foreign policy from 414/1023 to 484/1091 is clear and consistent, if self-defeating in the final analysis. The aims of Seville’s foreign policy were equally clear to those who pursued them, but were limited in terms of their long-term benefits and soundness. The long-term objectives were often confused with immediate goals, and the end and the means were sometimes one and the same. The foreign policy of the Taifa states was basically characterised by two flaws. Firstly, they overlooked their ultimate interest, which was the safeguarding and promotion of their
political and economic future. Yet it is perhaps naive to expect this from the Taifa states when their very existence contained the ingredients of their final self-destruction. Secondly, the Taifa states rarely took the initiative, so that, rather than planning a foreign policy based on a carefully studied and analysed strategy, their policies were essentially opportunistic and they usually found themselves responding to the course of developments imposed upon them by external forces. This state of affairs, which was characteristic of the foreign policy of the most powerful Taifas, including Seville, resulted from the general political environment which dominated political relations in eleventh-century al-Andalus generally.

The subjection and absorption of other Taifa states constituted a major objective of Seville’s foreign policy, and this target was pursued consistently, indiscriminately and forcefully. Several factors explain Seville’s pursuit of its aggression against other Taifas which it regarded as legitimate prey. Firstly, Seville considered the relative military and socio-economic weakness of the other Taifas as an advantage, concluding that their subjugation by the Sevillan army was only a matter of time. Secondly, Seville was attracted by the Taifas as a source of booty. In the context of power politics which formed the very essence of relations between the political entities in al-Andalus, booty was in fact institutionalised. It was an effective means of increasing the gap between the more powerful and
the less powerful political units through the gradual siphoning-off by the former of increasing portions of the latter's sources of income. On the one hand, booty was an important source of income for maintaining Seville's professional army; on the other hand, it served as a means of meeting Alfonso's demands for increases in the amount of tribute money imposed on Seville. Thirdly, Seville sought to increase its territory and, subsequently, the number of its subjects as a means of enhancing its position as a powerful state in al-Andalus. Fourthly, there are non-material explanations for Seville's policy of aggression against other Taifas. For example, the greatest dream of both al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid had been to rule over Cordoba, which was finally achieved by al-Mu'tamid in 463/1070. By this time, both the city and its surrounding areas had been ravaged on numerous occasions by various parties. Economically, Cordoba was not more attractive than a number of richer Taifas such as Toledo or Badajoz. The local Cordoban population welcomed al-Mu'tamid only because he had imposed his rule by force. Al-Mu'tamid's son, 'Abbād, lost his life when, at the instigation of al-Ma'mūn b. Dhī-n-Nūn, Ibn-'Ukasha reconquered Cordoba. Al-Mu'tadid had earlier lost his son, Ismā'īl, in an unsuccessful attempt to besiege it. It should also be

2. Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, pp. 323-24; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
remembered in this context that the immediate cause of al-Mu'tadid's decision to murder his other son, 'Abbâd, known as al-Manṣûr, had been the latter's refusal in 450/1058 to lead against Cordoba a Sevillan army which he considered not to be powerful enough for the task.\textsuperscript{1} Despite the apparent disadvantages and the numerous obstacles, both al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid placed the conquest of Cordoba among their highest priorities, and the main cause was that of prestige. Cordoba was more than what it represented materially; it was a symbol of the unity of al-Andalus, having served as the capital of the Banû Umayya dynasty for over three centuries.

The implications for its internal policy of Seville's attempt to absorb the largest possible number of Taifas were immediate. This policy seemed particularly attractive for its immediate benefits. The material gains (e.g. booty, territories, etc.) were extremely tempting. Furthermore, for Seville, which appeared as a giant in the midst of weaker Taifas, the risks of such a policy appeared minimal, because once al-Qâdî b. 'Abbâd had consolidated his position as the ruler of Seville, most of the Taifa states lacked the determination and the capability to strike back with any degree of success. The army's growth and power were appropriately nourished by Seville's expansionist policies, from which it benefited most directly.

\textsuperscript{1} Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 256; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
The ruler was, however, the ultimate beneficiary of this policy, given his place at the very heart of the Sevillan system. The inevitable long-term repercussions of this policy were therefore overlooked. The weight of constant warfare on the superstructure of Sevillan society, which was essentially not a war society, unlike other neighbouring societies such as the Castilian, exceeded the limits of Seville's capacity and was, in the final analysis, crippling. Its triumphs over other Taifas, glamorous as they were on the surface, only concealed the draining effects this policy had in the long run. Hence the symptoms of Seville's economic burdens, such as the tribute it offered Alfonso, were given little attention.

Seville's aggressive policy towards the Taifa states did not make any exceptions except on a temporary basis and for practical and tactical rather than ideological reasons. The only criterion that seems to apply consistently to the philosophy underlying the conduct of Seville's relations with the other Taifa states is that of Seville's immediate gain and self-interest, often at the expense of the rights of other parties and to the detriment of Seville's own long-term interest.

The lack of any deep-rooted consciousness of solidarity with other political entities was a major cause of Seville's failure to co-operate with other Taifas and to lead them as a united front. Instead, Seville sought to dominate them by force. The Banū 'Abbād rulers lacked a solid state
ideology, and their ties with the other Taifas were often based on contradictory positions. Like other Taifa states, Seville was officially a Muslim state. However, the actual manner in which relations with other Taifas were conducted was more often than not in flagrant contradiction of the most basic of Islamic principles. For example, it is a fundamental principle of Islamic international law (siyyar) that relations should be conducted differently during peacetime and during wartime. Yet Seville's relations with the Taifas made no such distinction. For example, the Taifa leaders of Arcos and Moron were not only assassinated by al-Mu'tadid during peacetime, but in their capacity as his allies.¹ Prince 'Abd-Allāh repeatedly expresses his astonishment at the appearance of Sevillian and Castilian military expeditions inside his territory without being provoked by Granada and without any justifiable reason.² The occupation of Cordoba by the Sevillian army was carried out even though Seville and Cordoba maintained peaceful relations. As a matter of fact, the Sevillans went to Cordoba in order to assist the Cordobans in defending themselves against the attacks of al-Ma'mūn b. Dhī-n-Nūn, and, having succeeded in their mission, the Sevillans occupied the city for al-Mu'tamid.³

¹ Bayan, III, pp. 295-96; A'mal, p. 181; 'Ibar, IV, p. 157.
² e.g. Tib., pp. 72-76.
The very fact of Seville's coalition with a Christian king against other Muslim Taifa leaders is hard enough to reconcile with the principles of Islamic international law. Al-Mu'tamid was indeed fully aware of contravening Islamic international law when he joined forces with Alfonso VI and caught Prince 'Abd-Allāh by surprise, for the latter did not expect a Muslim to join forces with Alfonso against him, as he states explicitly.\(^1\) This was a miscalculation on 'Abd-Allāh's part which he paid for quite heavily by losing the fortresses of Estepa and Martos in addition to being forced to increase the amount of tribute money paid to Alfonso.\(^2\)

Seville's consciousness of any ethnic solidarity was equally lacking, and we find that the Banū 'Abbād rulers fought Taifa leaders of several backgrounds. For example, their enemies included the deeply-Arabised Banū Jahwar of Cordoba and Banū al-Aftas of Badajoz. Berber Taifa leaders who clashed with Banū 'Abbād included Banū Zīrī of Granada and Malaga and Banū 'Abbād of Cordoba, Malaga and Algeciras. Yet racial origin was never a major cause of Seville's collision with other Taifas. For example, the Berber leader of Carmona was an ally, then an enemy, of al-Mu'tadid. At a period when coalitions were repeatedly arranged and dissolved, it seems futile to seek a racial pattern in the alliances of the Taifas. Where would the

\(^1\) *Tib.*, p. 69.

\(^2\) *ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
antagonistic Taifas of Granada, led by Prince 'Abd-Allāh, and Malaga, led by his brother Tamīm, fit in a racial scheme of allied Taifas? Seville was also hostile to other Taifas regardless of their size or power. Large Taifas like Badajoz and Toledo were among Seville's eternal enemies. Less powerful Taifas like Granada and Malaga also clashed with Seville, while the smallest Taifas such as Carmona, Moron and Arcos were its victims as well. Nor were any Taifas spared on the consideration that their populations would suffer from the consequences of military attacks, even though they had much in common with the inhabitants of the Sevillan Taifa state. The distinction between the rulers (i.e. the regime) and the subjects was never seriously conceived of, or the Sevillan army would never have attacked the fortresses of Granada and plundered its fields in alliance with Alfonso's army.

Like their internal policy, the foreign policy of Banū 'Abbād was in the final analysis based on crude force or, more specifically, on its abuse. It is this heavy reliance on power as a fundamental column carrying the full weight of their entire political system that best explains their success in al-Andalus and their inevitable end also.

A major objective of Seville's foreign policy was to consolidate and increase its sovereignty by promoting its authority among other Taifa states and gaining widespread recognition. In its attempt to seek general external acceptance, Seville was initially faced with colossal
handicaps, which were gradually overcome during the period 414/1023-431/1039, the reign of al-Qādī b. 'Abbād. As Seville's security was stabilised, and its sovereignty became unchallenged and finally accepted in al-Andalus, its hostility towards the Taifas persisted, becoming an end in itself. The forces which had served to achieve this end remained unleashed and were thereafter directed at increasing the range of Seville's newly-acquired privileges and status.

Seville's search for external recognition took different forms but evolved in a pattern that was determined by the earliest phase of its external relations. The most urgent issue for al-Qādī b. 'Abbād had been to preserve his leadership and the territorial integrity of the Taifa state of Seville legally, while his acceptance by the Sevillans was largely dependent on his ability to defend them against external perils. Al-Qādī's aims of imposing his legitimacy and achieving recognition by external political entities were therefore originally motivated by the need for self-preservation and constituted a defensive measure against the aggression of other Taifa leaders.

However, as Seville became more solidly established during al-Mu'taṣid's reign, its external relations took an increasingly offensive and aggressive turn. The aim of the Sevillan ruler was no longer the acceptance of his authority within the Sevillan frontiers; he now sought to implement his rule in other Taifa states. Al-Mu'taṣid therefore organised military expeditions in various
directions (e.g. southwards against Algeciras, northwards against Badajoz and eastwards against Carmona and Malaga). His methods varied widely, but he pursued his policy ruthlessly. This policy was continued and expanded from 463/1070 to 484/1091 when al-Mu'tamid's popularity reached an unprecedented level among the populations of other Taifas throughout al-Andalus, even though Seville's leadership over the remaining Taifas was at no time accepted by the Andalusian masses or even influential groups such as intellectuals or religious men.

The weakness of Seville's external relations since 431/1039 basically lay in a lack of depth and vision. The credibility of Seville's foreign relations was damaged by its high degree of opportunism and brutality, coupled by the often crude and unimaginative methods of implementation.

The aim of increasing Sevillan authority and sovereignty was without limits and constituted an obsession rather than a clear policy with long-term benefits. The soundness, wisdom and legitimacy of this policy were all presupposed, but its long-term aims and success were never seriously considered. The development of events was to illustrate that the type of recognition Seville sought with so much perseverance was in the final analysis contrary to its most vital interest, its struggle for survival. However, the legitimacy of Seville's quest for external recognition is not questionable in itself, rather it is the unlimited ambition that nourished Seville's external
relations, as well as the superficial style in which this was implemented, which in the end diminished its credibility.

III. The Role of Warfare in Sevillan Foreign Policy

(1) Plundering Expeditions

During a period when the more powerful states did not hesitate to impose their superiority upon the weaker ones, military aggression constituted the most direct and efficient method of implementing Seville's foreign policy. This method was as commonly used by the Taifas as it was by Alfonso VI or Yūsuf b. Tashufīn. It took a variety of forms, as dictated by varying circumstances and conditions, but regardless of its apparent sophistication or simplicity the basic function of military aggression remained that of a vital instrument for the execution of foreign policy.

One of the common forms of warfare in eleventh-century al-Andalus, plundering raids were organised as military expeditions against the weaker Taifas with the double objective of reaping material benefits and increasing the gap of power between aggressor and victim. Throughout the Banū ʿAbbād period, Seville sent military expeditions to devastate the territories not only of weaker Taifas, but equally of those with which it competed for supremacy over al-Andalus. At the same time, the Sevillan territories were subject to the aggression of expeditions sent by Alfonso. In the eastern parts of al-Andalus, raids organised by Rodrigo Díaz, the Cid Campeador, were identical to Alfonso's in pattern
and purpose, but on a minor scale. The sizes of the expeditions varied according to the magnitude of the raids and the immediate objectives aimed at, but their form and pattern of operation were fairly consistent.

The factor of surprise was an essential condition for the success of organised raids by military expeditions in al-Andalus. Great speed was required for expeditions to catch the enemy by surprise and unprepared. The purpose of military expeditions was not to confront the enemy, but to strike and, in case of unequal odds, to flee without giving the opposite party sufficient time to organise a counter-attack. As the cities were surrounded by protective walls, the rural areas were the main target for attack, and particularly common were the plunderings of villages and destruction of crops. Speed was required not only to initiate raids, but also to escape successfully with the acquired booty. Speed and surprise attacks also served to facilitate the retreat of military expeditions before the enemy was able to organise and strike back.

High mobility and an extended range of striking ability were other characteristics essential for the success of military expeditions in al-Andalus. During the early part of the eleventh century, al-Mansūr b. Abī-'Amīr's annual expeditions were able to overcome difficult geographical barriers, reaching as far northwards as Santiago de Compostela. During the Taifa period, the expeditions organised by Alfonso or Rodrigo Díaz, the Cid, ravaged the territories of Valencia, Denia, Tortosa, Granada, Toledo,
Seville, etc.¹ The particular advantage resulting from the mobility and long-range striking capability of military expeditions was that they could be directed at distant, vulnerable and materially profitable targets.

Alfonso’s expeditions into various Taifas were virtually unchallenged and unanswered. These expeditions were damaging enough to the Taifas agriculturally and materially, but their ultimate objective was to wage an economic war against the Taifas. The raids therefore served Alfonso as a means of expressing and manifesting his strength, with the final objective of intimidating the Taifas, thus forcing them to submit to such demands as offering him annual tribute money. The threatening power of Alfonso’s raids was consequently effective, and the psychological pressure it exerted on the Taifa leaders is frankly and repeatedly expressed by Prince ‘Abd-Allāh of Granada.²

Military expeditions implied a wider gap of power between the two parties involved and the capacity of the more powerful to exploit the weaker party’s incapacity to defend its territories and property. This disparity of power also implied that the attacking party would, at the most, meet ineffective resistance, and that no punitive measures would or indeed could be adopted against it. In the short term, military expeditions therefore constituted

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1. e.g. see Roderici, pp. 918-19, and Primera, II, pp. 537-38, 562.

a safe investment, because the risks of material loss were
nil or minimal, while material profit was almost always
certain. Such was, indeed, the historical pattern. For
example, Prince 'Abd-Allâh was in no position to contain
the expeditions sent by Alfonso and al-Mu'tamid into
Granada, nor could he retaliate.¹ Even in the prime of
its growth and at the height of its power, the Sevillan
army could not counter Alfonso's punitive expeditions into
Sevillan territory when Alfonso's ultimatum that al-Mu'tamid
surrender Seville unconditionally was rejected.² In all the
above-mentioned examples, and in many others, the military
expeditions reaped what fruits they could without directly
incurring any serious consequences. This may indeed be
considered as a major factor which encouraged the
peristence throughout the Taifa period of this type of
warfare, the immediate risks of which could be easily
calculated.

(2) Conventional Expansionist Warfare:
   Warfare between Seville and other Taifas

Organised expansionist warfare was the most conventional
method applied to obtain Seville's ultimate foreign policy
objective, the incorporation of the largest number of Taifas
into its territorial boundaries. When the Sevillan army
attacked another Taifa, the former was usually met in open
field, for this was the most efficient way of facing an

1. Tib., pp. 70-71, 74-75.
aggressor and avoiding the material damage that accompanies an army's free and unrestrained movement in enemy territory. In cases where the Sevillan army outmatched that of a weaker Taifa, the latter usually took refuge in a fortress or fortified city, giving the former the comfortable choice of laying siege to it or plundering the rural areas before collecting booty and returning to Seville.

The Sevillan army was usually on the offensive and triumphant, but two serious obstacles limited its success, with the result that the fortresses, cities or territories that the Sevillans acquired were costly. The first handicap that faced the Sevillan army was socio-geographical. The Sevillans fought in unfamiliar terrain and approached the populations in the Taifas they attacked as a conquered people. For example, the Sevillan army suffered one of its greatest military defeats in Badajoz, where geographical factors had a major role in determining the outcome of the encounter with al-Mu'azzafar b. al-Aftas' army.¹ A second obstacle which hindered the full success of Seville's military exploits was that the parties attacked often sought the assistance of others, thereby tipping the balance of power against Seville. An illustrative example is the successful conquest of Malaga by the Sevillan army during al-Mu'tamid's reign and its

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¹ The Sevillan army was attacked by surprise while crossing a valley, and that portion of the army which managed to escape suffered great losses while fleeing towards Seville through foreign territory (DhuKh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 225; Rabat, fol. 4v.; Bodl., fol. 4v.).
defeat following the arrival of Bādis b. Zirī's men to assist the few African mercenaries who continued to hold out against the Sevillans.¹

Until the fall of Cordoba to al-Maʿtamid in 463/1070, confrontation with the more powerful Taifas absorbed the largest amount of Seville's energies in the implementation of its foreign policy. Seville did not hesitate to confront the armies of the most powerful Taifa rulers including Banū al-Aftas of Badajoz, Banū Dhī-n-Nūn of Toledo, Banū Jahwar of Cordoba and Banū Zirī of Malaga and Granada. Curiously, the Sevillan army did not compete with Alfonso VI and other Christian leaders, but implemented a military policy vis-à-vis the other Taifas that was encouraged and complemented by the Castilian ruler. The offensive aggression of the Sevillan army against the more powerful Taifas is therefore not indicative of the former's absolute military superiority, since the former was not totally independent and only operated within limits conceded by the Castilian ruler. Alfonso's policy of non-interference with the activities of the Sevillan army served his long-term interest.

The Sevillan army prolonged its aggression against the more powerful Taifas despite the failures it suffered in the process. For example, it failed to annex Malaga, Toledo, Granada and Badajoz. This failure to defeat the

major Taifas can be explained by purely technical factors. The armaments, methods and military tactics employed by the Sevillan army were identical to those commonly utilised by the armies of other Taifas, and the Sevillan commanders were by no means exceptional by Andalusian standards. Furthermore, the Sevillan army was largely composed of mercenaries and slaves who did not fight for an ideological cause and were thus lacking in high morale, which is often decisive in determining the outcome of battles. The logical explanation for the pursuit of Seville's offensive against the more powerful Taifas must be basically political and economic. The Sevillan ruler's nourishment of these wars served to increase his prestige both internally and abroad. The Sevillan rulers were further compelled to encourage war against the other Taifas, which, along with taxation, served as a major means of meeting Castile's demands for tribute money.

Unlike the fall of Toledo (478/1085) and the Battle of az-Zallāqa (479/1086), two events the outcome of which shattered the precarious balance of power in al-Andalus, Seville's battles with the more powerful Taifas have received only cursory treatment from both contemporary and later historians. However, the importance of these battles arises from their relevance to Seville's history, the significance of which is generally recognised. Of the more powerful Taifas, Cordoba and Badajoz were the two chief targets that Seville's foreign policy was aimed at. For example, much of al-Ma‘tāmid’s struggle with al-Ma‘mūn b.
Dhī-n-Nūn was related to the supremacy over Cordoba, the symbolic value of which attracted the ambitions of the most prominent Taifa leaders. On the other hand, al-Mu‘taqīd’s eagerness and desire to annex his competitive neighbouring Taifa, Badajoz, was stimulated by a deep-seated antipathy towards al-Muẓaffar b. al-Aftas of Badajoz which dated back to the period before his accession to power. The irony of the apparent success of the Sevillan army over the other Taifas is that the manpower and financial resources that were required indirectly contributed to Seville’s vulnerability to the attacks and demands of Castile and, later, the Maghrib.

The internal divisions among the inhabitants of Baja (Bāja) during the fitna were expressed physically in the entire destruction of the city, including both the pre-Islamic and the newer sections. This sudden decline of Baja aroused the ambitions of al-Qāḍī b. ‘Abbād and al-Manṣūr ‘Abbād b. Muḥammad b. Maslama b. al-Aftas to dominate it, and their struggle reached unexpected dimensions. In 421/1030 al-Qāḍī b. ‘Abbād sent his army, accompanied by that of Muḥammad b. ‘Abbād al-Barzālī of Carmona and led by his son, Ismā‘īl, and just as they began to reconstruct the city the combined forces of the son of the ruler of Badajoz, al-Muẓaffar b. al-Aftas, and another Taifa leader, Ibn-Ṭayfūr, attacked, occupying the ruined city. The

1. Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 4r.; Bodl., fol. 4r.
Sevillan army reorganised itself and mounted a counter-attack, plundering wide areas up to Ebora (Yābira) and other parts of the Gharb. The result was a resounding victory for the Sevillan army. The captives sent to Seville included high-ranking officers and a brother of Ibn-Ṭayfūr who was crucified in Seville, while al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afṭas was taken prisoner by the Taifa leader of Carmona. With his son as a prisoner of war, the ruler of Badajoz found himself in no position to challenge his rivals. Al-Muẓaffar was released in Rabī‘ 1 421/March 1030, but the psychological scars of the humiliation of his defeat and captivity were to affect the future relations between Badajoz and Seville drastically.

In 425/1033 al-Qādī b. ʿAbbād sent his son Ismāʿīl at the head of a military expedition towards Galicia and, while crossing the territories of Badajoz, the Sevillans were ambushed by al-Muẓaffar at the head of the entire army of Badajoz. Part of the Sevillan army surrendered, but Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbbād and his soldiers managed to escape to Lisbon (Ushbūna) with tremendous difficulty, having had to kill their horses for survival. Ismāʿīl’s men were pursued and suffered great loss of lives at the hands of al-Muẓaffar and ‘Christian soldiers’.

1. ibid.
3. ibid.; Bayan, III, p. 203.
4. ibid.
The question of the effects of the encounters between the Sevillan army and that of Badajoz in 421/1030 and 425/1033 on al-Muʿtaḍid, and whether they influenced his outlook and relations with Badajoz after his establishment as ruler in 433/1041, is an intriguing one. It is quite clear that Ismāʿīl and not his brother ʿAbbād (later al-Muʿtaḍid) led the Sevillan army against Ibn-al-Aftas in Beja and Badajoz. What is not so obvious is the absence or presence of ʿAbbād during the two encounters, a matter on which all sources are silent. In 421/1030, when al-Muẓaffar was released by Muḥammad al-Barzālī, ʿAbbād was probably fourteen years old, having been seven years of age when his father offered him as hostage to Yaḥyā b. Ḥammūd in 414/1023. He was therefore perhaps too young to participate in the victory at Beja, but what about the defeat at Badajoz in 425/1033? If our calculations are correct, he must have reached the age of eighteen by 425/1033, and considering that the Banū ʿAbbād rulers encouraged the participation of their sons in military ventures, it is possible that ʿAbbād was among the defeated Sevillan troops who fled for their lives when ambushed by al-Muẓaffar's army. However, whether it was because of the personal suffering and hunger or simply the treachery of al-Muẓaffar, who had been freed mercifully by Seville's ally four years earlier, the defeat of 425/1033 triggered a permanent hatred and bitterness between Banū ʿAbbād and Banū al-Aftas that determined the unceasing deterioration of relations between Seville and Badajoz.
Although al-Mu‘taṣid's contempt for al-Muzaffar had a deeply personal and emotional dimension, the deeper explanation for Seville's aggression against Badajoz is to be found in their competition as powerful Taifas. Al-Mu‘taṣid did not wait long, after his establishment as ruler, to attack. In 442/1050 he attacked Niebla (Labla), forcing the helpless Taifa leader, Ibn-Yahyā, to send for al-Muṣaffar b. al-Aftas' assistance.¹ As often happened among the Taifa leaders, al-Muṣaffar came to assist Ibn-Yahyā, but decided to keep Niebla for himself, as a result of which Ibn-Yahyā turned to al-Mu‘taṣid for help. As the defender of Ibn-Yahyā, al-Mu‘taṣid formed a coalition with the armies of his allies the Berber Taifa leaders, especially Bādis b. Ḥabbūs, who immediately responded to the request.² In the meanwhile, Ibn-Jahwar of Cordoba attempted to intervene diplomatically with the hope of preventing a confrontation between al-Mu‘taṣid and al-Muṣaffar. Ibn-Jahwar's motive for desiring to maintain the status quo was his fear of the possible annexation of Badajoz to Seville, in which case Cordoba would become the next target. Al-Mu‘taṣid's claims as the champion of Hishām II's right to the Caliphate had met with success among some Taifa leaders, and any further increase in Seville's power would certainly lead to an attempt to conquer the old capital of Banū Umayya.

Ibn-Jahwar therefore sent his messengers to all the Taifa leaders on al-Mu‘taḍid’s side except Muḥammad b. Idrīs of Malaga who, like al-Mu‘taḍid himself, had claims to the Caliphate of al-Andalus. However, Ibn-Jahwar’s peaceful intervention failed and the armies of al-Mu‘taḍid and his allies began their march from Seville to Niebla, destroying whatever they found on their way. In Niebla, al-Mu‘taḍid personally participated in al-Muẓaffar’s decisive defeat, and the Sevillan army occupied several fortresses and destroyed buildings and crops as it chased al-Muẓaffar up to the capital city of Badajoz. Defeated, al-Muẓaffar found no supporters among the Taifa leaders willing to help him avenge himself on al-Mu‘taḍid and, with the mediation of Ibn-Jahwar, had to accept a peace treaty with al-Mu‘taḍid in Rabi‘ 1 443/July-August 1051.

Quite apart from the significance of Badajoz and other major Taifas as targets, the annexation of Cordoba was central to Sevillan foreign policy throughout al-Mu‘taḍid’s reign, and was brought to fruition by al-Muṭamid in 469/1076 when Cordoba was definitively reconquered. In 463/1070 the Sevillan army was successful in conquering Cordoba by posing

3. Ibid.
as Ibn-Jahwar's ally and striking unexpectedly from inside the city walls. Led by al-Mu'tamid's son, 'Abbād, the Sevillan army defeated al-Ma'mūn b. Dhī-n-Nūn's army which had come to attack Cordoba, and having fulfilled this mission the Sevillans occupied Cordoba for al-Mu'tamid.\(^1\) Having eliminated Ibn-Jahwar, al-Mu'tamid left his son 'Abbād and his commander Ibn-Martīn in charge of affairs in Cordoba before returning to Seville.\(^2\) However, Ibn-Dhī-n-Nūn did not accept his defeat as definitive and tempted Ibn-'Ukāsha, who commanded a fortress not far from Cordoba, to conquer the old capital of al-Andalus. Leading his troops in 467/1074, Ibn-'Ukāsha entered Cordoba by night by bribing the city guards.\(^3\) With the collaboration of a group of Cordoban dissidents, Ibn-'Ukāsha was led to the house where 'Abbād was residing and, killing the latter instantly, he searched for Ibn-Martīn who, despite a terrible state of drunkenness, managed to escape.\(^4\) Ibn-'Ukāsha was proclaimed in the mosque of Cordoba as the new ruler, and Ibn-Dhī-n-Nūn came to Cordoba where he died after only one month, perhaps as a result of poison. With the death of Ibn-Dhī-n-Nūn, al-Mu'tamid re-established himself as the ruler of Cordoba without difficulty, and had Ibn-'Ukāsha killed.\(^5\)

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1. Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 322; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.; A'mal, pp. 171-72.
2. ibid.
5. ibid.
The annexation of Cordoba to Seville was al-Muʿtamid's overriding ambition in foreign policy, and served to increase his image as a potential ruler and that of his army as a powerful military machine. However, the manner in which the Sevillan army occupied Cordoba reflects a high degree of irregularity. The sudden change of position from Cordoba's defender to its conqueror, without any provocation or apparent justification, not only reflects a total lack of ethical consideration but also indicates the lack of any realistic long-term calculation on the part of the Sevillan army. The latter's instinctive and spontaneous change of allegiance against Cordoba illustrates the superficiality and contradictions underlying the shifting coalitions of Taifas in al-Andalus. However puzzling it may appear, Seville's change of position was perfectly in line with the illogical character of the Taifa period.

The Sevillans' behaviour was in their short-term interest for several reasons. Firstly, there were similar precedents such as al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afṭas' sudden decision to occupy Niebla, having initially come to defend it against the Sevillan army in 442/1050. Secondly, there was no superior force to prevent the Sevillans from occupying any Taifa state they could. With the defeat of al-Muẓaffar b. al-Afṭas and the death of al-Maʾmūn b. Dhī-n-Nūn, no other Taifa leader was capable of contesting al-Muʿtamid's power to annex Cordoba. Thirdly, the repercussions of such an annexation were nil, since the other Taifas were suspicious of each other, too concerned with their own internal problems.
or in practice incapable of assisting the Cordobans.

Despite the immediate benefits of Cordoba's annexation by Seville, the long-term damage it caused was greater. Banū Jahwar of Cordoba, whom al-Mu'tamid had eliminated, had had a record as the most equitable, just and representative Taifa leaders. Although not elected by the people, a notion which did not exist either in Europe or in the Islamic world at that time, the Banū Jahwar rulers had the greatest sense of responsibility towards their subjects and, of all the Taifa leaders, they reaped the least personal benefit from their political power. Furthermore, their policy towards the other Taifas was one of conciliation and peaceful co-existence.

After al-Mu'tadid's victory over al-Mu'azzafar b. al-Afṭas in Rabī'1 443/July-August 1051, confrontation with the weaker Taifas was adopted as a part of Seville's comprehensive foreign policy towards the Taifas. The smaller neighbouring Taifas were the target of the Sevillan army by preference, which meant that Seville's military efforts were, initially, mainly concentrated in the Gharb (Western al-Andalus).

The fragility of the smaller Taifas had several causes and was an intrinsic feature of their existence. Firstly, because of their small size, their economic infrastructure forced them to maintain an economy of subsistence and dependence. Secondly, the internal situation was unstable because the rulers of the smaller Taifas were generally
tyrannical, thus losing the support of their people. One example was the ruler of Silves (Shilb), ʿAmmad b. Jarrāḥ, who adopted such titles as 'king of kings', only to be put to death by his oppressed subjects. 1 Thirdly, up to 1050, during the period when Seville did not interfere with their internal policies, the smaller Taifas were in constant strife with one another. The disparity of power between Seville and the smaller Taifas led to the former's plans to annex the latter, a task which the Sevillan army found simple.

Al-Muʿtaḍid directed his army in the Gharb against the Taifa leaders Ibn-Yahya, Ibn-Hārūn, Ibn-Mazīn and al-Bakrī, conquering their territories and concluding his first series of attacks with the annexation of Algeciras after the defeat of its ruler, al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. Ḥammūd. 2 Having annexed the weaker Taifas in the Gharb and secured control over the Strait of Gibraltar by conquering Algeciras, al-Muʿtaḍid ended his nominal recognition of Hishām II as Caliph and the latter's name ceased to be mentioned in the mosques. 3 In 1063, al-Muʿtaḍid secured the last Taifa in the Gharb, Silves, before concentrating his efforts southwards. 4 Seville's military

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activities were temporarily halted at the end of 451/1059, but al-Mu‘taṣid again resumed his activities by instigating trouble inside the remaining weaker Taifas south of Seville. He then commenced a series of attacks and annexed a number of weaker Taifas as swiftly as he had those in the Gharb. For example, Abū-n-Naṣr Fattūḫ b. Ḥilāl b. Abī-Qurra al-Yafrānī was defeated in 457/1064 and Ronda was occupied by the Sevillan army. The defeat of ‘Imād ad-Dawla Manad b. Muḥammad b. Nūḥ ad-Dammārī and the occupation of Moron by the Sevillans came in 458/1065. Carmona, which was ruled by al-Mustāẓirī ‘Azīz b. Muḥammad al-Barzūlī, succumbed to the Sevillans in 459/1066. In 461/1068 al-Mu‘taṣid’s army defeated Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Khazrūn of Arcos, despite his previous co-operation in overthrowing other Taifa leaders. However, although the superiority of the Sevillan army was significant, the internal weaknesses of the smaller Taifas facilitated their defeat. For example, in Silves, the ruler was killed by discontented subjects. Although on a smaller scale, Seville’s relations

with the weaker Taifas were similar in form and pattern to Alfonso VI's relations with the Taifas generally. Al-Mu‘taqid’s policy vis-à-vis the weaker Taifas therefore strengthened Seville in the immediate term and permitted al-Mu‘tamid to construct a policy that was essentially directed against the more powerful Taifas.

In a wider perspective, Seville’s elimination or weakening of the most powerful Taifas such as Cordoba, Badajoz, and Toledo served to diminish the defensive capability of the Taifas as a whole vis-à-vis Castile. The latter therefore came to constitute a direct military threat to Seville, because the belt of larger Taifas separating Castile from Seville was exhausted by the double military and economic pressures by Castile from the North and Seville from the South. It is clear that, by continuing the military attacks against the more powerful Taifas initiated by al-Qādī and al-Mu‘taqid, al-Mu‘tamid was unaware of the ultimate consequences of this policy even as late as 478/1035, when he adopted a neutral attitude to Alfonso's annexation of Toledo and did not assist its inhabitants. Seville’s victories against the more powerful Taifas therefore ultimately led to the inevitable military confrontation with Castile, a challenge the Sevillan army was not prepared to meet in terms of its technical and human potential.
(3) Defensive Warfare: Relations with Castile and the Maghrib

(a) The Fall of Toledo and its Effects on Seville

The fall of Toledo and its dependencies to Alfonso VI in 478/1035 shattered the entire pattern of relations between Castile and the Taifa states. After his conquest of Toledo, the Castilian king ended his policy of co-existence with the Taifas which had been based on exerting military and diplomatic pressures to extract tribute money from them. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo was an extraordinary occurrence in itself, with traumatic implications for the Taifa leaders, but the Castilian ruler went further and established it as his new capital. His arrogance following the conquest of Toledo, and his harsh treatment of the Muslim Toledans, aroused widespread anger in al-Andalus. For example, Alfonso's transformation of the great mosque of Toledo into a cathedral, while welcomed by the Catholics in Alfonso's court, was humiliating to the Andalusian Muslims, who resented it bitterly. Even the Mozarabs did not support such extreme action by Alfonso.

1. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo has been described in numerous sources (e.g. Primera, II, pp. 530-31; Dhakh., IV, vol. i, pp. 127-32; Tib., pp. 76-77; Iktifa: Hist. Abb., II, pp. 18-21; Wafayat, V, pp. 27-28; Kamil, VIII, p. 138).


Alfonso's behaviour is explained by the fact that he came to consider himself as the rightful ruler over al-Andalus.1 This is further indicated by his adoption of such pompous titles as Emperor of the two religions (al-Imbratür Dhū-l-Millatayn).2 The direct cause of the break between Alfonso and al-Mu’tamid was the incident involving the killing by the latter of Alfonso's Jewish tribute collector, Ibn-Shalib, for refusing al-Mu’tamid’s money on the grounds that it was debased.3 However, it is from

1. Alfonso's hostile and contemptuous attitude towards the Taifa leaders following his subjugation of Toledo was clearly expressed to al-Mu’tamid's envoy:

    'How can I leave these decadent people [in peace] when each one assumes the titles of their caliphs, kings and princes, calling himself al-Mu’tadid, al-Mu’tamid, al-Mu’taṣīn, al-Mutawakkil, al-Musta‘In, al-Muqtadir, al-Amīn or al-Ma’mūn, and none of them is capable of drawing his sword in his defence?' (Iktīfa: Hist. Abb., II, p. 20.)

    For Alfonso’s hostile attitude towards the Taifa leaders, see Dḥakh., IV, vol. I, pp. 130-31.

2. This title is used in Alfonso’s letter to al-Mu’tamid after the conquest of Toledo (Mawsh., p. 25). His use of the title is explicitly described in a twelfth-century chronicle,

    'He [Alfonso] called himself Prince of the Faithful (Amīr al-Ma’mīnīn), and in the letters which he issued he wrote "from the Emperor of the two religions (al-Imbratür Dhū-l-Millatayn)", and he swore to the numerous messengers of the Taifa leaders that he would not spare any of the rebels in the peninsula (jazīra).’ (Iktīfa: Hist. Abb., II, p. 20.)

3. Mawsh., pp. 28-29; Rawd, p. 84.
Alfonso's own letter to al-Mu'tamid that his ultimatum to
the Sevillan ruler is expressed in the most unequivocal
terms, because he orders al-Mu’tamid to actually hand
over all Sevillan territories to the new governor, Alvar
Fáñez.¹

The fall of Toledo convinced Alfonso that all the
other Taifas without exception could, and indeed must,
follow a similar fate. In short, he was no longer
willing to accept any price for offering peace, whether
it be political allegiance or hard cash. His un-
compromising attitude therefore led to his construction
of a new policy, fully orientated towards the achievement
of this end.

If the fall of Toledo came to the Taifa leaders as
a sudden surprise, Alfonso's new policy was in fact the
outcome of internal clashes in Castile between different
groups of conflicting political orientations. The
three major forces of political significance in eleventh-
century Castile were the crown, represented by the
monarch, the Iberian Church, represented by the Mozarabs,
and the Catholic Church, largely inspired by French
Cluniac monks. Despite the essentially socio-religious
dimension of the conflict, it is basically the political
implications of the outcome of this struggle in Seville
and the other Taifas that concern us most.

Alfonso's transition from a policy based on extract-
ing tribute from the Taifas to his new annexationist policy

¹. Mawsh., p. 25.
resulted in a break with the Mozarabs. The Mozarab Church emanated from the Arabised Christian masses whose coexistence with the Muslims in al-Andalus profoundly marked their life style, temperament and even beliefs. Just as the Muslim rulers had not sought their extermination, so the Mozarabs could not bring themselves to be uncompromisingly aggressive. Their religious affiliation to the Castilian crown was sincere and dedicated, but the Mozarabs still subscribed to a practical Castilian policy of extracting the maximum material profit by influencing and shaping the internal struggles among the Taifas.

Sisnando Davídiz, Alfonso's Mozarab adviser who was appointed as the first governor of Toledo, advised Alfonso to rule al-Andalus through the Taifa leaders.¹ In his sound analysis and perceptive approach to the general political situation, Sisnando supported a flexible policy that did not drastically affect the balance of power in al-Andalus which, if broken, would result in outside intervention from the Maghrib to the detriment of Castile's interest. Sisnando even hinted at this possible consequence of Alfonso's policy.²

1. Sisnando was of the view that the Taifa leaders would make ideal governors for Alfonso. He therefore offered the Castilian ruler the following counsel:

'...Do not get angry with the [Taifa] rulers of the peninsula, because you will not be able to do without them, and, in addition, you will not find governors who will be more obedient to you.' (Dhakh., IV, vol. i, p. 131.)

2. ibid.
The struggle of the Cluniac monks against the hispanic rite of the Mozarabs had taken an important turn in 473/1080 when the hispanic rite was officially banned from the kingdom of Leon and Castile during the council of Burgos. The fall of Toledo in 478/1085 contributed to furthering the cause of the Cluniacs who then established themselves definitely in Spain with their main headquarters in the monastery of Sahagún. The Catholic Church was sharply opposed to the Mozarab Church, and supported Alfonso's policy of tribute extraction only as an immediate state leading to the eventual annexation of al-Andalus in its totality. Leniency towards the Andalusians was interpreted as unnecessary compromise, even treason. The final success of the Catholic Church in persuading Alfonso to adopt a hostile policy towards the Taifas was due as much to the highly organised and disciplined Cluniac monks as to the more comprehensive ideology of struggle against the infidel, as part of a wider Christian liberation movement. The role of the Cluniac monks was of the greatest importance as a force of stimulation that furnished the growing Castilian state with a sense of spiritual and legal justification and an ideology of struggle. However, many of the advocates of a hostile policy who surrounded Alfonso in his court were not particularly religious. The campaign for the adoption of a more aggressive policy had been voiced by Alfonso's closest officials long before the fall of Toledo. For example, Alfonso's missions to force tribute money
on 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn, in approximately 467/1074 and 483/1090, were respectively headed by Pedro Ansúrez and Alvar Fáñez, two advocates of a stern policy vis-à-vis the Taifa leaders.  

This future policy was not even a secret to 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn, who recounts how Sisnando had informed him of Alfonso's intentions to subdue the Taifas. Finally, the Castilian king, who determined the final outcome of the struggle between the two Churches most directly, benefited most by increasing his power and status as a result of siding with the more aggressive tendency.

(b) The Battle of az-Zallāqa and its Effects on Seville

The results of the Battle of az-Zallāqa were portentous for Yūsuf b. Tashufīn in that the way to the establishment of his sovereignty over al-Andalus had been paved, and equally so for Alfonso VI, whose plans to conquer al-Andalus had been dealt a deadly blow.  

1. Tīb., pp. 76, 123.

2. ibid., p. 73.

3. The Battle of az-Zallāqa has been given partial or detailed treatment by contemporary and later historians. Examples include Alfonso X (Primera, II, pp. 557-58), Ibn-Idhārī (Bayan, IV, pp. 130-40), an-Nuwayrī (Nihaya, pp. 99-101), 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn (Tīb., pp. 101-6), al-Marrākushī (Mu'jib, pp. 132-35), and an anonymous author (Mawsh., pp. 44-53). Modern historians of al-Andalus and the Maghrib have also dealt with az-Zallāqa, particularly in the context of the reconquest initiated by Alfonso VI and the extension of Yūsuf b. Tashufīn's influence and sovereignty over al-Andalus. For example, see A. Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Almoravidas, Almohades y Benimerines), Madrid, 1956, pp. 19-82; and E. Lévi-Provençal, E. García Gómez and J. Olivier Asín, Novedades sobre la batalla llamada al-Zallāqa (1086), A.A., XV (1950), pp. 111-55. For a different approach, see Muhammad 'Abd-Allāh 'Inān, Duwal at-Tawa'il, 2nd ed., Cairo, 1969, pp. 321-32.
The extremely high morale of the victors at az-Zallāqa is portrayed in the letters they wrote describing their triumph.\(^1\) However, the consequences of az-Zallāqa were most fatal for Seville and the other Taifas. The battle led to the inevitable end of their very existence as political entities, despite the glamour of their superficial success.

The Sevillan soldiers, their commanders and al-Mu'tamid himself received great praise for their heroic conduct at az-Zallāqa. However, the Sevillans did not take the decision to participate in az-Zallāqa voluntarily, but were instead forced to take part by changing internal and external conditions.\(^2\) The essential nature of

\(^1\) e.g. see Yusuf's letter to Tamīm b. al-Mu‘izz reproduced in Duwal, pp. 446-50, and al-Mu‘tamid's letter to his son ar-Rashīd (Dhata, II, pp. 114-15).

\(^2\) The Taifa leaders were led to seek Yusuf's assistance in 478/1085 by a combination of circumstances (the fall of Toledo, Alfonso's military pressure, and the inability of the Taifas to present a united front). The following conversation which al-Mu‘tamid had with his son, ar-Rashīd, fully reflects his hesitation and reluctance before deciding to demand Yusuf's assistance:

'After seven years, this accursed Alfonso has wrested Toledo from the hands of Ibn-Dhī-n-Nūn and converted it into a seat of infidelity. He has now turned his attention on us and, if he attacks with his weight, he will not leave us in peace until he has taken Seville. Therefore, we think that we should send to this Saharan who is king of the Maghrib and ask him to cross over and chase away this accursed dog from us since we cannot do this for ourselves. I prefer, by God, to graze camels rather than pigs.' (Mawsh., pp. 31-32.)
Seville's involvement in az-Zallāqa was defensive and consisted simply in halting Alfonso's increasingly intensive attacks against the Taifas. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo in 478/1085 was, in 479/1086, very much in the minds of all the Taifa leaders, whose greatest fear was that they would follow suit. Given the intensity of inter-Taifa strife and its destructive economic and social effects which had existed from the time of their creation, the Taifas could not conceive the plausibility of a common response to Alfonso's annexationist policies even when the end of their very existence became imminent. The only possibility left was either to surrender unconditionally to Alfonso, or to seek YYYsuf's assistance, the latter being the choice of preference.

However, by reacting to Alfonso's policies in unison and by having recourse to YYYsuf, the Taifas had actually widened the scope of political involvement in the Iberian peninsula to include the Maghrib, without fully anticipating the consequences. By appealing to YYYsuf, the Taifa leaders were in fact falling into his sphere of influence, thus losing the power to initiate policies vis-à-vis Alfonso, whose threat they could no longer confront independently. Al-Mu’tamid and the other Taifa leaders had not given the probability of a massive involvement in al-Andalus by Alfonso and YYYsuf the weight it deserved. Consequently, the Taifa leaders were unable to deal with the developments involving an increasingly active role by their more powerful neighbours, which caught them by surprise.
at a point when the clock could no longer be reversed. In other words, the escalation of external political and military participation in al-Andalus became inevitable.

If the Taifas were defending their existence at az-Zallāqa, the outcome led to the development of several factors that rendered their survival extremely precarious. Firstly, Yūsuf's influence was solidly and definitely entrenched in al-Andalus as a result of the credit he received for the victory at az-Zallāqa. By recognising and appreciating his role as their saviour against the annexationist ambitions of Alfonso, the Taifa leaders placed themselves under Yūsuf's spiritual and moral tutelage and were obliged to consider his reaction before taking important decisions. In their weaknesses, divisions and frustrations, the Taifa leaders were politically obliged to accept and recognise his leadership as Amīr al-Ma'mīnīn (Prince of the Faithful). They went further and reported their grievances against one another to Yūsuf, thereby giving him the status of an arbitrator among them.\(^1\) Despite Yūsuf's official refusal on the grounds that it had never been his intention to interfere in the internal matters of the Taifas, the very fact that he had been asked to arbitrate reflects the

\(^1\) For example, Tamīm of Malaga appealed for Yūsuf's arbitration in his conflict with his brother 'Abd-Allāh (Ibid., p. 106). Ibn-Rashīq appealed for Yūsuf's arbitration in his disagreement with al-Mu'tamīd over Murcia (ibid., pp. 110-11). Following his second crossing to al-Andalus, Yūsuf gave up the idea of attempting to save the divided Taifas from Alfonso and decided to return to the Maghrib on several occasions, because the Taifa leaders burdened him with their frivolous complaints against one another (ibid., pp. 106-7, 111-14).
significant increase in his status in al-Andalus following az-Zallāqa. Yusuf had therefore gained the power to initiate policies in al-Andalus which the Taifa leaders were no longer in a position to reject.

It has been argued that Yusuf's participation in az-Zallāqa was basically a step towards his total subjugation of the Taifas, and that this had been his intention from the very start when he first crossed to al-Andalus. Although useful for vilifying Yusuf's personality, this argument has little supporting evidence. Firstly, there is no evidence to prove that he intended to subjugate al-Andalus before az-Zallāqa, the outcome of which he could not be sure of at that stage. It was, after all, the Taifa leaders who had approached Yusuf for his assistance. Far from being decided, Yusuf was initially extremely cautious before deciding to support the Taifa leaders against Alfonso. His reluctance to respond immediately even aroused the impatience of Alfonso, who sent Yusuf a letter accusing him of cowardice for delaying the confrontation and challenging him to a battle on Moroccan soil provided that Yusuf furnished him with the appropriate ships for
crossing the Strait. The assumption that Yusuf intended to subjugate al-Andalus before az-Zallāqa can only be derived from guesses at his personal motives. On the other hand, there is equally insufficient evidence to argue that his motive had actually been not to conquer the Taifas before az-Zallāqa. The only evidence there is

1. Alfonso's letter is described in a letter to Tamīm b. al-Mu'izz b. Bādis by no other than Yusuf b. Tāshufīn. Yusuf's letter has been discovered by Muhammad 'Abd-Allāh 'Inān and the text is fully reproduced in Duwal, pp. 446-50. Alfonso's letter is partly reproduced in Mawsh., pp. 29-30. A more complete version of Alfonso's letter has been reproduced in a more neutral source (Husn, p. 4). Several features indicate the authenticity of this version. To begin with, the letter appears in a work written by a trustworthy author, Shihāb-ad-Dīn Mahmūd b. Sulaymān al-Halabī, who attained the high post of ra'is diwan al-inshā in Egypt. The work in which the letter appears, Kitāb Husn at-Tawassul ila Sinā‘at at-Tarassul, was intended to illustrate style and rhetoric in letter writing. Al-Halabī quotes Alfonso's letter for its style, which he is unlikely to have altered, especially since he was really interested in Yusuf b. Tāshufīn's reply and Alfonso's letter was only quoted in this context. Furthermore, al-Halabī was an Egyptian who lived two hundred years after the letter in question was written and he was therefore not motivated to change its contents, by which he was unaffected. However, it is the contents of the letter that indicate its authenticity more convincingly. Al-Halabi gives the name of the Mozarab, Ibn-al-Fakhkhār, who wrote the actual text of the letter, thereby confirming that it had been written in Arabic (ibid.). Unlike the letter attributed to Alfonso in Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, this version opens with a reference to Jesus Christ, as Alfonso VI is likely to have done. More importantly, the version of the letter in al-Halabī's work is more complete than the one in Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, which seems to have been a condensed version of the form quoted by al-Halabī. Finally, Yusuf's reply in the form of a Qur'ānic sura is more credible than the poetic version of Yusuf's reply given in Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya.
indicates his decision to conquer the Taifas after he had become convinced of their incapacity to successfully overcome their divisions and to survive Alfonso's annexationist policy.

A second major negative effect of az-Zallāqa was the release of internal socio-economic forces aimed at the annihilation of the Taifa system as such. Supported by the Andalusian masses, religious and pseudo-religious men led a campaign against the Taifa leaders generally. The most serious accusation made against the Taifa leaders was that they imposed taxes which were anti-Islamic and unjust. The Taifa leaders had overburdened their subjects with taxes as a major means of meeting their lavish palace spending on the one hand but, more importantly, to pay Alfonso's increasing tribute in return for peace. After az-Zallāqa and Yūsuf's widespread popularity in al-Andalus, influential religious leaders from different parts of al-Andalus pressured Yūsuf to put an end to the oppressive fiscal policy adopted in the Taifas, by forbidding all extra-Islamic taxes. The fuqahā' assumed an active role in support of Yūsuf against the Taifa leaders. Even when sent to Yūsuf as envoys by Taifa leaders, they were openly critical of the latter and, though aware of this, the Taifa leaders were helpless to react. For example, the faqīh Ibn-al-Qulay'ī was well known for his role as an intermediary agent in contacts with Yūsuf.¹ 'Abd-Allāh b.

Buluggīn's brother Tamīm sent the Qāḍī Ibn-Sahl fifty mithqāls to plead his cause with Yūsuf, but Ibn-Sahl declined the offer. ¹ 'Abd-Allāh gives a full account of how his envoy, Ibn-al-Qulay, di did all he could to vilify 'Abd-Allāh's image.² The motivation of the fuqahā's enmity towards the Taifa leaders varied. For example, whereas al-Qāḍī Ibn-Sahl acted as a matter of principle, Ibn-al-Qulay had a grudge against Fadis, which he intended to settle with his grandson, 'Abd-Allāh.³ Due to the massive discontent with the heavy taxation in the Taifas, the Taifa leaders did not try to justify their fiscal policies on legal or rational grounds. Rather, they attempted to minimise the cause-effect relationship of the tribute they paid Alfonso and the increase in internal taxation, arguing that the former did not affect the latter.

Besides overtaxation, Yūsuf and the Andalusian fuqahā accused the Taifa leaders of an equally serious charge: conspiracy with the Christian king, Alfonso VI, against Islam and the interests of their subjects. This charge was equally difficult to refute because, following az-Zallāqa, Alfonso again initiated his attacks against

1. ibid., p. 117.
2. ibid., p. 116-19.
3. ibid., p. 118.
various Taifas, including Granada and Seville, on whom he reimposed tribute. ‘Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn admitted his inability to confront Alfonso, and sought to justify the tribute money he was being forced to pay the latter by informing Yūsuf that this did not constitute a burden on his people since he paid the tribute from his personal wealth. Al-Muʾtamid, who found himself equally helpless in facing Alfonso’s attacks, argued that making treaties with Alfonso did not affect his allegiance to Yūsuf or his duties towards his subjects. When Yūsuf’s decision to conquer Seville became apparent, al-Muʾtamid denied all allegiance to Yūsuf on the grounds that, whereas Yūsuf had been his guest and ally when the Taifas confronted Alfonso at az-Zallāqa, his pressure against Seville had made him equal in status to other neighbouring Taifa leaders. However, in the final analysis, the Taifa leaders failed to refute the accusations directed against them when they failed to contain the threat of Alfonso’s newly-revitalised annexationist policy. The Taifa leaders failed to meet Alfonso’s financial demands other than by resorting to heavy taxation, which brought them trouble from Yūsuf.

Although the Sevillan army remained exceptionally loyal to al-Muʾtamid throughout, the commanders of other armies in al-Andalus formed a pressure group that Yūsuf manipulated to actually execute his decision to conquer the Taifas. While the backbone of Yūsuf’s army was Moroccan, there is evidence

1. ibid., p. 127.
2. ibid., p. 169.
that Andalusian elements were incorporated into it once the decision to conquer the Taifas had become definite. Yusuf’s policy of rejecting Andalusian collaboration was replaced by his heavy reliance on Andalusian commanders whose familiarity with the terrain and internal weaknesses of the Taifa leaders rendered their guidance indispensable.

It should further be borne in mind that, despite the magnitude of az-Zallâqa and the appearance of the new factors mentioned above, some features of the previous situation remained unchanged, contributing significantly to the final collapse of the Taifas. Among these was the persistence of Alfonso’s threat to the survival of the Taifas. Az-Zallâqa served to discourage and halt Alfonso’s drive to conquer al-Andalus, but his army was not crippled permanently, as the victory was not pursued by the victors. Since Yusuf returned to the Maghrib immediately after the battle, Alfonso again began to prepare for his attacks against individual Taifas. Yusuf returned to al-Andalus when al-Mu’tamid and other Taifa leaders sought his leadership in organising a siege against the Christian fortress of Aledo (LiyyIt). However, when news arrived that Alfonso was coming to Aledo’s rescue, Yusuf abandoned the project halfway, on the pretext that the Taifa leaders were hopelessly divided and that it was their responsibility to defend themselves by uniting. With Yusuf’s departure to

1. ibid., p. 112.
the Maghrib after Aledo, the Taifa leaders began to consolidate their defensive capacity in anticipation of an eventual attack by Yūsuf or Alfonso. 'Abd-Allāh b. Baluggīn gives a detailed account of the preparations he undertook in Granada.¹ Using his military strength as a threatening weapon, Alfonso forced Ibn-Ḥād of Saragossa to pay him tribute money.² Threatened by the Christian army under the leadership of Alvar Fáñez, 'Abd-Allāh too agreed to pay him 30,000 mīthqāls for security over a period of three years.³ Other Taifas were also forced to accept Alfonso's conditions.

Another important point which should be stressed when considering the result of az-Zallāqa was that, despite the appearance to the contrary, the victory did not end inter-Taifa strife and thus produced no unifying effects internally. Added to the tribute money the Taifa leaders had to pay Alfonso were the great expenses which were required to court Yūsuf and to maintain his army in al-Andalus. These expenses were impossible to meet, given that the Andalusian subjects refused to pay taxes and could not be punished for it by the Taifa leaders.⁴ The faqīh al-Qilayī publicly preached in Granada, for example, that taxes should not be paid to 'Abd-Allāh b. Buluggīn.⁵ The internal strife of the Taifas persisted

1. ibid., p. 120.
2. ibid., p. 122.
3. ibid., pp. 123, 127.
4. ibid., p. 109.
5. ibid., p. 110.
even when Alfonso restarted his attacks following az-Zallāqa. Furthermore, the reaction of the Taifas to the new factor of Yusuf’s presence in al-Andalus was as passive and short-sighted as was their attitude towards Alfonso. The advance from the South therefore followed a course similar to the previous Northern advance of Alfonso, as Yusuf was permitted to conquer different Taifas individually with the others passively awaiting their turn. Hence Yusuf was successful in conquering the Taifas with unusual speed and efficiency. The paralysis of the Taifas and their self-destructive tendencies, which resulted from their disunity, ultimately led to their inevitable destruction, a task in which Yusuf proved more successful than Alfonso. The military situation following az-Zallāqa closely reflects the socio-economic and political developments. The armies of the Taifa states were not up to the task of defending their collective existence, for two reasons. Firstly, the Taifa armies were numerically inferior to those of Alfonso and Yusuf. Secondly, the Taifa leaders never considered the idea of collective defensive measures. They did not even conceive the possibility of a collective effort when their survival demanded it.\(^1\)

\(^1\) On several occasions in his memoirs, ‘Abd-Allāh expresses his conviction that it was impossible for the Taifa leaders to unite (e.g. ibid., pp. 69, 84).
IV. Conclusion:
The Failure of Sevillian Foreign Policy

The optimism of the Taifa leaders that followed the Battle of az-Zallāqa was short-lived. Yusuf returned to the Maghrib and then came back to support the Taifa leaders in besieging the fortress of Aledo (Liyyīt) in 481/1088, but after several months of siege he decided to abandon the project. The reasons for Yusuf's abrupt decision are not clear. Some sources suggest that, having heard of Alfonso's preparations to come to the rescue of Aledo, Yusuf was frightened away.¹ Others suggest that he abandoned the siege out of fear that some of the Andalusian Taifa leaders or rebels such as Ibn-Rashīq of Murcia would join Alfonso's forces, thus tipping the balance of power in favour of the Christians.² Yusuf's own pretext was that the Taifa leaders were hopelessly divided.³ However, it appears that, during the siege of Aledo, Yusuf had decided to conquer the Taifas for himself and, having directly acquainted himself with their weaknesses, he actually planned to implement an annexationist policy by attacking them individually. By this time, the situation in al-Andalus had changed fundamentally in Yusuf's favour, and the time for his intervention was ripe.

3. ibid.
After Yusuf's third crossing from the Maghrib to al-Andalus, his army began its conquest of the Taifas individually. The conquest was rapid and efficient, because the Taifas did not collaborate with each other and the al-Murābiṭūn army was able to subdue them one after another. Furthermore, neither Alfonso nor any other Christian ruler came to rescue the Taifas, which indicates the superiority of Yusuf's army. The campaign was successfully terminated by 495/1102 with the conquest of Valencia, which had fallen into the hands of the Cid Campeador, Rodrigo Díaz, in 478/1085. Seville fell in 484/1091, after strong resistance. Although some of the Taifas, such as Seville and Almeria, offered resistance, others, like Granada, preferred to capitulate under advantageous terms for the Taifa ruler and his family.\(^1\) Finally, all the Taifas except Saragossa fell to the army of the al-Murābiṭūn.

Like the other Taifas, Seville was unable to resist Yusuf's army. However, perhaps no other Taifa contributed as significantly as Seville to the creation of the conditions which made Yusuf's intervention inevitable, because by 481/1088 it became clear that either Yusuf or Alfonso would conquer the Taifas, the disintegration and continuous quarrels of which had attained such a level as to render their continuing existence as independent entities no longer viable. Moreover, the tremendous

\(^1\) ibid., pp. 154-59.
strength attained by the kingdom of Leon and Castile on the one hand, and the Maghrib on the other, created a disparity of power with the Taifas that could only lead to their annexation by one or the other of the larger entities.

The fall of Seville was therefore the final outcome of the limitations of its foreign policy, in that the latter did not take into account the possible direct intervention of Alfonso VI, which in turn stimulated Úusuf's intervention. In fact, all the principles of Sevillan foreign policy indirectly nourished Alfonso's increasing presence and influence in al-Andalus. Seville's hostility towards both the weaker and the more powerful Taifas did not consider Castile's competition in this area. Seville agreed to offer Castile tribute on an annual basis without realising that this could make the Castilian kingdom into a powerful state which even the combined might of the Taifas could no longer match. As a matter of fact, al-Mu'tamid's treaties and alliances with Alfonso at no time reflected any suspicion whatsoever that the latter could one day adopt an aggressive policy seeking Seville's unconditional surrender.

On the other hand, one observes that al-Mu'tamid continued to implement foreign policy on the exact lines adopted by al-Mu'tadid. Having inherited a Taifa that was far more powerful than it had been in 433/1041, when
al-Muʿtaḍid became the ruler, al-Muʿtamid pursued the same policy. Seville therefore expanded eastwards to Murcia, and north-eastwards to include Cordoba, during al-Muʿtamid's reign. Yet the very weakness of this policy was that it did not take into consideration the new factors which had developed, notably Alfonso's unprecedented consolidation of power as a result of the internal stability which followed his reunification of Leon and Castile, and the continuous inflow of tribute money from the shattered Taifas whose strength dwindled gradually as a result of their unceasing internecine strife. The ultimate objective of Sevillian foreign policy seems to have been no less than sovereignty over the whole of al-Andalus; but, given the unrealistic nature of this objective, taking into account the finely balanced power between the Taifas, it has to be concluded that Seville's entire foreign policy was inherently implausible and self-defeating.

However, in the final analysis, it is perhaps unreasonable to demand a policy from Seville that could have saved al-Andalus from the inevitable intervention of an external party. After all, the Taifa state was a non-viable entity as such because it contained the ingredients for its self-destruction, as has been observed by Ibn-Ḥazm, Ibn-Ḥayyān and even 'Abd-Allāh b. Baluggīn of Granada. The failure of Seville's foreign policy must therefore be considered in the context of the fragility and vulnerability of the Taifa state as a political system.
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