
by

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This dissertation is the original work of the candidate, and has not previously been published in whole or part.
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NOTE ON SPELLING AND ABBREVIATIONS

Spelling follows the accepted modern orthography of SeTswana, with the omission of diacritics. Archaic spellings (e.g. Kalahari and Khama) have been retained in the case of certain proper names generally known, and in quotations. Bantu-language prefixes have only been omitted where ambiguity is avoided. Where retained, the root of words has usually been capitalised to distinguish it from the prefix (e.g. SeTswana). But 'Bamangwato' (the people) and 'Gamangwato' (the territory), as well as 'Botswana', have been excepted. The reason behind this inconsistent usage of Bantu-language prefixes may be illustrated by the terms 'Bamangwato' and 'Ngwato'. Without its prefix, 'Ngwato' implies a stricter ethnic distinction - the nuclear group which can trace its descent back to its founder called Ngwato. The term 'BamaNgwato', on the other hand, is used by groups of other descent to identify themselves as nationals of the Ngwato state. We are faced with the paradox that only one-fifth of the 'BamaNgwato' are in fact 'Ngwato'. The root word within 'Bamangwato' has not been capitalised within this dissertation, because that spelling has become generally accepted in English-language literature.

Certain SeTswana and South African terms used within this dissertation are not familiar outside the area. Perhaps the most common will be kgotla, a courtyard used for purposes of justice and assembly, capitalised into 'Kgotla' for the central courtyard of a town. 'Kgosii', meaning King or Chief, has also been capitalised when referring to a paramount. Other common words are ngape (doctor), moruti (teacher), monare (missionary), thuto (teaching), bengwana (male initiation), bojaalwa (beer), kheadi ('hooch'), etc. The better known Nguni variants, Mfecane for Difaqane, and lobola for bogadi, have been preferred over SeTswana or SeSotho in certain instances. The Afrikaans (SeBuru) terms drift (river crossing), spruit (stream), and kloof (gorge) may not be familiar to readers.

The following abbreviations have been used in the text and footnotes:

- A.C. Assistant Commissioner
- Ag. Acting
- A.M.E. African Methodist Episcopal
- A.R.M. Assistant Resident Magistrate
- B.B.P. Bechuanaland Border Police
- B.N.A. Botswana National Archives
- B.P. Bechuanaland Protectorate
- B.S.A. British South Africa
- B.T.A. Bechuanaland Trading Association
- C.O. Colonial Office
- D.R.C. Dutch Reformed Church
- G.S. Government Secretary
- H.C. High Commissioner
- Imp.Sec. Imperial Secretary
- K.P. Khama Papers
- L.M.S. London Missionary Society
- O.C. Officer Commanding
- P.R.O. Public Record Office
- R.C. Resident Commissioner
- R.M. Resident Magistrate
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S.D.A.  Seventh Day Adventist
W.C.W./S.O. Willoughby Papers, Selly Oak (Birmingham)
Wenela  Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
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Three authors of written sources hold me particularly in their debt - W.C. Willoughby, Simon Ratshosa, and Khama III himself. I trust they forgive my errors and pardon my strictures on them. Nor can I ignore all those who helped me to shape my ideas during my first and formative stay in Botswana, at Moeng between 1962 and 1963, particularly Mr. B.C. Thema. Finally I acknowledge the seven typists who have worked on this dissertation at various stages of its production for gold or glory.
'Happy is the nation that has no history. By this standard there can be few nations in Africa happier than Bechuanaland, for apart from the inter- and infra-tribal conflicts normal to the African continent before its emergence into modern life and thought, its record is remarkably free of incident of any kind. The Batswana offered an equally friendly reception to missionaries, traders and soldiers alike when they came to offer their various receipts (sic) for happiness, and since the British drew a line on the map and said 'This is Bechuanaland' they have lived quietly and undemandingly for seventy uneventful years.'


'We were taught, sometimes in a very positive way, to despise ourselves and our ways of life. We were made to believe that we had no past to speak of, no history to boast of. The past, so far as we were concerned, was just a blank and nothing more. Only the present mattered and we had very little control over it. It seemed we were in for a definite period of foreign tutelage, without any hope of our ever again becoming our own masters. The end result of all this was that our self-pride and our self-confidence were badly undermined.

It should now be our intention to try to retrieve what we can of our past. We should write our own history books to prove that we did have a past, and that it was a past that was just as worth writing and learning about as any other. We must do this for the simple reason that a nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without a soul.'

(Sir Seretse Khama, speech of Chancellor at University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland graduation ceremony, 15 May 1970 - Botswana Daily News, 19 May 1970, supplement.)
This dissertation is the study of an African kingdom and its survival under dynamic leadership during almost three decades of European colonialism. It looks in detail at the history of the relationships between a pre-existing government (that of Kgosi Khama III), the population of a state (the Bamangwato) and a new imperial paramountcy (the British). The nature and narrative of the introduction of British rule to central Southern Africa need no elaborate introduction. Botswana and in particular the Ngwato state appear as the 'Road to the North' in British colonial, white South African, and Rhodesian history books. Substantial anthropological and biographical literature also covers the nature of Tswana government, and the character and early


career of Khama III. But the historical development of the Bamangwato - the basic 'material' of this dissertation - has been inadequately studied, which is hardly surprising since the term now includes people from up to fifty different historical origins.

How can one study historically a whole people - the diverse population of a given territory? The term 'Bamangwato' denotes a 'plural' society subjected to the organising principle of the Ngwato chiefdom. The term does not denote a homogeneous group in culture, social or economic status, or even 'racial' stock. The validity of the term, besides the fact of its colloquial usage by the people concerned, is ultimately a historical one. The Bamangwato are a 'historical phenomenon', and it is therefore through their history rather than through typological definition that their heterogeneous composition is to be understood. But their history cannot be appreciated merely through the story of the ruling lineage (the Ngwato) alone - as has been usual in 'tribal histories' collected from authorities in the predominant clan. Histories purely of ruling groups (whether Ngwato, Afrikaner, or upper-class English) are prone to 'Whiggish' distortion - i.e. projecting the values of the existing power structure back into the presentation of the past. In particular such mythology does, in order to legitimise present authority and land ownership, misrepresent the history of the ruling group's earliest contacts with those who were to become subordinates in the eventual political structure. Thus we have been told that Ngwato or Boer clans entered 'empty' lands but received instant recognition of their superiority by any people who happened to be there; and then the clans in question expanded


4 There is an able compilation of the main accounts of Ngwato (rather than Bamangwato) history in Anthony Sillery's The Bechuanaland Protectorate Capetown: O.U.P., 1952 (Chap.12, pp. 115-131: 'The Ngwato'). Invaluable classification and historical notes of 310 Bamangwato 'wards' are provided in Isaac Schapera's The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes London: L.S.E. (Monographs on Soc.Antn. No.11), 1952 - Chap. X., pp.65-93: 'Ngwato'.
their control of territory, justly provoked into conquest, 'protecting' refugees, and filling out to 'natural' frontiers.

Similar distortion in historical interpretation would be encountered in singling out the viewpoint of any one of the subordinate groupings. The only true indigenous viewpoint for a Bamangwato history is to start with the territory (Botswana's Central District) tabula rasa. As one looks deeper into the historical succession of past population influx, one can peel away from the Central District each ethnic group in turn. This dissertation therefore must begin with the geographical background of the Central District of Botswana.6

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The Central District7 lies at a mean height of about one thousand metres above sea-level astride the Tropic of Capricorn. A gentle watershed, its spine indicated by the present line of rail, runs from north to south between the Limpopo and Makgadikgadi river-systems, from the Tati and Rhodesian uplands to the depression of the Serurume plains. The solid geology of the District, especially westwards, is thickly mantled by red Kalahari sand and its derivatives. Flat-topped ranges of hills or smaller goat-teats (mabele-a-podi), generally of east/west orientation like ribs on the watershed spine, thrust up through the sand from the solid bedrock.

The plains east of the watershed dip down into the Limpopo (Crocodile or Odi) valley. The great valley flows into the north deeper with denser vegetation, and then turns east (at Mapungubwe where modern Botswana, South Africa, and Rhodesia borders meet) to run into the Indian Ocean. The plains to the south and west of the Central District, those which separate

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5 I. Schapera Ethnic Composition, p.93.

6 Lengthy discussion of the archaeological evidence of the peopling of the area, from the Early Stone Age, has been eliminated from this dissertation, and will be published partially as 'On the origins of the Bamangwato' in Botswana Notes and Records, Vol.5 (1973).
the Shoshong and Motshodi hills and those which stretch monotonously through the Kgalagadi basin, are flat and uninviting.

Vegetation cover has varied from age to age, but the Central District is mostly seasonal grassland, in a patchwork of acacia-thorn scrub, and mopane bush forest in the northern reaches. A dry climate predominates, markedly in the thirstland of the western and southern plains. Rains are restricted to the season between October and March - averaging 18.15 inches a year at Serowe between 1921 and 1950.

The Makgadikgadi river-system to the west is largely 'fossil' and has not operated since prehistoric times. The main fossil tributaries are the Okwa from the west and the channel that runs from Letlhakeng in the Kweneng, both of which traverse the central Kalahari towards 'Lake' Xau at the south-western edge of the Makgadikgadi salt pans. Only the Boteti, which runs from the Okavango swamps to Lake Xau, and the Nata which joins the north of the Shoa pan, still flow seasonally into the Makgadikgadi. The Boteti, like other rivers of the Okavango swamp system of which the Makgadikgadi is a prehistoric extension, is known to flow both 'backwards' and 'forwards' according to comparative Okavango/Xau water levels.

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7. The Central District is a unit of regional government in the modern Republic, not a recognisably self contained geo-political area - see Chapter II. But it is a better approximate synonym for the zone dominated by the Ngwato than 'Bamangwato Reserve'.


9. M.R. Stobbs & Bawden Land Resources of Eastern Bechuanaland Surbiton, Surrey: Directorate of Overseas Surveys (for Department of Technical Co-operation. Taken from 1930 to 1965 Serowe's annual average was 18.44 inches. The unreliable nature of annual rainfall can be seen in the Serowe rainfall totals for each year from 1961 to 1965 - 21.12; 16.99; 14.85; and finally 8.92 inches. For the 43 years before 1965 the norms of monthly
After the Marico-Crocodile (Limpopo) confluence in the Kgatleng in south-eastern Botswana, the major eastern tributaries of the Limpopo are the Ngotwane, Bonwapitse, Magalapswe, Lotsane, Motloutse, and Shashe Rivers. The Ngotwane runs from the vicinity of Zeerust past Gaborone and Mochudi, being joined by the Taung and Metsemotlhaba from south-eastern Botswana, to become the Central District's south-eastern Border for a short stretch before joining the Limpopo. The Bonwapitse runs from the Shoshong Hills; its own tributary, the Serurume from the Kgalagadi, is fossil. The Magalapswe and Lotsane rivers also flow from the region of the Shoshong and Makgware Hills (the heartland of the Central District), the latter round the north of the Tswapong Hills, and both are fed by numerous minor tributaries - as is the Motloutse to the north, of which the major tributary is the Thune. The Shashe is the north-east border of the Central District, and it is fed from its north by the Tati, Ramokgwebana, Simukwe, Shashane, and Tuli (Thule) rivers. The Limpopo's major tributaries from the east opposite the Central District are the Matlabas between the Ngotwane and the Bonwapitse, the Mokolo and the Phalaia between the Magalapswe and the Lotsane, and the Magalakwena between the Lotsane and the Motloutse. But despite the enormous extent of the Limpopo river-system, in modern times the river channels are only filled by flash floods in season - though there is usually water seepage in the sand beds throughout the year, and in very wet years there can be perennial flow in small streams near their source.

mean temperature at Serowe have been 71.2°F. maximum and 37.6°F. minimum for July (mid-winter), 87.6°F. maximum and 58.1°F. minimum for October (the height of the dry season), and 86.2°F. maximum and 63.3°F. minimum for January (mid-summer, with temperatures over 100°F., but also the rainiest month - at a mean of 3.66 inches over 1930-1965). Source: Bechuanaland. Report for the year 1965 London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966, Table XII, pp.180-181.

10 The Nghabe, which joins the Boteti and Thamalakane to Lake Ngami (Nghabe) is similarly erratic. Frank Debenham Kalahari Sand London: Bell, 1954, p.93.
The modern geography of the Central District is itself a product of its geological and climatic past. It has been remarked that the Kalahari as we find it today has the morphology of a desert (Sahara-type), but neither the climate nor the biology of one. The Kalahari has been a desert on different occasions in the geological past, and could become so again as the result of unpredictable, but relatively slight, changes in the prevailing weather systems in southern Africa.

The pioneer prehistorian and climatologist E.J. Wayland found that Botswana offered unique evidence of Pleistocene climatic changes. Wayland held that the present Botswana plateaux were an end-Tertiary erosion surface, with the remains of geologically-older plateaux above it in the form of hills. This surface is still developing as scarps are cut back and pediments widened. Following Wayland's explanation, the Central District watershed may be seen as the remains of higher plateaux which the pre-modern Limpopo and Makgadikgadi river-systems have helped to reduce.


12 E.J. Wayland to Govt. Sec. (Botswana National Archives - S.406/12/1-2. The work of Wayland (who died in 1966) has been followed up in A.T. Grove 'Landforms and climatic change in the Kalahari and Ngamiland' Geographical Journal (London), Vol.135, Pt.2 (June 1969), pp.191-212.

13 E.J. Wayland Outlines , pp.6-7. But the Makgadikgadi system of internal continental drainage is probably younger than the seaward Limpopo system. It could date, as a 'buckle in the African shield' from the later Miocene and Pliocene crustal movements of the Red Sea/Rift Valley geological fault, before which the Okavango ran to the Zambezi (to which it is still deviously connected). This would explain why diamonds from Orapa, a location presently in the Makgadikgadi system, can be found along the Motloutse tributary of the Limpopo, having been washed there in pre-Miocene times.
It is evident from aerial observation of the Kalahari that there have been a number of periods in the past of dominant wind action, which have blown the sands into new dune patterns later 'fixed' by vegetation.\textsuperscript{14} Wayland further posited a sequence of long arid and shorter wetter climatic regimes during Plio-Pleistocene and Pleistocene times (the recent geological past), which corresponded with the East African scheme of pluvials that he had been largely instrumental in discovering and formulating.\textsuperscript{15} Present Botswana river channels, said Wayland, are no older than 'a very few thousand years; perhaps not so much', only being formed at the modern end of the Pleistocene period.\textsuperscript{16} These channels are rejuvenated versions of older river courses; they expose earlier channels and riverine sediments as they cut deep and narrow into the sand.\textsuperscript{17} Botswana rivers were once perennial; that much can be seen in ancient gravel beds, boulder beds, extinct cataracts, and fossil waterfalls.\textsuperscript{18} It is suggested that when the Makgadikgadi river-system was in spate it filled a great lake of 34,000 square kilometres circling the present salt pans.\textsuperscript{19} However, since it was only 45 metres deep\textsuperscript{20} the Great Makgadikgadi Lake would have been like the Victoria-Nyanza as described by Wayland - 'a titanic puddle'.\textsuperscript{21} The reduction of the Makgadikgadi from a great lake to a great salt pan could have taken place in a very short period of time. One recalls that under modern Botswana climatic conditions surface water may be expected to reduce itself up to 80 per cent every year through evaporation.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{14} A.T. Grove 'Landforms', plates VI - Xb.


\textsuperscript{16} E.J. Wayland Outlines, p.43.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid p.7.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid p.7.
The above serves to illustrate the dramatic and unpredictable nature of the effects of cycles of wetter and drier climatic conditions in Botswana - effects which are apparent within every year and every man's life time. Marginal climatic variations can radically alter patterns of human and animal ecology; they can even become a factor in determining human morale. The driest and dustiest month, October, is known (in popular mythology at least) for suicides. And Biblical translators chose the Setswana word boitshepho for 'holiness', as it evokes the moist but fresh feeling when rain has just fallen, that rain can almost suddenly turn sunburnt pasturage to a vivid green. The conditions of Botswana as a whole, a thirstland where water supplies are the key factor always, are marginal for human occupation.

20 Ibid
21 E.J. Wayland Outlines, P.28n.
Chapter 1: THE NGWATO STATE FROM KGARI TO KHAMÀ, c.1817-75

'Khari is the chief whose name is most cherished among the Bamangwato. Brave in the field, wise in the council, kind to his vassals, Khari was all that Bechuanas desire their Chief to be. Under his sway the Bamangwato acquired great influence. The Makalaka sent presents or tribute of hoes from distant villages; even some outlying towns of the Mashona, whose country the Matabele now inhabit, were glad partially to own the sway of this chief......'

One may credit Kgari with being the historical progenitor of the Ngwato 'state idea'. It was the memory of his example that inspired Khama, and was therefore a major ideological link between the pre-Difaqane 'later Iron Age chiefdom' of the Ngwato and the post-Difaqane Ngwato state. Khama justified his northern expansion over the Kalanga by reference to Kgari, and both he and his father (Sekgoma I, son of Kgari) consciously built on the structural basis of government laid by Kgari. "How should I answer to Kgari", said Sekgoma I when king, "if I changed the customs of the town?"

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Kgari's contribution to the system of Ngwato government was to create, designate, or rationalise a system of socio-political stratification which enabled the monarchy to extend its political power over a scattered population in a large territory, while consolidating its authority within the nuclear community by a support structure of administration. By appointing batlhanka


2 Khama in C.5524, p.67.

3 J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.397. 'Town' may be a translation of motse (otherwise 'village') or of morafhe (otherwise 'nation'). Anyway in this context it is an equation with 'state', because of Tswana state nucleation on the capital town. William Charles Baldwin (African Hunting from Natal to the Zambesi... London: Richard Bentley, 1863, pp.290, 293 & 294) used 'Bamangwato State' as a synonym for the capital town. It was customary to refer to both capital and state as 'Gamangwato' (Ga-Ma-Ngwato) or 'Mangwato'. Cf. Edward O. Tabler The Far Interior... Capetown: Balkema, 1955, p.13 ff, re. the 'state of Mangwato'.

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baga Kgari, hereditary custodians of the royal (or state) cattle, whose descendants proudly held to that title (morwa Kgari), four political (even economic) classes were delineated on the basis of existing social/cultural distinctions. It was not revolution in government but evolution, a system of authority pushed into realisation by the extended power of a dynamic monarch, which accounts for why 'some informants said it (the system) was earlier in origin, and that Kgari's name became attached to it merely because he was a much loved chief, whom it was considered a high honour to serve.'

The same system, which may be called the kgamelo (milk-pail) system, also developed among the Tawana of Ngamiland in the reign of Mogalakwe (c.1830-47): this was not necessarily diffusion from the Ngwato, but the response of brother-chiefdoms to similar circumstances - the Tawana and the Ngwato, to whom the kgamelo system was exclusive, were the only Tswana states which incorporated a majority population of alien political, cultural, even 'racial' origin.

What was the kgamelo system? Simon Ratshosa in 1926 described it as a consolidation of Kgari's conquest or domination of subject-peoples, and a way of playing off commoner headmen against the royalty who otherwise (see the troubles of Mathiba and Kgama I) threatened the Kgosi's position - 'a new feudal system' (sic). Kgari created certain headmen his 'servants' (batlhanka) or batshwari-ba-kgamelo by entrusting to them the royal cattle that were confiscated from the conquered or refugee alien communities (baagedi or bafaladi), or collected through


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judicial fines or as 'waifs and strays' (matimela). Together with these royal or kgamelo cattle, which the batlhanka held in trust or fief, were distributed Sarwa (Bushmen) herds in a form of serfdom as property.

'Kgari introduced this system to keep order in the tribe and also to protect himself against aggressions, riots, civil wars, which might be made by the brothers of the ruling sovereign.

It is binding between the Chief and the headmen who are in possession of the tribal cattle, that in case of any dispute made by any of the Chief's brothers they must always be ready to support the Chief.

These headmen as long as they are loyal and obey the orders of the Chief are entitled to retain the tribal cattle and the Masarwa for life; and should they become disloyal, the cattle and the Masarwa will all at once be confiscated and be given to the next of kin.'

So the kgamelo system was thereafter hereditary. It divided the men (and their families) of the Bamangwato into four classes - dikgosana (royalty, brothers and uncles of the monarch), batlhanka (commoner headmen of the wards recognised as true-Ngwato), bafaladi (aliens under their own non-batlhanka headmen), and malata (Sarwa, Kgalagadi, and some 'Tswapong', acephalous without headmen). Together with the division of the Bamangwato into four sections (Ditimamodimo; Basimane; Maaloso; and Maalosa-a-Ngwana) formed in the reigns of four previous chiefs, the class-system (divided 'vertically' into wards and 'horizontally' into age-regiments) was to become the administrative/judicial and economic pyramid of the Ngwato state-system forged after Difaqane by Kgosi Sekgoma I.

5 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.80.

6 Simon Ratshosa 'Discolosing some of the serious facts for the first time to the Administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate how the Masarwa became slaves and why the Chief's word is law.' (Mss) in R.C. Mafeking to H.C., 21 Aug. 1926 - B.N.A.-S 43/7.

7 See below Chapter 2, Note 73 ff; Schapera 'The Political Organization of the Ngwato', pp.57-62.
The historical continuity between the chiefdom of Kgari and the state of Sekgoma was ideological rather than structural, since the government was shattered and the people dispersed by Difaqane. Difaqane marks a divide in historiography between what are here characterised as 'later Iron Age chiefdoms' and the 'post-Difaqane states' which in their turn were, in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, reduced to Native Reserves under colonialism.

Difaqane is the historiographical base for existing historical studies of central southern Africa, before which period the main historical patterns are unclear and after which literate contemporaneous sources come into play. Botswana is comparatively well covered by current and prospective historical research into the post-Difaqane years of the nineteenth century therefore this dissertation proceeds in less detail on the Bamangwato history from the Difaqane to British colonial rule. 8 What one might call the 'African dialectic' of history, ignored or underestimated or unknown in existing historiography, continued under and adapted to the so much better known 'European dialectic' in the form of colonial rule. Tensions within the Ngwato state, the importance of ethnic diversity among the Bamangwato, the character and career of Khama - all these cannot be explained merely as response to the 'Cs' of European intrusion: Colonialism, Capitalism, and Christianity. This is particularly

so in an African state which survived, and indeed benefitted from (since it was capable of adaption and indigenous development) the new political, economic, and religious circumstances that were so overwhelming in the rest of southern Africa. Of course the roles of caprice and of dynamic leadership must be recognised, but in their proper context. The time-depth of the two introductory Chapters should enable us to appreciate better the structures and on-going processes involved, and to be able to better differentiate innovation and continuity.

The first wave of Difaqane, an attack by the Kololo (Patsa-Fokeng) of Sebetwane, hit the Ngwato chiefdom of Kgari at Serowe in the mid-1820s. Kgari's chiefdom began to assume one of the characteristics of the later states of the post-Difaqane fringe, for as well as incorporating or subduing outlying non-Tswana peoples, he attracted Tswana refugees (including young Sechele of the Kwen) to his capital. But such power was restricted to Serowe and the north: the Kaa of the Shoshong hills, it seems, remained effectively independent. But the Serowe settlement was destroyed in a second Kololo attack and Kgari fled to shelter in the Khutswe hills in 1826 or 1828. In the chain reaction that had been started by the Zulu of Shaka, Kgari and the Ngwato themselves became marauders in their search for food and security. Kgari may have gone quickly as far north as the Zambezi before doubling-back: certainly he invaded VuKalanga and was killed at the 'Flodden of the Bangwato' in a Matopo hills valley. Though Khama later claimed authority as far north as Mangwe in the Matopos on the legitimate basis of Kgari's subjugation of the Kalanga that far, it would seem to have been

9 See Edwin W. Smith 'Sebetwane and the Makololo' (also Appendix A, pp.267-410, in E.W. Smith Great Lion) African Studies, Vol.15 No.2 (1956), p.61. The Kololo were in the Lefhurutshe and Kwen areas 1923-6. The Kololo were the third group of Tebele (Setswana, marauders) to hit the Kweneng - after those led by Legogwane and Phatane, and before the group led by Mzilikazi who adopted the 'MaTebele' (commonly spelt 'Matabele') Setswana name to Nguni form as AmaNdebele - Interview of W.C. Willoughby with MmaKgama (daughter of Legwale, born about 1833), Kweneng, 9 September 1915 (W.C.W./S.O.-No.739). There is a mark in the modern Serowe Kgotla where Kgari lived - T.P. Sebina interview, para 16.
no more than a raid by a brave Difagane battle-leader for corn and cattle.  

There followed the dispersal of the Ngwato, the invasion of the Kololo en masse and the setting up of a Kololo chiefdom resident in Boteti for maybe five years. After disputes and the regency of Sedimo among the Ngwato remanant, it was the young Sekgoma, a son of Kgari, who regrouped the chiefdom. In 1834 or 5 Sekgoma established himself as Kgosi in a war of succession by defeating MmaKgama II, his father's senior widow who wished to be regent until her son Macheng came of age. Having fled with Macheng to the Kwena in the south, Sekgoma then had to stave off the challenge of dikgosana from his own 'house' of Kgari's inheritance - his brothers Phetu and Bathoeng (a Kgari) were eliminated. Having secured himself dynastically among the Ngwato in the Khutswe hills, Sekgoma extended the power of the chiefdom outwards. The road to Boteti west of the Tswapong hills was already under his control, but the south was resistant. Sekgoma established an economic/tributary link with the Phaleng by marrying two of their chief's daughters. The Kaa in the Tswapong hills refused to (at least fully) submit. It was over the matter of cattle in tribute from the Kaa under chief Suwe that the Ngwato under Sekgoma came into conflict with the Ndebele of Mzilikazi. Having themselves been squeezed out of Lefhurutshe by Boer, Griqua, and other pressures, the Ndebele attacked the Ngwato and drove them out of the Khutswe.


11 E.W. Smith 'Sebetwane', p.61; T.P. Sebina interview, para 16; T.L. Kgosi interview, para 43; Mocwakhumo Kgositints mss. in B.N.A.-B.P.33/1016.

12 The dating and historiography of this period is most uncertain. Edwin Smith favoured 1829-1834 for the Boteti chiefdom of the Kololo - 'Sebetwane', pp.65-6. The history of Kololo migration and state-building from the Orange Free State through Botswana and Namibia to Zambia has yet to be adequately studied.

13 MmaKgama was Kgari's second wife: his first was barren. Sekgoma's mother was third wife. Macheng's conception was after Kgari's death by Sedimo 'for' his dead brother under the levirate. I. Schapera Praise Poems, pp.191 & 193. Sekgoma had himself been captured by the Kololo, but had escaped at Mabebe
hills (1837/8), whence again proceeded to Paje and beyond up the Boteti road north of Serowe. This main Ndebele section, under Mzilikazi himself, proceeded north almost to the Zambezi, 'recruiting' conscripts and cattle on the way, before turning back to re-join a subsidiary section under 'Kuruman' at Bulawayo - who had proceeded there independently from Lefhurutshe through what is now the Northern Transvaal. It was not until about 1840 therefore that the Ngwato chiefdom, relocated in the Shoshong hills, was able to begin again the process of 'reconstruction'. Sekgoma had been 'invited' back as protector of the peoples of the Shoshong hills from the Ndebele - by the Talaote (Tswapong-Kalanga) there at least, maybe even by the Kaa. Sekgoma's paramountcy was limited since for some years the Ndebele extracted annual involuntary tribute by cattle-raids. In 1842 the Ndebele even penetrated south of the Serurume plains again, far south of Shoshong, to raid the Kwena - carrying off the young fugitive Macheng and impressing him as a warrior.17

At this stage rather than territorial expansion, the Ngwato nuclear village of Shoshong was being expanded into a Bamangwato town by refugee groups who either joined other wards or were recognised in their own.18 The incorporation of these new aliens facilitated the extension of the batlhanka system, and: 'The flexibility of the Ngwato ward system, which allowed each people to be ruled according to their own customs, at least on the local level, facilitated absorption.'19 The ward system

as the Kololo moved north to the Chobe. - J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.359.

14 A. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.118. This challenge may have followed rather than preceded the Ndebele onslaught of 1837/8 - C.F. I. Schapera (ed.) Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence, p.39 (re.1842).

15 A. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.118-9; A. Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.83.


by providing immediate incorporation into the larger state structure but balancing it with the retention of individual group peculiarities provided a stable framework - so long as there was a firm but perceptive kingship to hold the town together - for state development within the limits of the land-use system whereby the town population utilized concentric zones of cultivation (nearest town), pastoralism, and hunting. It promoted the political identification of the town inhabitants as 'Bamangwato', and by assimilation the levelling out of cultural differences. Thus the SeNgwato dialect is basically SeKwena but greatly modified by other Central District dialects and languages. The success of Sekgoma's state building out of Difaqane could already be seen in 1842, David Livingstone remarking of Shoshong:

'Sekoni has a large number of people under him. In the town alone I numbered 600 houses, which is a number considerably larger than I have been able to count in any other Bechuana town in the country.'

Though the Ndebele swept through the Shoshong hills in 1842, Ngwato power under Sekgoma began to re-assert its independence. The story is that the Bamangwato used to cower in the hills when the Ndebele took their annual tribute by force, until one day an unnamed Ngwato warrior aroused his fellows and attacked the Ndebele. Thereafter Mzilikazi, whose lines of communication from the north were tenuously stretched and who may have looked more avariciously to his east, resorted to diplomatic methods to assert his authority and exact tribute from Sekgoma. But in about 1844 when Mzilikazi sent his envoys for tribute, Sekgoma had them all put to death as an act of extreme defiance and Mzilikazi did not react. An Ndebele army did not reach Shoshong until nineteen years later when Mzilikazi himself was feeling

18 See I. Schapera Ethnic Composition for a very valuable guide to the multiplicity of Bamangwato wards (pp.67-84) though it is not always clear when and where such groups joined, and whether their joining was always as voluntary as supposed by Ngwato ruling class historians. C.f. J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.393, on tshwaragana moshwang.

19 T. Tlou Melao vaga Kgama, p.20.

20 T.L. Kgosi interview & T.P. Sebina interview, passim.

21 I. Schapera (ed.) Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence,
threatened by Sekgoma. But one great bar to the integrity of the Ngwato chiefdom in its Shoshong hills core-area remained - the Kaa. In 1842 the Kaa village 25 miles south-east had had 250 households to the 600 of the Bamangwato town (plus 200 of the Talaote village), but was situated on impregnable crags. In 1849 Sekgoma succeeded in expelling the Kaa - who fled south to Sechele (Botshabelo: the Refuge, of 'Transvaal' peoples from the Boers) king of the Kwena, and arrived at his new capital of Kolobeng on May 3rd, 1849.

Thus the achievement of Ngwato state sovereignty may be dated from 1849. The Ngwato state developed parallel and closely connected to its brother kingdom - the Kgabo-Kwena of Sechele now established to the south of the Serurume plains in the Kweneng District. Even before its 1849 consolidation in the Shoshong hills, the Ngwato state was extending its power northwards. In 1848 Sekgoma, whose kingdom already encompassed the Boteti road through Serowe and Paje to the Makgadikgadi, secured control of the eastern Central District midlands as far as the tsetse-belt by attacking and subduing the Malete who controlled the Tshweneng and southern Tswapong hills. This would have meant control of an important iron-producing area. But the Seleka of Ngwapa hill, fast within the tsetse-belt, remained independent. In 1850 the new age-regiment of Mafolosa, under Sekgoma's young son Khama (later Khama III), was initiated and sent to be blooded in an expedition against the Birwa of chief Makhura. This may be taken to have extended the outer zone


of Ngwato state power to the Motloutse plains. In 1854 another Bamangwato age-regiment, the Matsosa under Kgama and Mphoeng, was initiated, and might have been sent north to the Motloutse plains. In the same year Robert Moffat, travelling north through the Ngwato domain, called the Shashe river on the northern flank of the Motloutse plains 'the Rubicon into Moselekatse's domains'. But there is no reason to believe that at that stage Sekgoma's power ended lineally where Mzilikazi's began. However in 1857 the young Khama's forced submission of 'Kalaka' in the north into tribute to the Ngwato state so much aroused Mzilikazi's ire, that the Bamangwato fully expected an Ndebele attack. Sekgoma I had - inspired as he was by Kgari's example - revived his father's claims to rule western VuKalanga which the Ndebele now regarded (with other Shona land) as their property.

The Ndebele threat to the Ngwato state abated. In 1857 Robert Moffat, a friend of both Sechele and Mzilikazi, visited the latter on Sechele's instructions and arranged that Mzilikazi should release Macheng to become the rightful king of the Ngwato royal house. Sekgoma bowed before the conspiracy of his powerful northern and southern neighbours, and with bad grace gave up his seat in Kgotla to the younger but more 'senior' Macheng. Sechele had a strong ally in the Ngwato court, Tshukudu, and arranged great pomp for the reception of the 'lost' king. But once Macheng was in power, the Ndebele/Kwena consensus dissolved. Macheng, who had been schooled as an Ndebele in allegiance to Mzilikazi, reformed the Ngwato state along Ndebele lines. The headmen were removed from their

25 I. Schapera Praise Poems, p.206n (Schapera says chief Makhura was on the Motloutse); J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.361. Mackenzie mentions only the Birwa of Maunatlala joining the Bamangwato in the 1844-1863 period. The village of Maunatlala is now on the northern side of the Tswapong: but in the mid-nineteenth century most likely those Birwa were at Shoshong itself - I. Schapera Ethnic Composition, p.76.

26 I. Schapera Praise Poems, p.209n.

27 C. Northcott Robert Moffat, p.224

28 C. Northcott Robert Moffat, p.262. The 'Kalaka' may have been Kalanga or even Birwa.
consultative role in government. And when one headman protested against monarchical autonomy not only in government but in control and ownership of all property, he was executed without trial. This alienated the vital support of Tshukudu. Sechele, anxious to have not a weak but a strong buffer state between his own and that of the Ndebele, sent an army to topple Macheng and made Sekgoma king again. Thereafter, until the final accession of Khama III, though the Ngwato kingdom showed a strong front to the Ndebele kingdom in the north it was for twenty years susceptible to the king-making intrigues of Sechele from the south. The strength of the Kwena kingdom itself buffered the Ngwato kingdom until the late 1860s against the expansion of the Afrikaner clans or chiefdoms and the Transvaal state.

The frontier frictions of the Ngwato state re-emerged after the deposition of the king Macheng in 1859. By fleeing to the Gananwa of Lerala, Macheng exacerbated the problem of the population (like the Seleka) of the fly-belt east of the Tswapong. Failing to attract Mzilikazi's aid, Bamangwato troops reduced those Gananwa and Macheng fled again - this time to Sechele's! Bolstering his northern claims Sekgoma I in his second reign cultivated relations with Talaote beyond the Ramakwebane river and advanced his cattle-posts to the Motloutse river - so that Mzilikazi was told that he could hear the cattle if he listened hard enough. And Sekgoma's 'impudence' had stretched relations with Sechele to near war by 1862. In 1863 the last great Ndebele attack on the Bamangwato materialised. The story, from the original account of John Mackenzie, has often been told. For it was the occasion when Khama emerged as a character of Ngwato history, the brave battle-

29 J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.359
30 C. Northcott Robert Moffat, pp.250-7
31 J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, pp.361-3; T. Tlou 'Melao yaga Kgama', p.34. It is not clear whether the disenfranchised headmen were dikgosana or batlhanka: Tshukudu himself was a senior kgosana.
leader, who even grazed the neck of young Lobengula (who respectfully never forgot it) with his bullet.\(^{37}\) The military encounters in the open were indecisive - a small mounted Ngwato commando holding its own against Ndebele numbers by its mobility and fire-power. Except in cattle taken from the Bamangwato, the Ndebele expedition under Mangwane was a military and political failure. It did not destroy Ngwato military might. Far from reducing Sekgoma to acceptance of the raid as just exaction of tribute, it provoked him to send men two weeks behind the northward Ndebele withdrawal to close up to the old frontier and raid Ndebele cattle-posts while the enemy army was engaged in the far north-west.\(^{38}\) When the Kwena eventually attacked Shoshong unsuccessfully in the following year, Sekgoma laughed off Sechele's ambitions on the Ngwato state as small-feed by comparison with an Ndebele raid or a Boer 'protectorate'.

'The Bakwena taking the precedence of the Bamangwato as to rank, it has been the life-long endeavour of Sechele to obtain such influence in the town of the Bamangwato as would enable him to secure some of the treasures of ivory and ostrich feathers and furs which are brought from its extensive hunting grounds, extending northwards to the Zambese.'

In those words John Mackenzie, a perceptive contemporaneous observer and Shoshong resident missionary, imputed an economic motive to Sechele's attempts to reduce the Ngwato state to clientship.\(^{40}\) It is a motive which explains the sequence of


33 When Marico Boers sacked Dimawe and Kolobeng in 1852, it was with difficulty that Sekgoma restrained himself from executing 20 Boer travellers at Shoshong. James Chapman Travels in the Interior of South Africa... London: Bell & Daldy, 1868, Voi.1, p.112.

34 I. Schapera Praise Poems, pp.194n & 213n; J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.363.


the pecking-order of post-Difaqane states in central southern Africa - the Griqua/Afrikaner states onto the Kwena, and the Kwena onto the Ngwato; the Ngwato state onto those of the Tawana and Lozi and (successfully with British paramountcy) onto the Ndebele state. Though the long-distance hunting trade, its professional pioneer being Roualeyn Gordon Cumming of Altyre, reached Bamangwato country in the late 1840s, its hub had been Sechele's town - the advance base of the Potchefstroom (for Port Elizabeth) and Kuruman (for Capetown) emporiums. But in the 1860s Shoshong was developing into an independent base for the hunting trade, and in the 1870s became the main emporium of long-distance trade from the Cape and Natal for the whole of the 'Zambesian' region. It should be recalled that prior to the 'opening up' of East Africa the voracious nineteenth century ivory trade (cutlery handles, piano keys, etc.) obtained its imports from southern Africa. This trade had reached as far north and west as Botswana in the 1840s, and did not begin to exhaust the area's elephant herds until the 1860s. The


38 Ibid, pp.285-91

39 Ibid, pp.404-6

40 Ibid, p.361

first hunter-traders, like Gordon Cumming, made irregular trips and slaughtered great numbers of animals at risk of life but for great profit.\textsuperscript{42} But the trade regularised itself.

\textsuperscript{42} Early hunter-traders supplying the coastal market with ivory included Sam Edwards (son of an ex-L.M.S. missionary), J.H. (sic) Wilson (who married Sechele's daughter and made £500 profit in ivory from Livingstone's first trip to Lake Ngami), and George Fleming (West Indian ex-slave) - see E.C. Tabler Pioneers, for further details and references. Earlier travellers - Eurafrican and European from the coast were adventurers rather than businessmen backed by sufficient capital, infrastructure, and firepower. The first named character is Coenrad de Buis: see - A. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.162; J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton Road to the North, Index; Schapera Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence, p.38n (citing Anna Schoeman Coenraad de Buys Pretoria: 1928); J.Du Plessis A History of Christian Missions in South Africa London: Longmans, 1911, p.285; W.C. Willoughby 'The first white man in Khama's country' in W.C.W./S.O.-No.795; 'In Khama's Country... by a British Official' Monthly Review (London), Vol.7 (June 1902), pp.115-6. A man called 'Kgowe' (the peeled one, referring to the red rawness of his skin) the mythical first European, whose name was adopted by the Tswana for all 'Europeans' (MaKgowa) may have preceded Buis - P.M. Sebina 'The Lost City' in B.N.A.-S.312/5; P.R. Kirby (ed.) The Diary of Dr. Andrew Smith, Vol.2, p.219. The term MaKgowa now excludes Boer/Griqua (MaBuru) of which Buis was one, but Kgowe is said to have left a son with the Ngwato called Mmegale, and Livingstone met a son of Buis at GamaNgwato - P.M. Sebina ibid; Schapera Missionary Correspondence, p.38n. For Doctor Cowan and Lieutenant Donovan who perished on the Limpopo post - 1801, see - A. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.9, 106 & 134; P.R. Kirby ibid, Vol.1, p.406n; note from 'Wookey Papers' in W.C.W./S.O.-No.740. Edwards, father of Sam, the missionary who became a 'hoary headed infidel', traded from the early 1800s - A. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.135; Hugh Marshall Hole The Making of Rhodesia London: Macmillan, 1926, p.21; Schapera (ed.) on David Livingstone omnia opera, index re. Edwards & Mabotsa. Itinerant small traders in the 1830s included Tswana - e.g. Baba (P.R. Kirby ibid, vol.2, p.163n). For David Hume the trader, cf. P.R. Kirby ibid, vol.1, p.289n; H.M. Hole The Passing of the Black Kings London: Philip Allan, 1932, p.112.
States and chiefdoms competed for better hunting lands and for control of initial marketing in their capitals; regular waggon routes and trading communities established themselves between and in Tswana capitals. The economic foundations of the central institutions of the states were strengthened. The king at the centre of town and territory would provide hunter-traders with teams of hunters (usually of the balala/malata servile class) or employed them himself; anyway he taxed the hunter-traders (taking the 'ground tusk', etc.), and the actual hunters in employ would be paid in arms and ammunition with which to improve their efficiency. Small settlements of traders and waggoners - Scots, Griqua, Boer, Tlhaping, and English - materialised as wards of Tswana towns, most of them on a seasonal or transitory basis but some permanently. Tswana kings took their toll of the trade in hunting produce (ivory, ostrich feathers, and furs), in firearms and horses, and in cash which provided for the redistribution of wealth from the head of state in hospitality, ironware, clothing, ploughs, wagons etc. Dikgosana families which employed their own balala hunters similarly profited, though taxed by the king. Among the Bamangwato some wards such as the Talaote and Khurutshe came to specialise in waggon-transport, leasing (go fhisa) their waggon from their chief (ward-head) or the king. As the hunting arena slipped further north, Sechel came to keep it within his control and profit by political (even religious through the 1862 Lutheran mission to Shoshong?) domination of the Ngwato state. He eventually failed. Sekgoma - see his relations with Livingstone - competed with Sechel but barely won through. The mantle of Sechel fell on Khama who in turn struggled to maintain his capital as the emporium of the north, and through the trade/tribute network expanded his state's power through sparsely populated hunting lands to the doorsteps of other states. By 1870 the trade frontier from the south had crossed into the Ndebele, Lozi, and Tswana kingdoms.

43 Q.N. Parsons 'Game preservation - is it "alien science" bestowed by Europeans?' Kutlwano, Vol.8, No.3 (March 1969), pp.10-11; Q.N. Parsons 'Khama the Great strengthened the customary control over game hunting' Kutlwano, Vol.8, No.4 (April 1969), pp.2-3 & 7; Schapera (ed.) Livingstone's Missionary Travels, pp.155 & 179; H.M. Hole Black Kings, p.65; E.C. Tabler
By 1860 elephants, which Cumming had found not far north of Shoshong in 1864, were all but shot out in the Central District, only to be found in the Limpopo fly-belt and the most northerly reaches. But until the setting up of independent white settlements (in the Ngwato/Ndebele and Ngwato/Lozi shatter-zones at Tati and Pandamatenga in 1869/70), and the accession of Lobengula (1870) amenable to whites in the Ndebele kingdom, Shoshong was unchallenged as the emporium of the south for the 'Zambesian' trade of the north in the southern African sub-continent. Shoshong was 'the largest, most prosperous, and hence best-armed town in the interior.' Its population in 1866 included a community of 42 whites (including 6 women and 13 children) among a total estimated to be in excess of 30,000 people.44 In the 1870s Shoshong maintained its commercial predominance in the ivory trade of the interior. But despite the Ngwato kings' insistence that alien traders and waggoners passed through and reported at, and preferably resided in, Shoshong, the Ngwato state economy's growth was dwarfed by that of the trade that passed through its capital without much profit to it. The Kgolata of the king was replaced by permanent white stores as the marketplace, and the ultimate control of the economy by coastal and overseas capitalism became more apparent. Though the condition of residence at Shoshong was always that traders should 'obey all the laws of the Chief' in relation to the rest of town and state, the white ward of Shoshong (a ward with its own kgolata for disputes) was virtually autonomous. In 1877 it was reckoned that 75 tons of ivory (from 12,000 elephants) passed through the hands of Shoshong merchants. A high estimate of the Zambesian ivory trade that passed through Shoshong has put its worth (at overseas prices?) at £200,000 a year in the 1870s and 1880s. Shoshong traders estimated the general trade through the Ngwato kingdom at £55,000 for 1877 - but Khama's


'personal' income for that year was put at £2-3,000 cash-equivalent. With the increase of African consumer demands and livestock sale in the north, and the growth of white settler numbers and demands for labour and foodstuffs in the south, Shoshong's commercial predominance was diversified and strengthened. Shoshong stood at the cross-roads of roads from the Kimberley and the Transvaal, and from Ngamiland, the Zambezi and Chobe, and Matabeleland/Mashonaland. It dominated the bottle-neck or 'bowling alley' between the Kalahari thirstland and the Limpopo tsetse-belt that became known as 'the Road to the North'. And the (white) South's interest in the (black) North was growing apace. In 1874 the first highly capitalised general dealer, the 'notable and sometimes naughty firm of William C. Francis and Richard Clarke', was established at Shoshong.

reformer and innovator' Bot. Not. & Rec., Vol. 2 (1970), p.102. Of course the 30,000 (today Serowe is 37,000) fluctuated seasonally (cf. E.C. Tabler The Far Interior, p.19) and according to water supplies and political stability - dropping after 1874 maybe as low as 3,000 in occupation at one time.

45 E.C. Tabler Far Interior, p.20; J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton Road to the North, p.153; Earl.Pap. C.2220 (vol.LII of 1878-9) pp.259 & 237. A paper read in 1868 gave Natal/Cape exports as £40,000 p.a. in ivory, and trade with Africans beyond colonial borders in other commodities was guessed at £47,000 worth in ostrich feathers, £10,000 in hides and skins, and £100,000 in cattle and smallstock - Archibald Hamilton 'On the trade with the coloured races of Africa' Journal of the Statistical Society of London, Vol. 3 (March 1868), p.33.

Though long-distance trade enhanced the economic patronage and control infrastructure of the Ngwato state, new administrative problems (and the desirability for new administrative machinery) were introduced by the interpenetration of independent-minded aliens, and also by the acquisition of wealth by the dikgosana class. Some Tswana states adapted to the new economic situation better than others. Some kings and dikgosana found Christianity an ethic or 'ideology' of accommodation. Both Sechele I and Khama III, converted Christian kings, in their espousal of capitalist values of accumulation and consumption (at state and personal levels), were independent African confirmations of the 'Protestant ethic'. In Khama's case the faction of like-minded dikgosana and others that he led in his 'revolutionary' youth became, when in power, a Christian state-church.\(^47\) The growth of post-Difaqane states, of which that of the Ngwato was but one, may be seen within the African historical dialectic as the typical expression of a new mode of production - based on long distance trade, and initially of hunting produce for items of advanced technology. But that trade was ultimately the offshoot of a greater, more universal economy, in Europe. In that light the growth of monopoly European control over the extra-subsistence means of production, eventually expressed politically in colonial rule, could be seen as an 'inevitable' development. Finally the economic and strategic importance of Khama's capital on the Road to their North was dissolved almost overnight when his state was leap-frogged by the Cape-Rhodesia railway. It was Khama's genius that he could anticipate and accommodate to such developments. It was good fortune for the Tswana states of Botswana, and nowhere more than Gamangwato, that indigenous 'African' and intrusive 'European' historical processes intertwined gradually rather than met head-on at a critical juncture.

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\(^47\) An outstanding example of adaption to 'modernity' from pre-Difaqane to the present day is offered by a list of the professions of the forebearers of Kgalemang T. Motsete, who founded Botswana's first modern nationalist party in 1961. The original Motsete was a Talate blacksmith in the days of Kgari; his son Maruapula (a member of the 1854 Matsosa) was a transport driver as far as Port Elizabeth (regiment of the Bamangwato); his grandson Tumedisho was a Christian evangelist and then a
1863 saw the beginning of Khama's dissent from his father's policies. Their disagreements before and after the battle of Shoshong appear to have been smoothed over, but in 1865 came confrontation. Khama and four other elder sons of Sekgoma - the nucleus of a young Christian faction - boycotted the initiation ceremonies of the new Maemelwa age-regiment. This action on moral grounds (against circumcision and pagan ceremonial) had revolutionary implications: it undermined the mepatho (age-regiment) system that bound together 'horizontally' all the disparate ethnic groupings of the state. Sekgoma I was greatly mortified; he persuaded Raditladi and Mphoeng to attend - but the other three sons (more senior), Khama, Kgamane, and Seretse, were resolute in opposition. The Ngwato were split asunder into progressive/Christian and conservative/Pagan camps. Khama and Kgamane both refused to take second wives (both having married daughters of Tshukudu, Sechele's old friend), thus undermining the polygamous basis of royal dynasticism. Factionalism erupted into civil war during March and April 1866. Khama was deposed as heir; Tshukudu fled; Khama was reinstated, but Macheng arrived back at Shoshong on Sekgoma's invitation to act as a counter-balance. In May 1866 Sekgoma I proclaimed a condominium with Macheng, and Khama replied, looking at Macheng:

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minister (d.1946); and his great grandson Kgalema (b.1899) was a school principal and party politician - Q.N. Parsons interview with K.T. Motsete (Mahalapye), 23 September 1969, paras 3 & 13-5.

48 J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, pp.411-2 - the Christians did not however want abolition of the age-regiment system (Ibid, pp.375-3). Khama had been introduced to Christianity by an L.M.S. evangelist from Kuruman; attended Lutheran school at Sechele's during his father's exile of 1858/9; and was baptised at Shoshong by a German missionary in 1862 - John Mackenzie arriving as L.M.S. missionary soon afterwards. Sekgoma's attitude to his sons' Christianity before 1865 was one of at least implicit encouragement: 'Perhaps Sekgome hoped to use his sons to acquire the secrets of the Europeans....Sekgoma wished to innovate selectively, and he believed he could regulate innovation, but he could not.' - T. Tlou Malat o ya Kgama, pp.27-8. Marshall Hole (Black Kings, pp.73-5) in 1932 compared the 'new morality' of Khama for Sekgoma to Bolshevism for Hole-shocking.

"I am sorry to see you have come, because I know that only disorder and death can take place when two chiefs sit in one kotla." Turning to his people, he said, "I wish all the Bamangwato to know that I renounce all pretensions to the chieftainship of the Bamangwato. Here are two chiefs already; I refuse to be called the third, as some of you have mockingly styled me. My kingdom consists in my gun, my horses, and my waggon." ⁵⁰

Macheng, the senior in precedence, in turn ousted Sekgoma, and during his second reign (1866-1872) southern Africa's first 'gold rush' occurred through his territory to Tati in the Ndebele/Ngwato shatter-zone. John Mackenzie, the political-minded Scot who meanwhile was building up a Bamangwato national church (with a 500-seat building), persuaded Macheng to appeal for British support against Boer threats of a Transvaal 'protectorate' (in fact, impracticable) over his country and the goldfields in 1868. ⁵¹ Mackenzie developed ideas of British dominion over the Road to the North on which he was to devote nearly two decades of campaigning in South Africa and England. ⁵² Macheng involved himself in the Ndebele succession dispute that followed Mzilikazi's death, giving material assistance to Kanda-Kuruman the (remotely) British-backed candidate who lost out to Lobengula. This provoked the disapproval of Khama, whom Macheng

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⁵⁰ Ibid, p.446

⁵¹ Macheng to Sir P.E. Woodhouse (Governor, Capetown), 29 March 1868: P.R.O.-C.O. 48/441 (I owe this reference to Mr. Richard Moyer); J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, pp.453-8; W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, pp.123-5; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.40-1. Macheng claimed the 'Shashe district' in which the gold was found was his, but neither Ngwato nor Ndebele proved to have effective control of the goldfields themselves, only of access. Cf. E.C. Tabler omnia opera; M'Intosh Notes, p.97; A. Brodick (pseud., Bamang-Wato) To Ophir Direct: or, the South African Gold Fields... London: Edward Stanford, 1868, p.11.

had allowed to stay at Shoshong in admiration of his spirit or security of Ngwato support. Sekgoma away in exile (at Kanye, not Sechele's this time), Khama and even the Christian church became the rallying point against the Ndebele-type despotism of King Macheng. As early as Christmas of 1868 a traveller noted: 'Khama therefore, as opposed to such innovation, was favoured by the people.' Apart from his lack of wisdom and sensitivity in judicial and administrative cases, Macheng alienated the batlhanke class (as Sekgoma had done making them amenable to his deposition) by squandering the state cattle in their trust and usufruct. Aware of Khama's rising popularity, Macheng tried to poison Khama, but - so the story goes - was foiled when a white trader gave him marking ink instead of strychnine to put in the coffee that Mrs. Macheng would sociably offer Khama. When the plot failed, Macheng turned on the whole Christian faction (abolishing Sabbath observance, not unpopular with 'pagans'), but so doing polarised Bamangwato support behind the Christians against Khama. In August 1872 Macheng (and Raditladi) were turned out of Shoshong by a coup d'état led by Khama with the assistance of a Kwena army under Sechele's eldest son, Sebele. Sekgoma I being reluctant to return from exile to assume the dangerous position of Kgosi for the third time, the headmen of the Bamangwato on Sechele's suggestion elected Khama king. Something of the character, not revealed in missionary accounts, of Khama at this juncture of his career (aged about 38) is caught in a Setswana poem praising his victory over Macheng:


54 M'Intosh Notes, p.102; Khama to H.C., 28 March 1916; B.N.A.-J.9784A.
Whenever fighting is mentioned his heart boils over like hot milk and resembles bush-willow embers, and at night he examines the rifles, seeking the one that shoots best.'

The reforming zeal of the youthful Khama as king of the Bamangwato was to make his first reign (1872-3) a short one. He attempted to put through a Christian revolution of social mores, to subordinate the privileged white community (easier now Tati had failed and the Kimberley diamond boom had taken over), and to establish concord with the Ndebele state. Khama succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Lobengula through the invaluable agency of their respective L.M.S. missionaries. Both new kings needed such security; and their rivals for kingship, Macheng and Kanda-Kuruman, were still in league. Negotiations were complicated by the fact that the Ndebele cattle which Macheng was keeping for Kanda-Kuruman had in turn been taken by the Kwena of Sebele as reward for instating Khama. Though being offered peaceful existence on the one hand, on the other hand the Bamangwato were abruptly reminded of Ndebele power by a frontier incident, for which — of course — Lobengula apologised as being 'unauthorised'.

55 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.4-5; W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, pp.139-41; C.2220, p.236. It was W.C. Francis of 'Francis & Clark' who foiled the plot (W.C.W./S.O. -No.361-2 'Khama's Official Papers' n.144; Khama to L.M.S., 11 April 1890), which explains Khama's later reluctance to expel Francis in 1878 — See Chapter 2, Note 10.

56 Schapera (transl.) Praise Poems, pp.202 (SeTswana) & 205 (English), lines 31-6. It is interesting to note that in the 1872 battle (line 16, pp.202 & 204) Khama employed breech-loading rifles as well as muzzle-loading muskets.

between King Khama and the white ward of Shoshong, liquor was the sparking point. Having consulted Mackenzie on the day before, Khama summoned the whites before him on New Year's Day 1873 to a ward kgotla meeting. He announced the substance of a law he was considering, to ban all liquor sales and importation in the state, and drew an unwelcoming response from the 21 assembled white males. As for the rest of the Bamangwato, Khama was determined to Christianise (in a Protestant way, i.e. to secularise) the grand ngaka (priest-doctor) role of the Kgosi. On the first Sunday following the August 1872 coup Khama held a Christian service in Kgotla. He then came up against his headmen by refusing to lead rain-making ceremonies but conceded that others might do so outside his Kgotla without sacrificing state cattle. And when the rain came and Khama was expected to lead his people to the ploughing lands, a compromise was arrived at. At the traditional letsemma (ploughing service) Khama announced toleration of non-Christian religious practices but complete withdrawal of royal patronage: a Christian service with the 'Old Hundredth' sung in Setswana followed his address.

For the origin of Khama's fanaticism against alcohol, see W.C. Willoughby 'Khama: A Bantu Reformer' International Review of Missions (London), Vol.13 (Jan.1924), p.75; 'Khama's father and the Dutchman's brandy' (ms) in W.C.W./S.O.-No.742. To this author's knowledge the study of the anti-liquor movement outside the U.S.A., such as the Native Races and the Liquor Traffic Committee of London for whom Khama was a saint, has been neglected: the catalogues of the Royal Commonwealth Society give useful bibliographic leads. Khama had turned against alcohol in youth; he saw it as a weapon whereby whites could trick Africans into submission. Liquor became a symbol of over-acculturation to Western mores. In the face of overwhelming technology and force, the quality of African resistance that Khama upheld was one of Mind (his main praise-name was Boikanyo: Determination), and liquor destroyed that Mind. With Mind black statesmen could resist, adapt, and deflect the advancing white tide that Khama appears to have recognised from an early age. His anti-liquor crusade was not merely an expression of Khama's dour Christian puritanism (none of his missionaries were ever so dogmatic); it was a conviction also rooted in 'cultural nationalism'.

W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, pp.145-7

J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.9 & 17-8; W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, pp.143-5
Sensitive to the tensions he had caused, and insecure in his new position, Khama felt obliged to call back his father from exile, and in early 1873 Sekgoma arrived back after six years - careful to avoid his old enemy Sechele on the way.

Sekgoma I's third, and last, reign lasted from 1873 to 1875. Having re-established himself in court circles at Shoshong, he cut off Khama from his inheritance, and recognised his second son Kgamane as heir within five months of arrival. This Sekgoma did by entrusting to Kgamane certain Sarwa herders (serfs), customarily in the right of the heir. 61 Khama's reaction was to split the nation by seceding from the Ngwato kingdom. Taking state or royal cattle that were by right the heir's, Khama withdrew to his Serowe cattle-post (between the hill and Thataganyane rock) in mid-1873. There he attracted round him from Shoshong the 'young men' and Ngwato supporters; Sekgoma at Shoshong generally retaining the 'old men' and Bamangwato subject-peoples. With the Bamangwato divided there were rumours of impending Ndebele brigandage, and so Khama (probably after the early 1874 harvest) withdrew further northwards to Boteti and the Makgadikgadi where he had spent his earliest years. Sekgoma took the opportunity to 'recover' those of Khama's cattle (and women) who were scattered travelling up the waterless Boteti road. Khama returned south to demand their return in March 1874, Sekgoma and Kgamane refused and, after skirmishes, Khama retired. He made a bid for the allegiance of the Shoshong hills subject-peoples but Sekgoma counteracted this. While Khama's people were regrouped in Boteti, Sekgoma was attacked unsuccessfully from the south-east by the two pretenders Macheng and Kanda-Kuruman. In February 1875 Khama and his brother Seretse successfully assaulted Shoshong and ousted their father, who fled. Thus, by deposing his father Khama III became what was to be 48 years (within a month) continuous rule as Kgosi of the Bamangwato. 62

61 Cf. below Chapter 2, note 4, & Chapters 6, 9 & 10

Das Produkt einer wilden Baumwolle vorzüglich, die hier üppig wächst. Anhaltend rechtseiten auch in solchen Teilen des Thales Taufende einzelne Bäume, als auch in Gruppen bis zu zehn Stück auf einem Dornbusche oder auch vereinzelt an einem entblätterten und herabhängenden Astende.

KHAMA BECOMES KING
Chapter 2: KHAMA III ESTABLISHED IN POWER, 1875-91

On achieving power for the second time, Khama judiciously set about shoring up the weaknesses in political support that had made his first rule impracticable. He did so by extending legal property rights (though land of course remained in state or royal tenure) which had previously been confined to the dikgosana class. He called a pitse (general assembly of adult males, and announced:

"From now on the cattle which are in your possession are your own to do what you like with, never come and ask permission again when you want to kill or dispose of an ox."

Though more precise interpretation was to become a matter of dispute between Khama and his own son, in effect Khama in 1875/6 abolished Ngwato state ownership of livestock and hunting produce for commoner and vassal (but not serf) family or ward heads. In particular this gave economic power to the bahlhanka chiefs of the four Bamangwato 'sections' (ward-clusters) who appear even at this period to have already had territorial responsibilities as overlords of outlying regions of the state though themselves resident in the capital. It is not clear but there may also have been a vestigial fifth 'section', the Sekao, created by Sekgoma for his heir but subsequently withdrawn. Khama himself, much to his son's annoyance, created no more 'sections'; and vested the Sekao ward in his wife Mma-Besi. Khama recognised that the old order whereby all property (except for that of the dikgosana family heads) was on lease from the king's absolute ownership, and therefore all economic transactions had to go through him, mitigated against broader-based economic development in a far-flung state (as opposed to a tight chiefdom) in a capitalist age. As he told a colonial government commission in 1907, 'the wants of the people became so multifarious, that it was more than the Chief could see to.' 2 And in 1916 he put it this way:

2. I. Schapera Ethnic Composition, pp. 77-8; A.C. Francis to R.C., 6 July 1907 (encl. Khama to H.C., 28 March 1916): B.N.A. J.978A.
'I thought a great deal about this treatment, all the time before I succeeded to the Chieftainship, and considered it as unjust and interfering with the freedom of the people. Therefore, upon becoming Chief I renounced the right to accept any tribute from these tribes, and at the same time declared them free to use their property to their own advantage. These tribes became in the first instance (so) apprehensive of the declaration that at last I had to ask European traders to travel amongst them and sell goods... and eventually I asked these Europeans to establish trading stores amongst them. Now these peoples are wealthy and enjoy the privileges which every man in the country enjoys.'

Khama exaggerated his case forty years afterwards - not all tribute (unless 'ground tusks' etc. are counted tax on earnings) was abolished, property rights were only vested in family heads, and his economic liberalism had had its political reasons.

'This custom also interfered to a very large extent with the people's freedom, and at times when the Chief was not liberal in his dealings with this people a bitter feeling generally existed between himself and his people which resulted in civil wars waged in order to have him deposed.'

The reform also gave Khama personal satisfaction, since:

'During my father's reign I attempted to keep separate from tribal stock certain cattle which I had acquired by barter from European traders and other people. My father objected and took them from me and gave them over to some of the headmen already referred to, as he said it was against the custom of the tribe.'

Having abolished state stock (allowing go fhisa on a national level to atrophy), Khama as king still had to discharge the economic functions expected of kingship at a court level - to be 'a father over the tribe, who is expected to have enough of this world's goods to supply the needs of his children, as it is his duty to support the tribe as a whole or as individuals in times of exigencies or distress occasioned by famine or otherwise.' Khama therefore had to build up the royal (i.e. 'personal' to the king) capital of livestock and cash, so 'I was able to discharge my duties as Chief of the tribe though

very inadequately.' Though regular tribute (until colonial 'Hut Tax') had been abolished, there was royal income from judicial fines, *matimela* ('waifs and strays'), tax on hunting or sale of labour, gifts etc. But the basis of the great Khama family fortune appears to have been from extensive employment of hunters and herders. The capital repository of income from royal hunting produce was in herds of cattle. Sarwa and some Kgalagadi, many or most having previously been economically independent, were kept in servile status modified by the extension of the *go fhisa* relationship to them that had been withdrawn from commoners and vassal peoples. Other dikgosana employed Sarwa hunters and herders in similar fashion. Khama on his accession as king announced that as a Christian his concern included the well-being of the Sarwa; but twentieth century enquiries indicate that, while Khama was the model master, his reforms of Sarwa status and his control of other Ngwato masters were incomplete in execution. He did punish masters for ill-treatment, order them to pay their Sarwa compensation in livestock and to recognise the heritability and legal ownership of Sarwa personal cattle - thus putting the Sarwa within the legal pale of citizenship of the state. As Khama's royal/personal stock grew so did the number of his Sarwa and other employees and the number of the royal cattle-posts at which those employees looked after the cattle in *go fhisa*. Khama 'paid', he said, Sarwa family heads in livestock to which they had personal legal rights; and hunters were paid in guns or livestock. But such payments were small enough to better integrate Sarwa into the royal-capitalist framework rather than to encourage their independence from it. The royal cattle-posts extended for practical and strategic regions into the fartherest hunting out-lands. By visiting all his cattle posts at least annually Khama thereby maintained a personal rule in

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4 File: 'Slavery and Similar Conditions' (contributions of Simon Ratshosa): B.N.A.-S.43/7. I am aware that this dissertation does not treat the subject of Sarwa serfdom, which emerged into the world spotlight after 1926, in any depth. A reference (cited by L. (Mrs. Wyndham) Knight-Bruce 'Khama' Murray Magazine (London), Vol.5, No. 28 (1899), p.461) could not be located on Professor Schapera's behalf by the South African
the most distant reaches of the state, until about 1910 when the exertion became too much for him. Khama was noted for running the royal economy in business-like manner. He became an accomplished livestock-breeder and salesman, especially of 'salted' (supposedly immunised against lung-sickness) trek-oxen and horses. Royal and personal wellbeing were to him indistinguishable: 'I bought my people horses, etc., and to some I sold them; for in other words the Chief has been an easy means by which the people were enabled to obtain from Europeans whatever they required.' His qualities of energy and acumen helped rescue him from the plight in which he put himself by abolishing the state stock system in 1875/6:

'I was left without any personal stock of my own... so far as prosperity was concerned, practically on the same footing as any individual member of the tribe, and like each of them I had to struggle hard for my subsistence; a matter unprecedented in the whole history of our tribe as well as that of the other native tribes in general........' (1916)

Having established himself in power, Khama III turned to the problem of the white community. As before, the immediate point at issue was that of liquor. The Shoshong whites had in general a hard-drinking 'frontier' reputation. On January 1st 1873, Khama had listened to whites' appeals not to ban liquor imports for their 'personal' or 'medicinal' consumption.

Public Library as cited, viz. Frank Johnston's letter on Khama's reform of Sarwa status in Cape Argus (Cape Town), 24 August 1888. And neither Mr. Jackson Mutero Chirenje nor I have yet been able to locate the relevant League of Nations report (cited in I. Schapera The Tswana London: International African Institute, 1953/1968, bibliography. Mr. Chirenje's forthcoming dissertation ('The European Impact on Tswana Society 1850-1910) will, I believe, deal with the subject on a comprehensive basis.

5 Khama to H.C., 28 March 1916: B.N.A.-J.978A.

6 E.C. Tabler omnia opera; A.A. Anderson Twenty Five Years in a Waggon... London: Chapman & Hall, 1888 ed., p.157 - recounting how Macheng in 1868 expelled all whites from Shoshong, temporarily, over a drinking incident.
But in 1875 when he called the whites to assembly, Khama announced a total ban on liquor import and consumption. There was to be no concession to whites, residents or travellers, as an imperium in imperio. Khama put his rule to the test by vowing to subordinate the whites to state control in enforcing his extreme prohibitionist law. The whites rose to the challenge and upon victory lay Khama's prestige not only with them, but also with the Bamangwato whose loyalty to the usurper was tenuous. Khama tried fines and threats to enforce the law and, after a number of incidents and provocations, banishment of offenders. Six months after Khama came to power in 1875 there occurred a notorious incident in the north of his country when a white waggoner, a German called Christoffel Schinderhutte, became crazed with 'Cape Smoke' (trade brandy: inferior wine fortified with tobacco juice) and shot his oxen and his Bamangwato servants. The climax of the liquor question came one Saturday in 1878, at Shoshong, when a drunken group of 'traders' had the audacity to send for Khama (or a harassed wife did) to come and join them; he went, and 'found them with their white shirts stained with blood. Their goods were strewn about the floor, a huge cask of water upset, and everything floating.' After the Sabbath, Khama assembled the whites before him on the cold and overcast Monday, 15th October 1878, and addressed them with a memorable speech recorded by the interpreter on that occasion – James Hepburn, the L.M.S. missionary replacement of Mackenzie. Khama expressed his determination to rule (though he recognised that whites might rule someday); condemned the racialist attitude of his hearers; and, in stunned silence, ordered all the now sobered offenders

7 E.C. Tabler Pioneers, p. 139. J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.143.
8 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.141-5
9 See Q.N. Parsons The Word of Khama Lusaka: Neczam (Historical Association of Zambia, HAZ2), 1972, p.6.
out of the country. Khama, the gentleman with a quiet but confident manner, had proved his mettle as a ruler.

One of the whites ordered out of Gamangwato for the blood-stained shirts incident had grown up in the country, and pleaded unsuccessfully on that basis (though another three's banishments were commuted to a fine). This was possibly Frank Shrigley. If so, his career represents an interesting progression of white status and identity among the Bamangwato. Frank was the son of English parents but had been brought up as a MoNgwato in Shoshong, and as a child he had been a herd-boy allotted to an Ngwato cattle-holding master in customary fashion. He was a Pagan and preferred black company. But the Price missionary family in the 1860s persuaded Frank into rising 'above' blacks to be their natural 'superior and master'. If indeed it was Frank who was expelled in 1878, his career reflects the progression of whites from no special status to that of a ward and finally to a measure of segregation in Shoshong. Khama as an individual was known (because of and despite his Christianity) for his warmth towards whites, but in 1875 as king he felt obliged to separate the white community like a canker from the rest of the Shoshong town-plan.

10 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.146-50; 'South Africa - Shoshong' Chronicle of the London Missionary Society (London), Sept. 1880, pp.215-9; C.5524, p.64. C.2220, p.237, states that Khama had 'expelled' 5 whites already before July 1878 for drunken brawling, and often reprimanded the Shoshong traders for riotous living. (See Chapter 1, Note 55). Khama's Country was ever after, until the 1950s, 'dry'. But of course there were infringements of the law - whites in the late 1870s resorted to eau-de-cologne or home-brews: Parker Gillmore The Great Thirst Land... London: Cassell, n.d., pp.425-6.

11 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.149-50


13 T. Tlou Melao Yaga Kgama, p. 30 (re.post-1862)

emphasised his authority over the white resident community by underlining their lack of legal title to property (the stands of stores) and thereby their dependence directly on the Kgosi for security of tenure. The whites he expelled in 1878 were allowed to take their iron roofs but not the clay and wood of the country that had gone into their buildings. In 1876 the law had been clarified by proclamation:

'Whereas it has appeared to me that there has arisen some misapprehension as to the conditions upon which Europeans have been permitted to build upon and occupy ground within my Territories I hereby make known that the law, as heretofore, is that all houses, Kraals, or wells made upon my ground are my property, and held during my pleasure: and that no person is allowed to make or add to any house, Kraal, or well without my permission first had and obtained -'

Given under my hand at Shoshong this seventh day of November 1876.

Khame (signature)
Chief of the Bamangwato.

In formalising the basis of tenure, this move was welcomed by white businesses at Shoshong. The security of Khama's rule reinjected Shoshong's trade boom. Regular postal services developed - 6 runners fortnightly to Zeerust in the Transvaal, and services to Sechele's and the Transvaal. A visitor of 1878 observed of the Shoshong whites:

'They seek their amusement in intellectual pursuits. Their disputes are settled by a collective court formed of and presided over by one of themselves: the award, never hitherto disputed, is made by a majority of voters. Khame is always present to make their proceedings legal, but takes no part in them. The usual native court tries any grave case between the races; the traders are satisfied with its decisions... The (native) law is one of custom, well-defined and understood; for minor offences the punishments are fines and floggings, for grave ones deprivation of all property and banishment; for murder only is capital punishment resorted to; police maintain order in the town.'

15 The top copy of the declaration, on blue paper and signed by Khama, is to be found in W.C.W./S.O.—No.742 (File: 'Khama'). The proclamation was made before 30 assembled whites; and then Khama asked Alex C. Bailie, a labour-recruiter from Kimberley with British official status, to help him draw up deeds of permission of tenure for the traders to sign - G.2220, p.54.
The control of itinerant whites was more difficult. It presented the problem of the integrity of the Ngwato state center's control over its territorial peripheries. Control of whites was ultimately dependent on the policing of Bamangwato regiments, and there were a number of incidents involving Boers on the Transvaal-Tati traverse which crossed into the Central District at Baines Drift. All travellers were required to travel via Shoshong and report to Kgotla. The control of whites and the control of the 'surplus' sector of the economy went hand-in-hand. Khama soon after accession banned all alien professional hunting (by 'traders and Boers') in his kingdom, but 'Khama is happy on personal application to grant permission to any gentleman hunting for sport.' Such a visiting gentleman was Captain Parker Gillmore, 'one who would not desire to eliminate the game', who was allotted a Sarwa hunter-guide and a specified hunting area. Other tourists, like Frederick Barber in 1877 on the southern side of the

The question of water rights was sensitive: in 1875 Khama bought from Francis & Clark the 80-foot deep well they had newly dug for the Shoshong white ward, and charged each household £1-a-month for the use of it - E.C. Tabler Pioneers, p.55.

16 C.2220, p.237 (R.R. Patterson, Shoshong, to Sir Th. Shepstone, July 1878. Mackenzie (Ten Years North, p.375) remarked that even in the case of murder fines were often substituted.

17 See maps in J. Mackenzie Ten Years North: J. Mackenzie Austral Africa, Vol.2 ('Austral Africa' by W. Shawe. English miles 69.15 to a Degree; Kilometres 113.3 to a Degree. Publ. Sampson Low, etc.); Mittheilungen aus Justus Perthe's geographischer anstalt ueber wichtige neue erforschungen auf den Gesammtgebeite der geographie von Dr. A. Petermann (Gotha), Vol. 16, Map 1 ('Originalkarte von K. Mauch's reisen im inneren von sued-Afrika zwischen Potchefstroom und Zambesi, bis 1865 to 1869,' 1:2,000,000); Frederick Jeppe 'Notes on some of the physical and geological features of the Transvaal' Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (London), Vol.47 (1877), pp.217-50 ('Map of the Transvaal and surrounding territories' by F. Jeppe. 1:1,850,000).

18 C.5524 (Vol.LXXV of 1888), pp.52, 55-9, re. Groening, Grotler, Van Zyl, Vermaak, & Greef.

Makgadikgadi, travelling in a game area might be confronted by an armed Bamangwato detachment and be warned to shoot no wildlife by their officer. On a second trip Barber at Shoshong found Khama 'much pleased because we had camped near his house, instead of among the traders' houses, which we had done on the occasion' - and thereby established himself as a man of refinement. 21

Elephant having been all but shot out of the Ngwato kingdom, 22 conservation was concentrated at this stage on ostrich - the feathers of a cock fetching £40-50. There was competition after the late 1870s from ostrich breeders in the south. Khama in 1876 therefore prohibited the capture of chicks for export to the ostrich farms. 23 Shoshong was still the emporium for the North through which Zambezial hunting filtered, but the economic activity of aliens within the Ngwato kingdom itself was restricted to the retail trade. Even at this juncture it appears that the Kgosi regulated the commerce of itinerant traders and peddlars with allotted regions for their activities. 2

It was the flagrant disregard for his law by two Boer hunters, Willem Göring and Antoni Fortman, that brought to a head in 1877 Khama's indignation against Transvaal expansionism into its north-west frontier zone. 25 The Transvaal threat had

21 Tabler (ed) Zambesia and Matabeleland in the Seventies, pp.3 70 & 112.

22 Khama to Lewanika/Coillard, 17 July 1889 (mss. in Library of Royal Commonwealth Society, London) - 'My reason for asking for an Eliphant Hunt on the other side of the River is that I have a son Sekhome who has never seen Eliphants and it is for his sake that I ask for a hunt that he may see them in large numbers.' James Fairbairn a trader of Bulawayo remarked of Zambesia in 189 'I came to this country, a lad, in 1872, trading for ivory and feathers, and I have seen many changes since then. We hardly ever see any ivory now, and the ostriches are nearly all shot.' - Extracts from his diary in Times (London), 19 Dec., 1895, p.5.
more fully materialised in the year before - provoking Lobengula's protest to the Z.A.R. (South African Republic, i.e. Transvaal) President in April 1876. 26 But such expansionism to west of the Marico can be seen as early as the 1852 Boer raid on Kolobeng, and (unsuccessful) claims to the north dated from the time of the Tati gold rush, when the Z.A.R. was establishing its north-western District (of Waterberg based on Nylstroom) which claimed the Limpopo frontier along the length of the present Central District-Transvaal border. 27 After 1868 the Z.A.R. pursued an aggressive policy of expanding its sovereignty by hut-tax collection (1870), vagrancy laws and impression of labour, and farm delimitation among the frontier black population—backed up by the commandos of individual farming families and veld-cornets, and increasingly of the state. The results of such policy could be seen in the 1869/71 flight of the Kgafela-Kgatla westwards across the Marico, and in the Republic's eventual foundering in the bankruptcy of the 'Secoceni War' of the north-east in 1877. By the second half of the 1870s Boer and British ('Afrikaner' and 'Anglo') competition for paramountcy or control of African ('Bantu') territory had extended from the diamond fields up the northern route of labour supply and commerce to Zambezia which ran through the string of independent Tswana kingdoms. 28

The threat to Khama's kingdom was both part of and reaction to Transvaal expansionism. The Transvaal was undergoing a process of state-formation and extension of sovereignty parallel to that of Khama's kingdom and other states of central southern


24 O.5524, pp.65-6.

25 O.2220, p.45.

26 Lobengula to T.F. Burgers, 10 April 1876 - C.1748 (Vol.LX of 1877), p.40.

Africa: the Z.A.R. may be taken to have gained equilibrium as a state during the reign of President Pretorious (1864-71). Z.A.R. 'polities' in the 1870s was split between modernising and conservative factions - the former was in power under President Burgers and was attempting to build a bureaucratic centralising state. The latter, represented by families of the Dopper sect, was as expansionist but anti-'centre', and may have been on the verge of a successful coup by 1877. It was Dopper disidents who also threatened the Ngwato kingdom. From 1873/4 Boers in the western Transvaal busied themselves in scouting routes across the Kgalagadi to Damaraland and Ovamboland (in Nambia), and Ngamailand, for which they had to cross through eastern Botswana. Their immediate aims were hunting and labour-recruiting (cf 'apprentices' to them: 'slaves' to Khama or Livingstone) - but such movements aroused African fears of mass Afrikaner migration, and developed Dopper dreams of secession from the Z.A.R. to 'a new world'. 29 As symptom of discontent with President Burger's government, a Dopper colony ready for migration assembled around the Limpopo-Marico confluence, the south-eastern tip of the Ngwato state frontiers. The Doppers ploughed and hunted on Khama's side of the river, plotted with Macheng and Kgamane, and were open in their loathing of black Christianity. 30


29 Walker Southern Africa, p.371; Thompson 'Co-operation and conflict on the high veld' in Oxford History, p.435; 'The custom of the Boers has always been to cause people to be sold, and to-day they are still selling people. Last year (1875) I saw them pass with two waggons full of people whom they had bought at the river at Tauane (Tawana, i.e. Ngamiland)' - Khama in C.1748, p.252.

30 Gillmore Thirstland, pp.273-86; C.2220, pp.53-4; Holub Seven Years, Vol.2, pp.33-8. Boer westward expansion and attitude to Khama was preaged by James Chapman (Travels, Vol.1, pp.15 & 17) - 'The root of the evil...lay in the assumption of
Khama took Dopper intransigence to be a threat of annexation of his country by the Transvaal - and on August 22nd, 1876 (no doubt pushed to it by his missionary, Hepburn, as Macheng had been by Mackenzie in 1868) appealed to the British governor at the Cape for the terms upon which the British would give him protection from the Transvaal, adding:

'I am weary with fighting. I do not like war, and I ask Her Majesty to give me peace. I am very much distressed that my people are being destroyed by war, and I wish them to obtain peace. I ask Her Majesty to defend me as she defends all her people.

There are three things which distress me very much - war, selling people, and drink. All these things I shall find in the Boers, and it is these things which destroy people to make an end of them in the country.'

The British governor, Sir Henry Barkly, who had his own ambitions for expansion towards Zambezia, replied regretting British impotence that far north. But at the beginning of November there had arrived at Shoshong the first semi-official British agent at Shoshong, Alex Bailie, sent to report on the labour supply and commercial route from Kimberley to Bulawayo and the extent of British interests along it. In March the next year Bailie, on his way south from Bulawayo, arrived at Shoshong again and found the town in considerable agitation over the Transvaal trekker war threat. On March 11th, 1877, Khama wrote to the Dopper commandant:

the Trans-Vaal Boers that all the country from the Orange river north, to an extent unlimited, and from sea to sea, belongs to them, and only waits the occupation which their roving propensities and the increasing demands of pasture for their cattle will in course of time necessitate.... the idea of a black man obtaining entrance into heaven appears to a Boer monstrous and absurd.'

31 Khama to H. Barkly (transl. J.D. Hepburn), 22 Aug. 1876 - C.1748, pp.251-2; C.2220, p.55.

32 Barkly to Khama, 24 Nov. 1876 - C.1748, p.252; Sillery BechuanaLand Protectorate, p.55 (citing C.2220 only); Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.64 (citing P.R.O.-C.0.48/479 original).

33 C.2220, p.54.
'Do you seek possession of my country? I and my people are resolved that that you shall not have. We have no confidence in you, and you have neither love nor pity for us. We are Kafirs, which means we are dogs or monkeys to be shot down or otherwise ill-treated as you may find it convenient. These are not mere idle words, but they are the words of sorrow of every day...

... However, I am quite content to leave my cause in the hands of Queen Victoria's government. I shall count it the proudest day of my life to have formed an alliance with such a nation, and to have come under its protection.

My traders often do things that I think wrong, but I can still trust the nation which sends forth so many missionaries to teach the word of God in the whole world wherever there are people ignorant of it to be taught...

They pay us wages when we work for them at the Diamond Fields, and then Boers rob us of our honest earnings on our way home. They have sent an agent with a sealed document to say they will protect us from such destruction. Had it not been for you my people would have gone down in whole towns to work for the English people, whereas now I shall only be able to send a few people whom I called from the veld, for we dare not leave our houses either to go to hunt or to work. In this way we are impoverished by you.' 34.

Khama exaggerated the tenuous and informal link he had made with British colonial authorities through Bailie. The prime motive of British official interest in the Road to the North was at this stage (openly) the securing of labour supplies for the diamond industry. Contractual friendship with the British by the Bamangwato therefore had to be expressed in the supply of human labour. In 1878 this was a token gesture of 105 Bamangwato (probably Malata etc.) labourers; 35 and the level of labour migration from the pre-colonial Ngwato kingdom appears not to have been high in numbers or significance in the overall economy.

34 Khama to L.M. du Plessis, 11 March 1877. - C.2220, pp.45-6; Parsons Word, pp. 4-5. The crisis and Khama's indignation had been caused by the recruitment by Goening of a Boer commando to crush Khama because the king had confiscated his horses and trek oxen for public insult - 'So then I must be insulted in my own town, and must not speak a word, but must keep a nice white heart all the time', wrote Khama in anger. War had been averted by a Boer friendly to Khama; but in March 1877 Khama feared that an escaped murderer, Fortman, might successfully recruit a commando from the Doppers.

35 C.2220, p.72 & p.79: Khama to W.O. Lanyon, Administrator Kimberley, 15 March 1877 (addressed to 'My good Friend'.)
The Transvaal was annexed by Britain in April 1877. The Dopper trekkers in the course of the next couple of years proceeded to filter through Khama’s country, with his permission, to Namibia. But their intransigence led to tragedy along the Boteti road. Ignoring experienced advice, a party trekked en masse through the thirstland (dorstland); water supplies proved insufficient; cattle and trekker families died of thirst leaving a trail of bleached bones. 36 Khama made his position clear in a letter of May 1878 to the British administrator of the Transvaal. Though as usual he would welcome ‘English gentlemen’ to hunt for sport, he would expel any Transvaalers who hunted illegally or attempted to settle in his lands:

'I cannot allow people to plough in my country and take my country by stealth...I must take care of my country for my people; it is my duty, and I would not be their Chief if I did not take care of it.' 37

In July 1878 a second British agent, R.R. Patterson, on a commercial and political fact-finding tour of the Road to the North, arrived at Shoshong. Famine and the drying up of water supplies, compounded by past political and military insecurity, meant that Shoshong had a population of only 10,000 - but, despite the famine of the previous two years, Patterson found a fair measure of wealth in town. There were 9 trading stores; many Bamangwato men and some women wore European dress; and there were about 40 imported ploughs in use. The proposed arms export ban from British colonies was a source of concern; rifles were the traders’ main barter item for hunting produce, and people had even forgotten how to handle a spear. Though without powers of negotiation, Patterson interviewed Khama on the British behalf and, after listening to the Kgosi’s catalogue of grievances, obtained considered replies to the three questions he put to Khama. Yes, Khama would welcome a resident British agent at Shoshong; He would fight Boer trekkers if necessary;

36 Holub Seven Years, p.37; Frederick Stanley Arnot, Missionary Travels in Central Africa Bath, Eng.: ‘Echoes of Service’, 1914 p.6; 0.2220, p.238.

37 Khama to Sir Theo Shepstone, 3 May 1878 - 0.2144 (Vol.LVI of 1878, pp.142-3. Khama’s confidence may have stemmed from the
And,

'He earnestly asked me to define "British protectorate".'

The subsequent career of British colonialism in the two 'Bechuanalands', north and south of the Molopo river, is well known. But the wars of 1879 onwards, and the 1881 regained independence of the Transvaal, do not appear to have especially affected the Ngwato kingdom before 1885. But Khama would have been kept well-informed of events in the south by the travellers who were obliged to report to his Kgolola with the news, by migrant labourers, by Setswana and English language newspapers, by missionaries, and through informal or diplomatic contacts with other (especially Tswana) governments.

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fact that Macheng had died; Kgamane and Raditladi had been allowed to return to Shoshong in shame, and the broken Sekgoma also returned some time before his 1882 death to accept Khama's rule.


39 'This is a custom everywhere followed in these regions - strangers on arrival invariably proceed to the chief's courtyard and tell their news.' J. Mackenzie Austral Africa, Vol.2, p.241.

The most important development in Ngwato state foreign relations in the period before 1885 was the resurgence of the Ndebele military threat. Though this threat was interpreted to be against the Ngwato state heartland at the time, in retrospect it appears to have largely been a clash of Ndebele and Ngwato expansionisms in northern Botswana as far west as the Okavango and north as the Zambezi. The clash did not materialise into open conflict because the forms of expansionism on either side were different in kind, reflecting the difference of their respective state-systems. In general, the Ndebele state extended and maintained influence by militaristic means whereas the Ngwato state did so by legalistic means. Ngwato political control and influence had, as had been indicated, followed and to a certain extent directed, its trade frontiers to the north and west into the arid sourveld and politically 'negative' zone between Mababe, Pandamatenga, and Wankie. The

41 See J.D. Omer-Cooper 'Political change', pp.218-22; and Roger Summers and R.W. Pagden The Warriors Bulawayo: Books of Africa, 1970, re. Ndebele 1883-1893. Of course, just as the Ngwato state used naked force, so the Ndebele state became more legalistic in operation as it transformed itself from a transitory chiefdom into a settled state - cf. R. Brown 'External relations', pp.261 ff; & William F. Lye 'The distribution of the Sotho peoples after Difaqane' in L.M. Thompson African Societies, pp.198-9. cf. T.O. Ranger 'The rewriting of African history during the Scramble: The Matabele dominance in Mashonaland' African Social Research (Lusaka), No.4 (Dec.1967), pp.271-82. Lobengula satirised the system of Ngwato government between king and councillors as: 'One kind says chwee-ee; another say chwee-ee; and presently all the birds in the tree say chwee-ee' - John Mackenzie 'Native Races and their Policy' in The British Empire Series, Volume II. British Africa, London: Kegan Paul, 1907, p.189. Mackenzie, in perhaps the first piece of 'political science' on central southern Africa, distinguished between two types of African government - Military Despotism and Limited Chieftainship, giving the Ndebele and the Bamangwato as his examples. Aurel Schulz & August Hammar (The New Africa. A journey up the Chobe... London: Heinemann, 1897, pp.11-12) explained the lack of an Ndebele attack on the Ngwato in 1884 in personal terms - because Khama after shooting Lobengula in the neck in the 1863 battle of Shoshong had refused to deliver a coup de grace but had helped him back to his horse, 'Lobengula in after life, when asked permission by his young warriors to raid Bamangwato, always refused, and, pointing to his neck, would say 'see this writing - "Ngwati" - it is from my brother - a sign of our friendship.'
Ngwato, from a power base along the line of the Boteti and Makgadikgadi, claimed the zone by virtue of their regular dominance over its sparse Khoisan hunter population. The other effective paramountcies that fronted onto the zone were the Ndebele state in the east, the Lozi in the north, and the Tawana in the west. By the late 1870s Khama was actively extending Ngwato political influence (as it had been for Sechele, it was control rather than conquest of other kingdoms that mattered) into the Tawana and Lozi kingdoms. The method of initial extension was ecclesio-political. Both the Tawana and the Lozi were linked to the Ngwato by common language and developed trade routes - which were the basis, as Livingstone had recognised (since SeTswana had such a large corpus of printed literature), for the imperialism of Christianity and Commerce. After contacts between Moremi II of the Tawana and Khama, starting when the latter was in his Boteti exile, between 1876 and 1878 a Christian church, which was to long remain 'the daughter and mission field of this church' for the Ngwato, was set up in Ngamiland by the Shoshong missionary and for Ngwato church leaders. And in 1878 it was Khama's good offices that directed a mission of the Lesotho (Paris Evangelical Mission) doctrinally compatible with the L.M.S.) Church under Francois Coillard to the Lozi state (Bulozi or 'Barotseland') then emerging from internal dynastic struggles. Khama of course saw all this as the extension of the power of God, not necessarily of the Ngwato or of his own power, and it is remarkable how often in Khama's life the interests of God and of Khama were synonymous!  

42 William Monk (ed.) Dr. Livingstone's Cambridge Lectures Cambridge, Eng.: Leighton, Bell, & Co., 1858, pp.19-21 & 43; D. Livingstone Analysis of the Language of the Bechuana, passim.  
44 C.W. Mackintosh Coillard of the Zambesi London: T. Fisher
In 1882-3 and 1884-5 Ndebele armies marched to Ngamiland and attacked the Tawana neighbours and kinsmen of the Ngwato. Khama moved mounted detachments under his personal command up to the Boteti to defend larger Ngwato cattle-posts. No Ngwato-Ndebele conflict ensued – though an Ndebele straggler was captured and used as an envoy to Lobengula. 45

The Boer threat in the south, though it put Shoshong on alert in 1882, did not affect the Ngwato state directly but rather the relations with it of its southern Tswana neighbours. The Ngwato kingdom was an island of relative peace and stability in central southern Africa, and Khama's international prestige was enhanced. The dynastically senior Kwena kingdom was still under Sechele who, as was his wont to oppose whoever was in power at Shoshong, married the widow of Macheng and upheld the right of his step-son Kgari Macheng to the Ngwato kingship. 46 Kgari Macheng himself was living at Kanye, the capital of the Ngwaketse state. 47 Common interests against the Kwena may explain the amenability of King Linchwe (Lentswe) I of the Kgatla state (there was a Kwena-Kgatla war in 1875 which was not settled till Montsioa’s mediation of 1881) towards Khama,


46 Annual Report for the Molepolole District 1885 (A.J. Wookey to L.M.S., 12 January 1886); Wookey, to L.M.S. 1 Dec., 1885.

47 E. Lloyd to L.M.S., 22 April 1886.
which meant that the Ngwato state had a defensive buffer against the Marico Boers of the Transvaal. 48

- 3 -

At three o'clock on the afternoon of Friday May 8th, an eccentric British general and a party of aristocratic officers and men, accompanied by John Mackenzie, rode into Shoshong. The next morning, in closed session, General Warren informed Khama that he had come because he had heard of external threats especially by the Ndebele, that German colonialism in the west meant that Bechuanaland borders had to be defined, and that he proposed that Khama should help out financially (i.e. buy?) a British protectorate. Khama spoke at length but said he would reply in writing. 49

On Tuesday 12th May, Warren ('Rra-galase') addressed a general assembly (pitso) in the Shoshong Kgotla, reading out a proclamation from the Cape Town High Commissioner's 'extraordinary' government Gazette for 23rd March 1885 — that there was a British protectorate over the Bechuanaland north of the Molopo river and south of 22°S. (a parallel which runs through the Motloutse valley between the modern mines of Selebi and Phikwe). 50 Nobody really knew what such a protectorate was to mean — neither Khama nor Warren, nor perhaps the British government. 51 Various Bamangwato speakers rose from the

48 Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.155-6; O.2220, pp.45-6. There was an obscure Ngwato-Kgatla dynastic relationship (one of Kgafela's daughters married an Ngwato chief).


50 The area in question had been defined by a British Order-in-Council in January, as 'not within the jurisdiction of any civilized power.' Sillery Founding a Protectorate, pp.40-1; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.36; Lloyd to L.M.S. 1 June & 4 July 1885; B.N.A. (8305) 'Bechuanaland Protectorate treaty mss (3pp) by C. T. Rey; Watkin W. Williams The Life of General
assembly - including Gohakgosi, Raditladi, Rauwe, Tiro, and Kgwati - and thanked Warren, supporting his views against liquor and making clear "to see our country sold, is that which makes our heart sore." 52

The next morning, Wednesday 13th May, saw a council of 50 headmen in the Shoshong Kgotla presided over by King Khama, whose long written reply to Warren was formally read out in address:

"I, Khama, Chief of the Bamangwato, with my younger brothers and heads of my town... accept the friendship and protection of the Government of England within Bamangwato country.

...I am not baffled in the Government of my town, or in deciding cases among my own people according to custom; but again I do not refuse help in these offices. Although this is so, I have to say that there are certain laws of my country which the Queen of England finds in operation, and which are advantageous for my people, and I wish that these laws should be established, and not taken away by the Government of England. I refer to our law concerning intoxicating drinks, whether among black people or white people. I refer further to our law which declares that the lands of the Bamangwato are not saleable..."

Having outlined the retention of powers of Ngwato state sovereignty, the document proceeded to define that sovereignty territorially. Agricultural, pastoral, and hunting zones were differentiated, and the boundaries of the latter included a great sweep through present-day western Rhodesia to Gwani-Zambezi confluence, and made nonsense of the British


51 cf Rote 55 & Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.41.

52 Lloyd to L.M.S., 1 June & 4 July 1885; S.(3305); W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, pp.387-8.
Instead of a financial offer in return for the protectorate, a land grant (for model British frontiersmen on probationary farms) in the vulnerable Ngwato frontiers was proposed - 'I am of opinion that the country which I give over will exceed in value the cost of the Protectorate among the Bamangwato.' The Ngwato state would also contribute to any public works ('roads and bridges') or education which Khama hoped the British would initiate. Finally, in the newly protected state,

'I shall be ready with my people to go out, all of us, to right for the country alongside the English: to stop those who attack, or to go after them on the spoor of stolen stock.'

The document was signed by Khama and his 50 notables and witnesses. And then, 'At the close of the meeting we were all photographed - Bamangwato and English together.' After five days at Shoshong, Warren left again for the south that Wednesday sunset, after instructing a small British detachment to proceed north to Lobengula and inform him of the Bamangwato compact on

53 See Map 1.
54 Parl. Pap. C.4588 (Vol.LVII of 1884-5), pp.36-46; Archibald R. Colquhoun Matabeleland: The war, and our position in South Africa London: Leadenhall Press, 1894, pp.45-6; Mathers Zambesi, pp.126-8. John Mackenzie claimed a large part in drafting the document with Khama - who was delighted to see his old moruti (teacher) back again - and claimed to have diplomatically hidden this from Warren; young Lloyd, though his StTswana was imperfect, claimed he wrote down Khama's reply and does not mention Mackenzie - W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, p.387 Lloyd to L.M.S., 1 June 1885. For the use of 'English' (v. 'British'), cf. R.C. Williams How I became a Governor, p.133. A copy of what Sillery (after Warren) calls the 'magnificent offer of 13th May 1885, was kept in Khama's papers (In-Correspondence (General) File: 1885-1889), and seems to have the basis of what Khama regarded as treaty relations with the British revised in 1895. But his son Tshekedi Khama produced an alleged verbal treaty in 1935, which he credited to Khama and the British in 1885 or alternatively 1895:

'The territory of the Bamangwato Nation is to become a Protected State whose Chief is, in general, to retain his Sovereignty in internal affairs; to retain full power to decide cases among his own people, and to administer the government of his people, in accordance with custom in the separate area retained for the exclusive use of such people'. (Tshekedi Khama to R.M. Serowe, 27 Nov.1895 - Appendage 'C' - Correspondence of J.H.L. Burns in L.M.S. Africa Odds Box 23. Cj. B.N.A.-S. (6305).)
a British protectorate. The junior L.M.S. missionary at Shoshong, Edwin Lloyd, who had been intimately involved in the negotiations as James Hepburn was away, was uncertain what to make of the Warren Expedition's visit, in a letter to his superiors in London:

'This may /my italics/ turn out to be an epoch marking event in the history of Mangwato.

...It may come to nothing at all, or it may result in making this country an English colony. Khame's reply is very cautious, indeed it might be termed indefinite, & he certainly has not taken any irreconcilable step.'

For the Ngwato state the British protectorate deflected the fear of Ndebele attack, and the guard on cattle-posts (in fact north of 22°S.) was relaxed. But the protectorate was a fiction. All British presence was withdrawn south of the Molopo river.56 Warren and Mackenzie were recalled, and the British imperial/humanitarian interest was replaced (so far as they were distinct) by a colonial/capitalist one in the annexation of Bechuanaland

The Watermeyer Judgment of November 1936, precipitated by Tshekedi Khama and Bathoen II, decided that any such agreement of 1885 would have been cancelled by the 1891 Order-in-Council, and thereafter British powers in the Bechuanaland Protectorate were 'not limited by Treaty or Agreement'.

55 Lloyd to L.M.S., 1 June 1885. The delegation to Lobengula was Sam Edwards, Haynes, and Maund - E.A. Maund's diaries are in Witwatersrand University (copies in Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London); see also B.N.A. - Index: Maund. The fascinating Warren Expedition is worthy of study for its own sake; it is notable for the first British military use of khaki (in fact brown corduroy) uniforms and of observation balloons, as well as for its family picnic nature centred round Warren himself. Indeed 1884–5 in one light can be seen in kingship terms as Warren coming to the aid of a relation by marriage, King Montsioa (Montshiwa) of Mafikeng into whose family Warren's relative Christopher Bethell had married. Cf. W.W. Williams Charles Warren, passim; R.C. Williams How I Became a Governor, pp. 18 & 112-8; W.F. Johnson Great Days, pp. 7-11; Siles M.Molema Montshiwa 1815–1896 Barolog Chief and Patriot Capetown: Struik; 1966, pp. 155-59. Warren was an unreserved admirer of Khama - speaking to the Bishop of Bloemfontein, 'he referred to Khama as "one of the finest" men he had ever met. Then he paused a moment, & uttered these oracular words: "Perhaps I ought to say the finest."' - Natal Mercury, 4 September 1886 (quoting Free State Express), encl. in Lloyd to L.M.S., 18 Nov. 1886.

56 J. D. Hepburn, Shoshong, to L.M.S., 7 August 1885; A. J. Wook Molepolole, to L.M.S., 4 Aug. & 7 Sept. 1885.
south of the Molopo as 'British Bechuanaland' on 30th September 1885 and the appointment of Sidney Shipard as the Resident Commissioner. The story is well known. 57

The period of the protectorate, given it began in 1885, began ominously for the Bamangwato, since Khama's first official contact with the British administration (based at Vryburg and Makefing) was in protecting from the British administration the very king, Montsioa, who had been the most crucial 'native factor' in bringing it to sub-Molopo Bechuanaland. The 'protectorate' there had been converted into a colony, annexed to the British crown, by the appointment of Shippard to his Vryburg residence and by the imposition on Montsioa's capital (Mafikeng) of the headquarters (Mafeking) of an ill-disciplined para-military force of adventurers called the 'Bechuanaland Border Police'. Old Montsioa fled to Khama, and had to be fetched back from Shoshong by a special B.B.P. patrol under the diplomatic Captain Hamilton Goold-Adams. 58 So when in

57 Proclamation No. 1, British Bechuanaland, signed 30 Sept. 1885 - British Bechuanaland 'Proclamations and the more important notices'. 1885-89. Vryburg: Townshead & Sons (Government Printers), 1890, p. 7. See A. Sillery omnia opera; A.J. Dachs Road to the North, pp. 10-12 & 'Missionary Imperialism'; etc. Shipard is known to SeTswana history as 'Morena Maaka', Lord Lies (Ian Colvin The Life of Jameson London: Edward Arnold, 192 Vol. 2, pp. 141-2), and with Hercules Robinson the Governor/High Commissioner at the Cape later proved to be a tool of the British South Africa Company - cf. S.M. Molema Montshiwa, pp. 170-1; Sillery Founding a Protectorate, pp. 222-4; Sidney Shipard 'Bechuanaland' in British Empire Series, Volume II, British Africa, pp. 51-2; Holmberg African Tribes, p. 133. September 30th 1885, also confirmed 'Her Majesty's Protection' over Bechuanaland north of the Molopo - and September 30th became 'Protectorate Day' (and subsequently Botswana Independence Day), rather than the dates of earlier British unilateral declarations of protection, which would indicate a recognition of the importance of Tswana consent obtained by Warren in May. See also Note. 59 below.

April 1886 Shippard sounded out one of Khama's missionaries on the king's reaction to possible annexation of his country, as Montsioa's had been, the retort was that as Khama had only just received an answer to his 'magnificent offer' of May 1885 the protectorate itself over Khama's country had only just begun, and:

'If it were annexed, I fear Khama would quickly find he wasn't Chief in his own town, & he could never brook that, he would fight. He has said so, & I believe he would do it.'

The first British administrative interference into the internal (in fact inter-state) affairs of their new Protectorate was a bid by Shippard later in 1886 to buy Khama's loyalty, and to punish Sechele's open lack of it. Shippard tried to settle an Ngwato-Kwena boundary dispute over the wells of Lophephe by blatant favouritism for Khama, but on-the-spot arbitration by Goold-Adams divided the wells between the two parties. In 1887 Khama was given British military cover, 30 mounted policemen, for his armed expulsion of the Seleka of Ngwapa across the Limpopo into land claimed by the South African Republic, an action in which at least 20 people were killed. Khama was the lynchpin of the inevitable British advance to the North. His interests were, for the time being, equitable.

Of the many references to the composition of the B.B.P. two will suffice here - Barry Ronan (Forty South African Years London: Heath Cranton, 1923, p.205) said B.B.P. stood for "Blue-Blooded Police" and its recruits were failures from the British army; Hugh Hastings Romilly (Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 1878-1891 London: Nutt, 1893, p.371,) succinctly remarked 'There are several policemen in this camp who do not bear the same names that they did when I knew them at Oxford'. See also Lancelot Dudley Stafford Glass The Matabele War London: Longmans, 1968, p.28ff.) The December 1885 mission to Shoshong under Goold-Adams was also over the 'Khama Deputation' (Sillery Founding a Protectorate, pp.72-80.), one of many private British ventures for colonial expansion before the Chartered Company.

An interesting scheme (not mentioned by Sillery) was Parker Gillmore's Bechuanaland 'Commonwealth' of April 1885, in which the Ngwato state would have been one of five Provinces under African government north and south of the Molopo - Parker Gillmore to Colonial Office, London, 22 April 1885: B.N.A.-H.C.46/3 See Chapter 3, Note. 2.

59 E. Lloyd to L.M.S., 22 April 1886.

60 A Sillery Founding a Protectorate, pp.87-90.
with the concerns that were to amalgamate into the British South Africa Company, with the British 'imperial factor' dragged along behind. There was no regular or resident administration before 1891, but by a series of administrative actions ostensibly in Khama's favour - the Lephephe arbitration of 1886, the Seleka expulsion of 1887, the (mining) concessions notice of 1888 and facilitation of correspondence with Lobengula, the enquiry into the Grobler incident of 1888, and the 1889 Kopong conference - Khama's constitutional sovereignty was whittled away from its 1887 stolidity as expressed by the British High Commissioner at the Cape:

'It must be remembered that the territory is not British soil. Khama is an independent chief, and he cannot be allowed, while retaining his sovereignty, to put on us the trouble and expense of policing his country. A protectorate entails no such obligations. Khama is quite strong enough to deal himself with refractory subordinate chiefs, and if any Boers enter his country and take part against him he should expel them.' 61

The internal reform of the Ngwato state and the establishment of Khama's rule before the 1890s need no elaborate treatment here. The comprehensive work of Isaac Schapera is to customary legal development in Botswana what that of Anthony Sillery is to the coming of the British. 62

61 A Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.91 & passim. See also L.M.S. in-letters from Shoshong and Molepolole etc., 1887-1891. Further bibliography is so extensive that it is omitted here as beyond the scope of this dissertation. A wide coverage of bibliography of contemporary travellers' tales of the events of these years is given by H.M. Hole omnia opera, and by L.H. Gann A History of Southern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1934 London: Chatto & Windus, 1965, bibliog. Sillery's Founding a Protectorate is the standard work, but suffers from the limited perspective of an 'official mind' study.

into effect were consistent with his own moral and religious belief and (though the reforms were also in response to international 'cultural' change) what he had long considered royal and national interests: "When I was still a lad, I used to think how I would govern my town, and what kind of a kingdom it should be." 63 His legal programme of reform, Melao vaga Khama, was a witness to his great determination of character and sense of divine mission. The most famous Khamaian reform was the absolute prohibition of all beer (bojalwa, sorghum-beer) manufacture and consumption, in addition to the ban on other alcoholic drink. The bojalwa ban, and his deliberate neglect (rather than prohibition) of the adolescent initiation schools (bogwera for boys and bojale for girls) produced a crises of religious opposition in the first years of Khama's reign. This opposition appears to have taken on a Mwari-cult formulation of the otherwise inchoate Tswana to religious tradition, but its back was broken in 1877 when 'Christian' rain from the south ended a 'Pagan' invoked drought. 64 It was in better security therefore that Khama made laws regarding marriage and inheritance (abolishing bogadi dowery), regulated the treatment of malate, 65 and enforced Sabbath observance and bans on dancing.

63 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.140.

64 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.125-8 &136-7. See also Parsons 'On the origins of the Bamangwato'.

65 See above Note 4. Hepburn in 1886 noted that Khama now called Masarwa 'Batho' (People, not dogs), and 'the change quietly going on in the relationship existing between the Bamangwato and their Bakgalagadi, and lower down between the Bakgalagadi and their Masarwa. Under Khama's mild rule the Bakgalagadi are increasing their possessions of cattle and extent of gardens, and the poor Masarwa, or Bushmen, have goats given to them in considerable numbers, Khama's own people especially.' J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.265.
at night, etc., though it is not always clear how far these laws extended beyond the upper classes and the confines of Shoshong. Royal control was backed by the discipline of a developing state-church over younger dikgosana, but the Melao yaga Khama and the difficulties in policing it ate away at the support for Khama of elders and batlhanka. In 1882-3 while Khama was away on the Boteti, his brother Kgamane who had been left as governor of Shoshong lifted the bojalwa ban and ordered the revival of the bogwera school in a bid for power at the head of anti-Khama elements - their father, Sekgoma I, having recently died at Shoshong. The Church and pro-Khama elements were discredited by accusations of vengeful murder of some Kalanga 66 - or possibly the Kgalagadi mentioned in a contemporaneous poem accusing Khama:

'You simply wasted your ammunition;
a serf is beaten with switches,
till his ribs feel hot as fire.' 67

But Kgamane failed and fled in 1883. Mphoeng, a half-brother in the second house of Sekgoma I, rallied the Church and dikgosana and batlhanka - the protests of deacon Gohakgosi for the church alone having been insufficient. 68 Hepburn the missionary had been absent during the affair, and the affair may have brought home to Khama the value of a non-African head of Church in internal as well as external affairs. 69

On the 9th day of May, 1891, in the terms of the British parliamentary Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 (53 & 54 Victoria cap.37.), and 'whereas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means Her Majesty has power and jurisdiction',

66 Schapera Tribal Legislation, pp.84-5; Schapera Tribal Innovators, passim; Tlou Melao yaga Kgama, pp.37-44; J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.236-43.


68 Tlou Melao yaga Kgama, p.44; J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp. 239-42.

69 See Chapter 4.
a British Order-in-Council was signed in London giving their High Commissioner in Cape Town powers to rule in the independent African territories north of the Molopo and south of the Chobe and Zambezi rivers. Henry Loch the High Commissioner snapped up the opportunity and, by the Proclamation of 10th June, 1891, in 'utter disregard for his instruction', established Courts of law and Offices, keeping Shippard as so-called 'Resident Commissioner' at Vryburg in British Bechuanaland. The administrative control of the High Commissioner and the Bechuanaland Protectorate was extended north of 22°S. to include the rest of Khama's Country, Ngamiland, and the Tati Concession, in 1892. But administration of the Ndebele paramountcy, under which the B.S.A. Company had taken the concession of Mashonaland in 1890, was left to the Chartered Company after the destruction of the Ndebele state in 1893.

From 1892 there developed a dual government over the Bamangwato-by Khama and by a resident British officer. The Imperial agent, Assistant Commissioner for the Northern Protectorate, was a magistrate with (theoretically) exclusive jurisdiction over aliens and appeals and capital offences, and an adviser in external policy to the king replacing the resident missionary in that role - the first A.C. was an ordained ex-L.M.S. minister John Smith Moffat (1892-5). Within a decade the Ngwato kingdom was reduced to a 'Native Reserve' and the king to a paramount Chief paying regular tax to the British. In international terms there was gradual loss of sovereignty, punctuated by Khama's 1895 negotiations and agreement with the Colonial Secretary in London - his 'last act as an autonomous king.'


72 Quoting Tlou Melao vega Kgama, pp.48-9.
What was the extent of the sovereignty that was lost by the Ngwato state in the early 1890s? This dissertation has established in some detail the character of the Ngwato Kingdom, not as a political anthropologist's model, but as a working historical phenomenon. Nevertheless it is illuminating to sum up the characteristics of the state on the eve of the assumption of British Imperial control. The sovereignty in question may be defined as the degree of control which Ngwato government had over the population and territory of the state.

Bamangwato society was divided 'horizontally' into four classes (royals, commoners, aliens, and serfs), and 'vertically' into age-regiments. The basic residential, administrative, and judicial unit was the ward. Each ward under its headman operated like the state in miniature - an aggregate of families under family heads, not necessarily of the same ethnic origin as the ward headman, and perhaps with serfs attached. A ward might constitute a hamlet settlement on its own or, more usually, together with others be part of a village or the capital town. Ward headmen might be royal, commoner, or 'settler'.

During the nineteenth century the growth of the state had resulted in the proliferation of wards, by the addition of 'settler' wards and the division of existing ones, to a number between 200 and 300. The wards were grouped into 'sections' - named after their leading wards, all of which had been formed by the reign of Kgari (died 1826/8), and were technically alien by ethnic origin but which came in time to be regarded as true-Ngwato. The four 'sections' were directly responsible to the royal government (puso). Every individual was therefore tied into the state-structure by cross-cutting group loyalties to ward and regiment.

In a state where perhaps only one-fifth of the population came from the nuclear kinship group, power and authority could not simply be transmitted through a kinship structure. There had to be a regular administrative framework, 'down' which the central government expressed its authority, and 'up' which cases rose on appeal. This was provided by the ward system - the ward headmen were 'the pegs on which the law is hung'. The administrative function of the regimental system was one of communal mobilization in extraordinary contingencies - war, hunting, fire-fighting, construction etc. Before about 1900 there were no territorial administrative units of the

74 Schapera Ethnic Composition, pp.65-93 passim; The ward system outside the capital among Kalanga, Talaote, Phaleng, Pedi, etc., apparently did not become formalized until post-1896. Though in practice such groups were usually under their own headmen, they were probably only 'officially' represented by Ngwato headmen (modisa wa lefatshe) resident in the capital - Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.215 & 223.

75 See above Chapter 1, Note 4.

76 Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.215 & 223.

77 Tlou ('Khama III - great reformer and innovator', pp.100-1) claims that by 1891 there was 'the beginning of a standing army', but this was not based on the regimental system but on the development of a corps of armed horsemen, from 1862 but more especially in the 1880s.
Ngwato state in the form of districts, except in so far as the capital town and the state were synonymous and each ward and 'section' constituted a territorial division.\textsuperscript{78}

So much for the administrative structure of the Ngwato state by 1891. What about the 'power structure' - who controlled the process of decision-making? Who were the political élite? Even if there was comparative institutional security in administration, how stable were 'politics', in the sense of the competition, conflict, or coalition of power interests? Khama had bolstered the power of the kingship by the Melao yaga Kgama.\textsuperscript{79} Foreign and economic policy were virtually his monopoly of decision-making, a monopoly with foundation in chiefly tradition but enhanced by his personal success in coming to terms with Commerce and Colonialism. It was in internal affairs that a political élite had a greater measure of control over policy making, though here also Khama had built up power by dint of personality (viz. liquor and beer prohibition). The political élite were the bomonna Kgosi (kingsmen), consisting of royal uncles and brothers and selected commoner and even 'alien' headmen, who exerted political pressure on government in two fields. One was as the 'natural advisers' whom the Kgosi was expected to consult before reference to any formal assemblies: the other was within a new institution, the state-church. In both fields, conflict between Khama and elements of the political élite was to erupt soon after 1891 - both as a reaction against growing monarchical autocracy, and as a reflection of a growing 'educated élite' with more universal

\textsuperscript{78} The ward was the usual unit of taxation and the regiment the source of labour tribute. It was not until the development of population nucleations outside the capital that a system of district administration became necessary, - see Chapters 6 & 10.

\textsuperscript{79} Bamangwato 'themselves sometimes distinguish between 'traditional Native Law' and 'Kgama’s Law', although both are equally binding on them.' - Schapera, 'The political organization of the Ngwato' (1940) p.69n. Cf. Tlou Melao yaga Kgama, passim
cultural values. But even if Tswana government (as contemporaneous trends elsewhere in the Bechuanaland Protectorate prove) was liable to fission among the political elite, stability in authority-relation compensated for instability in power-relation. 80

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To what extent in the Ngwato state of 1891 was there 'a government as distinct from merely government'? 81 Were there a centralised authority, judicial/legal institutions, and administrative machinery, within some more or less constitutionally defined relationship, and within which the struggles between 'power' and 'authority' could be played out? Constitutional relationships were defined by legal maxims, in general currency among the elders (bontate) or learned in the songs of adolescent initiation school (dipina tsamelac, 'songs of the law'). 82 Such maxims stated the central authority of the Kgosi - 'The word of the Chief is law' (Lentswe la Kgosi ke melac), or 'The Chief is a little god: no evil may be spoken of him' (Kgosi ke madingwana: gaesbiwe). 83 Other maxims defined the hereditary nature of his position ('A Chief is Chief because he is born to it', Kgosi ke Kgosi ka a tsetswe), his dependence on popular consent ('A Chief is Chief by grace

80 Secondary sources on the Tswana, following Schapera, often emphasise the fissiparous (centrifugal) tendencies of ruling families over the integrating (centripetal) tendencies of the state as a whole - cf. Stevenson Population, passim.


82 Schapera Tribal Legislation, p.4. The court remembrancers of law and customs were the baza-kolodi (or, more simply, banna ba lekgotla, 'men of the court') Schapera 'The sources of law', p.753.

83 Schapera 'Tswana legal maxims, p.122. Modingwana, a child-godspirit, implies that the Chief is a fledgling modimo who will be reverenced after death as a national ancestral-spirit.
of his nation', Kgosi ke Kgosi ka morafhe), and his obligations towards his people ('A Chief is wife to his nation', Kgosi ke mosadi wa morafhe). Maxims also defined the authority of judicial/legal institutions - the supremacy of the law, and equality before it of all including the Kgosi.

What were the judicial/legal institutions and executive machinery of the state by 1891? The crucial institution was the royal court or king's Kgotla, in which both legal cases and formal assemblies were held, and which was the apex of the cone of 'section' and ward courts similar, but inferior, in function. Judicial procedures among the Tswana have been extensively investigated by legal anthropologists. Legislative procedures, and their historical development, have been the special study of Professor Schapera, who distinguishes three forms of constitutional assembly. Firstly the fairly common phutego (all adult males in the capital) held in the royal Kgotla. Secondly the more ritual pitso (which brought in outlying members of the state) also held in the Kgotla and usually involving some thousands of participants. Thirdly the very rare letsholo (congregation of age-regiments) held in the veld to decide on matters of war or of communal hunting.

84 Schapera 'The political organization of the Ngwato', pp.75, 77 & 79.

85 The idea of Natural Justice was expressed by the law being 'immemorial' (ya tlhogo) or 'from God' (ke Modimo). Supremacy and equality were expressed by 'The law is blind: it even eats its keeper, i.e. the judge' (Molao sefofu: obile otle oie mongwane), by 'The law is a lion: it bites the great man too' (Molao tau: oloma lemokgoko), or by 'We look not at the person, i.e. the offender: we look at the offence' (Ga relebe motho: releba molato). Sources: Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.18, & Schapera 'Tswana legal maxims', pp.125-6. Of course these maxims were not exclusively SeNgwato but SeTswana or SeSotho in general.

Before the 1890s one cannot identify executive machinery of government separate from the judicial and administrative structure, except for 'police' charged with keeping good order in the capital. These 'police' (baatlane, beaters) were men who thrashed offenders in court and who saw to the physical enforcement of court judgments. But there was in Khama's reign increasing bureaucratisation in existing offices and in the addition of new ones. Ward heads, like Lozi or Nguni indunas, 'constituted a nascent appointee bureaucracy which could be used to increase centralization and liberate the ruler from dependence on his potentially rebellious relatives.'

These ward heads, like Tudor justices, were the 'maids of all work' who had to carry the increasing load of legislation into implementation. But there was not as yet the institutionalisation of 'universalistic' norms of bureaucracy — the impersonal, disinterested conception of Office. This was to emerge from the royal household in the 1890s in the form of the Chief's Secretary, and his small secretariat to deal with at first external correspondence, then with internal correspondence made necessary by decentralisation of the Kgosi's 'particularistic' authority in outlying areas, and after 1899 with taxation. Ever since the 1860s trusted foreign traders and missionaries had provided confidential secretarial help to Ngwato kings in foreign, or resident alien, affairs, on an occasional basis. Their role as 'foreign secretaries' to the Chief, as well as their headship of a state church, helps to explain the growing power of missionaries in Ngwato state politics up to the 1890s and the decline in missionary influence thereafter. In the

87 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 71.

88 Omer-Cooper 'Aspects of political change', p. 211. Omer-Cooper's 'historicism' in imputing such state-building processes to the Nguni, though it is conceded that they may apply to the Sotho of Moshweshwe, is attacked by Christopher C. Wrigley 'Historicism in Africa' African Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 279 (April 1971), pp. 113-24.

89 Cf. Lloyd A. Fallers Bantu Bureaucracy. A century of
1890s, two elements of a secretariat emerged. Firstly there was a Chief's Secretary, Ratshosa Sekokotlo, a commoner headmen of limited but valuable education (risen to prominence through his performance as a Kgotla speaker, his military prowess, and marriage of Khama's eldest daughter) who acted as scribe and confidant of Khama. Secondly there was systematisation of Khama's state papers by W.C. Willoughby in 1894. The importance of the state papers can be seen in the struggle for their control in the dispute of Khama and his son, Sekgoma, in the late 1890s, when Skegoma felt that Ratshosa was usurping his natural role both as heir and Lovedale-graduate to be his father's chief adviser. But it was not till 1909 that the secretariat had elements of being a 'faceless' bureaucratic institution, under the charge of the quiet, competent, and highly literate Gaopotlhake Kebailele Sekgoma. By the 1930s the Chief's Secretary had separated as an office from the royal household into being Tribal Secretary/Treasurer. The importance of the post in the 1950s can be seen in the fact that the rightful Chief, Seretse Khama, on being disbarred by the British from the Chieftainship, took up the position of Tribal Secretary

Parallel with the development of a state secretariat was the bureaucratisation of the office of Chief itself under the pressure of colonial administration. After 1899 the Chief became responsible first for the collection of 'Hut Tax' and then for an increasing number of permits and registration, for cattle export, labour migration, and censuses. The separation of the rights and revenues of the office from the person of Chieftainship can be seen in the Jousse Affair judgment of 1916. Though it is argued that in return the Chief was allowed to develop a personal form of capitalistic 'new feudalism', the new more 'universalistic' role of Chieftainship can be seen in Tshekedi Khama's temporary deposition in 1933 as an 'administrative' matter (without recourse to court of law), and in his being known as an 'Office Chief' rather than as a 'Kgotla Chief'. It may be argued that the Kgosi could exploit the lack of separation between executive and judicial powers in 'tradition' (vide legal maxims) - by aggrandising his
unprescribed executive powers at the expense of his traditionally prescribed judicial and legislative powers. The Chief's secretariat or 'Tribal Office' could take over from the Kgotla (with its constitutional checks) as the seat of real power.

All this should not be taken to mean that Ngwato constitutional history was stagnant, formalised, or codified before 1891. Quite apart from the shifts in the power structure evident in the political history previously related, there had also been significant developments in the nature of royal authority through the cumulative effect of royal laws and judgments since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century had seen the strengthening of central authority in the introduction of 'police' and restriction of magical practices,\(^{91}\) and the consolidation of control over newly acquired outlying areas — all this parallel with other Tswana kingdoms expanding contemporaneously.\(^{92}\) The last Kgosi before Khama, Macheng, turned back to internal reform, abolishing a form of tribute and restricting religious practice.\(^{93}\) It will thus be appreciated that the legislative and judicial reforms of Khama III were not novel in kind, but rather in their proliferation. By 1891 Khama had mollified Sarwa serfdom and other tribute relations; modified judicial court procedures, and fines; banned liquor and beer; regulated stock sales and game cropping; made provision for the good order and residence of alien traders; established Sabbath observance; Christianised...
traditional religious ceremonies; abolished bogadi and denounced other marital customs; up-graded the legal status of women; and promulgated many other minor administrative reforms. It was the right of every new Kgosi to exercise such 'innovation' - 'One bee does not use another's sting' (Gaemne kalebolelo laengwe). Of course, 'the lack of writing makes it possible to give the sanction of immemorial custom to relatively new rules', so that much of Melao vaga Khama by 1891 appeared to be part of the 'Good Old Law'. And other laws, notably those dealing with cash transactions, were obvious adaptions to the New Age. But there was also a personality factor, that of Khama himself, that could not be accounted for by the above explanations - and nowhere was this more evident than in his intolerance over the brewing and consumption of bojalwa (sorghum-beer).

The third sphere of political organisation in which the question of Ngwato sovereignty in 1891 should be considered, in addition to those of population and government, is that of territory. The hold of the Ngwato state over territory was, as Khama had pointed out in 1885, in three zones of sovereignty and land usage - agricultural, cattle-keeping, and hunting zones. The agricultural zone corresponded with the core-area ('the area in which or about which a state originates') of the state, being roughly the triangle that encloses Shoshong, Old Palapye, and Serowe. The hunting zone represented the maximum territorial claim, eagerly taken up by John Mackenzie, who identified Ngwato with British expansionist interests, and who identified 'Khama's Country' as stretching deep into 'Zambezia' as far north as the Chobe-Zambesi and as far north-

95 Ibid. p.19.
97 Parl. Pap. C.4588 (Vol.IVII of 1884-5), pp.36-46; E.Lloyd to L.M.S., 4 July 1885.
east as the Gwaai river. But land-usage was not the only criteria on which the pre-colonial frontiers could be reckoned - the map could be based on degrees of control of human population on trade and communication routes; on defence practicalities; on the approximation of peripheral populations to the metropolitan religion (L.M.S. Christianity in the case of Gamangwato), or other cultural factors such as language; on (maybe mythic) 'historical' claims (such as Kgari's conquests) and claims based on natural features or resources (such as hills and wells or mineral outcrops). Mackenzie's own ingenious mixture of such criteria in his first book (1871) was to posit that a Tswana state's boundary would be a conjectural line joining the waterholes, along footpaths in the hunting zone, where inter-state trade and exchange took place. The Mackenzie prescription appears to have been followed in the Ngwato-Kwena-Kgatla boundary settlements by the British between 1886 and 1894. The same prescription could also have been applied between the Ngwato and two other friendly and culturally akin states, those of the Tswana (the Boteti letter-tree) and the Lozi (Pandamatenga), but not with the Ndebele or Transvaal states with whom for reasons of hostility and divergent economic systems there were shatter-zones rather than frontiers. Sovereignties overlapped in the shatter-zones, and the essential criteria for establishing frontiers were cattle-posts or farms (i.e. in the agricultural or cattle-keeping zones) on either side of the shatter-zones. The shatter-zone concept helps


99 See maps at end of J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, & J. Mackenzie Austral Africa, Vo.1, and Map 1 in this dissertation. See also his map of proposed extension of British territory (dated 10 April 1889, in C.5524, p.197), and the comments of John Smith Moffat on the proposal (C.5524, pp.217-8) - agreeing on Ngwato hunting rights and existence of tributary Kgalagadi or Sarwa as far north as the Zambesi, but disputing Ngwato claims to the Tatj Concession area.

100 J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, p.369
illuminate the vexed problem of the 'Disputed Territory', raised by European mineral concessionaires on behalf of the Ngwato and Ndebele states, and which wasted much ink and ire to no avail till superior British force and Khamaian guile settled the question. In 1863 the Ndebele frontier in the form of a military invasion and holding camps for captured cattle, reached as far as the Tswapong Hills around Palapye (photo-photo): but the Ngwato frontier, in terms of cattle-posts also, soon followed up the Ndebele withdrawal as far as the Motloutse river. Thereafter for many years the shatter-zone began at the Motloutse and stretched north through the area of the Shashe river to the Mangwe river where Manyami's kraal or Lee's Farm served as the Ndebele frontier control posts. The shatter-zone extended westward through Kalanga territory and the northern Makgadikgadi. Between 1863 and their kingdom's demise in 1893 the Ndebele were careful not to penetrate the shatter-zone as far south as the northernmost Ngwato cattle-posts: this can be clearly seen in their raids against the Tawana which always skirted north of the Boteti where Ngwato frontier forces assembled. The shatter-zone also explains how, quite apart from the Ndebele royal succession crisis, the white mining community of Tati after 1868/9 managed to set itself up in effective independence from Ndebele.

101 Cf. above Chaper 1 Note 27: Edward C. Tabler The Far Interior: Chronicles of pioneering in the Matabele and Mashona Countries 1847-1879 Cape Town & Amsterdam: Balkema, 1955, pp.23, 26-31 & 4. As the mid-point of the shatter-zone the Shashe river could be said to have been the Ndebele-Ngwato frontier - as an aged local 'Bushman' pointed out to Frank Oates on 24 August 1873 (C.G. Oates (ed.) Matabeleland and the Victoria Falls: A naturalist's wanderings in the interior of South Africa. From the letters and Journals of the late Frank Oates. F.R.G.S. London: Kegan Paul, 1889 edn., pp.28-9.) Mackenzie's pro-Ngwato territorial claim fairly accurately traced the northern edge of the shatter-zone, passing through Manyami's marked as Makhobe's, but represented it as Khama's northern frontier - J. Mackenzie Austral Africa, Vol2, end map. Khama claimed the Talaote of Makhobe as subjects - J. Mackenzie Ten Years North, pp.268-97, explains why with reference to 1863.

102 See above Note 45. In 1873 Lobengula actually apologised to Khama for a minor Ndebele incursion in the Boteti area where Khama was in exile - adding that his enemy was Macheng, who was also of course Khama's (J. Mackenzie to L.M.S., 1 Sept. 1873).
or Ngwato, and to develop independent communications with the
Transvaal across Baines' Drift and the Bulolo via Pandamatenga. It
could indeed be argued that Tati white settlement converted
the shatter-zone into a buffer-zone of some substance which
precluded further confrontations between the Ndebele and Ngwato
states. Khama in 1888 observed:

'I have no dispute with the Chief Lo Bengula with
regard to the Shashi. I have a dispute with Mr. Chapman
and with the Boers about the Shashi.'

Lobengula had written to Khama somewhat petulantly in the
previous year:

'The white men are not your neighbours; I was your
neighbour. You settle everything without consulting me.
If you give your country over, what will I have to say?...
In olden times, from Sechele's up, it was one country.
We never spoke about boundary lines. It is only now they
talk about boundaries.'

103 Cf. Q.N. Parsons 'Bulozi and the South: patterns of
communication' (summary) of Seminar-Workshop on Oral History in
the Western Province, held at Mongu, Zambia, 7-9 August 1871 -
mimeo proceedings, Appendix C.

104 He added that he had communicated with Lobengula to say
that Ngwato troops were patrolling the Shashe, Motloutse, and
Limpopo; and that in reply Lobengula had thanked him for doing
so! (6,5524, p.68.) Mathers (Zambesia, p.138) suggested it
was the Lipokoli hills which proved a natural defence along
the lower Shashe.

105 Lobengula to Khama, 10 March 1887 - quoted in Daphne Trevor-
'Public opinion and the acquisition of Bechuanaland and Rhodesia
1868–96' London University: PhD. dissertation, 1936/7, p.613
more assertive claim to the whole of Khama's Country in 1885 to
Warren, on the basis that before it was GamaNgwato it was Bokaa
(cf. Chapter 1, p.59), and the Kaa became Mzilikazi's tributaries - Sillery Founding A Protectorate, p.83. Though most
accounts portray Lobengula's attitude to Khama as having
softened by 1888 (Sillery ibid, pp.81-5), Shippard later claimed
that Lobengula had told him then: "Khama is my dog; if my dog
had killed a Matabele, I should have known what to do; but since
Khama has only killed a Transvaal Boer, it is for the Transvaal
to protect its own subjects." (S. Shippard 'Bechuanaland', p.63
There was similarly no question of a linear boundary with the Transvaal state, even though contemporary maps customarily marked the Limpopo river as the boundary and South African historians have accepted this fiction as if before the 1890s the South African Republic had indeed 'filled out' as far north-west and north as the Limpopo river. The 1873 Transvaal census gave the white population of the Waterberg and Zoutspansberg districts as 575 and 801 respectively, and these colonies were above the malarial and tsetse belt (roughly the 1000 metre contour). The direct Ngwato-Transvaal confrontation of the later 1870s was limited to the area of the Ngotwane-Limpopo confluence where the valley rises out of the fever belt: successful Afrikaner penetration of the middle Limpopo valley followed the 1894 Malaboch war and the 1896 rinderpest and was not complete until after the Anglo-Boer War.  


107 See below account of Anglo-Boer War in north-western Transvaal. Cf. Colin Rae Malaboch. Or, notes from my diary on the Boer campaign of 1894 against the chief Malaboch of Blaauwberg, District Zoutspansberg, South African Republic London: Sampson Low & Cape Town: Juta, 1898, passim. In the late 1930s J.D. Krige after a field trip reported the triangle between the Limpopo and Magalakwena 'practically uninhabited' - J.D. Krige 'Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the Northern Transvaal' Bantu Studies (Johannesburg), Vol.XI (1937) p.321.
Khama was concerned the Limpopo border was a British-Transvaal convention and not a Ngwato one. It was in deference to the British and not to the Boers that Khama, in the late 1880s, withdrew his cattle-posts from the eastern side of the Limpopo.

All in all it may now be appreciated how inadequate it would be to describe the political system of the Ngwato as merely 'tribal' on the eve of British imperial control. The term Tribe was to become the nation's official colonial designation, and the term increasingly used by English-speaking Batswana in the twentieth century. But, in so far as the term can be given a minimal sociological definition as an 'autonomous group of people organized primarily by kinship ties', it is inappropriate to the Ngwato state, as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard pointed out in the introduction to their much used African Political Systems:

'This /that the administrative organization rather than the segmentary lineage system primarily regulates political relations between territorial segments/is clearest among the Ngwato, whose political system resembles the pattern with which we are familiar in the modern nation-state. The political unit is essentially a territorial grouping wherein the plexus of kinship ties serves merely to cement those already established by membership of the ward, district, and nation. In societies of this type the state is never the kinship system writ large, but is organised on totally different principles.'

108 Khama (1888): "Since General Warren came to see me, I have never allowed any of my people to hunt on the Transvaal side of the Limpopo River. I have removed all my cattle posts from that side of the river." (C.5524, p.70). Khama also withdrew cattle-posts from the Pandamatenga area in deference to the Imperial authorities during the 1890s: P.R.O. - C.0.879/1003, p.37.


110 Fortes & Evans-Pritchard African Political Systems (1940), p.6. (However by 1940 the Ngwato state had been divided into districts.) The kingdom of Khama has elements both of the 'regulative' and 'incorporative' models of Jan Vansina's typology - J. Vansina 'A comparison of African kingdoms' Africa, Vol.32, 1962, pp.324-35. Cf. also Peter C. Lloyd 'The political structure of African.
The colonial period was to distort and finally dilute the Ngwato state. There was no conquest. On the contrary, change was a gradual process. And its very gradualness raises problems of perception of change with which this dissertation is concerned. In particular there is the question of the monarchy. Most sources refer to the actions or attributes of Khama without distinguishing the products of internal political processes from those of personal inclination. This is an interesting question since particularly during the first phase of British imperial control (to the end of the Anglo-Boer War) Khama held high international prestige, and appeared to be using his special personal relationship with the British to move away from a conciliar to a more personal and therefore autocratic style of government - the watershed being 1895 when, though sent by his people to London, the agreement signed with Joseph Chamberlain was on with the Kgosi alone. Internal tensions of royal household and church politics, parallel to the coming of colonial rule, will be considered in Chapter 6.

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Kingdoms: an exploratory model', pp.63-112 in, Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth Political Systems and the Distribution of Power. London: Tavistock & New York: Praeger (A.S.A. Monographs No.2), 1965; Ronald Cohen et.al. 'The tribe as a socio-political unit: a cross-cultural examination' pp.120-49 in, June Helm (ed.) Problem of Tribe; Herbert S.Lewis 'The origins of African kingdoms' Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines (Paris), cah.23 (Vol.6, 1966), pp.402-7. Lest this be taken as modern and modish 'historicism' willing of unwonted political processes on the Ngwato kingdom, one more reference should be added, a review of William S.Naylor's Daybreak in the Dark Continent carried by the Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass on 3rd May 1918 - which referred admiringly to 'The years of state-building which have succeeded Khama's accession' (reprint in Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian, 7 August 1918, p.3.
KHAMÁ IN CAPE TOWN, 1895
Ratshosa
J.S. Moffat
Simeon Seisa
Khama
'They are not a warlike people, though they have proved their prowess in war; on the contrary, they pursue the arts of peace, and are quite willing to work for Europeans towards whom they are well disposed. Impressionable and of weak character, they are readily influenced for good or evil.'

'We thus see that in the Bechuana we have a ready medium for the expansion of British influence through a healthy and rich country suitable for colonial life, and leading from a strong political base in the south to the banks of the Zambesi. Therein lies our opportunity and our responsibility.'

The above quotation, extracted from The Development of Africa by Arthur Silva White, published in 1890, expresses much of the attitude towards the Tswana and towards the Ngwato state under Khama, held by the group of London and Cape Town capitalist magnates who had come together to form the British South Africa Company in 1889. This group was not the first to develop ideas of taking over the North of South Africa for Great Britain, but followed, pre-empted, or combined many earlier schemes in a very powerful combine whose influence reached deep into British home and colonial, and even royal, ruling circles. White freebooter precedents of the B.S.A. Company combine in the northward drive through Botswana had included Parker Gillmore's 'Commonwealth' scheme and the ill-fated (foiled by Khama and Goold-Adams) 'Khama Deputation' of

1 Arthur Silva White The Development of Africa London: George Philip, 1890, p.107. A map entitled 'Forms of Government' in the book marked Gamangwato as one of the independent 'Christian States' like Madagascar, Liberia, Abyssinia, or Buganda - while Matabeleland was a Pagan 'Negro State'. White relied on Ratzel's Volkerkunde for his ethnographic data. White was an imperialist who believed in the paramountcy of commercial interests (cf. p.218). At a 1895 congress White was cynically, or maybe satirically, prepared to equate the 'free' or 'contracted' labour demanded by European capitalism in Africa with 'slave labour' - A.S. White 'Africanists in Council' Nineteenth Century A Monthly Review Vol.38, No.223 (Sept.1895), pp.463-4.
1885, a Mashonaland British republic scheme of Neville and associates in 1886, and the Northern Gold Fields Exploration Company of Johnson and Heany (the later Bechuanaland Exploration Company) - which signed a mineral concession with Kama on 16 April 1887, and which subsequently became part of the B.S.A. Company. Boer competition north of the Limpopo was brought home to the Imperial Factor by the enquiry into the Grobler incident of 1888; officials like Shippard and Hercules Robinson (the High Commissioner), who were later to be identified with the B.S.A. Company, pressed for annexation and extension of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, not least because of Cape republicanism:

'Bechuanaland would be valuable to England in the event of the defection of the African colonies.'

Quickened interest in the 'inevitability' of British control up the Road to the North was also witnessed in missionary plans, such as those of the Anglican Church from 1887, the reinforcement to the Paris Mission in Bulozi (Baratseland) in the same year, and other schemes to be the 'advanced guard or be the pioneer to Civilisation and Christianity'. In all

2 See Chapter 2, Note 58. Hamilton Goold-Adams when then a junior officer of the Bechuanaland Border Police: he was congratulated on behalf of the Administrator, Vryburg, on his return to the Mafeking H.Q. of the B.B.P., on his 'tact and intelligence shown by you throughout your recent mission to Kama at Shoshong'. (Ashburnham to Goold-Adams, 14 Jan. 1886 No. 31/86 - Hamilton Goold-Adams Papers in possession of Mr. Richard Goold-Adams, Marble Arch, London.)

3 Lloyd to L.M.S., 18 Nov. 1886.

4 F. Johnson Great Days, p.27 ff & Appendix C; W.C.W./S.O. 691-2, p.46.


6 G.D.H. Knight Bruce (Bloemfontein) to L.M.S., 21 April 1887.

7 Lloyd to L.M.S., 26 May 1887.

8 Dr. S. Cartwright Reed (Douglas, Griqualand West) etc., to L.M.S., 28 June 1886 - their plan was to establish a hospital
these schemes the amenability of Khama's Country was the strategic lynchpin. 9

Under joint Imperial and Company patronage in 1890 the B.S.A. 'Pioneer Column' entered Mashonaland via Palapye and Tuli led on by a vanguard of Bamangwato pioneer scouts and road-clearers under Raditladi and F.C. Selous. 10 Selous wrote:

'It is my belief that had not Khama come to our assistance at this juncture, not a coloured boy would have crossed the Tuli, and the expedition in that case would have been lamentably crippled. I have never seen Khama's aid acknowledged or even referred to, and I therefore take this opportunity of stating that, in my opinion, he, by his hearty cooperation, in every way and whenever called upon, with the leaders of the expedition to Mashonaland, not only rendered inestimable service to the British South Africa Company, but earned the gratitude of all Englishmen who are interested in the expansion of South Africa.' 11

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and educational complex at Shoshong as the headquarters of a chain of minor medical/educational missions as far north as the Zambezi. 8

9 A British government Cabinet Memorandum was specially prepared on relations between Her Majesty's Government and Khama and presented on 7 January 1889. It was printed as a Colonial Office confidential print (African No. 363), but there is no copy in the P.R.O. (series C.O. 879).

10 The numbers are uncertain. Frank Johnson, Rhodes' contractor who organized the Column, had replaced 50 expensive whites by 150 cheap Bamangwato in the estimates, and mentions that there were 370 Natives (which presumably includes the Bamangwato) in the Column - F. Johnson Great Days, p. 130. This was despite the fact that Rhodes objected that Bamangwato scouts might inflame the Ndebele against the Column (C.J. Rhodes to B.S.A. Company Secretary, Kimberley, 7 July 1890: B.N.A. - H.C. 177/10). Major Leonard, in charge of supplies for the Column, wrote in his diary that 200 foot and 70 mounted Bamangwato under Raditladi reached the Lundi river where they finally turned back - Arthur Glyn Leonard How We Made Rhodesia London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1896, p. 60.

11 Frederick Courtenay Selous Travels and Adventures in South-East Africa London: Ward & Co., 1893, pp. 134-5. Other writers were more hostile - Sam Kemp (Black Frontiers. Pioneer adventures with Cecil Rhodes' mounted police in Africa) London:
But the Bamangwato had served their purpose for the B.S.A. Company once the Mashonaland colony had been established. Far from ever thanking Khama, Cecil Rhodes gave the king a deliberate cold shoulder on their first meeting in person on October 23rd, 1890. The immediate reason was Khama's 'mistreatment' of a B.S.A. Company subsidiary, the Bechuanaland Trading Association ('B.T.A.') which had its headquarters at Palapye. Khama had prevented the local manager of the B.T.A., Maurice Gifford, from opening up trade between Palapye and the adjacent Transvaal.  

The Bechuanaland Trading Association was an important factor in Bamangwato history between the late 1880s and 1916. In 1890 it reportedly achieved near monopoly of the booming northern trade: its profits from the B.S.A. 'Pioneer Column' can be gauged by its charging up to 2s 6d for a packet of ten cigarettes. The B.T.A. had originally been established as a subsidiary of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, with Khama's Country as the field of its operations on the guarantee to Khama that Frank Johnon (his church treasurer at Shoshong, who supervised the funding and removal of the church to Palapye) should personally supervise its operations. But when the

George G. Harrap, 1932, pp.61-2) was rude about the quality of the road cleared, and William Harvey Brown (On the South African Frontier. The adventures and observations of an American in Mashonaland and Matabeleland London: Sampson Low, Martson, 1899, pp.90-2) was rude about Bamangwato sanctimoniousness.

12 D.C. de Waal (transl. Jan H. Hofmeyr de Waal) With Rhodes in Mashonaland Cape Town & London: Juta, 1896, pp.34-40. Rhodes was also at loggerheads with Henry Loch on this trip - Barry Ronan Forty South African Years. Journalistic, political, societrical, and pioneering London: Heath Cranton, 1923, p.211. See also Parsons "Image" of Khama! pp.46 & 57 n.15; and Note 42 below.

13 Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, p.34 Johnson records only 6d per packet, 3s for tea, jam at 1s 6d per tin, and soap at 1s. Whites were on 7s 6d a day pay, and Native labourers on £1 a month - F. Johnson Great Days, p.130.
'Exploring Syndicate' was amalgamated into the B.S.A. Company, its South African directors were squeezed out by its London directors, Lord Gifford and Cawston, who deputed Mosenthal Bros. of Port Elizabeth as their South African managers, and replaced Frank Johnson by Lord Gifford's younger brother as Palapye manager.¹⁴ Even before meeting Rhodes, Khama was perhaps already referring to the Chartered Company as "Rhodes' concern", and after that meeting an unusually perceptive observer remarked in November 1890:

'It if you ask me, I have an idea that Khama has no love for the Chartered Company, and that he looks on our passage through his country with displeasure.'¹⁵

The observer was Major Leonard (author, The Camel: Its Uses and Management) who was negotiating for further Bamangwato labour on behalf of the Chartered Company: Khama had already supplied, apart from the scouts and road-clearers, waggons and construction workers for the B.S.A. base at Macloutsie (Motloutse police camp. One side of the development of the Chief as capitalist entrepreneur was as labour agent. The first strike of Bamangwato labour is recorded on September 26th, 1891, when telegraph construction workers withdrew their labour for the harvesting season, despite the threats of their foreman, saying:

'It is all very well for Khama and you white men. You have people who will till your lands, and take care of your crops and families in your absence, but we have no one; and if we do not do it ourselves, no one will do it for us, and our wives and children will starve and die.'¹⁶

¹⁴ F Johnson Great Days, pp.71, 87-93; Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, pp.19, 34 & 92.

¹⁵ Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, p.118

¹⁶ Ibid, p.311. The first 'crime' recorded in the 'Pioneer Corps Order Book', on 15 May 1890, was that of a Mongwato called Muicemong (moetsemong) for inciting another Mongwato to refuse duty: he was fined 15s - F. Johnson Great Days, p.130. Most accounts (cf. Note 49 above) underline the self-confidence of the Bamangwato in this period, and the consequent annoyance of white Rhodesians.
Relations between Khama and Rhodes were more cordial at their second meeting on November 18th, 1891. Rhodes may have been better disposed towards Khama by the fact that in the temporary war crisis with the Ndebele of August 1891, Bamangwato sentries and scouts had been mobilized to protect the B.S.A. base at Tuli. And the king confided in the magnate his problems with his meddlesome missionary, James Hepburn.

But from coordination, the relationship between the Ngwato state and the Chartered Company was slipping towards confrontation as competing elements within the British imperial system — the 'Native Factor' personified by Khama and the 'Colonial Factor' personified by Rhodes. Their competition for the car of the 'Imperial Factor' in London was unequal, but the 'Native Factor' did gain enough support from Missionary, humanitarian, or anti-monopolist lobbies in Britain to establish a long-standing 'tradition' or myth of Imperial restraint of Colonial ambitions. A distinguished Scots admirer of Khama expressed it this way in 1892, after a personal tour of southern Africa: 'Land-hunger and compulsion of black labour are the key-notes of the colonial policy. Protection and encouragement to the native are the key-notes of the Imperial policy.'

17 A.G. Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, p.294.
18 D.C. de Waal With Rhodes, pp.339-41. See also Chapter IV below, on the nature of the Hepburn-Khama dispute.
19 See, Q.N. Parsons 'The Cat's Paw and the Chestnuts: Khama and colonial rule in Botswana' London University, Institute of Commonwealth Studies: Seminar paper ('Colonial rule and local response') ColR/70/9, 4 March 1971, pp.1 & 3-5.
'... last year, without any warning and without consulting the chief, an Assistant Commissioner - Mr. J.S. Moffat - was sent to Palapye with power to levy taxes, issue licences, hold courts, and perform other acts of government. To many men it appears that in this action on our part Khama has just ground of complaint. He formulates his case against us as follows: "Years ago I offered to the British government much of my country; I offered to throw it open to the English on certain conditions - in fact I gave them a free hand. I believed in the English, in their justice and good government. They declined my offer, and I heard no more of the matter. And now, without formal concourse and agreement, when I should have the opportunity of consulting my headmen, and putting all important matters fairly before my people, they proceed to place a ruler in my town, so that I myself before I can buy a bag of gunpowder, have to go and obtain a permit. This is not fair or open-handed; it puts me in the wrong with my tribe, who say, 'How, then, is Khama no longer chief in his country?' and I feel deeply that I am slighted and made small. All my life I have striven for the English, been the friend of the English, have even offered to fight for the English, and am I at last to be treated thus?"...' 21

Until taking up his new post at Palapye in June 1892, J.S. Moffat had been British Resident at Bulawayo since 1889 - where he had been intimately associated with, and paid by, the B.S.A. Company. 22 His appointment as Assistant Commissioner for the


21 Times (London), 21 Oct.1893, p.8, col.2. Khama was referring to the 'magnificent offer' (see Chapter 2 above), and to the provisions of the Brussels Act restricting the arms-trade in Africa, even though most of Khama's country was south of 20°S mentioned in the Act (see Sue Miers 'Notes on the arms trade and government policy in southern Africa between 1870 and 1890' Journal of African History, Vol.12, No.4, 1971, pp.571-77 passim). The Brussels Act of 1890 came into operation in 1892, and the Bamangwato found they could not obtain enough gunpowder for the normal hunting season - Times, 7 Oct.1893, cols. 1-3. See also Note 43 below.

Northern Protectorate appears to have come as much of a surprise to the Colonial Office (at least, the Treasury) as it was to Palapye - but it was part of Henry Loch the High Commissioner's growing plans for increased Imperial control in the North.23

Khama was 'much disquieted' a few months after Moffat's arrival, in November 1892, by newspaper reports that his country was to be handed over to the Chartered Company. In fact this was a 'leak' of Rhodes' current secret negotiations in London. Moffat blamed 'some meddlesome person' for pointing out the reports to Khama, and added: 'I have told him I know nothing about it.' The king even wrote a letter to the Cape Argus (a Rhodes-ian organ) denying that this could be so. The High Commissioner assured Khama that this was not so, but rapped him for the indignity of a great man writing to a mere newspaper. Khama meekly accepted the rebuke, adding that Moffat had been away at the time.24

It was on the Imperial behalf therefore, and not for the B.S.A. Company that the Bamangwato participated militarily in the

A memoir. London: John Murray, 1921, passim. is perhaps too much at pains to stress his father's disassociation from the B.S.A. Company.


24 B.N.A.-H.C.110/4 (ex. Central African Archives HC.3/2/12/1) - various correspondence between A.C. Palapye & H.C. - citing Cape Argus, 14 Dec.1894 (Khama's letter, forwarded to London Times). On Tswana general awareness through the press even of British politics, see letter of George Baden-Powell (re. 1885) to Times, 14 Oct.1893, p.8. See also Parsons 'The Tswana press' pp.4-8; B.C. Thema ('The Development of Native Education') pp.15-17 remarks on the importance of the correspondence columns, Sechele and Batho being regular correspondents, in Mahoko a Becwana, the monthly Kuruman newspaper. L.M.S. in-letters from the Tswana area contain many references to the local 'power of the press' e.g. A.J. Wockey to L.M.S., 17 May 1886. On Rhodes' secret London negotiations, see Glass Matabele War, p.29.
Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893. Jameson of the Company put their proposal of a war to clear out the Ndebele sovereignty from Zambezia to the High Commissioner at Cape Town in July 1893. Henry Loch was again most anxious to involve the Imperial Factor, in the war as a check on the Company's private colonial ambitions. Telling Whitehall that it was all for defensive reasons, Loch secured the services of a joint Bechuanaland Border Police and Bamangwato force as an Imperial column for the hostilities, and then he agreed to Jameson's proposal on October 5th.25

In August 1893 Loch had recruited Bamangwato scouts to venture into Matabeleland; they annoyed the local Imperial commander, Goold-Adams, by not reporting the Ndebele mobilization trumped up by Jameson as the causa bellii, and which Goold-Adams must have believed. At the end of September Loch precipitously asked Khama to provide an army. Khama agreed to assist in what seemed the inevitable demise of the Ndebele state, but demurred that the talk of Matabeleland was "we wait for the English to attack us" rather than vice-versa as claimed by the English. 'If', the recent definitive study of the 'Matabele War' remarks 'Khama had his scruples he was alone: they were not shared by his future allies.'26

Khama provided an army of 1760 foot soldiers, 130 cavalry, 30 waggons, and pack oxen, under his personal command with Raditladi as his lieutenant-general. 980 of the men were armed with modern Martini-Henry rifles - the rest with Snider and Westley-Richards breech-loaders. A few may also have had muzzle-loaders (Enfield, 'Tower', etc.) which were general hunting-pieces among the Bamangwato.27 At least two of the

25 Glass Matabele War, p.122 ff.
26 Ibid, pp.139-41
regiments were in uniform - the Maolola led by Kebailele and Rathosa (formed c.1874) with red stuff trimmings, and the Maphatswa (formed c.1886) under Khama's own son Sekgoma (born 1865) with sheepskin trimmings. The Bamangwato soldiers were victualled and paid one shilling a day each by the Imperial authorities.

The Ndebele were to be attacked on two fronts - the Chartered Company's columns from Mashonaland in the east, and the Imperial column from Bechuanaland in the south. Loch and Jameson, who was the Mashonaland commander, seemed to regard the war as a race between them to Bulawayo - but Goold-Adams, the Bechuanaland force commander, 'advanced at tortoise pace' northwards, delayed deliberately by Chartered Company ploys and his own military thinking of an extended campaign with fronts rather than commando blitzkrieg. While the main Ndebele general, Gambo Sithole, covered the tortuous advance of the southern front, Jameson successfully used the 'flying column' technique that was to fail him so dramatically two years later against the Transvaal. Rather than Goold-Adams' confrontation and attrition slowly climbing up the highveld ridge to Bulawayo, Khama had favoured the strategy of sweeping round the higher ground, up the Gwaai river valley, and a surprise attack on

28 W.C.W./S.O.-810.


30 Glass Matabele War, pp.209 & 211: Bechuanaland News, 10 March 1894 tells Khama's version of subsequent events in great detail. See also Ranger Revolt, p.97; Summers & Pagden The Warriors, p.125; P.Gambo 'The royal house of the Gambos' NADA, No.39 (1962), pp.46-51. Most of the accounts of the Anglo-Ndebele war follow the official Rhodesian historiography and ignore the southern column. The London Saturday Review (ed. Frank Harris) charged that the 'persons who turn the tap of South African news' were suppressing 'the simple fact...that the Bechuanaland column was the only one that had any real fighting to do.' (Saturday Review, Vol.76, No.1986, 18 Nov. 1893, p.561).
Bulawayo from the west. Goold-Adams' dilly-dallying therefore chafed on Khama. There was no action until November 1st, 65 miles from Bulawayo at Empandine, when Bamangwato troops took the brunt of an attack by Gambo, which was beaten off. Goold-Adams and Khama disagreed on tactics for the battle: Adams wanted to close up into a laager, while Khama wanted to fight 'as he had been taught - while the enemy were in the open to fight them in the open.' On November 5th, Khama - who had received 'definite information from Makalaka sources that the Matabele were flying to the north-west' - informed Goold-Adams that 'The war was to all intents and purposes over and finished'. The rains had started and valuable ploughing time (after a drought year) was being missed back home, smallpox in Matabeleland was threatening his troops, and so he was withdrawing his army to Palapye. Goold-Adams begged at least to have Khama's waggons, and protested that his own scouts had brought no such news. Khama replied: "I cannot help it if your men are slow. I know it is true. I believe my men as you believe yours" - and declined to leave 'his' waggons. A few hours later, two Kalanga chiefs sought an interview with Goold-Adams; they informed him of the flight of Lobengula from Bulawayo. The B.S.A. and remaining Imperial forces


32 Glass Matabele War, pp. 208-14; Bechuanaland News, 10 March 1894.

33 Glass Matabele War, pp. 213-4, claims that Khama did not know of the Ndebele flight from Bulawayo at the time of his own withdrawal - as the fact was omitted from Goold-Adams' official report (Wills etc. Lobengula, pp. 217-21). That Khama had had prior intelligence is confirmed by Colquhoun Matabeleland, pp. 46 & 100-2; Daily Chronicle (London), 9 Sept. 1895; William T. Stead 'Khama, Chief of the Bamangwato (Character Sketch)' Review of Reviews (London), Vol. 12, Oct. 1895, p. 313; Parl. Pap. Vol. LXXI of 1893-4, C. 7290, pp. 11, 42-3, & 86. A common myth among Bamangwato today is that Khama turned back at Khami, afterwards named after him.

34 Wills etc. Lobengula, p. 221
followed up the victory by the 1894 campaign down the Gwaai valley, to rub out Ndebele power once and for all. This prompted Khama in 1895 to remark:

"I am reluctant to talk about war. I hate it. It is a thing of the past...I will not allow my people to follow up fugitives and take prisoners. If we are attacked, we must fight; but it must be short, sharp, and then done with. I do not fear war now." 35

The Chartered Company took the kudos: they were determined that they, and not the Imperial Factor, should have Matabeleland. Jameson and Rhodes vaunted of the Company's success 'without the aid of the Imperial government'. On arriving at Palapye on November 21st, to which the Bamangwato army with its casualties had returned eight days before, Cecil Rhodes strode into the royal Kgotla and furiously scolded Khama in public, for desertion. 36 This opened a rift of personal animosity between the two men that was not closed, on Khama's half at least, until August 1895 when for diplomatic reasons Jameson made a personal apology on his master's behalf to Khama, blaming the incident on young Howard Moffat's misinformation, and adding that 'Mr. Rhodes often lost his temper, so would K try to put it all out of his mind, and think no more of it.' 37 Khama gave a rather gloating reply to the London Daily Chronicle in September 1895 when asked about the affair:

35 Interview in Daily News (London), 9 Sept. 1895.

36 Stead 'Khama', p. 312. The date is based on reports carried by Scotsman, 22 Nov. 1893, p.7 Col. 7; Times, 22 Nov. 1893, p.5, col.4.

37 J.B. Shaw (Palapye) to W.C. Willoughby, 4 Aug. 1895 – L.M.S. Willoughby Papers.
'I do not want to speak about that, because since then Mr. Rhodes has asked me to forgive him for words which he said when he was misinformed, and I cannot go back on what I have already forgotten.'

Cecil Rhodes, in his vision of a united Afrikaner-British South Africa under his sway, had predicated that 'whatever State possesses Bechuanaland and Matabeleland will possess South Africa.' Having acquired Matabeleland in 1893/4, the Chairman of the B.S.A. Company and Premier of Cape Colony therefore turned his attentions to Bechuanaland with an eye on the Transvaal goal of his ambitions. The Rhodes-ian propaganda machine began to soften up British colonial 'public opinion' on the issue of Bechuanaland. It therefore began to deflate the considerable reputation of Khama as the good Christian king and loyal ally of the British—just as it had used Ndebele 'atrocities' against the Shona, and was yet to use Boer 'helotry' of the Uitlanders, as instruments of discredit. First the 1893 story of Khama's 'desertion' was allowed to circulate without contradiction: a special Reuter's interview with Khama which was designed for the British press, which gave his own account and refutation, was suppressed.

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38 Daily Chronicle, 9 Sept. 1895.


41 See Bechuanaland News, 10 March 1894 ('The Matabele War. How Lobengula's envoys were shot. As related by the survivor,'
Secondly, a series of articles by D.C. de Waal, an Afrikander parliamentary associate of Rhodes, which attacked Khama's reputation, were placed in Ons Land and then (in translation) in the non-'Argus group' Cape Times in October 1894. Khama was attacked under the headline 'Mordecai at the Gate' (of Rhodesia) - an article which a Palapye white resident described as a 'foul libel on Khama'. That correspondent and another who signed himself 'Veritas' sprung to Khama's defence, especially over his embargo on the sale of corn to aliens - this was only a famine measure, otherwise he had sold one thousand bags to whites in the last six years. The controversy in the Cape newspaper correspondence columns came to the boil when de Waal wrote to Ons Land denouncing the 'ant's nest of negrophilists' ignorant of the true facts, who were opposing him. De Waal was supported by 'Pro and Con', who quoted with approval Lionel Decle's rounding on Khama as a great hypocrite and deserter, in a recent Pall Mall Gazette. Elizabeth Hepburn, the widow of James Hepburn, defended Khama to the hilt; and 'Been There' boasted that the king was so mighty and his critic so puny that Khama 'could wring Mr. De Waal's neck with ease'. The Cape Times tried to balance the case by citing the praise heaped on Khama by Archibald Colquhoun, the former Administrator of Mashonaland. One correspondent, 'Excalibur' from Palapye, deflected the argument with a novel twist.


42 De Waal's article from Ons Land is printed in Diamond Field Advertiser (Kimberley), 23 Oct.1894. The replies of W.Ellerton Fry ("Libel!" & 'Veritas') are in Cape Times (Weekly Edition), 31 Oct.1974. The de Waal articles were reprinted in With Rhodes op.cit. The reference to Mordecai has its irony: Mordecai the Jew wailed at the gates of the Persian king because the Persian planned the genocide of his Jewish subjects - Esther, chap.IV.

43 Cape Times (Weekly Edition), 28 Nov.1894. Cf Lionel Decle Three Years in Savage Africa London: Methuen, 1898, pp.50-3
'The whole question lies in a nut-shell. The "vested interests" are afraid of competitors. Therefore, Khama's mind has been saturated with the idea that the erection of new stores means selling liquor to natives.'

De Waal was supported by another Rhodes-ian Afrikander, Te Water, and the controversy was capped by 'Imperialist' of the South African Review in January 1895 while Khama was in Cape Town:

'The Matabele campaign is now history, with its cruel inhumanities in the name of the extension of the Empire and the furtherance of civilization...and Rhodes is turning his eyes towards another prize worth rising even his political neck to gain. Straws show which way the wind blows.'

'Imperialist', remarking that Radicals such as Labouchere had been silenced in Britain, saw the attacks of de Waal and Te Water on Khama as 'preliminary moves in the game which it is hoped will end in the defeat of Khama and substitution of the beneficient and fatherly rule of the B.S.A. Co. in the place of the Christian endeavours of the present Chief.' Recalling the 'scandal' of the Matabele War, and the unfounded accusations then of the Company against Khama, 'Imperialist' concluded, ominously:

'Sooner or later some cause will be found to pick a quarrel with the chief: bogus parties of the enemy will be encountered by lonely patrols, Khama will be discovered to be massing his forces, and made responsible for some act of his subjects, and the dogs of war will be loosed upon him...Rhodes's young men have tasted blood and wet their spurs. The jackals are already on the trail: but the Bamangwato may yet be saved. Be

a work openly dedicated to Cecil Rhodes. Decle's clash with Khama involved a dispute over the powers of the new Palapye Assistant Commissioner — see above, Note. 21.

44 Ibid. This sounds like the argument later put forward by Paul Jousse ("Inquisitor" of 1913) of the Bechuanaland Trading Association. In that case the "vested interests" referred to were the trading companies at Khama's capital established before the B.T.A.: what they (Ellorton Fry, 'Veritas', etc.) saw as the B.T.A./B.S.A. tendency towards monopoly, the B.T.A./B.S.A. would see as fair 'competition'. On Jousse, see Chapter 9 below.
But the trail did not end at Khama and Bechuanaland: it led to Kruger and the Witwatersrand. The dogs of war would be loosed on the Transvaal within a year: the Bechuanaland Protectorate was the 'jumping-off ground', which could, it seemed, be obtained easily enough for Rhodesia by pressure on the British government. But the B.P. was not only the 'jumping-off ground'; it was also territory to be a sop to Afrikanerdon. It was 'die Kgalagari' which Boer westward expansion had sought since the 1870s. Rhodes had been interested in 'capturing' Boer trek fever, and his plans for his own Boer colony resulted in 'the great Ngami trek' of 1894-8 which settled the Ghanzi area of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

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'In Rhodesia I heard nothing but abuse of Khama; but those who wish to know what he has done for his people should read what Lord Randolph Churchill, a singularly acute and fair-minded critic, thought of him...'

For hostile account of the Rhodesian white pioneer-settler ethos see Stracey Chambers Sketches of English South African Life London: John Lane, 1900, passim.

46 In 1893 Rhodes was recommending Orange Free State farmers to the Foreign Office for settlement in "Uganda" — B.N.A.-H.C. 177/8.

47 (Anonymous: 'By one who took part in it') 'The Great Ngami Trek' Round Table. A quarterly review of the politics of the British commonwealth (London), Vol. 27, No. 65 (Dec. 1926), pp. 81-102. See also Sillery Pounding a Protectorate, pp. 160-91; J.T. Hahn 'Who is the lawful owner of Ghanzi?' (8pp) in P.R.C.-C. 417 142, 16669/95. Dr. Louis W. Truschel (Western Washington State College) is preparing a study of Ghanzi as 'the near creation of a second Rhodesia' — personal communication.
De Waal had expressed the hope and expectation that even Khama's Country would soon 'be occupied and tilled by the white sons of South Africa.'

Khama is to be the next victim...I do not think he would ever fight - his only hope is an appeal to the Queen and the people of England.' (J.S. Moffat, 1894)

The Bechuanaland Protectorate had been included in the B.S.A. Company's 'principal field of operations' by its British royal charter of 1889, and the then Colonial Secretary, Knutsford, had hinted that one day the Company might assume the Protectorate's administration in addition to its commercial rights. In 1891 Rhodes made an unsuccessful bid for Britain to pay him to take the B.P. off its books; at the end of 1892 he tried again; and in 1893 the B.P. Concessions Commission was 'set up largely to clear the way for the British South Africa Company' as scheduled administrative power. Having 'acquired' Matabeleland, Bechuanaland was all the more essential, for a railway extension from Cape Colony to Bulawayo and 'railway works' were to provide the perfect cover for the Rhodes-ian raid plans into the Transvaal. In November 1894 Rhodes, in London, tried to tie down the British government to a definite commitment and time-table for divesting itself of the Protectorate and giving it to the Company. Khama was therefore urgently summoned to Cape Town to meet the High Commissioner at the beginning of 1895.

48 De Waal With Rhodes, p.41.

49 R.U. Moffat John Smith Moffat, p.93

50 Anthony Sillery, Notes of lecture to Peace Corps Trainees, Syracuse N.Y., 28 Oct. 1966, mimeo, p.11. See also Note 24 above.

51 Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.215. See also Parsons 'Three Botswana Chiefs', Chap.2.
Meanwhile, quite separate from the question of incorporating the whole Protectorate into what in May 1895 became called **Rhodesia**, the Chartered Company was trying to push the administrative border of Matabeleland south into what Khama claimed as his territory. In August 1894 there was a frontier incident between the two competing sovereignties when B.S.A. Police arrested a party of Bamangwato (Sarwa) hunters in the Nata river area for contravening B.S.A. Company territory arms regulations. Khama claimed the Nata river area; the Resident Commissioner of the B.P. feared a Ngwato-B.S.A. armed border clash; and the Company claimed as legal justification that the area was within the old sovereignty of Lobengula which it had assumed by right of conquest.  

The August 1894 Nata incident had followed an unsuccessful attempt by the Chartered Company to formally incorporate the (Shashe-Motloutse) 'Disputed Territory' — to which Khama had responded on July 4th with the first hint that he might make a direct approach to 'the Queen and people of England' by-passing the local colonial administration. On its part the Company threatened to go to litigation with Khama over the 'Disputed Territory' — but the threat was effectively squashed by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, who could not accept that the B.S.A. Company had any legal claims on the basis of conquest to the former Ndebele sovereignty, but only on the basis of agreement with H.M.G.  


53 Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.211; The High Commissioner in July 1893 had requested Khama to hand over the 'Disputed Territory' to the Company, but Khama and a 'full meeting of his headmen' had flatly refused; the same request was repeated in April 1894, and again Khama and council 'replied with an uncompromising negative'. J.S. Moffat (Annual report for Northern B.P., 1893-4, signed 11 Aug.1894 - C.O.879/42/African No.484, p.5) added: 'I regret to say, that this transaction has called out a strong feeling and the time is within measurable distance, when Khama's patience will give
In the September of 1894 the Chartered Company adopted another tack to incorporate much of the Nata river area and 'Disputed Territory' into its realm of administration. The Company claimed that their southern administrative boundary should become coincident with the northern 'customs line' of the southern African zollverein (customs-union). High Commissioner's Proclamations of 12th and 26th June 1893 had defined the 'customs line' as running up the Shashe and down the Tati-Palapye road as far as the Motloutse river, thence westwards by the 'parallel' (fixed at 21° 27' 30" s) of the Motloutse source to the Nata (Palapye-Pandamatenga) road, and up that road towards Pandamatenga. The initial Colonial Office reaction to the Company's claim in November 1894 was that the 'customs line' had only been fixed so far south in order not to antagonize Lobengula. But by December the Colonial Office, in the form of Fairfield, had warmed to the Company. Obviously, as this Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote to the High Commissioner, the anomaly between the administrative and customs borders had to be rationalised to avoid the expense of two frontier services; the B.S.A. Company assured him that the Boer states might withdraw from the zollverein if its northern limits were extended any more; and the Company even offered to produce Gambo Sithole to back Ndebele claims to the area in question. In despatches of 11th December 1894 and 25th January 1895 the Colonial Office recommended to the High Commissioner that the B.S.A. request should be granted. This set in slow motion a series of administrative actions lasting a whole year, including a delimitation commission, that was eventually to be overtaken way, and he will cease to be our friend, if things of this kind happen! Loch's letter to Khama of 4 April 1894 (enclosing draft deed of cession for signature) and a copy of Khama's reply (refusing any outright land grant, only tenure-at-will) are to be found in W.C.W./S.O.No.795.

54 B.N.A.-H.C.182/2, passim; Sillery Pounding A Protectorate, p.214n.
by other events but meanwhile provided a source of cumulative friction between Khama and the Company.

Besides paring away at the northern edges of Khama's Country, the B.S.A. Company returned to its grander design of incorporating the whole of Bechuanaland Protectorate: at the end of November 1894 Cecil Rhodes in person made the formal claim again at the Colonial Office in London. The Company looked to the immediate extension of their railway from Mafeking to Palapye, and was now willing to administer the B.P. without an Imperial subsidy. But the Liberal government in Britain could not see any urgency. It replied that all that the Company desired would no doubt happen in good time, meanwhile the Company should desist from upsetting Khama. Khama's crusade against the evils of liquor had attracted the 'admiring attention' of 'large and influential classes' in Great Britain - the Temperance lobby upon whose support the Liberals (not least Gladstone the Prime Minister) were vitally dependent in the forthcoming election year.

In Cape Town, Henry Loch was approaching a crisis of principle over how much the Imperial Factor should be beholden to the Chartered Company. From Palapye came increasingly disquieting noises. Khama's letter of July 4th had indicated his despair with the local Imperial Factor against the Rhodes-ian megalith; and J.S. Moffat's first annual report as Assistant Commissioner filed on August 11th, remarked of the Bamangwato - 'At present there is a deep-seated and resentful conviction that we intend to take the ground from under their feet.' Khama could no longer be relied on as Loch's unquestioning catspaw after the decisions had been made elsewhere, but had to be taken into confidence. Loch therefore summoned Khama to Cape Town to

55 Sillery Founding A Protectorate, pp.215-6
56 African No.484, p.6.
57 Sillery Founding A Protectorate, p.176; & Parons 'Catspaw and chestnuts', Bawain.
discuss the impending railroad extension from Mafeking to Palapye, while Rhodes was in close negotiations with the Colonial Office in London, Loch told his superiors that Khama's trip was necessary,

'in order to remove unpleasant impressions entertained by him towards Mr. Rhodes in consequence of what had passed at an interview between them in November 1893.' \(^5^8\)

Subsequent events suggest that Loch was less concerned about making Rhodes' way smooth than he suggested to the Colonial Office: but whether or not Loch confided in Khama his own feelings is an open question.

In early January 1895 Khama travelled south to Cape Town for the first time in his life. He may have been better disposed towards the Imperial Factor because of the 14th October 1894 decision of the Lokgalo boundary commission, \(^5^9\) which had been favourable to the Ngwato against the Kwena and Kgatla cases. \(^6^0\)

At the nearly opened railhead of Mafeking Khama preached in the local Wesleyan chapel. At Cape Town, he was entertained as a celebrity by official, military, religious, and temperance bodies. \(^6^1\) Loch put before him the prospects of a railway and

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\(^5^8\) H.C. to C.O., 4 Feb.1895 (African No.484, p.174). When J.S. Moffat tried to interview Rhodes at Palapye in September 1894 on the Nata river question, 'The interview resolved itself into the delivery by Mr. Rhodes of a number of remarks the manner and tenor of which were such as to leave no course open to me for the time being but silence.' (Enclosed in R.C. to H.C., 24 Sep 1894 - H.C.110/4). It was about this time that J.S. Moffat finally sickened of unscrupulous B.S.A. methods and espoused (until falling out with him in February 1895) Khama's cause - see above Note 49 quotation. Other pressure on behalf of Khama on Loch came from Temperance lobbies in Cape Town during October and November 1894 - C.O.879/484, pp.71 & 78.


\(^6^0\) As Khama was going to Cape Town, the Kwena and Kgatla also tried to send envoys to protest at the new boundaries - C.O.879/484, pp.154-7; Bechuanaland News, 5 Jan.1895.
of a 'hut tax'; Khama 'should realise the wisdom and necessity of assisting in the development of his country', but could be assured that Her Majesty's Government would 'exercise, as hitherto, friendly protection' in return for taxation. Khama - ever with an eye on exploiting change - actually welcomed the railway: 'he fully appreciated the advantages that would result...by bringing his people within reach of a market for their produce.' He would not mind conceding land for railway works absolutely necessary, providing that the Imperial government continued to administer. He would not further commit himself until presented with detailed plans for the route from Mafeking to Palapye, but cautioned Loch that he would prefer to collect the 'hut tax' himself than have aliens do so. Meanwhile he must consult 'his people' on both railway and tax. He is averse to neither: it is merely a matter of conditions', wrote W.C. Willoughby.

On his return to Palapye, Khama gauged the views of his people at a pitso in the Kgotla. They asked for more precise details of the rail plans ('Is it like a road that is broad, or is it wider?'). They wanted the 'Disputed Territory' question settled once and for all, 'now there is no Matabele Chief to tell lies about it.' They expressed their despair 'because they see that the Company do evil and the Government do not interfere'. There were objections to the principle of a tax on housing rather than on age-regiments, since it would restrict house-buildings, promote insanitary urban congestion and adolescent sexual contact, and would discourage Ngwato masters from giving their serfs decent accommodation. But,


63 W.C. Willoughby to L.M.S., 18 March 1895.
'We are willing to pay tax to the Government that protects us in the enjoyment of our country. But we think - I and my people - that the Government should declare what are the boundaries of the country for which we pay the tax.'

When Loch received copies of the correspondence that had passed between Rhodes and the Colonial Office on the future of the B.P., he 'read it with forboding'. The implementation of the plans generally agreed upon would go back on Loch's promise to Khama in the previous month - of Her Majesty's Government's 'exercise, as hitherto, of friendly protection'. Loch therefore answered his London masters in no uncertain terms:

'Chief Khama has ever been a faithful friend and ally of Her Majesty's Government, and to hand over that Chief, his people and his territory to be administered by a commercial company, dependent for their prosperity upon what they may get out of the country, would be a breach of faith, such as I am sure the Government would not for a moment entertain.'

Loch was hastily replaced as High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony by a man who, since his previous tenure of that office between 1878 and 1889, had become scandalously involved in B.S.A. financial wheelerdealering - Hercules Robinson. Loch left suddenly for England, shielded by official denials of resignation, as Rhodes was returning from England. And on May 30th Robinson took up his post.

In April Khama received further proof of Chartered Company intentions when the Tawana king from Ngamiland, Sekgoma Letsholathebe, visited Palapye. The Tawana were dynastically close to the Ngwato, and Khama regarded Sekgoma Letsholathebe as his 'nephew'. What passed between the two kings can perhaps be seen in Sekgoma Letsholathebe's intransigent attitude towards the Company on his return. (He would already be knowledgeable about Lewanika's unfortunate experience in Bulozi over the Lochner concession of 1890) Sekgoma Letsholathebe

64 Khama to H.C., 13 Feb. 1895 - draft in W.C.W./3.0.795 (also quoted in Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp. 246-7, wrongly dated 1st February).

65 Sillery Founding A Protectorate, p. 216.
had come to Palapye to see the Assistant Commissioner. The Company were pressing him for complete mineral and administrative rights over Ngamiland which, following their argument of the 'natural' westward extension of the Ndebele and therefore Rhodesian states, they called 'West Charterland'. Rhodes had immediate plans for 'another Mashonaland with the difference that this time the pioneers would be Boers from the Cape and Orange Free State'; and Sekgoma Letsholathebe's corrupt (Bechuanaland Border Police) resident Magistrate was pressing him to concede. The local representative of the Imperial Factor was once again an agent of the Colonial/Capitalist Factor. Sekgoma cited the Ndebele precedent of B.S.A. dealings 'We are afraid to have our country taken from us and ourselves hunted down like beasts in the veldt.' He preferred his Imperial 'protectorate'.

On May 2nd it was announced in Cape Town that Rhodes' government of Cape Colony would press a bill for the incorporation of 'British Bechuanaland' into the Cape Colony. It was generally understood that Rhodes' Company would achieve the incorporation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate into Charterland at about the same time. For Khama and the Bamangwato this was tinder to the dry wood of their discontent. But flashpoint for protest


67 Sillery Founding A Protectorate, pp.134-6.

68 H. Beard, M.L.A. (Cape Town) to L.M.S., 21 Aug.1895 who observed: 'But when speaking of our late Governor there is no question in the minds of most here that he left here in consequence of difference of opinion on some points of importance. It may have been these questions of annexation of British Bechuanaland and the taking over the Protectorate by the Chtd. Co.'

69 Cf. Gerald Lewis Caplan The Elites of Barotseland 1878-1960. A political history of Zambia's Western Province London: Hurst 1970, Chapter III; Parsons The Word of Khama Lusaka: Meczam (Historical Association of Zambia, pamphlet HAZ.2.), 1972, pp.8-

70 Sillery Founding A Protectorate pp.131-91; C.0.417/142
was not to come until the end of June, over Shippard's arbitration of Khama's dispute with the Raditladi faction, which was the culmination of a number of incidents involving the territorial ambitions of the B.S.A. Company for Khama's Country.

Khama was, as has been seen, under pressure from his people to get the issue of the Shashe-Motloutse 'Disputed Territory' settled, but the British would not communicate to him the decision to hand the western half of the area over to Rhodesia under the 'customs line' understanding with Rhodes. Khama may have got wind of the fact that the (B.B.P.) Officer Commanding Macloutsie Camp. (Fort Matlaputla) on the Motloutse, was making discreet enquiries about the land claims of white residents with a view to creating a white reserve there.72 And suspicion would have been heightened by the fact that the Bo-Raditladi faction, probably on the advice of J.S. Moffat, also made a bid for the area now that the military were withdrawing. Faction members withdrew from Palapye to Motloutse - and on May 3rd Mphoeng on behalf of the faction gained an interview with the Officer Commanding Macloutsie, and requested refuge and their own reserved territory in the vicinity.73 Raditladi himself threw in his lot with the B.S.A. Company on May 12th when he wrote secretly to Dr. Jameson, supporting B.S.A. territorial

(Sekgoma Letsholathebe speech, Nakalatswe, 8 June 1895); A.J. Wooney Ngamiland) to L.M.S. 4 June & 14 July 1895; E.N.A.-H.O. 111, H.O.143-6. This is not to say that Khama and Sekgoma Letsholathebe were personally (as opposed to politically) friendly in April 1895 - cf. Alfred St. Hill Gibbons Exploration and Hunting in South Africa 1895-6 London: Methuen, 1898, p.349

71 Cf. Parsons 'Three Botswana Chiefs', Chapters 2 & 3.

72 O.C. (B.B.P.) Macloutsie to Col.Sec.Vryburg, 6 March 1895 - C.0.879/484, p.213. Cf. H.O.64/20 for the origins of Fort Matlaputla.

73 C.0.879/484, pp.240-1 and 217. On the Raditladi dispute, see below, Chapter 6.
claims. He told Jameson that Khama was fabricating the 'effective occupation' of his frontier claims by sending men and cattle, under Molefhe and Mokomane, to unspecified northern lands.74

On May 25th another frontier incident was reported. Two Bamangwato, Moruti and Modimoecho, made statements before the Palapye magistrate that they had been seized and flogged at a Kalanga village along the Nata road. As the High Commissioner observed, surprisingly, it appeared that both sides were in the wrong. The B.S.A. Police had been raiding the hapless Kalanga of the area (the former Mengwe paramountcy) for "king's cattle"; while the Bamangwato had been raiding them for escaped "slaves". To Khama's protests, the B.S.A. Company reply was that the Bamangwato were 'raising claims and pushing their interference' into lands ruled for the Company by the Ndebele induna Gambo Sithole.75

Also on May 25th at Palapye, one Harry Mafete made a statement before the Magistrate (the Assistant Commissioner). He had just returned from the Zambesi. On the road he had met with Henry Wall and Klaas Afrika; they had told him that they were on their way to Pandamatenga to take up a farm for a Mr. Fraser 'given' him by Dr. Jameson the Administrator of Charterland. Khama immediately protested to Shippard about this B.S.A. presumption. (Khama had, or had recently had, a cattle-post

74 Raditladi Sekgoma to Jameson, 12 May 1895 - C.O.879/484, p. 257 (original in H.C.182/2). It should be recalled that Raditladi had been the Ngwato general invaluable to the Company in 1890 and also prominent in 1893 - see Notes 10 & 27 above, & Scotsman, 16 Oct.1893, p.7, col.6.

On May 28th, Khama telegrammed the High Commissioner that he had heard that Police were beaconing a boundary from the Motloutse source towards Nata - why was his country thereby being 'divided'? The answering telegram, received the next day, was ambiguous but was a bombshell all the same: it admitted, for the first time to Khama, that the 'customs line' was being made the dividing line between Company and Imperial administrations. Robinson attempted to assure Khama that, even though his land would now be under two administrations, this would not affect Bamangwato land ownership! Khama's next telegram pointed out that the High Commissioner's proclamation of 26th June 1893 which Robinson had cited in justification only referred to customs and not to administration - and as for 'administration' was that not the same as government? Robinson replied complacently that the customs-administration lines equation was a fait accompli, which Khama could do nothing to stop: it had all been decided in London last December. But Khama's telegraphic fury had rocked the boat sufficiently for it to be necessary for Robinson's office to 'remind' the Company not to take up its administrative rights in their new area until a High Commissioner's proclamation, on the advice of the Colonial Office, had been made. Jameson, it was 'agreed', should be Administrator and Judge of the new territory which could be incorporated into Charterland as an extension of Matebeleland.

76 Statement of Harry Mafete, 25 May 1895 - H.C.182/2 & C.O. 879/484, pp.449 & 255. See also Chapter 2 (Khama's post near Pandamatenga); Tabler Pioneers of Rhodesia Cape Town: 1966, p.7 (Klaas Afrika); Schapera Ethnic Composition, pp.79-80 (Khama's claim to a section of Kwanje's as refugees); C.O.879/872, pp.35-9 (re. Pandamatenga boundary commission 1906). In 1895 the B.S.A. retorted that Fraser's farm was perfectly legal because it was east of the Pandamatenga road (H.C.182/2).


78 Khama to H.C., 30 May 1895; H.C. to Khama 31 May 1895; Imp Sec. (Cape Town) to B.S.A. Co., 4 & 11 June 1895 - C.O.879/484, pp.249-50 & H.C.182/2.
Hercules Robinson's tenure of his post had been supposed to begin on May 30th. Even before that date he had thrown in his weight as High Commissioner behind Rhodes' plans. The equation of the customs-administration lines, though somehow based on the Rhodes-Ripon understanding, was actually the initiative of the High Commissioner's office, without Colonial Office consent and only revealed to London by Khama's prompt complaint. Robinson was hard put to justify his move when he forwarded the correspondence to London on June 11th. On receipt, the Colonial Office ordered Robinson to retract and inform Khama that the equation in question was only proposed. The Colonial Office was too late to repair the damage in relations with Khama. Every week seemed to bring more confirmation of Company rapacity and local Imperial impotence (or corruption).

On June 7th, Khama sent his first letter, as opposed to telegram to Robinson, ironically 'to greet you upon your arrival in Cape Town.' On their recent telegraphic exchange, Khama observed that it was quite clear what the Company was doing, if not what the Government was saying. The Company had already occupied Pandamatenga, it had already started to take over the country: 'To this I most emphatically object.' He referred back to their telegraphic exchange:

'There is much said in the messages about respecting my rights and the rights of my tribe; but how can I believe these words when I see that they /the Company/are occupying my country without my permission?'

'I asked the Government of the Queen [In 1885] to enter into my Country; I offered, on behalf of my people, to give them a portion of my land, but they refused it. I also offered long ago to pay tax, but this also was refused.

In January he had been to see Robinson's predecessor, had agreed to pay tax and give railway land, and had asked for all this to be put in writing as a detailed request, but as yet no details had been forthcoming. As for his northern boundary, he had long pressed for delimitation by the British, but the

79 H.C. to C.O., 11 June 1895; C.O. to H.C., 28 June 1895 - C.O.879/484, pp.247-8 &244.
Government had stalled because it wanted no dispute with Lobengula, but now the Government was giving away half his country without consulting him.

'I cannot believe that the Chartered Company is wise and righteous. I live very near Matabeleland; and I hear many things about the Company. I do not wish to have anything to do with them. You mention Mr. Rhodes in your telegram. Is he not the man who insulted me in my own town after I had done all I could to help the Government in the Matabele War?'

The latter ended with a plaintive postscript:

'I have never heard anything of what you say was decided in December about the line of administration and yet I was with Sir Henry Loch in January.' 80

Sometime after June 2nd, Khama would have heard from his son Skegoma, who had just returned from hunting giraffe in the Semowane river area east of the Makgadikgadi and south of the Nata river, news of an encounter in the veld with Rhodesian whites. As Khama put it to a Birmingham, England, audience, a few months later:

"My child went forth to hunt game. Certain people of the Company met him in our country, and they said to him, "What do you mean by hunting here? This land is not yours! Stop the hunting." My child said, "This is the land of my father, and the land of his father. Here they always hunted and still we shall hunt" - (loud applause). They said, "If you speak to us in that way we shall seize all your property and all the goods which you have." My child asked them by what right or custom, and for what reason, would they so act. They said, "By right of this custom: we have taken this land from the Matabele, and now it is our land." And my child answered, "How can you take from the Matabele what the Matabele never had? If you talk about what you took from them, was it not my own father who helped you in that fight? Our land is not mixed up with the land of the Matabele; it stands by itself." And the others said, "Just go, and leave this talking...." 82

80 Khama to H.C., 7 June 1895 - H.C.182/2 (original letter).
82 Birmingham Gazette, 28 Sept.1895.
The showdown came in the month of June. Robinson determined that the dispute between Khama and the Raditladi faction (Bo-Raditladi) should be settled by a judicial commission. He proposed that the commission should consist of Shippard the Resident Commissioner, W.H. Surmon the Assistant Commissioner for the Southern Protectorate, and a Chief nominated by Khama. Shippard substituted J.S. Moffat for a Chief nominated by Khama, and added that Mr. Jules Ellenberger would interpret. Khama objected to Moffat sitting on the commission, but to no avail. Much to the king's chagrin Moffat acted in a violently partisan manner in favour of Bo-Raditladi. Seeing that the case was going against him, Khama made a bid to undermine Bo-Raditladi before Shippard made his judgment.

'Traced with one of the crises of his career Kgama did what for him was an extraordinary thing: he withdrew the ban on making native beer, thus violating the principle of a lifetime. The move was brilliantly successful. The followers of the dissident noblemen dwindled sharply.'

On June 27th, Shippard delivered his judgment. He gave to Bo-Raditladi, as their own reserve directly under the High Commissioner and independent of Khama, that part (the eastern half) of the Shashe-Motloutse 'Disputed Territory' which had not already been claimed by Rhodesia under the customs-administration lines equation.

On June 28th, the next day, Khama and his headmen drew up a petition which they addressed to the Colonial Secretary:

83 H.C. to R.C., 7 June 1895; R.C. to H.C., 11 June 1895 - C.O. 879/484, pp.243-4. It is not clear why Moffat was substituted: he was in dispute with both the B.S.A. Co. and with Khama at the time. The reminiscences of Mr. Jules Ellenberger (still alive and well and living in Salisbury, Rhodesia, in 1972) are being recorded by his son Mr. Vivien Ellenberger for the National Archives of Rhodesia.

84 Sillery Founding A Protectorate, pp.208-9. Moffat (to R.C., 29 June 1895 - C.O.879/493, No.27) added that 'I am informed that some of those who were present strongly urged the chief to delay his action in this matter and to consult the Headmen.' Khama had simply announced the lifting of the ban in morning Kgotla session on June 25th.

85 Enclosures in H.C. to C.O., 28 July 1895 (C.O.417/141).
'The petition of the undersigned Chief and Headmen of the Bamangwato tribe, resident at Palapye, in the British Protectorate, humbly showeth:—

That your petitioners have heard with alarm that their country is to be placed under the Government of the Chartered Company, or under that of the Cape Colony. Your petitioners placed themselves under the British Government some years ago, believing that it was a wise and righteous government, which would not oppress them simply because their skins are black; and they still wish to remain under the Government of the Great Queen. Your petitioners have heard that you are about to hand over our country over to others because it costs you too much money to protect it. They see that you have spent too much money maintaining soldiers who have done harm and not good in their country; and they would point out that no quarrel or disorderliness has ever occurred in their tribe to call for the interference of these soldiers. They know it is necessary to have police for the punishment of those who do wrong; but they think the Government might withdraw the soldiers and save much money. Our Government may place absolute reliance on the loyalty and orderliness of your petitioners, and upon their willingness to contribute towards the administration of their country. Your petitioners have offered on more than one occasion to pay Hutt-tax, and they venture to repeat the offer made by the Chief to his Excellency the High Commissioner, in a letter dated February 13, 1895. But your petitioners earnestly pray that Her Majesty's Government will not hand them over to the Chartered Company or to the Cape Colony.

Your petitioners do not know much about the Government of the Cape Colony, except that it does not protect its native from the white man's liquor. But your petitioners have heard much of the injustice and oppression which the Chartered Company inflict upon the tribes who live in the north; and your petitioners fear very much lest they should be killed and eaten by the Company. For your petitioners see that the Company does not love black people, it loves only to take the country of the black people and sell it to others that it may see gain. Your petitioners have already given the Company the right to dig for minerals in their country, and they say: "Let the Company be satisfied with the minerals, and, as for us, let us continue to be the children of the Great Queen."

Your petitioners have caused these words to be written on the 28th of June, 1895. We are loyal subjects of the Great Queen, and our names are as follows:—

KHAMA (Chief of the Bamangwato)
SEKGOMA (son of Khama)
KGAMANE (brother of Khama)
GOREOAN (son of Kgamane)
SERETSE (brother of Khama)
KEBAILELE (brother of Khama)
IKITSEN (brother of Khama) and 128 others.86

Such a petition was nothing novel among the Tswana, and the timing of the petition to June 28th, quite apart from final frustration with the local Imperial Factor over the Bo-Raditladi judgment, may have been determined by two other factors. Both black and white inhabitants of British Bechuanaland had been sending petitions and counter-petitions to London since May 7th over annexation by the Cape Colony.87 It is curiously significant that the Bamangwato petition was addressed in name to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary who took up his position for the first time on that very day, June 28th. And Khama may have just received a letter, which is to be found in his papers, dated June 22nd from Vryburg, which was of the nature of a circular to all B.P. Chiefs asking them to coordinate their opposition to the Chartered Company with British Bechuanaland's opposition to the Cape Colony:

'We do not know what you think on the matter /Unification of the two Bechuanalands/, but if you are opposed to going under the Company, we hope you will make your voice heard as we are doing.'88

86 C.0.417/141; H.C.185/1; C.0.879/498, pp.38-9. Moffat observed of Khama's petition in his covering despatch of July 2nd: 'I have every reason to believe that this is the genuine expression of his views and those of his leading people; although of course, these have been put into form for him by Europeans.' 'Europeans' presumably means W.C. Willoughby: Moffat had been sceptical of Khama's claim that some of his letters were written and translated by Simeon Seisa (A.C. to R.C., 27 May 1895 - C.0. 879/484, p.253). Simeon Seisa certainly proved fluent in English as Khama's interpreter in their tour of Britain; but Moffat was right to assume that Willoughby tidied up the translation - since there is an English rough draft in his papers corrected in his own hand (W.C.W./S.O.795). For the 13th February 1895 letter referred to, see Note 64 above. The B.S.A. mineral concession was successor to that of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company (cf. Note 14 above), transferred in 1893 - see H.C.140/1; Siller; Founding A Protectorate, p.167.

87 Cf. C.7932 (Vol.LIX of 1896), passim.

88 Letter dated 22 June 1895, Vryburg (signature missing) - in Khama papers, In-Corr. 1891-1902. Linchwe certainly received such a letter and Bapheen probably did - W.H. Surmon supposed the author was Mr. Townshend, editor of the Bechuanaland News (H.C.185/1 - Col.Sec.Vryburg to Imp.Sec. Cape Town, 11 July 1895.
The Bamangwato ("kill and eat") petition of June 28th was forwarded by the Assistant Commissioner, Palapye, to the Resident Commissioner, Vryburg, on July 2nd. Shippard did not (why not?) then forward it to Cape Town until July 25th; from whence it was despatched to London on the 30th. It is not surprising therefore that meanwhile Khama determined on other action to gain the ear of London — to go to London. He had been considering it for some time, apparently for the London Missionary Society centenary celebrations which were coming up in the English autumn of 1895. There are also hints that Loch's soothing tones in January 1895 quelled previous ideas of 'an appeal unto Caesar' of a political nature that was in Khama's troubled breast.

Bitterness may perhaps be seen, coming through Willoughby's translation, in the correspondence that Khama continued with the High Commissioner on the customs-administration lines equation. At last, said Khama on July 9th, it had all come clear to him. The Government was indeed giving away part of his country to the Company.

'I am astonished that the Government should treat me in this manner. What have I done to deserve such treatment? Is it the reward that I get for helping the Government to conquer the Matabele?'

Through missionary and telegraphic contacts, and using the as yet indefatigable Rev. W.C. Willoughby, Khama recruited kings Sebele of the Kwena and Bathoen of the Ngwaketse to join him in a united delegation to Britain. The arrangement was confirmed

\[\text{A.C. Gaberones to R.C., 24 July 1895.} \]

On the date of Chamberlain taking over the Colonial Office (E.A. Walker History, p.xix), coordination of the petition would imply that someone in close contact with British news, i.e. W.C. Willoughby, was involved in it. Chamberlain had of course been associated with the 'South African Committee' of John Mackenzie — cf. Sillery Founding A Protectorate, pp.217 & 227-8; Dachs 'Missionary Imperialism', pp.234-5; W.D. Mackenzie John Mackenzie, p.496 (J.Mackenzie pointing out to Chamberlain Khama's 1885 "magnificent offer").

89 As Note 86 above.

90 'It would be a great pleasure to some of us here to do what we would for him if he made up his mind to visit this country. I hope however that the necessity for such a visit has really passed away', wrote the Foreign Secretary of the L.M.S. (R.W. Thompson)
on July 29th, and the Tswana kings despatched their petitions to the Colonial Secretary, or in the case of Linchwe to the Queen, around that date. The united nature of Tswana protest can be seen in the Ngwaketse petition of July 31st:

'Hear I beseech you the prayer of your Petitioners - the people of the Bangwaketse Tribe which is in reality the petition of three Chiefs and their Tribes, namely Bathoen, Sebele and Kgama.'

On the 19th and 20th August, Robinson interviewed Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen, in Cape Town. Khama had already side-stepped the wiles of Dr. Jameson, who had rushed posthaste from Rhodesia to Palapye to get Khama to 'commit himself' to the principle if not the timetable of Chartered Company rule, and who had conceded to Khama that Bo-Raditladi should be settled in Chartered territory only to realise that Khama had conceded nothing in return.

Khama repeated his 'oyster' tactic on Robinson, who told Khama that the transfer of the B.P. was an incontrovertible promise to Rhodes by Ripon. That, said Khama, was what Rhodes said too. Robinson then told Khama that B.P. administration might involve a loss of £40,000 annually to the poor 'British tax-payer'. But that did not melt Khama's heart either.

'He was evasive and evidently wished to seal his hand; but, on being pressed, eventually admitted that he objected to come [sic] under the Chartered Company on any terms whatever, and meant as far as he could to oppose such an arrangement, and protest against it.'


91 Khama to H.C., 9 July 1895 - H.C.182/2.
92 Bathoen to C.O., 31 July 1895 - H.C.185/1; C.O.417/142.
93 J.B. Shaw to Willoughby, 4 August 1895 (L.M.S. Willoughby Papers); Jameson-Rhodes telegraphic correspondence in C.O.417/14.
94 Notes of interview, in H.C.185/1.
Willoughby Lloyd
Batheon Sebele Khama
= Bristol, 1895 =
A last minute attempt by Rhodes himself to dissuade the delegation from boarding their ship, failed; and the three kings sailed off, at their own expense and with their own attendants (plus W.C. Willoughby whom Khama took as fares-paid tour manager) and keeping their counsel. Khama telegraphed his son, Sekgoma Khama, acting as regent back home in Palapye:

'Bo-Raditladi leave at once. See that our people make no trouble. Take those who claim cattle and their witnesses to Lieutenant Williams who will decide. Sail today Tantallon Castle. Letter follows. Dumela Dumedisa Bamangwato. Give Mission trek oxen eight pounds ten.'

The story of the delegation of the three Tswana kings or Chiefs to Britain has been told in some detail elsewhere, and only facets inadequately covered in other secondary sources will be outlined here. Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen, arriving in London, received scant attention from Joseph Chamberlain, who was about to go on his Mediterranean vacation. So they proceeded to tour Great Britain to drum up support among temperance, missionary, and business circles in the major cities, and became a cause célèbre. The tour gave full vent to Khama to develop his characteristic righteous indignation to a fine art, using the interpreter as an amplifier for his own more hesitant voice. The Chartered Company, inconvenienced in its feverish preparations of the plan for the 'Jameson Raid', attempted to 'square' the three Chiefs (and Willoughby), by offering them reserves under an Imperial administrator as islands within a Bechuanaland that was otherwise...

95 Khama to Sekgoma, 21 Aug. 1895 - L.M.S. Willoughby Papers. (Lt. Williams was Palapye B.B.P. Officer; the cattle referred to are those claimed by Bo-Raditladi; recompense for oxen refers to Mission Oxen used by Willoughby to go to Mafeking.)

96 'Kings' has so far been used in conformity with modern (cf. J. Vansina 'African Kingdoms', passim) and with much contemporaneous usage. But the November 6th 1895, Chamberlain settlement provides a convenient point for converting to the colonial usages of 'Chief', 'Reserve', 'Tribe', etc.

wholly Chartered territory. The reserve offered Khama was a good deal smaller than the Central District of Botswana today. "Mr. Rhodes' maximum offer" consisted of the land west of a railway which would run 'fairly straight' between Palla and Macloutsie camp; the northern boundary would be the Shashe (thus conceding the 'Disputed Territory' to Khama) as far as about modern Tonota and thence to the vicinity of Moshu; the western boundary was longitudinal to the parallel of Palla. The new boundaries would isolate Khama's Country from contiguity with either the Transvaal or with any other Native Reserve.

Khama with Sebele and Bathoen answered the Company,

'We see clearly now that what the Company wants is to take our land: that is what we have feared... You speak to us as if you had taken our land in war and we had to beg it from you. The land is ours, not yours, and we cannot speak of giving the best parts to you.'

Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen, were only prepared to give land to the Imperial government for the 'railway works' that the B.S.A. Company was pressing so urgently. When Chamberlain returned from his vacation, the Colonial Office was anxious for a speedy settlement, as Fairfield wrote to Willoughby:

'I think we can make a satisfactory territorial settlement, if you can persuade them not to open their mouths too wide and not to stick out for any and every cattle post where some old cow may have wandered off in search of grass during a year of scarcity.'

98 Of Illustrated London News, 28 Sept. 1895. Khama's speech in Edinburgh is quoted in Parsons The Word of Khama, Note 27 ("I praise this town because I find friendship in it", etc.) An Edinburgh consortium even offered to take over Khama's country from the B.S.A. Company, with a 'purely Scottish Company for the development of his country' in which Khama 'would have the principal place.' They told the Colonial Office (which declined to entertain their proposal) that, 'As Scotch [sic] enterprise has long been associated with that is best in the history of African civilization this proposal might be found of practical value.' (J. Hay Thorburn, Managing Director, Scottish African Corporation Limited, 1 Howe Street, Edinburgh, to Joseph Chamberlain, 16 Oct. 1895 - H.O. 185/1.)

On November 6th, Chamberlain dictated a settlement, as notes taken at the time clearly show:

"Glad to see them. Sorry Sebele is unwell. Let us go to business. I must decide this question at once as I have very little time. I will speak about the land of the Chiefs, and about the railway, and about the law which is to be observed in the territory of the Chiefs... It is necessary that the railway should be made and I understand the Chiefs are ready to give me land for the purpose. I have consulted the people who know the country, and I see that it must go along Kruger's country. Now let us look at the map."

Chamberlain then turns to Bathoen and asks him for a 10-mile wide strip. Bathoen refuses. Chamberlain threatens to take it without Bathoen's consent. Bathoen agrees to 6 miles. Rutherford Harris, the representative of the B.S.A. Company present, stipulates at least 9. Meanwhile Chamberlain negotiates with Willoughby on behalf of the absent Sebele, and turns back to Bathoen to say that the strip shall be between 6 minimum and 10 maximum miles wide, adding "It is only for the railway we want the land." Turning to Khama, Chamberlain is equally peremptory demanding a boundary strip 10 to 12 miles wide along the Limpopo, and terminating the discussion despite Khama's continuing expressions of dissent.

CHAMBERLAIN (to Willoughby): "I will deal with Khama as I did with Bathoen. We will take the land we want for the railway, and no more, and if we take any of his garden ground (we shall not take much) we will give him compensation elsewhere."

KHAMA compromises,

"I say, that if Mr. Chamberlain will take the land himself, I will be content."

CHAMBERLAIN: "Then tell him that I will make the railway myself by the eyes of one whom I will send and I will take only as much as I require, and will give compensation if what I take is of value."

100 Khama etc. to Harris, 4 Nov. 1895 (rough draft) - L.M.S. Willoughby Papers.

101 E. Fairfield to Willoughby, 6 Nov. 1895 - L.M.S. Willoughby Papers.
KHAMA: "I would like to know how the railway will go."

CHAMBERLAIN: "It shall go through his [your] territory but shall be fenced in, and we will take no land."

KHAMA: "I trust that you will do this work as for myself, and treat me fairly in the matter."

CHAMBERLAIN: "I will guard your interests."

Now, given the railway strip, in which no mention has been made of B.S.A. Company ownership, Chamberlain turns to the western boundaries of the three Reserves in the Kalahari. On the Kalahari, Bathoen asks:

"Who will be the ruler of this country?"

CHAMBERLAIN: "the Company, under the Queen."

Having settled the pressing problem of the railway strip, the meeting becomes more relaxed. And Chamberlain outlines in great detail that was committed to English and SeTswana texts the next day, how the questions of administration, liquor, police, etc. are to be tackled, apparently giving the Chiefs no time for discussion before the settlement is formally drafted. Chamberlain ended with a phrase that was later to be much quoted in a slightly revised form:

"The Chiefs shall rule their own people as hitherto, but in serious questions there shall be an appeal."

From the letter of the next day, addressed to W.C. Willoughby as the Chief's interpreter, laying out the Chamberlain settlement, it emerged that considerable leeway had been given to Khama's northern territorial ambitions in exchange for his western concession. The northern border of the Bamangwato Reserve was

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102 [my italics] 'Notes by Mr. H.F. Wilson of the interview between Mr. Chamberlain, the Bechuana Chiefs, and the representatives of the British South African Company - 6 November 1895' (Encl. copy in H.C. to R.C., 27 July 1936) - B.N.A. S.466/1 (1936). The modified form of Chamberlain's dictum was: 'The Chiefs will rule their own people much as at present.' (Sillery BechuanaLand Protectorate, p.73)
was to run westwards up the Shashe to its source, excluding any wedge of B.S.A. territory between the Reserve and the Tati Concession, and

'thence a line running as nearly north as possible, so as to include Khama's present cattle stations, to where that line will strike the Maitengwe River; thence along the Maitengwe to its junction with the Nata River, along the Nata to its junction with the Shua River, along the eastern and southern shores of that lake to where the Botletle or Zuga River joins the lake; thence along the Botletle or Zuga to the junction of the Tamalakane.'

Having specified that the western border should run from the Thamalakane-Boteti confluence to the Kwena-Ngwato-Kgatla boundary as established by the October 1894 Lokgalo commission, Chamberlain's letter added:

'Khama will see that the country now allotted to him is very much larger than which he told Sir Charles Warren in 1885 was sufficient for his tribe, as he will now have the waters of the Pakwe and nearly the whole of the country between the Makloutsi and the Shashi, and also the country to the north as far as the Nata River, and to the west as far as Sir Sidney Shippard's award.'

Though the whole settlement was subject to a very important stipulation - 'Outside the boundaries now laid down for the Chiefs the British South Africa Company will administer' - the settlement was greeted with satisfaction by the Chiefs and with fury by Cecil Rhodes. From Cape Town he railed against the five B.S.A. Company principals in London who had negotiated the settlement, though this had been how they had wired him on November 2nd:

'J. Chamberlain will put pressure on them to settle. Fear we must increase Khama's boundary. Large breakfast to be given Khama 4th November, London. Fear speeches will damage British South Africa Company, but R. Maguire, Dr. Harris hold an interview with speakers tomorrow, hoping to influence these. Country press very much in

103 My italics/ E. Fairfield (for C.O.) to W.C. Willoughby (for Chiefs), 7 Nov. 1895 - C.7962, pp.21-3; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.71-4. One of the English and one of the Setswana (transl. E. Lloyd) original copies are in the L.M.S. Willoughby Papers. For the Lokgalo commission see Note 59 above.

104 Ibid.
favour of Khama.'

But on receiving news of the actual settlement, Rhodes sent off his famous telegram about his humiliation at being beaten by 'niggers' and 'canting natives', and told Rutherford Harris:

'...you have got nothing, and you have given half Matabeleland to Khama, that is from customs boundary to Maitengwe and thence down Shashi River to Tati. You have given also to Khama Sekgomo's /i.e. Sekgoma Letsholathebe/ country... Settlement is a scandal.'

Khama had trumped two years of Rhodes-ian manoeuvres to take away 'his country' as far south as the customs line. By sleight of hand he had achieved almost his maximum claims in the northeast. He had made an issue in negotiations of the eastern (Limpopo) border which the B.S.A. Company was obviously so desperate to obtain, while keeping his counsel on the really more contentious

105 [italics] Harris to Rhodes, 2 Nov. 1895 - William T. Stead, The Scandal of the South African Committee London: 'Review of Reviews' Office, 1899, p. 51, cablegram 2. The B.S.A. London five were Harris, Maguire, Beit, Grey, and Hawksley. The railway strip compromise, an expediency for the 'Jameson Plan' which the Chiefs were delaying, had first been suggested to the Colonial Office by Hercules Robinson on October 11th - Holmberg African Tribes, p. 147. The way in which Chamberlain fell in with the obviously impractical new railway route down the Limpopo valley suggests his implicit implication in the Plan: this is ignored by Elizabeth Pakenham (Jameson's Raid, passim). Within three days of the Chamberlain settlement, the Colonial Office telegrammed Robinson 'that the whole strip forms a frontier against an independent State, and that the Chartered Company now becomes charged with the responsibility of maintaining the frontier and performing all police and other similar duties connected with it; and that it may claim to be given the means of discharging such duties.' (C.O. to H.C., 9 Nov. 1895 - H.C. 185/1). According to A.J. Dachs ('Missionary Imperialism', p. 331) such a plan as Jameson's for invading the Transvaal had been threatened in 1890 and worked out in detail with Loch in 1894. The Saturday Review of 21 December 1895 (Vol. 80, No. 2095, p. 822) certainly tumbled to the Jameson Plan; and it is not impossible that W.C. Willoughby was given the tip by Harris to compromise him in the negotiations (cf. Harris to Willoughby, 11 Oct. 1895 - L.M.S. Willoughby Papers).


107 Sillery Pounding A Protectorate, p. 250.
northern or north-eastern border which slipped through the negotiations as a concession to him for his acquiescence on the eastern issue. As the truth dawned through, Rutherford Harris was increasingly hard-put to justify the B.S.A. London defeat to his chief in Cape Town:

'Natives chiefs and Willoughby acted like pigs',
he told Cecil Rhodes, and

'Native chiefs with Lord Loch and Temperance carried England with them...'  

The Chiefs' satisfaction with Chamberlain came out in their dubbing him 'Moatlhodi' — the righter of wrongs. Something of the holiday mood between the Chiefs and the English Establishment that followed can be sensed in the comment of the humorous magazine Punch on this:

'RIDER HAGGARD must look to the fame of his pen,
When KHAMA, SEBELE, and BATHOEN
Go stealing his thunder, and making us wonder,
At names that they can coin for JOE CHAMBERLAIN.'

Khama hunted with nobility, breakfasted with bishops, and was praised in person by the Queen herself. Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Chamberlain and Earl Grey of the Company in particular were anxious to be on the best of terms socially with Khama: other open friends included the Duke of Westminster, Lords Loch and Selborne, George Baden-Powell, and General Warren, and it was

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108 Harris to Rhodes, 11 & 13 Nov. 1895 — Stead Scandal, cablegrams 14 & 18. These contrast with Harris' (earlier?) comment how 'Khama will play the gooseberry with the blessed British public' (E. Pakenham Jameson's Raid, p. 38). Petitions of support for the Chiefs may be found in the Colonial Office files (C.O.417 158 & 159) from 10 Temperance and Religious organisations, and from 13 public meetings in British municipalities. See also Parsons 'Three Botswana Chiefs', especially re. civic or semi-civic receptions in Birmingham, Liverpool, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (Lord Loch was the principal speaker at the breakfast given in Khama's honour by the Duke of Westminster on Nov. 4th — see Note 105 above.)

109 Punch (London) of 30 Nov. 1895 carried two poems on Chamberlain's praise-name, which had been obtained from a London Times report quoting the (short-lived) Times of Africa. J.T. Brown's English-Tswana dictionary (3rd edn., 1935, p. 197) translates Moatlhodi as 'A decider between disputants; an arbitrator; a judge'.
noted how at ease the Chiefs were in 'high society'. Their last
night in London was spent at a meeting in Queen's Hall, Langham
Place, before an immense crowd, at which the Chiefs gave their
thanks to the British people, government, and monarch. And
on November 23rd, 1895, the Chiefs, their attendants, and
Willoughby, sailed from Southampton on 'one of those miserable
"drizzling" days that make it easy for an Englishman to leave
his native land.'

On arriving at Cape Town, Khama was summoned from the Customs
shed by Robinson, and told that Chamberlain had now decreed 'he
must choose' between accepting Bo-Raditladi back into his country
and giving the land north of the Dinokana (roughly Moshu)
parallel, i.e. Bokalaka, 'back' to the Company. Robinson demanded
an immediate reply.

110 Punch, ibid.

111 Dr. S.M. Molema's posthumous Montshiwa (pp.186-7), following
the reminiscence of a Miss Daniels, suggests that the Queen's Ha.
meeting was not all euphoric but 'turned into a murmuring and
threatening fiasco' because Edwin Lloyd stupidly translated
Khama's reference to the Queen as Mosadinyana not as 'grand old
lady' but as 'the old woman'. Mosadinyana literally means 'little
woman', a meiosis for Victoria in use among Tswana even before
the Chiefs met her at Windsor (cf. Daily News, 9 Sept. 1895), and
still used in Botswana (cf. Shapera Praise-Poems, p.165).

112 W.C. Willoughby circular letter to Brighton (Congregational
Church members, 7 March 1896 - copies in Willoughby (Palapye) to
L.M.S., 30 March 1896 (Box 52) & W.C.W./S.O.795. Khama's expense
(for himself, Willoughby, and Simeon Seisa his interpreter)
totalled £559/11/8, almost entirely on travel and accommodation
(as against Sebele's £371/16/9 for just himself and an
attendant). The London Missionary Society paid for the Chiefs'
London hotel accommodation, and advanced Willoughby an extra £10
to cover his 'special expenditure' - R.W. Thompson to
Willoughby, 28 Nov. 1895 (L.M.S. Out-Letters).
At first he said he would do neither and asked why, when the whole question had been settled between you/Chamberlain and him in London, this new point should now be raised here. He seemed annoyed and was somewhat over-bearing. Eventually he asked me/Robinson to telegraph to you that he would not give up territory referred to on any terms, but would take Taditladi back.  

Khama complained that Rhodes and Jameson had gone back on their previous firm promise to accommodate Bo-Raditladi in Chartered territory,  

as indeed they had. The Company had been so aggrieved about the 'loss' of the Bokalaka area from what they took to be Matabeleland, that, while the Chiefs were still at sea, Chamberlain had agreed that 'if necessary' Robinson could persuade Khama to give up Bokalaka or accept Bo-Raditladi back into his territory.  

Robinson argued strongly how dangerous it was for Khama to accept Bo-Raditladi back, and therefore Khama should really have no choice but to surrender Bokalaka.  

Rhodes admitted that he had only offered Chartered land for Bo-Raditladi in the expectation that the whole Bechuanaland Protectorate would soon become Chartered territory anyway, and made a belated attempt to resurrect the customs-administration lines equation to retain Bokalaka.  

113 H.C. to C.O., 16 Dec.1895 (H.C.185/1): W.C. Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 March 1895 (Box 52).

114 Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 March 1895. See Note 93 above.

115 C.O. to H.C., 9 Dec.1895 (H.C.185/1), which gave the 'if necessary' proviso, was an extremely prevaricating despatch, stating on the one hand 'that I cannot materially depart from my Land Settlement with Khama as bounded by Nata River', and on the other hand that since the Company obviously did not really want to give land to Bo-Raditladi, 'I do not think they can be held to it.' Rhodes had proposed (H.C. to C.O., 15 Nov.1895 - H.C.185/1) that rather than have territory north of the customs land, Khama should retain the Limpopo border strip and allow the railway to pass through the middle of his country. Yet another indication of the phoney nature of the border strip for 'railway works' (rather than Jameson Raid) purposes.

116 H.C. to C.O., 15 Dec.1895 (H.C.185/1). Robinson had previously argued (H.C. to C.O., 17 Nov.1895 - ibid) that all Native views should be disregarded over the disposal of territory, as Natives 'are practically children' at the mercy of unscrupulous whites (sic).

As Willoughby remarked, Khama 'was in a very nasty mood for days after' his enforced re-acceptance of Bo-Raditladi. The mood was not improved by his meeting with Dr. Jameson within a few days of the latter's abortive Raid into the Transvaal from Pitsane Photlo in the extreme south-east of the Protectorate.

'While at Mafeking, Khama had received a message from two of Dr. Jameson's friends, saying, that Dr. Jameson wished to see him...The friends of the Doctor had apparently imagined the message that they had delivered. Khama was accused by the Doctor of having made a dead set on the Company whilst in England on the Liquor Question.'

Simon Ratshosa's rather garbled account of the encounter has Khama saying to Jameson:

"Dr. Jameson you have got a smooth tongue...can you tell me why are these things in front of you? (meaning big guns) what is their object and movement aimed to, are these guns you have not the sign of destruction and death? Please don't think you can cheat me and take me for a child, your ambition is but one to kill...No doctor, don't take me for a blind, I can see this is an expedition. Go forward with your expedition, which will bring you nothing but shame and disgrace. When I went over to England, I was afraid of these big guns."

The Raid failed, and as part of its disassociation from the Raid the Office of the High Commissioner at the Cape took a hard line against the Chartered Company over the question of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in its despatches to the Colonial Office. On January 21st it advised London to revoke what had already been ceded by proclamation (Rolong and Lete lands) to the Company, and either to cancel or allow 'to remain for the present indefinitely in obeyance' the transfer of the rest of the Protectorate outside the three Chamberlain Settlement reserves (i.e. the rest of the eastern border, including the Kgatleng, and the western Kgalagadi and northern Tawana lands).

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118 W.C. Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 March 1896.
119 W.C. Willoughby circular, 7 March 1896.
120 S. Ratshosa 'My Book', pp.251-2
sufficient for the railway would alone be handed over to the B.S.A. Co., and the Protectorate as a whole would remain under or revert to Imperial administration. Two days later another telegram added that there was no need to transfer the Limpopo or Crocodile strip from Khama for railway works, as the line would, the surveyor (Charles Metcalfe) told them, have to go direct from Ramotswa northwards to within twelve miles of Palapye.

The Colonial Office followed the High Commissioner's advice, and authorised his Proclamation No.1 of 1896, on February 4th, which replaced under his authority the Rolong and Lete lands used by the Company for the Raid, and which effectively scotched the imminent transfer of the Kgateng to Company administration. A letter of January 24th from the Colonial Office to the B.S.A. Company laid down guidelines which, though the Company may have regarded them as purely temporary, in fact were to determine the eventual emergence of Zambia and Botswana as separate entities from Rhodesia. Matabeleland and Mashonaland, wrote Edward Fairfield, might be left to the Company in everything that related to their 'development' - 'public works, sanitation, education, and internal economy, including land-settlement and mining questions', though there might be restrictions on Company powers to raise troops, and the question of whether to have Imperial control of the police and judiciary was left open. The Colonial Office would not concern itself with the territory north of the Zambezi (where 'I am to observe', wrote Fairfield, 'that all questions...appertain primarily to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs'), but was most concerned about the parts of the Bechuanaland Protectorate outside the three Reserves of Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen. Because the Company had betrayed the trust of the Imperial Government as 'Border Authority' the Company would not have 'any part of the administrative work of the

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123 C.O. to H.C., 1 Feb.1895 telegram (H.C.182/5) - adding 'but I see no objection to B.S.A. Coy retaining private property in whole unoccupied land in western Protectorate such as Ghanzi and in portion of Strip ceded by Bathoen and Sebele and possibly in portion of territory ceded by Khama.' The Colonial Secretary stressed he was anxious to avoid injuring commercial interests.
inhabited Protectorate', i.e. the east. But it was still 'a question on which Mr. Chamberlain is open to argument', whether the Company might be allowed to extend its administration westwards from Matabeleland to ('West Charterland') Ngamiland. As for property, rather than administrative, rights, these were assured: the Company, with the actual railway route freed from the question of administering its so-called 'railway strip', could 'retain' rights to the land which the Chiefs had given to the Imperial government, and could carry on with their Ghanzi trekker plantation. 124

Other events of 1896 - the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, the Ndebele revolt, and the pressing extension of the railway to Bulawayo - overtook consideration of the Chartered Company's claims to administer the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The Company quite understood the need to postpone any such transfer, but wanted to obtain firm promises for the future. Firstly it wanted established that it could take over the administration of the territory north and west of Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen. 125 Secondly, in a letter of March 31st, the Company returned to its claims, based on understandings of December 1892 and 1894, to administer the whole Protectorate (the new factor of the Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen 'islands' being studiously ignored):

'...the Board of Directors is prepared, at Mr. Chamberlain's insistence, to acquiesce in the proposed postponement but on the distinct understanding that the policy of Lord Ripon's despatch is maintained during the interval that may elapse before this Company obtains the direct administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and adjoining territory pursuant of Clause 1 of the Royal Charter incorporating the Company.'

Meanwhile the Directors wanted, (1) the Customs Area in the north

124 C.O. to B.S.A.Co., 24 Jan. 1896 (H.C. 182/5, printed proof). As far as Ngamiland was concerned, the Colonial Office had told the High Commissioner on 15 December 1895 (H.C. 185/1) that the Company could not 'acquire' but only administer 'land in beneficial occupation of Sekhoma or other natives' - in much the same way as in Barotseland (Bulozi).

125 H.C. to C.O., 19 Feb. 1896 (H.C. 182/5).
of Khama's Country added to their administration, and (2) the 'Disputed Territory' removed from Khama's Country to their administration (because of mineral prospecting in the offing), and Khama compensated with land elsewhere.\textsuperscript{126}

Given the B.S.A. Company's arrogance at a time when even the future of its Royal Charter was in doubt, it is hardly surprising that the Colonial Office simply neglected to answer the letter of 31st March 1896. The Company wrote again on 31 August 1895 repeating their territorial ambitions, asking that all Reserve demarcation (on the basis of the 1895 Chamberlain settlement) be stopped until they had been cleared (sic) by the House of Commons' select committee of enquiry into their affairs, and complaining that their letter of March 31st had received no answer.\textsuperscript{127} The Colonial Office reply, sixteen days later, stated rather coolly that the Reserve demarcation had made progress and was going ahead, and added:

'As regards the hope, expressed in the concluding paragraph of your letter, that it should be clearly recognised that there is no change in the policy that sooner or later the Company should take over the Administration of the Protectorate, the Secretary of State cannot in present circumstances commit himself to any expression of opinion.'\textsuperscript{128}

Thereafter, though Company or Rhodesian claims to land rights and even to taking over the whole or half the Bechuanaland Protectorate or the Tati Concession were to continue up to 1966, the question of B.S.A. administration of the Protectorate was put into cold storage by the Colonial Office. The most cherished hopes, of 'West Charterland' over Ngamiland or of finally making the customs-administration lines equation, were finally dissipated by the High Commissioner's Proclamation No.8 of 1899 - which defined the border with Southern Rhodesia that still stands and which also gave it effect as the border of the South African customs union.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} Secretary B.S.A.Co. (London) to C.O., 31 March 1896 (Ibid).

\textsuperscript{127} (Ibid)

\textsuperscript{128} C.O. to B.S.A.Co., 16 Sept.1896 (Ibid).

\textsuperscript{129} Cf. C.O. 879/507, 552, 550, 8-374
Chapter 4: RAILWAY, RINDERPEST, AND THE NGWATO ECONOMY, 1896-7

In April 1899 the Bechuanaland News announced that 'The New Era in the Bechuanaland Protectorate' was beginning in that month. Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, had made three Proclamations (Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 1899) which, firstly, redefined the external borders of the Protectorate to squarely enclose the Tati Concession inside the Protectorate and the South African customs union; which, secondly, defined the internal boundaries of the Chiefs; and which, third and most important of all according to the newspaper, imposed 'Hut Tax' on the whole of the B.P. Fourteen years after the 'magnificent offer' of Khama to Warren, the era of regular colonial administration had apparently begun. Because of the troubled state of the subcontinent, it had taken over three years for the demarcation and taxation agreed upon in the 1895 Chamberlain Settlement to take form. Those years had also seen the demise of the Chartered Company from its former most favoured position with the Imperial Government, and the consequent extension of the Chamberlain Settlement terms to cover the whole of the Bechuanaland Protectorate as far north as the Chobe and as far west as the Pandamatenga Road. But it was to be another two or three years before the Protectorate was to settle down after the Anglo-Boer War, under the civilian administration of Ralph Champneys Williams as Resident Commissioner.¹

¹ 'We trust you; and we hope the men whom you appoint to carry out your will, will be strong and wise and just like yourself.'

So the Chiefs had written to Joseph Chamberlain, five days after the Settlement of 1895.² Hamilton Goold-Adams was therefore sent back to Bechuanaland to carry out the boundary demarcations involved in the settlement; but the Chiefs could hardly have been encouraged by the appointment of Francis James Newton as Resident Commissioner in that month, November 1895, to replace Sidney Shippard. Newton had once been Robinson's private secretary,

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¹ Bechuanaland News, 22 April 1899; see Chapter 8.
² Sebele, Bathoen, & Khama to C.O., 11 Nov.1895 (H.C.185/1).
and had been the man who 'whitewashed Mr. Rhodes and the Chartered Company over the Fort Victoria affair, which led to the outbreak of the Matabele War'. Newton was subsequently removed from his post in 1897 when he revealed his complicity in the Jameson Raid plans before the select committee of enquiry in London, and was replaced by Hamilton Goold-Adams as Resident Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Tati Concession.

Goold-Adams set about demarcating the eastern and western boundaries of Bathoen's Country (GaNgwaketse) at the beginning of 1896, with one waggon, 16 oxen, a watercart, Mr Worrall, and a Coloured interpreter. But in March 1896 his surveying party was ordered north to the more pressing problem of Barotseland and Portuguese West Africa (and the Caprivi Strip). St. Quentin, from British Bechuanaland, took over from Goold-Adams, while Panzera was sent north-west to Ngamiland. Panzera found that Khama's frontier with Sekgoma Letsholathebe was excessive under the Chamberlain Settlement terms. Khama suggested a compromise with a beacon at Makalamabedi, which was accepted by the High Commissioner in 1898, and only objected to too late by Sekgoma Letsholathebe after the 1899 Proclamation - the start of a bitter dispute between the two Chiefs. Meanwhile Sekgoma Letsholathebe was encouraged by Goold-Adams to establish territorial claims outside the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by claiming a frontier with Bulolozi irrespective of recent Portuguese and German colonial claims. Goold-Adams returned to Mafeking from his northward trip at the

3 Saturday Review, Vol.80, No.2092, 30 Nov.1895, p.716; Glass Matabele War, pp.113-111n.
5 Hamilton Goold-Adams South-Central Africa. A narrative of personal travels and experiences. An address Brisbane, Queensland: Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, 1915, pp.3-6; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.79-80
6 See C.O.879/574, reproduces two letters of 1891 and 1893 from Sekgoma Letsholathebe, Dithapo, and others, that the Tawana do not need a boundary with Khama, as "we are all one people". (pp.173-4). See also Chapter 5 below.
7 R.C. to H.C., 3 May 1899 - C.O.879/574, p.268.
beginning of June 1897, and soon took up the post of Resident Commissioner. Reserve boundaries were defined by Proclamation No.9 of 29 March 1899, and the international boundaries of the Protectorate by Proclamation No.8 of 28 March 1899, leaving an anomalous 'unassigned area' of a few square miles caught between the Bamangwato, Tati, and Southern Rhodesian boundaries, but within the Bechuanaland Protectorate, at the head of the Shashe river.

Proclamation No.10 of 30 March 1899 brought the imposition of 'Hut Tax' into force for the year ending March 31 1900. Collection was to follow procedure recommended by the Chiefs themselves in 1895. Within the assigned Reserves the Chiefs themselves were to take charge of tax-collection. They would first supply their Assistant Commissioner with a list of names of men liable to 'Hut Tax', and then later with a list of those who had paid up. The Chief would be rewarded for efficient tax collection by 10% of the total takings handed to him by the Assistant Commissioner. The 'Hut Tax' for each 12 months ending 31st March was to become due by July 1st of the preceding year, and after September 30th defaulters could be prosecuted. For the year ending 31st March 1900 the tax was 10/-, and receipts would be given to taxpayers in the form of metal tokens to be pinned to the 'hut'. (In operation the tax became not a tax on housing, but a poll tax on each male householder of adult age.) The tax had to be collected in cash, except in very exceptional cases where grain or livestock could be substituted. The insistence on cash payment was in accordance with the Chiefs' stated wish in 1895 to Chamberlain, but their corollary that local traders should be forbidden to operate on credit (slips


9 C.0.879/574, pp.218-221 (map, p.222). The border of the Tati Concession continued up the Shashe to its source at the watershed which was the B.P./S.R. border, while the Bamangwato Reserve border continued up the Shashe river to where the Francistown-Pandamatenga road crossed the river - at the Shashe Drift (sometimes confused with the drifts or fords on the Shashe where the Matlaputla-Tati or Palapye-Francistown roads crossed.) The 'unassigned area' briefly became an issue with the Tati Company in 1901 - C.0.879/694, pp.99-109. See also Chapter 9, re. Haskins & Co.
called 'good-fors') was not put into law.\textsuperscript{11}

The sum of £3816/17/3, representing the yield of almost seven and a half thousand tax-payers, was collected in Khamá's Country in 1899, and of that £3725/7/3 was collected in Palapye itself which was reckoned to have a total de jure population around 30,000.\textsuperscript{12} The tax yield from Khamá's Country, when compared with yields elsewhere and given its annual increase by up to 14½%, is an index not only of the efficiency of Khamaian government but also of cordial relations with the 'protecting' power. Indeed, when Hercules Robinson (Baron Rosmead) was replaced as High Commissioner by Alfred Milner, Chamberlain's nominee, the special relationship of Khamá with the Imperial Factor established in person by the events of 1895 was cemented, and maintained by every subsequent High Commissioner. Milner replied graciously to Khamá's letter of welcome, expressing the hope of visiting him soon - a hope that became reality in a few months, when Khamá greeted Milner at Palapye with thousands of armed Bamangwato on parade.\textsuperscript{13} Also particular care was taken by Chamberlain in 1896 over railway re-negotiations with Khamá, and the Resident Commissioner's intervention into the Sekgoma

\textsuperscript{10} C.0.879/574, pp.215-6. Cf. Cmd.4368 (Vol.X of 1933), Pim Report, pp.38-9. - which notes that a Chief was paid 10% if taxes were collected by October, and 5% thereafter.

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.74-5, & comment by Frederick Lugard The Dual Mandate Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1922, p.251. (Sebele etc. to C.O., 11 Nov.1895). Pim claimed that the 'payment of taxes is regarded in the B.P.7 as the hall-mark of citizenship, and not only the Chiefs but the mass of their people attach a great value to the maintenance of the degree of independence which still belongs to them, of which the collection of taxes through tribal agencies is an essential part.' (Cmd.4368, p.38.)

\textsuperscript{12} R.C. Williams to W.C. Willoughby, 3 March 1903 (W.C.W./S.O. 778) - containing a detailed breakdown of Hut Tax returns for 1899, 1900, 1901 and 1902. The figure of £3816/17/3 is confirmed by a note in Setswana ('Macli a Lekgetho Nea') also in W.C.W./S. 0.778. The sum actually collected by July 1st, 1899, was £3093/14/6, which exceeded the Assistant Commissioner's estimate by £600, and compared with £379 from Sebele (Kwena), £315 from Nokgoes (Lele), £292 from Linchwe (Kgatla), and only £98 from Bathoen (Ngwaketse). Khamá was therefore given £30% as his 10% share of the returns - C.0.879/574, pp.320-2. Apart from the 10/- Hut Tax on households, Khamá imposed his own tax of 5/- concurrently on members of the youngest regiment (Kobamotse of
Khama dispute in 1898 was tactful in its very tardiness.14

The relationship, apparently contractual, formalised between the three Chiefs and their Protecting Power by the Chamberlain Settlement of 1895 in London, was the implicit *magna carta* upon which the rule of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was based until the Watermeyer Judgment of 1936. In the case of Khama the relationship was particularly special and personal. When he died in 1923 there was widespread press speculation that somehow the Protectorate was automatically terminated. And as official memory of the 1895 visit grew dimmer, and a new generation of officials replaced the old, Khama had to become more explicit in reminding the B.P. Administration about the special relationship that existed. 'When I was in England....' became a favourite phrase in despatches. But that was to be fifteen or more years further on from 1895. Only a year or so after 1895 the special relationship had been clear enough.

'Railway works' was the convenient excuse for the preparation of the Jameson Raid plan to obtain the Transvaal border strip for the B.S.A. Company, and was the reason why Khama had conceded to Chamberlain (Who then gave it to the Company) the block of land ten to twelve miles deep along the Limpopo (Crocodile) river, which became known as the 'Crocodile Strip' and then as the 'Tuli Block'. Plunging as it did down towards sea-level while the railway to Bulawayo needed to climb higher gradually up to the highveld, it was manifestly unsuitable for Rhodesia's railway purposes, and was surely never seriously intended as a railway strip as Chamberlain had had to pretend it was.15

1894) who were not yet living separately from their parents' households. This was recognised by Proclamation No. 6 of 1900. Proclamation No. 17 of 1904 completed the conversion into a poll tax, by extending tax to all adult males who did not have households—though the official name 'Hut Tax' was not changed. (Schapera *Tribal Innovators*, p. 247.) See Also Note 10 above.

13 A. Milner to Khama, 8 June 1897 - K.P. (A) Bechuanaland News 6 Nov. 1897, p. 7.

14 See below and Chapter 6

15 Cf. Chapter 3, Note 99 above. Prior to September 1895 all
British cancellation in early 1896 of administrative concessions to the B.S.A. Company in the B.P. delayed the handing over of the Crocodile Strip to the Company for 'development' purposes until 1904.) Meanwhile in 1896 a 'new' (in fact the old and generally supposed) route for the railway had to be renegotiated with Khama, to run through his Country in the vicinity of Palapye from Mochudi in the south to the Tati Concession in the north.

On March 6th the High Commissioner wrote to Khama recommending the 'new' railway route, because the 'old' one would be uneconomic, and added that Earl Grey, the new Administrator of Mashonaland and Matabeleland (replacing Jameson), would negotiate with Khama for the route on his way north to take up his new position.16 Grey arrived in Palapye at the end of April, and had two long interviews with Khama. The Resident Commissioner, Frank Newton, had not been able to accompany Grey, but the new Assistant Commissioner at Palapye, John Anchitel Ashburnham, had been ordered 'to render every assistance'.17

'My fear that Khama would regard with suspicion any proposal coming from me as representing the Chartered Company has proved correct', wrote Earl Grey. Khama objected to Grey that Chamberlain had already settled the railway route; he had been told by the Queen not to sell off his land to whites; the new route would eat up good agricultural land; it would bring whites into the heart of his country; and,

'That this alteration of the London arrangement is regarded by him as the first step towards the breaking up of a settlement entered into by the Queen for his protection.'

Grey offered, in return for ownership of a 100 yard wide strip through Khama's Country, wells every ten miles for exclusive Bamangwato use; compensation of land in the Crocodile Strip; no buildings except those for railway purposes within the 100 yard strip; and that such a grant would not in any way prejudice the binding nature of the Chamberlain Settlement in London.

Sources had talked of the impending railway extension via Palapye up the established Road to the North - cf. Chapter 3, Note 63 above. The Company and the British Government
Khama replied that he would write to Chamberlain ("Mr Chamberlain is my defender! He is my mouth"). Grey rushed north to trouble-retain Rhodesia, left his brother-in-law C.W. Benson at Palapye to carry on negotiations, and appealed for Imperial assistance in pressurising Khama to accept the new railway strip.

Khama then wrote to Chamberlain saying that he could do nothing without the advice of his 'defender', whose wife he greeted cordially at the end of the letter. He summarised his fears about the 'new' railway route:

'I fear that it will lead to new discussions about the country & I am old & wish to spend the remaining days in peace & without discussion. You have given me my boundaries and I know them. They are firmly fixed because they were fixed by you. I cannot do anything that will open questions that you have settled... But I do not wish to hinder the railway nor to give the Coy. unnecessary trouble...Only I say let the Queen's Great Officer do this that it may be done also in the way that makes no after questions.'

He rejected any form of bargain, involving the provision of wells or land in the Crocodile Strip, with the Company, but in effect did insist on a quid pro quo in the form of the Company keeping its promise to accommodate Bo-Raditladi in its own territory. 19

reverted back to the Palapye route immediately the Jameson Raid was over - cf. C.O. to B.S.A., 24 Jan.1896 & 1 Feb.1896 (H.C.182/5). See Chapter 3, Note 122 above.

16 H.C. to Khama, 6 March 1896 (ibid).

17 Grey (Mafeking) to H.C., 18 April 1896; H.C. to Grey 18 April 1896 (ibid).

18 Grey (Palapye) to H.C., 26 April 1896 (ibid).

19 Khama to Chamberlain, 28 April 1896 (quoted in R.C. to H.C., 29 April 1896 - ibid. S. Ratshosa 'My Book', pp.253-5, quotes a slightly different version of the letter.) The British Government had been willing to allow the Crocodile Strip to revert to Khama's administration (C.O. to H.C., 1 Feb. 1896; H.C. to R.C., 6 March 1896; C.O. to B.S.A., 7 Feb.1896), but there is no record that this was known to Khama, and he chose to press the Bo-Raditladi land issue (cf. Chapter 3, Notes 113-5). The question of the Crocodile Strip remained fallow until 1904, though it was demarcated later in 1896 - St. Quentin (Gaberones) to R.C., 23 Sept.1896 (ibid).
The Company, anxious to build the railway to Bulawayo as quickly as possible, fell in with Khama's insistence. Grey telegraphed the High Commissioner on May 4th that Rhodes said,

'that though the settlement agreed to in London was not that which he understood would be made when he gave Khama the promise to take Radicladi, he undertakes to provide for Radicladi & thus relieve Khama.'

Grey added a rather vain hope: 'Impress on Khama that this is another proof of Rhodes keeping his word.' 20 Even Chamberlain was sceptical without a firmer guarantee about Rhodes' promise on the score of Bo-Raditladi. But he told the High Commissioner to tell Khama '...that I regard His Lordship [Grey] as a friend of Khama's, and that the latter should put the most favourable construction on His Lordship's proposals.' 21 As soon as he had received the go-ahead from his 'defender' in London, Khama was prepared to sign the new railway agreement, which Benson had left with Ashburnham. 22

The 'Memorandum of Agreement' signed by Khama on 14 May 1896 agreed to 'Grant Sell and Convey' a 100 yard strip for the railway, which the Company would construct 'with all convenient speed', and, when completed, would fence on both sides and provide with 'such crossings as Khama may desire'. 23

By June 1st, 1896, the only sign of the approaching line had been a surveyor who rode north through Palapye, and there had been no more systematic survey than that. But it was already planned to run the line from Mochudi into Khama's Country about ten miles west of the Ngotwane river in the vicinity of Lokgalo, via the Bongwapitse pan to within twelve and twenty miles west

20 Grey to H.C., 4 May 1896 (ibid).
21 Chamberlain to H.C., 10 May 1896 (ibid).
22 A.C. Palapye to R.C., 14 May 1896 (ibid).
of Palapye, and thence north leaving Macloutsie Camp forty or fifty miles to the west. The contract of the Bechuanaland Railway Company (a B.S.A. subsidiary) with Harold Pauling for construction to Palapye had already been signed. The building of the railway proceeded with remarkable speed, the last four hundred miles of track being laid in three hundred days. The track reached Mahalapye on January 20th 1897, and Bulawayo on October 19th. It crossed the Lotsane river 14 miles west of Palapye, at the drift on the old Shoshong-Tati road, where a station was erected called Palapye Road - which today is known simply as Palapye since Old Palapye had been abandoned for seventy years.

The threat to Khamaian 'Home Rule' had been deflected, but the railway gave rise to secondary problems of land and liquor for Khama. The liquor question arose because alcoholic refreshments at 'canteens' were to have been made available to passengers at stations within Khama's Country. Khama wrote to his supporters, led by the Duke of Westminster, in the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee of London:

24 W.C. Willoughby (Palapye) to L.M.S., 1 June 1896 (Box 53). The Bechuanaland Railway Company was floated in September 1896 in London: £900,000 of the required £1,300,000 share capital was subscribed by 'public' shareholders within two weeks. Saturday Review, Vol.80, No.2083, 28 Sept.1895, pp.400-1. The Company changed its name to Rhodesia Railways Ltd. in May 1899 - C.0.879/574, p.338. Harold Pauling was the cousin and partner of George Pauling and Henry Pauling, brothers involved in the Wood, Francis, and Chapman affair of 1888 - C.5524, p.32; George Pauling (ed. David Buchan) The Chronicles of a Contractor London: Constable, 1926, pp.86-7.

25 Rail services to Palapye Road from the south began on July 1st. African Review, Vol.VIII (1896), p.427; Vol.IX (1896), p.265. Also W.C. Willoughby Native Life of the Transvaal Border London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1900, p.13; W.C. Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Jan.1897 (Box 54); Pauling Contract p.160. 4th November is also given as the date when the railway (rail services?) reached Bulawayo - W.H. Brown Frontier, p.419. The railway was heavily subsidised by the B.P. administration by sums up to £20,000 p.a. until 1908-9.
'And I cause you to know that we have seen the path of the train in our land, and concerning the path of the train I rejoice exceedingly. But I say, concerning the path of the train, there is something in it which I do not like among you; it is the little houses which will be in the path to sell liquor in them. I do not like them, for my people will buy liquor in them, and I say, help me in this matter, for it is a thing which will kill the nation. And I cause you to know, because you are people who do not like nations to be destroyed in the land.'

Khama eventually agreed in 1897 with the High Commissioner that there should be one liquor licence, at Palapye Road, for off-counter (and no off-licence) sales to whites only. The licence was named Ellard. Otherwise Cape Colony bye-laws were to apply to the railway strip. But in 1898, because the railway found Mahalapye a more convenient coaling and watering station half-way between Mafeking and Bulawayo than Palapye Road, another liquor licence was granted to J.D. Logan for Mahalapye station and Ellard's at Palapye Road was still renewed.

The loss of Ngwato jurisdiction within the railway strip also gave a sanctuary to Bamangwato vagrants and criminals from the rule of the Chief. This necessitated the position where by September 1897 Khama had to apply to his Assistant Commissioner to apply to the Police at Palapye Road station for the extradition of such characters. Squatters within the railway strip outside Ngwato jurisdiction produced problems that were only partly solved by the appointment of railway station headmen after 1902.

Rhodesia Railways, as the Bechuanaland Railway Company became known, soon found the 100 yard strip through Khama's Country insufficient for 'protecting' water supplies from pollution at the three rivers of Magalapswe (Mahalapye station), Lotsane (Palapye Road station), and Shashe (Shashi station). So in early 1898 the Railways applied for extra land grants in these

26 Times, i Feb. 1897, p. 10 col. 3; H.C. Thomson Rhodesia pp. 249-50
28 A.C. Palapye to O.C., B.S.A.P., Palapye Station, 16 Sept. 1897 (B.N.A.-B.P.3).
these places. Goold-Adams, the Resident Commissioner, wanted Khama to grant the land either freehold or on 20-year tenure. Ashburnham pointed out to Khama that the Railways could not force him to grant them tenure, and all that Khama and two Ngwato notables did was to sign the plans of the Railways for use of the waters in the three areas - an approval similar to that whereby the Chief granted tenure at his will to anyone taking up a cattle-post or agricultural lands. In 1901 the Railways drew up new charts of their three claims, and the High Commissioner approved 'transfer' to the Company as long as Khama's written consent was obtained. The matter was not pursued until 1906 when the Railways sought to establish their private titles to the areas. Khama was asked to sign title deeds. He agreed to sign deeds granting the Railways freehold tenure of a triangle of 22 morgen at Shashi station, because the waters of the Shashe being on the border of his Reserve were not 'his'. But he refused to sign anything more on the Magalapswe or Lotsane areas. He recalled singing other plans in 1898, but accused the Railways of having fabricated the Lotsane grant at Palapye Road. The Chartered Company, he said, were always trying to cheat him. They still had not fenced the 100 yard strip as promised. So the Resident Commissioner, Panzera, 'threw the book' at the Bamangwato - namely section 3 of Proclamation No. 25 of 1896,
'saying that it was the arrangement which had been come to between their Chief and the Secy. of State in England on the occasion when he was at home (sic) as the representative of the whole Nation and if they disputed that fact now, then they would be going back on their own words which were spoken by their Chief and representative in 1896.' 34

Khama was again asked to sign deeds granting the Magalapswe and Lotsane areas to the Railways, and again refused, saying that the plans he had signed in 1898 were quite sufficient, and,

"as' I have signed, let the Railway Company take the land and fence it in, but I never wish to have any dealings with the Chartered Company again." 35

Khama's blank refusal resulted in Panzera's recommending that the signed plans of 1898, plus his Assistant Commissioner's written certificate of interview involving Khama's verbal agreement not to interfere with the Railways' demarcation of the areas, should be sufficient for Government to issue titles to Rhodesia Railways. 36 The Colonial Office stipulated that the Magalapswe and Lotsane grants should be for railway purposes only (including sidings), and should revert to the Bamangwato if ever abandoned. By Proclamation No.4 of 1908 the Railways were given to understand that they only had full title to Shashi station. The arrangement over Mahalapye and Palapye Road stations was given legal effect by Proclamation No.19 of 1908. 37 But this final legal settlement of the railway issue was to be by no means the last brush of Khama with the Chartered Company and all its works.

34 Ag.A.C. Francistown to Govt.Sec., 30 Jan.1907 (ibid).
35 Statement of Daniel, 8 April 1907; Certificate of R.M. Daniel, 1 May 1907 (ibid).
36 R.C. to H.C., 11 May 1907 (ibid).
37 C.O. to H.C., 15 Aug.1907; Rhodesia Railways resident engineer, Mafeking, to Govt.Sec., 13 Jan.1898 (ibid). Mahalapye grew into the major railway centre of the B.P., while Palapye Road was nothing more than the railhead for the Ngwato capital. The land tenure situation at Shashi station made it an anomalous 'no-man's-land' between Tati and Bamangwato territory where already by 1920 curio-sellers had begun to flourish; and Khurutshe were later to seek refuge there from Tshekedi.
The railway and the rinderpest (hololwane) between them, in the years 1896 and 1897, effectively stunted the indigenous economic growth which had characterised the Bamangwato in the eyes of passing travellers in the later 1880s and early 1890s. Together they removed the carrying trade and depleted the cash reserves that had made possible the elements of a cash-cropping capitalist economy, in turn built on the remnants of the trade in hunting produce that had been the economic dynamic of the Ngwato state's expansion. The boom economy of the Road to the North had also started the transformation of bomonnaKgosi (the political elite) into a petty bourgeoisie. The boom ended with the railway if not with rinderpest. Economic prosperity had some revival during the Anglo-Boer War, but the peace thereafter saw the emergence of 'the 1910-1961 Southern African state system', in which the Bechuanaland Protectorate had a subordinate role maintained by economic as well as political checks. There was no going back to the economic conditions described by the first annual report, for 1893-4, of the Assistant Commissioner for the Northern Protectorate, J.S. Moffat. He had remarked how the ivory trade was 'virtually extinct' as well as the export of ostrich feathers...

'in fact the whole of what used to be the staple trade, the produce of the chase, is now a diminishing quantity. The traffic in cattle and hides, and in native corn (maize) is now pretty well all that remains. Something is done in the way of transport riding, and this may settle into an industry, so long as there is no railway to connect Matabeleland with the present terminus at Mafeking. There is a very large number of wagons now in the possession of the tribe, and there will be constant progress in that direction... As years go on, the Protectorate may be turned to account for cattle-ranching, that is, after the expenditure of large

38 See Chapter 1 above, passim.

39 See Chapters 6, 7 & 10 below. The boom economy was noted by J.D. Hepburn in January 1891 in these terms: 'The new movement towards Mashonaland is like a flood rising rapidly. Probably no movement in South Africa has ever approached it. Transport, drivers' wages, wagons, oxen, everything is in an advancing market.' (J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.541.)

40 Parsons 'The catspaw and the chestnuts', p.6.
sums in the making of dams or sinking of wells, but at present it is native territory and the question is not a practical one.'

Equating as he did, 'development' with 'European encroachment', J.S. Moffat looked forward, as future critics of Khama from W.C. Willoughby to Emmanuel Gluckmann were to do, to an eventually united South Africa, in which black would have 'justice' but the predominant economic and cultural values would be those of white settlerdom:

'No serious trouble may be apprehended so long as we leave the people /Bamangwato/ and the Chief /Khama/ to manage their own affairs and do not worry them on the land question. If we are content to preserve the status quo as far as possible, to allow the people to live in their own way - which does us no harm, for they are perfectly inoffensive neighbours, and though in a low, I might almost say squalid, grade of civilization, yet they are far from being savage - there is no reason why things should not tend to a peaceful absorption eventually into the South African Dominion of the future.'

Moffat's second and last annual report, of 1894-5, for the Northern Protectorate was more positive about both the health of present economic and political conditions, and the twist of future prospects which could not support 'An independent chieftainship side by side with British protection.'

'Commercially the year has been fairly prosperous. A large amount of money is being earned by the natives in the carrying trade between this place and Bulawayo. There has been very little serious crime...The principal trouble has been in the matter of cattle and horse stealing carried on mainly by white men going through the country on their way to and from Matabeleland, and, unfortunately, these cases do not come to light until the offender is far beyond the reach of the law...

The Chief Khama has shown a steady disposition in carrying out the wishes of the Government...The present position is necessarily transitional, and it is to be hoped will not long be continued, as so much depends on the personal attitude of the Chief.'

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Bamangwato participation in the market economy was more limited than that of Southern Tswana groups, who supplied goods and services to Kimberley (as indicated by Saker and Aldridge) or to Mafeking. But there is good reason to suppose that in the 1890s such participation was greater among the Bamangwato than anywhere else in the Protectorate. Palapye had succeeded Shoshong as the commercial emporium for the North, and was the half-way house of the vastly increased waggon trade between Mafeking and Bulawayo. Benefit from the market economy in cash income, converted into private or 'public' possessions, came to Bamangwato in two forms - firstly by direct indigenous participation in the market, and secondly by indirect generation of cash flow by the presence of trading companies based on Palapye and Macloutsie Camp.

Direct participation in the market economy was mainly by employment (or engagement of capital) in waggoning itself. Some Bamangwato, like Griqua or Tlhaping from the south, were employed by whites as drivers and waggoners on the long distance routes which had once stretched as far as Port Elizabeth. Other Bamangwato were waggon owners and operators themselves. Khama himself, both by virtue of being Chief and by dint of personality, was the first and foremost of these waggon owners. By a system not unlike the old mafhisa system of lending out cattle to clients (or the newer system of giving guns to Sarwa hunters), the Chief lent out waggons and ploughs to individuals or families. Notables from among royalty and even 'settler' headmen (especially the Khurutshe) graduated to owning and operating their own waggons - which Khama had had to protest in 1890 and 1893 were not 'his' to control. These Bamangwato owners also probably lent out their waggons in turn to subordinates on a mafhisa or share-cropping system. There were


43 See above Chapter 1, Note 47, re. social climbing and adaption through waggoning.

considerable numbers of waggons among the Bamangwato in the 1890s: at least twenty were risked on the 1890 'Pioneer Column', and thirty on the 1893 Imperial Column in Matabeleland; Sekgoma Khama had no less than six waggons with him while out hunting in June 1895. By 1921 there were 1025 waggons among the Bamangwato. It was probably waggoning that gave certain families of notables among the Bamangwato a degree of financial independence that enabled them to push their sons up the scales of education as far as Lovedale.Photographs of people in the 1890s show the widespread adoption of 'Western' clothing among the Bamangwato to quite lowly levels of society, which indicates a flow of cash deeper than the families of the upper crust. As W.C. Willoughby remarked in 1896 when the rinderpest came:

'Many relied on transport riding for the money wherewith to buy books and clothing, and, some few of our people looked upon it as their trade.'

Besides waggoning, the other services and goods offered by the Bamangwato which enabled them to enter the market economy were cattle and agricultural production, various services to tourists or travellers, the hunting trade, and the export of labour itself.

Cattle - in the form of meat and hides, but also livestock for draught and for export on the hoof - were the most important local product offered to the waggon-trade. The evidence suggests

45 See above Chapter 3, notes 16 & 33.

46 Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, pp.61-2; H. Goold-Adams in Wills & Collingridge Downfall of Lobengula, p.217; Bertrand Kingdom of the Barotsi, p.49. Re: Lovedale and the Bamangwato see Chapter 7.

47 Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 April 1896 (Box 52). Mathers (Zambesia, p.129) noted that by 1891 all middle and upper class (sic) Bamangwato dressed in European clothes. Schulz and Hammer (The New Africa, p.13) noted in 1894 that the upper class now dressed in tweed and looked down on previously fashionable mole-skin. A Mafeking trader (J. Gerrans) observed: 'the traders, if only they had the grace to confess it, have the best reason to be gratified by the progress of Christianity, for as soon as a native becomes a Christian he begins to want to improve his home and to wear better clothing, and thus the demand for foreign goods is greatly stimulated. In this way, British and other manufacturers reap a rich harvest through the work of the Christian missionary.' (L.M.S. Chronicle, Vol.11, No.131 (Nov.1902), pp.264-5).
that all transactions involving cattle were channelled through the Chief and/or the resident traders of Palapye, rather than direct to travellers. The Chief was the major cattle-owner (indeed it was Khama's 'bank account' which he claimed to have started from scratch)\(^48\), and was also famous as a supplier of 'salted' (immunised, in theory) cattle and as a bloodstock breeder even of horses.\(^49\) Agricultural production was limited by poor rainfall and soils, but new agricultural technology in the form of ploughs (5491 among the Bamangwato by 1921) and improved transport, plus the agricultural specialisation of 'Kalanga' groups, seems to have made for some surplus that could be sold to travellers at Palapye, generally referred to as 'corn' (i.e. maize or sorghum). There is some evidence also of the seasonal sales of milk, melon, sweet reed and other surpluses.\(^50\)

Services offered to tourists and travellers in exchange for cash in Bamangwato country included the provision of guides, the maintenance of waggons which may have employed some indigenous blacksmiths and wheelwrights, prostitution and forms of entertainment, some sale of handicrafts (notably karosses) and, after 1895, the sale of sorghum-beer. The sale of water was

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\(^{48}\) See above Chapter 1; \& Parsons The Word, p.3


\(^{50}\) A journalistic book published in 1891 reported of Palapye: 'Khama is planting an immense area with mealies, in order to meet the wants of the Europeans expected on their way to Mashonaland... Fruit-growing, i.e. European fruit-growing, is being introduced on a small scale, and Mr Gifford, of the Exploring Company, has done something to awaken the native mind to the merits of the potato.' Mathers Zambesia, P.1371. The same source (ibid. p.137) describes the Tswapong area around Palapye as 'a most fertile and well-watered area', and added (p.137) that Shoshong had been 'the great mart for poultry'. Back in 1873 people around Palapye had been prepared to sell goat's milk to travellers by barter for tobacco - Oates Matabeleland, p.23. By 1901 Khama (though of course a non-smoker himself) is said to have had a tobacco plantation near Palapye - 'A British Official' 'In Khama's Country, Batsuanaland Protectorate. Station Studies III' Monthly Review, Vol.7 (June 1902), p.112. In 1894 a Palapye trader claimed that the Bamangwato had sold at least 1000 bags of grain to whites in the previous 6 years (Letter from 'Veritas' in Cape Times Weekly Edition, 31 Oct.1894). That would represent over £1,000 in prices paid to producers.
generally banned, and the sale of plots for accommodation was absolutely banned in order to prevent claims to water or land rights by aliens. However the use of pasturage and firewood, being unrestricted and free, was much to the detriment of the ecology of the Palapye area.51

Though always declining in terms of quantity, and undermined by the commercial farming of ostriches in the south, hunting produce was still an important commodity of exchange for cash. Here again Khama appears to have had the lion's share, if not a monopoly, in the export of ivory and feathers. It is not clear whether other notables who owned 'serfs' could employ them in hunting for profit as well as in cattle-herding.

Besides employment in the waggon trade or as menials in general retail business, Bamangwato labour had been exported to the diamond fields of Kimberley since the 1870s, though numbers do not appear to have been high and many recruits were Sarwa sent by notable families rather than from the upper echelons themselves.52 The Tati mines appear to have recruited from the


52 See above Chapter 1, Note 97; Schapera Migrant Labour and Tribal Life. A study of conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate London: Oxford University Press 1947, pp.25-6; Gillmore Great Thirst Land, pp. 186-7 (re. Kalanga labour mobility in 1870s). Also personal communication with Mr. Nicholas Hyman (School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London). One Mongwato who migrated to Kimberley in its early days was the father of the late Professor Z.K. Matthews - cf. Kutlwano, Vol.10, No.3 (August 1971), p.12.
north, from Matabeleland and Buluizi, rather than from the south. The employment of Bamangwato in skilled military and para-military roles by the B.S.A. Company and Imperial authorities in 1890 and 1893 has been noted already, as has their employment in setting up the telegraph route from Palla to Palapye to Macloutsie to Tuli. There was also some employment in domestic capacities both by white residents in the country, and by some travellers who may have 'exported' such labour with them.

Among the Southern Tswana employment for cash in the capitalist market economy may have weakened ties with their Chiefs. But the opposite appears to have been the case, with the exception of notable families, among the Bamangwato. Apart from the new basis on which Khama had put the Chiefship on the assumption of office, Khama maintained and extended his patronage of all classes, aristocrat, commoner, settler, and serf, by sharing out the benefits of his business acumen in terms of waggons, ploughs, wells, educational facilities, and relief to the destitute. His own personal life was modest: besides well-

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53 'Zambesi boys' were preferred most and Bamangwato least by the Tati mines: the mines closed in October 1896 because of the rinderpest and Ndebele revolt, having employed 1500 Africans and accommodated 250 whites - C.E. Fripp 'Recent travels in Rhodesia and British Bechuanaland' Journal of the Society of Arts (London: Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce), Vol.45, No.2318 (23 April 1897), pp.519-20. The main Tati mine after 1891 was the Monarch, for which Francistown was built as railhead station - Cf. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.85-8 - after T.P. Patterson 'The story of the Tati concession. A link with Lobengula, King of the Matabele' South Africa (London), 8 July 1950; Hugh Marshall Hole 'Gold in the Tati Territory' Gold Mining Record, December 1935.

54 See above Chapter 3, Notes 10-11, 16 & 25 ff. When 'many hundreds' of telegraph workers were paid off at Palapye on 14th November 1891, Randolph Churchill (Men, Mines, and Animals in South Africa London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 3rd edn.1893, p.319) noted that they were paid in cash - up to £150 for a sub-chief - much of which was then spent in the B.T.A. store.

55 Cf. Leonard How We Made Rhodesia, pp.46-7. But in general whites appear to have complained that Bamangwato were too anxious to work for themselves and not for whites - cf. Fripp 'Recent travels', p.520.

56 Saker & Aldridge 'Langeberg', p.304 - because the employment
tailed suits for himself and his family, he lived all his life within a predominantly traditional Tswana cultural milieu, in terms of architecture and diet, language and daily routine.

The white traders were subject to the checks and predominant patronage of Khama as controller and provider of the state. The Chief even refused to rent from traders so that he could dismiss them at will, though Imperial over-rule and its licensing system were to partially invalidate this system in the second decade of the twentieth century. Khama's maintenance of business confidence can be seen in a story told to the Captain of the Tantallon Castle on which Khama travelled to England. Khama sold a trader a horse. The price was high but the trader paid because the horse was 'salted' against lung-sickness, and the Chief gave a year's guarantee against the disease. Three weeks later the horse died of colic. Khama gave the trader his money back; but the trader refused to accept the refund because the horse had not died of lung-sickness. When the trader demurred, Khama threatened him that unless he accepted the money he must leave the Country for ever. 'And the trader had to take it because he loved the Chief'. Few businessmen can have gone to such lengths to ensure that no one could impute dishonesty against them!

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was in peasant production, which took people away from the Chief's town to live more permanently on 'the lands'.

57 Captain J.C. Robinson, in Outward Bound (London), Vol.3, No.31 (April 1923), p.485-6. It was often remarked how Khama preferred to live within housing of indigenous design - cf. Lloyd Three Great African Chiefs, p.115 - but it seems that at Palapye (as later at Serowe) the Chief also had iron-roofed, brick-built, accommodation of 'European' type - Fripp Recent travels', p.520; L.M.S. Chronicle, Vol.74 (June 1914), pp. 121-2. Khama's manner of dress (cf. Parsons The Word, Note 3 re. 1852) was the subject of much comment. 'If Khama has a vice it is that of dress', remarked J.T. Bent (Ruined Cities, p.28). Mrs. Knight-Bruce (The Story of an African Chief: Being the life of Khama London: Kegan Paul, etc., 1893, p.64) congratulated Khama on his good taste: 'He dresses in plain grey suits, and does not add the peacock feather or the pink ribbon that a native loves to put on his dull European garments'. The St. James's Gazette ('Trinity of dusky kings. Station platform interview with Khama', 7 Sept.1895) remarked how well-dressed Khama was, 'for a Cape tailor who knew how to use the shears had been at work upon his garb and had turned him out so that he should not disgrace the coloured population of Bloomsbury and Bayswater.'
'Commercially and politically in the world of Africa', remarked Khama's first biographer of 1889, 'he had become an interesting figure'. The development of the elements of a cash economy among the Bamangwato in the 1890s is not only to be explained by the commercial scramble for the North, or by the crucial role of the Chief: it was also a reflection of the potentialities of the Tswana politico-economic system, especially in the concentration of population at a market-centre. The reputation of both Khama and his people was later, as we shall see, to change to one of general conservatism, but while black and white interests coincided in the boom years of Palapye, contemporaneous white observers of the Bamangwato usually indulged in characteristic over-estimation of the people — 'Of all South African natives the Bechuana seems to adapt himself most quickly and most completely to our civilization', is but one example.

Such views tended to colour white observations of Tswana life, and particularly of the new capital of Palapye, as can be seen in a famous article which appeared in the Cape Argus of 23rd October 1890 headlined 'Palapye the Wondrous':

'We often speak of Kimberley and Johannesburg, as the Americans used to speak of Chicago, as wonderful cities for their age. In my opinion, King Khama's Bechuana city...is a city not one whit less wonderful than either. Palapye the Wondrous I christen it...20 square miles of ground, holding some 30,000 inhabitants; yet less than fifteen months ago there was no such place as Palapye in existence.'

The Cape Argus correspondent continued with a description of the view from the mission station a mile away on the side of a hill:

'From the house door you look over the city — or rather the group of five villages which together form this well-designed Palapye, to a picturesque high hill, which stands solitary at the gates like Arthur's Seat and the Lion at Edinburgh; and away beyond your eye surveys a vast plain, almost covered with trees and bush, the greens, and browns, and yellows of which merge finally in the blue of the distant horizon, where rise groups of rugged mountains, and at regular intervals other

58 L. Knight-Bruce 'Khame', p.453 — see also Parsons "Image" p.44.

mountains, solitary, and resembling, as they stand out blue against the sky, a row of Egyptian pyramids.' 60

A white resident at Palapye, writing at about the same time, was more sober in his estimate of the civic virtues of Palapye:

'The town is divided into many parishes, each ruled over by a headman, who is responsible for its morals and politics; and if the chief has any reason to suppose things are not as they should be, the entire parish is pulled down or burnt, and re-erected on another spot more under his personal supervision... The parishes are enclosed by circular fences, and, ranged round /inside/ them, are a number of large circular huts, so arranged as to leave a large open space in the centre. In the middle of this there is a semi-circular screen, erected to keep off the prevailing wind, and in this, around a fire, which is generally burning in the cold weather, the parish council and male gossips assemble... each parish enclosure has but a single opening... Probably no town is kept in order with so slight a visible show of authority, for during the some five-and-twenty years Khama has ruled, he has only twice inflicted capital punishment.' 61

A later traveller added:

'It will be at least a week before you realise what an orderly city this is; how its House of Parliament and the mansions of the hereditary chief determine the arrangement of its wards and thoroughfares, and stand themselves for that harmonious unity of law and order....' 62

The energies of Khama in the great Kgotla, the parliament referred to, at the centre of the many 'parish councils', were very evident. His everyday routine in the morning was to sit in the clean brushed Kgotla and conduct regular administration - dispensing justice, receiving all visitors to town, and receiving constant intelligence reports from every corner of

60 Cape Argus, 23 Oct. 1890 - quoted in J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp. 313-21; Lloyd Three Great African Chiefs, pp. 119-6.


Gamangwato carried in by bearers with cleft-sticks (sic). 63 Theodore Bent, the orientalist on his way to investigate Zimbabwe, vividly portrayed Khama's paternalist attitude to his people:

'Khama pervades everything in his town. He is always on horseback, visiting the fields, the stores, and the outlying kraals. He has a word for everyone; he calls every woman 'my daughter' and every man 'my son'; he pats little children on the head...' 64

However to other observers, notably the Frenchman Lionel Décéle, the organization of Palapye under Khama ('Self asserting, intensely fond of power') smacked too much of teetotal theocracy, with laws enforced by 'a most elaborate form of espionage' with paid informers. No Mongwato, claimed Décéle, was allowed to travel alone, and 'everyone fears his neighbour in Khama's Country'. 65 Other criticisms of Palapye centred on bad hygiene and prostitution - 'the most awful bed of pestilence throughout Africa. Imagine 15,000 people huddled up together on a swampy plateau with sanitary arrangements consisting of holes dug in the ground', wrote the African Correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette during the Chiefs' visit to Britain. 66 The town had become a hotbed of venereal disease 67, for as a white 'Pioneer' of 1890 remarked of Bamangwato women:

63 Knight-Bruce 'Khamé', p.462; Harman 'Khamaland', p.289 (also mentioning Khama's police - cf. above Chapter II, note 149


65 Décéle Three Years, pp.34-5. (Cf. above Chapter 3, Notes 43 & 45; Parsons "Image", p.48.)

66 'Another view of Khama: his country and people.' From our African correspondent' Pall Mall Gazette, 10 Sept.1895 - apparently using observations of James Johnston Reality Versus Romance in South Central Africa (London: Hodder & Stoughton,1893) which are harsher than Johnston's praise of Khama before the 'desertion' incident of 1893 - see Parsons "Image", p.46.
'Stupid, greasy, bestial though these women were, some of our men found them so attractive.'

In reply to a lady interviewer, Khama had painted a much rosier picture of the role of Bamangwato women in this period of social change:

"One thing I can reply is since the missionaries have taught us that our wives are our equals, we no longer expect them to dig. It is a sure sign of advance when you see the men use the ploughs which have come to us from Sweden and America; the men are proud to drive two oxen in a plough. A little Bechuana boy is said to have described his home as a place where women work and men dress their hair and fight and talk; but this is no longer true. This generation of women can many of them cut out dresses and sew for' themselves, and sew for their husbands as well."

INTERVIEWER: "Have they then made as much progress as the men?"

KHAMA: "No, I fear not, they have not as much zeal as the men. I can't tell you why, but they look to see what the men do, and then follow them. I wish they did learn more to spin and weave, but they mostly string beads."

INTERVIEWER: "But do you give them the same chance as yourselves?"

KHAMA: "Perhaps not, but I have heard even missionaries say that it were better the women still worked in the field than be idle at home. There is much to be done yet for them."

67 J. Johnston Reality Versus Romance, Chap. 9 (Johnston was a medical doctor from Jamaica). Cf. Tabler Far Interior, p. 20; D. Livingstone Missionary Travels, p. 113. These diseases had been introduced from the south and possibly the west in the first half of the 19th century, and were rife among the Lozi by 1853. But it was the development of Kimberley and its labour/trade routes that produced epidemic conditions - personal communication, Mrs. Caroline Dennis (London School of Economics). In a letter of 1912 written on Khama's behalf expressing faith in patent medicine which has cured many of his people, the disease referred to is implied to be venereal - Khama (per G.K.S.) to Rev. E. Noel (Zeerust), 25 May 1912: K.P. Out-Corr. March-Sept. 1912.

68 Kemp Black Frontiers, p. 63 - though the whole account is incredibly melodramatic, with half the 'Pioneers' having died of malaria, dysentry, and women, by the time the Column reached Tuli. 'A British Official' ('Khama's Country', p. 112) was much taken with the 'marvellous strength and beautiful carriage' of Bamangwato women.
This then was the context in which 'white Civilization' appeared to flourish in the Palapye of the 1890s. It was fundamentally, besides the adoption of Christianity as the state religion of the political elite, a situation in which white Commerce flourished. When Khama moved his capital from Shoshong to Palapye in 1889 he took care to see that the white commercial community was well integrated into the economic organization of the state, and socially segregated from the rest of the town. As his 1889 biographer remarked of Khama, 'Lately he has been regulating Bamangwato commerce in a spirit that reminds one of early Tudor statutes; is it a phase growing nations must go through?'  

By a notice of 28th June 1888, in efforts 'to change the system of barter for cash', Khama had finally forbidden traders to give credit for goods; offending traders were to be banished.

69 'King Khama interviewed by a lady. Three African chiefs on the evil of drink. Christianity and native wives' Christian World, 12 Sept. 1895. Khama had improved the legal position of women by allowing them to appear in court to plead cases, awarding them damages in divorce cases, and (by 1889) allowing daughters to inherit from their fathers' estates. It is also possible to see the abolition of bogadi soon after 1875, the denunciation of the levirate, the lapse of the sororate, and the discouragement (and partial abolition after 1896) of polygamy and concubinage, as improvements in women's rights during Khama's reign - Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.93, 135-45 & 173. However girls could not get damages for more than one paternity suit; were restricted from using the railway alone; and could be beaten in kgotla - ibid, pp.161, 174, & 222. Women were not allowed to participate in kgotla assemblies as elders, and Harman in 1892 contradicted stories of prostitution with the claim that women were not allowed outside their respective wards at night ('Khamaland', pp.288-9). Randolph Churchill (Men, Mines, and Animals, p.319) reported that 'Constant raids by Khama's police, sometimes led by Khama himself, swoop down on all prostitutes and immoral persons, who are forthwith banished by Khama'.

70 Knight-Bruce 'Khame', p.461.

71 Ibid.

(However the assumption of British control over traders after 1891 re-introduced the problem, and gave rise to the much disputed question between Chiefs and the Administration of 'good-fors'). At the same time Khama fixed minimum prices for Bamangwato produce purchased by traders—goats 10/- and sheep 15/- a head. As has already been noted, Khama's fervour as a mercantalist prince was nothing new but stemmed from 1876.

Khama had had his confrontations with the white commercial community in 1878 and in the events with Wood, Francis, and Chapman, leading to the Grobler incident in 1888. The still uneasy relationship between Chief and traders, and the maintenance of equilibrium at least during the boom period of the northern trade by Khama's force of personality can be seen at Palapye on Khama's departure for, and arrival back from, Britain. On his departure in June 1895 Khama was presented with an illuminated, loyal address by 46 white residents of the town, and some traders were conspicuous in their support of the Chief against B.S.A. monopolism. On his return in January 1895, Khama was again presented with such an address by nearly all the traders, who met him outside town at the Lokakulwe spruit, and Mr. Loosley (of 'Loosley & Maclaren') took photographs in Kgolta of the occasion. However, Charlie Clark, who presented the address, and Tom Fry another Palapye 'character', were somewhat the worse for drink, which infuriated Khama, and the Chief's reply to the address of welcome was a warning to whites 'that he would not have people in the stad who did not do the right thing, and those who meddled with liquor would have to go.' Willoughby noted how Khama, after his return from

73 See Chapter 9 below.

74 Knight-Bruce, ibid.

75 Lloyd Three Great African Chiefs, pp.135-6. The signatories were John B. Ellard and another 45, including S. Hoare, A.C. Clark, Samuel Blackbeard, Walter Blackbeard, Tom Fry, P.N. Vickerman, R.A. Bailey, H.A. Kirkham, E.F. Smith, and S.J. Selous. (I believe it is this illuminated address which is now in the Pilikwe house of the late Tshekedi Khama - personal observation.)
Britain, was brusquer than ever with degenerate whites, telling them they were not true Englishmen but white men's Sarwa! 78

"There are no Englishmen here; if you want to know what an Englishman is, go to England and see him." 79

was the sort of remark which made Lionel Décle observe,

'At the bottom of his heart Khama hates white men, and since his visit to England, where he was treated like a great man, probably despises them also.' 80

Others remarked on the lack of effect of the visit to Britain on Khama's personality. 81 Certainly he still made a point of the utmost charm and hospitality to visiting English gentlemen, such as Frederick Lugard and Robert Baden-Powell. 82 Perhaps the most illuminating statement about the relationship between the Chief and 'his' traders is by a later biographer of Khama:

'The chief sits on a three-legged stool, of which the supports are the Church, the British Government, and the Traders - all more of less extrinsic forces; and it is not surprising to hear it said that he plays one factor off against the other, always in the interests of the tribe.' 83

76 W.C. Willoughby to Brighton Congregational church members, 7 March 1896 (mimeo?) - encl. Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 March 1896. The photographs have not been traced.

77 Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Feb. 1896.

78 Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 April 1896

79 As Note 76 above.

80 Décle Three Years, p.36.

81 'It speaks well for the stability of his character that the absurd fuss made about him in England did not upset him nor fill him with an undue amount of self esteem.' Hole Black Kings, p.282. Cf. Parsons "Image" p.48.

82 'I am not in favour of eating with black men. My own Inspectors of course would not lunch with me, & they are men of my own colour. But Khama is an exception. I know no one else in Africa whom I would wish to ask to lunch, & treat as an honoured guest & be proud to entertain. He is such a gentleman' and yet, Lugard added to his diary entry at Palapye for 9th June 1896, Khama is himself proud of being a Black man. In his 1st June entry Lugard had credited Khama for 'his foresight, his skill in diplomacy, & his ability [which are] those of a White man,
On the traders' part there were definite gains to be drawn from the firm rule of Khama over a considerable area and number of people in a period of boom; and, as will be seen, the Chief's patronage was particularly valued by smaller traders against larger in times of less prosperity. White traders often preferred to take their cases before the Chief's court rather than to the lengthy and costly justice of the Assistant Commissioner's.  

The largest trading company in Khama's Country, from the late 1880s to the First World War, was the Bechuanaland Trading Association, whose origins and subsequent incorporation within the B.S.A. combine under the management of Mosenthal Bros. have already been mentioned. Until the foundation of Garrett, Smith, & Co. in 1910, the B.T.A. had no major rival in Khama's Country, though Messrs. A.C. Clark (i.e. Charlie Clark, not W.E. Clark expelled with W.C. Francis in December 1887) and Blackbeard Bros. were 'doing well' in the 1890s. The B.T.A. store at Palapye was a 60 by 30 feet stone building, with large outhouses, a smithy, and a wheelwright's yard. In 1891 its  

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- and a clever White man.' (Ngamiland Expedition Private Diary No.1, pp.153 and 142 Lugard Papers: Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS. Brit.Emp.S.81) Robert Baden-Powell passed through Palapye on 30th May 1896 and, to his surprise, was called upon by Khama before breakfast - 'He had not much to say. He knew me as George's brother, and asked about the baby niece.' (R.S.S. Baden-Powell The Matabele Campaign London: Methuen, 1900, p.10.) In 1923 the 'Chief Scout' of the Empire remembered how one could not get a drink in Khama's Country, and recalled in 1895 in London 'meeting him at my brother's house playing with the children and sitting down to dinner as if he had been used to it all his life.' (Outward Bound, Vol.3, No.31, April 1923, p.486.)

83 John Charles Harris Khama the Great African Chief London: Livingstone Press, 1922 (1st edn.), p.82.

84 Fripp 'Recent travels', p.519; H.C. Thomson Rhodesia, p.247. Chiefs' pre-colonial powers over traders were officially negated by the 1891 Proclamations, but there was some carry-over. In October 1894, Shippard wrote: 'I know of no means by which a native trader can be prevailed from boycotting a trader's store in his village', and remarked of taxes on traders levied by Sechele (Kwena) and Ikaneng (Lete): 'In the present circumstances it appears to me that in view of the large profits being made by traders in native villages, Ikaneng's demand is by no means unreasonable.' But in 1894 the High Commissioner claimed that except in the case of hunting rights, all taxation from whites
capital was valued at £130,000, of which £111,000 was held by the Bechuanaland Exploration Company within the B.S.A. combine, whose address (19 St. Swithin's Lane, E.C.) the B.T.A. London headquarters shared. During 1895-6 the B.T.A. moved its local headquarters from Palapye to Bulawayo, and closed its store at Macloutsie Camp which was abandoned by the Police. Sadler appears to have replaced Maurice Gifford as local general manager, and the profit for that year stood at £22,146 - a 127% increase over that for 1894-5.

The laying of the railway through the centre of Khama's Country brought to the fore the old question of what form white land tenure should take for commercial and other plots. For the first time ever Khama granted land in freehold - to the B.S.A. Company for the 100 yard railway strip - and in that year he had to resist plans for a white town.

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85 See Chapter 3, Notes 12-4 above.

86 Mathers Zambesia, p.137.

87 Ibid, p.460.


89 See Chapter 1, Note 77. Traders did not pay stand rents in the Bamangwato Reserve until 1938 - Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.109.

90 See above Note 23. On the Palapye Road railway station, see above Notes 50-7. Khama stymied plans for a white town at Palapye by insisting that all buildings were for railway functions only, and refusing to grant plots to any traders new to his country on any railway station or siding. The Palapye Assistant Commissioner remarked: 'Whether he has been wise in thus stifling competition may be doubted, but he has his own reasons for his action, and his right is indisputable.' (C.8650-40, p.15; C.0.879/517.) Palapye Road was 1132 miles from Cape Town station: in November 1897 H.M. Stanley's train left Cape Town at 4.00 p.m. on a Sunday and arrived at Palapye Road on the Wednesday at 12.47 p.m. (Mafeking, Tuesday 05.12 p.m.; Bulawayo, Thursday, 09.30 p.m.) - Stanley Through South Africa, pp.5-6. Palapye Road was connected to Palapye town 14 miles away by a Zeedeberg coach or Cape cart service. Besides Ellard's licensed
Significantly also it appears that in April 1896 Khama first extracted a nominal stand-rent from a commercial concern— which he had previously absolutely refused to do. The memorandum of agreement drawn up between Chief Khama and Messrs. Zeedenberg & Co., on 1st April 1896, served as the model which Tshekedi Khama followed as late as 1946. During the course of the Zeedenberg contract to carry mails between Palla and Palapye, and Palapye and Tati, Khama rented out to the company a plot at Palapye for £2/10/- a month, for their coach-house. 'The ground and building thereon as at present existing,' ran the most important proviso, 'remaining the property of Khama.' All plans for outhouse extension had to be submitted to the Chief in advance; no shop would be added to the coach-house nor liquor sold; and at the expiration of tenure, Zeedenberg could remove all wood and iron building materials, but no brick nor pole unless they be part of window and door frames or guttering.  

At the beginning of 1896 the rinderpest crossed the Zambezi in the slow progress that it had been making from north-eastern Africa since the early 1890s. Thereafter its speed of advance through the cattle-rich and waggon-laced areas of Matabeleland and Bechuanaland was as fast as 25 miles in a day. Rinderpest reached Bulawayo in March, and up the Limpopo valley as far as the Ngotwane confluence by the end of that month.  

station restaurant (see Note 27), which was presumably the hotel later run by Galanos, by 1901 there was one store, a post-office and the station itself, and a few white gangers' cottages and black labourers' tents at Palapye Road. (H.C. Thomson Rhodesia, p.246 British Official 'Khama's Country', p.102.) After the Ngwato capital moved to Serowe, Palapye Road expanded, being the main centre for the B.T.A. But in 1917 it still only consisted of 12 or 15 dwelling huts, both African and European— Interview with Mrs. Minnie Shaw, Palapye (Road), 18 Sept.1969, para.4.  


92 Howard Hensman A History of Rhodesia. Compiled from official sources Edinburgh & London: Blackwood, 1900, p.163; Howard Williams (Molepolole) to L.M.S., 27 March 1896. A. St. H. Gibbons claim (Exploration and Hunting, p.377) that Palapye was still itself rinderpest-free on April 26th, conflicts with Willoughby's report of April 26th quoted below in note 99.
Between April and November 1896 the disease killed nearly all the cattle, and it proved important in precipitating revolts against white rule both to the north and south of the Protectorate. More exact estimates of cattle mortality are probably wild exaggerations, and can usually be traced to the 'guestimates' of W.C. Willoughby, which gave the bovine population of Khama's Country at somewhere under a million. Willoughby's figures were self-contradictory at first: 60-70% mortality in April; 5-10% equalling 90,000 in May and early June; and 70-80% at the end of June. In July the figure settled at 70%; rising to 90% by September, 94-96% in October, and a peak of 96% or 800,000 cattle eliminated by November 1896. Though Khama's Country apparently largely escaped the accompanying scourges of famine, scurvy, and locusts, so evident to the south, and could live off the fat of its prosperity, the effects of the rinderpest were dramatic enough on the Road to the North:

'...hundreds of waggons were left abandoned, many with whole teams of sixteen bullocks lying dead and rotting in their yokes...The stench from these putrid bodies was appalling, and poisoned the air for great distances...the vehicles were loaded with every imaginable kind of article, from ladies' stays and artificial limbs to grand pianos!'  

93 Willoughby to Harry (of Heaton Mersey), 3 June 1896 - W.C.W./S.O. 742; Willoughby to Schofield, 30 Nov. 1896 - printed in Union Street Magazine (Brighton, England), February 1897; Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 April, 15 May, 29 June, 18 Sept., & 12 Oct., 1896. Cf. Ashburnham's report in C.8650-40, p.13. If indeed Willoughby's figures of total cattle population are correct it may be argued that the rinderpest was a blessing in disguise in relieving chronic over-stocking. The 1921 census gave the cattle population of the Bamangwato Reserve as 180,000 and in March 1970 the total national herd of the Republic of Botswana was estimated at only 1,433,000 head, of which the Central District would have less than half.

94 R.S. Godley Khaki and Blue. Twenty-five years service in South Africa London: Lovat Dickson, 1935, p.33. The locusts in Gamangwato (C.8650-40, p.13) probably came from the south - cf. C.E. Fripp 'Recent travels', p.517, on British Bechuanaland in May 1896: 'The locusts we sometimes saw hanging on the bushes in thick brown clusters, or blown about like dead leaves by the morning wind as they dropped in alarm at our approach.'

95 Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 April 1896.
On April 21st, Willoughby reported that £25,000 worth of goods was abandoned on the road between Palapye and Mafeking. But (at least until the end of the year) the Bamangwato maintained their reputation for absolute honesty and did not tamper with abandoned goods. However when the vanguard of Plumer's relief column to Matabeleland passed through Khama's Country, white policemen broke into the abandoned waggons, threatening and even stoning their Bamangwato guards employed by trading companies, and consumed or removed their contents such as jams and preserves, potted hams, brandy, claret, whisky, and Pommery or Greno champagne. A deputation of complaint from the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce got little satisfaction from the Rhodesian authorities.

Bamangwato regiments were employed in burning cattle carcasses, especially in the Limpopo valley in a vain attempt to halt the progress of the disease onto the higher land. And the British authorities began feverously shooting all the oxen, on the spot, even in the middle of Palapye, with no compensation, a mistake that was to cost them dear in the northern Cape Colony when it sparked off the Langeberg rebellion. Willoughby observed from the missionary residence on the hillside at Palapye:

'I went down to the town yesterday, and the stench was terrible. Many oxen are unburied, and most of those buried are buried many in a pit, seldom 3 feet from the surface in the lightest and sandiest of soils.'

96 Cf. Harman 'Khamaland', p.289 (on the exasperating honesty of Bamangwato in picking up and returning what was even thrown away by foreign travellers); H.C.126/4 passim; Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Jan.1897.


98 Bulawayo Chronicle, 15 Aug.1896 ('Palapye News').

99 Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 Aug.1896 - but cf. Willoughby to L.M.S., 29 June 1896, that Khama had cleared all rubbish and dead animals from Palapye in preparation for typhoid reported in Bulawayo. On Khama's sanitary regulations, see Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.151 & 177.
The effects of the rinderpest, and the rampant inflation it led to in the quite well developed consumer market of Khama's Country, can be clearly seen in the prevailing prices of meal and mealies at Palapye. In March 1896 at the beginning of the rinderpest, the price of mealies went up to 50/- a (200 lb) bag, and in April to 100/-; by October it was 170/-, dropping to 150/- with a good Bamangwato harvest in January 1897. After more good harvests and the opening of the railway the price dropped to 20/- in Khama's Country only, in the latter half of 1898. The price of mealie-meal or flour followed a similar trend - 200/- a (200 lb) bag in August 1896; 400/- by October; 212/- in January 1897. Transport was pulled by theoretically 'salted' trek oxen, but they soon died (Khama losing 300-400 trained oxen); and donkeys reached a good price - from the usual 15/- to 170/- in September (at Kanye) and 200/- by October 1896 (at Mafeking). Cattle sold at between £20 and £30 a head by August 1896. The opening of the railway greatly reduced transportation costs - which had been 45/- or 46/- per 100 lbs from Gaborone to Palapye. Inflation of the market during the rinderpest was not without manipulation by trading interests, and also not without profit to Bamangwato producers, because of the increased demand of the carrying trade to Rhodesia in a time of crisis and troop movements, which may have destroyed the demand for Pommery champagne but which increased demand for basic food commodities. For a start there was demand for the meat of the remaining cattle as well as for trek oxen: to that was added demand for smallstock such as sheep and goats, and for cereal products. By October 1896 Khama had sold off between 100 and 200 cattle; some Bamangwato managed to keep their waggons on the road; and, though the harvest was generally poor, Kalanga near Palapye sold perhaps a hundred bags of grain to local stores at 80/- a bag around June 1896. The 1896-7 colonial annual report for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, noted succinctly of the Batswana that, despite a poor harvest for the second year running, 'Their reserve

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101 Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Oct. 1896; Willoughby to L.M.S., 29 June 1896 (Box 53).
of purchasing power in cash, or in produce other than large cattle, was greater than had been estimated. The report noted of the Northern Protectorate a reckless extravagance in the spending of cash:

'In the midst of the times of the greatest want the natives would eagerly flock to local stores to secure meal at £10 a bag of 200 lbs., sugar at 2s. and 2s.6d. per lb., and sweets, jams, and other luxuries at exhorbitant rates... The local merchants have reaped a rich harvest, but this lavish expenditure by the natives of their cash must inevitably affect the trade of the district for some time to come.'

At the time of highest prices, October of 1896, one Palapye trader remarked that his receipts for the last month, because of the Bamangwato spending spree, were £2000 (sic) in excess of any other month. However these cash reserves were probably those of the semi-capitalised classes, the upper class and some Kalanga cultivators, who would otherwise invest their cash in education for their sons or in agricultural and transport equipment. It may be argued that it was not the rinderpest and high consumer prices which were to deplete their capital resources so much as the removal of the carrying and victualling trade itself by the railway which, both in the short run and more importantly in the long run, reduced producer prices, introduced the cheaper produce of the south, and deleted the existing marketing arrangements of the waggon route.

Despite the economic centralisation of the Ngwato state onto the capital, the situation of Palapye during the rinderpest epidemic was not that of Khama's Country as a whole, as W.C. Willoughby discovered when he made a tour of the Tswapong and Tsweneng hills east of Palapye in August and September 1896. He found the 'Pedi' peoples of the hills hungry but not starving, and surviving off motlhopa roots, pounded and boiled into a fermented but not very nutritious soup. He noted that agriculture was less advanced in techniques than around Palapye: the


103 Ibid, p.14 (Report of Assistant Commissioner Northern Protectorate, J.A. Ashburnham.)
Rinderpest, famine, and disease did not break the spirit of the old Tswana kingdoms enclosed by the Bechuanaland Protectorate: on the contrary they promoted, among the élite, assertions of independent spirit.

Because of the prestige gained by the three Chiefs in London, a group of sympathisers under the Duke of Westminster had formed a famine relief committee for the B.P. - in a sense a reward for its 'loyalty' to the British while lands to the north revolted. But this aid was to be all but rejected by the Chiefs of the Protectorate. On 17th June 1896 The Times had published an appeal from the Lord Mayor of London for the organization of famine relief for Bechuanaland.

'The visit of Khama and his fellow-chiefs to this country last autumn is not forgotten. Their manly and modest bearing etc. has awakened a very widespread interest in them and their country.' 108

Meanwhile letters went out from the London Missionary Society headquarters to their missionaries in the field as to how the relief should be organised. Willoughby echoed the general sentiment that relief, organised by the B.P. administration, 'should be in the form of opportunity for labour, except in such

107 Willoughby to L.M.S., 21 April; Lloyd to L.M.S., 15 Sept.1896.

All this was of course only a small part of a great missionary debate, which lasted over a century, on whether it was necessary to destroy or improve native culture for the reception of Christianity. But it is interesting to hear the argument of necessary destruction in the case of the Tswana, when it was usually used in the case of 'predatory' nations blocking white settlement. Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift (quoted by L.M.S. Chronicle, Dec.1895) remarked vis-a-vis the Herero - 'With many African tribes nothing can be done until their national life has broken down; then alone can either a true civilizing or Christianizing of the country take place. As proof of this statement I need only refer to the history of the Zulu and the Matabele; or I might point to the Masai and similar tribes in East Africa.'

108 Times, Weds., 17 June 1896, p.15 col.4. The initial appeal had been by Wardlaw Thompson on behalf of the L.M.S. in late May, but this appeal was absorbed by the Mansion House Committee - Times, 18 June 1896, p.6 col.6; African Review, vol.XI (22 May 1897), p.351.
cases as the chief may recommend for gratuitous gifts of food.' The Assistant Commissioner at Palapye also received enquiries via the Colonial Office from Lord Loch (the former High Commissioner) who was organising the committee in London. Loch enquired whether the supply of draught animals for ploughing would not be the most suitable form of relief, but — though this was just the solution (in the form of donkeys) favoured by one missionary a few months later — the proposal appears to have been rejected as impractical. On June 25th the composition of the 'Bechuana Relief Fund' (or the Mansion House Committee as it was to become known) was announced in London — the Duke of Westminster was Chairman, George Baden-Powell was Hon. Treasurer, and R. Wardlaw Thompson (foreign secretary of the L.M.S.) was Hon. Secretary. Committee members included many famous names associated with British African administration, commerce, and humanitarian bodies — including Joseph Chamberlain, the Bishop of London, Henry Barkly, Sydney Buxton, Donald Currie, Viscount Knutsford, Wildrid Lawson, Earl of Selborne, Marquis of Ripon, Bishop Knight-Bruce, Lords Kinnaid and Loch, and Major-Generals Lord Methuen and Charles Warren.

On June 29th the committee met at a public meeting in the Mansion House of the City of London. George Baden-Powell extolled the loyalty, Christianity, and temperance of B.P. Chiefs, and Westminster

109 Willoughby to L.M.S., 29 June 1896 ('I very strongly object to any indiscriminate giving to those who are able to work.'); C.O.879/517, despatches 108, 112, & 222; Lloyd to L.M.S., 15 Sept.1896. Miss Partridge the L.M.S. schoolteacher at Molepolole wrote (to L.M.S., 27 Nov.1896) of the Kwenya they 'need to learn next to "The Love of God" "The dignity of labour"'. Much as I like them, I cannot help saying that the Bakwena men are frightfully lazy and selfish. They would infinitely rather kopa beg/food from the whites than do a little work to earn it. Some of them have been persuaded to go work at the mines at Kimberley, & some have gone through sheer necessity. No doubt many more will be driven to go. It will do them good.'

recalled the ravages of rinderpest in the county of Cheshire (where his main estates lay) thirty years before. Chamberlain had started donations with 20 guineas, and the meeting passed a resolution 'sympathising, on the part of the citizens of London, with the natives of the Bechuana Protectorate'.

But when the offer of the Mansion House Committee was channelled through the local Imperial administration to the Chiefs of the Protectorate, they rejected it. The Molepolole missionary wrote:

'There has been no previous concert between the Chiefs as to the answer they should give. Each reply was quite independent. The English people will no doubt be much surprised.'

Chief Sebele told his missionary:

"The offer has come to the people through the wrong channels. The very fact that the Government officials have written to the Missionaries for information has caused my people to look upon the offer with suspicion. The Government in some of their dealings with my people have not been true to their Word." 112

Willoughby, though at first professing not to understand Khama's refusal, gave his analysis of the Chiefs' refusal a few months later:

'They look upon the distribution of food as their prerogative, and they regard it as a means of strengthening their own influence. And they are apparently afraid lest the Govt. should come in with its help and turn the hearts of the people away from them.' 113


112 H. Williams to L.M.S., 31 July 1896. Décle's version has it that Sebele (blunderingly called 'Sechele' by Décle) 'replied that he was not such a fool as to accept such presents as, later on, the white men could come and ask for something on the ground that they had helped him.' (Three Years, p.549).

113 Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct. & 12 October 1896.
It does not appear to have only been suspicion of Government activities that motivated the refusal of London's aid by the Chiefs. It was also probably resentment of the London Missionary Society, which seemed with its agents to have taken the kudos for the successful 1895 Chamberlain settlement away from the Chiefs themselves. Moreover this was a time of growing feelings of the need for Tswana church independency, which was sensed by many missionaries already, and which was soon given expression in the period of 'tribalist' Ethiopianism that bridged the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.114

Relief operations went ahead without the cooperation of the Chiefs. Willoughby travelled down to Kimberley to arrange the supply of food and seed to the destitute of Gamangwato. He was bitter about the attitude of Khama and the deacons of the church, who were drawn from the affluent classes ('Many of them are better off than I am'), towards the needy poor classes. The deacons had opposed discrimination in famine relief in favour of the poor, even of poorer church members, and Willoughby accused Khama of secretly allowing those Bamangwato who could muster oxen and waggon to go to the government relief centre at Gaborone's and 'unofficially' collect famine relief corn. Willoughby wrote to London from Mafeking,

'That looks as if it [famine relief] were to be distributed in proportion to the cattle which a man still possesses. You had better not use this last statement publicly, however, for I can not be sure of it till I return home.'115

Willoughby never reported more fully on his accusation. What is certain is that Khama insisted, both in 1896, and 1897, on cash payment by his people for aid accepted, and refused 'charity' from his London admirers. That would have meant that those who


115 Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 & 12 Oct.1896.
had cash could have been able to buy direct from the government
depot at Gaborone: and those who did not have cash would have
been dependent on the Chief's charity, or would have to sell
their labour for cash. By 1903 it was said of migrant labour
that Khama 'does the whole of the recruiting himself, and sends
messages to the men to come to him' - and this control of labour
export by the Ngwato government appears to have been character-
istic since 1876 and certainly in the early 1890s.116 The
Chiefs' insistence on cash payment for aid was no doubt gratefull
accepted by government, who could then pass on transport charges
to the consumers who proved 'quite happy to buy at the rate of
purchase', and black ideas about the virtues of self-sufficiency
fell in with white ideas of reducing the indigenous economy to
a state of dependency!117 The resolution of this paradox
however was a temporary affair, to last only so long as
Gamangwato was a haven of peace and comparative prosperity in a
sub-continent racked by war and economic disruption, and until
the Southern African state system that emerged from the Anglo-
Boer War took away, by its elaborate political and economic
checks and balances, the leverage that 'Khama' had had in the
previous more fluid situation.

The Mansion House Committee wound itself up in mid-1897. Its
final report put subscriptions received at £1,432/12/5, of which
£875 had been spent on the distribution of seed, £400 to
missionaries for food for the destitute, and £103 had been spent
on advertising.118 Famine and disease indeed continued elsewhere

116 C.O.879/552, passim; Schapera Migrant Labour and Tribal Life
A study of conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate London:
O.U.P., 1947, pp.25-6 & 152-5. Cf. above Chapter 1, Note 97, and
Chapter 3 Khama's insistence on food-for-work or in exchange for
earned cash, stemmed of course in part from his own 'puritan
ethic' ('I had to struggle hard' etc.) - cf. Chapter 1, Note 67.

117 Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Oct.1896. Peasant production versus
white capitalism is the main theme of Saker & Aldridge 'Langeberg
rebellion', passim. It was expressed crudely by 'Matabele'
Thompson, the 'inventor' of the Kimberley compound system, in
December 1896 with reference to British Bechuanaland - 'The
outbreak of rinderpest will drive the natives into the labour

Committee had no salaries to pay to staff, their efficiency
in the Protectorate, but Khama's Country had apparently survived well. In the worst season of 1896, the Bamangwato, it was reported, were much better off than southern peoples: working on the railway extension or using their last oxen for transport services. Khama's sanitary measures against typhoid and scarlet fever at Palapye appear to have been effective in preventing epidemic, and there was enough rain and few enough locusts to give his people a better harvest than elsewhere in 1896-7. The famine, remarked Khama, was not as bad as those experienced in Shosong. And though Khama thought 1897 would be the worst famine year of the 1890s, and Willoughby predicted dire distress by September because the previously ready flow of Bamangwato cash was drying up, yet, given reduced pressure on resources by decentralisation of the population to cattle-posts and to some new villages, the 1897-8 harvest appears to have been sufficient. At the end of August 1898 the missionary Howard Williams, so pleased to be posted to Palapye from Molepolole, wrote:

'The Bamangwato have a splendid harvest & our poor Bakwena are here in scores seeking food. Corn is to be purchased for 20/- per bag. The health of the staadt is good.'

The export of labour during the years of rinderpest and famine from Khama's Country does not appear to have been very significant, and indeed declined to very low or negligible level because of the abolition of a 'free' labour market by mining compares well with the modern OXFAM (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) which spends 82.1% of its income (v. Mansion House Committee's £1275 out of £1433) on overseas aid, the rest being taken by administrative and advertising costs - Private Eye (London), No.270, 21 April 1972, pull-out supplement.

120 Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Jan. 1897.
121 Willoughby to L.M.S., 9 June 1897.
122 Willoughby to L.M.S., 31 Aug. 1897.
companies and colonial administrations in order to achieve reduction in wage levels. The years before the Anglo-Boer War may be seen not only, on the J.A. Hobson thesis as the struggle of white monopolists to gain control of cheap black labour, but also as a period of short-lived and unequal black and white competition over the right to regulate the supply of labour. Tati may have been closed by the rinderpest but the mine-owners of the Rand took advantage of the wild fluctuations in labour supply, to minimise labour costs. This resulted in the October 1896 strike on the Rand by African workers, caused by the increase to a 9-hour-day for 300 to 400 underground 'hammer-boys' on the Crown Reef, which brought out 1,300 black workers on the same mine, and caused a rash of token support strikes across the Rand.\(^{123}\) It was apparently this which brought together the Witwatersrand chamber of mines to form a Native Labour Supply Association.\(^{124}\) This was the system extended to the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1899.\(^{125}\) Other mines however did not have the power of the Rand or Kimberley to use government and even armies to ensure a regular labour supply. The Koffyfontein mines of the Orange Free State, in February 1896, were almost obsequious towards Khama. For 1000 Bamangwato over 12 months, each paid £3-£5 monthly (and no liquor allowed).


\(^{125}\) Proclamation No.6 of 1899, licensing labour-recruiters. The Resident Commissioner explained: 'For the past few years, the Protectorate has been flooded by both white and coloured persons calling themselves Labour Agents', who, on commission from the mines, have no regard for the safety or welfare of the labour they recruited. (R.C. to H.C., 4 Oct. 1898). From 1899 labour recruiters operating on behalf of the Native Labour Association and other mines, were licensed at Assisitant Commissioners' discretion of payment of £100 deposit. (C.0.879/572, pp.193-4).
'In the event of your undertaking with your people to keep us supplied with boys \( \text{i.e. labourers} \) we ourselves, in consideration of the same should feel ourselves under an obligation to your Nation and would be willing to open a Technical School of Carpentry, with a capable Instructor, buildings and tools for the use and instruction of your people.'  

Khama turned down the request as impossible. 1000 was too many to spare; 12 months too long as it would include the ploughing season; and the mines were too far from home to be popular with Bamangwato men.  

Meanwhile in the south of the Protectorate the construction of the railway had 'one or two unfortunate misunderstandings between sub-contractors and labourers as to wages', and the supply of labour only came freely when 'the natives of the country' had 'not only learned to work, but also to appreciate the very liberal rates of pay allowed \( \text{by my italics} \) by the contractors and those who work under them', wrote the Resident Commissioner in his annual report for the Protectorate. The liberal rates of pay however soon passed the Bamangwato by, as the railway was built with such speed and ease without any major earthworks: But while it passed it re-injected cash reserves.  

In protest against high mortality, and probably against the reduction of African wages by 30% in 1897, Khama and Chief Linchwe of the Kgatla banned labour migration to the Rand in 1898. (A ban not lifted by Khama till 1903 under pressure from Government.)  

126 Koffyfontein Mines Ltd. to Khama, 13 Feb.1896 - K.P.(H) 'Receipts and accounts'. It is clear from the letter that a representative had previously had talks with Khama.  
128 C.8650-40, p.5  
129 Cf. Wookey (Palapye) to L.M.S., 14 Oct.1896. Employment on the railway appears to have been heavy while it lasted. In November 1896 Khama told Lugard he could not spare any more men for the British West Charterland Company, because the demand for labour by the railways was so high - Khama to Capt. Lugard, 9 Nov.1896: K.P.(A).  
130 Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.116 & 260.
Another form of income that became available with the arrival of the railway was the supply of wood, to feed the 'ravenous maw' of Kimberley and the railway itself for fuel and construction material. Within months the Protectorate administration was expressing grave concern about the rapid deforestation: it recommended the appointment of a forestry officer but the proposal fell through because of Colonial Office apathy.\footnote{131}

Henry Morton Stanley in November 1897 described the south of Khama's Country as a 'thin forest of acacia trees, about 20 ft. in height, covering the face of the land', and the north as 'leafier woods, which resemble dwarf oak'.\footnote{132} A fortnight earlier a prominent Mafeking businessman, in an interview with the Bechuanaland News, rejoiced how Khama's Country, as seen from the railway, had enough wood to last 15 years or more, and therefore tree-felling did not have to be discriminating:

'Khama's people are engaged in cutting it [forest] for fuel for De Beer's mines & are paid in grain, which is very welcome as, generally the natives in the Protectorate are on the point of starvation. Large numbers of Khama's people are engaged in this work. The Chief preserves excellent discipline & sends them out in regiments. Each man carries a gun beside his axe, so that any game which may be found can be bagged for the pot while the wood-cutting is going on.'\footnote{133}

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\footnote{131} C.O.879/552, passim. 'At that time Bechuanaland had not been stripped bare of trees to feed the ravenous maw of the Kimberley mines', wrote B. Ronan (Forty South African Years, p.211) in 1923 of his 1890 memories. It appears that Rhodesia Railways did not convert to coal-burning in their locomotives until after the opening of the Wankie coal mines in 1904. Lawrence Gann remarks how this 'did away with some of the ruthless deforestation' that had characterised the coming of the railway: adding, 'Trees were cut down, but the roots and lower section of the stem remained in the soil, being too troublesome to shift. New growth then sprouted forth in profusion which tended to compete successfully with the grass cover, leading to soil erosion.' Sources: L.H. Gann A History of Northern Rhodesia. Early Days to 1953 London: Chatto & Windus, 1964, pp.125-6n; Gann A History of Southern Rhodesia. Early days to 1954 London: Chatto & Windus, 1965, pp.160-1.

\footnote{132} Stanley Through South Africa, pp.13-5.

\footnote{133} Interview with J. Gerrans, Bechuanaland News, 23 Oct.1897, p.4. In August 1897 Khama had requested for special railway terms for the export of wood to Kimberley - Ag.A.C. Palapye (Capt. Ashley Williams, Bechuanaland Mounted Police) to R.C., 10 Aug.1897: B.N.A.-B.P.3: The payment in grain referred to
Denudation of the Protectorate's forest resources proceeded apace, though it was possibly less severe in the Northern than in the Southern Protectorate where the fortune of Richard Transfeldt was made along the line-of-rail. The pattern had been set whereby Botswana was regarded as a natural and human resource to be indefinitely bled for the benefit of the large-scale 'modern' sector of South Africa.

was presumably by the Chief, since labour was organised on a regimental rather than individual basis; and the labour was organised on a regimental rather than individual basis; and the labour would have been organised not under a foreigner but with the Chief as entrepreneur, since Khama claimed a monopoly on wood-cutting in his Reserve. Schapera *Tribal Innovators*, p.114.

134 Cf. Jules Ellenberger, in Sillery *Bechuanaland Protectorate*, pp.91 (vegetation) and 93 (Transfeldt). A photograph of Transfeldt appears in Schapera *Tribal Innovators*, plate 6. Cf. C.O.879/802, pp.195-7 (1906 re. Transfeldt). See also accounts and photographs of Selbourne's meeting with Chiefs of Southern Protectorate at Crocodile Pools on Transfeldt's Notwane Farm, in *Star* (Johannesburg), 17 April 1906 & *Diamond Fields Advertiser* (weekly edition), illustrated supplement, n.d. The area around Gaborone's was still thickly wooded in 1899, and Transfeldt subsequently built an attractive and prestigious wooden house (in Kimberley lattice and verandah style) south of Gaborone's where dignitaries stayed at the beginning of the twentieth century.
THE ANGLO-BOER WAR AND THE BECHUANALANDS
1899-1902

Scale 1: 4,000,000
Chapter 5: COLLABORATION AT A TIME OF RESISTANCE, 1896-1903

The railway represented the new infrastructure essential to the twentieth century (at least to 1961) Southern African state system, in which the Bamangwato Reserve and Bechuanaland Protectorate played such a minor role but could still spring to prominence. In the Protectorate itself the twentieth century system of administration began in 1901 with the more bureaucratic 'Williams regime'. In Southern Africa as a whole, uniform sovereignty (imposed by British agencies) over the area was not completed until 1902 by the Peace of Vereeniging. African and Afrikaner revolts and wars against the New Imperialism between 1896 and 1902 were the death throes of the previous state system. The old pattern of state alliances and antagonisms, based on the waggon-route infrastructure, was converted into the 'chains' of collaboration with or resistance to the British. Khama's Country, from being a strategic lynchpin became a 'key collaborator'. In terms of political leverage and economic gain it basked in the last rays of Imperial sunshine as an island of peace in the sea of turmoil.

While it is true that Khama sat by while the colonial yoke was finally put onto his old enemies, the only active assistance he gave to the process was against the South African Republic. He did not allow, as sometimes supposed, the recruitment of Bamangwato 'levies' or 'friendlies' (i.e. soldiers) for use by the B.S.A. Company within Rhodesia - though obviously scouts and guards had to be deployed within the Bechuanaland Protectorate in case of invasion. The Bamangwato who were fighting for the Chartered Company forces - sometimes misleadingly referred to as 'Khama's kaffirs' in despatches - were in fact from the Boer Raditladi party, which the Company had been obliged to accept into exile. After Rhodes' attempt to renege on his promise to

1 A confusion of Khama's with Raditladi's Bamangwato perpetuated by Ranger Revolt, p.161.
take Bo-Raditladi into Chartered territory, the Company had been forced to honour its pledge at the beginning of May 1896 in order to get Khama to agree to the urgent 'new' railway route. The Company made it a condition of settlement - for remember that Raditladi was a famous soldier - that Bo-Raditladi should fight on the Company's behalf. By the end of May, they were reported in action. At the battle of Mopema river, nine miles west of Bulawayo, a large Chartered force under Plumer was 'well supported' by Bo-Raditladi, who made a charge covered by Maxims. In particular the headman Rauwe distinguished himself. In a later action 90 men were reported in action under Major Watts, and another source mentioned the figure of 225 men in all under the command of Coope. However there seems to have been some trouble with Bo-Raditladi, 'who soon had to be disbanded and sent home'. One trouble was that they had no real home to go to, being temporarily settled along the Ramakwebane until they were allotted a reserve in the Mangwe District at the beginning of 1897. Bo-Raditladi soon split into three divisions - the Khurutshe of Rauwe, most of the Ngwato under Mphoeng, and only a few with Raditladi himself.

2 See above Chapter 4, Notes 19-21.
5 Gann Southern Rhodesia, p.132 - giving total as 240 men. For discussion of recruitment and settlement of Sotho or Coloured levies for Southern Rhodesia during the revolts, see National Archives of Rhodesia - H.C.3/5/37/12. At least one Afro-American also fought on the Chartered side - Hensman History of Rhodesia, p.182.
6 Earl Grey (Administrator, Salisbury) to Khama, 1 March 1897 - K.P. (J) 'Government Letters & Documents'; Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 February 1897
7 See below Chapter 6.
The presence of Bo-Raditladi may be one factor in the explanation of why the Kalanga of the Mengwe (Mangwe) paramountcy did not revolt and block the Bulawayo-Tati road. Early in the Ndebele revolt the Bechuanaland Police at Macloutsie Camp discounted any threat of invasion because, they telegraphed, 'We should imagine Matabele fear to violate Khama's country'. But explanation of the lack of revolt in the south-west of Southern Rhodesia must go deeper. Apart from any vestigial remains, in possibilities of either religious or political organisation, from the old Rozwi confederacy of paramountcies, one must needs look at the recent past of relations between the Ndebele and the Kalanga to explain the existence of a 'collaborator chain' of chiefdoms in the south-west. One must also consider the competing claims of the Ngwato, Tati, and Ndebele/Rhodesian sovereignties to the 'shatter-zone' area. As far as the Kalanga of the Tati District are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that at first during the revolt the Ndebele raided them (as allies of the whites?), and only subsequently tried to recruit them to join the revolt. Similarly elsewhere in 'VuKalanga', the Kalanga were attached by Ndebele, though early confused reports may indicate inter-chiefdom rivalries and some form of debate on whether to join the revolt, and also that the Mengwe chiefdom was the vital link in the 'collaborator chain'.

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8 Ranger Revolt, p.160 & passim.

9 Sergeant Douglas (Macloutsie) to Charter Cape Town, 1 April 1896 (N.A.R.-H.C. 3/5/37/12).

10 This follows the findings of David Beach re. the Shona chiefdoms east of the Ndebele: 'I suggest that the political alignment of 1896 corresponded very closely to those of 1881 and 1893, and that the Shona tended to draw upon their past experiences of those years in order to resist, or collaborate with, the Europeans.' (D.N. Beach 'Resistance and collaboration in the Shona country, 1896-7' University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies/School of Oriental and African Studies: African History Seminar AH/70/14, p.9.)

11 See Above Chapter 1, Notes 103 & 163-7; Chapter 3 Note 52 Chapter 4, Note 9.


13 G. Cullen H. Reed (Hope Fountain) to Deputy Commissioner Bulawayo, 2 July 1896 - C.8547, pp.33-5.
question is to what extent some Kalanga recognised themselves as coming within the over-rule of Khama. The disputes between Rhodesian and Ngwato authorities over what the Bamangwato called 'Bokalaka' have already been discussed. Khama had managed to gain recognition of his rights as far as the Pandamatenga road by the terms of the Chamberlain settlement of 1895, but this was not given effect by Proclamation until 1899.14 Meanwhile, according to evidence in July 1896, the Kalanga of Mengwe, Senete, Mfhasha, and 'Matundume',

'Up to the present time they have been governed by the Acting Native Commissioner for Bulilima, their cattle have been branded and taken, and their boys and men called out to work by the Chartered Company up to the present outbreak.'15

Though they were taxed by the Rhodesian authorities, it is not impossible that these people recognised some alternative loyalty to Khama as 'protector'. Khama had indeed given refuge to a number of Kalanga groups from Ndebele power, though the extent to which the Kalanga were 'refugees' has been and is still being exaggerated in Botswana. The moot point is whether these peoples know before they had the chance to revolt against Chartered rule, that they had been placed under Khama's rule by the Chamberlain settlement: the only evidence available is that the missionary among them, Cullen Reed, knew about and was protesting about the fact in July 1896.16

Khama usually kept quiet to white men about his assessment of external affairs, though he prided himself on his intelligence service. When his opinion was sought on the Ndebele revolt

14 See above Chapter 1, Notes 28-9, 35 & 166; & 3, Note 75.
15 As Note 13. Mengwe is ward 244, Senete ward 251, Mfhasha ward 170, and 'Matundume' is not traceable in Schapera Ethnic Composition re. Bamangwato. The Native Commissioner for Bulilima-Mangwe District, W.E. Thomas (at Tegwani), referred to the peoples of Mengwe, Senete, Mfhasha, and 'Madandume' in 1906 as 'subjects of Lobengula' who had 'seceded from Rhodesia in 1899' to Khama's Country - Thomas to chief Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, 11 Sept.1906 (C.O.879/802, pp.369-70).
16 Ibid. For Kalanga fortunes under Khama's rule see especially Chapters 7 & 10.
during or just before the first few days of May 1896, his reply was that the rebels were much divided in their councils, and would not make any concerted attack on Bulawayo. He did not have much more to say to Robert Baden-Powell on May 30th. By July, no doubt prompted by news of his attitude towards the relief sent by the Mansion House Committee or towards the railway re-negotiations, there were rumours circulating about Khama’s loyalty to the British which had to be refuted in a letter to The Times. Khama, wrote John Scott-Montague M.P. who had recently visited Palapye and witnessed Khama’s marriage, had indeed strained relations with Mr. Rhodes and the Chartered Company, but was notwithstanding supplying sheep and goats to famine-stricken Bulawayo. And if he had any counsellors who suggested ‘a bold stroke for the independence of the tribe’, Khama was strong enough to withstand them.

The period of turmoil before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, saw revolts and rumours of revolts in British Central Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the South African Republic, Cape Colony, and even Basutoland. Among the Tlhaping and Tlharo groups of Tswana in the north of the Cape Colony (former British Bechuanaland), there occurred the Langeberg rebellion. Khama’s comments at the time are not recorded, though a work by one of Khama’s later missionaries claimed:

‘He knew that what had happened to the people in the Langeberg, who were dispossessed and exiled, could never happen to his own people, because of the protecting hand of the Imperial Government. His loyalty after that became deeper rooted still, both for his own and for his people’s sake.’

18 R.S.S. Baden-Powell Matabele Campaign, p.10.
19 Times, 22 July 1896, p.15 col.4.
Other neighbouring kingdoms to Khama's remained neutral to the British in a 'collaborator chain' of states (Rolong-Ngwaketse-Kwena-Ngwato-Tawana-Lozi) in which it appears that Khama's Country played the key role. When the Rolong of Mafikeng mobilised 7000 men in 1896 it was only because they felt threatened by Boer commando mobilisation across the border. And the Chief of the Bamangwaketse, Bathoen I, was silent about the Langeberg rebellion, only asking "How do the white men fight when they fight?" But he proved a willing partner to Khama during 1896 in disciplining Sebele. Sebele, Chief of the Kwena, carried on the spirit of defiance to British imperialism, Christianity, and temperance, which had only temporarily receded within him during the 1895 visit to Britain. In November 1896 Khama sent his son, Segorna Khama, to Molepolole with a message which he insisted in delivering at public Kgotla meetings with Sebele present. Sebele in turn insisted that Bathoen also be present:

'Khama's message was - & Bathoen agreed with it - that if any further complaint reached them of Sebele's debauchery & drunkenness they would both forbid their country to Sebele & have no further relationships with him. They would not regard him as their friend for he had brought shame upon them as well as upon himself & people.'

The missionary account continued:

'The whole of the tribe present also said they would throw him away & no longer acknowledge him as Chief. Of course Sebele tried to deny it & made all sorts of charges but he seemed not to realise that he was talking to Bechuana.'


23 Cf. Parsons 'A colourful but selfish character - Chief Sebele I' Kutlwano, Vol.8, No.8 (Aug.1969) pp.6-7 - which suggest that his feelings of inadequacy may have stemmed from close personal proximity to Sechele, David Livingstone, and Msilikazi, in early youth.

25 H. Williams (Molepolole) to L.M.S., 20 Nov.1896. Williams' own reaction to the suppression of the Langeberg rebellion was too shame-faced to face his Molepolole parishioners: 'The name of a Whiteman must stink as from a bottomless pit.'
Sebele is usually not well-remembered among the Kwena largely because of his personal, especially marital, idiosyncrasies. Intemperant and pagan, he was an embarrassment, jokingly called "the sinner", to missionary supporters of the Chiefs in Britain in 1895. His ploys with the trader Boyne to evade the liquor prohibition were legendary, and the Molepolole missionary after 1898, A.J. Wookey, campaigned to have him deposed. After visiting Pietermaritzburg (Natal) in 1899, for eye-treatment, Sebele attacked L.M.S. thuto (education) as the source of the dissidence against him among his people and threatened to bring in another Church. He also attacked the Government for starting Hut Tax and for the theft of his eastern land for the railway strip, and Wookey claimed he was planning an armed rebellion. Though he was steadfastly anti-Boer during the war, in 1901 it was still being seriously considered that he should be deported to the Seychelles, or Walfisch Bay, or Robben Island.

The essential element for the maintenance of this 'collaborator chain', linked by common cultural and strategic interests, from Mafikeng in the Cape Colony to Lealui in North-Western Rhodesia, was regular communications by messengers or by letters. There is abundant evidence for this, from the 1890s to after 1910.

26 Interview with Bakwena Lesele, Molepolole, September 1969, paras 25-9 (to whom Sebele's main virtue was his maintaining links with both Khama and Bathoen after 1895); R.W. Thompson to H. Williams - L.M.S. Out-Letters; Wookey to L.M.S., 31 May & 1 June 1899. Wookey added that Sebele's attitude to L.M.S. Church and colonial state was 'a specimen of what is going on all over Bechuanaland, more or less.' Howard Williams as missionary had not been as vindictive as Wookey, but had long felt Sebele to be a capricious self-seeking King (Williams to L.M.S., 10 July 1892). Sebele's being called "sinner" tallies with his dying preoccupation with Psalm 51 (Miserere Mei, Deus) - R. Haydon Lewis to L.M.S., 25 Feb. 1911. An obituary of Sebele ('Death of a native chief') appeared in Diamond Fields Advertiser, 28 Jan. 1911.


28 C.0.879/694, passim.
With the three other states in the middle of the 'chain' (Ngwaketse, Kwenana, and Tawana), also enclosed by the Bechuana-land Protectorate, Ngwato contact was frequent and apparently mostly at the initiative of Khama whose seniority he stressed. With the Rolong and Lozi states at either end of the 'chain', contact was less frequent, and was on the basis of equal sovereignty at least so long as Montsioa and Lewanika lived.

Communications with the Lozi may have begun before Coillard went from Gamangwato to Bulozi. The Paris mission in Bulozi (permanently after 1886) opened up direct correspondence between Lewanika and Khama via their respective missionaries who acted as foreign secretaries. By 1890, there was a regular messenger between the Ngwato and Lozi capitals, Makoatsa, himself a Mongwato. The infrastructure of the 'collaborator chain' was the established trade, labour, and cattle-trekking routes. The direct route from Gamangwato to Bulozi via Pandamatenga, bye-passing the Tawana, had been open to the waggon-trade since the 1870s, but was probably hazardous to Bamangwato and Malozi themselves until after the 1893 destruction of the Ndebele state.

Lozi labour had gone to the mines of Tati and Kimberley for some years previous, but the cattle-trade was probably post-1893 up to the time when the railhead reached Livingstone in 1904.

Evidence for this can be seen in a letter that Khama wrote in response to one of Lewanika's in February 1898:

29 Evidence for this is based on the Khama Papers in general (see Statement of Sources), and on other specific references made in this dissertation, passim. Cf. Lesele cited above in Note 26; & Chapter 1, Notes 104-5.

30 In the year before Coillard's arrival Lewanika's contact with Khama had been through the medium of the Tawana king (Moremi II, ruled 1876-90) - Caplan Elites of Barotseland, p.40. See also above Chapter 1, Note 84; & Parsons "Image", p.54.

'I will tell you how your people sold your cattle. The cattle were brought by both whites and Bamangwato. Though the cattle were attacked by a disease and many died on the way quite a number were bought... Fifty were bought by Leburu in the veld, not at home i.e. before they reached Palapye.'

Continuance of the close connection of the Lozi with the Ngwato can be seen in the fact that the interpreter for Lewanika's trip to King Edward VII's coronation in 1902 - for which Chamberlain had been anxious that Khama accompany Lewanika - was a relative of Khama's, Boichwarelo. Lozi and Ngwato young men also attended the same schools in South Africa.

But relations within the 'collaborator chain' were not always ones of amity. Lewanika and Khama both had difficult, not to say hostile, relations with Sekgoma Letsholathebe and the Tawana kingship. The Lozi and Tawana states, perhaps encouraged by Goold-Adams' reconnaissance of 1896-7, disputed control of the Mpukushu - in Sekgoma Letsholathebe's case by making tributary raids. The dispute was only really settled when the disputed territory was in reality (rather than on the map) placed under Portuguese and German control.


33 Elizabeth (Mrs. J.D.) Hepburn Jottings. By Khama's Friend London: Simpkin, Marshall, etc., 1928, p.61. Boichwarelo (Boitsewarelo) was also nephew of a Ngwato church deacon.

Khama's dispute with Sekgoma Letsholathebe stemmed from the former's claim to seniority. In the large map that folded out from the second volume of John Mackenzie Austral Africa. Losing it or Ruling it - in fact a map of Ngwato territorial claims in the hope that Britain would take them over - the Tawana had appeared as the 'Western Bamangwato'. The cultural and historical kinship of the Tawana and Ngwato kingdoms had been cemented by waggon-trade connections and the planting of a daughter mission of the Ngwato church in Ngamiland in 1881. Sekgoma Letsholathebe in 1895 had consulted his uncle Khama over the B.S.A. Company threat. But Sekgoma Letsholathebe began to object to having to be so behoven to Khama. Like Sebele, he was kept in check by Khama through intervention in his state's internal politics. Sekgoma's resentment of Khama came out in an incident at Palapye in 1895, when the visiting Chief had been placed in the row behind Khama in church. During the service Sekgoma Letsholathebe drew up his chair alongside of Khama, and later explained "I am chief in my own country". The level of his relations with Lewanika could be seen soon afterwards in the message that Lewanika sent Sekgoma Letsholathebe's messengers back with from Lealui:

'Your father was a man with a fat belly your mother was a Masarwa.'

Relations between Khama and Sekgoma Letsholathebe appear to have broken down on a personal level in 1895, and thereafter the points that came to issue between them were a territorial dispute, the entry of the British West Charterland Company into Ngamiland, and most crucially of all Sekgoma Letsholathebe's own dynastic insecurity. One other character is essential to the story, Dithapo Meno, the Tawana king-maker (one of R.C. Williams' "Earls of Warwick") upon whose favour Sekgoma Letsholathebe's tenure of office depended.

35 See above Chapter 2, & 3 Notes 69-70.
36 A. St. H. Gibbons Exploration and Hunting, p.349.
37 Ibid. p.348.
38 R.C. Williams to W.C. Willoughby, 26 Sept.1903 - C.O.417/345 ("Earls of Warwick").
Moremi II of the Tawana had died in 1890. He left an 8 or 9 year old son, Mathiba. The other claimant to the throne was Sekgoma Letsholathebe, aged about 18, half-brother to Moremi II. So a regency was declared under Dithapo, son of Meno a former regent (c.1875-6). Dithapo ruled for about a year and then, at the beginning of 1891, declared Sekgoma Letsholathebe as Chief. This could be seen as a gesture of friendship to Khama, as Sekgoma's mother had been Khama's half-sister, Boleko - technically junior to Moremi II's mother (a MoNgwaketse), but given to their father Letsholathebe by Sekgoma I of the Ngwato on the supposition that her offspring would be recognised as dynastically senior to Mma-Moremi's. Dithapo had begun his regency in Khamaian fashion by prohibiting rainmaking and other ceremonies, and young Sekgoma Letsholathebe continued in the same vein (with Dithapo acting as secretary of state) by prohibiting the sale of beer, and abolishing circumcision schools. (He revoked both reforms later when he had broken with Khama.)

Within 6 months, in June 1891, Sekgoma Letsholathebe was challenged by a party backing the child Mathiba for the throne, and in 1893 the Chief according to his own account was threatened with assassination - another account tells us that he warded off such threats by waving a loaded rifle at the culprits in Kgotla. Sekgoma Letsholathebe later claimed that envoys, which his uncle Khama sent from Palapye to support him in 1893, asked him to surrender land around the Thamalakane so that if he were deposed Khama could give it back to him for his exile.

In 1895 Sekgoma Letsholathebe went to his uncle at Palapye to consult on the best course of action against the B.S.A. Company threat, and also to cement the dynastic link with the Ngwato by

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39 Petition of Sekgoma Letsholathebe and 37 others, March 1906 (C.0.879/802, pp.116-7 - & also see pp.216-21); Schapera Tribal Legislation, p.87; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.146-7.

40 Petition (see Note 39); Gibbons Exploration and Hunting, p.34

In 1906 Khama produced the copy of a letter (claiming that all later letters produced by Sekgoma Letsholathebe were forgeries) from himself to Sekgoma Letsholathebe, dated 20 Nov.1892, in which Khama said he could not judge on Sekgoma Letsholathebe's right to be Chief, because though his mother was a Mongwato she was not the royal wife of Letsholathebe - therefore "Let the Batawana speak" (C.0.879/802, p.234).
marrying Khama's daughter Millie. But Sekgoma Letsholathebe defied Khama and married the daughter of Khama's full-brother Seretse Mokuarone instead. 41

On Khama's return from Britain in early 1896, it is claimed that the Tawana headmen wrote to Khama about his plan to take the Thamalakane area as a refuge for Sekgoma Letsholathebe, asking him to put it in written treaty form. Khama is said to have replied that that was nonsensical, and that the Tawana should look out lest the Ngwato were 'commandeered' onto the white side in a war against the Tawana like they had been against the Ndebele. 42 A letter from Khama, produced in evidence in 1906, addressed to the headmen and dated 29th April 1895, told them that Khama recognised Sekgoma Letsholathebe as rightful Chief and that he should always listen to Khama's advice on how to rule. 43 In 1906 Khama rejected all such letters as forgeries, but even if he did not write them himself they may have been written in his name by either his own son, Sekgoma Khama, or by his Secretary, Ratsbosa - who were beginning to conspire against each other at Palapye. Sekgoma Letsholathebe was taking an active interest in the internal politics of the Bamangwato. In June 1896 Khama blamed Sekgoma Letsholathebe's new unfriendliness on the arrival of Bo-Raditladi envoys in Ngamiland, conspiring with Sekgoma Letsholathebe to give them land that Khama claimed - presumably the Thamalakane area. Sekgoma Letsholathebe had written to Khama that he would demolish the boundary beacons of the Chamberlain award. In August of that year Frederick Lugard met one of the Bo-Raditladi party on the Boteti, who confirmed that they intended to settle in Ngamiland.

41 Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.147; C.0.879/802,p.118.
42 C.0.879/802, pp.117-8
43 Ibid, p.118.
Lugard, who had spoken on Khama's behalf at the great Temperance breakfast in London that had immediately preceded the Chamberlain Settlement in 1895, was the leader of the British West Charterland Company (B.W.C.C.) expedition to Ngamiland of 1896-8. Though the question of Rhodesia taking over Ngamiland had been put off by the British government in 1896, the presence of the B.W.C.C. aggravated fears that Ngamiland would become a white colony. (The question remained ambiguous until the 1899 B.P. boundary Proclamations).\textsuperscript{45} The B.W.C.C. was not a subsidiary of the B.S.A. Company, but its headquarters were in the same street in London, and its very name implied recognition of the B.S.A. claim to administer Ngamiland as part of 'Charterland' or Rhodesia. The aim of the expedition was to prospect for gold and diamonds, but Lugard's own ambition, according to his biographer, was to obtain administrative powers for the B.W.C.C.\textsuperscript{47} The Company employed an eminent German minerologist and geographer, Dr. Passarge, but failed to locate payable quantities of minerals (though Ngamiland is rich in copper) except coal near the German border. Lugard signed a supplementary mineral concession with Sekgoma Letsholathebe on 28th September 1896, which by 1899 had been bought out by the B.S.A. Company.\textsuperscript{48}

Fear of the white settler rule which Khama had escaped, may explain the strange twist whereby in December 1898 Sekgoma Letsholathebe assured a B.P. official envoy that he stood by his and Dithapo's letters of 1891 and 1893 in which they had claimed they had no border with Khama but were of the same people, i.e. the Tawana did not want to be separated from the Protectorate.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{45} A.J. Wookey (Palapye) to L.M.S., 12 March 1897.

\textsuperscript{46} Khama to Lugard, 9 Nov.1896 - K.P.(A).

\textsuperscript{47} Margery Perham Lugard. The Years of Adventure 1858-1898 London: Collins, 1956 (Pt. 5 'The Kalahari 1895-1897), pp.561-620.

\textsuperscript{48} British West Charterland Limited Report of the Directors to Shareholders for the period ending 31st October 1897 - W.C.W./S.O.85; H.C. to C.O., 10 Jan.1902 - C.O.417/343 or C.0.879/702.

\textsuperscript{49} C.0.879/574, pp.173-80.
The envoy, Panzera, actually considered the border confirmed by Chamberlain (after Shippard) as unfair to the Tawana, but went ahead with demarcation. The Resident Commissioner, Goold-Adams, rejoiced at how 'most cordial' relations with Sekgoma Letsholathebe had become. The border was put onto the statute book by the High Commissioner's Proclamation of 29th March 1899. But by April 6th Sekgoma Letsholathebe had already complained. The High Commissioner then curtly dismissed Sekgoma Letsholathebe's objections as too late - though Goold-Adams thought the Chief should have the right to make compensating forays into the Caprivi Strip and Angola.  

Acrimonious correspondence between Sekgoma Letsholathebe and Khama ensued: the former jibing at the latter's dispute with and expulsion of his own son, Sekgoma Khama, and the latter accusing the former of giving over Ngamiland to Tlaping (refugees from the Langeberg?). On the land issue, Sekgoma Letsholathebe facetiously asked Khama, who railed against the dishonesty of the young: 'Are you a young man, that you break your word?' He dismissed Khama's claims to be a 'father' to him.

'You have deceived me often... why should you speak like a servant /motlhanka/ when you are a chief? Sir, I am not quarrelling. I am telling you, and advising you, and don't quarrel with me.'

Khama retorted that Sekgoma Letsholathebe was 'talking like a child', and re-affirmed his determination to stop the migration of Tlaping or Tlharo from the south to Ngamiland - which was not Rolong's (sic) but Tawana's country. ('This is not Mafeking, it is our land, Mathiba's children.') In the latter half of 1900 Khama took a direct hand in deposing Sekgoma Letsholathebe. He wrote to Sekgoma Letsholathebe:

50 Ibiï, pp.268-9

51 Sekgoma Letsholathebe to Khama, 18 Dec.1899 - C.O.879/659, p.99. Sekgoma told Khama that Khama was the same as Lewanika to him and that there was no special relationship. On these Tlaping see Scapera Ethnic Composition, pp.95-6.
'The Batawana are truly my people, and nobody shall rob them. I want nothing to do with you. Their chief is Matebe [i.e. Mathiba], the son of my sister, the son of my father’s uncle. I tell you, you have hurt yourself by talking to me like that [my italics], and swearing at me, your father, saying that I am a cheat. The chief is Matebe, one our children, and I am his chief... The Batawana and Bamangwato are my people and Matebe. They are not Batlaping, and you shall not rule them; they are my people.'

Khama wrote to Dithapo the king-maker, to read aloud in Kgotla:

'I will speak to Mathiba, my father’s son; he is the son of a proper Banwato [Ngwato], and not the son of Barolong like Sekgoma. I say Sekgoma shall not be chief at all. Mathiba is chief...I am the owner of the land and the Batawana are my people, and I place Mathiba over them as their keeper, he being responsible to me for both land and people...Don’t be afraid; just read this to Sekgoma and all the people so that they can hear what I, their chief, says.'

Khama also wrote to Khukwe, the evangelist at the Tawana capital, Tsau, paid as a worker of the Ngwato Church, in similar vein. ('Sekgoma is not my equal.') But Dithapo replied that he had read out Khama’s letter to the people in Kgotla, and

'We do not want any advice or interference from another person about our chief. Sekgoma is chief here, and we neither know nor want another one.'

Assured of support at home, Sekgoma Letsholathebe wrote to the Resident Commissioner at Mafeking on November 1st, 1900, and implied that Khama was complicit in an assassination plan (by shooting) by Mathiba against him. He therefore wanted to come to Mafeking. He trekked towards the railhead, and a new Magistrate appointed to Ngamiland met him on the way, taking him back to Palapye where Khama and Sekgoma Letsholathebe were 'reconciled', shaking hands in Kgotla, and agreeing to stop writing each other

52 Khama to Sekgoma Letsholathebe, 7 Aug.1900; Khama to Dithapo, 7 Sept.1900 - 0.0.879/659, p.97.

53 Khama to Khukwe Mogodi, 9 Sept.1900; Dithapo Meno to Khama, 17 Oct. 1900 - Ibid, p.98.
'insulting letters'.54 And there, with the Administration satisfied that 'Khama has admitted his error', the matter rested until taken up by Ralph Chamneys Williams.55

Rumours of warlike activities along the Bechuanaland border by forces of the South African Republic were current from 1896 up to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War on October 12th, 1899.

The Transvaal was itself pushing its sovereignty north-westwards towards the Limpopo, a process not completed until after the end of the War but which had begun in the suppression of the Malaboch tax resistance in 1894, and which finally divided the 'Northern Sotho' groups between Transvaal and Ngwato over-rule.

Malaboch (Mmalebogo) was chief of the Gananwa who was raided for tax or tribute in 1891 and withdrew to the Blouberg (Blaauwberg) massif, next to the Soutpansberg, and a little over a hundred miles east of Palapye across the Limpopo valley. A Transvaal expedition was mounted in 1894 to crush Malaboch's resistance.

Boer allies initially included Mapein (Mapena) of the Maunatlala-Birwa, though he had resisted tax in 1891. However it appears that the Boers turned on their Birwa allies as well as on their foes.56 The Malaboch war was followed by the 'Woodbush' revolt.

54 Sekgoma Letsholathebe to R.C., 1 Nov.1900; Magistrate Namailand (M.G. Williams) to Ag.R.C., 4 Jan.1901 - Ibid, pp.96 & 4.


56 N.J. Van Warmelo Die Tlokwa en Birwa van Noord Transvaal Pretoria: Unie van Suid-Afrika, Departement van Natureliesake (Ethnologiese Reeks No.29), 1953, pp.35-40 ('An incident during the Maleboch war'); Colin Rae Malaboch. Or, notes taken from my diary on the Boer campaign on 1694 against the chief Malaboch of Blaauwberg, District Zoutpansberg, South African Republic London Sampson Low & Cape Town: Juta, 1898, passim.; J.D. Krige 'Traditional origins', p.354. There is also a thesis - N.C. Wiedman 'Die Malaboch-oorlog (1896)' University of Pretoria, 1945 - which has not been consulted.

57 Reactions of British residents of the Transvaal to the Malaboch and 'Woodbush' wars or 'atrocities' are enclosed in B.N.A. - H.C.135/5. See also Times, 19 Aug.1901, p.8e.
organized along religious lines) in the south-eastern Soutpansberg. Apparently at this time (June 1895) Mapein arranged to be given refuge in Khama's Country. Immediately after the Shippard Award to Bo-Raditladi, Raditladi complained to J.S. Moffat that Khama had sent Maphute and Ramagagana to the Transvaal to negotiate with Mapein to settle his people in the area awarded to Bo-Raditladi.58 The Maunatlala-Birwa of Mapein had lived on the western side of the Limpopo before, and had last crossed to the east in about 1873. Despite the objections of the High Commissioner and the B.S.A. Company, the Maunatlala-Birwa were received into Khama's Country at the end of 1895, and were settled at Kopung (now called Maunatlala) on the northern side of the Tswapong Hills.59

Another small group who had historically straddled the Limpopo was the Seleka, who out of antagonism to the Ngwato had become Boer allies since the 1880s.60 Some of them may also have suffered at the hands of the Zoutpansberg and Waterberg commandos (under Barend Vorster and Frederick Grobler - brother of the Grobler killed by Bamangwato in 1888). In March 1896 a Mongwato spy, Baipedi, reported that Boer forces were massing at Seleka's, and were commandeering African allies. Baipedi thought this was to attack the Bamangwato; Ashburnham thought it was cattle control measures against rinderpest.61 Some BaSeleka crossed the Limpopo under Baitswe and Tlhasedi to settle at the old Seleka home of Ngwapa mountain. Khama complained against their cattle-rustling and bojale (initiation school), but probably did not expel them because they were in the Crocodile Block conceded to the Imperial authorities in 1895.


59 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.76; H.C.182/4. See also above Chapter 1, Note 25.

60 See above Chapter 1, Notes 24, 34, 80 and 124.

Seleka were expelled as illegal 'squatters' back into the Transvaal in June 1897; but Baitswe and a few followers soon returned, having quarrelled with his brother the chief Seleka (a hereditary title), and was with Imperial consent, received by Khama on condition that his followers resided in the Ngwato capital. These people were then called Moineedi - 'those who submit fully' (to Khama's rule).

Boer mobilisation in the Transvaal produced fears of retaliation into British territory for the Jameson Raid of early 1896. Individual Boers living in calico tents on the Palapye plain were 'training their eyes in case of war', according to Khama, during June 1896 by firing off cartridges (3/- for 10) every day: while a Transvaal force was poised on the frontier. Two Z.A.R. (South African Republic) rifles were the subject of long correspondence (since destroyed) after they were obtained at Palapye by the Assistant Commissioner at about this time. On March 10th 1897, the Boer population of Palapye withdrew en masse to the Transvaal, causing some panic that there might be war in the offing. And Willoughby observed:

'We shall be in a warm corner here if there is war with the Transvaal; for they have a great grudge against Khama.'

62 A.C. Palapye to Ag.R.C., 27 Feb. 1897; Ag.R.C. to Imp. Sec., 3 March 1897, etc. - H.C. 140/6. See also Schapera Ethnic Composition p. 78; C.O. 879/552. Sometime between writing to the L.M.S. in October 1896 and January 8th, 1897, Willoughby was taken to Ngwapa hill (Seleka's) by Khama as the possible site for an educational institution and was impressed by its sheer precipices and by its potential as a military stronghold. Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Jan. 1897.

63 Cf. H.C. to C.O. 1st April 1896; State President (Pretoria) to H.C., 28 March 1896 (Telegram) - H.C. 3/5/37/1.

64 Lugard Diary, 2 June 1896, p. 146 - Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 81. In August of that year Khama wrote to his Assistant Commissioner complaining of Boers, stranded by the rinderpest, living near Palapye, isolated from civil control, who were stealing the few remaining cattle - Khama to A.C.; 14 Aug. 1896 (W.C.W./S.O. 795).

65 R.C.'s Minute N. 1095 - H.C. 73.

66 Willoughby to L.M.S., 11 March 1897 - adding 'But we do not place much reliance on the rumours referred to; rumours and locusts are indigenous to this country, and they are both fertile breeders.'
But war fever abated until 1899 when it became general talk again. In August of that year a Boer transport-rider, Petrus Viljoen, was arrested in Rhodesia for having attempted to spread disaffection in Khama's Country — by boasting how he would shoot up the English, by having secret discussions with Khama's dissident son Sekgoma, and by claiming to a group in the Palapye Kgotla that the Boers had the Germans, the Hurutshe of Moilwa, the Ndebele of Rhodesia, the Kgatla of Linchwe, and even some Rolong, as allies.

On the first day of the Anglo-Boer War, intruders penetrated deep into Khama's Country and cut the Cape-Rhodesia telegraph wire around Mahalapye. British troops were already concentrated at the B.P. capital, Mafeking, and at the Southern Protectorate capital, Gaborone's: the Northern Protectorate was under the protection of Ngwato forces. Between the 12th and the 15th Boer commandos from the adjacent Marico District cut the telegraph and the railway between Mafeking and Gaborone's, and by the 17th, with Mafeking surrounded and a Boer camp established at Crocodile Pools south of Gaborone's, the Boer republics had successfully completed the first stage of their offensives on the Bechuanaland and Natal fronts. The Marico commandos prepared to drive northwards up the railway line to effect a junction with the Rustenberg commandos in the Kgatleng; thence northwards through Khama's Country to effect a junction there with the Waterberg commandos; and finally into Rhodesia via Tuli where the main force would unite with the Zoutpansberg commandos. The British obliged by withdrawing from Gaborone's on the 24th, and from Mochudi on the 27th of October, setting up their ne plus ultra at Mahalapye station.

67 H. Williams (Palapye) to L.M.S., 27 May 1899.

68 H.C. 177/6 passim. There is no real evidence for Khama's contention (Williams to L.M.S., 1 Nov.1899) that his son, Sekgoma, was conspiring with the Boers to make war. Cf. South Africa, Vol.40 (10 Feb.1900), p.394.

69 Williams to L.M.S., 1 Nov.1899. The account of the war that follows is taken from my longer essay on Botswana and the Anglo-Boer War presented to Thomas Packenham.
At the outbreak of war the Waterberg commandos were already advancing to take up position on Khama's border. On October 16th, Palapye received news that forces - under Commandant Grobler - were massing on the eastern side of the Limpopo at Seleka's (opposite Ngwapa), in a vicinity today marked on maps as Groblersburg. The next day Khama ordered out the Maolola regiment, under his brother Kebailele, to guard the Mahalapye railway bridge. And on the 20th and 21st came more definite intelligence that Grobler's force intended to attack Palapye by way of redoubts at Ngwapa hill, Sefhare hill, and Ratholo at the foot of the Tswapong hills. Khama immediately sent a regiment of 400 men to fortify Ngwapa, the key natural fortress of the area, while Ashburnham the Assistant Commissioner telegraphed Bulawayo for reinforcements. Thirty-six hours later, 100 Rhodesian white militia with 150,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and a 7-pounder gun, arrived at Palapye Road station, and 80 of them repaired to Palapye town - where the substantial masonry church building was converted into a fortress inside a double-ring of stone walls, and stocked with a month's provisions for the white population.

On October 22nd, Khama received an ultimatum from Assistant Commandant-General Grobler, couched in respectful terms and informing him of the Z.A.R.'s intention to invade. The ultimatum warned Khama to remain neutral while Grobler routed out the warlike British - 'I ask you to keep still, and quiet.' Khama made his reply to Captain (Kaptein: Dutch for chief) Grobler on the next day:

'My reply is: - If you do not intend fighting me what are you doing in my country with an armed force? If you enter with armed men into my country, and among my cattle-posts, I shall fight you...What I know is, that, you do not mean what you say in your letter. I do not trust you.'

70 R.C.4/14 passim & Williams (Palapye) to L.M.S., 1899 passim.
71 Ibid.
Khama claimed that the white people were under his protection, and not vice-versa. Grobler made no immediate advance: like Van Rensburg and the Zoutpansberg Commandos further north, he was awaiting the northward thrust of the Marico and Rustenburg forces. Khama and the British made use of the lull to reinforce Mahalapye, which was braced for the Boer advance from the Kgatleng, with Bamangwato and white defenders, and the 7-pounder. But the Boer advance never materialised; because Linchwe of the Kgatlala, whom Cronje had been satisfied would ally with the Boers for reasons that are yet obscure, managed to persuade the Boer forces to withdraw and re-group on October 31st. Grobler, characteristically impatient, withdrew with 400 men in a feint to the south and re-appeared at Rhodes Drift in the north where the Rhodesian forces of Colonel Plumer had bluffed a counter-invasion. Grobler's request to invade Rhodesia with Van Rensburg was turned down by Pretoria, so, on or before November 5th, Grobler came again to Seleka's reinforced by two more commandos. 637 Boers, with 97 waggons and 4 field-pieces, and about 750 armed African auxiliaries were now reportedly at Seleka's: so Khama despatched another regiment of 370 to Ngwapa hill - making a total of 700 defenders there. 74

On Tuesday, November 7th, the combined Transvaal forces crossed the Limpopo and fired four shells at Ngwapa, doubling back across the river to build a fort (Groblersburg?). There were no casualties on either side. Satisfied with this display of force (though the Ngwapa defenders were equally confident about their impregnability), the Seleka's concentration of Boer forces dissolved north and south to check on progress elsewhere on the Bechuanaland front. Attacks were made across Rhodes Drift on November 16th-18th, but the Transvaal forces had obviously lost the initiative. The British commander at Mahalapye, Colonel

Holdsworth, pressed home the advantage by advancing southwards to the Kgatleng, where a small victory north of Mochudi persuaded Linchwe to finally and irrevocably throw in his lot with the British. Holdsworth and Linchwe invaded the Transvaal, attacking the Marico forces at their Deerdepoort camp on November 24th, 1899. There followed the bitter Kga-tla-Boer war in the Rustenburg District which, though conducted independently of British control, proved invaluable in insulating the north-south railway from attack as late as 1902.

The Boer put sch up the line of rail had fizzled out, and a new Transvaal strategy had to be adopted on the Bechuanaland front. On November 24th, Palapye received intelligence that the Transvaal would make a three-pronged attack to capture Palapye, Fort Tuli, and Mangwe. Reinforcements arrived at Seleka's for the Boer forces, but hesitation again overtook the Boers on hearing rumours of defeat in the south. Though there were two minor exchanges of fire with Ngwato troops, the Boer concentrations suddenly pitched camp and retired to defend the south from Holdsworth (and Linchwe) on about December 2nd. That was the end of Grobler's ambition 'to make his mark on the war'.

The rising of the Limpopo waters because of the rains now made an invasion of Rhodesia via Tuli impracticable, and by the end of December Boer forces had abandoned the Northern Transvaal to their African allies. There was more heavy fighting at Deerdepoort, and Plumer rushed south to take over from Holdsworth. Failing to proceed direct down the rail from Gaborone's via Crocodile Pools, Plumer then (with active Kwena and especially Ngwaketse assistance) relied on a line of advance to the west via Kanye, shielded by the Kolobeng hills. Eventually, on

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75 This and subsequent incidents at Deerdepoort were the source of Kruger's bitterness about the active use of black troops against whites by the British - cf. Times, 28 Nov.1899, p.5a; 27 April-23 Dec.1901; 29 March 1902, p.5f; Scotsman, 19 Aug.1901, p.4d.

76 B. Gardner Mafeking, p.137.
May 17th 1900, Plumer's column linked with Mahon's from the south and relieved Mafeking, in which the Resident Commissioner (Goold-Adams) had been incarcerated since the beginning of the war.

But Mafeking was not relieved before Khama's Country had had another threat of invasion, to cut the north-south line of Plumer's communications and reinforcements. On May 9th, 1900, Khama received confirmation that a Boer force had disembarked at Pietersburg, the terminus of the railway from Pretoria, in the Northern Transvaal and was proceeding up the road to Seleka's. But this force's orders were countermanded, and it turned back. On May 19th Khama received news of Mafeking's relief. 77

There was no Bamangwato participation in the rest of the war, even though main areas of Afrikaner resistance to British 'mopping up' operations were adjacent - in the Rustenburg District and around Pietersburg. On Ashburnham's instructions, 'Khama [had] strictly forbade any of his men to cross the borders of his country', and these orders were 'faithfully, though reluctantly' obeyed. 78 But across the border in the Waterberg District the Seleka became important British collaborators, and Afrikaner resistance collapsed through lack of subsistence on farmlands where hegemony over the African population had collapsed. In February 1901 Boers in the area were reported to be near starvation, and were buying clothes off Africans' backs. In such conditions the once proud Commandant F.A. Grobler negotiated with the Assistant Commissioner at Palapye his surrender - and earned a Z.A.R. sentence of death in his absence and a price of £500 on his head for deserting the cause. 79

77 A.C. to R.C., 5 June 1900, - R.C.4/14.

78 Ibid.

79 A.C. to R.C., 19 Feb.1901 - R.C.4/14. The Aborigines Protection Society claimed that since the Africans of the Northern Transvaal were effectively independent of Boer sovereignty, they should be placed under a Basutoland-type British administration (Times, 14 Jan., p.4c. & 26 Aug.1901, p.9e.).
"Chief, I see that God has helped us wonderfully, for this war has not hurt us at all...no dead or wounded to lament, as in former wars. Instead we have made much money in this war...[the money] ought to be used for God, & my regiment agrees with me, all except three shameless ones, tho' one relented."

Thus spoke Kebailele, commander of the Maolola (Mafhiri) regiment, when charged by Khama at the end of the Anglo-Boer War to decide how to spend the £1728 which his regiment had earned from the British for military services rendered at Mahalapye. The Bamangwato economy gained more widely from the war in terms of indirect income - from the stimulation of the market for goods and services, by the demands of military personnel and of Rhodesian settlerdom cut off from the Cape supply centre. Khama's Country had had 'a splendid harvest' in mid-1899, and the war created high prices for meal and meat (though plentiful). Khama prophetically telling his people, 'to take full advantage of the opportunity for it is probably the last they will ever get.' Though the mid-1900 harvest was mostly destroyed by locusts, during that year sheep and goats from Palapye were fetching between 50/- and 60/-, and cattle between £25 and £30 - prices not to be reached again until the 1960s. The northern relief column for Mafeking from Rhodesia purchased £25,000 worth of cattle from Gamangwato, and agents from Bulawayo were searching as far as Ngamiland in search of slaughter-stock.

'Indeed Khama's Country may be said to be the great emporium for live stock at the present time', wrote the temporary Palapye missionary Howard Williams. Despite sky-high consumer prices, Bamangwato, in possession of so much cash, bought much imported food and clothing, and blankets - traders being so short of cash as to give concessions on bank notes, and premiums up to 15% on

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80 'Notes on the remarks of the Chief Khama and the Serowe deacons' - E. Lloyd to L.M.S., 20 Aug.1909. The money was spent on the new Serowe church - see Chapter 7 below. It is not clear whether this £1728 is the same as or additional to the £1000 referred to by Willoughby in 1903 as being paid to Bamangwato for current construction work on military fortifications (unspecified) - Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 June 1903.
silver and gold. On returning to the country after two years absence, W.C. Willoughby was surprised by the increase of prosperity. He presaged Alan Pim's economic report of three decades later in attributing the recovery of cattle numbers after the rinderpest to 'the opportunities for acquiring good cattle during and after the Boer War' - presumably from Ngamiland and Barotseland. The interruption of railway services and the demand for transportation of local produce also enabled waggon-owners, such as Khama, to accumulate cash from hiring their waggon out.

The economic health of Khama's Country at this juncture can be seen in a tax yield of around £5000, in the strict exaction of church-dues (phalalo) without opposition, in the educational boom at Palapye, and in fines being exacted (by Sekgoma Khama of his followers in exile) as high as £80 (£50 for the poorer) for breaking liquor laws. All this served to bolster the self-confidence of Khama in relation to the power of the British. 'Khama is proud to boast that he has never taken the money of the British Government', wrote Willoughby in June 1901,

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81 Williams to L.M.S., 27 May 1899 & 11 Jan.1900. Compare these prices with 10/- to 15/- (1888) for sheep and goats, and with £20-£30 for cattle at the height of the rinderpest in 1895 - Chapter 4, Notes 74 & 100 above. At the end of 1901 sheep and goat values at Mochudi had slipped down to 15/- to 18/- (and cattle down to £20 (C.0.417/343 - Linchwe to Ag.A.C. Gaborone's, 26 Nov.1901). For Mochudi, Schapera put the 1924 cattle price at only £3/17/-, and Pim in 1932 found the price at £2/2/- and still falling. (Cmd.4368, p.27). Such was to be the dramatic decline in the prosperity of the people of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. See also Chapters 8 & 9.

82 Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct.1900; L.M.S. Chronicle, No.108 (Dec.1900), p.297; Cmd.4368 (Pim Report), p.25. Cf. Note 11 above. While Bamangwato benefitted, white settlerdom in Southern Rhodesia apparently suffered from the regime of high prices - cf. Times, 31 Jan.1900, p.3e-f. The number of cattle estimated in the Bamangwato Reserve by the 1921 Census was 180,608 - which, given that growth rate of the national herd as between the 1904 and 1921 Census estimates (139,071 to 426,344), would have represented somewhere under 100,000 head in the Bamangwato Reserve by 1904.

83 Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 June 1901.

84 W.C.W./S.O.795; Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct.1900; C.0.879/659, p.77.
and in that year a particular spirit of Ethiopian independency was found among Bamangwato.\textsuperscript{85}

Though Khama failed to get 'the C.M.G. at very least', his strong stand against the Transvaal strengthened the informal special relationship that existed with the British Establishment. In May 1900, Willoughby, in London, personally tackled Chamberlain (still Colonial Secretary) about Khama's fear that the B.S.A. Company, as its chairman was publicly hoping, would be given the B.P. after the war was over. Chamberlain replied that Khama had nothing to fear as long as he kept his half of the bargain with the British government reached in 1895 - which "I was rather glad to arrange it as we did." All the B.S.A. chairman was after, was the land rights of the Strip conceded by the Chiefs in 1895, said Chamberlain.\textsuperscript{86} Khama's 'loyalty' was confirmed by his commiserations on the death of Queen Victoria in January 1901, and in August of that year he went with other 'loyal' Chiefs from all over southern Africa to Cape Town to greet the pulative Prince of Wales (later George V).\textsuperscript{87} And in 1902 it appears that Khama was given the distinction, shared with the dignatories of Buganda and Barotseland, of an invitation to the planned coronation of Edward VII in Great Britain. In the middle of that year a leading Glasgow goldsmith's was displaying a bronze bust of Khama in its window commissioned by Mr. John Stephen of Linthouse as a present for Khama and the Bamangwato.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{References:}

\textsuperscript{85} As 83. See below Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{86} 'Notes of conversation with Chamberlain, 25 May 1900 - W.C.W./S.O. 778; Parsons Word of Khama, Note 34.

\textsuperscript{87} Daily Mail (London), 24 Jan.1901; Willoughby to L.M.S., 27 Aug. 1901; C.0.879/694, passim. See also above Note 33 & below Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{88} Unidentified newspaper clipping (May or June 1902) in W.C.W./S.O.742. See also Parsons "Image" p.57, n38.
Chapter 6: DYNASTIC POLITICS, DECENTRALISATION, AND THE CHURCH, 1891-9

"God, Our Father, which art in heaven we praise thee that we behold the lamp of the Bamañwato still shining. The winds of the sea, Jesus, Lord, Thou didst rebuke to stop them. We praise thus that the name of Our Father in Heaven may be honoured, and that His Government may be seen here and in all lands always."

With such words, singing, a welcoming party under Khama's son Sekgoma approached the waggons of the old Chief at the Tauane (Towani) river on the road to Palapye, on the night of January 6th, 1896. The waggons travelled on into the night and, according to an account of one of the welcoming party, people came running from their gardens towards the royal party, chanting, singing, weeping. "Is it he, or do we dream as those who sleep?" Men rushed in among the horses, seized Khama by the hands, and kissed him. At the Lokakulwe river, where the whites of the town greeted him, Khama mounted a splendid horse and rode on it into town, where great crowds surged round him and guns were fired into the air in tribute.¹

But the euphoria that greeted Khama's return to his capital from Britain was not to last long, nor had it been typical of the years immediately preceding. A long and bitter dispute soon came to a head between Khama and his heir; and a dispute with some of his brothers had indeed been one of the reasons why Khama had gone to Britain. Tensions within the royal household found expression both in dynastic disputes and in ruptures within the state-church that catered largely for the political élite. These were tensions not only of personal ambition and rivalry, but also of alternative strategies as to how that political élite should 'modernize' itself.²

¹ Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 March 1896
² The theme of 'modernising autocracy' in relation to the Lozi and Ganda has been taken up in T.O. Ranger 'African attempts to control education in east and central Africa 1900-1929' Past and Present, No.32, Dec.1965, pp.57-85.
Though given a firm foundation by the work of John Mackenzie at Shoshong, it was effectively the accession of Khama, the first Christian King of the Bamangwato which gave the Church and education their predominant status in the state's ideology. There is no evidence that royal legislation ever gave de jure status to Christianity as the official state religion and schooling system. But by virtue of having come to power at the head of a Church (versus Pagan) party, by his banning or Christianising of state ceremonial, and by tacitly encouraging the élite to send their children to the Church school (where he himself had once probably briefly taught), Khama's rule gave de facto status to the Church as an essential state institution. That there was indeed an established state-church can be in Khama's resolute refusal to allow any other Christian body except the London Missionary Society to work in the kingdom. Non-Christian belief (if not always practice) continued to be tolerated among the masses, though it was indeed being permeated beyond recognition among the Western Tswana by Christian influences. Recruitment to the élite was widened to all who 'rose' through education, but in practice this usually meant modernising aristocrats, because few else had access to the financial resources required for the tools and symbols of the new education (books, clothing, etc.). The outstanding early example of the commoner (though not a 'settler') who thereby joined the ruling élite is Ratshosa. The holding of Church office - notably in the diaconate - also became an important source of leverage within the state hierarchy.

The irony of the Congregationalist L.M.S. supplying Erastian Churches to the Tswana states was not lost on all observers.


4 See Chapters 2, 7 & 10.


6 See Chapter 2.
John Brown, the L.M.S. missionary at Taungs, with reference to Khama, attacked his own mission for uncompromisingly opposing the union of Church and State in Britain, while 'swallowing the whole leek in South Africa without any wryness of face.' Bengt Sundkler has similarly remarked on the anomaly of the L.M.S purveying state-churches to the Ngwato and Malagasy royal courts.

It was in the interests of the resident missionary at Khama's capital to distinguish Church from State for disciplinary purposes while the king wished to identify the Church with the State as a national institution. This conflict of interests so familiar to history in other lands erupted into enmity between the heads of Church and State among the Bamangwato on a number of occasions in Khama's reign. Nearly every resident missionary eventually proved a Becket to Khama. The first was James Davidson Hepburn, who was stationed at the Ngwato capital from 1871-1892.

A pious Northumberlander, Hepburn had 'the faith of a little child'. His letters reveal a man with strong scriptural consciousness (in contrast with other L.M.S. missionaries), and a sense of identification with Old Testament prophets such as Ezekiel, which moved in his latter more pietistic days to identification with St. John. Hepburn disclaimed direct influence on Khama's religious and moral character development. But Hepburn it was who guided Khama's first steps in foreign policy towards 'white' powers, reinforcing Khama's sternly moralistic stand. However, Hepburn's role as a secretary of

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7 John Brown to L.M.S., 29 Feb.1896. Willoughby, after 24 years in the Tswana mission field remarked: 'The State establishment of religion cannot fail to exaggerate its externalities and cripple its realities. It has done this wherever it has been tried. But the Bechuanas have not been content with the State establishment of religion: they have identified religion with the State. This is true of all our L.M.S. stations in Bechuanaland.' ('Molepolole at the end of 1916', mss in WCW/30.382.)


state for foreign affairs declined in the 1880s: he was on overseas furlough during 1882-4, and was absent when Khama came to terms with Warren's 'protectorate' at Shoshong in May 1885. His re-engagement as Khama's foreign secretary in the later 1880s was as scribe to Lobengula and Lewanika via their respective missionaries.

Hepburn took no pride in either diplomatic or administrative skills, unlike both his predecessor Mackenzie and his successor Willoughby at the court of King Khama. From 1878 much of Hepburn's energy was poured into pressing the frontiers of evangelisation into the outlying areas of Khama's country, and into Ngamiland - which became the daughter mission of the Ngwato Church. In practice therefore, though in principle Hepburn and Khama attempted to deny this, Hepburn's efforts to spread abroad Ngwato evangelisation in fact spread Ngwato national influence abroad: and thereby the interests of Church and State were kept in harmony. But Hepburn's moral stance in frankly dismissing so much law and custom as 'pagan' and reprehensible, provided potential - and sometimes actual - conflict between Church and State. Though so long as Hepburn's intolerant and obsessive streaks did not clash with Khama's own, a modus vivendi as between old friends could be maintained.

The breaking point in the relationship between Khama and Hepburn was reached after the Bamangwato capital had been removed from Shoshong to Palapye in 1889. The removal associated the Church with the State more closely than ever in political and economic terms. The transportation of much of the actual Church building over up to 80 miles by waggon was an expensive and time-consuming operation. Khama contributed a hundred oxen to the cost, and

11 See Chapter 2.
12 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.183-4.
13 Ibid, pp.235-42
other Bamangwato lined up to follow suite in contributions of livestock and grain. It was in this manner that patronage of Church interests became a touchstone of allegiance to the State, and wealth became more than ever before evident as the criterion of participation in Church affairs, and therefore of access to formal education. Church membership was basically the prerogative of the existing political elite - the dikgosana (aristocrat) families who had surplus cattle and game produce to convert into cash. But wealth also enabled those batlhanka (commoner) and bafaladi ('settler') families who controlled a surplus earned from cattle, agriculture, or waggon-hiring, to gain access to the political elite via Church membership. Under Hepburn, therefore, both in intensification at the centre and extensification at the periphery, the Ngwato Church had a key function in the state-building and nation-building process.

Hepburn appears to have become aware of how the Church was diverging from the L.M.S. anti-establishmentarian and congregational (or Independent) heritage. But his reaction was to turn in on his own soul, and to concentrate his churchwork at its social and geographical periphery, neglecting its administration at the corrupted centre. Hepburn reached some kind of personal crisis - whether before or after his popular and humane wife left for the Cape with their children in 1891 - and began to quarrel openly with Khama. At the end of 1891 Khama sought out Cecil Rhodes, who was passing through Palapye, for confidential discussion of the matter; and it appears that Khama took over administrative control of the Church, confiscating its papers from Hepburn.

14 Frank William Frederick Johnson Great Days. The autobiography of an empire pioneer London: Bell & Sons, 1940, p.74
16 As late as 1898 Willoughby still did not understand the real reason for the quarrel - Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept.1898.
The directors of the L.M.S. obliged Khama by recalling Hepburn to England. Hepburn left in 1892: Khama sent a gift of £1000 after him - variously interpreted as a symptom of regret after twenty years association, or as a guilt-ridden attempt at 'buying out the missionary' to keep him quiet. Hepburn responded by turning over the gift to the L.M.S. in London. And in the following year he died, apparently broken-hearted.

The response of the L.M.S. missionaries of the 'Bechuana District Committee' (i.e. British Bechuanaland and Bechuanaland Protectorate) was one of forboding, opposing their London directors' decision as a disastrous precedent:

'It is also quite evident that the Chief's action arose in great measure, if not wholly, from a determination on his part to be paramount, not only in the management of the affairs of his own tribe as such, but also in matters purely ecclesiastical. It has further been made evident during these meetings that this same spirit prevails throughout the whole of Bechuanaland - that paramount chiefs and minor chiefs are making no secret of the fact that they are going to claim and exercise the right of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs; that the appointment of missionaries and evangelists is, in future, to be in their own hands, as far as their own towns or villages are concerned.'

The L.M.S. sent its foreign secretary, Wardlaw Thompson, out from London to investigate. He satisfied himself that the affair had been a special case, because Hepburn had become mentally unbalanced. Thompson held an enquiring at Palapye in August 1892, which brought the first inkling of a dispute between Church and State internalised among the Bamangwato. Raditladi, the half brother of Khama, rose to declare that Khama was not the Head of the Church. But his view was not pursued at the enquiry by the faction that he headed, out of 'forgiveness' - they later claimed for Khama and his supporters within the Church.

18 As Note 15: John Charles Harris Khama the Great African Chief London: Livingstone Press, 1922, p.84
19 B.D.C., 3 May 1892 (printed in L.M.S. annual 1892).
20 Church members, Palapye, to L.M.S., 16 March 1895.
This first cry of identification from Raditladi set in motion a complex of intrigue that involved not just Church and State, but differences within the Church, complicated by personal and dynastic ambitions and infected by the whole question of Bamangwato response to the new colonial situation. It set in motion the Bo-Raditladi affair.

Hostilities opened at a Church assembly in Palapye of 27th January 1894. Leading Church members wished to evangelise the semi-serf population of the Tswapong hills, while W.C. Willoughby the new missionary was concentrating his energies at the capital in political secretarial work for Khama. Khama vetoed this campaign because the preachers had caused, or would cause, trouble by diverting allegiance of the Tswapong people from his rule.

Khama likened his opponents in the Church to Pharisees, in their confidence in their own worth and correctness. They retorted that there were now two Churches in Gamangwato - Khama's and Christ's. Apparently associating the 'dissentients' with Hepburn Khama referred to his opponents as the 'old church':

"Let the old church go to teach in another town in another country, not in my country not in my town - they are spoiling my people for me."

William Charles Willoughby stood up and agreed with this statement of Khama's made on the communion Sunday of August 5th, 1894.

When the dissentients sent Kuate to gain Willoughby's support, Willoughby told Kuate that he had given Khama his heart, and Khama had given him his. The new missionary was anxious to follow the London L.M.S. line - though he changed his mind about the true nature of the affair in later years.

The 'dissentients' found support in John Smith Moffat - who had left the L.M.S. many years before and was now Assistant Commissioner for the British at Palapye. J.S. Moffat, like John Brown of Taungs, fell into the anti-Erastian camp of 'Bechuana'.

21 Ibid.

22 Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept.1898.
missionaries. It was in his capacity as an ordained minister that the 'dissentients' - or Bo-Raditladi as they may be called - turned to him for support in ecclesiastical matters. His support was forthcoming, and Bo-Raditladi as first a Church and then as a State faction coalesced from 'secret prayer meetings' in the Magistrate's house around the end of 1894.

On February 3rd, 1895, Khama announced - "The large church I have separated from it: it drinks liquor." And on March 16th, maybe at Moffat's instigation, Bo-Raditladi signed a long appeal to the directors of the L.M.S. There were 16 signatures, to which was appended: 'All these names are of people who have vowed to be crucified in the name of Christ - there are also some others.' Willoughby noted that 5 of the signatories had accounted for one-third of the subscriptions for the new church building at Palapye. The signatories included deacons (Kquate and Mphoeng), Khama's half-brothers (Mphoeng and Raditladi) and a son-in-law (Morwe), and the senior churchman of the prosperous Khurutshe group (Tumedi).

Though dynastically junior to Mphoeng, Raditladi proved the most important to Khama among the 'dissentients.' Raditladi and Khama had shot at each other in the 1860s and 1870s, but Raditladi had proved his worth as a military leader between 1890 and 1893, after the demise of Mokhutswane. It was Raditladi's high prestige with the B.S.A. Company and with J.S. Moffat that resulted in attempts to have his followers given their own reserve, carved out of the Shashe-Motloutse 'Disputed Territory'. Bo-Raditladi succeeded in being awarded the eastern half of that territory in June 1895 - Shippard's 'biassed' Award which, it will be remembered, decided Khama on going to London. By having the Shippard Award

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23 Willoughby to L.M.S., 18 March 1896.

24 As note 20.

25 As Note 23. The 16 signatories were: Tiro, Morwe, Kuate, Raditladi, Nkobele, Kgosi-e-yang, Tumedi, Ntiro, Mphoeng, Motlhapatse, Kgotla-etsho, Pudimaye, Soldate, Rra-Modisa, Rra-Kgamanyane, and Gaebepe.

26 See Chapter 3.

27 Ibid, Notes 73-4 & 85.
reversed, and Bo-Raditladi allotted to B.S.A. Company territory, Khama's 1895 visit to Britain solved the Bo-Raditladi problem. But it marked not the end but the beginning of a chapter in Bamangwato royal household and Church politics.

Within the Church, Bo-Raditladi taught Khama the lesson of controlling appointment to the diaconate to exclude 'overmighty subjects'. Though the Church continued to serve as a theatre for State per se. The Church as far as the congregation was concerned was now a subordinate part of the state establishment. Its future tensions were to be with the 'papacy' of the London Missionary Society control from outside - an echo of Ngwato state tensions with the outside control of British imperialism.

Willoughby had devoted his first two years at Palapye to being a political functionary of the state, acting as Khama's foreign secretary. He limited his Church work, besides its priestly functions, to learning the language and to extending the mission station buildings. But the exhaustion of organising the 'Bechuana' delegation to Britain in 1895, and the subsequent cooling of relations between Khama and Willoughby, determined the missionary in weaning the Church away from being the national institution of what was rapidly becoming an outmoded Native Reserve. In 1898 he wrote:

'I have done what I have done merely from a sense of duty. But I have quietly resisted the attempt to make the Missionary a kind of interpreter and private secretary to the Chief... For the future I am determined not to touch Native politics.'

In October 1896 Willoughby set about the reorganisation of the Church with a new code of discipline, based on reforms then being put through in L.M.S. stations further south. 'I am convinced that here, in the midst of a heathen community,' wrote Willoughby 'it is desirable to make a clear distinction between the members of the Church and those who are outside.' The new code drastically tightened up the financial and educational qualifications for membership, decreased the powers of the diaconate,

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28 Willoughby to L.M.S. 8 Jan 1897.
29 Lloyd to L.M.S. 15 June 1896.
restricted Christian rites to paid-up members, and made the Church financially self-sufficient bar the British missionary's own salary.

The most irksome part of the October 1896 code for existing members was insistence on the payment of phalalo - the annual church dues for membership. Admission to communion was to be by ticket, and ticket-books would only be given to the registered Church members on receipt of their phalalo. This strict insistence had a beneficial effect of church funds - putting them at £98/7/6 for the year 1897, and reaching £111 in 1899-1900.

Church membership now had privileges as never before. Infant baptism was now for members' children only. Christian marriage rites became so difficult to obtain that only 16 such marriages were celebrated between October 1896 and September 1898. All this was a dramatic change from the good old days when Hepburn had encouraged people to marry (or re-marry) with Christian rites. He had done this by entrusting the provision of the rites to the Church deacons. At the same time Hepburn removed Christian divorces from an ecclesiastical court to the royal Kgotla. What happened in 1896 was that Willoughby, following a new High Commissioner's proclamation on civil marriages, removed the right to marry from his deacons, and kept it to himself. 'This raised much discussion and some dissention,' he remarked of the Church meeting at which he made the announcement.

The most drastic 'reform' of the October 1896 code was insistence on literacy in the Setswana New Testament as the pre-requisite of future Church membership. When the seven deacons presented an illiterate candidate for membership, insisting that he was a true Christian all the same, Willoughby refused the candidate membership, resorting to a homily about oxen without teeth:

30 Goodall London Missionary Society, p.289.
31 Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 July 1900.
32 Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Oct.1896.
"I want to buy an ox; you bring me one. I look into its mouth and decide I will not buy. But you tell me that it is an ox, and I cannot deny it. Still I will not buy; for I see that it has no teeth, and I wonder how long it will continue to be an ox." 33

Willoughby was attempting to restrict entry into the Church to a youthful intelligencia - 'an intelligent youth can learn to read Secwana intelligibly in a few months, thanks to our phonetic spelling.' What in effect Willoughby did was to restrict the Church to a self-perpetuating 'new' élitiste, still admittedly based on the 'old' élite's access to wealth, but broad enough to admit 108 infant baptisms of members' children in 1897-8. 34

Maybe unconsciously, Willoughby's Church reforms fell in with Khama's current transfer of power from his brothers to a more youthful generation or intelligencia, that of Sekgoma his son and of Ratshosa his son-in-law.

Church discipline paralleled Khama's political changes on two other levels - the reintroduction of the ban on bojalwa (beer) and in so-called 'decentralisation'. On the question of bojalwa Willoughby himself was liberal:

'It is true that the removal of the native beer laws has introduced beer-making and drinking among the members; but there has been no case of drunkenness, as far as I can discover,' he remarked in March 1896. 35

But at the same time, writing on behalf of their Chief, five leading churchmen appealed to the L.M.S. in London to pray for the Church especially over the 'enemy called Drink'. Khama thought missionaries somewhat naive in accepting the common drinking man's stock excuse that bojalwa was a nutritious food. 36

33 Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept. 1898.
34 Ibid.
35 Willoughby to L.M.S., 16 March 1896.
36 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p. 151.
But by 1902, when Khama moved into a new offensive on beer-drinking, Willoughby had been won over to the Chief's point of view. Seven or eight years of observation had led Willoughby to an opinion that beer-drinking was a social evil, time-wasting and sloth-making in its endless parties moving from household to household across the town. Khama however saw it as a moral evil, equating all beer-drinking with drunkenness, and banned it from the Church. 37 He wrote an open letter against Drink to the 'Native Press' of South Africa, ridiculing the beer-drinking chiefs of the annexed territories for having lost their lands. And in the same year, 1902, he again took the drastic step of banning bojalwa for all his subjects. 38 In this he apparently succeeded, but it subsequently checked Khama as an innovator that he felt he had gone to the limits of national unity in imposing his autocratic predilections on his people. 39

The decentralisation of Church activities to outlying areas between 1896 and 1902 satisfied the evangelistic desires of the Church which had been shown in the Bo-Raditladi affair, while following Khama's own decentralisation in the political sphere during those years. Decentralisation took two forms. One form was the setting up of local congregations and schools in outlying areas under the patronage of the central Church. The other form was the loss of Ngwato control over the Ngamiland Church among the Tawana.

The Ngamiland mission, started in 1878, had been under the charge of the Ngwato Church, who paid its teachers' salaries. A.J. Wookey had been appointed the Ngamiland missionary in 1892 but never took up residence in 1896 as intended because of fever

37 L.M.S. annual report, Palapye, 1902 mss (printed, pp.255-8); L.M.S. Chronicle, No.113, May 1901, p.121; Parsons Word, p.15.
38 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.149.
affecting both him and his wife. Instead he remained at Palapye during 1896 and 1897, and then retired southwards - the L.M.S. local committee appointing an evangelist called Peter Gaeongale in his stead in 1899. Of the two Ngwato-paid teachers appointed to Ngamiland in 1878, only Khukwe Mogodi was still there by 1900: Diphukwe had been 'discarded' (he re-appeared in 1903 elsewhere as minister to an independent Church). In 1900, as already outlined, Khukwe snubbed Khama's attempts to interfere in Tawana politics. Peter Gaeongale returned to Gamangwato, and Khukwe faded from the picture, leaving the whole of Ngamiland in the charge of Shomolekae for many years. Shomolekae was a preacher who came to Ngamiland in 1892 independently, to work among both the Tawana and Koba (Yei) - The Apostle of the Marshes as Tom Brown titled Shomolekae's biography. Though the Ngwato Church continued to send and pay teachers (e.g. Madongo Matenge) it seems that the Ngamiland Church was effectively independent of the Ngwato Church from about 1900.

Ngwato reaction against L.M.S. 'papacy' first emerged on the return of Khama and Willoughby from Britain at the end of 1895. Willoughby put down Khama's coldness to dyspepsia, and then to jealousy, because Khama felt like Saul when David was heaped with praises by the ladies of Israel - a reference to people's exaggerated estimate of Willoughby's role in achieving the Chamberlain Settlement. Willoughby regarded Khama's resistant attitude towards famine relief at the end of 1896 as 'childish nonsense'. By February 1897 Willoughby had come to the point with Khama: there were 'doming troubles' between the Chief and the L.M.S. No, Khama implied, it was not he, but 'certain people some black and some white' who wished him to dispute with the

40 Wookey to L.M.S., 14 Oct.1896; Willoughby to L.M.S., 11 March 1897; Wookey to L.M.S., 12 March 1897.
41 Cf. Chapter 5, Note 53.
42 Lloyd to L.M.S., 23 Sept.1903
L.M.S. Willoughby came away with the impression, correctly, that the 'black' agitation was to lead not to a dispute between Chief and Missionary but to an outbreak of factionalism (the Sekgoma kgang); and he soon concluded that the 'white' agitation was by the Assistant Commissioner at Palapye, a scheming Anglican.

Willoughby was absent from Palapye between 1898 and 1900; and his locum tenens, Howard Williams, was not aware of tensions concerning the Church, even though he exacted phalalo more strictly than ever. The seeds of 'Ethiopianism' had already been planted, but the energies of the Church and of the élite were still engaged in the educational boom and kept buoyant by wartime prosperity. On his return, Khama conversed with Willoughby most cordially, excusing his stand-offishness of previous years. He seemed physically fitter than he had been ten years previously and was obviously spiritually refreshed by his marriage of 1900 to the young, lovely, and devout Semane. By the time the Ngwato capital was transferred from Palapye to Serowe in June-July 1902, Church activities had never been more active. When Willoughby announced his imminent departure to Khama in 1903, the Chief was surprised and sorry that the L.M.S. would replace a politically and socially experienced man with a greenhorn 'who does' not know people and things but knows only the teaching.'

The departure of W.C. Willoughby from the Bamangwato in 1903 marks the end of powerful missionary influence as a constant factor in Bamangwato politics, internal and external. This was not merely the result of personality or of circumstance, but the product of two other processes which had overtaken missionary influence. One process, which will be discussed below, was the growth of an educated élite as the major factor determining internal policies. The other process was the growth of the power and influence of the local British administration as the major factor determining external policies.

45 Willoughby to L.M.S., 11 Feb. 1897.
46 See Chapters 4 & 7.
47 Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 June 1903.
Open competition between the educated élite and the L.M.S. emerged in an 'Ethiopian Episode' of 1902: open competition from the Assistant Commissioner first emerged in the 1895 espousal of Bo-Raditladi by J.S. Moffat. Moffat was promptly replaced; and his successor, J.A. Ashburnham, attempted to outbid the L.M.S. in espousing Khama. An open haggle between the Magistrate and the missionary, to the Chief's embarrassment as arbitrator, developed in 1897. The magistracy challenged the mission's rights to control the water supply of the Photophoto kloof (gorge) at Palapye. Willoughby interpreted the challenge as the spearhead of a white settler attempt to expropriate Native land and to discredit the L.M.S., and projected his own native class and ecclesiastical prejudices into the dispute, as he wrote to London:

'I am writing to you privately; and I might as well tell you that this Magistrate is about the meanest and stingiest man I have ever met... He is of a class who looks down on all others as creatures of another species. And he and his wife, who is daughter of Roger Price, look down on dissent I.e. L.M.S. with contempt.'

As far as Khama was concerned all the magistracy wanted was free access to water supplies, but the mission, which had fenced the area, was claiming some unspecified form of land tenure. It was the mission's claim to tenure that Khama found 'painful', as he had always made a point of allowing no security of tenure to aliens. Willoughby saw the future of Bechuanaland Protectorate following the history of British Bechuanaland, where freehold tenure for whites had superseded 'tribal' land-holding and where the L.M.S. had lost out in the land case of the 'Kuruman Eye'. But Willoughby's obsession with land tenure estranged Khama, and proved of vital importance in the Bamangwato rejection in 1902 of plans to use Old Palapye as the L.M.S. educational institution.

48 Willoughby to L.M.S., 11 March 1897 & 22 April 1898.

49 Willoughby to L.M.S., 11 March - encl. Khama to Willoughby, 18 & 20 Feb. 1897; Willoughby to R.C., 10 March 1897.

50 Cf. Parsons 'Independency and Ethiopianism'; Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 June 1902.
The competition between Magistrate and missionary, or between Ashburnham and Willoughby in personal terms, extended to patronage of the local white trading community. The pre-colonial tradition had been that the traders of the Ngwato capital conformed to the practice of the Ngwato state religion in its English form, i.e. Congregationalism. Willoughby attempted to institutionalise this arrangement by building a chapel for English-language services, vested by Khama 'in the London Missionary Society in trust for the English-speaking inhabitants of Phalapye'. But Ashburnham wanted the chapel to be run by the British established Church in its South African form, namely the (Anglican) Church of the Province. He was not successful, and the Anglicans resorted to a mobile mission in order to penetrate the Bechuanaland Protectorate. After the construction of the railway in 1897, Bishop Gaul set up the Railway Mission in cooperation with the Rhodesian railway authorities, to minister to whites along the line-of-rail. In 1898 Ashburnham tried to persuade Willoughby's replacement as L.M.S. missionary, Howard Williams, to allow the Anglican railway chaplain (Rev. Fogarty) to use the new chapel at Palapye. Williams wrote back that the chaplain and not the Magistrate should make the application: Ashburnham complained of Williams' dictatorial attitude; and the 'Nonconformist'-dominated chapel management committee resolved that the Anglicans should hold their services in the Magistrate's courthouse! (Most of Palapye's 70 to 80 whites preferred to spend their Sundays playing cricket, practising shooting, or dealing cards).53

Such complexities thrown up by the 'advancing wave of European immigration' from white South Africa, led Willoughby to make the following observation in 1898 when summing up his first five years in Khama's Country:

51 Willoughby to L.M.S., 19 May 1897.
52 Williams to L.M.S., 31 Aug. 1898.
53 Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept. 1898.
The Chief difficulty of the immediate future, apparently, will be that of political disquietude. This has been an ever-present element of anxiety among these tribes ever since we have known them, and it promises more trouble in the future than it has ever given in the past... It is quite impossible to harmonise the old autocratic chieftainship with the democratic and freer forces that are ever playing on native life, as it comes more and more closely in touch with Europeans... The people cannot remain insensitive to the general air of freedom which ever accompanies the white-man's steps.'54

In retrospect Willoughby's prognostication has a strange logic, confusing race and culture, proved wrong in the case of Botswana in his belief in the certain triumph of white settlement and the inevitably swift demise of Chieftainship. But Willoughby's view is interesting on two counts. Firstly, as a revelation of current 'progressive' missionary thought. Secondly, in its prediction of the role of the educated African elite within what came to be loosely called the 'Ethiopian Movement'.

In October 1896, Willoughby, percipient as ever, was thinking that current Church affairs were 'very peculiar' but could not fathom why, concluding that the peculiarities were not in the Church itself but 'indications rather of a tribal disruption' yet undisclosed:

'There is a strained feeling as if there were pent up forces throbbing to be let loose and people fear to do anything or say anything lest they should be let loose.'55

These 'pent up forces' were to find their outlet in Bamangwato politics during the Sekgoma Khama kgang (i.e. scandal) of 1897-9. This kgang falls chronologically between the Bo-Raditladi secession (1895) and the muted 'Ethiopian Episode' of 1902. But such are the dynamics of the Bamangwato elite that the Sekgoma

54 Ibid.
55 Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Oct.1896.
kgang harks 'back' further than 1895 and 'forward' further even beyond the colonial period in Botswana.\textsuperscript{56} The Sekgoma kgang is, on the one hand, an echo of Khama's own dispute with his father over his inheritance: and in turn it sets in motion that sequence of dynastic and personal rivalries which finally erupted over the issue of Seretse Khama's marriage in 1948. On the other hand, the Sekgoma kgang was more 'tribal' and less a conflict of incipient class interests than the Bo-Raditladi secession had been.

How did the kgang begin? Its roots were in the efforts of a son, well into maturity, to assert his independence of thought and action from a masterful father. Private recriminations became public ones in the Palapye Kgotla on October 6th, 1897, but the peak of the quarrel was not reached until 1898, by which time it had become the rallying point of Tribal factionalism over current political issues. Khama himself traced the tensions to when Sekgoma had put aside his first wife, daughter of Mogwere, and had taken another, daughter of Seretse (a half-brother of Khama) - without Khama's consent or open objection ("I just kept quiet"). Before Khama went to Cape Town, he sent Sekgoma out to live at Moleloaneng, but on his return in early 1895 he found his son at Kgaman's village on the Ngotwane. Sekgoma had now put aside Seretse's daughter and had taken Serero the daughter of Kgaman - Khama's full-brother and old arch rival. "Even then" says Khama, "I said nothing and just looked at him."\textsuperscript{57}

However relations between father and son were still good enough for Khama to leave Sekgoma with full powers of regency during his absence in Britain during the second half of 1895. There was no question of Sekgoma (or Kgaman) having been involved with Bo-Raditladi. On Khama's return, Willoughby noted that Sekgoma had become a power to be reckoned with. Having been a successful regent he 'could now make his voice heard in the tribe as no one but he and his father can.' And, though he later

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Parsons 'Simon Ratsnosa: shots for a black republic?' Masa (Gaborone), No.1, 1972/3, forthcoming. Kgang means a dispute, controversy or scandal: in the plural dikgang simply means 'news.'

\textsuperscript{57} 'Khama's own account of the kgang' - W.C.W./S.O.742; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp.126-7; R.C. to Ag.H.C., 20 Dec. 1898 - C.0.879/574, p.85.
claimed to the contrary, Khama seemed proud of his son's administrative efficiency and subsequently delegated much responsibility to him.\textsuperscript{58}

There were two occasions in 1896 which alienated Sekgoma from his father, by the implications Sekgoma drew from them. The first was a \textit{letsholo} in April 1896 at which Khama announced the beginnings of his policy of political decentralisation. The second was Khama's third marriage, to Sefhakwane, on May 25th.

The marriage may be discussed briefly. Sekgoma was persuaded to 'give away' Sefhakwane to his father that Monday morning in the Palapye Church - while his eldest sister, Besi was maid-of-honour and baked a 40 lb. wedding cake, using ground-up sugar and peanuts because icing sugar and almonds were not available in the prevailing 'famine'. A \textit{Times} correspondent telegraphed a report of the wedding to London, and a photograph of Sefhakwane ('little hailstone') appeared in the \textit{June Illustrated London News} - looking about eighteen and rather sweet.\textsuperscript{59} However the wedding was not a popular one: she was a nonentity, her father being a very minor headman.\textsuperscript{60} Willoughby's opinion after a few months was that the new wife was very dull - 'though there is nothing distinctly bad about her.'\textsuperscript{61} Khama divorced her in July 1899. She had tired of an old husband and had taken up with a younger man, Gaofetohe Mathiba: 'a black Isabella' and 'a black Rasputin' as Simon Raphosa was to call the couple. Khama repudiated the child born to her as not his.\textsuperscript{62}

The slight of the Sefhakwane marriage as far as Sekgoma was concerned was that more children born to Khama would provide the

\textsuperscript{58} Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Feb. 1896.
\textsuperscript{59} Willoughby to 'Harry', 3 June 1896 (copy in W.C.W./S.0.742); \textit{Illustrated London News}, 20 June 1896; L.M.S. Chronicle, No.56, Aug.1896, p.186.
\textsuperscript{60} Willoughby to 'Harry', 3 June 1896.
\textsuperscript{61} Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 Oct.1896.
\textsuperscript{62} S. Ratshosa \textit{My Book}, p.136; H. Williams to L.M.S., 21 & 25 July 1899.
dynastic threat of a junior House. He was the only son of the only House. Khama's second marriage had been to a widow (Gasekatse) who had died in 1894 and been childless. It has also been suggested that Sekgoma held a grudge against his father for having 'poisoned' his mother (Mma-Besi) in 1889.  

The April 1896 letsholo was a decentralisation of power by Khama rather than of population. The growth of this policy can be attributed to ecological and political considerations. Tswana centralisation in large agro-towns promoted a cycle of depletion of local grasslands, cultivable soils, woods, and water supplies. The cycle of depletion at Palapye was more rapid than ever before - with itinerants and immigrants, new ploughs and trek-oxen, goats and horses, woodburners and grass-fires, in increasing numbers. The 'traditional' answer was to move the town, but Palapye constituted a considerable capital investment in immovable property. An alternative was to decentralise the population into satellite settlements in outlying areas, to slow down the depletion of natural resources at the centre. The political considerations of decentralisation were two-fold: the delegation of administrative authority and the pressures of a sub-colonial state. The delegation of authority was a sop to otherwise over-mighty subjects who might challenge the centre, and a reflection of incipient bureaucratisation in creating administrative subdivisions (for tax collection) maintaining correspondence with the capital. As for the pressures on the state by colonialism, these were the necessity to 'fill out' the frontier areas to stave off white settler claims to land, and the desire to demonstrate to the Imperial régime the continuing dynamism and integrity of the Ngwato kingdom if Khama were to die. (He was in his 60s).

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63 As Note 57. Poisoning between relatives is fairly common both in fact and repute in this part of the world.


65 See Chapters 2 & 6
The necessity of 'filling out' his Country into effective occupation may have been impressed on Khama during his visit to Britain of 1895. The L.M.S. foreign secretary wrote to Willoughby at the end of Khama's visit:

If Khama were a younger man and likely to understand and appreciate suggestions for a change of policy, I should strongly urge him to try the experiment of de-centralizing now that he is safe under British rule. If he could trust his people sufficiently to let his head men and subordinate chiefs settle down in various parts of his country and devise some means of keeping in touch with them, and settling only important questions himself, he would greatly help his people in view of days to come. I suppose, however, such a change would be too utterly revolutionary to be thought of by him for a moment.' 67

The historian T.P. Sebina would not agree that decentralisation proved 'revolutionary' to Khama. Sebina stresses that decentralisation was part and parcel of an administrative 'evolution' (sic), which had begun even before 1895. 68 However the letter from London on 'de-centralizing' was very likely never communicated to Khama, since the April 1896 lesholo took Willoughby by surprise. 'Quite a little measure of Home Rule!' he wrote in wonderment. At the mass assembly Khama had announced to the Phaleng, to the Talacte, to the remaining Khurutshe, and to the 'Kalanga' and other alien communities that:

There was some grumbling among a few of the people belonging to these tribes, who wished to persuade their people that they ought to be independent nations. They had come into this country of their own free wills in the lifetime of his father, and they had been treated as equals ever since he had succeeded his father. But if they thought it was better that they should have more tribal independence, he would not object. Henceforth he would not administer justice among them; they should be

66 See Chapter 3.
68 T.P. Sebina, para.24 - viz. Kgamane's pre-1895 Shoeshong settlement, though a sub-chief and not a district governor.
judged by their own chiefs, and they should have the control of their own villages. The breast of game was no longer to be brought to him but to the chiefs of their own villages. They would go on living in all other respects as they had been doing before. There would be no change in cattle-posts nor in gardens. The regiments would be constituted as at present, and no distinction of tribe would be recognised there. He has also the right to judge cases of appeal.' 69

From the delegation of judicial powers, the actual decentralisation of population was a logical next step, but that did not take place until 1898 - though Willoughby had pressed it on Khama immediately after the 1896 letsholo. 70

Meanwhile, Khama's apparently arbitrary judicial devolution and his marriage became grievances against Khama for Sekgoma Khama and for those Ngwato aristocrats who were to gather round him. It should also be remembered that these were generally unsettled times, with rinderpest and the economic distortions of scarcity, and with revolt in the North.

The personal breach between Khama and his son Sekgoma erupted sometime between March and October 1897. 71 The point at issue was a bureaucratic one. Khama accused Sekgoma of deliberately mislaying state papers ('I mean letters and papers of state, which had been written me by friends in foreign nations.'), and Sekgoma ceased to operate as principal secretary to his father. 72 Ratshosa assumed that role once again.


70 Ibid.

71 Sekgoma was still the Secretary in March 1897 - W.C.W./S.O.742.

72 'Khama's own account - W.C.W./S.O.742. From the numbers of Ngwato state papers in the Willoughby Papers at Selly Oak, one may argue that it was Willoughby who 'stole' the state papers. Sillery confuses the story of Sekgoma 'stealing' papers from R.C. to Ag.H.C., 20 Dec. 1898 (C.O.879/574, p.86) with the 1895 regency.
In Khama's own account of the kgang (taken down in Ratshosa's hand and dated September 1900), he revealed a whole catalogue of slights by his son which preceded the state papers issue. Apart from Sekgoma's marital exercises, Sekgoma had sold cattle, goats, sheep, and all the karosses in Khama's house during the 1895 regency, and had not yet given his father the money. Sekgoma had wanted his own village (at Mabele-a-pudi?) and his own cattle-posts; had terrorized Khama's MaSarwa, wishing to deprive them of thuto (learning or 'civilization'); and had commandeered servants away from Khama. Sekgoma had attempted to subvert the new age-regiment, the Maoketsa. Sekgoma had quarrelled with his elder sister, Besi. And Sekgoma had attempted to exploit to his own advantage the discontent of dikgosana (Ngwato aristocrats) over the judicial devolution to 'alien' communities:

"Khama's laws are chasing people out of their homes; he troubles you and does not rule in the proper manner; he is hurting you. But if I was your chief I would return to you all the things that Khama has taken from you." 73

The quarrel with Besi, the bossy elder sister, was particularly important in promoting the factional cleavage of the kgang. Besi was married to Ratshosa, and had three sons, and therefore presented a dynastic alternative to Sekgoma in inheriting the Chieftainship. Ratshosa, as a commoner Ngwato and a 'new man', 74, was resented by some Ngwato aristocrats. And as sometime Secretary to Khama he resented being superceded by Sekgoma and Seisa in that role, and was working to regain his former position of prestige.

Besi's attempt to quell her brother's rebellious attitude to their father had resulted in the boycott of her household by Sekgoma and by those attracted to his cause. Khama intervened, telling people that they must not be intimidated by Sekgoma from visiting the Besi-Ratshosa household 75, and thereby pushed himself further under the influence of Ratshosa. Sekgoma then

73 'Khama's own account' of the kgang'.
74 Cf. S. Ratshosa My Book, passim.
75 As Note 73.
retired to Shoshong apparently in a delayed protest at Khama's 1896 wedding, refusing to return - which led to Khama accusing Kgamane at Shoshong of conspiring with Sekgoma to usurp the Chieftainship. And it became understood that Khama wished Besi to be his heir, and if she could not become Kgosi he threatened that no one would be able to.

A long and graphic account of the October 1897 Kgotla meetings at which the kgang became formalised, was written at the time by one of Sekgoma's followers (Modisa-o-tsile) and has been preserved in the papers of W.C. Willoughby. Khama had summoned three followers of Sekgoma - Matlhodi, Mosweu and Radishaweng - from Shoshong to account for themselves. Sekgoma and other of his followers took the opportunity to return to Palapye and attend the Kgotla.

Mosweu told Khama that he was imagining any conspiracy to depose him. Matlhodi told Khama that he had no part in any conspiracy with Kgamane, but had only invited Kgamane's wife to drink beer with him as "an innocent friendly gesture." When Khama inquired why his own wife had never been invited to drink beer with them, Radishaweng, replied with provocative wit:

"But Chief you have said that you don't want beer, and you can't give a man's wife beer when you know the husband doesn't like it."

Khama then turned on the 'conspirators' warning them not to trifle with him, and accusing them of misleading Sekgoma. Sekgoma, he warned:

"As for the people you now talk about - Ratshosa and Besi - you will not touch them. I am the only one here entitled to do anything to any person I do not like. And to you Sekgoma I swear that you will never get the Chieftaincy... I must warn you that I can deny you the Chieftaincy and pass it to Ratshosa if I like."

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76 R.C. to Ag.H.C., 20 Dec.1898, - C.0.879/574, p.86.  
77 Willoughby to L.M.S., 22 April 1898.  
78 'Modisaotsile's account of the kgang' - W.C.W./S.0.742 (transl. J.Z. Letsholathebe & T. Mokgothu.)
Silence followed Khama's words. Then a subchief from Bokalaka, Motshegwa, spoke up and told Khama that he could not violate the natural law of succession: " - the rest are women and cannot rule us even if older" (referring to Sekgoma as Khama's only male issue). He urged Khama and Sekgoma to reconcile, and suggested that it had been Ratshosa who had manufactured the rift. Sekgoma then entered the debate, and proclaimed his undivided loyalty to Khama, adding that he now realized that it was Ratshosa who was dividing them. He proceeded to recount incidents of how Ratshosa and Besi were poisoning Khama's mind against him. Khama became increasingly angry, and the confrontation reached its climax when Sekgoma said that no one, not even Ratshosa, would stop him marrying the woman he wanted to. The account continues:

'These words about Ratshosa angered the Chief so much that he seized a stick and would have struck Sekgoma with it had not Sekgoma run away and people held the Chief back as he was chasing Sekgoma.

Sekgoma ran into his house and remained there until a man called Toronyane came to call him to the Kgotla.

Then a great Pitso was arranged for the next day.'

Khama opened the pitso of October 7th by naming other culprits whom he claimed were driving Sekgoma to war with him - Modisaotsile, Morwa, Ikitseng, Sephekalo, Molefhe, and Motswanaedi. With Khama waving a stick in his direction, Molefhe accused Ratshosa of trying to prevent Sekgoma from marrying Bitsang - and trying to get Sekgoma to marry Ntshwapong instead. Khama silenced the rest of the 'conspirators' and summoned speakers for the prosecution instead. At this, a deacon of the Church, Ntapu Kolobane, rose and scolded the Chief for his intolerant attitude, but turned the brunt of accusation against one of the 'conspirators' in particular, Morwa Mogomotse. Morwa had been one of Bo-Raditladi, Ntapu said, and as an evangelist had contravened the Law of God by preaching sedition against the Chief.

Two other apparent neutrals, Batsoma (another Bokalaka sub-chief) and Moloi (half-brother of Khama), pleaded for the Chief to

79 Ibid

80 Ibid - corroborated by Baruti Kaleakgosii (also one of BoSekgoma) to Willoughby, 22 Nov.1897 (W.C.W./S.O.742).
allow the accused to justify themselves now in public. But Khama silenced Batsoma and Moloi, and when Moloi persisted — according to Modisaotsile's account — the Chief attacked Moloi with his stick and beat him stunned to the ground. (It is poignant to recall here that Moloi had been one of those who in 1890 had accused Khama of poisoning Mma-Besi). Khama had to be forcibly restrained, railing against Modisaotsile and the other 'conspirators' for having spoiled his son.81

On the following morning, October 8th, Khama ordered most of the age-regiments (Malwelamotse, Maolola, Maphatswa, Makabamotse, Maoketsa) south to the Magalapswe to collect wood. Khama instructed Kebailele, the general in charge, to expel any recalcitrants.82

The events of Sunday, October 13th, are told in two accounts. The two senior regiments, Malwelamotse and Maolola, chose Morwa Mogomotse to preach the Sunday sermon. Morwa took as his text the Epistle to the Romans, Chapter One, Verse 16 —: 'For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ...’ — and used it as the vehicle for a general attack on baitimokanyi, the hypocrites of the Kgotla. In the uproar that followed the sermon, Morwa was driven back to Palapye.83

The regiments returned on October 28th, and it is said that Khama was heard gloating over Morwa's expulsion — now Morwa joined James Hepburn, John Smith Moffat, and Mphoeng in the list of those who had melted before the power of Khama. When Morwa attempted to attend church at Palapye on Sunday 31st October 1897 Khama saw to it that Morwa was ordered to leave the building — even though Sekgoma, Moloi and others were in the congregation.84

81 Ibid, re. Moloi, see Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.124
82 Ibid, cf. Chapter 4, notes 134 & 5.
83 As Note 80.
84 As Note 78.
As may be imagined, there was disruption especially in the Christian congregation (phutego) of Palapye. The kgang had come out into the open, but it had been diverted into other issues, and for the time being Sekgoma once more lived at Palapye. The active formation of factional divisions began, and attempts were made (as Bo-Raditladi to J.S. Moffat) to attract the resident missionary's sympathies to the Sekgoma cause. Ratshosa had been barred from communion some years before on the grounds of adultery, and made an easy candidate to be seen as the leader of an anti-Christian movement. The credibility of Christianity was at stake, Baruti Kaleakgosi wrote to Willoughby, putting his finger perhaps unwittingly on the prosperity of Church members at a time of famine and scarcity:

'The people have lost confidence in the Church. They see Christians as cheats, hypocrites, and murderers. They say we ask for money and clothes and food at the expense of the lives of other people. These things are said by the heathens (baheithene) and I feel very much ashamed. I pray that God may give you the wisdom to solve these problems.'

The kgang was heated up by Khama's actions in two fields. Firstly, he was depriving the young noblemen who supported Sekgoma of their right to hold cattle. Secondly, he was moving progressively towards implementation of his 'decentralisation' policies. A dry little note to Willoughby by one of Sekgoma's supporters, dated 5th January 1898, claimed that that morning Khama had not said 'much' in Kgotla - only that he was abandoning his Chieftainship and would no longer preside in legal cases: 'No one spoke after him as he has said that he didn't need a reply.'

By April 1898 there were strong rumours that the Bamangwato were soon to disperse from Palapye - seven 'sub-tribes' to go to live

85 Willoughby to L.M.S., 27 Sept.1898.
86 Baruti Kaleakgosi to Willoughby, 22 Nov.1897 /W.C.W./S.O.742)
87 As Note 76.
(transl.E. Legwaila).
in different parts of the country, where their chiefs would have self-rule in all aspects except relations with Europeans (Khama's prerogative). Khama had already announced this intention with regard to the Bo-Seboo, MaBirwa, and BaPhaleng, and others — it was understood — would follow suit, including the VaKalanga. There was also a rumour, which Willoughby did not believe, that the Ngwato, shorn of the 'sub-tribes', would then move to a new capital at Serowe. This was the break-up of the Tribe that many whites had predicted would inevitably happen on Khama's death, and which Khama was therefore attempting to canalise into safe directions while he still lived. Willoughby therefore attempted to lay white fears of chaos at rest:

'I do not imagine that the break-up will be attended with any display of force. A few men may get threshed with cudgels, nothing is more likely; but not fighting with guns.'

Bo-Sekgoma reactions were hasty in defence of Ngwato privilege and Sekgoma's right to the succession. This was Khama's way of ensuring that even if Besi could not succeed to the Chieftainship he would prevent Sekgoma from rule by diluting the real power of that institution. Khama did not dare, it was reasoned, summon a pitso to decide on decentralisation, because the Ngwato would vote against it while the seven 'sub-tribes' would vote for separation from Ngwato subordination. Bo-Sekgoma claimed that the 'blue blood' view would be the majority view, and therefore Khama would avoid the constitutionally requisite pitso and would act by autocratic decree. (Willoughby: 'it cannot be denied that Khama has never been notable for rigid adherence to the constitution.')

Sekgoma now appealed to the British colonial administration to intervene. That the administration had not already done so, speaks much for the trust and dependence placed by the British on Khama's rule, and indicates how little the Protectorate had moved towards the bureaucratic norms of a later colonial centralised state. The new Resident Commissioner, Hamilton Goold-Adams,

89 Willoughby to L.M.S., 22 April 1898.

90 Ibid.
therefore came north to Palapye to institute an enquiry. The enquiry in the Kgotla was confronted with a demonstration of armed and mounted Police 200 yards away, and Goold-Adams turned to Kgamanie saying he had decided not to arrest him yet, but he would do so if Kgamanie continued to cause trouble. Kgamanie visibly shook in his chair. The Government had evidently accepted Khama's thesis of a Kgamanie-based conspiracy even before the enquiry began. The enquiry itself was described as a 'fiasco' as far as witnesses were concerned. Goold-Adams announced that the British would support Khama as long as he lived, and warned all trouble makers, even naming Ratshosa, of the dire consequences of disloyalty to the Chief. The next day, a Saturday, Khama summoned all for a service of reconciliation at sunrise, when Willoughby read out prayers and scriptural praises for peace. Willoughby, who claimed to be neutral, was privately glad that he was leaving soon for his overseas furlough.

With the blessing of Government, dispersal of the population - without a constitutional pitso - went ahead. Most people went to the Motloutse, but were not yet concentrated in large settlements there. The Phaleng move to Shoshong was delayed until sufficient water supplies were opened up. Tension between Khama and Bo-Sekgoma was unabated. Bo-Sekgoma held private meetings at Lecheng, 6 miles south of Palapye, which became their base. Sekgoma refused to surrender a messenger whom Khama wished to punish, and the Magistrate was drawn into disputes as to whether the Chief had the right to withhold cattle (and Sarwa herdsmen) from batlhanka headmen in Sekgoma's camp. Four men were fined £30 in the Magistrate's court for supposedly purloining the Chief's cattle, and Khama threatened to confiscate their property and corn to ensure that they paid the fine. A Bo-Sekgoma supporter complained to Willoughby at the beginning of July that

91 Willoughby to L.M.S., 6 May 1898. A few months later Willoughby attributed all the trouble to that 'wily and unprincipled schemer' Ratshosa - Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept. 1898.

92 H. Williams to L.M.S., 31 Aug. & 10 Sept. 1898.
a servant of the four men had been fined £10 by Khama for complaining to the Magistrate about a beating he was given in the Chief's court. An attempt by the batlhanka in Bo-Sekgoma led by Koleatame, to appease the Chief with the customary (kgamelo system) tribute of a bag of madila (sour milk) was spurned by Khama.93

Meanwhile Khama definitely decided to move his capital away from Palapye, 'as the people were grumbling about the scarcity of water'. By the beginning of September, 1898, Palapye had dispersed perhaps two thousand of its population. Khama told his Assistant Commissioner that, subject to Government approval, he would move his capital in mid-1899 - probably to Mabele-a-pudi north-west of Serowe. But by November 1898 Khama had changed his mind again and decided not to move from Palapye.94

While Sekgoma had been invited to Mafeking for six months,95 the kgang took a new turn at Palapye at the beginning of November 1898. Taking advantage of Sekgoma's absence and the beginning of the rainy season, Khama summoned Bo-Sekgoma from their 'lands' to tell them that they must 'decentralise' as quickly as possible to new agricultural settlement at Lephepe in the far south. Kgamane had been ordered to Lephepe because he had been driving the Phaleng away from water at Shoshong, and Bo-Sekgoma must join him. Khama thought that the kgang would resolve itself at Lephepe because Sekgoma and Kgamane, as rival chiefs, would quarrel. Howard Williams, who had replaced Willoughby as missionary, compared Khama's solution to tying a cat and dog together by their tails.96

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93 Anonymous to Willoughby, 9 July 1898 - W.C.W./S.0.742 (transl. E. Legwaila). See also Note 76.

94 H. Williams to L.M.S., 31 Aug. & 10 Sept, & 10 Nov.1898; A.C. to R.C., 8 Sept.1898 - C.0.879/574, p.87.

95 As Note 92.

96 H. Williams to L.M.S., 12 Nov.1898. Then on 31 December, Williams wrote to the L.M.S.: 'Today the Magistrate informs me that father and son hold no communication with one another, & the dividing line between them is as distinct as the Home Rulers & Unionists of Great Britain.'
Bo-Sekgoma succeeded in staying their southward move until the rainy season was over, when the Resident Commissioner arrived at Palapye to supervise the property allocation of the migrants. Towards the end of March 1899, Goold-Adams addressed a pitse of up to 5000 men, of whom between 300 and 500 were Sekgoma supporters - including Kgamanke, Ikitseng, Mokhutswane, Morwa, Modisa, and Gaoetsae.  

Goold-Adams reaffirmed Government support for Bo-Sekgoma expulsion from Palapye - once cattle claims had been registered and their local harvests had been gathered in. Howard Williams claims that Goold-Adams added: 'Any unnecessary delay and Khama is to use force.' The Resident Commissioner, flanked by the Assistant Commissioner (Ashburnham) and the latter's white Clerk (Douglas), stressed that there was no question of the new Bo-Sekgoma town falling outside Khama's jurisdiction. When Kgamanke arose in the pitse to denounce Khama as the usurper of their own father in 1875, Goold-Adams allowed him short shrift.

Over the next eight days Goold-Adams sat in judgement at the Palapye court house over the claims of Bo-Sekgoma migrants to cattle and other property. He grouped the petitioners into four categories which he called 'classes' - true Ngwato, 'Maaloso' 'Basimane', and Kgalagadi/Sarwa. Goold-Adams was somewhat confused over exactly what socio-economic distinctions his 'classes' entailed, especially in regards to the 'sections' or ward-clusters - Basimane or Maaloso - involved. But the effect of his awards was to set the Bamangwato (and other Batswana by precedent) further on the road to clearer defined and more capitalistic (or 'neo-fuedal') conceptions of property rights - particularly those accruing to the Chieftainship. Furthermore, Goold-Adams' awards

97 Ikitseng and Mokhutswane (the hero of the Grobler incident) were Khama's half-brothers who had once before been expelled in 1890, to the Kweneng, for the poison accusation against Khama over the death of Mma-Besi - cf. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, pp 124 & 126. (Modisa is presumably Modisa-o-tsile - it is not clear whether he had yet married Khama's daughter, Mma-Kgama; it is more likely that he did so afterwards when he reconciled with Khama c.1900.)

98 H. Williams to L.M.S., 18 March 1899; R.C. to H.C., 12 April 1899 (C.0.879/574, p.246). Either Williams and the R.C. disagree over the date of the pitse, or here were two almost identical ones - on March 21st, and immediately proceeding March 18th.
were the legal basis of a subsequent judgement of 1907 on Bo-Sekgoma cattle holdings, and they thereby affected the estate and subsequent inheritance of the Khama family fortune. The awards must be outlined in some detail.

Goold-Adams recognised the right of 'true' Ngwato to hold and inherit cattle independent of the Chief's claims, even if once donated by the Chief, but refused to recognise their 'ownership' of any Sarwa herdsman attached to those cattle. Ikitseng, Modisa, and Morwa chafed at this restriction of aristocratic prerogative to control and profit in cash from 'tied' labour:

'That a large part of their annual incomes heretofore had been derived from contributions in the shape of grain, skins and feathers collected from certain of the Bakalahari and Massarwa; men given to them by their fathers.'

Goold-Adams' second class was the Maalose - by whom he meant those bafaladi settlers who had been incorporated into the Ngwato polity by conquest. He ruled that they could not have outright property possession, unless individuals proved that their cattle, sheep, or goats had been earned as payment for services rendered. All the other stock that they herded was 'tribal', i.e. vested in the Chieftainship for the state, and inalienable.

The third class was the Basimane - those bafaladi settlers who had voluntarily incorporated themselves into the Ngwato polity. Goold-Adams ruled that they owned only the stock that they had originally imported into the country. Here there was the particular case of certain Basimane, and the cattle they were in charge of, who had been allotted to Sekgoma on his marriage as his household to supply him with milk, furs, feathers, and grain. Khama insisted that members of this household should not be forced to go with Sekgoma but only those who wished - thereby giving them the option of shuffling off their client status. Sekgoma then claimed all the cattle of these reluctant householders as being his own property by right. He even threatened to seize the stock, but was forced to an apology by Goold-Adams on the evening of March 28th.
The fourth class, Kgalagadi and Sarwa, Goold-Adams concluded to be 'virtually slaves'. He justified Khama's recall of Sarwa herdsmen from the Bo-Sekgoma camp, and denied the right of one man to own another - since all 'natives' were equal in the sight of Government. In what Goold-Adams marked as 'an admirable speech', Khama remarked that eventually he wished to abolish Sarwa or Kgalagadi tribute 'but at the same time he pointed out that the servitude ... was an old tribal custom which would take some years to entirely overcome.' Khama wished to withhold all such clients from Bo-Sekgoma, but Goold-Adams persuaded him to relent in respect of individual household servants and herdsmen who were fed and clothed by their masters in return for service.

Khama was agreeable to Goold-Adams' awards, and indeed possibly instigated many of them. 1899 therefore clearly demarcates a stage in the evolution of Bamangwato property norms, rather than a revolutionary change. It indicated to the rest of the Bamangwato, as well as to the Bo-Sekgoma, where their property relations stood. It distinguished between 'personal' (i.e. vested in heads of families) and 'tribal' (held by the Chief for the nation) property, clarifying Khama's property and Sarwa reforms of c.1878 - but not sufficiently to prevent confusion and manipulation right up to the 1960s.

On March 29th, 1899, Goold-Adams announced the end of his deliberations in Kgutla. He ordered Sekgoma to Lephepe but ordered (apparently at his own initiative) Kgamane to go with the Phaleng of chief Kubung to Shoshong. Sekgoma was allowed to congregate his followers outside Palapye, to move once the harvest was collected. Khama offered waggon transport, and Goold-Adams told Khama to have the Ngwato-Kwena border near Lephepe demarcated.

99 R.C. to H.C., 12 April 1899 (C.O. 879/574, pp.246-50); H. Williams to L.M.S., 1 April 1899; K.T. Motsete interview, paras 34-6. T.P. Sebina, paras 10-11, claims that Khama had instituted personal property rights for bafaladi cattle-holders as part of his decentralisation programme of 1897 - and that this in turn provoked Sekgoma's objection that Khama was depleting the numbers of 'tribal' cattle due to the heir.

100 R.C. to H.C., 12 April 1899 - C.O. 879/574, p.249.
On April 1st the first wagons were in-spanned to take the 'Home Rule agitators', as Howard Williams called them, south. Bo-Sekgoma consisted of about 600 men, or 2000 people in all. Sekgoma was to take with him 3 of the 7 Church deacons, and 59 of the 480 Church members (both men and women) on the roll. About this time Khama took communion once more, having absented himself while Bo-Sekgoma supporters partook. He had emphasised that this was an entirely personal decision, not meant as an example to others, but his action caused strife in the congregation, so Khama resumed the practice, sitting next to Sekgoma one Sunday in a half-full church. (Khama had also just been granted his divorce from Sefhakwane by the Assistant Commissioner.)

By July 18th, 1899, Sekgoma and the main body of his followers were 45 miles south of Palapye. The Bo-Sekgoma factor had been excised from the body politic, at least temporarily, and the story will be continued in subsequent Chapters.

With Bo-Sekgoma removed, the decentralisation programme could proceed at Khama's behest. Indeed, Goold-Adams' awards extended the decentralisation principle to the legal property rights of the bafaladi who were moving out to their own regions of the state. It has also been seen how the 1899 Goold-Adams awards prompted the final migration of the Phaleng to re-settle Shoshong under Kgamane.

The decentralisation of authority is mirrored in the record of Church out-stations. In 1900 Williams was planning to re-roof the old Shoshong church building (never achieved) and to appoint an evangelist (Peter) to the newly settled Phaleng and Kaa.

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101 H. Williams to L.M.S., 1 April 1899; R.C. to H.C., 12 April 1899 (p.247). Bo-Sekgoma were responsible for £25 of the record £111 phalalo of the Ngwato Church for 1899 - Williams to L.M.S., 4 July 1900.

102 H. Williams to L.M.S., 21 & 25 July 1899.

103 J. Richardson to L.M.S., 19 July 1899

104 See Chapters 8 & 10.

105 T.P. Sebina, paras 10 & 11.

106 H. Williams to L.M.S., 4 July 1899.
In 1901, without the missionary's initiative, the Ngwato Church decided to appoint four teachers to Bokalaka\textsuperscript{107}—which had been given to the Ngwato state by the 1899 Proclamations.\textsuperscript{108} Three teachers subsequently arrived.\textsuperscript{109} Besides the measure of self-rule allowed to the chiefdoms of Bokalaka and the new settlements of Birwa and subsequently Talaote on the Motloutse, Khama despatched people from Palapye to the Boteti.\textsuperscript{110} And at the end of 1902 he ordered more Kaa to join their fellows at Shoshong.\textsuperscript{111} However Palapye did not shrink in geographical size, though the town-plan changed as familiar wards disappeared. By 1900 its population was still as high as 20,000—swollen partially by refugees from the Transvaal, though some were sent to outlying areas. The veldt and water-supplies around Palapye continued to deteriorate. On his return after two years absence, Willoughby found trees disappeared or dead, and the kloof overrun by smallstock and horses in search of water.\textsuperscript{112} Khama had decided by November 1st, 1899, not to move himself from Palapye, because so much immovable property was invested in it—but there was no follow-up to the Resident Commissioner's suggestion of conserving Palapye's water supply by a three-quarter mile pipe and a reservoir.\textsuperscript{113}

When the Anglo-Boer War was over, and payment for services tendered made less burdonsome the capital costs of moving to a new town, Khama therefore once again determined to move—and this time he chose Serowe as the site.

\textsuperscript{107} Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 June 1901.
\textsuperscript{108} See Chapter 5, Note 10 ff.
\textsuperscript{109} Willoughby to L.M.S., 27 Aug. 1901, & 8 Feb. 1902.
\textsuperscript{110} Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct. 1900. Cf. Schapera Ethnic Composition, pp. 79-80 (Ward 248); S. 416/7 (Talaote of Motsumi).
\textsuperscript{112} Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct. 1900. See Chapter 5, Notes 58-9.
\textsuperscript{113} A.C. to R.C., 1 Nov. 1899; R.C. to A.C., 19 Oct. 1899 (S. 1/3).
Chapter 7: 'ETHIOPIANISM' AND EDUCATION, 1896-1918

In 1902 an apparently arbitrary and isolated 'Ethiopian Episode', occurred with regard to Khama's Country. As it involved Britain's most famous African ally south of the Zambezi, the episode invoked immediate Government concern, a rapid enquiry, and consultation even with the Prime Minister of Cape Colony. As the episode was kept in confidence, and was indeed so short-lived, it has been forgotten and never publicised. But it deserves historical investigation both for its placing of Khama's Country in the mainstream of the pan-African movement, and for its revelation of social and political movements in the Bamangwato polity at the time.

The August 1902 number of the Christian Express of Lovedale, the leading South African missionary organ, reprinted a letter by C.A. Rideout, dated March 4th that same year at Maseru, and originally published in either the Voice of Missions or the Christian Recorder of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Rideout was a black American emissary of the A.M.E. Church, who was reporting a gift of £4,400 by King Lerothodi for his Church to build normal and industrial schools in Basutoland:

'Just a few days ago we had another call from Paramount Chief Khama of Bechuanaland, who made a similar offer to us as the Basutos, the difference being this: the buildings are ready for use, the same being occupied by other Missionary people who abandoned them and left the country, and the Government desires Paramount Chief Khama to take them over. The Chief has written a letter and sent it to the Bishop and Conference by the Rev. John S. Morolong, but received no reply; therefore he dispatched a man to me. I will do the best I can and advise him that the matter will be looked into at the earliest opportunity.'

The colonial authorities, either having seen the letter in the Christian Express or as part of a general enquiry to South

1 Christian Express, Vol.32, No.383, 1st Aug.1902, p.115 - 'A curious letter'. (J.S. Morolong was also known as Secele - coming from the Rratlou-Rolong settlement of Khunwana.)
African colonies as to 'Ethiopianism' and the activities of Joseph Booth, responded by confidentially contacting W.C. Willoughby at Palapye. Willoughby replied that he had interviewed Khama immediately he saw the copy of the Christian Express; and Khama had 'treated it as a joke, making a great fun of the whole business.' He denied any contacts with the A.M.E. Church; his only possible contact had been a strange preacher earlier in the year whom he had refused permission to evangelise. And the next day Khama came to Willoughby asking him to take down a letter of refutation for the Christian Express - challenging the A.M.E. to produce his own supposed letter to them.

There the incident ended - evidently to the colonial authorities' relief, for an index of Khama's crucial role in their estimation of 'native' politics can be seen in the fact that the correspondence was circulated to other colonial governments, and an essay on 'Ethiopianism' in general by the prime minister of Cape Colony (J.G. Sprigg) is to be found in the Colonial Office file marked 'Ethiopian Movement in Khama's Country.' The colonial authorities would also have been put at ease by Khama's professed ignorance of the 'Ethiopian Movement', when interviewed by the South African Native Affairs Commission at Mafeking on 15th September 1904.

But Khama's diplomatic blind eye should not deter the historian from further investigation. There is indeed evidence of Bamangwato contacts with the A.M.E. Church, as well as circumstantial evidence fitting this Ethiopian Episode in the context of local politics. More than all this the current though vague notion of 'Ethiopianism' illuminates the discussion of cumulative social and political tensions in the Ngwato state particularly in

2 Coan 'The expansion of missions', p.463.
4 Ibid.
regard to Education - tensions which elsewhere, notably Barotseland but also Basutoland, also produced Ethiopian Episodes at the same time.  

What contacts did Bamangwato really have with the 'Ethiopian Church' in 1902? There are two lines of explanation. Firstly that the letter published was a complete fabrication by Rideout. It is true that one senior secular employee of the A.M.E. Church subsequently disgraced himself by fraud and was dismissed by Bishop Coppin, namely Attaway, but there is no such evidence against Rideout. Rideout's good character is testified by his having been a U.S. attorney; and from his arrival in South Africa in 1899, he appears to have thrown himself into the task of expanding A.M.E. normal and industrial education with enthusiasm and flair. Moreover, though he had obviously not had first hand experience of Gamangwato (viz. the notion that the L.M.S. had abandoned the country), Rideout must have based his letter on privileged sources at Palapye. The mention of existing buildings being abandoned is a slightly garbled reference to the capital moving from Palapye to Serowe, five months before the actual event. So we should examine the alternative line of explanation of the 1902 Ethiopian Episode - that there had been some Bamangwato communication with Rideout.

Had Khama had contacts with the 'Ethiopians'? The first envoys of the A.M.E. had visited Palapye towards the end of 1898 - the Rev. Abel Samuel Gabashane and his middle son Martin Luther Gabashane, from (ex-L.M.S.) Khunwana. They presented themselves to Howard Williams, the then missionary, and tried to convince him of their disinterestedness in starting churchwork. There is

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7 Ibid., p.36.
no record of their meeting Khama, though as BaTswana themselves they would have followed the SeTswana custom of presenting themselves at the Chief's kgotla. Khama would no doubt have followed his normal habit of declining the services of any other denomination in his country; though that would not have prevented them from acquainted themselves briefly with other Ngwato notables. That their visit was not a practical success is indicated by the fact that Rev. Gabashane did not record the visit, and on the same tour rather made contacts with Khama's exiled brother Mphoeng, in the Tati area, who requested an A.M.E. mission (but never received one). From 1899 to 1901 the A.M.E. Church was impeded from northward missions by the Anglo-Boer hostilities which raged, in war on Afrikaner revolt, south of Mafeking. It is possible therefore that the strange, unnamed preacher whom Khama mentioned as having visited his country in early 1902 was indeed another A.M.E. envoy come to re-establish contacts - no doubt it would have been the Rev. John Secle Morolong, whom Rideout mentioned and who had been the L.M.S. evangelist who took Khunwana over to the A.M.E. in 1898. But Khama specifically told Willoughby that he never interviewed this preacher in person, but contacted him through an intermediary. The other occasion before 1902 on which Khama could have had contact with the A.M.E. was during his visit to Cape Town of August 1901. Chiefs from all over South Africa were gathered to greet the Duke of Cornwall. The Afro-American community at Cape Town therefore tumbled on the idea of a grand reception for the Chiefs on August 20th, addressed by the A.M.E. Bishop Coppin - with the appeal "If we are divided, we are weak; if we are united, we are strong", or a first step to 'Kaffir Union' as Harry Dean puts it. But the British

9 Coan ‘The expansion of missions’, p.474; L.M.S. annual (printed) 1898-9, p.179.

10 As Note 3.


authorities organised a small and select reception at the Governor's mansion, on the same night as Chief Lerothodi was invited by the A.M.E. Khama was no doubt also entertained by the British on this occasion.

Who then among the Bamangwato was in contact with the 'Ethiopians' before March 1902? We have already noted the visits to Palapye of Gabashane in 1898 and of the strange preacher, presumably Secle Morolong, early in 1902: Who would be likely to find an identity of spirit with them? Willoughby mentions 'young fellows without influence' returned from Bulawayo, where an A.M.E. congregation of Sotho, Tembu and Mfengu was already established. But if he means 'Lovedale boys' they were certainly not without 'influence', as they were drawn from the upper ranks of the state: 'Lovedale boys' is rather a loose term, including as it did both pupils and graduates from a range of schools in South Africa, of which Lovedale was the chief; but it was a term in currency among L.M.S. missionaries. A number of 'Lovedale boys' had removed themselves with Bo-Raditla in 1895 or Bo-Sekgoma in 1899, but the numbers continued to increase among the Establishment. In particular they were being joined by the sons of Ratshosa, who might therefore be expected to have thrown in his lot with a 'Lovedale' interest... It is this 'Lovedale' interest that would have had the strongest identity with a Bamangwato appeal to the A.M.E. in 1902 - since the concern held in common was the provision of normal and industrial education at a standard comparable to Lovedale's within Khama's Country.

13 Dean Umbala, p.245. Dean adds that there were 18 Chiefs at the A.M.E. reception, while Coan (p.311) states that there were 25 in Cape Town.


15 Cfr. John Brown to L.M.S., 20 Sept. 1899; Two Bamangwato graduates of Lovedale had derisively turned down the £40 p.a. offered them as teachers at home in 1900, because they could earn £60 p.a. in the Bulawayo post office - L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1900.
The 'Lovedale' interest explanation of the appeal for A.M.E. educational facilities gains some credibility from the supposition of Willoughby, supported by the Resident Commissioner, that Ratshosa was the 'clever scoundrel' behind the 1902 'Ethiopian Episode'. Ratshosa as Secretary to Khama held the royal seal in correspondence emanating from the Chief, and 'In many minds he is credited with more power than the Chief';16 With his own sons going to Zonnebloem, the Anglican school at the Cape, Ratshosa could no longer be simply regarded as the leader of an anti-progressive party as Willoughby had concluded over the Bo-Sebakgoma affair.17 It was as the leader of Bamangwato opposition to colonial rule that Willoughby now saw Ratshosa: An opposition that was 'a coalition of many elements on the principle of Opposition'; an opposition whose driving force was 'a growing number of young men who think more or less for themselves and want elbow room', who therefore tended to be objectionable to the Chief but for the time being were kept within the Tribal fold on an anti-colonial basis exploited by Ratshosa.18 To Willoughby, 'Ethiopianism' and Tribalism were 'objectionable features' which inevitably accompanied any such movement in the direction of Freedom, even though its ideological principles were still unclear to its participants: Willoughby indeed offered a cogent explanation of the phenomenon of 'tribal Ethiopianism' current in South Africa at the time — and thereby deterred the Government from hamhanded intervention in Khama's Country.

The Ethiopian Episode of the Bamangwato Reserve, as were the parallel events in Barotseland that followed between 1903 and 1906, was an expression of the modernising desires of what may be loosely called the Tribal elite. In particular the affair was a reflection of the failure of the established London Missionary Society (like the Paris Mission in Barotseland) to satisfy those desires in regard to education. As will be seen, the Ethiopian

16 As Note 3;
17 Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept. 1898;
18 As Note 3.
Episode echoed frustration with delays in setting up an L.M.S. Institution for 'Normal and Technical' education, over which negotiations had failed between Khama and the L.M.S., who found a site in the Northern Cape instead. Such frustration was tied up with the larger issue of cultural adaption to the colonial world, as Willoughby hinted two months before he read the Rideout letter:

'But there is more than the school question in this. I feel that there are currents here in native life that disturb all soundings and imperil even the navigation. I can't imagine what is wrong, but something is wrong.' 19

To understand how these educational desires had developed, and what they entailed in the relationship of the Bamangwato with the L.M.S., we must turn back to the history of education in Khama's Country in more detail.

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Formal elementary education at Shoshong had begun by 1860 with the establishment of the Moravian mission at Shoshong and was carried on by John Mackenzie after 1862. 20 Neither the practice nor the concept were so radically new: Manhood initiation in the circumcision schools involved learning maxims and precepts by rote, the modelling of clay figurines, and the infliction of physical pain to 'assist' the process; Detailed recall of speeches and sermons was a noted faculty of pre-literate Tswana memory. 21 As for the formulation of word-concepts, Bantu languages were adept at this, and even the recording of ideas in symbolic script was presaged by lokgwalo - a word for the abstract scratching by herdboys on flat stones which has come to mean 'writing' or 'printing'. 22 Nor was the idea of 'higher' educational specialisation entirely novel according to John Mackenzie, who remarked that a Tswana kgosi was supported by a

19 Willoughby to L.M.S., 9 June 1902;
20 Mackenzie Ten Years, p:113;
21 Ibid., pp:400-1;
22 MsWilman The Rock Engravings of Griqualand West and Bachuanaland Cambridge; Bell, 1933, p:1 - quoting Robert Moffat Missionary Labours, p:15.
'class' of dingaka, 'who not only practice the art of healing but are professors of witchcraft, and have taken degrees in rain-making: 23

Though the evidence is scarce, it is to be supposed that elementary education at Shoshong gradually extended itself during the 1862-76 tenure of John Mackenzie as missionary. The first two pupils inherited from the Moravian school became the first teachers - notably Kgama and Khama himself, though the latter never developed beyond rudimentary literacy. In 1864 the first district schools, apparently temporary projects (though they may have perpetuated themselves by training pupils as teachers), were attempted in outlying areas - Roger Price and Kgama at Maamatlala's in the Tswapong hills, and Mackenzie with Khama and Mogomotse in the Phaleng village west of Shoshong: Mrs. Bessie Price was left in charge of the central school at Shoshong. Mackenzie compared his pupils to those in an English country area. The characteristic reaction to the thuto, or new teaching, by elders was to invite the baruti (teachers) to teach the young, as long as they did not disturb the old with their newfangled ideas! Mackenzie noted that some BaTswana appeared deliberately dumb and ignorant to whites with new skills in order to draw out their knowledge: 24

At the elementary level, which instilled literacy on the basis of scripture in SeTswana, the thuto and the baruti meant as much Christian evangelism and evangelists as teaching and teaching. In the period before Khama's accession in 1875, and the establishment thereby of a state-church, the fortunes of formal education and Christianity were synonymous: The clash between the old and new types of education was symbolised by the April 1865 boycott of the bogwera school of the Maemelwa regiment by Christians: 25 Thereafter until 1875, attendance of the young

23 Mackenzie Ten Years, p. 381; The 'class' referred to was presumably the dingaka of Malela ward - Schapera Praise-Poems, p. 333n; Schapera Ethnic Composition, p. 71 (Ward 102).
24 Mackenzie Ten Years, pp. 397-8; Smith Great Lit, p. 146.
25 Thia, pp. 411-2
and noble at the mission school symbolised support of the Khama faction, and was the basis out of which the state-church's membership grew. Like the Church, the elementary school was financed and staffed by the Bamangwato with the nominal supervision (or inspectorate) of the resident missionary. The missionary's responsibility, as understood by James Hepburn at Shoshong between 1871 and 1891, was a Church and school system actually run and extended by 'native agency'. In addition the development of Christian elementary schooling had the function of intensifying and extending the Ngwato 'state idea' from the centre over the periphery - as can be seen in the Ngamiland mission led by Arnot' in 1882. The 1881 despatch of four baruti to Ngamiland from Shoshong was Hepburn's finest hour. But it was not only the sunrise prayers of Sunday 26th March that symbolized the new thuto that Gamangwato had to give Ngamiland: it was also the 'coffee, tea, sugar, candles, soap, and many other necessary articles' given to Gogakgosi, Kuate, Motlhapatse and Rrampodu by their home Church. The meaning of thuto could be understood as extensively as 'civilisation'.

By 1882 Hepburn's supervision had achieved the figure of 7 elementary schools in Shoshong itself, plus 2 baruti in outlying districts - Soldate among the Kgalagadi and Tsapo in the Tswapong. But when he returned from two years' absence in 1884, Hepburn claims to have found all educational work abandoned because Khama was in Boteti with an army while Shoshong was left in the charge of Kgamane and Gogakgosi. However by 1890 the wards of the Ngwato capital, moved to Palapye, had 9 or 10 elementary schools dedicated to literary and scripture. In 1889, it is said, 4-500 school-children competed to learn the whole of the Gospel of St. John in SeTswana by heart: the winners being given prizes of scriptural texts on Sekgoma.

27 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.181-2.
28 Vincent Segwai, personal communication to author.
29 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, pp.219-220, & 223-4.
In the 1890s, while the benefits of elementary education were spread to the more favoured commoners and settlers, the Ngwato élite began to look to the acquisition of primary education in addition. Primary education may be defined as having a higher emphasis on reading, numeracy, and technical or vocational skills, and increasingly on the achievement of fluency in the English language. The first primary educational institution in the whole L.M.S. 'Bechuana' mission area was founded at Shoshong 1871/2, but it was a seminary limited to the training of a handful of evangelists - Khukwe, Diphokwe, Matsane, and Ramochane (of whom three were to subsequently leave the L.M.S. and lead independent churches), and their wives. Kgamane withdrew his application for admission because he said he wanted the secular benefits of further education, but did not want to commit himself to a career as a moruti. Such self-critical awareness pleased the L.M.S.' Bechuana District Committee.\(^{31}\) Mackenzie as Tutor taught his students a two or three year course of arithmetic, geography, history, scriptural exegesis, theology, and homiletics. In 1875 the first four students graduated and the L.M.S. decided to move the seminary to a permanent site at Kuruman with freehold tenure and plentiful water supply - having rejected Shoshong or Serowe, Kolobeng or Kanye. In 1876 Mackenzie arrived at Kuruman and began to build what was now called the Moffat Institution,\(^{32}\) - ironically after the man, Robert Moffat, who had opposed Livingstone's original suggestion of a seminary. The Institution was very slow to expand, adding first a small girls' school and then one for boys in the later 1880s, falling far behind the missionary education institutions of the coastal Cape Colony. Apart from financial stringency and remoteness from communications, student numbers were also checked by standards of entrance, a probationary six months, an age limit:


31 J.Mackenzie to L.M.S., 15 April 1872; J.H.L. Burns & A.E. Seager 100 Years of Christianity Among the Bamangwato Lobatse:
of 30, and up to two hours manual labour a day. The Institution concentrated on religious education, producing 41 graduates by 1895, of whom 25 were at work as baruti. After two years of financial and local political crisis, the Moffat Institution was closed for ever in 1897.

The rising Ngwato demand for primary education was therefore met by the institutions of Cape Colony and Basutoland. By 1895 there were sufficient Bamangwato students at Lovedale to pose for a group photograph - four apparent teenagers and two older men, smartly dressed. The first to go to Lovedale had been Sekgoma Khama in 1892. He was placed there on the good offices of Henry Loch the High Commissioner, who suggested that Sekgoma repair to the Cape to perfect his English before proceeding to Europe on a projected grand tour. At first Loch tried the Anglican educational Institution at Cape Town, Zonnebloem, whose principal advised against the 'experiment' as 'dangerous'. The principal was flustered by the sudden decision to send Sekgoma to Zonnebloem and preferred to refuse - adding that the young dignitary would better take private tuition in a European gentleman's household. Meanwhile Sekgoma was sent south down the railway at government expense from Vryburg. There was some panic because the Palapye white trader who accompanied Sekgoma to Mafeking, Tom Pry, was imbibing alcohol on the way. But Sekgoma was safely met by his guardian, George McCall Theal, the South African historian and archivist. Theal became Sekgoma's

Bechuanaland Book Centre, 1962, p.6 (pp.5-6, SeTswana).

32 Smith Great Lion, pp.309-10

33 Ibid, pp.311-2. In November 1883, the Mahoko a Becwana reported that students had fled from the Moffat Institution complaining of the excess of manual labour demanded of them - Thema 'Native Education', p.14.

34 Ibid, pp.334 & 337-8

35 J.D. Hepburn Twenty Years, p.285.

guardian at the Cape since Mrs. Hepburn had declined. He tried to find a suitable temperance household for Sekgoma to stay in but failed; then he tried to rent a cottage next door to his own house, but the owner refused because Sekgoma was black; so Theal resorted to converting his own study into a bedroom for Sekgoma at no rental. 37

Sekgoma arrived at Cape Town with two cousins as attendants, Baipedi and Kagiso, and £400 for his education, plus karosses and ivory. The latter were sold to form the basis of his personal account, and the £400 became his education account in the Standard Bank at Cape Town for tuition and boarding expenses. While Sekgoma went sight-seeing it was arranged that he should proceed to Lovedale, the Scottish presbyterian institution in the Eastern Cape. 38 He arrived there five days later on January 14th, where the acting principal W.J.B. Moir remarked on the great privilege to the institution, and added,

'He will be treated in almost every way as if he were one of our European boarders.' 39

Sekgoma was persuaded to hand over his cheque book to Mr. Bokwe, the Lovedale book-keeper, and he apparently settled down well, playing games with the white students, though he complained it was difficult to learn English with so many SeTswana and SeSotho speakers around. He wanted to move back to Cape Town: 'I want to be among Europeans even when I do not know their language if I be among them! I am sure to grasp it sooner.' Sending Loch the present of a leopard skin, he professed that his aim in Cape Town was 'to study the Bible and the English language'. He told J.S. Moffat, who invited him round, the same. Theal apparently


39 W.J.B. Moir to Imp.Sec., 14 Jan.1892. Re. arrangement for Sekgoma to sit at high table with white students and teachers, see Loch to Khama, 5 Feb. 1892 - W.C.W./S.O.691-2 (No.353).
tried again to find a place at Cape Town but found that the only options were Zonnebloem - which refused - and boarding with Mrs. Hepburn - inappropriate because of the dispute of her husband with Sekgoma's father. Sekgoma remained at Lovedale, and in May the acting principal submitted a most flattering report ('superior intelligence...careful and earnest...good sense and modesty'), adding that in view of educational prospects at Palapye 'It would be a good centre for another Institution such as this'.

In June 1892 Sekgoma visited Grahamstown (a commercial depot for the Interior) on 'some business of his father'. But the acting principal of Lovedale's desire that Sekgoma should spend three years there was not fulfilled. Sekgoma left in December 1892 and stayed with Theal at Cape Town for over three months, where he was treated to a tour of Simonstown naval base because 'His father is the most important friendly chief we have in the North'. On April 8th, 1893, Sekgoma arrived back home with his father's grateful thanks to Loch and Theal.

It is not clear whether Baipedi or Kagiso extended their studies at Lovedale, as it has been suggested that Moachu Monga and Thibe Chiepe, Sekgoma's age-set mates, were the first Bamangwato at Lovedale. It further appears that Disang Raditladi and his cousin Phetu Mphoeng were brought to the Cape by Raditladi immediately in Sekgoma's wake. These two were joined at Lovedale by Kuate. The pattern of acquiring primary education was thereby

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40 Theal to Smuts, 21 Aug. 1892; J.S. Moffat to H.C., 8 April 1892; Theal to Smuts, 28 April 1892; Khama to Loch, 8 March 1892; Sekgoma Khama to Loch, 18 April 1892; J.S. Moffat to Loch, 24 April 1892; Moir to Governor, 26 May 1892 - H.C.116/1.

41 Moir to Governor, 26 May 1892; Imp. Sec. to Flag Lieutenant (Simonstown), 31 Dec. 1892; Khama to Loch, 8 April 1893 - H.C. 116/1. Khama subsequently accused Sekgoma of personal extravagance because the Imperial Secretary (Bower) reported the personal account spent, when in fact there was still almost £243 in it. This sum, plus £43 interest, was returned to Khama in 1902 when Bower's mistake was discovered - H.C.9/4.

42 T.P. Sebina, para 31 (Monga died soon after return to Palapye). Shippard to Khama, 30 Dec. 1891 - W.C.W./S.0.691-2 (no.350). Raditladi also considered sending his son to England for
set for the Bamangwato elite. Some students - like Johnnie and Simon Ratshosa in the later 1890s - went to Zonnehloem. Others, like T.P. and P.M. Sebina in the early 1900s, went to Healdtown - the Methodist institution near Lovedale. Others went to Morija, run by the Paris Evangelical Mission in Basutoland. But Lovedale was the favourite education institution in the South. Lovedale appealed to snobbery in offering a social hierarchy of dining tables and degrees of luxury according to wealth and race of its students. It was also the centre of African intellectual ferment: its local African pastor being the Rev. Pambani J. Mzimb with vocal political views and keen interest in Afro-American affairs, whose breakaway from the Free Church of Scotland in 1898 took two-thirds of the Lovedale parish congregation with him.

Education at the Cape went hand-in-hand with increasingly complex alliances of marriage in consolidating the families of some batlhanka and bafaladi headmen together with the sons and daughters of the dikgosana into a new and broader Bamangwato elite. Educational and marital links developed dynastic and socio-economic class connections firstly with other Tswana states and secondly across southern Africa. To take examples already mentioned - Phetu Mphoeng first married a daughter of the Khurutshe headman Rauwe who then divorced him and married into the Kwen royal family while he re-married into the Khama family; and the 'Kalanga' families of Thibe Chijepe and the Sebina brothers were both related to each other by marriage and subsequently in a number of ways to the Khama family.

Wealth was certainly the criteria by which it was possible for education - Willoughby to L.M.S., 18 March 1895.

43 M.M. Sekgoma, paras, 20 & 12; Motsete, para. 11;


45 Especially with the Ngwaketse and Rolong. The dikgosana as a whole had assumed the function of making wide-ranging marital alliances from the Chief, who was now limited by monogamy.

46 T.P. Sebina, passim.
the sons of headmen to proceed to education in the Cape. It has been noted how the right to hold wealth as personal property was extended to batlhanka c.1875 and to bafaladi headmen c.1896 - and the local economic boom of the 1890s which continued into the early 1900s should also be borne in mind. It may be assumed that the costs of sending a son to a Cape school were over £100-a-year; and such a sum could only be met by a father who owned sufficient cattle to sell off for cash, or sufficient Sarwa clients to bring in furs and feathers and possibly ivory, or sufficient waggons for hire and haulage.

But within Khama's Country it would have been social rather than economic factors that limited the acquisition of elementary education. The costs of a year's tuition here could be measured in shillings, or would have been negligible if slates and primers were begged or borrowed. The fact that limited attendance was the nature and periodicity of pupils residence in the royal capital. Only Sarwa-patrons could afford not to send their sons out to herd cattle for whole or part of the year. This in theory gave an advantage to girls and to those groups which were not based on cattle-keeping, such as the agricultural 'Kalanga' - but such an advantage could be dissipated by social discrimination against the continuation of studies beyond a certain level. This also helps explain why there was an educational boom at Palapye during the rinderpest which killed off most of the cattle. Self-help and uncontrolled growth are the keys to the understanding of the development of Tswana elementary education over the past century - they resolve the paradox of its longevity with its lack of achievement because of its fragmented and inefficient nature. Elementary education lacked a capital intensive programme by a mission society, though the L.M.S. had nominal supervision: a lack that made Botswana, according to the future first Minister of Education of the Republic, 'unique in Africa south of the Zambezi.'

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47 Thema 'Native Education', p.iv.
The Bamangwato mounted scouts who so annoyed 'Curio' Brown in 1890 by reading their Bibles while the white scouts took a coffee-break, probably came from respectable and wealthy families - of which their horses were token. The general spread of literacy to at least a significant minority of the Bamangwato was a product of the 1890s. While the wealthy went south for primary education, elementary education became more generally available for all at Palapye and at a few out-centres. In 1889 nine or ten ward-schools are mentioned at Palapye, and after the appointment of a missionary schoolmistress in 1893 (Alice Young) these ward-schools were fused into a central elementary school under her. This dual-medium central school was opened on 19th November 1894 by Khama, and had four class-rooms designed for 300 pupils (cost: £578). On that day 150 names were put forward, between the ages of 4 and 30, of whom 130 were accepted as under an 18 or 19 year old age limit - 40 of whom already knew the alphabet. Miss Young noted that many children had the same family name. School fees stood at 5/- per annum for tuition in SeTswana, and £2 for tuition in English. The fees went to teachers' salaries - 5 men, and 2 women for sewing lessons and kindergarten, under Miss Young. The Church donated five blackboards for the five forms, a sewing table and books. Miss Young found a reasonable supply of maps and pictures already in the Palapye school system.

By 1896 there were 209 names on the Palapye central elementary school register. Alice Young now had 8 assistant teachers including 'Semane, a very nice girl of 16 years of age... a most useful girl' who was in sole charge of needlework. Other subjects taught were reading, writing, arithmetic, scripture, geography, drawing, domestic economy, kindergarten, singing, and musical drill. Miss Young was proud that her school was on the lines of

49 Burns & Seager 100 Years, p.11 (p.10, SeTswana).  
50 Young to L.M.S., 23 April 1896; Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept. 1898.
one in England, but regretted that the pupils' keeness did not extend to arithmetic.  

Educational facilities at the successive Ngwato capitals went through cycles of fission and fusion. The ward-schools that were fused into the centre in 1894, re-appeared as 'feeders' teaching the alphabet by 1898. By then the passion for rudimentary literacy had even spread to adult women, who also took to dress-making with a new verve. In August 1898 the central school attendance stood between 900 and 1200, and on the 31st of that month Khama sent out regiments to cut poles for five more school-buildings around the town. One may attribute the educational boom to the local economic conditions or to an attempt to canalise the local political conditions (outlined above) in 1898, but it was also a product of the recent arrival and dedication of Howard Williams to elementary educational work, which Willoughby had left to Young. There may also have been a boost because of Willoughby's insistence on Christian oxen having educational teeth.

At the central school, supervision was impeded by Alice Young's residence outside the mission in the white ward and her preoccupation with courtship - eventually marrying a white trader, P.A. Johnston in June 1899, when she resigned. However just before becoming Mrs. Johnston she started classes for 'store-boys'. By the time she left, another ward-school had just been completed at Khama's direction, making a probable total of six. At the same time Williams began a seventh ward-school for white children to be taught by Violet Clark, Alice Johnston's sister, in fear that the Anglicans would otherwise assume that function.

51 Ibid, Burns & Seager, pp.11-12 (pp.10-11). Miss Young was joined by Miss Hargreaves in 1895, to take charge of L.M.S. women's work. Hargreaves fell out with all other missionaries, and her rumoured adultery with Col. Panzera led to her recall in 1900 - L.M.S. in-Letters, passim & Willoughby Papers in L.M.S. Archives; 52 Hargreaves to L.M.S., 17 Sept.1898; Willoughby to L.M.S. 23 Sept. 1898; 53 H. Williams to L.M.S., 31 Aug. 1898; 54 See Chapter 6; 55 Cf. H. Williams to L.M.S., 18 March 1899; Young to L.M.S.,
Ward-schools appear to have been started on the initiative of various individuals anxious to teach, in conjunction with the ward or 'section' authorities of the town. Thus Tumedisho Maruapula ran a ward-school for the Talakote community, while Thibe Chiepe, on his return from Lovedale with Standard VI, ran one for the 'Kalanga' of the town. The schools probably began as ad hoc affairs conducted under the trees in and around a ward kgotla, and were subsequently graced with pole and wicker shelters or sheds; 'A British Official', obviously not a local one but a visitor, early in the Anglo-Boer War, caught the spirit of the educational fervour at Palapye in an anonymous article published in the *Monthly Review* of London:

'No sooner has a Bechuana learnt how to write the letters of the alphabet than he must find some one else to share his new knowledge: To see the scholars (children is not the word for the mixed assemblage) as they troop out of the district or village schools maintained in Palapye by the London Missionary Society is a lesson in enthusiasm; The passion for teaching their friends probably accounts for the large number of natives who can read and write a little though they have never been to any school; I have often seen a truckload of good-humoured "kaffirs" at a siding of the northern line gathered round one of their number who is teaching a friend how to do simple addition on an old slate, probably stolen from a school which he attended in some favoured spot like Palapye.'

The number of ward-schools ('suburban! Willoughby preferred to call them) grew apace; The first five were constructed between July and the end of August 1898; by May 1899 there were 6 (or 7 including the white one); and by July-September 1899 there were 8 in one report and 6 with another being built in another report though an educational inspector only recognised four; In September 1899 another seven possible sites were identified, but, though 15 'sheds' were reported in 1900, by mid-1901 there were

3 June 1899:

56 Minnie Shaw, paras 22 & 24:

57 H: Williams to L.M.S.: 27 May 1899; Motsete, para 9:

The five schools inspected during the 12-day stay at Palapye of J. Richardson during July 1899 were the central L.M.S. school, Sekao, Boririma, Bakhurutshe and Botalaote. Remark ing how modern and well-kept the registers were, Richardson produced the following statistics on his examinations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Pupils Taking Exam</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Arithmetic</th>
<th>Dictation</th>
<th>Scripture</th>
<th>Singing</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Drill</th>
<th>Needlework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.M.S.</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>VG</td>
<td>VG</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VG</td>
<td>VG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekao</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>VF</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boririma</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>VF</td>
<td>VF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhurutshe</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>VF</td>
<td>VF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botalaote</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. who passed examination

L = Little; G = Good; VF = Very Fair; VG = Very Good.

Richardson found the 89 girls and 32 boys at Sekao ward-school could 'All repeat the Alphabet like parrots'! Despite the school's lower academic achievement, it had blackboard, bell, alphabet sheet and 74 slates. Boririma had 45 girls and 23 boys, blackboard, bell, alphabet sheet, 60 slates and a modulator for singing. Bakhurutshe had 40 girls to 21 boys, blackboard, bell, alphabet sheet, and 45 slates. Botalaote had 68 girls to 31 boys, blackboard, and 43 slates. (The proportion of girls to boys is characteristic of Botswana elementary education because of boys'...
economic role in cattle-keeping elsewhere; Richardson, an educational adviser to the L.M.S., was impressed by the central school's design and 'good English desks'. Twelve of the ninety-two he examined presented themselves in the English language, but he gave no break-down of the sex ratio.  

The pupils of the central school and the ward-schools came together each Friday, or sometimes on a Sunday, for drill and marching - making totals as high as 1100 or 1400 in all. With no head teacher, Willoughby thought the central school had declined at the expense of the ward-schools when he returned to Palapye in 1900. The ward-schools had not been charging fees - their teachers relying on donations for their salaries. Miss Partridge the schoolmistress at Molepolole had briefly been at Palapye in 1899-1900, but her stay may have done more harm than good to the central school, and re-organisation awaited the arrival of Ella Sharp the new Palapye schoolmistress with Willoughby in mid-1900. She took in hand the training of ward-school teachers and limited the teaching of Standards I and above to the central school. Fees were instituted in the ward-schools, and Khama promised £200 followed by £1527 for the building of schools and churches in mid-1901 - of which £600 was allotted by him to a new central elementary school. It was decided to amalgamate two or three of the 'suburban' schools into the central school, but this move was pre-empted by the decision made at the end of October 1901 to transfer the capital from Palapye.  

Howard Williams ensured that a preaching and Sunday-school boom

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61 *Ibid.* Some equipment was sent by L.M.S. supporters in Leicester, England - L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1898, A Young.

62 L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1898, A Young; Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct; 1900.

63 L.M.S. Chronicle, Dec; 1900, p:297, At one stage central school attendance dropped to 30 - L.M.S. Chronicle Aug; 1901, p:194.

64 L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1898, A Young; Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct; 1900.

65 Willoughby to L.M.S.; 4 Oct; 1900; 16 May, 5 June, 27 Aug; & 4 Oct; 1900.
accompanied the boom in elementary education. Because the church building was being used as a fort by British military forces in the War, services were held in Kgotla which were attended by enormous congregations, up to 10,000 for the ploughing service — rather than just by church members and 'enquirers' as in the church building. Sunday-school classes produced attendance of between 554 and 1400 children: Khama would address the children, though with reluctance as he was shy of speaking in public.

The town was divided into 30 preaching sectors and together with 7 outlying villages this provided 37 preaching stations for exactly 100 preachers. By August 1901 Willoughby had a preachers class of 50 intelligent men, drilling them in sermon preparation techniques:

66 That was not all: There were evangelists in five outlying districts who found a fervid reception to their teaching at the turn of the century:

'The desire for education is widespread in Khama's country: There is scarcely a village, hamlet, or even a cattle-post where the spelling book is not studied!' 67

The districts referred to by Williams in 1899 were Ratholo, Sefhare, Shoshong, Motloutse, and Tlhabala — where the baruti were salaried, at a cost of £90 to the Nkgwato Church. In 1900 Williams added a sixth district to the list, Mogonono: It has been suggested by one Nkgwato historian that the placing of schools and churches in outlying areas was a means of keeping up formal contacts between the centre and periphery of the state, since tribute had been abolished and the regimental system had declined through the abolition of bogwera, and Hut Tax was not yet collected: 68 More than that it is interesting that the timing of the dispersal of baruti paid by Palapye was in the later 1890s, as a centralising check on the decentralisation process: Khama refused Willoughby permission to import baruti

67 L.M.S: annual (printed) 1900-1, p.263.
68 M.M: Sekgoma, para. 15.


from outside his state, who might not show full respect for his authority. 69

Ratholo was the most go-ahead out-station because of its *moruti*, Noke Modisa-o-kgosi: In 1900 it had 86 Church members, 65 pupils and 7 teachers, and 12 out-stations with Sunday-schools. 70 A large village nestled on the southern scarp of the Tswapong Hills, Ratholo had been recognised with a paid evangelist since 1897, but the history of Christian evangelism in the area dated back to 1864. 71 Willoughby had camped beneath the baobab of Ratholo on 26th August 1896, and noted the village had 8 wards under headman Setlabi. 72 This was the reconnaissance for placing an evangelist there in the next year: It will be recalled that it was the question of evangelisation in the Tswapong area that was one of the bones of contention between Khama and Bo-Raditladi in 1895: and so the stationing of a paid resident *moruti* at Ratholo was a way of keeping evangelism in the area under Palapye control: Noke set up house and held his classes underneath the baobab tree, which he fenced in with a garden. 73

Sefhare, further to the south by the Tsweneng Hills, was visited by Willoughby also in 1896, and received a resident *moruti*, Ramocwiri Seema, in the following year, who did not prove very satisfactory: In 1900 Sefhare had 30 Church members, 160 pupils and 8 teachers, and 6 out-stations: Compared to Ratholo, remarked Howard Williams, 'the people are more ignorant of the Gospel from the fact of their being farther away from Phalapye.' 74

The history of the re-settlement of Shoshong has been indicated

69 Willoughby to L.M.S., 23 Sept: 1898;
70 L.M.S.: annual (mss) Palapye 1900;
71 See Notes 24 & 29 above;
72 W.C.W. /S: 0.734;
73 As Note 69; (The teacher still lived by the Ratholo baobab in 1962/3 - author's observation);
74 L.M.S.: annual (mss) Palapye 1900;
By 1899 it had a *moruti*, Peter Gaenale, formerly stationed in Ngamiland, who taught and ministered to the Phaleng on one side of the hill and to the still arriving Kaa on the other: (Kgamane had not yet re-settled there, but was still with Bo-Sekgoma at Mogonono.) In 1900 this district had 25 members, 41 pupils and 3 teachers, and apparently no out-stations.

The cinderella of the recognised church districts of the Bamangwato Reserve was Tlhabala, and Moiyabana, which were the two larger Kgalagadi villages astride the old route from Shoshong towards the Boteti: Despite the first evaneglising of the area in 1864, there were only 5 Church members and an unknown number of pupils at the school under the paid *moruti*, Maphanyane Moshomong, who had also previously served in Ngamiland.

Mogonono was the temporary settlement of Bo-Sekgoma during the War before removal further south to Lopepe on the Kweneng border: The station's statistics for 1900 reflect the number of active Christians who had followed Sekgoma, though some of his followers were trickling back to allegiance to Khama at Palapye. There were 66 members, 110 scholars and 8 teachers: The *moruti* was Baruti Kaleakgosi once Alice Young's senior teacher at Palapye — but Sekgoma openly pressed for the prestige of his own white missionary (*moruti-o-mosweu*).

The Motloutse district consisted in the main of Makomi's and Mmadinare. At this time Makomi's was the larger settlement, having been settled in 1898 by Talaote dispersed from Palapye under Motsumi. In 1900 Motsumi's had a population of about 700; The resident *moruti* was Peter Morutsi, an excellent Kalanga teacher recalled from service in the Kweneng at Khama's request. In 1900 he ministered to 39 church members, 152 pupils and 14 teachers in 5 schools.

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75 See Chapter 6;
76 *L.M.S.* annuals (mss) Palapye 1899 & 1900;
77 Ibid;
78 *L.M.S.* annual (mss) Palapye 1899 & 1900;
One major area stood outside these recognised church districts in 1900 - Bokalaka: Within a couple of years of arriving at Shoshong, James Hepburn had discovered the educational possibilities of the area on a corn-buying trip with two students from the Shoshong seminary - Khukwe and Diphukwe: They found SeTswana generally understood, but evangelisation in the 1870s was impossible due to Ndebele over-rule: Right up to 1893 Bokalaka was subject to Ndebele raids, and up to 1899 it was raided for cattle by B.S.A: Police from Southern Rhodesia: but from 1899 Bokalaka was brought within the Ngwato state system by Ngwato collectors of the Hut-Tax who travelled around in their ox-wagons: What is remarkable about Bokalaka is the alacrity with which it took to Ngwato-Tswana-Christian culture, even though politically it continued to show weak attachment towards the Ngwato state: As Mpubuli Matenge told an interviewer in 1971 referring back to his boyhood in the 1890s:

'Mr: Matenge told me that during that period, the Makalaka had not come into contact with western civilization whatsoever: Their clothing consisted of softened skins of stock and game they freely hunted in their mini kingdom: They first saw people wearing whitemen's clothes when they met the Bamangwato people of King Khama:'

The first Bamangwato to reside in Bokalaka, as distinct from hunting parties and waggoners who were itinerant, were the bar'uti sent by the Ngwato Church, who had arrived to a keen welcome by August 1901 - Motiki Tshobote to Mswazi's, Mmereki to Magapatona, and Tshube at Nkange: They arrived in response to a request of the villagers of Kalakamati to Chief Khama probably made in 1899, when they had been visited by the deacon Ntwetwe from Palapye: Kalakamati was a Kalanga village actually on the Shashe river: its thirst for education had been aroused by Bamangwato from the Makobamotse regiment who had been recruited

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80 J:D: Hepburn Twenty Years, p:234:
82 Lebotse 'Profile', p:28:
83 Willoughby to L:M:S:, 27 Aug:1901; Lebotse 'Profile', p:28:
to work in the Monarch Mine of the Tati Concession in the late 1890s. These Bamangwato visited Kalakamati for recreation, and began to teach young people the elements of literacy. In particular the Matenge brothers, Mpubuli and Mudongo, were stimulated to learn by their elder brother, Modisa, who had brought copies of SeTswana text books from Palapye - Sepeleta, the spelling primer, and Marang (i.e. First Light).

The Kalanga of Bokalaka produced even in poor years a surplus of maize which could be converted into elementary education. Willoughby reported how within a few months of their arrival in Bokalaka, the three Bamangwato baruti had been provided with grain houses, school shelters, and their own ploughing lands. The further equation of education with a consumer economy comes out clearly in the story of Mpubuli Matenge. He was not satisfied just with elementary education.

'My next ambition was to own a bicycle which he saw for the first time when Francistown was established. This made him take a contract in 1905 and he worked at a mine in Benoni, Eastern Transvaal. But, before he could buy one, his ambition was switched to a higher ideal - [primary] education.'

Mpubuli envied the life of the young clerks of his own age who sat behind desks at the mines, and did not soil their hands underground! He therefore walked home from Benoni via Mochudi to consult his father, with the ambition of going to the newly opened Tiger Kloof Institution. His father dismissed the school as a 'costly thing of the rich people', but the evangelist at Mswazi's, Motiki, referred Mpubuli to the then missionary at Khama's capital, A.E. Jennings, and to W.C. Willoughby who was the principal of the Institution. And on 1907 Mpubuli was admitted to Tiger Kloof trades department, for six years of carpentry and masonry, with academic lessons up to Standard V in the evening.

84 Lebotse 'Profile', p.28. i.e. A.J. Wookey Sepeleta, Spelling Book and First Reading; A.J. Wookey Waren a a cwan Testamenten, Precept upon Precept (New Testament History).

85 Willoughby to L.M.S. 8 Feb.1902.

86 Lebotse 'Profile', pp.28-30 (Students in the trades department were self-financing.)
The emergence of what was to become the Tiger Kloof Institution was intimately associated with the Bamangwato desire to have their own 'Lovedale', and helped sour Bamangwato relations with the L.M.S. until 1916 - the Ethiopian Episode of 1902 being a sign of this souring. The idea of a boarding school at Palapye, to cater for the boys who were otherwise leaving the country for Lovedale, appears to have gelled in W.C. Willoughby's mind at the end of 1894. He saw his 'little scheme' as a practicality with the impending arrival of the railway in Khama's Country - 30 to 40 boarders under an artisan boarding-master, attending Miss Young's school, and cultivating their own vegetable garden in the Palapye Kloof. Palapye, he thought, might well replace Kuruman's Moffat Institution, which was far from any railway and whose future was then under drastic reconsideration by the L.M.S. Bechuana District Committee (B.D.C.). By mid-March 1895 Willoughby had discussed his 'little scheme' with J.S. Moffat (then Assistant Commissioner, Palapye), with Miss Young, and with Khama and the Church deacons. He found all enthusiastic.87

During their visit to Britain, the three Chiefs discussed such a scheme with the L.M.S. foreign secretary, Wardlaw Thompson:

'We had very long talks upon this subject, and after a great deal of merely complimentary and meaningless assent to all that was proposed, I think we succeeded in having a candid expression of opinion. Khama spoke out very emphatically as to his unwillingness to send his boys into the territory of Chiefs who had not put down heathen customs and who were not particular about putting out drink. Of course I could not understand what was said in their discussion, but they evidently got tolerably hot on the subject, Bathoen's brother-in-law, who was evidently touched in some tender part by Khama's strong words, finally getting up and making a very excited speech to the others.'88

87 Willoughby to L.M.S., 18 March 1895.
There the issue rested as far as London was concerned for the time being. But rinderpest and revolt finally forced the Moffat Institution at Kuruman to close in 1897, and the issue was raised again by the L.M.S. but allowed to hang fire until the 1899 despatch of Richardson from London to investigate education in the L.M.S. 'Bechuana' area.

However the issue of a new and expanded central educational institution did not wither in the Bechuanalands, either among L.M.S. missionaries or with the Bamangwato elite. In January 1896 the ageing Roger Price at Kuruman looked forward to a new site for his institution in the Bechuana Land Protectorate - not at the Macloutsie Camp being abandoned by the Police in Khama's Country, he thought, but at Gaborone's. He objected to such an institution being placed in an area where 'native' ideas predominated, even under Khama's enlightened rule. Near Gaborone's was suitable because he had reason to believe that an 'English township' would be started in the neighbourhood. Better still would be Mafeking. Price looked forward to an educational and 'industrial' institution that only taught in English, with carpentry and blacksmithing and high fees for non-industrial students - avoiding all agriculture. And Willoughby would be the best principal. The rather cynical Rev. John Brown of Taungs on the other hand, in his observations of February 1896, came straight to the point in predicting what was to be the bone of contention between the L.M.S. and the Bamangwato over the institution site. In reference to the professedly Congregationalist L.M.S. 'swallowing the whole leek' of state-churches without wryness of face, he suggested that its directors follow up Hepburn's request for title-deeds to the church site at Palapye, and:

'You may test this matter indirectly when you ask for a site for a school in Kgame's country, to be given in such a way that the Chief shall not have power of control over the building.'

89 Price to L.M.S., 10 Jan. 1896. The Macloutsie Camp idea was negated when by-passed by the railway - Willoughby to L.M.S., 1 June 1896.

90 John Brown to L.M.S., 29 Feb. 1896. John Brown came to oppose English-medium education; Lovedale was a hotbed of rebels to him.
Wardlaw Thompson had taken to referring to the L.M.S. project by the shorthand term Khama’s Coll. While vainly waiting at Palapye to go to Ngamiland during 1896, A.J. Wookey travelled with Willoughby to look for sites in Khama’s Country. Khama took them to Manong (Phata-ea-Monong, i.e. vulture kloof) about 16 miles east from Palapye - 'one of the prettiest kloofs...in S.Africa' - but it proved too remote from the planned railway route. When Willoughby asked Khama is he would give the site to the L.M.S., Khama 'said he would think about it.' The increasing Bamangwato interest shown can be seen in the fact that there was a great assembly on the matter at the end of 1896. The consensus was in favour of granting the L.M.S. a site, though a few spoke very hotly against the missionaries, and the site offered at Seleka's was subsequently rejected by Willoughby and Wookey. Again the site was wonderful, a natural amphitheatre with two waterfalls (then dry) over sheer precipices - but it was too remote and possibly unhealthy, and would be in the B.S.A. Company border strip along the Limpopo.

In May 1897 the B.D.C. met and resolved to find a site for an institution, without a theological section, close to an 'English town' on the railway: it being 'unwise to accept gifts of land from Native Chiefs or Tribes' - a reference to the Kuruman Eye ownership controversy of 1886, ignoring the fact that Khama has just vested ownership of a plot of land at Palapye in the L.M.S. for an 'English' chapel. In April 1898 Tom Brown and W.C. Willoughby chose, though they did not buy, a site on a farm 4 miles north of Vryburg in the northern Cape Colony. Small wonder that when Howard Williams, as Willoughby’s locum at Palapye, told Khama in November 1898 that the L.M.S. was still anxious to obtain land for the institution in Khama’s Country rather than at Vryburg, Khama replied most sympathetically, but when Williams 'pegged away' at him, Khama turned and (playfully, Williams thought) said "Please monare be quiet!"

91 Ashton to L.M.S., 8 Aug. 1896. Thompson wrote to Khama in July 1896 that 'our promise to establish a School' had not been forgotten, but the missionaries could not agree on a site - K.P.(A). Cf. the Koffyfontein mine offer of a technical trades school in February 1896 - KP(H).
The arrival of Richardson to investigate the educational situation in the Bechuanalands for the L.M.S. in 1899 gave new heart to the B.P. Chiefs in expectation of a joint national educational institution. But the situation of uncertainty dragged on, Willoughby still giving hope that the institution might be sited at Palapye as late as August 1901. This was despite the fact that the B.D.C. had concluded the purchase of Farm Waterloo, 1300 morgen some seven miles south of Vryburg, for £1190 from an Afrikaner rebel on November 28th in the year before - a transaction which Willoughby himself had helped negotiate.

It is therefore not surprising that when the institution on Farm Waterloo, which came to be called 'Tiger Kloof' after its railway siding, began to operate under Richardson's principalship later in 1901, there were no Bamangwato candidates for entry. Instead, 6 promising pupils proceeded to Lovedale in August 1901, to be followed by an ex-teacher, from Palapye. Richardson conceded that the Bamangwato must have despaired of the L.M.S. Institution ever opening; and indeed their despair was further justified by Tiger Kloof not opening its doors to pupils until 1904, because in November 1901 the farm was raided by Boers and its buildings destroyed in their revolt which continued until 1902.

Even before Richardson withdrew and the first Tiger Kloof scheme collapsed, Willoughby was pressing the L.M.S. in London to sell off Farm Waterloo at a profit after the War, and to take up the option of a site at Palapye instead. Why? Because of 'perhaps the most important information I have ever had to communicate' - that Khama was to move his capital from Palapye to Serowe. The

92 Wookey to L.M.S., 24 Aug. 1896.
93 Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Jan. 1897.
94 Tom Brown to L.M.S., 25 May 1897; Willoughby to L.M.S. 19 May 1897.
95 Tom Brown & Willoughby to L.M.S., 19 April 1898.
96 H. Williams to L.M.S., 12 Nov. 1898.
97 Richardson to L.M.S., 19 July, 14 Sept., 25 Sept., 1899. Cf. John Brown to L.M.S., 20 Sept. 1899 - that Richardson despised 'ox-waggon missionaries', and his hasty temper was matched by breath smelling of liquor early in the morning.
98 Sharp to L.M.S., 14 Aug. 1901.
extensive stone church buildings at Old Palapye would then be an excellent nucleus for the institution. The L.M.S. would thereby save costs and could offer to provide the roofs and windows for the new church buildings at Serowe in return, which would otherwise be stripped from Old Palapye. To this Willoughby added a rider that was to prove fatal to good relations between the L.M.S. and the Bamangwato for a number of years: that he would not await the L.M.S. directors prior approval from London, but would go ahead and make the offer to Khama. 101

The upshot of Willoughby's initiative was that Khama put off any decision on what to do with the Old Palapye buildings, until arrangements for the actual move to Serowe had been made. The matter rested until May 24th, 1902, when the presence of the B.D.C. meeting at Palapye impelled a general assembly of the Bamangwato ('We are the Nation, of the Bamangwato') to agree to lend (adisa) the Old Palapye buildings to the L.M.S. for the educational institution - provided that it was understood that the nation was not selling or giving away the buildings or the land or the local water-supplies:

'But work in it, there will not be any hindrance in it. We gladly lend it to you.' 102

The reaction of the B.D.C. which met at Palapye between May 22nd and May 31st, was favourable in view of the closure of Tiger Kloof by hostilities. But the new Resident Commissioner was more in favour of Tiger Kloof and hinted at Government financial aid. The Committee had been glad to meet at Palapye, a haven of peace, contrasting the Bamangwato situation with that among the Bangwaketse where the Bo-Mothowagae Church was in the process of schism from the L.M.S. But, as we now know, their confidence was not entirely well placed - the letter from some Bamangwato to the

99 Tom Brown to L.M.S., 28 Nov. 1900.

100 Sharp to L.M.S., 14 Aug. 1901; Richardson to L.M.S., 3 Oct., 30 Nov. 1901; 19 March, 23 July 1902.

101 Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 Oct. 1901.

102 Willoughby to L.M.S., 8 Feb. 1902; Tom Brown to L.M.S., 31 May 1902 (copy of legal statement, 24-V-1902).
African Methodist Episcopal Church, inviting them to offer to occupy the Old Palapye buildings, had already been despatched on March 4th.\footnote{103}

The vital clue in explaining the Ethiopian Episode of 1902 probably lies in accepting the approach to the A.M.E. Church as being one of a number of opinions being explored for the setting up of a national school at Old Palapye.\footnote{104} There were three options that presented themselves - the L.M.S., which was a case of touch-and-go; the A.M.E., which appealed to current 'Ethiopianist' sentiment; and the Anglicans, who represented the respectable state-church of British imperialism. The latter two had the advantage of being 'proselytists', who might accept into membership those who had been debarred or disciplined out of L.M.S. membership. The disadvantage was that, whatever the deficiencies of the L.M.S., neither the A.M.E. nor the Anglicans had the organisational facilities at that time to extend their missions into the Bechuanaland Protectorate.\footnote{105} There is no direct evidence of an 'Anglican Episode' among the Bamangwato, but the process of Anglican 'proselytism' from the other Protestant missions established in Black South Africa (Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Congregational) had begun in October 1899 with the schism of J.M. Dwane to his own 'Order of Ethiopia' within the (Anglican) Church of the Province of South Africa.\footnote{106}

\footnote{103 See above Note: 1.}

\footnote{104 This is not only the thesis of Ranger's 'Ethiopian Movement' but also of Edwin Smith at the time - 'it is in the desire for higher education that the movement has its firmeast root': E.W. Smith 'The Ethiopian church movement in South Africa' \textit{Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review}, Vol.22, July 1905, p. 515.}

\footnote{105 A.M.E. Bishop Coppin was banned from Bechuanaland in 1900 (J. DuPlessis \textit{History of Christian Missions}, p. 457), but Khunwana in the Transvaal remained the effective base for Tswana missionaries of the A.M.E. penetrating the B.P.}

\footnote{106 Puller 'Ethiopian Order' \textit{East and West} (London: S.O.G.), Vol. 1, Jan. 1903, p. 31. (Dwane came from the Gaika of Chief Kama - not to be confused with Khama of the Bamangwato).}
Ratshosa sent his sons to the Anglican educational institution at Zonnebloem at about this time.

The other Protestant missions resented the arrogant way in which the Anglicans referred to themselves as the Church - 'in effect, as the true, the only Church'. The L.M.S. after 'allowing' the Anglicans through to Mashonaland in 1890, was expressing fears of Anglican infiltration into the Bechuanaland Protectorate by 1896. In the following year the Anglican railway mission was formed to serve the whites of every siding and station between Mafeking and Bulawayo, and their attempt to move into Palapye town has already been seen in the efforts of that 'well-instructed and well-trained Churchman' (my italics), J.A. Ashburnham, between 1897 and 1899. Willoughby suspected Ashburnham was agitating the Bamangwato to replace the L.M.S. ('Dissent' in historic English terms) with Anglicanism (Episcopalianism), and in June 1901 Willoughby still anticipated an impending Anglican bid for the Bamangwato. However the Anglican Church was not to become a serious challenge to the L.M.S., despite its 'native work' around Francistown and at Ganyesa in the Northern Cape, until 1907/8 and 1913/4 when the Anglicans entered Selepe and Molepolole respectively. The first recorded offer of the Anglican church of a 'College' to the Bamangwato is in 1915. It was too late.

The event that marks the beginning of thirteen years of semi-overt strife between the Bamangwato and the L.M.S. is the rejection by the L.M.S. of the May 1902 offer of the Bamangwato to adisa (lend) land and buildings at Old Palapye.

Willoughby went to Khama to remind him that the offer must be one specifying freehold land alienation. Khama said that that would be impossible, and went for advice to the Assistant Commissioner (Panzera), who refused to become involved. Willoughby was bitter: 'One never expects gratitude from natives... I never

beg from the Chief.' During the B.D.C. at Palapye during May 1902 Khama had a 'diplomatic cold', and never offered the L.M.S. missionaries hospitality. When the Committee held a festival Sunday, Khama absented himself to Serowe, and the Palapye deacons took the absence as a cue to complain to Willoughby about the presence of a Bo-Sekgoma delegation in church. Willoughby realised that Khama's mood was not (yet) necessarily one of hostility to Willoughby himself, because Khama sent his wife (Semane) to make diplomatic apologies for his absence,

'But the main feeling I have just now is one of fear that Khama will one day break from the church; and that nearly all the deacons and members will readily sacrifice everything to what they take to be his whim.' 111

Willoughby rode to Serowe and tackled Khama on his reason for leaving Palapye so suddenly. Khama - just as he was to laugh off the Ethiopian Episode soon afterwards - was affable and pleasant, but was very very busy and replied, "I will tell you about it another time." But never did. 112

The mutual antipathy between the Bamangwato and the L.M.S., stemming from the failure of negotiations over Khama's Coll., took a number of years to unfold. It explains why, in his classic report of 1906, E.B. Sargant took the view that 'in educational matters [Khama] may almost be said to have taken an Ethiopian attitude.' 113 The story is one not only expressing the tensions of colonialism and modernisation within Bamangwato society, but also such tensions within the body of the B.D.C. itself. And it is a story expressed in a network of personality clashes which reached their peak at the time when the Union of South Africa was formed.

109 See below Note 243ff.
110 Lewis to L.M.S., 12 Nov. 1915.
111 Willoughby to L.M.S., 9 June 1902.
112 Willoughby to L.M.S., 16 June 1902.
113 Sargant 1906 report (mss), p.38.
It will be recalled that Khama had admitted in 1897 to white and black pressure to make a quarrel with the L.M.S., but that had passed over despite (or maybe because of) the Sekgoma Khama kgang. Khama and the Bamangwato still entrusted first £200 in 1900 and then £1527 in 1901 (apparently a total of £1728) to Willoughby to use in the mission as he thought fit. But the L.M.S. interest in the provision of education was less deep than the Bamangwato supposed - Willoughby looking forward to Government assuming supervision and the use or misuse of the £1728 became a source of grievance. The May 1902 Bechuana District Committee was followed by mutual suspicions and sly dealing. Willoughby in the next month was pressing the L.M.S. to fence the new mission site at Serowe, because he believed the Government would unilaterally institute legal recognition of Europeans' land tenure within Native Reserves 'within two or three years.' And this despite the fact that Khama had been such a good protector of the Palapye mission site, fining a man £5 for cutting down a tree etc. Willoughby firmly believed Khama was senile and about to die - 21 years before he did!

But Khama was greatly pleased by the L.M.S. decision to have dual missions at Serowe and Shoshong now that Palapye was abandoned: and he would visit the new mission station at Serowe under Thataganyana rock even three or four times a day in August 1902 - seeming 'always in a very happy mood now' in his brand new capital. The mission apparently continued to flourish, with classes for preachers and catechumens, and services in open Kgotla attended by two or three thousand: 'for attention

114 Of H. Williams to L.M.S., 21 & 25 July 1899.
115 L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1900, & (printed) 1900, p.263; Willoughby to L.M.S., 16 May & 5 June 1901.
116 Willoughby to L.M.S., 30 Oct. 1901; The Government did not reply - 'For slowness our Government is hard to beat!': Willoughby to L.M.S., 9 Dec.1901.
117 Willoughby to L.M.S., 16 June & 28 Aug.1902. (In 1911, a missionary actually considered Khama's land grants as secure as Crown land - Cullen Reed to L.M.S., 25 Aug.1911.)
118 Willoughby to L.M.S., 2 July 1903.
and apparent interest I have never had anything equal to it' (Willoughby). By February 1903 Khama had even promised to pay for the new mission house, handing over £400. But in June 1903 Khama was annoyed by news that Willoughby was to leave to re-start the Tiger Kloof institution afresh as its principal. The men and boys providing the free regimental labour making the 70,000 bricks (otherwise 30/- each on the open market) for the £400 mission house were subsequently unforthcoming. The new missionary for Khama's capital, A.E. Jennings (Willoughby's nominee) arrived on October 1st, 1903, to take charge of what he considered 'the most important of the mission centres'. Jennings found the country in semi-famine, and in January 1904 Khama announced to him that he could not afford to advance any more money (£250 was needed) for the mission house. A similar story went for the new school buildings: £600 of the £1728 had been allotted in 1900 for Palapye and re-allotted to Serowe in 1901/2, to which Khama added two further sums of £100 each before refusing further donations. In July 1903 Ella Sharp complained that the regimental labour was being inordinately slow in brick-making for the new school; she had to teach with cupboards as well as desks and blackboards outdoors - in heavy winds or dust storms or great heat. By February 1904 old mission house bricks had to be resorted to in constructing the new school.

At the end of April 1904 Jennings had become aware that there must be something more than 'Hunger, Hunger, Hunger', as they claimed, behind Bamangwato reluctance to construct either mission or school buildings. He was particularly puzzled why they had

119 L.M.S. annual (printed) 1902-3, pp.255-8
120 Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 Feb. & 5 March 1902; Lloyd to L.M.S. 20 Aug. 1909.
121 Cf. Willoughby & Tiger Kloof papers in L.M.S. Archives.
122 Willoughby to L.M.S., 2 July 1903.
123 Jennings to L.M.S., 7 Sept. & 8 Oct. 1903.
124 Jennings to L.M.S., 28 Jan. 1904.
125 Lloyd to L.M.S., 20 Aug. 1909; Sharp to L.M.S. 22 July 1903.
not 'cannibalised' the Old Palapye church to start a new one at Serowe, where services were being held in the Kgolga. In a two-hour talk with his deacons the truth emerged:

"Monare we tell you the wish of the Tribe. The Tribe wants to keep the church building at Phalapye and make it into a school. Tiger Kloof is too far to send our children, and the Tribe wants to get a teacher of its own, to take charge of the school at Phalapye."

The revelation that now dawned on Jennings, struck him like a bombshell - that the L.M.S. was not after all indispensable in its most important mission station, and that the Bamangwato had begun to make at least partial arrangements to become independent of the L.M.S. Jennings traced this to the May 1902 breakdown of negotiations with the Bamangwato which had created a grievance with the L.M.S. (he either did not know or did not consider the Ethiopian Episode having earlier roots.) The grievance was that Willoughby had tried to buy the 'beautiful piece of land including a large tract of garden soil, with the church (valued at £4000), a large school building, and other buildings' - which the Bamangwato were offering as a free gift. As was well known, the Bamangwato never sold land. If all the L.M.S. had wanted was freehold tenure (like the railway strip) why had they not made that clear? 126 This then was why Tiger Kloof was boycotted. The only boy who had gone there had soon returned, leading Jennings to conclude that the boy had been the spy of that 'intelligent but unscrupulous schemer' - Ratshosa. 127 Jennings now raised the scare to his fellow missionaries:

'On this Mission Station there is a smouldering intention of beginning independent mission work with the building of Phalapye, which may burst into flame at any moment.' 128

The challenge of independency was hitting the London Missionary Society hard in its southern 'Bechuana' missions at that time. In the Northern Cape, church independency had become a widespread phenomenon since 1886, and first occurred within the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1902 being followed by the second major incidence.

126 Jennings to L.M.S., 3 May 1904.
127 Ibid; Willoughby to IMS, 22 April 1904.
in 1904. By taking up the logic of Congregational independency (A.M.E. episcopalianism being both stimulant and catalyst), these break-away churches had provided a serious challenge to the logic of L.M.S. 'missionary imperialism'. Ironically it was on the Ngwato Church that the L.M.S. local committees was forced to rely as its main bastion of support during both the 1902 and 1904 schisms in the Protectorate.

In 1902/3 when Bo-Mothowagae broke from the L.M.S. at Kanye, both Chief Bathoen and the L.M.S. referred themselves to Khama for advice. Khama regarded Bo-Mothowagae as a challenge that Bathoen rather than the L.M.S. had to come to terms with. This explains why Bathoen gave Bo-Mothowagae implicit support so long as that Church stressed corporate Tribal independency, but crushed it when Mothowagae himself began to challenge Bathoen's power. In 1903 when a similar dispute with the local L.M.S. missionary emerged among the Khurutshe of the Tati Concession, the 'Matabeleland District Committee' of the L.M.S. appointed three Ngwato Church deacons and Willoughby as its investigators. The dispute however was not solved and resulted in the September 1904 formation of the Khurutshe Free Church.

Jennings' May 1904 plea for help to stem the tide of independency among the Bamangwato did not receive a ready L.M.S. response, and so Jennings took it upon himself to do so. He visited Willoughby at Tiger Kloof, who protested that the Bamangwato 'grievance' against him was sheer fabrication to cover up deeper plots. As secretary of the Bechuana District Committee Jennings used its annual meeting at Serowe in October 1904 for an 8 day enquiry.

128 Jennings to L.M.S., 3 May 1904, Jennings did not help matters in June 1904 by forcing all Church members at Serowe to re-marry in Civil law; 50 couples, including deacons and up to 70 years of age then re-married - Jennings to L.M.S., 16 June 1904.
129 Parsons 'Independency and Ethiopianism', passim.
130 Willoughby to L.M.S., 3 March & 5 March 1902; Lloyd to L.M.S. 3 Sept. & 30 Oct. 1903.
On the face of things the enquiry was a disaster in that the majority view reached by the Committee was that education was not the most important part of L.M.S. work and 'was an absolute impossibility... under any conditions of tribal life.' But on another level it was the saving moment of the L.M.S.-Bamangwato relationship, even though actual reconciliation was to take over a decade. For the enquiry diverted a final confrontation on three levels. Firstly, because to some extent it projected Bamangwato grievances into its own membership, with Howard Williams as leading sympathiser and Willoughby as leader of the hard-line against Tribalism. Secondly, because the L.M.S. passed on primary responsibility for education in theory to the Government, with which Khama was then on mutually good terms. And thirdly, because Khama refused to let the independency faction of the Bamangwato get its head of steam — in case, like Bo-Mothowagae or the Khurutshe Free Church, it then challenged the rule of the Chief. Khama was able to rule by maintaining equilibrium between pro-L.M.S. (the deacons) and anti-L.M.S. (Bo-Ratshosa) factions: though, as Sargant heard in 1905, this limited his freedom of initiative to disturb the status quo through innovations.

Khama and Willoughby engaged in a long debate before the B.D.C. enquiry, which turned round the interpretation of the word theko as 'to buy'. At an open Kgotla meeting, elders arose to press the claims of Lovedale graduates to be teachers, and wanted a male headmaster to replace Miss Sharp. The Serowe deacons added that the Shoshong district under Williams was dividing the Bamangwato by claiming equality with Serowe. And the L.M.S. was attacked in general for its lack of educational progress — Khama telling Williams: 'I hide nothing from you, some day we shall seek (our own) teacher for the school at Palapye'. The extent of the breakdown in trust is exemplified by the fact that Khama


133 Jennings to L.M.S., 26 Oct. 1904.

134 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 190.
and then the B.D.C. lodged conflicting minutes of the proceedings with the Serowe Magistrate - the figment of passive and probably uncomprehending Government arbitration in which, significantly, both parties still held confidence. Even if Khama was just senile and not malicious, Jennings concluded:

'There appears to be a lawless section of the tribe evidently pro-Ethiopian, headed by Rachosa and his following, including several young men recently returned from schools in the Caps Colony and Basutoland Morija, who seem determined to upset the work of the London Missionary Society and involve the tribe in trouble.'

As a result of the enquiry the B.D.C. offered to provide a white male headteacher for Palapye in return for the Serowe school building being finished for another £350-400. The Bamangwato turned down this 'offer' and female members of the Committee took offence at B.D.C. as well as Bamangwato anti-feminism.

Sol Plaatje, the Tswana writer and South African nationalist, attacked L.M.S. educational incompetence in 'very offensive' terms in Koranta ea Becoana (2 November 1904), the newspaper he edited at Mafikeng. Even Willoughby, the target of the attack, was forced to agree to some extent:

'At present we are out-done in all that pertains to the true progress of the tribes (except, perhaps, in a purely spiritual sense) by every Society and Church in South Africa that touches native mission work at all. Our Schools are a disgrace to us...the present chaotic and wasteful condition is capable of doing nothing more than to bring the L.M.S. sooner or later into public contempt.'

It is at this stage that Government intervention, in the form of

135 Jennings to L.M.S., 26 Oct. 1904. I have not found the Bamangwato version in the B.N.A. files.

136 Ibid.

137 Tom Brown to L.M.S., 4 Nov. 1904; Partridge to L.M.S., 10 Nov. 1904; Sharp to L.M.S., 24 Nov. 1904.


139 Willoughby to L.M.S., 28 Jan. 1905.
inspection, enters the picture of Bechuanaland Protectorate education. The first hint had been in 1901 when a British official (possibly E.B. Sargant) had visited the B.P. on a familiarisation tour, from the 'Department' (i.e. Board?) of Education in London. In 1903 this led to the proposal by Lord Milner (High Commissioner) and Ralph Williams (Resident Commissioner) that the Protectorate should receive £500 p.a. from Government for industrial education. In January 1904 it was approved that the L.M.S. should receive £500 for elementary industrial training at their B.P. stations. And on March 31st the next year the Resident Commissioner gave the B.D.C. its £500 for 1904. This sum was apparently spent on 'industrial outfits' - i.e. tools and workshop equipment.

In December 1904 the L.M.S. produced a report on its educational activities for its directors and for E.B. Sargant, educational adviser to the High Commissioner. The statistics compare dramatically with 1899, if one considers that the Palapye suburban schools had been absorbed by the central school at Serowe.

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<th>1902</th>
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<tr>
<td>Roll</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>99.48</td>
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<td>Attendance</td>
<td>58.2</td>
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The Serowe figure for 1904 compared with a roll of 53 and average attendance of 45.7 at Shoshong in the same year. The low rate of attendance at Serowe during 1902 is accounted for by the move from Palapye. But other economic, social, and political factors must be looked to. There had been recession and drought which made the financial outlay impossible for large numbers of pupils. Both these and the decentralisation policy had kept children away from the capital in cattle-posts and rural villages. It also appears that Khama's gradual emancipation of Sarwa clients

140 Willoughby to L.M.S., 28 Jan. 1905.
141 Jennings to L.M.S., 11 Jan. & 7 April 1905; Sharp to L.M.S. 24 Nov. 1904.
142 J.H.L. Burns to L.M.S., 19 Dec. 1904. See above Note 60.
from 'serfdom' had the effect of forcing to the cattle-posts those boys whose fathers had previously relied on Sarwa herdsmen. But further than all this there developed a political boycott of the L.M.S. (and female) dominated central school by that faction loosely identified as Bo-Ratshosa, i.e. the followers of Ratshosa.

Possibly as a direct result of the October 1904 B.D.C. refusal to employ 'Lovedale boys', there were moves towards setting up an independent elementary school at Serowe - sometimes called the Kgolola school, because it met behind the Kgolola, but becoming known as 'Serowe Public School' (girls had 'S.P.S.' on their hats). Though the origin of the name is not authenticated, the Serowe Public School had in common with its namesakes in Great Britain the distinctions of being both 'private' and 'upper class', but in origin had a popular national and anti-ecclesiastical appeal. This strange mix of ideas comes out in the views, as expressed later in life in his My Book on Bechuanaland, of the principal of the S.P.S., Simon Ratshosa. He and his elder brother Johnnie, who apparently first founded the school and later became the Magistrate's interpreter, returned from their education at Morija, Lovedale, and Zonnebloem by 1905. According to the historian Tom Kgosi, the S.P.S. was Khama's way of indulging his grandsons, especially Simon who had returned as the most educated man among the Bamangwato, who were unable to find jobs at the L.M.S. central school.

It was the private school movement, not only at Serowe but at Kanye and Selelepeng (and later Molepolole in 1908) that struck E.B. Sargant as symptomatic of the failure of L.M.S. education. His report was submitted to the Resident Commissioner in April 1906 and was despatched to the Colonial Office on June 18th of

143 Sharp to L.M.S., 24 Nov. 1904.
144 Cf. Parsons 'Shots for a black republic?'.
145 Kgosi, paras 3-6; T.P. Sebina, para 30. The S.P.S. was also called sekole tsa Kgosi, school of the Chief, in 1913: W.C.W./S.0.742.
that year:¹⁴⁶ and in 1908 his conclusions and proposals were published and presented to the British parliament.¹⁴⁷

Sargant found the Serowe central school like 'a covered market' with iron roof 96 by 48 feet and 11 feet off the ground, iron uprights, with no walls and no floor of either clay or wood. There were 12 blackboards, 12 maps, and 12 large desks with 8 children at each. Ella Sharp, he found, devoted 'a very considerable part of her time' to the white traders' children. The Bamangwato children, though more than 60% of the pupils were reading in English, had too few books. They were divided under six Bamangwato teachers - Thibe (paid £30 p.a.); Kolebale (£18 p.a.) who taught girls knitting while they sang; Tumedisho for Arithmetic and SeTswana; Lethlhalerwa (£1-a-month) a Lovedale Standard V graduate on probation ('somewhat excitable'); Keedireev a male monitor; and Nonakang a female monitor. 'The best work done in the school was Arithmetic, the poorest in Sechuana.' English language pronunciation was fair; translation and dictation fair; writing generally good. He conducted tests on the 100 pupils present out of the 117 registered - arranged in 3 standards and 5 sub-standard classes. In addition to normal classes there were afternoon 'industrial' classes (4 hours-a-week) taught by a white Serowe carpenter, Neeve, using the building and tool-kits bought from the Government grant to the L.M.S. There were 13 boys in the senior carpentry class, and 8 in the junior class.¹⁴⁸

At Shoshong, Sargant found Howard Williams and his wife, unlike Jennings, involved in education. There was only one real teacher, Nonahang, a man (£36 p.a.) who had graduated from Lovedale full of airs and graces. He had at first told Williams he would employ two or three "niggers" to do his work, but had then

¹⁴⁶ 'Report by Mr. E.B. Sargant on Education in Bechuanaland Protectorate 1905' (copy in L.M.S. Archives).

¹⁴⁷ Cf. 411² of 1908.

¹⁴⁸ Sargant 'Report', pp.32-8 & p.15. The sub-standards were each following a different textbook, after the Alphabet in S.S.1-Speleta (S.S.2); Primer I (3); Primer II(4); Infant Reader (5).
become a zealous teacher even to running his own private night school. He was assisted by an old evangelist, Rra-Simeon, a very successful SeTswana tutor. Sargent tested the Standards and the Sub-Standard (only one, using the Sepeletsa textbook) - 13 boys and 37 girls. There was an 'industrial' class of 12 boys, who had constructed their own building under Williams. Mrs. Williams, with two outside assistants, ran a knitting and sewing class of 26 girls, with the use of two sewing machines.

'Mrs Williams holding that as many of the natives have such machines in their huts, it would be ridiculous to exclude the use of them in school.'

In addition to Shoshong, Williams was in charge of 4 out-stations with 240 schoolchildren - Lephepe (Bo-SeKgoma) being the largest with 80.

On Tuesday 7th November, 1905, Sargent interviewed Khama at Serowe through Jennings. He broached the subject of the walling of the Serowe school, and Khama 'set his face like flint', offering no satisfactory explanation beyond tight available funds. Sargent then suggested that Khama should follow Bathoen (1901) and institute a national educational levy, and set up 'feeders' for the central school.

'He refused to propose such a plan to his people directly, but admitted that to establish a free school supported partly by a local rate was in accordance with native ideas.'

Sargent left Serowe perplexed by Khama's 'obscurantist attitude to education', and was not satisfied by Jennings adding that it was the past history of Government interference which disinclined Khama to innovate further. Sargent subsequently heard of the private school at Serowe, and explained it as a means of employing otherwise unemployable Lovedale graduates. So impressed

149 Sargent 'Report', pp. 39-44. Fees were 3d a month.
150 J. Good to L.M.S., 1 July 1901 (Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 160, puts it two years later in 1903).
151 Sargent 'Report', p. 38.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid, p. 41.
was he subsequently with the Khurutshe Free Church school at Selepeng and the Dutch Reformed school at Mochudi, that Sargant then found the fault elsewhere in the protectorate to be in the L.M.S. His general reception led him to conclude that 'the natives themselves have an almost unbounded belief in the powers of the Imperial Administration' – and that the 'Ethiopian' tendencies against the L.M.S., exemplified by the private school movement, should be canalised into Tribal schools management committees divided between Tribal, mission, and Government representatives, financed by Tribal levies and a £1000 Government grant to the whole territory (i.e. 10% of Hut Tax revenue).\(^{154}\) This was the seed of the unique Tribal Schools Committees of Bechuanaland, but the system was not adopted in Gamangwato and, apart from the £500 p.w. which reverted to the 'industrial' department of Tiger Kloof, there was no Government follow-up to Sargant until the late 1920s, when the first full-time Inspector of Education (resident in Swaziland) was appointed.\(^{155}\)

In his Report on Native Education in South Africa; Part III - Education in the Protectorates, published in 1908, Sargant made great play on a letter sent to him at Khama's request, by Jennings explaining his 'obscurantist' views. Khama was apparently frank he had banned initiation ceremonies and beer and made other reforms 'solely in virtue of his powers as Chief, against the wishes of the majority of his people, but believing them to be for their advantage.' This had produced the Bo-Raditladi schism and led to the breakaway of his son Sekgoma: 'From these instances it is evident to Khama that his power over his people is weaker to-day than at the beginning of his reign, the Government practically putting a premium on dissent by promoting to independent Chieftainship the heads of the dissentients.' Khama therefore feared that Sargant's compulsory educational levy, though the Chief agreed with it, could not be pushed into Tribal

\(^{154}\) Ibid, pp.2-10, esp. 8-9.

\(^{155}\) Thema 'Native Education', pp.25-51.
law against the evident wish of the majority — because a group
of dissentients would then 'hive off' with Government recognition
'thus further dividing and destroying his Kingdom.'

Jennings saw the conflict as Christianity versus heathenism; Sargant saw it as reform being out-paced by conservatism; Schapera has seen it as autocracy being checked by the consultative process. All these views have some validity, though they — as Khama was himself wont — telescope together some twenty-five or more years of profound political and economic change. What must be asked is what Khama was responding to at this particular juncture in history. On a personal level it is possible to read between the lines of the Jennings letter to Sargant, that Khama feared that 'Bo-Ratshosa', or elements of it, would feed on majority dissatisfaction to recreate the Bo-Mothowagae Church dilemma of GaNgwaketse, where Bathoen had imposed the first national educational 2/- levy. Khama also was possibly put off by the attitude — which Sargant revealed explicitly in his published report: that Khama's 'unique intellectual and moral force' etc. practically meant that Khama was a Good African who 'would not hesitate to propose any reform' indicated by his European/Christian government and Christian/European mission, if only his people would not resist and lower his dignity with the Europeans. But Khama's turning down of Sargant's proposals cannot only be interpreted in terms of personal reactions. He held the vital national institution of Kgosi, and was therefore at the pulse of public opinion — responding as much intuitively as consciously to minority or majority trends. We may posit that in November 1905 he was responding to two general trends among his people regarding education and the whole question of cultural modernisation — the élite independency spirit as already indicated, and, on the other hand, popular disillusion with the education fervour shown at Palapye in the later 1890s.

156 Cd. 4116, pp.41-2.
157 Cf. Jennings to L.M.S., 13 Nov.1906; Cd.4116, pp.43-5; Schapera Tribal Innovators, Chap.9.
158 Cd. 4116, p.43.
The comment of an outsider coming to G-amangwato in 1908 - 'I regret to find very little interest shown in education both at Serowe and Shoshong' - contrasts markedly with the euphoric reports of ten years earlier. Nor was this new phenomenon confined to the Bamangwato among the Tswana of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. White respect for the BaTswana dropped rapidly in the early years of the century. A white missionary visiting some 'Bechuana' in 1907 could not believe that this 'sink of quarrels, wrongs and immoralities' was the same society portrayed in missionary literature: 'Either they have degenerated or Mackenzie had far too good an opinion of them as compared with other tribes in S.Africa.' And though on one level this drop in estimation obviously reflects the rise of British confidence and self-opinion now that the map was really red, it also had some truth in that post-1902 Tswana self-confidence and morale appears to have dropped. The typical southern African black-white power relationship of master and menial now even encompassed the previously most privileged and respected African allies.

The decline in educational fervour among the majority of people at the nuclear national settlements of Serowe and Shoshong may be seen as the cultural index of the loss of practicable political and economic national self-sufficiency. (It is noteworthy that areas where Ngwato national 'legitimacy' was weak, Bokalaka and the Tswapong, did not suffer the same educational recession.) These political and economic trends are outlined and analysed in later Chapters, but suffice it to say here that the laying of the runway for political and economic modernisation in the 1890s did not result in 'take-off' in the early 1900s - because these sectors were subordinated into a total southern African system. As elsewhere in Africa, the outside 'civilization' which at first stimulated indigenous growth, later smothered it.

However the education recession in Khama's Country in the early

159 Lloyd to L.M.S., 15 July 1908.
160 Reed to L.M.S., 30 Sept. 1907.
1900s was not absolute. The case of out-lying areas has been mentioned, though it may be argued that only Bokalaka did not subsequently follow the metropolitan national trend. Nor did the elite groups already involved up to primary school level abandon the 'wider world' which education offered. The recession indeed was a return to the educational normalcy of the early 1890s, stripped of its later 1890s popular aspect. The naive analysis of 'heathenism' and 'traditionalism' as positive forces opposing Khama in 1905 falls apart. The vocal part of this 'opposition' was Christian and 'progressive', but anti-L.M.S. and wary of Government. Much like later nationalist movements, it might go further and ally sympathies with ordinary batho (the people) in whose name it might claim, like Simon Ratshosa, to speak. 161

It has already been suggested that the October 1904 enquiry into the educational institution question was the 'saving moment' of the Bamangwato-L.M.S. relationship in the long run. The enquiry brought to the surface deeper currents, and thereby forced Khama and the L.M.S. to make compensatory gestures to each other in order to demonstrate that the relationship itself was not in jeopardy. Two 'spies' had been sent to Tiger Kloof in mid-1904 but had soon returned. 162 In July 1905 the Ngwato boycott was breached when two boys, a Khama grandson and another 'well-born', arrived at Tiger Kloof accompanied by Modisaotsile (who had evidently reconciled with Khama). 163 When the institution was finally officially opened on September 16th, the Bamangwato sent 20 delegates — his wife's pregnancy preventing Khama from going himself. Even Sol Plaatje sent Willoughby a cheque for £5 with his best wishes! 164

161 Cf. Parsons 'Shots for a black republic?' This helps explain the paradox of anti-Establishment aristocrats or even royals among Botswana national 'democrats'. (Democracy = *puso ya batho ka batho*.)

162 Willoughby to L.M.S., 22 April 1904; Jennings to L.M.S., 3 May 1904. The first 'spy' was vilified by Willoughby as having been convicted of ill-treating poor people: he was possibly a son of Seeletso, certainly a nephew of Khama).

163 Willoughby to L.M.S., 22 July 1905 — the grandson left after 6 months (possibly son of Tshwene).
It appears that the reconciliation partially followed from pressure from the Resident Commissioner, Ralph Williams, who was on good terms with Khama. The R.C. toured the country impressing the virtues of 'industrial education' on schoolchildren. Khama's two official delegates to the Tiger Kloof opening were critical but impressed: immediately on their return there were three 'industrial' and one 'normal' applications for Tiger Kloof. In March 1906 Khama gave the institution £120 to buy itself an outdoor clock, which was given its own clocktower and became the visual symbol of the institution.

Tiger Kloof advertised itself as training aristocrats, 'the wealthy and high born', as well as artisans. But this gesture towards elitism was not without resultant friction. First there was the 'latrine rebellion' in mid-1906, when Willoughby strictly enforced a rota for cleaning and emptying latrines, previously done by boys by arrangement among themselves. Four boys were expelled. Strict discipline produced a tradition of teacher sadism, which came under attack from other missionaries. On September 27th, 1909, Jennings was sent a letter from the Bamangwato pupils (16 out of 71 total enrolment) at Tiger Kloof, asking him to tell Khama they wished to leave the school - 'Why should we die here?' One boy had been beaten up by teachers Messrs. Gordon and Gillender, and when the rest protested, Gillender had threatened them with a shot-gun. They then attacked his house in fury. Investigations revealed that the cause of the trouble was racial and sexual. Wilson Jabavu (son of Tengu Jabavu) was meeting Willoughby's daughter, Doris, secretly at

165 Sharp to L.M.S., 28 Sept. 1905.
167 Willoughby Tiger Kloof, p.28.
168 Willoughby to L.M.S., 6 May 1906; B.D.C. minutes to L.M.S., Jan.1906. Goodall remarks (History of L.M.S., p.257.) that 'The disciplinarian in Willoughby provoked hostility from some quarters.
night while her parents were away. The two teachers managed to catch Wilson one night and 'gave him a tremendous thrashing'. This then produced the general disturbance - which the investigation blamed (in the earliest reference to the inter-élite rivalry of Ngwato and Kalanga) on two trouble-makers, Huparelang and Tshiano - who were leaders in the riot unspecified between the Bamangwato and the Makalaka'.

Tiger Kloof and the Bamangwato was also the issue which brought an acrimonious dispute between Jennings and Willoughby into the open, leading to the splitting of the L.M.S. missionaries in the Bechuanaland into two warring camps. The December 1907 edition of the L.M.S. Chronicle contained a long article by Willoughby on Tiger Kloof, which contained disparaging remarks on the Ngwato aristocracy. Khama's reaction can be gauged by the letter to the L.M.S. he had written for him by his Secretary in 1912 when the article was re-published as an illustrated booklet:

'I find it necessary to mention here, that the book is evidently misleading in some details, some of which are entirely strange to us. They are more so when he deals with matters relative to the government of the tribe and, also, to the influence of the high-born as hampering the freedom of the Church.

As regards the latter question, I need only say that, if the freedom of the Church is hampered at all, it is the missionaries who are more to blame, and to a very large extent considering that they, as the messengers of the kind and peaceful father of mankind, should set us good examples. But instead some missionaries will always intrude (including the disfavour of Khama) and respect from others.'

169 Willoughby to L.M.S., 15 Feb. 1908; Wookey to L.M.S. 31 May 1909.

170 Jennings to L.M.S., 8 Oct. & 23 Oct. 1909; McGee to L.M.S. 18 May 1909; Willoughby to L.M.S., 16 Oct. 1909; Gillender to L.M.S., 17 Oct. 1909. It appears that Wilson Jabavu's over-familiarity touched Mrs Gillender too: Mr Gillender resigned. Tshiamo was presumably Tshiamo Tamoko who refused to teach in the S.P.S. in 1913 and found a job at Mamutlehe in Griqualand West by Willoughby - W.C.W./S.O. 742; Re: Gordon's temper, see Reed to L.M.S., 29 April 1912.
in tribal matters which do not concern them and which they
do not understand at all, and thus cause people to dis¬
regard the Word of God but direct attention to the
disagreeable manner in which missionaries behave.'

However at the beginning of 1908 when Khama had the article read
to him, less waters of dispute had flowed under the bridge, and
there is no evidence that he then indulged in such sophisticated
(almost stereotyped to our modern ears) strictures of Church
'interrference' in the matters of State. Rather he was irritated
in 1908; and Jennings was furious with Willoughby for, he thought
deliberately stirring up trouble. There were two traders in
Gamangwato (one was Casalis at Palapye Road, with a MoNgwato
wife and a grudge against Willoughby) who read the Chronicle and
could have showed Khama the article. And the South African
'Native Press', especially the Koranta of Plaatje, read the
Chronicle avidly for stories to pass back to its readers.

In February 1909 the antipathy between Jennings and Willoughby,
especially over the running of Tiger Kloof, had reached a stage
where Willoughby asked the L.M.S. directors to make a full
enquiry. Wookey, a supporter of Jennings, was even 'threaten¬
with recall if I said another word about T Tiger Kloof'.

Willoughby traced back the affair to October 1904 when Jennings
had promoted the Old Palapye institution enquiry to poison the
Bamangwato against him; he blamed Jennings for conspiring to
have Sekgoma Letsholathebe of Ngamiland deposed; and said he
always complained rudely, about service in hotels, etc. Most
of the rest of the correspondence was privately printed in a
report and need not concern us here. What is important is

171 Khama (per G.K.S.) to Hawkins, 10 March 1913 (L.M.S. In-
Letters, Khama Deputation 1913);

172 Jennings to L.M.S., 17 Jan. 1908.

173 Willoughby to L.M.S., 6 Feb. 1909.

174 Wookey to Jennings, 8 Oct. 1909 - encl. Jennings to L.M.S.,

175 L.M.S. confidential print; Jennings to L.M.S., 31 July 1909;
Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 Sept. 1909.
that the personal dispute widened into missionary camps and involved the Bamangwato. On Jennings' behalf, Lloyd interviewed Khama and the Serowe deacons and recorded indictments of Willoughby based on past and present observations.

KHAMA: "I know Olloby; he is always speaking about the land, for I know that he wants to see our land divided into farms, and given to the white people. This is what he always talks about; no matter what he begins to talk about, he invariably falls into this subject of politics. He walks in the same road as Mackenzie who joined the Government."

NTWETWE: "Olloby! Batho ba mo tshaba botlhe." ("Willoughby! The people are afraid of him.")

The division 'so mechanical and so complete', that erupted between L.M.S. missionaries at Inyati in April 1910 was based on cleavages of personality, theology, and political viewpoint. On the one hand there were those like Jennings and Wookey, or Cullen Reed who wanted 'a genuine native church...to keep the national life and manners in our Christian communities' - though Reed added: 'It is difficult, for the missionary can hardly deEuropeanise himself as does the missionary of Islam, or rather for Africa he is already one of the soil.' This attitude may be characterised as Tribalist: it was also segregationist. Reed believed that the 'immense power' of African life sucked a European 'down'; Jennings opined that 'The principle of a white man as servant of a native community can find no place in (this part of) - he added) Africa for a long time to come.' Willoughby on the other hand stressed the need for integration into the modern world, the need for land reform and economic development, and the joining of the B.P. to both the Congregational Union and the political Union of South Africa. His views

176 Ibid.
177 Jennings to L.M.S., 23 Oct. 1909.
178 McGee to L.M.S., 11 May 1910.
179 Reed to L.M.S., 26 Nov. 1908.
180 Reed to L.M.S., 30 Sept. 1907; Jennings to L.M.S., 2 Feb. 1908.
were 'progressive' and liberal in contemporary terms. 181

A parallel division between traditionalists and modernists was found in relation to theological issues - notably biblical interpretation. Wookey had objected to Willoughby's appointment to the educational institution because of his Hunterian theology as early as 1898. 182 And in 1910 it was this issue, vexed by Mary Partridge's feminism, that caused the bitterest exchange at the Inyati committee. She protested at Willoughby's teaching of modernist views of the Bible at Tiger Kloof. Willoughby turned on her as more theologically ignorant than some of her pupils with black faces (sic), who could even write better English than she. Miss Partridge had objected that he taught there was no hell, and had never been an Adam or Job or Jonah as historical characters. Of course there is a hell, he snapped:

'I believe it will infallibly enter into the experience of persons of orthodox belief who lend themselves to gossiping, scandal-mongering and mischief making, and also of those who whether from jealousy or spite sow division in the ranks of those who ought to stand with a solid front against the armies of heathenism.' 183

The Bamangwato issue of the moment, which was mirrored in the missionaries' discussions, were the questions of African representation and of the proposed merger of the L.M.S. 'Bechuana District' into the Congregational Union of South Africa (C.U.S.A). As early as 1896 Willoughby had objected to the lack of congregational financial principle in the B.D.C. - when the

181 Birmingham Post, 27 Sept. 1895 - interview with Willoughby (Appendix 5 in Parsons' Three Botswana Chiefs'.)


phalalo of all stations was funnelled into the appointment of 6.
new evangelists for Kuruman. In 1907 the principle of
congregational consultation was enshrined in the first meeting
of the 'Bechuana' Native Advisory Council of 76 delegates which
met at the same time as the B.D.C. at Kanye. This corresponded
with the 'native advisory councils' elected for each 'race' which
Willoughby had proposed for a post-war united South Africa to the
Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, in 1900. The Native
Advisory Council was therefore a preparation for Union, as the
delegates discovered when they met at Kuruman in May 1909.
Willoughby gave them a talk on 'The Relation of the Bechuana
Tribes to the Future of South Africa', presaging the absorption
of the Protectorate by the Union, and hinting at an educational
levy. It was this occasion which gave rise to Khama's general
indictment of Willoughby quoted above, in which he also said:

'At Kuruman Olloby spoke words that gave me pain, when my
men told me what he said to them there. I mean his words
asking my servants to go home and try and persuade me to
join the S.African Union at once, for if I, and the other
Chiefs, did not join now, we should find it very difficult
to join the Union in future, and moreover, the terms would
be much less favourable for us black people later on. I
am told by my people that these are Olloby's words.'

As may be expected, the celebration of Khama's jubilee of being
fifty years a Christian was rather muted as far as the local
L.M.S. representatives were concerned. (He had after all been
baptised by a German Lutheran on 6th May 1860.) But Khama
retained his trust in the London headquarters if not in the men-
on-the-spot, just as he did in the case of British rule. At
the height of antipathy to the local L.M.S. in 1907 he had been
most cordial to one of its London directors, Sir Albert Spicer,
recalling warmly L.M.S. help in 1895. At the same time in

184 Willoughby to L.M.S., 29 June 1896.
185 Meeting of B.D.C., 21 Jan-1 Feb. 1907 in L.M.S. In-Letters.
186 W.C.W./S.O. 778.
187 Mc Gee to L.M.S., 18 May 1909; Lloyd to L.M.S., 20 Aug. 1909.
188 A. Spicer to L.M.S., 25 Oct, 1907; Jennings to L.M.S., 29 Oct.
1907.
1907 Khama reacted coolly to the offer of another mission - the International (Baptist) Mission of Robert K. Crawford, Jersey City, N.Y., a black American - to run a station in Gamangwato. Khama referred the enquiry to the L.M.S. directors in London. Khama's jubilee was celebrated in London, as it was in Serowe. There was a warm exchange of letters between London and Serowe; a commemorative china saucer was issued; and Congregationalists in Britain rejoiced in their overseas mission's most famous living member. There were two commemorations at Serowe. One was in May 1910 when full celebrations were cancelled because of King Edward VII's death. Khama, mindful of the threat of the recently formed Union of South Africa, took the opportunity to stress his connection with British royalty:

"I did not know King Edward personally, but I knew his mother; and I know his son [former Duke of Cornwall, 1901], who now takes up the work his father has laid down.

When I was in England Queen Victoria invited me to her palace and gave me this Testament which I hold in my hand, and said it was the greatest gift she could give me."

Full celebrations were held in February 1911 which coincided with the visit of an L.M.S. deputation from London. Serowe was en fête for a week; 500 horsemen and 8000 foot-soldiers paraded in their uniforms; and a pageant with mock battles was held on the Sunday, culminating in a service. Kgamane, reconciled again, spoke for the nation, and Khama used the opportunity for a moral lecture:

"I, Khama, in the midst of this Kgota to-day, wish to speak a few words to my own people the Bamangwato...if we continue in the service of God we shall be a nation still. But instead of that, unfortunately we are going back, because there are so many people who refuse to receive the Word of God...You know that the one thing which destroys our work, and is a great enemy to our work, is Drink. Intoxicating drink is a great Chief in the country."

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189 Jennings to L.M.S., 9 Oct. 1907; R.K. Crawford to L.M.S., 4 Oct. 1907.

190 C.D. Helm to L.M.S., 3 June 1910; Khama to L.M.S., 18 Feb. 1911.

191 M.G. Edwards 'The Jubilee of a King' mss, p.51 (L.M.S. Africa Odds, Box1).

Congratulations poured in from over the world, including Lords Gladstone and Selborne, the Mayor of Cape Town, and three hundred picture postcards from British children. Khama's reply to the L.M.S. directors ended - 'I pray that the Directors will continue their efforts to promote the spiritual and educational interests of my tribe in the future, to a larger scale [my italics].'193 The reciprocal anxiety of the L.M.S. directors to placate Khama was remarkable in subsequent years: there was a return to the early 1890s spirit even to the removal of two missionaries at Khama's request. And as with the B.P. and the Union of South Africa, to a great degree it was Khama who kept the 'Bechuana' mission field from absorption into the Congregational Union.

First Lloyd was removed and then Jennings. Edwin Lloyd had been appointed to Shoshong in 1907 to replace Howard Williams - who has the distinction of being the only missionary who left Khama's Country without sour relations. Khama accepted Lloyd, who had once before served briefly in Gamabgwato and had been in Britain during 1895 when he published Three Great African Chiefs in Khama's support, as an act of condolence to an old friend expelled from GaNgwaketse at Bothoen's request. Lloyd's tetchy character was already well-known to him. The Shoshong Church accepted Lloyd on condition that he did not promote separation from Serowe and Lloyd complied with Khama's wish,

'The this is one country, and has one Chief, and one Church; therefore there should be one Church law throughout this country. A strong desire was also expressed that the European missionaries should agree well and have no strife.'

The first stage that led to Lloyd's removal was his relations with Tshwene, the Phaleng chief at Shoshong who was married to Khama's daughter Pidio. On the morning of July 9th, 1912,

193 Ibid; Khama to L.M.S., 18 Feb. 1911; Diamond Fields Advertiser (Weekly Edition), 4 March 1911, pp. 16-7.

194 Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 March 1903; Williams to L.M.S., 31 March 1907; Jennings to L.M.S., 13 June 1907; Lloyd to L.M.S., 31 Dec. 1907. Khama accepted Lloyd rather than have the notorious A.J. Gould then being expelled by his congregation from Selepeng - Jennings to L.M.S., 13 Nov. 1906.
Tshwene came to Lloyd to ask him to publish the banns of marriage between his brother Bakaa-Batsile and his daughter Gaokohile. Lloyd refused because the marriage of uncle and niece was repugnant in British law, and Tshwene waxed emotional. As a result the Phaleng boycotted Lloyd, and the Lloyd family drew closer to the family of Kgamanse, the theoretical governor of Shoshong – an attachment that was to prove fatal. Lloyd appealed to Khama, and received a long letter back accusing Lloyd of welching on his word to marry the Phaleng couple. Lloyd, Khama had heard, was too concerned in collecting Church dues and not enough with the welfare of the people. The next stage in worsening relations was tragic. Kgamanse's daughters Serero and Maria used to play with Lloyd's daughter Isabel. When their brother Tsamette died from measles, Mrs. Lloyd banned the Kgamanse daughters from her household for fear of infection. At Christmas 1912, however, Isabel sent her friend Serero a cake with pink-and-white icing: the gift was returned by the eldest Kgamanse son, Gorewang. Soon afterwards Serero died, and in Kgamanse's grief a whole string of recriminations against Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd emerged. He was an inefficient pastor; they segregated themselves from the community. He did his own wood-chopping; she put wire (to keep the baby in) around the house, and locked the garden gate (to keep Mad Tom Bapegi out). He went off on Sundays to his cattle; she did not employ house servants (traders paid them £3-a-month); Mrs Lloyd objected that she had always tried to help and guide the people to do right; but they had abandoned her to nurse her dying baby while her husband was away: "I lost my boy only because I was a woman, and they would not help me."

When Khama received a full account of this domestic tragedy in 1914, his heart softened. But as far as he was concerned at the beginning of 1913, all indications showed that Lloyd was unsuitable to continue at Shoshong. Khama made a surprise

195 Lloyd to L.M.S., 9 July 1912. Tshwene was chief of 1600 Kaa at Shoshong, Ntsaga of 1400 Phaleng.
196 Lloyd to L.M.S., 7 Aug. 1912.
197 Mrs. Lloyd to Khama, 1 July 1913 (encl. Lloyd to L.M.S., 5 Feb. 1914).
visit to Shoshong in January 1913 to investigate. He summoned Lloyd to meet him at Kgamaneng's house, but Lloyd declined to make the visit for fear of infection. On the Sunday Lloyd sent the deacon Gaobatlelewe to invite Khama to communion but Khama declined for fear of infecting Lloyd (sic), and on the next morning he left without having seen the missionary. 198 At Serowe he told Jennings he wanted Lloyd removed because of his strife with the people of Shoshong, and within weeks the opportunity presented itself in the visit to Serowe of the L.M.S. foreign secretary from London, F.H. Hawkins. Hawkins was new to his job and very anxious to please Khama. The L.M.S. had written to Khama informing him of the appointment, in February 1912; and in October of that year Hawkins announced his visit to Serowe of early 1913, fondly recalling Khama's own visit to London in 1895. On arrival at Serowe, Hawkins made immediate enquiries to London about the status of Lloyd's contract. After his investigations Hawkins reported: Khama 'is like adamant about Lloyd leaving Shoshong and I am bound to say I think it inevitable - after my visit there and Lloyd admitted.' Hawkins determined to remove Lloyd by not allowing him to return from his furlough in 1914. 200 On March 23rd Hawkins wrote to Khama telling him of his decision, and to Lloyd in somewhat equivocal terms: 'The worst of it is that Khama had some sort of case which would appeal to the Directors...the Society's position in regard to the Bamangwato tribe is in a very critical state.' 201 The decision was kept from Lloyd until the beginning of 1914, when he wrote to London on February 25th from Shoshong: 'At last, I am trying to answer your dreadful letter of 20 Decr. last, which nearly killed me. 202

198 Lloyd to Jennings, 25 Jan. 1913 (Khama Deputation 1913).
201 Hawkins to Khama, 23 March 1913; Hawkins to Lloyd, 23 March 1913 (Khama Deputation 1913).
202 Lloyd to L.M.S., 25 Feb. 1914. Ironically it had been Lloyd who had married Tshwene's other daughter to Johnnie Ratshosa, her cousin, on 23 Dec. - Diamond Fields Advertiser (Weekly Edition), 10 Jan. 1914, p. 11.
He and his wife were bitter towards the L.M.S. and the people of Shoshong for casting them adrift, but Mrs; Lloyd could not personally blame Khama though Khama 'I do not fear;' Lloyd went to live on his father-in-law's farm (Hildavale) south of Lobatse, and hoped to live in the Tuli Block opposite Palapye Road, but went to Europe as a Congregational military chaplain. Khama remained, as with other missionaries he ousted, on cordial social terms with Lloyd: one of the last letters he ever sent was to Lloyd congratulating his daughter on her marriage: 203

Jennings' removal from Serowe was less dramatic and more mysterious. As far as the Bamangwato were concerned he was a scapegoat for the Congregational Union controversy with the L.M.S.; but as far as the L.M.S. was concerned, pressure from the British authorities, for undisclosed reasons, appears to have carried more weight.

The Congregational Union issue, which had been simmering for some years, came to the boil at the end of 1911 when the Serowe Church received a circular from the 'South African' (i.e; 'Bechuana' and 'Matabele' combined) District Committee of the L.M.S., asking them to consider unification within C.U.S.A. On January 9th, 1912, Jennings found himself summoned by the Church to appear before the Magistrate so that the proceedings of debate could be recorded in the court diary. The matter had been discussed in Kgotla, and Jennings had been accused by the people of conspiring to 'hive off' the Church from the Nation, thereby promoting the possibility of the political Union of South Africa taking over the country. The circular had contained phrases such as 'To secure the freedom of the Church from the interference of the Chiefs and headmen...'. Jennings claimed that confusion stemmed from the common use of the words 'Union' or Bokopano for both the Congregational and political S.A. Unions. Khama 'and the Bechuana', on the other hand, had been looking for a long time for external signs of what they knew to be the...desire of the missionaries, i.e: to divide the Church from the State.' If

the L.M.S. was tired of its Chiefs and the People, said Khama, why did it not say so and leave them entirely. There followed a remarkably candid assessment of the dilemma between elitism and popular congregationalism, which missionaries themselves had not come to terms with:

'. . . they could not understand the missionaries teaching the Bechuana to insult their Chiefs, and turn them out of the Churches. Most of the Church members and inquirers were headmen and their children. Did we [the L.M.S.] want two Churches, one for the headmen and Chiefs and the other for the common people?' 204

The L.M.S. foreign secretary in London, on hearing the news, immediately wrote to put Khama's mind at rest -- the proposed C.U.S.A. connection would have no effect on Chiefs, 'unless those who govern the tribes in the things belonging to law, order and this world, attempt also to regulate the Christian beliefs of the people.' 205 The Serowe Church subsequently made a formal rejection of C.U.S.A. membership. Jennings denied that he claimed the headship of the Church to the extent which Bo-Ratsho suggested, but suggested that Khama's intellectual consent to Jennings' headship conflicted with his reactions as the inheritor of a despotic state-system based on heathen popular participation:

'Nothing happens here that is not political, that is to say the Church and State are of necessity -- on account of the outstanding nature of Khama's life and faith -- one connected whole. Khama is the State -- and the State means Khama. Khama also means Church, and it is natural that in the eyes of both church-members and heathen, the Church means -- Khama! He and I both agree that it is not so, but the popular idea prevails. We live very much as in the days of Constantine I should say.' 206

It was their association with the C.U.S.A. scheme that made the new communion tickets (in effect, phalale receipts) unacceptable to the Bamangwato, tickets issued by the S.A.D.C. in both SeTswana and SiNdebele. The L.M.S. conceded by transferring the stock of old SeTswana tickets to the Serowe and Shoshong Churches

204 Jennings to L.M.S., 19 Jan. 1912.
205 Thompson to Khama, 17 Feb. 1912 (Khama Deputation 1913).
206 Jennings to L.M.S., 23 May 1912.
207 Hawkins to L.M.S., 27 Jan. 1913; Hawkins and Tom Brown to L.M.S., 29 March 1913.
Though there had been Bamangwato complaints to the L.M.S. about Jennings, they appear to have been pretext rather than direct cause of his removal. Two evangelists had just complained that Jennings had stopped them from preaching to the heathen, but Hawkins' February 1913 visit to Serowe contained no hint of action against Jennings. The complaint against Jennings which Hawkins took seriously was by a local Protectorate official. The substance of this complaint is not known, but it was made by the Assistant Commissioner for the Northern Protectorate, Major R.M. Daniel. On March 26th, Hawkins wrote to Daniel, having just visited Serowe, and told him cryptically that everything was as Daniel had warned him. The only solution was to remove Jennings (and replace him by Daniel's nominee, Haydon Lewis) - provided only that Khama's consent could be obtained: 'It would never do to propose such a step if there were any chance of his opposing it.' Daniel instructed his minion the Magistrate at Serowe, Captain Merry, to obtain that consent confidentially. Khama was agreeable but preferred a missionary fresh from Britain to Lewis. Daniel found this an example of how 'behind all the old Gentleman's political astuteness there is the tortuous native mind,

'It has always seemed to me to be his way to try and balance and use the Govt., the Society and the Traders for purposes of dealing with the affairs of his Tribe in influencing them one way or another.'

It therefore seems that Khama was merely following the disparagement of Jennings by the Government and the Society, when he

208 Motiki Tshobotla & Mosimanyane Thatidi to L.M.S., 4 Jan. 1913.
209 I was unable to locate the relevant file in the B.N.A., though this may now be possible with the completed subject index. The issue was possibly Jennings' becoming involved in trade, a sensitive issue since the Anglican upper classes of England looked down on Congregationalism as the faith of small traders. Reginald Pound Evans of the Broke (London, 1968) suggests that Jennings had been discredited for trading before 1933. During the Anglo-Boer War, Jennings was forced to become the local trader at Barkly West (Jennings to L.M.S., 3 March 1900). He may possibly have had some involvement in 'Khama & Co.' - i.e. Garrett, Smith, & Co., even though he had once quarrelled with Garrett (Jennings to L.M.S., 15 June 1904).
210 Hawkins to L.M.S., 26 March 1913 (Khama Deputation 1913).
211 J. Merry to R.M. Daniel, 19 April 1913; Daniel to L.M.S., 24 April 1913 (Khama Deputation 1913).
remarked in December 1913 that Jennings was like Lloyd - 'He is unfit for his work.' In March 1914 the removal of Jennings was presented to the S.A.D.C. as the desire of Khama and Bamangwato: its executive committee was meeting at Serowe where they found Khama a genial and helpful host (sic). Khama was insistent that he bore no ill will and refused to agree to Jennings' successor without Jennings' consent.

The S.A.D.C. executive committee that met at Serowe in 1914 offered to the Bamangwato a package deal of five missionaries to make Serowe the centre of an intensive mission zone. This L.M.S. decisiveness took Khama aback, and decisions were deferred by the Bamangwato, but all the same March 1914 marks the break-even point in the relationship between mission and state. For the rest of Khama's reign relations were warm; and the L.M.S. remained the state-church until the 1950s.

The touchstone of the L.M.S./Bamangwato relationship between 1905 and 1915 was the question of the new church to be build at Serowe or Khama's 'cathedral'. The Bamangwato would not consider the matter in the early years because expenditure on the move to Serowe was so high, and the future of the church buildings at Old Palapye remained open. In January 1905 Jennings thought, after tea and buns, that he had persuaded his deacons to take up the issue, and a Kgotla assembly appeared to agree that the building of a Serowe church should begin in that year, but nothing happened. The decision was dependent on the balance in the state's exchequer quite apart from political considerations. In 1906 the necessary sum yet to be accumulated was estimated at £4000 or £5000. Meanwhile the whites of Serowe built their own chapel, opened in April 1906. As Khama constantly reminded

212 Khama to L.M.S., 23 Dec. 1913.
213 Brown to L.M.S., 21 March 1914.
214 Jennings to L.M.S., 10 April 1905.
215 Jennings to L.M.S., 2 Feb. 1906.
216 Willoughby to L.M.S., 6 May 1906.
the L.M.S., Willoughby had spent up to £1120 of the money handed over after the Anglo-Boer War on a new church building for Shoshong and other out-stations. In 1907 Khama assured Jennings that a new church would be built at Serowe once the Old Palapye buildings were demolished, when also the Serowe school would be completed. But, though the missionary as Church treasurer held £2400 towards the cost of the new church (excluding Khama's personal contribution), and he was sent to Kimberley at the Chief's request to obtain plans and estimates for the new church in July 1907, nothing happened until 1911. The answer may lie in the suggestion that an architect was engaged but his plans were scrapped, and his enormous fees ate up £3000 of the funds.

The 1911 revived 'cathedral' scheme was part of a renewed campaign of Khamaian moralistic reform. Since the removal of the capital to Serowe, and indeed since his abandoning of the beer prohibition in 1895, Khama's moral autocracy had slackened. The answer may lie in the fact that after the defection of his own son with Bo-Sekgoma, he was afraid to promote further schism through his legislative reforms: this, as he indicated to Sargant in 1905, was how he refrained from giving a headstart to the ambitions of Bo-Ratshosa. However at the time of his baptismal jubilee in 1910-11 Khama felt strong enough to come down on Bo-Ratshosa: Ratshosa himself had been conspiring with Sekgoma in exile in preparation for Khama's death. This fact emerged in Kgotla proceedings on January 18th, 1911. And in time for his jubilee celebrations in the first half of February,

218 Jennings to L.M.S., 25 May & 11 July 1907.
219 Jousse Khama the King, pp.11-12.
220 Eg. strictures on girls' sexual immorality - Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.174.
Khama announced a sweeping return to the law abandoned in 1895—total prohibition of beer-drinking, giving as his immediate reason the need not to offend distinguished Europeans at the celebrations with any drunkeness.221

The beer prohibition had the dual purpose222 and effect of strengthening loyalty by strict discipline to Khama, and of providing finance for the building of the 'cathedral' through fines at a time when comparative economic prosperity had returned. Khama's critic, Paul Jousse, wrote of gangs of youths in the guise of regimental representatives going round violently enforcing the beer ban.223 But when the fines proved insufficient a more drastic measure was resorted to. The prohibition at first applied only to the three youngest regiments admonished against beer in 1896: 2,000 cattle were extorted in fines which raised £14,000 in cash when sold — and then the whole nation was prohibited from beer drinking.224 Jousse only mentions the income of the second stage of the prohibition — £4 or an ox from the whole nation (presumably meaning Serowe), which raised £10,000 in cash.225 However, a total income to the Church of £24,000 seems unlikely as the building apparently only cost £8,000 during its 1911-13 construction.226

The Bamangwato did not this time turn to the L.M.S. for assistance in the building of their 'cathedral'. Instead they turned to Government and appointed the Government's nominated contractors (J. Callaway of Mafeking) and architect (Wallace) to design and construct the building. When Jennings was summoned —

221 Minutes, 18 Jan. 1911 (B.N.A.—J. 1331); Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 211.

222 Cf. Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 211; re. Church.

223 Jousse Khama the King, p. 13.

224 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p. 221; Jennings 'Khama's Country' Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 3 May 1914.

225 Jousse Khama the King, p. 13.

to the Magistrate’s court in January 1912, the following appeared in the court diary as the statement of Monaheng, a prominent Church member:

'The new church will be built and will be the property of the Tribe. The Missionary, Mr. Jennings, will preach in it, but it will be the property of the Tribe.'

It was the Resident Commissioner of the Protectorate, Col. 'Pan' Panzera, who laid the church building’s foundation stone on August 6th, 1912 - a stone that made no mention of the L.M.S. Jennings, in consistency with L.M.S. policy in the South since before 1900, attempted to obtain the title-deeds for the London Mission, but was forced to back down meekly and turned over all church building funds in his treasurership to the Chief. This latter he did in order to out-manoeuvre Bo-Ratshosa, and 'it has been like eating dust.' The gamble had its pay-off: on the day after the ceremony Khama emphasised in Kgotla there was no difference or dispute with Jennings. The anti-L.M.S. party had recently imported an African minister from the Cape Province, but Khama had expelled him. By December 1913, with the church nearly completed, Khama was giving money to the L.M.S. mission to drill a very expensive new well of over a hundred feet.

It was expected that the 'cathedral' would be opened in the New Year by the High Commissioner, Lord Gladstone, but for reasons probably not unconnected with the contractor's inefficiency and possibly with the 'Jousse Affair', the church was not opened until June 9th, 1915 - by Panzera, with the symbolic representation of reconciliation with the L.M.S. in the form of W.C. Willoughby helping to officiate. Up to 15,000 people attended, 200 or 300 of them white: the 'cathedral' (of reddish limestone from the surrounding hills) commanded an open plain on which the regiments paraded in their bright colours.
The offer of a medical missionary and a schoolmaster to supplement the then mission establishment of three (two ministers and a schoolmistress), made by the L.M.S. to the Bamangwato in March 1914, appears to have reconciled Khama to the good intentions of the London Mission. Bamangwato representatives welcomed the proposal to 'abolish' the separate Shoshong Church, and instead to station two ministers at Serowe (one for itineration to the Ngamiland Church). The removal of Jennings was universally regarded as a private L.M.S. affair - but the addition of a medical missionary (in fact to replace a previous Government man and to be paid by Government) and a schoolmaster was resented as an attempt by the L.M.S. to smother Bamangwato self-sufficiency. Jakoba and Modisaotsile, apparently in the Bo-Ratshoa camp, regarded it all as an attempt to force further the C.U.S.A. scheme. 231

The Jousse Affair had just begun and Khama could not afford to dispense with old allies in London, to whom he wrote effusively on March 17th, 1914, proclaiming that their 'inestimable help' in 1895 had made him feel 'more alive to the sense of a true son of the Directors' of the London Missionary Society - oh how impossible it is for me to forget these things.' Khama referred to the L.M.S. as 'our mother denomination', of which he personally would forever like to remain a member; and he declared his only discontent had been 'not unusually', with their messengers in Africa and not with the directors in London. 232

The two missionaries appointed to Serowe were R. Haydon Lewis and G. Cullen H. Reed (for Ngamiland). They agreed to equal status, and to treat Ngamiland - 'the daughter and mission-field of this Church' - as an integral part of the united Serowe-Shoshong Church. 233. Rev. Andrew Kgasa, one of the first

231 Tom Brown to L.M.S., 21 March 1914.
232 Khama to L.M.S., 17 March 1914.
233 Reed to L.M.S., 6 Feb. 1915.
BaTswana ordained in the L.M.S., was to become resident in Ngamiland during 1915.234 Bamangwato relations with the L.M.S. improved as Bamangwato relations with the Government declined over the mishandling of the Jousse Affair. Jennings himself leapt to Khama’s rescue in the Johannesburg Sunday Times, while the Chairman of C.U.S.A. did so in the Eastern Province Herald.235 As a result even the ‘young bloods’ of Bo-Ratshosa abandoned their anti-L.M.S. stance.

'I have very recently had a long talk with Simon Rachosa,’ wrote Haydon Lewis in August 1915, the leader of this so-called anti section of the tribe, and the nett result of my talk with him left me in the belief that there is no anti L.M.S. section, and that while the L.M.S. has suffered in some ways, owing to the independent action of this educated class of natives, it is only because the L.M.S. has not learnt to foster and deal with the new type of native character.’236

The actual reconciliation took the form of the L.M.S. institution at Tiger Kloof, re-building the Serowe ‘cathedral’! The Government’s own contractor had proved to be a jerry-builder. Lewis remarked, delighted: ‘Khama is not likely to forget the day when he thought he had a better friend in the Resident Commissioner than in his Missionary.’ (Proof of refound friendship was already seen in the donation of £90 by Khama for a mission motor-car to make touring of out-stations faster.)237

The Tiger Kloof instructor in masonry inspected the building: the main gables were giving outwards up to 3 inches out of true, the roof was leaking, walls were left unpainted, carpentry and joinery were ‘wretched’, and building materials skimped. Above all the construction had failed because of insufficient cost planning and inefficient quantity surveying – the mortar was already turning to dust! Remedial action would cost at least £700, re-building £3000. Khama gladly handed the solution of the

234 A Kgasa to L.M.S., 8 March 1915; Reed to L.M.S. 28 June 1915.
236 Lewis to L.M.S., 19 Aug. 1915.
237 Ibid.
problem to the L.M.S. in September 1915; and it was arranged that repair would be undertaken by the 'industrial' students of Tiger Kloof in 1916. Khama declined to sue the Government's contractor or architect, to shame them as he said: he insisted the restoration would not cost the Society a penny, and showered the L.M.S. with thanks. He even opened the question again of an L.M.S. schoolmaster for Serowe from Britain or America, and in February 1916 Khama and the Serowe Church sent £50 each to Tiger Kloof to help the L.M.S. in its financial troubles. The figures were later doubled. An estimate of at least £1225 was given for restoration expenses in March 1916; and the 'industrial' students arrived in Serowe at the end of June — when Lewis dispatched another £500 from the Bamangwato to Tiger Kloof. By January 1917 the church was almost re-built, and towards the end of the year Khama gave to the L.M.S. another £200 as thanks to God for his recovery from his riding accident. The reconciliation with the L.M.S. was complete, and the final symbolic end to Bamangwato claims to invite another mission into the country was made in the second half of 1918 when at last the Old Palapye church roofing (after sixteen years) was removed and brought to Serowe.

The climax to Anglican attempts to set up a mission in Gamangwato came too late. Bishop Gore-Browne arrived at Serowe at Easter time in 1916 and stayed with the Magistrate (now Capt. Reilly), but was only allowed to see Khama for five minutes — because the Chief was seriously ill from his riding accident of Good Friday.

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238 Ibid; Lewis to L.M.S., 29 Aug. 1915; McGee to L.M.S., 9 Sept. 1915 (encl. Ballantyne's report, 9 Sept. 1915). The suggestion of Tiger Kloof students taking a hand in building had first been made by Jennings to L.M.S., 25 May & 11 July 1907 (sic).

239 Lewis to L.M.S., 13 Sept. 1915; Khama to L.M.S., 12 Nov. 1915.

240 Lewis to L.M.S., 12 Nov. 1915; McGee to L.M.S., 17 Feb. 1916; Reed to L.M.S., 21 March 1915; Lewis to L.M.S., 4 April & 2 June 1916.


242 Sharp to L.M.S., 2 Sept. 1918; Motsete, para 12; E. Quinn to Khama, 15 Aug. 1918 - K.F.(C).

243 Lewis to L.M.S., 16 May 1916; Mrs Bevan Wookey to L.M.S., 5 July 1916 (encl. extract of Kimberley diocesan magazine).
It is thought that the bishop would otherwise have made Khama a firm offer of an Anglican educational mission based at Old Palapye.244 The bishop had made his first reconnaissance a year before, when the Bechuanaland Protectorate (minus Tati Concession) was transferred to his diocese from that of Southern Rhodesia. Gore-Browne, as the first Bishop of Kimberley and Kuruman (where there was no Anglican mission) by his very title laid claim to the L.M.S. area: 'The London Missionary Society is doing little and we ought to claim the whole native people.'245 Anglican penetration beyond the Tati had begun in 1912 when Leina Prudence Rauwe by her marriage to Sechele II founded an Anglican community at Molepolole. The B.P. Administration prevented Molepolole from receiving an Anglican offshoot-denomination, the African Catholic Church, and Molepolole came first under the supervision of Kimberley and then, at the end of 1913, of Mashonaland.246

Leina was the daughter of Rauwe, chief of the Khurutshe, who had broken away from the Bamangwato with Bo;Raditladi in 1895, and who had attached the Khurutshe Free Church to Anglicanism in 1908. In 1913 Rauwe started negotiations with Khama to return with his people back into Gamangwato. It was well-known that Khama insisted on one-church-on^-state indivisible, but the Anglican Church was encouraged by Daniel the Assistant Commissioner to send a white clergyman into Khama's Country with the Khurutshe. This plan to penetrate the territory, 'on the coat-tails' of Rauwe as Willoughby put it, failed because Khama made the abandonment of Anglicanism (i.e. acceptance of Serowe Church authority) a pre-condition of Khurutshe return.247

The L.M.S. fear of Anglican interpenetration had not died since 1903. Bishops would occasionally visit Khama's Country and meet the Chief socially; and young Bamangwato (notably Bo-Ratshosa) came in contact with Anglican education abroad. However, L.M.S. reports such as 'That the Church of England...are making a pretty

244 Lewis to L.M.S., 16 May 1916, also 12 Nove. 1915.
245 Reed to L.M.S., 16 April 1915; Diamond Fields Advertiser (Weekly Edition), 4 April 1914, p.4; Gore-Browne to S.P.G., 15 July 1912 (after his consecration) & 7 Feb. 1913 (U.S.P.G.-B/K&K: C.L.R., Vol.3).
high bid for Serowe at present' (1912), are probably more symptomatic of L.M.S. insecurity than Anglican intentions. It was not until late 1913 or early 1914 that the Anglican 'threat' had organized itself sufficiently to affect Serowe on the Khurutshe 'coat-tails'. Khama, as we have seen, came down heavily on the side of the L.M.S. as a 'true son' in March 1914; and by August 1915 the feeling had spread to the leaders of Bo-Ratshosa, as Haydon Lewis found:

'There is not the slightest ground for the belief that these fellows want either the Church of the Province or anyone else in place of the L.M.S.' 248

The 'Church of King George' (or 'Edward'), as it was known among the BaTswana, had lost its appeal as the established Church of Imperialism as disillusionment with the Imperial Factor set in. The offer of a 'College' for the Bamangwato in 1915 was indeed too late, and the demolition of the Old Palapye buildings in 1918 was the final nemesis of the 'Ethiopian' phase in Ngwato educational and ecclesiastical politics.


248 Lloyd to L.M.S. 9 Nov. 1908; Lewis to L.M.S., 27 July 1912; 19 Aug. & 12 Nov. 1915; Khama to L.M.S., 17 March 1914; Tom Brown to L.M.S., 21 March 1914.
'There is nothing more memorable in Bechuana history than the action and character of this great white chief. He had a body suited to the character of mind, and which became command, he could roar like a lion when law is transgressed, and thunders there and there when duty is not performed to his satisfaction. The Bechuana nicknamed him "Lorate".

I heard him saying to Khama, "Had I been Resident Commissioner during your son's revolt, your son could not have deserted you, for I should have deported all the ring leaders".

Sir Ralph knew native much, and therefore generally trusted them, but little, but when he knew any man to be good like Khama, he reposed in him an entire confidence. His skill as Resident Commissioner was directed by practised wisdom and common sense acquired from the many years he had spent in different parts of South Africa. He rarely made mistakes and he provided for every possible contingency from the strength of his courage and his will which always aimed high to rule the native was his pride that he earned for himself the great name "Kgosi Lorate".

He had behind him a strong personality, Mr. Barry May, as Government Secretary.

His shrewdness and inflexible determination was beyond compare when dealing in native cases, and yet he could not speak the language.

A ruler as capable as he, has never been in the Bechuanaland.

Yes, he had vices in his Administrations, and great ones but they were vices of a great mind. Ambition which aimed high, the malady of every extensive genius of a great man.

The first glance at him when you enter his presence for the first time produces an arresting impression upon you, even if you are not aware of his identity, you feel at once as you look into his stern but ugly face that you are in the mouth of a hungry lion or in the presence of greatness of an extraordinary superiority. The law-breakers, white or black or even the chiefs who are today looked upon as paragon of perfection, he looked upon with contempt, and treated with cruelty when they receive their doom.
He could scream like a wounded elephant, tables turned up-side-down, papers thrown here and there as if by magic or a cyclone, the walls of his office shake as if by earth tremour at the thundering order of this great chief.

He would never permit himself to be oil-influenced by his subordinate officials, to this point he was very sarcastic.

He cared not even for his own staff, when wrong is committed, was imperious and arbitrary and was severe to all who opposed his plans but above all he took a deep interest in the police that was one of his standing pride.'

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This entry from Simon Ratshosa's *My Book on Bechuanaland Protectorate* (c.1931) sums up the Bamangwato view not just of Ralph Williams' character, but of the way in which he put the Bechuanaland Protectorate on a regular administrative basis - and how he established a mutual confidence with Khama, which subsequent administrators were not to match up to.

Ralph Champneys Williams (1848-1927), a Welsh relative of the Bethell and Warren families, came to the B.P. from the Colonial Secretaryship of Barbados (1897-1901) and Treasurership of Gibraltar (1890-7). So though he had had the conventional pro-Rhodes South African and military experience (1882-90) of B.P. administrators, Ralph Williams imported for the first time Colonial Office bureaucratic norms into B.P. government. His first problem as Resident Commissioner of the B.P. was to create a uniform system of administration. The Protectorate was faced with the anomaly that most of its junior administrative officers were not wholly subject to the authority of the Resident Commissioner - because they were officers of the Police, which since 1895/6 had been part of the British South Africa Police. Indeed the reason why the administrative capital of the B.P. had been placed at Mafeking, a ridiculous but understandable expedient, according to Williams, was that it was the temporary local police

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1 S. Ratshosa 'My Book', pp.160-1.

headquarters in expectation of the imminent transfer of B.P. administration to the supervision of Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. On appointment in 1901, Williams tackled the B.S.A.P. commandant at Mafeking, Col. Walford, who made it clear that the R.C. had no control over him.

'I then made it clear to him that the old dual control... was at an end, and that I intended to assume the control of everything... after a time I asked Lord Milner to allow me practically to disband them and to reconstitute them.'

In 1902 and 1903 the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police (B.P.P.) was formed from the amalgamation of the B.S.A.P. with the ('Basuto Native Police, reducing the number of white N.C.O.'s. "I was never prouder of anything in my life than my Basuto police" - Williams later recalled.

The second area in which Williams for the first time established the supremacy of his civilian Administration was over elements of the British Army which had exploited its weakness, despite the fact that the B.P. was the only British territory south of the Zambezi not under martial law during the Anglo-Boer War. His Assistant Commissioners at Gaborone's and Palapye were confirmed in their criminal jurisdiction and civil judicial power, while the R.C. was the court of appeal and sole arbiter of murder cases. Williams obtained a railway carriage for frequent travel into the B.P., and utilised the telegraphic service to the full.

The third element of Williams' 'system of control' was reinforcement (at least outside Ngamiland) of the principle that 'the paramount chief retained the dignity of his power and the respect of his people while knowing well that his position depended on

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3 Ibid, p.271; Sillery Founding A Protectorate, p.177.
6 Williams Governor, p.275.
7 Ibid, p.275.
8 Ibid, pp.299 & 301.
the Resident Commissioner.' This he ensured through frequent, almost ritual, visits to the Chiefs. In the Southern Protectorate (and in 1906, Ngamiland) Williams particularly depended on Vivien Ellenberger - 'probably the best Sechuana linguist now living' - who assured the South African Native Affairs Commission (S.A.N.A.C.) in 1904 that there was no Code of B.P. administration, only a supervision of the Chiefs' powers of judicial administration and tax-collection, plus control of aliens, peacekeeping, and acts of violence to persons or property. In the Northern Protectorate outside the Tati Concession, R.C. Williams relied heavily on Chief Khama.

Khama, of course, was on terms of extreme personal cordiality with the Colonial Secretary himself, and every High Commissioner made it his duty to establish such personal contacts. Even Mr. Chamberlain was the subject of Khama's 'old-fashioned grace that would have done honour to the English beau of a hundred and fifty years ago.' The 'advice' of his Assistant Commissioner, Panzera, had to be couched in almost obsequious terms - to persuade him only to make official communications with foreign whites through the Administration, for example.

Ralph Williams' first substantial contact with Khama was in October 1901, when the R.C. personally inspected the proposed new Bamangwato capital site at Serowe prior to official approval for the move. The ever exuberant Williams apparently exploded in fury when Khama led the party on mules off the beaten track on a prolonged waterless hike. Williams thought Khama had lost his way: Khama explained it was a diversion to avoid a washed-out

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9 Ibid, pp.277 & 279-81 - Williams thought his position well-paid and comfortable even if his successors did not (pp.303-4 & 310).
10 S.A.N.A.C., Vol IV, pp 37138 - 37170.
11 Chamberlain to Khama, 8 Feb.1901 (K.P. In-1891-1902); Williams Governor, p.278
12 A.C. to Khama, 8 Nov.1902 (K.P.In 1891-1902).
drift; anyway the two headstrong men made up their quarrel and became firm friends. Colonial Office approval for the removal came in January 1902, and on February 26th Khama and his chiefs pegged out the wards of the new town away from the government 'camp' (i.e. boma) that Panzera had chosen on the previous day. The church and mission sites were chosen on February 27th, and trading stands allotted on March 20th. Once the removal was completed, Khama sent a regiment to burn down the old capital at the end of August:

'It was a novel and wonderful sight. The regiment divided into parties and went into different sections of the town, the men running from one hut to another with torches, and setting them on fire, so that presently the huts were all ablaze together. The whole place was enveloped in flame and smoke, and it was so hot one could hardly breathe. For two or three days afterwards a haze hung over the ruins... Nothing could exceed the weird dreariness of Phalapye after that fire.'

But the Magistracy and the Assistant Commissioner remained at Old Palapye, for the time being. The Colonial Office did not want to take on the expenditure of following Khama, so in 1902-3 Ralph Williams persuaded the Office to sanction instead the A.C.'s removal to Francistown in the Tati Concession, while Serowe was allotted a Police officer with the lowly rank of Assistant Magistrate.

Williams found a role as champion of the interests of the 'Bechuana' before that bugbear of all colonial administrations - the British Treasury. He was particularly concerned that Chiefs who had shown singular loyalty to the British during the War, supplying invaluable men and money and intelligence services, should not have their taxes doubled to the Basutoland rate of £1/13.

13 Williams Governor, p.304; W.C.W./S.O.795 'The Bamangwato'.
14 W.C.W./S.0.795; C.0.417/343,344.
15 L.M.S. Chronicle, Vol.12, April 1903, pp.80-2; Goodall L.M.S., p.261.
16 Williams Governor, p.305; C.0.417/345. Williams had abandoned his December 1901 desire to keep the A.C. with Khama - C.O. 417/343.
'The imposition of such a tax would give colour to a rumour which I have sometimes heard of as current amongst the natives that now we have beaten the Boers we should give away native property also.'

It was the Williams policy to support a Chief against all comers 'if we support our weak kings we will not allow Earls of Warwick to trouble us': he absolutely rejected the old policy of rewarding conspirators with 'quasi independence' and threatened their banishment (to the Colonial Office's chagrin) right out of the Protectorate. To this he added the proviso that Chiefs would be foolish to disturb their 'golden ease' with 'Ethiopianism', and 'that the day is gone when a native chief may dictate to Government.'

The celebrated deposition of Sekgoma Letsholathebe from the Tawana Chieftainship by R.C. Williams in 1906 can be seen as the culmination of a long-term plan by Khama. The growth of antagonism between the two Chiefs from 1895 up to 1901 has already been outlined. Khama was determined that the Tawana Chieftainship should be within his patrimony, and trained up young Mathiba at Lovedale as pretender while cultivating the Tawana 'Earl of Warwick', Dithapo Meno, against Sekgoma Letsholathebe. The B.P. Administration was alerted to the situation in Ngamiland in 1905, because it lay in the crutch of African resistances to German and Portuguese colonialism, and the pro-Mathiba party was openly arguing against Sekgoma Letsholathebe's continuation as Chief. After an investigation Ralph Williams dismissed the pro-Mathiba case as missionary propaganda, and would have been content to let the matter lie had not Sekgoma Letsholathebe himself arrived in Serowe in April 1906 when the High Commissioner, Lord Selborne


19 Williams Governor, p.277

20 See Chapter 5.

21 Willoughby to L.M.S., 15 Jan.1903.
was there. Williams' attitude had been that 'Premature inter-
vention simply creates a party against the whites, which it is
above all things necessary to avoid in the interests of economy
and a peaceful South Africa.' 23 Or, otherwise expressed:

'They who in quarrels interpose
Do often get a bloody nose.' (Hudibras) 24

But Selborne, preoccupied with the Bambata rebellion in Natal,
fell in with Khama's point of view, and even gave Khama the right
to detain Sekgoma Letsholathebe. While Sekgoma Letsholathebe was
detained at Serowe and then Mafeking, Selborne ordered Williams
to the Tawana capital, Tsau, where the Resident Commissioner,
after a long enquiry into marital and dynastic claims, ruled in
favour of Mathiba's succession, much to Khama's satisfaction. 25
Khama had evidently made a strong impression on Ralph Williams as
the official party left Serowe in May 1906 to trek to Ngamiland:

'I shall never forget Khama's greeting to me when he
came to bid me good-bye. After assuring me that I
might be confident that he would aid me in every
possible way, even with force should I call upon him
to do so, the old man put his hand on my shoulder,
an unusual thing for a native to do, and, speaking
in Sechuana, said, "You are going far and on a
dangerous mission, may the great God guard you and
bring you safely back".' 26

Khama and R.C. Williams never saw each other again. Williams
went off to become Governor of the Windward Islands at the end
of the Ngamiland enquiry, but he and Selborne left a stamp on
Imperial relations with Khama that was not dissipated until 1916.

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22 R.C. to H.C., 5 Sept.1905 (C.0.879/763, pp.358-9); R.C. to
H.C., 6 Jan.1906 (C.0.879/802, p.44).

23 R.C. to H.C., 17 Feb.1906 (C.0.879/802, p.77).


25 C.0.879/802, passim; Williams Governor? chap.23; Jackson
Mutero Chirenje 'Chief Sekgoma Letsholathebe II: rebel or 20th
century Tswana nationalist?' Botswana Notes and Records, Vol.3,
1971, pp.64-9.

26 Williams Governor, p.328
As far as B.P. Administration was concerned, the Williams régime institutionalised the supremacy of a Secretariat through the promotion of the R.C.'s Accountant to Government Secretary in 1903, the post held by the efficient Barry May from 1904 to 1915. But the post of Resident Commissioner was weakened by the succession to Williams of Panzera, generally characterised as a bone-headed military man. Williams' momentum was lost: if only he had stayed, a subsequent R.C. told the European Advisory Council in 1921, the capital (that ultimate symbol of B.P. subordination to South Africa) would have been transferred to the Protectorate.

William Waldegrave Palmer, second Earl of Selborne (1859-1924), had been the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies in 1895 who was largely instrumental (against the advice of his 'Rhodes-ian' subordinates like Fairfield) in granting Khama his 'victory' against amalgamation into Charterland. As the man who had entertained Khama to an English fox-hunt on his country estate, therefore, Khama was most anxious to show Selborne reciprocal hospitality when the latter made his first visit as High Commissioner to Serowe in March 1906. The South African press was full of reports of the colourful, indeed deafening, reception of Selborne's 'cavalcade' by tens of thousands of Bamangwato at Serowe. On the next day Selborne and Williams addressed perhaps 15-20,000 people in the Kgotla. Selborne's speech is worth quotation not just for its praise of Khama but for its implications in the subsequent shielding of Khama by Selborne from the proposed Union of South Africa, and for its impression on the assembled Bamangwato. It demonstrated very clearly the special relationship between Khama personally and the Imperial Factor:


'It is more than ten years since I last had the pleasure of meeting you, Chief Khama. We stood together then in the presence of Queen Victoria. How much has happened since then, how many countries have risen and fallen in those ten years... Great nations elsewhere in the world have had great calamities, people that were small have become big people, many tribes of Africa have suffered many cruel things, the map of Africa, south of the Zambesi has been changed, but the Bamangwato remain peaceful and prosperous. Why, when there are so many changes in the world, do these changes pass you by? Why is it that you can go peacefully about and no man disturbs you? Why do you feel that you live in a country where justice prevails? It is because the prosperity of the Bamangwato is founded upon two sure rocks - the loyalty of the Chief and people to the King of England, and the protection by the King of the Chief and people.

Chief Khama, I have no advice to give you, you have found for yourself the path of a good ruler, and you have shown your people what firmness and justice can do. I will only say that if ever I can help you to lead forward your people in the path of Christianity and civilisation there will be no work more genial to me.'

A great hunt followed the next day involving thousands of beaters, which even if it was a spectacular failure in fact, endeared Khama to Selborne all the more.

In his speech to Selborne of April 1906 Khama had not mentioned any new white settler threat of amalgamating his country - the threat of the Union as it was to turn out. But a new threat had already emerged in South African press reports of the desirability of the Khama's Country for white settlement, and concomitant speculations that the allowance of guns and ammunition to 'the noble Bechuana' (55,000 rounds in 1904), as to the 'Basuto', presaged the 'extermination' some-day of two-legged white quarry in the territory. In the middle of 1906 such rumours of impending B.P. revolt reached fever pitch among Transvaal white farmers. The scare was aroused that messengers from Witbooi and Dinizulu were coordinating a coming revolt in the Northern Transvaal.

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with ones in Basutoland' and the B.P., to cut the railway lines and form a solid band of revolt from German South-West Africa to Natal. Suspicion was put on the Rev. Gabashane of the A.M.E.; and two unfortunate Zulu peddlers who happened to be subjects of Bambata, were interrogated at Serowe in August 1906. The Assistant Resident Magistrate dismissed there being the slightest interest in Natal affairs at Serowe, except amongst 'a few educated natives whose information... is obtained from the newspapers.' And Ralph Williams filed his opinion that the loyalty of the B.P. Chiefs and people to the British compared favourably 'with any body of white men in any portion of British South Africa.' The South African press was guilty of fomenting the very discontent it dreaded. The white dread, however, was not easily quelled; in January 1910 the Western Transvaal rang with rumours that Chiefs Linchwe and Khama were stock-piling arms in the B.P. in preparation for revolt.

Exactly why the Bechuanaland Protectorate, together with Swaziland and Basutoland, was kept out of the Union of South Africa in the Act of 1909, has recently become a matter of slight controversy. Alan R. Booth has put forward the case for Selborne being converted in 1907/8 by Sotho and Paris Mission pressure; and has been damned by Ronald Hyam from the Public Record Office viewpoint that the decision to exclude the three territories was really Whitehall's. Both arguments are primarily presented with reference to Basutoland and Swaziland. Indeed though he shelves sudden conversion of Selborne for Basutoland, Hyam raises the insufficiently explained spectre of a sudden conversion of Selborne for Bechuanaland in July 1906, which in turn destroyed Whitehall's confidence in transferring any of the three territories! A fuller answer must await the opening of the Selborne Papers to a biographer, but certain observations

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33 S.33/3, passim.
34 A.R.M. Serowe to G.S., 11 June 1906 - S.33/3.
35 R.C. to H.C., 24 Aug.1906 - S.33/3.
36 Native Affairs Department, Pretoria, to H.C., 18 Jan.1910-Ibid.
may be made here vis-à-vis the relationship of Selborne with the B.P. Chiefs' protests against incorporation into the Union.

The 'Selborne Memorandum' published in July 1907, produced by the 'kindergarten' that Milner had bequeathed, first raised the question of Union officially, looking forward to the day when all British Africa south of the Zambezi would be under one administration. Bechuanaland was not mentioned by name, but it appears that a protest from B.P. Chiefs led by Linchwe of the Kgatla followed soon afterwards. The Colonial Office already had misgivings about transfer of the three S.A. 'Protectorates' to the Union, and the question of the most vulnerable 'Protectorate' Swaziland, was already linked to the bargaining process of Union as a carrot to the Transvaal to accept the Cape native franchise.

The decisive factor that kept the Bechuanaland Protectorate out of the immediate plans for a Union of South Africa, was its links with the B.S.A. Company. In May 1908 Selborne, in his first official despatch on the subject, as a result of the vocal 'Bechuana' and 'Basuto' protests no doubt, was against immediate


38 Hyam 'African interests', pp.94-6.


immediate absorption of either Bechuanaland or Basutoland into the Union because of the British Crown's semi-contractual obligations to their Chiefs. Then, to appease the territorial ambitions of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, in July 1908 he declared for the immediate transfer of Basutoland and Swaziland on the occasion of Union - but excepted the B.P. until such date when Southern Rhodesia joined the Union. 42 The Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 had had the B.S.A. Company administrative claim over the B.P. written into it, by providing that the Colonial Secretary could incorporate the B.P. into Rhodesia at some future date. 43 Selborne may have been reminded of this by current B.S.A. claims to 'development' within the Protectorate. 44 The response of the Colonial Office in August 1908 to Selborne's exclusion of the B.P. from the Union plan, was to exclude Basutoland and Swaziland too - and to use the 'Protectorates' (notably Swaziland) as territorial bait for the Afrikaner nationalists to keep in line with the British. 45 After the 'National Convention' of delegates of the four states who agreed on Union, at Durban in October 1908, the Colonial Office agreed that the three 'Protectorates' should be grouped together under the (British) High Commissioner for South Africa, who was also to be the Governor-General of the Union.

Even if it was not the decisive factor behind-the-scenes in 1908, African protest was the vital reinforcing factor behind the decision not to include the 'Protectorates' in the 1909 Union. In the case of Bechuanaland it was vital because of a twenty-five year tradition of that territory's importance in British internal politics, and because the 'victor' of 1895, Khama, was still living and internationally famous for his devotion to the British Crown. During the otherwise uncontroversial passage of the Union Bill through the British Parliament, the Liberal Government

42 Hyam Failure, pp.16-7; Hyam 'African interests', pp.91-2; Hailey Republic, p.40; Booth 'Lord Selborne', pp.137-8.
43 Hailey Republic, p.53.
44 See Chapter 9 below, & Chapter 3 above.
45 Hyam 'African interests', pp.94-6.
(perhaps as a blind to the weakness of 'Native' rights in the actual Union) made show of an additional pledge to consider African views in the High Commission Territories before any transfer. And the Colonial Secretary of 1913 specifically made the point that so long as Khama was alive, the bare suggestion of handing him over to the Union would bring the whole missionary world and others upon me at once. \(^46\)

Once the British Government had accepted the draft Union plan at the end of 1908, the Acting Resident Commissioner, Barry May, was instructed to tell the Chiefs of the B.P. that while no change was contemplated at present, incorporation was one day inevitable. May first repaired to Khama's town, where there were five Kgotla meetings. It was obvious that Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen (whom May thought jealous of their 1895 reputation as saviours) objected strongly in principle - but Khama declined to send his personal reactions to the High Commissioner. Instead he and his headmen prepared a petition, which was coordinated with those of other 'Bechuana' Chiefdoms - in that the petitions were not so much aimed against the remote threat of incorporation into the Union (as naive commentators stressed\(^48\)), as against the immediate threat of the type of administration proposed for the 'High Commission Territories'. The Colonial Office had agreed to the administration of the Territories being subject to the High Commissioner as Governor-General in council - i.e. on the advice of his Union ministers, effectively subordinate to the Union's Native Affairs Department. The Ngwaketse petition questioned whether the High Commission could prevail against the Union parliament, provoking the Whitehall comment that 'Bathoen's dialectic is very good'. The Kwena petition (probably penned by Sidzumo) attacked the 'native policy' of the white settler states of South Africa, while the Bamangwato observed of them:

\(^46\) Hailey Republic, pp.34-6 (re, Section i5i of S.A. Act, 1909); Hyam 'African interests', pp.85-6.

\(^47\) Hyam Failure, pp.86-8; Hyam 'African interests', p.104 (quoting Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 April 1913).

\(^48\) Hyam 'African interests', p.100 citing Crewe; Booth, passim.
'We do not know how it is possible for a nation to change the character of its treatment of the native races through the mere fact of union between themselves, nor how it can come to pass that four separate faulty native administrations when joined into one can be anything else than a faulty administration.'

These 'Bechuana' petitions succeeded in that in March 1909 Selborne took note and succeeded in removing the High Commission from any responsibility to the Union government. Selborne, to Colonial Office surprise, then moved further with the fervour of a convert to the idea of giving the High Commission Territories their own Imperial administrative cadre recruited from Britain (like the Sudan or Northern Nigeria civil services), but this plan was scotched by his successor who continued the tradition of white South African recruitment.

The 'Bechuana' Chiefs - or their 'Private Secretaries'- followed the fashion of sending delegates to London to protest the Union Bill somewhat belatedly. The Act became law rather rapidly, on September 20th, 1909, when the 'Bechuana' delegate - the Cornishman Gerrans, a trader of Mafeking - may not have even reached Britain. (This initiative was entirely without prior consultation of any missionary, a symptom of the times.) The fate of Gerrans remains a mystery.

Selborne abandoned his annual trip to the B.P. in 1909 because of a cerebro-meningitis epidemic, so he summoned the Chiefs to Mafeking in March 1910 to quiet their anxieties that no transfer was contemplated in the immediate future. Khama spoke:

49 C.0.417/465 & 482.


51 Lloyd to L.M.S., 29 Sept.1909 & 17 Aug.1910 ; Wookey to L.M.S., 8 Oct.1909 (L.M.S. discredited by own Union plans); L.M.S. Chronicle, Nov.1902, pp.264-5.
'My "Union" was made with England a long time ago when at that time the chartered company tried to take us under their control, I fled to England...and when I arrived I saw the Great Ruler, Mr. Chamberlain, and said "I do not wish to be under the control of the Chartered Company, but under the control of England", and Mr. Chamberlain said "All right, there is no one who will compel you to do what you do not want to do. I have received you and there is no one who will take you out of my hands." 52

The Union of South Africa came into being at the end of May, 1910, and soon afterwards Selborne came to Gaborone's to introduce his successor as High Commissioner, Lord Herbert Gladstone, to the B.P. Chiefs. Selborne much displeased the Chiefs by urging them to join the Union.53 It appears that Khama had already sent a petition to the new British King, George V. The British sent a bland reply that in the event of final incorporation the appropriate Schedule (Section 151 of the Act) would guarantee rights to land and to hold assemblies, and the restriction of liquor. Khama pestered the authorities for confirmation that the King had received the petition, and was granted the 'irregular' privilege of a copy of the Colonial Office telegram of acknowledgment.54

The next occasion for protest was the visit of the British royal, Arthur Duke of Connaught, to Gaborone's in November 1910, inviting the Chiefs to present their views on Union for conveyance to the King - no doubt to quiet their fears that the new King was deaf. Khama duly arrived and presented yet another petition against Union: the reply again being that he must trust the timing of incorporation to His Majesty's Government.55


53 Lloyd to L.M.S., 17 Aug.1910.

54 C.O. to H.C., 27 June 1910 (ackn. H.C. to C.O., 14 May 1910); R.C. to Khama, 14 July, 8 Aug., & 15 Nov.1910 - K.P. (J). May 6th was Khama's baptismal jubilee - see Chapter 7 above.

Khama's jubilee celebrations in February 1911 featured a large banner bearing portraits of Khama and George V in juxtaposition, and George's June 1911 coronation was celebrated at Serowe with pomp and circumstance filmed by W. Butcher & Sons, 'cinematograph operators' of Farrington Avenue, London E.C. While stressing the Imperial connexion, Khama studiously avoided involvement in Union affairs. At the end of 1911 he was contacted by the South African Native National Congress, then in the process of formation, offering him the post of an Honorary President. Khama refused repeatedly - because he was not under the Union but 'His Majesty's Direct Government' - and requested that his name be withdrawn from the programme. However the Congress accepted his name (together with Dinizulu, Lewanika, Letsie II, and others) by acclaim at its inaugural meeting in 1912; and Khama had to testily return the copy of *Molomo oa Batho* that Isaka Seme sent him in February 1912:

'You know I have written you, to say I will not have anything to do with your Congress.'

In September 1913 Khama, with some delight, feigned ignorance of the S.A. Natives Land Act when Lord Gladstone informally raised the topic in conversation - adding the hope that internal troubles in the Union would make the British leave the B.P. well alone. The Acting Resident Commissioner, J.C. MacGregor, recently transferred with long experience from Basutoland, had noted a few months before, after returning from a familiarisation tour of Bechuanaland:

'Notwithstanding all they have been told from time to time, the natives of the Protectorate are not prepared to enter the Union in the same sense as those of Basutoland. There they dislike the idea, but have accepted it with more or less misgiving and reluctance. Here they have not accepted it at all, and appear to think that it is still an open question.'

56 See Chapter 7. Jennings to L.M.S., 1 July 1911.


58 C.0.879/1003, pp.63-4 (quoted in Parsons Word, p.21).

On February 28th, 1913, the Union of South Africa made its first public call in its parliament for the transfer of the B.P. But this was largely Premier Botha's reaction to the counter-claim of the B.S.A. Company to incorporate the Protectorate into its administration. Botha had been blunt about B.P. incorporation when in March 1909 the Company had renewed its claim to administer the Tuli Block (Limpopo Strip); and in 1909 and 1911 Bechuanaland had been included with the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in suggestions of a British Central African state. Then Jameson as chairman of the Company publicised plans to 'develop' the B.P. which produced Botha's 1913 reaction. Botha recruited Gladstone to involve the B.P. in Union land policy as a 'dumping ground', but the Colonial Office reacted sharply to Gladstone's disturbance of 'wise passivity' - adding 'Khama and Co. cannot be treated as so many chattels to be given away...at least during Khama's lifetime'. Refusal of Botha's request was phrased explicitly because of the 'strong opposition' of the 'Bechuanas', Khama being mentioned in particular. But this refusal still encouraged Jameson to entertain Bechuanaland joining the Rhodesias, and it was probably the old B.S.A. claims to his Country rather than the Union's new claims which exercised Khama's primary concern in the early stage of the 'Jousse Affair' which erupted in 1914.

The obvious confidence placed in Khama by the Williams regime and by the Imperial authorities, from Chamberlain to Harcourt and from Milner to Gladstone, favourably disposed Khama towards the territorial representatives of the Imperial Factor in the B.P., during the years of peace from 1902 to the 'Jousse Affair' of 1914. We have seen evidence of this in how Khama placed his confidence in the B.P. Administration for the planning, building, and dedication of the Serowe 'cathedral' in the years before 1915.

60 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 14 Aug.1913 - C.0.879/1003, p.48.
63 See Chapter 7 above.
Panzera replaced Ralph Williams as Resident Commissioner on the latter's departure in 1906. One of Panzera's earliest duties was to supervise the removal of Bo-Sekgoma from Lephepe in the Bamangwato Reserve northwards to Nekati (near the Nata river) – in the south of the same Crown Lands where Sekgoma Letsholathebe was exiled in the north (on the Chobe river). The removal was in direct response to Khama's request: Khama having persuaded a number of Bo-Sekgoma to defect to Serowe and others to Shoshong. Though Government officials were more sympathetic to Sekgoma Khama than missionaries, Panzera as the responsible Assistant Commissioner in 1903 had proved unsympathetic - berating Bo-Sekgoma as children who starved because they neither dug wells nor sold their labour abroad, and refusing them aid until they did so.

Sekgoma Khama, anxious to impress Government with his capacity to rule, had attempted to rule his thirstland principality at Lephepe with a rod of iron. In 1900 he declared that 'big' men would be fined £80 or 6 cattle, 'small' men £50 or 3 cattle, and 'common' men 3 goats, on their first offence of buying or brewing strong liquor. But in 1904 Bo-Sekgoma split up on the issue of Sekgoma's marital affairs. Sekgoma had divorced one daughter of Kgamane and allegedly impregnated another, but had now taken a commoner girl, Lehemu, to wife. This alienated Kgamane, who was then finally reconciled to Khama and was subsequently appointed to the sub-chieftaincy of Shoshong. And Bo-Sekgoma divided between Lephepe, Serowe, and Shoshong. It was then agreed with Khama in 1906 that the rump under Sekgoma himself should be removed from Lephepe: Selborne argued that Sekgoma should go to exile to be better educated by a white Officer for eventual succession to the Ngwato Chieftainship. (If the Tribe were to be allowed to

64 Jennings to L.M.S., 12 April 1907.
66 Panzera to Sekgoma Khama, 6 July 1903 - K.P. In 1903-5; C.O. 879/717.
68 R.C.12/4, passim.
split up on Khama's death all those new boundaries would entail a dreadful expense.\textsuperscript{69) The B.S.A. Company refused to take Bo-
Sekgoma into their new 'Tuli Block' or into Southern Rhodesia, so
it was agreed to remove them to the Nata area, proposed by Panzer
and accepted by Khama but previously rejected in 1903 by R.C.
Williams as too near the Bamangwato Reserve.\textsuperscript{60 Sub-Inspector
Hodson was appointed to accompany Bo-Sekgoma, thus causing some
friction with Khama who claimed that the proper chain of admin-
istrative communication should pass from the British through him
to Sekgoma.\textsuperscript{71}

The removal of Bo-Sekgoma involved legal claims to property on two
important levels of precedent. The first set of claims involved
compensation for 'improvements' effected in immovable property at
Lephepe. Khama refused to countenance Sekgoma's claims for 8
wells driven for £260, 3 houses valued at £150, and 13 other well
belonging to his followers valued at between £25 and £40 each.
But Panzera, who had after all encouraged these improvements to be
made, persuaded the Government to compensate Bo-Sekgoma by up to
£500 worth of 'special consideration' (not cash) in removal costs.
Administrative initiative thereby undermined the 'customary' non-
individual tenure of lands and waters so strenuously upheld by
Khama.\textsuperscript{72}

The second set of property claims made by Bo-Sekgoma in 1907
touched on the cattle tenure question raised by Goold-Adams' judg-
ment of 1899 at Old Palapye. It will be recalled that Goold-
Adams had ruled that Maaloso cattle not earned by individuals were
Tribal and reverted to Khama; and that only those Basimane (and
Sekao) who wished, needed to go with Sekgoma and maintain their
special tribute relationship (the kgamelo or usufruct of their
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\textsuperscript{69 H.C. to C.O., 21 May 1906 - C.O.879/802, pp.140-1.
71 R.C. to H.C., 5 Feb. & 13 Feb.1907 - C.O.879/872, pp.65 & 114-
73 See Chapter 6.
paralleling Khama's successful action of 1899, to the cattle of those kgamelo-holders of the Basimane and Sekao 'sections' who now wished to leave him and return to his father's domain.

Khama counterclaimed that Sekgoma had no right to own the Basimane and Sekao cattle involved. When Sekgoma attained his majority he had not been given the cattle of these clients he had only been made the leader of these people with the right to their kgamelo ('milk pail') tribute. "I gave Sekgoma his personal cattle", which Khama claimed had been about half the royal herd, "to avoid him getting into trouble with the tribal stock" - a reference to the troubles over cattle-holding that had led to the deposition of Macheng and Sekgoma I. Sekgoma (II) now had enough cattle, Khama asserted, to fill a two-mile radius: his son was making a spurious claim based on a tradition that he himself had never known. In the heat of the enquiry being held by the Assistant Commissioner, Col. Daniel, at Lephepe, Khama waxed so emotional that a 'disorder' ensued. What is most important is that at Lephepe Khama's declarations cleared away the last vestiges of the kgamelo system by confirming to its holders their personal ownership of the cattle involved, and thereby opened the way, at least in principle, for the notion that the only Tribal cattle were those actually in royal possession. In 1899 Khama had claimed that Basimane etc. cattle were Tribal and therefore his own property; in 1905 he had confirmed this; but now in 1907 he declared with the fervour of Protestant Ethic:

'All people are God's and were created by him. Everyone is given the means to obtain property just as much as God wishes to give him. Old laws caused people to be slaves, and I don't want my people to be slaves with no property.'

74 Khama's reply to A.C. at Lephepe, 22 July 1907 - K.P. (I).
75 See Chapter 1 above.
76 Cf. Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.80-1, who remarks that the evidence is conflicting. The question of cattle-holding as the basis of property and capital accumulation of certain families demands more intensive research.
77 Ibid.
78 Khama, 22 June 1907 - K.P. (I).
This was communicated via the report of Col. Daniel to the Resident Commissioner, who ruled on 6th July 1907 that Sekgoma and his followers only had rights to their personal cattle, there no longer being any 'tribal cattle'. If Sekgoma interfered with this decision, added Panzera, he should be liable to prosecution in the Protectorate courts - thereby giving the general sanction of Civil law to property rights in Customary law, and drawing the two legal systems closer.

The appointment of Panzera to succeed Ralph Williams was symptomatic of continued reliance on British administrative staff with a South African and military background. Indeed the High Commissioner, Selborne, specifically made the point while recommending Panzera in 1906 that the lower administrative ranks should be filled with South African Constabulary members declared redundant. Recruitment to the B.P. administrative service continued on an ad hoc basis according to personnel available. There was no follow-up to W.C. Willoughby's plea of 1902 for the Government to recruit SeTswana-speaking officials 'conversant with native ideas' Ralph Williams had reacted that 'an English gentleman of intelligence' was far preferable to a lower class white with 'some native experience'. But then neither was a recruitment system formalised to recruit 'English gentlemen of intelligence' as envisaged in Selborne's belated conversion to the concept of an Imperial administrative cadre. The Pim Report of 1933, looking back, found much to be desired in the recruitment and performance of the B.P. administrative service. But what Pim diagnosed as a tendency to malaise - in the obscurity and lack of news about the Protectorate for the outside world - Selborne ascribed in 1911 to 'the complete and consistent success of the administration' in making the system run so smoothly.

\[\text{References}\]

79 Panzera to Khama, 6 July 1907 (encl. Khama to H.C., 28 March 1916 - J.978A): Basimane, Sekao, and even Maaloso cattle, were kept at Lephapetse pending the R.C.'s decision, but the cattle of Sekgoma and of 6 individual followers (including Seisa) were allowed north on the signature of the Police N.C.O. at Mahalapye. The move north to the Nata via the Tati Concession was completed in late 1907 and early 1908 - B.P.5/3403; B.P.5/3567.

80 H.C. to C.O., 7 June 1906 - C.O.879/802, pp.134-5.

the same time as Selborne were not so generous. The Palapye Road trader, Paul Jousse, described the Administration as an Imperial sham, staffed by apathetic gentlemen with military titles ignorant of Native language, history, traditions, aspirations or prospects. It may well have been true, as Selborne pointed out, that 'unless the High Commissioner misbehaves himself, he is practically left alone by the Secretary of State', and that he had 'absolute authority both in administration and in legislation in respect of the Protectorates'. 86 But the effective involvement of the High Commissioner in the affairs of the Protectorate was negligible, Jousse claimed, and so the 'local' Administration was both inactive and impotent. 87 Or, as the missionary Haydon Lewis put it, the Protectorate was run by 'an Administration which, Ellenberger excepted, should be washing clothes, instead of Governing nations'. 88

This administrative policy by default of being left well alone, but at the same time having his advice accepted as in the cases of Ngamiland in 1906 and Lephepe in 1907, of course suited Khama admirably, as he indicated to Gladstone in 1913 - 'the more domestic quarrels there were in the Union, the less time would the Government have to think of the Bechuanaland Protectorate'. 89 Khama's contact with his local Magistrate could well be confined to 11 o'clock tea-parties 90, so long as no problems arose concerning relations with aliens or outside the Reserve. But problems did arise, and the chain of administrative communication from Serowe to London, via Francistown and Mafeking and Pretoria, had grown too long and weak to deal effectively with such problems -

82 See Note 50 above.
83 Cmd. 4368, pp.57-62
84 Selborne 'Protectorates', p.353.
85 Jousse Khama the King, pp.29-30.
86 Selborne 'Protectorates', p.355.
87 Jousse Khama the King, p.28.
88 Lewis to L.M.S., 23 Dec.1913.
89 See Note 58 above.
90 Jousse Khama the King, pp.30-1.
unless the High Commissioner personally intervened. Tensions were to build up between Khama and the lower end of the administrative chain by 1911, and by 1916 were to reach its upper end.

The position of Assistant Resident Magistrate for Serowe had been created in 1903 because of the removal of the Assistant Commissioner for the Northern Protectorate from Old Palapye to Francistown. Major Daniel - 'an able military man ... incapable of using his abilities as a ruler of natives' according to Simon Ratshosa 91 - does not seem to have aroused Khama's antagonism while in this minor office (1903-7) under Panzera, but only on his subsequent transfer to Francistown as Assistant Commissioner (1908-27). Grievances against Daniel dating from 1908 were included in a letter of protest sent by Khama to the High Commissioner, dated 12th July 1911, requesting that the officer at Serowe be raised to the status of Assistant Commissioner.

The seven grievances against Daniel listed by Khama all stemmed from the fact that the court in which cases were heard was outside the Bamangwato Reserve and that, in consequence, Daniel remained ignorant of African life and tended to support those who challenged Khama's authority. 92 (While Merry at Serowe was comparatively pliant in accepting Khama's account of the merits of a case.) 93 Barry May, the acting Resident Commissioner, minuted to the High Commissioner:

'We recognize fully that, under existing conditions in the Protectorate, the powers reserved to the Chiefs in the Proclamation issued just twenty years ago 1891 are not only best for them and their people, but that were they withdrawn or even seriously tampered with, the Territory could not possibly be governed by its present skeleton administration. There is not the slightest desire to interfere with the exercise of the judicial powers of the Chiefs, and Khama is perfectly aware of the fact.' 94

91 S. Ratshosa 'My Book', p.191.
92 Khama to H.C., 12 July 1911 - J.1362.
93 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 25 July 1911, paras 9-20. - do.
94 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 25 July 1911, para 17 - do.
May added that Khama had 'blamed the individual [Daniel]' where indeed the system had been at fault': so the High Commissioner responded with support for placing the Assistant Commissioner at Serowe and reducing the office at Francistown to Assistant Resident Magistrate. The proposal was communicated by the High Commissioner (Gladstone) to Khama with apologies for not yet having visited Serowe - with the proviso that it needed the consent of Panzera, the Resident Commissioner, on his return from England. Panzera reacted emotionally to May's suggestion that he as Assistant Commissioner had lost touch with Khama on removal to Francistown: he (unlike Daniel) had visited Serowe up to twice a month, hearing all but the most trivial cases, attending Kgotla, etc. Panzera blamed the present inadequacies on the individuals, Khama and Daniel, and not on the system. But he supported the removal of the Assistant Commissioner and his Clerk (Mr. Butler) to Serowe, at a cost of £800 in the next year's budget as Public Works Extraordinary: Capt. Merry would be transferred as full Resident Magistrate to Francistown.

Khama's response to the proposal to transfer the A.C. to Serowe was: 'I am awfully obliged to know that.' But he made the mistake of recommending that Merry be promoted to A.C., thus raising administrative hackles in Mafeking and Pretoria. Panzera exploded at this attempt to manipulate the Administration ('I have personally never given way to him. ...'), and imputed a possible conspiracy between Khama and his minion Merry. Merry's promotion was out of the question: and so too was Daniel's transfer to Serowe as A.C. 'As I have said I always feared', claimed Panzera typically

'Khama has such autocratic powers in his tribe; is so bitterly prejudiced; and his obstinacy so increases with age; that he has the power, by pulling the strings behind the scenes, of making it practically impossible for a white official to carry on judicial work at Serowe if he is secretly opposed to him.'

95 H.C. to Ag.R.C., 7 Nov.1911 - do.
96 Ibid; H.C. to Ag.R.C., 16 Nov.1911; H.C. to Khama, 16 Nov.1911 - do.
97 R.C. to H.C., 24 Nov.1911 - do.
98 Khama to R.C., 25 Nov.1911 - do. (style of G.K.S.)
Panzera then suggested a compromise which would magically save the Treasury £1000 (sic): that Merry should be promoted to full Resident Magistrate, with the same judicial powers as an A.C.\(^\text{100}\) This proposal was accepted by the Colonial Office, with the proviso that the appointment be 'for the term of Khama's life only'. The Colonial Office censured Merry for allowing the Daniel-Khama friction to arise, and was anxious that bowing to Khama's will should not set a precedent - 'it is clear that the promotion of an officer of the Administration cannot be made dependent on the personal predilections of a native chief'.\(^\text{101}\) The High Commissioner therefore stipulated that the Magistracy must be an acting appointment\(^\text{102}\); and Panzera wrote to Khama on March 9th, 1912, covering the new arrangement as 'the only one to which the Secretary of State will agree, and we must all accept his decisions loyally'. However, even if judicial cases were to go direct from Serowe to Mafeking on appeal, administrative matters were still to be left in the hands of the Assistant Commissioner at Francistown.\(^\text{103}\) As we shall see, the question came up again in 1916 when the Government again reduced the Serowe residency to the level of Assistant Magistrate.\(^\text{104}\) The question of Major Daniel 'as an individual' was not dead either. Khama retained his next official outburst against Daniel until after 1916; but meanwhile, it will be remembered, Daniel was active behind the scenes in engineering the removal of Rev. Jennings from Serowe so mysteriously in 1913.\(^\text{105}\) Daniel maintained his habit-of-maintaining-his-power-base at Francistown, and visiting Serowe seldom. His continuing lack of influence at Serowe can be seen in his failure to persuade the Bamangwato to institute an educational levy.\(^\text{106}\)

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99 R.C. to H.C., 12 Jan. 1912 - do.

100 Ibid.

101 C.O. to H.C., 2 March 1912 - do.

102 H.C. to R.C., 1 April 1912 - do.

103 R.C. to Khama, 9 April 1912 - do.

104 See Chapters 9 & 10.

105 See Chapter 7.

106 Cf. Jennings to L.M.S., 16 April 1912.
But despite the friction at Assistant Commissioner level, Khama's relations with the Imperial Factor continued well with his (Assistant or Acting) Resident Magistrate, with the Resident Commissioner, and with successive High Commissioners. The Bechuanaland Protectorate was saved from Union; and the good offices of Panzera were recruited at all stages of 'cathedral' building at Serowe. The tax increase of 1908 was met without a murmur; indeed Khama was consulted as to the increase from 10/- to £1, and the change from metal tax tokens (pinned onto doors or poles of houses) to paper book receipts. The appointed auditor for the B.P. was impressed by the efficiency of Ngwato tax-collection. Khama and other B.P. Chiefs had always welcomed and indeed encouraged 'hut tax' as symbol of the legitimacy of British-Tswana relations being based on contract. By 1908 this tax provided 61% of the total B.P. revenue; and from 1911-2 the territory was self-sufficient financially in administrative terms, and even in future years produced a surplus of revenue over expenditure.

This apparently healthy relationship between Khama and the Imperial factor, and the encouragement given him by the bluster of Panzera, were both the initial strength and eventual weakness of Khama's venture into commerce of 1909-16. As Panzera put the received view to his new master, Buxton, in 1914:

'Your Excellency is fully aware that if we persistently ran counter to Khama's wishes and representations we should quite unjustifiably change our whole policy, which is to support the Chief's policy when wise and just, and have to increase by at least one hundredfold [sic] our Police's force in his Reserve. He most loyally supports the Administration...'

107 H.J. Roberts to Imp.Sec., 6 Aug.1907 - C.0.879/872, pp.264-6. (The increase to £1 was proclaimed in 1907 and first collected in 1908.)

108 Hailey Native Administration, p.207; Cmd.4568, p.170 ff; B.P. Annual Report 1911-12, p.4.

109 R.C. to H.C., 18 Nov.1913 - J.978.

Sometime in 1909 a meeting was convened in the Serowe Kgotla at which Khama announced that he had been approached by two white traders to take over their insolvent firm, Garrett & Johnston - formerly Whitely, Walker & Co. Khama agreed and invested the cash proceeds of thousands of cattle and smallstock in the new firm which Khama announced would retain the name of its managers as Garrett, Smith & Co. According to Simon Ratshosa - whose account is not to be wholly trusted - at the same time Khama publicly announced that his firm would in no way unfairly compete with other firms, but 'the Bamangwato were all dissatisfied with the business which will at the end deprive the chief of his property.'

The demise of 'Khama and Co.' was indeed to have far-reaching effects on the relations of Khama and the Ngwato state with the British 'protectors' - but this demise was a reflection not of its failure as a business venture but indeed of its very success. It belied a movement towards economic self-sufficiency that was at root a challenge to the southern African state system - though a later biographer of Khama, writing in 1931, somewhat distorted the situation by describing 'Garrett, Smith & Co.' as a state trading venture, which was:

'a picturesque excursion into that realm of the Bolshevist economic system that Lenin was to test in Russia.'

The reasons that led 'Khama & Co.' into business may be traced to the general economic history of the Protectorate since the Anglo-Boer War in its effect on both European traders and the indigenous sector of the economy, as well as to developments in the mode of

1 S. Ratshosa 'My Book', p.199.

2 'KHAMA & CO., O Midland Joe!' - Punch, 30 Nov. 1895; 'Khama & Co.' headline in Sunday Times 'Inquisitor' article, 8 March 1914.

(Khama Transport Co. of London S.E.27, was named after its original location in Khama Road, London S.W.17, and had no connection with Khama.)

Chieftainship and state-control, and to the particular circumstances of the setting-up of Garrett, Smith & Co.

The boom of the Anglo-Boer War, in which the Bamangwato had had privileged selling access to the high price military victualling market\(^5\), was soon over. In 1903 the foreign secretary of the L.M.S. remarked that the Tribal economy of the BaTswana was becoming increasingly depressed with cattle depleted and agriculture sparse, with labour contributing only to the growth of white controlled production, to an extent where even subsistence was barely maintained.\(^6\) This no doubt was true of the south already, but it was not yet true of the north. Details of the economy of the Bamangwato Reserve at the time need more systematic research and collation, particularly of the internal structure of commodity exchange and specialisations of production, but some outline of development may be attempted here. As a whole the Reserve's economy was pitched at self-sufficiency except for an export sector earning cash for considerable imports of consumer products. The economy was emphatically not merely pitched at local subsistence: right from his accession in 1875 Khama aimed at socio-economic growth for the state based on capitalist principles of accumulation and thrift.\(^7\) He had been the great entrepreneur in pressing forward change in the pattern of production to meet the demands of the early colonial period; and he had been joined by certain dikgosana and others in pressing forward the transformation of the 'tribal aristocracy' towards the role of 'rural bourgeoisie'.

Perhaps the clearest index of the fortunes of the semi-subsistence sector of the Bamangwato economy is the succession of good and bad harvests. The economy as a whole was probably internally

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5 See Chapter 4.


7 Cf. Parsons in Kutlwano, March and April 1969; & Chapters 2 & 4 above.
self-sufficient in grain crops; more productive areas supplying the deficiencies of other (predominantly cattle-keeping) areas, and the surplus of one year being stored by traders for sale in a year of shortage. The proclivity of Bokalaka for grain production has been remarked, as has the fact that the whole Reserve boasted the extra-ordinary total of 5,491 ploughs by 1921 - which would have opened up productivity beyond family subsistence level even in less favoured areas. The large number of wagons (1,025 in 1921) belies the extent to which bulk commodities could be exchanged between one area and another of the Reserve. The large number of trade-stores (maybe 23 separate firms in 1915), the tens of thousands of pounds raised for tax and fines and Church or educational activities, and the widespread adoption of European dress evidenced in contemporary photographs, all point to a general cash-nexus even in internal trade and transaction. The cash-nexus was becoming an integral part of the socio-political system, as Khama pointed out with regard to the liberation of vassal groups from tribute:

'These tribes became in the first instance apprehensive of the declaration that at last I had to ask European traders to travel among them and sell goods.'

1903 saw the continuation of a run of crop-failures in the Bamangwato Reserve: a bad harvest forced those without cash ('hundreds' from Serowe, the expensive new capital town) to take advantage of the post-war boom in labour demand for public works, mines, and new railways in South Africa. By January 1904, despair in the prospect of prolonged hunger and famine had overtaken Serowe residents; women and children left for the cattleposts, and 150 men left in one batch on January 7th for the mines. The harvest by mid-1904 had proved disappointing again, except in the south between Shoshong and Lephepe where good rains had fallen. Drought resulted in water costing up to l/- a pot in the Shoshong kloof by September 1904, but the good local harvest

8 In 1950 the whole of Northern Rhodesia had only 22,746 ploughs; in 1962 its Eastern Province had only 9,9046 - John A. Hellen Rural Economic Development in Zambia, 1890-1964 Munchen: Weltforui Verlag etc., 19168, pp.13 & 190.

9 Quoted in Parsons Word, p.3.

10 L.M.S. in-letter, 2 July 1903.
had decreased the pressure for local labour to export itself. The seriousness of the drought in the B.P. was underlined for an observer reviewing 1904 by the fact that even the Bamangwato had been affected, i.e. their cash reserves had proved insufficient to carry them over without resorting to migrant labour. There appears to have been a recovery in the harvests between 1905 and 1907, with 1908 proving a drought year throughout southern Africa. It was remarked how Bechuanaland as a whole had been drying up since the 1890s. However patches of agricultural prosperity were maintained in the Tswapong and Kalanga areas, while Serowe/ Shoshong-based cattle production was in depression - an index to this being the high demand for education in the former areas while it was low in the latter areas. But the 1908/9 rainy season began well at Serowe: and it seemed as if a cycle of plentiful harvests had begun again - though the abundant harvest of 1909 was inevitably accompanied by much fever, and much of the harvest was beaten down by rain and wind. 1909/10 proved disappointing for maize (the earlier crop), and later rains only enabled sorghum to be planted - a pattern almost repeated in 1910/11. The year 1911 saw the first May rains for 25 years, and dire drought returned in 1911/12 continuing into 1913 and 1914, though late rains allowed pasturage if not crops to recover. Of the 1912 harvest it was estimated that 'Round Serowe.. a fifth of the population has reaped sufficient grain for their own requirements while in Bokalaka the customary surplus was cut to bare subsistence level. The 1914/15 rains proved the first good season since 1908/9 (28" fell at Serowe by February 8th); but the very

11 Ibid, 7 Jan, 3 Feb., 20 Feb., 26 May, 15 June 1904.
12 Ibid, 6 September 1904.
13 L.M.S. annual (printed) 1904, pp.263-5.
14 L.M.S. In-Letters, 24 April, 26 April, 15 July 1908.
15 Ibid, 9 Nov.1908; 24 Feb., 14 April, 10 June 1909.
16 Ibid, 6 Jan, 9 March 1910; 9 Jan, 19 May 1911; 11 Jan, 17 July 1912; 29 Jan, 1 Dec.1913; 19 Jan, 16 Feb.1914.
17 Ibid, 2 Feb., 8 Feb.1915; 21 March, 4 April, 21 March 1916.
next year proved disastrous with virtually no rain at all.\(^{18}\) After a few more years of unextraordinary harvests, severe drought had set in again by 1919/20 and famine conditions again ensued.\(^{19}\)

When set against the general economic history of Bechuanaland in the southern African context, this erratic climatic sequence of 1903-22 can be seen as contributing to a downward spiral, rather than a mere cycle, of rural impoverishment. For these same years saw the setting into operation of the southern African colonial economic system with a structure that reduced African areas to below subsistence level - to be subordinate but vital appendices locked into the central system by 'structural underdevelopment'. To examine this process in the Bamangwato case is all the more fascinating because through the colonial period their Reserve remained possibly the most economically independent of all black areas within the South African customs union.

By far the most important commodity of the export sector of the Bamangwato Reserve was livestock. This was the dynamo of the cash reserves of the cattle-keeping people of the Reserve, including the Ngwato proper and especially dikgosana, who constituted a majority over those people based on crop-production. (The extent of the no-crops/no-cattle tribal-proletariat 'discovered' in the 1960s remains an open problem for the early 20th century.) The sale of cattle had been related to two main factors: either the demands for cash value for consumer hardware and software and services, or the need to realise cash for food in a time of drought and scarcity. These factors became increasingly complicated by rising consumer prices matched by falling producer prices for livestock, and by the imposition of whole or partial embargoes on livestock export (including minimum weight restrictions most poignant in times of drought) to neighbouring markets. There also appears to have been a decline in the quality of Bamangwato cattle\(^{20}\), brought on by the natural disasters of

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18 B.P. annual (printed) 1911-12, p.10.
20 Jousse Khama the King, pp.40-1, claimed that Bamangwato cattle weights had dropped from 900 to 400 lb average in the c.1900-14 period.
disease and drought as well as by overstocking promoted by inadequate ranching methods and the export embargoes.

The Anglo-Boer War saw a producer boom in livestock sales from the Bamangwato Reserve to British troops and to Southern Rhodesia. When rinderpest threatened in 1902, therefore, Bamangwato cattle were not shot by the Government as in 1896 but were instead vaccinated with glycerinated bile with Gen. Kitchener's approval. Later that year another cattle disease threatened to spread southwards from Southern Rhodesia, a new strain of redwater (East Coast fever), but by 1904 it had spread only to the Transvaal, thanks to stringent road-traffic restrictions for the B.P. press by R.C. Williams' 'pure despotism'. However it appears that the export of smallstock to Southern Rhodesia continued: 'Rhodesia for years consumed nothing but the mutton of this country', claimed Paul Jousse. Exports of sheep and goats railed north ran as high as 3000 in a month; but by the 1910s anthrax had reduced the flow to a maximum of 300 in a month.

The East Coast fever epidemic (c. 1902-6) closed the Cape Colony cattle-markets, where Kimberley had been the major importer of B.P. cattle on the hoof since at least 1884. And the same epidemic, compounded by fears of the endemic lung sickness that emerged particularly virulently in 1905, greatly restricted the access of B.P. cattle to the Transvaal until 1908. Scarcity did not raise producer prices either: by June 1907 the price of oxen at Serowe had dropped 'very low' to £6 or £7 per head. In 1909 the Cape Colony import embargo was extended to its new partners in Union, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State; and lung sickness within the Bamangwato Reserve resulted in highly localised quarantine precautions. The closure of all markets to B.P. cattle resulted in 'an exceedingly hard time' for the people.

21 See Chapter 3.
22 L.M.S. In-Letter, 3 March 1902; B.P. annual (printed) 1902, pp. 6-10.
23 Ibid, 28 Aug. 1902 & 30 March 1904; Williams Governor, pp. 309-10; Cd. 3094, p. 11.
24 Jousse Khama the King, p. 41.
26 Ibid; Barnes New Boer War, p. 130; L.M.S. In-Letters 13 June
Transvaal market, which had briefly opened between 1908 and 1909, was opened again in January 1911 on condition that such 'slaughter stock' went straight to the new Johannesburg municipal abattoirs: within three months 11,812 head of cattle had been railed from the B.P. to Johannesburg (or some to Kimberley) - at an average price of £5-a-head, thus pumping £59,060 into cash circulation. In the year 1910-11, the Bamangwato Reserve exported 2,500 slaughter stock to Southern Rhodesia - a market presumably re-opened since 1908. At £4-a-head this brought £10,000 in cash back to the Bamangwato: consequently a general recovery in the internal consumer market was noted for 1911-12. However the South African market was again closed to the B.P. in January 1917 because of lung sickness, and was only opened for the Southern Protectorate in June 1919. And though from 1911 onwards the numbers of cattle exported from the B.P. to South Africa rose (to 26,404 for 1923), the producer price only rose till 1914, and after 1919 it dropped dramatically - the real price index of 100 based on 1910 was not reached again till 1942. In 1922 the cattle price reached a mere 15/- or £1 per head! And from 1924 the minimum weight restrictions declared by South Africa drastically reduced the numbers exported. Meanwhile cattle exports from the Northern Protectorate to the Rhodesias appear to have fluctuated around the 2000 mark - thus maintaining a modest cash-flow for at least the larger Bamangwato cattle-owners. Khama, however, refused to sell cattle to Southern Rhodesia in 1917, in protest against the destruction of Bamangwato cattle which strayed across the border into Southern Rhodesia.

1907 & 20 Aug.1907.

27 Cmd.4368, pp.14-5; L.M.S. In-Letters 7 April & 24 Sept.1909; Ag.R.C. to Khama, 5 Dec.1908 - K.P. (B).

28 B.P. annual (printed) 1911-12, pp.4-5.

29 Mafeking Mail, 13 May (p.2) & 20 June (p.2) 1919.

It is axiomatic that the rate of labour migration out of any area in colonial Africa reflected the rate that the demand for cash could not be met from internal sources. Taking the Bamangwato as a whole this demand was not only to pay tax (doubled to £1 per household in 1908), but also to maintain fairly widespread and complex consumer demands. Over the colonial period the increase in labour migration (developing the no-land/no-cattle rural-proletariat based on remitted earnings) is the indicator of the Reserve's progressive impoverishment and incorporation within the South African grid of structural underdevelopment. But for much of the period up to 1923 under consideration the Reserve maintained its, though diminishing, considerable economic independence — and indeed was even probably a net importer of labour for a time.

The pre-eminent section involved in labour migration was the 'lower classes' - the clients of large cattle-holders, small cattle-holders, and agricultural groups, driven by poverty, or by the coercion of their masters, but also by the desire to gain new status (e.g. Sarwa on the Rand) or new skills (e.g. Kalanga).

More precise discussion of Bamangwato labour migration awaits statistical and oral research, but B.P. labour export came mainly from the south-east of the Protectorate, and was directed towards Kimberley rather than the Rand until 1914. It also fluctuated according to the economic conditions indicated above. The question of the Bamangwato is complicated by the fact that from 1913 to 1934 labour from north of 22°S was officially prohibited from going to the Rand, and that latitude sliced the Reserve in an unmanageable half. A further complication is that the Reserve stood on the main labour route to the south and so northern labour in transit might be confused with the Bamangwato in statistics. However, though the Bamangwato were noted for their reluctance to export their labour services, we have seen that the migration of

31 Nicholas Hyman, personal communication; Kgosi 'Pioneer'; Hailey Native Administration, pp.163-4.


33 Hailey Native Administration, p.160.
servile groups (traditionally to earn a gun) began in the late 1870s; that individuals from groups such as the Talaote exported themselves subsequently; that there were Bamangwato at the Monarch Mine of Francistown in the late 1890s; that in 1896 Khama spurned the advances of an Orange Free State mine; and that in 1899 it was felt necessary to legislate to control the influx of labour recruiters in the B.P. By 1904 there appears to have been substantial migration at least from Shoshong. In the same year the General Manager of Central South African Railways wrote to Khama to apologise for ill-treatment for Bamangwato railway construction workers near Vereeniging in the Transvaal. But the fact that the General Manager recalled personal acquaintance with Khama in a somewhat obsequious manner indicates that the labour in question was 'pulled' rather than 'pushed' into employment by cash incentives. Schapera has indicated that Khama like Linchwe banned labour export to the Rand (because of high mortality) between 1898 and 1903; and that in 1903 Khama effectively controlled all labour recruiting personally. And one of Jousse's accusations against Khama was that he restrained all labour export during his years of 'cathedral' building - 'a wanton waste of muscle. Michael Scott has claimed that Tshekedi inherited from his father the idea that migrant labour was disruptive to family life, and that instead a 'socialistic' (or family-tribal) ideal of totalistic 'development' was adopted - modernising the indigenous economy so that the labour force could be employed at home. Such an ideal might possibly explain the fact that Khama kept most alien labour-recruiters out of his Reserve. But it was certainly diluted by the economic pressures of drought, and cattle

34 Cf. Fripp 'Recent travels', p.520.
35 L.M.S. annual (printed) 1904, pp.265-6; General Manager Central South African Railways, Johannesburg, to Khama, 16 May 1904 - K.P.In.1903-5.
36 Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.116-7 & Schapera Migrant Labour pp.25-6 & 152-5; Cd.1897, p.194.
37 Jousse Khama the King, pp.23-4
38 Michael Scott A Time to Speak London: Faber & Faber, 1958, p.209. That the Bamangwato maintained independency of spirit can be seen in their threats to withdraw labour from the Rand unless the sale of liquor there was checked - Mafeking Mail, 17 Dec.1918, p.2.
export control. In 1914 the Native Recruiting Corporation applied for 'a good big boy' to supervise Bamangwato mine labour - though Khama declined it 'a principle native of my people' until the rainy season was over.\(^{39}\) By 1916 the 'push' of local economic depression had produced a clamour of potential labour recruits from Bokalaka and Tonota.\(^{40}\) Bamangwato from such areas north of \(22^\circ\)S were technically illegal recruits, but could easily by-pass such regulations - at least until 1921 when all Africans wishing to enter South Africa from the B.P. had to carry work-permits or contracts, and the deferred pay scheme was instituted.\(^{41}\) It is not clear whether 'the mines' which Bamangwato from the Shashe River were forced by crop-failure to migrate to in 1922, were South African or Southern Rhodesian.\(^ {42}\) The gold mines now encouraged Chiefs to visit their men; but the standard of accommodation at 'Gauteng' (the Rand) was not generally up to the standard given Khama in 1922.\(^ {43}\)

Such then is the general pattern of the integration of the Bamangwato Reserve into 'structural underdevelopment'. The thriving internal economy of 1900 was reduced to an overall subsistence level in the 1910s. By 1930 the Reserve had an unfavourable trade gap of £27,611 (\(£82,683\) imports v. \(£55,072\) exports) and, given taxes and levies of \(£30,000\) and migrant labour earning of \(£40-50,000\), Leonard Barnes reckoned that 'the native community, even at present standards, is living beyond its income and eating into capital.'\(^ {44}\)

If the 1890s saw a net loss of population from the Bamangwato Reserve, the period c.1902-1919 probably saw a net gain.\(^ {45}\) Labour

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40 Haskins, Francistown, to Khama, 27 Jan.1916.

41 G.S. to Magistrates, n.d. & Native Commissioner (Zeerust) to G.S., 11 Nov.1921 - K.P.\((J)\): B.P.33/163.

42 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1922.


45 See Chapter 10.
from Barotseland, the Zambezi, and Ngamiland came southwards: many found employment within the Bamangwato Reserve, 'and although most of them ultimately returned, many remained behind and married local women' - giving rise to Toka, Lozi, and Subia wards among the Bamangwato. One Toka man, Kammela, was Khama's cook.\(^{46}\)

A spate of pilfering at Serowe in 1902 was blamed on migrant Yei from Ngamiland in search of employment - a probable symptom of their failure to obtain it.\(^{47}\) The single factor that must have promoted the influx of labour was the opening of copper mining in the Reserve.

The very fact of colonial-capitalist mining without land alienation, within a Native Reserve, is itself unique.\(^{48}\) The question of mineral prospecting rights in Khama's Country, based on the 1887/1893 concessions, was raised in 1901. On behalf of the B.S., subsidiary the Bechuanaland Exploration Company (then also prospecting in North-Western Rhodesia), in 1902-3 Howard Moffat undertook extensive test mining at Malokobye Hill, a group of 'ancient' workings in Bokalaka on the Mosetse river - and Khama objected that Moffat was interfering with wells and cattle-posts as expressly forbidden in their agreement. Khama had appointed a watchman, Lesetedi, to look after the white prospectors; and in 1903 Khama succeeded in getting the Government to stop the operation of what became called 'Bushman Mine'.\(^{49}\) But in 1909 the Exploration Company renewed its mining at Malokobye - requesting Khama for 'boys' whom he said could be recruited locally in Bokalaka.\(^{50}\)

46 Schapera *Ethnic Composition*, pp.82-3
47 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1902.
49 C.0.879/694, 702,717,932; also Khama to A.C., 30 Oct.1902; A.C. to Khama, 27 July 1903 - K.P.(F). The 1893 concession laid down £25-a-month for Khama in the course of mining.
liquor restrictions, stock-thefts to meet its demand for meat, and the employment of predominantly 'Barotse' labour. And Khama had to remind H. Moffat in 1916 'to begin paying me please' (his italics) under the terms of their Agreement. But the mining, whose operators took the name Bechuanaland Copper Co. in 1912, continued fairly smoothly on a small scale (producing a total of 94 tons of metallic copper), despite infrastructural difficulties of transport and water, until 1919 when a fall in the world copper price forced the company into voluntary liquidation. Its financial contribution to the Bamangwato economy was not insignificant at a time of cattle export embargo and drought. Chief Khama's mineral concessions bank account of 1918-22 reveals annual lump payments every February-April of between £394/18/- and £213/13/1, and numerous smaller sums of up to £56/10/6 which probably record sales of cattle for slaughter to Bushman Mine.

It is of course impossible to separate Khama's economic prosperity and transactions from those of his state. His personal fortune was synonymous with state capital. Matimela and confiscated cattle for example went into the royal herd, as did the products of his own personal skill as a breeder of cattle and horses. This anomalous legal situation was the foundation of enormous Tswana royal personal and family fortunes - the so-called 'neo-feudalism' of the middle and later colonial period. But evidence already cited, points to Khama as personally modest in expenditure unless one includes his predilections of 'cathedral' building and ceremonial uniforms for the regiments.

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54 re horse breeding see Outward Bound, Vol.3, No.51, April 1923, p.484; Lilias Rider Haggard Cloak, p.226; Khama to H. Friedman (Gaborone), 11 April 1912, - K.P. Out 11912.

55 See Chapter 9 & 10.
State capital and expenditure under Khama involved considerable sums - though the claim of 1922 by Serowe traders that Khama's 'wealth in cattle can be estimated at £4,000,000', is neither exact nor strictly analogous to a European capitalist economy, in which land had an economic function parallel to (but more secure than) cattle in the Tswana economic system. The question of capital in cash value is therefore largely irrelevant. What can be gleaned from scattered economic data is an indication of annual royal income and expenditure. Khama's annual income, estimated perhaps optimistically at £3,000 early in his reign, is likely to have topped £10,000 in cash value in good years. Only a fraction was banked with traders or commercial banks and the rest was either invested (in imported transport and other equipment, in breeding-stock, and other items given or loaned out) or spent in public works (such as buildings, roads, and water supplies). A single well in 1903 cost £250; in 1912 he was invited by estate agents to invest £72,000 in English property; the Serowe 'cathedral' cost up to £10,000 - as maybe did the purchase of uniforms and other military/ceremonial outfits; and his donations of a few hundred pounds (£1000 in 1891) now and then to missions and charities and even British war funds, were matched by the acquisition of his white Overland car, a ranch apparently in the Tati concession, and his paying-off of his partners in the demise of 'Garrett, Smith & Co.'

Khama's deposit account at Mafeking's Standard Bank 1917-23 reached peaks of £874/15/6 in 1918, £1201/6/1 in 1919, and £1252/11/- in 1920 despite withdrawals down to under £300 between-times - though after April 1920 the balance never again reached £500.

It was uncertainty in cattle as the basis for capital generation.

56 Receipt by Panzera, Serowe, 20 Nov.1903-K.P.In.1903-5; Young, Holbech & Sadler (Hove, England) to Khama, 18 July 1912 (cf. Young, Henderson, & Sadler to Parsons, 29 Sept.1971 - their records are since destroyed: cited in Parsons Word, p.15); Daily News (London), 4 April 1922; Jousse Khama the King, pp.27-8; Agreement with Cornelius Lettering re. Farm Chadibe, 9 Sept.1908 K.P.(J).

57 Manager of Standard Bank, Mafeking, to Ag.R.M., 28 April 1923 - K.P.Out.1923.
that brought Khama to invest in a commercial company in 1909; and possibly also prompted his enquiries into the land market within England in 1912. On the one hand, this uncertainty was the product of the general downward spiral of a cattle-based economy within the southern African colonial-capitalist structure. In this light Khama's actions can be seen as African resistance to structural underdevelopment of a virulence and sophistication rare in colonial southern, central, or eastern Africa. But on the other hand this uncertainty must be related to the particular circumstances - a seventy-year old manager failing in physical energy to supervise spatially extensive economic affairs; and the opportunity presented by a significant trading company going bankrupt in need of capital.

Khama himself explained the transition of the basis of his prosperity from cattle-holding to commerce generally by reference to 'my political career'. He had renounced tribute and had progressively extended the civil rights of property ownership from royals to serfs between 1875 to 1907. This had denuded the state of income from the people (not counting judicial income from fines and matimela). He therefore built up his own system of cattle-ranching based on wells and cattle-posts in all corners of his 48,000 square mile Reserve, employing 'different people including Bushmen...paid in stock'. This proved effective because so long as it was 'my duty to visit these cattle posts and inspect them in person.' But:

'When I became old and unfit to undertake long journeys, for as a rule my cattle posts are far away, the cattle herders neglected to do their duty, and besides they took to stealing and killing them. Thus the losses increased enormously, so that almost every year I lost from 50 to 100 in each of the various posts. From natural causes and in the manner already described I lost [c. 1909]...454 head of cattle and this was only in four of my posts. In the years of the general drought... I lost a larger number of cattle from all my posts.'

Khama then concluded:

'For reasons already mentioned above [my political career] and in view of these enormous losses, I considered it necessary to establish a business in which I would invest my stock.'
He thus expressed in personal terms what in effect were the economics of the state machine at a time of national depression. These were the conditions that disposed the state under Khama to enter into commerce. Equally worthy of consideration are the conditions which disposed commerce to invite state participation.

Commerce, in the form of white traders under the 'protection' of the state, was an integral part of the national economy of the Bamangwato Reserve, as we have already heard Khama indicate. The white traders owed their presence in the Reserve initially to the Chief, a right for which Khama had struggled in his early reign, though eroded in principle by the colonial Administration taking over the renewal of trading licenses. White traders were still 'tribesmen' in many respects, with their futures and their families (increasingly with local-born wives, white or black) tied up with the fortunes of the Ngwato state. But they also constituted the sector of the state most closely linked by economic criteria (as well as the cultural one of perceived 'race') to the increasingly powerful and pervasive South African economic-political juggernaut. There was a conflict of loyalties based on this economic contradiction, whose resolution for each firm depended on the scale between their activities within the Reserve and their links to big business in South Africa. 'Khama & Co.' so far as it represented a strong Ngwato market economy was in the interest of small traders with purely local interests - but was a threat to the only large highly-capitalised trading company, the Bechuanaland Trading Association, whose financial ramifications stretched through branches in Southern and North-Western Rhodesia to the heart of the B.S.A. Company empire.

The B.T.A. had moved from its profitable establishment at Old Palapye to Palapye Road railway station, and Paul Jousse - born

58 Khamato H.C., 28 March 1916 – J.978A.
59 See above Note 9.
60 Schapera Tribal Innovators, p.109.
61 See above Chapter 4, Notes 12-14 & 215-8.
in Lesotho of the French missionary family - had become local manager in the late 1890s. Apparently on the instigation of the B.T.A. owners, Mosenthal Bros. of Port Elizabeth, Jousse was appointed Justice of the Peace for Palapye Road - an area of Rhodesia Railways freehold tenure (confirmed by Proclamation of 1908). It was Jousse's free-lance activities as imperator in imperio that produced friction with Khama. In 1902 Jousse dug a well at Palapye Road without permission, and Khama followed his usual practice of laying claim to it as state property - appointing a white trader called C.C. Vials as its guardian. The B.P. Administration tried to get Khama to compensate the B.T.A. for drilling costs, and he refused. Jousse refused to hand over the well to Vials until the well had been emptied to a level where it needed further drilling and lining. Khama wrote to the Resident Commissioner:

'The quarrel about the well is entirely due to Mr. Jousse's habit of doing what he likes in my country and then when the matter is done trying to force me to agree.'

The dispute that erupted between Jousse and Khama built up over a decade. It was not a dispute that involved the B.T.A. itself until 1911. The company, like others, acted as a banker for Khama in cash received for cattle sold and transported by rail from Palapye Road - in February 1903 for example the B.T.A. supplied £2511/8/- in cash on a bank cheque from Khama. Simon Ratshosa, in later years a Jousse sympathiser, claims that Khama deposited from £5,000 to £12,000 with Jousse at times, 'and Khama never lost a penny.' Khama's relations with A.H. Casalis of the B.T.A., Jousse's nephew also from a Lesotho French missionary family, were most cordial - at Palapye Road, Serowe, and then Rakops. But all the same in 1911 Khama refused Casalis permission to take over

62 Ibid, Notes 158-9 & 167; Lewis to L.M.S., 4 April 1916.
63 Ag.R.C. to Khama, 28 Aug. 1902; Khama to Ag.A.C., 30 Sept. 1902; Khama to R.C., 30 Sept. 1902; C.C. Vials, Palapye Road, to Khama, 19 & 25 Oct. 1902 - K.P.i.n. 1891-1902.
64 A.H. Casalis, Palapye Road, statement 26 Feb. 1903; S. Ratshosa, 'My Book', p.211.
Barker's at Mopipi for the B.T.A., unless Casalis made himself financially independent of Jousse, who 'is in almost every respect behaving unsatisfactorily.' This marks the end of B.T.A. expansion with Khama's compliance, to branch-stores at Macloutsie (1890), Serowe and Rakops (post-1903), and in Ngamiland at Tsau.

It was Jousse's status as a J.P. which produced his quarrel with Khama in 1913. Firstly in 1912 Jousse stopped Police from removing squatters within railway land at Palapye Road, who thereby could avoid Khamaian liquor and prostitution controls. Khama objected that Jousse encouraged Bamangwato at Palapye Road to by-pass Ngwato law, and added: 'Your constant troubles previously and up to this time have always led me to complain about you.' Secondly in 1913 Jousse took advantage of the visit of Viscount Gladstone, a former British Home Secretary now the High Commissioner, to show his vigilance as a J.P. by reporting an alleged crime to Gladstone. But the crime had been outside his jurisdiction, at Bobonong (Modisotsile's), and should properly have been referred to Khama's court in the first instance. Attendant B.P. officials pointed this out to Gladstone, but Gladstone retorted that since the crime had been first reported to him it must go before a colonial Magistrate and not Khama in the first instance. Khama smarted bitterly under the humiliation of his law being by-passed so conspicuously. And one week later Khama withdrew his account from the B.T.A. It was this action that led Jousse to plot the downfall of 'Khama & Co.'

The well dispute of Palapye Road in 1902 highlit potential tensions both within the commercial community and with Ngwato state control. Khama was resisting Palapye Road becoming a white township while his own capital moved to Serowe. The B.T.A. had set up a large store in expectation of that. But the well

68 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 17 Nov.1915; Sloley to H.C., 10 Dec.1915 - J.978. The crime was torturing a supposed witch and the offender were sentenced to 6 months to 2 years imprisonment, for
question also involved smaller traders, exemplified by C.C. Vialle who objected to the B.T.A. monopoly over the only well at Palapye Road. The local Lotsane riverbed water supply was insufficient and other traders did not have the capital of the B.T.A. to drill wells, so they were in a position to welcome Ngwato state ownership of the well which they could then use at a charge. It was the problem of capitalisation that predisposed under-capitalised traders to the system of state participation institutionalised by 'Khama & Co.' in 1910.

Jousse criticised other traders in the Bamangwato Reserve for clubbing together rather than competing with each other, for their 'deplorable and quite unnecessary degree of close contact with the native', and for their abject kowtowing to 'the patronage of the Chief'. And indeed a traveller of 1898 had remarked that they seemed to prefer the law and government of Khama to that of the British. It was by no means true, as popularly supposed elsewhere, that traders opposed a Christian African nation: such a nation stimulated all consumer demands from clothing to books, as Gerrans remarked in 1902. It was a trader, Gerrans himself, who acted as the emissary of the B.P. Chiefs to Britain in 1909. The Khama Papers reveal considerable continuous correspondence between the Chief and his traders and with firms outside the Reserve in Mafeking, Francistown, Bulawayo, and the Transvaal - mostly concerning the minutiae of cattle and other commercial transactions but also with paying off the 'bad debts' of Bamangwato creditors, the question of credit slips called 'good-fors', the sale of liquor at railway stations, his ban on purchase of breeding stock.

details of the vicious torture see Jousse Khama the King pp.20-1. (There had apparently been a brief informal Bamangwato boycott of the B.T.A. in Dec.1911).


70 Cf. Note 63 above.

71 Jousse Khama the King, p.25.

72 Fripp 'Recent travels', p.519.


74 See Chapter 8.
the Serowe and Ngamiland chambers of commerce, applications for new trading licenses and stands, and social matters such as wedding invitations and settling personality disputes. There were at least 21 separate firms (plus at least one blacksmith/motor mechanic, P.A. Mackintosh) in 1915, with stores at 18 or more locations, and five firms with more than one branch. The most frequent correspondence appears to be with Messrs. R.A. Bailey, C.C. Vialls, and N. Galanos (all at Palapye Road), H.L. Giles (Mahalapye), A. Grenfell (Francistown/Tonota), J. Haskins (Shashi Sebina), and S. Hoare (Mahalapye/Shoshong) - who appear to have been the major traders with the exception of those at Serowe (Blackbeard Bros., Garrett & Johnston, M. Greenberg, F. Jacob, H.T. Parr, and W.J. Woodford) with whom little correspondence was necessary.

The main question on which Khama took a stand with his traders during his last quarter-century of rule, was 'good-fors'. Khama had banned such credit by his proclamation of 1888, but the drought of the 1900s and the fact that since 1891 colonial law, (which did not ban credit) had become supreme opened the question again. The B.P. Administration took legal advice on 'good-fors' in 1905, and concluded that they were undesirable though not illegal as they approximated to a private paper currency, and enabled traders 'without possessing a farthing of capital' to obtain 'large credits in cattle from natives, who are unable to gauge the value of such documents'. The Administration issued an advisory circular in that year which halted the practice - but this action was the result of B.T.A. pressure, not Khama's. The B.T.A. as the most highly capitalised company in Ngamiland and Khama's Country, had objected that 'good-fors' kept firms in business which should go bankrupt. But the practice again revived in the 1909 depression - with the B.T.A. again opposing.

75 R.C. to H.C., 13 Nov.1915 - J.978A.
76 For a photo of typical store (Blackbeard) see L.M.S. Chronicle 1916, p.63.
77 See Chapter 4, Note 201.
78 S. Minchin (Crown Prosecutor) to G.S. 22 Nov.1905; G.S. to Crown Prosecutor, 21 Nov.1905 - S.29/2.
79 Paul Jousse to R.C., 9 Nov. - S.29/2.
and in 1912 Paul Jousse brought to light a serious case, in which the Birwa chief Malema of the Tuli Block had been tricked out of £106 by a cattle-dealer called Jack Mitchell who had not honoured his 'good-for' promissory note. Jousse objected that Mitchell had destroyed confidence in business in the Motloutse area to the extent that the B.T.A. branch there had made a £243/4/8 loss there instead of an expected £400 - £500 profit for 1911-12. Meanwhile 'good-fors' were a source of strong complaint in the Bakwena Reserve. Though Khama warned his people against 'good-fors' in both 1905 and 1912, he now had no power to enforce his advice, and the practice continued. In 1916 Khama extracted a promise from the Serowe chamber of commerce, signed by all traders in the Reserve, not to give credit. The 1923 Credit Sales to Natives Proclamation was a discriminatory act against Africans who wished to become traders as it only affected wholesalers, and the question of credit given by retailers continued to be a source of discontent.

Besides the B.T.A., other firms in Khama's Country are worthy of special historical attention in the latter years of Khama. There are three firms which developed beyond the level of small trading because of the special relationship they maintained with Khama. They are R.A. Bailey; Haskins & Sons, which prospered in Bokalaka and Garrett, Smith & Co. which was in effect 'Khama & Co.' between 1909 and 1916. Taken together the history of these firms reveals that, while their friendship with Khama was not always smooth, the Chief's patronage was the prerequisite for success.

R.A. Bailey himself had his headquarters at Palapye Road and he and his employee Thos. Shaw built up the firm as the favoured outlet of Bamangwato produce at the railhead of the capital. Where Bailey ran into snags of personnel relations was his branch at Shoshong, where the delicate relationship of Kgamane with the Kaa


81 Wookey to L.M.S., 4 Dec.1907.


83 Cmd.4368, pp.17-18.
and Phaleng muddied the waters with political complications that affected both missionaries and traders. In 1911 another trader, Hoare, had quarrelled with Kgamane\(^84\): calling each other a Bushman and 'Satan, dog, snake and other gross insults'; and Rev. Lloyd had fallen out with both Tshwene and Kgamane. Bailey's employee, old Tom Fry, on the other hand became unacceptable not to Kgamane but to the Kaa and/or Phaleng. Khama blamed it on Tom Fry's laxness in management, often closing early or not opening, and leaving the work to counter-assistants who undercharged their friends or gave merchandise away. So Khama appointed M. Greenber to open a second store at Shoshong to improve the service to the people (sic)\(^85\). Bailey responded by replacing old Tom with his son Courtland Pry, in 1914, but it was a bad choice, since Courtland had once before been expelled from the Reserve\(^86\), and he immediately caused trouble by setting a policeman after Kgamane for selling grain to people without a trader's licence - which Khama saw as no offence.\(^87\) Bailey himself was quite prepared to sue Khama as Chief of defaulting clients\(^88\), and fell out with Khama after the demise of 'Khama & Co.'

Haskins & Sons, established 1897, apparently started well by placing a store in the extreme north of the Bamangwato Reserve at the upper Shashe drift, where the anomalous 'unassigned area' provided a neutral ground between the Reserve, the Tati Concession and Southern Rhodesia - thus serving them all without being encumbered by their commercial regulations, notably by the Tati Company monopoly.\(^89\) The store appears to have been re-sited a few miles to the south at Kalakamati, and in 1912 a second store was opened in Bokalaka at Sebina. The firm regarded Bokalaka as its

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84 Khama to S. Hoare (Mahalapye), 6 Dec.1911 - K.P.Out.1911-12. see Chapter 7.
85 Khama to Bailey, 16 April & 7 May 1912 - K.P.Out.1912.
86 For apparently trying to take upland for settlement at Moloutse in 1908 - C.A. Fry to Khama, 27 March 1918 - K.P.(A).
88 Cf. J.199 (1922).
89 R. Werbner, personal communication.
trading area and objected strongly to Jews and 'coolies' (Asians) hawking there. In about 1909 Khama had given permission to one Goldring, a former hawker in Bokalaka, to set up a store at Senete because the people 'liked him so much'. And in 1914 Khama refused Haskins a store at Senete because Haskins had sunk a well at his new Mswazi store without permission. On this occasion Khama wrote that he now regretted having allowed Haskins any stores at all in his Reserve, and in 1919 Khama objected to the renewal of trading licences to Jas. Haskins & Sons at Sebina, Senete, and Matlhakwane - claiming that only Kalakamati had been established with his permission, and that the other three were a liberal interpretation of his permission for itinerant hawking.

When the Administration produced evidence of Khama having given permissions before Magistrates in May 1912, November 1914, and during 1916 respectively, and reminded him he could not legally object to licence renewals (Section 27 of the Proclamation of 10th June 1891), Khama withdrew his objections - but asked for the removal of a particular manager, and for company employees to cease ploughing any Bamangwato land. However, other correspondence shows that Khama retained a personally cordial relationship with Jas. Haskins himself, and a very thick file of cattle transactions between 1912 and 1917 reveals that the Francistown-based company did extensive business with the Bamangwato Reserve in managing cattle exports to Southern Rhodesia while the South African market was under restriction.

Khama's partnership in Garrett, Smith & Co. did not stem from the business acumen of his partners (indeed it was from their verging on bankruptcy), but from their personal relationship to Khama.


92 J. Haskins & Son; 1919 - B.P.6/5849.

93 'Haskins & Sons' file - K.P.(G). The secret of Haskins success in capturing the market appears to have been his readiness to pay cash - Khama to Ag.R.C. 3 Nov.1922 - K.P.(B).
The firm was established in 1909 out of the partnership of Garrett & Johnston. P.A. Johnston had come to the country in 1895 and established himself at Tlhabala/Moiyabana (the Kgalagadi villages in 1899, in accordance with Khama's policy of sending traders to ex-servile groups. In the same year he married Alice Young the Palapye L.M.S. schoolteacher (whose sister married another trader G.E. Clark). R. Garrett was the Hon. Secretary of the whites' Congregationalist chapel, though his father (an ex-sea captain and De Beers compound manger) living with him in retirement alienated the L.M.S. missionary on one occasion. It appears that G.W. Smith was the George Smith who came new to the Reserve in about 1909, and that he replaced P.A. Johnston (who retired to his own store at Moiyabana) in the partnership with R. Garrett.

The prevailing economic conditions of depression and drought, foxted by the restriction on 'good-fors', reduced firms like Garrett & Johnston to capital starvation, while the B.T.A., with the resources of Mosenthal behind it, could weather the storm. In 1909 Khama announced he would take over Garrett & Johnston, and by an agreement of May 1910 Khama supplied the entire capital of the firm by buying up the old firm's assets and supplying his own capital worth £20,000 by 1916 in 'farms, dwelling houses, other buildings, debts owed by supported accounts, stock in trade and cash'. When Khama applied to the Administration for a trading licence, a report was made by the Serowe Magistrate (Hannay) on the orders of the High Commissioner (though the Mafeking secretariat did not file a copy), and no objection was raised, provided Khama was not an active partner in the management of the new firm because that could be 'a very strong passive factor' in creating a monopoly in the Reserve for his firm. In a despatch of 9 June

94 Young to L.M.S., 18 March & 3 June 1899; Tagart Report p.20; Minnie Shaw interview.

95 Jennings to L.M.S., 15 June 1904.

96 Exactly who G.W. Smith was is mysterious: there was an E.Smit with a firm at Kalamare, and a J.G. Smith at Palapye Road whom Khama refused permission to extend his chicken runs to the other side of the Lotsane riverbed. Khama to J.G. Smith, 10 Dec.1910 - K.P.Out.1908-11; Tagart report, p.20.

97 See above Note 1: Garrett to Ag.R.C., 29 Feb.1916; Ag.R.C. to H.C., 15 Jan & 5 April 1916; Khama to H.C., 28 March 1915 - J.978
1910, the Resident Commissioner asked the Serowe Magistrate to,

'Please convey my greetings to the Chief Khama and say that I very much regret that I cannot agree to transfer the Licence in his name. This not a personal matter but a principle. I have refused another Chief [unspecified] and I cannot create a precedent...I have no objection to Khama's being a sleeping partner, or even owner of the store, as a private investment. The Licence must, however, be in the name of Mr. Garrett, or jointly "Garrett and Smith". Khama's interests can easily be secured by a legal agreement between himself and his managers.'

So the licence granted to the company by the Government was in the name 'Garrett, Smith & Co.'. The capital was Khama's (or the Ngwato state's), but the actual management of the store was with his white partners - as Khama's Secretary had rather testily to remind the Serowe telegraphist in October 1910 when he persisted in sending cables marked 'Garrett & Smith' to Khama and not to the men concerned.

Garrett, Smith & Co. prospered: its comparatively high capitalisation enabled it to take over, or 'support the accounts', of other stores within the Bamangwato and Batawana Reserves. It supported the accounts of, and thus saved from bankruptcy, H.J. Dennison at Bobonong, and the traders who took on the stores of the late Mr. Chadwick - Mopipi, and Tsau and Karoube in Ngamiland. One of the supported accounts in Ngamiland amounted to £4,000. The areas served by Garrett, Smith & Co. overlapped substantially with those served by the B.T.A. (at Serowe, Macloutsie Camp, Rakops, and Tsau), where it not only saved B.T.A. competitors from winding-up, but may even have put them in a dominant position as 'the Chief's stores'. Certainly it did not need a royal proclamation to induce people to patronise what evidently approximated to a national commercial institution. And one can understand the growing hostility of the B.T.A.'s local manager Paul Jousse to 'Khama & Co.' on commercial grounds.

100 Garrett to Ag.R.C., 26 Feb.1916; Ag.R.C. to H.C., 15 Jan.1916 - J.978A.
What did Khama gain from Garrett, Smith & Co.? He took no part in everyday management, but was no doubt responsible for the policy of steady growth and re-investment of profits into expansion of the number of trade outlets. The achievements of the company are impressive in that they took place at a time of economic depression within the period of only 4 years before the company came under attack, and 6 years before Khama was forced out of partnership. It is obvious from his long struggle to retain his partnership stake, that Khama considered the company as a long-term investment in the economic security of the state after his death. His cash income from profits was kept comparatively low at £800 p.a., and he considered the main current benefit to his finances to be in favourable terms of trade for cattle and other commodities, which had been the subject of so much profiteering at times of scarcity in the past. Besides, with a Hut Tax percentage (10%) yielding up to £1,700 p.a., he had not much need for more cash. Garrett, Smith & Co., as one manager pointed out, was Khama's new method of meeting his public duties of providing his people with food (storing the harvest and controlling the re-sale price) in famine, and oxen for ploughing or draught purposes. On what sort of cooperative basis the latter was achieved is not clear, but it was presumably on the go phisa loan system.

Three factors started Jousse in his attempt to destroy 'Khama & Co.' which began with a letter to the Acting Resident Commissioner on September 19th, 1913. Firstly, there was Garrett, Smith & Co. moving into the Motloutse area (to support the account of H.J. Dennison at Bobonong), an area which Jousse considered as the B.T.A.'s own since 1890. Secondly there was the cattle permit system (invented by the Government Secretary in conjunction with

101 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 15 Jan & 5 April 1916 - J.978A. In 1923, G.W. Smith claimed that Khama had drawn £22-23,000 from Garrett Smith & Co. in value: this figure is not confirmed, and possibly exaggerates to prove a point against the Harris biography of Khama - G.W. Smith to L.M.S., 1 March 1923 (end.in.N.Jones to L.M.S., 28 March 1923).

102 Garrett to Ag.R.C., 29 Feb.1916 - J.978A.
Chief Seepapitso of the Bangwaketse), instituted in 1913 to stop sales of stolen cattle, whereby the Chief or his delegate issued a permit describing sex, colour, and distinctive characteristics, before cattle could be sold to traders. There had been no Government Notice to this effect, and so Jousse claimed it was Khama's attempt to gain a monopoly of cattle sales for his company.

Thirdly, Jousse listed other instances of attempted monopoly — compulsory purchase from his store of all regimental uniforms, and cornering the market in sale of wagons. All these grievances, contended Jousse, were the natural outcome of a Paramount Chief being allowed to compete in trade with Europeans. He harked back to his last warning about Garrett, Smith & Co. to the Government of 12th January 1912 (not traced) after his Palapye Road store had been briefly boycotted, that:

'...the Chief's two stores at Serowe are gradually absorbing the trade of that place, the Chief's purse is long, and his investment is not for profit apparently [my italics], it seems therefore only a matter of time before the absorption of trade by his is complete.'

J.C. MacGregor, the recently transferred Government Secretary now acting as Resident Commissioner during one of Panzera's absences, who knew Jousse from long-standing Basutoland experience and similar French missionary connexion, replied to Jousse in a somewhat dismissive tone. Jousse was well known to the Administration for wild accusations against commercial competitors, and for mad tirades of abuse or poison-pen 'private statements' which had aroused administrators, policemen, and missionaries to ire. His most recent clash had been with Chase (later of Chase-Me-Inn, Mahalapye), the Veterinary Officer who had quarantined Jousse's personal dairy farm in the Tuli Block. So MacGregor's reply to Jousse of 5th November 1913 baldly stated the facts of Garrett Smith & Co.'s licences, adding that H.T. Parr of Serowe had imported the uniforms in question. But then MacGregor made the

103 Jousse to Ag.R.C., 19 Sept.1913 - J.978.
105 R.C. to H.C. 9 April 1914 - A.C. Francistown to R.C., 4 May 1914 - J.978.
fatal mistake of adding, whether from ignorance or administrative incompetence or malice:

'There is no information before me as to the alleged ownership of the store by the Chief Khamo, and beyond your assertion your letter affords none.' 106

This assertion must have rung like a declaration of war in Jousse's mind. Jousse went into the attack with renewed vigour. On November 13th he reacted fairly civilly but with annoyance at an Assistant Commissioner's Notice (No. 64 of 1913, Northern Protectorate), which had come to his attention, and which authorised Khamo to issue the hated cattle permits.107 On the next day, apparently on having received and read MacGregor's of 5th November, Jousse became distinctly abusive to the Administration:

'I would have you understand that when a man in my position makes an assertion, he only does so because it is true in fact, and here I assert that any Government Official who says he does not know that the name of Garrett, Smith & Co. of Serowe and elsewhere is anything else than the trading name adopted by Khamo, the Official is either a blind lunatic fit for the mad-house or else a stupid liar... when the interests of Khamo as a trader are concerned, Khamo is your master here, and speaking metaphorically, the present Administration is as subservient to him as the Chinese eunuchs to their Emperor.'

Jousse went on to threaten the B.P. Administration. Since he represented a great commercial interest that, he implied, could influence even the Imperial Factor, he was not to be trifled with. He threatened to ask the London Board of the B.T.A. to take the matter up with the Colonial Office.108

And that in effect is what followed. The details of any wider political conspiracy are not known, and are outside the scope of this dissertation. But it appears that Jousse's campaign against 'Khamo & Co.' fitted in, consciously or unconsciously, with the

106 Ag.R.C. to Jousse, 5 Nov.1913 - J.978. It appears that Messrs. Blackbeard and Woods of Serowe supplied a regiment each with uniforms - W.C.W./S.0.810 (W.C.W. handwritten note on 'Khamo the King').

107 Jousse to Ag.R.C., 13 Nov.1913 - J.978 - Copy of A.C.'s Notice 64, 2 Oct.1913 in J.503.

108 Jousse to Ag.R.C., 14 Nov.1913 - J.978.
plans being unravelled within the English-speaking monopoly-
capitalist sector of Southern Africa to amalgamate the Bechuana-
land Protectorate into Southern Rhodesia, possibly to strengthen
the B.S.A. Company hand within that colony or possibly as a
larger counter-weight in the event of that colony joining the
Union of South Africa.

On January 4th, 1914, there appeared in the Johannesburg Sunday
Times, an Argus group newspaper, the first of a commissioned
series of articles by an anonymous author who gave himself the
pseudonym 'Inquisitor'. The series continued on the 8th and 15th
February, 1st and 8th and 22nd March, and was reprinted as a
7,000 word pamphlet under the title Khama the King: Truth about
the Bechuanas. The dedication was:

'To those who should, if they would, but couldn't.'

'Inquisitor' was, of course, Paul Jousse - revealed by his familiar
arguments, his privileged information, and his style, though he
did not officially admit the fact until December 1915.109

Khama reacted strongly to the first Sunday Times article of
January 4th. He was 'very much upset' and saw the Assistant
Commissioner, whom it appears had especially travelled to Serowe
from Francistown to see Khama. Khama wished firstly that an
injunction should be taken out against the editor of the Sunday
Times to withhold publication of any further articles in the
series; secondly that the editor should make a public apology in
the Press or be sued for libel. As an administrative figure
himself he further wished that the Protectorate Administration
should sue on his behalf: if not, he added, he would approach
counsel himself and employ a lawyer such as Sir Charles Coghlan.110
The Resident Commissioner replied by telegram, advising the Chief
to maintain his dignity and be like 'white people in high posi-
tions' and treat such scandalous attacks with contempt.111

109 Sloley to H.C., 10 Dec.1915 - J.978A.
111 R.C. to A.C., 27 Jan.1914 - J.978.
Administration itself had never replied to Jousse's letter of 14th November 1913. Panzera's feathers had been ruffled; in typical fashion he had begun to back-track on his previous decision to allow Khama to be a 'sleeping partner' in 1910, but had been soothed by the new and more competent High Commissioner, Lord Buxton, who said any action against Jousse would be infra dignum.¹¹²

So Khama and the Administration kept quiet, and thus assured (or maybe disappointed by lack of a libel case), 'Inquisitor' continued with a further five articles. As it emerged, the main target of the attack was not so much Khama himself - who 'is the natural product of his race and traditions, which is savage' - as the system of Imperial rule whose weak officials bowed before his stronger personality. Khama was portrayed as a despot going senile, whose most serious kink was love of flatterers, black and white. His ruling class was 'undersized, ophthalmic, and tuberculous'; his capital was insanitary and morally degenerate; the poor masses were crying out for the dignity of exporting their labour as relief from domestic slavery. Trade was monopolised by 'Khama & Co.', even boycotting 'the oldest and best firm in the country', and the cattle permit system was Khama's personal poll-tax. And all this was perpetuated by a costly Imperial Administration that spent half its budget on Police patrols when 'No fear of native risings or the like need to be entertained'. Here 'Inquisitor' asserted that 'The whole system requires to go into the melting pot', and after a sally against missionaries, returned to his main thesis with the heading 'PART OF RHODESTIA'. This reads like an after-thought as it took up the recent claims of Jameson (for Southern Rhodesia) and Botha (for South Africa) to the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the former being 'the most satisfactory of the two'. Appealing to the twin gods of Progress and Development, 'Inquisitor' concluded that amalgamation was inevitable and necessary: the Protectorate must be 'made to play its part instead of being left permanently as a playground for jackals and a few natives'. Only the 'conservative' Chiefs opposed it: the down-trodden masses would welcome it. He

¹¹² R.C. to H.C., 15 Nov.1913; H.C. to R.C., 29 Nov.1913 - J.978.
illustrated this point with,

'All natives know that in Rhodesia the black is treated with justice and consideration... by Native Commissioners who understand them.'

The colonial authorities were content to allow the matter to become a war confined to the newspaper columns, with Khama awaiting the result before he took libel action. The field of battle shifted to the Eastern Province Herald of Port Elizabeth - in which Eben T. Anderson, Chairman of the Congregational Union of South Africa, and E. Brown, of Mosenthal Bros., exchanged salvoes. The debate was supposedly capped by a weak refutation of 'Khama the King' by A.E. Jennings, exercising the right of reply on Khama's behalf in the Sunday Times of 26th April and 3rd May, 1914.114 But meanwhile back in Khama's Country, Jousse found a new pretext to advance the quarrel with Khama.

It was usual for stores to close for up to ten days at Easter (Sunday April 12th in 1914115) and after consultation with the Serowe chamber of commerce Khama duly announced the holiday. It appears that at least the B.T.A. store-keeper at Serowe (Casalis) if not the local manager at Palapye Road (Jousse), concurred in the chamber of commerce decision. Jousse held that body 'in some contempt by reason of the commercial insignificance of some of its members', and determined to induce Bamangwato to break the Chief's customary edict of a commercial holiday by leaving the B.T.A. stores open for them to trade in. If this was an attempt to test and strain the loyalty of Khama's people to their Chief (for 'Inquisitor' had complained that Khama was basically unpopular with the majority of his people), it failed - because no customers came to his store, probably at first out of ignorance of its being open rather than from any malice towards Jousse. Most importantly all the other white traders cold-shouldered Jousse. In fact the pretext that Jousse took in complaining to the Resident Commissioner about the 'boycott' was that the one 'boy' who dared to come to his store was assaulted by the 'store boy' of a rival white

113 Jousse Khama the King, passim.

114 Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), 16 April, 1 May & 6 May 1914; A.E. Jennings 'Khama's Country' Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 26 April & 3 May 1914. (reprinted in Diamond Fields Advertiser Weekly Ed. 16 May 1914 pp. 24-5). See also Christian
The Assistant Commissioner, Daniel, reported the situation to Panzera after the Resident Magistrate of Serowe had investigated. Daniel saw the 'boycott' affair in terms of a commercial ploy for extra trade by Jousse which failed, and so Jousse had to invent a reason. What seems apparent is that Jousse’s complaints of a boycott, taken in the context of his general attitude and his rumoured authorship of the 'Inquisitor' articles, completely alienated him from both black population and white traders and in fact helped an actual boycott to materialise beyond the Easter holidays. This could be seen as the ironic repercussions of foolhardy statements on an impetuous man: but, taking both the history of past actions and later events in mind, it could also be seen as the desired effect of an agent provocateur.

On 1st May 1914 the B.T.A. was removed from membership of the chamber of commerce. Jousse was thus disowned by all the other 2 traders on the Bamangwato Reserve, who combined together to sign a joint document disclaiming any authorship of the Sunday Times articles – and thus laid the accusation of authorship squarely on Jousse’s doorstep. It had been generally agreed that only a trader in the country could claim the intimate knowledge of it that 'Inquisitor' had based his articles on.116

The 'boycott' collapsed at the end of the Easter holidays, and for the next four months the Government mulled over what action should be taken. R.M. Daniel the Assistant Commissioner thought that Khama should merely oppose the renewal of the B.T.A. trading licence when the present one expired on 31st December 1915.117 Panzera the Resident Commissioner went into a more discursive examination and justification of the white trader system in the Protectorate.

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Express (Lovedale), 1 July 1916, p.111-2.

115 Date of Easter 1914 - source, Church Information Office, London (telephone call).

116 A.C. to R.C., 4 May 1914; Ag.R.C. to H.C.17 Nov.1915 - J.978

117 A.C. to R.C., 4 May 1914 - J.978.
'As Your Excellency is aware, the Imperial Government promised in 1895 that only such white traders should be admitted to their Reserves as were acceptable to them; and, before allowing Europeans to enter the Reserves with a view to becoming domiciled therein, the Chiefs are always consulted. There are many instances in which Chiefs have become prejudiced against a European after he has taken out licences, etc.; in that case I invariably decline to take any action.'

Once a trader had a licence, as a non-Native he fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the colonial authorities. There was an unwritten code between Chief and traders which was a matter of commercial common sense: the Chief was the senior representative of the great bulk of the traders' customers. Jousse had broken this unwritten code, and Panzera was dumbfounded at a man 'constantly baiting a powerful Chief like Khama, upon whom his success as a merchant entirely depends.' [His italics]

Should there be an official enquiry into the Jousse Affair? Panzera opposed the enquiry blossoming into an investigation of the whole system of traders' rights in the Protectorate: that would upset a delicate and generally understood balance between Chief and traders which Panzera called the magna carta of the 'Bechuana'. Nor should the enquiry challenge Khama's rule which if 'occasionally autocratic... is actuated (even when his rules appear unnecessary or mistaken in the view of others) by a really conscious desire to benefit his people.' Only Khama's essential strength, so Panzera thought, could keep such a large territory and scattered population together successfully. Panzera had his doubts about holding any enquiry at all, because of its potential effects on the Bamangwato and Batswana as a whole: 'the suspicion native mind invariably associates enquiry with projected changes.' (A suspicion hardly surprising given the history of the Protectorate.) Panzera was most anxious not to disturb the status

118 R.C. to H.C., 8 May 1914 - J.978. In a subsequent letter he added: 'There has never been a case of friction in Khama's country except in that of the Bechuanaland Trading Association, and all traders are unanimous in their testimony as to the courteous treatment they have received from the Chief and his Council.' - R.C. to H.C., 23 May 1915 - J.978.

119 R.C. to H.C., 23 May 1914 - J.978.

120 Cf. Chapters 2, 3 & 7.
quo of Bamangwato passivity in the face of British over-rule:

'It would be a great misfortune if the enquiry
should be construed into a kind of trial of the
aged Chief Khama, and such would be bitterly
resented by all his tribe, even by any section
which is, under other circumstances, nominally
not too cordially disposed towards the Chief.'

The High Commissioner did not take up the suggestion of acting
unilaterally to remove Jousse, and preferred to hold an official
enquiry instead - though he agreed that it should not take in
general questions about trading in the Protectorate. He proposed
Major Mullins, V.C., 'a very able lawyer', to hold the enquiry,
and at the beginning of September, 1914 Khama was informed of the
decision. The Colonial Office meanwhile had not raised any
objection to Khama taking libel action against Jousse if desired:
it is not known why Khama's ambition lapsed in this respect.

Chief Khama did not react positively or immediately to the proposed
Mullins enquiry. He merely replied through his Resident Magistr¬
ate on October 15th - 'Chief Khama states that he does not wish an
enquiry to be held as he is quite satisfied that you are fully
aware of the facts' - when pressed to an answer by the Resident
Commissioner's telegram. Panzera interpreted Khama's answer this
way in a letter to the High Commissioner: 'As a matter of fact a
Chief has a great dislike to any course which appears to place
him on trial, as he considers this lowers him in the eyes of his
people.' The question of an enquiry was then dropped by the
High Commissioner - an interesting commentary on Khama's remaining
influence on the decision of the Imperial authorities, before the
commercial interests backing Jousse took a hand in the affair and
approached the High Commissioner at length.

Both the decision to drop the Mullins enquiry and the delays in
dealing with the Jousse-'Inquisitor' affair in 1914 must of course

121 R.C. to H.C., 23 May, 1914 - J.978.
122 H.C. to R.C., 16 & 18 June 1914; R.C. to Khama, 31 Aug.1914 - J.978.
123 C.O. to H.C., 16 May 1914 - J.978.
be seen in the light of convulsive contemporary events in Europe which had African repercussions, and which would have preoccupied both time and the minds of all in the meantime. On 28th June 1914 Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo; Britain declared war on Germany at midnight of the 4th August. German South-West Africa was adjacent to the Bechuanaland Protectorate: a spate of Protectorate Proclamations ensued, establishing censorship, prohibiting trade with the enemy, etc. There was a minor German raid into western Bechuanaland and, though shielded by the expanse of the Kalahari, Khama would have not been unconcerned.

However the issue, apparently a dead-letter to others, was still alive to Paul Jousse himself, and in December 1914 he found fresh pretext for dispute with Khama. The Chief summoned witnesses employed by the B.T.A. at Palapye Road to Serowe for a court case. Jousse countered Tribal law with Colonial law - by instructing the Police to arrest any B.T.A. employee leaving their Palapye Road compound, under the (criminal, not civil) provisions of the Masters and Servants Acts. He threatened to sue any B.T.A. employee who appeared before the Serowe court. Two men, Matotere and Oitse, were arrested: a third, Otimile (a Kaross-maker for the B.T.A.), appeared in the Serowe court. Proceedings in the latter court revealed that Jousse condoned beer-making on his premises at Palapye Road.

Khama reacted with Tribal law, issuing an edict that no Bamangwata might work for Jousse. And then, more importantly, a motion was carried by an assembly the Kgotla that the people would 'voluntarily' withhold all trade from Jousse's stores. The aim was to force the B.T.A. to replace Jousse with another local manager. This time the popular boycott of the B.T.A. was fully deliberate.

125 Cape of Good Hope Nos. 15 of 1856, 18 of 1873, 7 of 1875, 30 of 1889 - substantively adopted in Laws of B.P. 1891.
126 Khama to R.C., 26 Feb.1915 - J.978.
127 Ibid.
Paul Jousse then protested to Government; and the Serowe Magistrate, Reilly, investigated the boycott at a Kgotla assembly of Friday, February 26th, 1915. In customary fashion the Chief would not speak until the assembly had spoken. Speakers included Lekhutile, Baipedi, Modisaotsile, and Johnny Ratshosa. There was consensus that the boycott was against Jousse, who flouted the Chief's law, and not against the B.T.A. Most mentioned Jousse's evident authorship of 'Inquisitor' and looked to a new B.T.A. man who did not 'interfere with the politics and domestic affairs of the country about which he has no concern.'

On the same day, Khama wrote to the Resident Commissioner, summing up the views of the Kgotla as his own. He stressed that Jousse was the only white man to flout his law, and listed five lies ('so transparent... merely spiteful') propagated by Jousse both as conspicuous trader and anonymous journalist. The boycott, he emphasised, was the spontaneous will of the people, and not the result of any judicial order by himself. As an individual he fully supported his people's wish that Jousse should go, and added that Casalis should go too. Amidst protestations of loyalty to His Majesty's Government, Khama hinted ominously that Jousse was a threat to internal security:

'People are beginning to think that Mr. Jousse has some power above the Government and above other traders and this idea tends to lower the governmental authority in the eyes of the people, and it is therefore absolutely necessary for all parties concerned to get rid of one who is constantly trying to stir up trouble.'

The B.P. Administration took Khama's part in replying to Jousse's complaints about the boycott by 'unruled savages'. MacGregor told Jousse that the boycott was a 'spontaneous' reaction to his own interference in the lawful activities of the Chief. Panzera similarly found that Jousse had alienated the 'good will of the people', and used the bluster of empty liberalism to reinforce his point:

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129 Khama to R.C., 26 Feb.1915 - J.978.
'I wish to point out to you that the Government cannot possibly intervene to coerce a free people, living under the British flag, to trade at any particular store.'

But the voice of big business was soon to give the lie to such bravado by sinking its teeth into the soft flesh of the High Commissioner, who was first and foremost South Africa's Governor-General. Adolph Mosenthal Bros., the management on behalf of the B.T.A. London board, took Paul Jousse's part in earnest in April; and on May 6th, 1915, the Serowe Magistrate held a second Kgotla, with resolutions identical to the first, on the reasons for the continuing boycott of the B.T.A. both at Palapye Road and Serowe (where Casalis publicly denied there had been pickets). Khama, however, was obliged to rise and announce to the Kgotla that he never had, and would not now, order his people to boycott the B.T.A., and so a certain amount of renewed custom was given it from May 6th to May 31st.

On May 31st three Bamangwato - Setiko, Gaokgethelwe, and Modibetsane - were fined an ox each by their regiments for making unlicensed cattle-sales to the B.T.A. However these fines do not appear to have become known to either Mosenthal Bros. or the B.P. Administration for a couple of months. When the Mosenthal representative, Chappell, arrived in Serowe at the beginning of July he did no more than interview the Chief, address a Kgotla meeting, and hear additional complaints against Jousse (illegal road-building, moving boundary-beacons, etc.). It was not until the end of July that the Serowe Magistrate called Setiko, Gaokgethelwe, and Modibetsane, before him: pardoning them he gave them their oxen back, but they at first refused, and then deposited the oxen with the Chief.

Khama had already written most vociferously to the Resident Commissioner about the legality of the fines by 'the Tribe':


131 Ag.R.M. Serowe to R.C., 6 May 1915; Ag.R.C. to H.C. 17 Nov. 1915 - J.978.

132 Ag. R.C. to H.C., 17 Nov. 1915 - J.978; R.C. to Chappell, 19 Aug. 1915 - J.978A.

133 Ag. R.M. to H.C., 22 July 1915 - J.978.
'I dread to think what the outcome of nullifying any part or parts of our custom at such a critical time as this... I pray Your Honour's indulgence as I would like to explain how this incident affects one of our greatest and oldest traditional laws, that the people support their Chief who looks to them in all matters of whatever nature. They formulate whatever is deemed advisable in his interests, protect his honour, power etc., and by unity accomplish all that is desired by them, and anyone contravening any such custom or law so acknowledged or passed by the people is punished.

I solemnly assure Your Honour that the day this particular law can no longer be enforced, Chieftainship ceases, the Chief becomes a mere figure head open to insults, his commands disregarded, and so weakened that a man of Jousse's calibre could with impunity disregard the orders and wishes of the Chief causing dissension and worst of all corruption amongst the people, such dire consequences mean utter ruin of the tribe... ... I have the support of the Government, I know, but it is essential that I should not lose the confidence of my people.'

Panzera's reaction was to write back a heavily underlined and impassioned letter of counter-protest to Khama. He always, he said, respected Ngwato law, but this was a case in which the Magistrate had to interfere and return the oxen fined from their owners - because the Ngwato judgment had proved 'repugnant' and endangered life and property! Panzera was little concerned with the constitutional implications of parallel legal systems. What worried him was that the fines on Setiko, Gaokgethelwe, and Modibetsane, had given the B.T.A. 'a very strong case against both you and me' should the company approach the Secretary of State in London. Panzera saw the matter in personal terms, ending his letter with, - 'consider my position if I have to go to the Secretary of State.'

134 Ag. R.M. to H.C., 24 July 1915 - J.978A.

135 All underlining is in the archival copy, quoted in Parsons Word, pp.21-2 - Khama to R.C., 22 July 1915: J.978A.

136 R.C. to Khama, 29 July 1915 - J.978A. A month before Panzera had written privately to Khama saying that he must 'make a show of enquiring into things' that the B.T.A. complained of, and implying that the British South Africa Company hated him (Panzera) for foiling their plans - Panzera to Khama, 27 June 1911 K.P.(L).
Chappell of Mosenthal Bros. indeed considered the fines to be 'the most flagrant violation' by Khama of the R.C.'s 'orders', and in a letter of August 4th completely exonerated Jousse from any blame as a result of his investigations in the Bamangwato Reserve. The root of the trouble was Khama's trading: relations between Khama and Jousse had been perfect until the Chief became a commercial rival. As for any promises of powers given to the B.P. Chiefs by Queen Victoria, were not the obligations of the Crown to British subjects always paramount over those to Natives?  

For the time being, Chappell's representations were confined to the Resident Commissioner, who curtly told him he could not interview the High Commissioner until mid-October. Panzera attempted to influence Buxton (the H.C.) with a rather ham-fisted logic: that even if Khama had ordered the boycott himself, there would be no Mongwato prepared to say so in a court of law. Anyway, Panzera finally retired in October or November; Chappell interviewed Buxton; and Buxton on consultation with the Acting R.C., MacGregor, appointed Sir Herbert Sloley (or Slowly, as Simon Ratshosa would have it), the retiring Resident Commissioner of Basutoland, to hold an official enquiry at Serowe. MacGregor thought the fact of an enquiry at all was a surrender to commercial lobbying; but Sloley was an old friend of his from Basutoland, as he told Khama.

Chappell and MacGregor engaged in long and complicated letters to Buxton re-iterating all the components of the Jousse Affair. The fines on Setiko etc. were regimental like those imposed by clubs or societies, said MacGregor. The 'Greek chorus' of the Bamangwato proved that Khama was staging the accusations, said Chappell. As far as the Bamangwato were concerned, said MacGregor, the 'root and substance' of the Affair was the 'Inquisitor' articles; and 'I beg to assure Your Excellency that it would be

137 Chappell to R.C., 4 Aug.1915 - J.978A.
138 R.C. to Chappell, 19 Aug.1915 - J.978A.
139 R.C. to H.C., 13 Oct.1915 - J.978A.
140 Ag.R.C. to Khama, 13 Nov.1915; H.C. to Khama, 11 Nov.1915; Ag.R.C. to H.C., 17 Nov.1915 - J.978A.
easier to prove the authorship of the letters than the authorship of the boycott.'

MacGregor was sure that the Jousse Affair had an 'Imperial importance' which Buxton did not realise (or admit). There was some greater conspiracy than merely the question of 'Khama & Co.' - if that company had really been a threat, other traders in the Reserve would have complained as well as Jousse. The 'root and substance' was indeed the authorship of 'Inquisitor' by Jousse, and:

'...he did so under the instructions and with the cognizance of his principals for the furtherance of some political-commercial scheme of their own.' 141

Sir Herbert Sloley arrived in the Bechuanaland Protectorate at the end of November, 1915, and proceeded to Serowe with MacGregor. On the morning of Saturday the 27th a great Kgotla assembly was held at Serowe. Jousse and Casalis were there, and Jousse spoke first as the complainant. The meeting ran from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. before the momentum of assertion, counter-assertion, and debate had spent itself. At 3 a.m. on the Monday the enquiry continued, with Jousse answering the specific complaints against himself, and the enquiry was terminated at 1 p.m. While at Serowe and Mafeking, Sloley went out of his way to interview traders, and Rev. Jennings and Chappell. 142 In private conversation, Jousse,

141 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 17 Nov.1915 - J.978A. Willoughby (to L.M.S. 25 April 1916) thought Government had closed Garret, Smith & Co. on private pressure from all traders in the Bamangwato Reserve, who feared being swamped up by the Chief's stores - but there is no evidence to this effect in B.P. Government files of elsewhere. Within a matter of days Willoughby was writing: 'The Chartered Company may be behind it...They may be wanting to weaken Khama for some bigger plan of their own after the war is over.' Willoughby therefore advised that Khama should concede, better to bend before the Company now than be broken later - Willoughby to Lewis, 2 May 1916 (W.C.W./3.0.742). An anonymous manuscript forwarded to the L.M.S. apparently at Khama's request (Lewis to L.M.S., 12 Feb.1917) 'The Jousse Trouble', dated Serowe 21st June 1915 - possibly by John Ratshosa - also concluded that Jousse's 'main object' was to replace Imperial rule of the B.P. by Rhodesia or the Union, and added that Jousse had indeed gained some support among Bamangwato by flouting Khama's beer laws. Panzera's ominous references to the Union and the B.S.A. Company in his private letter to Khama of 27 June 1917 would have been further fuel to the fire of Khama's suspicions - K.P.(B).
in an expansive mood, admitted for the first time to the author¬ship of 'Inquisitor', and used words which Sloley later thought confirmed MacGregor's political-commercial conspiracy theory, but which Sloley could not exactly recall:

"You must not think I am fighting for my living. I am pretty well fed up with this trading business and in any case I don't think I should be with the Bechuanaland Trading Association much longer. I look forward to a more pleasant life as a farmer and am sure I would do well - indeed I am making quite a good thing as it is out of my milk. But I don't want to be driven away by Khama and I am going to see this thing through." 143

The political-commercial theory, thought Sloley, gained substance from both Chappell's proud boast that the B.T.A. was an offshoot of the B.S.A. Company, and from Khama's own suspicions:

'I understand from Khama's remarks on this subject that he, in his mind, connects the Bechuanaland Trading Association with the Chartered Company. The suggestion contained in the letters to the "Sunday Times" (page 39 of the pamphlet) that the British South Africa Company should be given control of the Protectorate must therefore have appeared particularly significant to Khama, who suspected and suspects the Manager of the Association of having written those letters.'

The report of the Sloley Enquiry did not recommend any official action backed by compulsion. It cleared Khama from having attempted a trade monopoly, and imputed 'Inquisitor' to Jousse's hand. On the question of Khama, Sloley recommended that any further trading licences should be vetoed, and the Chief should be privately pressed by the High Commissioner to cut off all connections with trade: even though, it must be acknowledged, Khama had entered trade 'with the consent and knowledge of the Administration'. Khama must be further persuaded to use his influence to stop the B.T.A. boycott. As to Jousse, the B.T.A. should be pressed to replace him. 144

142 H.C. to Ag.R.C., 6 Jan.1916; Sir H.C. Sloley to H.C., 10 Dec. 1915; Chappell to Sloley, 7 Dec.1915 - J.978A.

143 Sloley to MacGregor, 24 Feb.1916 - J.978A.

144 Sloley to H.C., 10 Dec.1915 - J.978A.
The High Commissioner handed down his decisions on the basis of the Sloley Report to the Acting Resident Commissioner on January 6th, 1916. One - that Khama must withdraw from all trading interests, and the firm's name should be changed. Two - that Khama be asked to help stop the boycott. Three - that the B.T.A. principals, though at liberty to do as they wished, be informed of Buxton's strong recommendation that Jousse be replaced. Four - that both Khama and the B.T.A. should be given leeway in time to do so. Copies of Buxton's decisions were transmitted to MacGregor (for verbal relay to Khama) and Chappell of the B.T.A., but not to Khama himself. It is evident that the decisions were written in a manner designed to placate Chappell:

'The administration of a territory which is purely a Native reserve, a Protectorate in the true sense, where Europeans have only trading or mining rights and no rights of occupation, is not free from difficulties. It is the policy of the Government not only to encourage Europeans in the development of their legitimate enterprises, but to welcome their cooperation in settling difficulties which arise and in furthering the general welfare.

On the other hand, it is part of the obligations of those engaged in commercial enterprise in such a territory to remain on friendly terms with the native inhabitants and with the Administration.'

MacGregor visited Khama, who protested that, though he would naturally follow the H.C.'s official decisions when officially announced, they were grossly unfair to him. He was being penalised for a venture that had had Government permission; it was a sell-out to Jousse; it meant the impoverishment of the Chief (i.e. state). By what principle was it wrong for him to invest in a commercial venture?

Chappell's reaction was the H.C.'s decisions were admirable for eliminating 'Khama & Co.' and the boycott of the B.T.A. - but otherwise they were a slur on a blameless man, Paul Jousse, and a blow to his prosperity. The removal and retirement of Jousse

145 H.C. to Ag.R.C., 6 Jan.1916 - J.978A.
would be a personal disgrace and humiliation to a white man 'at the will of a native chief'. Chappell added that he need not 'amplify any further... the results of such a decision on Jousse' an interesting piece of innuendo which implied further recourse to the South African white press. The Government, Chappell subtly stressed, had wittingly allowed a native chief to indulge in trad while knowing all along that it was wrong in principle: it was this open contradiction which provoked Jousse to such strong language in print - his only possible offence.

The Chief must be penalised, said Chappell. It was he who had engineered the dispute against Jousse and the B.T.A. - whom Chappell claimed were indistinguishable to the native mind. The Bamangwato had loved 'their store', the B.T.A., which had served them so long and well. And therefore Jousse had also been loved. 'The native, as is well known, is either suspicious or he trusts completely with childlike blindness.' How then did the indistinguishable B.T.A./Jousse come to be boycotted? Because of one man's jealousy, the Chief's. Yet even Khama had once loved the B.T.A./Jousse - until the Government had (foolishly) allowed him to become a trader. Any rudeness to Government on Jousse's part was the product of understandable frustration. Chappell further argued that 'Inquisitor' (to which Jousse had now admitted) was irrelevant. Only the abolition of 'Khama & Co.' could solve the affair: Jousse and Khama would get along fine together again. Why then remove Jousse? 147

Chappell then got on a train to Cape Town and presented himself to Lord Buxton. One is impressed by the ease with which the B.T.A. had access to the highest official in southern Africa, while the other party to the dispute, a mere 'native' Chief, was only allowed indirect communication. Chappell's purpose in meeting Buxton was basically to press through the renewal of the B.T.A. licences in the Bamangwato Reserve, which the B.P. Administration had held in abeyance for two months. It was agreed, in the spirit of compromise (sic), that the B.T.A. would remove Jousse once Khama had

147 Chappell to H.C., 3 Feb.1916 - J.978A.
folded up his business.  

When Buxton wrote curtly to MacGregor ordering him to disist from obstructing the renewal of the B.T.A. licences, MacGregor's reply to his superior was as indignant as possible. MacGregor was caught in the cross-fire of Khama and the High Commissioner-cum-B.T.A. managers. He had discovered that Khama's anti-Jousse grievance was now over-shadowed by bitterness against the colonial Administration whom he considered had surrendered to Jousse's plots to make him liquidate his business interests. And indeed MacGregor was disposed to agree with Khama, and effectively told Buxton so. 'From first to last no compromise was possible with Mr. Chappell ... Khama must be humiliated, Garrett & Smith ruined and the people dragooned into buying from Mr. Jousse.' Chappell had slandered Panzera, MacGregor, and Sloley: and had had privileged access to the High Commissioner, who accepted his 'mis-statements of fact and false deductions' without reference to the B.P. Administration. MacGregor now went further in his thesis of a political-commercial conspiracy:  

'The suggestion is more than confirmed by subsequent developments and I have no doubt now, if I had then, that there is some financial or political motive underlying them. If it had not been that the European war broke out soon afterwards and gave men bigger things to think about I think it is more certain than probable that there would have been some sort of newspaper agitation against native rights not only in the Protectorate but in all the territories.  

Mr. Jousse, I suggest, was merely the tool of bigger men behind him and that is why they cannot afford to let him take the logical consequences of his action.'  

If to MacGregor, Jousse was a snake in the grass whose masters wished to keep him there for future conspiracies, to Willoughby he was a cuckoo fattening in Khama's nest. To Khama the matter  

148 Chappell to H.C., 7 Feb.1916.  
149 H.C. to Ag.R.C., 18 Feb.1916; Imp.Sec. to Chappell, 17 Feb. 1916 - J.978A.  
150 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 23 Feb.1916 - J.978A.  
151 Willoughby notes in W.C.W./S.0.810.
was so serious, and he had been so slighted by Buxton's acting over his head, that he maintained an outraged silence until the High Commissioner graced him with an official letter setting out his decisions. Garrett acted as unofficial spokesman - that Khama believed that the situation could still be changed by Buxton coming to his senses, by his realising that Khama had not invested in 'Garrett, Smith & Co.' in order to become a trader, but primarily as a method of setting in good shape for the future the economy of the Chieftainship - and therefore the welfare of the people. If the Government had acted against its own principles by giving him a licence in 1910, why should he be made to pay for its incompetence? He put in a firm claim to see the High Commissioner in person.152

MacGregor's replies to Garrett and Khama repeated his sympathy, but told them not to quibble any more - 'His Excellency's decision is final', was his despondent note. The principle 'that persons in authority should not engage in trade' was described as 'a very strong one', without reference to rationale or precedent - and no distinction was made between engaging in trade and investing in commercial enterprises (the latter having indeed been the norm for colonial officials in this part of the world with regard to the B.S.A. Company).153

Meanwhile Khama complied with Buxton's 'wish' that he use his influence to stop the boycott of the B.T.A. stores. And on March 2nd, 1916, Jousse jubilantly announced that business had returned to normal, writing to the Serowe Magistrate: 'Please accept our sincere thanks for your personal influence in the matter.'154 The B.T.A. now agreed to remove Jousse from Palapye Road to the Tuli Block, where he would be manager of the Limpopo Ranching Company and carry on dairy-farming at his personal farm.155 In return for

152 R.J. Garrett to Ag.R.C., 29 Feb.1916 - J.978A.
153 Ag.R.C. to Garrett, 3 March 1916; Ag.R.C. to Khama, 3 March - J.978A.
154 Ag.R.M. Serowe to Ag.R.C., 2 March 1916; B.T.A. to Ag.R.M. Serowe, 2 March 1916 - J.978A.
155 A.C. to R.C., 4 May 1914 - J.978.
this consideration, Chappell insisted that Khama's 'illegal' trading should stop forthwith; and the firm should not be sold to any single highest bidder, but the stock should be sold off (like in bankruptcy cases).\(^{156}\)

On April 1st, 1916, Paul Jousse left the Bamangwato Reserve, and was replaced by the liberal H.F. Kirkham (a correspondent of the Aborigines' Protection Society) as local manager of the Bechuana-land Trading Association.\(^{157}\)

Three days before Jousse's removal, Khama had at last written to Buxton with a long historical justification for his investment in commercial enterprise, and stating the certainty of 'the entire ruin and diminution of my life resources' if he were forced to withdraw that investment. Khama's long review of the changing duties and resources of the Chieftainship has already been cited above in a number of instances. Khama reviewed the injustice of the whole Jousse Affair, and reiterated his personal innocence and indignation.

'Your Excellency will then observe that as civilisation advances, my efforts to endeavour to do my duty towards my country and people are bound helplessly to collapse, should Your Excellency insist on this decision. It is essential as Your Excellency knows that the Chief of the tribe must maintain his position as such, and must at the same time look after the private interests of himself and his family.

That the Government have themselves given me a thoroughly open and legal permission to establish this business, and that Your Excellency should now direct the business to cease, urging that a man cannot be a Chief and a trader at the same time, are matters which I am unable to reconcile and which puzzle me a great deal. More so because the Government appear to have all along been aware of the fact that I as Chief should not engage in trade. Was it not their duty, therefore, as my chiefs and advisers, to have refused to grant this permission in the first instance? Had this been the case I should, of course, have obeyed them, and would have saved all this worry and pain of mind...

\(^{156}\) Chappell to H.C., 11 March 1916 - J.978A.

\(^{157}\) Chappell to Imp.Sec., 4 April 1916 - J.978A. Casalis was transferred from Serowe to Macloutie - R.C. to H.C., 18 July 1919 - J.978A. The B.T.A. sold out its interests in the Bamangwato Reserve in 1928, mostly to R.A. Bailey - Mockford, Seretse Khama p.179; Minnie Shaw, para.5.
Now it appears that the responsible people who gave me this permission are exonerated from blame, while I the innocent party who received permission from the hands of my Chief, am burdened with the blame and must suffer for the faults, if any at all, of my Chief, and be penalised for availing myself of his permission.'

There is no evidence in official correspondence that any colonial official grasped from this letter - though Khama apologised for its length and any obscurity - the true significance of what Khama was saying about his attempt to put the Ngwato state on a new basis of economic self-sufficiency in the modern world. Despite the suggestion that MacGregor et al represented a local 'trusteeship' factor (backing the protection of Native Protectorates from white settler interpenetration), all officials and settlers - 'progressives' and 'conservatives' alike - seem to have shared the common preconception that progress was to be equated with the growth of white settler power, and that protection therefore inevitably entailed black decline into 'structural underdevelopment.'

MacGregor's own reaction to Khama's plaint of 28th March, 1916, was that Khama could not complain of impoverishment with a Hut Tax share of £1,700 that year. But MacGregor still held to his views of the injustice of the action against Khama, and would not give up his political-commercial conspiracy thesis.

Buxton's reply was brief: he pooh-poohed the idea of any political agitation by Chappell, and enclosed copies of their correspondence to disprove it.

Buxton now made belated efforts to conciliate Khama - writing that he attached no blame to Khama even in his thoughts and that he would now like to meet Khama in person to finalise the winding-up.

158 Khama to H.C., 28 March 1916 (encl. R.C. to Khama, 6 July 1901 & 9 June 1910) - Copies in J.978A; Lewis to L.M.S., 4 April 1916; W.C.W./S.O.742 (Lewis to Willoughby, 25 April 1916).

159 Even the missionary Haydon Lewis, who forwarded the copy to L.M.S. did not grasp its full significance - Cf. Lewis to L.M.S. 15 Aug.1916.

160 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 5 April 1916 - J.978A.

161 Ag.R.C. to H.C., 8 April 1916 - J.978A.

162 H.C. to Ag.R.C., 14 April 1916 - J.978A.
arrangements; Khama, such a highly respected man, must feel free to write him personally any time, and should trust in him as he had in the Earl of Selborne. Buxton then prepared a bonne bouche for the interview he planned with Khama - obtaining permission to extract £500 p.a. from the surplus of the B.P. budget, for an annuity which, Buxton stressed, would only be due to the Chieftainship for Khama's life ('which I fear is likely to be brief'). When Buxton arrived at Palapye Road station on his way to Rhodesia, he found that he had to travel to Serowe since Khama was seriously ill after his riding accident. The account, in Buxton's own words, of their meeting on 1st June, 1916 makes amusing reading given fore-knowledge of the demise of 'Kham & Co.' Buxton's rather pathetic attempt to pass off the £500 annuity as a 'token of good will', and not as recompense for the winding-up of Khama's commercial affairs, was greeted with a grump of scarcely disguised hostility from the sickbed. Sixteen days later Khama had recovered sufficiently to repeat his grievances again to the Resident Commissioner (Col. Garraway, newly appointed), who made the pilgrimage to his sickbed. Khama refused the offer of a Government auditor to help wind-up the business. Mosenthal Bros. were pressing for quick execution.

163 H.C. to Khama, 13 April 1916 - J.978A.


165 Buxton 'Khama. Some personal impressions. A peaceful chief' Times, 28 Feb.1923, p.13. Khama heard Buxton (through an interpreter) say £40-a-year, which may account for his extra gruffness Lewis to L.M.S., 2 June 1916. Had it not been for his accident there is some reason to believe that Khama would have absolutely refused to withdraw from Garrett, Smith & Co. He wrote to that effect to Jas. Haskins on 17 Jan.1916 (K.P.Out.1915-20), and Lewis still thought that he would refuse after Buxton's visit because of the £40. Khama may not have realised that it would be £500 until he received R.C. to Khama, 9 Aug.1916 - K.P.(B).

166 R.C. to H.C., 18 July 1916 - J.978A. Garraway, new to his job, took it as the test of his mettle, as an 'old hand' with Khama, to press on the Chief withdrawal from trade - because Khama was the representative of the (British) king, who could not soil his honour in commerce; Lewis to L.M.S., 2 June 1916.
Khama undertook to wind-up the affairs of 'Garrett, Smith & Co.' himself. Simon Ratshosa recounts that upon his recovery to health, Khama presented Garrett and Smith's wives with Buick cars and themselves with valuable cheques and cattle, and that one fine day he signed over all the effects of the company to the managers and their assistants, ignoring the Magistrate's good advice to consult Government first. Then a few months later it was revealed that the managers had run up a last moment overdraft of £2-3,000, which Khama had to pay off, vowing he would never set foot in the store of Garrett or Smith again. His death in 1923 came before the firm was fully wound-up. 167 Simon Ratshosa's account tallies somewhat with the assertion of Harris' L.M.S. biography of Khama in 1922, which asserted (p.104) that while Khama had withdrawn penniless, 'his two European managers are now in a position of unquestioned opulence. 168

And so ended Khama's attempt - not to say that it would otherwise have been successful - to break the Ngwato state out of the spirit of structural underdevelopment. 169 The demise of 'Khama & Co.' was not merely the product of then unperceived historical movements pushing inexorably 'forwards'. The demise was a conscious

167 S. Ratshosa 'My Book', pp.201-3.

168 John Charles Harris Khama the Great African Chief London: Livingstone Press, 1922, p.104; confirmed by Lewis to L.M.S., 20 Jan.1923). Simon Ratshosa had supported Garrett and Smith for political reasons against the L.M.S. (S. Ratshosa to L.M.S., 15 May 1923), but by c.1931 ('My Book', pp.301-2), he was in exile himself and switched his allegiance to the point of view of Jouss who was then a farmer in the Tuli Block. He claimed that it had been obvious from the start that Khama should not have entered into trade.

169 Simon Ratshosa, in retrospect, claimed that Sekgoma Khama opposed his father's trading, because he himself had once been the victim of rapacious trading partners. Sekgoma's commercial investment is not known, but may have something to do with Sekgoma giving a white man freehold tenure in his 1895 regency, which Khama had to buy out for £100s in 1896 - W.C.W./S.0.810 (Willoughby note). Chief Seepapitso attempted to follow Khama's example in entering into trade, but was foiled by the demise of Garrett, Smith & Co (Willoughby to L.M.S., 25 April 1916). By 1928 when the Rolong Chief applied for a trading licence, the B.P. Administration gave four good reasons why it could not be granted, including one of open racial discrimination - Cmd.4368. In the case of non-whites gaining freehold land in the B.P., the Administration used purely administrative checks against this, hoping they would not be challenged in a court of law - C.0.879/1003, r.8 & C.0.879/1015.
retreat by the colonial Administration before a large combine in whose interests the structure of the southern African economy was shaped. Though everyday civil administration within the Bechuanaland Protectorate might proceed on the assumption of territorial autonomy, the effective sovereignty of Governorship was vested in the High Commissioner, who therefore dealt with all irregular issues and was at liberty to intervene in any matter to which his attention was directed. The High Commission for the Protectorates had not after all taken on constitutional responsibility to White South Africa in 1910, but it was open to settler-capitalist pressures in South Africa on a semi-personal level, because its incumbent was also Governor-General of the Union until 1934 and British representative to the Union government until 1964. The Jousse Affair shows how a High Commissioner could translate semi-personal response to outside pressure into policy. High Commissioners resisted the Afrikaans-speaking political rulers of South Africa over the Protectorate, but were prepared to collaborate with the English-speaking economic rulers of southern Africa.
THE TRIBAL ELITE

Gohiwmang   David Sebonego
Simeon Seisa   Kwena-E-tisle
Khamal   Sebele   Bathoen

=Ngwato, Kwena, and Ngwaketse
dele gate s in Britai 1895.
Chapter 10: TWENTIETH CENTURY TRIBALISM, 1913-23

Tribe and Tribalism have generally been discredited as concepts in the tool-kit of social investigation, for their lack of precision as much as for their sub-colonial associations. However the terms are not without utility in the case of the Bamangwato in the high colonial period. Tribe was then used not only by outsiders but by insiders of the system concerned. It was the colonial official designation of the people contained within the Bamangwato Reserve, but it was also adopted by both the educated elite and more generally as self-designation. Tribe constitutes not just a set of social and political relations modified under colonialism: it sums up the consciousness of diminished status that reduced Nation to Tribe, King to Chief and Kingdom to Reserve, house to hut and town to village, man to 'boy' and person to native. Tribalism is not an unuseful concept for labelling historical phenomena that people who participated in them (rather than academic observers) recognised as such. Tribe and Tribalism denote acceptance of the regular legitimacy of the colonial system in a territory once independent.

In southern Africa in particular, Tribalism became the term used after about 1900 to describe the Native Reserve system that stood 'outside' the freehold white settler system. The term came to imply a backward-looking nature to those who were in the South African national mainstream (white or black, English or Afrikaner and who called for economic development and political uniformity. While to others ('progressive Chiefs' and their sympathisers), Tribalism meant the fending off of white rapacity, and the spurring on of institutions given the time-honoured air (often spurious) of traditionality. There was a third view of Tribalism which combined the two mentioned above — and this was the preconception held by the Imperial Factor, or the colonial Administration as a whole, that since Tribalism and Settlerdom were 'dual' or 'separate' or 'parallel' (rather than structurally interlocked), so the Native Reserves could be left well alone to fend for themselves and not be provided with the social and

economic returns channelled by the colonial state in the settler-dominated sector. W.C. Willoughby's plea of 1916 for the 'breaking up' of Tribalism in the B.P. in order to facilitate educational progress, was only a more humane version of the pleas for the crushing of African nations that were characteristic of the European Scramble for Africa 20 or 30 years before.\(^2\)

We have already seen the transition of the sub-colonial status of Tribalism on the level of economic development. It remains for us to identify other elements, political and social and cultural, or Tribalism which emerged in the latter years of Khama. Firstly, there was the reconsolidation of the population and dynastic security of the Tribe. And secondly, there was the political equilibrium reached externally with the British, and internally in the system of Tribal administration and in élite formation among the Bamangwato.

- 1 -

The years between 1913 and 1922 saw an overall population increase of the Bamangwato Reserve from the return of exiled groups and the immigration of new groups. These people were accommodated within the Reserve by an extension of regional government, following the decentralisation programme begun in 1896.\(^3\) The vital exile who returned, was Sekgoma the son of Khama, who was reconciled between 1916 and 1920, and his re-accommodation at the centre provided the dynastic security essential to the new Tribal system which balanced delegation at the periphery with security at the centre.

The dynastic security of Sekgoma's succession to the Chieftainship (as Khama's only son) had been threatened not only by his exile but by Khama's re-marriage. Khama's marriage to Sefhakwane, one

\(^2\) Willoughby to L.M.S., 28 March 1916 - 'Taking a broad outlook, I see no hope...until tribalism is broken up, and the Protectorate is merged: either in the Union or in Southern Rhodesia.'

\(^3\) See Chapter 6 above & Note 129 below.
of the causes of the Sekgoma kgang, was dissolved in 1898, and the daughter of the marriage, Bontle, disowned. And if Sekgoma achieved nothing else by the kgang, he succeeded in getting the Bamangwato to declare against the succession to Khama of his eldest daughter Besi, or by her offspring the Ratshosa brothers. So when Besi engineered Khama's fourth and final marriage, to Semane in 1900, this jolted Sekgoma's hope of succession, but not seriously since it was generally held that Khama was too old to sire more children. Semane was a commoner, daughter to Setlhoko. She was young and strikingly beautiful and was held in high esteem by the missionaries as an intelligent and diligent school teacher - though enemies said she was the mission kitchen-maid. Within months of the marriage, Khama was said to be acting younger and happier than he had been even ten years before; and in 1901 a daughter, Bonyerile Victoria, was born to the marriage.  

Sekgoma Khama's chances of succession were strengthened by the backing of Ralph Williams and the B.P. Administration. Furthermore his sister Besi died on June 17th, 1902, thus weakening the Ratshosa challenge. But on September 17th, 1905, another son was born to Khama - Tsekekedi - and the missionary Jennings remarked prophetically: 'I am afraid that this new son will eventually bring trouble to the tribe, as Sekgome openly says he is going to reign after his father, notwithstanding anything to the contrary that his father may say or do.'  

Another son, Ewetse, was born to Khama, on January 19th, 1909, but he was sickly in 1911 and soon died, as did twin daughters (born in 1913) when they were a year old.

4 See Chapters 6 & 7 above; S. Ratshosa 'My Book', p.137; Motsetse, para 92; Willoughby to L.M.S., 4 Oct, 1900 & 8 Feb. 1902; photos in L.M.S. Chronicle, Vol. 13, No. 146, Feb. 1904, p.48. & Vol 19, No. 900, May 1911, p.93. This has not stopped suggestions that Khama's children by Semane were not really his. Photographic comparisons of Khama and Tsekekedi, and with Tsekekedi's own sons, give the lie to this.

5 Cf. Jennings to L.M.S., 2 Feb. 1906.


7 Jennings to L.M.S., 10 Nov. & 30 Dec. 1911 & 29 Aug. 1913; Ella
The birth of Tshekedi affected dynastic politics in a way that was to have dramatic repercussions down through the years. Bo-Ratshosa, removed from the line of succession, began to shift their allegiance to Sekgoma - to back the first House, to which they also belonged, against the second (technically fourth) House represented by Semane and Tshekedi. In 1907 Khama had publicly disowned Sekgoma in favour of the second House, so Ratshosa privately made contact with Sekgoma to prepare for his return and oust the second House. Khama was well aware of this, and at the end of 1910 Ratshosa temporarily went into shamed seclusion when Khama publicly berated him for his general conduct; the actual point at issue was that Khama had not given the Duke of Connaught at Gaborone on November 23rd the Ratshosa-sponsored message from the Bamangwato, but his own. The Serowe Magistrate Merry, berated Ratshosa as 'that swine...who is at the bottom of every rotten scheme here', and said he would be 'jolly careful to keep a watch on such a slim kerel (crafty fellow).'

The 1910 incident blew over, and the link between Ratshosa and Sekgoma was cemented by the marriage of his son, Simon, to Sekgoma's daughter, Oratile. Khama's serious illness from his 1916 riding accident proved a good occasion for the reconciliation between Khama and his son to be initiated. Sekgoma came to his father's bedside at the end of 1916 and appeared to be in full harmony with Khama, making friends with his small half-brother Tshekedi. Bo-Ratshosa however, it appears, attempted to poison Khama's mind against Tshekedi's mother, Semane, even imputing with the 'witchcraft' that had caused Khama's accident. Other rumours suggested that Khama had not fathered Tshekedi, etc. And relations between husband and wife deteriorated while Khama lay ill.


Relations between Khama and Semane recovered with his health, as they did with the Church of which she was the senior deaconess. Ratshosa himself died in 1917, and with the restitution of Sekgoma to the succession, the Ratshosa brothers dropped their hostility for the time being to the second House. Johnnie Ratshosa willingly witnessed that Khama's dying gasp was in fact Semane's name.  

Sekgoma's first attempt to reconcile himself with his father was after their loud and riotous confrontation at Lephepe in 1907. Khama, who accused Sekgoma of having had a revolver under his overcoat, would have none of it. Sekgoma therefore went to his new exile at Nekati with the intention of waiting for his father to die, while cultivating support in the Bamangwato Reserve for his succession, where he had friends like (future Rev.) Baruti Kaleakgosi. His removal to Nekati from Lephepe was made somewhat disconsolate by strictly enforced restrictions on exactly which cattle could be taken north. Only Sekgoma, Simeon Seisa, Thatedi and four others had 'personal' (v. 'tribal') cattle that they could take with them. In their new residence there was friction between Bo-Sekgoma and Khama over the ownership of strayed cattle and their Sarwa herders in 1908, but the Administration found the case to be an unfounded slight by Khama against his son. With the initial assistance of the Khurutshe of Rauwe, and a good relationship between Sekgoma and his attendant policeman, Lt. Hodson, Bo-Sekgoma settled in exile and became more confident.  

The change from bitterness to confidence can be seen in relations with the L.M.S. in Bo-Sekgoma's educational facilities. Cullen Reed, from Plumtree in Southern Rhodesia, visited Bo-Sekgoma in 1908 and found them antagonistic to his Society - an antagonism partly attributed to the example of the Khurutshe Free Church.

11 Tom Brown to L.M.S., 7 July 1921; Parson's Word, p.25.
13 B.P.5/3567; B.P.5/3403.
But by 1910 Sekgoma had sufficiently recovered relations with the London Mission for him to lay his grievances before a delegation; the Church at Nekati (except Seisa) denied it had broken with the L.M.S.; and the L.M.S. then recognised the Church leader, Seakgane, as its evangelist. And in 1913 the L.M.S. agreed to send one of its first black ordained ministers Rev. Moyahi, with his son, Joseph as schoolteacher, to Nekati. The school achieved a record 98% attendance because Sekgoma himself dealt with every malingerer. Rev. Moyahi was replaced by Rev. Baruti Kaleakgosi, Sekgoma's old friend, about the end of 1915.15

But any enthusiasm for the imminent release from exile of Bo-Sekgoma, through contacts with Ratshosa in 1910, was dampened by Khama's continuing cold shoulder (for example refusing to supply Sekgoma with another wife) backed by the B.P. Administration.16 Sekgoma, Seisa, Lebang Raditladi, and others were summoned to Francistown before the Assistant Commissioner in January 1911 to be 'dressed down'. Bo-Sekgoma was threatened even with 'troops from the T'vaal... this could be done quickly and would be done.' But the A.C. also offered his good offices to effect a reconciliation with Khama, and proceeded to Serowe to offer the prodigal's request for forgiveness. Khama's reply was that he could not possibly consider the request unless it was presented in person, adding that 'I am certain the people now want Sekgoma back.' The matter was then presented at Kgotla, where elders proved lukewarm and the matter was dropped after the A.C. repeated his threat of immediate military intervention if 'young people' rebelled against their elders. The result of this failure in reconciliation, was that Sekgoma married a woman of his own choice in the latter half of 1911 - a choice however which belied his ambition to make a dynastically respectable marriage, for she was Kwena-e-rona the daughter of Gaseketse (the second wife of Khama) by her first marriage to Sebogisho, being thus intimately connected with the Ngwato, Ngwaketse, and Kwena royal families. In this same period Simeon Seisa was ousted as Sekgoma's Secretary by Lebang the son.

15 Reed to L.M.S., 14 Nov.1908; Lloyd to L.M.S., 14 April 1909; Reed to L.M.S., 15 Aug.1910, Jennings to L.M.S., 20 Oct.1910. Hawkins and Tom Brown to L.M.S., 29 March 1913; Reed to L.M.S., 27 May 1916.

16 B.P.6/407; J.1331.
of Raditladi, who had joined Bo-SeKGoma at Nekati from southern Rhodesian exile.\textsuperscript{17}

It is not clear why it took so long to formalise the reconciliation of Sekgoma with Khama that had begun in late 1916. Possibly the key is Sekgoma's complex marital relations. He had to see his way through to marrying his father's choice, Tebogo the daughter of Khama's most trusted brother Kebailele (and sister of Gaapotlhake the Chief's Secretary). This was arranged and in the month before the marriage Khama travelled down to the Resident Commissioner's office at Mafeking and formally presented Sekgoma as his heir (then proceeding to Cape Town to say good-bye to Buxton). The wedding in September 1920 was a sumptuous occasion, with two thousand congregation (including 200 whites) in what a newspaper hyperbolically described as the £25,000 stained-glass window church at Serowe. The service was conducted in SeTswana by Rev. Tom Brown, but Khama did not attend because of rheumatism (sic). The obvious public joy in the Kgolola was great, but Brown wrote that at times the reconciliation seemed 'very superficial and politic'.\textsuperscript{18}

On July 1st, 1921, a son, Seretse, the future first President of the Republic of Botswana, was born to the marriage.

\textsuperscript{3-}

The dynastic settlement between father and son was one part of the national re-integration of Khama's latter years. Most of the other reconciliations involved the people who had split away with Bo-Raditladi in 1895.

Bo-Raditladi had split into three parts fairly early in the years of exile - the Khurutshe to the Tati concession, and Mphoeng and

\textsuperscript{17} Minutes of meetings, 17 Jan & 18 Jan.1911 - J.1331; R.C.12/14 Sgt. Nekati to R.C., 18 Feb.1911 - J.1331.

\textsuperscript{18} R.C. to H.C., 18 Aug.1920 - C.0.417/638; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate pp.128-9; Brown to L.M.S., 7 July 1921; Wedding invitation list in K.P.(A); unidentified newspaper clipping (British Weekly?), 25 Nov.1920 in L.M.S. Press-Cuttings, Vol. 1923-30, p.200.
Raditladi separately in an adjacent part of Southern Rhodesia. Raditladi's followers were the most limited in numbers, and he feared their further depletion, begging the L.M.S. to make his settlement at Ramokwebane a major mission centre. Raditladi personally could never reconcile with Khama, and so his followers went their own ways and he died in exile in 1911. His son, Disang, as we have seen, had already joined Bo-Sekgoma by 1911.

Mphoeng and Khama were reconciled in 1912, and in 1913 Mphoeng returned to Khama's Country, bringing his son, Oteng, and Nwako Nkobele among others. His elder son Phetu (Phetlho) had already returned in 1903; and probably in mid-1912 was sent as district governor to the western Motloutse to concentrate the scattered hamlets of the area into the new town of Mmadinare. He was rewarded with the hand of Kham's daughter Milly in marriage. (Phetu Mphoeng had divorced Leina daughter of Tauwe; she subsequently figures in Kwena history.) But the father could not live under the son, and old Mphoeng retired to Mabele-a-podi near Serowe, where he died. Phetu as chief of Mmadinare gained the animosity of Simon Ratshosa. Khama disciplined him for drinking liquor: 'Simon Ratshosa claimed that Khama almost banished him in 1915 and 1919 for maltreating Milly - but the substance of the dispute lies after the death of Khama.'

Other former members of Mphoeng's party went their separate ways. The preacher Motlapitse had returned to Serowe by 1908. Rramorotong had joined Bo-Sekgoma, while Seeletso had died in Rhodesia. Kuate returned paralysed to Serowe where he died in 1922, the year that Tiro returned.

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19 See Chapters 3 & 5.
22 Lloyd to L.M.S., 15 July 1908; D.C. Serowe to R.C., 9 Jan. 1950 - B.P.34/N.3; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.125.
The largest group to return were the Khurutshe of Rauwe, whom Khama placed in the new town of Tonota near the Shashe railway bridge in 1913 - so near the border, it is said tongue-in-cheek, that they could leave the Reserve should their wanderlust overcome them again. The history of Khurutshe settlement and religion between 1895 and 1913 is indicated in other publications. As far as religion is concerned it will be recalled that Khama made the abandonment of their Anglicanism a strict condition of their entry into his Reserve. Crypto-Anglicanism appears to have survived among the Khurutshe, but it did not become a problem till the reign of Tshekedi. What had importance during the reign of Khama was the dynastic and personal divisions among the Khurutshe that religion had brought on before 1913.

Initially there had been a division between the main body of the Khurutshe under Rauwe, who sponsored a Free Church, and the L.M.S. rump under Mpotokwane. Then the Free Church joined the Anglican Church, and Rauwe's rival Molefhe went to live with Mpotokwane. The last-named stayed in the Tati Concession while Rauwe returned to the Bamangwato, and did not go to Tonota until 1921 when forced out by the Tati Company. But Molefhe fluctuated. He had not originally left the Bamangwato Reserve in 1895, but had joined Rauwe in 1902/3 with six others. In about 1908 he joined Mpotokwane, but in 1913 (or maybe before) he chose to go with Rauwe to Tonota. Then in late 1914 he applied to return to Mpotokwane in the Tati Concession. Khama was agreeable but the local Kalanga of Ramokate in the desired area were not - 'Molefhe and Mpotokwane are like a burning paraffin fire.' The result

23 It was reported that 2,500 accompanied Rauwe, leaving 5,000 behind in the Tati Concession (S.34/5), though the latter number may include Kalanga, and it should be remembered that over 1,000 BaKburutshe had not left Khama's Country in 1895 - Jennings to L.M.S., 13 Nov.1906.

24 M.M. Sekgoma, para 23.


26 See Chapter 7; also S.34/5.

appears to have been that Molefi lived officially on the Tati side and unofficially on the Bamangwato side of the Shashe river, doing good business with Haskins as a cattle 'smuggler' up until 1920 when he moved from the Tati Concession to Tonota, with 13 men, 13 women and 46 children. The picture of Khurutshe transhumance is made more kaleidoscopic by the fact that Tumedi, sometime pastor of the Free Church, attempted unsuccessfully to leave Tonota for the Tati in 1920.\(^{28}\) One can now understand Kham's joke about Khurutshe wanderlust!

Though the overall situation is a stabilisation of population in the latter years of Kham, there are a number of groups which moved in and out and around in those years. Firstly there was the undetermined rate of labour migration of often servile individuals to the Rand, some of whom settled there. Secondly there were the shifts of Kalanga population between the Bamangwato Reserve, the Tati Concession, and Southern Rhodesia, which have yet to be fully determined by extensive field research in the area.\(^{29}\) Thirdly there are identified minor chieftains who moved around in Kham's latter years such as Motsumi, Kgari Macheng, and Mokhutswane.\(^{30}\) And fourthly there are two larger groups with political significance - Herero (Damara) and Birwa.

The Herero had fled the German war of annihilation in 1905, from South-West Africa into the Bechuanaland Protectorate, under Samuel Maherero. By 1912 they had scattered from Ngamiland to the Limpopo - at Tsau, Tshaong, Boteti, Serowe, and in the Tuli Block. Samuel Maherero himself was in the Transvaal. By 1915 the Herero had begun to settle near Mahalapye station in Kham's Country; and in 1919 Samuel Maherero formally placed himself

\(^{28}\) Court proceedings at Francistown, 9 April 1903 - KPM-1903-5; E.P.6/2751, passim; Gen.Man.Tati Co. to Kham, 14 Sept.1920 - KP (A). Tumedi led the Anglicans who resisted Tshedi in 1926 - S.34, 50 S.416/7 i.e. Motsumi; Kgosi, para 67. See also Chapter 6; AJ to Kham, 12 Jan.1896 - KP In.1891-1902; S.416/5 (Ngwaketse); Heln to L.M.S. 29 July1908; Kgosi, paras 16 & 59; Seeletso, para.27. (My sources are confused and so am I on these points). Re. Mokhutswane - BP.6/6430 & Sekgoma, para.11.
under the care and protection of Khama. There then began a
process of reconsolidation of the Herero under their Chief. Herero communities had spread to Gabane (near Gaborone), Lobatse, and Kraaipan (south of Mafeking). In 1922 Samuel Maherero finalised his move from Nylstroom to take up residence at Mahalapye. He died a month after Khama in 1923, and was succeeded as Herero paramount chief by his son Frederick, who was increasingly joined at Mahalapye by other Herero exiles. The Administrator of South-West Africa, at Samuel's funeral in that territory, advised the Herero to follow Khama's example and cooperate with the whites, not fight with them as Samuel had done. But on Khama's part, his welcome of the Herero to his Country, allowing them to retain their cultural identity (and their Lutheran evangelists), gave implicit approval to Samuel Maherero's resistance against white rapacity.

The moves in and out of the Bamangwato Reserve by the Birwa of Chief Malema had a less happy political significance for Khama. Like the Jousse Affair before it, the Gluckmann Affair that resulted from Khama's relations with these Birwa was to embitter the last years of Khama's life.

The Birwa were a number of disunified chiefdoms (e.g. Maunatlala) who lived in the northern Tswapong, Motloutse, and lower Shashe areas of the Bamangwato Reserve. The chiefdom of Malema resided by the Limpopo within the Crocodile Strip surrendered by Khama to Chamberlain (for the B.S.A. Company) in 1895. But until the B.S.A. Company took up its farms, the Strip remained effectively under Khama's jurisdiction: in 1902 it was he who was instructed to police the area for Transvaal Africans crossing the Limpopo.


32 C.S. to R.C., 13 July 1921 - C.O. 417/663; L.M.S. Annual (mss) Serowe 1922-3 - B.P. 33/163; B.P. 33/165; S. Ratshosa Book; pp. 125-6 & 182-3. Nicodemus settled at Boteti - AgAC to AgRm KaSane, 18 Jan. 1923: K. (J).
to surrender their arms after the War, and the Bamangwato were allowed temporary water rights at Seleka within the Strip. But in 1903 the B.S.A. Company began to survey the Strip, after the Government had chosen small administrative reserves within it — though this was not formalised in law until 1904-5, when the Strip was placed unequivocally under B.S.A. Company freehold. Demarcation of the Strip brought friction between Company and Tribe from the start. In August 1903 the Bamangwato had complaint of beacons too far west, but in 1904 they were fobbed off with the assurance that these were merely 'observing stations' for the purpose of surveying. When these beacons were then used as farm boundaries, Khama revived his old plaint about the Chartered Company stealing his lands and the Company used its old ploy of claiming it was 'too late' to object now. A B.P. government surveyor in 1907 showed the 'Company is absolutely proved to be in the wrong' — even 1,500 yards west of the line agreed between St. Quintin and the Bamangwato in 1896. But the High Commissions did not entertain the idea of fraud by the Company but of a 'mistake in surveying, and ... I think we ought to do our best to help them out.'

Already by 1907 the Company attempted to follow the example of the Tati Concession by imposing its own private taxation on Africans resident in the Strips of the B.P. it was beginning to sell off to whites (only) as farms. Such was the 'development' to which it was committed by law. But such moves towards Chartered administration were frowned upon as prejudicing a small part of 'the Union's future heritage'. In 1909 the Company was obliged to consider a Native Reserve within the Crocodile Strip,

33 H.O. to C.O., 24 Jan.1902 — C.0.417/343; Ag.A.C. Palapye to Khama, 1 Oct.1902; Legal Declaration, 11 March 1902 — K.P.In-1891 1902; C.0.879/694, p.277.

34 Cf. C.0.879/694; 702; 717; 746; 763; Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate p.84.

35 Khama to A.C., 8 Aug.1903 — KP.M-1903-5; C0.879/872, pp.96-108 & 227-9. Cf. C0.879/517, pp.150-1.

36 C0.879/872, pp.22 & 45; H.C. to C.O., 15 March 1909 — C.0.417/ 465.
to the south of the Motloutse-Limpopo confluence. The B.P. offered Police assistance to segregate (sic) the Natives into a reserve that would serve as a labour pool for the white farms. And a number of small groups moved into the Crocodile Strip Native Reserve, with the permission of Khama under whose jurisdiction they had been, to pay rent to the Company under that time-honoured method of labour inducement. In May 1911 the Birwa of Malema arrived to take up residence.37

The Chartered Company now began to 'develop' the Crocodile Strip in earnest. Their Native Reserve resolved the ambiguity of Khama having jurisdiction over Tuli Block African residents; and the boundary line was further demarcated for fencing, with Bamangwato assistance (under Cape Law enacted in the B.P. tenants of both sides of a fence were financially liable for it). In 1912 the Company advertised widely in the S.A. Press for white tenants - 'your natural enemies' the Boers, as an English farmer of Middelberg wrote to Khama.38

But in 1920 the Chartered Company sought further adjustments, involving the removal of troublesome tenants - the Birwa of Malema, who after being tricked by a white cattle-dealer had themselves taken to sharp dealing in cattle which set the Bechuanaland Trading Association and the B.P. courts against them.39 The Company turned to the B.P. Government, and the Government turned to the Bamangwato Tribe to effect the removal of the Birwa - and herein lie the seeds of the 'Tragedy of the AbaBirwa' and the Gluckmann Affair.

The death of Khama in 1923 marked the end of an era of colonial rule, in so far as the long-standing personal relationship

37 BP.5/5110.


between Khama and the British was terminated. Furthermore, because of Khama's removal from the scene, the vital medium of mutual accommodation also disappeared, leaving the Bamangwato as a Tribe and the British as Imperialists in an open juxtaposition that could lead to confrontation.

The sourness between Khama and the British that marked the end of the Jousse Affair, wore off slowly, only to be revived by the Gluckmann Affair. Khama who had come so conspicuously to the aid of the British in the wars of 1893 and 1899, refused such assistance in 1916 - in itself an implicit refutation of the 1885 Protectorate promise to 'fight for the country alongside the English'. Khama declined to record his reasons for not offering men to the British between 1916 and 1918 - but three reasons are suggested. Firstly there is Jules Ellenberger's belief that Khama did not wish to involve himself in difficulties over their withdrawal as in the 1893-4 Anglo-Ndebele War - a rather unconvincing reason, given the time span of 23 years and given the fact that Bamangwato were involved in the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War. Secondly there is the possibility that Khama objected to his men being used merely as non-combatant labour in a far-off war in France, though he had been willing to involve his men in 1914 against Germans and Boers in adjacent territories. Thirdly, and most convincingly, the refusal was part of Khama's 'oyster' policy to the British brought on by their betrayal of him in the Jousse Affair.

Anglo-German military activity in the Ghanzi District was limited to November 9th, 1914, with one fatality. The only involvement of the populated part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in hostilities was the capture of Boer rebels by the Ngwaketse Chief Seepapitso in January 1915: on November 11th, 1914, Kuruman had

40 See Chapter 2.
41 Sillery Founding a Protectorate, p.177n.
42 H.C. to C.O., 13 Feb, 1920 - C.O. 417/635.
been captured by these rebels, and Tiger Kloof had been threatened. Recruitment for railway construction in captured South-West Africa began in 1915, but it was not until 1916 that the B.P. Chiefs were called upon to offer labourers for the South African Native Labour Contingent to 'serve' in France. The overall response in southern Africa was low, from distrust of the Union and of a white man's war. Khama declined to respond, but he had made a strong declaration of loyalty to the English King at the outbreak of War, and by February 1916, had already given the British £1200 and 2,000 'curios' for their war funds. Harry Johnston's The Black Man's Part in the War, published in 1917, reported that Khama's people 'have jealously guarded every crossing and railway bridge of the Rhodesia trunk-line passing through Bechuanaland to Central Africa... reinforcing the Rhodesian armies fighting against Germany in Central Africa.' In 1917 recruiting for the S.A.N.L. was intensified, and the R.C. wrote to Khama requesting for labourers for France 'thus releasing His Majesty's troops for fighting' (sic). Garraway said he was much embarrassed by other Chiefs asking why Khama, the greatest Chief of all, had declined to send any men yet. Khama again declined to be of service, and Garraway replied that he was 'very sorry that you do not feel inclined to help His Majesty the King in the matter of sending men home to work in France'. Garraway just couldn't understand why.

45 As Note 42 above; Lewis to L.M.S., 12 Feb.1916; Harry Hamilton Johnston The Black Man's Part in the War London: Simpkin, Marshall etc., 1917, pp.80-1.
46 R.C. to Khama, 22 June 1917 — K.P.(B) Sekgoma to Khama had supplied men and was assured that they came 'in no way in contact with the French people' — Ag.A.C. Francistown to Sekgoma Khama, 25 May 1917: K.P.In.1915-23.
47 R.C. to Khama, 10 July 1917 — K.P.(J)
contribute to the East African campaign (as mentioned by Johnston). Vialls, the trader from Palapye Road, and Philip Sekgoma, both served in the South African forces in East Africa as individuals. But the War came to an end without the Bamangwato committing their regiments to service outside the Reserve. They ceremonially lined the route in their uniforms when MacGregor came to Serowe to announce the Armistice on December 11th, 1918.

Relations between Khama and the B.P. Administration and the L.M.S. operated on a see-saw principle for the last two decades of his reign. When relations were in favour of the Administration, it was entrusted with the planning of the Serowe 'cathedral'. When both the building and good relations began to crumble in 1915, the L.M.S. leapt at the chance to regain confidence with Khama by remedying the 'complete muddle and failure' of the Protectorate officials, by reconstructing the building. The system of administration came under increasing fire from missionaries, who a decade earlier had become despondent at their loss of political influence in the Tribes to government officials. Willoughby called it a Government which, since the loss of Ralph Williams and Milner who had followed Willoughby's advice, 'has never shown the smallest desire to care for the health of body or of mind of the natives that it professedly exists to serve.' Willoughby found no regret in the passing away of the B.P. Administration to Rhodesia or South Africa, which he in 1916 thought inevitable. 'The natives are continually finding fault with it, and many of them state that they have lost all hope of justice from the Govt.'

Haydon Lewis, Khama's resident missionary, on the other hand, was a 'tribalist', and was in favour of reformation rather than abolition of an Administration that he found 'childish and stupid.'

48 C.C. Vialls (HQ Military Labour Corps, Dar-es-Salaam) to Khama 19 Nov. 1918, Rev. Lack (Thaba Nchu) to Khama, 3 July 1917 - K.P(C
49 Mafeking Mail, 17 Dec. 1918, p.2.
50 Lewis to L.M.S., 29 Aug. 1915; Willoughby to L.M.S. 25 April 1916.
51 Willoughby to L.M.S. 28 March & 25 April 1916.
The appointment of Garraway as R.C. (and J. Ellenberger as his deputy) in 1916 gave Willoughby some temporary hope: Garraway was frank and human whereas Panzera "would have saved his face and broken his back" in the process of winding up Garrett, Smith & Co. But by 1918 Lewis was more virulent than ever in denunciation of

"the capacity of the Administration, the chief business of which is to collect taxes, and receive salaries, a business which seems to exhaust the whole of its administrative energies, if such can be called administration." 54

As the failure of the Administration to deal effectively with the Gluckmann Affair led Lewis to further strictures in 1922 against,

"a policy of drift, combined with a sort of divide-and-govern method, put into practice by a staff whose ignorance of the native is simply colossal, and whose body, soul, and spirit are en-coffined by red tape." 55

Garraway's frank and human approach to soothing Khama about the demise of Garrett, Smith & Co. in August 1916, was to blame it on Panzera for granting permission to take on the firm in 1910 - and now it was up to Khama to help the Government out of its difficulty. However, for Khama, faced with a blank wall of official incomprehension ('They know quite well he is wealthy and does not need the money.') over his protest against the undermining of his livelihood, Garraway's approach did not wash at all. Khama pleaded to be left alone to run his business, 'and not worried in his old age in regard to a matter which, though a great matter to him, can be but a small thing in the eyes of His Majesty's Government.' 56 The subsequent dismantling of

53 Willoughby to L.M.S., 5 June & 29 Aug. 1916.
54 Lewis to L.M.S., 27 Aug. 1918.
55 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1922.
Garrett, Smith & Co. was drawn out into the reign of his successor.

The arrangement of 1912 (which Panzera lied about to Khama by calling it the Home Government's initiative rather than his own) whereby the Magistrate was given the judicial powers of an Assistant Commissioner at Serowe, was terminated without Khama's consent or knowledge when Reilly (who succeeded Merry) left the post in August 1916. The post then reverted from full (or Acting) Resident Magistrate to Assistant Resident Magistrate, and it was not long before Khama began to notice that judicial cases were coming up in the Assistant Commissioner's court at Francistown which should have been tried at Serowe. On November 11th, 1916, Khama wrote to the Resident Commissioner who was visiting Serowe. His major complaint concerned an accused murderer, Gaolaolwe, whom he had handed over to the new Serowe Magistrate, Capt. Nettleton, only to have the case transferred to Francistown. This, said Khama, contravened the principle established when he was in England in 1895, and re-affirmed in 1912, that 'when any trial takes place which affects my people and was beyond my power to try, I should be present with the magistrate to hear what is going on.' Khama then came to the general point about the necessity to maintain one capital for the Bamangwato, 'the fountain of their laws', for administration as well as justice. He instanced two administrative issues that were confused between Serowe and Francistown - the granting of traders' licences, and the issue of ammunition permits - which should be rationalised to Serowe alone. His letter ended by emphasising the need to maintain popular legitimacy for the process of law:

In conclusion, Your Honour, I beg to state that unless all matters connected with my country are dealt with at Serowe, Your Honour need not expect the people to obey your laws properly. When any cases are heard at Serowe many people generally go to listen and this is how they are

57 Panzera to Khama, 22 Jan. 1912 (private) - K.P.(B). See Chapter 8. Reilly had fallen ill and Khama expressed the wish that he would not be allowed to return, so Garraway removed Reilly in 'the best interests of the Protectorate,' R.C. to Khama, 25 Aug. 1916: K.P.(B).
benefitted by the hearing of cases at Serowe, and the news of any trial are [sic] thus spread all over the country and as the case is heard here they take particular notice of it.

The R.C. then revealed that Nettleton had only been appointed Assistant Resident Magistrate, unlike Merry or Reilly. And Khama protested by reference to Panzera's decision in 1912 to raise the status of Khama's colonial resident to a full Magistrate. To this Garraway's reply was the the situation could not be helped, because Nettleton was too junior for a full Magistracy. With a War on, it was impossible to find a qualified official, and Nettleton had the rare virtue of fluency in SeTswana. But as soon as a qualified official became available he would be posted to Serowe.59

Thus was Khama satisfied until 1920, when the appointment of a Magistrate to the Tuli Block (Crocodile Strip) further segmented the unity of Bamangwato justice and administration. It was 'with deepest emotion' that Khama confidentially lay complaints against Capt. Garbutt (the Tuli Magistrate) and Col. Daniel (still the A.C.; continuing to exasperate Khama at Francistown). Garbutt had arrested men from inside the Bamangwato Reserve at Bobonong without informing Khama. Daniel had refused a Ngwato tax-collectors entry into the Tuli Block, declaring that the inhabitants were no longer Khama's but the Chartered Company's.

'I have reported to Col. Daniel many things happening leading to corruption but [he] does not take any notice. He only listens to those who break my laws and the Government ... I therefore ask Your Honour to exempt me from Colonel Daniel. I also ask Your Honour to remove Captain Garbutt from the Strip for this reason: I cannot get on well with my people and cannot possibly allow any Magistrate to rule over them without me. They are my own people and the Imperial Government has granted me a big authority to rule over them. The Protectorate is ruled by her own Chiefs, it is not like the Union government where the power of the Chiefs is totally abolished. Colonel Daniel and Captain Garbutt their main

58 Khama to R.C., 11 Nov.1916 - J.503.

59 R.C. to Khama, 22 Nov.1916; Khama to R.C., 28 Nov. 1916; R.C. to Khama, 30 Nov. 1916 - J.503; K.P.(B).
their main object is to stamp out the Chieftainship and introduce the merciless Union Government law. It is rather awkward to me to go on well with the Magistrates of this kind: they will soon put me into trouble with my Government and their removal will be of great value.'

Khama then refused to pass on official correspondence to the R.C. through the A.C. so long as Daniel held the post, and the letter becomes a tirade against him:

'Colonel Daniel has pained me very often ... at first I thought Colonel Daniel is put in Francistown to be your ears ... and I deeply regret he does not at all keep order in the country. He likes petty disputes ... stirs and agitates my people to rise against me, there is now so much understanding with my people he has divided my people into parties and some of them do not at all recognise me as their chief ... I have tried my very best to get along with him and deeply regret cannot do it any longer.'

The letter ended with a plea for immediate answer directly from the Resident Commissioner - otherwise,

'I shall be compelled to come down at once and see you personally ... It is not at all my wish that the tribal correspondence should stop - but they will have to, because as long as Colonel Daniel is on my way I shall not attempt to say anything through him ... I don't know Colonel Daniel - I know His Honour the R.C. who is sent here by the home office to look after me and the affairs of the country.'

The R.C. replied twenty days later regretting 'the personal nature of your complaint against Colonel Daniel ... an old and trusted servant of the Government', and saying that he had asked the High Commissioner to promote Nettleton at Serowe to full Resident Magistrate. On the matter of the Tuli Block, the R.C. (MacGregor assured Khama that Bamangwato tax-collectors would be allowed in after reporting to its Magistrate, nor would that official interfere with Khama's jurisdiction over Bamangwato living within the Tuli Block.

The 'Bamangwato' in question were groups of Birwa living under various headmen, of whom Malema appears to have been the senior.

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60 Khama to R.C., 9 Sept.1920 - J.503.
61 R.C. to Khama, 1 Oct.1920 (ref. A.C. to R.C., 18 Sept. 1920) - J.503.
And in 1920 the B.S.A. Company gave these 'tenants-at-will' notice to quit, as their residential land had been sold off. On October 15th of that year the Magistrate of the Block, Garbutt, interviewed the Birwa headmen - but Malema was not present. By pointing out to them that neither Rhodesia nor the Union would accept them, Garbutt persuaded the headmen to ask Khama for permission to reside in the Bamangwato Reserve - even though they knew that they would be placed under Bobonong where the district governor, Modisaotsile, had in the past 'ill-treated them'.

The B.P. Administration, no doubt anxious to involve Khama because of his recent representations on the Tuli Block, passed the responsibility for removing the Chartered Company's tenants to Khama, who entrusted it to Modisaotsile. On December 24th, 1920, a regiment under Modisaotsile arrived with 23 waggons to 'assist' the migration of the Birwa to Bobonong. Malema, still absent in the Transvaal, and his Johannesburg advocate, Emmanuel Gluckmann, later claimed that the Matsapa (kilted) regiment were first welcomed by a B.P. Policeman, Sgt. Whittlesea, and then attacked the Birwa who refused to move. One Mmirwa had his face smashed in, and others were beaten up: there were other cases of torture, presumed rape, and maybe even murder. Modisaotsile had all Birwa buildings destroyed as well as burnt; and the sum of £1,640 was stolen from Malema's house. On a forced march to Bobonong, Malema claimed water was sold at 2/6 a tin and women were raped every night. Khama on the other hand later produced witnesses to state that there was no lotting, and the only burning was in customary fashion after the houses had been abandoned: a few villagers fled into the bush, but only one man was beaten, for insolence.

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62 The others were Pitso, Madima, Sebatana, Secumalo, & Thutwa.
63 Ag.R.M. Serowe to G.S., 28 Oct.1921; A.R.M. Tuli Block to G.S. 29 Oct.1921 - C.0.417/664. The Gluckmann version is that Garbutt made an order to the Birwa after Khama's envoys had failed to persuade them. Gluckmann never recognised the original B.S.A.Co. initiative in expelling the Birwa and put the initiative on Khama - Tragedy, p.3.
64 Gluckmann Tragedy, pp.3-4.
The fact that crops already planted had not been harvested would support the notion of Birwa resistance, and the need no doubt to meet a December 31st deadline (set by the Company) would support the idea that the Bamangwato action brooked no resistance. The use of a regiment suggests compulsion, though the provision of 23 waggons dilutes the suggestion of a forced march with property burnt and destroyed already. The reputation of cruelty in Motloutse district administration, and particularly by Modisaotsile (cf. Jousse's torture allegations), is born out by circumstantial evidence: Simon Ratshosa called Modisaotsile's rule severe, ruinous and drastic.\(^6\) Cruelty in punishment is the blot placed on Khama's good justice, but it was characteristically accompanied by discipline not seen in the Malema/Gluckmann version. Malema was known to the B.P. Administration as an unscrupulous character, and Khama he had annoyed by his boastful dalliance with the ladies of Serowe.\(^6\) He could not brook over-rule. Did the Birwa in December 1920 really refuse to move because, as he claimed, his chief was not present? The balance of the evidence suggests that though there was arbitrary compulsion and violence in December 1920,\(^6\) in fact the most vicious outburst of Modisaotsile's wrath was directed against Malema and those Birwa who re-occupied their Tuli Block home during 1921 in defiance of the order to quit.

Force was fully in evidence when Malema was expelled from the Tuli Block in May 1921. Buildings were flattened and burnt. Malema was flogged, and then fled to the Transvaal where - in consultation with an 'agitator' named Paul in the Pietersburg District - he approached a Johannesburg legal firm, Saltman & Gluckmann, in June 1921.\(^6\) In October Emmanuel Gluckmann


\(^{66}\) S. Ratshosa 'My Book', p.179.

\(^{67}\) M.E. Malema, para 10.

\(^{68}\) Cf. Sillery Bechuanaland Protectorate, p.138.

\(^{69}\) Saltmann & Gluckmann to H.C., 14 Oct.1921; A.R.M.Tuli Block to G.S., 29 Oct.1921 - C.0.417/664; Gluckmann Tragedy, p.9.
petitioned the High Commissioner for the B.P. Special Court to investigate the case, but the Resident Commissioner reacted that this was 'preposterous' and 'provocative'; Gluckmann had never been admitted to practice in the B.P.; such action would undermine the 1895 'understanding' with the Chiefs; and the case should be referred to the local Administration. 70

Complications arose from Malema's payment of advocates' fees in cattle to Gluckmann. Malema 'gave' Gluckmann 400 cattle probably not all his; and the question of sale permits was complicated by Khama's obstructive attitude as licensing officer and by lung-sickness and Johannesburg abbatoir regulations which Gluckmann did not fully grasp. This led to Administrative slights against a 'German Jew lawyer' who was wheeling £2,000 worth of cattle from Malema to sue Khama for £40,000, and to frustration and fury on Gluckmann's part. In February 1922, the R.C. intervened to make the sale even more impossible. 71 Though as a result lawyers were forbidden to represent Africans in the B.P., Gluckmann took up the issue as a crusade for the Birwa against Khama, or as he quoted the B.P. Crown Prosecutors as saying in a letter from Mafeking:

'Mr Gluckmann... describes himself as a second Moses setting out to deliver his people (the Mabirwa) from the cruel hands of a second Pharaoh.' 72

The Administration set a white-washing administrative enquiry in train, with the reliable Sir Herbert Sloley as commissioner, and excluded it from the judicial field much to Gluckmann's chagrin. So Gluckmann, like Jousse before him, went into print

70 Saltmann & Gluckmann to H.C., 14 Oct. 1921; R.C. to H.C., 5 Nov. 1921; Crown Prosecutor, Mafeking, to G.S., 27 Oct. 1921 - C.O. 417/664.
71 Gluckmann Tragedy pp.6-7; L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1922; Ag.R.M. Serowe, 28 Oct. 1921 - C.O. 417/664. (Gluckmann's lack of local knowledge is belied by his giving the Nguni prefix 'Aba-' to the Birwa, and by a number of other minor errors.)
72 Rand Daily Mail, 16 May 1922.
with an article titled 'Native Tribe Raided and Tortured ... Victims carried off into slavery' in the Rand Daily Mail of May 10th, 1922. This was followed by others on May 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, and 16th - which were then republished as The Tragedy of the Ababirwas and some reflections on Sir Herbert Sloley's report by the Central News Agency. Emmanuel Gluckmann's young son, Herman Max, has since recalled the tension of the times, and how the family employed an ex-(Tribal?) policeman who was too terrified to return to the B.P. after testifying against Khama at the enquiry.73

The Sloley enquiry was published at the beginning of August, leading the London Times to observe: 'Khama exonerated from blame'.74 But Sloley found that Modisaotsile had acted high-handedly - destroying maybe 30 cattle, 5 pigs, etc. Khama was asked to remove Modisaotsile from Bobonong. Arrangements were then begun for the dispersal of the Birwa.75

On August 21st, 1922, Khama wrote his bitterest ever letter to the British - to complain about the 'tyrannical correspondence' arriving at the Serowe A.R.M.'s office, from officials and from Gluckmann. He blamed Jules Ellenberger, the Acting R.C., and 'Sir Herbert Slowly' for their handicapped and dilatory actions in the face of Gluckmann's threats. (The deeper significance of the correspondence may be glimpsed by accepting that 'Gluckmann' symbolised the semi-immediate prospect of


74 Government Gazette No.1083 (unseen); Times, 9 Aug.1922.

75 H.C. to Khama, 16 Sept.1922 - J.199; L.M.S. annual (mss) Serw 1922. These Birwa refused to buy land in Rhodesia offered by the B.S.A.Company for £5,000; and Nata, Sekgoma Khama's former exile, was ruled out. Sekgoma II inherited the Birwa problem. Malema (d.19 March 1960) was placed at Bobonong; his son Senamolela (d. 1949) was released from imprisonment at Serowe to live 13 miles from his father at Molalatau. Other Birwa were kept at Serowe (GoKonyane), while others scattered to Southern Rhodesia and in the Tswapong - M.E.Malema, passim; J. Mockford Seretse, pp.177-8.
absorption into the Union.) The Administration had arrested men on the prerogative of Tribal government - at Bobonong for rape over a year after the Birwa incidents merely to please the pamphleteer ing Mr. Gluckmann:

'The Protectorate Officials look upon Mr. Gluckmann as their supreme head ... I am despised and neglected by the Protectorate authorities ... The Protectorate is now governed by the Laws invented by the Government Officials of which no agreement has been signed between the Late Queen Victoria and myself at the time I invited her to protect me.'

Unless precautions were taken to preserve the power of the Chieftainship on which the system of colonial rule depended, Kham warned, 'serious tribal riots are sure to come.' (The full flower of his prophesy took exactly thirty years to materialise). Khama assured H.R.H. Prince Arthur of Connaught, High Commissioner and Governor-General of South Africa, that he remained loyal to the British Crown, but:

'I receive nothing of the good laws of England but oppression from the Officials.'

Connaught promptly summoned Khama to Pretoria on September 2nd, and concentrated on the solution of specific issues on which the H.C. expressed 'pleasure in complying with your requests' - the watering arrangements for Gluckmann's cattle, the destruction of palm trees by Birwa at Bobonong, and settling a claim by R.A. Bailey against Khama out of Protectorate funds. Furthermore Connaught admitted that the Administration 'must accept some responsibility' for the mishandling of the Birwa removal, in not having properly informed Khama of its rationale, method, or consequence. Therefore, Gluckmann's complaints ('out of consideration for your feelings') had been or would be dealt with as complaints against the Administration in general, of which Khama was a component, and not as a judicial matter for the arraignment of an illustrious ruler. Gluckmann was to be given the paltry sum of £350 for 728 head of cattle by the Administration (which would then hand them back to the Birwa via

76 Khama to H.C., 21 Aug.1922 (private via Tom Brown) - K.P.In.: 1915-23; also Parsons Word, p.25.
Khama, as it was feared that Malema's commitment had deprived the Birwa of their livelihood. And it was no longer insisted that Modisaotsile be removed from Bobonong.\footnote{H.C. to Khama, 16 Sept. 1922, J. 199.} Khama had indeed been given a moral victory over Gluckmann by His Royal Highness.

As for Gluckmann, he was - like W.C. Willoughby - a liberal exponent of Development by the abolition of Tribalism and the incorporation of Africans into the modern sector symbolised by the Union. \((\text{He subsequently specialised in defending Africans in the Union, and was Clements Kadalie's attorney}^\text{78}.\) Nobody suggested, as with Jousse, that he was part of a wider conspiracy. But the willingness of the Argus Group to publish his story does have wider political significance in that the future of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, whether to join Rhodesia or the Union, was again in the melting pot.

The question of incorporating Bechuanaland into the Union had been left high and dry by the Great War, and was floated again after 1919. The Colonial Office reached the private decision that the decision should be deferred until two conditions had been fulfilled - until Rhodesia joined the Union, and until Khama was dead (so great was their respect for his ability to raise up clamour in the House of Commons).\footnote{Gluckmann Tragedy, p. 1; Gluckman 'The tribal area', pp. 373-4.}\footnote{This is brought out clearly in Hyam Failure, pp. 86-8.} Furthermore, it was explicitly stated that the B.P. must remain 'undeveloped', for (as Gluckmann had also realised) 'any successful policy of development would almost certainly precipitate a demand for transfer to the Union Government.'\footnote{Hyam Failure, p. 87; Gluckmann Tragedy, p. 1.}

The difference between the British and the BaTswana on the question of incorporation into the Union was that the former

\footnote{\text{77} H.C. to Khama, 16 Sept. 1922, J. 199.} \footnote{\text{78} Gluckmann Tragedy, p. 1; Gluckman 'The tribal area', pp. 373-4.} \footnote{\text{79} This is brought out clearly in Hyam Failure, pp. 86-8.} \footnote{\text{80} Hyam Failure, p. 87; Gluckmann Tragedy, p. 1.}
always talked in terms of mere postponement of the inevitable, whereas Tswana Chiefs (and, later, African nationalists in the Union) blankly opposed transfer on any terms at any time. Selborn had caused annoyance to the Chiefs in his hand-over speech to Gladstone at Gaborone's in August 1910, when he urged them to join the Union voluntarily. Willoughby took much the same view, in order to gain the best terms for the inevitable.81 Khama can hardly have been well pleased by Panzera's private farewell letter of 1915 in which, puffed up by the usual 'Pan' face-saving and bombast, Khama was given 'assurance' of the protection of Tribal lands from the Union government when the inevitable happened.

'I was at home and was one of those who drew up the Schedule to the Act of Union and it was through my strong representations that clauses were put in which secured to the Chiefs their present powers in their own Tribes and the undisturbed possession of their Reserves, even if ever the Protectorate came into the Union.'82

Between 1919 and 1924 the Bechuanaland Protectorate was not under direct threat from the Union, whose energies were concentrated on Swaziland: Bechuanaland came behind Basutoland as the next victim if Swaziland should fall.83 The greater threat to Bechuanaland was piecemeal incorporation at least of the Northern Protectorate should Khama die. In 1921 Southern Rhodesia laid claim to the Tati Concession in the event of its own self-government in 1923, and J.C. Smuts the South African prime minister made no objection.84 In 1920, the Birwa expulsion being a direct consequence, the Chartered Company began the 'development' of the Crocodile Strip delayed by the War. The very fact that it was re-named the 'Tuli Block' belies Rhodesian expansionist

81 Lloyd to L.M.S., 17 Aug. 1910; Willoughby to L.M.S., 28 March, 10 April, 25 April, 1916 & 7 Jan. 1914.
82 Panzera to Khama, 27 June 1915 - K.P. (L).
83 Hyam Failure, p. 93.
expectations, since the place called Tuli, though adjacent to the Block was in fact in Southern Rhodesia. And in July 1921, meeting at Mahalapye, the new whites of the Block asked to become part of the Rhodesia Province should S.R. and the B.P. be incorporated into the Union. 85

Khama's death was followed by much speculation on the B.P.'s future, now that the 'compact of Khama with the British Colonial Office' had expired. 86 The idea of such a 'compact' had been formulated by J.C. Harris' popular biography of Khama in 1922. 87 Though legally fictitious, it did indeed have foundation in the understanding of the British Colonial Office, and in the fact that the British, especially where 'Natives' were concerned, were unable to grasp that political arrangements and understandings had an institutional value beyond mere personalities. However in this sense, because Union and Rhodesian claims abated in 1923 for a decade, Khama lived on until the 1930s in the survival of the 'compact' - just as did his 'understanding' of 1895 till the Indirect Rule proclamations. In both cases his son, Tshekedi Khama, was to take on the mantle of his father.

The view of Khama's relationship with the British so far presented in this Chapter has stressed its negative aspects. But the frustrations given vent by the Jousse and Gluckmann Affairs must be seen in the wider context of a colonial system of administration that, as with Barotseland or Buganda or Northern Nigeria, normally implicitly relied on Tribal government for the continuity of everyday policy and practice. This reliance was made even

85 H.C. to C.O., 29 July 1921 - C.O.417/663.
87 Harris Khama, pp.102-3. Cf. Jennings to L.M.S., 15 Jan.1923, which pointed out that the lifetime 'compact' between Khama and the C.O. had no foundation in documents pertaining to 1895.
stronger by Khama's personal status as a 'G.O.M.', whose distinctive voice could be heard as far as Whitehall on occasions, even if the accumulation of petty officialdom between Khama and the Colonial Secretary increasingly blocked the channel.

Khama was part of the 'old boy' network of the British Empire. Selborne and Buxton had been involved in his 1895 deputation to Britain; Milner, his High Commissioner of 1897-1901, became Colonial Secretary between 1919 and 1921. Lord Lugard, with whom he had dined in style, published his *Dual Mandate* in 1922; Robert Baden-Powell, the leader of the Imperial Boy Scouts movement was the brother of a friend and was moved to observe that Khama 'led a clean, healthy life' and was a fine example for boys to follow. The words of Khama ("England takes care of her things, but she throws away her people") even featured in an appeal for the East London Foundlings Society in the early 1920s.

After his initial abortive meeting with Khama on his sickbed in 1916, Buxton saw to the cultivation of good relations with the Chief. They met at Mahalapye in 1917 when Buxton was on a shooting trip to the Limpopo, and chatted amiably. Their third meeting was at Palapye Road station on July 22nd, 1919, when Khama greeted Buxton with 400 men in uniforms and a band. Their fourth and last meeting was in August 1920 when Khama came to say good-bye to Buxton at Cape Town. Khama held Buxton's 14-month grandson in his arms to be photographed: 'the very tall, very dark South African Chief, holding in his arms with the greatest tenderness the very small, very fair, English child'. Buxton felt he had good reason, as he wrote in the *London Times*,


89 Barbara Tchaykovsky M.D. to Editor of unidentified newspaper, n.d. - L.M.S. Press-Cuttings, Vol.1920-30, p.200. (The words were not Khama's but Bathoen's in fact - remarked after visiting the Tower of London museum in 1895: Parsons 'Three Botswana Chiefs', Chap.4, Note 66.)
to look upon Khama 'as a personal friend'.

Prince Arthur of Connaught, who succeeded Buxton as High Commissioner, was also initially unsuccessful in gaining Khama's confidence, but eventually won through by showing due deference to a ruler of 50 years experience and nearing 90 years of age. Khama celebrated his golden jubilee as King (1872-1922) in July 1922, with the Maphatswa (black-and-white), Makobamotse (green), Matlhohela (yellow), and Matsapa (red) regiments putting on the last great daylight tattoo of Khama's life. Khama made this the occasion for public preaching to his re-instated heir on the duties of Chieftainship. He indeed stressed loyalty to the British Crown, but it is ironic that the L.M.S. had a predominant role in his 1922 political jubilee, while in 1910/11 the Government was predominant at the time of his religious jubilee. August saw the height of Khama's bitterness against the British over the Gluckmann Affair, but September 2nd saw Connaught's soothing interview in Pretoria with Khama entertained as a venerable dignitary. Khama was accompanied to Pretoria by his new Resident Magistrate (E.H.M. Drury) and by the Acting R.C., Jules Ellenberger. Also present was the latter's son, Vivien Ellenberger, a new recruit to the B.P. Administration as a Police sub-inspector - who, according to the reminiscence of Amos Kgamanyane Pilane, together with Johnnie Ratshosa acted as constant personal attendant and almost bodyguard to the ancient Chief. The party stayed at KaMoselekatse, the mines' compound manager's reception centre for guests on the Rand: Khama ate with the whites. While in the city centre of Pretoria, he was

91 He gave Khama only 20 minutes of his time, on his way through to Southern Rhodesia by train on 10 Aug. 1921 - H.C. to C.O., 4 Nov., 1921; C.O. 417/664.
presented to the prime minister of the Union, Jan Smuts, who was courteous in accepting Khama's thanks for the hospitality. 94

An indication of Khama's ambivalent attitude to the British emerges from talks, long into the night by his fire, that Khama had in 1920 with A.E. Blackburn, the visiting Secretary of the Native Races and the Liquor Traffic United Committee of London. Khama constantly barked back to his earlier more direct relationship with Great Britain, especially in 1895, and how the colonial system increasingly diverged from the principles upheld by the metropolitan power.

KHAMA: "For me the law of the Protectorate must be the law administered from England..."

KHAMA: "I want to stay here with my own people in my own land, that I may speak to them plainly that they may not be tempted by outside influences for wrong, and in this I desire to be protected by the British Government, from every outside influence that would tend to evil."

KHAMA: "I am still looking to England with both eyes and listening with both ears." 95

Blackburn evidently felt himself commissioned to represent Khama's loyalty to the King in Britain; with the result that Khama was then obliged to deny to his masters that he would make such an approach through unofficial channels. 96

The Khama Papers reveal a significant measure of continuing unofficial and semi-official contacts, carried on by Khama, often

jubilee address sent by the Ngwato Church to the L.M.S. dated 24 July 1922 (encl. Lewis to L.M.S., 30 July 1922) quoted "I govern by means of the Church" as a favourite expression of Khama. The testiness of his relations with the Imperial Factor comes out over a young female giraffe which he offered to the British king in 1921: the gift was refused unless Khama paid transport costs, which Khama wouldn't do - R.C. to H.C., 30 May 1921 (C.O. 417/661); H.C. to C.O. 11 July 1921 (C.O. 417/662).

93 H.C. to Khama, 16 Sept. 1922 - J.199; A.K. Pilane, para. 20.
94 P.M. Pretoria to Khama, 29 Sept. 1922 - K.P. (J).
96 H.C. to C.O. 23 Aug. 1921; Ag. R.M. Serowe to G.S. 25 July 1921 (C.O. 417/663).
with roots in 1895, with British individuals in Britain and South Africa ('Europeans' in local English terms). Khama's contact with estate agents in Hove, England, has already been cited. This quite probably stemmed from 1895 when Khama twice stayed in Brighton. It was not unusual for correspondents to introduce themselves as observers of his visit to Britain - a man wanting game for a private park in 1902; a clothing manufacturer (presumably for regimental uniforms) in 1912; a seeker of leopard skins from Sheffield in the same year; a Transvaal farmer's wife wanting 'boys' for 5/- a week and 'girls' for 2/6 in 1922. Khama maintained correspondence with the captain of the Castle liner on which he had steamed to Plymouth, and with the brothers Sir Evan and Sir Albert Spicer. Correspondence with 'Europeans' also stemmed from common concern with temperance and/or Church affairs. This was particularly fervid in 1912 over a S.A. bill to introduce 'light wines' into mine compounds, and provide contacts with English-speaking 'liberal' families of the Cape, like the Schreiners and the mother of Will Stuart. Semane was a leading light in the W.C.T.U. (Women's Christian Temperance Union) 'white ribbon workers.' Other correspondence covered such topics as the origins of cattle breeds (Prof. Wallace of Glasgow), and whether a lady called Miss Glossop could paint Khama's portrait.

No less significant were Khama's contributions to British or European charities, which increased towards the end of the Great War because of proliferating appeals from the charity-based

97 See above Chapter 9.
98 C. Newberry (Prymnsberg O.R.C.) to Khama, 20 Sept. 1902 - K.P(1) 1891-1902; Chas. Wills & Sons (Bristol) to Khama, 14 Sept. 1912 - Arnold Marsh (Bulawayo) to Khama, 10 Nov. 1912 - K.P.(C); Mrs. O.M. Cottrell (Farm Goedgelegen, Zeerust) to Khama, 15 Nov. 1922 - K.P(C). 99 Outward Bound, Vol. III, No. 31 (April 1923), pp. 484-6.
100 Sec. Church Temperance Society (Cape Town) to Khama, 1 & 24 March 1912; H.H.R. Shaw (Cape Town) to Khama, n.d. 101 Theo L. Schreiner (Cape Town) to Khama, 13 Aug. 1918 - K.P.(C); Mrs. M. Shaw, para. 10.
101 R.A. Bailey to Khama, 17 Feb. 1914 - K.P.(C); E.C.C. Garraway (Maseru) to Khama, 13 April 1921 - K.P.(J); Khama to Garraway, 23 April 1921 - K.P.(I).
welfare system in Great Britain, and because Khama preferred to give money than men to a remote war as a symbol of his 'loyalty'. The Bamangwato are officially cited with having given £1642/13/- to the 'war effort' - inducing Serowe whites to give £1013/19/6 against a total of £148/11/11 from Mafeking and £2516/9/6 from Francistown. Most of this money went to the British Red Cross, and the Prince of Wales Fund. Other reports speak of a total of £1200 and 200 'curios' (karosses, wooden figurines, horns) by 1916 or £817 by early 1917; 2598 'curios' for the Governor-General's fund in November 1917; and a gift of cigarettes by Khama to every member of the S.A.N.L.C. in France. Among numerous appeals and donations are: £43 (October 1917), £63 (July 1918), and £200 (December 1918) to the Red Cross; £175 to a London naval hospital and £8 to a widows' fund; a donation to a cemetery in Flanders; appeals from Charing Cross Hospital (claimed as Livingstone's training ground) and on behalf of the 'suffering mites' of post-war Europe.

Khama was no rebel therefore, but a passionate supporter of the British Empire and the better values that he recognised in its metropolis. He supported the 'weak' system of local administration in the Protectorate so far as it remained weak in relation to forcing outside opinions and plans on him. What provoked his dissatisfaction was the real or supposed impotence of its officials in yielding before settler pressures from Rhodesia or the Union, as exemplified by the Jousse and Gluckmann Affairs. The threat to Khama lay in the impermanence of the system of local administration rather than in the system itself. It was by itself powerless against white settlerdom: it could only be maintained by the leverage of a special relationship direct with Great Britain.

The judicial administrative relationship of the local colonial representative, the Serowe Magistrate, with the Tribal


administration depended on whether the post was 'Acting' (full) or 'Assistant'. The Magistrate's role was to deal with cases on appeal from Tribal courts, with the alien (especially trading) community, and with administrative details such as enforcement of government regulations and the checking of tax returns. An Acting R.M. had more power in these respects, and was assisted by a white Clerk, whereas an Assistant R.M. had to pass on most such matters to the A.C. at Francistown. The Magistrate did not move from Serowe to 'tour' as did the later District Commissioner at least not until after 1920 when the use of a motor-lorry made such itineration feasible. Unlike Native Commissioners in other territories, he did not have to ride or walk round collecting taxes. There were white Police officers at Palapye Road, Rakops, Macloutsie, Seleka, Nekati, and Mahalapye, with sub-magisterial duties, but it is not clear how far they were subordinate to Serowe, to Francistown, or to Mafeking.

Local colonial administration - though its office hours were short and its itineration minimal and, as Jousse complained, its main function was a social one maintaining the Chief's favour - was not merely a thin gloss on Tribal government. The case of Sgt. G.M. Petrie, the R.M.'s Clerk at Serowe, illustrates this. It was the duty of the Magistrate's Clerk to keep the central tribal tax registers: a duty so well performed by Petrie, and ill performed by other Policemen, that Khama petitioned for Petrie to stay on in 1916, and was at least successful for a matter of months. The sharing of responsibilities between Chief and Magistrates can be seen in the case of two mail-runners, Masasa and Chilomi, between Serowe and Tsau in Ngamiland. They were recruited by Khama but paid by the British. When they erred in 1914 by exceeding their normal maximum run (30 days) by 11 days, the Tsau R.M. asked Serowe to fine them. Khama wouldn't, so the Serowe R.M. docked their pay by half.

104 M.M. Sekgoma, para. 20.
106 H. Butler (Mafeking) to Anti-Slavery & Aborigines' Protection Society, 5 April 1916; R.C. to H.C. 3 Oct. 1916 - R.H.L. Oxford:
There are few records of judicial cases given a first hearing in Bamangwato courts that reached beyond the Acting R.M. or the A.C. at Francistown. Most, if not all, these cases would have been of murder, which was the prerogative of the Resident Commissioner to try. Ralph Williams judged one such case at Old Palapye in 1901/2; and a sensational case, that of Mookodi, came before MacGregor at Lobatse in 1919. A preliminary hearing had been held before the A.C. at Serowe. Mookodi, a ngaka from the Boteti (the characteristic location of 'medicine murders' in Botswana), admitted to being a moloi (sorcerer) who killed a woman for medicine. Mookodi was sentenced to death, now protesting his innocence to Khama from Gaborone's gaol.\(^{107}\)

The cordial level of normal contacts between Tribal and Colonial administrations can be seen in British anxiously to justify their actions to Khama, and in his desire for the bureaucracies to smoothly interlock. The R.C. obliged Khama by not returning Reilly as R.M. in 1916; and in 1922 when a row erupted between Druzy as R.M. and his Clerk, it was considered right to inform Khama that an infra-Administrative enquiry would be initiated, and indeed Khama and Sekgoma became involved in the quarrel!\(^{108}\)

Another form of cooperation with the British was the provision of Tribal land for colonial public works. The precedent for this was the 100-yard railway strip and its three station reserves; but the Administration did not - as Khama was reassured when refusing a stand for a veterinary laboratory at Palapye Road in 1920 - press for freehold title. In 1920 amicable arrangements were reached for a new government administrative reserve at Elebe on the Tuli Block border, and for an aerodrome for the Cape-to-Cairo route at Palapye Road. Palapye Road was the logical midway stop between Pretoria and Bulawayo en route for

\(^{107}\) Williams Governor, p.281; Mafeking Mail, 10 Nov.1919, p.3; Mookodi (Gaborone's jail) to Khama, 12 Nov.1919 - K.P.(K). There are references elsewhere to Khama handing over murderers to the British: I have not checked the relevant judicial files of the R.

Livingstone (viz. terrain and land communications), and was first inspected by an R.A.F. pilot in January 1919. Bamangwato laid out the aerodrome at Tribal expense, and the B.P. undertook to maintain it for £50 p.a. It was to serve for an R.A.F. Handley Page mailplane and later for Imperial Airways. A British newspaper greeted the news of Khama's assistance to the air-route with a 'prediction', difficult for a historian to restrain from quoting on the centenary of David Livingstone's death.

'And Livingstone has not yet been half a century in his grave. Who can imagine what the newspapers of fifty years hence will be reporting as the latest events in Africa.'

But cordiality did not mean espousal of all the Administration's projects, especially if they threatened to upset the political balance. Khama resolutely refused to join the Native Advisory Council, formed in 1920 at the same time as one for the Europeans of the territory, to advise on the administration of a Native Fund derived from a new tax. When the Chiefs at the first session of the N.A.C. at Gaborone's regretted that 'our father' was not there, MacGregor the R.C. informed them that Khama had said he was an old man and would not have anything to do with the Council, but would enforce the 3/- Native Fund tax on his people. MacGregor attempted to end the discussion there, but under more questioning cited Khama as having said:

"I am old and want to deal with the Government only."

MacGregor sent Khama a copy of the minutes and received no answer. The second session was held in March 1921, and delegates asked that Khama ('a trunk of a tree on which we lean'), if too old himself to attend, should send delegates.


110 Minutes of First Session of Native Advisory Council (Nov.1920), pp.3-4 (Copy in B.N.A.); R.C. to Khama 10 Dec.1920 - K.P.In.1915-25.

111 Minutes of Second Session of Native Advisory Council (March 1921), pp.4, 6-7, 12 (copy in C.O.417/661).
the progressive Regent of the Kgatla, then corresponded with Khama on the issue. Khama replied by harking back to his lifetime's obsession - Drink. He would only attend if the abolition of liquor and beer drinking were discussed. Isang Pilane's reply can hardly have reconciled the very old monarch: Isang defended the drinking of beer, and talked glowingly of the rights of black people and of Parliaments, condemning Absolute Monarchy ('which you, Chief, are possibly seeking'). 112

Khama's action succeeded in influencing the whites of Serowe and of the Tati Concession (the Tati Company manager of the time, J.W. Bowman, being friendly to Khama) also to boycott the European Advisory Council. Delegates from Ngamiland could not attend the N.A.C. because of travel difficulties, so both N.A.C. and E.A.C. were for some time, as Isang Pilane said, 'Southern Protectorate Councils' and not 'National Advisory Councils'. 113

At Khama's death therefore it is difficult to classify his relations with his 'protectors' as uniformly good or bad. The administrative relationship had become institutionalised by time and custom; but it was not capable of undergoing processes of reform dictated from outside. The basis of the relationship had been partnership of a form between Tribalism and Colonialism. Tribalism, though it was too well grounded to fall apart with Khama's death, at least lost momentum in the development of the relationship. This comes out nowhere clearer than in Bamangwato tax returns, which burgeoned onwards from £3000 to over £13,000 between 1899 and 1908, but which dropped from over £18,000 to under £14,000 between 1918 and 1922. 114

This may primarily be attributed to economic conditions - restricted access to the

112 Schapera Tribal Innovators, pp.185-6 (citing Schapera 'The native as letter writer' The Critic, No.2, 1933, pp.20-8). Isang had presented a constitution to the N.A.C. which was thought to have A.N.C. connections, with clauses including:

4f. To discourage and contend against racialism and tribal feuds, or to secure the elimination of racialism and tribal feuds, jealousy and petty quarrels, by economic combination, education, goodwill and by other means.

113 Minutes of First Session of European Advisory Council (March 1921). J.W. Bowman (Francistown) to Khama, 10 Feb.1921 - K.P.(A) H.C. to C.O., 22 Feb.1921 - C.O.417/657 Minute of First Session of Native Advisory Council; p.4.
export market for cattle; and the effects of a general depression in South Africa which dipped the cattle price to 15/-.

Drought brought on crop failure and famine, and the depletion of cash reserves: debilitation brought on disease and a high death rate. It may be called a time of spiritual depression; and it even saw unusual spirit-possession cases in Shoshong. And yet, as Haydon Lewis said, the Government continued to demand its pound of flesh in tax, adding three shillings to the demand, thus heightening taxes in proportion to the deepening distress of the general public.  

But the rate at which taxation was paid, may not only be seen as an index of economic conditions but also of 'loyalty' to the British on the part of the Tribal administration which did the collecting through the regimental system. For example, the collection for 1922-3 proceeded during the height of Khama's bitterness during August 1922, and the first returns for 1922-3 in November showed a yield of only £2,653 for the Bamangwato Reserve. (By March 1923 it had climbed back to £13,768: but the system penalised a Chief by reducing his 10% if he delivered after July). That the 'Hut Tax' was not without political effect on the morale of the people can be seen in one of Khama's Exhortations to his people as preserved in the Khama Papers. His people had not sent their young men to form a new regiment (presumably the Masokola of 1912). Why not?

'The reason for your refusal being that if the young men were to be given a new name, the hut-tax was going to increase and become more severe than before, for you would have to pay for both yourselves and your young men.'  


115 Tom Brown (Serowe) to L.M.S., 7 July 1921; L.M.S. annuals (mss) Serowe 1921 & 1922, Molepolole 1922 & Kanye 1922.

116 Ag.R.C. to Khama, 21 Nov.1922 - K.P.(B); B.P.33/163; 'Khama's Exhortation' (Appendix 1 below).
The bureaucratisation of Tribal administration was pressed forward by the emergence of a literate elite and by subordination of the state within the colonial administrative framework, making necessary tax-registers for audit, the filing of correspondence for reference purposes, etc. These processes, already outlined, were consolidated in the latter years of Khama by rationalisation of a Tribal secretariat at the centre and of Tribal district administration at the periphery of the state.

The genius behind the organisation of a central secretariat was Gaopotlhake Kebailele Sekgoma - as can be seen from the great numbers of carbon-copy letter books and looseleaf correspondence in the Khama Papers with out-letters signed for Khama 'per G.K.S.' Gaopotlhake was the son of Kebailele, Khama's full-brother and right hand man for the last half of his reign - acting as regent during the Chief's absence, and as a sort of prime minister inside the Kgotla, and outside as an envoy. Gaopotlhake graduated from Lovedale with a pass in the (non-racial) Cape Colony pupil-teachers second grade examinations of December 1903. His role was more of a clerical than of a political nature: John Ratsosa succeeded his father as political Secretary and adviser (also becoming the Magistrate's interpreter at one stage), whereas Gaopotlhake's role as Secretary was more that of a principal bureaucrat (in the steps of Simeon Seisa). The intrusion of hands other than 'G.K.S.' for both English and SeTswana correspondence is evident in the Khama Papers. We know that Simon Ratsosa, the principal of the 'Serowe Public School', also acted as a member of the Chief's secretariat. But Gaopotlhake stands out both for the amount of correspondence handled, and for developing a literary fluency which reads like that of a well educated native-speaker of the English tongue. As Edwin Lloyd remarked in 1909, it was not just colonial Magistrates who had ousted foreign

118 K.B, passim; M.M. Sekgoma, para 17.
missionaries as political advisers to Chiefs - but, more importantly, local born Private Secretaries. Gaopotlhake, though, became trusted as the 'objective', discreet, efficient civil servant rather than displaying himself as a 'politician'.

An indication of the operation of the Tribal secretariat may be had from the numbers of surviving carbon-copy letterbooks in the Khama Papers. There are 11 such books of out-letters between 1898 and 1922, of which 7 cover the years 1908-1920. For example, the volume for March to September 1911 contains 96 letter copies, of which 6 were deleted: other volumes have room for 100 copies. To take another example, the volume for November 1908 to February 1911, covering the first two years of Gaopotlhake's tenure as Secretary, includes 79 entries. 32 letters were written to traders, 29 to various Bamangwato headmen in outlying areas, and 12 to other Chiefs or headmen elsewhere in the B.P.; 3 were written to Africans in South Africa, and 1 each to Howard Moffat in Bulawayo and Wardlaw Thompson in London. There are no letters to Government in this volume: copies of these, and of other letters sent on loose-leaf files (probably not all surviving) marked with subject titles. Not all the correspondence conducted by the secretariat was for the Chief: other Bamangwato would dictate letters, on such matters as transactions with traders in Bulawayo etc.

Gaopotlhake died in 1919 from the current influenza epidemic. He was succeeded by John Ratshosa as Secretary to Khama in a clerical as well as political capacity. His death produced financial complications for Khama, as 'G.K.S.' had been speculating in cattle sales between producers and traders, and therefore left a number of debts to be paid off. A file in the Khama Papers on his estate, records loans of up to £50 from traders and a current account at the Standard Bank, Mafeking.

119 Lloyd to L.M.S., 29 Sept. 1909.
121 See Statement of Sources II/A.1. below.
One letter in the file from Garrett, Smith & Co. in 1915, is ambiguous but mentions the sum of £600 in two instalments.\(^{122}\)

The importance given to the secretariat can be seen back in 1898 when Khama accused Sekgoma of having tampered with his papers of state: and in 1922 part of infra-elite factional struggles consisted of a Bo-Ratshosa accusation that Semane had bribed her own maid to steal some of Khama's official papers.\(^{123}\)

The contacts of the secretariat (personified as 'Khama') with traders and officials have been the subject of previous Chapters. It remains to consider the two other main areas of bureaucratic contact - regional administration within the Bamangwato Reserve, and with Chiefs and other Africans outside the Reserve.

Within the B.P. the Khama Papers show irregular but not infrequent contact with other Chiefs - Ngwaketse, Kwenla, Kgalala, and Rolong. There is surprisingly little evidence of correspondence with the Tawana Chief, to whom there was a direct mail service from Serowe - perhaps a separate file was kept for this which has since been mislaid. Outside the B.P. there is evidence of contact with the Lozi, with the Sotho (Basuto), and with various people such as Rev. Sehemo, an independent pastor (over a marriage) in the western Transvaal. Such correspondence is nearly always in SeTswana, and concerns such matters as the actions of Bamangwato individuals abroad. But much of it is of a general nature: communicating Khama's advice and ideas - again liquor and *bogwera*: sorrow or surprise at the death of Edward VII, the outbreak of the Great War, etc.\(^{124}\) Khama's contact with

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\(^{122}\) K.P.(D) 'Estate of Gaopotlhake Keabailele (1909-1919), passim; also comment in file marked 'Simon Ratshosa' in Bamangwato Tribal Archives.

\(^{123}\) Lewis to L.M.S., 24 April 1922.

\(^{124}\) K.P., passim. Some letters have been translated for me; others I have perused myself. My coverage has been inadequate. Khama's SeTswana correspondence is voluminous enough to merit a small scholarly project of analysis. (Much of it is too faded to be photographed).
outside royalty was usually on the level of paternal advice, but in the case of his Kwena and Ngwaketse relatives he was more intimately concerned. The papers contain a full report of the civil divorce case of Seepapitso II from Mogatsakgari Ratshosa, his grand-daughter.\[125\]

Khama, as has been seen in the case of the South African Native National Congress, did not wish to maintain contacts with educated African nationalists or pan-Africanists, who might embroil him in the politics of the Union.\[126\] (He was only prepared to combine with other Africans if they were Chiefs inside the B.P. - viz. 1895 and 1910, though not in the N.A.C. of 1920.) Khama tartly refused to see the eccentric pan-Africanist F.Z.A. Peregrino in 1911 (and warned Chief Lekoko of Mafikeng off him): no doubt Peregrino wished Khama, like Iewanika, to become a patron of the New York-based Negro Society for Historical Research.\[127\] In reply to a request ultimately for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in February 1923, the R.C. replied that pan-Africanism did not even exist in the Protectorate, 'and I do not expect there will be so long as the tribal system is maintained'.\[128\] However in September 1923, Sekgoma II received a letter from J.A. Barbour James, President of the Association of Coloured Peoples (London) and of the Victoria Institute of British Guiana, who claimed to have been a correspondent of Khama III since the Anglo-Boer War.\[129\]

Bureaucratization was an integral part of decentralisation in the

\[125\] K.P.(E).

\[126\] See above Chapter 8.

\[127\] Khama to Peregrino (Francistown), 12 Aug. 1911; Khama to Lekoko Montshiwa, 18 March 1911 - K.P.Out 1911. Cf. 'Peregrino' mss by Q.N. Parsons for Edinburgh University History Dept. 1970.

\[128\] R.C. to H.C., 20 March 1923 (secret) - S.8/3.

\[129\] J.A.B. James (London W.3) to S.K. 19 Sept. 1923 - K.P.(H)
Ngwato state. Intensification of the central secretariat went hand-in-hand with the extensification of regional centres of control in the Reserve. This process did not reach its apex until the 1940s, under the direction of Tshekedi Khama. By 1949 there were 12 Chief's Representatives, or district governors, in the Reserve. The process of their formation had been gradual and evolutionary, but it is possible to see the foundations of the governorships of Shoshong, Bobonong, Mmadinare, Tonota, Palapye/Tswapong and Mahalapye within the reign of Khama III. Only Bobonong (under Modisaotsile) and Mmadinare (under Phetu Mphoeng) can be recognised as true district governorships within the reign of Khama - its governors having no local ethnic affiliations, but exercising the delegated powers of the Paramount Chief by virtue of individual appointment (an implicit 'contract' not hereditary), and maintaining contact with the central secretariat through regular correspondence. Payment took the form of a share of matimela cattle due to the Chief. However, some of these conditions were already met by sub-chiefs or headmen elsewhere in Khama's Country. Khama had appointed his brother to act as sub-chief of other ethnic groups at Shoshong; special headmen had been appointed to check discipline and influx at the railway stations; Rauwe at Tonota, Mhafshwa in Bokalaka, Motsholapheko Kedikilwe of Sefhope, or Nkobele Ngwako (Makome), all had some degree of correspondence with the Serowe secretariat.

However Khama did not spurn age-old methods of maintaining the allegiance of his regional chiefs, by giving them his daughters as wives. A marriage, as could be seen in his own son's marriage to a woman of Khama's choice in 1920, was the seal of contract. Phetu Mphoeng probably put away another wife in order to marry Khama's daughter Milly; Modisaotsile was already married to another daughter, Mma-Kgama. Khama's daughter Pidio had married Tswwene Mosinyi of the Kaa; their daughter, Kwakogile (Mma-Kgari married Masupe of Maunatlala before the Great War. Besi had of

130 D.C. Serowe to G.S., 19 Jan.1949 - B.P.34/N3.
131 This has been impressed on me by two experienced 'tribal bureaucrats', M.M. Sekgoma and L. Seeletso.
132 See above Chapter 6 & K.P., passim.
course married Ratshosa; Babone married Morwa; and another daughter (either Tumelo or Olefhile) had married Rauwe. One daughter survived from the second House of Khama, and that was Bonyerile Victoria - 'a very refined girl, fairly well read in English Literature'. She was unceremoniously married off to the ancient Lekhutile, headman of the Taloate, after a domestic drama of her screams and her father's threats, in 1921. This intermarriage into the Khama family outside the 'true' Ngwato produced resentment among the blue-bloods, but was an ongoing process of incorporation: by 1948 even a British woman was included in the marital network.

Decentralisation and national uniformity were also the keynotes of regional social and cultural development, in the form of Church-sponsored education to produce regional élites contributing to the national one based at Serowe. By 1922 there were 5 recognised Church districts - northern (Bokalaka), central (Tonota/Mmadinare), eastern (Bobonong), south-eastern (Tswapong/Sefhare), and southern (Shoshong). There was no north-western district (Boteti), belying educational neglect of the area.

The southern district had been enhanced by the acquisition of its own missionary, Howard Williams, as enthusiastic educationalist, at Shoshong in 1903; but in 1914/5 this arrangement ceased with the departure of Edwin Lloyd, when Ngamiland replaced Shoshong at the twin-Church of Serowe. The elementary school at Shoshong had 53 pupils on average in 1904, and 50 in 1909: full Church members who had numbered 25 in 1900, numbered 119 in 1923 under evangelist Seakgano. Educational efforts in the Kgalagadi settlements (Molyabana and Thabala) was very modest, correlating with the economic 'backwardness' of the people in adopting the

133 Tom Brown to L.M.S. 7 July 1921 S.Ratshosa 'My Book', pp138-40
134 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1922.
135 Cf. Reed to L.M.S., 23 Sept.1916.
136 H. Williams to L.M.S., 20 Feb. & 6 Sept. 1904; Willoughby to L.M.S., 19 Dec.1904; Lloyd to L.M.S., 20 Aug.1909; Reed to L.M.S. 6 Feb.1915; L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1900; Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.
cash nexus: from 5 members and an undetermined number of pupils in 1900, the teachers Maphanyane Moshomong and then Lekone Maede built up a congregation of 18 members and 75 pupils by 1923.\textsuperscript{137}

The cultural jewel of the south-eastern district was Ratholo (Rratholo) on the southern scarp of the Tswapong hills. Willoughby had appointed the energetic evangelist Noke Modisa-o-Kgosi to the area in 1897: by 1900 it boasted 86 members and 65 pupils, with 85 'enquirers' in 1904; and in 1906 Ratholo was given a new brick church building. 'Like the Makalaka', remarked Edwin Lloyd of the BaTswapong, 'they are more progressive than many Becwana.

To the north of Ratholo, ancient Mapene of Maunateala welcomed the missionary in 1910.\textsuperscript{138} By 1923 there were congregations at Seifhare, Leralo, Seolwane, Maunatlala, Moeng, Ga-Moshupa, Ratholo, Go-Tau, and Lecheng — under evangelists Gabanamotse and Peter Morwetsi.\textsuperscript{139}

The eastern and central Church districts drew little attention from the L.M.S. missionary. In the case of Tonota this was because the Khurutshe still maintained the independency from missionary supervision that they had developed in the 1890s, but under an evangelist appointed in 1913 by Serowe, Tumedisho Maruapula, the father of K.T. Motsete. Tumedisho worked hard and was ordained a full minister: by 1923 he had 96 members and 112 pupils.\textsuperscript{140} In the case of Mmadinare and Bobonong, education appears to have been entirely neglected in the initial years of re-grouping and settlement — possibly because their headmen, being district governors responsible to Serowe, were not as

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\textsuperscript{137} L.M.S. annual (mss) Palapye 1900; Lloyd to L.M.S., 11 Jan. 1912; In 1917 Church work began at Mookane (Menche & Monyai) in the extreme south. Kalamare was run from Shoshong by Seakgano — Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.

\textsuperscript{138} See above Chapter 6; L.M.S. annual Palapye (1900); Williams to L.M.S., 6 Sept. 1904 & 24 Oct. 1905; Lewis to L.M.S., 15 July 1908, 17 Aug. 1910, 11 Jan. & 26 April 1912.

\textsuperscript{139} Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. Cf. W.C.W./S.O.804.
\end{flushleft}
responsive to the inhabitants' desires as in other villages. The school at Mmadinare was apparently not founded until about 1919: one of the teachers being Oteng Mphoeng, a Lovedale graduate (in search of employment?) and brother to the district governor. However there had been a flourishing school under Peter Morutsi (Morwetsi?) at the sister settlement of Makomi in 1900 (152 pupils), at the time of national educational boom. As for Bobonong, it had been visited by the new mission motorcar in 1916, and a minister was ordained in 1923 - Rev. Seodubeng Lesotho.

The northern Church district, Bokalaka, had, as already seen, been awakened to education just before 1900, and thereafter saw the most extensive development of elementary schooling anywhere outside Serowe. Again this was an area in which there was little missionary supervision, except by Rev. Maruapula (who also visited Bobirwa to the east). The Kalanga lived in hamlets and schools were run in the larger ones; but there were some villages or hamlet-clusters (the largest of which was probably Mfhashwa) with a school population of 155 pupils in 1923. Noko was posted from the Tswapong to the villages of Sebina and Shakashungwe, with 75 and 61 pupils respectively by 1923. Matangwane had no Church members but 39 pupils, which suggests that education - as Mpubuli Matenge showed by shifting his ambition from owning a bicycle to attending Tiger Kloof - was respected for secular advancement of the individual. Teachers were paid with the proceeds of the local grain harvest. Even after a run of poor harvests £400 was raised at Mfhashwa for a new church building - probably from accumulated cash surplus and not from migrant labour, which went to low paid employment.

141 L. Seeletso, para. 21.
142 L.M.S. annual (ms) Palapye, 1900.
143 Sefhope was run from Mmadinare, and 'Mackaatunwa' remains a mystery - Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.
144 See above Chapter 7.
in Southern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{146}

The unrecognised north-western Church district of the Bamangwato Reserve was the latest starter in educational development. Preaching at Makalamabedi and Rakops (Tsienyane), and other minor settlements, made little headway in Khama's reign, before Rev. Monyeki Mashabe was appointed in 1923.\textsuperscript{147}

Though the process of formation of a national literate elite was concentrated in Serowe, there was therefore a substantial contribution from the regions. Children in non-SeTswana areas grew literate in the national language: children might even proceed from a region to the centre to climb the educational ladder, and might settle and marry there to become recognised as nuclear Bamangwato. However, education could also lead members of a regional group out of and well as into the Ngwato/Tswana power-structure. Education could promote regional cultural nationalism, which developed undertones of political independency, as in the case of people who recognised themselves as Kalanga. The case of the two earliest schoolmen from Bokalaka presages this paradoxical situation: Mudongo Matenge rose high in the hierarchy of the Ngwato Church (being posted as it evangelist to Ngamiland in 1921); while Mpubuli Matenge, after Tiger Kloof 'industrial' training (to Standard V, c.1914) became a builder and store-manager for Jas. Haskins, and chaired one group writing TjiKalanga religious literature, and another guarding L.M.S. interests in the Tati Concession.\textsuperscript{148}

Education within Serowe was divided between schools supervised by the L.M.S. and those directly under the Chief. But all schools were Tribal in the sense that their capital and recurrent costs were borne by the Bamangwato, and that the ethos they projected

\begin{verbatim}
146 Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923; Reed to L.M.S., 27 May 1916; L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1922.
147 Lewis to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.
148 L.M.S. annual (mss) Ngamiland 1921; Lebotse 'Profile', p.30
\end{verbatim}
was Tribal-national. The main difference between the Kgotla and Mission schools – besides the principalship of the Chief's grandson and an L.M.S. lady teacher – appears to have been the socio-economic class of pupils. It is important to grasp that though education also produced 'new men' to join or confront the Ngwato/Tswana power-structure, its main effect was to promote the adaption of the old 'aristocracy' into a rural petty bourgeoisie. Though agriculturalists and migrant labourers might invest their earned income in education, their ability to do such was sporadic by comparison with the larger cattle-owners. Promotion consistently up the educational ladder was the advantage bestowed not on the children of an emerging peasantry but on those of the petty bourgeoisie, who cashed the unearned income derived from selling off their cattle and who had no need to employ their sons in herding but entrusted that to their serfs. Livestock was the repository of capital, what land-ownership was in Europe. Ngwato dikgosana like Prussian junkers, responded to a more capitalist age by converting their customary or 'traditional' rights on the clientship of others into stricter and more economically rational 'second servitude'. They maximised the unearned income needed for a more 'bourgeois' and bureaucratic life style in the capital. Such are the seeds of the 'Sarwa question', and of the modern Botswana national bourgeoisie drawn from both Tribal aristocratic and rural proletarian roots, through access to education stretching back for generations.

By 1906, in the opinion of the missionary, education at Serowe reached a crisis. Mission school attendance had dropped as low as 63.6 pupils for the year 1904. The Kgotla school under Johnnie and then Simon Ratshoa had begun; but as it only catered for 20 royal relatives, it was no great threat to the Mission

149 In 1904 Miss Sharp complained that Tswana boys were interrupting studies to go to cattleposts because Sarwa being employed less as herdsmen - Sharp to L.M.S., 24 Nov. 1904. It is not clear whether this was a temporary or permanent circumstance, and how widespread it was - it at least clearly demonstrates the correlation between serf-holding and consistent educational opportunity.
school at first. By 1912, as 'Serowe Public School', there was open competition. But 1916 saw the recovery of the political stock of the L.M.S., and a modus vivendi was reached at a time when education was beginning to flourish again for the first time since 1902. The Serowe Public School was an open-air affair; but between 1916 and 1920 a building was constructed for it, using the Old Palapye church roof - while the Mission school 'stables' was given walls. In 1921 the Serowe Public School was ceremoniously re-opened as the 'Khama Memorial School' (despite the fact that he was not yet dead) - with the Mission school choir in attendance. And later in the year, in June, the new Mission school building was opened with ceremony and songs and 482 pupils. The reports of the Mission school for 1922 and 1923 reveal attendance rising from 150 (1922) or 30 (1923) in January, to 400 (1922) or 380 (1923) at the end of the school year in November - rates which indicate an earlier harvest in 1921/2, and a later one in 1922/3 keeping children away from Serowe.

Within Khama's Country there was therefore widespread availability of education - but only a minority of children could rise to the top of the local scale to Standards II or III. An even smaller number could afford to travel outside the country to further primary and then secondary education. Even abroad there was socio-economic distinction among Bamangwato: the richest might sit at the high table at Lovedale while the poorest worked his way through the 'industrial' course at Tiger Kloof. Though the general Bamangwato boycott of Tiger Kloof had been dropped in 1905, and Khama's gift of a clock was given pride of place in its own tower, the institution was still spurned by the upper classes as 'just a cattle post'.

150 Willoughby to L.M.S., 9 Dec. 1904; Jennings to L.M.S., 3 May 1906; B.D.C. to L.M.S., Feb. 1907; Jennings to L.M.S., 16 Aug. 1912. See above Chapter 7.
151 Kgosi, paras 3, 4 & 12; Motsete, para. 6.
152 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1921.
153 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe, 1922, & 1923.
spartan and run under strict discipline. After 1905 Bamangwato soon became identified there as 'trouble-makers', in both the 'latrine rebellion' and in Ngwato-Kalanga faction fighting.

In 1911 Khama wrote a stern letter deploiring news of trouble among 'boys from my country', for reasons unknown to him at Tiger Kloof: they had been sent there to work and not to make rows. Even in the eyes of its new principal, A.J. Haile, Tiger Kloof was an educationally inferior institution parked out in waterless bush; and of the 146 non-theological students in 1915, only 54 had any connection with an L.M.S. background in the 'Bechuana' or 'Matabele' areas. The reply of his predecessor W.C. Willoughby was that the cause lay not in the L.M.S. but in Tribalism - a system which educationally favoured the few children who could stay in a Tribal capital for the whole year.

'usually the children of the wealthier natives, always the children of the most intelligent in the community; and often the children of those who live morally better lives than their neighbours.'

Even if Willoughby wished to see Tribalism superceded, he supported an elitist educational system based on parental worth and inherited opportunity. In his prospectus for Tiger Kloof in 1912 Willoughby had listed the 'education of the sons and daughters of the comparatively high-born and wealthy' (to Christianise 'the public opinion of the Africans' by their influence on the whole community) as No. 3 aim of the institution - after producing (1) ministers and (2) schoolteachers, and before (4) training craftsmen and women. Scholastic fees were quoted as £16 a year, to which of course must be added travel and clothing at least, plus the 'loss' of the child's productive capacity at home.

Response to the general unrest and depression following the Great

155 See above Chapter 6. By 1920 there were 116 Tswana, 23 Kalanga, & 78 others at Tiger Kloof (some Kalanga would be from Tati or Southern Rhodesia.) - L.M.S. annual (mss) Tiger Kloof 1920.

156 Khama to Rev. Reid (7K), 18 Nov. 1911 - K.P. Out 1911-12.

157 Haile to L.M.S. Dec. 1915; Willoughby to L.M.S., 28 March 1916.

158 Willoughby Tiger Kloof, p.28.
War took the classic form of food strikes at both Tiger Kloof and Lovedale. The Tiger Kloof strike was not particularly serious; the school was closed, some boys expelled, and some of them re-admitted after parental pressure. Young Tshekedi, who had been sent there because of his father’s re-found enthusiasm for the L.M.S., was sent with about nine others to board temporarily with Mrs. Clark (former Miss Johnston) at Moiyabane as their teacher. The Lovedale strike of 1920 was much more serious, becoming a food riot, causing a reputed £2000 worth of damage. Relations between Khama and Lovedale had been cordial since the 1890s, but had broken down in 1917 when Khama ordered all Bamangwato students home during a typhus scare; James Henderson, the principal threatened that unless Khama withdrew his order, Lovedale would never again accept Bamangwato entrants. (Henderson was particularly concerned to keep Modisa and Tshwene, but did not want Sebina to return on any condition.) But the disagreement must have been patched over, because there were 15 Bamangwato among 198 students tried in the courts for the Lovedale riot of 25 April 1920 - 9 were fined over £19 (including two Tshwene brothers and J. Mpotokwane) and 1 was fined just under £4, while the rest (including Tshekedi Khama, transferred from Tiger Kloof) were acquitted with £1/3/- costs each. All 15 then entrained for home. In early 1921, Johnnie Ratshosa arrived at Lovedale to negotiate re-admissions, which touched at least one old Lovedale teacher with nostalgia for his ex-pupils in the Bamangwato Reserve - so many of whom were not to return.

The socio-economic division between 'upper' and 'lower' members of the educated elite, evidenced between the Serowe Public School with Lovedale on the one hand versus the Mission school with

159 J. Whiteside to L.M.S., 15 July 1919; M.Shaw, para. 24.
161 Haile to L.M.S., 28 May 1920; List of Lovedale Rioters etc. - K.P.(L); Shepherd Lovedale, pp.336-9.
162 A.W. Roberts (Lovedale) to Khama, 10 Jan. 1921 - K.P.(A).
Tiger Kloof on the other, naturally had its reflection in continuing anti- and pro-L.M.S. tensions within the state-church. Such factionalism also seems to have aligned itself with the cleavage between supporters of the first ('royal') House of Khama against the second ('commoner') House. There was also the complicating factor of the various Houses of Sekgoma I. So long as Khama lived, these factions remained pressure groups on the edge of power, but on his death such fronts clashed and shattered and re-aligned for many years in the struggle for power over the Chieftainship.

In the last years of Khama, though the L.M.S. had made its peace with the Chief himself, its progress was not without buffetting from within and without the Ngwato Church. It was not while Khama lived that the L.M.S. feared, but the prospect when he died. There was the continuing, though muted, threat of Anglican incursion from bridgeheads in the Kweneng and the Tati Concession to satisfy elite demand for higher education on the spot—though that was scotched by the dismantling of the Old Palapye church buildings. Another means of Anglican influence was on migrant Bamangwato on the Rand. Peter and Philip Sekgoma, adopted Anglicanism probably through their maternal Kwena connections. Quite apart from his reconciliation with the L.M.S., Khama cannot have been pleased by Bishop Gore-Browne's failure to contact him at the right moments, nor by the former Francistown clergyman's frosty reply to an offer by Khama to pay the medical expenses of a MoNgwato in the Orange Free State:

'It is not the custom of the Church of England to accept money from natives in payment of any kindness they may be able to show a sick person.'

The other supposed threat to L.M.S. tenure of the Ngwato Church was not the seductive glamour of Anglo-Catholic episcopalianism, but the aggressive American selling techniques of the Seventh Day Adventists, who thereby gained footholds further and further north from the Cape. But Khama was hardly likely to yield to a

163 Reed to L.M.S., 16 April 1915; Lewis to L.M.S., 12 Nov. 1915; 16 May 1916; Mrs. B. Wooley (Kumman) to L.M.S., 5 July 1916; Mpotokwane, para 21; Walter Lack (Thaba Nchu) to Khama 3 July 1911 - K.P.(C).
Church which wrote to him, 'I beg of you to soften your heart towards the Lord' - casting him in the role of a sinner for holding onto the L.M.S. and resisting 'the truth'. He rejected several overtures in 1922, and in May 1923 his son, Sekgoma II, after a meeting, declined to admit the S.D.A. missionary from Kanye into his country. 164

Khama gave thanks to God for his recovery from his 1916 accident by renewed generosity to the L.M.S. - a gift of £200 in 1917, plus 32 trek-oxen for the Church. The Church reciprocated by pressing anew Khama's old obsession with temperance and abstaining from Drink. But Khama, pleading indigency, declined to raise the money for a European schoolmaster offered by the L.M.S. By 1920 the Mission school at Serowe had 300 pupils again, and by 1921 it had walls! Tom Brown, as missionary locum in 1921, discovered of Khama, 'One has to live with him to realise what a splendid type of Christian he is.' 165

The more insidious threat to the L.M.S. position lay in what one missionary called 'educated scoundrels' with a tendency to 'sheer bestial materialism' (worse than heathenism); 166 what another noted as a high rate of sexual immorality; and what the author J.C. Harris stamped as the 'Ratshosa brood'. Khama indeed censured the activities of Bo-Ratshosa, but Sekgoma was all set to follow them on his succession. Since the death of Ratshosa himself (1917), Bo-Ratshosa had taken on a new form in L.M.S. eyes, as not threatening to bring in another religion anymore but as undermining the Church itself. The last few years of Khama's reign saw Bo-Ratshosa flushed with the expectation of heirs presumptive - while those who stood in dread of losing the assurance of royal patronage on Khama's death, like Phetu

164 R.A.F. O'Reilly (Magopella, P.O. Taung) to Khama, 16 Sept. 1922 - K.P.(L); B.P.33/157

165 N. Jones (TK) to L.M.S., 15/28 Nov.1917; Lewis to L.M.S., 3 Feb.1919 & 6 March 1920; Khama to L.M.S. 6 March 1920; Brown to L.M.S., 7 July 1921. Brown advocated a return to multiple school for Serowe (6) with 2 as higher primary/secondary schools for girls & boys.

166 L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe 1923 - Haydon Lewis.
Mphoeng or Modisaotsile or those connected with the L.M.S. in Church or education, braced for an inevitable struggle with the 'Ratshosa brood'.

The tensions which Bo-Ratshosa generated in these last years took the form of personality disputes and personal umbrage. It is said that Old Ratshosa himself died on February 17th, 1917, in a fit of apoplexy, caused by the impregnation of his daughter by a young commoner, whom the three sons then chased from town. With the death of Gaopotlhake and other close advisers of Khama, in the bouts of influenza between 1918 and 1920 that ravaged Africa, the three brothers assumed pre-eminence among positions of power - Johnnie as 'State Secretary', Simon as 'a sort of Minister of Education', and Obeditse as clerk-interpreter to the Magistrate.  

Simon Ratshosa in his later writings traced their closeness to Khama to Khama's promise to their mother, Besi, on her deathbed, to look after them. To which effect Khama bequeathed them what Simon called the 'Tamasane Estate'. But other evidence suggests that by 1922 Khama had tired of constant Bo-Ratshosa plotting, and especially that of Simon Ratshosa himself.

Early in 1920 the L.M.S. missionary at Serowe determined on a drive to stave off Bo-Ratshosa in the future by building a stronghold while Khama still lived:

'Now is the time for us to work like fury, for the consolidation of our position, which is strong in the church but needs strengthening educationally.'

To this effect a struggle developed which resulted in the deposition of both the Khama Memorial and Mission school heads. During Ella Sharp's absence, Kgaleman T. Motsete had been appointed acting principal of the Mission school in March 1919.

167 Mockford Seretse, pp.174-5.
170 Lewis to L.M.S., 6 March 1920.
an extraordinary achievement at the age of 19, having just graduated from Tiger Kloof with the scholastic distinction of coming out top of all blacks and coloureds who took the Cape Province pupil-teacher's exam in 1918. Simon Ratshosa and others saw K.T. Motsete as a threat and an insult. Here was a young and inexperienced man of education and erudition exceeding Simon's own, who had been brought up after his mother's death as a boarder within the royal household (kgosing) to attend the Mission school, but who was not even a Ngwato commoner but a Talaote. According to Lewis, and by implication from an interview with Motsete in 1969, 'he was persecuted by the Ratshosas and almost compelled to abandon his post! The opportunity came in 1920 when he had returned to Tiger Kloof to take a higher teacher's diploma. Motsete was called back to Serowe to answer for the paternity of the child of a girl pupil-teacher. He admitted guilt and left for home to face judgement, but then 'disappeared' for three years - teaching in Natal, at Pietersburg, and in Northern Rhodesia - until he appeared at the L.M.S. headquarters in London. Lewis was convinced it was fear of the Ratshosas which prevented him from returning to Serowe.

Simon Ratshosa's own fall from grace began in 1920-1 with his expulsion from Church membership for 'immorality' - one of the victims of a drive against sexual profligacy by Lewis' locum, Tom Brown. (Lewis disagreed with Brown, claiming that concubinage or a sexual 'slip' did not disqualify a man from holding membership of, or even office in, the Church: he accepted 'gross sensationalism' as an integral part of African Christianity - while Willoughby remarked that few Bamangwato over 30 had had more than one spouse unless they were Christians.

171 Lewis to L.M.S., 3 Feb.1919; Jones to L.M.S., 31 March 1919
173 Lewis to L.M.S. 6 March 1920; L.M.S. annual(mss) Serowe 192
174 Lewis to L.M.S. 30 Dec.1921 & 21 Sept.1923; W.C.W./S.O.779
Simon Ratshosa was next suspended from his position as headmaster of the Khama Memorial School by Khama himself.\(^{175}\)

These conflicts with Bo-Ratshosa allied with Sekgoma Khama, were not confined to the L.M.S. Indeed the L.M.S. received unlikely bed-fellows like Phetu Mphoeng. But one issue specifically concerned the L.M.S. - the pamphlet biography of Khama (by J.C. Harris) that it published in 1922. It had been compiled largely from sources, including the letters of Haydon Lewis, available at L.M.S. headquarters in London. In its naivete it included not only such aberrations as constantly calling Khama a 'kaffir', but also revealed what had otherwise been confidential or only implicit among missionaries. It called Ratshosa 'notorious for deceit and cruelty' and Sekgoma 'weak and easy-going', and added:

'Ratshosa is dead, but his "brood" remain, and they are all the more dangerous because they have a veneer of Christianity and education over their heathen instincts. They have never ceased to plot against Khama's ideal, and in every way possible to foment trouble.'\(^{176}\)

Khama himself, in January 1923, it is said, laughed at the passage and said it was all true.\(^{177}\) Simon Ratshosa, however, was deeply offended at being libelled in a best-selling pamphlet, as were Garrett and Smith for being accused of defrauding Khama. Simon Ratshosa snapped, 'I always maintain that a good sound white man of exemplary character does more good than a missionary, and wrote to J.C. Harris in complaint.

The Harris biography ensured that Sekgoma II was antagonistic to the L.M.S. on his succession, though he wished to retain that denomination. In November 1923, Lewis was shut out of the

\(^{175}\) L.M.S. annual (mss) Serowe, 1923.

\(^{176}\) Harris \textit{Khama}, pp.100-1.

\(^{177}\) Lewis to L.M.S., 20 Jan. & 20 March 1923; G.W. Smith to L.M.S. Vryburg, 9 March 1923 - end in Jones to L.M.S., 28 March 1923; Simon Ratshosa to L.M.S., 15 May 1923; Sekgoma II, to L.M.S., 8 June 1923.
'cathedral' in Serowe, and Mission teachers were accused of various offences against the state. Phetu Mphoeng had already been disciplined by Sekgoma II, together with Lebang Raditladi. Sekgoma was seen waving around the pamphlet in Kgotala, saying he would deal with Harris as he had with Phetu.

The first phase of a thirty year feud had opened.

Khama died at 7.45 a.m. on February 21st, 1923, from cardiac failure following on gastritis and lung congestion, for which the doctors noted:

'He absolutely refuses all alcoholic stimulants, but is otherwise amenable to all forms of treatment.'

His bowels had been upset since February 14th, following a chill he had caught in a downpour on a long-distance horse ride at the age of nearly 90. 178

The death of Khama did not pass without notice or comment in the world's Press, though the New York Times got the details incorrect as did the London evening Star. The London Daily News called him the 'African chief who met Livingstone', and another daily newspaper confused his having had four wives with being a polygamist. 179 But at least all these different variants on his life-story reveal that a number of newspapers felt they had something extra with which to embellish the press agency reports, culled from dim memory. In the London Times, tributes continued for a fortnight. Comments at the (Royal) African Society even reached the Daily Herald. 180 Africanist and missionary periodicals all subsequently carried obituaries - 'a gentleman and a Christian'.

178 Lewis to L.M.S., 21 & 23 Feb.1923; Semane Khama to L.M.S., 17 April 1923; Times, 22 Feb.1923. (This edition of The Times was never bound into the relevant volume in the Edinburgh University Library - which may indicate a souvenir hunter). Death certificate of Khama in B.N.A.


180 Times 22 & 26 Feb & 5 March 1923; Daily Herald 27 Feb.1923.
the African World called him.\textsuperscript{181} It was left to W.C. Willoughby to put the knife in the corpse in the International Review of Missions. Khama was a Bantu reformer, 'not a great man if measured against the great men of the Anglo-Saxon race'; he was a hero, such as thrown up by 'the Bantu' every other generation who contended against his racial inheritance. Willoughby added:

'His political and economic views were narrow and stern; for he had not been schooled in sociology and had to handle crude and refractory material.'\textsuperscript{182}

Even in the midst of death, Khama was being subjected for the first time to revaluation, which if 'academic' was also pseudo-scientific in its invocation of the garbled jargon of racial determinism. The biographical approach to Khama as a symbol of the 'herculean struggle of a soul... above the morass of human slime and ooze... stretching from horizon to horizon'\textsuperscript{183} was to obscure understanding of the very heredity and environment which it was claimed Khama rose in despite of. It is to be hoped that this dissertation has cleared away some of that misunderstanding by placing Khama firmly in his historical context, thus illuminating the context and the man.


\textsuperscript{183} Cf. Parsons 'The "image" of Khama the Great', passim.
CONCLUSION

'THERE ISN'T ANYTHING in this village that an historian might care to write about. Dr. Livingstone passed this way, they might say. Historians do not write about people and how strange and beautiful they are - just living...

There are just people of Africa here and endless circles of mud huts. They do not seem to be in a particular confusion about anything...the women just go on having babies and the families sit round the fire chatting in quiet tones. Everybody survives on little and there may be the tomorrow of nothing. It has been like this for ages and ages - this flat, depressed continuity of life; this strength of holding on and living with the barest necessities.'


This passage expresses something like my own early reactions to Serowe and Bamangwato society. Mrs. Head, however, was more perceptive and poetic in expressing her view of the village rhythm of the town. It is the reaction of a stranger who feels a basic empathy, but does not yet realise that the search for causes and consequences, origins and impact, is possible. It is not an untypical reaction, even among scholars, who discover that there exist in southern Africa sprawling agro-cities covering maybe 20 square kilometres and with de jure populations of up to 42,000 souls. Walking around such a town impresses on the stranger that the apparently higgledy-piggledy pattern of enclosures and passage does indeed have a rationale based on function, status and inheritance from the past. Here indeed is a recognisable 'civilisation' in the sense of a settled large-scale community life with pride placed on human achievement. Here is the kind of living heart vanished in the burnt-out shells of Great Zimbabwe and other walled cemeteries of the dead.

If the enigma of the subject dwindles, empathy remains an essential prerequisite for the social scientist, to inform his curiosity to search out the apparently trivial 'fact', and to guide the imaginative leaps sometimes necessary to link one 'event' with another where no primary evidence is available. Where historians usually differ from other social scientists is the degree with
which they initially approach their subjects without conscious models. I am no exception and the 'thesis' of this dissertation has evolved slowly, using the familiar historical method of dividing my material over time into themes and periods, which have shifted and reformed themselves during each phase of production of the dissertation.

-1-

The subject title of the dissertation pegs out the overall theme of the relations between Khama III, the Bamangwato, and the British - and the overall period to concentrating on the last 28 years of his life. The relations between the main themes then roughly mesh themselves into four lesser periods - their emergence before 1890, their gestation in the periods before and after the Anglo-Boer War, and their flowering or decline or continuation (in terms of the thesis) from the Great War to the death of Khama. The main themes fall within two areas, Bamangwato and British, mediated usually in political and often in economic terms by Khama. The economic and social situation prior to 1890 was essentially autonomous, in that the indigenous system had its own momentum into which 'outside' influences (n.b. Christianity) could be incorporated or rejected at will. There then developed a dual political system of Colonial v. Native sectors, which became (not 'naturally' but by conscious manipulations) a dual economic and social system controlled from outside. The fascination of Khama III is that, as a man and as an office-holder, he fought first for the whole process, and then against it - when the 'enlargement of scale' that benefitted the Bamangwato became the restriction of their horizons. "Only the present mattered and we had very little control over it", to quote his grandson again. It is his resistance within accommodation that makes his rule interesting. This was an 'African initiative' which had roots beyond mere reaction to colonialism. And Khama not only brought out inherent contradictions within the colonial system, he created them even in Europe by his differentiation between Colonial and Imperial factors. He was that true rarity - an African with a voice in Britain during the scramble and early colonial period.

Within a holistic approach, this dissertation attempts to bring
out the significance of a number of historical developments. Certain of these developments are given a special importance from the perspective of later times, because they gave rise to circumstances that either hit world headlines or that today present themselves as problems of heritage for the Republic of Botswana.

The dispute between Tshekedi and Seretse Khama, which erupted after 1948, highlit the importance of family political or dynastic developments during the reign of Khama III (see Appendix 3). Though Bo-Ratshosa etc. had withered away, their shadows within the political matrix were crucial in determining the alignment of 'uncles' and elders. More than that, the Tshekedi-Seretse dispute brought into focus past developments in the state structure, the Chieftainship, and the Imperial relationship with Great Britain. Power had come to be centred round a bureaucratic type of Chieftainship, which balanced out aristocrats with 'new men' in its employ, and which was decentralised into regional centres under the firm control of the capital. Such successful institutional modernisation enabled the Chief to maintain an autocratic mandate of internal self-rule from the Protectorate Administration, a 'contract' maintained by personal cordiality rather than by delegated powers of the Administration. It was an Administration low in prestige and numbers until the end of the colonial period, an irregularly recruited cadre in an Imperial backwater kept stagnant by threats of being swamped by either South African or Southern Rhodesia. The power relations established by the end of the Great War therefore survived little changed for forty years, showing that Khama III was not as vital a factor as supposed by his contemporaries in the maintenance of those relations.

Restriction on economic development is evidenced dramatically by the Jousse Affair, and formed the negative basis of structural underdevelopment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in southern Africa - with political, social and cultural effects which can still be seen. The neo-feudal relationship between Ngwato dikgosana and their Sarwa clients, which developed out of the cas nexus and changing legal conceptions of property, was mirrored on the macro level between the white and black areas of southern Africa. The proletarianisation of the peasant areas of the Union of South Africa also had its reflection within the Native Reserve
of the B.P., where whole families came to subsist purely on labour migration, with no crops or cattle to support them. In fact the Bamangwato Reserve proved more resilient within the white-controlled economy (viz. lower labour migration) partially because it had more successfully integrated itself into the world economy than other independent African sectors before the full imposition of white rule. The white commercial community of the Central District, has now been an integral part of Bamangwato society for a century, sharing the aspirations of the state even if standing culturally apart from the people.

Developments within the Bamangwato Reserve during the colonial period ran parallel to other Reserves of the B.P., and it had the largest population of any of them. So, though there were significant differences in degree between one Reserve and another, the history of the Bamangwato is in many ways the historical mainstream of Bechuanaland Protectorate history. The origins of the modern Botswana elite composition and ethos may be seen clearly enough — with both fusive and fissive effects of educational advance for national development — in Bamangwato history of the first third of the colonial period. The familiar paradox of an educationally 'open' society with a self-perpetuating intelligentsia is brought out, where wealth determines access to facilities. The problems of national integration on one ethnic basis (Ngwato or Tswana) from a multi-ethnic society are also evident.

The area of historical change which is most difficult to quantify and which should yet be more adequately studied, is 'cultural' — i.e. how change was perceived, intellectually and artistically, by people low and high. A response to change is part of that change in historical perspective. Some insight has been gained from the recorded observations of an aristocrat (Simon Ratshosa), a missionary (W.C. Willoughby), an official (R.C. Williams), and of Khama himself. We have seen how Khama channelled his modernising tendencies in a Protestant Ethic; how missionaries and officials imported their own British heritage of class discrimination etc. What we have not really seen are the intellectual and artistic responses of commoners, settlers, and serfs. The general indicators to this were religion and education — how men saw
their relation to life, natural and supernatural, and how far they were prepared to allow others to bring up their children with a new set of ideas. What we have seen has been general receptivity to both Christian beliefs and to formal education, the rate of which was determined by economic considerations rather than by fervour for or against. We may generally conclude that, however exciting and novel some trends and events were at the time, the Bamangwato took the historical change between the 1880s and the 1920s in their stride. If their national status was diminished by the colonial period, the self-esteem of Bamangwato as human beings was not particularly impaired as long as they remained within the Reserve and did not expose themselves to white baaskap.

I have recently gone on record criticising other scholars tackling similar topics and similar areas to this dissertation, for neglecting the 'broader social and economic context' germaine to the history of chiefly innovation and elite politics in Bechuanaland and Barotseland. I am conscious that my own work here did not always do justice to the perspective I advocated or the issues that I raised - 'questions about the nature of the introduction of the cash nexus; the role of a state church, the racial ethos of the colonial superstructure, the "new feudalism" of Chiefs as capitalist entrepreneurs, etc.'. But I trust that this dissertation has made headway in analysing such questions, which can be taken up - or broken down - by other social scientists.

This dissertation has tried to balance an analytical with a relativist approach to the history of a time and place which, if not obscure, is at least not well covered in existing literature. In such a case it is the social scientist's duty to present evidence in sufficient detail for others to put forward hypotheses alternate to his own. Furthermore a historian has an obligation to present with some narrative vigour the results of his investigations to a wider non-academic audience. (At least one copy of

this dissertation will be made available in Botswana.) However, this has not therefore been a descriptive biography. It has attempted to get away from the personality approach to Khama perpetuated by British authors and officials. For the purposes of the dissertation the man, given his individual foibles, is primarily seen as the institutional link between two political communities, Bamangwato and British, standing at the helm of an African kingdom sailing into colonial seas. The dissertation investigates what currents, what conditions, what variables preceded, accompanied, or followed from, that course against time. If the work produced is not a neat scientific bundle of balanced and predictable factors, no apology is made. It makes no claim to be definitive. In a way it is a collective work, the product of many minds in many conditions, at different moments in time.
APPENDIX 1

THE CHIEF KHAMA'S EXHORTATION TO HIS PEOPLE

Laws and regulations which have been disobeyed.

My people of the Bammanwato: I am beginning to speak with you about the laws and regulations which I have passed ever since we settled at Serowe. Having noticed that my tribe was in an awful state of neglect, I was induced to hold, at different occasions, big Khotla meetings, in which I passed the following laws and regulations, respectively according to the occasions:-

I said in one of the meetings, that you could drink Native beer but moderately and on condition that you would avoid drunkenness, I further added, that you should drink it everyone in his own house without inviting friends so as to gather around you pots of that hateful drink. Gatherings for native beer, I said, were the source of fights, disturbances and quarrels common among my people.

You neither opposed the law or said anything in favour of it, at that meeting; but afterwards I saw you heedless of my law carrying about invitations for friends to gather around beer at different places in the different villages; and moreover drunkenness became more common than it ever was.

Some time afterwards I said total prohibition for beer to young men was necessary. I then passed a law forbidding young men to use beer. You willingly welcomed this law and promised to assist me in maintaining it. In order to fulfil your promise, I saw you one day bringing your young men, why by themselves professed that they would never use beer. But in spite of their good profession they never ceased to drink it. To my disappointment I saw that drunkenness was common to both the old people and their sons. But when I issued the law none of you opposed it.

Later on I said your young men were perpetually in the habit of divorcing their wives, and that a remedy against this habit was to prohibit them marrying many wives. Polygamy, I said, was unavailable to young men of the present day, because after divorce their fathers-in-law have to meet great inconveniences in providing the divorcees and their children with all the necessaries for living. This law also, was not opposed at the time but you continually married them with the reason that you fully appreciated the necessity of polygamy for in a case where a wife is barren there is always the opportunity of having children with any of the other wives.

Not very long ago, I passed a law forbidding the sale of cows. The object of that law was, as I told you, to avoid a decrease of our stock. I also pointed out to you that if white people buy breeding stock from us they would sweep them out of this country and they would export them to foreign and far remote countries beyond the reach of most of our people where they would increase immensely, while we here are left destitute of any stock. Further I said white people were buying cattle for the purpose of keeping them in farms where they would breed them in order to sell them. Then we will always hear that a certain white man has visited the
farms and has bought some cattle to send to either Transvaal or Bulawayo. Thus farmers will have intercourse with the buyers while we here are not dealing with anybody. I also recalled to your memory that breeding stock were the sole and chief dependence for our living as natives, and if we had to sell them we might expect, soon or later, lamentable poverty in the country.

The law, just as the preceding ones, was not obeyed. Breeding livestock were sold in the same way as before, and I had to undertake to buy the sold stock myself of which I bought 680 goats and sheep. Two hundred of which are at Shashane and four hundred at Mmokwe.

On one occasion also, I said, "No livestock of any nature should be sold at the Railway or at any of the unauthorised places" and I also said that you were only entitled to sell your livestock in the well-known towns where you are known and cannot be suspected of having stolen the property you sell. I further said, that cattle which have been sold at the Railway and away from towns have always presented many difficulties, because among them the majority are those which have been stolen by people, who either found them straying or actually took them away from the posts. Then in many cases people could not recover their cattle for the buyers generally took them away into some other countries.

You did not obey this law also.

Observing that great immorality among young people was the result of marriage feasts to which were often gathered great multitudes of the people, I had to pass a law forbidding such gatherings at the feasts and I also ordered that the pair after entering the marriage ceremony at the church should on leaving the church proceed to the bridegroom's home without having any such feasts as already described. You did not take any notice of this law also.

On one occasion I called another meeting in which I expressed my disapproval of any of you visiting any of those villages that have seceded from us. Saying your communicating with these villages was liable to cause disputes as well as troubles in our tribe. But you did not obey.

Lately we had a trouble with Sekgome who was trying to confiscate cattle belonging to those people who were no longer willing to follow him and were wishing to come over to me. Against my law you joined to bring the trouble to a head by privately communicating with Sekgome advising him to seize the property of those people. Owing to this trouble it became necessary for the Assistant Commissioner to go to LEPHEPE and hold inquiries leading to the ownership of the Basimane and Sekao cattle which Sekgome claimed to be his. I wish some of you accompanied the officer to witness against the claim. At the meetings held there Sekgome spoke against me as an enemy and in one of the meetings he attempted to kill me and as a result of this a disturbance occurred which brought the meeting to a close. Owing to that disturbance I had to remain at our camp next morning when another meeting went on, for it seemed quite likely for me to fight with Sekgome. You by yourselves could notice Sekgome carrying a revolver under his overcoat all the time we spoke with him.
When meetings were over and the evidences fully obtained we returned from LEPHEPE to Serowe where soon after our arrival I called for a big meeting in which I told you that I had lost all hope about Sekgome. You said nothing at all when I told you this. Now, a day came when we had to go to Mhalapye to attend a Periodical Court. At the first court held there, the respectable officer gave his decision in our favour. After that claims were brought forward for three days in succession; at the end of which time you asked me whether you would be allowed to speak to Sekgome before both Capt. Daniel and myself. I then asked Capt. Daniel if he would let you do so. You were allowed to speak with him but in the course of your speeches I could understand just as others would that you wanted Sekgome to return to the tribe at Serowe. But being uninformed of what you were speaking with Sekgome, I had to tell Capt. Daniel that I knew nothing about it. The following morning we got away from Mhalapye and returned to Serowe. On our way back I called you together and asked you if you would be right in telling the people who had remained at Serowe that the people I went with to Mhalapye have been trying to persuade Sekgome to return to Serowe. Some, when answering me said that they did not know if they ever tried to do so, but some said that I would be quite right. Some day after our arrival, I called you for another big meeting and repeating what I had told the people I had gone with to Mhalapye I said that those people that I had been with at Mhalapye have been trying to persuade Sekgome to return to Serowe. Even yet I was not answered by anybody in that meeting. I then stayed a short time after which convened another meeting in which I told you that I had not heard anything in the first meeting and that I wished you to say your opinions as to what I told you. Again you did not answer me.

Later on people at Lephepe who were coming back to Serowe were deficient in waggons and asked for some more waggons from us, to bring them to Serowe. I then asked you to help me and lend them as many waggons as we could afford to give out, in order to bring them home all at once. Of you, only KEPHORILWE and RAUTSHABO lent me their waggons. The third waggon I got from a Mr. Sam Black-beard. SEGOTSO lent me his oxen. MOTSOSE told me his waggon was being repaired at the Smith's shop and that he would lend me some oxen to span if I could get a waggon for them. I understood the reason why he did not lend me his waggon and I noticed that he was willing to do so if the waggon had only been repaired. After you had refused with your own waggons I had to send out men to the outside villages of the Makgalagadi and there I obtained many waggons which I joined together with mine and brought home all the people from Lephepe. A short time afterwards I heard a rumour that you said that you had been refusing to lend me the waggons because you did not deem it proper and necessary to help those people who had left Sekgome, and that as for your own part you were going over to join Sekgome in that as your own habits were consistent with his, and that with Sekgome polygamy was allowable and he Sekgome unlike Khama still clings to the customs of his forefathers. Again Khama is old, you said, and being old he will always worry us by talking too much.
According to the custom and law of the Bamanwato nation, I asked you to gather together from the cattleposts all young men who were not yet given a new regimental name which I had to give them. They only were collected together and unnaturally we had to take several months to organise a new regiment. Some were left alone to stay at the cattle-posts and even some of those who were at home were not brought before me. The reason for your refusal being that if the young men were to be given a new name the hut-tax was going to increase and become more severe than before, for you would have to pay for both yourselves and your young men.

On one occasion I reinforced the law forbidding assaults. I told you it was not legal for anybody to use stick or an axe against another. Further I made you understand that murder was punished with death. Yet sticks and axes have always been employed in fighting. Your fights are to a large extent caused by beer which you use excessively and which is also your chief which exercises great influence over you. He is the conductor of quarrels and all sorts of disturbances common in your town.

By going through all these I mean to bring home to your minds the fact that you have transgressed my laws, and that by doing so you meant to show that you have no chief whatever.

Now there is a choice before you. Having thus broken my laws you will have to choose who will be your chief whose laws will suit your opinions. But yet, my people, I have got a good experience of the chief that rules over yours. He is a chief whose kingdom is always affected and prominently distinguished by such a sleep as leads to the downfall of the nation.

Things of long ago have passed away, at least they are passing away. As in many other countries of South Africa we feel a change in our country as well. The Government is the law. Now I ask you to choose and crown your chief lest another chief steps up with his own laws before you had time to say who will govern you. As far as concerns me I have chosen my own chief on whom I rely and trust. He is the Government. Now answer my question! Will my chief not outwit your own by bringing into force his own laws while your chief is still affected by that deadly sleep? Your chief, my people, has funny laws. He refuses your children of learning. He is one of the main obstacles that impede the progress of children in schools. For these children have to be stopped from attending schools by being employed the whole time of their life in making beer for their parents.

Do you call yourself a living people? If you are rightly called a tribe, drunkenness ought not to exist in our nation. Good laws which can benefit a tribe are expected from law-abiding people who would give good examples to the young men. But you do not deserve to be called law-abiding people. Now my people, I give you six months to choose your chief and I also wish you would
clearly understand that I will have to try no cases in this period for I have realised that I have been dethroned and on my place native-beer has been installed a chief.

I hope this will do for the time being although I should have said much more of your misconduct.

(Source: Khama Papers, file 'Receipts and Accounts', n.d. Apparently an unedited translation of a Khama speech by Gaopotlhake K. Sekgoma.)
APPENDIX 2
LIST OF BAMANGWATO REGIMENTS (MEPHATO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>SEKGOMA I (C.1835-57/1858-66/1873-5)</td>
<td>Mafholosa</td>
<td>Khama</td>
<td>1850</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matsosa</td>
<td>Kgamane</td>
<td>1853</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malwelamotse</td>
<td>Seretse</td>
<td>1861</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maemelwa</td>
<td>Seeletso</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maolola (Mafhiri)</td>
<td>Kebailele</td>
<td>c.1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Malekantwa)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHAMA III (1872-3/1875-1923)</td>
<td>Maeketsa</td>
<td>Gorewangs</td>
<td>1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maphatshwa</td>
<td>Sekgoma</td>
<td>c.1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makobamotse</td>
<td>Kaelo</td>
<td>c.1894</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathogela (Maoketsa)</td>
<td>Lediretse</td>
<td>c.1897</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matsapa</td>
<td>Lentwetse</td>
<td>post1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masokola</td>
<td>Gasebalwe</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEKGOMA II (1923-5)</td>
<td>Maletamotse</td>
<td>Tshekedi</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOREWANG (1926)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TSHEKEDI (1926-33/1933-1952)</td>
<td>Makgasa</td>
<td>Keaboka</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malekantwa</td>
<td>Seretse</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASEBOLAI (1952-63)</td>
<td>Mahetsakgang</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maholosa</td>
<td>Leapeetswe</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAPEETSWE (1963- )</td>
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</table>

Basic source: Mr. Nolegolwa of Pilikwe, 23 June 1969 at Serowe - The original was written down by and is in the possession of Sekgoma T. Khama. With amendments and dates added.
**NEWATO GENEALOGY**

N.B. The Roman figures preceding a man's name indicate the rank of the house to which he belonged.

[Source: Judicial enquiry into Seretse Khama's marriage - Exhibit "T".]

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KHAMA I (r. 1795-1817)
- MATERE
- TIDIMANE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

(1810-26)
- RAMABOE
- (III) MOODIMA
- MORE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

(II) KHAMA II (r. 1833-5)
- MATERE
- TIDIMANE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

(1858-66)
- IRI-MARAE
- TIDIMANE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

(1873-5)
- IRI-MARAE
- TIDIMANE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

(1895-97)
- MA-TS!F!NG

(1895-57)
- KHAMA III (r. 1872-3 [1875-1923])
- MATERE
- TIDIMANE
- PELOTONA
- KUATE PELOTONA
- PELOTONA KUATE

M materes, T temes, K kites, P potes, E eales
STATEMENT OF SOURCES

I ORAL SOURCES

II ARCHIVAL SOURCES

III PRINTED SOURCES

IV THESIS

V SEMINAR PAPERS

I ORAL SOURCES

I/A Botswana

1 Tom Letso Kgosi (Serowe)
Schoolteacher since 1932 at Serowe, recommended by Isaac Schapera. Son of Kgosi, grandson of Leepile; Marobela Ward (Nos. 56 & 57: Kwena/Kalaka). Interviews 26 & 27 August 1969, 69 paragraphs.

2 Molaba Edison Malema (Transit)
Haulage contractor, met on train between Gaborone and Palapye. Son of Senamolela, grandson of Malema; Birwa. Interview 25 August 1969, 14 paragraphs.

3 Kgaleman Tumedisho Motsete (Mahalapye)

4 James Mpotokwane (Gaborone)
Former Tiger Kloof boarding master, now senior state interpreter. Son of Mpotokwane; Khurutshe. Interview 3 November 1969, 22 paragraphs.

5 Amos Kgamanyane Pilane (Mochudi)
Retired Tribal official and folklorist. Of the Kgatla royal lineage. Interview 20 August 1969, 23 paragraphs.

6 T.P. Sebina (Serowe)
Retired schoolteacher, formerly of Khama Memorial School etc. Brother of P.M. Sebina, son of Peter Sebina, grandson of Mokgopo Sebina, great-grandson of Sebina (Chizwina) etc; Sebina Ward (No. 94: Kaa/Kalaka). Interview 25 August 1969, 43 paragraphs.

7 Letsholathebe Seeletso (Mmadinare: interpreted by Secretary)
Subordinate African Authority for Mmadinare. Son of Seeletso, grandson of Sekgoma I; of the Ngwato royal lineage. Interview 17 September 1969, 27 paragraphs (interviewer assisted by Simon Gillett, District Officer Shashe Project).
8 Molwa Mokhutswane Sekgoma (Palapye)
Subordinate African Authority at Palapye (Road). Born 1919, son of Mokhutswane, grandson of Sekgoma I; of the Ngwato royal lineage. Interview 22 September 1969, 31 paragraphs.

9 Minnie Shaw (Palapye)

I/B Great Britain

1 Isaac Schapera (London)
Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of London. Fieldwork in the Bechuanaland Protectorate since 1929. Interviews 4 April, 13 October & 17 November 1967; January, 15 March & 29 October 1968, etc.

2 Anthony Sillery (Oxford)
Secretary of Taylor Institution, University of Oxford, since retired. Former Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland, author, etc. Interviews 13 & 14 October 1968.

(All the interviews were conducted in English.)

II ARCHIVAL SOURCES

II/A Private Papers

1 Khama Papers
These Papers are in the keeping of Mr. Sekgoma T. Khama (of "Motlagaana", Serowe) on behalf of the Khama family and of the Bamangwato Tribal Administration. They are mostly administrative, covering the reigns of Khama III, Sekgoma II and Tsekedhi Khama, but also contain some private papers of Tsekedhi and are therefore restricted. I helped to amalgamate papers from the Serowe and Pilikwe houses of the Khama family and others from the Bamangwato Tribal Administration. It was obvious that nearly all these Papers had once been subject to filing systems since lapsed. I went some way towards reviving the archival order of the papers relating to Khama III. I re-sorted the general In-Letters and Out-Letters into chronological files, but did not attempt to resolve the anomalies within the Subject files, e.g. a list of 1920 'Lovedale Rioters' in a file marked 'War'. The files themselves are not marked 'In-Correspondence' or 'K.P.(A)', etc. but the following abbreviations for 30 files have been used in this dissertation:
1a Khama Papers In-Correspondence (cf.II/C.4 below - W.C.W./S.O.691-2)

K.P.-In 1876-85
K.P.-In 1885-89
K.P.-In 1890
K.P.-In 1891-1902

K.P.-In 1903-05
K.P.-In 1915-23
K.P.-In 1923-25

1b Khama Papers Out-Correspondence

K.P.-Out 1898-1901
K.P.-Out 1908-11
K.P.-Out March/Sept.1911
K.P.-Out 1911-12
K.P.-Out March/Sept.1912
K.P.-Out 1912-15

K.P.-Out 1914-15
K.P.-Out 1915-20
K.P.-Out 1916-18
K.P.-Out Sept./Oct.1920
K.P.-Out 1921-22

1c Khama Papers Subject Files

K.P.(A) Europeans Letters (1896-1924)
K.P.(B) Government Important (1908-22)
K.P.(C) Europeans Mixed (1905-17)
K.P.(D) Estate of G.K. Sekgoma (1909-19)
K.P.(E) London Missionary Society (1906-20)
K.P.(F) Mining Khama to Sekgoma
K.P.(G) Haskins & Sons
K.P.(H) Receipts & Accounts
K.P.(I) Reply to the Government Letters
K.P.(J) Government Letters & Documents
K.P.(K) Confidential
K.P.(L) War

2 Goold-Adams Papers

Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams (1858-1920), served in B.P. military and administrative capacities between 1884 and 1901. Certain of his letters have been inherited by his son Mr. Richard Goold-Adams (Marble Arch, London) and his daughter Mrs. Elizabeth M. Main (Kilmacolm, Renfrewshire). I found these useful 'colour' if not directly germane to the subject of Khama and the Bamangwato.

Official Papers

1 Bamangwato Tribal Archives (Serowe)

See also Khama Papers (II/A.1)-above. I was allowed to scamper around at floor level in the main office, and found numerous files dating from Tshekedi's day in an out-office. It is evident from the state of Tribal Archives in general (e.g. Kanye and Maun) that there is a pressing need for salvage and removal of documents to the National Archives. Most such records do not date from earlier than the 1930s. I found two files useful in the Bamangwato Tribal Archives:

la Resident Magistrate: Miscegenation
lb Mining Khama to Sekgoma - transferred to K.P.(F).
lc 'Simon Ratshosa'
2 Botswana National Archives (Gaborone)

Approved abbreviation - B.N.A. On their transfer from Mafeking the old Secretariat archives have become the National Archives within the Ministry of Home Affairs. There is at present (1973) no Archivist, and backfiles may be transferred to join a new National Library and Archives at the south-east end of the Gaborone Mall. The Archives were exceptionally well-ordered under the direction of Mr. H.C. Thompson in the 1960s, complete with a subject-index of the central government files back to the 19th Century. The documentary collection was enhanced in the 1960s by the addition of over 200 boxes of material withdrawn from the National Archives of Rhodesia. These are the papers of the (British) High Commissioner for South(ern) Africa, relating to Botswana and the North between 1873 and 1910 - previously extracted by the British High Commission papers at Pretoria (which to my knowledge have never been consulted by a scholar) in the 1940s. A list of files from the B.N.A. cited in this dissertation follows. (Some file codes may have changed since consultation, but the B.N.A. keeps a list of former file code numbers.)

2a B.N.A. High Commissioner 1873-1910

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2b B.N.A. Resident Commissioner c.1900-11

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2c B.N.A. Secretariat c.1904 onwards

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2d B.N.A. Bechuanaland Protectorate (District Records)

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<td>Palapye</td>
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<td>Palapye/Francistown</td>
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<td>1888-1903</td>
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<td>B.P. 5</td>
<td>Francistown</td>
<td>1904-11</td>
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B.P. 6 -do- 1911-25
B.P. 7 -do- 1924-43
B.P. 8 -do- 1939-56
B.P. 9 -do- 1911 etc.
B.P.10 Palapye/ Francistown 1896-1909
B.P.11 -do- 1896-1902
B.P.12 -do- 1896-1902
B.P.13 -do- 1900-38
B.P.14 Francistown 1909-1912
B.P.15 B.B.P., Palapye 1894-5
B.P.16 B.S.A.P. 1898-1901
B.P.17 Francistown 1909-1912
B.P.18 Bulawayo(J.S.Moffat) 1890-2
B.P.19 Palapye 1897-1903
B.P.33 Serowe 1917-47
B.P.34 -do- 1947-57
B.P.35 -do- 1923-54

This list is taken from one compiled by V.F. Ellenberger, and does not indicate which series I have more fully consulted. B.P.3, one of the most important for my purposes (Carbon-copy volumes of Assistant Commissioner Out-Letters, 1897-1907), was almost impossible to consult, as pages literally crumbled when touched and the carbon impressions are now extremely faint and yellowed. For fear of destroying evidence I only consulted those pages which easily fell open in the volumes. I recommend that delicate copying should somehow be made of these volumes, and the originals should be withdrawn from consultation. Other series (e.g. B.P. 1 & B.P. 2) either fell outside my period of specialisation or were copies of letters filed elsewhere in the B.N.A. The B.P. files that I have cited in this dissertation are:

B.P. 3 B.P. 6/2751 B.P. 33/N.3
B.P. 5/2772 B.P. 6/4695
B.P. 5/3557 B.P. 6/5421
B.P. 5/3403 B.P. 6/6460
B.P. 5/4145 B.P. 6/5849
B.P. 5/5110 B.P. 33/157
B.P. 5/5193 B.P. 33/163
B.P. 5/5342 B.P. 33/748-1
B.P. 6/406 B.P. 33/748-2
B.P. 6/407 B.P. 33/1016

3 National Archives of Rhodesia (Salisbury)

Though no visit was made to Salisbury, a number of records were consulted in the Botswana National Archives which were being donated to the National Archives of Rhodesia, taken from the High Commission papers and considered to be of little interest to Botswana. The following have been cited (using old Central African Archives No.):

3a N.A.R. High Commissioner (1873-1910)
H.C. 3/5/37/1
H.C. 3/5/37/2
H.C. 3/5/37/9
4 Public Record Office (London)

4a P.R.O. Colonial Office records Series 417

Correspondence between Colonial Office and High Commissioner re. B.P.

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4b P.R.O. Colonial Office records Series 879

Colonial Office Confidential Prints (African)
Further Correspondence re. Bechuanaland, etc.
(Most of these are also available in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office library, in Great Smith Street, London W.C. 2.)

1888-1894

1894-1914
Nos. 484, 498, 517, 552, 559, 574, 656, 659, 694, 702, 717, 746, 763, 802, 872, 899, 932, 948, 969, 989, 1003, 1015, 1034.

There are other Nos. relevant to Bechuanaland, in particular the Estimates series which carries on the 1920 - Nos. 1045, 1055, 1060, & 1073 are not mentioned in List of Colonial Office Confidential Print to 1916 London: H.M.S.O. (Public Record Office Handbook No.8), 1965.

5 Scottish Record Office (Edinburgh)

5a S.R.O. Munro of Allan Papers (GD.71/491-2).
The diaries of a Bechuanaland Border Policeman, mostly on the Jameson Raid.

II/C Non-Official Papers

1 Botswana National Library (Gaborone)

See IV.4.

2 London Missionary Society (London)

These Archives were consulted at the Congregational Council for World Mission, at Livingstone House, Carteret Street,
Westminster - but will soon join an amalgamated mission archive at the School of Oriental and African Studies. In addition to the archival material, the Library collection at Livingstone House is of lasting value, containing minor and not so minor publications unavailable elsewhere.

2a L.M.S. South Africa In-Letters (re. Botswana)

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2b L.M.S. Reports: Africa - South, (manuscript)

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2c L.M.S. Annual Reports (printed)

1894-5 etc. to 1924.

2d L.M.S. Confidential Print


2e L.M.S. 'Odds'

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Box 11- Simon Ratsbosa 'The age of Senang', letter to Bulawayo Chronicle, 2 Sept.1938.

Box 23- Bechuanaland Protectorate Proclamations of 4th January, 1935: appendage "C" to minutes of Serowe Kgotta, 8/11/35.
2f L.M.S. 'Memorials
No. 6 re. Chiefs in Britain, 1895.

2g L.M.S. Out-Letters to South Africa
Letter books, occasionally consulted.

2h L.M.S. 'Africa Personal'
John Mackenzie letters, 1890-9

2i L.M.S. Pictures: Africa
Box 1 Africa general
Box 6 Bechuanaland, etc.

3 Rhodes House Library (Oxford)
3a R.H.L. Anti-Slavery Papers
MSS.Brit.Emp.S22/G8 - British South Africa, Bechuanaland
MSS.Brit.Emp.S22/G150 - Native case in Bechuanaland 1916

3b R.H.L. Lugard Papers
MSS.Brit.Emp.S81-4 - Ngamiland expedition private diaries 1-6.

4 Royal Commonwealth Society (London)
4a Khama to Lubosi (Lewanika) and Coillard, 17 July 1889
(printed in R.C.S. Library Notes, n.s.136, April 1968.)

5 Selly Oak Colleges Library (Birmingham, England)
5a Papers of Professor W.C. Willoughby

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III PRINTED SOURCES

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(place of publication is London unless otherwise stated)

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2a Published in Africa

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Cape Argus, weekly edition (Cape Town)
Diamond Fields Advertizer, weekly edition (Kimberley)
Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian (Mafeking)

2b Published in Great Britain

African Review (London), weekly
Anti-Slavery Reporter (London), bi-monthly
British Weekly (Edinburgh/London)
Saturday Review (London), weekly
Scotsman (Edinburgh), daily
South Africa (London), weekly
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3 Official Publications

3a Bechuanaland Protectorate (Mafeking)

Minutes of the First Session of the Native Advisory Council ... Held at Gaberones 2nd November, 1920. (Type copy in B.N.A.)

Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Native Advisory Council held at Gaberones on the 21st and 22nd March 1921. (Type copy in P.R.O.-C.0.417/661)

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Report by Mr. E.B. Sargant on Education in Bechuanaland Protectorate (London/Vryburg/Mafeking). With Great Britain Parliamentary Papers No.

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3c Great Britain - Parliamentary Papers
(Excluding Colonial Annual Reports)

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C.2220 (Vol. LII of 1878-9)
C.5524 (Vol. LXXV of 1888)
C.5918 (Vol. LI of 1890)
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3d South Africa


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V

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