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Security as Change?

An Institutional View of Contemporary EU-Africa Relations

Adetoun Antoinette Adeola Haastrup

PhD – University of Edinburgh - 2010
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AASM</td>
<td>The Associated African States and Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDS</td>
<td>African Chief of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defense and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Africa-EU Cairo Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDC</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in the Continent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General (European Commission, Council &amp; Parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMIFCA</td>
<td>EU-MERCOSUR Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>EU Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCASED</td>
<td>Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoA</td>
<td>Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>AU Political and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>DG External Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCI</td>
<td>UK Transfer Control Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Declaration

I hereby declare that, except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is entirely my own work and that no part has been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

Signed:
Abstract

Increased regional integration in Europe, Africa and Asia is a defining feature of the 21st century. This increase has been followed by the growth of region-to-region collaboration (inter-regionalism) as a means of international cooperation. In the past, EU-Africa relations mainly served as a medium for economic cooperation however, this is now changing with the inclusion of security cooperation in EU-Africa relations. This new relationship was explicitly outlined in the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). Within the new relationship, security cooperation through inter-regionalism is founded on the principles of equality, partnership and ownership. Despite these shifts, academic research has not caught up to examining the reasons and implications of security through inter-regionalism. The thesis therefore explores the extent to which security cooperation has contributed to changes in contemporary EU-Africa relations.

In this context, the thesis specifically evaluates security cooperation between the EU and Africa primarily through the African Union (AU). The thesis develops institutionalised inter-regionalism as a framework through which this new type of international cooperation is best understood. It assesses two cases of EU support for new security initiatives in Africa. The first case study examines the efforts to create functional battle ready groups for peace missions. The second case study evaluates the European Union’s commitment to small arms control initiatives through the African Union. It does this by applying the historical institutionalism theoretical approach to the empirical concept of inter-regionalism. The thesis uses a multi-method qualitative approach including elite interviewing, non-participant observation, documentary and narrative analysis.

The thesis finds that while the inter-regionalisation of security cooperation constitutes a shift in EU-Africa relations, changes to the institution are more likely when the EU is internally coherent, coordinated and employs a division of labour model to implement its support for the African Peace and Security Architecture. The lack of division of labour among EU actors has been impeded by lack of political will on the part of EU Member States as well as a ‘turf war’ or competition between the European Commission and Member States. The competition within the EU has been particularly detrimental to a region-to-region approach in EU-Africa relations. The lack of a single or streamlined approach undermined some of the African
Union's peace and security aims. In addition, the limited capabilities of the African Union, has negative implications for the implementation processes of the peace and security cooperation as it undermines the aspirations of ownership and partnership.

This research thesis makes a substantive contribution to the literature on EU external relations generating new insights into the changing nature of international cooperation based on regionalism. It moves beyond the discourses on EU challenges in achieving common positions on security matters. Rather, it focuses on challenges (and opportunities) occurring in EU external relations despite the common positions. Additionally, it contributes to the debates in EU-Africa relations beyond the development focus of the literature to consider insights from the empirical reality of security cooperation. Finally, the thesis contributes to the burgeoning literature on burden sharing in international security through division of labour among international actors. The thesis is therefore relevant to current trends in the study and practice of international relations.
CHARACTERISING EU-AFRICA SECURITY COOPERATION AS CHANGE
AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Over the past five decades, a defining feature of the European Union’s (EU) international relations has been its relationship with developing countries, particularly those in Africa. Between 1957 and 1989, the bulk of the European Union’s development assistance and preferential trade cooperation favoured the African dominated African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. Further, EU Member States such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany maintained bi-lateral relations with their former colonies sometimes beyond solely economic cooperation. For instance, France intervened several times in the internal political situations of African countries (see Charbonneau, 2008). Additionally, both France and the United Kingdom contributed to training African military troops for participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Africa has therefore served as a venue for many of the EU’s external relation actions in the past 50 years.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (including the institutions in Brussels and Member States) has taken steps to alter EU-Africa relations from relations dictated primarily by the separation of economic cooperation and political cooperation. The reticence of EU Member States to integrate politically created a dichotomy between European Community actions (including EU-ACP relations) and Member States bi-lateral actions in African countries (including some parallel development assistance cooperation and political cooperation). The purpose of these steps is to merge political and economic concerns borne out of mutual EU and African interests. The 2000 Cairo Declaration and Action Plan provided the platform for a new explicit political dialogue between Europe and

---

1 Stephen Hurt (2003) argues that the Cotonou Agreement in the context of EU-ACP relations has always been political. Economic cooperation in this context refers to preferential trading arrangements between the EU and African states as well as development aid donation from the European Commission and EU Member States to African States. Political cooperation includes political dialogue beyond the trade and aid commitments including security cooperation, support for regional integration and regular political dialogue on issues such as climate change and migration between Europe and Africa.
Africa. The *Cairo Declaration* especially highlighted peace and security as prerequisites to socio-economic development.

By explicitly addressing the political concerns linked to previous economic cooperation in EU-Africa relations such as continued poverty in Africa, state fragility and conflict in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, the agreements issued between 2000 and 2007 introduced something new to EU-Africa relations – the inter-regionalisation of security. In 2007, peace and security became a core area of cooperation between the EU and Africa. Although the volume of literature on EU-Africa relations has since mushroomed, literature often ignores the new political subtext of cooperation (for an exception see Whiteman, 1998). This thesis aims to explore the impact of peace and security considerations on changes to EU-Africa relations. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on EU-Africa relations. Yet, it is innovative because of its analytical framework, a historical institutionalist approach to inter-regionalism, and its investigation of security cooperation specifically.

First, this thesis applies the historical institutionalist approach to the empirical concept of inter-regionalism to create *institutionalised inter-regionalism*. Inter-regionalism provides the context from which to understand EU-Africa relations. Although the literature on inter-regionalism accepts EU-Africa relations as an example of inter-regionalism, this literature does not account for why relations have developed as they have, and why change has occurred when it did and how it did (for an exception see Olsen, 2006: 199-214). Further, it contextualises the EU-Africa relations by illuminating the processes of cooperation within formal and informal structures. Additionally, the application of historical institutionalism to inter-regionalism addresses the historical dimension in EU-Africa relations while providing the tools to examine and chart the types and extent of changes, as well as continuity in EU-Africa relations.

The primary focus of this thesis is to investigate whether the inter-regionalisation of security cooperation has contributed to changes in existing EU-Africa relations. Specifically, this thesis analyses the process of EU support for African peace and security initiatives through support for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
thesis treats Africa as a single region while acknowledging the role of its 54 countries and sub-regional organisations. Examining the continent as one is useful and accurate in that all African countries, in principle, subscribe to the peace and security aims of the African Union. The thesis’ overarching research question is to what extent has security cooperation contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations? Additional questions include, what can this EU-Africa security cooperation tell us about the European Union’s role as an international security actor? Who are the actors involved in EU-Africa security cooperation? How does the EU coordinate its support for African security initiatives?

The thesis examines two cases of EU support for the African Peace and Security Architecture. They include support to build the capacity of the African Standby Force, and institutional support for the fight against small arms. These cases meet three criteria:

1. Actions defined within the framework of the Africa-EU partnership and dialogue.
2. Actions oriented towards a specific security goal within the criteria of the security strategy.
3. Actions “made operational with physical activity [including] financing and diplomacy”.

As a sub category of (2) both the EU and African Union (AU) must agree that the goal can be classified as ‘security’. The thesis establishes the incorporation of security cooperation as part of the institutionalisation process between the European Union and Africa. An in-depth assessment of the EU-AU relationship refocuses the relationship between these two regions in a new context, separately from the ACP arrangement and as political partners. Security cooperation addresses only one dimension of EU-Africa relations. This thesis is therefore only a contributory analysis to our understanding of contemporary EU-Africa relations and does not claim to be an overarching explanation of changes in EU-Africa relations. In assessing the potential contribution of security cooperation to change, it is important to understand the current state of EU-Africa relations.

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2 The criterion based on Smith’s (2004b) measure of cooperation.
1.1. EU-Africa Inter-regional Relations: An Overview

In 2007, the 53 African leaders (excluding Morocco) and the leaders of the 27 European Union Member States signed the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), ushering a new era in social, economic and political cooperation between Europe and Africa (see Chapter 4). This signalled a potential shift in EU-Africa relations. First, it included cooperation in policy areas beyond economic cooperation, such as peace and security. The inclusion of peace and security is significant because it suggested a holistic approach on the part of the EU, i.e. a shift from the bi-lateral relations dominated by Member States. Second, it expressly stated the support for African initiatives and institutions, especially the African Union as the core aim of the new institution. On peace and security in particular, the JAES committed the EU to cooperation with the African Union on:

- Enhanced Dialogue on Challenges to Peace and Security;
- Full Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); and

Prior to 2007, the EU’s engagement in Africa often involved direct interventions whereby the EU planned and implemented a programme on its own. In theory, the JAES approach considers the role of African institutions, particularly the African Union as the vehicle for European engagement in Africa’s security. These institutions are therefore integral to the decision-making process on peace and security. The new EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security is important when examining the change in EU-Africa relations, since concerns about achieving security in Africa have been a central motivator for change in the European Union's approach to Africa. The 2003 European Security Strategy for instance notes, “sub-Saharan Africa is poorer than it was…, which is linked to political problems and violent conflict” (ESS, 2003: 6). Further, the ESS identifies security as a precondition for development and views regional organisations such as the African Union as integral to “a more orderly world” (ESS, 2003: 9).

The year 2000 was a significant year for the evolution of EU-Africa relations. In the first instance, the European Union and the African states negotiated and acceded to the Cotonou
Although drafted as a continuation of previous collaborations, the Cotonou Agreement also reflected a marked shift by including political dimensions to EU-Africa relations. The 2000 Agreement reflected a comprehensive revision, preceded by broad interregional consultations and debates in Europe and Africa. The process of negotiation particularly reflected the new challenges and opportunities for Africa, Europe and within the international arena. In addition to the Cotonou Agreement, the African and European leaders were in the parallel process of negotiating the 2000 Cairo Declaration and Plan of Action, thereby bolstering their commitments to the African continent outside of the ACP framework.

This marked the first time that the European and African states entrusted the African representation to the now defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as it prepared to transform to the current African Union. In the years since its inception in 1963, until prior to the 2000 Agreement, the OAU neither had the capability nor a clear mandate to act on behalf of its African members. Instead, it served as a ‘talking shop’ for corrupt governments and leaders despite the many challenges of insecurity and poor governance faced by the majority of states in the African continent.

The imminent formation of the African Union provided another impetus for inter-regional cooperation. First, the African Union is a model of the European Union, making the EU a natural partner to Africa in order to share its own integration experiences. Second, the EU saw the new aims of the AU as a sign of Africa’s commitment to their mutual interests. The AU is a more credible partner for tackling the European Union Member States’ security concerns as well as EU-wide interests. In addition to the African Union, EU-Africa dialogue took place in the context of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in early 2000. African leaders adopted NEPAD in 2001 as a programme of the OAU to integrate the socio-economic development framework for Africa. Presently, the NEPAD is integrating its processes into the African Union’s structures to reinforce a holistic approach within Africa and in EU-Africa relations.

The political and socio-economic situation in Africa is one basis for the recent developments in EU-Africa relations. Despite the challenges and opportunities for Africa
within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

3, the fragility of the continent’s political landscape became apparent in the period following the end of the Cold War. African leaders and the international donor community acknowledged that insecurity through violent conflicts has exacerbated poverty and stagnated development, thereby undermining the systems of governance in Africa. This acknowledgement inspired the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa on the part of the European Union. Deemed largely unilateral on the part of the EU and its Member States, intense consultations leading to the JAES started in December 2005. African governments and civil society organisations, as well as the civil societies in Europe and Africa participated in what is the most comprehensive EU external relations strategy to date. The aim was to create a new strategy that emphasised African priorities as much as European interests.

One of the reasons this project is timely is that most of the literature on EU-Africa relations is still concerned with the economic and development assistance aspect of the relationship (Asante, 1996; Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978a, b; David, 2000; Stevens, 2006; Carbone, 2007a; Olsen, 2001; Babarinde & Faber, 2005; Misser, 2008). Additionally, until a few years ago, the literature did not consider Africa as a region by its own in the context of EU external relations. Most of the literature often addressed Africa in the context of EU-ACP relations, neglecting the myriad of European-Africa relations including the bi-lateral relations. A holistic and focused assessment of EU-Africa relations is important because the different relations serve as subtexts to other relations, i.e. France’s political engagement in Africa influences its position when negotiating with other EU Member States about continued support for Africa. By considering only the EU-ACP, which is primarily a conduit for economic development and poverty reduction, the literature limits our knowledge of the European Union and Africa’s new political institutions. Further, this narrow approach limits the potential for Africa’s integration process by not considering Africa on its own.

In the immediate post-independence era, security was not an area of cooperation between the EU and Africa. The newly independent states of Africa resisted interventions from external parties. The Organisation of African Union (OAU) Charter highlights this

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3 MDGs include: End to poverty and hunger; Universal Education; Gender Equality; Child Health; Maternal Health; Combat HIV/AIDS; Environmental Sustainability; Global Partnerships
resistance claiming that such interference would breach sacrosanct sovereignty of the nation-state (OAU Charter, 1963). This resistance reflected Africa’s policy of non-intervention. The Charter emphasises the protection of territorial integrity, directed against the possibility of intervention from former colonial powers. In addition, the Charter prohibited external entities from “interfering in the internal affairs of States” (OAU Charter).

Further, European countries coming out of WWII into the Cold War saw Eastern Europe as the main threat to their security, not African countries. With the exception of French military support to African regimes, the European states were largely absent in the security landscape of Africa. The ‘security’ engagement in Africa by foreign countries was limited to the United States and Soviet Union’s support for proxy regimes. Otherwise, Europeans were absent from Africa’s security landscape. At that time, security was very traditional – it involved protection against external military threats. Therefore, insecurity came from the outside not from within. It is therefore not surprising that it was not viable for the Western European and African states to cooperate on security.

Despite the scholarly attention to development assistance and economic cooperation, other areas of EU-Africa relations are experiencing change. These changes, encouraged by shifts in the international system as well as in Europe and Africa have brought ‘security’ to the forefront of the EU-Africa cooperation agenda. This interest in what security means and how it pertains to African matters is therefore essential when attempting to understand contemporary EU-Africa relations.

The implementation of the various agreements and the processes of consultation and negotiation has institutionalised the relationship between the EU and Africa for over 50 years. The thesis defines institutionalisation as a process whereby cooperation between the EU and Africa continually incorporates norms, or shared standards of behaviour starting first with the processes of EU-ACP relations (Smith, 2004a,b). Further, in transferring national competencies to the EU governance level, EU Member States have

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also transferred the norms and rules of their bi-lateral relations to EU-Africa relations thus reinforcing historical European-African historical ties.

1.2 The European Union in Africa: Security and Change

A core argument of this thesis is that developments within Africa and the European Union have contributed to the inclusion of security in EU-Africa relations. In Africa, the most significant acknowledgement of the need to tackle security challenges on the continent has been the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) within the African Union (AU). The APSA was a mandate through the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. APSA replaces the informal mechanisms of conflict prevention within the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU). The APSA encourages and actively promotes cooperation between the African states on issues relating to Africa and international peace and security. However, as this entity is in its infancy, it relies on external partners to help support its institutional capabilities as well as its initiatives. In this regard, the European Union has proven to be the most prominent supporter of the APSA. The reinvigorated pan-Africanist agenda has further contributed to the EU’s ability to pursue an interregional approach in its foreign policy towards Africa. Furthermore, the African Union is more open to institutional and political collaboration than its predecessor was. In assessing its contribution to change, the concept of security itself deserves examination.

In the EU, as the integration project has evolved and its competencies have expanded, the predominantly intergovernmental area of security is gradually becoming institutionalised in some cases as a part of the development policies and in others as part of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). This is evident in the EU’s external relations discourse through statements issued under the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP) and the European Consensus on Development (ECD). Further, the EU through its

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5 Article 17 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is dedicated to using international cooperation with the UN and other institutions to achieve and promote peace and security in Africa.
Action Plan Framework of the ESDP is committed to helping sub-Saharan Africa (under the auspices of the AU). Under its new commitment towards security in EU-Africa relations the EU funds the African Peace Facility (APF), founded in 2003. This fund of about €250 million also supports the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Table 1.1 shows the aspects of the APSA funded by these two sources. Whereas the fund itself is from the Development and Humanitarian Aid sector of the European Union, it is geared specifically towards the prevention of conflicts and other peace and security issues.6

Table 1.1: EU funding for African peace and security institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(€) Amount (in millions)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Uses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
<td>22,682</td>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>Main instrument of EU aid to Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>Primarily dedicated to peace support operations, including training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this alone, there is the clear understanding that intervention in security concerns is of importance in the collaboration between the African Union and the European Union. Further, it exemplifies how security is being linked to the EU’s development agenda. This linkage is the security-development nexus. The security-development nexus is a succinct description of the links made in foreign policy practice that is holistic and seeks to address the interconnectedness of conflict management, security sector reforms, disarmament and rebuilding societal infrastructure in post-conflict settings (Hurwitz and Peake, 2004; OECD, 2001). It is a unique way of viewing security, even when it must involve traditional security dimensions of militarised intervention or civilian police action. According to Kerr (2007), “empirical observations and several data-collections studies reveal the significance of that nexus” (92).


7 Of this amount, 21,966 million goes to ACP countries, while the rest goes to the European Commission for its work on development.
International donor agencies have frequently promoted the security-development nexus based on extensive research in the field (OECD/DAC, 2004; USAID, 2005; UN 2003; Hurwitz & Peake, 2004). The security-development nexus is consistent with EU's continued engagement in international peace and security. This is evident from the views expressed in the 2008 European Council's Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, which states that

“As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security and without development and poverty eradication, there will be no sustainable peace” (2008: 12).

The security-development nexus is a useful tool for describing the current nature of security threats in international relations and the responses to these threats. It has been a valuable frame for analysing the complexities of intra-state conflicts, and other antecedent insecurities. Accordingly, the increased engagement of the international community in African affairs through direct support for peace support operations, disarmament and security sector reform and the strengthening of African capabilities are seen as part of the increased relationship between security and development or the security-development nexus (see Mark Malloch Brown’s address, 2003; Raymond Johansen speech, 2007). The concept of a security-development nexus goes beyond the suggestion that security and development are interlinked. In practice, it proposes a proactive version of security invested in prevention and reconstruction rather than reaction, especially in the case of violent conflicts.

Some commentators contest the linkage between security and development particularly since the start of the War on Terror (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 133). It is within these policy frameworks that the European Union's Member States jointly maintained a political presence in the Sudan, where under an EU mandate they adopted a civilian-military support mission to the AU mission in Darfur (General Reports on the Activities of the European Union, “Contribution to Security in the World, Common Foreign and Security Policy”). More importantly, it is within these frameworks that the current EU-Africa
Dyck for instance notes that the United Kingdom and Denmark for instance put the security-development nexus at the centre of the foreign policies in Africa.

Some have argued that there is the potential for the diversion of development aid from development purposes to traditional security, e.g. money being diverted for infrastructure and education and reduced in favour of counterterrorism or border control purposes (see Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 133; Bachmann and Hönke, 2008). There is the idea that members of the international donor community are securitising development issues based on the perception that Africa is a source of the risks and threats associated with terrorism (Bachmann and Hönke, 2008: 6). This entails that the resources for development assistance are being diverted for use in ‘security’ initiatives, or when traditional development issues are being linked to security concerns (see Duffield, 2005; Bachmann and Hönke, 2008; Brown, 2008; Bagayoko and Gibert, 2007). Bagayoko and Gibert (2007) depict the security-development nexus in EU-Africa relations as mostly positive. However, some of the literature on the securitisation9 of development interprets the linkage of security and development as having a negative effect on donor-recipient relationships including the civil society (see Howell and Lind, 2009; IPA, 2006).

Despite concerns about securitisation, practitioners in both the EU and Africa believe that there is some overlap in development and security. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that security concerns have overridden tangible development needs. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on “the natural link”10 between security and development has served to enhance the priority of development concerns to international donors. While challenges of policy implementation exist in merging these seemingly divergent fields, facilitating the proposed changes in EU-Africa relations security-development nexus can prove useful to achieving Africa’s security and development aims.

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9 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) characterise securitisation as the extreme politicisation of an issue. Specifically, an issue or a referent object that is presented as being existentially threatening to security and may require emergency measures that justify actions outside of the normal bounds of political procedure. For an issue to be securitised it must also be committed to a speech-act, i.e. the rhetoric of actors will persistently link the existential threat to more tangible security concerns. So, those arguing that development has been securitised see the linking of underdevelopment to insecurity as a securitisation of development.

According to Kolodziej (2005), the notion of security is “laden with emotion and deeply held values” (1). The idea of security and the peace derived from it is therefore very complicated. This thesis, explores security defined within the confines of the areas elucidated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. In the ESS, security takes a holistic approach that recognises the “political, socio-economic, cultural, ecologic and military” (Biscop, 2005). This explanation moves beyond the traditional understanding of security. Traditional security has always concerned itself with security between states. Consequently, the traditional understanding of security, which was characteristic of the Cold War era, emphasised the protection of the state from external threats.

The security-development nexus for instance has developed from a particular approach to security known as human security. At least three of the approaches in the field of International Relations, Liberalist, Critical Security and Constructivism, have influenced the development of human security as a security concept. Indeed scholars like Dannreuther (2007) place the human security approach within a liberal/conventional constructivism/historical sociology continuum, which indicates its robust lineage. The concept of human security pursues a people centric notion of security. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report first coined the term human security. The notion of human security is the widely accepted functional definition for security within the African and European institutions under consideration.

International framework documents such as the European Security Strategy and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (of the African Union) have all expressed the new concept of human security. Presently, African institutions and government, at least in theory, embrace the concept of human security. In a region where the majority of the insecurities are within the borders and mainly perpetuated by the state’s government, the concept of human security helps to analyse the normative dimensions of security by raising ethical issues (Kerr, 2007: 93). The concept presents a shift in the focus from the

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11 The EU Security Strategy does not define security per se and instead defines the areas of insecurities it wants to tackle.
protection of states and regimes to the protection of the individual and communities. Further, approaches to security by regional structures have contributed to the further development of the concept (2003). As one author notes, human security stretches the concept of security from the horizontal, beyond military objectives alone, to the vertical to incorporate the participation of individual, local, regional and international structures and actors (Hutchful, 2008).

Nevertheless, while Africans and Europeans espouse human security in its broadest form, the bulk of African security challenges are linked to active, dormant, and potentially violent conflict situations, which sometimes require traditional security responses. These insecurities are deeply rooted in the social, political, and economic situations on the continent, which is supported by the human security concept in various ways (Boucher and Holt, 2007; Johansen, 2007). In Africa however, this reality means that the military (with the holistic cooperation of civilian and police actors) remain central to promoting the human security agenda on the continent. According to the Ghanaian scholar, Eboe Hutchful, the human security concept divested of a military aspect is a concept that is pushed by international organisations and NGOs who miss the point about the continued usefulness of some aspects of ‘hard security’ (Hutchful, 2008: 79), which could potentially hinder Africa’s quest for peace. As evidenced by one of the examples of security cooperation assessed in this thesis, African states take this view as they commit to building the capabilities of the African Standby Force (ASF).

Broadly, security in this project relies on Hutchful’s functional analysis of security in Africa. This thesis of course goes further by examining security cooperation between the EU and Africa, which are in essence the activities of cooperation between the EU and AU, which constitute responses to insecurities in Africa. References to security cooperation, especially its operationalisation, therefore include those instances where the EU and AU decide to cooperate in their responses to (potential) humanitarian emergencies or violent conflict situations. These include processes and mechanisms that address the root causes of the insecurities and incorporate non-military responses to security challenges before, during and after the cessation of violence. Further, the operationalisation of security must include continued engagement in the political space after the cessation of violence to rebuild
institutions that contribute to democracy, good governance and the establishment of a viable human rights regime.

Human security contrasts with the meaning of security expressed by the two main theoretical perspectives within international relations: realism and liberalism. According to Morgan (2007), these approaches to state security have four basic elements, which are safety, autonomy, development and rule (14). The realist approach to security, particularly neo-realism emphasises the importance of state security and autonomy. Further, this approach views the state as the central unit of analysis in international relations. As an entity, the state is a supposedly unitary, self-interested and functioning in a unique position apart from the rest of society (Morgan, 2007: 17). According to the realist approach, states are driven by the need to accumulate and ensure autonomy from other states, and often this is achieved through physical security, primarily military. The solitary nature of achieving security within a realist paradigm makes it difficult for governments to cooperate or entrust others with their own security. The realist tradition continues to dominate the discourse on security. For instance, it offers an explanation as to why EU member states find it difficult to transfer the powers of a Common Foreign Defence and Security Policy (CFSP) to the supranational level.

Despite this, the realist approach does not adequately account for any of the developments that have occurred in the past twenty years among EU Member States to make their foreign policies more coherent, i.e. realism cannot explain why states actively seek cooperation. Further, it cannot account for why the EU has explicitly included peace and security as an area of cooperation with African states and institutions after many years of development and economic cooperation. In addition to this, the realist approach is not sufficiently equipped to assess the upsurge of region-to-region cooperation beyond the remit of the traditional state. Because it cannot adequately account for the new EU-Africa security cooperation, it is not an appropriate approach to security in this context.

The liberalist approach to security emphasises the role of ruling elites in determining the security of the state. The liberalist approach, unlike its realist counterpart, rejects the notion that the state is a unitary actor. Proponents of this approach see the state as a
representation of the elites’ preferences in a domestic setting, that is, on a national level. The liberalist perspective does not discount the states’ interests but sees government policies as being dependent on those in charge of the government at a particular time. Unlike the realist traditions, liberalists contend that states get tired of the competitive nature of the anarchic system (Morgan, 2007: 26). Neo-liberals especially therefore see the value of cooperating on issues of mutual security such as nuclear proliferation, international arms control and terrorism. Although neo-liberals acknowledge the anarchic structure of the international system, they favour cooperation through multilateral institutions and regimes such as the United Nations and European Union.

A third alternative to the liberal and realist traditions of security is constructivism. Constructivism has contributed to the post-Cold War era discourses on security (Dannreuther, 2007: 39 – 42). It has also been influential in re-defining the traditional views of security held by both the realist and liberal schools. It places an emphasis on the idea of a cooperative security system (see Wendt, 1992) which relies on history and social context rather than a pre-determined set of behaviours. It also considers the role of institutions or systems and other non-state actors in influencing the reality and the study of international relations (see Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Buzan and Waever, 2003). Constructivism arose in the post-Cold War era to confront what is happening in international relations (Dannreuther, 2007: 39) and served as a useful alternative to the neo-realist and neo-liberalist approaches.

Beyond constructivism, critical security studies characterise the different views outside the conventional structures of realism and liberalism. Critical security critiques the state-centric focus of security in both the realist and liberalist traditions especially the idea that security is “the threat, use and control of military force” (Walt, 1991:212). Although without one definition, as the literature contains several different proponents (see Williams and Krause, 1997; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998; Erikkson, 1999; Booth 2005), Booth describes critical security as “security...conceived comprehensively embracing theories and practices at multiple levels of society from the individual to the whole human species” (Booth, 2005: 16).
The evolving approaches to security have resulted in a different practice to security over the past two decades. Table 1.2 below outlines the differences between the traditional models of operationalising security and the ‘new’ model.

Table 1.2 Key differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ models of security engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional model of security engagements</th>
<th>‘New’ model of security engagements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses to threats</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military and non-military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of threats</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>External (border disputes) and internal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors (belligerents and non-belligerents)</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>States and non-states (sub-nationalist groups, civil society organisations, international organisations and regional organisations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of engagement</td>
<td>Short-term (cessation of violence)</td>
<td>Medium to long term through post conflict reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the forgoing, the evolution of security and its new inclusion in EU-Africa relations suggests that security potentially contributes changes to overall EU-Africa relations. However, how do we know change when we see it? A simple assessment of the new policy agreement is inadequate to understand the function of security cooperation vis-à-vis previous relations. Hence, three principles of change have been devised to evaluate changes in EU-Africa relations.

1.3 Defining the Change in EU-Africa Relations

Shifts in EU-Africa relations are intended to result in a dynamic political outcome due to the changes in the characteristics of the political context, the institution itself and the role of the dominant agent (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 15). Essentially, the inter-regionalisation of different policy areas, as well as the new roles of the African Union as regional actor and new EU capabilities as exhibited through security cooperation ought to contribute to changes in EU-Africa relations. Figure 1.1 seeks to capture the trajectory of the shifts in EU-Africa (security) cooperation in the post-Cold War era.
Figure 1.1 Expected Causal Pathways of Change through EU-Africa Security Cooperation

This diagram views the inter-regionalisation of security as the impetus for changes in the EU-Africa institution. However, what sort of changes does the institution aspire to? A detailed analysis of policy documents pertaining to EU-Africa relations identifies three desirable principles that are deemed to underpin the new inter-regional relations (see EU Strategy for Africa, 2005). These principles are equality, partnership and ownership. If these concepts are translated into practice then we can consider an evolution or change to have occurred in the EU-Africa institution. There is a considerable literature on these concepts in relation to broader international development and to a great extent, they need to be approached as discursive aspirations. It is not central to this thesis to go into these debates in great depth. However, the centrality of these concepts of equality, partnership and ownership within the Strategy make them useful principles to assess changes in EU-Africa relations in relation to security cooperation.
The new EU-Africa relations are founded on the principle of equality. It is defined in the EU Strategy for Africa as the “…mutual recognition and respect for institutions and the definition of mutual collective interests” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005). In translating equality to actionable objectives, EU-Africa relations would weigh African interests in the same way as European interests. The outcomes of European policies since decolonisation, such as continued poverty and stagnant social development, suggest that while Europe may have benefited from EU-Africa relations Africa has not. A scenario where security cooperation creates a forum for the equal participation of the EU and the AU leading to a real potential for equal benefits would signal the change in EU-Africa relations

Partnership is a relatively new indicator of change in the context of North-South relations. Over the past two decades, development studies literature has defined partnership in two ways: dependent partnership and active partnership (Lewis, 1998; 2000). Dependent partnerships “…are often linked to the availability of funding” wherein, the recipients of support acquiesce to the demands of the donor partners and have no independence (Lewis, 1998: 504). This makes participation in the decision making process difficult for the country or institution receiving assistance from partners in the global North.

Active partnerships are difficult to achieve in the context of North-South relations. They are

“… built through ongoing processes of negotiation, debate, occasional conflict, and learning through trial and error. Risks are taken, and although roles and purposes are clear they may change according to need and circumstance” (Lewis, 1998: 504).

Active partnership is what the EU strives for when working with African institutions, especially the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). However, the ability to achieve this in security cooperation is often threatened since the African Union is less developed that the European Union as a regional actor. The findings of this research project therefore make the distinction between the two types of partnerships.
Ownership is perhaps the murkiest of practices to define. It can have multiple meanings and it is extremely difficult to assess (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009a). Nevertheless, given that it is an expressed outcome of changes within EU-Africa relations, it deserves acknowledgement. In the context of this project, Ownership expresses the degree of control the African Union can exercise over the initiation, the design and the implementation of security cooperation (adapted from de Renzio, et al., 2008: 2). Ownership is the “acceptance of, commitment to and responsibility for the implementation of...home grown solutions” (Girvan, 2007:3). Homegrown solutions are based on local knowledge of the policy environment. According to the United Nations’ International Peace Academy, ownership should further the six dimensions: “responsiveness, consultation, participation, accountability, control and sovereignty” (IPA, 2006: 7). Ownership as an aspiration of North-South relations has emerged because of the imbalances of power between supposed partners in the international system. Where local knowledge is lacking, the resulting policies may be short-lived in their usefulness or efficiency. Although the discourse around ownership has existed for well over a decade, it has only recently emerged as an expressly defined aim of EU-Africa relations in the past five years. Hence, ownership in this regard has become a new principle of EU-Africa relations.

Achieving change in the context of EU-Africa relations would ensure that ownership, as defined by Girvan (2007), is the benchmark for new relations. In looking for ownership in EU-Africa security cooperation, this thesis will be evaluating the new role of the African Union as Africa’s interlocutor and consequently, the core African decision maker and implementer of joint policy objectives.

The translation of these three principles into practice would indicate a transformation in existing EU-Africa relations. Security cooperation is only one arm/pillar of the JAES, but the extent to which these principles demonstrate change in this sector may provide insights into broader change in EU-Africa relations or indeed an impetus for change in other areas.

1.4 Thesis Limitations & Outline

The thesis seeks to understand the impact of security cooperation on new EU-Africa relations. Unlike previous EU-Africa studies on economic relations, this thesis offers unique
insight into new security relations, the new role of the African Union as Africa’s interlocutor and the organisation of the EU’s new security capabilities. It analyses two cases studies undertaken as part of the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The thesis finds that the contribution of security cooperation to change in EU-Africa relations is not absolute. Rather, current security cooperation practices put EU-Africa relations on a continuum of change, heavily influenced by the internal organisation of EU actors and the capabilities of the African Union.

Chapter 2 identifies and evaluates the key strands that typify literature on EU external relations. This chapter highlights the limitations of these areas and argues that these approaches to EU external (security) relations ought to consider the specific instances of engagement to understand or judge the EU’s impact on peace and security. The chapter argues that a fusion of the concepts of inter-regionalism and new institutionalism provide a suitable analytical framework for understanding the EU’s relations with Africa. Further, it offers a new way to evaluate the change built on previous relations. It reviews the literature on inter-regionalism and its appeal to the EU and African states and contends that the institutionalisation of inter-regionalism is evidenced by shared norms and values, which are apparent in the cooperation agreements.

Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methodological framework utilised in the thesis. It explores the relationship between the method of process tracing and elite interviewing and makes a case for the appropriateness of the methods and data collection technique. It further justifies the use of the case study approach and the choice of case studies. Additionally, it tackles the ethical issues that arose throughout the project.

Chapter 4 chronicles the historical development of EU-Africa relations. This chapter analyses the process of institutionalisation in EU-Africa relations. Further, it highlights the potential for change in EU-Africa relations based on the inclusion of security to EU-Africa relations. It examines what constitutes the ‘turn’ or change in the institution of EU-Africa relations, including the creation and function of the African Union. The chapter mainly relies on official documents including agreements relevant to EU-Africa relations for charting the institutionalisation process. This chapter further explores the construction
and development of the institution and emphasises the role of *path-dependency* and continuity.

Chapters 5 and 6 describe and analyse the two case studies selected: capacity building for the African Standby Force, through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA; and collaboration on combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa. Each of the case studies explores the development of EU-Africa relations in the context of peacekeeping activities and the eradication of small arms. In Chapter 5, it is argued that the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process is indicative of a high degree of change within EU-Africa relations. Additionally, it explores the limitations of cooperation with a new institution like the African Union with its limited capabilities. Chapter 6 undertakes the evaluation of a different type of security cooperation engagement between the EU and Africa in order to contrast the extent and type of change observed. This second case deals with the efforts of the African Union to institute a comprehensive framework for curbing the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). This chapter examines the extent to which the EU’s support for the African Union in this regard illustrates changes in EU-Africa relations. This chapter also highlights tensions among EU actors, which affect the external relations of the EU.

Chapter 7 offers a detailed analysis of the two cases studies, as illustrative examples of EU-Africa security cooperation. It argues that while institutional factors within the European and African establishments affect changes in EU-Africa relations, the practice of division of labour has a significantly positive effect on changes in EU-Africa security cooperation. The chapter further revisits the three principles of change. The analysis shows that the extent to which security cooperation has contributed to the aims of institutional transformation through *equality*, *partnership* and *ownership* varies across the two cases studies. The findings of this analysis suggest that changes contributed by security cooperation in EU-Africa relations are on a continuum between gradual incremental change (layering) and transformative change (conversion).

In addition to reflecting on the issues raised in the previous chapters, Chapter 8 looks forward beyond the assessment of EU-Africa security cooperation. This chapter considers
the possibilities for continued transformations in EU-Africa relations. Further, it offers some thoughts on the prospects for division of labour within the rapidly evolving EU external relations architecture especially in the context of the Lisbon Treaty. This final chapter puts forward some thoughts on how the EU’s arrangements with Africa on security affect the EU's aims as an international actor.
INSTITUTIONALISING INTER-REGIONALISM: An Analytical Framework

Introduction

Finding one existing theory or framework within international relations literature on cooperation, which captures the current trajectory of EU-Africa cooperation is challenging. Further, the existing theories and concepts developed by EU experts have proved inadequate. The theories' inadequacies exist despite the fact that theorising on EU external relations is abundant. This literature on EU external relations has not attempted to understand or explain the evolution of external relations in the context of the unique EU-Africa relations. Much of this literature focuses on EU motivations to engage in external relations or EU decision-making processes, often excluding the reality of EU engagement in international (security) relations.

In developing a framework that probes the reality of EU-Africa relations, this chapter argues that an institutionalist view of inter-regionalism provides the best tool to define and understand the scope of current EU external relations vis-à-vis Africa. This merger of inter-regionalism and institutionalism considers the whole of EU-Africa relations in its historical context and within the field of international relations. This chapter therefore develops institutionalised inter-regionalism as an analytical framework. The chapter develops this framework by ‘marrying’ historical institutionalism to the empirical concept of inter-regionalism. Often, the theories and concepts applied to EU external relations focus on integration debates. While these debates are important for understanding the European Union’s limitations, these debates do not always contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s external (security) relations within a specific context, in this case Africa.

The chapter consists of five sections as follows. First, it briefly explores the concepts and theories that are central to explaining the internal integration processes that have contributed to studies on EU external relations. It explores other concepts used to
delineate the ‘actorness’ of the EU externally, i.e. how is the EU driven and able to act with purpose when engaging in foreign affairs. At the end of this section, the chapter addresses Africa’s challenge to international relations. Second, the chapter engages with the concepts of regionalism and inter-regionalism arising from empirical studies of EU external relations engagements in Africa and other regions of the world. Third, the chapter introduces the empirical concepts of regionalism and inter-regionalism as methods of international cooperation. Fourth, the chapter brings together the literature on inter-regionalism and historical institutionalism in the context of new EU-Africa security cooperation to create an appropriate analytical framework, *institutionalised inter-regionalism*. The chapter then concludes that by considering EU-Africa inter-regionalism as an institution, historical institutionalism offers tools through which change can be analysed.

2.1 Theorising the EU in International Relations

Often, assessments on EU external relations start with integration theories or assumptions related to the internal constitution of the European Union. These integration theories explain how the internal procedures of the European Union determine its different policies including foreign or external relations policies. Two EU integration theories often proffered within the international relations approach are *neo-functionalism* and *liberal inter-governmentalism*.

Ernst Haas most notably advanced the theory of *neo-functionalism* in the late 1950s and the 1960s. He used this theory to explain the development of EU policy integration (Haas, 1958). This theory falls within the liberalist school of thought in that it sees the value of cooperation among nation-states. The theory however emphasises the role of non-state actors in driving forward the integration project (Schmitter, 2005). Although neo-functionalists do not discount the role of Member States as actors in the integration process, it posits however, that, “they [Member States] do not exclusively determine the direction and extent of subsequent change” (Schmitter, 2005: 257). Rather, neo-functionalists argue that the initial process of economic integration within the EU will produce *positive spillover* into other policy areas such as political cooperation. Positive spillover will occur when the Member State governments give over power and
responsibility to the supranational institution. Over time, they argue, the economic integration will yield to social integration, which will in turn yield to areas of political cooperation (Haas, 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Initially, the logic of neo-functionalism seemed obvious especially during the earlier stages of EU integration. However, the perceived stagnation of European political integration discredited this theory especially in the area of foreign policy and security cooperation. Further, neo-functionalism as an integration theory has been unable to account for the EU’s role as an international actor. Liberal Inter-governmentalism (LI) then arose as an alternative theory to and critique of neo-functionalism during the period of stagnation in European political integration.

Liberal inter-governmentalism is one of the most influential EU integration theories. It posits that states will only cooperate when they have similar interests and states not institutions determine the course of EU integration. Its most famous proponent is Andrew Moravcsik who outlines the logic of why and how EU Member States cooperate in the book *Choice for Europe*. Moravcsik argues that economic interests primarily drive policy integration among European Member States. As these interests converge, the integration project is more likely to advance (Moravcsik, 1998: 3; 60-66). These economic preferences are derived from domestic debates within governments and other social groups within each state and subsequently through inter-state bargaining from whence polices emerge. In short, liberal inter-governmentalism contends that the process of integration continues if it strengthens national governments’ powers domestically. Liberal inter-governmentalism further downplays the role of institutions in shaping the behaviour of EU actors, especially the Member States (Moravcsik, 1998; 2009).

The inability of the EU to achieve a truly ‘common’ foreign policy despite the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concrete evidence of the liberal inter-governmentalist thesis. The continued reluctance of EU Member States to cede power to the supranational level is further evidence that the States drive integration. Although there are a few areas where the Member States often act cooperatively these are limited by the fact that ceding the powers to create unified foreign and security polices for all EU Member States has often been seen to potentially weaken national government powers (Smith, K.E.
2003: 3). Liberal inter-governmentalism would therefore be applicable to the internal mechanisms currently in place to create foreign policy, especially security policy.

While liberal inter-governmentalism makes a very convincing case it does not acknowledge the impact of prior relations with external partners on the trajectory of further policy integration. For instance, the relationship between the European Union and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries neither strengthened nor weakened EU Member States domestically. Rather, past colonial ties drove the EU Member States’ decision to cooperate with the countries in the ACP. This motivation does not imply that the Member States did not benefit from their relationship with the ACP; however, this was not the primary motivation. Further, liberal inter-governmentalism ignores the impact EU partners (and other external forces) have on EU policies. For instance, it is now apparent that the formation of new institutions such as the African Union and the increasing geo-strategic importance of Africa has affected EU-wide policies in Africa. Whereas the new Eastern European members of the European Union do not have immediate interests in Africa, the EU has consistently sought more cooperation rather than less with African institutions. Essentially, EU Member States’ decisions are not only a result of national interests. External pressures on individual Member States can drive integration at the EU level. Additionally, while the EU Member States aim to promote a unified EU in certain policy areas, their ability for promotion depends on the perceptions of partner institutions like the African Union (Gomez, 2006: 4, 10). Finally, liberal inter-governmentalism cannot explain why the unified development and economic cooperation policy towards Africa prevailed or why it has expanded to a security dimension, i.e. it cannot explain endurance or change outside of perceived EU interests. Ricardo Gomez (2006) therefore rightly notes that liberal inter-governmentalism debates do not contribute much to the role of the EU as a security actor in the international system (9-10).

Where integration theories have not succeeded, EU scholars have formulated new concepts for the particular purpose of explaining the EU’s role as an international actor in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 1992. Christopher Hill’s concept of the capabilities-expectations gap (1993) is one such concept and it moves beyond the integration debates of foreign policy formation. Hill seeks to understand the
challenges the EU faces in trying to achieve a coherent foreign policy and act upon those foreign policy objectives. He argues that the EU is unable to fulfil the expectations other political actors have of it because it has limited security capabilities (Hill, 1993). Essentially having created the CFSP, the EU raised the expectations of other Members of the international community. The CFSP is therefore seen as a promise of EU capabilities intended to contribute to international peace and security, a promise which according to Hill’s thesis the EU cannot fulfil.

Hill defines capabilities as “the use and threat of force, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, cultural influence” among others (Hill, 1998: 23). In effect, the capabilities one might expect from nation-states participating in the international political system. Expectations refer to the “ambitions or demands of the EU's international behaviour which derive from both inside and outside the Union” (Hill, 1998: 23). Expectations are therefore the pressures that the EU faces internally from among the Member States and externally to candidate countries and other third countries (or institutions) to act in a certain way. The fundamental assumption of Hill’s thesis is that expectations of the EU exceed its current abilities, and they are the same for both nation-states and the regional institutions. Hill posits that the EU is unable to fulfil these expectations based on its “[in] ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its disposal” (Hill, 1993: 11).

Overall, the capabilities-expectations gap is a useful concept for understanding the EU's internal limitations in dealing with its external partners. Despite the increase in capabilities, internal inadequacies within the EU's external relations architecture affects the ability of the EU to fulfil its foreign policy commitments. In relation to Africa, specifically, he argues that the ACP countries had high expectations of the EU during the creation of the CFSP because they feared the EU might “lose interest in development policy” (Hill, 1998: 31). Yet, Hill’s analysis did not provide any evidence that implies the EU was not able to meet its expectations.

Further, the existence of a capabilities-expectations gap has not precluded the European Union from being an international actor and on this issue, Hill’s analysis falls short. The EU’s capabilities as a security actor exist beyond traditional state capabilities such as
autonomous military capabilities (even if this is desirable). As Söderbaum and Stålgren (2010) recently noted, notwithstanding the complexity of the European Union's reticence towards a single common foreign policy, the EU's role as an actor is often framed "within rather conventional state-centric notions about world politics." (2) Framing the EU's role as an international actor through state-centric lenses renders such analysis problematic for the assessment of EU-Africa relations. Original analysis of EU external actions transcends the characterisations that depend on the states as the central unit of analysis since other factors beyond the Member States influence the function of the EU. The point is this: while the capabilities-expectations gap exists, capabilities in EU terms differ from state capabilities. In examining the EU's complex and ongoing relationship with Africa, the capabilities-expectations gap does not elucidate on increasing common positions among members of the European Union towards Africa, and increasing cooperation between European and African institutions.

Ian Manners (2002) further contributes to the debate on the role of the European Union as an international actor by categorising its (EU) contribution to international relations. Manners argues that despite what may be considered limited capabilities, the EU is able to and does perform in the context of a specific international role. This international role of the EU is described as normative, by which Manners means that:

"the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system" (Manners 2002: 252).

The EU as a normative power is different from the EU's role in the scenario presented by Hill. It is meeker, seemingly more altruistic and relies more on carrots than on sticks. Manners argues that scholarship on the external roles of the EU ought to move beyond traditional conceptions of how an international actor, primarily states, might act. Essentially, basing judgement of the EU's abilities on the intergovernmental nature of its security resources through dependence on Member States for its military capabilities is not useful for understanding the actual external actions of the European Union (Manners,
To contend that the potential of the EU as an international (security) actor is weak or ineffectual would be an untrue assessment.

For Manners, the EU’s role in international affairs stems from the ‘normative elements of its international identity’ (2006: 69). He identifies nine norms which the EU aims possess. One of these is peace. Arguably, any means to promulgate the peace norm is acceptable and does not only involve military capabilities or force as suggested by Hill. Indeed, evidence from EU actions suggests that the European Union has especially been welcomed in areas where its primary mission was civilian rather than military. Indeed the EU shows its strength in civilian crises management and articulates its position as a civilian crises actor in the security strategy. The concept of normative power in relation to Europe therefore gives a holistic view of EU international actorness in many areas including sustainable peace (and security) beyond militarised interventions. A further benefit of the Normative Power Europe thesis is that unlike neo-functionalism, liberal inter-governmentalism and the capabilities-expectations gap, it looks beyond the decision-making processes of the European Union.

Despite its broader outlook on EU roles in international relations, Normative Power Europe (NPE) does not account for those areas where the EU does engage in external relations. It cannot explain the use of the EU’s limited military capabilities adequately (for example, providing logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, police action in the Democratic Republic of Congo and current military training for African troops). Further, the thesis Normative Power Europe paints the EU as an altruistic do-gooder. This certainly is not the case when one looks at the whole of EU-Africa relations; it would be misleading to assume that the European Union is not self-interested. Indeed, the shortcomings of the European Union as an international power have precipitated the new developments in EU-Africa relations.

Additionally, NPE like the capabilities-expectations gap, which specifically address the EU’s external relations, leaves out the impact of the EU’s external partners on its actions. Even if the EU was to be a force for good by exporting the peace norm to Africa, undoubtedly it would have to do export the norms with partners on various levels. These partners matter
when determining the extent to which the translated norms remain EU interventions. For example, if the norm is internalised by the recipient partner and practiced as within those particular contexts, the norm potentially ceases to be an ‘EU’ norm. Therefore, while normative power addresses some of the motivations of EU action by establishing the presence of the EU in the international arena, it leaves out the processes and the role of external partners in the formation and implementation of foreign policy.

The majority of the literature is preoccupied with the EU’s international identity, its values and principles, its international actorness and presence. The internal perceptions of the EU rather than its performances are often at the heart of these analyses. Consequently, the literature on the EU as an international actor often fails to consider the cooperation dimension outside of EU Member States. However, even mainstream IR theories, which examine international cooperation more broadly, fail to capture the dynamics of recent EU-Africa relations adequately.

The realist approach to international relations for instance views the state as the central unit of analysis. Further, the state is a unitary, self-interested actor who acts apart from the rest of society (Morgan, 2007: 17). Neo-realists view cooperation among states in the international system as a temporary condition (Mearshiemer, 2001; Waltz 1979). This view of cooperation justifies why the EU has found it difficult to achieve a common foreign policy among its Members. Yet, the realist approach cannot account for developments among EU member states to make their foreign policies more coherent. Further, it cannot account for why the EU has explicitly included peace and security as an area of cooperation with African states and institutions after many years of development and economic cooperation. In addition, the realist approach is not sufficiently equipped to assess the upsurge of region-to-region cooperation beyond the remit of the traditional state. As it cannot adequately account for the new EU-Africa security cooperation, it is not an appropriate approach within which to frame this research.

The Liberalist approach to security in international relations has more to say about cooperation. For proponents of the liberalist approach, the state is an actor in international relations; however, institutions are also important. It sees the state as a representation of
the elites’ preferences in a domestic setting, i.e. on a national level. The Liberalist perspective does not discount the states’ interests but sees government policies as being dependent on those in charge of the government at a particular time. The Liberalist traditions therefore view cooperation between states favourably. Unlike the Realist traditions, Liberalists contend that states get tired of the competitive nature of the anarchic system (Morgan, 2007: 26). They therefore see the value of cooperating on issues of mutual security such as nuclear proliferation, international arms control and terrorism. This cooperation takes place within institutions. This liberal tradition has often promoted the creation of multilateral institutions and regimes. Liberalists, therefore, perceive the European Union as one of the relevant institutions.

Despite its contributions to the study of international cooperation, the Liberalist approach falls short of explaining non-state security actions and inter-regional cooperation. Like the Realist approach, it puts governments or states at the centre of international affairs, thereby bypassing the recent upsurge in regionalism in international cooperation and by extension inter-regionalism too. The Liberalist approach therefore does not consider the European Union or the African Union as actors in their own right (Jorgensen, 2007:519). The lack of empirically detailed research means that theorising based on the actual analysis of the EU’s performance, as an international actor based on the CFSP, is still relatively thin (for exceptions see Holland, 1998; Ginsberg, 2001; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; 2007). This body of existing empirical research has yielded better interpretations of the EU’s performance as an international political actor.

In 1999, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler published the first edition of their book *The European Union as a Global Actor*, which relies on a constructivist interpretation of the European Union's external identity. Bretherton and Vogler present some of the most convincing empirical evidence and interpretations of EU external relations. Their work depicts the European Union as a hybrid institution – neither state nor intergovernmental institution (even in its foreign policy), unique, and evolving. Further, they conceptualise the external ‘actorness’ of the European Union by applying three criteria, *opportunity, presence* and *capability*. These three criteria establish the extent of the EU’s involvement in policy areas outside its own borders (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24).
Bretherton and Vogler further argue that actorness is a construct based on the perception of actors within the European Union and third countries. Whereas previous EU external relations studies often focus on the shortcomings of the European Union, they neglect the perception of the action recipients, that is, the third countries and other international organisations. The opportunity criterion is therefore “the structural context” within which an action takes place. The external environment enables or constrains the ability of an actor to act in a certain way. The existence of the EU and its influence beyond Europe denotes its ‘presence’ in the international system. Presence along with actorness had been a measure of EU visibility outside its borders. Capability remains as defined by Hill, the “internal context of EU action” although Bretherton and Vogler do not insist on the EU’s state-like Military credentials (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24). The important contribution of Bretherton and Vogler’s analysis is the idea of opportunity. This criterion emphasises that the actorness of the EU cannot be judged without consideration of the sorts of constraints that it may face externally.

However, the notion of opportunity does not go far enough in its overall assessment of EU external relations, commitments and actions. Although opportunity considers events and ideas as conditions that influence the EU’s participation in the global political system, it does not consider the historical context of these events and ideas. Essentially, it does not answer the question of why those particular events and ideas, at that particular time? The influence of these ideas on EU relations with external partners is important because they are often specific and play a role in determining the trajectory of future relations. Thus, while opportunity acknowledges the roles of individual actors and groups of actors the analysis too fails to communicate how history plays a role in the development of the EU relations with its external partners.

Another example of good empirical evidence of the EU’s international action is the work done by Roy Ginsberg in Baptism by Fire. Ginsberg examines the EU’s foreign policy. He contends that unlike the general assumption of theories such as liberal inter-govermentalism and the capabilities-expectations gap the EU does make a significant contribution to non-economic areas of external relations including security. Ginsberg
(2001) suggests that studies on EU external relations ought to consider the ‘real time’ participation of the Union in what constitutes ‘security’. Rather than engaging solely with the normative debates or theoretical assertions about what the EU ought to be doing, or what it is incapable of doing, a better gauge of EU roles in international security is the analysis of what it is actually doing. Further, the success or failure of these roles also depends on the perception of the action recipient. Hence, theorising about the EU’s participation in international security must therefore consider the impact of EU action on its intended target. This outlook guides the research into contemporary EU-Africa relations.

2.2 Regional Cooperation and Inter-regionalism

Building on Ginsberg’s observations, the thesis makes an additional premise that history, i.e. the existing relationship between the EU and its partner (in this case Africa) plays an important role for present and future relations. Whereas prior conceptions of the EU’s abilities or roles as an international actor rely on a view of international relations that is unchanged, they are also too preoccupied with the internal EU dimensions of security. They fail to examine constraints and opportunities provided by the international environment, especially the EU’s partners including third countries and regional and international institutions. Additionally, they fail to consider the type of relationship itself and the impact that relationship has on EU performance. In this context, this chapter seeks to understand EU-Africa relations based on region-to-region cooperation. Increasingly, international cooperation is being determined by nation-states joining regional groupings. Further, nation states are increasingly calling on these groupings to act on their behalf with other regional groupings.

In her contribution to the study of EU external relations, Karen E. Smith (2003) makes the point that regionalism or regional cooperation has been a long identified goal of EU external relations (69). Often, the regional groups promote themselves while the EU shows support for their integration efforts through funding and various other partnerships. In a world increasingly ordered by regional groupings, it is not surprising that the EU favours inter-regional cooperation as one of the frameworks within which it interacts with third countries on foreign policy issues (Aleçu de Flers and Regelsberger, 2005: 317). The EU
defines Regional Cooperation as “all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring countries to address issues of common interest” (Commission, 219) 1995).

To understand the propensity of the EU to externalise regionalism and use it in its external relations framework, it is important to define the concepts accurately. Regionalism, which is often used inter-changeably with regional cooperation, can be defined broadly as “a policy whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region” (Fawcett, 2004: 433). Regionalism denotes a certain policy drive happening within a given region. A region is either defined by the geographical proximity of the members, as with the European Union, or by zones that share identical patterns of behaviour based on similar histories, as with the Commonwealth States or the ACP states (Fawcett, 2004: 432). The central aim of regionalism is the pursuance of common interests on specific issues which could happen by promoting a sense of community among members (soft regionalism) and through the formalisation of regional networks into organisational structures (hard regionalism). Importantly, regionalism involves the efforts of state representations as well as non-states actors such as civil society organisations and research partners (Fawcett, 2004).

The related concept, regionalization, which is often confused with regionalism involves not only motivation for regionalism, but also the process through which regionalism occurs. Simply, regionalization may be described as the process through which regionalism is integrated. It can be spontaneously prompted or can develop over time. It involves the consolidation of cooperation in one policy area or sector to the rest of the region. Events in the international system have prompted the development of these concepts. Evidently, the EU itself is a product of regionalization and it arguably continues to promote this model because of a narcissistic urge to reproduce itself. There is already evidence of the EU reproducing itself through the AU thus highlighting the fact that this urge to reproduce regions is more than an aspiration. This is especially the case in Africa where the institutional structures of the AU are similar to that of the EU; yet the EU model is not easy to export (Smith, K.E. 2003: 70).

12 Here I do not consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO a regional organisation but rather an inter-governmental alliance or network of independent states.
Finally, there is the concept of **regionness**. Regionness\(^\text{13}\) is about the level or extent of cohesiveness which a particular region has achieved through its ideological project of region building (regionalism), and through the spontaneous processes of region formation (Hettne, Söderbaum and Stålgren, 2008: 15; Hettne, 2008: 3). Five variables or measurements of cohesion determine the level of regionness within a certain space (Hettne, 2008:6). These variables include regional social space, regional social system, international society, community and institutionalised polity.

*Regional social space* is a geographical area, bounded in a specific territory by mostly non-related local groups of people. Through various process of interaction within the regional social space, a *regional social system* (or regional security complex in security terms, cf. Buzan & Wæver) is founded with the view to regionalise or deepen integration. Historically, a regional social system has often happened through coercion as in empire growth through colonisation. Viewing the region in terms of *international society* implies that the sets of rules that make interactions between the states that constitute the region orderly are “enduring and predictable” (Hettne, 2008: 4).

In seeing itself as a member of international society, a region may seek to formalise its integration thus far, thereby constituting a **de jure** regional institution, as with the EU and the AU or it may choose not to, relying on spontaneous acts of integration (**de facto**). At the fourth level, the region becomes a *community* through enduring organisational frameworks which facilitates even deeper cooperation through more fluid communication networks, the “convergence of values, norms and behaviour throughout the region” leading to an identity formation on a regional level (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 466). In terms of security, at the regional level, the test for the region is whether it has considered what its role could be in bringing about a peaceful order and if necessary using force to stave off conflict. In this way, the region becomes a *security community* (Deutsch et al., 1957).\(^{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) This section on regionness is based on recent works by Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren in ‘the EU as a Global Actor in the South’ 2008.

\(^{14}\) In this instance, we mean a pluralistic security community, in the cases of both the EU and AU, where members of the communities are integrated to the extent that they have decided not to fight each other and will find other means to resolve disputes if any still occur (ref. Karl Deutsch, 1997).
Within the most advanced and final level of regionness, the community becomes an *institutionalised polity* with permanent structures for decision-making and a level of integration that allows for collective action and actorness. According to Hettne, this polity does not have to confirm to the configurations of any existing entity and is therefore *sui generis*. To date, only the EU has achieved this fifth level of regionness; however, it remains an aspiration of states in the African and Latin American regions\(^\text{15}\) and is therefore useful to analyse regions. The regional actorship approach to region formation demonstrates the evolutionary process of integration although this process does not occur so neatly. Moreover, although no other regional grouping is on the fifth level, the impact regionness has on how a region acts in its external relations is of great interest. The concept of regionness, when taken together with the previously discussed concepts of presence and actorness produce the notion of *regional actorship*.

Regional actorship is important to understand the regional positions and external relations preferences of each regional actor. It is “the relative cohesion of the regional actor [which] shapes external action ... [It] in turn impacts on regional identity and consciousness through the expectations and reactions of external actors' vis-à-vis the region” (Hettne, 2008). Through regional actorship each interacting region strives to exert its influence on the political process of cooperation and within the defined institution of operation. As has been shown, as the EU moves towards replicating itself, it chooses to interact with third countries at a regional level creating an inter-regional approach to its external relations. This inter-regional arrangement or *inter-regionalism* has become another concept that is growing in currency in EU external relations studies. Essentially, regional actorship provides the description of what is actually happening when we say inter-regionalism is occurring, i.e. what each region is doing to prompt and ensure inter-regionalism.

As Hänggi (2000) has noted, while there is much literature on regions, and regionalism, the role of inter-regional interactions in the international political system has often been neglected until recently. By seeking to understand how two regions that have both embraced regionalism and regionalisation cooperate in international politics, one can hope

\(^{\text{15}}\) Both Col. Ghadafi of Libya and President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela consistently call for deeper regional integration in the African and Latin American regions respectively.
to contribute to the burgeoning literature on inter-regionalism, on the one hand and on the other hand to analyse in-depth the true nature of EU relations with Africa, vis-à-vis the concept of inter-regionalism.

I. From Regionalism to Inter-regionalism: A Method for External Relations?

Inter-regionalism refers to arrangements in the international system that brings together states within or without formal regional organisations to cooperate on socio-economic and political purposes. Understanding interregional arrangements from an empirical standpoint is useful to tease out the motivations for each arrangement in specific policy areas, and to understand prior arrangements and current complexities. Hänggi (2000) identifies three different types of inter-regionalism in which the EU engages including:

(a) Relations between regional groupings
(b) Bi-regional and trans-regional arrangements
(c) Hybrids such as relations between (ad-hoc) regional groupings and single powers\(^\text{16}\)

This thesis however considers a specific definition of inter-regionalism to mean the relationship between two regional groupings both exhibiting regional actorship. While some eminent scholars have written about EU inter-regionalism, these have usually been in respect to Asia, and in the area of economics and development cooperation (Söderbaum et al., 2005: 366; Aggarwal, and Forgarty, 2004; Edwards and Regelsberger, 1990; Gilson, 2002; Hettne, 2004; Hänggi, 2000; Camroux, 2006). Through its dialogue process with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU has established what some considered the group-to-group inter-regionalism with Asia. With the development of frequent dialogue with Asia, the EU actively used its dominant position as the most advanced regional organisation to promote regionness in other regions. In promoting regionness, the EU also promotes its own external relations through inter-regionalism.

This campaign soon yielded regional cooperation among countries in Latin America, Central Asia and increased integration in Africa. Currently, EU-Asia convenes its relations through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which initially met in 1996. Meetings between

\(^\text{16}\) Cf. http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/Haenggi.PDF for in-depth explanation
the two regions under the auspices of the forum are now a regular occurrence and the grouping is set to admit more members including India in the near future. In Central Asia, EU inter-regionalism is relatively new and therefore less integrated. However, the European Council recently adopted the 'EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Interim Agreements, the EC Regional Assistance Strategy Paper 2007-2013 programmes of the European Union. The countries recognised under this inter-regional arrangement are: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (EU-Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 2007).

In addition to the literature on Asia, recent literature has also reflected on the experiences of the EU and Latin America through its dealings with MERCOSUR and the Rio Group. With some exceptions, prior to the 1990s, the European Union was not typically involved in Latin America (Smith, K.E, 2003: 78). Smith has ascribed the lack of EU involvement in Latin America to the greater presence of the United States in this region, and the absence of an intense regionalization drive. Two of the leading experts on inter-regionalism previously described the EU-MERCOSUR relationship as “the closest approximation of 'pure inter-regionalism’” because it reflects an instance of “two relatively coherent, self-defined and highly-institutionalized regional blocs that have been negotiating a commercial agreement on a one-to-one basis” (Aggarwal & Fogarty, 2003: 346). Through the institution of EMIFCA, EU-MERCOSUR Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement, the EU continues to negotiate on trade with MERCOSUR and consistently refuses to deal with individual members by insisting on interaction on a regional level (Aggarwal & Fogarty, 2003: 347-8; Aggarwal & Fogarty, 2004: 4-5). Based on the forgoing, the EU indicates a preference for inter-regionalism on economic issues.

Hybrid inter-regionalism is a type of inter-regionalism defined in the context of the ACP grouping (Aggrawal and Fogarty, 2003). Although Hettne and Fawcett (2004) characterise the ACP as a region in this regard, the ACP had none of the elements of regionalization or regionness. The purpose of its existence was to engage with the European Union. While the creation of a secretariat contributed to greater efficiency in dealing with African Caribbean and Pacific nations, as well as institutionalised the practices of EU-Africa relations, it did
not significantly increase the regional actorship of Africa between 1957 and 2000. I would therefore contend that the ACP did not meet the criteria of a region although it has helped to foster a sense of regional actorship of Africa by bringing together African leaders to negotiate on behalf of the whole continent.

As an entity, the EU is in the position to promote regionalism in other areas through its own actions (presence) and engagement as we have already mentioned, and we see this in its relations with other regions. In other cases, and in tune with Manners’ argument that the EU will export the norms that make up its own identity, the Union encourages the cooperation. It is therefore appropriate that it will use an inter-regional approach to carry out other foreign policy aims, including security aims.

2.3 Inter-regionalism in Security Cooperation
While the literature depicting inter-regionalism as one method of EU external relations is steadily growing, the literature on inter-regionalism in security relations is almost non-existent. A summary of EU external relations activities shows the Union’s proclivity to establish region-to-region interactions as a means of establishing its external presence and actor-ness in various regions. However, there is no indication of what the desire to establish region-to-region interactions might mean for international security relations cooperation in general. The majority of the inter-regional pairings discussed often commence with the intention of economic alliances, which includes trade agreements and aid packages in some cases. Although the literature on peacekeeping operations chronicles the UN support for regional initiatives as mandated in Chapter VIII, Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter, there is scant evidence to suggest the pursuance of inter-regionalism that is aimed at promoting peace and security within a specific space and in the international system. Given the increased regionalisation of international cooperation and the lack of adequate academic resources on security through inter-regionalism, this research aims to fill the conceptual and empirical knowledge gaps on the subject. It will contribute to the academic literature on regional interactions as well as EU roles in international security.
II. Inter-regionalism, Regional Agency and Power

Although inter-regionalism involves two regional actors who project regional actorship, their positions, their contributions to the institution of inter-regionalism are not always equal. As with any other political relationship, these asymmetries of power affect the processes of interaction as well as the outcomes. Being the most developed regional entity, it is not surprising that there are some asymmetries in the relations of the EU with other regions. The level of organisation and internal coherence (compared to that of other regions) in the EU is the basis for this assessment. The high level of regional development in Europe tends to exacerbate ‘power’ relations, vis-à-vis a region like Africa.

Africa has a less established regionness, despite its long history of regional integration. Although the regional organisation, Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was functional from 1963-2000, the organisation did not foster interdependence among its members (see Chapter 4). It simply provided a forum for discussion and lacked any substantive influence within Africa and even less outside. Presently, Africa relies on the support of the EU to build its own structures. In this way, the African region is dependent on the EU. Although the EU lacks autonomous military capabilities to tackle traditional security concerns, it is at a further stage of regional integration than any other region in the world. The EU position as the most integrated region acts as leverage for the EU in its inter-regional relations. The EU’s level of integration means it is highly organised, more so than Africa. The uneven position of the partners forces us to address the issue of power.

Traditionally, the study of international relations defines power as the ability to make others do something they would not otherwise do – i.e. coercion (Morgenthau, 1948; Keukeleire, 2002; Strange, 1989: 165). However, conception of power can hardly be applicable to the European Union since intrinsically its appeal is its cooperative rather than confrontational preferences as evidenced by its own development as a region. For all the talk about asymmetrical power, there is no clear indication as to what sort of power the EU possesses aside from Manners’ consideration of normative/civilian power, which does not elucidate the sorts of power utilised in actual interactions. Essentially, normative power is possessed prior to interaction and remains a constant. There does not seem to be an indication that normative power influences proceedings given the existence of regional
actorship on the part of third countries. It is therefore necessary to conceive regional power in another manner that reflects the constant bargaining that goes on within the inter-regional establishment. In the past, it has not been typically useful to conceive regional power in the same sense as state power and as alluded to earlier it is actually a shortcoming of some of the most important concepts in the EU’s external relations.

Lavenex (2008) and Keukelaire and MacNaughtan (2008) have argued that the predominant conception of power in international relations (relational power) fundamentally excludes the ‘structural’ element of EU agency in its external relations as we have argued above. Their argument is that the sheer position of the EU as a formalised polity representative of over 500 million people influences the political process and institutions of interaction without coercion (Strange 1994: 310). Bossuyt (2008) further argues that the ability of the EU to exert influence and its power ought to be differentiated from the classical form of relational power to the structural form.

**Structural power** denotes the ability of an actor to determine the conditions under which relations take place. The idea of structural power is not new. Susan Strange, one of the early proponents of this type of power argued that structural power conferred “the power to decide how things shall be done, [and] the power to shape frameworks...” (Strange, 1988: 25). An actor possessing structural power has the capacity to determine the best arrangement through which it can maximise its international security interests. One example of EU structural power has been its ability to engage in relations through frameworks of *dialogues, strategic partnerships* and *agreements*.

Undoubtedly, the outflows of these arrangements are relative to its success; however, the ability to define relations within these frameworks is a reflection of marshalling structural power as understood here. Hay (2002) further reinforces this perception of the EU by defining structural power as the “ability of actors to ‘have an effect’ upon the context, which defines the range of possibilities for others” (185). In understanding these sorts of less tangible, non-coercive power, Lukes (2005) argues that this sort of power is exerted at the level of

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17 The EU currently has ongoing dialogues in Asia (through ASEM) in Africa (through the EU-Africa Summit and the AU) in Latin America (through the Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU Summit). It also has strategic partnerships in Africa and Central Asia and existing agreements with the ACP group (cf. Hill, 1998; Smith, K.E., 2003).
agenda-setting on issues and potential issues and can be covert and subjective, which captures the idea of regional actorship (Lukes, 2005: 29).

While it does not negate the quest for relational power, and indeed leaves room for the exercise of such power by a political actor, structural power can give an insight into how the EU actually functions based on its present capabilities and actions, rather than how it may want to function. Power conceived in this way further confirms the concept of presence as we have previously described. In sum, traditional conceptions of power do not capture the influence of the EU on its external partners. Nonetheless, despite the regional actorship of both the EU and Africa (AU) asymmetries have occurred, which intrinsically favour the European Union given its level of regionness and ability to project its interests.

The extent of its structural power makes the EU the dominant partner within EU-Africa relations. Its role as a dominant partner is important because it influences the structuring of security cooperation and by extension the changes that result from this organisation. The extent of its resources, the length of its integration experience and position in prior European-African relations measure the EU’s role as a dominant partner. The role of the EU as a dominant power however does not preclude some African advantage in EU-Africa relations. In addressing the EU’s engagement with Africa on migration, Van Criekinge (2008) argues that African countries exploit EU capability deficiencies to further their own agendas. The existing power asymmetry between the EU and Africa therefore does not automatically rule out the ability of the EU-Africa institution to achieve equality among all the relevant actors. With this understanding of structural power, and in considering the EU’s long history of international cooperation with Africa the institution of the EU-Africa relationship itself becomes the preoccupation of the next section.

The arrangement between the European and African blocs is dependent on history and representative regional organisations. Together, these form the basis of a single EU-Africa institution. It is therefore appropriate to employ tools that help to understand the function of this institution as well as the formal organisations within which cooperation takes place between the two regions. A thorough analysis must also consider the development of the EU and the AU, and develop an understanding of how both contribute to the way in which
we understand inter-regionalism. Such an analysis will also consider the nature of the European Union’s external engagements. **New institutionalism**\(^{18}\) is an analytical tool, deployed to understand the partnership between the EU and AU as well as the motivations, constraints and outcomes of that relationship. This approach considers the establishment of inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa as an institution in itself, and the roles that the formal structures play in the exercise of inter-regionalism. The next section lays out the tenets of new institutionalism. It includes the various forms of this institutionalism and its relation to the previously discussed EU-Africa inter-regional arrangement.

### 2.4 When Theory Met Concept: a New Institutionalist Approach to Inter-regionalism

From the new institutionalist perspective, institutions are important in the structuring of political relations (March and Olsen, 1984). Beyond this, institutions also affect political outcomes, i.e. institutional types are critical to understanding their policy outflows such as decisions to cooperate and types of cooperation (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Steinmo, 2001). New institutionalism also allows social research to move beyond the roles that individual actors play within an organisation to shape it. It allows us to consider the effects institutions have on individual actors, groups of actors and other institutions, for instance, how does engaging in the inter-regional process shape EU-Africa actions? Concerning this particular project, the tools of new institutionalism will allow one to observe, understand and analyse the consequences of the persistent EU-Africa relations on African States, the EU (Member States and organisations) and AU structures as well as other actors in Africa such as China for instance. Using new institutionalism as a tool of assessment is especially relevant to this research where the central aim is to understand the function of inter-regionalism in a specific policy area and the outcomes this collaboration generates.

In their seminal article, March and Olsen (1984) argue that the social sciences were increasingly being organised around institutions and therefore proposed New Institutionalism as a way to understand the role of institutions in political processes. To understand this analytical approach fully, it is important to know what an institution is. As will be shown subsequently, there are different types of new institutionalisms, which

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\(^{18}\) **Neo-institutionalism** (or new institutionalism) understands the EU to be an institution with its own agenda with “a powerful normative role” (Kaarlojarvi, 2003).
specify their own definition of the institution; however, amongst the different approaches there is a consensus that these are ‘new’ ways of looking at ‘institutions’. According to Steinmo, within the New Institutionalism approach, institutions structure the process of political interaction in three ways: 1) they define the actors who can participate within a specific context; 2) influence the political strategies of the various actors and 3) shape actor preferences (Steinmo, 2001: 462). New institutionalists move away from the ‘old’ conception of institutions, which were materialist, often considering only formal structures, to consider the rules and routines of organisations including the informal and formal practices – their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2; Hall, 1986). In the context of the New Institutionalist approach, the formal structures of the African Union and the EU structures in Brussels represent organisations representing political processes; the sum of actions that take place in the context of these organisations make up the institution.

In “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish between three analytical approaches that rest within what is called new institutionalism, namely rational choice, sociological and historical. Peters (1999) however notes seven types of New Institutionalism. In addition to the three cited by Hall and Taylor, he adds Normative Institutionalism, Empirical Institutionalism, Interest Representation and International Institutionalism (Peters, 1999). Recently, another account from the Constructivist perspective has been added to the debate on New Institutionalism (Hay, c.2006). The sheer number of approaches to institutions is indicative of their importance to the political environment (see Table 2.1). For pragmatic reasons of utility, we will use the typology established by Hall and Taylor.

Hall and Taylor centre their analysis of the three institutionalisms on the ideas of ‘calculus’ and ‘culture’, which have different roles within the three approaches. The calculus approach contends that institutions persist because of the individuals in it. These individuals are supposedly unwilling to deviate from the standard rules and norms for fear that it would be to their own personal disadvantage. Essentially, within this framework, the individual is the principal subject within the institution and maximises utility. The calculus approach maintains that institutions serve as the contexts within which the
individual can maximise their preferences. Conversely, the culture approach emphasises the normative role of the institutional actor. Those that hold a preference for the cultural approach argue that the configuration of institutions is not attributable to individual choices. Instead, the institutional structure determines individual behaviour. Consequently, the structure of the institutions is restrictive on the individual, and institutional change is stagnated because its influence limits individual choice. These two approaches inform the three New Institutionalism schools of thought, and are drawn into the structure-agency debate, where in the calculus approach, the agency is prime and in the cultural approach, structure is more important.

Rational choice institutionalism holds that actors within an institution cooperate to solve collective action problems (Hall and Taylor, 1996). It sees institutions as formal sets of rules within which rational actors define the boundaries of action. The institution in the rational choice frame does not influence actors’ preferences; instead, it simply provides context within which the actors’ aims are to maximise interests. Rational choice institutionalism assumes the institutional contexts give the social actor information about the implications of their actions. Based on this approach to institutions, the structure of the institution is dependent on the actors in it (Lowndes, 2002: 95-6).

Sociological or normative institutionalism defines institutions broadly as including, in addition to formal rules and procedures, cultural practices that are socially constructed. Whereas the rational choice institutionalism sees institutions as the parameters needed to maximise benefits without shaping actor preferences, sociological institutionalism is the opposite and therefore fits in with the cultural approach. This type of institutionalism moves beyond the rigidity of material structures and argues that the embedded practices of the institution as derived from formal and informal rules affect actor preferences and determine institutional identities. Sociological institutionalism emphasises the social and political constructs of institutions.

Table 2.1 The Other Institutionalisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalism Type</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Institutionalism</td>
<td>This terminology is interchangeable with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalism</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Institutionalism</td>
<td>Concerned with the structural constraints of states by formal and informal realities of international politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Institutionalism</td>
<td>Shows how informal interactions between agents (individuals and groups) shape political behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivist Institutionalism</td>
<td>Emphasises the role of ideas and narratives within institutions to shape behaviour and influence political action through specific frames of meaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Institutionalism</td>
<td>Concerned with how gender norms operate and how gendered dynamics are constructed and replicated with institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Lowndes 'The Institutional Approach', 2010, p.65.*

In addition to the EU-Africa relationship, the EU security architecture is also institutionalised (Smith, M.E. 2004). Although acutely aware that negotiations on EU security actions remain primarily intergovernmental, the security architecture still has a structured function. Thus, the EU’s security architecture defies the rationalist explanation that states are the sole determinants of security within the EU. According to Michael E. Smith (2004), rationalist approaches (realism and liberal inter-governmentalism) towards the institutionalisation of security within the EU are inadequate because they place too much emphasis on rigid actor preferences and outcomes without explaining the processes or an account of the institutional constraints of the European Union itself. Smith further argues that concentrating on specific events that bring about further cooperation is inadequate since much goes on between intergovernmental negotiations to affect the subsequent events (Smith, 2004: 26). These apply also to EU cooperation with external partners. By applying an analytical framework of new institutionalism because it considers both strategic and normative considerations of security integration, one is able to investigate how the EU’s internal coordination and assess security cooperation with external partners.

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19 Michael E. Smith’s 2004 Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy provides the best argument for how external policy cooperation in the EU is institutionalised despite the intergovernmentality of the process.
The thesis contends that the formal and informal institutional rules, norms and processes that rely on, and are motivated by the histories, ideas and strategic interests of the two regions determine the EU's collaboration with Africa through the AU on matters of security. To this extent, cooperation in the form of inter-regionalism is itself an institution. In this context therefore, it is most appropriate to utilise the historical institutionalism approach to analyse inter-regional cooperation. Historical institutionalism considers the importance of both calculus and cultural approaches in the institution of cooperation.

In using new institutionalism as an analytical tool, the thesis navigates the collaboration of the European Union and Africa within the context of the formal structures in Brussels and Addis Ababa. It uses the historical institutionalism approach because the approach assumes some level of self-interest on the part of the relevant actors. Yet, the historical institutionalist approach also depends on their histories and the ideals motivating and constraining their interactions.

Most of the work on new institutionalism has often utilised historical institutionalism to varying degrees because it constitutes the most eclectic approach to institutions. It is not without reason that historical institutionalism has been the choice for many social scientists, however. Historical Institutionalism is the approach in New Institutionalism which aims to understand how political outcome is determined “by the institutional setting in which [they] take place” (Ikenberry, 1988: 222-3) by considering the evolution of the institution. Historical Institutionalism brings together the seemingly divergent approaches of calculus and culture as contributing to the relationship between structure and agency and suggests a symbiosis between actor preferences and its exogenous impact on the institution and the institutional context and its endogenous impact on the actor (Hay & Wincott, 1998; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). In acknowledging this relationship between the calculus and culture, institutional change from a historical institutionalism perspective occurs within the context of an interactive relationship between the institutions and the individuals, whereby they influence each other. Further, the thesis shows a preference for historical institutionalism because we cannot understand the security aspect of EU-Africa relations without understanding the opportunities and constraints of the inter-regional arrangement and the political outcomes that result from these. Inter-regionalism in the
historical institutionalism analysis is considered a structuring variable “through which battles over interests, ideas and power are fought” (Steinmo, 2001).

III. Institutions from the Historical Institutionalism Perspective

In using a new institutionalist approach, particularly historical institutionalism, this thesis also takes a particular view about the nature of institutions and the process that creates the institutions. While institutions are the “rules of the game” (North, 1990:3), institutionalisation describes the active process of cooperation occurring between the EU and the AU on specific decisions. These decisions continually incorporate existing “norms, or shared standards of behaviour” based on history and ideals to create new outcomes (Smith, M.E. 2004: 26). Additionally, Hall and Taylor emphasise four core features of institutions from the historical institutionalism perspective.

The first one, as previously discussed is the relations of individuals (or actors) to the institution. The second feature of historical institutionalism and its practitioners emphasises the “asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). The logic behind this feature is that institutions affect the distribution of power among social groups privileging certain groups at the expense of others.

Related to this is the third feature of historical institutionalism, which highlights institutional development over initial formation. The institution is developed and persists over time because of path-dependency, the idea that patterns of initial institutional choices will “persist, unless there is some force sufficient to overcome the inertia” (Peters, 1999: 64). Essentially, an institution from the historical institutionalism perspective is prone to continuity rather than change. Finally, for historical institutionalists, ideas play a key role in determining political outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942). They contend that while institutions are very important to the organisation of political relations, ideas play a key role in influencing political actors. Historical Institutionalism thereby leaves room for the other influences that could account for the broader EU-Africa relationship.
In the absence of an appropriate theory to illuminate recent EU-Africa relations, *Institutionalised Inter-regionalism* serves as a useful analytical framework for several reasons. First, it provides an appropriate and precise context of contemporary EU-Africa relations. While other studies accept EU-Africa relations as an example of inter-regionalism, they do not account for why relations have developed as they have and why and how change is occurring (exception is Olsen, 2006: 199-214). Second, institutionalised inter-regionalism moves beyond the descriptive nature of the empirical concept of inter-regionalism. It contextualises the EU-Africa relations by illuminating the processes of cooperation within formal and informal structures. Further, it considers the historical dimension in EU-Africa relations. Third, historical institutionalism applied to inter-regionalism provides the tools to examine and chart the types and extent of changes, as well as continuity in EU-Africa relations. It further assesses the whole of EU relations as a global actor rather than internal challenges of the European Union alone.

As an analytical framework, *institutionalised inter-regionalism* is useful beyond charting the inclusion of security in EU-Africa cooperation. It is also useful for evaluating the other new dimensions of international cooperation between the EU and Africa especially in the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. This framework will therefore be useful in developing new research avenues based on EU-Africa relations and inter-regionalism more broadly. Beyond EU-Africa relations, institutionalised inter-regionalism can be useful in understanding patterns of change in other long-term region-to-region cooperation.

The historical institutionalism approach to the study of EU-AU cooperation links the institution, its interactions and intentions on a practitioner level to the formal structures that outwardly represent the two sides of the inter-regional pair. Further, it emphasises the temporal dimension of processes, in this case, the importance of time in the evolution of inter-regionalism, which takes into account the combined effects of the structures and processes of interaction (Pierson & Skocpol, 2001). As an analytical tool, the application of historical institutionalism to inter-regionalism allows one to trace the historical processes to support or challenge the institutionalisation of inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa.
Applied to the inter-regionalism framework, historical institutionalism squarely confronts the association of the EU in reality and moves away from the continued debates on integration. Additionally, it contributes to an understanding of how a political actor might act in security relations within the institutional framework of inter-regionalism. It also emphasises “endogenous historical process” of regionalisation and consequently inter-regionalism (Hettne, 2004).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the structure and benefits of a new analytical framework for EU-Africa relations, institutionalised inter-regionalism. By highlighting the main concepts and theories often used for understanding the structure and motivation of EU external relations, this chapter exposes their limitations. Given the gaps in some of the concepts currently being utilised to explain EU external relations, the chapter has used the empirical concepts of regionalism, regional actorship and inter-regionalism to create a new framework. These concepts also provide a means with which to evaluate this relationship by proposing that the nature of the relationship, often defined only as a process, is itself an institution (constituent of formal and informal processes). In this section, we attempt to grapple with the constant preoccupation of international relations studies, the concept of power and what form it takes given the parameters of this specific relationship. Having defined EU-Africa inter-regionalism as an institution, the chapter speaks to the attributes of institutions. It further considers how these relate to what we are observing in EU-Africa affairs, concluding that the tools of historical institutionalism best fit with the goals of this project.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The central question of this thesis is: to what extent has security cooperation contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations? In accounting for the shift from bi-lateralism to inter-regionalism in EU-Africa security relations, the chapter outlines the design and methodology used in the thesis to ascertain the conditions of this change. I discuss the process of investigation by justifying the methodological approach influenced by the historical institutionalist approach to the research project. Through a nuanced case study research design, I chart the processes of EU-Africa cooperation to determine the extent of the change and conditions under which security cooperation in EU-Africa relations have been transformative. First, I provide an overview of the case study design within qualitative research. Second, I present the data collection methods arguing that interviews, narrative analysis, direct observations and document analysis provided the best form of answers to the research question. In this section, I also examine the primary method of data analysis through process tracing especially through the historical institutionalist framework of the research project. In the third section, I consider the ethical implications of the research and the methods applied to ensure the highest quality from the data derived.

3.1 A Qualitative Case Study Design
The thesis has used a qualitative case study research design, based on interpretivist epistemology. The research questions which seek to understand and assess the historical and contemporary contexts and processes of EU-Africa relations determined the qualitative approach used in the thesis. These questions then inform the approach to data collection and analysis methods, which include interviews, documents, narrative analysis and process tracing. Often, qualitative research lends itself to the interpretivist epistemology “which interpret the meaning and actions of actors according to their own subjective frame of reference” (Williams, 2000 emphasis added). Schwardt describes the
interpretive approach as a deep insight into “the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live in it” (Schwardt, 1994) Qualitative research has been defined as “all those approaches in the human sciences that do not take a hypothetic-deductive approach to investigation” (Williams 2000: 210). Similarly, Labuschagne (2003) notes that qualitative methods place an emphasis on processes and meanings, to give careful description to situations or contexts, and the behaviour of social actors including their interactions with each other. However, qualitative research and interpretivist epistemology are not synonymous. While qualitative research is interested in the lives of the actors involved, among other things, an interpretivist approach is concerned with interpreting the meanings of those actors. Thus, while they work well together, qualitative research does not have to be interpretivist (Diaz Andrade, 2009: 43). Within this research project, interpretivism serves as the de facto epistemological standpoint since the thesis seeks to understand the whole context of EU-Africa relations through direct engagement with the social actors involved with the process.

A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). Within this research, a case study design examined the different facets of EU-Africa cooperation on security. While case studies are often used in qualitative research, they can also be used in quantitative research (Gerring, 2004: 342; Yin, 1981: 58; Bryman, 2004: 49; Burnham et al., 2004: 53). The core advantage of a case study research design is that it allows a holistic observation of the phenomenon being investigated (Diaz Andrade, 2009; Creswell, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989).

The case study design helps to focus real-life complex social phenomena where information is derived from different sources. It is able to illustrate the institutional processes of cooperation between the EU and Africa concretely (Yin, 1981: 59). A qualitative case study design is particularly relevant as it allows for descriptive complexity and the necessary personal observation necessitated for a thorough study of these institutions (Stake, 1978: 7). Further, it is conducive to the historical institutionalism approach as it highlights the relevant observations in the historical process that are pertinent to the study.
This thesis assesses two recent cases of EU-Africa security cooperation. Its central aim was to determine the extent to which security cooperation has changed EU-Africa relations and to understand the conditions under which these changes have occurred. In the context of this research, inter-regionalism has been identified as the institutional framework of interactions between the European Union (EU) and African states. EU-Africa (security) relations therefore constitute one bounded unit of different interactions in the international system. The thesis is a product of a “detailed and intensive analysis” of the security cooperation between the EU and Africa using two examples of security cooperation (Bryman, 2004: 48).

Historical institutionalists have argued for the value of in-depth case study research, which emphasises the contextual features of institutions (Thelen, 1999). For example, an in-depth case study unpacks the complex nature of the EU-Africa relations since 1957, situating security cooperation within this complexity. This sort of information is germane to a historical institutional approach because it provides the requisite information to analyse the data and to make causal historical links.

Case studies are useful where “the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them” (Tellis, 1997). One of the main advantages of the case study design is that it critically assesses the given event or events, with the intention of highlighting extreme or unique phenomena or making a revelation about the phenomena (Bryman, 2004; Yin, 1998: 235-236). Within this project, a case study design serves the larger purpose of providing the context and background to EU-Africa cooperation. It tells the ‘story’ of the actors, stakeholders and the processes that are involved in the cooperation.

Despite the advantages of a case study design, one of its main challenges is case selection since there is often a range of alternatives (Creswell, 2007: 75-6). Although an easily identifiable bounded system, activities pertaining to security and involving the EU and Africa are numerous. For instance, there are direct EU engagements in Africa such as police missions, military missions, and Security Sector Reform initiatives. There are also indirect engagements such as EU support for capacity building which are thematic, institutional,
short-term and long-term. It was therefore critical to establish a rationale for the selection so that the examples adequately represented the reality of cooperation while contributing an original assessment to the literature on EU external relations.

The choice of cases is important to the quality of the research produced (Burnham et al., 2004). Further, the choice of cases also depends on the number of suitable cases appropriate to the research question (Burnham et al., 2004: 74-75). The research question and framework was the initial limit for case choices. The case choices had come from a range of cases where security was cooperative and undertaken within an inter-regional framework. The cases were therefore selected from activities jointly undertaken by the European Union and the African Union where the latter represented Africa. Further, it was important to examine those cases where of initial benefit to African security with broader international implications. These criteria made the project more manageable and gave voice to the often-neglected African institutions as actors in international politics. In contributing something original then, two cases of capability building for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) were selected.

These case studies are: 1) EU support to build the African Standby Force, of five combat ready multidimensional brigades; 2) The second example is the EU support to strengthen the institutions and programmes that fight the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. These choices were based on several factors. First, these two cases were implemented during the research project (2007-2010). Second, both cases are examples of security cooperation, which are based on shared meanings of security in the African and European Unions, i.e. both cases were co-owned by the EU and AU. Third, both cases were undertaken under the mandate of the Joint Africa EU-Strategy.

In formulating a qualitative case study, one acquires data in a number of ways. This research employed a multi-method research design to compensate for the weaknesses of each method and to derive the maximum information. A multi-method design is distinguished from a mixed-method one, as the latter refers to the use of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). The
following section tackles data collection and analysis through documents, interviews, non-participant observation, narrative analysis and process tracing.

### 3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

#### I. Documentary Analysis and Interviews

The initial phase of the project focused on desktop research, gathering and analysing the literature on the origins of EU-Africa relations to gain a thorough understanding of the EU and Africa’s post-independence relationship, and the evolution of the AU’s security agenda. This phase also included an examination of all relevant agreements and actions undertaken by the EU with the AU or through the AU. This initial phase also highlighted the points of causal mechanisms. An in-depth evaluation of the EU-Africa relations also directed the selection of the two cases of security cooperation. Following the initial stage of research, documents were also used throughout the duration of the research project to track developments in EU-Africa relations and the literature. The central purpose of this initial desktop review was to build the context within which the changes in EU-Africa relations were developed.

The thesis utilises different types of documents. These documents are often divided as primary, secondary or tertiary sources. A primary source is a document that depicts an event or situation as it is happening. They are produced at the time of the event or by the event, some of which are restricted or classified as internal at the initial stage (Burnham et al., 2004: 165). These documents also contributed to the construct of how norms and ideas within the EU and between the EU and African states and institutions were formed. For instance, the Cotonou Agreement is not only an update of previous EU-Africa economic agreements; it also suggests the influence of an increasingly integrated African contingent. It also subtly introduces security into EU-Africa relations, which reflects a change in previous relations. The inclusion of security also suggests the increased capabilities of the EU in security policy and it reflects a maturity in EU-Africa relations. In this example, a primary document reveals a lot of information about one event.

Although they are seemingly factual, primary documents are designed with specific purposes. Primary documents attempt to convey the institutions and structures issuing
them in the best light possible (see Freeman, 2009). So, while primary documents depict factual information, they also expose underlying meanings and patterns. Primary documents used include European Union (EU) directives and joint decisions, and institutional communiqués from the EU and African Union, United Nations and the five African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Secondary documents comment on an event or situation that has already happened. They include reports and publications of the institutions concerned, as well as reports by NGOs and newspapers. Finally, documents of the tertiary nature include all the elements required for a literature review such as books on the subjects, journal articles, biographies, theses on similar subjects, and other documentary reflections on certain periods or events relating to the project.

As documents are permanent representations of events or situations, they can be reused. Documents contribute to this research in two central ways. First, they set the narrative context of action for EU-Africa relations. The research made use of all the agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries. These helped to create a ‘thick’ description of EU-Africa relations (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Secondly, documents were also useful because they are able to elucidate ‘politics in time’. Essentially, documents elaborate on the historical accounts and temporality of events, essentially to gain an understanding of ‘why’ certain outcomes happened when they did (Pierson, 2004; Prior, 2004). Documents helped to establish the historical trajectory and the institutionalisation process of EU-Africa relations.

Data collection also involved interviewing experts and practitioners (also referred to as elites) working on EU-Africa cooperation. The purpose of this method was to obtain further insights into how EU-Africa relations have changed broadly and to learn about the conditions that have facilitated change. Specifically, these interviews highlighted the processes of cooperation through the two examples examined in the thesis. Interviews allow the researcher to get close to actors in their institutional setting to derive information not forthcoming in the documents (George and Bennett, 2005: 102-103).

In-depth semi-structured interviews are a common method of data collection in qualitative research and are intended to get a wide and deep understanding of the pertinent issues
(Legard et al., 2003). They are also supposed to elicit the maximum amount of information from the interviewee. They are less rigid than the structured interview since they allow the interviewee the freedom to answer as they wish (Bryman, 2004: 321). Furthermore, the interview process is not linear although guiding themes and questions provide the context within which the conversation between interviewees and interviewers takes place. In the course of this project, each interview session was approached with themes and topic guides as well as specific open-ended questions. This method of interviewing creates the impression of a natural conversation, putting the interviewee at ease and increasing the potential for an accurate rather than a prescribed description of a subject. Further, in-depth interviews allow the flexibility to include topics deemed important by the respondent or critical to the project but not previously considered as such (Davies, 2007: 155; Legard et al., 2003). In-depth interviewing was especially conducive to the research where the emphasis was on behaviours and interactions within the confines of an institution.

In-depth (elite) interviewing is useful for several reasons. Within the case study design, it generally helps to focus the case study and “provides perceived causal references” (Yin, 1998: 231). Interviews can provide these causal references by providing the context behind actions recorded in documents. The less structured interview also helps the researcher get close access to social actors’ meanings and interpretations...of the social interaction in which they have been involved” (Blakie, 2000: 234). This interviewing approach also serves as a check on other methods used during research.

Despite the advantages of interviews, elite in-depth interviewing is fraught with the same concerns as other types of qualitative interviewing. As one case study scholar has noted, interviews are only useful to the research if the questions are properly constructed since the opposite can lead to bias (Yin, 1998: 231). Additionally, a problem of all types of interviewing is the response bias where the interviewee gives the response that they think the researcher expects. Further, even when they are being entirely truthful, the information received may not be accurate due to the respondent’s poor recollection (Yin,

20 Interviewees are also referred to as research participants.
For selecting the potential interviewees, the research project relied on qualitative non-probability sampling (Tansey, 2007; Bryman, 2004).

Non-probability sampling is distinct in that it is admittedly subjective and does not hold the researcher to the rigours of quantitative research, which demands random sampling. Non-probability sampling is purposive and was conducive to the research aim of this project, which is to investigate EU-Africa security relations rather than generalise EU external relations. During the fieldwork, two types of non-probability sampling were employed: purposive sampling and chain-referral sampling. Purposive sampling relies on the researcher's knowledge of possible respondents and is guided by the aims of the research. The chain-referral or snowball sampling method is useful in that it helps to broaden the information outlet of elite interviewing (Tansey, 2007). This method was most useful within the African context where issues relating to security tend to be carefully guarded and kept secret. Consequently, each interviewee helps to identify other relevant actors whose identities were not publicly known.

This sampling method may present a challenge in that access is only granted to those who share the same views as the initial referee. However, this challenge was easily mitigated through extensive contact with diverse institutional actors outside of the remit of the referee. Further, other data collection methods such as direct non-participant observation offset these biases (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983). Although interviews can fall short of producing enough information for data analysis, they are the most useful to understand the social actors who represent the institutions being researched. Also, as interviews were not the only method of data collection, concurrent checks with other methods (triangulation) mitigated the disadvantages, making interviews useful. It is worth mentioning that in using process-tracing for analysis, interviews are useful for uncovering the obscure meanings and interpretations needed to derive casual mechanisms from interviewees (Tansey, 2007).

II. Non-Participant Observation and Narrative Analysis

As a part of the multi-method approach employed for this project, non-participant observation was also used as a method for data collection. Observation methods have come
to political science from anthropology's ethnographic approach. Researchers using ethnographic approaches are often attempting to understand human society. In the past 40 years, institutional and organisational ethnography have contributed to understanding how people within organisational settings interact with each other. As one of the tools used in institutional ethnography, observation methods are used to capture the language and action of institutional participants to arrive at a better understanding of institutional relations (Campbell, 1998). Based on the analytical approach of this project, which considers EU-Africa interactions as occurring within an institution, the observation approach is relevant to understanding how these interactions work. An observational method considers the role of actors in the formation of institutional dynamics.

There are two types of observation often employed in the social sciences: participant and non-participant observations (or direct observation). Participant observation refers to “observation carried out when the researcher is playing an established participant role in the scene being studied” (Hamersley and Atkinson, 1983: 248). Non-participant observation allows the researcher to attend and record activities within an institution without being part of those activities. Non-participant or direct observation is often seen as the ‘poor relation’ in political research (Moug, 2007). This type of observation has been described as an imposition on the political researcher especially when access cannot be otherwise negotiated (Burnham et al., 2004). This description implies that non-participant observation is a method that would not be deliberately chosen. Direct observation was undertaken in the context of the African Union where I sat in on informal meetings of officials working the African Union's peace and security department. This observation allowed me to access unguarded conversations about the nature of cooperation and the challenges facing the African Union.

However, non-participant or direct observation has proven useful, especially where it seeks to understand institutional functions. Direct or non-participant observations “provide the opportunity to document activities, behaviours and physical aspects without having to depend on people's willingness to respond to questions” (Taylor-Powell and Steele, 1996). Additionally, the method is advantageous as it surmounts some of the weaknesses of in-depth interviews. They too can provide “perceived causal inferences” to
the phenomenon being observed (Yin, 1998: 231).

Direct observation, however, shares many of the weaknesses of participant observation in that it could become too selective, therefore excluding vital information. Furthermore, during its application for this project, it was still impossible to observe certain proceedings due to the perceived sensitivity of the issues discussed. Despite these weaknesses, the non-participant observation method is useful in that it does not require the intense investment of time that is needed with participant observation. Importantly, non-participant observation bypasses the impediments of access since the limited access can be detrimental for a research project when other alternatives sources are unavailable.

A final method used throughout this research project is narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is rooted in the ‘new’ post-positivist ontology as it acknowledges the messiness of the policy processes (Clemons and Foster, 2004). Narrative analysis is able to highlight the contested definitions, ideologies, and interests of actors within the EU-Africa inter-regional institution. Essentially, it reveals the politics of “ideas and ... socially constructed categories of shared meanings” (Clemons and Foster, 2004). There are different typologies of narrative analysis. Fay (1996) for instance identifies three categories, namely narrative realism, narrativism and narrative constructivism. Kohler-Riessman (2002) however identifies five. They include thematic analysis, structural analysis, interactional analysis and performative analysis. This research project combines two typologies, namely Fay’s narrativism and Kohler-Riessman’s thematic analysis.

Kohler-Riessman defines thematic analysis as “emphasis is on the content of a text, ‘what’ is said more than ‘how’ it is said, the ‘told’ rather than the ‘telling’” (Kohler Riessman, 2002). This is in contrast to discourse analysis. Kohler Riessman further acknowledges that narrative analysis goes well with the case study design, which includes other methods. Narrativism is the middle ground meta-narrative, which organises information derived from interviews and documents in a concise and systematic manner so that other tools that trace causal mechanisms can then be applied. It is useful “to analyze (sic) stories while placing them within contexts of larger meaning” (Clemons and McBeth, 2001: 203). Together, these typologies “frame(s) or focus the story in a way that brings a particular
organization, order, and meaning to the complexity and chaos of reality” (Clemons and Foster, 2004: 8; emphasis added). Narrative analysis proved a useful method of ‘information control’ whereby pertinent information forms the core of the thesis.

III. Process Tracing

While data collection methods gather and organise information, data analysis synthesises that information to describe, explain and present a coherent outcome from in-depth investigation. This research utilises process tracing to achieve coherence in research. Recent endeavours in social science research emphasise the need to understand the processes that lead to socio-political outcomes (Falleti, 2006). These literatures emphasise the need to explore causal mechanisms, which link causes to outcomes in within-case analysis (see George and Bennett, 2005). It has also been argued that a robust research process must also pay attention to the context of a process and its relationship to the causal mechanisms to portray a strong representation of political outcomes (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). Causal mechanisms are “unobservable, physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with casual capacities operate” (George and Bennett, 2005). Mechanisms are on a lower analytical level than theories and have the aim of giving more nuanced explanations of specific socio-politico phenomena (Checkel, 2006). They explain what connects an action to an outcome. Within this project, the explanation a causal mechanism tries to understand is how and why security cooperation has contributed changes to EU-Africa relations.

In attempting to decipher cause and effect, social scientists have turned to process tracing, which is a method of causal process analysis. It seeks to uncover how the links between causal mechanisms and outcomes are made (George and McKeown, 1985; George and Bennett, 2005: 206). Process tracing has long been used in the social sciences to “incorporate historical narrative” (Falleti, 2006; see also Collier et al., 2004) and it has therefore been associated with the historical institutionalist approach. Due to this association with the historical approach, process tracing can be cast as ‘a theoretical’ story telling and thereby represents a descriptive element of research (George and Bennett, 2005: 210). Process tracing is however much more; it is an evaluation tool, which uses the historical narratives to explain political and social outcomes. Process tracing directs the
researcher to unravel the connections between events and situations in a methodical manner (Kenny, 2009).

Within this research, process tracing helped to identify the core steps that led to the changes in EU-Africa relations and the conditions under which these changes were possible. By using process tracing, causal mechanisms including the instances of path dependency, institutional layering and aspirations for institutional conversion were observed as contributing to the status of security cooperation in EU-Africa relations. Within the historical institutionalist framework, then, process tracing helps in identifying 'why' security cooperation is an outcome of EU-Africa relations and why it is structured as it is.

Process tracing is a useful method in qualitative research because it generates observations that can be linked together, and thereby constitutes case explanation. Falleti (200?) notes that “it permits the study of complex causal relationships such as those characterized by multiple causality, feedback loops, path dependencies, tipping points, and complex interaction effects” (see also George and Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2003). While process tracing is a useful tool for analysis, according to Checkel (2005), it is at odds with interpretivist epistemologies (and constructivist ontology). Process tracing, according to Checkel, requires a constant linearity, which is contrary to the aims of interpretivist research. As Adler, a constructivist notes however, epistemologies, which rely on the social construction of international relations “result from the combination of objective hermeneutics with a ‘conservative’ cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social reality” (Adler, 2002: 98). Consequently, research in constructivist tradition also seeks to identify causal mechanisms and explore constitutive relations. Further, the use of narrative analysis to organise the non-liner data mitigates Checkel’s concerns. Indeed, constructivists such as Wendt see the value of process tracing by recognising that informed research requires a systematic chart of what processes conclude in particular outcomes.

Two years after his initial contribution to the literature on process tracing, Checkel notes it is possible for process tracers to move beyond the meta-theoretical divides between positivist and post-positivist epistemologies. He suggests that this can be done by focusing
on the empirical nature of the research content (Checkel, 2006: 363). Then, process tracing can benefit from interpretive research. By considering the fluidity of meaning, the interpretivist/constructivist outlook regards the unobservable ‘variable’ as constructing, varying and essential. The interpretivist element allows one to observe the endogenous ideas that inform the process and therefore the outcome, unlike the positivist contributions that search for one objective truth (Checkel, 2005:5). Hence, narrative analysis complements process tracing and bridges whatever gap of difference may exist between positivist and interpretivist epistemologies.

Yet, as with any method, process tracing has one core limitation. It has been argued that its focus on micro-level analysis leaves out the core contextual information, thus eliminating the understanding. However, the nature of the case study design, which is in-depth and considers the whole of a phenomenon, makes this thesis less susceptible to this limitation.

3.3 Ethical Considerations & Quality Measures in Qualitative Research

As Seale (1999) notes, what constitutes good research quality varies within the social sciences. For this research project, I consider four categories: full ethical audit, case study criteria measures, reflexivity and triangulation.

A full ethical audit involves a wide range of issues such as informed consent, confidentiality and privacy, and accuracy (Reamer, 2007). The initial ethics process involved completing a level 1 self-audit with my first supervisor. This ethics review was revisited constantly throughout the research process. First, I describe the project in detail at the initial invitation (in-text). Second, the project is summarised again verbally before the interview commences. The purpose of the verbal description was to introduce myself and to state the expectations of the interaction between the participant and the research investigator. Additionally, the research project used consent forms during interview sessions as a further guarantee and a source of accountability for both the myself and research participant. The transparent process of giving the research participant all the necessary information to make a thorough judgement about participation is also known as informed consent. Informed consent is necessary good practice in social science research (Wiles et al., 2004).
In any sort of social science research, there are issues relating to how one can assess the outcome of academic research. The measures of quality often invoked are reliability, replicability and validity (Bryman, 2004: 50-51). These are terms often used for assessing quantitative work where quantifying is the most important factor. The nature of qualitative works in which contextual information is more important than measuring variables has contributed to the specific terminologies used in qualitative/case study research. Bryman notes that there are other ways of ascertaining “trustworthiness and authenticity” in a qualitative study (273). These ‘qualitative’ counterparts include credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, which are parallel to internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity in quantitative designs respectively (Bryman, 2004: 273; see also Lincoln and Guba, 1986).

Kirk and Miller (1986) note that the detailed description embedded in the data establishes credibility in qualitative research. Through careful analysis and acceptance by stakeholders such as other academics in the field and examiners, the research may be held to be ‘valid’. To hold the research as valid, the researcher must check that theories and models derived from the research process are not the result of alternative explanations (Diaz Andrade, 2009: 49). For instance, despite the common understanding from which the EU and Africa actors conceive security cooperation, there were competing accounts of certain aspects of particular events. As the researcher, I had to explain and corroborate these competing accounts with the actors involved and other observers. Credibility was achievable by ensuring good research practices and appropriate ethical measures (Bryman, 2004: 275). Transferability (external validity) is the attempt to make a unique social context relevant (generalised) in other similar situations (Bryman, 2004: 275). Qualitative/interpretive researchers often contend that the research cannot be generalised because it deals with a specific situation. However, some aspects of the research can be replicable and therefore generalised such as the specific methodology used. For instance, this research has benefitted from past research on institutional evolution. Consequently, other research on EU institutions can use the same methodology and perhaps arrive at similar conclusions on a different aspect of EU external relations.
*Dependability* or reliability requires the researcher to assume the role of an auditor. Lincoln and Guba (cited in Bryman, 2004: 275) suggest that it is possible to produce reliable research through meticulous record keeping of the entire research process. According to Diaz Andrade (2009: 48; 50), maintaining a chain of evidence “contributes to the trustworthiness of the analysis.” Maintaining the chain of evidence feeds directly into the ethical commitments that require accuracy in the use of research. I achieved dependability within this research process by keeping thorough notes and transcripts from interview sessions. Additionally, the research regularly consulted supervision notes and minutes to strengthen arguments and provide further explanation.

A consequence of a qualitative, interpretive case study is that the researcher is very much involved in the processes of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 1998; Klein and Myers, 1999; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Morse 1994). The researcher then becomes a ‘passionate observer’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 115). Inevitably, the interpretation of data is likely biased towards the researcher’s assumptions and social contexts despite precautions that may have been taken. It is therefore important to acknowledge that role of the researcher and its impact on the research results (Yin, 1998: 231). By acknowledging the researcher’s role, his or her subjectivity can be addressed constantly. This exercise is known as reflexivity. Reflexivity is the “thoughtful self aware analysis of the inter-subjective dynamics between researcher and the researched” (Findlay and Gough, 2003). Reflexivity was a useful tool applied at different stages of the project including case selection and sampling phases.

A final method to confirm the accuracy of the research data is *triangulation*. Triangulation is the use of multiple sources to address the same phenomenon (Diaz Andrade, 2009: 48; Yin, 2003: 99). In qualitative research, triangulation is also corroboration, which is “the act of strengthening [an argument] by additional evidence” (Hayward and Sparks, 1975: 253, cited in Diaz Andrade 2009: 48). Triangulation in this project consisted of the use of the multi-method approach and the use of research participants as fact checkers following the initial analysis of research findings.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a concise account of the research process. It argues that the interpretive qualitative case study design aids the researcher in determining the effect of security cooperation on EU-Africa relations. First, it gives a general description of qualitative case study design and its benefits to this type of research. Second, it outlines and provides the rationale for the cases selected in the research. Further, it describes the data collection methods and analysis including their respective benefits. The chapter concludes with a consideration of what makes for good research practices and standards by outlining the ethical considerations and research quality gauges taken during the research process. In the subsequent chapters, the thesis applies this research design to the analyses of the history of EU-Africa relations, the in-depth evaluation of two cases of security cooperation since 2008, and a detailed analysis of these two cases.
Introduction

This chapter presents a historical account of EU-Africa relations through events, culminating in the recent EU-AU security cooperation. It establishes the whole of EU-Africa relations as an institution. This historical account is necessary to understand the development of the current relationship and to delineate the institutional qualities of EU-Africa that gave rise to the inter-regionalisation of security. It identifies the norms and standard operating procedures that enable this institution to endure. I argue that the inter-regionalisation of peace and security signalled a shift within the EU-Africa institution. The chapter further examines the motivations and ideas that have constituted the institution over time.

While this chapter intrinsically highlights the continuity of the EU-Africa institution, it also aims to provide the basis from which changes can be evaluated within an enduring structure. First, the section examines EU-Africa relations primarily through Europe’s interaction with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries while acknowledging other bi-lateral relations. Second, it explores how newer mechanisms have contributed to the institutionalisation of EU-Africa relations and the eventual inter-regionalisation of security cooperation. Third, it uses the historical institutionalism literature to explain the tendency towards continuity rather than change in the context of EU-Africa relations. In the fourth section, the chapter highlights the type of changes necessary to transform EU-Africa relations. It further notes the importance of formal structures in institutionalising a cooperation pattern. This chapter and the entire thesis rely on the assumption that the inception of this institution was shaped by the colonial history of Africa and Europe (Hettne, 2004; Olsen G.R., 2000).
4.1 From Yaoundé to Lomé: Building an Inter-regional Institution

After World War II, a group of European countries conceded to cooperate amongst themselves by integrating the economic sectors and subsequently other areas of policy. They consisted mainly of former colonial powers. Cooperation between France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy was first finalised in March 1957, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). This year also marked the first decolonisation in Africa with Ghana gaining its independence from Britain and other countries following throughout the 1960s.

In the Treaty of Rome (ToR) that established the EEC, France had requested that its colonies and territories have special consideration. In Section 4 (Articles 131-136) of the Treaty of Rome, EEC Member States established the Convention of the Association of Overseas Territories (OCTs). The inclusion of the former European colonies was to ensure the continued association of France and Belgium with their former colonies. The EEC Member States would in addition to their commitments to integrate, assist the OCTs and decolonising nations with technical and financial support from a joint pot of money, the European Development Fund (EDF). The aim of this support was twofold. On the one hand, it was to help the former colonies develop their social, political and economic infrastructure. On the other hand, it gave European countries continued, arguably unchanged access to their former colonies.

This consideration of the OCTs in the Treaty of Rome was not based on an agreement between the EEC and the OCTs but rather amongst the European signatories. Thus, European states had not consulted the newly independent states of Africa making the terms of association strictly European. In addition, inclusion was geared towards French and Belgian colonised states. Years of negotiation driven by France and supported by Belgium preceded the inclusion of the former colonies in the Treaty of Rome. The government of France in 1956 believed that it was essential that it remained associated with its formal colonies within the framework of the EEC (Bossuat, 1956). Despite the

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21 In a letter to the president of the French Council, Guy Mallot, Gaston Defferre, the Minister for Overseas France reiterated the importance of an association with French colonies under the proposed European Common Market.
inclusion of former colonies in the ToR it was not an idea favoured by everyone within the French establishment.

Some French officials were hesitant to open the colonial markets to other European partners. In an article for the French newspaper, *L'Express*, Boris George a former adviser to Pierre Mendès, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, argued that to include the OCTs in the Common Market would mean a loss for France to the other European Members of the Common Market (George, 1956). George (1956) argued that a bi-lateral relationship would be more advantageous to France in the context of asymmetrical colonial relations that had always best served the interests of the French Republic. However, following negotiations among the initial members of the EEC and a joint report commissioned by the Belgian and French governments' delegation to the European Atomic Community (EURATOM), the Intergovernmental Conference supported the inclusion of continued OCT relations with the *métropole*.

These commitments to assist the OCTs did not preclude existing bi-lateral relations between France, Belgium and their former colonies. On the contrary, France became more entangled in the political life of its former colonies (see Diop, 2010; Hansen, 2008). The term *Françafrique* was used to describe this relationship between France and its former colonies. In what has been identified as French neo-colonialism, between 1962 and 1995, France has committed more than 60,000 troops to support the national governments of its former colonies (and former Belgian colonies too). During this period, France intervened 19 times ostensibly to protect its citizens and/or defend legitimate governments (Hansen, 2008). However, it has also been suggested that these interventions were solely to protect French interests. In many cases, dictators led these African governments and as such, France has been seen as systematically undermining democracy and the rule of law in Africa.

By including association with African countries in the Treaty of Rome however, the other European members of the EEC had equal economic access to the African francophone countries. The inclusion of relations with the OCTs in the founding document of the EU is important to understand how the first steps towards the institutionalisation of cooperation
commenced as a direct result of the prior colonial relationship. The impact of this commitment, including disbursing monies from the EDF to the overseas territories was initially intended to last 5 years, commencing in 1959.

Following the independence of the OCTs, the commitment made in the Treaty of Rome was re-examined. This re-examination of the Treaty of Rome led to a new arrangement. In 1963, the European Economic Community (EEC) and 18 countries, which formed the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) signed the first in a series of agreements. This agreement was different from the previous one because it was between the European countries and the African ones. Although a small change in practice, it held much significance as it meant the colonial state no longer made the decisions for the client territory.

The Convention was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon giving the agreement its name, Yaoundé I. This agreement too focused on former Francophone colonies. Since Britain was not a part of the EEC at this time, it did not advocate for the membership of its own Commonwealth countries (Anglophone colonies). Yaoundé I preserved preferential trade relations between Western European countries and their former colonies and it was especially favourable to France. It guaranteed France with raw materials from Africa, which made up the bulk of the newly independent states’ revenues. Additionally, due to Britain’s conspicuous absence from the EEC, this association of African and European states contributed to the artificial but persistent colonial division of sub-Saharan Africa with the AASM on the one hand and the African Commonwealth states, (Britain’s former colonies) on the other hand. Former British colonies promptly complained that the bias of Yaoundé I towards the former French colonies with premium access to European markets. Thus, Yaoundé appeared to preserve the French colonial system in Africa.

Germany and the Netherlands supported this view since both countries also had similar concerns about the undue influence of France in Africa’s post-colonial relations (The Courier, 2008). These criticisms led to several bi-lateral agreements between the EEC and individual Commonwealth countries including Nigeria in 1969 (although this was not ratified due to the Biafran War) and the Arusha agreement with three East African
countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which was implemented in 1971. Under the new arrangement, the second EDF provided financial assistance to the African states as support to build up infrastructure. The fact that France retains a historic neo-colonial agenda in Africa remains a concern for Germany and other European Union Member States.

The Yaoundé I arrangement reinforced the notion that cooperation between the EU and Africa is steeped in colonialism. At the conclusion of the negotiation rounds for Yaoundé I, the possibility of a partnership based on African ownership of its economic processes was not apparent. As one scholar would later note, this agreement, and other ACP agreements, were structured around the aspiration and factors within the European institution itself rather than through a consultative process between Europe and Africa (LDCs) (Forwood, 2001: 424). This EU approach is formulaic of colonial practices and later evolved into the donor-recipient relationship. Yaoundé I provided what is often referred to in new institutionalism as the institutional innovation of the current inter-regional institution in Euro-African relations. This particular agreement laid the foundation through which other agreements where initiated and adapted to foster EU-Africa relations throughout the 20th century.

Yaoundé I lasted four years and in 1969, Yaoundé II was signed. It entered into force in 1971. Not significantly different from its predecessor, Yaoundé II incorporated the Arusha agreements, thereby including some former British colonies. The incorporation of some former British colonies was intended to address earlier criticisms that relations between Europe and Africa was a consequence of French driven neo-colonialism. In 1972, Mauritius was accepted in the Yaoundé II Convention. The third EDF covered the Convention from 1969 to 1975. According to Brown (2002), the acceptance of Yaoundé II by African countries reflected the continued influence of French external relations towards former colonies within the EU context. Although Yaoundé I ought to have provided African countries with a greater market share and consequently more wealth in the international economy, this was not the case. The arrangement mostly benefitted Europe and other countries were clamouring to be included in Yaoundé II. France had successfully projected the image that it would always take care of its former colonies. Britain unlike France absented itself from the continent soon after decolonisation. It seemed however that the
young African countries wanted a custodian while enjoying the freedom of independence and France presented a solution.

In addition to the concerns or perceptions about France's *svengali-like* engagement in Africa, European countries were also worried about the spread of communism. They saw it as their duty to keep communism at bay from Africa, further encroaching on choices. So, despite the added membership of other African states to the Convention, relations between Europe and Africa remained largely the same. However, with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC in 1973, the conditions seemed right again for the re-evaluation of the collective association of the EC towards Africa. Unlike the other European countries, Britain had former colonies outside of Africa in the Pacific and Caribbean regions. This meant that the EEC could no longer play favouritism to francophone African countries, hence the re-evaluation.

By August 1973, the European Community (having evolved from the European Economic Community) had invited 21 Commonwealth countries and Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to negotiate association agreements intended as a possible successor to Yaoundé. With the exception of South Africa, all independent sub-Saharan African states had been invited (Goutier, 2008). Led by Nigeria, the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries suggested a single agreement believing they were bound together by their colonial experiences and economic development status in the international system. A single agreement among former colonies suited the European Community (EC) as it made it easier to consolidate external economic cooperation. The consolidation of countries from 3 regions paved the way for the formal grouping of countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific later known as the ACP Group (Babarinde & Faber, 2005: 3). The creation of the ACP grouping included formalised rules and norms and the standard operating procedures. When the ACP Group signed the Georgetown Agreement (amended 2003), its Member States from three diverse geographical regions were committing to a hybrid regional entity with formal organisational structures including a secretariat (ACP/27/005/00 Rev.16).22

The ACP Group secretariat is located in Brussels and is the base of operations for the African Caribbean and Pacific countries engaged in development (economic and social) cooperation with the EC and now the European Union (EU). The ACP secretariat “is responsible for the administrative management of the ACP Group. It assists the Group’s decision-making and advisory organs in carrying out their work” (ACP Secretariat, 2008). It is its purpose to implement the internal positions of the member states of the ACP Group through the other institutions and to coordinate external relations especially relations with the EU.

The formalisation of the grouping further reinforced the pattern of cooperation between the EU and the ACP Group. As the new institutionalisation literature suggests, the creation of institutions for the purpose of cooperation, in this case an organisation representing multiregional interests embeds or institutionalises the established pattern of cooperation from whence further interaction will follow. While the establishment of the ACP played a significant role in the present institution of EU-Africa relations, it is important to note that the ACP was not a real region in the sense defined in Chapter 2. Indeed, its formation was driven solely by the engagement of its Member States with the EU. Evidence is in the fact that the ACP was based in Brussels rather than in Africa, the Pacific or the Caribbean.

Lomé I was the first agreement established under the aegis of the EC-ACP cooperation. It continued the system of preferential trade between the EU and ACP countries; it was an extension of the Yaoundé Conventions (Goutier, 2008: 8). It guaranteed non-reciprocal trade concessions to ACP countries, thereby allowing 90% of ACP exports into the EU duty free. According to The Courier, it retained the contractual nature of aid among other things, although it was more detailed and precise, focusing also on the growth of agricultural infrastructure. After five years, the agreement was renewed as Lomé II. In Lomé II cooperation between the ACP and EC remained the same with the exception of two things. First was the further expansion of ACP membership. Second, the System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products or SYSMIN was added under this Convention. The SYSMIN mechanism was designed to assist the ACP countries to upgrade their own mineral production capabilities (Goutier, 2008; Babarinde & Faber, 2005: 4).
Five years after Lomé II, Lomé III (1985), signed in Mauritius, came into force. This agreement reflected the evolution of the relationship between the European Community and the ACP Group of countries as well as a maturity in the agreements’ priorities. While Lomé III retained all the trappings of the previous agreements, it also reflected the sort of weariness that comes with seemingly inescapable static relationships. Goutier (2008) notes that the period of negotiations that led to Lomé II reflected ‘aid fatigue’ on the part of the donor nations. They believed they were not getting the positive returns expected from the agreements with the ACP, i.e. social and economic development especially in Africa. The lack of positive results was blamed on the frequent and often volatile political crises within many African states.

The EC Member States believed that developmental progress had reached a plateau under the construct of existing agreements. This situation was therefore a key motivator when the European Commission began to renegotiate the Lomé III on behalf of the Member States. Prior to Lomé III the EC maintained political neutrality (Frisch, 1997). The maintenance of political neutrality on the part of the European Commission did not preclude the interference of EC Member States in the political affairs of other individual African states; however all policies mediated by the EC were supposedly politically neutral. Indeed, the claim to political neutrality was used for political gains by the EC, ensuring (superfluous) influence on matters that are now attributed to human insecurity concerns.

The core evolution of Lomé III was the introduction of ‘policy dialogues’. By the time Lomé III came into force in 1985, the parallel nature of ‘high’ politics to social and economic development was no longer tenable. The untenable separation of politics and social and economic development would become apparent in the years to come; however, even then many African states viewed the acknowledgment of political issues as an imposition of conditionalities to aid. The ACP countries especially took issue with the phrase in the Lomé III agreement, which induced the commitment on the part of the ACP countries to preserve ‘human dignity’. This reference to human dignity was to emphasise the observance of

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Form: DG Dev Dieter Frisch recollects in *The Courier, Nov. 1997* how subsequent to his conversation with former Ethiopian President Mengistu about the indignity of forced population transfers, the administration claimed to have halted the transfers.
human rights in the function of trade, aid and development, which clearly veers in the direction of political concerns not economic cooperation.

In 1990, the ACP and European Community acceded to Lomé IV. In this agreement, the EU stipulated stricter controls on the use of funds. Additionally, the European Commission increased the period of validity for each agreement from the usual 5 years to 10 years. The change was an attempt to provide “better continuity of development programmes” (Goutier, 2008: 9); however, the new 10-year period was subject to a mid-term review in 1994-95. The agreement put more emphasis on issues considered more political in nature than those in previous agreements:

“the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance; strengthening of the position of women; the protection of the environment; decentralized cooperation; diversification of ACP economies; the promotion of the private sector; and increasing regional cooperation” (European Commission, 2008; Lomé IV).

These new strictures were not welcome by the ACP states. They believed that the European Commission was deviating from the purpose of the institution whose aim was trade and aid for social development, rather than political concerns. However, the changes imposed by the European Commission were part of the broader shifts in international development cooperation in the 1990s as acknowledged by the European Commission in the Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and ACP Countries. One of the themes highlighted in the Green Paper was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of the newly democratising nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the consideration of EEC external policies and relations. If the European Community was pursuing democracy as an external policy objective in the Neighbourhood, it made sense that the Commission would also pursue it elsewhere, including Africa. The end of the Cold War had created new opportunities and challenges for international donors, and this period had an impact on the trajectory of development assistance.

**4.2 Juggling Inter-regionalism: Beyond the Cotonou Agreement**

Following the mid-term review of the Lomé IV, the EU sought to re-evaluate its relationship with the ACP Group, dominated by sub-Saharan African countries. Attempts at
this re-evaluation are seen in the first Cotonou Agreement, which is both a continuation and shift from the previous agreements. Although the European Development Fund (EDF) funded the Cotonou Agreement like the others, the new terms of EU-ACP relations was very explicit about the political nature of development assistance in the 21st century. The negotiation of the Cotonou agreement was contingent on the internal changes occurring in the international system and among the actors involved. This includes actors such as the European Union (having evolved from the European Community) and Africa. Globalisation was in ascent and although it included everyone, it did not benefit everyone equally.

The increased EU visibility in the global arena meant that at the very least it had to consider what others saw as a preferential role given to the ACP countries, possibly at the expense of other external cooperation agreements (Babarinde, 2005: 18). The increased visibility was coupled with the development of its external relations capabilities, particularly the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the CFSP provided a framework for more cooperation and coordination among Member States regarding their foreign policies.

Further, the decade had seen the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. EU enlargement was underway and the prospect of further enlargement meant that the utility of resources committed externally had to be maximised. Because EU-wide external relations commitment had increased beyond Africa to areas of arguably greater geo-strategic importance, it became necessary to see the tangible results of expenses.

Additionally, Africa had remained poor despite decades of preferential treatment, which suggested that the existing formula was not working. Further increases in violent conflict and state fragility meant that the prospects were at an all time low for socio-economic development. The worst of these culminated in the Rwandan Genocide and the protracted conflict in Somalia. By the mid-1990s, politics, security and economic development were on an irreversible collision course. It was untenable to keep these spheres separate. It is within these contexts and processes that the European Union and ACP countries committed themselves to the Cotonou Agreement on 23rd June 2000.
One of the innovative inclusions in the political dimension of Cotonou was the EU’s commitment to support regional initiatives on peace and security in Africa. The inclusion of the commitment to support regional peace and security reflected the internal EU commitment to cooperate with ACP countries involved in armed conflict [COM (1999) 240]. Further, the commitment in the Cotonou Agreement supported the ongoing parallel process of security cooperation between the EU and Africa through the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). Internal changes within the EU, such as the re-definition of development aid to include the promotion of democracy, created the space to include more in the Cotonou Agreement.

One the one hand, the Cotonou Agreement created a new avenue of dialogue within the trade-aid relationship. This agreement reflected the slow but sure erosion of the old arrangements. Unlike the previous agreements where the inclusion of political elements constituted a broadening of norms and principles in the already established relationship, the Cotonou Agreement was creating a new norm, including security. On the other hand, the Cotonou Agreement also laid the foundations for the establishment of regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to deal with the unwieldiness of the ACP as one group. Given the intentions of the EPAs, it is clear that the Cotonou Agreement had not strayed too far from its initial purposes.

With Africa being the central focus of the political concerns of the EU-ACP cooperation, the ACP grouping had become redundant for dealing with the multitude of issues. By the time Lomé IV commenced, the EU had started a dialogue with the OAU although it still relied heavily on the ACP apparatus. For instance, in 1993, then EU Commissioner for Development Aid Joao de Deus Pinheiro commissioned the first initiative specifically aimed at peace building and security in Africa. The initiative was breaking new ground on the part of the EU. Prior to commissioning the initiative, security was considered strictly the domain of states despite the CFSP. To include security as part of development was therefore a departure from previous approaches where EU Member States favoured their bi-lateral commitments.
In 1995, at the European Council Meeting in Madrid, the challenges of conflict in Africa were again brought to the forefront of global political concerns especially after the inadequate performance and perceived complicity of EU Member States in the Rwandan genocide (Jaboeuf, 2008; Dallaire, 2003). The EU agreed that it had a role in mitigating armed conflict in Africa (*Conclusions*, 1995). As part of its re-evaluation of its relationship with Africa, the EU set up an initiative with countries in the Mashriq and Mahgreb regions. This initiative is the *Euro Mediterranean Partnership* or the Barcelona Process, and the commitments included five North African nations: Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. Whereas prior to 1995 the focus of EU-Africa relations had been relations with sub-Saharan Africa through the ACP framework, the inclusion of the North African countries in the EU's cooperation framework also signalled a change in EU-Africa relations. It also opened the debate about how best the EU should respond to conflict in Africa, which is a regional security concern for both Africa and Europe. The debate was outlined in the Commission’s *Green Paper* on future EU-ACP relations. It outlines the challenges and opportunities for a new partnership (Commission, 1996). The *Green Paper* identified four different options including breaking the existing ACP conventions in favour of regional agreements, i.e. separate African, Caribbean and Pacific agreements.

By 1997, the European Commission had issued a *communication* highlighting the nexus of security and development. Further, the EU Member States had reached a common position that designated security a necessary area of cooperation between EU Member States (Olsen G.R., 2001). With the European Commission pushing for the conflation of security and development, the EU was also moving into new territory. While the security-development nexus is accepted as a fact of international relations, within the EU it has the potential to create rivalries among the key actors: the European Commission on the one hand, and the Council representing Member States on the other hand. Suffice to say, the EU’s relationship with Africa was affecting the internal dynamics of the European Union.

Observers saw the situation in Africa as an opportunity for “a global affirmation of the European Security and Defence identity” (Lenzi, 1995: 63-64, cited in Olsen G.R., 2001). Essentially, cooperation with Africa on security was envisioned as a prototype for the EU to...
test its own abilities as a security actor or develop its ‘strategic culture’\textsuperscript{24} (Martinsen, 2003; Cornish and Edwards, 2001). It was also an opportunity to develop a new kind of relationship with African countries. This idea was especially pushed by Britain and France, two former colonial powers whose foreign policy future continues to be intertwined with their past in Africa (Olsen G.R, 2001).

The \textit{Cairo Declaration} and the EU-Africa \textit{Cairo Plan of Action} (CPA) of 2000 laid out the extent of the proposed cooperation between the EU and OAU Member States. EU Member States, the European Commission, and the African states adopted the Cairo Declaration and Action Plan. The adoption occurred at the first ever EU-Africa Summit under the aegis of regional organisations, the OAU and EU respectively. Although Olsen (2006) argues that the Cairo Summit was largely symbolic and lacked substance, it was nevertheless a significant moment in EU-Africa relations. It signalled the move from the convenient EU-ACP cooperation to a new kind of cooperation based on inter-regionalism, founded on the regional actoriness of both Europe and Africa.

The timing of this declaration was important because it coincided with deliberations among African states about the state of Africa's regionalism. Although the OAU represented all African countries, it was ineffectual in addressing the pressing security concerns of the 1990s. Founded in 1963, African leaders created the OAU to celebrate African independence from colonial rule. This political organisation viewed security issues of the continent within a specific context. As emphasised in Article 3 of the OAU Charter, the protection of territorial integrity was the central security concern for the pan-African institution. Its intention was to dissuade the possibility of interference from former colonial powers, which was the driving force of this collaboration between African States. The Charter prohibits external entities from “interfering in the internal affairs of States” (OAU Charter, 1963). The offshoot of this provision of non-interference by the OAU Charter was that many African leaders took advantage of the knowledge that there would be no external interference or accountability to external entities. The cardinal rule of non-

\textsuperscript{24} Strategic Culture has been defined as “the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray, 1999: 53).
interference was almost literally killing Africa. Nonetheless, the non-interference rule did not prevent the interference of external entities like France and to an extent Britain. Yet, this interference was malignant and at the expense of the citizenry, and fostered a culture of impunity.

I. Developing Africa’s Regional Actorship: 2000-2010

Following a series of overhauls within the OAU and negotiations among African states, the decision to create the African Union (AU) was finalised in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa in particular pushed for the reforms within the OAU and the creation of the new AU. After a process of patient negotiations, conciliation and reconciliation (Tieku, 2004) the Constitutive Act of the African Union was established on 11th July 2000 (African Union, 2000). In addition to accelerating integration, one of the primary aims of the new institution was to address the experiences of the continent since independence such as combating poverty, HIV/AIDS attaining universal education and tackling state fragility and insecurity. Consequently, the African Union (AU) was tasked with maintaining stability, peace and security (see Engel and Gomes Porto, 2010; Akokpari et al., 2007; Muritihi, 2005). The remit of the AU goes beyond addressing the traditional military defence of a specific territory against external threat but also, inter alia, the challenges of intra state conflict (Williams, 2007; Muritihi, 2005).

As a result, the Constitutive Act sought to create

an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the area of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (African Union, 2000).

The new AU remit also led to the adoption of The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) of the African Union in 2002. The AU’s Peace and Security Council is the tangible representation of an evolved and comprehensive peace and security regime. It is also the decision-making organ of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and therefore has the responsibility to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. The APSA (like the rest of the AU) relies on the integration of the
peace and security mechanisms of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of African states to be successful.

Figure 4.1 Components of the African Peace and Security Architecture

With the shift from the OAU to the African Union (AU) it became necessary to tackle the insecurities in some parts of Africa based on the high occurrence of violent conflicts, humanitarian crises fuelled by gun trafficking and famine, and the general malaise of state fragility. These insecurities challenged the very essence of continued territorial integrity and the sovereignty of African states, values still held in high regard. African states also understood that the perception of security, still being a sensitive area had to be tackled internally for two reasons. The first was consistent with the old philosophy of the OAU, which is to keep out external interference. The second was to mitigate atrocities like the Rwandan genocide, by being self-sufficient so as not to depend solely on the political will of Northern countries even within the framework of the United Nations (UN). Political will is a slippery concept to define or measure; however, it undeniably plays a role in achieving policy change. The lack of conceptual clarity often means its means everything and nothing.
Within this thesis, political will is the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem (Post et al., 2010: 659).

Additionally, the UN, having acknowledged its limitations based on its failure to defend international security in Rwanda, had begun a campaign to activate Chapter VIII of the UN Charter fully. Chapter VIII allowed and encouraged the development of regional organisations to defend international security through their regional activities. These provided the impetus for the shift from the OAU to the AU.

One of the motives for the new role of the Africa Union is that “a collective security and early warning arrangement [ought to] facilitate timely and effective responses to conflict and crises situations in Africa” (Dersso, 2009). The PSC has been an important element in the institutionalisation of the AU’s new peace and security outlook. For instance, the PSC can and has recommended sanctions against unlawful changes in governments (PSC Protocol, 2004). The role of the PSC is a marked shift from the previous OAU, which was complicit in the successive reign of dictatorships in the African continent due to its policies on maintaining state sovereignty at all costs. Further, the PSC can recommend interventions with or without the consent of the Member State embroiled in conflict. The PSC is therefore an important institution to those who have long campaigned for a regional organisation with more teeth. The members of the PSC consist of 15 Member States representing the five sub-regions in Africa on a rotating basis.²⁵

Although the raison d’être of the African Union has ceased being non-interference, territorial sovereignty remained embedded in its institutional framework, as inherited from the OAU (Williams, 2007). The emergence of the African Union as a regional security actor has contributed a critical moment in the relationship between Africa and Europe. This incarnation of African regionalisation and regional security actorness has created new institutions committed to peace and security cooperation, which had been unlikely within the prior EU-ACP framework.

²⁵ See Sturman and Hayatou (2010) for a detailed discussion of the PSC’s processes.
As the core interlocutor for Africa, the African Union plays an active role in trying to achieve regional actorship, i.e. promoting African interests and implementing peace and security initiatives on behalf of its Member States. Despite its commitments to regional integration and the creation of important institutional structures, the AU itself is less developed as an institution of external relations. Rather, the African Union is an organisation that relies on a network of other actors including the regional economic communities (RECs) and its key Member States to push forth on peace and security. The literature on Member States contribution is thin at best. However, activities in the Peace and Security Council indicate that States like Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa who have long promoted integration within their own sub-regions have positively impacted the regionalisation processes of the continent.

In 2005 five years after the initial EU-Africa Dialogue in Cairo, the EU unveiled an internal strategy for Africa adopted by the Commission and Members States titled The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership [COM (2005) 489 final]. In this document, the EU committed itself to “address Africa as one entity” [COM (2005) 489 final]. Further, it reinforced the desire for a relationship based on equality, partnership and ownership and clearly identified peace and security as an area of cooperation. The 2005 Strategy was important because it acknowledged the fundamental challenges of EU-Africa relations under the ACP Framework and clarified the changes expected under new EU-Africa relations. In identifying the need for equality, partnership and ownership, the EU was introducing new norms with the full intention of transforming the existing institution of EU-Africa relations. While this document was unilateral, the three principles identified as prerequisites of change were consistent with aims articulated at EU-Africa Troikas. These three principles or norms challenge the very basis of previous EU-Africa relations as established in the Treaty of Rome and subsequently within the EU-ACP framework.

Between 2006 and 2007, the EU engaged in extensive negotiations with African States to create a new cooperation agreement, which went beyond the boundaries of previous ACP agreements. Following these negotiations, which also included extensive consultation with

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members of civil society organisations, a new agreement was developed. In December 2007 at the Lisbon EU-Africa summit, EU Member States, the European Commission and 53 African countries signed the Joint Africa - EU Strategy (JAES). It was the first agreement that enjoyed a ‘contribution of equals’ based on the active participation of the African side in the drafting process. Its principal aim was to address the concerns of the African continent vis-à-vis its relationship with the EU from a holistic viewpoint to combat the persistent insecurities and underdevelopment within the external relations framework of the EU. In this agreement, the EU and AU delineate eight specific areas of cooperation as being equally important (see Box 4.1).

**Box 4.1**

Main Partners: European Union, African Union (including African Regional Economic Communities) and the UN (in the case of Peace and Security).

Funding: EU Member States, European Commission (European Development Fund).

8 Areas of Cooperation:

1. Peace and Security
2. Governance and Human Rights
3. Trade and Integration
4. Partnership on Millennium Development Goals (poverty reduction)
5. Energy
6. Climate Change
7. Migration, Mobility and Employment
8. Science, Information Society and Space

The existing instruments under the European Development Fund (EDF) support these eight areas of cooperation. Additionally, concerning the peace and security partnership, both the EU and AU have committed to seeking additional funds for the African Peace Facility (APF). Initial funds for the APF came from the European Development Fund (EDF). The aim is that the APF would eventually become independent of the EU-Africa relations, owned solely by the AU and based on predictable funding from other donors outside of the EU.
4.3 Temporality, Positive Feedback & Increasing Returns: Persistence in EU-Africa Relations

Thus far, the effort has been made to synthesise the processes of institutional formation, institutional maintenance and evolution in EU-Africa relations. At the core of this project however is the quest to understand the contributions of security cooperation to shifts in EU-Africa relations. It is not enough to examine each new agreement as an instance of change in itself. Change must be observed where it has impacts on the aims of the institution or institutional actors no matter how small it may seem at the time of its occurrence. Most importantly, principles of change would reflect attempts to renegotiate the positions of the institutional actors in order to maintain the status-quo or re-achieve equilibrium, as well as new alterations that can potentially re-shape the institution. To understand the dynamics of interactions among the relevant actors, using an institutionalist framework to locate the aspiration of equality, partnership and ownership through security cooperation is useful.

Historical Institutionalism has long been criticised for its failure to explain how change occurs within an institution without major exogenous shocks to the system. Instead, the strength of this analytical tool has often been that it focuses on the endurance of an institution and the proclivity of such endurance to stability. It is the idea that an institution is ‘path-dependent’. Path dependency is the term used by social scientists to describe an institution’s resistance to change. They claim that at the time of institutional formation, the timing and sequence of patterns matter for initial innovation and indeed affect subsequent choices made to ensure institutional endurance (Pierson, 2004).

Political scientists have taken path dependence to mean that despite the possibility of a range of choices, when a path is taken at the period of institutional innovation, it is difficult to deviate from that path because the actors within the institution adjust to their positions and are reluctant to give up their existing positions. There is the assumption that once an institution takes a particular cause of action, it becomes difficult to change in the future. These changes are the result of critical moments or junctures, supposedly big events of high impact (Pierson, 2000; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Krasner, 1989). Nevertheless, one precise definition of path-dependency is rare and indeed, there are many broad and
narrow definitions of what path-dependency means. Despite acknowledging the risk of conceptual fuzziness or concept stretching due to a broad definition (Levi, 1997; Pierson, 2000), this work will use the definition invoked by William Sewell. Sewell defines path-dependency thus: “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcome of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996: 262-3).

As Pierson (2000) rightly points out, this broad definition is loose and only seems to reinforce the idea that ‘history matters’. However, this definition is more conducive to examining the idea of change within an established institution while acknowledging the patterns of innovation and operation. Indeed, Pierson further notes that Sewell’s definition does not suggest that a path is difficult to exit or doomed to everlasting reproduction. While still broad, Sewell’s definition leaves room for the consideration that re-directing paths might be risky given the best intentions at the point of innovation.

The ability of the institution to permit new policy areas such as security within it is interpretable as a notion of path dependency, that is, if security is as an extension of existing relations. To view security as an extension of existing relations is not to suggest that EU-Africa relations have remained static; if anything, the contrary is true. However, path dependency scholars are insistent on the probability of endurance rather than change. They understand this as the lock-in effect. Path dependency, according to Streeck and Thelen (2005), encourages scholars to view institutions within a restrictive two-way approach concerning the notion of change. It sees change as “minor and more or less continuous” or changes as “major but then abrupt and discontinuous” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 6). However, even when we can prove the notion of path dependence within an institution, empirically there have been observations of change. To evaluate these evolutionary trends as path dependent patterns within institutions, scholars utilising historical institutionalist tools have introduced the ideas of positive feedback or increased returns.

As institutions go about their regular routines, the result of these activities increases the attractiveness of the course chosen. The attractiveness of the chosen course in turn reinforces the routine (Pierson, 2004: 18). This loop is known as positive feedback which
Arthur (1994 c.f. Pierson, 2005:18) argues has four main characteristics. The first is *unpredictability*. Unpredictability means that although the positive aspects of a chosen course are reinforced, we cannot know what aspects of these are positive *a priori*. Second, positive feedbacks are supposedly *inflexible* making it difficult to change the direction from a certain course possibly succumbing to the ‘lock-in’ effect. The lock-in effect explains the monotony of EU-ACP agreements until Lomé III. Third, positive feedback processes further give allowance for small events at the beginning of institutional formation to have effects that contribute to the path of the institution. Known as *nonergodicity*, these events are important to the overall analyses of institutional process.

Finally, considering all that may have resulted from taking a particular path, which has resulted in positive feedback, one must leave room for the possibility that although a particular set of processes may be preferred or locked-in, these might not be the most efficient set of processes to pursue to achieve the aims of the institution. For instance, despite acknowledging the effects of politics on a mostly economic relationship, nothing in previous EU-Africa relations promoted equality and partnership between EU and African partners. Further the ownership of the decision making processes and implementation of initiatives by African actors was not part of previous relations although these have been recognised by the EU as goods in themselves. Rather, all agreements within the EU-ACP framework still emphasised the same ‘unequal exchanges’ (Onwuka, 1989: 65). On the face of it, the trajectory of the EU-Africa relations suggests path dependency as found in a historical institutionalism analysis. A historical process that is path dependent remains so because of the self-reinforcement of positive feedback (Arthur, 1994; David, 2000). Overall, the processes are difficult to reverse once a particular trajectory is taken (Hacker, 2002: 54).

Similarly, scholars of historical institutionalism have borrowed the notion of increasing returns from the fields of economics and technology. It is the idea that each “increment added to a particular line of activity yields larger than smaller benefits” (Pierson, 2005: 22). This idea has been used to examine economic processes as well as advancements in technology. Essentially, increasing returns have triggered positive feedback effects in the field of technology causing lock-in patterns even when there are alternatives that are more
efficient. According to Pierson (2005) in the study of politics, four features occur where self-reinforcing processes are at work (44). The features include multiple equilibria where initial conditions conducive to positive feedback and a range of outcomes are generally possible. In addition, there is contingency where relatively small events occurring at the right moment have lasting as well as the important role of timing and sequencing in that the right things need to occur at the right moments in order to have positive effects. Finally, yet importantly, is the stage where a single equilibrium is reached and the institution is stable, in inertia. Arguably, at this settled state, the institution is resistant to change. The next section turns to examine the EU-Africa relations to understand the extent to which these characterisations of change are true and what their implication may be.

4.4 Inducing Institutional Change: Refinement, Growth & Organisation in EU-Africa Relations

In examining the evolution of the EU-Africa relations, there seems to be change on a superficial level with alterations to the agreements defining the relationship. The first instance of this sort of change was with the ascension to Lomé III, which as we have highlighted included certain political conditionalities. Although the introduction of political conditionalities was new to EU-Africa relations, there is no evidence that it had an effect on the purpose of the (EU-Africa) institution to decrease poverty and increase development through trade and aid. Indeed, a seeming lack of returns on the economy and aid of the EU to Africa prompted the inclusion of these political conditionalities. In other words, the EU believed that the inclusion of this specific conditionality would bring about a better function of the existing trade and aid regime. For this reason, the motivation for change was to increase positive feedbacks within the institution.

Despite the difficulty of negotiation between the EU and Africa, and the further inclusion of the political conditionalities to the final Lomé convention, Lomé IV (much to the dissatisfaction of many African states) it has been argued that the agreement was not foisted on the ACP Group (Babarinde & Faber, 2005: 5). However, it must be noted that like the previous agreements and symptomatic of the notion of positive feedback, the power asymmetries within the relationship lingered and were indeed reinforced (Pierson, 2005: 36-37).
A significant feature of the Lomé IV convention was its timing. The European Development Fund cycle of aid commenced in 1990 just as the Soviet regime collapsed, marking a shift in the geopolitical landscape of the international system. Additionally, European countries were negotiating their position as a single voting bloc within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The end of the Cold War and demands of membership in the WTO had an effect on previous preferences given by the EU to former colonies because the rules of the international trade regime penalised favouritism, the hallmark of EU-ACP relations. Further, the increasing state fragility in Africa made conditions on the continent tense and unstable, a potential threat to European security. The timing of these events had a profound impact on the content of the Lomé IV and subsequent negotiations about the direction of EU-Africa relations. Yet, these changes were not enough to alter the status-quo. The changes were not enough because although perceived as intrusive, more conditionalities within the framework of the EU-ACP were not seen as altering the institution. This is because the changes being made were still for the purpose determined during the period of innovation.

However, Lomé IV was important because it exposed the increased contestations within the institution. It exposed the fact that the EU-ACP arrangement and bi-lateral relations between European and African countries could no longer support the strictly donor-recipient relationship. Consequently, Lomé IV paved the way for a critical moment in EU-Africa relations. For instance, by the mid-term review of the Lomé IV the EU had started an ongoing dialogue with Africa within different frameworks of the OAU and the Barcelona process. Thus, the negotiations that occurred for the Lomé IV revealed the opportunity for EU cooperation with Africa outside of the ACP.

The new opportunities provided by the Lomé IV negotiations reinforces historical institutionalists' claims that although institutions are more susceptible to incremental change, these changes can result in progressive outcomes through the *layering* of new ideas. Change as institutional layering occurs when institutional actors attach new elements to existing institutions, gradually changing their status and structures. These new additions rely on the foundations of the initial institution (EU-Africa relations 1957-2000)
because of positive feedback in EU-ACP relations. Further, although the institution endures, it also adapts.

Although layering goes further than *positive feedback* and *increasing returns* (since it expressly introduces new contexts) there is no consideration for breaking away from the original structures of the institution when it (layering) is employed (Schickler, 2001; Thelen; 2002; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). As Streeck and Thelen (2008) acknowledge, “new dynamics are set in motion by political actors...by introducing amendments that can initially be ‘sold’ as refinements of or correctives to existing institutions” (23). By enacting change through amendments, institutional actors are constrained since their aim is not to undermine the existing institutions or antagonise those who would rather maintain the status quo (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 23). By maintaining the status-quo (more or less), the EU-ACP relationship as the core of EU-Africa relations still focused primarily on economic development, poverty reduction and humanitarian aid. Hence, political conditionalities and policy dialogues within the EU-ACP framework did not alter EU-Africa relations significantly.

Based on the *Cairo Declaration* and Plan of Action, the *Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, the move towards true inter-regionalism and the inter-regionalisation of security, it is reasonable to expect change in EU-Africa relations. Effectively a new sort of relationship has emerged from the old one. Not only have agreements changed, but the new face of EU-Africa relations has also prompted organisational restructuring. The changes that affect the dynamic of the organisation are very important since the organisations themselves are able to determine the extent to which an alteration results in substantive change based on the implementation of new policies. The implementation of this new political dimension through security cooperation is the focus of this thesis and the subsequent chapters will be exploring this cooperation. In addition to investigating whether the implementation of security cooperation has resulted in substantive changes, categorising this change will also be important.

In cases where the implementation of security cooperation has yielded progressive changes by advancing equality, partnership and ownership, the thesis assumes the
presence of change through *conversion*. While the inclusion of security cooperation in itself and the development of inter-regionalism are new and justify change through layering, conversion transforms the institution. Between 2000 and 2005, and indeed between 2000 and 2007, despite the changes occurring within EU-Africa relations, the relationship was still based on donor-recipient logic. Being the impetus for many of the changes, security (cooperation) is an appropriate area through which to evaluate the possibility of conversion.

An important element in the historical development of the EU-Africa institution is the role of formal structures in guarding the institutionalisation process. Although institutions as defined within this thesis go beyond formal structures, it is also important to acknowledge the role of these structures in determining the institution and changes within it. The literature on historical institutionalism makes a distinction between institutions as the "rules of the game" and the structures that enforce these rules as organisations. While the terms institutions and organisations have been used interchangeably, it is important to distinguish them.

Organisations may be described as sub-sets of institutions, the ‘players’ under the rules (Leftwich, 2007: 11). Organisations are characterised by their sovereignty or autonomy; the criteria by which members are distinguished from non-members and the chain of command, which specify responsibilities and obligations in the organisations alone (Hodgson 2001 cited in Leftwich, 2007). Essentially, only the members of the organisations are governed by the rules of the institution. So while inter-regionalism is replicable, EU-Africa relations are unique and are the composite of organisations that make up the institution.

In evaluating the institution of EU-Africa relations, several ‘organisations’ overlap, forming the players or actors within the institution. Formal organisations and institutions have governed the majority of EU-Africa relations, designing and implementing the joint aims of inter-regionalism. They include the European Union’s Parliament, Council, Commission and on the African side, the ACP secretariat and its other organs and the African Union, including the Commission, the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the Panel of
the wise. Additionally, there are sub-regional organisations or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa that have ad hoc relations with the European Union within the context of the EU dialogue with Africa. Further, these RECs are instrumental to regional actorship as presented through the African Union. It is important to note however that in an attempt to address Africa as a whole, the majority of the substantive EU-Africa relations that concern this project have been executed through the ACP and associated institutions and more recently through the African Union especially on political matters [COM (2003) 316].

4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated how national norms and rules of EU Member States have influenced the advent of inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa (Dimier and McGeever, 2006: 487; COM (2007) 357 final). Although the process of institutionalising EU-Africa relations began with the creation of the European Union itself, inter-regionalism did not truly start until the 1990s coinciding with the emergence of a viable African regional actor. In 2000, with the Cairo Declaration and Plan of Action, peace and security became a part of EU-Africa relations. Unlike previous security engagements on the continent, this new approach to peace and security was different. First, the definition of security became broader through the human security concept. Second, where security engagement was often bi-lateral, its introduction throughout the first decade of the 21st century reflected an inter-regionalisation of security. Third, this new engagement emphasised three important dimensions that signalled a change from prior EU-Africa relations. They include equality, partnership and ownership. As a historical analysis of the EU-Africa relations confirms a history of power asymmetries, investigating whether these three principles of change are evident in the practice of security cooperation is important to understanding current EU-Africa relations. This chapter further acknowledges that the creation of the African Union and the EU’s new security competencies has also played a role in the inter-regionalisation of security.27

27 So have the events in the international system such as the War on Terror. The attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001 have undoubtedly shaped all security dialogues in the international system, including those of the EU and AU.
In the past, the European Union has dominated the EU-Africa institution causing political contestations among the actors. As we have already shown, the EU initiates the new inclusions of successive EU-ACP agreements. In those cases where there were instances of political contestation among institutional actors, they came because of EU impositions. This was the case for instance when the EU imposed political conditionalities to the previous trade and aid arrangement. Regardless of the discontent of the African partners, the outcome of the negotiation always ended with the inclusion of the conditionalities, suggesting an unequal relationship fostered the EU’s interests. The proposed changes suggested by the JAES however propose a new relationship driven by the mutual interests of both the European Union and its African partners.

It is clear from the forgoing that recent occurrences internationally, within the EU, and in Africa have the potential to change EU-Africa relations. The impact of these changes is important for understanding current EU-Africa relations as they potentially signify a deviation from the aims of the original institution at the point of innovation. The potential for a new EU-Africa relationship is based on the assumption of a partnership of equals that gives African states a voice in the inter-regional arrangement. The aim of an inter-regional arrangement is that the transformation of the new EU-Africa institution would benefit Africa, providing a more developed and secure continent.
EURORECAMP: FROM MOLEHILLS TO MOUNTAINS

Introduction

The chapter presents one example of how the EU and Africa work together to tackle the challenges to security in Africa as part of the broader EU engagement in international affairs. EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA\(^{28}\) is a process and a good illustrative example of how the security partnership between the EU-AU has contributed to the changes that have occurred in EU-Africa relations. It is “a tool to help the African Union (AU) to validate the African Standby Force (ASF)” by 2010 (EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA website, 2009). Cooperation in the past was among the donors rather than between the donors and recipients. This chapter argues that this change reflects a marked shift in the conceptualisation of peace support capacity building programmes in EU-Africa relations. The existence of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reflects the importance of Africa’s security, its security threats and its institutions to the European Union. Additionally, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA illustrates the consequences of African states’ departure from the concept of non-interference in security from external powers. In Europe, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is a concrete illustration of the ability of EU Member States to merge their interests and to collaborate on matters of international security. In addition, the examination of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reveals new opportunities for multilateral actions, which occur in the context of evolved inter-regional cooperation. It also offers an insight into the impact of EU-Africa cooperation in the policy area of security on internal EU integration (and contestations) in the area of security.

This chapter is divided into five sections. First, it defines and describes the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA concept as a process designed intentionally to build the capabilities of the African Union’s African Standby Force (ASF). Second, it discusses the context within which the African Union is building the African Standby Force. It places the AU’s initiative firmly

\(^{28}\) The African partners also know the current 2 year cycle of the EURORECAMP as the AMANI AFRICA Cycle. For ease, the terms may be used interchangeably to describe the same multilateral process of peace support training and capacity building for the African Standby Force.
within an international context, which must rely on external partnerships such as EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. Third, it explores the origins of the cooperation, which led to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle. It makes this exploration by focusing on the national, regional and international impetus resulting in the Europeanisation of the EU Member States’ national programmes. Fourth, the chapter addresses the challenges to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA from three perspectives: European, African and International. In the fifth and final section, the conclusion draws on the analytical tools described earlier in the thesis, which describe change. The chapter concludes that EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is an example of how security cooperation between the EU and Africa has resulted in a shift from prior relations.

5.1 EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA: The method

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA transforms the French RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix)\textsuperscript{29} programme into an inter-regional/multilateral process. Its core stakeholders are the African Union and the European Union (including the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Member States).\textsuperscript{30} The purpose of this process is to assist the African Union with operationalising the African Standby Force (ASF). It is also a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) instrument implemented in accordance with the provisions of the European Security Strategy, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which was adopted in December 2007 at the Lisbon Summit (EU Council Secretariat, 2009).\textsuperscript{31} EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is a result of the second Action Plan (AP) within the peace and security cluster of the JAES. The Action Plan commits the EU to supporting the APSA. The peace and security cluster of the JAES aims

“To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedom, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa.” (JAES, 2007)

\textsuperscript{29} English translation: The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities

\textsuperscript{30} In addition to the EU Member States, the United States, Japan, NATO and the UN form the consortium of external partners or donors helping to develop African capabilities through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.

The concept is also linked to Proposal 6 of the Action Plan for the implementation of proposals relative to the EU concept for Strengthening African Capabilities. Further, it supports the integration of ASF brigades at a continental level and support the development of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA). In sum, as the chapter will show, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA goes beyond a simple Europeanisation of the French RECAMP to include the participation of other non-European actors and importantly, African actors too. It is also a transformation, a new tool, which retains the education and training component of the French RECAMP (Figure 5.1 below illustrates this transformation). Figure 5.1 shows the re-organised structure of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. One of the noticeable changes is that whereas France conducted previous process design, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA requires a new decision-makers training which includes African personnel. It is important to reiterate that part of the political execution of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA belongs to the African Union as part of the bid to allow Africa to own its peace and security process, an expressed aim of change in EU-Africa relations.

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA as it currently exists is more than a European process because its implementation cannot exist without the African partners’ approval. The joint action of the EU and AU constitutes part of the transformation. As part of the conditions of the cooperation with the EU, the AU made three central demands. The first condition was that the project be truly continental thereby ensuring that the AU rather than African states or sub-regional organisations acted as the main coordination counterpart to the EU in Africa. This condition allowed the AU to assert its authority in the area of peace and security. Second, the AU requested for the process and product to be owned by Africans. So rather than directly training African armed forces, the European partners’ responsibility is to train the trainers, who then use the knowledge gained in their local context to help their troops prepare for multidimensional peace support operations. Third, it was important for the EU rather than France to lead the European side of the partnership. The role of the EU was necessary because according to sources in the EU and the African Union, the history of colonialism lingers when it comes to issues of peace and security.\^32

\^32 Interview, 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2009, African Union, Addis Ababa.
AFRICA officially began in 2007, although the intended length of the cycle was two years, from November 2008 until June 2010\textsuperscript{33}.

**Figure 5.1: Transformation of bi-lateral to inter-regional/multilateral process**

![Diagram of FROM RECAMP TO EURORECAMP](image)

*Source: EURORECAMP Presentation, 2007*\textsuperscript{34}

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA aims to define and effectively execute the problems of command and control within Africa’s peace support operations architecture. In addition to training troops and potential heads of peace missions (which constitutes a significant part of the project), the aim is also to make the decision-making processes clearer and strategically sound.\textsuperscript{35} The implementation of the cycle relies on a network of African Training Centres including the Bamako Peacekeeping Centre, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra Ghana, the International Peace Support Training Centre in Karen, Kenya and other region-specific national training centres (EU Council Secretariat, 2009). Additionally, EU Member States offer military and civilian peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{33} At the conclusion of the fieldwork process, the report was pending and the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process had been extended until the end of 2010.

\textsuperscript{34} Available at: http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article2&lang=en

\textsuperscript{35} Interview, EU Council DG E, Brussels 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2009,
at national training centres in Italy, France, and Hungary among others.\textsuperscript{36} Both AU (through the peace and security department) and EU (through the EU Delegation to the AU) personnel lead the cycle. France is the framework nation meaning it is the European country responsible for the overall coordination of the process. The European team therefore has its headquarters in Creil, France under the guardianship of General François Gonnet as director, with the posts of deputy director, coordination officer, police expert and civilian crises advisor occupied by British, French, Italian and Finnish nationals respectively (EURORECAMP, 2009).\textsuperscript{37} France is an important EU Member State to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA for several reasons, one of which is the fact that the process is inspired by the French RECAMP concept.

Thus far, the mission to achieve a functional Standby Force through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has involved a strong tripartite alliance of EU-UN-AU. The UN has contributed a seconded team of six personnel from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Their official designation is the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team (DPKO-AU PST). The UN's involvement is obvious to the extent that the AU's peace operations are part of the broader response to international security threats. A panel led by Italian diplomat Romano Prodi submitted the recent report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General (Prodi Report, 2008). The Prodi report argued for greater integration between international security structures (the UN) and regional agencies (the AU). This report is an addendum to the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operations report known as the Brahimi Report. The Brahimi Report (2000) assessed the shortcomings of the UN's peacekeeping capabilities and stated that “there are many tasks which the United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go” (Brahimi Report, 2000). The Brahimi Report highlighted that regional organisations could potentially play the role of agents of international peace and security within their spheres of influence. These roles, the Report argued, would make up for the deficiencies in the UN's peacekeeping system. The Prodi Report however highlights the challenges to regional peacekeeping and peace support operations, by taking on the issue of predictable funding. In the Report, the panel called for the reform of the UN's peace operations funding system.


\textsuperscript{37} EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA website: http://www.amaniafricacycle.org
The current system only allows the UN to fund peacekeeping when the UN Security Council expressly mandates a mission (Prodi Report, 2008).\textsuperscript{38} Because AU Member States, as UN members, pay dues that go towards peacekeeping the Prodi Commission's investigative team believe that a system in which a few countries on the Security Council have the power to determine how the funds are spent was irregular\textsuperscript{39}. According to the UN's current rules for instance, an endorsement or acknowledgement of an AU mission is not enough to secure the necessary funding.\textsuperscript{40} The difficulty in securing the UN's support has been a key motivator for the African Union to develop its own capabilities and funding sources.

The creation and implementation of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been influenced by events at the international level. The United Nations in particular has played the most crucial role in shaping this context. In 1992, the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published the report \textit{Agenda for Peace}. The report highlighted the new demands of global peace and security. In the report, Boutros-Ghali highlights four areas of activity as responses to international peace and security (types of peace operations). They include:

1. Preventative diplomacy, which refers to the efforts designed to prevent conflict among actors or preventing the spread of conflict where it has begun.
2. Peacemaking, which refers to those actions promoting the agreements between the conflicting parties (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) such as mediation.
3. Peacekeeping, which refers to activities such as humanitarian assistance and election monitoring missions, i.e. civilian and military engagements (Diehl, 2008: 11).
4. Post-conflict peace building (Gomes, 2008: 114). Peace building remains a contentious term; however, Boutros-Ghali explains it as “the creation of a new environment” beyond the cessation of hostilities through peacekeeping (Boutros-
Peace building therefore connotes a longer-term commitment to peace than is available through traditional peacekeeping models.

Often the terms peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building are used interchangeably, however, it is important to note the distinction between these concepts. Additionally, new understandings of security necessitate that peace operations consider these distinctions in the planning and execution of missions.

The proposals in this report reaffirmed the provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VIII. Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes recognises the role of regional organisations to help resolve disputes and preserve international peace and security. Through the implementation of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, both the AU and the EU can meet the demands of the UN’s provisions. Further, since Chapter VIII in particular allows regional arrangements or agencies to deal with “such matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions” both the EU and AU are effectively able to claim their security actoriness in international security through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA (UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Art. 52). The changes in the international context of peacekeeping and peace support operations have enabled the design and implementation of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.

Table 5.1: EURORECAMP Contribution Offers as of February 2009; updated July 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Nation/Org</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 | UN | Senior Level Retreat.  
Senior Mission Leaders Courses for the AU Commission, RECs and RM.  
Technical advice to the AU on the ASF.  
African peacekeeping support team.  
IT & infrastructure support (no detail).  
Support of centres of excellence in training action. |
| 2 | U.K. | €550,000 already donated to the Trust Fund. |
| 3 | Canada | $Can 400,000 (€240,000). |
| 4 | Finland | €100,000.  
Application to provide EURORECAMP with a civil team expert. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Further support to police and civilian features under study.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Support still being studied. Likely areas of support are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Experts (speakers and mentors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Air transport in support of activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Support in the form of experts in integrated planning:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ 2 each for SDM, MAPEX, Pol Strat Seminar and Strat Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ 5 for CPX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ 2 for evaluation training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ 2 for one integrated training period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Contributions being considered favourably but still being studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>€400,000, part of which has already been expended on the Initialisation Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Prepared to support EURORECAMP by providing material for the CPX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Provision of a general officer and a Lt Col as well as providing support to the EURORECAMP team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>€300,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Further contributions (mentors and instructors) will be considered when more detail is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>One officer in the EURORECAMP team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Police training effort already underway (2 possible courses: 1 police strategic level and 1 humanitarian).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Finance to follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>€20,000 (approximately).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Support of experts in the fields of communications and defence and security policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Financial contribution to the trust fund but the project is still being studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>€10,000 confirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Financial support is not possible but support will be provided for the evaluation (training for evaluators and the ‘lessons learnt process’) + staff training at a strategic level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Seeking more details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Wants to ensure synergies with the existing efforts in Mali, Egypt and Kenya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ Considering supporting PSO training centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>€30,000 is the figure being considered but remains under consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>EU Commission</td>
<td>APF is available to fund these activities and capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ €20 million is available for capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▶ A new APF of €300 million has just been negotiated. Detailed requests required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Awaiting further detail but prepared to provide support to the civilian component.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA, www.amaniafricacycle.org

The prominent role of the UN in the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process does not discount the participation of other actors as evidenced by the attendance and offers made
at the AMANI Africa Contributors Conference in February 2009. Countries such as Canada, Norway and Japan have invested in the process and so is NATO to a certain extent. Despite the participation of other donor partners, the EU, including the Member States and the European Commission have contributed the most to the process. The Commission sponsors the African Peace Facility. Of the €300 million allocated to Africa as part of the 10th European Development Fund (2008-2010), €20 million was earmarked for capability building. A portion of this fund is held in a trust fund for use in the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process. In 2007, the EU peace and security Committee decided that the framework nation for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, France, should manage a trust fund for the activities of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. EU and non-EU states and international organisations as shown in Table 5.1 can make contributions to the trust fund (EURORECAMP, 2008). A board manages the fund, and the director of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA who is the board president, administers it.

In addition, within the framework of the EURORECAMP and outside the immediate training processes, the EU through its delegation assists in less technical administrative capacity building as it tries to export its own regional integration model to Africa. Exporting its regional model is a purposive foreign policy objective of the European Union. At the EU’s Addis Ababa office, a military adviser is on hand to share the best methods of practice regarding the constitution with the military committee. The establishment of a viable AU Military Staff Committee will contribute in the long term to problems of command and control within the AU security architecture.

The European Union is an important component in the development of Africa’s ability to deal with security threats. The EU’ role is important because it contributes the most monetarily and in terms of expertise to training African personnel. “The EU has the means, willingness and experience the AU needs to develop its structures” and through EURORECAMP it uses these.41 While Europeans may not always have an easy relationship with Africans, there is a clear sense that the AU prefers the European EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA approach to programmes proposed by the United States for instance. The EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is distinctive as its intentions (if not always met) are to

41 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, 30th April 2009
support the African Union, thereby promoting ownership, partnership and equality. An approach by the United States as based on past request would require AU Member States to provide military bases to American military personnel. The United States approach does not sit well with African leaders. As such, the majority of US Military engagement in Africa remains bi-lateral.\textsuperscript{42} EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA incorporates many of the recommendations proposed by critics of earlier British and French capabilities building programmes. The broader contribution of EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA is to the creation of a viable African Peace and Security Architecture, which is to maintain regional peace and security. Because regional security contributes to international security, EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA is therefore a contributory tool to international security.

Having defined the scope of the EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle, this chapter now seeks to explain and evaluate the specific context within which the cycle is being deployed, that is, what is the African Standby Force and why does it need EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA to function? In order to answer these questions, the chapter first examines the history and development of the African Standby Force concept. Then, it traces the different stages of the process involving the external partners (particularly the European partners) including those leading to the creation of EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA. This evaluation is necessary in order to understand and justify the formation of EUROCAMP and to trace the changes that are occurring and have resulted in the current EU-Africa security cooperation.


The African Standby Force (ASF) is an African regional arrangement created for the expressed purpose of undertaking peace support operations. The ASF is a support mechanism of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and a component of its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Indeed, the ASF constitutes the actionable element of the APSA.

\textsuperscript{42}The US’ bi-lateral engagement in Africa includes the \textbf{Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa} based in Djibouti; and the \textbf{Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism initiative} focusing on North African countries.
According to Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the ASF will consist of ‘multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components’ (emphasis added). The multidimensionality of the arrangement stems from the reality that “conflict does not happen in a vacuum”\(^{43}\) and must include an array of non-military solutions to ensure lasting peace. The ASF is empowered to intervene in African border wars and intra-state conflicts including civil unrest caused by unlawful changes in government. Each brigade will represent the five sub-regions and will act under the auspices of the AU rather than under the political authority of the RECs.\(^{44}\) The AU expects that the brigades will consist of three to four thousand troops each with a sixth multinational formation based permanently in the African Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa.\(^{45}\)

The policy makers involved with EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA and the implementation of the ASF insist that the mechanism is not intended for full traditional peace keeping missions, but rather as a rapid reaction stop-gap mechanism of the African Union. AU (and UN) officials are emphatic in explaining the continued role of the United Nations as the primary enforcer of international peace and security.\(^{46}\) They contend that the actions mandated by the AU PSC ought to be viewed as acting on behalf of the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Lamambra, 2009). Hence, regional security arrangements form part of the broader international security arrangements. However, the six scenarios (see Table 5.2 below) which form the basis for ensuring the viability of the Standby Force indicate that the AU intends to work towards self-sufficiency regarding the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

\(^{43}\) Interview, African Union, Peace and Security Division, Addis Ababa, 29\(^{th}\) April 2009

\(^{44}\) The configuration for the ASF has changed. Previously, when RECs forces participated in peace support operations, they intervened in their own sub-region for instance, ECOWAS, the West African REC only intervenes in West Africa. In the new reconfiguration, the brigades can be deployed anywhere on the continent, for example the Southern African Brigade can be deployed to a conflict situation in Eastern Africa.


### Table 5.2: African Standby Force Conflict Intervention Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarios</th>
<th>Descriptions and Deployment requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission, co-deployed with UN mission. Deployment is required within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3</td>
<td>Stand alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment id required within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4</td>
<td>AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment missions. Deployment is required within 30 days from AU mandate resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 5</td>
<td>AU regional peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional missions with low-level spoilers. An ASF deployment is required within 90 days from AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 6</td>
<td>AU intervention in a genocide situation lacking prompt reaction from the international community. It is envisaged that the AU would have the capacity to deploy a robust military force in 14 days.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) have proposed the development of the ASF in two incremental phases. The AU intended to attain the capacity to conduct observer missions, i.e. fulfil the demands of scenarios 1 to 3 by the end of June 2005, which was the end of the first phase; however, this work is still in progress. The proposal also recommends that at this first stage the AU needed a 15 member staff whose only tasks are dedicated to planning and logistics of capacity development of a multidimensional force geared to respond to scenarios one to three (Neethling, 2005: 13). During this phase and into the second one, the AU and the RECs ought to continue to train the members of the

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47 Annex to Roadmap for the Operationalisation of ASF, pB-1.
regional brigades. The main purpose of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle was to assist with this second phase of the ASF’s development, i.e. the training of the brigades. The AU has developed a schedule for the standby brigades so that at least one would be ready for deployment within the allotted periods. Subsequent to the meeting in August 2003, the ACDS set about meeting in all of the five core sub-regions. They identified elements of the ASF including the “standby force, the rapid reaction elements, centres for excellence for peace support operations training, lists of military and civilian observers, regional logistics support.” Additionally, they identified early warning and communications capabilities to shore up the APSA (Kent and Malan, 2003; see also Neethling, 2003, 2005).

Between July 2005 and June 2010, the AU has been working on the launch of independent peace support operations that require some traditional peacekeeping and intervention logistics. Currently, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is the primary tool through which the AU’s seeks to increase its peace support capabilities. The development of the ASF is very important because at its best, it will integrate the security apparatuses of the five regional economic communities as they share the same training modules.

The Brahimi Report has been an impetus for the formation of ASF since it recommended a regional standby brigade of at least 5000 troops to “deter or deal with spoilers of a peace process” (Kent and Matalan, 2003: 72). The ASF exemplifies the interconnectedness of regional and global security challenges and thereby necessitates a support system that goes beyond Africa. This is where a tool like the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle shows that there is added value in multiple countries working together to achieve the African Union’s aims for the African Standby Force.

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA helps to support the ASF by providing a source of predictable funding (for training), knowledge or logistical expertise of peace support operations and a well-functioning institutional infrastructure. The lack of these three provisions, according to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, “have an erosive effect on Africa’s ability to effectively resolve conflicts and prevent fresh ones” (Lamambra, 2009). Despite the AU’s comparative advantage in the African peace and security arena due to its personnel contributions, political legitimacy, and its strategic location, its lack of
the provisions above makes it amenable to partnering within frameworks such as EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. Indeed, Article 17 of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council makes provisions for international cooperation to further the aims of the APSA.

5.3 The process that Europe built: The historical context of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA

Regional security challenges in Africa have been linked to those in the international community. Therefore, insecurity in Africa is not solely Africa’s problem (Lamambra, 2009). This observation is the reason why the international partners have shown such support for African peace and security initiatives. However, the enormity of the security problems is such that the literature identifies the central challenge to peace support operations in Africa as being financial, i.e. there are financial constraints preventing the successful and timely launch and operation of peace missions. Neethling for instance argues that unlike other regions, Africa has the required political will and troops to engage but no funds (Neethling, 2005).

However, some interviewees indicated that the biggest impediment to Africans dealing with African problems is the lack of political will among some African states. Further, the lack of expertise within the African Union and inability to utilise existing capacities fully remain fundamental hindrances for EU-Africa relations. Despite the shift in the continental philosophy from non-intervention to non-indifference, African politicians are still unfamiliar with the proposed role of the pan-African institution to take over guardianship of peace and security in the continent. Therefore, for the sake of further integration and ownership on the part of Africa, African leaders especially need to commit to the aims of

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50 See ‘From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and development of the African Union’s security culture’ Williams, 2007; ‘From non-interference to non-indifference: the emerging doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa’, Mwanasali, 2008; The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?’ Murithi, 2009
the African Union, and by extension, the APSA. Indeed, it has also been argued that some of the financial constraints facing the African Union are a consequence of the lack of political commitment on the part of many of the leaders. Thus, political will, in addition to financial constraints contribute to the problems of launching successful peace support operations.

Excluding the financial and political aspects needed to make the ASF practicable, the AU and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) also lack the required expertise and training to undertake complex missions. The support from external partners is therefore aimed at ensuring predictable funding to guarantee the integration needs of the AU on matters pertaining to conflict prevention management and resolution, and contributing to the training needs. The EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process exemplifies a process of institutionalisation of the various donor programmes of security cooperation and support in Africa.

As indicated previously, the African Union and partners formally launched the process in November 2008. However, its origins date back to 1997. I contend that the events and processes subsequently evaluated were essential precursors to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle. Without them, the opportunity for cooperation on capacity building for security would not have arisen when it did and in the manner in which it did. This section examines the role of EU Member States particularly the so-called Big 2, France and Great Britain. It particularly addresses the impact of the prior relations between the Member States and African states, as well as the cooperation among EU Member States on the eventual establishment of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA by assessing the early efforts to consolidate the resources earmarked for peace support training and capacity building in Africa.

In 1998, the United Kingdom proposed the P3 initiative as a consortium of France (RECAMP) and the USA (ACOTA). The purpose of the joint initiative was to engage in “a more focused and systematic approach to the implementation” of training for peace support operations for Africans. The initiative allowed the participation of all African states; however, it was not a continental strategy. It therefore differs from EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA since the latter emphasises a truly inter-regional dimension. The following discussion focuses on the component programmes of the P3 initiative, highlighting the role
of certain states in instigating donor support for African efforts.

France officially launched the RECAMP in 1998. It was France’s attempt to ‘Africanise’ the face of the peace support operations on the continent, which were usually dominated by non-African peacekeepers. Through ‘Africanisation’ France also introduced a new system of security defence whereby African troops could respond to African security threats rather than rely on French intervention. France’s engagement in Africa is longstanding. France laid the building blocks of the present institutionalised inter-regionalism by insisting on the inclusion of its former colonies in the Treaty of Rome as priority trade and aid partners. Further, France designed and implemented the direct precursor to EURORECAMP- AMANI AFRICA. RECAMP however was deeply politically motivated. It aimed to legitimise the French security presence in Africa. Unlike EURORECAMP, its ‘Africanisation’ concept lacked equality, partnership or ownership because French officials rather than Africans planned and implemented the programme based on French interests.

A unique feature of RECAMP was that unlike the French security interventions in Africa prior to 1998, the concept made no distinction between former French colonies and non-colonies, thereby broadening French relations with other African nations. France pitched the programme as a “mechanism to establish an open partnership to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity, in terms of training, equipment and exercises” (RECAMP Website, 2009).

One of the four principles of the RECAMP programme is multilateralism. Multilateralism has been translated to mean receiving financial contributions from other donor countries like Japan, Argentina and Canada among others. However, the design of RECAMP and its implementation has been the domain of France and no other country. Receiving contributions from other countries have survived the Europeanisation of the process within EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. Further, these countries also engage substantively within the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process beyond their financial contributions. RECAMP focused on training and support for peace missions through instructional courses

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51 Interview, European Union Council DG E Brussels., 19th June, 2009
and training in African regional peacekeeping centres (Scorgie, 2007). Unlike EURORECAMP however, RECAMP emphasised the military characteristics of peacekeeping rather than the current advocated broader outlook of military, police and civilian forces. As a respondent notes “procedures and doctrines used during ... exercises were not really multidimensional.” Nevertheless, RECAMP was unique in that its aim was to develop African states’ capability more than their integration into UN missions (Scorgie, 2007).

The U.K. lacked the sort of security presence that France had in Africa during the Cold War period as it did not directly participate in any bi-lateral interventions in Africa until 2000 when it intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone. However, it also participated in enhancing the peace support capabilities of African troops. The U.K. component of this programme was the *U.K. African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme*. Unlike France, Britain provided training to sub-regional organisations’ peace support missions as well as individual countries. In many cases, the provision of training for African peacekeepers was intended to prepare them for being part of the multinational UN peacekeeping force. By 2001, internal changes within the U.K. government’s bureaucracies made the training of African troops a joint remit of the Department of International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The sharing of responsibilities in the area of peace support operational training is indicative of the new understanding of insecurity and the necessary multidimensionality of the response to security threats. The British training component is a key component of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle. Within the new European framework, the U.K. continued its support of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Ghanaian Staff and Command College and the Kenyan Staff College and Peace Support Training Centre (DFID, 2004).  

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52 Interview, European Union Council DG E, Brussels. 19th June, 2009
53 Interview, European Union Council DG E, Brussels 19th June, 2009
54 The U.K. for instance provided training to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (see Walpole, 1998 for more details).
56 Recent budget cuts due to the 2008 financial crises have led to a reduction in the level of support for the Kofi Annan Training Centre.
Despite the different contexts of their engagement in Africa, there were some similarities between the French and British initiatives. These similarities made cooperating appealing to both countries. Similar to the French programme, the British train individual leaders and test the effectiveness of the training cycle through multinational peacekeeping exercises based on practiced scenarios.

The first instance of cooperation between EU Member States occurred when the U.K and France jointly provided the funds to produce an English/French peacekeeping dictionary. Additionally, they also sponsored the secondment of African officers to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) for further training (Walpole, 1998). An assessment of how France and Britain collaborated shows that cooperation between France and Britain was possible and successful because the two countries maintained division of labour between them. Further, the arrangement was such that neither country upstaged the other for preferential treatment or a privileged position within the African countries.

Although a non-EU member, the United States (US) plays an important role as the third partner in the P3 initiative, which is the first building block towards joint donor operations. In addition, in its role as an influential member of the G8, the US has been a key driving force in promoting joint operations among donor countries in support of building African capabilities. Furthermore, the US is a partner in the ongoing EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA operation. In 1996, the US established the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and in 1997 established training African military units in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda (Mays, 2003: 119). This initiative further provided training and non-lethal combat equipment for use in peace support operations. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme (ACOTA) succeeded ACRI, which is currently the training module of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). It has been argued that the GPOI is the most “ambitious and all-encompassing” of the American programmes (Scorgie, 2007).

There are two main reasons why P3 is important to this analysis of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle: the first is its success as a cooperative initiative with two core EU Member States and the second is the role its members later played in mobilising support
for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. One of the key reasons the P3 cooperation worked was because each country formed a component of the initiative rather than a complete centralisation of the training process. The differentiated role participants allowed each country to retain their perceived interest and maintain their privileged position within Africa. While duplication was eliminated, no one programme superseded another. This formula would become important for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA on the European side of the partnership, as EU Member States still jealously guard their sovereignty on matters of security. The ability of each partner to own a component of the EURORECAMP was one of the reasons why the EU Member States agreed to cooperate with each other.

In addition to the success measured in terms of the ability of these three donors to cooperate, the United Kingdom, France and the US played important activist roles in persuading other donor countries to contribute and participate in capability building projects for African peace support operations. While this activist role within the EU eventually led to EURORECAMP, much of the groundwork preparation started within the G8 institution.

At the Canadian Summit of 2002, the Group of 8 leading industrial nations, G8 (with the EU represented), adopted the G8 African Action Plan which pledged support for African efforts to ensure lasting peace and security. The action plan guaranteed the AU financial and technical assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organisations (sic) are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter (G8 Action Plan, 2002: 4).

Following the establishment of the African Union and the commitment to build the African Standby Force, the African states held discussions with international partners to ask for their assistance. Part of this process involved engaging with those donors who had a previous relationship with the African states such as the U.K., France and the US. The result of this was a formal request to the G8 in June 2003 at the Evian Summit to ask for assistance to defray the costs of building the ASF. This first overture was unique in that it was done by an African Union representative rather than by individual states. It embodied
the African states’ commitment to regionalism through security cooperation. With the active lobbying of the P3 countries and the EU representations, particularly the European Commission and Council Secretariat, the G8 countries pledged their support for the AU initiative and committed to the “continuation of funding, training and enhanced coordination of activities” (Kent and Malan, 2003). The G8 welcomed the prospect of engaging in African security, bearing in mind that by 2003 the US and some of the EU Member States with historically privileged positions in Africa’s international relations had a growing concern about the influence of China in Africa (see Diebert, 2008 for expressions of more recent concerns).

The result of these initial dialogues with the G8 was the Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations (2003). In response, the G8 called for a more gradual approach to the implementation of the ASF by identifying key “building blocks” which targeted the specific aims of building African capabilities to launch peace support operations (Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan, 2003; see also Kent and Malan, 2003: 74). The Action Plan sets out the precise aims of the partnership and emphasised African ownership of the process. Further, it acknowledged other ongoing training programmes undertaken by the G8 in the assumption that these would be components of the G8-Africa partnership.

The role of the G8 is important because it presents the first concise and robust platform for the initiatives of EU Member States and institutions (Scorgie, 2007: 13). Further, the G8 presents another avenue where the EU works together in the context of its own arrangements (the ESS and the JAES) to multilateralise its external relations and cooperation with Africa in the area of peace and security. Additionally, the G8’s decision to cooperate as one entity also reflects another early attempt to consolidate and coordinate donors’ contributions to African capacity building efforts within a framework that allowed African institutions to retain some ownership of the processes. Not surprisingly, the G8 relied on the knowledge and experience of its three members to formulate new ideals and

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57 I refer to France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium and Germany.
58 With the exception of Canada, Japan, the United States and Russia, the remainder of the G8 is made of EU Member States.
59 Other efforts include the P3 initiative. This was an amalgamation of the training programmes of France, the U.K. and the US.
responses, which reflects how the processes of institutionalisation work with particular actors. Finally, the G8 agreement served as the second building block after the P3 initiative towards the EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA cycle.

Since 2003, developments to support African training and capabilities for peace operations have accelerated. The shifting attitudes to security, the purpose of peace support operations and the role of regional organisations in maintaining international security have supported these developments. These attitudinal shifts have occurred at international (especially through the UN), regional (both European and African), and national (especially in Europe) levels.60

France, the European pioneer for African capabilities’ support, has sought to strengthen its own national position within the European Union. In 2002, France began the process of Europeanising the RECAMP concept or process. In preparation, it sought to adapt RECAMP to the African states’ requirements and introduced a continental dimension through dialogue with the African Union.61 The French government was aware of RECAMP’s weaknesses including its lack of integration with African sub-regional organisations, which at the time had the primary task of enforcing peace in the region. First, it included the participation of international organisations, including the UN and EU and non-governmental organisations; however, there was still no reference to a broad regional framework or further integration of African resources. As one EU official remembers, “we did not talk about the ASF at that time. There was not really any talk about APSA either. Nor the AU.”62

By 2005, France had reshuffled its troops and trainers to fit with the seven sub-regions identified by the AU in accordance with the guarantees the G8 had made in the Action Plan. In the same year, former French president Jacques Chirac also announced the desire to include RECAMP in the ESDP framework as the “operator of reference” for other EU Member States’ programmes. The reorganisation of RECAMP in 2005 reflects the

62 Interview, European Union Council, DG E, Brussels, 18th June 2009
willingness of the French government to make the process more adaptable to a continental approach. In addition, it showed France’s ambition to be the vanguard for European security integration while maintaining its position in Africa.

In the U.K., former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared 2005 as the ‘year of Africa’. Following the publication of the report, Our Common Interest, by the Commission for Africa (CFA)\(^{63}\), Africa became a focal point for debate within the U.K. among development and security practitioners. The report emphasised the need for development agencies to work with the African Union in particular. It also made the crucial link between development and security emphasising the role development plays in the prevention of violent conflict \(\text{(CFA, 2005: 153).}\) Further, it laid out the framework from which the U.K’s Labour government intended to engage with Africa on development and security initiatives. The CFA emphasised the role of the regional organisations including the EU and AU in “preventing and resolving violent conflict \(\text{(CFA, 2005: 153).}\)” Thus, the British government clearly supported the expanding role of the EU to engage in issues of peace and security in Africa. It further supported the interregional structure of peace and security cooperation as far as it provided the U.K. with a role to play.

Blair played a crucial role in promoting the panel’s report to other EU Member States through inter-governmental networks, EU institutions and the G8 grouping. Following in the footsteps of the U.K., Germany announced its own programme, Partnership with Africa. Established in 2005, Horst Kohler, the German president at that time announced the programme. Germany conceived this partnership as part of its broader development strategy although it included support for the African Union and its peace and security objectives. Germany is unique in that while it uses its European heritage to promote the partnership in Africa, it relies more on the G8 mechanism rather than the European Commission. Nevertheless, the prioritisation of Africa’s peace and security by the Big 3\(^{64}\) fed into the supranational psyche, which culminated in the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa by the EU Council in 2005.

\(^{63}\) The Commission is often referred to as the Blair Commission.\(^{64}\) Germany, France and the United Kingdom
Following the end of the Cold War, the EU began to strengthen its ability to participate in the fields of foreign security and conflict prevention as a single entity. Although the Member States had different views as to what developed European capabilities would look like, it was nevertheless an aspiration of the EU to be an international security actor. In 2004, the EU Peace and Security Committee (EU PSC) adopted the ESDP Action Plan for Africa (EU Council, 2004). The Action Plan outlined practical recommendations that would later contribute to the establishment of an EU delegation to the AU, which included sending liaison officers to Addis Ababa and providing expert training in political affairs and peace and security.

In the following year, the Council adopted the Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa. The Common Position is a declaration by EU Member States, which highlighted the international dimension of regional peace and security in Africa. The document emphasised the commitment of EU Member States and institutions to support the objectives of the African Union to promote “peace, security and stability in the continent” (EU Council, 2005). Further, the Common position highlighted that cooperation on security was part of existing relations with the view to develop longer-term partnership. The impact of the institutional presence of the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council in particular in the proceedings that have led to the adoption of a more comprehensive programme. Specifically, emphasis was placed on inter-regionalism where possible with regards to the EU’s cooperation with Africa on peace and security. The EU has been instrumental in promoting this method of engagement rather than bi-lateral relations. Between 2005 and 2008 when the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership was being negotiated between the EU and Africa, the EU Member States also negotiated among themselves the acceptable terms of Europeanising the RECAMP process, terms, which were based on the principles of inter-regionalism. Following President Chirac’s announcement, the French government requested that the EU PSC evaluate the

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65 The Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2002) all contributed to the further integration of security within the European Union.
proposals for a Europeanised RECAMP concept/process. The PSC asked the General Secretariat and the Commission to design a “concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” (EU Council, 2006) The final version of the concept as presented to the PSC in July 2006 identified three categories of measures to enhance the EU’s response. These measures include:  

1. a. Improved coherence, consistency and coordination within the EU, and especially among its peace and security programmes. This would include developing a support and coordination structure for the EU. 

b. Ensuring a consistent source of financial support for African peace and security initiatives through the African Peace Facility, and the Regional Initiative Programmes (RIPs). The RIPs support the integration of RECs into the APSA. THE APF should be complemented by other financial support through the CFSP/ESDP budgets. 

2. The support for African capabilities through the training of Africans using EU Member States’ existing facilities and transforming the RECAMP and other Member States’ programmes to deliver EU policies. 

Following the internal negotiations within the EU, the former High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana, appointed General Joana to the post of Special Advisor for African Peacekeeping Capabilities in the General Secretariat of the Council. His primary task was to oversee the Europeanisation process of RECAMP. While EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA highlights cooperation between the EU and the AU, and among the EU Member States themselves, the implementation process is not without its challenges. The subsequent section will consider these challenges.

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70 In addition to France and the U.K., Portugal also had a bi-lateral programme with former Portuguese colonies.
5.4 Challenges to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA

There are three main threats to the aims of the EURORECAMP process. These are: the attitudes of EU Member States; the problem of unequal partnership from the perspective of the AU; and other factors in the international system that hindered the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process.

One of the main aims of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is the convergence of EU Member States’ programmes to ensure less confusion on the African side and to promote further integration within the EU, particularly regarding issues of foreign and security policy. It is also a way to manage the EU’s resources through an effective division of labour. However, the reality is that although there is unwavering support for the initiative, there are different conceptions of participation and commitment levels among the Member States of the EU. Because the Member States of the European Union form the integral part of the process, any problems in the articulation of their commitments creates problems for the whole endeavour. As Brummer (2006) accurately notes, a fundamental impediment to Europe’s security performances is that “the security interests of EU Member States diverge.” This divergence constitutes one of the central challenges to the process. The subsequent discussion examines the reactions and attitudes of key EU Member States, including Britain, Germany and France to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.71

Britain, which we discussed in the context of its own training programmes, is committed to the development of Africa’s capabilities. However, the British are resistant to forgoing bi-lateral programmes (Bagayoko, 2007: 12).72 To be clear, the British support a continental approach but would rather not let go of bi-lateral privileges, which keep Britain’s relationship with its former colonies relatively intact. According to Bagayoko (2007), Britain resists the idea of a new centralised office to serve as a clearinghouse for all EU-Africa’s peace and security policies that incorporate Member States. The British fear a situation whereby EU arrangements will overtake national ones, which could make the EU more relevant than the nation-state in the area of foreign security engagement. This fear

71 These three EU member states are known as the Big 3 because they are the key drivers within the EU on matters relating to the CFSP or the ESDP.
came out as a central theme when investigating this particular case and will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. The U.K. is content to engage in security matters as part of an EU contingency when the EU GSC and the Commission only act as organisers and fact finders and do not seem to threaten the status quo.

This attitude within EURORECAMP is consistent with the UK’s general position towards the integration of security within the EU. Most studies on British attitudes towards EU security integration contend that the U.K.’s actions are guided by its commitment to NATO as well as its ‘special relationship’ with the United States (see Howarth, 2005; Whitman, 2006). Consequently, when security integration within the EU is seen to undermine continued Member States primacy and challenges to NATO, the U.K. tends to be very cautious. The U.K’s dependence on NATO and its special relationship with the United States is potentially detrimental to the aims of objectives and aims of continued the inter-regional cooperation between the EU and AU on peace and security. The unwavering commitment to NATO and the United States leaves room for unnecessary duplication among EU member states’ activities in Africa. Most importantly, and perhaps not highlighted enough, it undermines the AU’s vision which seeks to consolidate peace and security at the strategic continental level.

Although Germany too had colonies in Africa, and maintains strong ties to Namibia and Ethiopia for instance, it does not share the same sort of history that Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium do with Africa. Yet, as one of the so-called big three, its interests, perceptions and dispositions matter for continued EU-Africa inter-regionalism in the policy area of security. German interests in Africa in the post-independence era consist mostly of development assistance to some African countries. Germany’s relationship with African countries is a good example of typical donor-recipient relationship. Unlike some other EU Member States, Germany is a newcomer to the field of peace support operations. It is trying to make its own independent mark in the area of peace and security. Germany has therefore embarked on bi-lateral cooperation with the African Union to develop the capacity of the AU’s peace and security department by providing staff training and advisory services in both the AU and RECs. Germany’s preference for bilateralism is not to discount its investment in EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA; indeed Germany is keen to help
the AU develop its peace support capabilities within an inter-regional framework and commits a substantial amount of money to the process (see El-Ghassim Wane et al, 2010). Further, its component part of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process is to develop the police and civilian component of the ASF. Two things are clear from the level and method of German support. First, it prioritises the development of civilian components of security over other hard-security components of the EURORECAMP. The official documents of the German government have repeatedly emphasised the role of the GTZ in implementing a Federal Foreign Office initiative (GTZ, 2008). Second, although this component is clearly a part of Germany’s commitments to EURORECAMP and are presented as such within the EU, Germany’s documents present its support of the ASF as a German initiative rather than an initiative that is also part of an EU cooperation engagement (GTZ, 2008).

This suggests that Germany would rather continue its bi-lateral relations with African states even when engaging in new security cooperation, just as Britain and France have already done (Federal, Foreign Office, 2009). The main change in the German approach is that it also engages with African states through the African Union. Additionally, building a relationship with African institutions allows Germany to opt out of proposed EU initiatives when dissatisfied with British or French motives. One reason for Germany’s reluctance to engage in security actions under the EU banner is common knowledge among EU academics and practitioners. Some EU officials suggest that EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is not truly a partnership of Europeans and African but rather a continuation of France’s African foreign policy. By Europeanising the RECAMP process however, France seeks to re-legitimise its position in Africa. So, rather than being seen as a triumph for the ESDP, the position of France as the framework nation for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA makes German policymakers think that EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is the French way of entrenching its influence in Africa and legitimising its

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neo-colonial aspirations. Thus, security remains the least common denominator in EU integration and making Member States’ policies more coherent continue to be problematic.

Throughout the chapter, France’s role in the creation of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process is very apparent. Aside from the fact that in its first incarnation it was a French programme, France’s role as the framework nation immediately makes it the most important European actor in the process. However, France’s leadership position in this endeavour has its disadvantages as evidenced by the attitudes of both Germany and Britain. Britain and Germany’s suspicions certainly help to restrain French ambitions; however, they could also constrain France, so much so that the EU and the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process is unable to take full advantage of France’s expertise in the area of peace and security in Africa. As the most active former colonial power in Africa during and after the Cold War, France has an advantage that neither Britain nor Germany has.

Evidently, the continued support of EU Member States for Africa’s peace and security capabilities depends on the extent to which each can overcome their suspicion of each other about the motivations for supporting the African Union. This challenge goes beyond EURORECAMP–AMANI AFRICA. Indeed, it is a challenge within the EU and affecting the EU Member States the ability to integrate further in the areas of foreign and security relations.

The challenges of EURORECAMP go beyond the problems of cohesion and competition within the EU. While the 2008-2010 cycle of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is on track to be completed successfully, the AU could (potentially) have a negative impact on present and future processes within the JAES framework. The central challenge for the African Union is its still embryonic organisational infrastructures, which present problems on different fronts. As an organisation that begun its operations barely 10 years ago, the AU has created an ambitious task for itself. Moreover, peace and security is the area in which it has invested the most in terms of expertise, expense and time. Although the programme functions on the logic of equality between the two institutional partners, the EU and AU, the AU is far less developed than the EU in its capacity to plan and organise the daily demands of a partnership, and even less in terms of the demands of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA exercises. Presently, the AU does not perform at its optium levels, which
affects overall the process, and Africa’s regional actorship. Several respondents link the under-capacity of the African Union to the growing pains of a new organisation. Nevertheless, this reality can jeopardise the African Union’s ownership of peace and security processes.  

According to several observers, Addis Ababa still has trouble convincing the African Member States to buy into the ideals of the institution and the notion of non-indifference when they concern peace and security issues. The lack of commitment together with the internal incoherence is compounded by the fact that the AU does not have enough people to do its job properly. The lack of EU capabilities is a sentiment shared by every respondent and a reality which is witnessed daily within the compounds of the African Union in Addis Ababa. The AU’s current recruitment process exacerbates the situation. The process is too long and cumbersome as it takes an average of 18 months. Furthermore, in this area, the European Union supports several AU staff working within the peace and security structure. Members of the AU bureaucracy know these problems and while they are taking steps to deal with them with the assistance of external partners, the sluggish pace at which changes are occurring is delaying the work that can be done in the area of peace and security where it is most needed.

In addition, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have yet to be fully integrated into the APSA. The lack of full integration has caused tension between bureaucrats in the AU headquarters and those in the REC offices. However, officials from the AU deny that these tensions have impeded the progress of EURORECAMP. Civilian experts and EU personnel confirmed that tensions observed between the AU and some of the RECs hamper day-to-day operations. The AU for its part believes it has primary jurisdiction on matters of peace and security, while some of the RECs feel they have more to offer the AU based on their experiences and institutional evolution. All interested parties need to clarify issues of
mandates and legal authority and who does what, i.e. delineate between the AU's and the
RECs responsibilities for the ASF to function effectively once it has been established.
Further, concerning the preparations for making the brigades that make up the Standby
Force ready, some of the RECs have had difficulties with integrating the civilian
components of their brigades during the initial phases of the EURORECAMP cycle. The
difficulty in integrating the civilian components has contributed to several delays in the
implementation of the EURORECAMP process. The lack of a civilian element would have
defeated the aim of multidimensionality for which EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been
designed and inevitably, the full function of the ASF (Dersso, 2009).

Further, according to Colonel Debrah of the African Union, the ASF has not been fully
integrated into other aspects of the APSA. While there is a lot of attention paid to building
the ASF, it is unclear how it fits seamlessly into the peace and security architecture. The
uncertainty is problematic since EU commitments state a broader support of the entire
architecture (cited in Dersso, 2009). If the operationalisation of the other aspects of the
APSA challenges the function of the ASF, the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process would
undermine broader EU-Africa security cooperation.

Additionally, similar to the OAU, the lack of meritorious joining conditions of the AU poses
a challenge to progress in the area of peace and security in Africa. Unlike the EU, which
requires a prospective Member State to fulfil (at the very least) the conditions of
Copenhagen criteria for membership in the Union, the African Union is a club for all African
states with the exception of Morocco.79 It is still not widely accepted for the AU to
intervene in a country if the country has not invited intervention80. While in principle the
notion of non-indifference suggests intervention in cases of humanitarian crises, this is in
reality contingent on the allowances of the host government, which may itself be the
perpetrator. Because the AU is the sum of its members in terms of peace and security, the
formation of the AU potentially works against the very interests it tries to promote.

79 The only observed criteria for membership in the AU (as with membership in the OAU) are that a country is
African, sovereign, and does not impede on the sovereignty of another.
80 Despite the reluctance of some AU member states to accept the new principle of non-indifference, the African
Union has successfully intervened in cases of unlawful change in governments and in cases where a
government is not functioning as in Somalia.
The recent financial crises of 2008 and recession in the partners’ countries raised concerns about future contributions to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA and the building of African peace and security. Although African economies on the whole are not tightly enmeshed in global financial systems, the impact of the crisis still resonates in the form of slashed aid contributions, remittances and foreign investments by the countries in the Western hemisphere. With reference to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA for instance, the U.K. withdrew its support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Another challenge created by the international sphere comes from the organisation of international security itself. While the UN Charter makes provisions for the actions of regional organisations in matters of peace and security, more clarity is needed concerning precise mandates. The UN Security Council retains the right of forceful intervention in international affairs. However, because of the failure of the UN in Rwanda through its lack of response, African states no longer intend to wait for UNSC mandates when a situation is deemed urgent. The recent peace operations in Somalia, the Sudan and Mauritania reflect the AU’s responses to African crises. The commitment to this response is apparent even when means and resources are limited. It must therefore be assumed that until there is no conflicting situation, the last challenge cannot be mitigated as the AU will do what is required. One AU official said, “If our house is on fire, will we not do all we can to put the fire out? Will we just stand aside and wait for a fire brigade that may never come?” This quote sums up the current African thinking on security crises on the continent – Rwanda has taught Africa not to rely on the international community as they may let them down. The ASF is intended to serve actions outside the immediate remit of Chapter VIII of the UN’s Charter. The legalities, thus, have to be clarified (Dersso, 2009). The situation raises the interesting issue of how regional security governance fits within the international security architecture where decision-making has so far been left to five states.

Related to the challenges discussed above, EU and AU officials cited the lack of donor coordination as a major problem for the daily functions of EURORECAMP-AMANI.

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81 Interview, United Nations DPKO, Addis Ababa, 29th April 2009.
83 A UN official from the UN African Support team raised a similar concern. Interview, United Nations DPKO, Addis Ababa 29th April 2009.
AFRICA. EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA is quite significant in that it is the closest the international partners have come to having one voice on an issue they have already committed to. Yet, as one AU official noted “we spend so much time just coordinating the partnership rather than doing the real work; we need a special office dedicated just to partnership.” External partners inundates the APSA with offers of contributions and donations; however, the AU’s Peace and Security Department suffers structural deficiencies that make the department an inefficient coordinator. The lack of efficiency affects the work of the entire APSA including AMANI AFRICA, thereby leaving the bulk of the coordination to the EU Delegation to the AU. This situation further endangers the principle of ownership in EU-Africa relations. Yet, by acknowledging this possibility, the EU Delegation to the AU makes a concerted effort to accept direction by the AU even when things go off schedule.

EU officials have also expressed frustration at the slow pace with which the donor coordination takes place if any coordination is agreed. Respondents in the European Commission admit that part of the problem is the EU Member States, as discussed above, but also blame it on mixed messages from the AU. An EU official for instance notes an incident in which the African Union denied that Portuguese contribution was needed for the EUROCAMP at an informal Portuguese-AU meeting when the opposite was true. In addition to being unable to keep up with the demands of receiving contributions, the AU also finds it difficult to account for the money and other resources contributed by the European Union. The result of the lack of accountability has sometimes resulted in the reluctance of the EU (and other donor agencies) to make future commitments to the AU since these partners are also accountable to their electorate and parliaments.

This issue must be resolved on both sides, with the AU developing better bureaucratic capacities to respond adequately to the requirements of receiving contributions and with

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84 This is not a unique problem to EU-Africa Relations. See: 'Aid Co-ordination in Africa: A Review' Adams, 1989; ‘Keeping a tight grip on the reins: donor control over aid coordination and management in Bangladesh’, Buse, 1999; Donor coordination and the uses of aid, Bigsten, 2006.
85 Interview, African Union, Defence and Security Division, Addis Ababa, 27 April 2009
86 Interview, EU Delegation to AU, Military Personnel, Addis Ababa, 13 July 2010
the partners needing to follow through their commitments with actual actions and more cohesiveness and coherence in their approach to capability building in Africa.

5.5 Conclusion: Where there's a Will there's a Way
EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reflects a unique case of cooperation on security among EU Member States, which relies on new understandings of international security. The process of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been a long time coming. The creation and function of the process has transformed internal EU dynamics as well as cooperation dynamics between the EU and Africa. The process represents a distinct embrace of inter-regionalism (and arguably multilateralism) in lieu of bi-lateral relations. Within the broader framework of EU-Africa relations, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA constitutes a change in how EU Member States relate to African Member States on matters of security. While power asymmetries remain between the EU and AU, the AU’s ability to contribute to the function of the cooperation process, by insisting on some conditions of operationalisation is evidence of the erosion of the strict donor-recipient relationship. Through experiences and lessons learnt from previous bi-lateral programmes, the EU and AU have forged an exclusive instance of cooperation that champions partnership in security without necessarily compromising the jealous hold of the nation state in this arena. Indeed, the arrangement of the EURORECAMP perhaps confirms the continued importance of EU Member States' roles in international security and to achieving inter-regionalism.

In addition to examining a unique alliance on peace and security, the study of EURORECAMP reveals the evolved methods of implementation, which is the reflection on the transformation from the bi-lateral to the inter-regional security engagement. Contrary to reports about the EU's ineffectiveness in the area of security, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has made the EU a new type of institutional contributor to the international security architecture. EURORECAMP strives to give much needed legitimacy to Western governments. This is at least the perception of EU Member State governments as they seek to convince Africa that the malignant colonial legacy is gone and new engagements are based on partnership and mutual good will. Time will tell whether the image of Europeans as good will ambassadors and equal partners is fully accepted by African countries.

87 Interview, African Union Conflict Management Division, Addis Ababa, 15th April 2009
Presently, supporting AU initiatives rather than imposing condition of cooperation are steps in the right direction.

While the chapter has carefully outlined the aims and processes of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, particularly the impact on the formation of the African Standby Force, the analysis also addresses the key issues raised here in relation to the broader research question, i.e. how the implementation of one aspect of security cooperation contributes to changes in EU-Africa relations. The EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reveals the intricacies of the inter-regional relationship, the nature of international cooperation on security and the EU’s external role in international security. The introduction of security cooperation as an explicit aspect of EU-Africa inter-regional relations has allowed for a shift in the implementation of the European training programmes to improve African capabilities. EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been able to allow for better coordination among EU Member States thereby reducing duplication.

The change from bi-lateral relations to inter-regional ones has however taken advantage of the existing relations and bureaucracies as evidenced by the role of EU Member States and the EU bureaucracies in organising EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. At the same time, it has transformed those bureaucracies. It has introduced new offices such as the EU delegation to the AU and the office of the Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities to help deal with the changes happening within EU-Africa relations. The new security cooperation has fostered these changes. Additionally, EURORECAMP has allowed for the broader participation of EU countries such as Finland whose engagement with African countries had been limited to its external development policies in a handful of countries. In addition to broadening interregional cooperation, EURORECAMP has deepened interregional cooperation as implementation methods call for an in-depth knowledge of countries and regions in Africa as well the bureaucratic arrangements of EU Member States. Further, through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, the EU’s commitment to Africa has increased. Not only does the EU delegation to the AU represent the EU, it also conducts daily briefings with the ASF headquarters. As practical evidence of deepened integration

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88 Finland’s bi-lateral development relations in Africa was confined to Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland). Through EURORECAMP Finland is more involved in both EU and African regional processes
based on EURORECAMP planning and implementation, towards the end of May 2009, the EU delegation office relocated from offices shared with the European Commission’s representation. The delegation office is now located in the building next to the offices of the ASF staff, behind the African Union compound.

The challenges to the AU’s peace and security face are substantial and therefore the eventual outcomes of EURORECAMP, i.e. the ability of the ASF to conduct independent mission must be monitored closely. As one EU official notes,

“Its not ideal that we ... work on the build up [sic] of the APSA and at the same time a lot of attention has to be absorbed by Somalia, by Comorros, by Mauritania, by whatever crises you want to name. If you compare that to the lack of staff in the African Union and the over-burdening of key personnel in the African Union ... that is probably the biggest challenge in the AU.”

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is a discernible example of regional cooperation within the EU and the AU, and interregional cooperation between the EU and Africa, which builds on previous relations. Indeed, the characteristics of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process show clear examples of path dependent processes within the EU-Africa institution. However, through its implementation mechanisms and the infrastructures on which it depends, the process reflects a transformation of prior relations that is more political and closer to an equal partnership, with clear strategies and practices for the African Union to take ownership of decision-making and implementation of African peace and security initiatives.

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89 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, 14th April 2009
“Small arms and light weapons destabilize regions; spark, fuel and prolong conflicts; obstruct relief programmes; undermine peace initiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hamper development; and foster a ‘culture of violence’” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed July 2010.

Introduction

The UN defines small arms as “any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive” (UNPoA, 2001). Small arms are the most readily available weapons used by state and non-state actors in violent conflicts. It is estimated that approximately 875 million small arms are in circulation and legitimate security forces (Stohl and Hogendoorn, 2010) hold only around 291 million. Small arms are easy to handle and acquire, inexpensive and easy to replace and repair. The ease with which one can acquire small arms makes them the weapon of choice for rebels, illegal paramilitary groups, terrorists and criminal gangs. In addition, the proliferation of small arms has also been cited as a direct contributor to conflict, crime, violence, suffering and human development in Africa (IANSA, Saferworld, & Oxfam, 2006; Small Arms Survey, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; Schroeder and Lamb, 2006; Djinnit, 2006, News 24, 2005).

This chapter examines EU support for African initiatives to control the illicit flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) or micro-disarmament in Africa. Recent efforts to tackle the challenges of small arms in Africa signalled a change from previous EU interventions. The EU has placed small arms control at the heart of its conflict prevention strategies especially those strategies that support African regional institutions. I argue, however, that EU practices in the context of its relationship with Africa reflect a path-dependent process rather than a shift. Both the EU and African states independently and through regional organisations agree in principle that establishing lasting peace and

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90 Small Arms and Light Weapons will be referred to as small arms for short, fire arms or guns in some instances.
enforcing security in Africa relies on the eradication of the illicit transfer and use of small arms.91

The chapter is divided into five sections. First, it assesses the problem of small arms in Africa and the initiatives introduced to tackle the illicit proliferation of small arms. This section then describes and evaluates the intended process of mainstreaming and its intended impact on peace and security in Africa as well as peace and security institutions. Mainstreaming is “a comprehensive process which ensures that an issue and approach is systematically addressed across all strategies, programmes and initiatives undertaken by any agency or process” (Sherriff, 2005). Second, it provides a context for the current EU-Africa initiative to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It focuses on EU frameworks and actions in the area of small arms control. Third, it examines the recent pan-African initiative, an intended example of changes in EU-Africa relations. Fourth, it confronts the challenges of EU support for African small arms initiatives. Finally, it concludes a case study of EU-Africa cooperation by highlighting the impediments to substantive changes in EU-Africa cooperation on small arms control.

6.1. How do you solve a problem like small arms?

Controlling the illicit transfer of arms within national, regional and international contexts is known as micro-disarmament. Micro-disarmament is a field that emerged in the 1990s and it is defined as an “umbrella concept designed to include the control of light weapons through counter-proliferation activities through the inception of international regimes and through attempts to search for and destroy extant inventories” (Carr, 2000). These control measures are also referred to as small arms interventions. The practice of micro-disarmament goes beyond internal small arms control measures, which feature the collection and destruction of weapons. The practice also includes tracking and measures put in place to prevent trafficking and illegal sales of firearms on the black market. International and regional organisations, like the United Nations, the European Union and increasingly the African Union have driven the development of this field.

In Africa, where some of the poorest people in the world live in (post) conflict societies, failing or failed states, the acuteness of the small arms problem is evident. Many of the conflicts in Africa are primarily fought with small arms. Many of these weapons were originally from developed countries and were surplus to requirements; consequently, they were dumped in Africa where they fuel crippling conflicts.

The challenge of small arms in Africa is two-sided: supply and demand. Often the focus of small arms research and control is the supply side of proliferation. This includes programmes aimed at controlling the import and export of weapons, monitoring existing stockpiles and tracking the movement of weapons. Essentially, the supply side of small arms proliferation focuses on sale and transfers. One Africa expert however argues that Africa’s challenges have to do with the demand side of proliferation, that is, what drives people to own guns? The answer to this question relates to other aspects of human insecurity on the continent. In Africa, private citizens often obtain their weapons when the state cannot secure their safety or livelihoods. Often these guns have been circulated illicitly. It is in this environment of state fragility and uncertainty that violence thrives.

Aside from fuelling conflicts, weapons are easily available when violence has ceased and this impedes the aim of achieving lasting peace. For example, in Burundi, a post-conflict society, the prevalence of small arms prevents democratic norms such as the rule of law from functioning fully, despite general progress in other areas (IRIN, 2006). According to police interviewed, unemployed civilians make a living by hiring out guns to criminals (IRIN, 2006). Problems with arms are particularly common in West Africa, which is home to a plethora of illegitimate armed groups (Florquin and Berman, 2005).

In African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, small arms fuel internal insurgency in the northern and southern regions respectively (Hazen and Horner, 2007). In oil producing Nigeria, the proliferation of small arms and its consequent violence is directly attributable to the recent drop in the production of crude oil. Small arms aid the

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92 Africa is not the only region that feels the devastating effects of small arms. It is a global problem with negative consequences in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. However, Africa is worst affected by SALWs.
93 Interview, African Union, Conflict and Security Division, 13th July 2010.
94 Interview, African Union, Conflict and Security Division, 13th July 2010.
expediency of indiscriminate kidnappings and the frequent harassment of oil workers (Hazen and Horner, 2007; Bello, 2009; Berger, 2010). While insurgents claim to be fighting for a greater share of oil wealth, their activities have furthered under-development as cuts in oil production also limit the economic gains derived. In this context, the control of small arms by the state’s security forces is seen as an essential component of securing peace and achieving stability in the country.

In the past, controlling small arms and tackling the trafficking of them across borders has often been within the ambit of African national governments. Additionally, the sub-regional organisations provided the normative framework for tackling the illicit transfer of arms while the national governments were tasked with creating concrete structures and implementing policies that curb the flow of arms (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 African Sub-regional Frameworks to halt Small Arms Proliferation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa Sub-regional Frameworks</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Voluntary moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of small arms in the ECOWAS region.</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Declaration</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Provides a comprehensive framework to combat the SALW which contributes to prolonged conflicts, political instability and armed crime in the region.</td>
<td>Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Protocol</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Legally binding on countries in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. Forbids SALW ownership and use among the civilian population.</td>
<td>Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Declaration</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Reinforced the commitment of Southern African states to fighting small arms, but not legally binding.</td>
<td>Southern Africa and DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Protocol</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>This is a legally binding document which prohibits civilian ownership or use of all types of small arms and light weapons.</td>
<td>Southern Africa and DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Legally binding measure with monitoring mechanism aimed at reducing guns and gun violence in Africa. More comprehensive than the moratorium and enforceable.</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 1999, African leaders have made stopping the flow of illegal arms on the continental a priority level (OAU, 1999). However, these indigenous frameworks are part of an overall international strategy to control small arms, despite their regional focus. Hence they have occurred in parallel with the United Nations' political and policy instruments.

Since the mid-1990s, international partners have supported implementing these initiatives, especially the European Union, including the Member States and European Commission. While European and African actors acknowledged existing national and sub-regional actions, they also noted that more cooperation and coherence was necessary among African States (Djinnit, 2006). The Sirte Declaration was issued at a meeting of African leaders in Libya. It called for greater regional integration in Africa, as well as the establishment of a new regional structure. African leaders also requested the convening of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in the Continent. The conference, which took place in 2000 prominently featured the issue of SALW as a direct threat to peace and security on the continent (CSSDC, 2000).

Between 1999 and 2001, African states worked towards a cohesive framework of reference to tackle the issues of SALW in Africa as part of an international effort. In December 2000, the African heads of states met once again to endorse the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. While the Bamako declaration formed a part of Africa's preparation for the 2001 UN PoA, it was also important for being the first African initiated continental statement on small arms. The declaration delineated between the different roles of national, regional and international actors. The Bamako declaration recommended the creation of national agencies to oversee the destruction of surplus arms

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and confiscated weapons (Vines, 2005). All these also coincided with the creation of the African Union.

Since Bamako and the establishment of the AU, African states have sought to coordinate their efforts better within one holistic network housed in the African Union’s peace and security department. This has been a critical point since SALW is considered a peace and security issue and the central ambit of the AU. However, the nature of SALW issues also necessitates a micro approach at national and regional levels. Further, some of the sub-regional organisations in Africa have more experience of tackling SALW issues. One of the core aims of African efforts on SALW is therefore the strengthening of national and especially sub-regional structures within a broad continental framework. According to one AU official, the role of the African Union will primarily be to assist with the better coordination between all the regions, by setting up programmes in regions where they are non-existent and ensuring that all the regions have matching capabilities, which means that all the regions must be able to initiate effective control measures.96 So, as part of its remit as a norm-setting institution, the AU aspires to lead the mainstreaming of small arms control into the continental peace and security related initiatives.97 This aspiration is consistent with the view that the peace and security mechanisms of the regional economic communities constitute the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) unequivocally communicates the urgency of the small arms challenge. It further emphasises the need to halt proliferation within African borders. The PSC Protocol therefore gives the AU the continental mandate to plan, design and implement continent-wide initiatives relating to SALW issues. The nature of the continent wide initiatives is in the proposal stage in the Continental Strategy, a draft of which is awaiting approval.

The key feature of the pending continental strategy is the mainstreaming of small arms interventions into the African Peace and Security Architecture (Hamzaeva, 2009). Both the EU and the AU (including the Member States) have endorsed the mainstreaming approach

to micro-disarmament.\textsuperscript{98} This process addresses the impact of SALW as a crosscutting issue across institutions, sectors, and policy areas, which emphasises the nexus between security and development. It thus bridges the gap between the interventions and institutions committed to the different phases of conflict including prevention, management, resolution, and post conflict reconstruction.

Importantly, the mainstreaming that is proposed by SALW strategies considers the early stages of conflict; during conflict prevention as much of a priority as later stages. Practitioners who work in the field of small arms control contend that it is best to start small arms intervention processes earlier since interventions could potentially halt the onset of conflict.\textsuperscript{99} Yet, the concept of mainstreaming small arms strategies at the various stages of the conflict is not prevalent in the written discourse on small arms practices. Often there is still a bias in favour of micro-disarmament activities occurring in the last phase of the conflict cycle, during post-conflict reconstruction. The implementation of these activities usually occurs through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes and/or Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects.

DDR is a three-pronged process involving the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms and their munitions; the formal discharge of combatants and the integration of ex-combatants to civilian status with adequate opportunities for a sustainable livelihood. DDR has seen exponential development, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations who currently has ten programmes in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Central America (UNDDR, 2010) promotes DDR.\textsuperscript{100} Although DDR programmes recognise the interconnectedness of socio-economic, political, military and humanitarian dimensions of small arms issues, the purpose of DDR processes is "to contribute to security


\textsuperscript{100} Country Programmes. Available at: http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php.
and stability in post-conflict environments”. An approach targeting post-conflict reconstruction rather than a mainstreamed approach to the earlier phases of conflict misses a vital opportunity to prevent armed conflict.

Further, DDR programmes are often planned in the context of broader peacekeeping operations, which means the Department of Peacekeeping takes the lead on planning and implementation, supported by other UN agencies (UNDDR website, 2010). Despite the intent to reintegrate former combatants into society, the organisation of DDR programmes through the UN does not emphasise the involvement of local institutions or the broader community affected. Understandably, many post-conflict societies lack the viable institutions to deal with the demands of the DDR. However, the involvement of local institutions and groups is important to the sustainability of rehabilitation and continued provisions for former combatants. Thus, beyond the fact that a lack of coordination with local actors reinforces a top-down approach and discounts the principle of ownership, the lack of local ownership jeopardises the progress of sustainable peace.

The gaps in DDR have contributed to the development of Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes. SSR programmes or initiatives present a broader framework from which micro-disarmament procedures are being undertaken. SSR “is the process of reordering state security structures – military, police, and intelligence – to better fit the threat they face and the society they serve” (Donald and Olonisakin, 2001). According to Hänggi however, SSR remains an ambiguous concept, as its implementation is broad and inclusive of many actions (Hänggi, 2004; Wulf, 2004; Caparini, 2005). Despite the conceptual ambiguity, aid agencies, international organisations and practitioners use the concept to describe the building of democratic institutions intended to promote the rule of law and increase security. These include justice institutions such as the police, military and legal order (DFID, 2002; OECD/DAC, 2001; Donald and Olonisakin, 2001). The core distinction between DDR and SSR programmes is that while the focus of DDR is on ensuring that ex-combatants fit into a peaceful society, the focus of SSR is on building institutions. The SSR concentrates on reforming the military, police and intelligence services and their over-

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101 Muggah (2009) notes some limited instances of DDR interventions in the pre-conflict and during conflict contexts.
sight actors in post-conflict societies. Specifically, well-planned SSR programmes emphasise the importance of building justice institutions that support democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The aims of the SSR projects are therefore generally broader than the aims of DDR programmes.

Although often within DDR and SSR frameworks, micro-disarmament initiatives can occur outside of DDR and SSR frameworks. For instance, Muggah (2009) notes that micro-disarmament programmes have grown independently of DDR programmes since the 1990s. However, they still form the bulk of small arms control interventions. DDR programmes and SSR projects attempt to address the challenges associated with the illicit proliferation of small arms. However, both have their drawbacks. DDR programmes are often criticised for not addressing the ‘demand’ aspect of SALW, i.e. not addressing the reasons why groups accumulate weapons. SSR projects are criticised for their broadness, which marginalises the control of small arms (Atwood et al., 2006; Muggah et al., 2005; Brauer and Muggah, 2006). These criticisms are noted as the main contributors to the failure of many DDR and SSR programmes. As the two main approaches to micro-disarmament, the enactment of DDR and SSR are often designed as part of the post-conflict reconstruction strategies. They therefore undermine commitments to conflict prevention.

The concept of mainstreaming, should however not be seen as a blanket enforcement of micro-disarmament frameworks across every policy area. Rather, mainstreaming SALW issues into a broad range of related issues encourages a realistic and holistic approach to the broader impacts of SALW. These include their negative impact on the implementation of economic and social development strategies, criminality, conflict escalation, peace negotiations and the post-conflict environment. Further, there is evidence that EU supported initiatives which adopt the mainstreaming approach have been rewarded with tangible successes.  

In the context of the African Union, mainstreaming would involve the integration of counter-proliferation activities into the major components of the APSA with a renewed focus on conflict prevention and management. The process is innovative in its application

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102 Examples of these include the EU’s support for the Cambodian government and ECOWAS Moratorium.
because it moves away from the typical small arms interventions occurring during post conflict reconstruction. As envisioned in the AU, a mainstreamed approach would allow for interventions before, during, and after conflict. A mainstreamed approach to SALW control is unique from other control initiatives. The mainstreaming approach prioritises building small arms control mechanisms into the whole of the APSA rather than seeking implementation as a single self-contained initiative. Consequently, an effective strategy that is mainstreamed would aim to mitigate the negative impacts of SALW before (early warning), during (conflict management) and after conflict (conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction).

I. Building SALW into Conflict Prevention: the Continental Early Warning Scenario

While past post-conflict interventions may have been appropriate, their continuation is not useful given that Africa needs earlier interventions. In many cases, these interventions are necessary to prevent large-scale conflict (Greene 2005; Laurance, 1999a). In a scenario where practice follows policy, the need for post-conflict reconstruction engagements could be minimised. Given the importance ascribed to early micro-disarmament interventions, one area that would benefit immensely from a mainstreamed approach, which connects conflict prevention to small arms control, is the Continental Early Warning System of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Until recently, the discourse about micro-disarmament or small arms control did not include its incorporation into early warning systems. Often the practices of disarmament processes, and other small arms control measures favour short to medium term programmes that take place after the cessation of violence. However, small arms initiatives incorporated into an early warning system presume a long-term commitment to lasting peace, which occurs beyond the cessation of violence. For this reason, prolonged dependence on external partners is not sustainable, and local solutions are required to create the tools and implement the necessary measures.

Practitioners in academia and civil society organisations (CSOs) have long identified the linkages between outbreak, escalation, resurgence and intensity of conflict to the

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103 Interview (Owen Greene), Centre for Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, 29th September 2009.
“proliferation, accumulation, availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons (Laurance, 1999a). However, small arms interventions have not been a priority in planning early warning tools. It has been recommended that as part of an integrated mainstreamed approach to small arms, early warning systems require weapons-specific initiatives that use operational indicators in the prevention stages of the conflict cycle. These operational indicators link small arms supply to an effective early warning system. They include: monitoring insecure arsenals and weapons theft in particular which may reveal an arms build up and also monitoring the movements of known groups such as known rebels organisations within a country with the potential to launch violent attacks (Laurance, 1999a).

In the AU, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is in its early stages and derives its mandate from the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. The early stage of CEWS’ development makes it a suitable entry point to adapt small arms interventions using a continental approach. The CEWS framework is defined around three iterative and interactive phases or steps: (1) ongoing information collection and monitoring, (2) conflict and cooperation analysis, and (3) formulation of policy and response options (African Union, 2008).

Figure 6.1: CEWS in Addis Ababa

Source: Jakkie Cillers
Additionally, good information derived from monitoring and data collection for an early warning system, such as increased movement of weapons, monitoring border activities and coordinating with national and regional institutions, helps with identifying the causes, predicting an outbreak of conflict and halting the commencement of conflict escalation (Austin, 2003). The creation of a continental early warning system is significant in that it constitutes a significant change in how African states approach conflict and conflict prevention. As part of the shift from non-intervention to non-indifference, the early warning mechanism is set up as a tool of the Peace and Security Council which is charged with anticipating and preventing disputes and conflicts (PSC Protocol, Art. 7, 1, a).

The focal point of the CEWS is the Situation Room located in Building B of the African Union’s main compound (see Figure 6.1 above for CEWS layout). The Situation Room forms part of the Conflict Management Department (CMD) and serves as an observation and monitoring centre. In theory, the staff of the Situation Room should be trained as specialists involved in collecting systematic data on small arms and arms movements on the continent. The specialised training of the Situation room staff on arms movement could aid in informing early warning indicators. By incorporating the micro-disarmament or small arms control initiatives into the early warning system, the AU can fulfil in part the aims of mainstreaming SALW into the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The international partners of African institutions who support conflict prevention have welcomed the mainstreaming approach. These include EU Member States such as Germany and Britain, the G8 and the European Commission. Indeed, the European Commission and Member States have committed their support for such an approach as part of their broader commitment to support the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Additionally, Member States like Germany have highlighted the value of linking micro-disarmament initiatives to early warning systems in their development assistance to Africa.

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the German government’s technical assistance programme, has contributed substantively to the development of early warning systems in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of Africa. Through

104 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 9th January 2009.
training, funding and experimenting with new software technology, Germany supports strategies that include an explicit reference to small arms controls (Federal Foreign Office, 2009). The target of this support is the improvement of the sub-regional mechanisms and conflict prevention capabilities, as well as the promotion of a mainstreamed approach to small arms issues.

The overall commitment of the European Union to small arms initiatives in Africa is detailed in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The JAES aims to support small arms control and conflict prevention based on inter-regional cooperation. In this roadmap for cooperation, the EU is both a supporter and guardian of AU efforts to develop the capacities to control small arms on the continent. More than supporting an approach, the European Union (Commission and Member States) has committed itself on paper to work through the African Union. If this commitment is implemented, it will constitute a change from prior relations.

6.2 Leader of the Pack: EU & the Fight Against Small Arms

Controlling the proliferation of small arms is clearly a priority for international security actors. The types of intervention programmes discussed above have only come about through a regime governed by agreements and policies that are international, regional and national. The UN set the tone in 1995 when it brought the issue to the forefront of international security and development politics through the UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/50/70). Subsequent expert meetings culminated in the 2001 UN conference and framework, which governed the illicit transfer of small arms. In 2001, the United Nations adopted the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNPoA). The PoA serves as the central framework for tackling SALW proliferation, and it is politically binding on all UN members. In addition, there is the Protocol against Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunitions, which focuses on arms used in the committing of crimes.

105 UN resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, available at:
The UN policy instruments encourage local solutions to tackle the problems of small arms and light weapons. Additionally, the UNPoA recommends the commission of regional agencies to implement the solutions to the proliferation of small arms, thereby supporting regional approaches to small arms control. The UNPoA has been the central framework for European countries in their efforts to stop the spread of illicit weapons. Accordingly, European states subscribe to politically binding policy instruments within the framework of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union.

The European Commission and EU Member States use international, regional and national instruments in support of their external small arms initiatives (see Table 6.2). The perspective gained from EU institutional documents is that the illicit spread of small arms hampers the development efforts of the European Commission and EU Member States. Further, small arms increase insecurity in areas where Member States have strategic and historical interests.

### Table 6.2 EU Micro-Disarmament Policy Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Policy Instruments for SALW</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>What it does</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Convention on the Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Firearms by Individuals</td>
<td>Adopted 1978; came into force 1982</td>
<td>It is a political document and not legally binding. It recommends arms control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Principles on Conventional Arms Transfers</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>OSCE adopted these principles with the view to avoid those arms transfers that may aggravate or prolong conflict, endanger peace, used for the purposes of repression, violate human rights or used outside legitimate defence and military needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Established to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms. 40 countries are currently members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Weapons</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The document recognised the negative impact of SALW on security and human suffering and commits to greater coordination and cooperation among EU Member States on SALW action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Joint Action on SALW</td>
<td>1998/2002</td>
<td>Framework adopted as guidance for EU institutions and Member States to tackle the threat of small arms. Updated in 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>A political agreement that further develops the common criteria for arms export control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to its development and aid responsibilities, the EU views SALW interventions as a matter of practical security and moral responsibility. This view arises because its Member States include some of the largest arms producers in the world and generally contribute to the challenge of small arms proliferation. Although bound by common frameworks, EU countries are governed by different national policies as to which countries or regions receive small arms. Research has shown that selling weapons is ‘big business’ and profit sometimes outweighs the security imperative of micro-disarmament (Levine and Smith, 1995, 2000; Arendhorst, 2005). The sale of small arms can therefore be in the economic national interests of developed countries despite its negative impact on developing countries. The rise of globalisation, which espouses deregulation and free trade as the key to development, further exacerbates the difficulty of reconciling economic

| EU Development Council Resolution on Small Arms | 1999 | The document reaffirms the previous commitments of the EU and further requested Member States to include SALWs into their development policies, especially the ACP countries. |
| OSCE Document on SALW | 2000 | A politically binding agreement that includes “provisions for information exchanges on SALW imports and exports as well as criteria for exports, imports, stockpile management, and surplus small arms destruction.” This agreement is only binding among OSCE Member States. (Naval Treaty Implementation Programme, 2010). |
| The Cotonou Agreement | 2000 | The agreement constitutes EU development commitment to African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of countries. It also highlights the EU-ACP commitment to eradicating illicit SALW. |
| OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition | 2003 | An agreement of OSCE Member States where they recognise that ammunitions, with their weapons, cause considerable damage to security. Member States commit to reducing the availability of ammunition. |
| European Security Strategy | 2003 | While it does not directly mention SALW, the ESS keeps conflict prevention at the heart of its strategy. Further, SALW issues are relevant to 4 key threats identified including organised crime, regional conflicts, terrorism and state failure. |
| European Consensus on Development | 2005 | The EU commits itself to arms export controls with the aim of reducing the instances of violence and conflict aggravation in its partner countries. |
| Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition (EU SALW Strategy) | 2005 | Builds on previous instruments and advocates a comprehensive approach. It identifies Africa as its priority area for tackling the illicit trafficking and accumulations of SALW. |

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107 Germany, France, Netherlands, the UK, Italy and Sweden are respectively the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th top arms exporters in the world.
interests and moral duties. An economic system that allows free movement of goods helps governments and arms traffickers ferry weapons into conflict zones. The lack of consistency in policies means that the EU contributes substantially to the problem of proliferation.

EU Member States have also contributed to bi-lateral programmes with specific African countries and institutions to eradicate small arms proliferation and aid micro-disarmament initiatives. France has identified the illicit traffic of small arms as a fundamental problem of international security. It has therefore been a French priority to contribute to small arms control. French support is usually in the form of monetary contributions. For instance, France contributed €487,000 towards the ECOWAS Moratorium through PCASED and a further €381,000 over four years through the United Nations Regional Centre in Lomé. More so than other Member States, France channels the funding for small arms through regional organisations such as the European Commission and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than through direct development or conflict prevention programmes as is the case with Germany. France also works through the UN agencies but tends to balance these multilateral commitments with regional ones vis-à-vis the EU.

As one of the other core Member States on matters of security, the United Kingdom too has its own small arms schemes. While the UK acknowledges its membership in the EU as integral to its own outlook on small arms and light weapons (DFID et al, 2000a) it still prefers its own engagement outside of the common European frameworks. The most prominent of these schemes is the Transfer Control Initiative (TCI). The TCI “seeks to prevent irresponsible transfers, such as those that might exacerbate instability, conflict or repression” (TCI, 2009). Indeed, the UK seems to have developed the TCI because it believed that the EU Code of Conduct did not go far enough (UN-LiREC).

Since its creation, the UK through the TCI has sponsored workshops and seminars that promote small arms control on a regional basis believing that regional approaches are more suitable rather than a one-size-fits-all model. The result is that despite a general rhetoric of support for EU activities, the UK spends the majority of its resources on self-
initiated schemes. Consequently, well-intentioned UK programmes work at cross-purpose with the expectation of African owned initiatives implemented through the EU-Africa institution. Smaller EU countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands and their civil society organisations are also committed to the eradication of small arms although on a bi-lateral level with individual countries.

Although all legislative frameworks and treaties are binding on EU Member States and institutions, the majority of the small arms initiatives undertaken on behalf of ‘the EU’ have been designed and led by the European Commission. The Commission’s support for SALW control programmes around the world goes back as far as 1992. Since the early 1990s through its budget and the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Commission has spent approximately half a billion Euros and contributed bi-laterally or multilaterally to 19 projects as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget (European Commission, 2006; Dicorradto, Andreoni, 2010). Africa has been a major beneficiary of EU efforts to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

However, the European Commission dealt with small arms issues in Africa on a case-by-case basis. The European Commission, especially DG Development and DG External Relations (RELEX), funded small arms and light weapons interventions in self-contained programmes or based on requests from developing countries. Small arms interventions were therefore part of a broader development framework and they were bi-lateral.

In the past two decades, the reality of the small arms problems as well as the European Commission’s increased capabilities and instruments has meant that small arms is considered both a development and a security issue. In acknowledgement of this realisation, some SALW projects have been funded as joint initiatives between the Council (the corpus of the Member States and the General Secretariat) and the European Commission using the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget rather than the European Development Fund. In spite of the fact that the EU classifies small arms initiatives as both development and security interventions, the European Commission usually acts as a single donor agency while Member States have their own separate
programmes. Since the Commission often takes the lead on the ‘EU’ initiatives, small arms initiatives are treated as development rather than security concerns.

Before adopting the *Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition* in 2005, the EU relied on loose regional frameworks and international instruments. One such regional instrument was the 1997 *EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking of Conventional Arms*. This framework consisted of EU contributions to the UNPoA negotiations. Although a positive step for tackling small arms proliferation, the *EU Programme* was not legally binding. Consequently, the EU Member States relied on their existing policy and the UN policy instruments. Further, like other intervention instruments on small arms, it too focused on providing assistance to post-conflict societies and fragile states.

In 1998, the *EU Joint Action on Small Arms* became the first substantive step towards a more integrated framework. This *Joint Action* reinforced the EU’s commitment to international and regional cooperation to reduce small arms accumulation and decrease existing surpluses (EU Council, 1999).108 The European Union Commission played an activist role by getting the EU Member States to agree to the *Joint Action* in the Council.109 One result of the Commission taking on this role is that the institution has long considered SALW issues its domain. Although the EU Member States readily acceded to the *Joint Action* as a common ground for their small arms control initiatives, the agreement did not compel more integration among Member States. The lack of integration meant many programmes were implemented in parallel to European Commission implemented programmes.

In 2000, which coincided with the final negotiations regarding the UNPoA, the development of the AU and the expansion of EU external relations instruments, EU Member States became more confident about including security concerns in their external relations tasks. This increased confidence resulted in the comprehensive 2005 *SALW Strategy*. This strategy is binding on all Member States and focuses on Africa as an area of priority. The strategy functions within the broader frameworks of the European Security

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108 This Joint Action was updated in 2002 (see Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP).
Strategy and existing EU development, conflict prevention and security and defence initiatives and policies. The strategy explicitly links the illicit circulation of SALW to conflicts, terrorism, organised crime and state failure, which are all seen as direct threats to the European Union. The SALW strategy “...serves as political guidance for all EU activities...” making it part of the broader EU external relations (European Commission, 2008). From the forgoing, the EU views the problem of small arms and light weapons as a direct contributor to four out of the five threats identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003). Essentially, the EU SALW strategy is a tangible example of the EU Member States’ commitment to UNPoA guidelines, which recommend complementarity at the regional levels. African states are seeking to adopt the model of regional complementarity on small arms eradication.

The external commitments of the EU are dedicated to the financial assistance and technical development of regional capabilities for small arms control. While these programmes are often self-contained, they have seen the EU working with the UN, regional organisations and non-governmental organisations, including those in Africa such as the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) secretariat, the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) based in Nairobi, Kenya and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The EU for instance has been funding the activities of RECSA through the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is a crisis response mechanism to support long term peace-building and capacity building projects. RECSA is a specialist civil society organisation, which supports the East African Community in establishing a sub-regional framework on small arms control in the region. RECSA is charged with coordinating national efforts “to prevent, combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa” (RECSA website). Further, between 1992 and 2006, the European Commission through the European Development Fund has supported wholly or partly more than 50 small arms control initiatives in Africa. However, these contributions were made without regard for broader coherence among initiatives. Rather, they were created to tackle specific issues as they arose (European Commission, 2006).

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110 Small arms do not contribute to the proliferations of Nuclear Weapons identified as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the security strategy.
As an advocate of a mainstreamed approach to small arms control and micro-disarmament in Africa, the EU has sought to support African initiatives that promote this approach. The European Union (including the Commission and Member States) support early stage interventions in small arms controls initiatives. This support exists despite the fact that the practices of most interventions occur during post-conflict reconstruction. In supporting a system that incorporates these strategies into conflict prevention frameworks and institutions in Africa, the EU is effectively shifting its *modus operandi* on matters of small arms and light weapons in Africa.

Because a mainstreamed approach is also a long-term approach, international partners can better contribute to eradicating the small arms problem by enabling local institutions and communities to carry out the appropriate initiatives. Consequently, in 2009 the EU pledged to “enhance capacity building, networking, cooperation and exchange of information on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) ...as well as fight against illicit trafficking” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2009; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). It is in the spirit of this pledge that the European Commission (on behalf of the Member States) first initiated negotiations to support the creation of a pan-African small arms initiative designed in full cooperation with the African Union. The critical question however is whether this initiative contributes to supporting African-led initiatives to create a continental framework and promoting the changes in EU-Africa relations suggested in the JAES.

**6.3 Supporting African Ownership through Partnership? The Pan-African Initiative**

Following the adoption of the Joint African-EU Strategy in December 2007, representatives from the African Union and the European Commission met to discuss the possibility of EU support of a continental small arms initiative. This request was different from previous EU small arms engagements in Africa. First, it was coming from the African Union although it had the support of African countries. Second, it was requesting support for a continental strategy, which differed from bi-lateral support of national governments. Third, by instigating these negotiations under the aegis JAES, the expectation from the African Union
was that the product of the negotiations would come from the EU as a whole. On the latter point, the African Union expected a coordinated European approach with the EU Member States and Commission together.

In December 2009, the AU officials presented the first draft of this strategy to representatives of the regional economic communities (RECs) for reviews and revisions towards a final version in January 2011. The proposed AU SALW strategy seeks to harmonise previous African regional and national positions, within a broader international framework, which the UN and the EU support.

Importantly, the proposed strategy seeks to synchronise the small arms interventions proposed across the activities and components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) unlike previous micro-disarmament interventions. The strategy would provide “synergy and flexibility”\(^\text{111}\) across the different peace and security sectors including the Continental Early Warning System. In Africa, the current guidelines for combating the scourge of small arms on the continent are fragmented. The proposed continental strategy will serve as a multifaceted framework with various opportunities for SALW interventions within the APSA.

At the initial stages, the pan-African initiative was envisioned to be similar to the *Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development* (PCASED). This was the main implementation support for the ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms. The difference would be that rather than ECOWAS implementing the small arms initiative, the African Union would take the helm.

In 1998, the EU, through its Member States including France and the UK, and the Commission provided substantial funding to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to implement the *Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa*. This particular initiative has been highlighted as a model for future EU-Africa cooperation on small arms control. The

\(^{111}\) AU-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons; Interview, AU Defence and Security Division, April 2009.
ECOWAS Moratorium has been lauded as a successful instance of a mainstreamed approach in EU-Africa cooperation on issues of small arms as part of a broad institutional framework.

At the end of the Cold War, ECOWAS identified the proliferation of SALW as a central challenge to human security. The sub-regional organisation further considered the problem a regional challenge and sought to tackle it within an international and multilateral framework. The 15 Member States of ECOWAS adopted the Moratorium. The Moratorium was pitched as part of a broader security and development framework spearheaded by the United Nations initiative, the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). The process of this initiative contributed to the dialogue preceding the Programme of Action in 2001. The Moratorium was executed over an initial five-year period through with PCASED serving as the overall framework (see Box 6.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6.1:</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PCASED Support for ECOWAS Moratorium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Establishing a culture of peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Training programmes for military, security, and police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enhancing weapon controls at border posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Establishing a database and regional arms register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collecting and destroying surplus weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Facilitating dialogue with producer suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reviewing and harmonising national legislation and administrative procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mobilising resources for PCASED objectives and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enlarging membership of the Moratorium</td>
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</table>

*Source: PCASED Plan of Action, 1998*

The main success of the Moratorium and its operationalisation through PCASED was that it had clear parameters and addressed the multifaceted nature of the SALW issues. Further, the specific focus on SALW ensured that micro-disarmament was not marginalised despite the breadth of PCASED. Additionally, by having nine areas of support through the framework of PCASED, the ECOWAS Moratorium was effectively mainstreamed into different areas, which promoted development and security within the ECOWAS region. The
ECOWAS Moratorium therefore served as a successful case of mainstreaming SALW within the African institutional context. Additionally, it confirmed the value that the EU had placed on this approach in its engagement with Africa. The parameters of the ECOWAS Moratorium implemented through PCASED provided an exportable model for the African Union.

Since the central precept of local ownership drives cooperation between the EU and Africa on the issues of SALW, the core role of the EU is to act as an observer. Ideally, the EU would be an adviser during ongoing AU intra-regional deliberations, providing the support necessary to realise the aims of the AU. This role is entrenched in the JAES, which guides the current relationship between the EU and Africa on matters of peace and security (JAES, 2007). Consequently, the actual process of institutional mainstreaming in Africa is left to the abilities of the peace and security department of the African Union, particularly the Defence and Security Division. However, despite the progress made on a first draft, the final draft has taken over a year to materialise and in the interim, the EU seems unsure about how it will support this strategy.

Although the continental strategy is yet to materialise, the EU has proceeded with its support for small arms control in Africa. The European Commission has recently launched a project aimed at building up the institutional capabilities that will support future small arms initiatives. The project was launched in March 2010 and it is the first ever donor supported pan-African initiative on SALW. The EU and RECSA launched the Fight against Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Firearms in Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. This initiative was developed by RECSA, an institution that already has experience of working successfully in implementing small arms control initiatives and working with the European Union. The purpose of RECSA is to enable and integrate national and sub-regional policy tools. The Pan-African initiative was designed to integrate the institutions engaged with small arms control (see Box 6.2).

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112 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 9th January 2009.
114 This will be subsequently referred to as the Pan-African initiative.
Initially a pan-African initiative was proposed as a mapping exercise or a precursor to the continental strategy. Its aim was to ascertain what the main small arms issues were in Africa and ideas for integrating small arms control into the African Peace and Security Architecture. Naturally, the African Union was intended to drive this process forward. However, due to resource shortages, the African Union suggested that the RECSA be contracted to carry out the initiative under the auspices of the African Union. These deliberations took place in the context of a steering committee where African sub-regional organisations, the European Commission and the United Nations are represented (AU Meeting Minutes, 2009).  

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According to one official in the African Union however, both the design and implementation process of the pan-African initiative as unveiled in March was not as envisioned by the AU. First, the AU representatives felt short-changed by the European Commission. Although initially consulted about the pan-African initiative, once the decision was made to have RECSA support the AU, the AU was left out of EU-RECSA negotiations. The initiative therefore came as a surprise to members of the Steering Committee who were oblivious to bi-lateral negotiations between the Commission and RECSA. Second, these negotiations were carried out outside the framework of the JAES. This omission is apparent because the European Delegation to the AU tasked with implementing the JAES was also unaware of these developments despite the presence of a dedicated officer in charge of liaising between the whole of the EU and the AU. Additionally, unlike the support for PCASED, the EU Member States were not involved in the process.

Additionally, the European Commission contracted out the pan-African initiative to a consultant of its choosing. The EU commissioned the consultant without the input from the African Union or the Regional Economic Communities. Further, the current initiative does not refer to the existing African Peace and Security Architecture or conflict prevention as an aim for a continental strategy. Indeed, this initiative does not support that aim. The current initiative undermines the concept of ownership as proffered in JAES. Further, it also challenges the AU’s attempts to mainstream small arms initiatives since the AU is dependent on international partners. The discontent felt by African officials concerning the pan-African initiative are only a microcosm of deeper and broader issues with EU support for small arms control in Africa.

### 6.4 External Challenges to African Initiatives

The officials involved in EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security constantly insist that the future success of economic and social development in Africa through conflict prevention, management and resolution relies on effective small arms controls (see EU SALW strategy). Yet the predominant focus of many EU programmes for micro-disarmament occurs during post-conflict reconstruction. EU programmes have this focus

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despite the fact that the EU has also committed to targeting the proliferation and trafficking of small arms as part of its conflict prevention strategies and practices (European Commission, 2001; Cameron, 2005). Further, as seen with the pan-African initiative, the role of the African Union is vague in the EU’s execution of support for African-led initiatives. There is tension between the EU’s stated aims and its implementation processes.

I argue that this tension arises from three main avenues. The first is the lack of institutional resources on the part of the African Union. The second is the lack of integration of small arms control within the European Union itself due to competition among the core actors. The third is the tendency to go with the familiar modes of practice in small arms control, otherwise known as path dependency. These areas of tension challenge the ability of the EU to support the African Union in its aims.

The motivations behind the creation of the African Union are well intentioned. However, the institution suffers from a lack of coordination that affects its ability to be an efficient representative of African interests. For instance, despite the importance attributed to mainstreaming small arms into the CEWS by various officials, its (CEWS) operationalisation framework does not mention SALW indicators. The division responsible for small initiatives is separate from the one responsible for the continental early warning system, and there are currently no formal linkages for coordination. One official further admitted that at present the majority of the relationships between the small arms control experts and CEWS staff is based on their informal relationships. Further, the official noted that small arms control is only one aspect of the CEWS and therefore it is not central. AU SALW experts reiterate the importance of small arms control initiatives to the continental early warning system, but they admit that the early warning culture and the small arms culture need to be further integrated into each other to yield positive results for African peace and security.

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Another challenge posed by incorporating micro-disarmament measures earlier in the conflict cycle comes from challenges to the mainstreaming process. A central problem is that there is no clarity as to how mainstreaming would work. The absence of mainstreaming from the CEWS operationalisation framework is further evidence of the problem. Indeed the information and literature on mainstreaming is quite sparse. However, those like Andrew Sherriff, who have studied mainstreaming in the context of development and humanitarian processes, argue that mainstreaming SALW is tedious for the institution (Sherriff, 2005). Yet, the conflict prevention organs of the AU peace and security architecture permit the inclusion of small arms initiatives as conflict prevention mechanisms through a mainstreaming approach SALW. The flexible nature of the APSA will therefore make mainstreaming easier. Further, given that the African Union and the APSA mechanism are still new, they are in a unique position to incorporate new strategies into the function of the continental early warning system.

Aside from these problems, there is also the matter of limited capacities within the African Union. The AU’s limited capacities continue to be a core challenge for the whole of the Peace and Security department. The inability of the AU to cope with an initial mapping project encouraged the European Commission to continue with its existing pattern of bilateral relations with RECSA. Furthermore, until more staff is dedicated to the complex issues of small arms control, implementing strategies through the AU will be slow. Given the situation as it is, there is an obvious mismatch between the aspirations of the AU and its ability to implement a continental control on small arms and light weapons.

The internal dynamics of the European Union further exacerbate this mismatch between reality and aspirations. In Europe, there is also fragmentation. Then fragmentation within Europe is arguably more pronounced than the AU’s in the sense that as the dominant partner, the European Union has a larger impact on the processes of EU-Africa cooperation. There are two dimensions to this fragmentation: one is regarding policy coherence while the other is about coordination. This fragmentation contributes to the challenges of implementing small arms control within the African Union.
One of the main impediments to mainstreaming SALW strategies for the EU is the fragmentation of EU support for small arms. Much of the fragmentation has to do with the competition between Member States and the European Commission. Given that small arms control programmes were often executed as part of development aid, the European Commission has often been the main implementer. However, the European Commission rebuffed the attempts by Member States to integrate small arms issues further within the CFSP. The lack of institutional clarity has led to squabbling between the EU Council, Member States and the Commission over competence in the area of small arms control. So rather than coordinate, the European Commission sued the Council in 2005 through the European Court of Justice to clarify which party had primary competence on small arms issues. The Court found in favour of the European Commission. The Court reasoned in situations where a primary security purpose cannot be proven, the First Pillar (so the Commission) had precedence. The European Commission treats small arms interventions as a way in which to retain some power in EU external relations. The European Commission’ pursuance of power is important since Member States retain most of the power on matters related to foreign policy and security. However, the attitude of the Member States suggests that the approach of the Commission towards small arms control is viewed as a threat to the inter-governmental nature of security.

Consequently, although Derks and More argue that the ECJ case helped with clarifying “the division of competencies between the First and Second Pillars when it comes to external activities” (2009: 6), it was also a major drawback for Commission and Member State coordination. I contend that the cases fundamentally affected the will, especially among the EU Member States, to formulate a more cohesive approach to small arms control in its external relations. They (EU Member States) have abandoned further efforts for coordination. Core EU Member States such as the UK and Germany continue to run parallel bi-lateral projects. In doing so, the EU does not fulfil the aims of inter-regional security cooperation. Further, because the individual country support is ‘piece-meal’ and only focuses on one single aspect at a time, it is difficult for the African Union to mainstream small arms across all aspects of its peace and security architecture as this objective requires a comprehensive approach.
In most cases, Member States’ efforts are still more visible than those of the European Commission. For instance, the work of the German technical agency coincides more with the vision of mainstreaming that the AU small arms experts want to adopt. However, most of that work takes place on a bi-lateral level with a few African countries. Nevertheless, the agency has the experience of supporting sub-regional institutions. Currently, Spain is also bidding to support the African Union’s efforts at small arms control. The AU officials who felt bypassed by the planning of the pan-African initiative have welcome interests from EU Member States.

However, EU Member States’ are implementing their schemes in parallel to European Commission-led initiatives rather than in conjunction with them.121 This existence of parallel schemes causes unnecessary duplication on the part of the European Union, which is frustrating for the African Union official dealing with small arms. The lack of coordination among EU actors also requires the duplication of briefing meetings and donor requests, which takes time from the actual work of small arms control. The AU representatives on arms were particularly taken aback to learn that the European Union delegation to the AU was not aware of the European Commission’s launch of the pan-African initiative. As the delegation office is increasingly seen as the AU's advocate to Brussels, the lack of information was further seen as the EU’s lack of desire to implement an African-owned initiative, which reflects equality and partnership between the EU and AU. In reflecting on the current EU small arms control efforts, the lack of coordination between the EU Member State programmes and EU institutional commitment does not bode well for support of the African Union.

In those cases where the Commission attempts to support other comprehensive initiatives, it falls short of expectations especially from the African Union. For instance, in the current pan-African initiative there is no mention of integrating small arms control into conflict prevention measures. For African Union officials this is not surprising, given that EU Commission officials had not consulted their AU counterparts on the document. Additionally, RECSA lacks the continental mandate that the African Union has in the regional economic communities. RECSA lacks a clear mandate because the European

121 Correspondence, GTZ, Eschborn, 20th October 2009.
Union, rather than the African Union eventually commissioned this particular pan-African initiative. Therefore, the pan-African initiative potentially impacts negatively on the regional integration of micro-disarmament measures in Africa. It is concerning if the Commission’s best efforts actually undermine the vision of the EU’s core African partner, the African Union. Acknowledging the detriment of the pan-African initiative to regional integration efforts is not to suggest that the pan-African initiative harms efforts at small arms control – indeed using RECSA is generally seen as a good thing; however, it may also take away from the much-required need to directly integrate small arms strategies into the African Peace and Security Architecture.

In addition to the contradictory relationship with the African Union, the EU’s small arms control initiatives, which were promoted and implemented by the European Commission and the Member States, are being contradicted by the Member States’ small arms sales practices. In 1998, by acceding to the EU Code of Conduct on Export of Arms, it appeared that the EU was moving in the right direction and fulfilling its international security obligation to control the spread of illicit small arms. Signing the Code of Conduct was important since 5 EU states (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) accounted for a third of small arms transfers between 1994 and 2001 (Grimmett, 2002).

6.5 Conclusion: The Grass is not always Greener

In evaluating recent developments in EU-Africa cooperation, particularly small arms control, it is apparent that the relationship remains more or less the same. Despite advances made by European partners in their approach to small arms control, the EU (including the Commission) contributes to the maintenance of the status quo. In this position, African institutions are not true partners but continued recipients and implementers of donor preferences. Although early examples like the support for the ECOWAS Moratorium indicated changes in EU-Africa cooperation, cases such as the pan-African initiative illustrate the tendency for things to remain as they are. In addition, recent

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124 It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of small arms produced and exported by these countries as such information is shrouded in secrecy.
programmes like the EU Security Sector Reform programme in Guinea Bissau illustrate the preference of EU actors to maintain a donor-recipient relationship with African partners.

The inability of the EU to change its approach on issues of SALW despite the rhetoric stems in part from internal coordination challenges within the EU. These challenges include the unwillingness of EU Member States to *Europeanise* their policies on small arms and the Commission’s strong desire to retain control of the small arms policy area. Consequently, Germany and Britain’s governments continue to have their own parallel programmes, although they are segregated from the European Commission’s programmes. This segregation also means that the country programmes are also not integrated into EU support for the AU or pan-African initiatives since the Commission has been granted the mandate to implement EU-wide small arms initiatives.

Without coherence, it is difficult to support the AU in mainstreaming small arms initiatives. The divergent initiatives within the EU are difficult to adapt to each other when there are no systemic or systematic processes across the whole of the EU’s external relations programmes. The lack of a ‘joined-up’ approach among EU actors makes it difficult to implement necessary SALW initiatives successfully. Furthermore, practitioners in the field of small arms and light weapons have pointed out the discrepancies between the European Union’s trade and development policies as they affect small arms and light weapons and are a further example of the far-reaching consequences of incoherence.

As one experienced micro-disarmament practitioner noted, “the genuineness of the African Union’s aspiration is apparent”; however, implementation also relies on the external partner’s support in a cohesive manner.\(^\text{125}\) The process of mainstreaming small arms issues and prioritising conflict prevention mechanisms is the focus of this chapter, and its ultimate aim should not be forgotten: creating a safe, peaceful and secure environment free of arms. It is therefore important that the EU’s support for African initiatives is aligned to curb the flow of arms.

\(^{125}\) Interview (Owen Greene), Centre for Peace Studies, Bradford, UK, 29th September 2009.
Concerning the pan-African initiative, which has been touted as emblematic of the changes in EU-Africa relations, the case evaluation has shown that it falls short. While there is a mention of helping the African Union, the rest of the commitment reflects the Commission’s agenda rather than a joint programme with the AU. The initiative further makes no mention of integrating national and regional mechanisms into a continental framework. Additionally, while the initiative places a lot of emphasis on regional police involvement, the security dimension to small arms control in Africa is absent from the initiative. By ignoring the ‘hard’ security aspect of small arms control in this initiative, the Commission has succeeded in keeping small arms a development issue. Making small arms solely a development issue however contravenes both the EU and AU’s assertions that small arms challenges are at the intersection of security and development rather than development alone. In this way, the European Commission reinforces its role primarily as a development donor.

While EU support for African-led peace and security initiatives has been ongoing for over ten years, there has been no coherence in terms of small arms control. With the establishment of the EU SALW strategy in 2005 and the JAES in 2007, in theory, the discourse on small arms was less dependent on specific programmes but rather integrated into external relations packages. Indeed, the EU does consider its small arms interventions such as the SSR programme in Guinea Bissau to be within the JAES framework. However, it is still the case that the EU’s practices in the area of small arms are confined to specific issues as they arise, which is inevitable during the transition and post-conflict reconstruction phases. New approaches to small arms interventions, which reflect change in EU-Africa relations, must respect the parameters of the new agreement, and consider African institutions as partners.

Thus far, the changes in the EU’s approaches to Africa’s aims for small arms control are minor and do not contribute any substantive change to the small arms control agenda. Inasmuch as AU initiatives rely on the support of the EU, the EU needs to be clearer, and have a more focused strategy for comprehensive support, which meets the present challenges of preventing violent conflicts. Additionally, this support has to show that the priority will be for local ownership and that it will be directly inputted into the conflict
prevention strategies and institutions of the African continent. The inability to achieve coherence diminishes the effect of the immense contributions that the European Union makes to international peace and security.
Introduction

The principal purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: to what extent has security cooperation contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations? Framed within the context of an institutionalised inter-regionalism, the thesis examines EU-Africa relations as a process of shared norms, values and practices thereby constituting an institution. In the preceding two chapters, two examples of security cooperation were examined to illustrate the extent of the changes occurring within the institution of EU-Africa relations. These two cases focused on the European Union’s (EU) efforts to support the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union through capability building for: 1) peace support operations (EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA) and 2) fighting the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. While both cases are reflective of the EU’s commitment to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) both have resulted in different levels of achievement or outcomes. Further, the extents to which the cases have been transformative of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of EU-Africa relations also vary.

The objective of this chapter is to assess the two cases examined. This assessment is done with the view to understand the conditions under which security cooperation has contributed to equality, partnership and ownership in EU-Africa security cooperation. These three principles are assessed in terms of where the locus of decision-making lays in EU-African cooperation; the shift from bilateralism to inter-regionalism and the equal participation of EU actors as counterparts to the AU. I argue that substantive changes in EU-Africa relations through security cooperation are more likely because of division of labour among EU actors on the one hand, and the ability of the African Union to be an effective interlocutor for Africa on the other. The chapter categorises the type of institutional changes within EU-Africa relations and revisits the typologies of layering and conversion highlighted in Chapters 1 and 4. First, it identifies and evaluates the similarities
and differences between the two cases. Second, it outlines the extent to which changes have occurred in EU-Africa relations through the lens of security cooperation. Third, the chapter proposes that a division of labour arrangement within the EU is the key to fulfilling the obligation to promote and practice the principles of change. Fourth, this section highlights the challenges of a division of labour framework given the existing EU structure and the state of development of the EU’s main partner, the African Union. The chapter concludes with a characterisation of the changes achieved in recent EU-Africa security cooperation.

7.1 Comparing Cases: EU-Africa Security Cooperation

In assessing the contribution of security cooperation to change in EU-Africa relations, I chose two case examples, which met three criteria:

1. They are both defined within the framework of the Africa-EU partnership and dialogue.
2. They are both oriented towards a specific international security goal, including conflict management and the eradication of illicit small arms and light weapons.
3. In each case, both the EU and AU contribute through physical activity, financing and/or diplomacy.

These two cases further represent the types of security cooperation between 2008 and 2010. Based on the two case studies, the first impression is that European Union and African Union actors approach security cooperation with a shared agenda. For instance, both cases are being implemented under the aegis of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. So, unlike previous capacity building programmes, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is implemented through the African Union without preference for particular countries. Additionally, rather than a training programme for military peacekeepers, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is supporting African-owned initiatives to meet the defined needs of regional security in Africa. Similarly, the intent behind the pan-African initiative is to be encompassing. Unlike previous small arms programme on the continent, the initiative targets the whole continent rather than specific countries. It supports the work of the African Union primarily through funding. It differs from previous EU engagements in
Africa, which were directly implemented by the EU as donors. Further, the new approach is intended to defer to the African Union in the design and implementation of the project.

Further, regarding similarities, both the EU and AU actors emphasise the link between security and development in the operationalisation of both cases. In the case of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, this link is initially emphasised during the design of the concept. The design included multidimensional brigades, which are able to undertake military peacekeeping, civilian (police) and humanitarian missions, and post-conflict peace-building on behalf of the African Union. By moving away from traditional peacekeeping and having a broader ambit for peace support operations, the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA project considers the changing nature of conflict stemming from intra-rather than inter-state grievances affecting the very livelihoods of the citizens. As such, the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been formulated within a human security rubric rather than traditional security. Similarly, the framework for the *pan-African Fight against the Illicit Transfer of Small Arms* straddles that gap between security and development. Previously considered the domain of development practitioners, especially within the European Union, small arms control has also become a goal for security experts, which is the case within the African Union. New opportunities for micro-disarmament are being identified, putting small arms control at the heart of conflict prevention. This linkage between security and development has however resulted in different outcomes for the two cases.

In the case of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, linking development with security has helped re-conceptualise how peace and security is organised within the EU Brussels establishment. It has allowed closer cooperation between the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council to engage in areas traditionally reserved for EU Member State capitals. Together, actors within the EU work to plan and implement relevant components of the EURORPECAMP-AMANI AFRICA in Brussels through the EU Working group. The work of the Council Secretariat and the commitment of EU Member States’ contributions to capability building in Africa through the office of the Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities provide further evidence of this cooperation. Additionally, the creation of the unique EU Delegation to the AU whose mandate originates
from both the Commission and the Council is further evidence of collaborative engagement within the EU.

In contrast, the explicit initiation of small arms control into the security domain has resulted in competition among the EU actors. Initially considered solely a development issue, the Commission claimed eminent domain when it came to proposing and implementing EU-wide small arms strategies as part of its development policies in Africa. Essentially, the European Commission acted as a separate donor when it came to administering small arms initiatives in African countries. This approach to small arms initiative is consistent with the European Commission's approach to many development activities. This separateness exists despite complete consensus among the Member States that small arms control was a priority for security in Africa, especially conflict prevention. However, the dispute between the European Commission and Council illustrates the competition and lack of coordination among EU actors despite similar goals. The resulting court case and judgment which has privileged the position of the European Commission over that of the Council underscored the rivalry between the two organs and also seemed to create tension between the seemingly complementary development and foreign and security policies. This rivalry has implications for cooperation with external partners (see Table 7.1 for a tabular representation of the similarities and differences between the two case studies).

**Table 7.1 Characteristics of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA and SALW support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA</th>
<th>SALW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administered within the framework of the JAES Peace and Security cluster</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building programmes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example of security development-nexus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-actor engagement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union Involvement</td>
<td>Yes (with some challenges)</td>
<td>No (initial involvement did not last)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126 In various ways, Germany, France, Italy and the UK have all identified the proliferation of illicit guns and ammunition as a hindrance to conflict prevention and development in Africa within their national policies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competition among EU actors (Commission and Member States)</th>
<th>No (not overtly evident)</th>
<th>Yes (obvious)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal EU Coordination (Commission and Member States)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour among EU and other actors (Commission, Member States and UN)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In analysing the two case studies, it is evident that both face challenges. The core difference of these challenges has to do with where they originate. The challenges of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA arise from the implementation of the project itself rather than the design of the cooperation effort. Thus, the EU and African actors have a relatively good relationship, share the same aims for African peace support capabilities but face operational challenges within the capacity building process. Further, the actors within the institutions have accepted an inter-regional approach to cooperation despite existing bi-lateral relationships. The challenges of small arms control on the other hand arise from the design of the cooperation effort itself rather than the implementation of the pan-Africa initiative. Consequently, the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA’s challenges are endogenous while the small arms control challenges are exogenous.

The extent of these challenges reflects or affects three other inter-related areas where we see divergences between the case studies. They include the level of multi-actor engagement, the level of internal EU coordination, and the extent of competition among EU actors. Multi-actor engagement is a continued aspiration of the European Union as it seeks multilateralism in its external relations. For the African Union, this engagement is a necessity as it seeks to build its capabilities and international networks. Multi-actor engagement is therefore part of the design of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

Through the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA case study, one can observe that there were many stakeholders involved. First, there were the EU Member States including the Big 3 and those with prior interests in Africa. There were also newer EU Member States such as Hungary. In addition, non-European members of the G8 such as Japan and the United States as well as the NATO command were invited to participate using their resources to support an EU-Africa cooperation endeavour. Further, the European Commission and
Council through the EU Delegation Office provided operational support together with the Peace and Security Department of the African Union. The design of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA therefore promoted multi-actor engagement within and outside Europe.

The pan-African initiative case study partly supports a multi-actor environment. The African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, the European Commission and the RECSA have initially been working together to formulate a strategy, coordinating with relevant authorities at national and sub-regional levels on the African continent. Although the initial act of creating a trilateral arrangement between the AU, the European Commission and the RECSA is unprecedented, the absence of EU Member States is obvious and is evidenced by the parallel process in which they are engaged. The continued parallel processes of EU Member States jeopardises the inter-regionalisation of security and the continental/holistic approach to security being promoted by the African Union. This situation also inadvertently undermines African institutions since parallel initiatives fail to support what Africans want. Consequently, the notion of African ownership within the EU-Africa cooperation is tenuous at best.

One of the hindrances to multi-actor engagement is competition among the relevant actors. One of the successes for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA is that the Member States came together with the sole aim of supporting the African Union. To be sure, each state wants to maintain its relevance or position in Africa. For instance, France successfully bid to be the framework nation for EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA without opposition from Germany or Britain. This result was despite the former’s initial misgivings about France’s intentions in Africa. Similarly, neither France nor Germany opposed Britain’s bid for framework nation for EU NAVFOR. Further, the European Commission was willing to share expertise on its knowledge of the African Union and served as the initial clearinghouse for EU-Africa cooperation before operations shifted exclusively to the EU Delegation to the AU. Actors were allowed to use their comparative advantage of capabilities support to contribute to the whole project.

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127 EU NAVFOR is the European Union Naval Force in Somalia
The lack of competition in a specific cooperation area among Member States has been useful for the daily administration of implementation. For instance, it is easier to brief Member States about a specific development without having to placate them too. Further, with everyone on the same page, there are fewer chances of contradictions in external relations policies and there is more likely to be better coordination. In addition to this, the European Commission does not feel left out of security proceedings since the administration of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA relies on both Commission and Council officials at the EU Delegation to the AU.

Competition or turf war among EU actors is not new in EU external relations. It however affects relations with third partners. When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in favour of the European Commission to undertake activities relating to small arms, this was seen as a coup for the Commission. Derks and More (2009: 6) further note that the so-called ECOWAS case clarified the division of competencies between the European Commission and the Council. This clarity however did nothing to quell competition; rather, it increased it. This split is evident in the design and implementation of the current pan-African initiative. The Commission is willing to act alone because it has the mandate from the ECJ, and the Member States chose not to engage with the Commission for fear of marginalisation by the Commission. Hence, while competition is not adversarial, Member States are less willing to coordinate their policies on small arms control with or through the Commission.

Another drawback of competition among EU actors is its impact on internal coordination within the European Union. The two case studies have shown that the African Union finds it difficult to fulfil their part of the security cooperation. This difficulty is due in part to the newness of the institution and the lack of human resources. It has also been suggested that the lack of engagement by African countries make the work of the AU more difficult. This is a core deterrent to change within the EU-Africa institutions, since inter-regionalism depends on an effective regional actor.

However, situation of the AU is therefore a given, known to both AU and EU partners. Indeed, it is because of this that the EU has agreed to support African Union peace and
security initiatives. What then is the guarantee that cooperation can succeed, i.e. lead to change and deliver on the commitments? The answer mostly rests in the EU’s ability to coordinate internally. As the partner with ample resources and experience, there are expectations of the EU to be able to deliver on its policy priorities in an effective manner. However, maintaining efficiency and delivering expectations has been difficult because external relations were spread over the three pillars among actors who often competed against each other for relevance.

The EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA case study suggests that when the EU as the dominant partner is internally organised the chances of effectively supporting the African Union’s aims are more likely. Such internal organisation requires that EU actors – the Member States and the European Union institutions – have an integrated approach to the same issue. Further, because the actors all contribute to the process, they are all relevant and there is less need for them to compete with each other. Unlike the former case study, the European Commission’s role within the pan-African initiative is very similar to previous programmes wherein the Commission acts as a donor in the same way that Member States do. This duplication creates new problems for cooperation especially given that the African Union still lacks the capacity to coordinate all its external partners’ input effectively.

Additionally, it can be confusing for the African Union to know whom to deal with. Within the EU Delegation to the AU, there is a political advisor assigned to small arms control partnership with African institutions. The remit of this small arms official includes supporting the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to develop effective control initiatives. However, there is no evidence that this work is done in harmony with their European Commission counterparts. Further, this official has not been present at AU Steering Committee Meetings on Small Arms. Thus, although the intention of pan-African initiative may be to support the work of the African Union, it currently works outside of the framework of an inter-regionalised security system.

I argue then that the challenges to security cooperation caused by programme design (as with EU support for small arms in Africa) are more difficult to address and less conducive

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to change than the procedural ones (as with EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA). The challenges of programme design fundamentally affect the ability of the EU-Africa institution to realise its purpose within the new inter-regional framework, that is, equality, partnership and ownership. The continued mismatch between the EU’s aims of conflict prevention through small arms control and the lack of coordination between the main EU actors has a stalling effect on the progress of EU-Africa relations. Despite new strategies and policies, the lack of coherence between arms export policies and small arms controls impede the potential of the EU’s support for regional security in Africa. From the forgoing, it is evident that the outcome of the small arms control cooperation contrasts with that of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. This difference in outcomes begs an additional question: under what conditions can EU-Africa security cooperation move towards change?

A key objective of this chapter is to ascertain why EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has largely yielded positive results where security cooperation is concerned and the fight against small arms proliferation still falls short. The analysis of both cases of security cooperation suggests that achieving substantive change in EU-Africa relations requires a particular type of institutional organisation among EU actors. This institutionalisation is characterised through a system of division of labour prior to the implementation of a particular project or process. This process is important for the EU because it is the dominant partner in EU-Africa relations and therefore tips the scale to affect the outcome of the collaboration process significantly.

7.2 Division of Labour as a Model for EU External Security Actorness

Division of Labour is a principle originating from the fields of economics, and sociology. The principle is especially relevant in the works of Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations) and Emile Durkheim (The Division of Labour in Society) respectively. It is used to explain the organisation of labour in society. It typically describes the social interaction of workers in relation to their specific organisation and society. Division of labour involves breaking down a complex process, so that an individual or a group undertakes each component of the whole.
Smith argued that by instituting division of labour on the production line, technical efficiency is derived in the product. Further, such specialisation saves time and duplication (Smith, 1804). For Durkheim (1984), the central thesis is that division of labour is universal and creates solidarity within society. The reason for this solidarity is that each component compensates for the limitations of each of the other components so that all actors perceive the common goal as mutually beneficial. In the same way, division of labour among actors in international relations can theoretically yield solidarity inasmuch as the common goal is seen as being in the interests of each actor.

In international relations practice, the principle of division of labour has been used in two contexts: aid effectiveness in development assistance and more recently burden-sharing among international security actors. In studies of development assistance, the principle of division of labour is linked to the idea of aid effectiveness (see Schulz, 2007.) The *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008) introduced the principle to the international development fora. The core argument is that the “fragmentation of aid at global, country and sector level impairs aid effectiveness” (Paris Declaration, 2005: 6). So to ensure effectiveness, harmonisation through division of labour has been suggested. Harmonisation in this context refers to the use of donor countries’ comparative advantage within a certain sector or in a country, with the aim to make the delivery of development aid more effective (Paris Declaration, 2005).

As a development aid donor, the European Union, especially the Commission, is no stranger to proposals for a division of labour and complementarity. With development policies being less contentious than security policies, the European Commission has spearheaded the drive to make EU development policies less fragmented. There have been several documents, which explicitly outline division of labour as a goal of EU external development relations or imply this (see Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Expressions of Division of Labour in EU Policy Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Policy Documents</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Consensus on Development</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Guiding Principles on Complementarity and Division of Labour</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While there is no formal definition for division of labour itself within these EU documents, the concept is more than just coordination. With better coordination, we can expect Member States to agree in principle that they will not have parallel programmes. This commitment if implemented ought to mean less duplication and perhaps more effectiveness; however, neither are guaranteed. Member States may view parallel interests as more vital and instead choose to pursue those.

Since development constitutes a component of new peace and security engagements, the application of division of labour is also relevant in the context of EU-Africa security cooperation. One of the benefits of division of labour is evident in the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA case. While a single foreign policy may be desirable, it is not necessary to effectiveness if division of labour can be achieved.

I. Forging EU Foreign Policy through Division of Labour

The notion of division of labour has also recently found resurgence in international security regarding the shared burdens between the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and especially the United Nations (UN) (Lindley-French, 2006; Whitman, 2006; 2004; Croft et al., 2000). There is growing consensus within the EU and NATO, for instance, that both institutions would benefit from coordination based on individual strengths. For instance, the EU has strength in civilian-political operations while NATO’s strength remains in military defence. In order to realise this division of labour, it has been argued that the interests of the actors have to be aligned. This requires “political will and the removal of mistrust and lack of confidence from the EU-NATO equation” (Douti, 2007).

The concept of division of labour is also useful for the *internal* organisation of EU support for African security capabilities. By organising its contribution to security through a division of labour among Member States and EU institutions, the EU is able to contribute to international security in a positive way. Stephen Keukeleire has defended this idea.
According to Keukeleire, division of labour among EU actors will enable the EU to move beyond the quest for a ‘common’ foreign policy to deliver a more operational foreign policy (Keukeleire, 2007: 3-4). He further contends that this move is necessary given the difficulty of overcoming the different foreign policies of Member States and shortcomings not legally addressed in the constitutional treaties (Keukeleire, 2007: 4). According to Keukeleire, the expertise of small groups within the EU institutions who have specialised knowledge of specific issues, sectors, countries or regions is advantageous for the EU security actorness.

In the context of internal EU security cooperation, what Division of Labour proposes is that the EU (Member States and European Union institutions) creates a common strategy or plan wherein each actor fulfils a component of that mission (see Figure 7.1). In this scenario, the component part of each actor is the actor’s main interests. Hence, the result of working outside the common plan is costlier than working within it. In this scenario, the belligerent actor will be going against its interests, thus jeopardising the entire mission. Further, the actor also risks alienating the external partner and allies if it falls short of commitments to fulfil a component of the mission. Additionally, within the common strategy, each actor is treated as integral to the process – the Commission does not supersede the Member States and vice-versa.

**Figure 7.1 Division of Labour: Component Parts Creating the Whole**

![Diagram of Division of Labour within the EU](image)

*Internal Division of Labour within the EU*
The aim for Division of Labour as proposed is more than just efficiency. I contend that division of labour has been necessary to the progress towards transformation in EU-Africa security relations. It has been argued that current interventions to attend to the deficit of the EU as an international security actor often ignore a nuanced approach to problems of common interests and lack of political will (Keukeleire, 2007: 6-8). Although the literature on Division of Labour in security is still at its infancy, non-governmental agencies working on Africa rightly note that uncoordinated policies undermine the efforts at peace and security in already fragile conditions (Faria and Ferreira, 2007).

Admittedly, the lack of common interest and lack of political will will disrupt the ability of the EU to forge common foreign policy. ‘Big’ international issues, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, are illustrative. However, these alone do not account for the underwhelming performance of the EU in relation to developing countries. Keukeleire suggests that a lack of affinity for a particular foreign policy issue can be to blame for the lack of EU action. For instance, Africa has been and in the near future will continue to be a foreign policy priority for France. Using Keukeleire’s logic, rather than impede France or slow down its foreign policy aims, it is more useful to allow France to use its comparative advantage in the region to further the European Union’s aims. This logic was employed in the formation of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. This logic is further reinforced in recent analyses of the proposed European External Action Service (Avery et al., 2007; see also Keukeleire, 2007).

The benefits of EU division of labour in its external security relations are evident in the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA case study. Here, EU Member States used their network of resources within the EU, UN, NATO, and the G8 to support capability building for the African Standby Force. At present, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA due to the involvement of multiple participants is the only comprehensive process supporting the building of the African Standby Force. Division of Labour has therefore ensured that there is no duplication among the international donors and it presents less of a bureaucratic challenge to the donors and especially the African Union.

Additionally, division of labour ensures that the relevant international institutions work together for the goal of peace and that no one institution is overburdened by its
commitments. Designing cooperation as division of labour also puts more pressure on international donors to fulfil their obligations and counters free riding. For instance, although Italy has consistently fallen short of its international aid commitments in the past, it fulfilled its limited obligations to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA. It has provided training facilities and one officer to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA team. By being part of the whole rather than one of many, contributors know they will be held accountable if they do not deliver as they may jeopardise the whole endeavour. Division of labour as created by EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has fostered close relations between the international donors through shared knowledge concerning African peace and security. Despite the benefits of arranging EU external relations or foreign policy using the concept of division of labour, achieving this within the current EU is challenging.

7.3 Challenges to Division of Labour within the European Union

There are four related dimensions of EU external relations. These dimensions prove problematic to maintaining a division of labour in EU external relations. The first is the pillar structure of external relations in the European Union. The second is the position of the actors in relation to each other. The third challenge is one of international cooperation, which is about the differing interests of nation-states. The fourth and final challenge is the idea that security remains a sacred area of policy, which Member States prefer to control for themselves.

Concerning the first challenge, although the pillar system has ceased to exist under the Lisbon Treaty, creating cohesive external relations remains a problem for the EU. The two cases examined in this thesis were conceived and executed under the pillar system. Further, sources within the EU note that external relations integration, despite the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will remain problematic for several years. The reason given is that there will be difficulty “marrying” the different “institutional culture” of Commission and Council employees. According to Whitman,

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129 While this thesis acknowledges the collapse of the pillar system under the Lisbon Treaty and its impact on the EU’s external relations (see Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis), changes resulting from the non-pillar system have yet to take effect in the implementation of EU external relations. Consequently, the challenges of the pillar structure remain.

130 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, 13th July 2010.

131 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, 13th July 2010.
“creating a new institutional ethos” in the EEAS will be challenging (Whitman, 2010: 3). The retention of certain functions from the old pillar structure including procedures and staffing conditions will further exacerbate switching over to the EEAS (Whitman, 2010: 3). 132 In effect, although the names have changed and new institutions have been built to foster a more cohesive foreign policy strategy for the EU, the practice of external relations is more or less the same.

Regarding the relation of EU actors to each other, there are two sub-challenges. In the EURORECAMP case for instance, Germany was reticent to participate in the process not because it did not believe in its merits, but because France was leading. France’s prior relationship with Africa affects its credibility with other core actors within the EU who fear that EU resources are being used to promote French rather than EU (or African) interests. This challenge is particularly difficult to counter since France still vigorously pursues its relationship with its former colonies and has been accused of neo-imperialism in the process (Charbonneau, 2008).

In addition to the position of Members States vis-à-vis each other, another challenge to division of labour is the position of the Council, the Member States and the Commission. The uneasy relationship between these actors leads to EU intra-institutional competition. This rivalry arises when one actor feels less relevant than the other does. The small arms case study revealed the European Commission to be the belligerent actor when it came to implementing small arms control strategies. By suing the Council for predominant competence on the implementation of small arms initiatives, the Commission has alienated Member States. Essentially, it backfired! Therefore, while acknowledging EU frameworks championed by the Commission, Member States like Germany and the UK chose not to integrate their programmes with Commission-led programmes. This reaction to the European Court of Justice’s ruling shows that Member States prefer being at the top of the hierarchy within the EU security architecture. However, so does the Commission.

132 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, 13th July 2010.
As a result of being shunned by the Member States, the Commission advertently or inadvertently also left out the EU Delegation to the African Union. In bypassing the EU Delegation, which is the African Union's main point of contact, the European Union sends a confusing message to its AU partners. As one AU official noted, he had requested the inclusion of the EU Delegation's small arms expert at subsequent meetings between the 'EU' (which was actually the Commission) and the AU. Apparently, the requests made to the EU through the delegation office had not been considered by the Commission since dialogue was limited. When consideration for equality among institutional actors is unavailable, EU actors are unlikely to institute division of labour as their paradigm for external relations. Unfortunately, the unlikelihood of division of labour has negative consequences outside of the EU.

EU Member States like other nation-states in the international system have specific interests shaped by geography, history, and necessity. Many works on EU external relations have argued that this is where the problem of coordination in EU external relations lies. The third challenge is therefore about the difficulties of aligning EU Member States' interests (Keukeleire, 2007). This alignment is arguably the most difficult challenge to mitigate as it concerns the very identity of the state itself. Where EU Member States perceive that their interests are not being served, they aim to correct the situation even at the expense of an 'EU' foreign policy or existing external relations commitments.

These tensions are evident within EU-Africa relations especially with regard to newer EU Member States. Many of the newer EU Member States, most of which are from Eastern Europe have little or no interest in Africa. Among them, there is the sense that the interests of a few Member States at the expense of important non-EU countries drive the EU's commitment to Africa. Neighbourhood countries have greater proximity to the EU and most of them aspire to join the EU in the future. Unaligned interests create a problem of internal coordination between Member States. In the situation whereby interests are unaligned, the EU Member States with interests in Africa may find it easier to continue bi-

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133 It is unclear why the Commission chose not to appraise the EU Delegation to the AU of its intentions since all AU requests to the EU are communicated to both the Commission and the Council.
134 Interviews: DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 8th January 2009; EU Council, DG E VIII, Brussels, 13th January 2009. It should be noted however that Hungary contributed to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process.
lateral policies outside of the EU. The non-alignment undermines security cooperation through inter-regionalism, as well as the motivation to engage in division of labour practices.

Keukeleire (2007) proposes the division of labour in EU foreign policy through a flexible system of Core Groups (or EU Liaising Groups). These Core Groups will consist of the highest foreign policy officials within the EU as well as Foreign Affairs Ministers from Member States that can contribute to that particular area of foreign policy. In the flexible Core Group model suggested by Keukeleire, uninterested Member States do not have to decide on matters they neither understand nor wish to understand (2007: 13). The idea then is that different issue areas will have different core groups. Indeed, a similar construct has led to the success of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process. The case of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reinforces the notion that Member States have the primary responsibility of decision-making. Yet, it also exemplifies the potential of division of labour among EU Member States. It is reflective of less competition among Member States and institutions, more internal coordination within the EU and more multi-actor involvement, giving rise to multilateralism.

Keukeleire further states that the Commission can be excluded where the focus of the Core Group is “military crises management or if it is concerned with strategic military matters” (2007: 13-14). However, excluding the Commission because a matter is perceived irrelevant to its mandate would be an error in judgment if the quest is for more integration within the EU as a whole. The perception that the Commission is irrelevant when these matters are under discussion is a false one. Often, Commission representatives have the country knowledge and the expertise to assist and advise the Council and Member States on how to proceed within a specific terrain. Personnel from the Commission played a significant role regarding day-to-day dialogue with the African Union as the inception of EU Delegation Office to the AU. Their inclusion in the EURORECAMP AMANI-AFRICA process has served to integrate Council representatives and Commission representatives in the field. It would therefore be important for this to be replicated at the headquarters in Brussels.
Despite the role of the Commission as the belligerent actor in the small arms case study, Member States are often the obstacle to division of labour on peace and security issues. This is evident regarding the final challenge. Security as part of foreign relations remains jealously guarded by Member States. If Member States are unwilling to muster the will to contribute to strategies jointly based on comparative advantage and specialisation, attaining a foreign policy for the EU based on division of labour is impossible. Without political will, the implementation of EU external relations commitments through a division of labour model becomes irrelevant. Although division of labour allows the EU Member States to bypass the urgency for a single foreign policy, this is simply a fact but unactionable due to the lack of political will. Additionally, domestic sentiment towards the existence of and participation within the European Union will also play a crucial role in Member States’ further involvement in the EU’s external role.

Resolving the challenges identified will be critical to the role of the European Union as an international security actor in the 21st century. It is no longer enough to separate external relations into different spheres: one that is Community based, as is development policy and one that is intergovernmental, as is security. Both have been shown to be mutually dependent and they require an integrated approach. However, each sphere currently represents two different images of the European Union that may be difficult to reconcile. As one EU military official notes, in order for division of labour to work for EU-Africa relations, “the European Union must decide what type of actor it is: is it an NGO with altruistic motives, just there to support the African Union, or is it a Governmental Organisation there to promote its own interests. ...At the moment, it is trying to do both.”135 Finding the right balance between supporting the African Union, while promoting ‘EU’ interests is important to the EU’s image as a progressive international security actor. Without addressing its internal limitations however, the EU remains limited in its ability to be a more effective international actor.

The challenges addressed here further the argument that through the achievement of Division of Labour, change or something akin to this will occur. On the one hand, it transforms the nature of the external relations structure of the EU and consequently the

135 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Military Personnel, 13th July 2010.
nature of EU-Africa relations. On the other hand, division of labour also transforms the policy outcome of cooperation.

7.4 Security as Change: Between Layering and Conversion

In evaluating change within EU-Africa relations, this thesis relies on expressions found in recent scholarships on historical institutionalism. Traditionally, one of the benefits of historical institutionalism had been its ability to highlight the power of path-dependency within an institutional framework (Pierson, 2005). However, the reality of institutional evolution has re-directed recent studies in this field to theorise about change (Hacker, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003, 2004).

In the books *How Institutions Evolve*, and *Explaining Institutional Change* Thelen (2004 & 2010 respectively) suggests that endogenous factors have a greater effect on institutional change than exogenous ones. In examining the case of security cooperation within the institution of EU-Africa relations, changes occurring within the international system after the Cold War had a big impact on the re-examination of insecurity in Africa as well as re-defining security to include new concepts of the security-development nexus and human security. The prevailing historical institutionalist literature would argue that the end of the Cold War constituted a critical juncture for EU-Africa relations without which the changes we see could not have occurred. Thelen’s thesis about institutional evolution does not discount the impact of a critical juncture such as the end of the Cold War; however, she contends that substantive changes happen beyond those critical junctures which are enabled by internal changes within the institution itself. The evidence from the case studies strongly supports Thelen’s argument. While the international environment may have been conducive to security cooperation in EU-Africa relations, it was the strength of EU security capabilities and the re-organisation of regionalism in Africa that has most affected the changed processes we see today.

In the overall context of international relations and international cooperation, the inclusion of security cooperation in 2000, the EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007 were *internally* significant for the EU and Africa. Hence, the changes were internal rather than external ones (see Thelen, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2004; Hacker,
Further, these three milestones can be viewed as incremental rather than ‘shocks’ as they have not caused dramatic upheavals among the core actors. These incremental changes have affected the direction of EU-Africa relations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) to varying degrees. It is in this context that mechanisms of institutional evolution, layering and/or conversion are relevant to the study of contemporary EU-Africa relations.

As introduced earlier in the thesis, layering is “the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable institutional framework. Such amendments . . . can alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s development” (Thelen: 2004: 35). The period of politicisation until 2000 is emblematic of change through layering where the primary institutional framework being used was the EU-ACP relationship. By pursuing a new relationship with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and subsequently the African Union, based on new goals, the EU-Africa institution aspired towards institutional conversion as a means of evolution. Conversion is “the adoption of new goals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalition on which institutions are founded can drive a change in the functions these institutions serve or the role they perform” (Thelen, 2004:36). The extent to which this conversion has been realised has been an overarching concern of this thesis. The evidence suggests that conversion has not been realised.

In Chapter 1, I identified and defined the three principles of change in EU-Africa relations would hope to achieve. They are equality, partnership and ownership. Indeed, the observance of these principles sits at the heart of whether security cooperation between the EU and AU suggests a shift from prior relations. The in-depth account of the two case studies offers a wealth of information from which we can ascertain the impact of security cooperation on the three principles (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Observing Change in EU-Africa Relations through Security Cooperation

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA</th>
<th>SALW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a principle of change, *equality* is a core aspiration of new EU-Africa relations and the intended result of partnership. First articulated at the EU level in the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, equality is an indicator also internalised by EU Member States. For instance, sources close to former Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasised the administration’s desire that all British foreign policy in Africa reflect an equal relationship (Forsyth, 2008). The French foreign policy towards Africa also suggested a change that moved towards an equal relationship with African states, both bilaterally and through the African Union (Nabakwe, 2003; Chafer, 2002). This was certainly a driving principle when proposing the shift from RECAMP to EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.

The core impetus as articulated by European partners for the shift to a more equal relationship was that it would yield a more mutually beneficial relationship for both the EU and Africa. Hence, equality was perceived to be a quality that would change EU-Africa relations for the better. Overall, EU-Africa security cooperation shows that some degree of equality has been achieved in EU-Africa relations. In examining EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, we find that the European Union is very sensitive to the preference of the African Union. The peace and security department of the African Union has as much say in the daily organisation, training and capacity building as the European Union. Indeed, this activism is sometimes detrimental to the process since the African Union does not have the same resources and internal decision mechanisms that have been devised for the European representatives at the Delegation offices in Addis Ababa, Paris and Brussels.

The division of labour employed by the European counterparts in EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA helps to mitigate some of the shortcomings of the African side. While the arrangement of EURORECAMP encourages equality, the significant advancement of the European side, which can be advantageous for efficiency, also impacts on equality. For instance, the European Union has been more vociferous about needing other partners to ensure multilateralism through the inter-regional process. While the African Union agrees with the assessment that other partners would benefit its capability building projects, it
has not always promoted this type of multilateralism. Although the AU seeks funding from external partners, it is not always willing to give these partners access to its own planning processes. This obstinacy is consistent with the culture of secrecy in intelligence and other security matters. This is of course in contrast to the transparency advocated in Europe and North America. This difference in approach has sometimes put the EU and AU partners at odds with each other. The tendency for the European Union to demand transparency on collaborative projects and EU funded initiatives can however be seen as rendering the relationship unequal.

Regarding the pan-African initiative and overall cooperation on small arms, acknowledging the African Union as the EU’s partner signalled the move towards equality. However, the practice challenges this initial impression. In bypassing the African Union in favour of RECSA, the European Commission gave the impression to the AU that it was not competent enough to be a partner. This, AU officials felt could have been remedied if there was better communication among EU agencies such as the EU Delegation and the AU.

Aside from being a desired principle in itself, equality is also a component of the new EU-Africa partnership (JAES, 2007). Partnership is determined by the continued institutionalisation of political dialogue and cooperation and it is another aspiration of current EU-Africa relations. Partnership is a “move away from a traditional relationship” (JAES, 2007). The new drive towards partnership identifies 2000 as the changing point from previous relations with the Cairo Declaration and Action Plan. Empirically, partnership would mean African preferences are incorporated into decisions about Africa, changing the dynamic of the relationship. Rather than simply absorbing European requests in exchange for development aid, partnership would involve consensus on issues which enhance development, peace and security.

In examining whether security cooperation has contributed to partnership and in what ways it has happened, the two case studies yield two different results. In the case of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, elements of partnership as defined within the parameters of the goals of the EU-Africa institution are observable. In the first instance, the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA arrangement emphasises the importance of consensus
among the EU and AU partners. Indeed, the success of the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA’s mission depends on true partnership among the actors. Further, by actively participating at every stage of the planning and implementation, partnership is possible. For the most part then, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA exhibits the characteristics expected from an EU-Africa partnership.

Concerning the small arms cooperation, partnership is more difficult to observe. For instance, although the EU contends that it is implementing the current Guinea Bissau Security Sector Reform (including micro-disarmament) project in the context of the JAES this claim is not evident. Although supported by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and therefore by the Member States) it is being implemented by the European Commission. The EU at no time consulted the African Union about how to best approach the situation in Guinea Bissau. One AU official noted the AU Commission’s disappointment at the seeming exclusion.\footnote{136 Interview, African Union, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 13\textsuperscript{th} July 2010.} The EU countered AU concerns by asserting that the government of Guinea Bissau invited EU participation, not EU-AU engagement. This alibi however reinforces the idea that the SSR project is another programme implemented by a donor to a country recipient. In this example, the EU bypasses the new aims of inter-regionalism for existing patterns of a bi-lateral engagement in Africa. Further, the case study on SALW generally indicates that there is currently no shared vision between European and African partners, which impedes the process of partnership. Additionally, the lack of local input creates a vacuum when EU practitioners decide to leave.

As of August 2010, the European Union is suspending its activities in the Guinea Bissau citing insecurity. Yet, the job is not complete and the Security Sector in Guinea Bissau remains precarious. Having a local partner such as the African Union could have been useful to the EU. Unlike the EU, the African Union is required to stay until it establishes a workable security within its Member States since insecurity here has consequences for African regional security. However, the EU can opt out whenever it chooses, which is exactly what has happened. Presently, it is difficult to gauge what the benefit of the EU’s engagement in Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau is, in light of the current situation.
Achieving *ownership*, if realised, would arguably be the most important change in EU-Africa relations. Achieving ownership meaning the local control of policy design and implementation has been difficult. I have shown that when there are disagreements over policy choices between international partners, the tendency is for the dominant partner to see ownership as “commitment to policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen” (de Renzio, et al. 2008: 2). For instance, despite the inter-regionalisation process of security which begun in 2000, the partnership of European and African actors was not officially forged until 2007. Even then, it was only on paper with no indication of how this would translate to practice. Given the institutional challenges the AU faces, effectiveness is sometimes traded off for ownership, wherein the AU loses control of key decision-making opportunities as in the pan-African initiative. In doing this, Africa’s partners like the EU rob the AU of the opportunity to empower itself and African institutions.

The SALW case study is a classic example of the dominant partners’ “commitment to policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen” (de Renzio et al. 2008: 2). In this case, the failure to ensure proper ownership of the process for Africa has been detrimental to the African vision for small arms control. As soon as the AU expressed difficulty with implementing the European Commission’s pan-African initiative, the Commission regressed into old practices. It chose a contractor it felt comfortable with by using RECSA. Further, the Commission chose not to utilise other EU resources such as the EU Delegation to the AU, and left out the African Union in the final stages of negotiations. Arguably, had the AU been involved in the process it would have done the same things the European Commission has, but it did not have the opportunity to be involved. The edging out of local actors for the sake of efficiency was consistent with past practices of SALW interventions in Africa where the EU is simply a donor whose primary concern is simply to fulfill the perceived objectives of the mission without regard for immediate and future implications for leaving out the local voice (see Carbone, 2010). Further, it undermines the aims of regional/continental integration on small arms issues in Africa since RECSA lacks a continental mandate. All these three principles are mutually constitutive and for the success of each one, the EU-Africa institution needs the other two.

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137 Interview, African Union, Defence and Security, Addis Ababa, 19th July 2010. An AU Official contends that because RECSA lacks a continental mandate, the African Union has had some trouble convincing the other
7.5 Conclusion: Change on a Continuum

This chapter has offered a detailed analysis of the two case studies of security cooperation in the context of their contribution to changes in EU-Africa relations. In assessing the case studies, it is apparent that change is not a rigid category; rather at this stage of EU-Africa relations, it is a moving target. Whereas the EU’s support for the African Standby Force suggests changes in EU-Africa relations through security cooperation, EU support for building the AU’s small arms capabilities is less positive. The unevenness of change within the policy area suggests a middle way where the contribution of security cooperation to changes in EU-Africa relations is both static and in motion.

The aim of new EU-Africa relations as outlined in the JAES is to alter the existing framework through the eight partnership areas. While the aim of the JAES is conversion, the research evidence suggests security cooperation in recent EU-Africa relations is still partly based on layering. This being the case, security cooperation illustrates changes within EU-Africa relations as being on a continuum between layering and conversion (see illustration in Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2: Illustrating Security as Change in EU-Africa Relations

The evidence from the case studies also suggests that in cases where the EU-Africa relations are moving towards this change, positive results are being yielded. It is evident from comparing the case studies that both the EU and the AU have a role to play in changing EU-Africa relations. However, the role of the EU as the dominant partner has a more pronounced impact on the transformation of EU-Africa relations. The inability of the EU to fulfil its commitments as an actor within the institution (EU-Africa relations) adversely affects the African Union’s ability to be an active, equal partner.

Regional Economic Communities that RECSA is right for this job. This has especially been the case with RECs like ECOWAS who already have extensive experience with small arms control initiatives.
The two cases show different outcomes despite being based on the same inter-regional framework, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The comparative analysis has identified the conditions under which change has been possible. It reveals that the changes in EU-Africa security relations have been more likely when the European Union contributions are organised through a division of labour among EU actors and when the AU is able participate significantly in the design and implementation of a particular process. Division of labour tends to reduce competition since each actor is viewed as a constituent part of the whole and the actors’ interests are aligned. Whereas new initiatives have introduced the potential for changes in the EU-Africa relations, the potential is only realised when a division of labour model is instituted. While the European Union remains the dominant partner as a result of its capabilities vis-à-vis the Africa Union, its position is not necessarily malevolent. On the contrary, where the European Union acknowledges its position and its potential impact on the ability to achieve local ownership, and promote partnership and equality, the EU-Africa institution tends to be more transformative.

Change remains an aspiration of recent EU-Africa relations. Both the European Union and its African partners intend for each of the eight cooperation areas in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy to contribute to this change, which makes security cooperation relevant for assessing changes in EU-Africa relations. This aspired change is determined by the extent to which African actors can engage in active partnership through equality and ownership. It further relies on the European Union to support African-led initiatives and to consider the local knowledge of the Africa partners. Overall, this assessment of the two case studies highlights the usefulness of using the analytical framework of institutionalised inter-regionalism to assess the aspiration of change in the context of recent EU-Africa security cooperation.
CONCLUSION: CHANGE DEFERRED

Introduction
The thesis has examined the contribution of security cooperation to changes in EU-Africa relations by addressing the question: *to what extent has security cooperation contributed to changes in EU-Africa relations?* This thesis argued that current EU-Africa relations rely on the institutionalisation of prior processes. Consequently, it developed an appropriate analytical frame, *institutionalised inter-regionalism* through which it examined contemporary EU-Africa relations. The thesis further argued that the inter-regionalisation of security creates an opportunity for a new sort of relationship between the two partners. The thesis has undertaken a systematic analysis of the evolution of EU-Africa relations, highlighting newer processes of international security cooperation.

This chapter reviews and reiterates the thesis’ research outcomes. It demonstrates the contribution of the thesis to the study of the EU in international relations. It broadly addresses three main issues. First, it highlights the continued significance of EU Member States within EU foreign policy arrangements and the emergence of the African Union as an emissary for Africa’s security concerns. Second, it shows the continued institutionalisation of EU-Africa relations through the acceptance of new structures and ongoing dialogue between the African Union and European Union. Third, the chapter assesses the thesis contribution to the literatures on regionalism and the EU as an international actor, while assessing the prospects for further changes within the EU-Africa institution.

The chapter consists of four sections. The first section highlights the primary findings of the research project. The second section locates the thesis findings within the broader scholarship of the EU as an International Actor, highlighting the role of relevant actors within the EU and the process of EU-Africa relations. This section concludes that EU Member States are important to the construction of EU external relations policies. Nonetheless, it highlights the potential for the EU’s security actorness without a single
European foreign policy. The third section explores avenues for future research based on EU-Africa relations, EU external relations and the increasing role of the African Union as an international actor. The fourth and final section concludes the chapter assessing the prospects for EU-Africa relations under the new Lisbon Treaty.

8.1 Making Sense of Change in EU-Africa Relations

The in-depth analysis of cases illustrating security cooperation in Chapter 7 reveals that security cooperation's contribution to change in EU-Africa relations is uneven. Whereas European Union Member States were able to coordinate their efforts to support the African Standby Force (through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA) despite the military element, and effect some changes in their approach to Africa, the case of small arms was less successful in modifying how things work. The unevenness in the achievement of change is also compounded by the fact that this thesis has a narrow scope assessing only security cooperation. It therefore cannot speak to overall change in EU-Africa relations without having assessed the other seven cooperation areas. Nevertheless, the assessment of one area of cooperation, security, offers a tangible exposition of EU-Africa processes towards change.

From the onset, the thesis sought to understand the contributions of security cooperation to change within the EU-Africa institution, that is, what security cooperation says about changes in EU-Africa relations. The thesis does this by examining relevant instances of cooperation and the effect they have had on the institution. This appraisal highlighted the endogenous changes within the EU-Africa intended to result in bigger aspirations of partnership and equality between the EU and Africa partners as well as local ownership of peace and security process within Africa. However, one of the interesting findings of this systematic appraisal of changes is the possibility of an alternative trajectory of where change comes from. Whereas, the intention of the research question posed was to investigate security cooperation as a condition of changes in EU-Africa relations (see Figure 1.1), the result of the study could also suggest that security cooperation is the end result of other external changes affecting the EU-Africa institution. In other words, changes such as the creation of the African Union and increased EU capabilities contributed to the
inter-regionalisation of security and the eventual inclusion of security cooperation as one source of evolution in EU-Africa relations.

The results of security cooperation in EU-Africa relations is certainly not linear; further, the research process considers factors affecting the EU-Africa institution which has subsequently led to the prioritisation and cooperation on peace and security issues. However, while a factor such as the reinvigoration of the pan-African agenda has resulted in a new type of relationship within the EU-Africa institution, substantive changes have only occurred after security cooperation was instituted. For instance, the African Union is able to exhibit ownership of peace and security practices after the process of security cooperation had already started. Indeed, the AU is able to exhibit regional actorship following international support and commitment for its peace and security aims. Further, the exercise of new EU capabilities, and the shift towards division of labour (within the EU) are necessary the demands of cooperation. The complex nature of change within the EU-Africa institution suggests that while security cooperation produces changes in EU-Africa relations, these changes also reinforce the process of security cooperation (see Figure 8.1).
Overall, the case analysis showed that several factors affect the degree of change in EU-Africa relations. Although the European Union accepts the African Union as a credible partner, the limited resources and capabilities of the AU impede activities that reinforce inter-regionalism, active partnership and local ownership. The limited resources of the African Union were a challenge when the European Commission initially approached the African Union about supporting continental small arms initiatives. The inability of the African Union to contribute sufficiently to a partnership with the Commission led to the prioritisation of the RECSA as the African partner on the pan-African initiative. Nevertheless, the European Union also has a significant role to play in contributing to changes in EU-Africa relations, especially as the dominant partner.

The case studies confirmed that in addition to historical relationships, prior interests within the EU Member States guide new commitments for support. When the Member States with the support of the European Commission are committed to a particular security aim, they are willing to use their resources through the European Union. In evaluating EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA for example, because both France and Britain had the previous experience of working together, it was easier to get both to replicate that experience. Although Germany articulated its initial commitment through the G8, its commitment to continental conflict prevention made the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA a relevant avenue for supporting the AU. Prior areas of interests therefore provided the additional impetus for coordination among EU Member States.

Additionally, changes within Africa such as the African Union’s increased willingness to work with the European Union has enabled changes in EU-Africa relations, especially the inter-regionalisation of the EU-Africa institution. A good illustration of the increased acceptance of the EU as a key external partner of the AU is the growth of the EU Delegation to the AU. In April 2009, the number of officials representing the EU at the delegation office was under 20. In the same period, the EU Delegation to AU shared spaces with the Commission delegation in Ethiopia. A year later, the EU delegation office had moved closer
to the Africa Union in its own office space and had more than 50 staff members. According to officials from the delegation office, the working relationship between the EU and the AU has improved because the delegation office is able to translate the African Union’s demands to the EU institutions in Brussels and to Member States’ capitals.

The ability to communicate African demands through the Delegation has improved African ‘ownership’ within joint Africa-EU collaborations. Whereas in the past the EU initiated decisions about partnership that affected both the EU and Africa in Brussels, the ongoing process of consultation and negotiation between the African Union and the EU delegation office is gradually changing this status-quo. In the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA case study, the military personnel based in the EU Delegation to the AU acts as the intermediary between Brussels and Addis Ababa. As the EU Delegation is able to experience firsthand the needs of the African Union, they can make a better appeal on behalf of the African Union. However, in the case of small arms where the EU Delegation to the AU has been absent from negotiations between the European Commission and the AU, AU officials feel African needs are not being met.

8.2 Regions, Regionalism, Inter-regionalism: Actors & International Cooperation

The findings of this thesis have implications for the study of the international organisations in international relations generally. The role of EU Member States in the design and implementation of relevant security processes has heavily influenced the progress towards change through security cooperation. Since the European Union does not have independent capabilities, this involvement of national capitals is consistent with managing security within the EU. Further, when the Member States initiate a process in which they can choose their roles as part of a collective effort, there are increased chances of fulfilling EU obligations to external partners. Additionally, in addressing security cooperation through inter-regionalism, Member States such as the UK, France and Germany supported by Italy, Spain and Portugal significantly influence the ability of the EU to engage in international security. Aside from the commitment to division of labour, individual commitments to treating the African continent as a whole has contributed to elevating the status of the African Union as the key and equal partner in EU-Africa relations.

138 Interview, European Delegation to the African Union, Political Affairs, 13th July 2010.
Additionally, since 2005, the emphasis on empowering African countries that has emerged as part of the discourse of foreign policy in individual Member States has also contributed to its adoption of partnership and ownership principles at the regional level. Consequently although the parameters of new EU-Africa relations guide the cooperation processes, the EU Member States had provided active agency within the institution.

In the case of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, the EU was able to support the Africa Standby Force as well as achieve changes in EU-Africa relations. Achieving change through support of African initiatives, i.e. local ownership was a main objective for peace and security cooperation. In contrast, despite the individual Member States' commitments to eradicating the scourge of small arms, the perceived challenge of the European Commission means that this policy area remains a bi-lateral policy. One AU official expressed surprise at Spain’s approach to supporting small arms initiatives within the AU despite the ongoing dialogue vis-à-vis the European Commission. Pursuing individual small arms policies not only impedes integration of policy in the EU; it imposes the same disintegration on the AU, since the AU has to cater to individual partners, rather than a single one – the EU. The fragmentation of AU attentions on different partners strains the AU’s limited resources to engage with external partners. Further, it confirms that increased security capabilities for the European Union for the present and immediate future will continue to rely on the political will of the EU Member States.

The key role of Member States does not discount the role of the EU institutions such as the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC). They assist in shaping Member States’ interests and responses to challenges in international security. For instance, the European Commission who managed the EU-ACP relations has been integral to providing general guidelines and objectives for the EU-Africa dialogues. Furthermore, the Commission has played a substantial role in defining the parameters of ‘division of labour’ within the European Union. Similarly, the Special Advisor on African Peacekeeping and his staff based in the GSC and the EU Delegation to the AU are integral to designing, planning and implementing the European position on EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.

139 Interview, African Union, Defence and Security, 19th July 2010.
The European Parliament has its own positions on Africa, and on security within the European Union. Often, the Parliament commissions projects on EU external relations and perceptions of EU external relations. However, the present research did not reveal the parliament to be a significant actor in the construction or implementation of EU-Africa security cooperation. Despite the role of the Commission and the Council, the ultimate decision of creating a regional position on security cooperation with external partners rests with the Member States themselves.

Undoubtedly, the African Union has also contributed to the change and *status* in EU-Africa relations. The very existence of the African Union has been a core motivator for the changes in EU-Africa relations. The prioritisation of peace and security within the African Union has further created an amenable environment for the EU to engage in security cooperation with African institutions. Although the EU engages with the AU and other African institutions and countries in other policy areas such as development assistance and trade, peace and security currently represents its highest investments. However, the lack of complete integration of the Regional Economic Communities into the African Peace and Security Architecture encumbers the full ownership of African initiatives. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the African Union has proved to be an effective advocate for peace and security in Africa. Given the pressing challenges of security in places like the Sudan and Somalia where the African Union is actively engaged, external partners admit that overall, the AU’s actions have been impressive. In demanding ownership of peace and security, the African Union has initiated a possible metamorphosis of Africa’s role in international relations.

Some of the economics literature on regionalism has contended that regionalism will replace comprehensive cooperation among actors in the international system, in the form of multilateralism (Bhagwhati, 1992; Winters, 1996; Koopman, 2003). The findings of this thesis would generally disprove this argument. In both of the cases examined the quest for EU-Africa security cooperation led to the involvement of more actors. The EUROCAMP-AMANI AFRICA case illustrates the EU’s potential to practice effective multilateralism, a

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140 This includes commitments to conflict prevention initiatives, which are also associated with development cooperation.

141 Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Peace and Security, April 2009.
specific aim of the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003). In addition to EU Member States and institutions, NATO as a group as well as Canada and the United States and the UN all contributed to the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA process.

As for the role of the EU in international relations, the thesis also highlights the importance of external actors in the construction, implementation and outcomes of EU foreign policies. Whereas most studies on EU external relations focus on negotiations within the EU, this thesis shows that the action recipient also has an impact on policy outcomes (for an exception see Elgström, 2007). Empirical evidence from this research shows that the lack of integration on the part of the African Union, and its limited capabilities had a negative impact on the progress towards change. Additionally, it has also affected the progress of both EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA and a mainstreamed continental small arms strategy to the frustration of EU actors. The institutionalised inter-regionalism framework is able to account not only for the existence of other partners, but also for how prior actions in those partnerships can influence EU-Africa relations. Further, an institutionalist approach to patterns of international cooperation links the activities on one level (among EU Member States and within Africa), to a second level (the inter-regional level between the African Union and the European Union). Overall, the findings of this research suggest that the EU is able to implement its external relations commitment without a single foreign policy. This is possible when it works within existing resources, especially the prior interests of Member States and supportive EU institutions.

8.3 Beyond Europe and Africa: Reflecting Back, Looking Forward

This thesis has covered a variety of related topics. It examined the conditions under which changes can occur within an international institution. Additionally, it has also examined the process of inter-regionalism in EU-Africa relations, the historical context of current relations and new patterns of international cooperation. It highlighted the opportunities and limitations of the new regional integration process in Africa vis-à-vis the African Union. Still, the research also raised issues and highlighted research paths beyond the immediate scope of this thesis. This section will consider some of those issues as possible avenues for future research.
The thesis has also revealed an increasing role for the EU delegation office to the African Union in the implementation of EU-Africa relations. The EU delegation to the AU has become a necessary intermediary between the AU and the EU in Brussels. It is the first integrated EU representation mandated by both the Council and the Commission. Consisting of over 50 officials, now including Member States secondments, it is essentially the first EU Embassy, a possible precursor to EU representations conceived as part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). An academic study of the EU Delegation to the AU would provide further insight into the benefit of EU diplomatic missions to increase EU influence in the international arena.  

One issue that would have linked in to the desire for change in EU-Africa relations is gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is the balanced participation of men and women in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies resulting in more gender equity and empowerment especially for women. Gender mainstreaming would therefore involve a gender audit prior to the implementation of any cooperation. Indeed, both the African and European Unions have committed to this objective in their external relations (Gya, 2009; Valenius, 2007; FAS, 2008). However, the need for gender mainstreaming is admittedly unacknowledged within the two case studies examined. In trying to decipher why the EU-Africa partnership did not apply gender mainstreaming to EURORECAMP AMANI-AFRICA or small arms control cooperation, the initial response from EU and AU officials was that there are more pressing concerns than gender mainstreaming. Given the EU’s opportunity to transfer gender mainstreaming as a norm to the AU and as the literature on EU gender mainstreaming in external relations is practically non-existent, assessing gender mainstreaming in EU-Africa relations would be a perfect avenue for further research. Research in this area can contribute to EU external relations, EU-Africa relations and gender studies.

This thesis has focused on EU-Africa security relations, primarily through the African Union. In doing so, it has overlooked other policy areas of cooperation in region-to-region cooperation including EU Member States bi-lateral relations. The thesis however

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142 Whitman (2010) begins to consider some of these issues.
acknowledges that existing relationships between EU Member States and particular African countries influences the level of commitment to African issues during European negotiations. For example, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was the main priority for the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007. According to one official, Portugal’s interests in Africa vis-à-vis its former colonies played a role in Portugal’s campaign for a comprehensive EU-Africa strategy. Further assessment of EU Member States’ position on African issues could be insightful in forecasting a division of labour within the EU. Similarly, the thesis narrowly focused on capacity building support for the African Union rather than any other EU actions such as enhancing dialogue, establishing predicable funding for African Peace Facility or direct interventions such as the EU’s Naval Mission on the coast of Somalia (EU NAVFOR).

These other examples of the EU’s engagement in security issues in Africa are also important to developing a holistic understanding of the EU’s security relationship with Africa. For good reasons, the scope of this research necessarily prevents broader exploration to the other eight areas of cooperation. Assessing the seven other areas of cooperation would provide an answer that can be generalised to the question of whether new EU-Africa relations signal a transformation of the institution. These other areas also present avenues for future research on EU-Africa security cooperation, and the division of labour process within the EU.

Although the focus of this thesis was the relationship between two regional actors, its findings offer a glimpse into one area of regional actorness. A further avenue for research would be a comparison of the integration processes of these two regions. There is the potential to contribute to the literature on comparative regionalism by comparing the African experience, which started out as a political process, to the European experience which started as an economic process. As it stands, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to studies on regionalisms by highlighting the integration processes of both Europe and Africa.

144 Interview, Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels, 14th January 2009.
Finally, Rudy Baker (2009) has noted that International Relations theorists and practitioners have not appreciated the usefulness of new institutionalist perspectives for the field. However, the New Institutionalism literature has proved useful at examining ‘bounded systems’ such as inter-regionalism within the international system. The analysis of change undertaken within this thesis offers insights into the function of inter-regionalism as a mode of cooperation within the international system, and its effect on other processes such as multilateralism.

8.4 Conclusion: Deferring Change

At the conclusion of the field research for this thesis, an EU official admitted that the first Action Plan outlined under the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which included support for building the African Peace and Security Architecture, had been too ambitious. It would seem that the institutional capabilities of the African Union had been overestimated. Additionally, the EU overestimated its own abilities to be a cohesive actor, as evidenced by the small arms case study. There is still much to learn about EU-Africa relations, in general and about the security cooperation in particular as both the EU and AU prepare for the second Action Plan in November 2010. The construction and implementation of the second Action Plan would be a test for the EU’s external relations apparatuses given the new Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty intends to increase the impact of the EU in the world. However, while the Lisbon Treaty provides the legal framework for further integration within EU external relations, only time will tell the extent to which its provisions will impact on EU-Africa (security) relations.

To conclude, the current peace and security cooperation undertaken by the European Union and African Union is emblematic of the long history of relations between the EU and Africa; yet it also represents an evolution of the historical relations. The thesis has undertaken a careful appraisal of the current cooperation in the context of existing relations. The thesis applies a historical institutionalist approach to the inter-regional EU-Africa relations. Through this framework, it explored the impact that changes in international relations have had on EU-Africa relations. These changes, including the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in Africa, the formation of the African Union and better
coordination among EU Member States and institutions have contributed to incremental changes within EU-Africa relations.

The thesis finds that the inter-regionalisation of security introduced something new in EU-Africa relations. Substantive changes in these relations are however dependent on the importance of the African Union as Africa's interlocutor, the increased capabilities of the European Union and the better organisation of those capabilities, as well as the conditions in the international system promoting renewed engagement in African peace and security. I have argued that Division of Labour within the European Union's security apparatus is critical to further effectiveness and progress which allow African ownership, active partnership between the EU and Africa and the continued consideration of African institutions in the decision making processes – changes - of the EU's external relations towards Africa. Presently, transformative change, which alters existing EU-Africa relations, has not (yet) happened insofar as security cooperation is concerned.

New arrangements under the Lisbon Treaty and increased African Union capabilities could hasten change. However, the political will of all the actors involved, especially EU Member States is central to further changes. The EU's longstanding relationship with Africa and its increasing participation in international security engagements, makes the EU a viable international actor, albeit one with much to do and learn. Further, the role of the African Union as Africa's intermediary has developed through its security cooperation with external partners, especially the European Union. The thesis has highlighted the practice of the human security approach in EU-Africa relations, and the prioritisation of a continental approach to security in Africa. Further, EU-Africa security cooperation depicts new patterns of international cooperation through inter-regionalism. Overall, security cooperation contributes to changes in EU-Africa relations and these changes in turn reinforce the processes of security cooperation.
Appendix I

Research Notes

At the beginning of this research, the academic literature on recent political cooperation, particularly security cooperation was limited. It was therefore necessary to rely on the analysis of official documents and conduct interviews. This project conducted 35 interviews with officials within the European Commission, and the European Union Member States in the General Secretariat of the Council and in the Permanent Representation offices. Interviewees also included experts in the African Union (AU), African Regional Economic Communities, as well as the United Nations. In addition to these, interviews were conducted with respondents outside the EU and AU including academics and consultants working in the area of EU-Africa relations. All interviews were conducted in person except one; while one was conducted via email correspondence. All interviews in-depth semi structured interviews with the personal interviews varying from 45 to 90 minutes in length. All interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis to encourage free expression and honesty on the part of interviewees.

For this research, I was well aware that each interviewee would undoubtedly be concerned about how the institution he or she represents is portrayed and this may affect the type of data collected. However, by broadening the base of possible respondents, this problem was mitigated. For instance, asking contract workers to the AU the same questions as permanent staff members or asking the EU staff seconded to the AU about the African institutions. In this way I was able to corroborate statements about institutional function, contexts and planning for future cooperation.

There were other challenges that deal with the actual interviewing processes, such as the pre-interview process of identifying interviewees. Inherent in the pool of interviewees, which consisted of elites or experts, were problems of access both because of the subject matter, and also because elites are in general hard to get to. Many interviewees were difficult to reach, as they are often busy and/or reluctant to speak on matters such as security perceived as sensitive. The research subject, security, is one where the ranks are often closed to outsiders intrinsically limiting interviewee choices. Yet, it was necessary to
rely on the pool of possible of respondents, which consisted of experts who work on peace and security issues and had the authority to speak.

In preparation for the fieldwork, interviewees were derived through extensive searches within the European Union’s directories and European NGOs and research institutions whose works focus on EU-Africa relations generally. It focused on people working in the area of peace and security, development and aid, humanitarian intervention, civilian and military missions, the CFSP, and EU Member States representation offices. In Addis Ababa, interviewees were introduced through three key contacts: an official in the EU Delegation to the African Union, an official of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and an Africanist working at the South African based Institute for Security Studies. These contacts made the appropriate introductions to the peace and security personnel of the African Union. Further interviewees were identified by a continuous referral system from prior interviews. These personal referrals gave me access to otherwise inaccessible senior officials.

Each interviewee was required to read and sign consent forms explicitly granting permission for the contents of the interview to be used in the thesis. The consent forms contained a summary of the research and expectations of the interview processes. It specified that identifying and personal details such other than generic terms like ‘EU official’ will not be divulged. The consent forms also gave the research participant an opportunity to allow or decline a recorded interview. While some participants declined to be recorded, all research participants allowed me to take detailed and the opportunity for follow up questions and interviewees. Both the myself and the participant signed the forms and each kept a copy for reference.

In addition to interviews, the analysis of documents also contributed substantively to the research thesis. Miller and Alvarado (2005) offer three categories of document analysis “(a) the analysis of documents for their content (content analytic); (b) the analysis of documents as commentary (context analytic); and, (c) the analysis of documents as actors (context analytic).” These categorisations reflect the importance of document in the contextual analysis of social and political events. Within the thesis, documents formed a
critical part of construct the narrative of security cooperation. Documents were organised using various categories including what type it was (e.g. press release, official agreements or journal articles), who was issuing it (e.g. EU, AU, UN, joint issuance, NGO, think tank, research publication, newspaper article etc) and what it was addressing (e.g. EU external relations, African security, methodology, concepts etc). I also applied categories to interview transcripts and field notes. With the majority of the documents used in the research, categories overlapped more often than not, which was enriching to contextual analysis. Dividing documents in this manner was primarily for organisational ease. However, it helped to create a well-ordered narrative construct.

An important part of the research process was reflexivity. Reflexivity served as an advantage during the selection of research participants. Because non-probability sampling potentially creates selection bias, thereby compromising the findings of the research project, interviewees outside the EU and African institutions became essential to the project. Hence, other interviewees included including academics and senior officers in not-for profit institutions working in the field of EU-Africa relations, EU external relations, African peace and security and international relations.

Finally, a unique opportunity for triangulation was undertaken following the initial period of field research and analysis. In early 2010, I returned to Addis Ababa to share some of initial findings with previous respondents and new research participants. The purpose of returning was for clarification on nagging questions, and confirmation of initial impressions. It was also an opportunity to receive feedback on my initial analysis. This second fieldwork also provided an opportunity to consider whether activities occurring between the initial field research in 2009 and 2010 had significant impacts on the research findings.
Interview Consent Form

The research project to EU-Africa relations has been described to me. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in the project at any time without penalty. I understand that either the interviewer or a professional transcriptionist will listen to the tapes and type of the conservation we had. (These records will be kept confidential). Further, all attempts to anonymise my responses will be made by the primary researcher. I also understand that I will have a chance to review, correct, amend and approve (or not approve) the transcriptions, if any portion of the interview is quoted directly in the research project. I understand that the contents of the interview will only be published with my permission. I have read and understood the above information, and I consent to participate in this research project by signing below.

Name

Signature

Date

Interviewer:
Organograms of AU & EU Institutional Actors

AU Peace and Security Institutional Actors

Peace & Security Council

Peace and Security Directorate

Defence & Security Division

Conflict Management Department

Peace & Security Department

Secretariat of the Peace & Security Council

1) Counter Terrorism
2) Landmines
3) CADSP
4) SALW

1) Early Warning
2) Conflict Management*
3) Operational Support

1) ASF*
2) AU Military Staff
Appendix II
List of Interviews

Brussels (January 2009)
Interview with an official from the European Commission – DG RELEX (08/01/2009)
Interview with an expert from the EGMONT Institute (08/01/2009)
Interview with an official from the European Commission – DG Development (09/01/2009)
Interview with an official from ECDPM (12/01/2009)
Interview with an official from the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (12/01/2009)
Interview with an official from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (13/01/2009)
Interview with an official from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (office of special representative to Sudan) (13/01/2009)
Interview with an official from the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU (14/01/2009)

Paris (January 2009)
Interview with an official from the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (19/01/2009)

Addis Ababa, April – June 2009
Interview with an official from the AU Peace and Security Department, Conflict Management Division (08/04/2009)
Interview with an official from the AU Peace and Security Department, Conflict Management Division (08/04/2009)
Interview with an official from the EU Delegation to the AU, Peace and Security (14/04/2009)
Interview with an official from the AU, Defence and Security, (15/04/2009)
Interview with an official from the AU, (15/04/2009)
Interview with an official from AU Peace and Security Department (20/04/2009)
Interview with an official from AU Peace and Security Council (21/04/2009)
Interview with an official from AU Peace and Security Department (23/04/2009)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, Political Affairs (24/04/2009)
Interview with an official from ECOWAS (27/04/2009)
Interview with an official from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (29/04/2009)
Interview with an official from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (30/04/2009)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, Military Staff (30/04/2009)
Interview with an official from the General Secretariat of the Council (27/06/2010)

Bradford, England (September 2009)
Interview with an expert on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Owen Greene, University of Bradford, Centre for Peace Studies, (21/09/2009)
Eschborn (Germany) (October 2009)
Email interview with an official from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (20/10/2009)

Addis Ababa (July 2010)
Interview with an official from AU, Peace and Security Department, (08/07/2010)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, Political Affairs, (13/07/2010)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, Military Staff, (13/07/2010)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, Military Staff (13/07/2010)
Interview with an official from EU Delegation to the AU, (13/07/2010)
Interview with an official from AU, Defence and Security, Peace and Security Department (16/07/2010)
Interview with an official from AU, Conflict Prevention, Peace and Security Department (19/07/2010)
Interview with an official from the AU, Defence and Security, Peace and Security Department (19/07/2010)
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RECSA – Regional Centre for Small Arms. Available at: http://www.recsasec.org/

SHIRBRIG – Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations. Available at: www.shirbrig.dk
