Gear Shift:
Hindu Nationalism and the Evolution of Indian Security

Chris Ogden

PhD in Politics & International Relations
The University of Edinburgh
2010
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Abstract:

While many scholars have analysed the impact of culture, beliefs and norms on foreign policy, few have connected domestic political identities to international politics. This thesis makes this agenda explicit by showing how domestic policy sources directly impact upon a state’s external security policies. Rather than focusing on material factors (such as military expenditure or economic growth), I instead combine work concerned with constructed identities in international relations with accounts from social psychology of how identities develop and evolve over time. Relying upon empirical evidence from party documents and extensive interviews with over 60 members of India’s security community, this PhD thesis investigates how the identities, norms and ideologies of different political parties have influenced India’s foreign policy behaviour.

Employing an analytical framework consisting of multiple composite norms, I find that;

1) there has been a consistent approach to how Indian foreign policy has developed since 1947;
2) the 1998 to 2004 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance inculcated several substantive changes to India’s security policy, especially relating to nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, greater regional pragmatism and the use of realpolitik;
3) these normative changes continued into the post-NDA period, and produced an irrevocable gear shift in India’s accepted and evolving security practice.

By confirming and explaining the impact of domestic political identities on India’s foreign policy behaviour, this research makes a significant original contribution to the study of Indian security.
Acknowledgements:


I have also presented drafts of various sections of this thesis at several international conferences. At Edinburgh, I have especially benefited from participation in the International Politics Research Group and the Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS) Seminar Series. I wish to thank the participants and co-presenters at all these forums (see Appendix 2 for details) for their questions, insights and suggestions - many of which have informed and improved this project.

Finally, I am very grateful for the guidance and expertise of my supervisors; Professor John Peterson, Professor Roland Dannreuther (now at the University of Westminster) and Dr Gareth Price (at Chatham House) - your input over the last four years has made this project what it is. I also wish to thank the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for generously funding this PhD and an earlier MSc by Research (Politics). Thank you too to all the individuals I variously met, blindly contacted and interviewed while in India - your generosity, openness and knowledge taught me more than any library. Lastly, I am indebted to the solidarity of my fellow students over the years (especially Marc Herzog), The Eye, my parents and family, and, above all, Emilitsa.
Declaration:

This thesis is entirely the result of my own work. Material from the published and unpublished work of others which is referred to in the thesis is credited to the author in the text. This research has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification and it is approximately 78,000 words in length, excluding the bibliography.

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Dated: ............................................
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<td><em>Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad</em> (Indian Students Association)</td>
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<td>ahisma</td>
<td>non-violence</td>
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<td>AIADMK</td>
<td><em>All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</em></td>
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<td>AIPAC</td>
<td>American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>Akhand Bharat</td>
<td>undivided India</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meetings</td>
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<td>BCIM</td>
<td>Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar</td>
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<td>BEM</td>
<td>Big Emerging Market</td>
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<td><em>Bharat Mata</em></td>
<td>mother India</td>
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<td>BIMSTEC</td>
<td>Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand for Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BJS</td>
<td><em>Bharatiya Jana Sangh</em> - Indian People’s Alliance</td>
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<td>BJP</td>
<td><em>Bharatiya Janata Party</em> - Indian People’s Party</td>
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<td>BLTF</td>
<td>Bodo Liberation Tigers Force</td>
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<td>BMS</td>
<td><em>Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh</em> - Indian Workers’ Association</td>
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<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil-Russia-India-China</td>
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<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Cabinet Committee on Security</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism</td>
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<td>CICA</td>
<td>Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia</td>
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<td>Congress</td>
<td>Indian National Congress Party</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Far Eastern Naval Command</td>
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<td>Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>constructed Hindu nationalism</td>
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<td>Hizbul Mujahideen</td>
<td>the largest militant group in Kashmir</td>
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<th>International Atomic Energy Agency</th>
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<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa</td>
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<td>Indian Foreign Service</td>
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<td>IOR</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Region</td>
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<td>Indian Ocean Rim - Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<td>Inter-Services Intelligence - Pakistan's security agency</td>
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<td>the lower house of the Indian Parliament</td>
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<th>mutually assured destruction</th>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>Mukti Bahini</td>
<td>East Pakistan / Bangladesh liberation forces</td>
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<td>National Council for Educational Research and Training</td>
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<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>North East Frontier Agency</td>
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<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<td>the five powers with permanent UNSC vetoes</td>
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<td>the upper house of the Indian parliament</td>
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<td>Sangh Parivar</td>
<td>family of associations</td>
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<td>US-India Political Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vishnu Hindu Parishad - World Council of Hindus</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter 1:

‘Introduction: Identity, Indian Security Policy and the BJP’

‘we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies … (only) our interests are eternal and perpetual’
(Palmerston, 1848)

‘foreign policy should not be considered the policy of one party … (it) affects the fundamental interest of our society and has to be conducted … over an extended period of time’
(Kissinger, 2005: 215)

‘Self: that invisible chain that snaps tight whenever we stray’
(Lababidi, 2008: 72)

While many scholars have analysed the impact of ideational factors such as culture, beliefs and norms on foreign policy, few have connected domestic political identities to international politics (for exceptions, see Hopf, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Nau, 2002; Walker, 2009). I make this research agenda explicit by showing how domestic policy sources directly impact upon the construction of a state’s external security policies. This thesis investigates how the identities, norms and ideologies of political parties in India influence its security and foreign policy making and behaviour. My approach emphasises the primacy of ideational over material factors (such as military expenditure or economic growth), and synthesises predominantly social constructivist work within International Relations (IR) theory concerning norms with identity-driven accounts from Social Psychology. Such an inter-disciplinary and multi-faceted approach aims to comprehensively develop IR and security studies research (especially on strategic culture), by offering new perspectives on how norms, identities and history impact upon the formation of a state’s security practice and doctrine.
1.1) - THE PUZZLE:

Just as individual identities develop as a result of historical interaction, experience and precedent, the same is true for national security. By constructing an analytical framework ("security identity") which scrutinises multiple norms simultaneously, this thesis asks whether there has been a regular pattern to India's security policy since the state's independence in 1947. This security identity has three essential features –

a) it spans different political generations and changes to the international structure;
b) it is reflective of national security discourses; and
c) it is a key determinant of India's security policy and behaviour.

As such, the resultant security identity highlights the historical experiences of India’s security community in terms of how they perceive Indian national security. This approach largely differs from IR theory accounts (principally neo-realism) that focus upon the primacy of the system for delineating international relations, whereby states are all uniform entities. Instead, there is an insistence upon the consideration of ideational factors (including history, interaction and experience) as being more critical to our understandings of continuity and change in a state’s security policies.

From this basis, I analyse whether or not this security identity limited the impact of the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP's) Hindu nationalist orientation when they led the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1998 to 2004. Based around a right-wing Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) stance, the BJP's ideology differs from previous Indian Congress Party (Congress) governments. These previous regimes had been primarily secular, socialist and religiously inclusive, and had dominated Indian domestic politics from independence until the early 1990s. In contrast, the BJP are regarded as being more communal, pro-capitalist and religiously exclusive - differences that suggest a different (foreign and domestic) policy orientation. As this research will show however, for example concerning Pakistan and China, the BJP's ideological basis appeared constrained once in power. I therefore ask why, despite a different ideological orientation, were the BJP not radically different concerning Indian security when they
were in power through the NDA government? I argue that India’s security identity was central to this constraint.

The BJP-led NDA government acts as a test case for the security identity approach and as an examination of continuity and change in international relations. The research tackles this specific empirical puzzle through a comparative analysis of the policy beliefs and actions of different Indian governments, in order to explain the BJP’s behaviour. In turn, given their own values and normative beliefs, the BJP are also a dynamic influence on India’s security policy. We will therefore see how the BJP-led NDA constituted a “gear shift” in Indian security as they effectively rearranged the hierarchy of India’s security priorities and practices. Such a gear shift is analogous to a car leaving a highway for an expressway - signifying not a change in direction but a stepping up and acceleration. Such a shift was aided in the 1990s by India having greater (economic) resources, as well as the decline of the Soviet Union - factors that helped to both speed up her trajectory and remove obstacles from her path. This empirical journey will be carried out by analysing the beliefs and values (collectively defined as norms) underpinning India’s security community. The consensus of this community and its composite actors is what informs and produces India’s security policy and behaviour. Appendix 1 lists and pictures the various Indian security actors cited in this thesis.

Through this analysis, I aim to conceptualise a link between the study of national security, identity and political parties in India by focusing on their shared normative basis. This research will produce the first ever in-depth analysis of the BJP’s foreign policy both before and during their time in power. As such, it is also a case study of the first non-Congress Party or non-Congress Party affiliated government to last a full five-year term. In addition, it will provide indicators for future Indian security policy behaviour. Given India’s rising and expanding international profile, this research therefore poses ‘a question that is “important” in the real world’ (King et al., 1994: 15). Furthermore, because of the ideological contrast between the BJP and previous governments, the research fits in with Bechhofer and Paterson’s observation that ‘researchers need to develop an eye for events, patterns and groups of people which are in some way anomalous and do not fit accepted theories and arguments’ (2000: 2).
Critically, security identity must be understood as a heuristic analytical tool not as a
generalisable theoretical model.

1.2) - LOCATING SECURITY IDENTITY:

As an analysis of the BJP’s ideational impact on Indian foreign policy and security, this
thesis is firmly placed within debates between constructivism and realism in IR theory
(Baldwin, 1993; Kegley, 1995). The starting point of these debates is that for
constructivists, ideational and social factors shape international relations through
interaction. These factors are largely perceptual, such as beliefs, threats and fears (Legro
& Moravcsik, 1999; Onuf, 1989). Constructivists also stress the importance of identity,
culture and learning in foreign policy, whereby identities are socially and
intersubjectively constructed via a system of norms and values (Checkel, 1998; Wendt,
1992; 1994). These perceptions can have far-reaching effects, becoming shared social
norms that shape foreign policy and security over time, and which are dependent upon
relevant (national) identities (Hopf, 2002). Therefore, norms and their identities inform
interests, which then motivate their actions and policy. There is consequently a
normative basis to a state’s foreign policy that is driven by domestic political ideals and
ideologies. By extension, there can be normative assumptions and structures (identities)
within national security policy, socially constructed through international interaction.

Constructivism is juxtaposed with neo-realism, which primarily understands foreign
policy through rationalist balance of power calculations based upon military or
economic power (Waltz, 1979). Such an approach is both structural through its stress
upon the state as the key denominator of international relations, and essentialist through
its emphasis on (relative) material factors (Krasner, 1992; Rose, 1998). Broadly, for
realists, the same set of interests continually drives state interaction and remains fixed
(Glaser, 1994/95; Zakaria, 1992). Such a basis negates the influence of both identities
and domestic politics, which realism regards as being irrelevant to the distribution of
material power (Brooks, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996). It also negates history and ideational
mechanisms of continuity and change (Koslowski & Kratochwil 1994). In turn, it is the

1 A full non-monolithic evaluation of the different strands of realism will be undertaken in Chapter 2
(including classical realism that acknowledges the value of normative beliefs).
make up of the international system that impacts on states rather than vice versa - an approach that is outside-in compared to the constructivists' inside-out viewpoint.

As an analytical tool, constructivism therefore pushes identities and domestic politics to the forefront of IR research. It also considers questions of continuity and change through the creation of social norms and a consideration of history and precedent (Adler, 2002; Gaddis, 1992; Walt, 1998). All these elements contrast it with the mainly static, state-based, resource-driven calculations of neo-realism. Thus, analysing Indian security from a predominantly constructivist perspective can allow us to isolate the specific impact of the BJP's political (domestic) identity on Indian foreign policy (Farrell, 2002; Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994). A purely realist position would not allow for such an analysis of the BJP-led NDA government and would only reveal differentials in India’s material power relative to other states. Further still, the ideology of the BJP and that of its predecessors would be regarded as purely domestic and irrelevant. Within the security identity framework, I will thus show both the presence of different domestic policy norms and their impact on India’s foreign policy and security behaviour.

With reference to Indian foreign policy, these debates have been touched upon by some theorists (Chaulia, 2002; Chiriyankandath, 2004; Das, 2003; Hewitt, 2000; Misra, 2001), but rarely in analyses done in an explicit or holistic manner. Other existing literature concerning identities (Hewitt, c.2001; Jaffrelot, 2002; Malik, 2002; Puri, 1995) and perceptions (Koithaha, 2004), have also failed to fully explore the links between domestic policy and foreign policy. Few of these works have contended that domestic political ideologies significantly impact upon foreign policy. A theoretical orientation based on constructivism therefore aims to fill some of these empirical gaps. In addition, it will broaden our analysis of the BJP away from its traditional focus on the domestic tenets of Hindu nationalism (Hansen, 1999; Hansen & Jaffrelot, 2001; Zavos, 2002). Such perspectives allow us to achieve a more mature analysis and understanding of the BJP, especially concerning their long-standing beliefs and policies concerning Indian security. Despite the focus upon domestic factors, my analysis will remain largely focused on India’s external security practice and relations. It will thus not fully contend with issues such as internal terrorism.
I also build upon the work of various scholars who have studied the trajectory of Indian security over the last 60 years. These include Kanti Bajpai (2003) on the presence of multiple ideological persuasions in India (including Nehruvian, Gandhian and Hindutva), Perkovich on how ‘India’s national identity and normative assumptions have shaped nuclear policy choices’ (1999: 448), and Nayar and Paul concerning India’s ‘enduring and deep-rooted aspiration’ (2004: 3) to be a great power. I wish to challenge Mohan’s analysis of Indian foreign policy fundamentally shifting in the 1990s ‘from porcupine to tiger’ (2005: 260). Rather than seeing this change as purely structural (primarily the end of the Cold War), this research explores more nuanced and alternative arguments that such change occurred due to ideational and internal factors (such as the rise to power of the BJP and their influence within the NDA). The influence of Cohen concerning the temporal development of India from emergent (with Park, 1978) to emerging (2002), also informs the themes of continuity and change that underpin this research. Many of these accounts are very fine-grained and dependent upon primary materials - an approach that I hope to emulate.

1.3) - SECURITY IDENTITY AND INDIA:

Within constructivism, security identity serves as a potentially invaluable tool with which to assess how the normative basis of Indian foreign policy and security has developed over time under the influence of domestic political identities. It is defined as the tacit consensual norms existing across political parties, within strategic and analytical communities, inside academic environments and via mass media. Here, “norms” are defined as a long-standing behaviour, value or belief. In turn, these groups are collectively defined as a state’s “security community”. The fundamental defining points of this consensus produce a topography of Indian security and foreign policy that defines India’s international outlook. Foreign policy interactions and experiences between India and other states also feedback into this topography and serve to hone and redefine its normative content. Rather than acting as a culture that is overly deterministic, security identity is instead indicatory and signifies when, where and by whom foreign policy has developed. I define “security” as how a state ensures its survival through the protection and advancement of its interests. “Security practice” is
defined as the accepted and habitual behaviours associated with how a state carries out its security policies.

The ideational side of the security identity framework is derived from social psychological constructs of identity. Based upon values, practices and norms, such constructs enable us to understand history as an experiential mechanism that builds up and engrains beliefs. Within the realm of national security and foreign policy, these beliefs concern how security policy has been and should be. These values are often deeply enshrined attitudes formed and entrenched over time. In the Indian context, these values concern issues such as the status of Kashmir, India’s position in the world and the state’s secular democratic basis. The norms that collectively form India’s security identity are argued to originate from, and to be influenced by, two specific political identities - predominantly (although not exclusively) that of the Congress Party from independence in 1947 to the 1990s and potentially by that of the BJP when they were in power from 1998 to 2004.

The security identity framework entails three major normative sources and the consensuses within them that have become normalised through India’s historical international interaction. The three sources are –

- the political - defined as the ideological and social basis of the Indian state;
- the physical - India’s geographical nature and strategic location; and
- the perceptual - how India’s leaders and external others regard India in the international system.

The three sources are independent variables that impact upon the dependent variable of security identity. These sources also attempt to draw the analysis of Indian security away from its relative traditional myopia centred on Kashmir (Bose, 1997; Ganguly, 1994; Puri, 1995; Schofield, 2002). They also constitute the mechanism with which to study normative change on the domestic, regional and international levels, thus capturing the full spectrum of Indian security. Unpacking the history of Indian security is a critical part of this procedure, as it enables the construction of the three different sources and a holistic analysis of India’s security identity. This unpacking shall first be
done for Indian security from 1947 to the 1990s and aims to confirm the embedded normative structures present in Indian security. Such an approach will then set up the analysis of the BJP’s impact upon these structures.

As a way of combining security studies with identity studies, security identity declares that a state’s foreign and security policy has an entrenched ideational and normative basis. In turn, by combining political ideology and identity formation with national security and foreign policy, security identity acts as an analytical framework that accounts for both continuity and change. Consisting of deep-seated beliefs, security identity limits the scope of a state’s security policy behaviour. It is posited that the BJP-led NDA will act within these limits from 1998 to 2004. However, as an ideational factor themselves, I further argue that the BJP are also capable of influencing India’s security identity by being in government and having responsibility for carrying out India’s domestic and foreign policies. This ideational influence has the potential to accelerate or decelerate parts of the pre-1998 security identity, and to replace or add new norms to it. It is envisaged that the BJP’s pro-Israel sentiment or pro-nuclear weapons bias could have such effects, for example, and will constitute a gear shift in India’s security policies and behaviour.

From this basis, I will consider the following three questions in this thesis concerning Hindu nationalism and the evolution of Indian security –

1) how do concepts of security identity help to explain the BJP-led NDA’s security policy?
2) did India’s security identity constrain the BJP-led NDA’s desired policy norms?
3) did the BJP-led NDA influence the norms structuring India’s security identity?

1.4) THESIS OUTLINE AND STRUCTURE:

Following this introduction (Chapter 1), this thesis consists of eight core chapters and a final conclusion. Chapter 2 introduces notions of norms and normative change within IR, as well as their theoretical and empirical usefulness for this thesis, and includes a literature review of traditional explanations of Indian security. In turn, Chapter 3
defines notions of security identity, facilitating a conceptualisation of security that is based upon continuity and change. It is focused upon how norms, values and practice are formed. Chapter 4 then applies this analytical framework to the development of Indian foreign policy from 1947 to 1998. Through the three key sources (political, physical and perceptual), it analyses the interaction of both domestic and foreign influences on this development.

Continuing to employ the security identity framework, Chapter 5 sets out the often contrasting political origins, ideologies and agendas of the BJP concerning India’s domestic and foreign policies. This contrast is especially apparent concerning their Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) ideology and their links to the Sangh Parivar. Consequently, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in turn analyze the impact of the BJP-led NDA on each of the three sources of India’s security identity. These chapters compare the behaviour of the BJP-led NDA with previous regimes to ascertain patterns of continuity and change in Indian security. In order to assess whether the changes witnessed in the previous three chapters remained in place after the BJP-led NDA left office in 2004, Chapter 9 then analyses the policies of the successor United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from 2004 onwards. So as to draw clear conclusions, this chapter’s analysis terminates at the end of 2009. Chapter 10 then concludes the thesis, details four core findings, and outlines some future empirical and theoretical research pathways.
Chapter 2:

‘Analyzing Security: Pathways to a Norm-Based Approach’

“(history is) some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reveries have been inscribed … all of them exist together in our conscious or subconscious selves … (and) build up the complete, mysterious personality of India’

(Nehru, 1994: 59)

‘India’s foreign policy is a projection of the values which we have cherished through the centuries, as well as our current concerns’

(Gandhi, 1972)

‘foreign policy does not sit static’

(Interview A19, 2008)

How can themes of continuity and change both be measured concerning the security practice of a state? If security practice develops and solidifies but then evolves, how can these processes be explained simultaneously? An identity-driven account of international relations provides an answer to these questions by isolating and analyzing the “normative” beliefs underpinning state security practice. Compared with more conventional accounts (that emphasize material and structural factors), mine instead stresses the primacy of ideational factors in determining international relations. It will be argued that these ideational factors (primarily identities and their composite norms) provide a superior understanding of (Indian) security by highlighting the impact of temporal factors, and successfully linking domestic ideology with foreign policy. In this chapter, I investigate how these themes have featured in the analysis of Indian security, where are they located within International Relations (IR) theory, and my approach for their measurement.

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2 Interview with leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 19 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
2.1) CURRENT APPROACHES TO INDIAN SECURITY:

I study the impact of a political ideology (Hindutva) on the dominant historically-based beliefs inherent to Indian security (its security identity). Such an analysis demands an eclectic approach encompassing the analysis of domestic factors, India’s relations with her neighbours and India’s interaction with the world, as well as an appreciation of identity as a driver of security policy. This analytical approach is dependent upon an appreciation of events and their historical chronology, an understanding of foreign policy making within India and a comparison of political (and security) ideologies. Analysts have touched upon several of these themes but have rarely treated Indian security as a product of the interaction between the domestic and international or as something that is identity-driven. Carrying out this review therefore serves to locate my approach within existing literature and to identify the gaps it will fill.

India-Pakistan, South Asia and Global Structures

Much analysis of Indian security has solely dealt with some dimension of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Engineer, 1991; Lamb, 1991; Puri, 1995; Schofield, 2002). These analyses have often rested upon detailed blow-by-blow accounts of the historical origins and development of the conflict (Jha, 1996; Ganguly, 1994; Wirsing, 1995), with some citing conflict resolution ideas (Bose, 2003; Chari et al., 2008; Kabir, 2002). Other scholars have focused upon the insurgency in Kashmir, its ongoing relationship to both India and Pakistan, and how it is a threat to South Asian stability (Bose, 1997; Ghosh, 2003; Malik, 2002). In turn, many analysts have explicited discernible patterns and repercussions within Indo-Pakistani relations, including regarding Kashmir as a proxy war with Pakistan and how it impacts upon India’s internal stability (Bloeria, 2000; Dixit, 2002; Ludra, 2002; Rudra, 2003). The impact of the Kashmir conflict on India’s international influence has also been noted, especially in terms of becoming a major power (Ganguly, 2006; Thakkar & Kulkarni, 1999).

Many scholars have also linked the India-Pakistan conflict to regional and international structures, serving to show its relevance to regional stability and the impact it has on alliances and global power dynamics. These approaches have investigated South Asia as
an imminent nuclear flashpoint and, in particular, its importance to the US and China (Chellaney, 1993; Cohen, 2002; Mansingh, 1998; Masood, 2004; Sathasivam, 2005). The nuclear theme has also driven many other accounts of Indian security (Chengappa, 2000; Karnad, 2002; Ganguly, 2000; Perkovich, 1999; Sagan, 2000). The majority of these accounts show little regard for domestic factors, employing a largely state-international structure emphasis often in terms of global proliferation. In turn, others have highlighted how changes in extra-regional structural (rather than domestic) conditions have influenced India-Pakistan relations, such as the end of the Cold War and the impact of 9/11 (Hewitt, 1997; Jones, 2003; Rizvi, 1993; Sawhney, 2002).

Discreet and specific analyses of India’s relations with other states and multinational institutions have also been a recurring theme in the literature. These have included a number on India-China relations, mainly focused upon (realist) contentions of inevitable competition, potential engagement and border issues (see respectively Garver, 2001; Frankel & Harding, 2004; Hussain & Karki, 1977). The analysis of India-US relations has also been amply covered, often situated in terms of common democracy, emergent power politics or nuclear capabilities (see respectively Bertsch et al., 1999; Cohen, 2000; Ganguly, 2003; Kux, 1992). India’s relationship to multilateral institutions has also been investigated, such as her role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Allison & Williams, 1990; Goya, 1986; Sengupta, 1979), as well as those based in South Asia such as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Chaudhury, 2006; Jha, 1986; Sinha, 2007). While many of these accounts have utilized historical approaches, the majority of them rarely employ an analysis that accounts for India’s perception of herself (and desired status) in the world or in the South / South-East Asian region.

**Analyzing Foreign Policy (Making) and Utilizing Identities**

Several analysts have produced research looking at Indian foreign policy and security as a whole (Bajpai & Mallavarapu, 2004; Harshe & Seethi, 2005; Mohan, 2003; Sinha, 2005), with some focusing upon conceptions of India as an emerging or potential great power (Cohen, 2002; Nayar & Paul, 2004). One downside of all such analyses is that they focus only on the immediate short-term repercussions of an event at that time rather
than investigating how that event impacts *throughout history*. Through such presentism, there is consequently little recognition of the dynamism of history, particularly in terms of how it is remembered and how this impacts on present and future self-conceptions. Indeed, most analyses insist upon the criticality of a certain singular event - the end of the Cold War or India’s 1991 balance of payments crisis, for example - as a particular “turning point” in India’s security practice. Such approaches contrast to conceptualizing the ongoing influence of history as a whole on India’s security policies, and explaining Indian security as being in response to domestic influences - both of which are core aims of this thesis’ security identity approach.

In terms of empirical analysis, there have however been many investigations of Indian foreign policy detailing the minutiae of policy decisions by generations of Prime Ministers, either singularly or collectively (Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990; Khilnani, 1995; Panda, 2003; Shivam, 2001). Many of these examinations acknowledge domestic influences on India’s security policy, highlight the impact of (individual and political) identities on security, and appreciate continuity and change in Indian security as a whole (Appadorai, 1981; Prasad, 1979). These works have included analyzing the decision-making processes underpinning foreign policy, as well as the role of domestic executives and legislatures. As such, these approaches reflect my concern with investigating domestic influences on security practice, along with conceptualizing normative formation and change within it. My research compliments such analyses but in a more inter-connected manner by looking at how Indian foreign policy and security practice has formed *across* different political leaders and different political generations.

Identity has also been regarded as a driver of conflict (Koithara, 2004) - especially in India-Pakistan relations, which Cohen regards as a “paired-minority” conflict (2002: 198-199) - and also as part of nationalist outlooks (particularly in Kashmir, see Ganguly, 1994, 2001; Hewitt, 2001; Malik, 2002). Other scholars have carried such an identity-based approach into foreign policy analysis by looking at the ‘dynamic interaction between domestic and international change’ (Hewitt, 2000), and have often compared Congress and *Bharatiya Janata Party* BJP security policy. Thus, Chiriyankandath (2004) found that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) had a limited impact on nuclear weapons policy and India’s links with the United States (US), while Chaulia
(2002) revealed the robustness of the Nehruvian approach concerning nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan and ties with the US during the same period. In contrast, Das (2003) suggested a need to redefine Indian security because of the BJP-led NDA, and Misra (2001) showed how the Indian government’s policy towards Kashmir and Pakistan changed once the BJP entered political office, as did nuclear policy versus the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Hewitt, 2000).

Other studies have also analyzed strategic culture in India - nominally defined as ‘enduring beliefs and attitudes’ (Latham, 1999). These have concerned the influence of Kautilya (Uz Zaman, 2006); weapons of mass destruction and threat assessment (Lantis, 2006); proliferation (Latham, 1999) and nuclear policy choices (Das, 2009). Other analyses have been carried out by Tanham (1992) based upon geography, great power status and colonial experiences, and by Bajpai (1998) based upon territorial sovereignty, foreign policy autonomy and national power. I acknowledge the influence of all these analyses but aim to expand the scale of investigation beyond a singular theme to include multiple dimensions of Indian security simultaneously. By looking at multiple dimensions, I will be able to see how different factors (for example India’s physical makeup and self-perceptions) inter-relate, thus producing a synthesized account of India’s security practice. To capture how these themes have developed, I apply a longitudinal lens to the study of Indian security (as will be carried out for the Congress-dominated period from 1947 to 1998 in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 through an analysis of the solidification of BJP policy attitudes over time). I will also broaden the object of analysis to enable comparison along three sources - the political (India’s political system and domestic affairs), the physical (India’s relations with her immediate neighbours) and the perceptual (India’s worldview of itself and others) - delineating a historically contingent national-level (security) identity.

2.2) - LOCATING NORMS IN IR THEORY:

Analyzing India’s security identity complements some existing research concerning Indian security but also revolves around several distinct key factors. These are the influence of domestic politics on security; recognizing the continuous impact and
dynamism of history; and acknowledging self (and other) perception in international relations. Such factors focus our attention on ideational factors, for example on the presence of identity-based structures within security, and how this identity is temporally constructed and reconstructed along normative lines. The following section locates these approaches within International Relations (IR) theory in order to highlight their theoretical origins and efficacy. Rather than insisting upon a comparison with liberalism - predominantly based upon economic cooperation, multilateralism and maximization of interests (Baldwin, 1993; Brown, 2005; Weber, 2004), this section looks at realism and constructivism. This comparison is carried out because alternative accounts of (Indian) security predominantly utilize realism as their analytical and theoretical basis.

Realism: Multiple Definitions and Apparent Counterfactuals

In general, proponents of realism share several assumptions about the nature of international relations (Donnelly, 2000). First, realists state that the international system is anarchic based upon the primacy of sovereign states and that these states are constantly vying against each other as rational unitary actors based upon their own self-interest (primarily national security). In turn, relations between states are determined by comparative levels of power (mainly military and economic). Within realism’s common attributes, there are several dominant competing strands - predominantly classical and structural realism. Classical realism chiefly argues that man’s selfishness in statecraft places interests over ideologies (Hobbes, 1996; Kautilya, 1929; Machiavelli, 1981; Thucydides, 1943). Thus, human nature is an important driver of international relations that helps determine how interaction is carried out between states.

In turn, structural realism (also often referred to as neo-realism), primarily focuses upon the international system and the struggles between the great powers within it. Here the international system has primacy, impacting upon states and the agency of individuals in those states, as summed up in the levels of analysis (Waltz, 1959) and structure-agency debates (Carlsnaes, 1992; Dessler, 1989; Suganami, 1999). Structural realism is itself split into two sub-strands - offensive and defensive (Brooks, 1997). Offensive realists believe that states are primarily aggressive, seeking hegemony through a maximization of aggregate power (Gilpin, 1986; Mearsheimer, 2001). Defensive realists believe that due
to the anarchy of the international system, states are obsessed by security (Jervis, 1999; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). In addition, neoclassical realism combines structural realism and classical realism by adding intervening domestic variables between the international system and the state (Rengger, 1999; Schweller, 1998; Zakaria, 1998).

Beginning with structural realism, several of my research arguments concerning the study of security in the Indian context appear to be incompatible. Firstly, structural realists view states as ‘undifferentiated and unitary actors’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 23) disregarding any consideration of state identities and their construction. Such realists believe that ‘states view each other as “black boxes” (and) focus on other states’ observable behaviour’ (Glaser, 1994/5: 55) rather than their type of government, decision-making processes or the beliefs of their political parties or leaders. Therefore, realism ‘it is not a theory of foreign policy of individual states’ (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 250; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1999).

Not only does such an largely approach negate ideational (that is identity and normative) sources of security but it also gives primacy to the international structure as providing motivational force rather than each state or actor (Katzenstein, 1996: 13). Although scholars such as Putnam (1988) note the existence of multi-level games whereby domestic influences affect international negotiation strategies, primacy is still given to structural factors. In these ways, structural realism challenges any analysis that involves competing identities (India’s security identity and Hindutva [defined as constructed Hindu nationalism]), as well as any focus upon the influence of domestic politics on security policy-making. Security principles based upon Hindutva, or indeed Nehruvian concerns [as pertaining to India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru], would be mainly irrelevant to a structural realist account.

Following on from these arguments, the emergence of offensive-defensive theory within structural realism led to greater conceptualisations of the importance of balancing either through alliance or deterrence (Walt, 1998: 31). These contentions have led to empirical problems for realists, especially when dealing with states that are neither great powers nor necessarily drawn into balancing arrangements. These arguments are especially true for India in the 1950s and early 1960s, when its leaders specifically sought to avoid great power competition and alliances, and disregarded her military build-up. It is therefore accurate to state that structural realism ‘only captures a fraction of empirical
reality with its assumption that different distributions of power tend to produce
different propensities towards balancing behaviour by great powers’ (Hopf, 2002: 271).
Concerning India and its nuclear programme, such assertions do not adequately explain
the state’s early security policy, as India failed to significantly accelerate its nuclear
programme even after China defeated India in 1962 and tested nuclear weapons in 1964
(Basrur, 2001: 188). These actions largely defy (structural) realist self-help accounts.

Furthermore, as structural realists ‘ignore human nature’ (Walt, 1998: 31), they bypass
the issue of national and regional identities by assuming a blanket definition of identity
that makes it irrelevant to inter-state relations. By focusing upon ‘variation in the
distribution of objective material power capabilities’ (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999: 34),
interests appear as exogenous to state practice, emanating from the system to the state.
Interests are thus generalized across states and ‘formed prior to any social interaction or
historical evolution’ (Oros, 2008: 29). Such arguments fail to acknowledge the role of
competing nationalisms for determining the fractious India-Pakistan relationship,
especially concerning Kashmir, which can be seen far more clearly in ideational rather
than material terms. Indeed, Palit has described the various India-Pakistan wars as
“communal riots with armor” (quoted in Cohen, 2002: 224). Additionally, structural
realists cannot account for BJP desires for a nuclear bomb that pre-dated the Chinese or
Pakistani nuclear threats that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. My research argues that
such a desire instead rests upon an ‘ideologically-driven notion’ (Vanaik, 2002: 323).

Due to its determinacy and focus on fixed states and interests, realism in general cannot
adequately account for change and evolution in IR (Copeland, 2000: 190). Defensive
realism in particular is distinctly ahistorical, holding that ‘the substance and style of
international politics remain strikingly constant’ (Zakaria, 1992: 195; Cox, 1986). In
addition, structural realists assume that the international system has no normative
content (Katzenstein, 1996: 25) and regard norms as lacking causal force (Checkel, 1998:
327; Kowert & Legro, 1996: 460). Realism therefore functions in a cultural-neutral
manner, eschewing identity and any possible non-unitary normative content and
difference, as ‘culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of
capabilities and have no independent explanatory power’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 17). Apart
from raising issues such as the failure to foresee the end of the Cold War (Legro &
Moravcsik, 2001), for any analysis of identity-driven security principles (including how India regards itself and other states), such a lack of normative content underlines the inappropriateness of realism for this thesis.

Through its general disregard of state identities and normative content, its insistence on the primacy of the international system rather than domestic politics, and its dismissal of history, structural realism appears incompatible with the aims of this research. However, to refute any influence from realism is inaccurate, particularly given classical realism’s insistence on human nature informing values and interests, and how it regards human beings as consisting of social groupings (Barkin, 2003; Brown, 2001: 212; Gilpin, 1986: 305). Classical realists acknowledge how ‘identities and values (a) are more important determinants of policy than the constraints and opportunities of the external environment’ (Jackson et al., 2004: 346). As we shall see below, these are areas traditionally seen as the preserve of constructivism. For these reasons, Danreuther notes how classical realism (and defensive realism) appear contrary to the rationalist assumptions of structural realism, and are thus part of the constructivist (and historical sociological) slant within IR theory (2007: 35).

**Constructivism I: History, the Ideational and the Domestic**

In contrast to most realist theory, constructivism is concerned with ideational factors (such as identities and norms) rather than with objective or material conditions. It is founded upon ‘a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction’ (Wendt, 1992: 394; Ruggie 1998). In turn, constructivists declare that countries are social constructions based upon historically contingent conceptions of the self, the international system and their mutual relationship. As Onuf asserts; ‘we make the world what it is … by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other’ (1998: 59). Therefore, the social-psychological milieu is of ongoing significance to international relations, as are its incumbent identities and norms which are constructed and reconstructed through enduring social interaction. This man-engendered, man-constituted, identity-based social constructivism is what Wendt (1992) refers to when he states that “anarchy is what states make it”.
Intrinsic to this approach is the importance of exogenous and endogenous change whereby the historical facts of the system’s previous interaction cannot be seen as ‘ahistorical givens’ (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 232) but as precedents and normalising forces. Critical to constructivist methodology is ‘the historical reconstruction of social facts’ (Adler, 2002: 109), recognising the importance of continuity and change, particularly concerning identity formation and evolution. Thus, the interests and identities of states are not only specific to each state but are malleable through the temporal process of history. We will see such factors present in the development, entrenchment and solidification of Indian security along norms which are specific to India and which arise from India’s international interaction. Furthermore, self-conceptualisation is central to constructivist understandings of international relations, especially concerning how identities are created and then shape a state’s behaviour.

Critically, constructivism ‘assumes, a priori, that identities are potentially part of the constitutive practices of the state, and so, productive of its actions at home and abroad’ (Hopf, 1998: 193). Conceptualizing of an identity underpinning Indian security practice will help indicate the inter-relationship between domestic and foreign policy in India. Further still, identities and interests are regarded by constructivists as intertwined, co-constitutive and dependent (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9). Therefore, constructivists endeavour to find alternative understandings of the international system and the states which form it, often by focusing upon how states have interacted and the beliefs underpinning this interaction. Overtly concerned with ‘the social construction of knowledge’ (Adler, 2002: 95), constructivism also focuses upon discourse as establishing accepted behavioural norms - processes that are observable in the development of both India’s security identity and the ideology of the BJP.

Through this emphasis on identity and the role of history, constructivism has the ability to theorize and analyze change by focusing upon ‘the dynamic, contingent and culturally based condition of the social world’ (Adler, 2002: 96). Thus, human nature is not reducible to one notion singularly applicable to all states but can include many attributes and can be studied in a multi-faceted manner. This argument is the basis for carrying
out a holistic examination of Indian security along multiple parameters, and across different political ideologies. Through ideas of precedent, interaction and experience, history has an indicatory strength along with an ability to isolate and explicate change rather than asserting a unitary realist viewpoint (Snyder, 2004: 61). Henceforth, constructivists show how ‘something we cannot directly observe (culture) shapes something we can (behaviour)’ (Farrell, 2002: 62).

Constructivism therefore deals with subjective reality and ‘function(s) along behavioural, structural and evolutionary axes simultaneously’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 55), providing rich identity-led accounts of security. Furthermore, constructivism links and concurrently analyses domestic and international change (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 234; Zakaria, 1992: 188), allowing in this research for the analysis of variables such as Hindutva. Again, by emphasising endogenous aspects of security, constructivism counters a weakness of structural realism, according to Ruggie, that ‘“power may predict the form of the international order, but not its content”’ (quoted in Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 365). In turn, levels of analysis and agency-structure debates are seen as relational and co-constitutive rather than oppositional forces (Checkel, 1998: 325; Hay, 2002: 127, 191), again stressing interaction and change over stasis.

**Constructivism II: Identities as Composite Norms**

Constructivism uses norms to trace and structure its ideational accounts of international relations. These include regulative norms - norms that order and constrain behaviour and ‘are intended to have causal effects (such as) getting people to approximate the speed limit’ (Ruggie, 1998: 871). In turn, constitutive norms ‘define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately’ (Hopf, 1998: 173). Additionally, evaluative and prescriptive norms act to respectively assess and regulate social behaviour (Axelrod, 1986: 1097). In this study, the emphasis is on regulatory and constitutive norms as encapsulating notions of continuity and change rather than any norms that are proscriptive or evaluative (moralistic) of practical action. In general, norms can be defined as ‘intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action’ (Wendt, 1995: 73-4).
Central to regulative and constitutive norms is experiential learning that underpins both the development and solidification of new or existing beliefs. Such learning comes about ‘as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (Levy, 1994: 283). This learning primarily stems from interaction whereby ‘the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning’ (Hopf, 1998: 75) - a factor that is essential for both self-perceptions and perceptions of others. In turn, learning is a fluid behavioural guide inherent to preference formation, as ‘which behaviours are conceivable, that is which norms are accepted, varies over time’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 366). For this thesis, these ideas are central to developing an analytical framework which acknowledges how India security has “learnt” from its international interaction, as well as from the type of interaction involved (for example war, trade, negotiation or isolation).

Therefore, ‘norms constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning’ (Adler, 2002: 103), whilst presenting shared ideas as a causal force separate from material structures (Copeland, 2000: 189-90). Both states and the international system are thus constructed through interaction. Furthermore, interaction highlights dominant values and beliefs that then become norms, and which in turn structure identities. The frequency of this interaction also determines the relative “strength” of a norm - for instance I argue that repeated conflict in 1947, 1962, 1971 and 1999 between India and Pakistan has strongly entrenched conflict with Pakistan as a normative belief in Indian security mindsets. From this basis, and as Hopf notes, “by providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty” (quoted in Duffield et al., 1999: 167) and act as ordering mechanisms essential for the understanding of their constitutive norms.

Mixed with these arguments is a sense of a dependent relationship. Even as changes in behaviour can lead to changes in the normative structure, this structure will still be dictated by the precedents and experiential limits of its previous interaction. Therefore norms represent ‘a particular set of interests and preferences’ (Hopf, 1998: 175). Moreover norm development is cyclical, maintaining old precedents and mixing them with new experiences, while being inter-generational and formed over time. By structuring practice, behaviour, interests and threats for states, ‘norms, like genes, are
instructional units’ (Florini, 1996: 364). Consequently, as a way of understanding behaviour and the social practices that underpin it (formulated through interaction), constructivism offers good leverage for explaining how threats are formed. Fundamentally, constructivists argue that norms shape interests - a constitutive characteristic not captured by rationalist arguments (Checkel, 2001: 554).

Of particular importance concerning security policymaking is instrumentality as norms affect ‘the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 463). This approach has been applied to foreign policy analysis to determine how national norms shape state behaviour, in particular using the cases of Germany and Japan (Berger, 1993, 1998; Duffield, 1998; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993). Such research has shown how ‘the preferences of agents are largely shaped by historically constructed identity norms’ (Checkel, 1999: 108). I echo the focus and rationale of this approach by analyzing the underlying normative identity inherent to Indian security practice. Social learning is critical in this respect whereby prior experiences and worldviews underline continuities in behaviour. In the Indian context for example, an ongoing fear of Chinese invasion would be underlined by India’s comprehensive 1962 defeat by China. Therefore, states ‘not only accumulate experience but also learn from it’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 16).

This notion of knowledge, where cognitive understanding acts as a learning mechanism, indicates how ‘once regimes are established, they may feedback on the basic causal variables that gave rise to them in the first place’ (Krasner, 1982: 358). Hence, states can be seen to ‘interpret historical experience through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and worldviews’ (Levy, 1994: 283). These factors are the basis of the security identity - an identity that learns from India’s security interactions with other states and the international system, and which then interprets new events and interactions through this existing experience. This definition includes understandings such as Hacking’s “looping effect”; an ongoing mutually constitutive learning cycle that adapts to changes in the norms dominating the interactional process (see Adler, 2002: 109).
Intrinsic to these contentions are assertions that ‘new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 898) and as such, norms are always contested. As collections of multiple composite norms, identities therefore carry the ‘ability to highlight deviations from deeply held norms of appropriate behaviour’ (Snyder, 2004: 60). This ability is essential to my thesis’ aim of isolating change and continuity in Indian security between the Congress-dominated regimes up to 1998 and the BJP-led NDA from 1998 to 2004. Furthermore, we can regard norms as micro processes within these mechanisms, which will help us to understand the causal mechanisms at play within identities and their incumbent interests and preferences. Analytically, this ‘require(s) considerable sensitivity in historical analysis’ (Farrell, 2002: 57) to deconstruct this process, especially as learning will be unique and state-specific (Hopf, 1998: 195).

2.3) - NORMS IN IR: FULCRUMS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The issue of norms has received significant coverage in IR over the last fifteen years, resulting in a large body of empirical research that covers many diverse topics and issues. These areas have included analysing non-intervention, women’s suffrage and the laws of war (see Herrman & Shannon, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), as well as human rights, the territorial integrity of the nation-state, and the dominance of the nation-state and its sovereignty (see Donnelly, 1999; Zacher, 2001; Jepperson et al., 1996). Other analysts have focused upon the proliferation of conventional weapons; chemical weapons taboos (see Eyre & Suchman, 1996; Price, 1997) or the Council of Europe; apartheid; and collective security (see Checkel, 1999; Klotz, 1995; Cortell & Davis, 1996). Commonly, these studies have encompassed an emphasis on ‘historical particularity’ (Donnelly, 1999: 80) by focusing on specific time periods and circumstances, in order to reveal their precise ‘cultural (re. normative) context’ (Duffield et al., 1999: 174).

**Approaches to Norm Operationalisation and Norm Tracing**

Reflecting the variety of norm-based research, analysts have utilised several operationalisation strategies to measure normative change and continuity. First, analysts
have detailed criteria for measuring norms themselves. Legro (2000) highlights three central factors; how the norm is codified (specificity), how long it is in effect and how strong it has been versus challenges (durability) and how widely it has been accepted (concordance). Other analysts have referred to a norm “tipping point” which then develops into a norm cascade dependent upon ‘legitimation, confirmation and esteem’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 902). Relatedly, Zacher refers to the ‘three stages of norm development as emergence, acceptance and institutionalisation’ (2001: 236). Building upon these approaches, Florini has carried out research concerning the prominence of a new norm in a “norm pool” and how well it fits with the general normative environment (1996: 374). In turn, in their work on human rights, Risse and Sikkink list ‘instrumental habits, material pressures, argumentation (and) persuasion’ (1999: 37) as the criteria for normative change.

Looking at the sources of norms, Cortell and Davis focus upon “norm salience” by analysing national discourse, laws and policies to measure norm legitimacy and strength (2000: 72). Axelrod (1986) investigates differing mechanisms for norm strengthening ranging from dominance, internalisation, social proof and deterrence to membership, laws and reputation. Who promotes norms has also been a focus of analysis. Thus, Cortell and Davis investigate various socialising forces, along with the role of scientists, experts, advocacy networks, non-government organizations (NGOs) and lobbyists in gaining acceptance of a norm. These groups ‘fram(e) their ideas in ways that “resonate or fit with the larger belief systems” of the target states’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 83). Checkel builds on this point, when he notes that ‘researchers need to pay greater attention to the adopter’s “experience, norms, values and intentions” when studying diffusion’ (1999a: 86). In turn, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to actors who help with norm diffusion as norm agents or norm entrepreneurs (1998: 895-6).

Other useful approaches present within IR (although not directly concerning norms) deal with notions of continuity and change through the investigation of causal pathways. One such theoretical undertaking concerns process-tracing which, according to George, “traces the process - the intervening steps - by which beliefs influence behaviour” (quoted in Yee, 1996: 77; Haydu, 1998; Kennedy, 1988). Connected to these ideas is path dependence, which rests upon assertions that ‘the relationship of new normative
claims to existing norms may also influence the likeliness of their influence’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 908; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). Many of these approaches rest within the field of historical institutionalism (Ertman, 1996; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999). In turn, there is also useful research on punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge, 1985) and critical junctures (Collier & Collier, 1991; Gaddis, 1992a: 39-40; Hogan, 2006), which highlights key shifts in state behaviour. However, pinpointing when such shifts will occur has been especially problematic for scholars.

The majority of the work cited above has looked at norms and their diffusion / normalisation from the international to the domestic sphere. These works analyse system-level norms (such as human rights) to see how systemic influences have led to each norm’s acceptance or not on the domestic level. Such analyses do not take sufficient account of domestic factors, ignoring ‘significant sub-systemic social understandings that can contradict and overwhelm international prescriptions’ (Legro, 1997: 32). In contrast, this thesis concerns continuity and change, and looks at norm diffusion in terms of (national) security and the identity (the collective normative underpinnings) that regulate it. Therefore, this research includes internal sources of foreign policy, in order to determine what is normative in India’s international relations. As such, I analyse security norms in a state-specific (Indian) context (Jepperson et al., 1996).

2.4) - THE NORMATIVE ROOTS OF (INDIAN) SECURITY:

The overarching focus of this research is ‘a concern with explaining the evolution and impact of norms on national and international security’ (Farrell, 2002: 72). Security is based upon normative understandings surrounding state behaviour, which evolve as a state experiences more international interaction. My approach to norm operationalisation consists of three core elements –

1) isolating and measuring the norms inherent to India’s security identity;

2) integrating these norms into an analytical framework that reflects the different parameters integral to India’s security practice; and
3) establishing the various sources (what and who) of the norms present in the Indian context.

These elements are integral to norm-based research because ‘conceptual precision is essential for both meaningful theoretical debate and defensible empirical work’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891). Overall, this approach enables the analysis of ‘which norms matter, why and how’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 236).

**Isolating and Measuring Norms**

An analysis concerned with tracing norm continuity and change within India’s security identity requires effective indicators to isolate and measure these norms. These indicators must reflect how the norms develop, become solidified and are then engrained through India’s international interaction and acquired experience. Essential to these understandings is that norms must be considered, as Dore notes, as “‘flexible rigidities’” (quoted in Katzenstein, 1996: 3). Norms represent continuous entrenched variables which are simultaneously open to change versus competing norms and new interactions. In terms of security, such a view recognises that ‘identities are a congealed reputation’ (Hopf, 1998: 190). Acknowledging the influence of other analysts who have measured norms (in particular Legro, 2000), this research will focus upon three major indicators - event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance - as detailed in Table 2.1 below.

| EVENT TYPE: characteristics of an event, action or interaction | EVENT FREQUENCY: - how often an event type occurs | EVENT HARMONY / DISSONANCE: - how complementary an event type is with other existing norms |

**Table 2.1: Three Major Indicators for Norm Measurement**

We can see the BJP’s (and earlier Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s (BJS’s)) policy towards the development of nuclear weapons as showing these three indicators. Thus, in 1962 the BJS first called for the development of nuclear weapons, and this call became a part of their manifesto promises for the next 36 years. Not only did the action have particular specific characteristics (event type) but it then became repeated and regularized
(indicating high event frequency) and reflected other BJS / BJP aims such as making India militarily strong and improving her position in the world (thus showing harmony with other existing norms). In turn, repeated conflict with Pakistan from independence onwards also became normalized within India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 in the same fashion. Thus, the same event type (war with Pakistan) became a regular (highly frequent) occurrence that reflected (and harmonized with) common beliefs of Pakistan as an enemy that threatened Indian sovereignty and territoriality. In both cases, note how only with high frequency and repetition does an event type become a norm.

These key indicators are not only of use in structuring historically-contingent and inter-generational understandings of BJS / BJP security beliefs (Chapter 5) and those of India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4) but are also useful as a way to understand similarities and differences between their two positions. Of particular importance here is the third indicator - event harmony / dissonance - as a way of tracing potential and actual differences between the two perspectives pre-1998 and from 1998 to 2004 during the BJP-led NDA government. Thus for example, we will be able to analyze potential harmony or dissonance between the BJP’s position towards Pakistan, China and the US, and that of India’s security identity. This approach will therefore allow us to analyze the strength of India’s security identity as a constraint on the BJP’s security policy while in office. Overall, these examples indicate how ‘norms become relevant and causally consequential during the process by which actors define and refine their collective identities and interests’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 9). Furthermore, while not traditionally comparative in terms of a state-state analysis, this thesis is comparative in terms of comparing the various foreign policy norms of different Indian governments and political parties across time.

**Three Normative Sources of Security**

This thesis is interested in the *multiple* norms structuring India’s security practice as determined by both her domestic nature and her international interaction with other states. As many of these norms relate to similar issues (the nature of Indian democracy, threats to Indian sovereignty or Indian self-conceptions of her place in the world), it is
worthwhile providing a structure within which to place groupings of composite norms. Security is therefore considered to consist of three composite sources –

a) a political source - the principles and foundations of a state’s political makeup;  
b) a physical source - the sovereign and territorial basis of the state; and  
c) a perceptual source - how the state regards itself and how it regards others.

The basic attributes of each normative source can be seen in Table 2.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) POLITICAL</th>
<th>B) PHYSICAL</th>
<th>C) PERCEPTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- political system</td>
<td>- territorial nature</td>
<td>- defining national texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- elite beliefs</td>
<td>- global geographic position</td>
<td>- national symbols</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Three Normative Sources of Security and their Basic Attributes  
(adapted from Lantis, 2006)

Taken together, these sources enable a holistic understanding of security in a state-specific context and produce a basic security profile that can be completed for any state. These sources can therefore be regarded as “established guiding characteristics” that historically structure a state’s security practice. Alternatively they can be viewed as a state’s ‘national proclivities’ (Basrur, 2001: 183). In addition, it is the key understandings regarding norms (as outlined above) that provide the makeup of these characteristics - for example, how long a particular political system has been in place, the competing elements within that system and importantly, the relationship of these factors to other states. In turn, the three sources are the independent variables that impact upon the dependent variable of security identity. The basic, generalisable attributes of these three normative sources of security are defined in Table 2.3 below (note that these attributes are indicatory rather than exhaustive).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>ATTRIBUTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| POLITICAL: | ▪ type of political system and how that system is organized –  
  - political basis (democratic, autocratic, militaristic, communist, monarchical)  
  - style (liberal, conservative, authoritarian, totalitarian)  
  ▪ elite beliefs concerning the –  
  - organization (and size) of the economy (capitalist, socialist, free market, command) and the military (independent, civilian controlled, ruling)  
  - social ordering of society (hierarchical, ethnic, religious) |
| PHYSICAL:  | ▪ territorial nature of a state –  
  - physical area  
  - topography, nature of borders (mountains, rivers, sea), climate  
  ▪ global geographic position –  
  - number and size of neighbours, continental placement, sea access, colonial possessions, embassies |
| PERCEPTUAL:| ▪ defining national texts concerning –  
  - self-image (status quo, balancer, hegemon, presence / absence of grand strategy)  
  - desired position (regionally, globally)  
  ▪ national symbols –  
  - recording interaction (history, memory, myth)  
  - remembering interaction (national days, anthems, museums, textbooks) |

Table 2.3: Three Normative Sources of Security and their Detailed Attributes

Collectively these three sources can be regarded as expanding circles of influence (Interview A3, 2008)³, radiating outwards from a state into the international system. By breaking down the separation between the international system and the domestic sphere, and by seeing them in relational terms, a specific exploration of which norms explain which policies becomes possible. Additionally, the three normative sources provide a structure by which to study multiple norms concurrently, enabling the pinpointing of norm transformation and evolution, which ‘are the main vehicles for system transformation … norms shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895). Such an analysis will simultaneously and clearly indicate how both foreign and domestic politics

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³ Interview with former think-tank head and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, April 30 2008.
contribute to national security, and the inter-relationship between the two. The basic attributes of India’s three normative sources of security will be outlined in Chapter 3.

**Establishing the Empirical Loci of (Indian) Security**

Apart from recording norms and collectively structuring them, empirical sources of security in terms of who shapes the security policy and practice of a state must be isolated. This research aims to attain Hopf’s goal of ‘a need for greater attention to how discourse, identity and social practice … (in order to) provide an additional source of empirical evidence for the operation of norms themselves’ (2002: 283). Norms can therefore be regarded as shared, common beliefs, which are communicated and entrenched through discourse. This approach reflects how ‘constructivists emphasize that ideas and communicative processes … (aid the) understanding of interests, preferences and political ideas’ (Risse & Sikkink, 1999: 7). Furthermore, the emphasis on norms and their delineation are self-serving to the researcher because ‘norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 892).

Three empirical loci of security have been identified. First, there is the political-rhetorical locus, analyzing the discursive and language practices as *security norms were made*. Second, there is the temporal-historical locus, focusing on the role of history, precedent and memory in *recording security norms*. Third, there is the reflexive-individual locus investigating the individuals who make/made, shape/shaped a state’s security practice and their *reflective attitudes and beliefs towards security norms*. The specific empirical sources of each locus are detailed in Table 2.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I: POLITICAL-RHETORICAL</th>
<th>II: TEMPORAL-HISTORICAL</th>
<th>III: REFLEXIVE-INDIVIDUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- policy documents</td>
<td>- secondary literature</td>
<td>- interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- speeches / manifestoes</td>
<td>- biographies</td>
<td>- autobiographies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.4: Empirical Loci of Security and their Specific Sources**
These three loci build three axes of analysis; structural, behavioural and evolutionary. Furthermore, this approach uncovers the social mechanisms and constitutive social rules that make Indian security practice, as ‘social facts depend, by way of collective understanding and discourse, on the attachment of collective knowledge to physical reality’ (Adler, 2002: 100). Overall, the use of multiple loci also allows for triangulation strategies to be employed in this research, for example, between a party speech, how it is recorded in a biography and what the individuals connected with it then say about it.

**Loci I: Political-Rhetorical – The Making of Security Norms**

Analyzing various speeches, policy documents and manifestoes enables the investigation of discursive and language practices that were formulated as security norms were made. Discourse is critical to tracing this process as it precedes and accompanies change, whilst serving as evidence for the rationale behind any change. Therefore, ‘one reason language is so important to constructivist analysis is that speech binds together is and ought’ (Kowert, 2001: 279). Language constructs and describes reality, and thus serves as ‘the medium for the construction of intersubjective meanings’ (Adler, 2002: 103). An emphasis on language and discourse is also critical concerning ‘the contestation of a norm … (and) the social construction of the meanings of the discursive instruments being used in these struggles’ (Hopf, 2002: 279). Such an emphasis will be essential for comparing BJP security beliefs (Chapter 5) with those from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4) in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

In these ways, ‘political rhetoric - or persuasive discourse - is a mechanism for generating collective understandings’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 76). Processes of repetition and reiteration act as reinforcing strategies and reiterate the key indicators (event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance) highlighted above. Language is open to manipulation but can also be constraining, acting as both a recorded repository and as precedent creating. Therefore ‘when a norm is salient in a particular social discourse, its invocation by relevant actors legitimates a particular behaviour or action, creating a *prima facie* obligation’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 69). This sense of obligation is important in this thesis when tracing the development and solidification of certain political beliefs and accompanying policies. In order to analyze
the political-rhetorical locus in the Indian context, I mainly utilize speeches, policy documents and election manifestoes from the BJS and BJP, as well as those from Congress and other Indian political parties. I also make use of speeches, policy documents and other papers available from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) concerning the actions of all governments who have held power in India.

**Loci II: Temporal-Historical – The Recording of Security Norms**

The second locus (the temporal-historical) focuses on the role of history, precedent and memory in recording security norms. This locus rests upon assertions that time impacts upon behaviour and ‘influenc(es) what happens, even as it provides the chronological framework we use to make sense of what has happened’ (Gaddis, 1992a: 38). Part of this process is that of iteration which strengthens norms and, which ‘stresses the passage of time and continuity in the environment; … the longer a norm goes unchallenged, the more it tends to “solidify”’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 472). Again, this path to reinforcement reiterates the rate and frequency with which a norm is repeated and regularized. In relation to constructivism, this empirical emphasis underlines ‘the importance of historical clusters, myths, memories, values and symbols for cultural community formation’ (Smith, 1996: 12).

By providing a chronological structure, we are able to monitor norm emergence, development and solidification. Temporal influences thus not only provide analyses with notions of ongoing continuity but also indications of change, again reflecting the “flexible rigidities” central to norms. Critically, this is ‘a form of “process-tracing” whereby the development of the interpretative frames employed by actors is recounted in a historical fashion’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 67). In this sense, analyzing how India’s international interaction has been recalled, tempered and constituted, allows for the validation of the constructivist’s concern with achieving ‘the social construction of subjectivity’ (Wendt, 1992: 393). The empirical foundation of this second locus is based upon pre-existing secondary literature on all facets of Indian security. Of particular use are those texts and biographies that have analyzing the security practice of different Indian Prime Ministers (for example see Damodaran & Bajpai, 1990; Panda, 2003; Shivam, 2001).
Loci III: Reflexive-Individual – Reflecting on Security Norms

The third locus rest upon investigating the individuals who make/made, shape/shaped a state’s security practices, and their reflective attitudes and beliefs towards security norms. These individuals are primarily the senior leaders of nationally recognized political parties (both in government and in opposition), as well as senior bureaucratic officials from within a state’s civil and diplomatic services. Other shapers include members of leading national universities, the heads and staff of think tanks, journalists, ex-members of a state’s bureaucracy and armed services (army, navy and air force), as well as political party ideologues and supporters. These latter individuals collectively form a state’s security community, transcend different political generations and represent compounded knowledge as per a state’s security practice. Such a research focus acknowledges how decision makers ‘cannot disregard the cultural values and traditions of their society, especially those transmitted through successive generations’ (Jha, 2002: 41). These actors also act as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895-6) and norm transmitters.

Security making in the Indian context is based upon a Prime Minister-centric and cabinet-dominated system that need not necessarily consult the Indian parliament (for an overview of India’s decision-making apparatus see Cohen, 2002: 66-83). In practice, a small group centered on the Prime Minister, the External Affairs Minister, the Home Minister and the Finance Minister are the principal foreign policy-makers. From 1998, this group included the National Security Advisor, a position first introduced by the BJP-led NDA. In turn, there is India’s foreign policy and security bureaucracy, which includes the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) who staff the MEA and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) who staff the Ministry of Defence (MoD). To these groupings can be added India’s external intelligence agency - the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), and its internal intelligence agency - the Intelligence Bureau (IB), both of which report directly to the Prime Minister. India’s own security community is also a key (and growing) dynamic in influencing public debates on security and foreign policy. Collectively analyzing these individuals’ beliefs shows how, for one of India’s leading
strategic thinkers, ‘the security management of India can be studied’ (Interview A7, 2008).

It is however important to recognize that the normative beliefs of those actors making up India’s (and any other state’s) security community will be to a degree, necessarily different. This statement is most readily appreciated concerning the different viewpoints of Congress and BJP officials concerning how they view the world (and thus conceive of foreign policy) but also applies to any groups or individuals associated with them. Thus, certain academics, think-tank heads, journalists, bureaucrats and so on, will argue for particular political viewpoints over others. This affiliation creates inter-group biases towards certain policies and underscores how political leaders will be prone to emphasise those opinions that converge with their own and dismiss those that diverge. What becomes important is ‘the relation of incoming bits of information to the receivers’ already established images’ (Jervis, 1969, 457). For our analysis, we must be aware of different (and shared) cognitive mindsets concerning (Indian) foreign policy. Collectively, these mindsets create an implicit hierarchy of interests and biases within a security community, which is then stratified from differing political perspectives.

Accessing the discourse presented by these individuals rested upon extensive interviewing, as well as analyzing the autobiographies of key actors within and without of Indian security (for example see Nehru, 1994; Singh, 1999a; Talbott, 2004). In particular, the research benefited from meetings with Indian politicians, ex-officials from across India’s foreign policy and security bureaucracy (especially MEA diplomats active at the time of the BJP-led NDA), and retired heads from all three of India’s armed services. I also met former and current heads of India’s leading think tanks, academics, and journalists. I especially benefited from access to former and current members of the BJP’s Foreign Policy Cell who help inform the party’s foreign policy orientation. A list of individuals met, where and when can be found in the Primary Sources section of the Bibliography. In the interests of anonymity and confidentiality, this list and any references to the individuals on it has been coded. Overall, this empirical locus recognizes that ‘foreign policy is a form of social action … a foreign minister is part of the social milieu in which he operates and he cannot disregard the

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4 Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008.
basic values held in his society’ (Appadorai, 1981: 11). Further details of my methodological approach concerning data collection and analysis are in Appendix 2.

CONCLUSIONS

A norm-based and identity-driven account can be employed to produce a viable alternative research path with which to analyse a state’s (India’s) security practice. While recognizing the influence of classical realism, its emphasis on ideational factors and composite norms primarily takes place within constructivist debates. This approach is appropriate for an analysis of competing identities and ideologies (the norms underpinning India’s security identity and those of the BJP), and also allows for a focus on both international and domestic factors. This chapter has hoped to show that norms can be operationalised effectively in order to structure three normative sources of security (political, physical and perceptual). Additionally, using norms will help us to investigate internal sources of foreign policy and their influence on security practice, and will also link domestic norms to international politics (rather than vice versa). A norm-based approach thus emphasizes the domestic in constructivist accounts and reverses its dominant international to domestic emphasis (Hopf, 2002: xiv; Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 216).

This norm-based approach forms my distinct analytical framework with which to study India’s security identity. By recognizing and recording both continuity and change, an analysis of norms will allow us to compare (differing) security practices between the BJP-led NDA government of 1998 to 2004 and its Congress-dominated forebears. Using this framework will also underline how there are multiple, composite and competing norms present within a state’s security practice. Finally, it will stress the primacy of ideational over material factors in the analysis of (Indian) security, and how history and interaction is integral to their formation. The next chapter will continue to utilize the norm-based approach in order to define notions of “security identity” (in relation to India) through a synthesis of identity construction and the three normative security sources. It also sets out the operationalisation strategy and analytical framework with which to trace the presence of multiple norms across political generations and any wider structural changes.
Chapter 3:


‘the basic objectives of any country
have been shaped by their physical situation’

(Interview B25, 2008)\(^5\)

“ultimately what we really are
matters more than what other people think of us”

(Nehru quoted in Sen, 1964: 146)

‘securing and strengthening this twin India,
one representing its body, the other its soul … should constitute
(the) fundamental doctrine of our national security’

(Advani, 2005: 5)

How can multiple norms be analysed simultaneously across history and different ideologies? What are the key attributes of an ideational security approach? Here, I present a norm-based and identity-driven analytical framework (security identity) that produces an evolutionary analysis of (Indian) security. Security identity collectively utilises three normative sources of security to represent the established guiding characteristics or the independent variables inherent to a state’s security behaviour. Integral to the framework is an acknowledgment from social psychology of the importance of self/other perceptions in international relations. Fundamentally, I argue that it is at the “/” between self and other that security is produced through the interaction between the domestic and the international. Overall, such an analytical focus, ‘conceiv(es) of the state in relational terms … investigat(es) the domestic sources of foreign policy (and) focuses attention on the degree to which the identities of actors are constructed by state-society relations’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 56).

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\(^5\) Interview with a senior ex-MEA official and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
A Preliminary Definition of Security Identity

Defined as the symbiosis of identity construction and security, security identity transmits composite norms pertinent to the security policy and outlook of a state. These norms represent the tacit consensual reference points concerning appropriate security policy, which exist across political parties, strategic and analytical communities, academic environments and mass media. Over time, this consensus indicates the ongoing, habitual forms of behaviour, understanding and inference that structure a state’s attitudes and responses to its security. Any security identity is reiterated and entrenched with the passage of time, whereby continued interaction feeds back into this topography and serves to hone and redefine its normative content. Security identity acts ‘as an attitudinal and behavioural transmission belt’ (Macmillan et al., 1999: 15), constraining actors’ agency. As an analytical construct, security identity therefore gives ideational rather than structural explanations of security choices, mechanisms and environments. Furthermore, rather than being overly deterministic, security identity is instead indicatory - indicating when, where and by whom foreign policy has been developed.

Security identity uses methods of identity construction as a way to conceptualise the construction of composite norms into three normative sources of security (or “established guiding characteristics”). These normative sources encompass political, physical and perceptual parameters of security, and include both domestic and foreign influences on security behaviour. As an analysis of security carried out over time, security identity allows the simultaneous ‘reinterpretation of past events, current conditions and future goals’ (Berger, 1996: 317), in order to trace the basis of a security interest or threat. Such insights are driven by seeing ongoing identity construction as a form of learning and by seeing security as being in constant development rather than based upon fixed assumptions. This analysis recognises how ‘structures of constructed meaning, embodied in norms or identities, affect what states do’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 66). Security identity’s analytical approach helps to determine if security is driven by state-specific identity-derived norms built up through historical interaction and transferred across political generations.
Concerning the study of Indian security, security identity provides fresh insights into the foundations, characteristics and guiding principles that structure the state’s security consensus. It also specifically allows for the study of continuity and change between governments led by different political parties (Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) and across different political eras and leaderships. This thesis’ starting investigative point is that ‘elites socialized in different cultural contexts may behave in different ways and make different choices, even when placed in similar situations’ (Latham, 1999). Reflecting these concerns, in subsequent chapters I will outline the development of key norms in India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4), then investigate the norms underpinning BJP foreign policy ideology during the same period (Chapter 5), before comparing these two sets of norms within the context of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1998 to 2004 (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In addition, combining identity building with security studies attempts to achieve theoretical pluralism as advocated by several International Relations (IR) theorists (Alker & Biersteker, 1984: 123; Wendt, 1999: 33), while successfully acknowledging domestic sources of (international) security (Cohen, 2002: 4).

3.1) - CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY:

Social psychology informs work on the formation of norms, as well as their role in the construction of identity. Of particular use are conceptions of norms and practices as collectively structuring and determining an identity’s constituent principles. These conceptions are important when applied to constructivist accounts where ‘the state is a social actor’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 23) embedded within interaction and learning. Here, identity can be defined as ‘the lens of a long-standing self-image and a set of established behavioural principles’ (Legro, 2009: 51). Social psychology also offers other insights concerning differentiation between identities, as encapsulated by notions of self/other. These insights can help us to understand (security) identity formation as situated in the contested space between the self and the other, and between India and other states. Taken together, these concepts indicate how social psychology can help explain the interaction between states concerning security policy ‘as a complex, dynamic concept’ (Hudson & Sampson, 1999: 667). Overall, using these approaches ‘yield(s) an
account of national identity that explains changing interest and foreign policy behaviour’ (Kowert, 1998: 101).

**Socializing Forces: Interaction and History**

Norms are the core components of identities and specify the practices associated with that identity, not only through their recording of interaction and experience but also their indication of interests. Importantly, without the dynamism of interaction, identities and their composite norms would not form because of the lack of an evaluative or comparative process, and as such they cannot be considered as a natural, genetic or an *a priori* given (Ozkirimli, 2000). It is interaction that leads to the formation of norms, encouraging ‘certain dispositions and orientations whilst opposing and delegitimising others, a process that is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally hegemonic in its consequences’ (Campbell, 1992: 10). Continued interaction and normative entrenchment, as fulfilled through the key indicators highlighted in Table 2.1 (event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance), further serve as guidance devices that simplify choices and impart “rationality” (Kratochwil, 1989: 10).

Consequently, norms are collective meanings which organise actions and behaviour between states through an ‘intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests’ (Weber, 2004: 64). These collective meanings in turn constitute social knowledge that establishes rules and practice for interactions between identities. State identities and interests are thus compound entities, ‘socially constructed by knowledgeable practice’ (Wendt, 1992: 392). As socially conceived conceptions of the world, norms are also dynamic and malleable - formed and reformed through continued interaction. By being part of an ongoing synthesis, norms, practices and identities become reference points for each other, as ‘encounters are informed by prior constructions of identity which in turn are reconstituted in and through the encounter’ (Shearman, 2000: 112). This process is reinforced by notions of “modulation” which assert that there are ‘replicable narratives or scripts that govern our actions and enable us to find our way in the world’ (Chambers, 2002). Security identity is such a replicable narrative that directs state security policy and interaction.
History traces interaction and is the process by which both interaction and experience are recorded and recollected. Formative interaction shapes international history, providing the defining inference points of what states are, whilst acting as a potential projector of future behaviour. For example, India’s conception of being historically coveted by other nations has been consistently equilibrated with its sustained sense of being a great power (Alagappa, 1998). Reflection and the formation of longstanding attitudes are also part of such a process, leading into a history that is ‘built not merely of events but of varying perceptions of them’ (Gong, 2001: 3). Thus, history (and its recollection) is the kinetic force behind norm continuity and change. Collectively, this approach emphasises how ‘history is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 23), and thus on security policy. By recording shared meanings, values and dispositions, history-contingent models of identity produce predictable ‘propensities of thought, reaction and action’ (Hudson, 1997: 18).

Importantly, history is not a collection of facts but a collection of interpretations whereby meaning and importance are attached to events. As such, history can often be regarded, as Hill sees it, as a “conscientious effort to place actions of the past into a coherent explanation of use to the present” (quoted in Gong, 2001: xii). Thus, BJP policy in the 1950s concerning Pakistan rested upon conceptions of Muslims as disruptive fifth columnists intent on vivisecting India, views which stemming from centuries-old Muslim invasions of India coupled with Partition in 1947. During the same period, Congress policy towards Pakistan and Muslims rested upon entirely different parameters - instead arguing for an inclusive Indian respectful of all religions. As an adjunct to history, memory - that is how events are (selectively) remembered - ‘is plural and … elastic’ (Pye, 2001: 118) and can be recalled in different ways. In this sense, history and its interpretation can be regarded as a distilled stimulus on identity-driven accounts of security.

Learning is also part of this process, making norms both resilient to change and restraining identities from wholesale alteration (Eckstein, 1998; Hudson, 1997). Thus in the context of security, ‘through the negotiation and adoption of a series of policies and precedents, an identity can be created that exerts a presence of its own’ (Oros, 2008: 29), delineating a certain modus operandi. By being within an ongoing historical process,
(security) identities and their composite norms are within a continual learning cycle, as new interactions legitimate and de-legitimate past experiences. Thus, as Sandholtz remarks, ‘norm change occurs in cycles that are linked, forward and backward, in a longer historical dynamic … earlier cycles provide the normative context, and a set of precedents, for current disputes. The outcomes of today’s disputes help to shape the context, and the pool of precedents, for later cycles’ (2008: 103). It is through this “feedback” that security identities effectively learn and, through this learning, gradually evolve. Decision-makers drive this learning by facilitating security policy and action, and by ‘examining precedents and establishing analogies with current situations’ (Sandholtz, 2008: 107).

**The Self/Other Nexus: Capturing Inherent Differentiation**

Inherent to social psychology are concepts of self/other that encapsulate differentiation between identities in order to show the influence on actors of actual (or imagined) others (Allport, 1954). The Sherifs (1953) used these ideas in their “minimal group paradigm” to show how groups will be in conflict when given an interdependent but competing goal, but will be harmonious when cooperating together. Other scholars have noted how individual perceptions fall into line with ‘the state of relations between the two groups’ (Wetherell, 1996: 204). Thus, individuals will enhance the in-group and devalue the out-group (Tajfel, 1978). Often such differentiation stems from a desire to aid future recollection and easier social labelling, with this cognitive simplicity resulting in the creation of stereotypes (Hawstone & Greenland, 2000). This research contends that it is as a result of the interaction amid the contested space between self and the other - at the “/” - that both conflict and cooperation, and therefore security, occur.

Self/other reveals where and how identities diverge whilst offering explanations for this process. An appreciation of the core sentiments of self/other can thus help us to conceptualise and pinpoint patterns of differentiation whilst underlining how perceptions are built, shaped and remembered. Several analysts have used these understandings within IR research to look at national and international images, belief systems and misperception (Boulding, 1956, 1959; Holsti, 1962; Jervis, 1969). As already noted, the self/other dichotomy in this analysis concerning India’s security
practice comes from different political norms (Congress versus BJP) but is also substantiated by corresponding views within India’s wider security community. This process is affirmatory as ‘decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images’ (Jervis, 1969: 455). It also helps to indicate how once opinions diverge, they can be reinforced by similar and supporting viewpoints, adding legitimacy to one’s self-image and worldview. Within IR theory, these perspectives are exemplified by the security dilemma and (misperception-led) spiral dynamics, whereby differing beliefs are inherently fixated and then over-emphasised (Boulding, 1959).

The importance of self/other to a norm-based account of security is stated by Wendt, who notes that it is ‘the medium by which they [state actors] determine who they are, what they want and how they should behave’ (1999: 332). Furthermore, the logic of identity requires the ascription of boundaries that enable comparison and difference, meaning that no definition of the self can be asserted ‘without suppositions about the other’ (Campbell, 1992: 70). Quintessentially, according to Peterson, this definition is exclusionary and adversarial; “us versus them, insiders versus outsiders, citizens versus foreigners” (quoted in Zalewski & Enloe, 2002: 287). Applied to this study and the notion of security identity, this dichotomy translates into divergent Congress-dominated and BJP norms concerning the conduct of Indian foreign policy.

On a more micro-level, self/other also recognizes the presence of divergent worldviews within groupings – for example hard versus soft Hindutva worldviews in the BJP (broadly LK Advani versus Atal Vajpayee) or secularism versus Hinduism in Congress (for Nehru and Gandhi respectively). It also shows the importance of politicians who switched political affiliations (such as KC Pant and the realist Arun Singh (to advise Jaswant Singh) who both moved from Congress to the BJP) or were former diplomats (such as Brajesh Mishra who was National Security Advisor during the BJP-led NDA). The latter two examples are useful for explaining possible policy overlaps and norm commonalities between the two parties. In turn, the former example indicates how worldviews within parties are at times hierarchical and often dependent upon the wider context. Thus, hard Hindutva views were predominant around the time of the Ahodhya demolition in 1992 and the BJP’s domestic political rise but were de-emphasised prior to the NDA when the BJP needed to secure domestic coalition partners.
In this research, I apply the notion of self/other to the three normative sources of security as expounded in Chapter 2. While this application is most obvious with the perceptual source (splitting it into self and other), it also splits the political (into domestic and international) and the physical (into internal and external) sources. The splitting of the three sources of security can be seen in Figure 3.1 below.

![Figure 3.1: Splitting the Three Sources of Security](image)

This splitting further highlights a relational quality within each source, while pinpointing the location of security at the “/” between political systems, territorial borders and inter-perceptions. This pinpointing allows for ‘the construction of various mutually reinforcing dichotomies’ (Campbell, 1992: 65) that stratify distinctions between actors and their related security interests. Security is also dependent upon how states read the internal self-images of other states (Nau, 2003: 220), ideas salient to the formation of threat perceptions. At the same time, comparison investigates similarities and in the absence of conflict can lead to cooperation and inter-dependence via mutual identification, a process just as open to becoming normalised. Evidence of shared normative beliefs between different identities is emblematic of such mutuality.

Both self/other and norm-based constructions of identity can be applied to national (security) identities, as ‘states are themselves institutions whose existence and characteristics are dependent on the reproduction of particular sets of practices’ (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 223). Security policy is one such set of practices, and collectively one such identity, present within a state. “Security identity” therefore encapsulates the norms critical to the practice of security in a state’s given geo-political, historical and interactional circumstances. These arguments are especially valid when
the state is seen as ‘a social formation embedded in a particular set of historical social relations, rather than as something outside time’ (Hobden, 1998: 187). This reasoning is readily applicable to the emergence of modern India and Pakistan in 1947, which came about as a result of British rule ending in the subcontinent. Equally too, modern India has been variously portrayed as being “discovered” or as an “idea” (see respectively Nehru, 1994; Khilnani, 1997).

These perspectives on identity in relation to security also draw upon arguments concerning national identity as being a source of legitimacy and demarcation for states. This differentiation is certainly the case between states and the international system (Alagappa, 1998: 36). It also relates to the importance of nationalism for group and state self-definition, particularly when viewed as ‘a psychological sense of belonging to a single community and of shared experiences’ (Shearman, 2000: 83). These ideas are pertinent not only for the perceptual sources of India’s security identity concerned with non-alignment and great power status (among others) but also for comparing the security policies of the BJP with those of the Congress-dominated regimes up to 1998. Anderson’s conception of “imagined communities”, whereby national identity represents ‘the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of discrete historical forces … to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations’ (1991: 4), further backs up considering security identity as something historically distinct yet ongoing and flexible.

3.2) - ANALYZING SECURITY:

How do norm-based identity frameworks and the self/other nexus relate to the study of security? Building upon social psychological concepts concerning identity formation, here these ideas are located into the analysis of international security. First, I look at traditional approaches used for the examination of security policy and the influence of contemporary events upon these modes of analysis. Then, I review identity-based frameworks of analysis (in particular those driven by threat perception and strategic culture), in order to further draw out the comparative strength of the security identity approach. Overall, I will affirm the analytical validity of using the concept of security identity to trace a state’s ‘set of discursive practices that are historically emergent and
orientated towards the creation and maintenance of boundaries, borders and distinctions between self and other’ (Chambers, 2002: 4).

**Traditional Approaches and the Background to Change**

IR theory has been inherently based upon material and structural concepts of the state - predominantly realism and liberalism. To broadly reiterate, realist thought became based upon power projection dictated by the strength of a state in an international system where anarchy is the prevailing condition, with balance or hegemony the only guarantees of stability. In turn, liberalism, centring on economic losses and gains, became based upon mutual co-operation for mutual benefit but still came down to the power of each state in competition with each other. These concepts of inter-state competition became the framework for IR theory, reflecting conflict as the historically predominant factor in international relations. This preoccupation continued during the Cold War with low intensity proxy wars between the two superpowers and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). During this period, ‘bipolar rivalry dwarfed … the domestic idiosyncrasies of nations’ (Hudson, 1997: 1) along with ideational influences.

For these reasons, and as Patomaki states, “’there has been … a tendency to reduce all problems of IR to an almost eternal dispute between political realism and liberalism’” (quoted in Barkawi & Laffey, 2001: 118). Security theory itself has also been largely systemic in nature (Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998), visualising a world based upon unitary states and their place in the international system. This vision is true of the mental and linguistic conceptualisation of world regions, such as Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, as well as East versus West, and North and South, along with multilateral bodies that often bear only an abstract resemblance to what they are representing - such as the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). Overall, this splitting and demarcating embodies the physical and mental distinction of regions and people, us and them, self and others to which traditional notions of security theory ultimately pertain.

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6 SEATO member countries were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), the United Kingdom and the United States. SEATO was dissolved on June 30 1977.
Such was IR theorists’ preoccupation with realism and liberalism, and despite the work of Kennan (1947), it was only in the 1970’s that analysts, such as Snyder (1977), began to collectively suggest that different countries could have different strategic approaches. This difference rested upon seeing culture as ‘a semi-permanent influence on policy shaped by elites and socialized into distinctive modes of thought’ (Lantis, 2006: 7). Analysts had also begun looking at ideational influences on security from operational codes (George, 1980) to analysing political leadership (Hermann, 1977) and decision-making (Allison, 1971). This insertion of identity as a causal, subjective factor behind state actions and behaviour ran inimical to general realist assumptions that all states have a prior, fixed and preordained identity, seemingly alike in each state. Such ideas formed the basis for constructivism that emphasised social identities made up of norms and practice defined by history, and which in turn determined state identity, interests and behaviour (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992, 1999). From this basis, analysts produced several state-specific studies of identity continuity and change (Barnett, 1998; Campbell, 1992; Johnston, 1995; Hopf, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Nau, 2002).

For many scholars, the end of the Cold War marked the triumph of the liberalised Western system and solidified IR theory as revolving around the Westphalian-delineated logic of the nation-state. The emergence of an apparently US-dominated unipolar international system saw a growth in multilateralism and regionalism, emphasising ideas of common interests and agendas. In turn, the role of ideas was apparent in the ending of the Cold War as democracy appeared to surmount communism. These formations were bolstered by emergent globalisation, which increasingly linked internal and external spheres of engagement and influence, and reflected the growing complexity of international interaction and security. The September 11 2001 terrorist attacks then exacerbated the need for greater cultural engagement and cooperation, as traditional ideas of deterrence - based upon massive retaliation - began to have little meaning if the enemy was stateless. In light of these events, there was a move towards less state-based analysis and more inclusive approaches, such as constructivism, which ‘direct our attention to the ways in which collectively held beliefs and values influence and shape actor behaviour’ (Berger, 2003: 407).
Bringing Identity into the Study of Security: Threat and Insecurity

An emphasis on the role of self/other emerged in the post-Cold War era as ‘international politics became the site not of universalistic claims but the realm of difference itself’ (Walker, 1993: 117). Greater emphasis was given to the role of culture within security (Hudson, 1997; Tickner, 2002) but also to how danger, threat and insecurity were represented by ideational difference. Any definitions of identity which distinguished between self and other thus implied ‘definitions of threat and interest’ (Kowert & Legro, 1996: 18-9) through their implicit difference. Such definitions additionally encompassed not only traditional threats to the state - such as to its sovereign and territorial integrity - but also to national self-perceptions and beliefs about a state’s proper political functioning. These definitions in turn involved considerations of threat based upon how other states conceived of each of these attributes (Nau, 2003: 220). Therefore, not only were the domestic politics of a state important to that state’s security policy but so too were the domestic politics of other states.

Furthermore, how a state envisions its own physical mass also impacts on its security policy - especially if they are neighbours. This point is most clearly shown in the Indian context by Pakistani claims in Kashmir, as well as Chinese claims over Arunachal Pradesh and other parts of Kashmir - all of which impinge on India’s territoriality. Such claims relate to Pakistani and Chinese self-perceptions as per either the “correct” extent of their territory or their desired position in South Asia or Asia as a whole. These perspectives are not only collectively represented by the three sources of security as laid out in Figure 3.1 above, but also indicate their inter-relational quality. Such perspectives are equally apparent in the Indian context, as while appearing nominally independent, the three sources are also interdependent. For example, threats to Kashmir reveal not only issues concerning territorial integrity (the physical) but also perceived threats to India’s democratic basis (the political) and rising international status (the perceptual). The three sources of security can therefore be more accurately represented as interdependent entities, as shown in Figure 3.2 below.
An emphasis on the role of culture within security has also been apparent through protagonists of strategic culture. Strategic culture can be defined as ‘an integrated system of symbols that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military action in inter-state affairs’ (Johnston, 1996: 222). Acknowledging anthropological work on national character (Benedict, 1946; Gorer, 1948), as well as political culture (Dittmer, 1977; Elkins & Simeon, 1979; Pye, 1985), analysts initially considered national style in relation to strategy. Many of these focused upon predominantly realist accounts of the (nuclear) strategies of either the US or the Soviet Union (Booth, 1979; Gray, 1981, 1986; Jones, 1990), and included variables such as historical experience, political culture and geography (Weigley, 1973). National styles were understood in historical and anthropological terms, arguing that ‘a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action’ (Gray, 1986: 35). Some of these analyses also highlighted the risks involved with misperceiving a rival (Booth, 1979).

By including multiple variables that covered factors from technology and geography to national character and ideology, this first generation of scholars suffered from an imprecision concerning their definitions of strategic culture. Despite multiple inputs, these scholars were also regarded as overly deterministic, with Johnston noting that there ‘was little conceptual space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice’ (1995: 37). The first generation also failed to explain the empirical sources from which strategic culture is derived, how it is transmitted across time, and how it can develop and evolve (for details on these different generations, see Johnston, 1995). This thesis confronts and answers all of these criticisms through its norm-based approach that analyses specific empirical sources from speeches and manifestoes to interviews and
biographies. I also detail alternative explanations by comparing constructivist with realist accounts from IR theory in order to provide a clearer exposition of non-normative (and non-security identity) approaches, thus counter-acting a fallibility associated with first-generation strategic culture approaches.

A second generation of theorising regarded strategic culture as an instrument of domination used by elites to draw support for declaratory, rather than operational, strategies. Strategic culture thus explained how leaders justified and legitimated certain behaviour rather than explaining the behaviour itself. Importantly however, analysts focused upon strategic culture as a product of historical experience that by definition varied from state to state. This elucidation of security is something central to my security identity approach, as it is both state-specific and historically-specific. Second generation theorists also often noted similar strategic (often realpolitik) preferences as an eventual common denominator, regardless of different experiences and backgrounds (Hollander, 1985; Klein, 1988). The security identity approach rejects such a common basis, arguing that a state’s security practice rests upon its own actions, interactions and behaviour that are specific only to that state. States may share experiences (for example, being allies during a conflict) but will ultimately be conditioned by their own (normative) precedents.

In turn, a third generation regarded strategic culture not as being deeply rooted ‘but as the product of recent historical military-strategic experience’ (Basrur, 2001: 182). Other strategic culture scholars also used institutionalist approaches in league with constructivism to link state identity to foreign policy and IR (Hall, 1999; Neumann, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1997; Ruggie, 1997). Linked to these research areas, research has carried out explicitly norm-based approaches in relation to national security culture (Katzenstein, 1996). Some of these works have analysed the roots and origins of engrained security outlooks (Berger, 1998) or explained intervention in international conflicts (Ringmar, 1996). Others have focused upon investigating ideational influences on the formation of military doctrine (Kier, 1996) and military effectiveness (Rosen, 1995). A common bond in these works is that structural-materialist accounts do not sufficiently explain state behaviour and that norm-based accounts (focusing on beliefs,
identities and culture) offer superior explanations for a state’s strategic behaviour. My research echoes this bond.

The importance of culture as an engrained belief plays a major part in these third generation works, although again often in terms of military or strategic approaches rather than wholesale security policy. These approaches have continued into research concerning the strategic culture of various states and non-state entities. Variants of strategic culture have thus been used to analyse the foreign policy of Germany (Malici, 2006), Canada (Belanger, 1999), Iran (Davies, 2008) and the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Cornish & Edwards, 2001). Recent work by Oros (2008) and Singh (2009) has emphasised the role of organisational structures in Japan, by considering the possible transformation of Japan’s security practice after the end of the Cold War. Research has also been carried out comparing US and European security policies (Lantis, 2004), on the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Junemann, 2003), as well as explaining hegemony (Wang, 2003) and weapons of mass destruction (Kartchner, 2006).

There have been several elucidations of Indian strategic culture (Bajpai, 2002; Jones, 2006; Tanham, 1992). Often these studies have had a timescale of centuries, with Jones’ analysis in particular encompassing India’s ‘philosophical and mythological foundations’ (2006: 4). Likewise, Tanham (1992) chose to focus upon geography, great power status and India’s colonial experience - eventually finding no discernible strategic culture. In turn, Uz Zaman (2006) has concentrated on connecting the strategic thought of Kautilya to contemporary Indian strategy. These approaches remain very military centric. Thus, Basrur (2001) analyses nuclear weapons in relation to strategic stability, while others have looked at nuclear proliferation (Das, 2009; Lantis, 2006; Latham, 1999). Jaswant Singh, the first Minister of External Affairs during the BJP-led NDA government, has also contributed to strategic culture debates, seeing it in an extremely historical fashion, especially concerning India’s armed forces (1999: 61-141). To these ends, Bajpai describes a ‘cognitive map or “operational code”’ (1998: 162) based upon India being coveted, needing internal stability and having mediating institutions. In turn, Cohen regards India’s security “style” as a historical mix of being firm, conciliatory and didactic (2002: 58-65).
Security Identity versus Strategic Culture

Strategic culture initially appears to be congruent with the notions of security identity as employed in this thesis. This congruence is particularly so concerning the focus upon ‘strategic culture as a product of historical circumstances and national identity’ (Kartchner, 2006: 16), as well as seeing how ideational settings limit behaviour (Johnston, 1996, 2006). Further similarities also exist concerning explaining shared meanings, and recognising the role of domestic politics and experiential precedents. However, strategic culture differs from security identity for two main reasons - namely its insistence on analysing strategy and its persistence on the formation of culture. These criticisms fit with calls by analysts for the refinement of the strategic culture approach, especially concerning the ‘development of more reflexive models’ (Lantis, 2006: 4), and for greater theoretical rigour ‘in demonstrating the linkage between identified cultural traits and actual behaviour’ (Basrur, 2001: 183).

Concerning the strategic dimension, strategic culture has been readily applied to situations concerning the ‘goals and tactics and tactics of foreign policy’ (Wittkopf & McCormick, 1999: xii). These situations have mainly included looking at military doctrine, warfare and war fighting (particularly nuclear politics). In contrast, security identity is not strategic as it neither represents an outlook nor a plan nor a doctrine. It does not insist that states have a strategic framework or an accompanying grand strategy but instead that there is an aggregated consensus within a state’s security establishment based upon core beliefs and common reference points. Equally, this aggregated consensus is not solely based upon militaristic rationales but also includes domestic ideological influences (such as Hindutva or Nehruvian thought, in the Indian case), as well as perceptual influences. Furthermore, it is event-driven and as a leading Indian strategic actor notes, ‘events create consensus’ (Interview B4, 2008). Thus, security identity is based solely upon past experience and precedent, producing long-term established guiding characteristics.

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7 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
Within India, this viewpoint furthermore reflects the dominant attitude of both Tanham (1992), and the majority of those interviewed for this project, that there is no pre-ordained strategic plan or outlook within India. Typical of this opinion, a strategic analyst noted that ‘we don’t have a kind of security culture in this country … we approach things in an extremely ad hoc, extremely unplanned and extremely ill-conceived framework’ (Interview A18, 2008)

8. In contrast to most strategic culture analysis, I also contend that domestic factors are the key influence on a state’s security policies across time. Thus, my analysis focuses almost exclusively on the first 60 years of Indian independence and contrasts the security policies of the BJP-led NDA with Congress dominated regimes. More importantly, my study encompasses critical events in international relations (such as the end of the Cold War and 9/11) in order to underscore the persistent and entrenched nature of (Indian) security identity that defies more structuralist explanations. Security identity can thus be regarded as a “constant” that encompasses a state’s historical interaction and behaviour, and which informs its present and future policy orientations. Key international events influence this behaviour but will always be informed by prior experiences, producing an evolving composite whole rather than a wholesale re-evaluation of security practice.

Security identity also differs from strategic culture concerning the latter’s insistence upon culture rather than identity. This difference centres upon the problem of culture being difficult to operationalise. Many approaches have abstracted a strategic culture from a state’s actions and then used the resulting strategic culture to explain further actions, resulting in a tautological confusion whereby it is nearly impossible to separate independent and dependent variables in a reliable way. Part of this confusion lies with seeing strategic culture as having some kind of predictive power, which often appears deterministic (Johnston, 1995: 63). Security identity is more useful in these regards as it only indicates possible choices within a constraining normative framework, rather than pre-determining which will be undertaken in certain scenarios. These contentions have some commonalities with existing work (Basrur, 2001; Das, 2009). This thesis also counters another criticism directed towards strategic culture analyses concerning their failure to gain access to those elites who make a state’s security policy (Rosen, 1995: 14). I gained access to many of those central to Indian security policymaking both before

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8 Interview with think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008.
and during the BJP-led NDA, allowing for a much more reflexive appreciation of Indian security.

3.3) - THE SECURITY IDENTITY FRAMEWORK:

Drawing together the findings of the previous two sections concerning identity construction and approaches to the analysis of security, this section encapsulates them together to present a framework for analysing security identity. The framework joins together three factors –

1) the cyclical dynamism of identity creation and evolution, as enabled by composite norms formed through ongoing interaction and learning through history;
2) the patterns of differentiation delineated by seeing identity in terms of self/other - including splitting the three normative sources of security in order to focus on the contested space between them; and
3) regarding security as something, which is ideational and temporally-based - encompassing both domestic and international influences, and which, includes threat perceptions between states.

After the framework has been introduced, its salient features are also explained.

Visualising the Framework: Inputs, Outputs and Feedback

Following on from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that conceptualised the three normative sources of security as split and then interdependent entities, Figure 3.3 below conceptualises the full security identity framework.
The framework represents the ongoing and cyclical nature of identity formation as derived from social psychology and the formation of norms. Thus, after the existing security identity inputs have passed through the confluence of the three normative security sources, the resulting outputs then feed back into the framework as evolved security identity inputs. This cycle effectively allows the security identity to be in a persistent state of development, permitting existing norms to both continue and change in the face of new interactions and experiences. Not only is such a process dynamic it also links contemporary events to past interaction, allowing for the building of
precedent and learning - key factors in the formation of norms. Such a process recognizes how a policy (and thus norm) maker’s ‘perceptual thresholds … are influenced by what … he has experienced and learnt about’ (Jervis, 1969: 466). In this way, through their greater repetition, the evolved security identity inputs have a critical filtering role concerning reactions to new events and experiences as they select or de-select events that confirm their dominant basis. As Jervis pertinently notes, ‘historical traumas can heavily influence future perceptions’ (1969: 470), as is evident for India concerning the events of 1947 for attitudes towards Pakistan or 1962 concerning China.

Again, the framework also emphasises multiple aspects, sources and locations of security simultaneously, and recognises that a state’s security exists at the confluence of all these sources. This understanding does not mean that every source of security is always effectively and ongoingly inter-connected within the security identity framework. Instead, it simply states that prior to any filtering and screening by the pre-existing inputs, any event or experience has the potential to affect the security identity’s underlying normative basis. In union, these ideas produce a collective ‘identity topography’ (Hopf, 2002: 262) of a state’s security practice. The framework also acknowledges that, by virtue of self/other differentiation, security is inherently different from state to state. Finally, the framework explicitly reflects the importance of internal factors to our understanding of security and is (inter)relational in nature.

**Salient Attributes of the Security Identity Framework**

**Three Normative Sources of Security**

The security identity framework collectively analyses three normative sources of security (the political, the physical and the perceptual), which act as the independent variables that impact upon the dependent variable of security identity. These sources are further split into two parts to represent the state under examination and its relationship with other states and identities - hence domestic / international, internal / external, and self / other. The interface of these dichotomies is where security takes place, indicating either harmony or dissonance between political systems, territorial integrity and national self-conceptions. Such categorisations also indicate how security is state-specific, proximate
and contested. The disaggregation into multiple sources also enables the definition of several established guiding characteristics (the constant variables) inherent to a state’s security behaviour. Through the splitting of the three sources, the analyst can simultaneously and clearly see how both foreign and domestic politics contribute to national security. The framework additionally includes (through the international aspect of the political source) major international events which are so critical for system-based accounts. This inclusion indicates how such events are relevant but not critical to the development of a state’s security identity and thus security practice.

The emphasis on normative sources also enables greater precision for analysing normative continuity and change through a micro-structuring of a state’s security identity, leading to a clearer elucidation of an ‘actor’s operational code beliefs’ (Yee, 1996: 76). Using normative sources coupled with ongoing dynamic identity construction also allows several different strands of emphasis and analysis to be drawn together. Thus, when the sources are seen as relational and interdependent entities, their interlocking confluence (or “focal point”) consequently enables their collective analysis. At the same time, the three normative sources show how ‘security and insecurity are relational qualities, not a material distribution of capabilities, threats and vulnerabilities independent of such relations’ (McSweeney, 1999: 3). The three normative sources thus structure the security identity framework and represent, as Snyder notes, “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour … of a national strategic community” (quoted in Macmillan et al., 1999: 4).

In this context, it is norms that are the critical element for explaining continuity and change within the security identity framework, and for structuring the three normative sources of security. It is the consistency, reliability and durability of these norms, which determines the long term established characteristics of a state’s security identity (Johnston, 1995: 48; Oros, 2008: 7). Security identity research thus regards norms as representing habitual behaviour made up of beliefs and interests ‘that are culturally transmitted’ (Florini, 1996: 367). This transmission indicates experiential precedents in state behaviour that temper ongoing security interests. Such an observation also shows this research’s interest in how ‘structures of constructed meaning, embodied in norms or
identities, affect what states do’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 66). These perspectives acknowledge the influence of strategic culture analysts concerned with semi-permanent national styles (Gray, 1986: 35), security “pre-dispositions” (Duffield, 1998) and seeing security development as analogous to language development (Basrur, 2001: 184).

**History as Recording Interaction and Experience**

When and how the norms structuring the normative sources of security have been threatened, indicates their relevance to a state’s security identity. History is critical in this regard as it acts as a chronological tool (and as a temporal manager) that traces a state’s interaction. Concerning security identity, history represents recorded dynamism, providing a depository of experience and precedents about prior policymaking and behaviour. Furthermore, history situates security identity as a long-term, persistent, established and relatively consistent phenomenon. Time is a necessary variable, serving to confirm that a state’s security is not a timeless essence but is instead historically contingent and contested. As a linking device between current practice and entrenched precedent, security identity can thus ‘serve to legitimise dominant conventions about a state’s past, present and future’ (Johnston, 1995: 15). Furthermore, as Johnston notes, ‘the weight of historical experiences and historically-rooted strategic preferences tends to constrain responses to changes in the “objective” strategic environment’ (1995: 34).

History’s importance for recording interaction and experience additionally relates to what Pye terms “‘post-ism’” (2001: 19) - that is the importance of looking to the past in order to see contemporary trajectories. Tilly reinforces this notion by stating that “‘all reliable knowledge of human affairs rests on events that are already history’” (quoted in Hobden, 1998: 36). Here security identity, through the constructivist lens, shows how formative interaction is at the root of relationships between states, rather than material capabilities. The overarching aspect of history is of special importance in terms of linking different historical eras and overarching specific events. Thus, my analysis focuses upon continuities despite perceived shocks to the international system such as the sudden oil price rises of the 1970s, the end of the Cold War or 9/11. This approach is partly in response to the difficulties faced with analysing critical events (Das, 1997;
Varshney, 2002) but also to emphasise how security identities are contingent, responsive and essentially absorbent of multiple eras and events (Bessho, 1999: 11).

**Analytical Placement**

It is important to note that security identity has the ability to be inclusive of different facets of IR theory. Security identity is not a theory or a model but a heuristic analytical tool that, through the coalescence of identity and security, encompasses the principles or security norms inherent to an identity-based conception of security. Despite the descriptive terms used - values, principles, norms, identities - security identity is not ostensibly constructivist, but is merely an epistemological way of describing the grouping of these concepts. This point again reflects strategic culture analyses such as Johnston (1996), who has described Chinese strategic culture as having elements of both realist-centred *reapolitik* and Confucian-Mencian influenced pragmatism. Likewise, in the Indian context, Bajpai (2002) has described Indian security culture as being simultaneously a mixture of Nehruvian, neo-liberalist and hyper-realist. In this way, realism can itself be regarded as a set of beliefs (in anarchy, in hegemony and power balance). Security identity ought to be regarded as an analytical framework for investigating the dominant principles within a state’s security outlook. It is not a positivist theory that is falsifiable or generalisable. Instead, security identity is an indicatory framework that is readily transferable to other states as an analytical tool with which to examine their normative (and discursive) preferences.

3.4) - APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO INDIA:

Now that the security identity framework and its salient attributes have been discussed, what core profile does the framework provide in the Indian context? This section outlines the basic essences underpinning India’s security identity in terms of the style of its political system and how that system is organised; the geographic nature of the state and its position relative to others; and the defining national texts and national symbols that inform its self-perception. Explicating each normative source of security is this way is designed to provide an initial structure with which to locate the empirical analysis. This collective profiling of the core elements of Indian security provides the starting
basis for the analysis of the Indian security from 1947 to 1998 that will be carried out in the next Chapter.

First Normative Source: Political Profile

India’s political system is a federal republic founded upon popularly elected national and state governments. The republic is currently split into 28 states and 7 union territories as listed in Table 3.1 below, 3 of which are offshore. The number, borders and areas of these states and territories have fluctuated since 1947 as a result of political policy and electoral reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>UNION TERRITORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh; Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; Bihar; Chhattisgarh; Goa; Gujarat; Haryana; Himachal Pradesh; Jammu and Kashmir; Jharkhand; Karnataka; Kerala; Madhya Pradesh; Maharashtra; Manipur; Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagaland; Orissa; Punjab; Rajasthan; Sikkim; Tamil Nadu; Tripura; Uttar Pradesh; Uttarakhand; West Bengal</td>
<td>Andaman and Nicobar Islands*; Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu*; Delhi; Lakshadweep*; Pondicherry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: List of Current Federal States in India (CIA, 2010)

Centered upon a secular constitution (defined as being inclusive and tolerant of all religions rather than being non-religious - see Smith, 1963), India’s democratic tradition is based upon a parliamentary-style consisting of an upper (Rajya Sabha) and lower house (Lok Sabha), currently with 245 and 545 members respectively. As shown by Table 3.2 below, the Indian National Congress (Congress) party has dominated the governance of India since 1947 until the late 1980s, which witnessed the rise of the BJP and smaller regional state-based parties. With the exception of the brief BJP government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1996, all Prime Ministers previous to 1998 had been one-time Congress ministers or legislators. Furthermore, and again with the exception of the 1996 BJP government, all non-Congress governments up until 1998 had been coalitions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIME MINISTER</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>TENURE IN OFFICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J L Nehru</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>August 15 1947 - May 27 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G L Nanda*</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>May 27 1964 - June 9 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L B Shastri</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>June 9 1964 - January 11 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G L Nanda*</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>January 11 1966 - January 24 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>January 24 1966 - March 24 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>January 14 1980 - October 31 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
<td>October 31 1984 - December 2 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandra Shekhar</td>
<td>National Front (coalition)</td>
<td>November 10 1990 - June 21 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A B Vajpayee</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>May 16 1996 - June 1 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H D Deve Gowda</td>
<td>United Front (coalition)</td>
<td>June 1 1996 - April 21 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I K Gujral</td>
<td>United Front (coalition)</td>
<td>April 21 1997 - March 18 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - interim Prime Minister

Table 3.2: Indian Prime Ministers, Political Affiliation and Tenure in Office (1947-1998)

Until the gradual liberalisation that occurred from the early 1990s onwards, economic policy in India was mainly conceived along nationalist and command-economy lines. In turn, the military ‘plays almost no role at all’ (Cohen, 2002: 77) in the political decision-making process, remaining detached from politics. This detachment underscores a fear amongst India’s leaders that India’s military may be inspired by the several coups carried out in Pakistan since independence. In addition, Indian society can be traditionally regarded as ‘based on ascriptive criteria (caste, family, and upbringing) … (which) assigns status and tilts opportunity’ (Jones, 2006: 7). Such a basis encourages a hierarchical system based upon family ties and inherited positions of influence, which in Indian politics often translates to the existence of inter-generational political dynasties.
India is physically located in South Asia below the Himalayas and between the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Globally, India is positioned between the Middle East (West Asia), Russia, Central Asia, China, South East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Both India’s global and regional location can be seen in Figure 3.4 above. The world’s seventh largest country, India physically dominates the region with its total area collectively exceeding that of all its neighbours combined with the exception of China, which is located to India’s north-east. This dominance is replicated in terms of population but India currently achieves near numerical parity with China. Overall, India has land borders with six other states (five before 1971) totalling over 14,000 kilometres. India’s coastline with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is around 7,000 kilometres in length and includes proximity to two other states. Precise comparisons of these factors can be seen in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: South Asian Populations, Total Areas and Borders with India
(CIA, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA (KM² - MTAL)</th>
<th>POPULATION (JULY 2009 EST.)</th>
<th>BORDER WITH INDIA (KM - M AR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3,287,263</td>
<td>1,166,079,217</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9,596,961</td>
<td>1,338,612,968</td>
<td>3,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>796,095</td>
<td>176,242,949</td>
<td>2,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>143,998</td>
<td>156,050,883</td>
<td>4,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>676,578</td>
<td>48,137,741</td>
<td>1,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>147,181</td>
<td>28,563,791</td>
<td>1,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>65,610</td>
<td>21,324,791</td>
<td>31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>38,394</td>
<td>691,141</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>396,334</td>
<td>450*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - distance from Indian coast

Table 3.4: Defining Indian National Texts and National Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL TEXTS</th>
<th>NATIONAL SYMBOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Arthashastra</em> - Kautilya</td>
<td>Flag - Tricolour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mahabharata</em></td>
<td>Anthem - <em>Jana Gana Mana</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ramayana</em></td>
<td>(&quot;thou art the ruler of the minds of all people&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Discovery of India</em> - Jawaharlal Nehru</td>
<td>Song - <em>Vande Mataram</em> (&quot;bow to thee, Mother&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?</em> - VD Savarkar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third Normative Source: Perceptual Profile

Perceptually, India has traditionally regarded itself as the natural hegemon of South Asia that dominates her smaller neighbours (Cohen, 1997: 27). This approach has been based upon her relative physical size, her potential economic and military power and a strong desire for autonomy in her foreign affairs - all resultant perhaps from her colonial experiences under the British Raj prior to achieving independence in 1947. Several defining national texts and national symbols have influenced this worldview, a selection of which be found in Table 3.4 below.

Ancient Indian statecraft influences this viewpoint, in particular Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* (“science of politics”) whereby ‘all statecraft revolved around the manipulation or balancing of a ring of antagonists’ (Cohen, 1997: 30). Not only aimed at establishing suzerainty over other states, the *Arthashastra* ‘held that wars should be undertaken only as the last resort when statecraft failed to achieve this purpose, not because wars were
immoral but as they were expensive and troublesome and victory was not certain’ (Murty, 1964: 2). In turn, important texts relating to Hinduism (such as the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*), explain the relation of individuals to society and the world. The *Mahabharata*, in particular, stresses that it is ‘illegitimate for Indians to provoke a war with people of another culture, or try to conquer territories outside India’ (Murty, 1964: 8), additionally stating that any Indian empire must not extend beyond the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

National self-perception has also been dominated by the dual forces of Jawaharlal Nehru (India’s first Prime Minister) and Mahatma Gandhi who broadly conceiving of India as a non-violent great power in waiting. The ideology of Hindutva can also be regarded as an influence on India’s national self-perception, especially the writings of VD Savarkar (1923) concerning rediscovering the glory of previous Hindu rulers. Overall, such findings were necessarily historically selective, given the ‘limited periods of unification’ (Hilali, 2001: 742) present in Indian history. India’s national symbols also influence the state’s perceptual outlook. The colours of India’s national flag - the tricolour - reflect her religious make up, with orange representing Hinduism, green representing Islam and white representing any other religions. The national anthem and national song respectively detail India’s geographical makeup and India’s struggle for the freedom and independence of “Mother India”. Through their high incidence and frequency, the repetition of these songs and symbols significantly impacts upon India’s national self-perception.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Based upon the symbiosis of security and identity, the security identity framework allows for the ideational analysis of (Indian) security practice. Through its inherent outputs, inputs and cyclical feedback, this analytical framework records norm continuity and change through the historical behaviour and interaction of a state. These norms are themselves disaggregated into three major sources (the political, the physical and the perceptual) in order to facilitate the precise, yet simultaneous, analysis of where and how each norm has developed, entrenched and evolved. The necessity of differentiation via the self/other nexus also confirmed how the study of security can be located at the
boundary between states (and identities), and must be seen as an inter-relational and inter-dependent entity. The security identity framework thus allows for the analysis and comparison of differing norms during different time periods - one of my central research aims.

Developing the security identity framework advances analytical approaches used in norm-based research. Specifically, it emphasises an ability to record norm development as underpinned by social learning garnered through state-to-state interaction, as well as providing a collective overview of a state’s security practice (especially the presence and influence of domestic norms). In these ways, security identity credibly contributes a new and distinctive approach to constructivist accounts of international relations. Furthermore, it also develops (and improves) strategic culture studies away from military-dominated and culturally deterministic analyses. Through an ideational lens, security identity produces a coherent ‘orientating framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies’ (Jepperson et al., 1996: 36). The next chapter builds upon these foundations and uses the security identity framework to provide an overview of the development of India’s security identity (and its incumbent composite norms) from 1947 to 1998.
Chapter 4:

‘India’s Security Identity Develops, 1947-1998’

‘what does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence’
(Nehru, 1961: 240)

‘accidents of geography have had a powerful effect on determining national character and history’
(Nehru, 1994: 501)

“”India will not go with a begging bowl … New Delhi cannot be ignored … considering India’s strength and size””
(Gujral quoted in Jain, 2007: 101)

Can the security identity structure sufficiently provide a norm-based and identity-driven analysis of Indian security over time? Can such an account successfully overarch and encompass changes across both political generations, and structural and systemic change? Here I positively answer these questions by analysing the development of Indian security from post-colonial independence in 1947 to the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 1998. My approach employs the security identity framework to show how Indian security consists of a number of entrenched composite norms structuring her security practice during this period. These norms reveal deep continuities in Indian security across notable structural and system changes, adding greater validity to the security identity approach. Isolating these norms simultaneously emphasises multiple sources of security, and recognises that Indian security practice exists at the confluence of these sources.

With the exception of the Janata Party from 1977-80, Congress resolutely dominated India’s government, and thus national security making policy, from 1947 to 1998. Within the immediate independence context, India’s security identity consisted of norms
derived from Nehru’s core principles, which dominated Indian foreign policy until his death in 1964. These principles were *ahimsa* (non-violence), non-alignment, peace, disarmament, economic self-reliance (*swadeshi*), positive neutralism and complete independence (*purna swaraj*). Collectively, these principles can be described as enlightened national self-interest. Other core characteristics, many stemming from a Hindu heritage, were intended to maintain equilibrating balances within Indian society; namely tolerance, equality and general detachment. Additionally, India was regarded as a great civilisation, earning her special recognition, duties and rights in the world.

The chapter is split into three major sections reflecting the three normative sources of India’s security identity, as derived from an analysis of the discursive content of the three empirical loci (the political-rhetorical, the temporal historical and the reflexive-individual - see Table 2.4). The process of norm solidification is also shown through the socialising forces of event type, event frequency and event harmony / dissonance (Table 2.1). Section one analyses the multiple norms making up the political source of India’s security identity and investigates the core guiding principles of India’s political system. The second section then deals with the norms that form the physical source of India’s security identity, and details India’s historical relationships with her immediate neighbours. In turn, the third section investigates those norms formed in the perceptual source of India’s security identity, and notes how India has learnt from her international interaction. The chapter concludes by collectively summing up the composite norms integral to each normative source of India’s security identity up until 1998.

4.1) - GOVERNANCE, INSTABILITY AND COMMUNALISM:

As British rule weakened over India in the early twentieth century, the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress Party (Congress) promoted a mandate for a single inclusive nation tolerant of all creeds and religions. In contrast, Mohammed Jinnah’s Muslim League held a strict communal stance that solely represented the Muslim population. Unable to envision mutual tolerance and harmony within a single country, Jinnah called for a “two-nation” solution through Partition to establish a separate Islamic fatherland of India: Pakistan. The Muslim League achieved its goal, while Congress gained power of the new India and impressed their ‘liberal, secularist, anti-
communal and anti-violence (ethos)’ (Kundra, 1956: 59) upon the state. In addition to Congress’ ‘moral scruples’ (Chiriyankandath, 2004: 204), these aspects complimented a Nehruvian Consensus based upon socialism, democracy and non-alignment (Sinha, 2003: 201). Previous to becoming leaders of a newly sovereign state and according to a leading think-tank head in India, ‘the Indian political leadership (had) never had to think about security’ (Interview A12, 2008). India thus began its independence with little experience of international relations except that of the ex-colonial powers.

Within India, there was a search for “unity in diversity” articulated through ‘a multinational vision of nationhood - in which region, language, social status are combined’ (Desai, 1996: 119), and which was nominally non-religious, anti-elitist and socially cohesive. This secularism acknowledged a legacy of communal violence and separatism since independence, whereby ‘the history of Partition was assimilated into the career of the Indian state’ (Pandey, 1994: 204). Congress’ dominance of Indian governments from 1947 to 1998, as well as Nehru’s long tenure as India’s first Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister), ‘created two generations of Indian politicians and bureaucrats committed to Nehruvianism’ (Cohen, 2002: 37). Overall, Congress’ beliefs formed the ideological underpinnings for the norms that compose the first source of India’s security identity, in particular its democratic, tolerant and secular basis.

Establishing Practice - Congress Secularism, Equality and Control

British rule institutionalised India’s political system around a functional democratic process (Vora & Palshikar, 2004: 22-30). These practices combined with a first-past-the-post electoral regime and a parliamentary form of cabinet government. Nehru’s dominance of the political process also underlined the importance of individual leadership in India - a pre-eminence replicated by strong Congress leaders (often from the Nehru dynasty) until the 1990s. From this basis, the Indian Constitution promulgated in January 1950 declared India to be a sovereign democratic republic that was federal and non-monarchical, with an independent judiciary, a single electorate and guaranteed rights. Given the state’s history however, Indian ‘democracy was

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9 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Army General, Delhi, May 5 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
constructed against the grain, both of a society founded upon the inequality of the caste order, and of an imperial and authoritarian state’ (Khilnani, 1997: 9). (Socialist) democracy thus became the overriding norm of the political source of India’s security identity.

Secularism was a response to potential instability and divisiveness within an India ‘marked by deep attachments to cultural identities’ (Jayal, 2001: 2). These attachments had been apparent during Partition and would be manifested during the next fifty years by communal tensions and separatism. Secularism also encompassed the Arthashastra tradition, according to Pannikar, of ‘a purely secular theory of state of which the sole basis is power’ (1960: 116), as well as the separation of state and religion. Accordingly, Article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution grants individual freedom of religion - reflecting sarva dharma shambhava (equal treatment of all religions). This validation of a secular state confirmed not only Congress’ ideological roots but also India’s demographic diversity derived through repeated exposure to conquering empires. The process of rooting state practice upon historical beliefs concerning secularism and plurality helped to establish their normative legitimacy within India’s security identity, and confirmed their strength across international structural changes (such as the end of World War II and the creation of modern India).

India’s Constitution also instituted notions of equality through a commitment to protect ‘religious difference rather than imposing a uniform “Indianness”’ (Khilnani, 1997: 167). Such principles were deemed necessary in a Hindu-dominated society and the Constitution rejected majoritarianism by protecting the rights of minorities. Henceforth, the Constitution included Article 15 (1) - no state discrimination on the grounds of religion - and protected the customs, laws and practices of India’s minority (religious) communities. Additionally, government jobs and education were reserved for lower castes through positive discrimination under Articles 330 (1) and 332 (1). The Constitution therefore established the institutional basis that normalised the presence of socialist democracy, unified equality and tolerance into India’s security identity. Through their persistence and continued high frequency in official political discourse, these norms became established guiding principles within the political source of India’s security identity.
The new Indian state also carried on (from its previous British rulers) principles of a centralised administration and the domination of neighbouring states (Sathamurthy, 1990: 342). Within the Indian state itself, these principles translated into the centre dominating the provinces. Consequently, India’s Constitution contained national security functions to reassert central control via the emergency powers of President’s Rule whereby the Prime Minister could subordinate all national functions to direct rule (Articles 356 and 357). These articles represented an institutionalised response to any threats against India’s secular and unified political basis, as well as any potential territorial dismemberment (as apparent in the physical source of India’s security identity, see below). President’s Rule would be invoked on many occasions (particularly in Kashmir), and through its high frequency produced accepted structured protections against threats to those norms concerning India’s political and physical basis.

Concerning economics, India’s leaders insisted upon a swadeshi approach consisting of principles of socialist self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Dating from anti-colonial movements, swadeshi emphasised domestic production and limited international engagement - an approach intended to make India strong and to dissuade the influence of outsiders. Swadeshi signalled the state as the key determinant of economic growth (including the institution of Five Year Plans), negating both foreign involvement and investment. In a newly independent India, this approach was suited to developing the country’s infrastructure, becoming normalised and entrenched until the 1980s. Then, faced with an early 1990s balance of payments crisis, as well as the decline of industrial and economic support from the Soviet Union, India gradually set about adapting and liberalising her economy. Such a policy reflected a perceived need to catch up with other Asian states whose trade levels were rapidly expanding in the 1990s. Average annual Indian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 1963 to 1997 can be found in Figure 4.1 below.
The Threat of Communalism and Militancy

Communalism describes ‘the political functioning of individuals and groups for the selfish interests of particular religious communities or castes’ (Smith, 1963: 140). Its religious association is also a powerful force across borders - as shown by conflicts between India and Pakistan, which often function along a secular / communal rather than a Hindu / Muslim dialectic (Nanda, 1976: 1-23). At independence, the contrasting political agendas of an inclusive India or a two-nation solution produced communal tension and rioting as each side desired political influence. This rioting led to over a million deaths, as an estimated 10 million people changed lands (Wolpert, 1997: 216). Regarded by Nehru as an Indian fascism that was undemocratic, segregative and non-inclusive, the communalism of Partition ‘inflicted a deep wound in the heart of the people’ (1991: 25). This continued association between the birth of modern India and mass violence helped establish anti-communalism as a central norm within the political source of India’s security identity.

Militancy by ethnic groups against the central government also became commonplace after 1947. In response, Congress insisted that India’s ‘national integrity and sovereignty were inalienable and indivisible’ (Damodaran & Unnithan-Kumar, 1990: 17). Furthermore, the threat perceived from militancy (and indeed communalism) highlighted ‘the importance of internal political stability in dissuading outsiders from...
threatening India’ (Bajpai, 1998: 159). These beliefs resulted in the Indian state’s prescriptive attitude towards potential separatists - be they in the northeast (the Mizo, Naga and Gharo freedom movements in the 1960s), Assam or across India (the Naxalites). Such groups bolstered the threat to India’s political (and territorial) integrity, and through their high frequency, engrained anti-militancy into its security identity. Other threats came from Punjabi Sikhs who wanted to establish an independent Khalistan (land of the pure) during the 1980s and 1990s, and from Tamils in southern India who demanded self-rule from the 1950s to the 1980s. Indian politicians would often placate agitations by granting minorities their own linguistically-based states (Jones, 2006: 11; Sabhlok, 2002).

Repeated (and often coercive) attempts by the Indian state to politically integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union contributed to an insurgency in the state from 1989. This policy highlighted underlying assumptions that Kashmiri Muslims were communal and wanted to be part of Pakistan (Jha, 1991: 34). As the Kashmir situation worsened, Indian politicians placed a greater emphasis on Pakistani involvement in the insurgency. Much of this emphasis stemmed from historical memory; particularly how both the post-Partition 1947 invasion and the 1965 border incursions had been initiated through Pakistani-backed militants. Here we can clearly see the role of history and repetition in establishing and normalising long-standing conceptions concerning militancy within the security identity. Moreover, Pakistan took advantage of the situation in Kashmir, encouraged by a successful jehadi strategy in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and a desire to avenge its 1971 defeat by India (Jane’s Information Group, 2001).

The Kashmir insurgency fashioned protracted threats to the democratic secularism, plurality and tolerance emblematic of the political source of India’s security identity. It also exacerbated ethnic tensions and precluded the prospect of communal violence and insurgency from other states in India. The insurgency spilt over into other parts of India with evidence of Pakistani, Afghan and Kashmiri militancy in Bangladesh and the northeast provinces (Ataov, 2001; Devotta, 2003; Ganguly, 2006; Saikia, 2002). Such unrest often overstretched the Indian army, and further internal societal linkages could be seen via ‘the enlarging nexus of the jehadi forces with the Indian underworld’ (Rudra, 2003: v) - forces which encouraged both communal and militant tendencies in India. As
omnipresent and repeated themes within Indian politics, each new outbreak of violence compounded their significance and resonance within the political source of India’s security identity, confirming their normative presence. In response to these conditions, Prime Minister Rao appointed India’s first-ever Minister of State for Internal Security in the early 1990s.

Several examples from India’s political history show the dangers of ethno-nationalism and its association with foreign policy and national security. Through their repetition and frequency, these examples personify the established threat of militancy against India and thus its presence in India’s security identity. For instance, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984 after troops stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar to flush out Sikh militants pressing for self-rule. In turn, Indian attempts to balance Tamil and Sinhala in Sri Lanka led to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by a suicide bomber on May 21, 1991. Both cases were accompanied by an aftermath of communal (religious community-based) violence, and underscore how the domestic politics of India’s neighbours is part of India’s security identity. In 1992, these tensions became exemplified by the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque at Ahodhya by Hindu nationalists. Collectively, these examples served to cement Indian state concerns over communalism and militancy into the political source of India’s security identity. Reflective of these concerns, spending on police and paramilitaries regularly increased from independence until the 1990s (Bajpai, 1998).

The 1975-77 Emergency and Emergent Communal Politics

India witnessed the full evocation of President’s Rule from 1975-77 when Indira Gandhi suspended the legislature and constitution. This move was in response to the predominance of vote banks (loyal blocs of voters from a single ethnic community) in the electoral system and perceptions of an overly influential federal system. The Emergency came to represent ‘a twenty-two month eclipse’ (Khilnani, 1997: 9) of Indian democracy by state authoritarianism and was symptomatic of corruption, paranoia and disharmony within Congress and government (Bates, 2007: 231-5). Even though Indira Gandhi was deposed in the 1977 Lok Sabha elections by a Janata Party coalition, the Emergency represented a distinct erosion of India’s democratic legitimacy.
and threatened the democratic norm underpinning the political source of the security identity.

Congress’s political monopoly was only briefly broken however, and Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980 amid violence due to the new government’scoalitional and factional make-up. During the 1980s, political fluctuations and instability became an increasing common and normalised aspect of Indian democracy. Moreover, Indira Gandhi inculcated mass politics and populism, invoking religious identity into national elections and breaking established electoral taboos. Such actions appeared to weaken the tolerance, plurality and anti-communal norms present within the security identity. Furthermore, as Congress’ political rule became more threatened, it became more authoritarian. This greater authoritarianism was backed up by the greater incidence of President’s Rule - up from 10 times between 1947 and 1966 to 70 times between 1967 and 1986. These events led to criticism of Congress and the (normative) secular basis of the state, and aided the regional diversification of Indian politics.

Consequently, the elections of 1989, 1991 and 1996 saw an increase in communal politics. This increase had much to do with the emergence of lower caste political parties, aided by the Mandal Commission in the 1990s. Such phenomena also coupled with the rise of coalition governance, such as the Janata Dal who won the 1989 election. Although the norm of democracy remained engrained in India’s political landscape (and therefore as part of its security identity), the Indian state’s vulnerability to the politics of caste and religion was unveiled, questioning both its secular self-determination and legitimacy. Within this atmosphere, the emergent nationalist Hindutva philosophy of the BJP represented a backlash against Nehru and Congress who were seen to have discriminated against Hindus by being overtly inclusive. Increasingly, ‘the rise of Hindu fundamentalism stood on the platform of majoritarian democracy’ (Mohanty, 2004: 110).

By the 1990s, communal politics appeared to be threatening the secular character of the Indian state, indicating the difficulties of subsuming religious identity into India’s national identity. As India’s political system changed, electoral and communal violence also became increasing normalised, signalling for many the communalization of the
Indian polity (Vanaik, 1997: 296-360). Against this backdrop, the rise of Hindutva, the BJP and Hindu communalism became ‘one of the counter-trends to the democratic process in India’ (Mohanty, 2004: 106). Therefore, while a democratic system had become a normalised part of Indian political life, the system was developing away from the norms of secularism and anti-communalism (and being Congress-dominated) to being more divisive and pluralistic. This challenge to Congress’ secularism translated into electoral success for the BJP as they ‘gain(ed) access to parliament through a deliberate appeal to communal emotions’ (Austin, 1994: 21).

As communalism changed India’s political landscape, the self-reliance of swadeshi also showed signs of development towards gradual economic liberalisation. Overall however, Indian policymakers remained suspicious of ‘foreign investment, multinational corporations and (a) globalised economic order’ (Bajpai, 1998: 160), regarding them as threatening Indian independence. As the 1990s reached their conclusion, India remained juxtaposed between two positions - seeing ‘the anarchy of the global financial system’ (Hasan & Nakazato, 2001: 472), particularly in relation to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, yet recognising that ‘modernise we must but we must be aware that modernisation is not necessarily jettisoning our value system’ (Vice Admiral Nayyar, 1995: 57). Moves towards economic liberalisation also acknowledged both depleted Indo-Russian links post-Cold War and the need for new foreign policy dimensions. Despite this adaptation, the norm of swadeshi remained present within India’s security identity through its underlying principles of self-reliance and autonomy.

4.2) - KASHMIR, CHINA AND REGIONAL HEGEMONY:

The newly independent India subsumed a multiplicity of social and religious identities into a centralised state apparatus. Geographically, many of India’s physical characteristics came from the heritage of British rule with her northern borders with China, Nepal and Bhutan demarcated by the Curzon and McMahon lines. In turn, the act of Partition that created India and Pakistan, relied upon the Mountbatten Plan’s “basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims” (quoted in Wirsing, 1995: 13). Furthermore, the British bought with them the concept of the state with its specific spatial dimension (Hilali, 2001). These legacies were
ongoing influences on Indian security concerning the composite norms relating to both her border relations and her internal homogeneity, norms that came to collectively represent her “cartographic anxiety” (Krishna, 1996). Given their relative consistency, a state’s geographic features can be viewed as ongoing established characteristics that will transcend most major international structural changes, except direct invasion or annexation.

A Curzonian mindset was also prominent concerning India’s physical position in South Asia, as India ‘inherited the Raj tradition … (of having) an influential, if not dominant, role over the wide arc from Aden to Singapore’ (Panda, 2003: 49; Kavic, 1967), including Iran, Afghanistan, Thailand and Tibet. This logic led to an ongoing campaign of territorial consolidation, recognising the importance of geography and territoriality as major attributes of sovereignty. Thus, 1954 saw the integration of former French settlements, while 1961 witnessed the reclaiming of Portuguese Goa. In 1975, Sikkim was absorbed into India. Earlier, the remaining Coco Island under Indian control was returned to Myanmar (in 1951). Proximity to other states also played into this logic especially given India’s enduring territorial conflicts with Pakistan and China. For a leading think-tank director in Delhi, the physical source of India’s security identity represents ‘the imperatives of our [India’s] circumstances’ (Interview A18, 2008).

**Origins - Kashmir as an Engrained Seat of Conflict**

Partition was accompanied by territorial problems as some of India’s 562 princely states sought independence rather than accession to either the new India or Pakistan. While most of these issues were quickly solved - such as Hyderabad and Junagadh - the status of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) became contested. With a Muslim majority and occupying 85,000 square kilometres of land bordering India and Pakistan, Kashmir served as a strategic window into Afghanistan and Central Asia. Furthermore, Kashmir’s maharaja - Hari Singh - wanted the state to be an independent “Switzerland of the East”, and postponed his decision on accession. Singh’s hand was however forced in October 1947 when Muslim peasants rebelled against their Dogra Rajput (Hindu) landowners and Pakistani Muslims invaded across the newly established border

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10 Interview with a think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008.
to help them. In return for their military intervention, Singh signed an Instrument of Accession with India. After a limited conflict, a United Nations (UN) brokered ceasefire was reached, with Pakistan gaining a third of Kashmir and India receiving the rest of the territory.

The contested status of Kashmir led to a psychological state of mutual demonization between India and Pakistan. Centring on Westphalian and Weberian precepts of sovereignty and self-determination, the issue quickly became ideological and non-negotiable. It also became zero-sum with both sides fearing the demonstration effects of Kashmir seceding to the other as it would question the cohesion and viability of their new-found sovereignty. Kashmir therefore came to symbolise threats to the legitimacy of the new India, with only its successful re-absorption enough to successfully affirm India’s physical makeup. In the 1950s, as India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Pakistan joined the US-backed South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), these differences increased. Keeping Kashmir became a moral and strategic belief for India to signal both her NAM credentials and to dissuade external subversion of her physical borders. These factors established the territorial threat from Pakistan concerning Kashmir as a norm within the physical source of India’s security identity.

Repeated efforts were made to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully. These multilateral and bilateral attempts included the 1951 Dixon Plan, the Graham efforts (1953-8) and negotiations in October 1954. In 1949, 1953, 1956 and 1959 (and 1968 and 1969) India also offered Pakistan a no-war declaration. However, in August 1965 under the leadership of Ayub Khan, Pakistan initiated a guerrilla war to liberate Kashmir. After a short conflict (including Indian advances into Pakistan), a UN ceasefire was reached and the status of Kashmir was manifested in the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 whereby India and Pakistan withdrew to pre-conflict positions. The 1965 war compounded India’s normative fear of fragmentation present from the first Kashmir conflict and, through its repeated frequency, critically habitualised the physical threat from Pakistan.

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11 The NAM was founded in 1961 by Jawaharlal Nehru, President Nasser of Egypt and President Tito of Yugoslavia.
Clashes with Pakistan in 1971, this time in response to East Pakistani calls for the establishment of an independent “Bangla Desh”, again highlighted continued Pakistani enmity which was seen to threaten South Asia’s and India’s stability. After New Delhi-trained Mukti Bahini (“liberation forces”) attacked East Pakistan in September 1971, a subsequent offensive by Indian forces liberated East Pakistan leading to Pakistan’s surrender and the establishment of Bangladesh. On July 3 1972 India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement that created a de facto border between the two sides in Kashmir via the Line of Control (LoC). Again, India relinquished any territorial gains and also returned 94,000 prisoners. This agreement engrained the sustained threat to India’s border with Pakistan, effectively normalising it further within India’s security identity but also reiterated the continued territorial division of Kashmir between the two sides.

Kashmir would remain contested by India and Pakistan throughout the 1970s and 1980s, remaining as ‘a test of Indian state sovereignty, its capacity to protect its citizens, keep order and justify its territorial ownership’ (Khilnani, 1997: 31). Repeated efforts at negotiation and some agreements (most notably between Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and IK Gujral and Pakistani Presidents Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) continued throughout this period, often following conflicts and crises. These negotiations included attempts to ease trade, travel and communication restrictions, as well as the gradual normalisation of diplomatic and cultural interactions (see Bajpai, 1998: 169). Negotiation often rested upon the implementation of different Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). A summary of these continuing trends is shown in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Major Indo-Pakistani Conflicts, Agreements and Negotiations (1947-1998)

Few tangible results took place from 1947 to 1998 between Indian and Pakistan, with few meetings actually taking place in either country (most took place at the sidelines of international conferences, especially at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation - SAARC). When negotiations were successful, they floundered because of further conflict or disagreement. This oscillation between conflict, negotiation and (occasional) agreement became the norm by 1998, indicating profound dissonance between the two sides. Further still, the de facto partition of Kashmir was by 1998 ‘more or less accepted by all parties in India’ (Vanaik, 2002: 337), and thus normalised. Overall, the frequency of these interactions served to integrate the Kashmir issue within Indo-Pakistani relations, solidifying a key dimension of India’s security identity whose symbolic appeal went beyond realpolitik (Kartchner, 2006: 15).
**Entrenching the Threat - Chinese Invasion**

India-China relations were warm in the late 1940s and early 1950s as they both emerged as modern states. India was the first non-socialist country to have diplomatic ties with communist China under Mao Zedong and consistently voted in its favour at the UN. In addition, ‘Nehru believed that an India-China détente could stabilise Asia and keep the superpowers at bay’ (Cohen, 2002: 56), beliefs based upon centuries of friendship. These beliefs were exemplified by the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement embodying five principles - respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. Accompanying Panchsheel, India conceded suzerainty over Tibet, and recognised it as an autonomous region of China (China had annexed Tibet in 1950). This concession, along with some fruitful 1950s border negotiation, marked the high point of India-China relations, celebrated by the slogan *Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai* (“India and China are brothers”).

However as the Cold War developed, China under Chairman Mao began to see India as threatening its perceived leadership of the Third World. Relations between the two countries became more fraught, especially given Chinese aid to the Mizo and Naga insurrections in India’s northeast (Norbu, 1997; Thomas, 1993: 44) and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959. This tension and an inter-perception of ‘caution and circumspection’ (Shirk, 2004: 126) became personified by ongoing border disputes between the two sides, beginning in 1959 with Chinese incursions into Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Eventually, these tensions led to war in October 1962, resulting in a heavy Indian defeat as she lost thousands of troops and large stretches of territory. Chinese incursions into India amounted to 90,000 square kilometres of Arunachal Pradesh by 1998, engraining the continued territorial threat from China as a norm within India’s security identity.

Soon after the 1962 conflict, Pakistan and China exchanged land to bolster their positions in the region, much of which resulted in China gaining land from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. These events (and particularly the unresolved territorial implications) served to personify further ongoing threats to India’s territorial integrity.
within its security identity. They additionally created a norm of suspicion concerning Chinese (and Pakistani-Chinese) intentions towards India’s physical existence. Widely regarded within Indian strategic circles as a betrayal by China, an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official noted how after 1962 ‘foreign policy became national security’ (Interview B35, 2008)\(^{12}\). India-China relations continued to be marked by border disputes, and led to several skirmishes—such as at Nathula on the Sikkim-Tibet border in September 1967 and at Somdurong Chu in 1987.

Despite the events of 1962, a succession of Indian politicians endeavoured for better relations with China. These included initial statements of friendship in May 1970, the resumption of diplomatic relations in July 1976, and a joint communiqué in May 1980 on avoiding border clashes that included the implementation of hot lines, face to face commander meetings and prior notification of military exercises. These developments continued throughout the 1980s under China’s Deng Xiaoping. Coupled with his summit with Premier Zhao Ziyang in New York in October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi’s state visit to China in 1988 helped to end the stasis between the two sides. This visit included establishing a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border issue plus a Joint Economic Group (JEG) on economic and commercial issues. Consequently, and as a sign of improving relations, India did not condemn China’s actions at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Reciprocal visits continued into the 1990s, such as those by Chinese Premier Li Peng in 1991 and Indian President Venatraman in 1992.

During a September 1993 visit by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, a landmark agreement was signed on maintaining Peace and Tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). This agreement significantly improved relations and included force reductions, air exercise restrictions and the setting up of the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to support the JWG’s. After high-ranking Politburo members visited India in 1993 and 1995, in 1996 Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese head of state to visit India since the 1962 war. His visit increased the 1993 measures, including minimal border forces, the removal of major weapons, as well as having police and paramilitary (rather than military) border patrols. In line with heightened

\(^{12}\) Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 10 2008.
diplomatic links, India-China trade increased from $200 million in 1991 to $1.02 billion in 1995 (Bajpai, 1998). While relations had improved, unresolved border issues and ongoing suspicion (as personified by continued close China-Pakistan relations), these norms continued to be present in the physical source of India’s security identity.

South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

With her smaller neighbours, India continued a tradition of special relationships inherited from the British. These relationships often centred upon unequal treaty-based security arrangements, with neighbouring states effectively becoming protectorates in Indian security rationales. Emblematic of this stance, under Article 5 of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal, it was compulsory for Nepal to tell India of any planned arms purchases. A 1949 Treaty with Bhutan held to similar principles. Other prominent regional treaties were the 1972 twenty-five Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Bangladesh, and the July 1987 Accord with Sri Lanka that ‘reflected New Delhi’s desire for [regional] pre-eminence’ (Hagerty, 1991: 356). Through the repetition and acceptance of such principles, a norm of regional hegemony became gradually engrained into the physical source of India’s security identity.

Often referred to as the Indira Doctrine, the norm of regional hegemony also rested upon India denying external powers any influence in South Asia. Concurrently, Indian military power was used as a deterrent and as an interventionist force in the region. Thus, India engaged in several bilateral peacemaking operations - in Nepal (1950), in Sri Lanka (1971 and 1987-90) and in the Maldives (1988). While not always wholly successful - as with the total failure of the 1987-90 operations in Sri Lanka (see Kadian, 1990) - India embraced interventionist policies towards South Asia, even if it would abhor such policies if applied to itself. Indian policy was also never entirely settled - relations with Bangladesh for example were at times fraught over illegal immigration and the cross-border infiltration of Islamic and separatist militants. South Asian states have also tried to balance Indian interests with those of external powers - as personified by China’s influence on Nepal’s 1989-90 trade dispute with India.
In the face of heightened energy diplomacy and economic relations, Indian policy towards the region changed in the 1990s, mainly through the actions of Prime Minister Gujral, who effectively gave up reciprocity in bilateral affairs. Regarded as necessary to counter the influence of states such as Pakistan, China and the United States (US), the Gujral Doctrine based regional relations upon good will and benevolence (Gujral, 1998, 2003). The doctrine ‘helped improve considerably India’s [regional] relations’ (Ayoob, 2000: 30) in the 1990s, and resulted in a number of important agreements. These agreements included the 1996 Ganges River (Farakka) Water-Sharing Agreement with Bangladesh, the 1996 Mahakali Treaty for power production in Nepal and trade agreements with Sri Lanka. Concerning Myanmar, Nehruvian idealism was dropped as engagement over gas supplies trumped the state’s continued undemocratic basis (Lall, 2006). Overall, by 1998 India had developed a ‘concessionary stance towards its neighbours’ (Bajpai, 1998: 197) and the norm of regional hegemony moved from being based upon reciprocity to benevolence.

The physical source of India’s security identity also contained engrained norms of tacit Indian dominance of the IOR. Apart from protecting the Curzonian arc, this norm rested upon historical elements whereby British, Dutch and French colonialists had all invaded Indian from the sea. India insisted that ‘great powers should leave the Indian Ocean’ (Mohan, 2003: 234) and in the 1960s and 1970s endeavoured to declare the IOR a Zone of Peace. After this approach failed, India joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1995, a trade association composed of 18 member states. By the 1990s, the security importance of the IOR was underscored by India becoming the biggest consumer of natural gas from the Gulf, Central Asia and South East Asia (Mohan, 2003: 210). Rising strategic competition with Pakistan and China increased this importance, underpinned by India having the IOR’s most developed navy in 1998 (Hiranandani, 2002).

4.3) - ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING AUTONOMY:

India’s autonomy in international affairs was to be achieved through positive neutralism and purna swaraj (complete independence) from great power politics. This approach encompassed specific policies of non-alignment, self-reliance, ahisma (non-violence) and
nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Indian conduct was based upon the idealistic internationalism of a Nehruvian world order based upon peace, harmony, cooperation and development, whereby all countries were treated equally regardless of status or position. The legacies of colonialism (and Partition) played into this logic by instilling an inherent distrust of any outside forces. This Nehruvian approach to security represented, for India’s leading strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam, a “‘strategy of balance of power for a militarily weak but large and self-confident nation in a bipolar world’” (quoted in Mansingh, 2005: 46).

Set against this pragmatism, there was a deep-seated belief that India was destined to achieve great power status, as India’s leaders believed that “‘fate has marked us for big things’” (Nehru quoted in Gordon, 1995: 1). This aspiration was rooted in the perceived standing of earlier Indian empires, her long interaction with the outside world through various conquering powers and also India’s physical location as the meeting point of Asia. These beliefs combined with India’s struggle for independence, which India’s leaders interpreted ‘as part of the resurgence of Asia’ (Nanda, 1976: 2) with India at the helm. In addition, a nuclear capacity was regarded as part of this aim in terms of developing independent capabilities, technological prowess and national self-worth (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 3). These notions collectively established the basis for the composite norms structuring the perceptual source of India’s security identity.

**Post-Independence Autonomy yet Vulnerability**

India’s leadership of the NAM endeavoured to counteract the ‘rigidly biglobal and pejoratively hegemonial’ (Sharma, 2001: 20) Cold War world. Non-alignment also generated moral influence for India and reinforced arguments that ‘to join any of the two superpower blocs … mortgage(ed) India’s eventual emergence as a future major player’ (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 157). In the first decades of independence, this belief existed ‘regardless of the realities of what India is’ (Dixit, 2004a: 113), as India’s leaders saw great power based upon moral idealism rather than territorial, economic or military indicators. Employment of this language helped to portray India as ‘a self-confident actor’ (Khilnani, 1997: 176), entrenching such beliefs into a norm of great power status as part of the wider security identity. Overall, the NAM created an independent voice
for India in international politics, and became the second largest multilateral organization after the UN.

Non-alignment was neither isolationist nor neutral as India criticized various states over their policies in Korea, Congo, Suez and Vietnam. Reflecting India’s own experiences, such criticism targeted expansionist powers rather than specific ideologies. The norm of economic self-reliance (swadeshi) from the political source of India’s security identity also backed up non-alignment aims of stability and self-sufficiency. Furthermore, eschewing arms races allowed military spending to be concentrated on economic development. These policies were central to establishing and protecting India’s interests on the international stage, and showed for Nehru how ‘the ideology of peace was bound together with India’s security interests and power considerations’ (1994: 533). An ex-MEA official also noted how India’s leaders wanted to overcome the ‘parity syndrome’ (Interview B4, 2008) commonly held by external powers (such as the US and China) of supposed India-Pakistan equality.

The vulnerability of these beliefs and the low priority given to defence contributed to India’s 1962 defeat by China. This defeat forced India to accept ‘that the pursuit of a major power role in the absence of hard power or military capabilities was a chimera’ (Nayar & Paul, 2004: 19). The 1962 experience “socialised” India into the international order, as India learnt the limits of her conception of great power status. It also questioned the efficacy of non-alignment, diminished India’s international standing and led to pronounced and increased military spending. Much of this military aid came from the two superpowers (for figures see Kundra, 1956: 154-5; Nanda, 1976: 15-6). India’s humiliation was compounded when she was compelled to institute limited economic liberalisation in order to develop her heavy industry and infrastructure, thus marking the need for ‘greater external dependencies’ (Khilnani, 1997: 40). While India’s defence expenditure increased in the 1960s, the percentage of GDP spent would not significantly increase after this period, as shown in Figure 4.2 below.

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13 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 17 2008.
Despite the 1962 setback, the norm of pursuing great power status remained in the mindsets of India’s security community and India’s 1965 victory versus Pakistan strengthened the state’s self-sufficiency. India’s growing awareness of great power politics was again shown before the 1971 war with Pakistan when she signed a twenty-year Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union (then led by Leonid Brezhnev). This treaty protected India from UN censure by the US, balanced against the Islamabad-Beijing-Washington triplex entente and acted as a socialising experience in great power realpolitik. The 1971 conflict consequently showed India capable of successfully fighting a conflict and redefining her strategic environment. In this period, we can therefore see how the norms contained within the perceptual source of India’s security identity (although domestically-derived) were adapting to the international environment. Subsequently, post-1971, ‘India emerged as the pre-eminent power on the subcontinent’ (Ganguly, 1999: 163). 1971 furthermore confirmed the ongoing morality present within India’s security identity and remains as a rare case of successful state-to-state humanitarian intervention.

India’s lessons in realpolitik emboldened her acquisition of nuclear weapons, achieved through the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of May 18 1974. Although resulting in sanctions, the PNE was carried out to counter China’s regional nuclear monopoly and to lessen any reliance upon, and involvement in the region of, the great powers.
Although only publicly emergent in 1974, nuclear research had begun in India in 1944 and India’s Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948. The Indian Prime Minister held responsibility for the Department of Atomic Energy, with no institutional checks or balances and little military influence (Perkovich, 1999: 9). In turn, from the beginning, many India’s scientists and leaders knew that nuclear technology ‘would bring nuclear weapons’ (Jones, 2006: 16). This view coupled with tensions between a moral antagonism towards nuclear weapons (including demands for disarmament) and a desire to be a great power. Throughout, India’s leaders maintained the same policy, that ‘unless everyone closes the nuclear door, it is not in India’s interests to do so’ (Basrur, 2001: 195).

Emblematic of this norm, India was the first state to call for a ban on nuclear testing, for a universal non-proliferation treaty (in 1965), for a treaty of non-use of nuclear weapons (in 1978) and for a phased programme to totally eliminate nuclear weapons (the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan in 1988). India was a co-sponsor of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1965 (but refused to ratify it due to objections over Article 6 and an inability to gain a nuclear guarantee from other powers) - a situation repeated with the later Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). International rebuffs towards Indian attempts at restricting proliferation (as well as Chinese and Pakistani nuclear development) spurred Indian leaders towards nuclear (weapons) development.

By the 1990s, India’s nuclear weapons programme appeared to face an existential crisis. Still contending with international sanctions, it also seemed that many international proliferation controls were India-specific (such as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group set up in response to India’s PNE) and intended to threaten her great power emergence. Thus, Indian analysts talked of a US-European Union (EU)-Japan (and even US-China) concert against India (Bajpai, 1998: 174-5). When the CTBT’s entry into force provisos (Article 14) opened up a final testing window from September 1996 to September 1999, such nuclear inequity appeared to be explicit (particularly after China and France tested nuclear devices in 1995). By 1998, India’s nuclear stance appeared as ambiguous recessed deterrence (Bajpai, 1998: 184), and she remained one of the ‘main NPT holdout states’ (Thomas & Gupta, 2000: 5) along with Pakistan and Israel. Overall,
concurrently pursuing nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons development had become entrenched as a norm of nuclear ambiguity within India’s security identity.

**Looking West, Central and East**

Characteristic of India’s policy towards West Asia was a preference for closer (and more explicit) relations with Arab countries rather than with Israel. This preference was based upon expediency, namely to secure energy supplies from Iran and Iraq, but also to weaken Pakistani influence over the region, especially concerning Kashmir. It also fed into maintaining closer relations with those NAM members based in West Asia (such as Egypt) and from the 1970s, reflected growing India-Soviet ties. Domestically, a preference for dealing with Arab countries was also deemed necessary to maintain the political support of India’s Muslims for Congress. By the 1990s, the importance of remittances from Indian workers (especially in the Gulf States) added to this rationale. Overall, through continued and more frequent interaction with Arab countries, this pro-Muslim inclination in India’s West Asia policy became an established norm within the perceptual source of India’s security identity.

Consequently ‘non-relations with Israel became the hallmark of India’s [West Asia] policy’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 192). Typical of this stance, India voted against Israel’s inclusion into the United Nations (UN) in May 1949, supported the Arabs in the 1967 War and gave the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) full diplomatic recognition in 1980. These policies were additionally influenced by seeing Israel as effectively a colonizer of Palestinian land. In turn, Indian passports were invalid for travel to Israel and Israel only had a consul-general in Bombay. However, some clandestine Indo-Israeli links were in evidence - such as Israel giving military assistance to India in 1962 (Banerjee, 2006: 249). From 1984 onwards, Rajiv Gandhi began to forge closer ties and met Israeli officials in Washington, restored a full consul in Bombay, relaxed visa restrictions and allowed Israel to compete in the 1987 Davis Cup in India. Wider aims influenced these actions, as they also become ‘an integral part of [Indian] policy vis-à-vis Washington’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 197).
As Soviet support (and 85% of India’s arms supply - Interview B1, 2008) evaporated following the end of the Cold War, on January 29 1992 India became the last major non-Arab and non-Islamic power to establish relations with Israel. Earlier in 1991, India had supported the repudiation of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. 1991 also saw the first military links between the two countries and in 1993 Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres visited India. India remained cautious however, and, as noted by a former MEA official, asked Yasser Arafat for his agreement before initiating these contacts (Interview B2, 2008). In turn, Indo-Israeli engagement from the 1990s onwards ‘signalled India’s aspirations for great power status’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 193). Still reflective of its domestic constituency, Congress however kept such ties outside of the MEA. Overall, by 1998 these ties now reflected a norm of having a more balanced relationship with all West Asian states, as well as a continued engrained belief in religious moderation.

Indian attention also focused upon Central Asia with the decline of the Soviet Union. Building upon ancient historical and cultural links, in 1991 and 1992 diplomatic relations were started with all the new Central Asian states. India also signed agreements on trade, agriculture, science and technology issues (such as with Kazakhstan in February 1992 and Kyrgyzstan in March 1992). Greater mercantilism played into these links as did economic integration and energy security. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s heightened this need and led to consistent Indian support of the Northern Alliance. This stretching of Indian influence also fed into continued Indo-Iranian ties that had been close since independence. Apart from long established historical and cultural ties stemming from shared borders pre-1947, India has the world's second largest Shia population and was among the first to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1978. Protecting oil supplies travelling from the Strait of Hormuz across the IOR to India also underlined these links.

Indian leaders also attempted to initiate Asian multilateralism. These efforts dated from Nehru’s Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, and included the Baguio

14 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
15 Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 17 2008.
The Conference of May 1950, (on economic and cultural cooperation and collective security) the Columbo Plan of July 1951 (on economic and technological cooperation) and calls in 1967 for an Asian Council. Building on the consensus with the state’s security community concerning its pre-eminent regional status by the 1970s, India stepped up multilateral links within the region in order to provide stability, trade links and increased global standing. This policy included membership of various multilateral bodies such as SAARC in 1985 and BIMSTEC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand for Economic Cooperation) in 1997. Through these actions, India steadily transcended her ‘long standing confinement (and) … began to carve out a wider role as an Asian great power’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 120).

From 1992, India also created further military, economic and diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia through the “Look East” Policy that built upon her religious, artistic, linguistic and political legacies. Thus with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), India became a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1995, and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. These relationships helped to both strengthen India’s territorial integrity and her regional standing. Looking East also signalled a growing diversification in India’s international focus, especially as the economic importance of ASEAN had increased as unrest in international oil markets became apparent through the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s. By 1998, attempts at stretching India’s influence beyond South Asia had become a developed (but not yet normalized) part of its security identity.

**Negotiating US Power**

Although the US had encouraged Indian independence, post-1947 India had no domestic profile in the US and was marginalised in the post-World War II global hierarchy. Furthermore, the US regarded non-alignment as a regression of the international system that circumvented its influence, and was a threat to US-Soviet bipolarity. Following Indian state visits to Moscow and Beijing in the 1950s, US leaders were convinced ‘that India’s claims about being a non-aligned country were a tactical posture, whereas in substance India was becoming part of the Soviet bloc’ (Kapur, 1996: 290). Indian advocacy of China’s membership of UN only crystallised this opinion.
These perceptions were also compounded by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and India’s planned economy and socialistic orientations. In turn, the US’s arming of Pakistan throughout the Cold War in the hope of creating Indo-Pakistani parity facilitated a norm of mutual distrust between the two sides.

While containing positive interactions (such as the US giving India financial help, food aid, nuclear fuel for reactors and space program assistance in the 1950s), Indo-US relations until the 1990s were marked by ‘pattern of mutual attraction and disillusionment’ (Cohen, 2002: 1-2). The pattern of Indo-US attempts at accommodation mixed with mistrust would slightly thaw in the 1980s but remained a key norm within the perceptual source of India’s security identity. Thus, the US tried to prevent India’s use of force in Goa in 1961 but supported India in the 1962 war against China and gave India $80 million in military assistance post-1962 (Cohen, 2000: 3; Mishra, 2005: 82). In turn, in July 1965 US food assistance was suspended by US President Johnson when India was undergoing a harsh famine, while the USS Enterprise was sent into the Bay of Bengal by US President Nixon during the 1971 East Pakistan conflict. Reflective of these fluctuations, analysts collectively described the two sides as estranged democracies and comrades at odds enduring a cold peace (see respectively Kux, 1992; Rotter, 2000 and Brands, 1990).

India’s refusal to sign the NPT, as well as US technology sanctions after the 1974 PNE and deepening US-Pakistan ties, increased this estrangement as India and the US remained distanced powers (Cohen, 2000: 11). After the mutual visits of Jimmy Carter and Moraji Desai in 1978 during the Janata government, the repeated visits of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to Ronald Reagan’s US in the 1980s served to improve relations. Against a backdrop of hopefully ending sanctions mixed with a perceived over-reliance on arms from the USSR, these meetings resulted in the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the transfer of defense related technology, as well as increased trade. Sanctions on dual-use and sensitive technologies however remained, as did divergence concerning the USSR’s policy in Afghanistan. As such, Pentagon officials noted that “while India is playing chess, the United States is playing checkers - we are not even on the same board” (quoted in Saksena & Grillot, 1999: 157).
In many senses, and according to a former Indian Foreign Secretary, the Cold War had been ‘a conditioning reality’ (Interview B4, 2008) on Indo-US relations and one which also harnessed mutual distrust. As the Cold War ended, US strategic disinterest in the subcontinent grew, particularly given the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Conversely, relations between the two sides began to improve. Thus, following initial interactions between their defence secretaries in the late 1980s, senior military commander visits began in 1992 through a ‘joint consultative mechanism on defence policy and security issues’ (Dixit, 2004a: 40). Referred to as the “Kickleighter proposals”, these efforts included reciprocal Army Chief of Staff visits and participation in Indo-US strategic symposiums. 1992 also witnessed the first Indo-US army joint training exercise (Teak Iroquois) and the first joint naval exercise (Malabar I). Such exercises would be repeated over the next six years. These links were backed up by the 1994 Agreement on Sharing Sensitive Information and the January 1995 Agreed Minutes on Defense Relations, which formalized nascent cooperation between the two sides.

Concurrently, the (middle class) profile of Indians in the US was rapidly increasing as a result of US efforts in the 1960s to make university study, immigration and citizenship easier to fulfil. The early 1990s also saw the creation of an India caucus in the US Congress. In 1993 India was named a Big Emerging Market (BEM), and trade between the two states increased from $5.3 billion in 1990 to $8.5 billion in 1995 (Cohen, 2000: 18). Indian suspicion remained however over the NPT and CTBT that threatened India’s nuclear autonomy and also US Defence statements concerning “’discourag(ing) India’s hegemonic aspirations over other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean’” (quoted in Dixit, 2004a: 43). Thus, while India saw greater US links as a potential way to achieve great power status, distrust of the US (and general anti-western sentiment) continued as a key norm in her security identity, despite the end of the Cold War. In turn, through the cultivation of multiple international partners India steadfastly remained “non-aligned” concerning relations with any of the great powers.

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16 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 17 2008.
CONCLUSIONS

Using the security identity framework, this chapter has identified the dominant normative sources running through the formation and evolution of India’s security practice from 1947 to 1998, revealing the origin, basis and continuance of India’s central security concerns. From the legacy of Partition and the orientating principles of Nehru, these sources guided the intricacies of Indian foreign policy, collectively structuring India’s security identity. In turn, the norms revealed in each source are reflective of the discursive consensus present within India’s security community concerning how India’s foreign policy ought to be conceived and delivered. Based upon self-sufficiency and complete independence, India’s security identity was dominated by the understanding ‘that power-seeking provokes power-seeking, force begets force’ (Bajpai, 1998: 195) with India never pre-emptively invading other states. India’s policymakers also learnt from India’s international interaction and adapted their behaviour accordingly, especially with regard to realpolitik and swadeshi, while some of the major norms had an ongoing influence on their attitudes towards ongoing and future events (particularly ahisma and non-alignment in the context of the post-colonial and Cold War periods). Furthermore, Indian diplomacy represented ‘a combination of force, negotiations and indirection’ (Bajpai, 1998: 169). The major composite norms of each of the three sources of India’s security identity can be found in Table 4.2 below.

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<tr>
<th>NORMATIVE SOURCES OF INDIA'S SECURITY IDENTITY</th>
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Table 4.2: Major Composite Norms in India’s Security Identity until 1998

Through the isolation of specific norms, the validity of a norm-based and security identity-driven account of (Indian) security has been confirmed. In particular, we have
been able to see how these norms developed through India’s historical interaction with other states, revealing how repeated events engrain certain normative security practices. Whilst nominally independent, the analysis has also shown how the three sources are interdependent, particularly between the domestic and international domains. Splitting Indian security into ostensibly separate but connected sources helped us to understand these complexities and the collective strength of India’s security identity over time. In turn, through experience, interaction and history, this specific Indian security identity maintained and sustained norms which continued to structure the state’s foreign and domestic policy - effectively producing a “security consensus”.

Whilst some of these norms evolved, their essence remained - for example with Indian democracy moving from a broadly secular-dominated Congress basis to a more thoroughly mixed secular / communal footing by the 1990s. In turn, despite some fundamental political changes within India (the Janata regime of 1977-80 and emergent caste politics in the 1990s), as well as outside it (the ending of the Cold War and burgeoning globalisation), India’s security identity consistently revolved around the same core sources and major composite norms. This consistency shows the strength and continued impact of the norms isolated within India’s security identity, despite wider structural and systemic changes. A constructivist approach has thus been shown to be more efficacious than a realist one. These norms also came from domestically derived sources, not external ones, and reflected the dominant ideologies concerning the state and foreign policy present within India during this period. Such remarks highlight not only continuity and change in India’s security practice but are essential for our analysis of Indian security during the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA government. The next chapter sets the foundations for this comparison, by outlining the development of the norms underpinning BJP ideology from their origins in the nineteenth century until the party’s accession to government in 1998.
Chapter 5:

‘The BJP and Indian Foreign Policy: Origins, Ideology and Agendas’

‘the security of the nation is an integrated whole: an amalgam of the internal, the economic, the social, the political, the military and the diplomatic’

(BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 416)

‘diplomacy and defence are two sides of the same coin’

(BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 352)

“it is out of the past that the future is moulded … it is the past that becomes the future …”

(Swami Vivekananda quoted in BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 247)

What principles structure the domestic and foreign policies of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) Hindutva (constructed Hindu nationalist) ideology? Like India’s security identity, are there longstanding and established norms underpinning these policies and how did they form? Here I analyze the core norms central to Hindu nationalism and the BJP until 1998, in terms of how the party views the world and conceive of India’s place within it. Produced through a uniquely Hindu nationalist driven agenda, often in contrast to the secular and socialist basis of Congress, I trace the development, solidification and evolution of these key policy norms, revealing their established and entrenched nature. As with India’s security identity up until 1998, it is the themes of repetition, high frequency and harmony / dissonance that have dictated whether or not beliefs became norms within Hindutva policy. Using the three sources of security inherent to the security identity structure, these composite norms inform BJP ideology domestically (the political), regionally (the physical) and globally (the perceptual).

The chapter is split into three major sections. The first section investigates the BJP’s political heritage through an analysis of the origins of its Hindutva ideology and the
party’s role as the political arm of the wider Sangh Parivar. Section two then analyses the ideological basis of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) (the BJP’s predecessor) from its foundations in 1951 to its disbanding in the late 1970s. The third section then concentrates on the political rise of the BJP, charting its emergence onto the national stage in the 1980s until its 1998 general election victory. This structure allows us to analyse the emergence of norms central to Hindu nationalism across multiple political generations (and as with India’s security identity, across major international structural changes), while charting Hindutva’s electoral rise. The chapter concludes by setting out the norms making up the BJP’s domestic and foreign policy agenda, and initially compares them with those norms structuring India’s security identity until 1998.

5.1) - “HINDU, HINDI, HINDUSTAN”:

Hindu nationalism originated in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the European domination of India and from the neo-Hinduism of high caste Brahmans wanting to revive the Hindu past. In particular, Western Christian missionaries were seen as a foreign “Other” threatening both Bharat - the sacred land of the Himalayas - and Sanskrit (and its vernacular Hindi) - the mother of all (European) languages. Consequently, the Arya Samaj was formed in 1875 in Punjab to increase Hindu self-esteem and assert Hinduism’s spiritual superiority (Gupta, 1991; Jones, 1976; Rai, 1914). Distinct Hindu (rather than Aryan) organisations emerged in 1907 as upper caste trade and commerce leaders formed Hindu Sabhas (Hindu Associations) to counteract British moves against Hindu land ownership through the 1901 Punjab Land Alienation Act. Additional plans to grant India’s Muslim minority a separate electorate (eventually decreed under the 1909 Morley-Minto constitutional reforms), awakened a ‘feeling of vulnerability and … the need for a … pan-Hindu consciousness (Jaffrelot, 2007: 39).

In 1915, the All India Hindu Sabha (or Hindu Mahasabha) was founded and spread across northern India. The emergence of the Muslim Khilafat movement in the 1920s, along with nascent inter-communal rioting and economic frustrations, galvanized the perceptions of Hindu India under threat. In particular, Hindu solidarity according to Lal Chand (a member of the Arya Samaj) was ‘to be communal and not merely geographical’ (1938: 103). In the 1930s, the Hindu Mahasabha became an independent
political party, with its ideology codified through the leadership of VD Savarkar and his book - *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* (1923). Representing more than religion, *Hindutva* indicated Hinduness simultaneously based upon a common people (Hindus), language (Hindi) and geography (Hindustan). This triptych is the basis for the norms structuring the BJP’s domestic and foreign policies. *Hindutva* was also a reaction to inaccurate Western orientalist conceptions of Hinduism as a single world religion (King, 1999: 146). In turn, Hindu nationalism was both xenophobic and paternalistic, crystallizing a modern, masculine Hindu culture to protect *Bharat Mata* (mother India).

**Key Hindutva Components**

Proponents of *Hindutva* regarded Hindus as the largest and the oldest community in India, while Muslims and Christians were divisive outsiders. Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs were not considered as non-Hindus because they followed sects closely related to Hinduism. *Hindutva* therefore rejected the universalist approach of Congress’ secularism, which they argued was discriminatory. As Lal Chand remarked, the ‘Hindus have no outside friends or sympathizers to look after them or press their claims’ (1938: 6) and thus had to protect their own interests. Being threatened also coupled with a sense of superiority, whereby Hindu civilisation had “perfected society” through their scientific and military advances (Jaffrelot, 2007: 56). As the mother of all languages, Hindu nationalists demanded that Hindi be the national language as only an enslaved race took on another (foreign) language.

In turn, Hindustan had been defiled by foreign invasions, which had degraded the ancient glory and superiority of Hindu civilization. India’s Muslim minority was a remnant of these invasions and a threat to Hindus by giving allegiance to Mecca rather than Hindustan. Christians were equally disloyal given their faithfulness to the Church of England or Rome. Both Islam and Christianity were therefore anti-national and alien religions and this extra-cultural and extra-territorial loyalty prohibited their assimilation into Hindu culture. Additionally, the oppression of Hindus had been continued by the westernized Indian (Congress) elites’ (secular) appeasement of Muslims. Instead, *Hindutva* ‘attempted to provide an outlet for the religious and cultural consciousness of the people, one that was completely ignored and devalued by secularity and nationalism’
(Momen, 2005: 256). These sentiments were the foundations of anti-Muslim and anti-Christian norms within Hindutva.

Outsider disloyalty existentially threatened the unity and hegemony of Hindus and the existence of Hindustan itself. Hindutva protagonists thus talked of “a Mohammedan corridor” from Constantinople to Delhi (Jaffrelot, 2007: 71-4) and of Muslim dominions being created in India through Indian Muslim connivance. British censuses that showed a Hindu majority in steady decline - threatening Hindus with a future minority status - augmented these views (Shraddhananda, 1926). Hindu nationalism therefore successfully identified a range of enemies (Muslims, Christians, colonialists, Congress) to justify its cause, confirming Savarkar’s belief that ‘nothing makes Self conscious of itself so much as conflict with non-Self’ (1923: 46; Kakar, 2000). This dichotomy also reveals how Hindutva self-conceptions contrasted with the norms of India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998, specifically an insistence upon a solely Hindu outlook and a fear of all non-Hindu outsiders.

Savarkar also coined the territorial dimension of Hindutva - the Hindu Rashtra - the land of the Hindus beyond the Indus, between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean. From Kashmir to Ceylon, from Sindh to Bengal, the Hindu Rashtra was entrenched as an independent state of, and for, Hindus. This state also recalled historical notions of Akband Bharat (undivided India) when India’s territorial strength had extended into Afghanistan, Central Asia, Persia and the Indian Ocean. In an address in 1937, Savarkar even spoke of a “greater Hindustan” encompassing Africa, America and Mauritius (Béné, 1998: 120), which had to be reclaimed to confirm the territorial unity of the Hindus. To fulfill this cultural uniformity, Savarkar’s wanted to “Unite Hindus and Militarise Hinduism” (1923) to ensure their (national) security. This conceptualization contrasted with norms within India’s security identity until 1998 that largely accepted India’s post-independence territory (besides Kashmir). It also went against other established security identity norms of secular tolerance and ahisma (non-violence).
Hindutva’s Umbilical Cord

Hindu nationalism’s organizational structure was established by KB Hedgewar via the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS - National Volunteer Corps) in Nagpur in 1925, and aimed ‘to propagate the Hindutva ideology but also to infuse new physical strength into the majority community’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 16). Hedgewar created a national movement based upon local branches (shakhas) of volunteers (swayamsevaks) led by preachers (pracharaks). An all-male cultural organization, the RSS is based upon paramilitary skills, ideological training and supreme life-long loyalty to the Hindu nation. Members pledge allegiance to a saffron flag rather than the Indian tricolour. By 1947, the RSS had over 600,000 swayamsevaks across India, and were India’s biggest Hindu nationalist movement. These numbers continued to grow and by 1998, the RSS had 2.5 million swayamsevaks with shakhas in at least thirty-seven countries outside India (Seshadri, 1988: 313). RSS members are mainly urban lower middle class businessmen and shopkeepers.

MS Golwalkar succeeded Hedgewar as head of the RSS (sarsanghchalak) in 1940 and it was his book We or Our Nationhood Defined (1939) that provided the RSS with its ideological charter. In keeping with the Hindu Mahasabha and Savarkar’s Hindutva, Golwalkar stressed how India’s national identity equated with Hindu culture in terms of country, race, religion, culture and language. This understanding included an emphasis on Brahmin dominance and on racial factors whereby lower caste Hindus diluted the purity of upper caste Hindus, referred to by Pandey as ‘upper caste racism’ (1993: 252). As a negative impact on the racial purity of Hindus as the “national race”, Muslims were again primary targets and personified Hindutva’s fear of outsiders. Furthermore, Hindus had to re-find their spiritual and physical superiority through their own mobilization, independent of ‘self-serving and corrupt’ (Josh, 2000: 295) politicians.

Golwalkar drew inspiration from the racialist core of fascism and ‘encouraged Hindus to emulate Nazi Germany’s treatment of Jews in their relations with Indian Muslims’ (Bacchetta, 2000). Furthermore, Islam was a “foreign body” in Hindu society (along with Christians and communists - the latter because they have no religion), and their previous conquests of India represented the “rape of the Motherland” (Hansen, 1996a: 148). Indian Muslims were blamed for Partition and the violence that accompanied it,
especially the aggression of Jinnah’s Direct Action Day in 1946. In general, ‘the very existence of Pakistan, and the period of British rule over India, (we)re de facto evidence of a betrayal of India by Muslims to other Muslims, and then to the Western powers’ (Cohen, 1997: 31). Muslims were therefore disloyal and as an internal threat to India’s national security, reinforced such normative beliefs within Hindutva.

Post-independence, Golwalkar would continue to target India’s Muslims as an “enemy within”, blaming them for bombings, terrorism and insurgency (1966: 232-265). Christians were also seen as anti-national through their policy of conversions and were accused of trying to create a secessionist “Padrestan” in India through the smuggling of arms by American missionaries (ibid: 232-265). The RSS’s military training was designed to combat these threats (and indeed RSS swayamsevaks protected Hindus during Partition), and aimed to generate the leaders for a renascent Hindu Rashtra in order to nullify them. Achieving great power status to make India strong thus became established in Hindutva thought as a way to eradicate foreign influence, displaying initial similarities with core normative beliefs from India’s security identity until 1998.

**The Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) and the Sangh Parivar**

After Mahatma Gandhi was killed by an ex-RSS swayamsevak (Nathuram Godse) in January 1948 and the RSS was banned, its leaders realized the need for political mobilisation. Negotiations between Shyama Prasad Mookerjee (then president of the Hindu Mahasabha) and Golwalkar led to the creation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS - Indian People’s Alliance) in 1951 on the eve of India’s first general elections. Senior RSS swayamsevaks were sent to help the BJS’s foundation, including Atal Behari Vajpayee and LK Advani who would lead the party and its subsequent incarnation, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP - Indian People’s Party). Despite the RSS’s insistence on being solely a cultural organization, RSS-BJS links remained strong with an RSS leader, Dr Mahavir, becoming the first BJS General Secretary. The BJS thus represented a ‘front organization’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 18) of the RSS.

The BJS was part of the RSS’s wider Sangh Parivar (Family of Associations), which aimed to penetrate all levels of Indian society. The RSS oversees the structure of each
organization, controlling their decision-making and appointment making. This control is often achieved by having RSS pracharaks as affiliate leaders within these organizations. Consequently, in any local government or state government structure controlled by the Sangh Parivar, there is always an RSS pracharak. The RSS therefore remains as the ‘ideological and strategic leadership of the Sangh Parivar’ (McDonald, 2003: 1567). The BJS and later BJP are no exceptions to this influence. Major Sangh Parivar organisations are listed in Table 5.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (National Women’s Volunteer Committee)</td>
<td>exclusively female RSS branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP - Indian Students Association)</td>
<td>students union / anti-communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS - Indian People’s Alliance)</td>
<td>political wing (1st generation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA - Centre for Tribal Welfare)</td>
<td>anti-Christian tribal movement / anti-conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS - Indian Workers’ Association)</td>
<td>workers union / anti-communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Vishnu Hindu Parishad (VHP - World Council of Hindus)</td>
<td>centralizes all Hindu religious sects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Vidyabharti (Indian Knowledge)</td>
<td>coordinates school networks based on Hindutva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP - Indian People’s Party)</td>
<td>political wing (2nd generation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Bajrang Dal (BD - Army of Monkeys/ Hanuman)</td>
<td>all-male militant wing of the VHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Durga Vahini (Army of Durga)</td>
<td>all-female militant wing of the VHP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Foundation Dates and Functions of Major Sangh Parivar Organisations

Aimed at mobilizing as many sectors of society as possible, there were over 200 Sangh Parivar organizations by 2000 (Bacchetta, 2000). In particular, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP - Indian Students Association) and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS - Indian Workers’ Association) were the biggest unions of their kind by the 1990s, as the Sangh Parivar became ‘almost omnipresent’ (Du, 2001: 151) throughout India. In order to secure India’s Hindu majority, the RSS ‘wanted “the entire gamut of social life” to be designed “on the rock bed of Hindu nationalism”’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 39). Like the RSS, many of the Sangh Parivar groups also opened branches abroad to
incorporate the Hindu diaspora for the nationalist cause and as an important source of revenue (Anand & Kakaria, 1993).

5.2) - THE FIRST GENERATION:

As the political wing of the Sangh Parivar, the BJS’s agenda remained based upon the ideology of Hindutva, particularly the writings of Deendayal Upadhyay, who paid homage to Savarkar. Mookerjee’s death in 1953 removed some liberal influences and deprived the movement of a legitimate national leader, leading to a BJS mainly based upon discipline and control. Throughout its existence, the BJS alternated between being a populist (largely centrist) patriotic party protecting the rights of the poor and small businessmen, and being a more militant organization aggressively promoting national unity. This alternation was often due to maintaining the BJS’s political survival while promoting ‘the sectarian and community interests of Hindus’ (Arora, 2005: 284). Under the BJS, Hindutva’s core domestic and foreign policy beliefs began to solidify as established guiding principles and norms.

Full Spectrum Indianisation

Drawing upon Hindutva ideals of a Hindu Rashtra where outsiders were regarded as an existential threat, early BJS ideology rested upon ideas of Indianisation. The BJS thus demanded that non-Hindus and all religious, social, caste and regional minorities “Indianise” and culturally adapt to the “Hindian” nation (Fox, 1987). The ‘evil consequences’ (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 244) of Partition had much to do with this outlook, which threatened the BJS’s core manifesto mantra of “One Country, One Culture, One Nation, One Ideal”. Indianisation was therefore a policy aimed at the ‘purification of India through Hinduization’ (Cohen, 2002: 47). For the BJS, Congress’ secular policies that typified the political source of India’s security identity until 1998 ran contrary to these aims, polluted the Hindu Rashtra and ignored its fundamental Hindu-orientated nature.

Indianisation was inspired by Upadhyaya’s theory of Integral Humanism (1958), which aimed to achieve national harmony and regeneration. Outsiders threatened this
harmony and the BJS demanded that all outsiders give their ‘undivided allegiance to Bharat … and her great and ancient culture’ (BJS 1951 Manifesto, 2005: 284). The perceived continued failure of Congress to build a successful, modern India was put down to ignoring these essential values and effectively encouraging communal behaviour (BJS 1972 Manifesto, 2005). The BJS also aimed to combat Nehruvian notions of a “composite culture” based upon equality and plurality by removing existing special religious provisions (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 179).

Indianisation maintained an emphasis on Sanskrit and Hindi, with other languages being seen as divisive and dangerous (particularly the Hindi-derived but Pakistan-based Urdu, as well as English). The BJS campaigned for Indian education to be conducted entirely in Hindi, Hindu festivals to be celebrated as national holidays and Ayurvedic medicine to be the basis of India’s National Health System. Indian history also had to be rewritten so “that it may be the record of the Indian people and not merely of foreign invaders and conquerors” (BJS Resolution quoted in Jaffrelot, 2007: 167). A continued anti-conversion stance formed part of the Indianisation approach, as did major campaigns aimed at protecting cows (which are sacred for Hindus).

Hindutva’s distrust of the state was reflected in the BJS’s economic policy. The BJS was against nationalization (except defence industries) and interventionism, and was distrustful of any socialist or communist agenda, such as Nehru’s policy of co-operative joint farming. Furthermore, the BJS was pro-private business but against complete free enterprise - policies that were mainly middle class orientated. Swadeshi was a mainstay of their (protectionist) economic agenda, conceived as a consciousness of self-reliance aimed at strengthening the Hindu Rashtra. Thus, in the 1950s, the BJS discouraged foreign goods but advocated limited foreign aid along with the (partial) Indianisation of foreign industries (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 256). By the late 1960s, the BJS supported a gradual opening up to foreign trade (but not with communist countries) and having a mixed economy (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005). During this period, BJS notions of swadeshi therefore appeared similar to those within India’s security identity until 1998 but were influenced by a clear anti-socialist discourse.
Protecting the *Hindu Rashtra*

In line with core concepts such as the *Hindu Rashtra* and *Akhand Bharat*, any land occupied by outsiders was a “national humiliation” (Mookerjee quoted in Jaffrelot, 1996: 196). As such, the BJS supported the liberation of Indian territory from the Portuguese and French. In turn, Pakistani occupied Kashmir (PoK) (taken during the 1947-8 Kashmir War) was “historically, geographically and culturally” (BJS 64.04, 2005: 107) part of India. To this end, the BJS advocated repealing and then abrogating Article 370, which gave Kashmir special constitutional privileges. While the BJS initially wished for a peaceful solution, repeated Pakistan aggression led to demands that Kashmir be reclaimed by any means necessary - demands contrary to Congress policy during the same period. Consequently, the BJS laid ‘maximum emphasis on warning and preparing the country against the Pak danger’ (Vajpayee, 2005: ix).

Furthermore, Indian Muslims were a potential “fifth column” and “all separatist tendencies and attitudes betraying a pro-Pak bias must be curbed and the outlook of Indian Muslims must be nationalized” (BJS Committee quoted in Graham, 2005: 254). Only through a reunification of the two countries could India’s problems with Pakistan (concerning Kashmir, high defence spending, and economic instability) be solved. Being a Muslim state underpinned these problems, as did Pakistan’s policy of discriminating against Hindu minorities, especially in East Pakistan. For the BJS, these Hindus were effectively “denationalized” (BJS 1958 Manifesto, 2005: 227) and threatened with ‘genocide’ (BJS 64.01, 2005). The BJS were however keen to have a reciprocal relationship with Pakistan, as displayed by their support of the 1961 Indo-Pakistan Canal Waters Agreement. This dichotomy between confrontation and engagement suggested underlying norms of pragmatic behaviour towards Pakistan.

As the United States (US) commenced supporting Pakistan in the early 1950s, the BJS warned of the Cold War encirclement of India and the danger of a ‘hot war’ (BJS 54.08, 2005: 202). Pakistani collaboration with China over Kashmir, as well as military aid, increased this perception. When Pakistan invaded Kashmir in 1965, the BJS felt vindicated and praised Congress’ repulsion of the attack (BJS 65.26, 2005). However, they criticized Congress over the subsequent Tashkent Agreement, which failed to keep
India’s territorial gains. Similarly, the BJS were happy at the liberation of East Pakistan in 1971 but criticized Congress weakness for returning Pakistani prisoners and failing to take back PoK (BJS 72.13, 2005). Continued Pakistani arms build-ups (with US and Chinese help) entrenched BJS perceptions of a weak and appeasing Congress government. Again, (and contrasting to India’s security identity at this time), these sentiments pointed to the formation of belligerent BJS policy norms towards Pakistan.

Besides Pakistan, ‘the arch enemy of Hindu nationalism has always been China’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 299). This status came from a suspicion of communist fifth columnists, China’s rival civilisational status and its ‘aggressive designs’ (Situation, 2005: 5) against India. China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the inclusion of Indian territory on Chinese maps (BJS 53.15, 2005: 209) sustained these reservations. From the late 1950s, the BJS demanded military action to counter Congress’ “weak-kneed” policies against China’s ‘continued cartographic and military aggression’ (BJS 60.20, 2005: 157). When China invaded India in 1962, the BJS again felt vindicated as they had warned of Chinese aggression but had been ignored (BJS 63.22, 2005: 127). BJS policy towards China continued to reflect an ongoing threat, with promises to help free Tibet, refuse China’s United Nations (UN) entry, ally with Formosa [Taiwan] and oppose Chinese support of Indian insurgents (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 162).

Emblematic of these viewpoints, the BJS demanded ‘a more realistic, dynamic and firm (foreign policy)’ (BJS 1962 Manifesto, 2005: 221) than that of Congress governments during this period. They advocated compulsory military training, a large territorial army and increased military spending. Furthermore, the BJS wanted a foreign policy ‘guided solely by considerations of national interests rather than by moralizing impulses’ (BJS 53.16, 2005: 210). These policies contrasted with those norms within the Congress-dominated security identity until 1998, which the BJS considered to be overly pacific in their security outlook. In comparison, BJS policy appeared to be much more forceful in terms of protecting the Hindu Rashtra. Aimed primarily at Pakistan (and to a lesser extent towards China), such policies were engraining norms to regain Kashmir, reabsorb Pakistan and protect India from all outsiders.
Strength (cultural, territorial and military) characterized the BJS’s perceived role for India in the world. Envisaged as a way to overcome India’s historical subordination to outside powers, this strength would enable India ‘to be accepted alongside the “great” nations of the world’ (McDonald, 2003: 1565). Making India militarily strong by developing nuclear weapons was part of this policy and from the 1950s the BJS demanded that nuclear tests be undertaken (Sarkar, 1998). They were the only party to advocate such a position, which pre-dated clear nuclear threats from any of her neighbours (such as China’s 1964 nuclear tests) and thus confirmed the domestic rather than external origin of such a stance. In turn, the Hindu Rashtra’s violation by China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965, led to manifesto promises to manufacture nuclear weapons (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 177). Such weapons were necessary both for military strength and as a deterrent (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 174). Nuclear weapons would give India greater international autonomy (BJS 68.14, 2005), although the BJS were also pro-disarmament (BJS 73.01, 2005: 38). The BJS additionally promised to get India a permanent seat the United Nations (UN) Security Council (BJS 1957 Manifesto, 2005: 267).

Concerning India’s non-aligned policy, the BJS called for “genuine non-alignment” based upon ‘strict neutrality’ (BJS 57.23, 2005: 187). Henceforth, the BJS lamented Congress policies that leaned ‘towards a particular [Soviet] bloc’ (BJS 1962 Manifesto, 2005: 221). In general, the BJS criticized Congress for letting India be used by the US, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (UK) as a ‘cockpit of intrigues’ (BJS 58.09, 2005: 170), reflecting the BJS’s normative suspicion of outside powers. Instead, the BJS wanted a purely South Asian political and economic order. By the late 1960s however, the BJS recognised the need for allies against India’s aggressors, regardless of power blocs (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 177). The BJS also wanted non-alignment that was useful militarily or a move towards bilateralism ((BJS 60.03, 2005; BJS 73.01, 2005: 39). Much of BJS policy highlighted a distaste at Indo-USSR linkages particularly when the Soviets had armed Pakistan, and published maps showing Indian territory as Chinese (BJS 68.14, 2005). The BJS’s anti-communist policy norm additionally fed into these beliefs.
In turn, the BJS was critical of the US, especially its arming of Pakistan - seen to be contrary to US and Indian democracy and which badly affected India’s foreign policy independence. These criticisms reflected a common distrust of the US shared with India’s pre-1998 security identity but did however belie an underlying pro-Western and pro-democracy orientation within BJS policy (Arora, 2005: 287). This latter perspective contrasted with norms in India’s security identity that were much more pro-communist (especially during the early 1970s). Reflective of these attitudes, US-Pakistan links were blamed on Congress, as Congress governments had declined US help (BJS 53.16, 2005) and the BJS argued that the China threat should necessitate closer US links (BJS 63.24, 2005). An admiration for US pragmatism and realpolitik was also in evidence (BJS 71.02, 2005: 60). However, the BJS still congratulated Egypt (after the Suez Crisis) and Vietnam (after its victory) versus the US.

In West Asia, the BJS demanded ‘full diplomatic relations with Israel’ (BJS 1967 Manifesto, 2005: 178). This policy reflected a belief that Indo-Israel links could help stabilize West Asia and also recognised Israel as the region’s only democratic state (BJS 63.24, 2005: 131). Such a policy called for a more evenhanded, neutral and mediating Indian position, unlike India’s pro-Arab stance blamed on Congress’ appeasement of India’s Muslim voters (Arora, 2005: 294). In turn, as Israel had fought against Islamic countries, she was therefore a ‘natural friend’ (Bhambhri, 2001: 33). This policy belief clearly contrasted with the norm of pro-Muslim engagement present within India’s security identity at this time. Elsewhere, the BJS had an established policy to revive ‘ancient cultural relations’ (BJS 1954 Manifesto, 2005: 280) with South-East Asia. Protecting the interests of Overseas Indians, especially in Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Africa was also a steadfast policy. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also began to figure in the BJS’s security considerations, as they promised to ‘develop the Indian Navy to become the biggest in the Indian Ocean’ (BJS 1971 Manifesto, 2005: 174) - views that matched norms in India’s security identity until 1998.
The BJS’s Electoral Record

The BJS never succeeded in winning control of any Indian state or more than a small number of seats in the Lok Sabha. By the 1970s however, they had become established across India and had a rising membership and percentage of the national vote, as shown in Table 5.2 below. Although strong in northern states, the BJS did not challenge Congress for a political majority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>SEATS WON</th>
<th>NATIONAL VOTE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BJS</td>
<td>CONGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: BJS and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1951-1971)
( Electoral Commission India, 2010)

The BJS’s lack of electoral success often resulted from their militant communal strategy and continued links with the RSS, which ran ‘against India’s constitutional rules of secularism’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 20) and prevented larger political alliances. The dominance of Congress, especially in terms of patronage and largesse, as well as the relative obscurity of the BJS’s leadership aided their poor electoral performance (Graham, 2005). In turn, continued difficulties reconciling RSS elements with BJS principles fractured relations between the two groups, with the RSS often exerting control over the BJS. The BJS however remained ‘closely identified with the severe Hindu nationalism of the RSS’ (Graham, 2005: 237). Core developing BJS policy norms of Indianisation, re-establishing the Hindu Rashtra, ongoing suspicion of all outsiders and capital, and a desire for a strong, nationalist and nuclearised foreign policy, accurately reflected this identification. Although some dilution of BJS doctrine was attempted in the late 1960s (particularly concerning Hindi), it failed to improve their political position.

The BJS did however gain experience of government as part of the Janata Party rainbow coalition, which won the post-Emergency election of 1977, as BJS politicians won
nearly 100 seats (Arora, 2005: 294). As the most senior BJS leader, Vajpayee was appointed Minister of External Affairs, while Advani became Minister of Information and Broadcasting. Janata Party (foreign) policy differed though from many stock BJS lines (especially concerning Pakistan) and advocated diplomatic normalization with Vietnam and China (see Janata Party 1980 Manifesto, 2005). Some BJS influence was evident however, such as closer links with Israel and Iran (Kishore, 1969: 125-40). Additionally, *Hindutva*’s cultural agenda was implemented in some states and sporadically in India’s national education system. However, frequent Hindu-Muslim riots caused some Janata Party members to demand that Vajpayee and Advani withdraw from the RSS. Their refusal led to the coalition’s breakdown in 1979 and subsequent electoral defeat in 1980.

5.3) - THE RISE OF THE BJP:

On April 6 1980 the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) was established under the dual leadership of Vajpayee and Advani. The party aimed to dilute *Hindutva* to make it more politically acceptable - an approach ‘resented by the rest of the *Sangh Parivar*’ (Jaffrelot, 2007: 20). The RSS initially rejected the new party. However, BJP policy still largely followed that of the BJS, and the BJP remained as the political wing of the *Sangh Parivar*. Reflective of its largely upper caste leadership and origins, BJP policy thus concentrated on its traditional political basis of a ‘militarized vision of a unified, politicized Hinduism’ (Bacchetta, 2000). This basis continued to be structured by the policy beliefs (and nascent norms) that had developed under the BJS. Overall, BJP policy came to be summarized by its foreign policy thinkers as ‘nationalism, national integrity (and) national interest’ (Interview A20, 2008)\(^1\).

**Communalism, Mandal and Ayodhya**

Indian politics became more communal in the 1980s as Congress’ explicitly drew on both Hindu and Muslim vote banks - a strategy that often played into the BJP’s hands. As such, in 1987 the Shah Bano affair, Rajiv Gandhi courted the Muslim vote by

\(^1\) Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
passing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill, which adopted sharia law into secular law and fuelled BJP arguments of a pseudo-secular Indian state that appeased Muslims. The BJP also gained succour from the influx of Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam (said to be diluting the Hindu-dominance of India’s population) and the visit of Pope John Paul II. Additionally, in Punjab, Congress bought religion into politics when Indira Gandhi funded the extremist Sikh leader Sant Bhindranwale to combat rising Sikh nationalism. This funding led in 1984 to the storming of Amritsar’s Golden Temple and Indira Gandhi’s subsequent assassination. For the BJP, these ‘misdeeds were like manna from heaven’ (Corbridge, 1999: 232), and provided a platform for their core policies. Against this background, the BJP won 85 seats in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections and membership of the National Front (NF) coalition.

The BJP’s success came at a time of reform in India’s electoral system, in particular the 1990 Mandal Commission’s recommendations to reserve 27% of government jobs for the lower castes. The BJP used Mandal to mobilise upper caste Hindus against the increasing political power of lower castes (Bhargava, 1996). In 1990, BJP president Advani then went on a Rath Yatra (chariot procession) across India, intended to culminate in Ayodhya where the RSS and the Vishnu Hindu Parishad (VHP - World Council of Hindus) were trying to replace a Muslim mosque (Babri Masjid) with a Hindu temple (Ram Janmabhoomi). Advani was arrested before his arrival, leading to communal rioting by Hindutva activists and the withdrawal of BJP support for the NF coalition, which collapsed. With a joint focus on the nascent insurgency in Kashmir, BJP support grew in the subsequent 1991 national elections to 120 seats, giving it a national base and making it India’s principal opposition party.

The VHP held further ethno-religious mobilizations in Ayodhya throughout 1991 and then on December 6 1992, a BJP-VHP rally at the site led to the destruction of the mosque and sparked Hindu-Muslim riots across India, leaving 1,200 people dead. Although BJP-held state assemblies were dissolved, and the RSS and VHP temporarily banned, Ayodhya established the legitimacy of Hindutva among the Hindu middle class (Hansen, 1999). It also appeared as a validating justification and entrenchment of the BJP’s pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim policy norms. Portrayed as an event that protected all Hindus, Ayodhya mobilized Hindu support across caste lines and enabled the
mainstream political integration of the BJP. For Advani, “the Ayodhya movement reaffirmed the nation’s cultural identity … (and was) the dynamo for a resurgent, resolute and modern India” (quoted in Jaffrelot, 2007: 291).

After Ayodhya, the BJP became more moderate as it pressed for further electoral success, looked for regional partners and was restricted legally (Lochtefeld, 1996; Van Dike, 1997). Consequently, the BJP and the RSS remained at cross-purposes in their pursuit of the Hindutva agenda (Jaffrelot, 2005) - confirming the ongoing tension between the two groups. Growing disillusionment with the leftist political order helped the BJP’s pursuit of power, as manifested by government corruption, rising economic and social dislocation, and internal instability. In contrast, BJP leaders boasted a ‘record of clean public life’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 392) that contrasted with Congress’ ‘dynastic rule’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 392). Simultaneously rejecting Islam, Christianity and socialism, the BJP voiced ‘deeply-held grievances, frustration and aggression against the state and the Congress party’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 99).

In the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP gained 161 seats - becoming the single-largest political party in the Indian parliament, outranking Congress for the first time. They were asked to form a government, with Vajpayee as Prime Minister. Unable to form a coalition and due to internal wrangling, the government collapsed after 13 days in power. Then in the Lok Sabha elections of 1998 the BJP won 182 seats. As leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with a total of 250 seats, the BJP formed the government through a simple majority and Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister on March 19 1998. The BJP’s electoral rise is shown in Table 5.3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>SEATS WON</th>
<th>VOTE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>CONGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: BJP and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1984-1998)
(Electoral Commission India, 2010)
Cultural Nationalism, Positive Secularism and Self-Reliance

The BJP developed and solidified many of the norms present within BJS policy. As such, the BJP remained dedicated to Indianisation and the forging of ‘one nation, one people and one culture’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 248). Developing this norm, Indianisation and Hindu dharma became referred to as “cultural nationalism” - a unifying principle of ‘timeless cultural heritage’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 146). All India’s minorities were to be assimilated into the state, as Advani referred to “Mohammadi Hindus”, “Christian Hindus”, and “Sikh Hindus” … to emphasize the ancient and persistent Hindu character of the Indian nation-state (Smith, 1996: 122). To counter any threats to Indianisation the BJP remained dedicated to banning religious conversion and cow slaughter. These policies continued and cemented existing norms from the BJS era.

Developing its pro-Hindu (and anti-Muslim, anti-Christian bias) the BJP campaigned for “positive secularism” rather than the “vote secularism” of Congress (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 397). Positive secularism represented ‘justice for all, appeasement of none’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 359), and contrasted to Congress’ secularism, which was seen as pseudo-secular and discriminatory against the majority Hindu population. BJP leaders therefore made regular commitments to implement a Uniform Common Civil Code for all Indians. In turn, they wanted to abolish the constitutional autonomy of India’s only Muslim-majority state, Kashmir, through the repeal of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. These policies would eradicate ‘any legal and political recognition of cultural and religious difference’ (Khilnani, 1997: 188) and represented the development of clear entrenched policy norms, which contrasted with the secular and equality norms typical of India’s security identity up to 1998.

These traits fed into ‘the aura of cultural injury and martyrdom (that) is a trademark style of the BJP’ (Khilnani, 1997: 189). Manifesto promises to construct the Ram Janmabhoomi temple at Ayodhya as ‘a symbolic righting of historic wrongs’ (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 320) testified to these normative sentiments. The BJP also called increasing numbers of illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh ‘an invasion’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 279) that diluted India’s Hindu majority. This national
chauvinism continued to include a militaristic inclination towards Pakistan whereby the Kashmir insurgency heightened fears of an internal Muslim fifth column. The loyalty of Indian communists was also questioned (BJP National Executive 01.05.92, 2005: 265), as were Christian missionaries (often seen as being in league with Congress) (BJP National Executive 03.03.89, 2005: 89-90), all of whom weakened India’s national integrity. This behaviour compounded BJP fears of outsiders and personified their perception of local and global threats to India.

The BJP wanted to reform the Indian education system to reflect its cultural nationalism norm. According to Murli Manohar Joshi (the BJP’s education spokesman), India’s western-orientated English medium education system had ‘destroyed the indigenous system’ (1994: 27). A new free education system would build ‘a system worthy of the genius of our heritage’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 382-3), inspire an emergent Hindu Rashtra and include Vedic mathematics, yoga and Sanskrit. Although the BJP’s linguistic policies were weakened by a need for wider political support, with Urdu being encouraged (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 182), Hindi did remain as the dominant national language. In addition, foreign universities were to be stopped from setting up in India (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 182). The BJP also focused on the importance of cinema for encouraging ‘national integration’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 388), although globalizing media was regarded as posing a threat to Indian values and morality (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 229-233). Again, all of these policies ran contrary to India’s pre-1998 security identity.

BJP policy norms concerning swadeshi developed to become “liberalisation with self-reliance or … self-reliance with liberalization” (BJP Executive Meeting quoted in Jaffrelot, 2007: 343). Swadeshi was now retuned to mean ‘economic sovereignty’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 265) or simply ‘India first’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 159). Thus, wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries were to be discouraged and Indian businessmen given priority over foreigners. Concurrently, rapid internal liberalization, decentralisation and de-bureaucratisation were promised and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) allowed only in exporting industries. The BJP’s swadeshi norm contrasted with the norm present within India’s security identity until 1998 but only in that it limited the rate of liberalization. This difference inspired confidence in India’s businessmen - a
major BJP constituency, and helped plans to attract investment from overseas Indians. Overall, according to BJP ideologues, the party stood for ‘free market, free enterprise, corporate society’ (Interview A20, 2008).

The BJP still advocated government control in some areas due to India’s large population and its relative underdevelopment but remained wary of total free trade. Thus, their economic policy came to be described as ‘full liberalization and calibrated globalisation’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 160). Often this wariness reflected tensions with the RSS and BMS who remained suspicious of outside investment and its cultural impact. These tensions were manifested through the Enron controversy of August 1994, anti-Kentucky Fried Chicken agitations and the 1996 election slogan of “computer chips, not potato chips”. Overall, the BJP recognized that increased economic strength was a way to compete with Asia, China and the US. Furthermore, improved links with the US was ‘the best guarantor of the continuity of the neo-liberal orientation’ (Vanaik, 2002: 323). BJP norms were thus pro-capitalist and pro-western concerning world economic engagement, displaying a nuanced difference with norms of limited liberalization and a socialist economic orientation.

**Land and Neighbours**

Restoring and protecting the *Hindu Rashtra* remained central to BJP policy towards India’s neighbours, whereby national integrity was dependent upon territorial integrity. Strong borders were also part of great power status and the BJP had especially tough policies concerning separatists (Jaitley et al., 2005: 78). Overall, these beliefs enshrined a policy norm of anti-militancy and compounded norms concerning protecting the *Hindu Rashtra* and restoring *Akhand Bharat* - norms that were more explicit than those in India’s pre-1998 security identity, such as “accepting” the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. These norms included legislating against terrorism and secessionist movements, mainly associated with Pakistan (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 275). Development was also seen as key to stability, particularly in the northeast (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 199). Overall, the BJP regarded India as under threat ‘from one or

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18 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.
another combination of Islamic, Western, Chinese and small regional powers’ (Cohen, 1997: 29).

Nowhere else was the exclusionist notion of the Hindu Rashtra more under threat than in Kashmir. Thus, BJP promises to achieve Kashmir’s full territorial and political reintegration, including taking back the parts of it claimed by Pakistan and China, were now key policy norms. Overturning India’s defensive and reactive outlook through a strong, assertive and militaristic nationalism would rectify these problems. The BJP also recognized that Kashmir had been the root of three wars and that there were clear security, economic and social benefits to resolving the issue (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 390). Looking for a resolution revealed an ongoing norm of pragmatism within BJP policy as they recognised the need for friendly relations with the Muslim countries that surrounded India (Malik & Singh, 1994: 124). The repetition of such sentiments in BJP policy documents underscored this norm’s entrenchment. Such pragmatism was not apparent in India’s security identity until 1998. A fear of suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons however tempered such viewpoints. Enduring US and China transfers of weapons and nuclear technology (respectively) were also blamed for creating a regional arms race (Mishra, 1996: 79-123).

BJP policy towards China focused upon the continued occupation of Indian territory and continued military support to Pakistan as affronts to Indian nationalism and sovereignty (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272). At the same time, BJP leaders ‘were not entirely adverse to rhetoric about Sino-Indian cooperation on behalf of the third world’ (Garver, 2002: 13). This move away from the previous anti-China policy of the BJS now encompassed the underlying norm of pragmatism apparent in policy towards Pakistan (and again contrasting with India’s pre-1998 security identity). Policy norms towards China had thus developed between the BJS and BJP periods. Overall, the BJP aimed for the ‘normalisation of relations with China … (based upon the) proper recognition of India’s national interests and (the) honourable solution of the border dispute’ (BJP 1989 Manifesto, 2005: 390). Furthermore, BJP resolutions called for negotiations at the political rather than the official level (BJP National Executive 13.04.83, 2005: 125) in order to maximize Indo-China ‘friendship and cooperation’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272). Increased trade levels were integral to such policies.
Towards South Asia, the BJP recognized that India’s ‘national interest is best served by creating an environment of peace and harmony’ (Arora, 2005: 282). In addition, an emphasis remained upon ‘re-establish(ing) India’s Asian identity’ (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 416). Regional peace and non-interference furthermore underpinned BJP policy, and they demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 417). Concerning Myanmar, the BJP saw ‘scope for greater co-operation in the fields of defence, security, economy and culture’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 194). In turn, with Bangladesh, criticism of ‘unabated illegal infiltration’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 195) continued. Overall, the BJP wanted ‘the proper ordering of relations with our neighbours’ (BJP National Executive 09.11.89, 2005: 96), based around a norm of India as the region’s natural hegemon. In the IOR, the BJP rejected ‘the domination of superpower interests’ (BJP 1984 Manifesto, 2005: 417), advocating a blue water Indian Navy to ‘increase the radius of (India’s) power projection’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 197). These policies established norms of India as the region’s natural hegemon and of controlling and protecting the IOR - norms similar to those of the pre-1998 security policy but with added bite.

**Restoring India’s Place in the World**

Contrary to Congress’ perceived effeminate idealism and morality, the BJP argued that India had to be much more responsive and assertive in its foreign policy aims - indicating an appreciation of *realpolitik*. In turn, national interest had to be assertively protected, with a strong and secure India being a prerequisite for ‘transform(ing) India into a prosperous and powerful nation’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 201). These principles established norms of being assertive, and displaying realism in BJP foreign policy - whereby according to Kautilya “power is the only means to ensure friendly relations with other nations” (quoted in Arora, 2005: 281). These beliefs contrasted with the *ahisma* and idealism norms within India’s security identity until 1998. The BJP also continued to equate becoming a global power with a norm of acquiring nuclear weapons, and had manifesto promises to ‘give our Defence Forces Nuclear Teeth’ (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 352). While contrary to the nuclear ambiguity norm typical of India’s security identity up to 1998, the BJP also remained pro-nuclear disarmament.
This duality suggested a different style and emphasis from Congress rather than a completely different normative basis.

Nuclear weapons were central to ending Congress’ ‘policy of drift and escapism’ (BJP National Executive 19.07.85, 2005: 117) and ensuring India’s total autonomy in her foreign policy. Furthermore, having nuclear weapons would build a proud and resurgent India, and validate the norm of making India a global power. National security spending also increasingly became a focal point of BJP discourse and the party continued to advocate defence expenditure increases as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Mishra, 1996: 121-3). Additionally, the BJP supported ballistic missile production (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 277) and institutionalizing foreign policy via a National Security Council (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 351). Further promises included coordinating the Indian government ministries towards foreign policy, harmonizing the Indian military and undertaking a Strategic Defence Review (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 193-7). All of these policies fed into the rationale underpinning the core BJP policy norm of proactively making India into a global power.

The BJP also wanted to give India a loud, important and respected voice in international relations. BJP policy makers saw no common ideology with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), complaining that it did not help India versus Pakistan or China and that the NAM’s interests were put above India’s (Interview A20, 2008). Such a vision criticized Congress’ governments that had ignored ‘our rightful place and role in world affairs … (leading to) a loss of national self-confidence and pride’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 192). The BJP also recognized that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, India needed a new international voice (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 350). The BJP wanted new horizons beyond Congress’ pre-occupation with Pakistan and began comparing India with the rest of the world, rather than Congress’ sole comparisons of India with South Asia (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 273). The BJP thus continued demands for permanent UNSC membership, and bilateral ties based upon ‘strict reciprocity’ (BJP National Executive 07.11.92, 2005: 73) - both of which became established norms within its foreign policy outlook.

19 Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.
Elsewhere, the BJP continued the BJS norm of insisting on closer Indo-Israeli ties (and balanced West Asia relations) although the former partly diminished after relations were normalized during the 1990s. Indeed, by 1998, Israel was clubbed together with other countries including Iran, Central Asia, Africa and Japan, as critical bilateral partners (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 194). In turn, historical distrust against the USSR (based upon anti-communist sentiments) seemed to evaporate after the end of the Cold War, as the BJP recognised a ‘compatibility of interests’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272). The BJP also continued to advocate protecting Indians (particularly Hindus) abroad in Guyana, West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius and South Africa, promoting dual citizenship (BJP 1991 Manifesto, 2005: 352), and ‘economic, social, cultural, emotional and spiritual links’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 209). In these ways, the BJP wanted to ‘mobilize Non-Resident Indians to effectively lobby India’s case with the governments and business establishments of their host country’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 209).

Globally, the BJP rejected the US’s self-adopted role as a “world policeman” (BJP National Executive 23.04.81, 2005: 135). They also opposed US pressure on nuclear weapons, which was seen to be against Indian sovereignty, pro-Pakistan and emblematic of weak Congress governments (BJP National Executive 23.12.95, 2005). Conversely, by the late 1990s the BJP saw better relations with the US as key to making India a global power but ‘based on mutual respect and a congruence of interests’ (BJP 1996 Manifesto, 2005: 272), especially economic. The BJP therefore expected the US ‘to be more sensitive to India’s security and economic interests’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 193), particularly over their links to Pakistan. In fact, the BJP wanted closer Indo-US defensive ties provided they helped to annul the Pakistan threat (Mishra, 1996: 110). The party also saw the US as a potential reliable partner and that closer US ties would help India’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ambitions. By 1998, BJP policy towards the US had developed into a norm of distrust mixed with a pro-capitalist leaning that recognized the advantages of closer Indo-US ties. It also reflected the US-based education of many BJP politicians, in contrast to India’s elites in the 1930s to 1950s who had been predominantly educated in the UK (Cohen, 2000: 19).
CONCLUSIONS

From their emergence in the nineteenth century to their election victory of 1998, there was a normative consistency to political Hindu nationalism based upon an ongoing process of policy development and solidification. Repeated narratives and consistent principles critically entrenched key norms into the BJP’s domestic and foreign policy perspectives. As per the three indicators of norm measurement (Table 2.1), the high frequency of similar events harmonized these norms across different generations of political Hindu nationalism and (like India’s security identity until 1998) predominantly transcended international structural changes. The BJP did recognize however the need for Indian to find a new voice in international affairs, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the norms were developed and refined as the BJP rose to power in the 1980s and 1990s, often in response to fresh political interactions and experiences (including its ongoing relationship with the RSS). Of particular note were the BJP’s nuclear ambitions, which pre-dated the 1962 war with China, China’s 1964 nuclear tests and Pakistan’s 1965 invasion, thus stressing the primacy of the ideational (rather than material) account critical to the security identity approach. Just as was evident concerning norms in India’s security identity prior to 1998, we also saw how BJP conceptions of the world helped to shape their ongoing assessment and attitudes towards other states (most pertinently Pakistan and China). A summary of major BJP policy norms until 1998 can be found in Table 5.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR COMPOSITE NORMS IN BJP POLICY UNTIL 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: cultural nationalism (Indianisation / Hindutva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: positive secularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: India first <em>swadeshi</em> / calibrated globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: anti-militancy (as external)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Major Composite Norms in BJP Policy until 1998
Referring back to Chapter 4, which identified the dominant norms structuring India’s security identity until 1998, a cursory comparison with BJP policy norms becomes possible. Such a comparison highlights where possible harmony and dissonance between the two sets of norms would occur when the BJP-led NDA came to office in 1998. Importantly, the norms underpinning the BJP’s policy consensus appear to (largely) differ from those structuring India’s security identity from 1947 to 1998, despite developing in the same context and in response to the same events taking place at the same frequency. This divergence confirms not only that differing ideologies are structured around differing norms but that there are multiple, composite and competing norms concerning how Indian security ought to be practiced. These composite norms are set out in Table 5.5 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORMATIVE SOURCE</th>
<th>MAJOR COMPOSITE NORMS UNTIL 1998</th>
<th>BJP POLICY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL:</strong></td>
<td>: (socialist) democracy</td>
<td>: cultural nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: equality / tolerance</td>
<td>(Indianisation / Hindutva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: secularism / plurality</td>
<td>: positive secularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: <em>swadeshi</em> then limited</td>
<td>: India first <em>swadeshi</em> /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liberalization</td>
<td>calibrated globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: anti-communal</td>
<td>: anti-Muslim, anti-Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: anti-militancy (as internal)</td>
<td>: anti-militancy (as external)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHYSICAL:</strong></td>
<td>: Pakistan: conflict, negotiation,</td>
<td>: protect the <em>Hindu Rashtra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>suspiccion / LoC “accepted”</td>
<td>: <em>Akhand Bharat</em> – explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: China: continued territorial</td>
<td>: but pragmatic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>threats / ongoing suspiccion</td>
<td>with Pakistan and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: regional hegemon - reciprocity</td>
<td>: natural regional hegemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>then benevolence</td>
<td>: control / protect the IOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCEPTUAL:</strong></td>
<td>: <em>ahisma</em> / idealism</td>
<td>: assertive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: autonomy / non-alignment</td>
<td>: <em>realpolitik</em> / realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: great power aspiration</td>
<td>: global power / UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: nuclear ambiguity</td>
<td>: pro-nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: West Asia: explicitly pro-Muslim</td>
<td>: West Asia: explicitly pro-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>then balanced</td>
<td>Israel and balanced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5: Comparing India’s Security Identity with BJP Policy until 1998

Through this comparison, examples of dissonance can be seen in the political source concerning the basis of the Indian state (secularism versus cultural nationalism), in the physical source concerning the status of Kashmir (“acceptance” of the Line of Control...
(LoC) versus an explicit policy to regain all the state), and in the perceptual source concerning their style of international engagement (abisma versus assertive). It is the clear differences in their core beliefs and principles that produce this dissonance. Conversely, we can see near harmony between some of these norms, such as the shared balance between swadeshi and liberalisation, as well as commonalities concerning being South Asia’s hegemon and achieving great power status. Here, the difference between the norms underpinning India’s security identity until 1998 and BJP policy appears to be of style, nuance or indeed semantics. Overall, this evidence of norm dissonance and harmony confirms this research’s central premise that differ ideologies produce different (domestic and foreign) policy norms. It is also the basis for comparing NDA policy from 1998 to 2004 with previous governments. The following three chapters carry out this comparison to isolate divergence and convergence between BJP policy norms and those within India’s security identity.
Chapter 6:

‘Mainstreaming Hindutva: the BJP’s Impact on India’s Domestic Politics’

‘the cultural impulses of India are the first building block’

(Singh [Jaswant], 1999a: 4)

‘making the party … bring about parivartan (change) in every sphere of national life - economic, social, political and cultural’

(BJP National Council 03.05.98, 2005: 107)

‘Ayodhya bought us to power’

(Advani, 2008: 31)

Having established the presence of two sets of composite norms concerning Indian foreign policy and security, how did these differing norms converge and diverge during the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government? Here, I investigate this interaction in the first source of the security identity - the political - in order to analyze the impact, or otherwise, of the core normative practice of India’s security identity upon BJP policy when in government. Such an approach substantiates our focus upon analyzing the internal (domestic) sources of security and emphasizes how there are multiple, composite and competing norms present within a state’s security practice. This approach also shows the ways in which India’s security identity limited the BJP-led NDA government’s influence on the domestic political basis of the Indian state, revealing evidence of norm continuity and change in India’s security practice. A summary of the two (competing) sets of key composite norms that structured India’s security identity and BJP policy until 1998 can be found in Table 6.1 below.
INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY       BJP POLICY

: (socialist) democracy                     : cultural nationalism
: equality / tolerance                      : (Indianisation / Hindutva)
: secularism / plurality                    : positive secularism
: swadeshi then limited                     : India-first swadeshi / calibrated
    liberalization                          : globalization
: anti-communal                             : anti-Muslim, anti-Christian
: anti-militancy (as internal)              : anti-militancy (as external)

Table 6.1: Political Norms in India’s Security Identity & BJP Policy until 1998

The chapter is split into three major sections. The first section deals with how the BJP behaved in government, especially concerning the coalition constraints it faced in the NDA, their promotion of Sangh Parivar activists into state institutions and the nuclear nationalism of the 1998 Pokhran tests. Section two then analyses how the BJP’s programmatic communalism became personified through its policies towards India’s Muslims and Christians, the conceptual linkages engendered between Pakistan and terrorism, and attempts to re-write Indian history. The final section then assesses the BJP’s positioning within India’s emergent modernity, especially in terms of globalization, and a growing middle class and mass media. I end the chapter with some conclusions, especially concerning how the BJP-led NDA constituted a shift in Indian politics that appeared to not only threaten India’s secular foundations but also to change the basis of the political dimension of India’s security identity.

6.1) - POLITICAL REALITIES AND POKHRAN II:

Although by far the largest party in the NDA coalition that won the 1998 Lok Sabha general election, the coalition’s diverse nature constrained the BJP’s activities while in government. Consequently, many of the BJP’s core election promises were set aside to be reflective of coessional consensus and, as an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official notes, the ‘discipline of the democratic system’ (Interview B12, 2008)20. In the NDA’s National Agenda (drafted by all its coalition partners), BJP plans to enact a

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20 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and ambassador, Delhi, October 22 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
Uniform Civil Code (negating special provisions and personal laws for Muslims and other minorities), to build the Ram Janmabhoomi temple in Ayodhya, and to remove Article 370 from the Constitution (providing the state of Jammu and Kashmir with a special status), were all shelved. Coalition partners did however agree with the BJP’s pledge to ‘exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons’ (BJP 1998 Manifesto, 2005: 197). The composition of the winning NDA coalition in the 1998 Lok Sabha general elections is shown in Table 6.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COALITION PARTY</th>
<th>NATIONAL VOTE (%)</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>25.59</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samata Party (SAP)</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal (BJD)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress (WBTMC)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SS)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lok Shakti (LS)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana Vikas Party (HVP)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Party (JP)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTR Telugu Desam Party (Lakshmi Parvathi) (NTRTDP (LP))</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizo National Front (MNF)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>254</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: NDA Parties, National Vote and Seats in the 1998 Lok Sabha General Election
(Electoral Commission India, 2010)

In turn, the BJP recognized that trying to implement all their manifesto promises would threaten the stability and continuance of the coalition, and instead elected for a ‘pragmatic rather than dogmatic posture’ (Kantha, 1997: 3096). That no coalition had ever served a full term in Indian politics underscored such a prerogative. For Hansen and Jaffrelot (2001), such actions represented the “compulsions of politics”, whereby once a political party enters government in India it gravitates to the political centre ground. Such observations are important indicators for our analysis of India’s security
identity, especially in terms of indicating the potential acquiescence of political parties to dominant, established and embedded normative practice. The overriding anti-Congress and anti-Left nature of the NDA, conversely suggested prospective discontinuity and polarization from such previous normative practice, as India’s security identity had formed and developed under Congress-dominated regimes.

**Constrained yet Dominant**

Despite its diluted agenda, the BJP dominated the NDA coalition and secured the key domestic cabinet roles. Atal Behari Vajpayee was Prime Minister, Lal Krishna Advani Home Minister, Yashwant Sinha and then Jaswant Singh Finance Minister, Murli Manohar Joshi Education Minister, and Jaswant Singh then Yashwanth Sinha External Affairs Minister. Such dominance enabled the BJP’s steering of government policy and its promotion of Hindutva. Confirming their still close ties, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) vetted both the full list of cabinet ministers before their appointment, as well as the National Agenda (Vanaik, 2002: 324). Advani confirmed such a working relationship, describing the RSS and the BJP as a ‘duo working in tandem’ (2005: 6).

The makeup of the coalition was also representative of an Indian political system mobilized ‘along ever narrower lines of political identity’ (Tharoor, 1998: 131), with many of the smaller coalition parties more concerned with regional than national or international politics. These smaller parties were diverse in their (often) exclusive domestic concerns, variously focused upon religious, cultural, linguistic and caste interests. Thus, while the NDA constrained the BJP’s radicalism, the BJP was the only party in the coalition with an international agenda.

The BJP’s susceptibility to coalition politics remained apparent however, most particularly in April 1999 when the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) withdrew its support, resulting in the fall of the NDA government. In the subsequent Lok Sabha general election in October 1999, the NDA was re-elected and achieved a larger majority than in 1998, as shown in Table 6.3 below. The NDA’s renewed mandate was bolstered by an additional 29 seats from the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), who were affiliated with the BJP but were not part of the NDA. While Congress’ share of the national vote rose from 25.82% to 28.30% in 1999, their number
of seats fell from 141 to 114 (Electoral Commission India, 2010), further increasing the NDA’s governing position through an enhanced majority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COALITION PARTY</th>
<th>NATIONAL VOTE (%)</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>23.75</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SS)</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal (BJD)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress (WBTMC)</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Lok Dal (AILD)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (I&amp;KNC)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asum Gana Parishad (AGP)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lok Shakti (LS)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.06</strong></td>
<td><strong>270</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: NDA Parties, National Vote and Seats in the 1999 Lok Sabha General Election (Electoral Commission India, 2010)

The BJP’s dominance of the NDA was reinforced by the structure of Indian governance and Indian bureaucracy. Critical to these structures is the personalised nature of Indian politics based upon unquestioning loyalty and the willingness to subordinate ministry interests to those of an individual political leader (Coen, 1971; Charlton, 1997: 206-212; Hardgrave, 1986; Interview A18, 200821). Such a system can foster both corruption and nepotism, especially in conjunction with the promotion of one’s own party workers and loyalists (Das, S.K., 2001; Jai, 2001). Accordingly, the BJP systematically promoted its own supporters to positions of influence during the NDA period. Furthermore, and despite election promises to fight *bhrashtachar* (corruption) and ensure *shuchita* (probity in public life) the NDA was no less prone to scandal than its predecessors. In separate

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21 Interview with a think-tank director, Delhi, May 7 2008.
incidents, the BJP’s president, Bangaru Laxman, and the president of the Samata Party (a key partner in the pre-1999 NDA coalition), were filmed accepting bribes.

The BJP’s promotion of its RSS supporters, along with members of other Sangh Parivar groups, strengthened the party’s political position, while allowing these groups to influence the Indian state as ‘extra-state powers (that) enforce accountability at a lower level’ (Froerer, 2005: 39). Such positioning allowed the BJP to challenge established norms in India’s security identity (such as equality and secularism), by introducing Hindutva-orientated policy norms (such as Indianisation and positive secularism). For example, evidence increased of Supreme Court judgments developing an inherently pro-BJP or pro-Hindu bias (Pinto, 1999). The BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-Christian policies also became increasingly institutionalized into India’s political fabric, again confronting established norms of anti-communalism, tolerance and plurality within India’s security identity. These incidences suggested a trend of “saffronisation” (developing a Hindutva-orientated prejudice) within Indian politics. Therefore, even though the more militant aspirations of the BJP’s political manifesto never materialized, the BJP did introduce normative prospective change through the political promotion of their RSS supporters.

**The Proving Ground of Nuclear Nationalism**

When the NDA government took power in April 1998, the BJP wanted to quickly prove their Hindu nationalist credentials in a way they had never had the chance to do so in 1996, when they collapsed after 13 days in government. They also wanted to break the status quo of previous regimes and to demonstrate as a former Indian Army officer noted, ‘that they had more guts than Congress’ (Interview A12, 2008). In turn, Vajpayee stated, the BJP wanted to “show them [the electorate] that we mean business” (quoted in Chawla, 1998). Pursuing their one core policy sanctioned by the NDA’s National Agenda and fulfilling an election promise dating from the 1950s, these aims were personified through the nuclear tests carried out on May 11 and 13 1998 at Pokhran in Rajasthan, 150 kilometres from the Pakistan border. Often referred to as their “nuclear nationalism” (Chaturvedi, 2005: 273), the nuclear tests characterized the

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22 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Army General, Delhi, May 5 2008.
BJP’s assertive policy approach intended to ‘build a new India that will stride and not shuffle into the next century’ (BJP National Council 03.05.98, 2005: 107).

Domestically, the 1998 tests carried out a BJP (and Hindutva) normative commitment, secured the status of the new NDA government and mobilised popular sentiments for the BJP's militant nationalism (Tremblay & Schofield, 2005; Seethi, 2005). Reflecting such perspectives, the tests were officially dubbed Shakti after the Hindu goddess of strength and energy. Despite the precedents of the 1974 PNE, the onward trajectory of India’s nuclear programme and also the tests being known as Pokhran II, 1998 represented a fundamental development in India’s security identity. By making India’s nuclear capacity overt, norms of nuclear ambiguity that had evolved since independence were overturned. Pokhran II underlined intrinsic differences in the normative security practice between the BJP policy (and actions) and India’s security identity until 1998.

The 1998 tests also fitted with the BJP’s pre-1998 rhetoric that the “political Hinduism” dominant under Congress regimes was historically defensive and reactive (Kapur, 2006: 39). Such Hinduism, the BJP had argued, was unwilling to assert itself against outside forces such as Muslims, Christians and other western influences, and had produced a weak and subservient India. Therefore, the nuclear tests represented, according to The Pioneer, an ‘explosion of “self-esteem”’ (quoted in Sarkar, 1998: 1725) that was assertively projected inside India and externally to the rest of the region and the world. The 1998 tests further represented a public enunciation of the core beliefs and norms underpinning BJP ideology and policy. Only Prime Minister Vajpayee, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, and Professor Rajendra Singh (an RSS officer) knew of the timing of the tests (and notably not the Defence Minister, Georges Fernandes). This grouping confirmed the historical, ideological and organizational links between the BJP and RSS central to the tests’ rationale. The tests also placated RSS hard-liners, as “the party hawks wanted to extract their pound of flesh … too many other concessions were being made” (Ahmad quoted in Serrill & McGirk, 1998).

The BJP’s normative policy beliefs concerning Pakistan and China as threats to the Hindu Rashtra were additionally optimized by the tests (as further explored in Chapter 7). Pokhran II also asserted the norms present within both BJP policy and the pre-1998
security identity of India’s aspired-to great power role in the world versus other nuclear powers and opposition to international multilateral controls (as will be shown in Chapter 8). These normative linkages confirmed the interconnectedness and interdependence of the multiple composite norms structuring India’s security practice across the three normative sources (political, physical, perceptual), from both the perspective of India’s security identity and BJP policy. Furthermore, we can see how the BJP’s Hindu nationalist foreign policy fed into both the domestic and international dimensions of the security identity’s political source by portraying Hindus under threat from (internal and external) outsiders. Some observers additionally (and critically) saw Pokhran II as the ‘swadeshi bomb’ (Sarkar, 1998: 1725) and as a symbol of India’s renewed autonomy.

Moreover, the tests were a political statement to show the BJP as the only party who were serious about national security not only in the international but also in the domestic context (Interview B3, 2008). Here, the Muslim-Pakistan nexus was added to such underlying principles and reinforced the ideological underpinnings of what was referred to as the “Hindu bomb”. In turn, the tests were regarded as an act that unified the whole country, mainstreaming (and normalizing) these sentiments outside of any political affiliations. As Vajpayee accurately remarked afterwards “an overwhelming majority of Indians … have spontaneously supported India’s step of conducting nuclear tests … there is an absolute national consensus on this issue” (quoted in Chawla, 1998; Dettman, 2001). To maximize public support, the tests were coupled to the public holiday of Buddha Purnima. In short, the tests buttressed the BJP’s political support from their coalition partners, the Indian public and the RSS while establishing a pro-nuclear weapons norm in India’s security identity and practice.

6.2) - FINDING ENEMIES:

Through its emphasis on cultural nationalism, India was ‘an object of reverence’ (Tarkunde, 1998: 1696) for the BJP. In turn, their policy norm of Indianisation aimed to “obliterate the differences between all the cultures co-existing in the country” (Indian Supreme Court quoted in Nauriya, 1996: 11). Against this backdrop, pre-1998

23 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
Indian security identity policy norms of secularism and plurality were deemed to devalue ‘the religious and cultural consciousness of the people’ (Momen, 2005: 256), were anti-Hindu and went against the very nature of India itself. Furthermore, the promotion of core Hindutva policy norms such as cultural nationalism and positive secularism demanded the identification and targeting of suitable outsiders with which to portray the Hindu Rashtra as under attack. These outsiders were primarily the traditional BJP / Sangh Parivar scapegoat of India’s Muslim population but also India’s small Christian minority.

The BJP attempted to put into practice policies intended to overcome the politics of appeasement and pseudo-secularism they believed to have been practiced by Congress. Possessing the power of governance gave the BJP an opportunity to shift away from notions of an inclusive, secular nation to one that was communal, Hindu-based and Hindu-orientated as per the demands of Hindutva. At their strongest, BJP activists such as Prafull Goradia proclaimed “we haven’t come out of the slavery complex … we need a heavy dose of nationalism to develop national and communal self-confidence so that we get over this” (quoted in Elliott, 1998). India’s composite culture was thus to be refocused from plurality to hegemony in order to claim back what Advani regarded as its “Hindu content” (quoted in Noora ni, 2008: 85). Rewriting the role of Hindus within Indian history helped amalgamate such policies and was explicitly undertaken by the BJP during the NDA period. Implementing these BJP policy norms directly challenged the composite norms that had structured India’s security identity, and threatened to overturn the normative basis of its political source.

**Programmatic Communalism and Exclusionary Politics**

By the 1990s the politics of Congress (especially around elections) were deemed by Indian commentators of all hues to be increasingly communal in nature. The binary opposition of communalism/secularism had therefore blurred, whilst attempts ‘to portray the BJP as being synonymous with communalism … ignore(d) an almost universal resort to (the) communal card for political gains by most actors in Indian politics’ (Kantha, 1997: 3090). However, while Congress’ increasingly ambiguous definition of secularism ‘often tolerated, encouraged and supported communalism … (it
was) opportunistic … the BJP’s communalism is programmatic - dedicated to the creation of *Hindu Rashtra* (Ram, 1999: 1567). The BJP was thus seen to use communalism out of (a normative) conviction rather than electoral opportunism. The BJP’s continued links with the RSS underlined the party’s ideological commitment to communalism, in particular its anti-Muslim tendencies, which had become normalized in their domestic policy since India’s independence.

Despite establishing a Ministry for Tribal Affairs and purportedly being more pro-reservation for India’s lower castes (BJP National Council 27.08.00, 2005: 75), BJP norms of Indianisation were insinuated into India’s political process. This introduction was aided by India’s courts sanctioning the acceptance of *Hindutva* as “a way of life or state of mind … it is not to be equated with or understood as religious fundamentalism” (quoted in Crossmand & Ratna, 1996: 2613). While unable to introduce their Uniform Civil Code, the BJP-led NDA did set up a Constitutional Review Commission, as it investigated how the established norms of secularism and equality within the Indian Constitution could be surmounted. In turn, the BJP continuously cast aspersions on the loyalty of Indian Muslims to the Indian nation, deeming them to be linked to Pakistan and by extension (through insurgency in Kashmir and elsewhere) linked to terrorism.

By continuing to use this group as an ideational scapegoat, the BJP were able to personalise apparent threats to their vision of a united Hindu nation (*Akhand Bharat*), which in turn helped to solidify their exclusionary politics. In this regard, the BJP also became purposefully anti-terrorist as a covert way to be anti-Muslim. Following on from the normative content of BJP policy pre-1998, Bangladeshi Muslims continued to be seen as creating communal problems in bordering Indian states through illegal immigration, as well as drug and people smuggling (BJP National Executive 04.04.01, 2005: 54-5). Such attitudes were then aggressively linked to the fear of Pakistan and Muslims as shown in the Pokhran II tests and consequently connected with BJP policy towards Pakistan by feeding BJP supporters with anti-Muslim sentiment. These fears became personified in 2002 as large-scale anti-Muslim communal violence erupted in Gujarat.
Since assuming power in Gujarat in 1995, the BJP had ‘stacked its inner ranks’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 41) with members of the Sangh Parivar (predominantly from the RSS and VHP) in order to promote its cultural nationalist agenda. According to a 1998 joint report by the Committee to Protect Democratic Rights and the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, it was “a well planned strategy … aim(ed) at communalising society at the grass root level” (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2002: 44). Such radicalizing trends were compounded in 2001 with the appointment of Narendra Modi as chief minister in the state, the first RSS pracharak (leader) to gain such a position. By 2002, Gujarat’s institutions had become effectively saffronised, and exemplified Hindutva norms of Indianisation, positive secularism and (tacit) anti-Muslim sentiments. These trends signaled ‘a dramatic reversal of that gradual process of integration and consolidation which has been going on for the past three centuries (in India)’ (Frykenberg, 1997: 22). Further still, Gujarat in 2002 would earn ‘the dubious reputation of being a laboratory for the Hindutva agenda’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 41).

On February 27 2002, a Muslim mob attacked a train at Godhra, killing 58 Hindu pilgrims (including Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) - World Council of Hindus) activists who were returning from an attempt to restart the building of the Ram Janmabhoomi temple at Ahodhya. In the attack’s immediate aftermath, Modi claimed that the violence was an “‘organized terrorist attack’” (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2002: 13) aimed at destabilizing the state. Building upon the proximity of Pakistan, the RSS additionally argued that the Godhra attack had been instigated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and that local Muslims were to blame and were inherently pro-Pakistani (Chenoy et al., 2002). In turn, Gujarat’s Minister of State for Home, Gordhan Zadaphia (who was also a senior VHP activist), stated “we will teach a lesson to those who have done this. No one will be spared and we will make sure that the forces behind this act will never dare to repeat it” (quoted in Chenoy et al., 2002). On the following day, February 28, Hindu-Muslim communal violence erupted across the state, leaving thousands dead in a matter of days.

The infiltration of Sangh Parivar activists into the Gujarati state apparatus aided the resultant organized, systematic and pre-planned violence, whereby rioters were given
lists of Muslim houses, flats and shops (Shah, 2002: 1391). This state complicity and orchestration was supported by local police as the saffronisation of state institutions meant that there was often no physical or legal protection for Gujarat’s Muslim population (Human Right Watch, 2002). The face of ‘hard Hindutva’ (Kapur, 2006: 205) was also manifested as the VHP’s militant wing - the Bajrang Dal - led the rioting. These events seemed to exemplify the extreme communal agenda of the BJP (and the Sangh Parivar) that becomes possible when an Indian state is under their control (Mehta, 2006: 158). In December 2002, the Modi government re-won the state assembly elections, revealing the powerful succour of majoritarian communal politics and their acceptance into mainstream Indian government. Although not replacing existing norms of tolerance and equality within India’s security identity, Gujarat in 2002 showed how these norms were being widely challenged by competing BJP policy norms, producing new and developing (proto-normative) practices in Indian domestic politics. It also confirmed the presence of different norms within the BJP itself (hard Hindutva and a softer Hindutva), and how these norms were balanced / employed by the party’s politicians.

**New Targets and Anti-Terrorism**

The arrival of the BJP into power also witnessed the targeting of India’s Christian minority who make up 2-3% of the Indian population. Much of this violence stemmed from BJP and Hindutva hostility to Christian conversions of the Indian population away from Hinduism and the presence of Christian missionaries in tribal areas. Indeed after 1998, the RSS explicitly prohibited Hindus from conversion to Christianity (Du, 2001: 151) and the BJP prevented foreign missionaries from entering the country. All of these actions represented distinct continuities from the BJP’s anti-Christian policy norms established up until 1998, and were in direct competition with norms of tolerance and secularism in India’s security identity. Apart from being regarded as a religious threat through lower-caste conversions, discrimination against Christians was also becoming increasingly based upon their association with anti-war and anti-nuclear protests (Shourie, 2006). Anti-Christian actions also drew attention away from the BJP’s anti-Muslim activities, particularly as ‘Ayodhya is no longer yielding the fruit it once did’ (Pinto, 2000: 3636).
Increased violence against Christians rose when the BJP-led NDA entered power (Sarkar, 1999: 1698), and often involved the setting on fire of prayer halls, churches, shops and houses. Most infamously, on January 27 1999, an Australian missionary called Graham Staines and his two sons were burnt to death by Hindu extremists. In the wake of further attacks on Christians in Gujarat and Orissa in 1999, the BJP government, as Mishra argues, ‘question(ed) the religious freedoms guaranteed by the Indian constitution . . . (and) created a culture of impunity in which even low-level police officials felt emboldened to harass them [the Christians]’ (2004a: 30). By 2001, Human Rights Watch noted that “attacks against Christians . . . (had) increased significantly since the BJP came to power” (quoted in Beer & Mitchell, 2006: 1003). In turn, RSS youth organisations attacked Christians and burnt Valentine’s Day banners (Elliott, 2001). Christians had publicly become the BJP’s ‘new enemies’ (Sarkar, 1999: 1691), targeted to consolidate the rise of Hindutva and its core policy agenda of cultural nationalism.

The increased number of attacks against minorities during the BJP-led NDA period also signified a rise in human rights abuses. Furthermore, according to Varshney (2002), the diametric opposition between Hindu nationalism and secular nationalism had resulted in increasing state repression, particularly with a central apparatus led by the BJP. Sangh Parivar elements were increasingly and regularly blamed in inquiry commission reports for instigating communal violence (Ram, 1999: 1568). The failure of the Indian government to find anyone guilty of such violence also appeared to signify the normalized presence of pro-Hindutva personnel within India’s political apparatus (Interview A14, 2008)24. In 1999, Amnesty International reported that state complicity in human rights abuses “continued to be widespread … conditions in many prisons (were) cruel, inhumane, or degrading … “disappearances” continued and hundreds of extrajudicial executions were reported” (quoted in Beer and Mitchell, 2006: 997).

In turn, the BJP shared an anti-militancy policy norm with the pre-1998 security identity but regarded such threats to India as being primarily funded by external, rather than internal, forces. This basis stemmed from viewing outsiders (Muslims, Christians, westerners) as anti-national forces threatening the Hindu Rashtra. Within the

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24 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
international dimension of the domestic source within the security identity, this rationale largely focused upon terrorism emanating from Pakistan (and to a lesser extent from Bangladesh and Nepal). From this basis, and building upon existing anti-terrorist provisions in the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1987, the NDA passed further anti-terrorist legislation. The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was passed in 2001, and then replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002 - both of which were widely perceived as draconian and fundamentally against human rights. POTA allowed security forces to hold individuals for up to 180 days without charge, expanded the reach of the death penalty, denied any presumption of innocence and allowed confession through torture (Sáez, 2003: 191).

Terrorism remained a major problem for the Indian state during the NDA government, in particular from left-wing extremists and separatists in the north-east (BJP National Executive 04.04.01, 2005). To counter these problems (in addition to POTA), the NDA set up a Terrorism Coordination Centre in 1998 and piloted the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN. These legal measures fulfilled established BJP manifesto promises. Apart from some evidence of negotiation attempts with northeast insurgents, success was apparent, with the NDA making a peace agreement with the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) in 2003. In turn, Pakistan continued to be regarded as ‘an established headquarters of terrorism’ (BJP National Executive 26.09.02, 2005: 39), and was explicitly linked to several major terrorist attacks against India in this period. Apart from peaks in 2000 and 2001, Indian fatalities from terrorism were lower during the NDA than in the preceding four years, as shown in Figure 6.1 below. Disaggregated, the figures show a significant reduction in civilian and security personnel deaths and, before 2004, an overall increase in terrorist fatalities. Deaths from left-wing extremist violence remained constant during the same period (SATP, 2010a).
Recasting the Past

Along with their campaigns against India’s Muslim and Christian minorities, the BJP attempted to rewrite Indian history to compound their discrimination against these groups, and to reinforce the BJP’s Hindutva-derived policy norms. Primarily carried out through the rewriting of textbooks, major school staff changes and the reorganization of educational institutions, the BJP attempted ‘to recast the past by giving it a strongly Hindu religious orientation’ (Panikkar, 2001). This manipulation of history by the BJP was intimately tied to their norms of Indianisation and positive secularism that rested upon constructing a ‘past on religious-communal lines … to promote and propagate history undistinguished from myth and equate individual and collective faith with historical acts’ (Corbridge, 1999: 233). These policies further coupled with their anti-Muslim and anti-Christian norms, as rewriting Indian history was designed to promote a pro-Hindu worldview that fully subscribed to the ideals of a resurgent and glorious Hindu Rashtra.

Central to education in India is the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) established in 1972. In 1978, attempts had been made under the Janata Party coalition to purge it of all “undesirable” elements and fill it with those acceptable to the RSS and like-minded people’ (Aligarh Historians Group, 1979: 58). These actions were taken to
promote nationally the *Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan* interpretation of Indian history that is strongly communal and biased towards *Hindutva*. In 1998, with its Murli Manohar Joshi as Minister of Human Resource Development (which includes Education), the new BJP-led NDA ‘reconstitute(d) the ICHR … (and) directed it to promote “national history”’ (Corbridge, 1999: 233). The BJP also gained control of the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT), which produces the majority of India’s national school texts. Both institutions ‘rapidly los(t) their academic freedom, as renowned historians (we)re replaced by bureaucrats and academics willing to toe the political line’ (Panikkar, 2001).

The rewriting of Indian history by the BJP aimed to reorder the secular disposition of the Indian state and ‘to redefine the character of the nation as Hindu, and to lend legitimacy to the politics of cultural nationalism’ (Panikkar, 2001). This reordering amounted to an attempt to replace existing secular normative accounts of history and included pushing back the period of the *Rig Veda* to 5000 BC against the general consensus of 1500 BC in order to establish India (and Hinduness) as the world’s oldest civilization (Panikkar, 2001). Furthermore, RSS-inspired schoolbooks stated that ‘India is the mother country of ancient China and that the ancestors of the Chinese people were Indian *kshatriyas* (Hindu warriors)’ (Elliott, 2001). Science and social concerns were also demoted in favour of religious education, while astrology was introduced into schools along with the study of Sanskrit (Elliott, 2001). Such ideas reflected the worldview of the VHP, while representing ‘an agenda for the “Hinduization” of education’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 40) and the downgrading of non-Hindu contributions to the world. The increased usage of the Hinduised *Vidya Bharat* system in over 17,000 schools aided this process (Hasan, 2007: 243).

Place names were also “linguistically cleansed” whereby non-Hindu designations were increasingly replaced by Hindu ones (Smith, 1996: 124). Delhi became Indraprasth, Lucknow renamed Lakshmanpuri and the Indian Ocean called Ganga Sagar. The singing in schools of *Vande Mataram*, a patriotic song offensive to Muslims, was also made compulsory (Myers, 2001) and effectively re-asserted one of India’s key national symbols. Other policies included the issuing in 2000 via NCERT of a (later scrapped) national curriculum framework based upon *Hindutva*. Overall, all new school history
books had to be cleared by religious leaders before publication. As a consequence, the result for Indians (and millions of students) was ‘not a full history of their country but a sanitised and stilted version (of it)’ (Elliott, 2001). Some critics went even further, stating that these were efforts to saffronise Indian education and to “Talibanize” Indian history’ (Hasan, 2007: 243). These attempts again defied existing norms of plurality, equality and tolerance within India’s pre-1998 security identity.

6.3) - EMERGENT MODERNITY AND THE BJP:

The BJP emergence as a mass party in the 1980s was aided by its pro-capitalist nationalism that promoted a norm of India-first swadeshi. In particular, the BJP’s pro-capitalist roots were often promoted by adherents such as Jaswant Singh (among others) who had joined the BJP from the Swatantra Party. Placed against an increasingly liberalizing Indian economy this norm included calibrated globalization, which differed from India’s security identity norm until 1998 of swadeshi couple with limited liberalisation. By being pro-capitalist and neo-liberal, this policy agenda had stabilized into an established normative belief for the BJP. Intrinsically, economic liberal reform was always a central tenet of BJP policy rather than being purely reactive due to outside circumstances. This difference was the stock BJP criticism of Congress’ liberalisation in the early 1990s (Interview A21, 2008)25 and partly stemmed from the BJP’s anti-socialist perspectives. It also indicated a nuanced divergence between BJP policy norms and those of the pre-1998 security identity, despite their shared adherence to the swadeshi norm.

Being the party which had the greatest support from India’s middle class augmented these foundations for the BJP, with the middle classes as major stakeholders in India’s modern capitalism. The BJP were able to take advantage of this positioning by talking ‘about moral or ethical decline by pointing to modern society’s lack of morality, loss of ethical values, increased corruption … where the only answer to the current “decay” is a reinforcement of religious norms’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 89). India’s new middle class effectively became the major vote-bank of the BJP (Interview A17, 200826). Additional

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25 Interview with a senior analyst of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, May 9 2008.
26 Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008.
representations of India being subject to outside economic threats (western capitalism and globalization) would reinforce this rhetoric and thus the BJP’s support base. In turn, the electronic media revolution that gripped India from the late 1980s provided the public space within which to further distribute and circulate these perspectives. Compounding this effect was the position of the middle classes as the major consumers of mass media and increasing ‘infotainment’ (Interview A17, 2008).27

Redefining Swadeshi and Embracing Globalization

The initial emphasis that the BJP placed upon swadeshi - based upon a need to protect India’s independence and sovereignty from outside influence - appeared to be initially reshaped once the BJP came to power. As a result, the BJP largely advocated the emergent neo-liberal position held by previous Congress-led governments from the early 1990s onwards (Seethi & Vijayan, 2005: 63). To an extent, this faithfulness reflected the centralist tendencies of Indian politics, as well as the imperatives and incentives of the international economic system (Nayar, 2001). The need for a stable environment in order to support India’s continued economic growth was also a factor, as was ‘the badly needed gas and oil (which) was central to India’s new foreign policy’ (Lall, 2006: 427). Both these factors necessitated outward looking economic linkages, and suggested a harmonious convergence between BJP policy norms and those of India’s security identity. As shown by Figure 6.2 below, despite some higher annual readings, average annual GDP percentage growth in this period was only marginally above the 6.12% figure for 1993 to 1997 (as per Figure 4.1).

27 Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008.
However this approach was an adaptation rather than a repudiation of *swadeshi*, and reflected core BJP policy norms of an India-first policy and a gradual movement towards the globalization of India's economy. This redefinition of *swadeshi* meant that as long as it benefited India's national interest, economic self-reliance could be from both within *and without* of India. For example, increased foreign direct investment (FDI) benefited both India and any foreign investor, while additionally allowing India to gain foreign expertise to be purely self-reliant in the future. As such, in March 2001 the BJP lifted any qualitative restrictions on the import of nearly all foreign goods (Lakha, 2007: 111). This redefinition successfully harnessed BJP rhetoric of re-masculating India by pragmatically placing the national interest of economic expansion within the already established security identity norm of great power aspiration (from the perceptual source). Overall, this coupling indicated how, for BJP policy makers, *swadeshi* was ‘taken more seriously’ (Interview A20, 2008)\(^\text{28}\). Signaling this change, Advani declared that “the BJP believes in *swadeshi*, which in essence means that India has to develop on its own … it certainly does not mean xenophobia or a belief that everything foreign is bad” (quoted in Alden & Vieira, 2005: 1088).

Much research concerning the rise of Hindu nationalism in the 1990s has firmly situated it in the context of globalization (Jaffrelot, 1996; Kurien, 1994; Rajagopal, 2001; Vanaik, 1997), arguments that compliment the presence of the BJP’s growing middle class voter base in this period. Part of this association comes from the observation that religion

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\(^{28}\)Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.
and nationalism are ‘particularly relevant organizing principles at a time when modern society is making increasing demands on individuals’ (Kinnvall, 2002: 79). The combination of these factors gave the BJP’s Hindutva a contemporary relevance within Indian politics at the turn of the millennium, and was an attractive ideological response to changing economic conditions. Furthermore, the emergence of a (western) liberalised and globalised economy in India (increasingly driven by consumerism and privatization) questioned what national identity ought to be. The rise of Hindutva through the political emergence of the BJP was ‘a bold strategic response to this question’ (McDonald, 2003: 1563), and challenged existing (but weakening) socialist norms within India’s security identity.

Therefore for the BJP, ‘economic prosperity, a strong state, and an authentic and unequivocal cultural and national identity … (were) the necessary ingredients for realizing the promise of recognition in global modernity’ (McDonald, 2003: 1565). Furthermore, previous (Congress) protectionist strategies were argued to have neither helped to combat poverty nor made the economy stronger, especially when compared with Chinese growth in the 1990s (Srinavasan & Tendulkar, 2000). Having a global economic growth capacity was thus equated with being a global power (another core security identity and BJP policy norm), which the BJP used to justify its calibrated globalization policy (Anderson, 2001: 772-773). As part of perceptually building this aim, during the NDA the BJP declared their Vision 2020 to make India a developed country by 2020. This public pronouncement was ‘a big mental leap, given the traditional self-perception (of India) as a weak and developing country’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 317). Such links between economic performance and becoming a great (or even global) power had not, up until this point, been made explicit in Indian state practice (or its security identity).

The Middle Class and Mass Media

In electoral terms, while nationally representing a minority of the population, the majority of BJP supporters come from the educated, upper caste and upper class groups (Brass, 1998: 503). Made up of a variety of entrepreneurs, businessmen, traders and small indigenous manufacturers, the middle class gain the most from a modern India,
and are at the frontline of rapid cultural change in the face of outside forces and neoliberalism (Hansen, 1996b: 181). For the Hindu middle class, ‘the BJP’s support of economic liberalization policies also address(e) the rising economic ambition of this class while the ideology of Hindutva takes care of their identity problems’ (Pandey, 2007: 541). By being aligned with the developments within the mainstream of Indian society, the BJP become part of that mainstream - legitimising Hindutva and consolidating its middle class support base. By being at the fulcrum of India’s new capitalism and consumerism, the middle classes effectively set and reinforced the BJP’s agenda, from ardent chauvinistic nationalism to economic reform (Rajagopal, 1996).

Just as the rewriting of history can reinforce national identities, the use of media imagery became a vital aspect of the BJP and Hindutva’s presence within India’s globalising economy. In particular, the relationship between the media and domestic policy produced a nationalist discourse ‘according to which the BJP view India as having been under siege in the face of the enemy within, the Muslims who live in India, and the enemy without, Muslims who live in Pakistan and Bangladesh’ (McGuire, 2007: 22-3). The funding of violence at Ayodhya in 1992 by diasporic Hindus in Canada and America (Robbins, 1998: 11) shows the strength of such imagery and the reach of the associated normative practice that accompanies it. Overall, Hindu nationalism benefited from how India’s “constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent, and recognize themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expression” (Hansen quoted in Momen, 2005: 250). Modern media in India again coupled with the country’s growing middle class, further cementing the BJP’s support base and normalizing their political presence.

Images play a critical role in reinforcing identities, stereotypes and threats. For the BJP, the symbols of Babri Masjid and Muslim infiltrators all became ‘coded images associated with our innermost fears or desires, which are being incorporated and exploited in the political process’ (Momen, 2005: 256). Hindutva’s mass appeal to specific identity markers (such as religion, national difference and masculinity) overlapped with modern consumerism by redefining “popular symbols and … including these symbols in daily narratives” (Breckenridge quoted in Momen, 2005: 251). Pre-NDA examples included the screening of an adaptation of the Ramayana on Indian television in the late 1980s to
weekly audiences of eighty million, as well as the broadcasting of large-scale events such as Advani’s Rath Yatra in the early 1990s that culminated in Ahodya (Bénéï, 1998: 122; Corbridge, 1999). Other examples include attempts by Shiv Sena to sponsor a Michael Jackson concert in 1996 in Bombay (Katzenstein et al., 1997) and BJP attacks during the NDA on anti-Hindu messages in the media, cinema and the arts that defied the BJP’s cultural nationalism platform (Hasan, 2007: 16; Marsh & Brasted, 2007).

The circulation of mass imagery was coupled with a revolution in print media, which observers linked to the electoral rise of the BJP (Page & Crawley, 2001). It also encompassed Anderson’s “print capitalism” that creates and sustains a shared pan-national consciousness (1991). In turn, Jeffrey noted how, ‘coinciding with the growth of television and the political struggles over reservation and Ayodhya, circulation of Hindi dailies grew by 250 percent in ten years’ (2002: 292). As part of this phenomenon linking Hindu organisations, ideology, imagery and the media, “the ‘Hinduization’ of the press … led to the portrayal of the upper-caste Hindu’s view as the only and true reality” (Charu & Mukul quoted in Jeffrey, 2002: 291). Adding the intellectual influence of the English language media when used by political analysts and elites, the power of the media for the promotion of Hindutva became even more apparent. Overall, commentators noted how the Sangh Parivar’s ‘media mastery and an eye for symbols’ (Lochtefeld, 1996: 105), established their political position and that of the BJP, and helped normalize the presence of their cultural nationalist policies during the NDA.

CONCLUSIONS

During the BJP-led NDA period, the normative basis of India’s domestic politics was in flux with the established norms of India’s security identity being contested with those entrenched within BJP policy. Through attempts at institutional saffronisation via the promotion of its supporters and the introduction of its Hindutva-orientated policies, in office the BJP mounted an effective challenge to the traditional normative practices present within the Indian state. These policies directly stemmed from their policy papers and manifestoes of the previous four decades. Such observations confirm two of my key research premises. First, there are multiple, composite and competing norms actively present within the Indian state, as shown by the interaction of norms between
those of India’s security identity and those of BJP policy. Thus, we saw the pre-1998 security identity’s anti-communal norm compete with the BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-Christian norms during the 1998 to 2004 NDA government. Furthermore, the BJP policy norm of anti-militancy (as externally-derived) contested with the security identity’s norm of anti-militancy (as internally-derived).

Second, through this interaction and comparison, we were able to see both continuity and change in the two sets of composite norms during the NDA period. Thus, the pre-1998 norm of swadeshi then limited liberalization (from the security identity) became supplanted by the BJP norm of India-first swadeshi and calibrated globalization. In turn, BJP norms of cultural nationalism and positive secularism resulted in the saffronisation of many state institutions towards a pro-Hindutva standpoint, challenging existing security identity norms of equality, secularism and plurality. The extent of continuity or change with pre-1998 security identity norms appears at this stage to be dependent on their relative harmony or dissonance with BJP policy norms prior to 1998. Thus, in this first case, their similarity with BJP norms allows for a nuanced evolution. In the second case, their high level of dissonance implied a hardening of their differences. Only by examining the norms present in post-NDA governments from 2004 onwards can this mutual relationship and impact be fully established (as will be carried out in Chapter 9).

It appears however that the most contested norms are those which stem from ideological differences between the BJP and Congress.

Also evident is the extent to which the BJP became established as a legitimate political force, and thus as a normative and mainstreamed feature of Indian politics. By becoming the first coalition to serve their full term in office, the BJP-led NDA displayed stability, were a genuine alternative to Congress and ‘transformed the complexion of the political process in India’ (Harshe, 2005: 50). Furthermore, towards the end of the NDA, observers noted how the BJP began winning state elections without explicit Hindutva policies (Elliott, 2003). Such success was no longer limited to the traditional Hindu belt of northern India, instead the BJP had become ‘a “normalized” component in the regional party structure of most states in eastern and southern India … moreover the Sangh Parivar has begun … to permeate social structures in these non-core regions’
(Gillan, 2002: 36). A settled political presence and increasing saffronisation had thus both become normalized elements of India’s domestic political scene by 2004.

The BJP’s advantageous electoral positioning within a modernising, globalizing, and media-dominated middle class strengthened their mainstream acceptance. Commentators also talked of a commensurate shift of ‘the centre of gravity of Indian politics to the right’ (Vanaik, 2002: 322), especially concerning capitalism, positive secularism and the nuclear tests. Additionally, BJP policies recast Hindu India’s relationship to its Muslim and Christian minorities. These shifts questioned the legitimacy of Congress’ normative secular basis but also seemingly demanded that Congress and India’s leftist parties become less socialist in orientation (Momen, 2005: 254). Reflecting their emergence as a political tool in the 1980s, under the NDA communal (and therefore anti-secular) politics therefore became an accepted part of Indian politics for all parties (Interview A13, 2008; Interview A14, 2008). As closer election results and coalition governance made voter support more critical, this acceptance increased. It must also be remembered that state complicity in communal violence was evident decades before Gujarat in 2002 (Engineer, 1994: 835), with Gujarat actually just confirming it as one of India’s ‘centrifugal impulses’ (Dixit, 2004b: 114).

These observations draw us to a deeper conclusion as to the BJP’s impact on the political source of India’s security identity, namely that of adding substance and producing a gear shift in India’s security practice. Thus, while many of the trends above were present before the ascendancy of the BJP-led NDA government in 1998, it was only during the NDA that they became more fully assertively established and entrenched - in effect, more normalised. This proto-normalization most noticeably applies to the validation of the BJP’s political legitimacy, India’s political centre ground shifting to the right and the affirmation of India’s ‘communalised commonsense’ (Sarkar, 1993: 164). Importantly though, apart from the security identity norm of nuclear ambiguity, no other norm from the pre-1998 security identity was comprehensively overturned. Thus, the influence of the BJP’s cultural nationalist, positive secularist, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian norms was dependent upon them.

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29 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008; interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
being in (and maintaining) a position of power. The next chapter investigates how the pre-1998 norms from both India’s security identity and BJP policy interacted within the physical source during the NDA period. It will also continue the themes of the BJP-led NDA adding substance to, and producing a gear shift in, India’s security practice.
Chapter 7:

‘Confronting, Engaging, Consolidating: the BJP and India’s Neighbours’

“’let us fight it out face to face …
we have fought thrice, let there be a fourth war’”
(Advani quoted in Bowers, 2004: 31)

‘we know where we have come from …
the better we understand each other, the more we can do together’
(Vajpayee, 2003: 7)

‘(to engage) with our civilisational neighbourhood’
(Interview B34, 2008)30

Did India’s relations with her neighbours continue or change under the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 1998 to 2004? What permitted or tempered any differences in the normative security practice of India during this period? Here, I analyse how the norms structuring India’s security identity and BJP policy pre-1998 within the physical source of India’s security identity interacted during the NDA government. This analysis encompasses one of my core research arguments that views security as a holistic entity occurring between the domestic and the international. It is in this space that composite norms compete and coalesce, and is where we can see evidence of norm continuity and change. This space also links together all three sources of India’s security identity, confirming their interdependent relationship, while emphasising the multiple sources that simultaneously construct a state’s security practice. The starting basis of this analysis is the summary of the two sets of (often competing and converging) norms derived from India’s security identity and BJP policy until 1998, which can be found in Table 7.1 below.

30 Interview with a BJP ideologue, Delhi, November 10 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY</th>
<th>BJP POLICY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan: conflict, negotiation, suspicion / LoC “accepted”</td>
<td>protect the Hindu <em>Rashtra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: continued territorial threats / ongoing suspicion</td>
<td><em>Akhand Bharat</em> – explicit policy to regain Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regional hegemon – reciprocity then benevolence</td>
<td>but pragmatic engagement with Pakistan and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tacit IOR dominance</td>
<td>natural regional hegemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>control / protect the IOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.1: Physical Norms in India’s Security Identity & BJP Policy until 1998**

In keeping with its domestic profile, the BJP was able to dominate the NDA coalition from 1998 to 2004 and ‘the small circle of policymakers’ (Basrur, 2002: 50) central to making foreign policy. Almost immediately, the BJP instituted India’s National Security Council (NSC) to centralize and oversee the running of India’s security policy. The NSC consists of a main group of ministers (and a National Security Advisor) reported to by the Strategic Policy Group, the National Security Advisory Board and a Secretariat represented by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The NSC’s structure and constituents are shown in Figure 7.1 below. Broadly, the Strategic Policy Group undertakes periodic Strategic Defence Reviews of India’s short and long-term security threats, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) provides the long-term prognosis and analysis of Indian security, and the Secretariat analyzes intelligence data from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and all of India’s armed forces.
Of the main ministerial group, all the posts were held by BJP leaders during the NDA apart from that of Defense Minister, which was given to George Fernandes of the NDA’s Samata Party. The External Affairs Minister was Jaswant Singh until July 2002, then Yashwant Sinha. The new position of National Security Advisor was given to Brajesh Mishra, a highly experienced career diplomat who became the key security confidante of the NDA’s Prime Minister (Interview B25, 2008). Such dominance, even with some attempts at consensus building (see Mohan, 2003: 264), gave the BJP (and hence any Sangh Parivar associates) de facto control of external relations and policy. The overwhelmingly regional outlooks of the other NDA coalition parties who had little or no foreign policy perspectives, underlined this control. The BJP fulfilled an established manifesto promise by initiating the NSC but in effect, according to a think-tank head, continued a process initiated by former Prime Minister VP Singh (Interview B10, 2008).

The chapter is split into three major sections. The first section deals with India’s relations with Pakistan from 1998 to 2004, and focuses upon the cycle of conflict and negotiation emblematic of this period, before identifying certain points of change in their

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31 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008.
32 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008.
relationship. Section two investigates India’s interaction with China, noting an accelerated period of engagement through deepening economic and military ties. The third section then analyses BJP policy towards South Asia as a whole, as well as growing relations with Myanmar and South East Asia - in particular highlighting the expansion of India’s security horizons. The chapter ends with some conclusions on how underlying assertiveness and pragmatism in BJP policy norms towards India’s neighbours, helped to improve (in particular) relations with Pakistan and China.

7.1) - CONFRONTING PAKISTAN:

For the BJP, their pre-1998 policy concerning Pakistan revolved around norms of protecting the Hindu Rashtra and an explicit policy to regain Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (to achieve Akhand Bharat). Cultural nationalist and anti-Muslim norms from the political source fed into these rationales. Conversely, according to a leading Indian academic, there was also a norm of pragmatic engagement in order ‘to map out a foreign policy which would at least neutralize Pakistan’ (Interview A13, 2008). In turn, in India’s security identity up until 1998, norms of a cycle of conflict, negotiation and suspicion, as well as “acceptance” of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir had been prominent. From this basis, some degree of dissonance between these norms could be expected during the 1998 to 2004 NDA regime. Accordingly, observers noted how for the BJP concerning Kashmir, ‘only a hawkish attitude and international pressure will compel Pakistan to end … (its) interference’ (Basrur, 2002: 185). In addition, in an increasingly communal India, the ‘desire to hold on to Kashmir (had become) less a result of moral principle and more an imperative of statecraft’ (Ganguly, 1996). It was thus feared that a BJP government would exacerbate the risk of conflict with Pakistan.

However, the BJP were also free of much of the historical baggage and associations carried by Congress - namely their secular norms and the Nehru/Gandhi dynasty being Kashmiri Pandits, all of which had made it difficult to ‘bury the ghost of Partition’ (Interview B32, 2008). As such, an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official

33 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
34 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, November 8 2008.
noted how Congress were regarded as being ‘over-conscious’ (Interview B1, 2008)\(^{35}\) of alienating Muslim voters, making any resolution concerning Kashmir hard to achieve. In contrast, a senior Indian journalist argued that the BJP were freed from such constraints by being much clearer than Congress as to their policy intentions (Interview B3, 2008)\(^{36}\). Coupled with their general *Hindutva* credentials, according to another journalist, the BJP’s projected image as the party of national security could also give legitimacy to any peace efforts in a way unimaginable for Congress (Interview B5, 2008)\(^{37}\). Indeed, more moderate voices in the BJP (most prominently Prime Minister Vajpayee) wanted to finally resolve the Kashmir issue in order to raise India’s global profile. During the NDA, these voices were countered by more militant BJP elements (along with those in the wider *Sangh Parivar*) who wanted to fulfill a strict *Hindutva* agenda.

**The Conflict and Peace (Re)Cycle**

In broad terms, India’s relations with Pakistan continued to oscillate wildly between conflict and peace initiatives during the NDA period. This cycle was punctuated by acts of terrorism, which India increasingly blamed on Pakistani laxness in countering Islamist groups, possibly with some ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) complicity (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)\(^{38}\). While the collective frequency of these events was perhaps the highest at any point in Indo-Pakistani relations, by 2004 the cycle was resulting in India having tentative normalizing relations with Pakistan. Such developments were helped by greater levels of Indo-Pakistani back-channel diplomacy instituted under the BJP (Interview B11, 2008)\(^{39}\), as well as Brajesh Mishra’s meeting with the head of Pakistan’s ISI - the first such senior level meeting for fourteen years (Dixit, 2004b: 289).

A simplified timeline of the period’s major events can be found in Table 7.2 below.

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\(^{35}\) Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.

\(^{36}\) Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.

\(^{37}\) Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.

\(^{38}\) Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.

\(^{39}\) Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pokhran / Chaghai Hills nuclear tests</td>
<td>May 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Declaration</td>
<td>February 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kargil war</td>
<td>May-July 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar hijacking</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceasefire with Hizbul Mujahideen</td>
<td>July 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian ceasefire in Kashmir</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agra peace summit</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack on Indian Parliament</td>
<td>December 13 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant near war situation</td>
<td>December 2001 to late 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite Dialogue re-initiated</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting with Kashmiri separatists</td>
<td>October 2003 - January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoC ceasefire (India and Pakistan)</td>
<td>November 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peace talks in Islamabad</td>
<td>January / February 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Timeline of Events between India and Pakistan (May 1998 - February 2004)

In the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests, the BJP’s anti-Muslim policy norms and opposition to Pakistan spread into much of their public rhetoric concerning the success of the tests. Thus, Advani declared that “Islamabad should realise the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region … any other course will be futile and costly for Pakistan” (quoted in Inderjit, 1998). More belligerently, the BJP’s Tourism and Parliamentary Affairs minister, Madan Lal Khurana, stated that “if Pakistan wants to fight another war with us, they should tell us the time and place” (quoted in Tension Rises, 1998). Analysts also saw the testing of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile in April 1998 (with an optimum range of 1,500 kilometres) as the trigger for the tests (Ganguly, 1999: 171), along with Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons project that had been in place since the 1980s (Bhattacharjeya, 2001: 429). In response to domestic pressures, Pakistan carried out its own nuclear tests at Chaghai Hills in Baluchistan on May 28 and 30 1998.

Reactions to the tests were diverse, with some observers claiming a greater sense of realism between the two sides, particularly as their nuclear threshold was now so low given their proximity (Interview B10, 2008). The tests also appeared to add a sense of maturity and responsibility to India-Pakistan affairs and an impetus to normalize relations (arguments supported by Waltz, 2003), particularly in the face of almost unanimous international opprobrium. In contrast, pro-nuclear hawks believed that

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40 Interview with a think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008.
India could win any nuclear conflict - wiping out Pakistan and remaining relatively intact (Interview A5, 2008). A lack of understanding concerning the impact of nuclear weapons sustained these arguments (Private Correspondence 1, 2009), as well as the rhetoric of some BJP leaders. Furthermore, the nuclear tests conversely gave a “freer rein to unconventional military options” (Krepon quoted in Gellner, 2003: 140), particularly low-intensity conflicts and continued infiltration across the LoC.

These factors were the context of the Lahore talks of February 1999, which went against both public sentiment and BJP logic, as it ‘almost seems like if you are going over there, you are begging them … showing a certain weakness in our system’ (Interview A19, 2008). Such actions challenged established norms from within India’s pre-1998 security identity and asserted BJP policy norms of pragmatic engagement.

After Vajpayee’s highly publicized “bus diplomacy” to Pakistan and his speech vowing not to reverse Partition (Dixit, 2004b: 260), the resultant Lahore Declaration promised to intensify dialogue and to resolve all issues including Kashmir. Widely lauded by MEA officials and senior military commanders respectively as ‘a critical symbolic gesture’ (Interview B35, 2008) and a ‘remarkable and unique’ (Interview B6, 2008) achievement, Lahore appeared to be a fundamental watershed in India’s relations with Pakistan. It was also the first time in 10 years that the two countries had signed a joint agreement (Singh, 1999b).

The optimism of Lahore and Vajpayee’s ‘dialogue of reassurance’ (Interview B4, 2008) was broken by the 1999 Kargil war. Initiated by Pakistani soldiers dressed as freedom fighters, a limited conflict was fought between the two sides in Kashmir from May to June 1999 (Malik, 2007). The incursions resulted in domestic pressures from the Sangh Parivar and India’s strategic community for an extension of the conflict into Pakistan (Tellis, 2001: 80). Such rhetoric was reciprocal, with Indian and Pakistani officials exchanging nuclear threats thirteen times in five weeks during the conflict (Bidwai &

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41 Interview with a senior strategic analyst and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, May 2 2008.
42 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.
43 Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008.
44 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary, Delhi, November 10 2008.
45 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008.
46 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary, October 17 2008.
While resisting this rhetoric, Vajpayee also refused to accept any ceasefire until Pakistan had withdrawn from Indian territory, something that contrasted with the policy of Congress-led regimes in earlier conflicts (Interview B3, 2008). After a limited conflict, India claimed total victory by removing Pakistani forces from India, won international admiration for limiting the fighting to the Kargil sector and convinced the international community that Pakistan was the dangerous aggressor. Such behaviour did not however fulfill more hard-line Hindutva expectations (Interview B8, 2008).

The BJP’s counterintuitive restraint continued after Kargil, most prominently with the handling of the Kandahar hijacking (that began on December 24 1999), when their release of political prisoners in exchange for hostages prompted criticism from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Baber, 2004: 707). In turn, in July 2000, Hizbul Mujahideen - the biggest militant group in Kashmir, declared a unilateral cease-fire and expressed its desire to open negotiations for the first time with the Indian government. Although these talks broke down, in November 2000 India announced its first-ever unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir - again ‘an unprecedented development’ (Bose, 2001: 43).

While these events confirmed the norm of conflict and negotiation present within India’s security identity, they also harmonized with the BJP policy norm of pragmatic engagement (although to the detriment of other norms such as re-establishing Akhand Bharat). Members of India’s strategic community accurately saw such actions as evidence that the BJP ‘thought outside the box’ (Interview B3, 2008) and were serious about resolving the Kashmir issue (Dixit, 2004b: 263-5).

This pragmatism continued in May 2001, as the BJP called off India’s ceasefire with Pakistan but then surprisingly invited Pakistan’s General Musharraf for a summit in Agra from July 15 to 16 2001. This invitation was ‘a significant shift’ (Baral, 2002: 290) in India’s Pakistan policy that did not rely on Pakistan stopping aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir. Despite what analysts saw as Vajpayee’s ‘magnanimity’ (Interview B10, 2008), internal divisions in the BJP over Pakistan’s unwillingness to state “cross-

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47 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
48 Interview with a think-tank head, Delhi, October 21 2008.
49 Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
50 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008.
border terrorism” in an agreement (rather than “terrorism”) led to the collapse of the talks (Baral, 2002). Such divisions helped to underline how norms (both within and without of BJP policy) were competing for prominence in the NDA’s foreign policy behaviour. Other pressures were also evident at Agra - particularly from the United States (US) to get President Musharaff to attend and for the two sides to reach a deal - pressures that BJP officials stated earlier Indian governments had not rebuffed but which the BJP-led NDA did (Interview A15, 2008). Thus, we can again see how norms of pragmatic engagement were becoming more prominent in India-Pakistan relations during the BJP-led NDA.

Forcing the Issue

The failure of the Agra summit was quickly exacerbated by two acts of terrorism in India at the end of 2001. First, a suicide bomb attack on October 1 on the provincial legislature of Indian-administered Kashmir killed 38 people. Then on December 13, terrorists launched an attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi killing 7 people. Both these events took place in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and growing US-led moves towards an international “war on terror”. Amid accusations that Pakistan had harboured the groups responsible for the attacks, the bilateral advances made at Lahore were scaled back (including cutting bus and train links, and for the first time since 1971 recalling the Indian ambassador). Vajpayee’s belief in making Pakistan give up its support of terrorism (Interview B6, 2008) - itself a core threat to the Hindu Rashtra - fed into BJP impatience as he declared “we do not want a war but war is being thrust upon us” (quoted in BJP National Executive 29.12.01, 2005: 63). In turn, the Sangh Parivar wanted ‘a “permanent lesson” taught to Pakistan’ (Vanaik, 2002: 327).

Subsequently, India carried out its largest troop movements (Operation Parakram) since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war in ‘a strategy of preclusive defense’ (Sáez, 2003: 187). BJP threats towards Pakistan also continued, such as Advani’s call for the “hot pursuit” of terrorists into Pakistan (Basrur, 2002: 42). Tensions simmered throughout 2002

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51 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008.
52 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008.
(supported by the state-sponsored attacks on Muslims in Gujarat) and then a militant attack on an army base in Jammu in May 2002, which killed 34 people, sparked a full-blown crisis. This attack provoked heavy artillery and machine-gun exchanges across the LoC, buoyed by demands from Vajpayee for “a decisive battle” (quoted in Sáez, 2003: 189). With both sides carrying out nuclear missile tests in October 2002, the threat of escalation increased (Interview B38, 2008). In addition to pooja (worship) being performed by Hindu saadhus (holy men) before troop deployments, scientists were concocting remedies from the Arthasastra in an attempt to make India’s soldiers invincible (Rahman, 2002). It appeared that established BJP and Hindutva policy norms of assertively protecting the Hindu Rashtra and achieving Akhand Bharat were now gaining ascendancy in India’s security practice under the NDA.

Facing what seemed to be an imminent nuclear conflict that threatened its hunt for Osama bin Laden, the war on terror and its troops in Pakistan, the US maintained pressure on both sides to peacefully resolve their differences. This pressure made India regard US policy towards Pakistan as contradictory and as Brajesh Mishra stated, “how can we talk with cross-border terrorism still going on? … when the US … urges us to talk, that is a double standard on terrorism” (quoted in Bowers, 2004: 31). Such comments led observers to conclude in June 2002 that threats of escalation were ‘in fact a well-thought-out attempt by India to end Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Kashmir’ (Zakaria, 2002). This strategy successfully linked Pakistani involvement in Kashmir to both international terrorism and nuclear weapons within international (predominantly US) foreign policy mindsets (BJP National Executive 24.12.02, 2005: 40). Furthermore, a senior MEA official confirmed that there was ‘absolutely no plan to have war’ (Interview B1, 2008) during this period. It appeared that BJP norms of belligerence against Pakistan had been used as a tool for political gain, rather than as an end in themselves.

In October 2002 the India reassessed its high border mobilization, and realized that ‘the policy of “coercive diplomacy” was no longer providing a balance of benefit’ (Bowers, 2004: 26). Despite continued terrorist attacks in early 2003, such as the massacre of 24

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53 Interview with a senior Indian newspaper editor, Delhi, November 14 2008.
54 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
villagers in Nadimarg on March 23, Vajpayee began moves to defuse tension with Pakistan, and re-established communication and diplomatic links on May 6 2003. These moves marked the re-initiation of the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan, aimed at resolving all areas of dispute between India and Pakistan from territory and water rights to terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as economic and commercial cooperation. The BJP were noted by various members of India’s strategic community for being more generous than previous Indian governments on the Composite Dialogue’s structure (Interview B14, 2008)\textsuperscript{55} and for making it more ‘institutionalised’ (Interview B3, 2008)\textsuperscript{56}. As a result of these measures (and further Track II diplomacy), Pakistan offered an unprecedented ceasefire along the LoC in Kashmir, which India reciprocated in November 2003. The ceasefire ended thirteen years of hostility across the border.

These developments led to the meeting on January 6 2004 of Musharraf and Vajpayee in Islamabad, where Pakistan was hosting the annual SAARC summit. The meeting resulted in the Islamabad Declaration whereby Pakistan publicly committed to stop terrorism, representing a critical watershed in India-Pakistan relations (Interview B6, 2008; Interview B14, 2008\textsuperscript{57}). This meeting also led to formal peace talks in Islamabad from February 16 to 18 2004, with both sides agreeing to hold further negotiations in June 2004 following the next Indian general election. Furthermore, since October 2003 BJP leaders had twice met leaders from Kashmir’s separatist All-Party Hurriyat Conference - the highest-ever level talks between the two sides (Advani, 2005: 49-50). Such events were aided by the 2002 Kashmir elections, widely recognized as the fairest in decades (Ganguly, 2006). By 2004 BJP policy norms had added pragmatism to the normative cycle of conflict and negotiation present in India’s pre-1998 security identity, often by instrumentally using (rather than implementing or establishing) other norms, such as trying to forcefully regain Kashmir or being explicitly anti-Muslim.

\textsuperscript{55} Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 23 2008.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008; interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance government, Delhi, October 23 2008.
7.2) - CHINA: ACCELERATED CONTINUITIES:

BJP policy norms towards China before their ascendency to government in 1998 were much like those with Pakistan; to protect the *Hindu Rashtra* but also to have pragmatic engagement that focused away from territorial disputes to enhance regional trade and interaction. These norms appeared to compliment those norms from India’s security identity prior to 1998 of seeing China as a continued territorial threat mixed with ongoing suspicion. By 1998 there was also an increased sense of China encircling India through its emergent “string of pearls” policy aimed at securing Chinese influence from Hong Kong to Sudan (Interview B4, 2008; Pehrson, 2006). Ongoing border disputes, historical animosities and economic competition fed this threat. Many analysts began to see the India-China relationship as a classic realist contest based upon a growing regional power struggle (for various perspectives, see Garver, 2001, 2002; Malik, 2001; Lee, 2002, Mohan, 2003; Dabhade & Pant, 2004). Conversely, the BJP-led NDA entered an already developing and fledging strategic dialogue between the two sides as shown by their increased interaction (including multiple reciprocal visits and agreements) in the 1990s.

Compared to previous Congress-led governments, the BJP also had some important advantages. Firstly, in his role as Foreign Minister in the Janata government of 1977-1980, Atal Vajpayee had ‘strategically visited China’ (Athwal, 2008: 24) at the time of the Sino-Vietnamese war, helping to unblock communications between Delhi and Beijing. Vajpayee’s reputation as a hardliner also helped in negotiations (Interview B12, 2008). Secondly, the BJP did not have any direct (political) historical baggage concerning India’s 1962 humiliation against China as it occurred under a Nehru-led Congress regime. Therefore ‘the BJP, unlike the Congress Party, (did) not suffer because of defeat in the border war and could … adopt flexible means on the border issue’ (Du, 2001: 160). Furthermore, improved relations with China had potentially significant economic and political benefits that could facilitate the BJP’s (and the security identity’s) pre-1998 norm of becoming a great power. Creating strong borders through the resolution of any border disputes would aid such an aim.

58 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary, Delhi, October 17 2008.
59 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, October 22 2008.
Nuclear Maturity and Deepening Ties

The Pokhran II tests appeared to mark a severe downturn in the India-China relationship. Not only had the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared China to be India’s “enemy number one” preceding the tests but after the tests, in a letter to US President Clinton, Vajpayee cited China as central to the test’s rationale (Indian’s Letter to Clinton, 1998). Therefore, it was their unresolved border issues, as well as ‘emulation, strategic competition and the China-Pakistan nexus’ (Ahrari, 1999: 434) that were the tests’ major motivations. Such pointed criticism led to a strong Chinese reaction and a diplomatic campaign to isolate New Delhi, as their official disharmony and distrust increased. In addition, China used its rotating presidency of the UNSC to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1172 condemning the nuclear tests. China also cancelled the planned November 1998 Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting in Beijing.

Such condemnation and isolation induced Indian officials to retract their statements and to ‘seek rapprochement’ (Jing-Dong, 2007: 132) with China, revealing a certain ad hoc nature intrinsic to the NDA’s foreign policy in 1998. By June 1998 officials declared that the Indian bomb was not “country specific” and by late 1999 that it was not even “threat specific” (Perkovich, 1999: 420; Vanaik, 2002: 325-326). Then in June 1999, during the Kargil crisis with Pakistan, Jaswant Singh traveled to China (the first visit by an Indian External Affairs Minister in eight years) to open a security dialogue between the two sides. The visit was a turning point in Sino-Indian relations and set out an agenda for renewed (and regular) exchanges and visits. This process was confirmed by the reciprocal visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxun to New Delhi in July 2000. Furthermore, observers began remarking how the 1998 nuclear tests had produced a strategic clarity between India and China by exposing Indian motivations, removing previous nuclear ambiguities and injecting maturity into their relationship (Jing-Dong, 2007). Previously established JWG’s also resumed meeting after the 1999 Security Dialogue was initiated.
Furthermore, Chinese analysts noted that the Pokhran II tests had given India ‘creativity, power and self-confidence’ (Du, 2001: 159). In turn, the nuclear tests were regarded as ‘part of a(n) [Indian] grand national strategy (present) since independence’ (Jing-Dong, 2007: 996). Here, we can see how the ascendancy of the BJP’s norm of pragmatic engagement with China was aided by the removal of the norm of nuclear ambiguity from the security identity. This observation confirms the interdependence of norms within India’s security practice. Improved diplomatic ties continued as Indian President KR Narayanan visited China in May to June 2000. The visit saw the announcement of a four-point engagement proposal - namely to increase bilateral personnel visits, to expand trade and economic cooperation, to strengthen cooperation and coordination in international affairs and to properly handle historical issues (Rajan, 2007: 152). As a result of this visit, economic, scientific and border negotiations resumed between the two countries, marked by visits to India by Li Peng in January 2001 and Premier Zhu Rongzi in January 2002 (the first such visit in 10 years). Tensions remained however, such as in January 2001 when India tested the nuclear capable and ‘China-specific’ (Interview B5, 2008) Agni-II, and in November 2002 when Vajpayee became the first-ever Indian head of state to describe China as a competitor (Nanda, 2002).

The most substantial diplomatic developments during this period came in 2003 when Fernandes (in April) and Vajpayee (in June) visited China. As the first trips by either an Indian Defense Minister or an Indian Prime Minister to China in over a decade, for the BJP these visits represented a concerted effort to essentially ‘unfreeze the relationship’ (Interview A20, 2008). This period marked a substantial number of important agreements between the two sides, as shown in Table 7.3 below - most notably the 2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation (their highest-ever level document).

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60 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.
61 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.
Table 7.3: Significant India-China MoUs and Agreements (June 1999 - October 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / AGREEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>India-China Security Dialogue established (meets annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>5 Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed (on tourism, water conservancy, space, science, culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation / 9 MoUs (including border trade at Nathula) / Joint Study Group (JSG) established on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and Technology (secretarial level) / Special Representatives appointed (secretarial level / for border issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>first ministerial level discussions in Beijing on border issues (meets again in Delhi, January 11-12 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the 2003 visit, Beijing and New Delhi also forged a consensus on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues, and found convergence on ‘the development of a fair and equitable international political and economic order’ (Jing-Dong, 2007: 133). Overall, Vajpayee’s visit was seen by China as “a major diplomatic move … reflecting India’s strategic orientation towards improving its relations with its neighbours” (Ambassador Zhou Gang quoted in Rajan, 2007: 153). Assertive and proactive BJP norms (as were apparent in their Pakistan policy) were again in evidence, as was unfreezing dialogue by not focusing on any single issue such as disputed borders. For the NDA, the 2003 visit sent a message of seriousness from India about India-China relations to China, the region and the world, which challenged existing pre-1998 security identity norms of suspicion towards China.

Making Advances

India-China engagement during the NDA saw developments concerning the two states’ shared, and heavily disputed, borders. For the BJP, such developments were possible because Vajpayee had created a ‘comfort level … and dialogue with China’ (Interview

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62 Between Brajesh Mishra (Indian National Security Advisor) and Dai Bingguo (Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister).
A15, 2008). Therefore, for the first time, Beijing and New Delhi exchanged maps on the middle sector of the disputed border area (covering the Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh boundaries with Tibet) in November 2001. Then, in June 2003, China recognized Nathula as an entry and exit point in Sikkim. At the same time, two border trading posts were established; one in the Tibetan town of Renqinggang and the other at Changgu in Sikkim. The latter post signaled (for the first time) China’s de facto acceptance of India’s sovereignty in Sikkim. In return, India conceded to Chinese sovereignty in the Tibet Autonomous Region, reversing claims made by previous Indian governments (Dixit, 2004b: 268) and also importantly, Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) policy norms.

Overall, border negotiations were helped by the appointment of Special Representatives in 2003, which made the issue political rather than bureaucratic - a significant ‘step up’ (Interview B22, 2008) from previous Indian governments. Such developments also fulfilled a BJP manifesto promise. An ex-MEA official did however note that the recognition of Sikkim was a ‘pin drop’ (Interview B1, 2008) compared to wider border issues. Indeed, other India-China border disputes (the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh) gained less ground in this period. China therefore continued to pose a territorial threat to India. However, ideas for an east sector-west sector land swap did begin to gain greater credence from 1998 to 2004 due to the success of the Sikkim-Tibet recognition swap (Interview B4, 2008). Concerning India’s other territorial dispute (with Pakistan over Kashmir), China was now more neutral and had been cautious during the Kargil conflict to appear to support either side (Guihong, 2006: 99). China-Pakistan relations continued however (including arms transfers), which Indian and Chinese leaders tried to de-link from their negotiations.

Heightened diplomatic engagement between India and China was also accompanied by rapidly growing economic ties during this period (for details see Gandhi, 2007; Rahman & Andreu, 2006; Smith, 2007). The 2003 visit was critical to facilitating this growth,
widely perceived as ‘win-win’ (Sibal, 2003: 89). Spurred on by their business supporters (Private Correspondence 1, 2009; Vajpayee, 2003), the BJP realized that much could be gained through mutual economic growth and access to markets. Such rationales also came from BJP policy norms of India-first swadeshi and calibrated globalisation, as well as making India a global power but negated the BJP’s policy norm of fearing outsiders. In addition, securing India’s borders could be helped by greater cross-border trade, particularly in India’s northeast and adapting Chinese-inspired special economic zones (SEZs). Although the latter were not so successful (Private Correspondence 1, 2009), there were India-China exchanges on agricultural productivity, rural industrialization, export promotion, tourism and proposed natural gas pipelines. By 2004, India was the largest steel exporter to China (Ramesh, 2005: 94), as their mutual trade grew exponentially (see Figure 7.2 below).

The accelerated continuities and links between the two countries continued into the field of military interaction, further underlining the BJP’s norm of pragmatic engagement with China. Military exchanges emphasized in particular the ‘diversification of bilateral relations’ (People’s Daily, 2003: 54) and a growing convergence of interests. In November 2003 there were high-level military exchanges between China and India,

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67 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.
68 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.
69 Data for 2001 was not available.
as well as joint naval exercises and cross-border army base visits (Athwal, 2008: 110; Das, 2007: 182-4). Part of these exchanges involved India giving China its counter-terrorism experience, which the latter applied in Xinjiang (Rajan, 2007: 161). In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), there was naval cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits to protect Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and trade routes (especially from piracy). In contrast to previous regimes, these developments and linkages were far more institutionalized under the BJP. India and China also recognized shared attitudes towards the US and the world order, with both sides opposing hegemony and proposing a multi-polar future (Garver, 2002: 15). The BJP norm of pragmatic engagement appeared to be the new *lingua franca* in India-China relations.

**7.3) - CONSOLIDATING THE PERIPHERY:**

The assertiveness associated with BJP policy towards Pakistan and China from 1998 to 2004, was also in evidence in their interaction with the smaller peripheral states of South Asia. This factor seemed particularly prominent when looking at the pre-1998 norms within India’s security identity of being the regional hegemon (based upon reciprocity then benevolence) plus tacit dominance of the IOR. Indeed, BJP policy norms of India being the natural regional hegemon and protecting the IOR clearly harmonized with these pre-1998 security identity norms. Furthermore, the BJP continued trends from the pre-1998 security identity of being ‘obsessive in its apprehensions about the smaller neighbours developing extra-regional equations’ (Dixit, 2004b: 57). Importantly though, the BJP regarded the Gujral Doctrine as not adequate enough to ‘convert hostility into friendship’ (Arora, 2005: 315), preferring mutuality and a return to reciprocity. More generally, according to an ex-MEA official, relations with South Asia were given a lower priority than with Pakistan or China (Interview B28, 2008).70

Good relations with her neighbours were however central to India’s internal security - particularly in helping these states resist supporting terrorism in India, be it either Naxalites or north-east separatists (on this topic, see Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Dixit, 2002; Lall, 2006). BJP spokesperson references to having ‘very ordered relations with

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70 Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008.
our neighbours’ (Interview A15, 2008)\textsuperscript{71} reflected these security concerns. During this period, the term neo-Curzonian also emerged to describe the foreign policy perspective held by BJP politicians such as Jaswant Singh and KC Pant. Such a perspective is ‘premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagement with all major powers’ (Mohan & Khanna, 2006). It also emphasised economic cooperation and institutional links as the main forms of interaction with neighbouring states. These changes marked advances from the prior Curzonian view of denying outside powers influence in South Asia and now extended to include South East Asia in India’s “neighbourhood”. Thus, what had been present in India’s pre-1998 security identity had developed and evolved. Finally, India’s relations with its immediate region formed the core of an adherence to Kautilya’s “circle of states” logic - an idea that also resurfaced during this period (Ministry of Defence (MoD), 2001:7) and radiated out into India’s global relations.

\section*{Seeking Dominance}

In general, the BJP-led NDA followed the security precepts of previous Congress regimes of dominating India’s smaller neighbours through its greater landmass, population and GDP. In particular, the policy of regarding Nepal as a strategic buffer against China continued as did policies to prevent Nepal helping Naxalites in India (Pant, 2005: 107). These efforts had extra significance as Nepal was the world’s only Hindu state. The BJP also encouraged its other neighbours to remove militant bases used for attacks on India, predominantly those in Bhutan and Bangladesh (Interview B28, 2008\textsuperscript{72}; Mishra, 2004c: 254). An Agreement was signed with Bhutan in late 2003 to flush out ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) militants and, in both cases, JWGs instituted prior to 1998 continued. Furthermore, the NDA remained protective of its regional dominance, for example preventing Bangladesh from signing a ‘force-stationing agreement’ (Jing-Dong, 2001: 989) with the US. These actions backed up the BJP policy norm of India as the natural regional hegemon.

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008.
\textsuperscript{72} Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008.
Several ideas were mooted during the BJP-led NDA for a South Asian Union built upon existing South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member nations - ideas in common with their pre-1998 policy. Partly aimed at achieving a regional ‘peace dividend’ (Vajpayee, 2004), such an institutional configuration would be based upon open borders, free trade regulations and a common currency. However, observers duly noted the existing diplomatic, political and economic difficulties of arranging such a ‘grand regional council in India’ (Jalal, 1999) particularly between India and Pakistan. Despite its SAARC (and Indian Ocean Rim - Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)) memberships, Rubinoff additionally remarked that ‘India has been a follower rather than an initiator of (multilateral) activities … (its) principal objective … has been to ensure that the organisation can only deal with unimportant matters’ (2000: 289). Such comments suggested that control of South Asia remained the NDA’s overriding concern, as did the norm of India as natural regional hegemon.

The most important developments for India with any of its smaller neighbours from 1998 to 2004 occurred with Myanmar. India-Myanmar relations in the mid-1990s had been characterized by Nehruvian principles and estrangement due to Myanmar’s military junta crackdown on pro-democracy supporters. Under the NDA this policy was reversed to resume what the BJP saw as ‘the correct relationship’ (Interview B27, 2008), despite Myanmar still being led by General Than Shwe. This reframing occurred through ‘a policy of constructive engagement’ (Mohan, 2007: 112), which was also a strategic response to China’s growing influence in Myanmar. Such a policy summed up the BJP’s neo-Curzonian agenda of purposefully projecting their security concerns out beyond their borders. Additionally, strategists increasingly realized Myanmar’s geographical position as the only effective route for India into South East Asia, and demanded Indian attention regardless of its political circumstances - an awareness that reflected the BJP’s policy norm of realpolitik. The presence of large numbers of people of Indian origin (PIO) in Myanmar and their economic links back to India were also part of this policy’s rationale.

Increasing economic links between the two sides were a critical part of this deepening engagement, particularly the building of critical infrastructure to ‘increase external

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73 Interview with a former head of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008.
connectivity' (Mohan, 2002). During a visit in 2002 Jaswant Singh announced a project to connect India by road to Thailand via Myanmar. This deal bought additional ‘substance and synergy to India’s Look East strategy’ (Batabyal, 2006: 185) by explicitly physically linking South and South East Asia together. Other agreements included initial plans in early 2004 to build a port at Dawei, in order to help India protect its growing energy needs and energy security. Such plans were made in conjunction with increased Indian purchases of Myanmar gas, which had begun in 2001 (Lall, 2006: 437). These purchases complimented India’s access to Nepalese and Bhutanese hydro-electric power (through the Kurichhu Project which was finished in 2002) and Bangladeshi gas - assets not always fully exploited by India (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)74.

Military cooperation was the final aspect of the India-Myanmar relationship to develop during the NDA. High-level military-to-military links resumed in 2000 (the first since 1988) along with the carrying out of joint military operations in shared border areas. Central to such contacts was cooperation on cross-border terrorism (a mutual problem for both sides) with Myanmar promising to ‘flush out Indian insurgent camps’ (Lall, 2006: 435). Tackling cross-border smuggling also saw several joint developments with Indian officials training their Myanmar peers in anti-narcotics and anti-arms smuggling techniques. Overall, such cooperation was envisaged to promote ‘greater trade in the region, with the border opening up gradually, (hence) leading to more local prosperity’ (Lall, 2006: 433). While these interactions greatly improved India-Myanmar relations, their success in this period continues to be questioned (Private Correspondence 1, 2009)75.

Positive Asymmetry

In South East Asia, the BJP expanded India’s South Asian dominance. This new modality was defined by Yaswant Sinha as “institutionalizing positive asymmetry in favour of our neighbours” (quoted in Muni & Mohan, 2004: 317). Positive asymmetry made an ideological fit with Hindutva’s Akhand Bharat through its emphasis on a (physically) greater India, which had a greater influence and reach beyond the usual

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74 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.
75 Private Correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.
confines of South Asia. The critical difference with the Gujral Doctrine was that Vajpayee, Singh and Mishra ‘gave a security cast to the policy, and Indian defense and security links … began to proliferate after 1998’ (Garver, 2002: 21). Positive asymmetry could also enable India to gain ‘strategic “release” from the region’ (Bajpai, 2006: 198) and away from constraining border and territorial preoccupations. Spreading her influence beyond South Asia would additionally confirm India’s position as the region’s natural hegemon. This engagement was to be proactive and assertive whereby ““escalate and negotiate” was the new Indian mantra’ (Athwal, 2008: 15).

The BJP’s policy emphasized India’s cultural and ethnic (especially Hindu) heritage in South East Asia, reasserted and extended India’s Look East policy and confirmed a relative strategic neglect of West Asia. The BJP-led NDA perceived this policy to be different from that of Congress-led governments, as they displayed a greater receptivity to (mainly eastern) regions outside of South Asia. Congress had not shown such receptivity, for example refusing to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its creation in the 1960s as it was regarded to be a US-inspired piece of Cold War security architecture. In turn, BJP officials noted how Nehru’s combination of agnosticism and secularism had neglected India’s historical and cultural links with South East Asia (Interview B27, 2008). Instead, Vajpayee visited Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam during the NDA. The BJP’s injection of security into these regional relationships also reflected a particular emphasis on the common fight against transnational terrorism, ties which could help improve India’s security.

Central to successful engagement with South East Asia were India’s links with ASEAN. This importance was shown after the Pokhran II tests, when Jaswant Singh visited most of the ASEAN capitals in July 1998. The tour succeeded with ASEAN only moderately censuring India’s actions (Batabyal, 2006: 191-192). After extensive diplomatic activity, India became a summit-level partner of ASEAN in 2002, matching the status of China, Japan, and South Korea. The relationship was consolidated by the first ever India-ASEAN summit in November 2002 (in Cambodia), which followed the India-ASEAN Business Summits held in New Delhi and Hyderabad in October 2002. These interactions represented how South East Asia was, for the BJP-led NDA, “”one of the

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76 Interview with a former head of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008.
focal points of India’s foreign policy, strategic concerns and economic interests” (Vajpayee quoted in Acharya, 2006: 305). To bolster their relationship, India announced tariff concessions for the less developed countries in the region (mainly Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos). The process also involved a joint India-ASEAN Vision 2020 Statement.

In 2003, at the second India-ASEAN summit in Bali, India acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation on Southeast Asia, and signed the Joint Declaration for Cooperation on Combating International Terrorism and the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (to create an India-ASEAN Regional Trade and Investment Area (RTIA) by 2011). Collectively, these agreements represented ‘step(s) forward in the implementation of its [India’s] Look East strategy’ (Batabyal, 2006: 192), continuing but also heightening norms present from India’s security identity prior to 1998. Furthermore, they acted as counter initiatives against the increasing (economic) influence of China in South East Asia. The role of the IOR also played into these agreements in terms of trade and energy security, and reflected BJP policy norms of controlling and protecting the IOR. Overall, trade between India and ASEAN increased from US$5.6 billion in 1998 to US$14.5 billion in 2004 (Zhao, 2007: 125).

The greater projection of Indian security into the IOR rested upon naval deployments and maritime diplomacy, particularly the protection of trade routes to the east and energy supplies from the west. This importance underlined how, according to an ex-MEA official, 90% of Indian trade (Interview B2, 2008) \(^77\) and 70% of her oil needs (Pant, 2005: 112) were dependent upon sea access. Indeed, the NDA began referring to the IOR as India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reflecting the BJP policy norm of explicitly controlling and protecting the IOR. The establishment of the Far Eastern Strategic Command on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in August 2001 backed up this view, as did India having the largest submarine fleet and the only aircraft carriers among the IOR’s littoral states (Athwal, 2008) - capabilities which (indirectly) fulfilled a BJP manifesto promise. Such prowess was displayed through the India Navy’s successful interception of the hijacked Japanese Alondra Rainbow in 1999. Naval

\(^77\) Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.

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exercises with South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and the US underlined these capabilities and the IOR being part of what an ex-MEA official now deemed to be India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’ (Interview B2, 2008).78

Other greater extra-regional links were also in evidence during the NDA. In March 2000, India signed a joint protocol on defence cooperation with Vietnam that included the ‘sharing of strategic threat perceptions and intelligence’ (Scott, 2007: 128). In 2002, India also signed accords with Cambodia. On an institutional level, the signing of the Vientiane Declaration on November 10 2000 saw the creation of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Forum. Consisting of India, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand the Forum focused on mutual tourism, culture and education, as well as improving transport and communication infrastructures. Importantly, it acknowledged how for India the ‘Mekong countries provide strategic accessibility into the heartland of Asia-Pacific’ (Batabyal, 2006: 189), again highlighting how greater extra-regional ties helped to secure BJP policy norms of being South Asia’s natural hegemon and becoming a global power. The BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) grouping inaugurated under the Kunming Initiative of August 17 1999 complimented these developments.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Apart from their underlying assertive and proactive nature, many of the BJP policy norms that informed NDA policy from 1998 to 2004 effectively harmonized with those from India’s security identity pre-1998. Thus, we observed how BJP norms of pragmatic engagement coalesced with prior security identity norms of a cycle of conflict and negotiation with Pakistan, and ongoing territorial threats and suspicion with China. Rather than competing, these norms became complimentary - and contradicted other BJP policy norms of trying to regain Kashmir and fearing all outsiders. In turn, there was little difference between BJP and pre-1998 security identity norms concerning India’s regional position or the IOR, suggesting relative harmonization. Thus, an analysis of the norms interacting within the physical source of India’s security identity

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78 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
during the NDA showed multiple sources of security coalescing rather than competing for pre-eminence within India’s security practice.

The NDA’s foreign policy behaviour within the physical source of India’s security identity did however show that some BJP policy norms were present but were being used for strategic effect. Thus, during India-Pakistan relations from late 2001 to late 2002, we saw the use of the BJP’s anti-Muslim and anti-militancy (as externally-derived) norms to coercively confront Pakistan and to achieve outside (US) recognition of Pakistani complicity in terrorism (BJP National Executive 24.12.02, 2005: 40). Importantly, rather than being ends in themselves, these norms enabled the BJP to be both assertive in its conduct of India’s security practice and also free of much of the historical baggage carried by earlier Congress regimes. Indeed, it was the combination of these (normative) traits that made Pakistan and China more amenable to dealing with a BJP-led India (Interview B5, 2008)\(^79\). Furthermore, BJP assertiveness carried on their entrenched norm of protecting the \textit{Hindu Rashtra} and reconfigured their \textit{Akhand Bharat} norm to now indicate the extent of India’s strategic (and economic) influence and stability, rather than its purely geographic scope (Interview B30, 2008)\(^80\).

Through this harmonization and coercion, the NDA achieved discernible advances with all its neighbours. Thus, via unparalleled peace processes and ceasefires with Pakistan (and anti-India militants), the BJP endeavoured to go beyond the Pakistan-centric myopia typical of the 1970s and 1980s (Chari, 1987; Wright, 2007) in order to help free India from its regional constraints. Often these advances were, according to a former MEA official, due to Vajpayee’s ability to overcome militant Sangh Parivar elements (Interview B12, 2008)\(^81\) or being free from Congress’ historical international relations baggage. Equally with China, the benefits of interdependence outweighed continued enmity as both sides deepening their interaction despite ongoing border disputes. Both these relationships added extra resonance to India’s normative great power aspiration, although observers noted how the 1998 tests had now made India and China explicit strategic rivals (Vanaik, 2002: 335). For BJP affiliates, this change was a major long-

\(^79\) Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.  
\(^80\) Interview with a former think-tank director and strategic analyst, Delhi, November 7 2008.  
\(^81\) Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, October 22 2008.
term shift in Indian foreign policy (Interview B5, 2008). Finally, through its heightened engagement with the South Asia, Myanmar and South East Asia, the NDA injected security precepts into these relations and extended India’s security horizons.

As in Chapter 6, our analysis has noted how the assertiveness and pragmatism underlying many BJP policy norms harmonized with, but also substantiated, many of the norms already present within India’s security identity. This substantiation stemmed from the BJP’s historical policy norms and their behaviour during the NDA, rather than any significant structural or systemic developments in South Asia. The BJP pushed their normative policy agenda rather than being dictated to by events. In turn, part of this substantiation rested upon a policy of ‘all-dimension diplomacy’ (Jing-Dong, 2001: 984-985) that demanded greater Indian global interaction in order to speed up her economic and social development, and to improve her regional security. Chapter 8 investigates how this broadening of India’s (physical) security horizons continued under the BJP into the wider (perceptual) global environment. It also analyses if the NDA were able to keep on adding greater substance to India’s security identity and hence produce a lasting gear shift in India’s normative security practice.

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82 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.
Chapter 8:

‘Exploding Perceptions:
the BJP and India’s Global Relations’

‘the greatest meaning of the tests is that
they have given India shakti, they have given India strength,
they have given India self-confidence’
(MEA, 1998b)

“it will be wrong to think of our position as
pro-US, or pro-Iraq, or pro-west, or pro-third world, or
pro-this or pro-that … we are pro-India”
(Sinha quoted in Jain, 2007: 142)

‘India has moved from being totally moralistic
to being a little more realistic’
(Singh [Jaswant], 1998: 47)

How did internal sources of foreign policy influence India’s security practice beyond its immediate neighbours in South Asia? Are domestically derived norms linked to international politics (rather than vice versa)? Here, I answer these questions through an analysis of how the norms structuring India’s security identity and BJP policy until 1998 interacted in the perceptual source of India’s security identity during the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) period. As we shall see, BJP policy norms had a major impact on India’s security practice and, in some ways, altered the normative basis of India’s security identity. The BJP’s electoral success also came at a time of international flux and readjustment for India, especially with the decline of bipolarity and emergent globalization. Thus, while links with Russia remained in place, there were new possibilities for global engagement, especially with the end of the Cold War politics that had dictated much of the United State’s (US) involvement in South Asia. Such possibilities had not been fully realized by Indian governments prior to 1998 but would
be grasped by the BJP-led NDA. Table 8.1 below outlines the composite norms structuring both India’s security identity and BJP policy norms before 1998.

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<th>INDIA’S SECURITY IDENTITY</th>
<th>BJP POLICY</th>
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<td>: abhima / idealism</td>
<td>: assertive</td>
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<td>: autonomy / non-alignment</td>
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<td>: nuclear ambiguity</td>
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<td>: West Asia: explicitly pro-Muslim then balanced</td>
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Table 8.1: Perceptual Norms in India’s Security Identity & BJP Policy until 1998

8.1) - FROM OUTLIER TO MAINSTREAM:

BJP policy until 1998 within the perceptual source of the security identity revolved around norms of India becoming a global power and obtaining a permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto, coupled with being pro-nuclear weapons. These norms respectively displayed harmony and dissonance with norms established prior to 1998 in India’s security identity - namely a general great power aspiration and nuclear ambiguity. Chapter 6 has already established how concerning the latter, this norm was effectively overturned with the 1998 nuclear tests. An assertive and muscular outlook, mixed with realpolitik and realism, further informed BJP policy norms in the perceptual source. These norms went against ‘Nehru’s idealistic romanticism’ (Singh, 1999a: 35) - personified by the BJP through non-alignment and abhima - both of which were prominent in India’s early security identity. They did however appear to compliment India’s often-assertive foreign policy under Nehru (the post-1947 incorporation of several princely states, conflict over Kashmir, the invasion of Goa and challenging China across the Himalayas). Observers also noted how a ‘new aggressive and belligerent (elite) Indian nationalism’ (Vanaik, 2002: 322) informed BJP policy norms. Furthermore, a pragmatism ‘mantra’ (Interview B18, 2008) - as seen in NDA

83 Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, October 27 2008. Please refer to the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
policy towards India’s neighbours in the physical source of India’s security identity - was also a critical influence on BJP policy.

With the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the impending ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India felt isolated from the group of great (nuclear) international powers by 1998. As Jaswant Singh argued, this situation amounted (for the BJP in particular) to a “nuclear apartheid” that cast South Asia and Africa outside of the ‘nuclear security paradigm’ (1998: 48; see also Pande, 1996: 5-24). It was discriminatory, putting India ‘in a position of inferiority by structures of power over which they ha(d) little influence’ (Walker, 1998: 511) and often associated India with Pakistan (Vajpayee, 2000: 41). Within this context, from 1974 there had been calls from India’s strategic enclave of analysts and academics to resume testing. Although India had the appropriate scientific-military nuclear infrastructure in place, it was often only US pressure (and intelligence) that stopped any new tests. By 1998, BJP supporters declared that ‘the genuine demands of national defence cannot be made hostage to international approval’ (Pant, 2005: 91). Finally, an academic observer remarked that even if they had been discovered by the US, ‘the BJP would not have succumbed … they would not have bowed to pressure’ (Interview A14, 2008).

**Open Defiance**

Pokhran II was shrouded in secrecy with preparations for the tests camouflaged, done at night or to coincide with satellite blind spots, while India’s scientists dressed in army fatigues (Bhatia & Bhandari, 2008; Fair, 2005: 44). In addition, the plans were kept secret from most of the NDA as well as the Indian army (Interview B10, 2008). As the BJP-led NDA entered office, US President Clinton asked for a “strategic pause” in testing. In response, BJP leaders assured US officials that it only planned to undertake a “strategic review” (Mohan, 2005: 90). Further still, Advani told US envoy Bill Richardson that the ‘BJP knew the difference between “campaign rhetoric and the pragmatic demands of governing”’ (Fair, 2005: 43-44). Successfully carrying on the

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84 Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
85 Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008.
nuclear tests via this ‘organised deception’ (Joshi, 1998; Vajpayee, 1998b), indicated how the BJP had learnt from the experiences of previous Indian governments (and hence India’s normative security practice) and were willing to defy international opinion.

Internationally, a central BJP rationale for the nuclear tests was to promote the image of a powerful, resurgent and dynamic India to the world. Therefore, the tests not only defied the international community but were also about restoring national confidence and pride - India ‘believe(s) that it does not get the respect and prominence it deserves … (it) feels out of place, forced to compete in a game it does not like, following rules made up by someone else’ (Zakaria, 1998). Furthermore, for a former Indian ambassador to the US, the tests forced the world to engage with India, by showing that India was willing ‘to take on the world establishment if necessary to protect its national security interests’ (Interview B21, 2008). Challenging the world’s conception of India, forcing global engagement and clarifying India’s (previous) nuclear ambiguity were also ways to assertively implement BJP policy norms of India as a global power. Internationally, Pokhran II was therefore an ‘essential building block’ (Pant, 2005: 85) in this implementation.

Explicit realpolitik and realism driven rationales also underpinned the testing, certainly from the viewpoint of BJP strategists whereby ‘the enhancing of national power is the strategic objective of nation states’ (Pant, 2005: 85). The 1998 tests helped to sustain core Indian security identity norms of maintaining autonomy and independence but eschewed norms of idealism and, to an extent, ahisma. In particular, BJP leaders talked of enhancing India’s ‘strategic space’ (Sinha, 2003: 62), while party resolutions noted how the tests had ‘immunize(d) our country against blackmail by any hostile power’ (BJP National Executive 04.04.03a, 2005: 22). Testing also showed the prominence of the BJP’s assertive (and muscular) norm concerning India’s security practice, and a willingness to ‘do everything it takes to preserve India’ (Vajpayee, 2000: 43). The NDA continued the (pre-1998 Indian security identity) norm of being pro-nuclear disarmament, but used their acquisition of nuclear weapons as a new point of leverage (Cohen, 2002: 169) in non-proliferation debates. Controversy over the real atomic

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86 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008.
yields of the tests underpinned the general symbolic and leveraging value of Pokhran II (Perkovich, 1999: 430-5).

BJP policy norms concerning UNSC recognition also became more prominent post-Pokhran II, with a permanent seat now seen as ‘not a quest … (but) India’s rightful due’ (Singh, 2000a). The BJP believed that the 1998 tests had put India in the top tier of the global hierarchy and that existing non-proliferation structures had to be redefined (Interview B2, 2008). Furthermore, public rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons as India’s ‘due’ (MEA, 1998a) emphasized this normative perception, oft invoking - for an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official - similarities with Indira Gandhi after the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) (Interview B25, 2008). Underpinning such themes of continuity (as opposed to change), the BJP-led NDA were quick to talk of India’s nuclear heritage and the ‘same [nuclear] policy tenets that have guided us for five decades’ (Vajpayee, 1998b). Overall, according to a senior security official in the NDA, we can see some harmonization between norms within India’s security identity and BJP policy but with a presence in the latter of a stronger ideological [Hindutva] motivation (Interview B11, 2008).

BJP beliefs in an emergent and strong India were underpinned by recognition of India’s increased economic power and international significance by 1998. The BJP argued that ‘India has the strength to withstand and survive sanctions’ (BJP National Executive 21.08.98b, 2005: 27) and had discussed this point before the nuclear tests (Interview A15, 2008). In turn, not only could India withstand the pressure of sanctions, but India’s financial linkages to international corporations and other countries would protect them from complete economic isolation. Indeed, while the US and Japan issued sanctions, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom (UK) did not. Such an approach was both a new assertion of India’s strategic power and autonomy, and (according to an ex-MEA official and a strategic analyst) conversely a gamble that paid

87 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
88 Interview with a senior ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008.
89 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.
90 Interview with a BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6 2008.
off (Interview B2, 2008; Private Correspondence 1, 2009)\textsuperscript{91}. Sustained diplomacy by Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra post-Pokhran II, also enabled India’s viewpoint in all these countries (and elsewhere) to be understood. It was thus the actions of the BJP-led NDA that had changed the international (perceptual) environment, not vice versa.

**Restoring India’s Place**

With the end of the Cold War and the dwindling significance of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in the early 1990s India was regarded by one of India’s leading strategic thinkers as an outlier state without any meaningful international impact (Interview A7, 2008)\textsuperscript{92}. The BJP’s foreign policy aimed to counter such a trend by ‘integrating India into the global political and economic mainstream’ (Mishra, 2004c: 256). Pokhran II sustained these aims and mixed with other established BJP policy norms, such as protecting the Hindu Rashtra and making India a global power. Further still, the tests challenged the image of India as being ‘a low performing, badly administered state’ (Advani, 2005: 68) with a dysfunctional democracy. For security officials in the NDA, now other states had to ‘rethink about India’ (Interview B11, 2008)\textsuperscript{93} and how to engage with the state. By questioning the dominant global nuclear consensus (and being the first country to proclaim a new nuclear status since China in 1964), Pokhran II had thus ‘brought India into the global strategic mainstream’ (Athwal, 2008: 66). This result personified the assertiveness of the BJP-led NDA, leading a military observer to see the 1998 tests as a ‘paradigm shift’ (Interview B10, 2008)\textsuperscript{94} in India’s normative security practice.

High levels of Indian diplomacy also came to characterize India’s mainstream re-integration, as the BJP endeavoured to maintain their normative push to make India a global power. Thus, NDA and MEA officials began to overcome India’s regional fixation (Interview A19, 2008)\textsuperscript{95} via a policy of ‘total diplomacy’ (Sinha, 2004a: 188) with

\textsuperscript{91} Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008; private correspondence with a leading UK India expert, via email, November 30 2009.

\textsuperscript{92} Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008.

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.

\textsuperscript{94} Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22 2008.

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008.
all states. Through this approach, and the catalyst of the 1998 tests, India aimed to inculcate new and deeper relationships. An ex-MEA official and an ex-military officer also separately noted a new ranked hierarchy in Indian diplomacy, with greater attention given to the P5 powers [those with permanent vetoes in the UNSC] and second tier powers such as Japan, Australia, France, Germany and the EU (Interview B2, 2008; Interview B26, 2008\(^{96}\)). This ranking differed from the pre-1998 security identity that gave equal status to all countries, regardless of (current or potential) political and economic relations. Such developments also signaled to other states ‘that India’s strategic frontier may not be coterminous with its political borders’ (Cohen, 2002: 44) - itself a sign of its increasing international influence and reflective of the enlarged neighbourhood we witnessed in Chapter 7.

Overall, a leading Indian academic regarded the NDA as more accomplished at diplomacy than earlier governments (Interview B31, 2008\(^{97}\)), perhaps courtesy of the BJP’s entrenched policy norms for being assertive and pragmatically engaging with other countries. This success was particularly apparent at the Seattle (1999) and Doha (2001) World Trade Organization (WTO) summits, when working in multilateral combination with other BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) countries. Indian diplomacy’s new primacy also related to the BJP’s self-projection as India’s party of national security. Unlike any party (or government) before them, the BJP put foreign policy on the political agenda - regarding it as part of India’s ‘national will’ (Advani, 2005: 12) and thus made it a domestic and election issue. By seeing diplomacy as a tool to collectively achieve (core BJP) policy norms (from being a global power to protecting the Hindu Rashtra and India’s regional hegemony), for a senior NDA official, the BJP succeeded in adding a new dimension of strategic evaluation into Indian foreign policy (Interview B11, 2008)\(^{98}\).

Apart from the introduction of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the BJP-led NDA bought about other substantial

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\(^{96}\) Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17; interview with think-tank head and former Indian Army officer, Delhi, November 3 2008.

\(^{97}\) Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 7 2008.

\(^{98}\) Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.
changes to the overall organisation of Indian security’s apparatus. Thus, in 1999 the NDA carried out a comprehensive review of national security (the first since independence). This review was not only a BJP manifesto promise but also resulted in India’s first-ever integrated command and control structure for defence staff, and the co-ordination of India’s armed forces under the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Other steps included the introduction of a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) under the authority of the Prime Minister and the National Security Advisor, as well as a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) to appoint India’s Commander-in-Chief. As shown in Figure 8.1 below, the actual amount spent on military expenditure increased by 47% during the NDA. However, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) it averaged the same as the 1990s as a whole (see Figure 4.2) at 2.9% (SIPRI, 2010) - suggesting no new (forceful) spending approach (and thus continuities) from earlier Indian governments.

On August 17 1999, the NSAB unveiled India’s draft nuclear doctrine. The main elements of the doctrine were a no-first-use policy, non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, a moratorium on nuclear tests and working towards universal nuclear disarmament (Pant, 2007: 249). Conservative in nature, the doctrine displayed a commitment to using ‘strategic nuclear assets as instruments of retribution in case deterrence fails’ (Tellis, 2001: iii) rather than as tools of assertion. Observers
thus noted how ‘India’s evolving nuclear doctrine is likely to be conducive to - rather than subversive of - strategic stability in South Asia’ (Tellis, 2001: 104), reassuring the US in particular. The doctrine created the image of India as a responsible nuclear power, although for some often using a western lexicon inappropriate (or not fully understood) in the Indian context (Interview B35, 2008)\(^9\). Building upon the 1999 draft, India’s nuclear command structure was made public on January 4 2003.

8.2) - “NATURAL ALLIES”:

Emblematic of its diplomatic surge based upon a ranked hierarchy, the 1998 to 2004 NDA represented a period of heightened interaction in Indo-US relations. Apart from their residual normative distrust of outsiders (which harmonised with a norm of US distrust present in India’s security identity before 1998), the BJP were seen as being traditionally pro-American (Dixit, 2004b). This belief was based, according to an ex-MEA official, upon core BJP policy norms of a pro-capitalist leaning (Interview B1, 2008)\(^10\), as well as wanting to assert India as a global power. US dominance of the global system after the Cold War validated the potential of such a relationship, whereby the US was a necessary partner with which to achieve the BJP’s ambitions of a resurgent India. Buoyed by perceived common democratic foundations, BJP leaders saw the two countries as ‘natural allies in the quest for a better future’ (Vajpayee, 1998a).

Yet by the early 1990s, India’s strategic community had largely regarded the US as a benign power that was neither harmful nor favourable to Indian interests. Indeed, Indo-US relations were regarded as a low priority. While there had been some mutual diplomatic activity in the aftermath of the Cold War, two asymmetries were apparent - ‘anti-Americanism on the Indian side and paucity of interest in the relationship on the US side’ (Bajpai, 2006: 209). However, the nuclear tests of 1998 with their incumbent defiance of global (US-led) anti-proliferation controls ‘played a catalytic role in bringing the two democracies together’ (Mishra, 2005: 79). Despite initial sanctions there was a slow, consistent and deepening level of strategic cooperation between the two sides.
during the NDA period (for various accounts, see Das, 2005; Gaan, 2007; Ganguly et al., 2006). These developments formed part of BJP attempts to strategically lift India away from South Asia towards a greater global role, and challenged the normative basis of how India could be a great power (as per India’s pre-1998 security identity).

**American Anger and Secret Talks**

Furious at their deception by the BJP, the US’s immediate reaction to the 1998 tests was to issue new sanctions against India under the Glenn Amendment. US officials stated that “India is not going to blow its way onto the Security Council as a permanent member” (Rubin quoted in Jain, 2007: 104). Emblematic of this stance, the US supported the Chinese-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 4 1998 against proliferation in South Asia. During Clinton’s subsequent visit to China, the “Sino-US Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia” of June 27 1998 further condemned the tests and called on India (and Pakistan) to accede to the NPT. Such events roused fears in India of a Sino-US pact towards South Asia. Furthermore, Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton citing China as the reason for the test was leaked to the New York Times, insulting India’s elite (Interview B2, 2008). These factors created a ‘psychological and material fall-out in the subcontinent’ (Mansingh, 1999: 127) between India and the US.

The nuclear tests had however forced US attention onto South Asia - particularly given India’s significance as the largest military (and now nuclear) power between the US’s two major military presences in the Persian Gulf and East Asia. Likewise, Pakistan’s own tests placed the region under greater scrutiny, as did (according to a former Indian ambassador) negative US reactions to the BJP’s nationalistic and jingoistic Hindutva (Interview B21, 2008). India’s nuclear tests severely undermined the Indo-US relationship but were also the spur for serious dialogue between high-level envoys from both sides. Initiated by India, there were eight rounds of talks between two envoys (Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh) from June 12 1998, which remained unreported in the Indian and US media. Lasting eight months, it was the longest sustained dialogue

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101 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
102 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008.
between high-level Indian and American officials since 1963. The talks would ‘liberate India’s nuclear policy and American policy (towards India)’ (Athwal, 2008: 3), as well as reverse (previously harsh) Japanese and Australian attitudes towards India’s new overt status.

Against the backdrop of discussions on nuclear proliferation (with the US urging India to sign the CTBT), Kashmir, economics and the US’s sanctions that had been in place since 1974, the talks transformed a difficult relationship between the two sides into a cooperative one. In effect, for a former Indian ambassador to the US the talks prevented relations ‘from boiling over’ (Interview B21, 2008). Critically, the US accepted the new significance of India in terms of its economy, nuclear capabilities, stable democracy and large middle class. The ‘new willingness of both sides to pursue a non-ideological approach to bilateral relations opened the path to greater security cooperation’ (Ganguly, 2003), as the BJP’s realism norm superseded the idealism norm present within India’s pre-1998 security identity. Additionally, there was also an appreciation that ‘humiliating the most pro-US Indian foreign policy team in a very long time would strengthen Nehruvian arguments about US perfidy’ (Garver, 2002: 29). Here the pro-capitalist and pragmatic engagement norms within BJP policy (while dissonant with norms in India’s pre-1998 security identity) were important factors in deepening Indo-US engagement. Misgivings over US ties with China also underpinned these sentiments.

The responsible attitude of India towards its new capabilities, coupled with the Talbott / Singh talks, appeared to pay dividends during the Kargil conflict. For the first time, the US intervened in New Delhi’s favour in any Indo-Pakistani clash, telling Pakistan to withdraw its forces back over the Line of Control (LoC). While taking place to prevent any (nuclear) escalation of the conflict, such an intervention was regarded as significant by Indian observers (Dixit, 2004b: 40; Jain, 2007: 106-9). Furthermore for a senior security figure in the NDA, Clinton’s actions showed that US behaviour did not have to be against Indian interests, underlined the US’s strategic interest in India and represented a more neutral stance towards South Asia as a whole (Interview B11,

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103 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008.
Vajpayee’s restraint, shown by not retaliating against Pakistan, also made US officials “gain new respect (for India)” (Inderfurth quoted in Jain, 2007: 114). Allowing US involvement additionally indicated a willingness by the NDA to relax India’s traditional normative opposition to any internationalization of the Kashmir conflict. Continued US-Pakistan ties (particularly military aid) would however temper all these developments, especially when the US designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally during this period.

In March 2000, Clinton visited India - the first sitting US president to do so for twenty two years and the first formal state visit since Eisenhower in 1959. Through the Agreed Principles of March 21 2000, both sides resolved ‘to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship’ (Vajpayee & Clinton, 2000: 137). Thus, dialogues and forums on terrorism, Asian security, technology, trade and democracy were announced, and regular high-level summits planned between the two leaders. Overall, these actions institutionalized dialogue between India and the US, forming the basis of a nascent security architecture. Clinton’s ‘perfunctory five hour stopover in Pakistan’ (Kux, 2002) after his five day visit to India seemed to confirm Washington’s more neutral tilt in the sub-continent. Vajpayee reciprocally visited Washington in September 2000. These exchanges made India more visible on the US’s radar (Singh, 2000b), as US officials talked of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, not focusing on Kashmir and seeing India as a key global player of the 21st century (Jain, 2007: 125, 228, 117).

From Clinton to Bush

While Clinton’s engagement with India had been based upon friendship and normalisation but with core (and international system-based) benchmarks (signing the CTBT, joining the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), displaying strategic restraint and having export controls), new US President Bush had no such conditions (Hathaway, 2003: 9-11). Instead, India was now simply strategically relevant to the US - seen by some as a U-turn in US foreign policy (Interview B2, 2008105; Drezner, 2007).

104 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.

105 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
For an ex-MEA official, deepening relations were also helped by Bush’s rejection of the CTBT, fears of Pakistani nuclear proliferation via the AQ Khan network and seeing India as potentially useful against China (Interview B1, 2008)

Marking this change, US and BJP defense officials (Donald Rumsfeld and Jaswant Singh) met in April 2001 - the first such high-level meeting since 1995. In addition, new talks between Kanwal Sibal and Kenneth Juster were part of a continued effort to deal with Indo-US divergences over non-proliferation and advanced technology transfers. These complementarities all represented ways in which the BJP-led NDA could further fulfill their (and Indian security identity) policy norms of India as a global power.

India’s reaction to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on New York confirmed the importance of these norms within the security practice of the NDA government, and almost immediately their leaders offered India’s “unconditional and unambivalent” (Hathaway, 2003: 7) support. Building upon India’s own experiences of terrorism (BJP National Executive 02.11.01, 2005), the BJP recognized ‘that a decisive moment in world affairs had arrived and should be seized firmly’ (Mohan, 2002: 144). Declaring its support of the US could also help counter Pakistan’s support of terrorism and secure Indo-US relations. India’s support was ‘an unprecedented offer’ (Garver, 2002: 41), openly opportunistic and went against the decades-old security identity norms of non-alignment and anti-Americanism. In response, the US removed some of its sanctions dating from 1974. Importantly however, some Indian support (particularly to allow US bases in India) was stopped by domestic Lok Sabha opposition, revealing the limits of a new government to completely overhaul foreign policy and the residual strength of its established policy norms.

The BJP’s reaction to 9/11 served to increase cooperation and dialogue between Washington and New Delhi, as President Bush stated that “my administration is committed to developing a fundamentally different relationship with India” (quoted in Hathaway, 2003: 19). The US became more considerate of Indian sensitivities - making Indian (and BJP) officials more reassured, especially concerning terrorism (Interview

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106 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
Furthermore, as the world’s attention fixed on South Asia, India emerged as a stable country in an increasingly unstable neighbourhood. Democracy helped to seal the new security links, with Indian officials seeing the two countries as ‘twin towers of democracy’ (Sinha, 2004a: 20), while President Bush remarked ‘“a billion people in a functioning democracy … isn’t that something?”’ (quoted in Mohan, 2007: 107). In 1999, India had also become one of the ten founding members of the Community of Democracies (MEA, 2001). Norms of democratic rule in (the political source of) India’s security identity thus also helped to bolster Indo-US engagement.

While the BJP (and indeed the US government) had taken advantage of 9/11 to further their own interests, further synergies apart from terrorism and democracy became increasingly apparent. Of particular note were the BJP’s links to India’s modern, pro-capitalist, media-driven culture that contrasted with the socialist vision that the US traditionally had of India. Moral links to Israel and Taiwan as multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracies surrounded by one-party states, added to BJP views of the US ‘as less an imperialist bully than a fellow democracy and a strategic partner’ (Kaplan, 2001). The BJP had also replaced any trace of the non-alignment norm within India’s security identity with one of being unaligned, announcing its mainstream integration and newfound global importance. Overall, as a senior MEA official at the time remarked; the ‘US realized that there is no way that India could be ignored’ (Interview B32, 2008).

All of these developments additionally normalized more positive conceptions of the US in India, laying the basis for the ‘qualitative and quantitative expansion of Indo-US cooperation’ (Dixit, 2004b: 40).

Pressure for heightened Indo-US engagement also came from the US’s sizeable Indian diaspora. Indian-Americans were substantial contributors to US technology and industry, while the US-India Business Council (founded in 1975) promoted Indo-US economic links, along with the Indo-US Friendship Council. On Capitol Hill, there were large influential India caucuses in the House and the Senate, as well as an active US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC). However, a senior MEA official

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107 Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence agency], Delhi, November 6 2008.
108 Interview with a former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, November 8 2008.
stated that (despite hiring four firms (including Verner Liipfert) and former Congressmen like Stephen Solarz during the NDA) lobbying was kept to a minimum, as growing US links meant that ‘India doesn’t need to lobby’ (Interview B21, 2008)\(^{109}\). Due to their economic (pro-capitalist) status, the largely middle class Indian-American diaspora were also largely sympathetic to the BJP. *Hindutva* discourses concerning the resurgence of a strong, proud India fed into these sympathies, bolstered by media outlets such as the JAIN (Joint American Indian Network). The BJP’s introduction of dual citizenship for the diaspora underlined this relationship.

**Securing Engagement**

Public opinion surveys in 2002 reflected the new relationship, with the percentage of respondents saying the US has vital interests in India increasing from 29% to 65% since 1998, the largest increase for any country (Mishra, 2005: 81). These increases were accompanied by deepening economic links, aided according to ex-MEA officials by the NDA’s quicker implementation of economic reforms compared with previous Indian governments (Interview B1, 2008; Interview B4, 2008)\(^{110}\). India was also regarded by many US strategists as resembling China in the 1980s - ‘a giant awakening from a long economic slumber’ (Kripalani et al., 2002). Indo-US trade was “as flat as a chapatti” (Blackwill quoted in Sáez, 2003: 196) in the late 1990s and the potential mutual benefits were clear. Furthermore, the BJP saw the US as necessary for continued Indian economic growth to bolster its policy norms of India as a global power, to benefit its middle class voter base and to allow for more infrastructure and military growth. Indo-US trade nearly doubled during this period, as the US became India’s largest trading partner (see Figure 8.2 below).

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\(^{109}\) Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008.

\(^{110}\) Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008; interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
Counter-terrorism also became an area of Indo-US cooperation during the NDA. For the BJP, the 9/11 attacks on the US and those on the Indian Parliament on December 13 2001 were part of ‘one global arc of terrorism’ (Sinha, 2003: 61). Further still, according to BJP policy norms, terrorism represented an external threat to the Hindu Rashtra that prevented the creation of Akhand Bharat. On December 26 2001, the US reciprocated this perspective by putting Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba - two militant Pakistani Islamic groups that India blamed for much of the trouble in Kashmir - on its list of terrorist organisations. In turn, India gave logistical support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, including over-flight clearance, refuelling, medical assistance and berthing facilities, and escorted US warships through the Malacca Straits. Extensive Indian donations to help reconstruct Afghanistan added to the perception of India as a stable “strategic flank” against Pakistan and Afghanistan. To coordinate these efforts, over fifteen Indo-US institutional fora were established during the NDA plus several agreements signed (see Table 8.2 below). These efforts were a reversal of the anti-western norm typical of India’s pre-1998 security identity.
188

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / AGREEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>Indo-US JWG on Counter-Terrorism instituted (meets biannually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>inaugural session of the India-US Commercial Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>Indo-US General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) (on sharing information on classified technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>1st (India-US) Global Issues Forum (meets annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) instituted (for technology, space and nuclear cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (N SSP) instituted (on the “Trinity issues” of civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programmes and high technology trade plus a dialogue on missile defence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: Significant Indo-US Fora and Agreements (July 1999 - January 2004)

While the war on terrorism “transformed US-India relations” (Blackwill quoted in Kux, 2002), the convergence of mutual interests also continued militarily through numerous joint exercises. These included Indian and American paratroopers in Agra in May 2002 (Cope India-02) and the two countries’ air forces in Alaska in September/October 2002 (Geronimo Thrust). The Indian and US navies also jointly patrolled the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, escorting merchant vessels and combating piracy. Continued meetings by the Defence Policy Group (DPG), set up as part of the 1995 Agreed Minutes, also led to the institution of the Military Cooperation Group (to coordinate military exercises and exchanges), the Security Cooperation Group (to coordinate sales and licensing), and the Joint Technical Group (to coordinate Research and Development - R&D). As the US reduced its 1974 sanctions, the first Indo-US arms deals for forty years were undertaken. Pentagon officials spoke of a “diplomatic revolution” (quoted in Hathaway, 2003: 11) in military-to-military relations between the two countries, overcoming norms of US distrust present in India’s security identity.
8.3) - AN EXPANDING STRATEGIC NEIGHBOURHOOD:

Reflective of its notions of India’s extended neighbourhood, the BJP wished to expand India’s strategic reach away from the confines of South Asia. This viewpoint built upon having increased control and protection of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as well as deepening ties with South East Asia - as shown in the physical source of India’s security identity. Within the perceptual source, pre-1998 BJP policy concerning West Asia was based upon explicitly pro-Israel norms and being balanced toward the region as a whole. These norms had a degree of dissonance with those of India’s pre-1998 security identity that were initially explicitly pro-Muslim and then more balanced. Although Indo-Israeli ties had finally been established in the early 1990s, BJP leaders promised a more unambiguous relationship and according to an ex-MEA official at the time, even met Israeli leaders shortly before coming into power (Interview B1, 2008)\textsuperscript{111}. Furthermore, when Vajpayee had been Foreign Minister during the 1977-80 Janata Party government, Israel's Foreign Minister - Moshe Dayan - had secretly visited India.

The BJP-led NDA also assertively looked for non-traditional partners to bolster their normative aim of India being an emerging global power. New partners helped raise India’s international image and helped to attract greater trade levels, thus giving greater stability to India’s political and economic growth. The ranked international hierarchy that emerged during the NDA played on these instincts, as Indian diplomacy sought to improve relations with Central Asia and Iran, find new partnerships with Australia and the EU, and maintain old partners, most notably Russia. The BJP's realpolitik norm bolstered these rationales, confirming ‘India’s movement away from Nehruvian concepts of nonalignment and international moralism toward a hardheaded realism that proclaimed India’s far-ranging strategic aspirations’ (Blank, 2003: 145). In particular, greater diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific was regarded as phase two of India’s Look East policy, marking continued harmonization with the heritage of India’s pre-1998 security identity. Multi-directional engagement also amalgamated BJP policy norms of \textit{Akband Bharat} into a more perceptual than geographical conceptualization.

\textsuperscript{111} Interview with former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
Indo-Israeli Co-Dependence

Based upon oil politics, foreign remittances by Indians living in the region and a fear of alienating India’s Muslim voters, Advani argued that “India’s [pre-1998] Israel policy (had) bec(o)me captive to domestic policy and therefore an unstated veto” (Indian Express, 2000), a view supported by some ex-MEA officials (Interview B1, 2008)112. Freed from such domestic constraints and also seeing several mutual commonalities (Israel was a nuclear power outside of the NPT and CTBT, and was ruled by the religious nationalist Likud party from 2003), the BJP sought to implement its normative policy belief to have open Indo-Israeli relations. The residual anti-Muslim BJP policy norm complemented these perspectives. The BJP had ‘no hang up’ (Interview B11, 2008)113 about engaging with Israel and in September 1999 Brajesh Mishra traveled to Israel, followed in June and July 2000 by Advani and Jaswant Singh. Collectively, these visits laid the foundations for a new and ‘long-term security relationship between India and Israel at the political leadership level’ (Pradhan, 2004: 23).

Ariel Sharon became the first ever Israeli Prime Minister to visit India on September 8-10 2003, taking Indo-Israeli relations to a new high. The visit saw six agreements signed between the two countries covering the fields of environment; health co-operation; drug trafficking; visa free travel for diplomats, officials and service personnel; education; and cultural exchanges. Indian and Israeli officials also enhanced cooperation on technology and infrastructure issues; biotechnology development; telecoms; and the civilian use of outer space (Interview B5, 2008)114. Overall, the visit ‘heralded a new phase of assertive independence in India’s foreign policy, … bade farewell to past rhetoric and ideological baggage and opted for interest-driven realism’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 192). Deepening Indo-Israeli relations marked a ‘sea change in relations between the two states’ (Pant, 2004: 60), as BJP policy norms effectively challenged (and surmounted) those norms present within India’s established pre-1998 security identity.

112 Interview with former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
113 Interview with a senior national security official in the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 22 2008.
114 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.
Furthermore, the NDA was much more neutral towards West Asia, particularly concerning Israeli policy towards Palestine and Gaza. Such a foreign policy position went ‘beyond the past comprehensive alignment with the Arab world in its disputes with Israel to a long overdue even-handed approach to the region’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 328). NDA officials even noted how Israel wanted India to be its interlocutor in negotiations with Iran (Interview B14, 2008)\(^{115}\). While Congress had been responsible in the early 1990s for creating diplomatic ties in bilateral relations, under the BJP-led NDA Indo-Israeli relations were unapologetic and had ‘gathered substance’ (Kumaraswamy, 2003: 200). The BJP policy norm of explicitly pro-Israeli links was so thoroughly implemented that it replaced previous norms within India’s security identity, leading observers to conclude that the NDA had had ‘an irreversible impact’ (Interview B5, 2008)\(^{116}\) on Indo-Israeli relations. Further still, by 2004 the NDA had established a durable relationship that enjoyed widespread support in India.

This new substance was critically manifested through heightened military links and arms sales. Israel sent weapons to India during both Kargil and Operation Parakram (Pant, 2004: 65), while in 1999 there was the first ever visit by an Indian Army Chief to Israel. India’s increasingly favourable US links also helped relations, with the US green-lighting Israel’s sale of Phalcon airborne warning and control system (AWACs) to India - itself regarded as ‘a pivotal moment’ (Riedel, 2008) in Indo-Israeli relations. BJP and MEA officials noted how the US circumvented their own Congressional controls by telling Israel to trade (US-)restricted arms with India (Interview A20, 2008; Interview B1, 2008)\(^{117}\). Indo-Israeli military relations were further institutionalised during this period through the regular consultations (every six months) of their defence secretaries. By 2004, Israel was India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia, representing over $10 billion in annual trade (Athwal, 2008: 215). In turn, India’s non-military trade with Israel went up from $202 million in 1992 to $1.27 billion in 2002 (Pant, 2004: 66).

\(^{115}\) Interview with a senior national security official during the 1998-2004 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Delhi, October 23 2008.

\(^{116}\) Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.

\(^{117}\) Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008; interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15 2008.
Particularly post-9/11, counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing also became an important element in the Indo-Israeli relationship. This interaction was based on shared perceptions whereby ‘both nations saw each other as hapless victims of rising Islamic terrorism … worse, they were favoured with only limited sympathy from the international community’ (Banerjee, 2006: 249). An Indo-Israeli JWG on counter-terrorism was set up in 2000. Furthermore, Israeli’s intelligence agency (Mossad) gave Advani a demonstration of its resources during his June 2000 visit, while in October 2000 Israeli counter-terrorism experts visited Kashmir (Pradhan, 2004: 81). Both sides also shared intelligence on Pakistani militancy. Moreover, India wanted to learn determination and strength from Israeli counter-terrorism experts, in order “to produce a stock of political will and killer instinct … without which terror can only be fought without hurting the enemy” (General Mehta quoted in Banerjee, 2006: 253).

Greater Indo-US links also helped foster greater Indo-Israeli links in this period, based upon their shared ‘natural logic’ (Mishra, 2004b: 250) concerning terrorism, democracy and nuclear proliferation. In May 2003 at the American Jewish Committee (AJC), Mishra called for a “‘triadic alliance’” between the three sides (quoted in Bidwai, 2008: 89). Moreover, improved ties with Israel acted ‘as an important political and a psychological platform for India because of its enormous influence in US political and strategic affairs’ (Athwal, 2008: 215). Co-dependence was also seen to help India garner Israeli support for a permanent seat of the UNSC. Furthermore, Indian-American lobbyists helped to develop ties through their ‘growing coordination’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 329). In particular, the Indian diaspora in the US began modeling their lobbying activities on those of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) - the premier Israeli foreign policy lobbying body. All of these links further entrenched the norm of now explicit (and lasting) Indo-Israeli links into India’s security identity.

New and Improved Partnerships

BJP pragmatism and a desire to extend India’s strategic horizons in a new vision of Akhand Bharat supplemented their diplomatic efforts to raise India’s profile and status in the world. Typical of this effort, in 2002 there were forty one international summit visits at the Foreign Secretary level or above (Sinha, 2003: 80). Balance was also a core
part of this diplomacy, with an ex-MEA official noting how (for example) visits to Israel were tempered by summits in Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Interview B25, 2008)\textsuperscript{118}. Cognisant of them having the largest overseas Indian community (and being an important source of remittances), the NDA were much more active in cultivating ties with Gulf countries than previous Indian governments had been (Interview B13, 2008)\textsuperscript{119}. Closer ties with these states also drew them away from internationally supporting Pakistan, helping the BJP to isolate the latter and providing new leverage for resolving any India-Pakistan disputes. Such pragmatism was a new form of Indian diplomacy and adhered to ‘a trend that most of the great powers have adapted … (and) will be a permanent imperative’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 329).

With Iran the NDA continued to have strong diplomatic ties, and established a JWG on economic and security relations during a May 2000 visit by Jaswant Singh to Tehran. Vajpayee’s visit in April 2001 then resulted in the Tehran Declaration, which launched a strategic dialogue between the two. Common anti-Taliban, pro-Northern Alliance and anti-terrorism positions concerning Afghanistan bolstered this dialogue. January 2003 then ‘took Indo-Iranian relations to its zenith’ (Pradhan, 2004: 39), when Iran’s President Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day parade. The visit also saw the signing of the New Delhi Declaration on bilateral economic cooperation including science and technology, information technology, education and international terrorism. Then, in March 2003 there were Indian-Iranian navy engagements in the Arabian Sea, which - much to the US’s chagrin - coincided with the US greater military presence in the region prior to the invasion of Iraq. Arms sales were also discussed between the two sides, along with Iran agreeing to Indian access to Iran’s military bases in the event of war with Pakistan (Ehrari, 2003).

In turn, Central Asia was regarded as an essential part of India’s “immediate and strategic neighbourhood” (Sinha quoted in Muni & Mohan, 2004: 326). The NDA maintained Indian diplomatic initiatives taken in the early 1990s to gain a political and economic (particularly pharmaceutical) presence and to secure access to the region’s

\textsuperscript{118} Interview with a senior ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3 2008.

\textsuperscript{119} Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, October 22 2008.
natural gas and oil reserves (Joshi, 2004: 210; Sinha, 2004b). For BJP ideologues, other aims included limiting Pakistani influence, providing access to an increasingly unstable Afghanistan and advocating Indian membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Interview B27, 2008). Bilateral and trilateral agreements (often with Iran) in this period backed up these motivations, as did achieving a diplomatic presence in every Central Asian state. The first Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in Almaty on June 4 2002 solidified these links, especially the Almaty Act on combating terrorism and promoting dialogue. Central Asia was additionally seen as ‘the land bridge between India and Europe’ (Sibal, 2004a: 269). Overall, an ex-MEA official who worked in the region noted deep continuities, with ‘no ripple of change’ (Interview B7, 2008) under the BJP-led NDA.

After the post-Cold War Soviet meltdown, India’s historically close relations with Russia were revived during the NDA, confirming their established normative engagement and again marking continuities with the norms of India’s security identity. These links also fulfilled a BJP manifesto promise. Through regular high-level meetings (including the visit to India of Russian President Putin in 2000 - the first since Yeltsin in 1993), several bilateral declarations were made in this period. The most significant events, agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) are summarized in Table 8.3 below.

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120 Interview with a former head of BJP Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5 2008.
121 Established in 1996, CICA members are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Palestinian National Authority, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Observers include the United Nations (UN), the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Indonesia, Japan, Ukraine and the US.
122 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, October 20 2008.
Table 8.3: Significant Indo-Russia Agreements and MoUs (June 1998 - December 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / AGREEMENT / MoU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>nuclear reactor deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Declaration of Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>Indo-Russian Strategic Agreement / 1st China-India-Russia Trilateral Academic Conference (meets annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>Moscow Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>1st Trilateral Meeting of Foreign Ministers of India, Russia and China (meets again in September 2003, then annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Delhi Declaration / JWGs set up on Afghanistan and Combating International Terrorism / multiple MoUs (on trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, the 2000 Declaration of Strategic Partnership, cemented a shared vision of a multi-polar world and was accompanied by the largest ever Indo-Russian defense deal - amounting to over $4 billion (Ganguly & Scobell, 2005: 107). The 2002 Delhi Declaration also enshrined their shared interests in Central Asia and their close military-political relationship, all of which helped India to develop ‘a serious power projection capability’ (Blank, 2003: 145) in the region. Overall, India continued to gain a ‘strategic edge’ (Chenoy, 2008: 52) from its relationship with Russia concerning Kashmir, energy security, Central Asia and China. In 2002, the two sides signed a deal securing Indian access to natural gas in Sakhalin, and in 2003 their two navies held full-scale exercises in the IOR. All these measures aided NDA diplomacy to strengthen India’s role in the world and to extend its (global) strategic engagement.

During the NDA period, the BJP also began a second phase of the Look East Policy. This policy now ”extend(ed) from Australia to East Asia ... (and) mark(ed) a shift from trade to wider economic and security issues” (Sinha quoted in Scott, 2007: 130). The second phase drew upon India’s significant positioning in the IOR and the perceived neo-Curzonian arc of influence from the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. Such ideas played into BJP policy norms of controlling the IOR as a way to increase India’s global standing. India’s geo-political position was also increasingly important in an age of globalization. The first ever India-Australia Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi in August 2001 while in June 2003 Yashwant Sinha visited Brazil, the first ever visit by an Indian Foreign Minister. In turn, the 2003 Declaration of Brasilia created the
India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), increasing their trilateral trade and military relations. This evidence of NDA diplomatic engagement again suggested a substantiation of India’s global diplomatic presence and desired global status. For a former Minister of External Affairs, engagement with African states was however not as substantial during the NDA as under previous or latter governments (Interview B24, 2008). Relations with Japan also increased in this period and resulted in the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership of 2000 and the India-Japan Comprehensive Security Dialogue in 2002. Japan-India military-to-military consultation and deepening economic links bolstered these relations, especially in relation to China. Elsewhere, there was an intensification of India’s relations with the EU based upon ‘shared values of democracy, pluralism and liberalism’ (Sibal, 2004a: 273). These relations expanded with the first annual India-EU summit in 2000 and included shared issues such as economics, terrorism, migration, conflict resolution and global power balances. These links revolved around co-operative multi-polarity and India as one of the world’s (emergent) poles (along with the EU, Russia, China and the US). India continued to contribute to international peacekeeping, and by 2003 had sent 67,000 troops to 37 of the UN’s 56 operations (Sibal, 2004b), increasing her profile in the international community. India also set up JWG on terrorism with most major EU countries.

CONCLUSIONS

BJP policy norms affected the conduct of India’s security practice during the NDA period. The analysis of the interaction of these norms has shown both how internally-derived sources of foreign policy influence India’s security practice, and also how domestic norms are linked to international politics (rather than vice versa). These norms were domestically derived and at times expressed clear harmony and dissonance with norms established in the perceptual source of India’s security identity pre-1998. We were thus able to see how BJP norms of India as a global power and distrusting the US harmonized with similar established security identity norms. Conversely, BJP norms

123 Interview with a former Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister], Delhi, October 31 2008.
of being pro-nuclear weapons and explicitly pro-Israel and balanced (in West Asia), displayed dissonance with traditional security identity norms of nuclear ambiguity and being explicitly pro-Muslim then balanced. Concerning nuclear weapons, Indo-Israeli relations and India’s apparent ‘strategic embrace of the US’ (Bidwai, 2008: 88), core BJP policy norms surmounted (and replaced) the traditional normative behaviour typical of India’s pre-1998 security identity.

These changes were often facilitated by the BJP’s core norms of assertiveness, pragmatic engagement and making India a global power - all of which enabled the NDA to add substance to policies that had often been only embryonic prior to their arrival in power. Thus, as a senior figure in India’s strategic community commented - in asserting their established foreign policy goals, the BJP were willing to ‘pull the trigger’ (Interview B6, 2008). The BJP made explicit what had been frequently implicit under previous Congress regimes. This intent was certainly evident with the 1998 nuclear tests, which represented ‘a long-term choice and a clear break from the past’ (Ahrari, 1999: 432) and laid the basis for India’s mainstream re-integration, rising international profile, greater pro-western orientation and strategic convergence with the US. Moreover, the BJP’s general foreign policy behaviour in the security identity’s perceptual source added new elements of realism and realpolitik to India’s normative security practice. As a senior BJP figure reported, “‘one either changes the policy to suit the environment or changes the environment to suit the policy … the nuclear tests helped us change the environment’” (quoted in Nuclear Tests Helped, 2003).

Apart from influencing the practice of Indian security, we have also seen how multiple norms interact across the three sources of the security identity, confirming again that they are both interconnected and interdependent. Further still, such an analytical approach has successfully stressed the primacy of ideational over material factors, by showing that norms do influence the practice of Indian foreign policy. Indications of India’s foreign policy behaviour learning and developing were also evident during the NDA, especially in the conduct of the 1998 tests but also the broadening of India’s diplomatic relations and India’s diversifying strategic neighbourhood. Hence, with

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124 Interview with a former Chief of Army Staff in the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20 2008.
Israel the BJP were ‘willing to break new ground’ (Interview B29, 2008)\(^{125}\). In turn, for a senior Indian academic heightened Indo-US relations became ‘the new commonsense’ (Interview A17, 2008)\(^{126}\). A norm-based approach argues that these changes were because the BJP ‘embraced a very different set of intellectual precepts to guide India’s foreign and defense policies’ (Ganguly, 2003), rather than being influenced by the international system. The BJP-led NDA was proactive rather than reactive in its foreign policy.

Of further importance is that many of the changes invoked during the NDA were not dynamic changes in direction but a gear or level shift that produced acceleration along the same trajectory (Interview B3, 2008)\(^{127}\). Thus, India got closer to being a global power, became more explicit in some of its relations and acted more overtly with several of its policies. In these ways, the BJP-led NDA added substance to India’s normative security practice, introduced new characteristics and behaviour but left its core essence unchanged. Such ideas underline the primacy of India’s security identity for mitigating change but also its ability to evolve, suggesting an ongoing and organic process. Furthermore, it highlights a dynamic synergy in India’s security practice that is absorptive of multiple normative influences from across India’s domestic political spectrum. The next chapter will collate the impact of the BJP on each of the sources of India’s security identity, and assess the long-term effect of these impacts. This assessment will be achieved by analyzing India’s security practice (and hence security identity) during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments that succeeded the NDA in 2004.

\(^{125}\) Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence agency], Delhi, November 6 2008; interview with a senior journalist, Delhi, October 21 2008.

\(^{126}\) Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008.

\(^{127}\) Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
Chapter 9:

‘Aftermath:
2004, 2009 and the Evolution of India’s Security Identity’

‘Atalji’s tenure is an era of statesmanship, stability and development … it marks the evolution of India as a global force, an economic power, a crucial diplomatic player and a nuclear power’

(BJP National Executive 04.04.03a, 2005: 20)

‘we will maintain our tradition of an independent foreign policy, built on a national consensus and based on our supreme national interests’

(Singh [Manmohan], 2004a)

‘India’s approach to the world is naturally a function of our values, civilisational heritage, historical experience, and geography’

(Mukherjee, 2008)

There were distinct examples of normative continuity, contestation and change within India’s security identity during the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1998 to 2004. But did the BJP-led NDA result in lasting developments concerning how Indian security is practiced? Here, I analyse the period after the NDA left power in 2004 to assess whether or not the BJP had an enduring impact on the nature, consistency and underlying normative basis of India’s security identity. As the post-2004 period saw the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) victorious in two Lok Sabha elections in 2004 and 2009, such an approach is well suited to these aims. My analysis also helps us to assess the role that the BJP-led NDA played in the development, substantiation and evolution of India’s security practice. These themes are particularly apparent when investigating how emergent trends in India’s pre-1998 security identity (such as communalism and realpolitik) became established, entrenched and thus normalized during the NDA and beyond.
To aid my analysis of the post-2004 period, I use three groupings (harmonized continuities, contested dissonances and substantive changes) to highlight the impact of the 1998 to 2004 NDA on the entrenched pre-1998 norms underpinning India’s security identity. Harmonized continuities mark where the norms from India’s pre-1998 security identity and from pre-1998 BJP policy coalesced and effectively combined into shared, common norms. Contested dissonances show where the norms from India’s pre-1998 security identity and those of BJP policy pre-1998 remained dichotomous, underlining entrenched normative differences. Finally, substantive changes represent where pre-1998 BJP norms replaced norms from India’s pre-1998 security identity, essentially reorienting its normative basis. Collectively, the harmonized continuities show normative consensus between India’s security identity and BJP policy norms; the contested dissonances show where the BJP-led NDA challenged but was constrained by existing security identity norms; and the substantive changes indicate where the BJP significantly altered how India conducts its security practice. After an initial prognosis, I investigate if the norms in each of these groupings remained in place during the Congress-dominated UPA governments from 2004 onwards.

9.1) RE-ARRANGING THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE:

The interaction of norms between those of India’s pre-1998 security identity and pre-1998 BJP policy norms resulted in discernible harmonization, dissonance and change during the BJP-led NDA from 1998 to 2004. As shown by Figure 9.1 below, harmonized continuities were present concerning *swadeshi*, as pre-1998 security identity and BJP norms combined through a shared focus on the diplomatic saliency of continued Indian economic growth via gradual liberalization and calibrated globalization.
Figure 9.1: The Political Source of India’s 1998-2004 Security Identity

Shared norms concerning anti-militancy also effectively combined by portraying militancy as stemming from both internal and external sources, as the BJP successfully emphasized Pakistan’s role but domestic threats from Naxalism and separatists continued. Clear contested dissonances were present with pre-1998 norms of equality / tolerance and secularism / plurality being pitted against the BJP’s cultural nationalism and positive secularism. Although these BJP norms gained pre-eminence during the NDA as the party promoted its Sangh Parivar supporters, this normalization appeared to be heavily dependent upon the BJP being in power, and thus seemed likely to be overturned in the event of an electoral defeat. These norms displayed the highest degree of dissonance with those of India’s security identity during the NDA.

Figure 9.1 also appears to highlight three important substantive changes. Firstly, the pre-1998 norm of (socialist) democracy was replaced by a norm of (multi-faceted)
Democracy. As such, the NDA established the BJP’s political legitimacy as they served a full term in office and hence reoriented Indian democracy away from its socialist roots to something more multi-faceted and composite. Secondly, the pre-1998 anti-communal norm was replaced by a communal norm, although not in a specifically anti-Muslim or anti-Christian manner. This replacement occurred because the BJP legitimized communal politics through the NDA, inspiring what had been a nascent trend before 1998 to become a core norm within India’s security identity. Finally, the BJP-led NDA added a new norm to the political source of India’s security identity - that of making foreign policy an election issue. As the foremost concern in their own manifestoes since the 1960s, during the NDA foreign policy became of vital significance to India’s domestic electoral politics. In the following three sections, I analyse whether each of these substantive changes continued their new normative function in India’s security identity in the post-NDA era.

**Democracy Redefined**

Despite predictions from the majority of India’s political analysts of a guaranteed renewed mandate, and being ‘poised for a great leap forward’ (BJP National Executive 11.01.04, 2005: 208) the BJP lost the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. As Table 9.1 below shows, Congress significantly ameliorated their 1999 election performance by gaining 31 seats while the BJP lost 44.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>SEATS WON</th>
<th>NATIONAL VOTE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>CONGRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 9.1: BJP and Congress Lok Sabha General Election Results (1999-2009)*

( Electoral Commission India, 2010)

From this basis Congress went on to form the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with 11 coalition partners. To gain a majority, the UPA became dependent on the support of the Left Front (consisting of 4 Communist parties) and made Manmohan Singh India’s new Prime Minister. The comparative strength of the UPA and NDA in 2004 is shown in Table 9.2 below.
Table 9.2: NDA and UPA Lok Sabha General Election Results (1999-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION</th>
<th>SEATS WON</th>
<th>NATIONAL VOTE (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>UPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BJP’s loss was partly ascribed to the failure of the NDA’s “India Shining” campaign, which led to a polarization of rich and poor voters (Thornton & Thornton, 2006: 406). More voters were also concerned with their immediate water, road, electricity and job needs rather than with the BJP’s emphasis on India’s economic growth that mainly benefited the middle classes (Varshney, 2007). The rise of low-caste parties (such as the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party) was also of importance, as was voter backlash concerning the Gujarat pogroms of 2002. Within the Sangh Parivar, activists cited the neglect of core Hindutva ideology as the cause of the defeat, ideological dilution due to coalition demands and leadership differences between Advani and Vajpayee (Jaffrelot, 2005; Shastri et al., 2009).

As Tables 9.1 and 9.2 also show, these trends were compounded in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections with the BJP losing a further 22 seats, while Congress gained 61 - figures that corresponded to the respective losses and gains for the NDA and UPA. With 262 seats, the UPA were only 10 seats away from a majority and gained the seats of several low-caste parties to renew their mandate. In addition, analysts noted how the rise of caste-based politics fragmenting the BJP’s voter base, as did the emergence of the Third Front of mainly Communist parties. Despite their loss, the influence of the 1998-2004 BJP-led NDA was important concerning the 2004 and 2009 results as it had proved the political legitimacy of a non-Congress-dominated coalition, which then validated future political possibilities for other groupings in Indian politics. The BJP thus redefined the nature of Indian democracy away from a norm of (socialist) democracy to (multifaceted) democracy. While Congress almost reversed the coalition trend in India politics present since the 1980s, in 2009 Indian democracy had matured into an entity

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128 These seats came from the Janata Dal (Secular), the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party plus several other independent candidates.
consisting of multiple parties, a maturation which redefined the traditional normative basis of Indian democracy.

**Communalism Entrenched**

The BJP’s political rise and political validation through the 1998 to 2004 NDA resulted in a further substantive normative change whereby the pre-1998 security identity’s anti-communal norm was replaced by a communal one. Thus, something that had been a trend before 1998 became legitimized by a communal party (the BJP) as they entered India’s political mainstream and served a full term in government. As a leading intellectual noted, post-2004 there has been a ‘normalization of the BJP and its way of thinking’ (Interview A17, 2008)\(^{129}\), particularly concerning India’s growing media-influenced middle class and India’s continued neo-liberal economic growth. Congress attempts to attract such voters compounded this shift, as it effectively plays ‘a paler version of saffronised politics’ (Vanaik, 2002: 341). If one also accepts that the BJP’s contribution to Indian politics has been a hatred of Muslims, Islamic parties and Pakistan (Interview A11, 2008)\(^{130}\), then the previous anti-communal norm is even more redundant. In this way, the electoral rise of Hindu nationalism ‘altered the balance of power between Hindus and Muslims that had persisted since Partition’ (Nasr, 2005: 193), by providing a communal-orientated political grouping capable of successfully countering Congress’ secular and inclusive heritage.

Furthermore, the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA allowed those groups associated with it to firmly establish their political positions. Thus, Sangh Parivar activists spread their influence through the national and local institutions of government across India. In particular, Jaffrelot noted how “the saffronisation of the state and society has made progress in the last 15 years … the Hindu Rashtra is in the making along the societal lines the RSS has always valued” (quoted in *The Times of India*, 2009). Through their active discrimination against Muslims, Christians (in particular Sonia Gandhi on account of her

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\(^{129}\) Interview with a leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7 2008; interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008. Please refer to the Primary Sources in the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.

\(^{130}\) Interview with a leading think-tank head, Delhi, May 5 2008.
Italian roots - see Naithini, 2008; Interview B39, 2008\textsuperscript{131} and the lower castes (themselves becoming a bigger target in light of their electoral success), these groups entrenched the shift from an anti-communal to communal norm in India’s security identity. Pankaj Mishra, a leading Indian intellectual, describes how this development has “infected India’s state and civil society with illiberalism” (quoted in Outlook, 2008). The involvement of Sangh Parivar activists in domestic terrorism against Muslims in 2008 (and potentially earlier) further compounds this perspective (Marpakwar & Hafeez, 2008).

Foreign Policy becomes Critical to Electoral Politics

A new norm was also inculcated in India’s security identity during the NDA; that of making foreign policy critical to electoral politics. BJP policy norms concerning making India strong, focusing on India’s economic growth, the 1998 nuclear tests and linking outside forces (primarily Pakistan) to India’s domestic terrorism, bought foreign policy into India’s domestic politics (Interview B1, 2008)\textsuperscript{132}. The BJP-led NDA also portrayed itself as the party of national security (BJP National Executive 22.06.04, 2005: 6), and gained (domestic and international) plaudits for the Pokhran II nuclear tests and its refusal to have a ceasefire during the 1999 Kargil war until Pakistan withdrew from Indian territory (Interview B3, 2008)\textsuperscript{133}. Direct links between the 1998 nuclear tests and India’s subsequently improved global (especially US) relations, along with a greater focus on economic growth, transformed India’s foreign and domestic policy debates (Mohan, 2003). The UPA maintained the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the position of National Security Advisor\textsuperscript{134}.

In addition, economics played an increasingly important role in foreign policy calculation, especially concerning energy security, with India looking likely to become

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with a BJP activist, Bhopal, November 30 2008.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with a senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17 2008.
\textsuperscript{134} After Brajesh Mishra, J N Dixit was National Security Advisor from May 27 2004 until his death on 25 January 2005. He was succeeded by M K Narayanan who served until 24 January 2010. The present incumbent is Shiv Shankar Menon.
the world’s third largest energy consumer by 2030 (Dormandy, 2007: 122). The growth of India’s middle class since the mid-1990s also necessitated this new importance and confirmed the elevated primacy of foreign policy issues in the domestic political realm. The establishment of the new norm of foreign policy as a domestic political issue was thus underlined after 2004 by India’s continued economic growth (see Figure 9.2 below), which averaged 8.49% from 2004 to 2008 and outstripped the annual average of 6.16% from 1993 to 2004 (see Figures 4.1 and 6.2).

![Figure 9.2: Annual Indian GDP Growth (2005-2008)](World Bank, 2010)

The presence and significance of this new norm in India’s security identity was clearly shown during the summer of 2008 when the Communists withdrew their support for the UPA coalition in response to the government’s support of a nuclear deal with the US. Here what was regarded as an international imperative for India impinged on the UPA’s domestic position and threatened to topple the government. Such events also show how the Congress-led UPA continued the BJP’s policy of effectively co-joining India’s foreign and domestic politics. Collectively, this new norm was contiguous with India’s emergence as a global player - something which figures prominently in the other substantive normative changes that occurred in the further two sources of India’s security identity.

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135 Figures for 2009 not available at time of writing.
9.2) ASSERTING INDIA REGIONALLY:

Within the physical source of India’s security identity, the BJP-led NDA government showed a degree of norm continuity and change (but little contestation) with pre-1998 Indian security identity norms. As shown in Figure 9.3 below, the interaction of pre-1998 security identity and pre-1998 BJP policy norms resulted in several harmonized continuities during the NDA but few substantive changes.

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**Figure 9.3: The Physical Source of India’s 1998-2004 Security Identity**

Several of the competing norms between the BJP and India’s security identity prior to 1998 resulted in clear harmonized continuities during the BJP-led NDA. Thus, norms concerning India’s regional position in South Asia (regional hegemon - reciprocity then benevolence and natural regional hegemon) became shared, as did the NDA’s position on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) - as tacit IOR dominance harmonized with control / protect the IOR. We also saw how the normative cycle of conflict, negotiation and
suspicion, which was typical of India’s relations with Pakistan prior to 1998, continue under the BJP-led NDA and combine with the BJP’s policy norm of protecting the Hindu Rashtra. This last combination came about as the BJP saw protecting the Hindu Rashtra in terms of providing India with greater regional stability, greater economic growth and a less Pakistan-centric policy, rather than as a geographical goal.

This understanding towards Pakistan impacted upon the BJP’s explicit policy norm of regaining Kashmir, as it effectively harmonised with the pre-1998 security identity norm of “accepting” the Line of Control (LoC). While surprising, this norm was de-emphasized by the BJP in its attempts at a peace agreement with Pakistan, and was highly influenced by their need to present India as a responsible power (especially during Kargil in 1999 and Operation Parakram from 2001-2). The NDA coalition also prevented the BJP from pursued this norm either politically or constitutionally. The NDA period additionally displayed evidence of substantive change, as pre-1998 security identity norms concerning continued territorial threats from Pakistan and China were replaced by a norm of pragmatic engagement, whereby for the BJP ‘peace with China, peace with Pakistan were … essential’ (Interview A20, 2008). Other core BJP foreign policy norms substantiated this approach as being assertive / proactive and making India into a global player came to characterize and dominate how the NDA conducted its regional relations. In the following sections, I analyse whether these substantive normative changes continued to dictate India’s regional security practice in the post-NDA era.

**Edging Towards Normalcy**

When the BJP-led NDA left office in May 2004 India-Pakistan relations were on an upswing, with Pakistan publicly committing to stop terrorism through the Islamabad Declaration of January 2004, and promising further peace talks with India in June 2004. Ceasefires, peace talks and fair elections had also helped to ease violence in Kashmir, and personified the assertive and proactive diplomacy of the BJP. More importantly, this improvement was sustained under the successor UPA government, and shortly after they came to power President Musharaff dropped demands for a plebiscite and

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136 Interview with a senior analyst in the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, May 9 2008.
‘abandoned what had been the core of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy for more than fifty years’ (Luce, 2006: 234). The November 2003 LoC ceasefire also held, both sides reduced the number of troops on their shared border and the Composite Dialogue continued, along with negotiations on a planned Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. These events improved relations through the multi-pronged (non-Kashmir-specific) diplomacy established by the BJP-led NDA, and as an ex-MEA official noted, reversed a trend that had ‘deformed Indian foreign policy’ (Interview B35, 2008).

India-Pakistan relations continued to improve during the first UPA government - the major agreements and events of which are shown in Table 9.3 below. More regular visits (such as Musharraf’s to Delhi in April 2005) and more frequent meetings (often on the sidelines of multi-lateral meetings) by the two states’ leaders also helped to improve relations. In turn, between 2003 and 2007, trade between the two countries increased from $200 million to $1.6 billion (Zaman, 2008), and from 2004 to 2008 the number of people traveling between the two countries increased twenty-fold (Kumar, 2008: 9).

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137 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 10 2008.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / AGREEMENT</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>first meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Study Group (JSG) on Trade and Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>bus line between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad re-established (for the first time since 1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>after a 7.6 Richter scale earthquake, the LoC is opened at 5 points to facilitate humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>mutual ceasefire declared in the Siachen region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>India renews high-level contact with moderate leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Agreement to open the LoC to trade through a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad truck service &amp; a second bus service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>Mumbai bomb attacks (India accuses Pakistan of complicity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>India-Pakistan Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism set up as Musharaff and Singh meet at NAM in Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>Baglihar dam dispute settled (after 25 years &amp; in favour of India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>Agreement signed to reduce risk of accidental nuclear war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>first Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Pakistan admits responsibility for all wars with India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>Mumbai bomb attacks (India accuses Pakistan of complicity - peace process “paused” by India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Pakistan charges 7 men with the 2008 Mumbai attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.3: Significant India-Pakistan Agreements / Events (January 2005 - November 2009)

Back-channel talks structured by feasible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) progressed so well that by 2005-06 the Pakistani government ended its support for armed groups operating against India. Although not always sustained, talks with both Pakistan and Kashmiri militants, resulted in a steady decline in violence (Kronstadt, 2008: 65-66), as the two sides edged towards normalcy in their relations. While not as coercive as the BJP-led NDA (for example after the December 13 2001 Indian Parliament attacks), the UPA accepted the NDA’s policy position towards Pakistan (Interview A13, 2008; Interview A14, 2008). In turn, the UPA did not shirk from publicly condemning Pakistan complicity concerning terrorism in India (thus confirming the UPA’s acceptance of the harmonized norm of anti-militancy (as internal and external)). These perspectives married with that of a BJP official who stated that ‘you may not become friends but you can at least try … unless you have peace on your borders you can’t have the right basis for economic development’ (Interview A20,

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138 Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008; interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
The UPA had thus continued the ‘logic of Vajpayee’ (Mohan, 2005: 280) concerning Pakistan. They also underlined the UPA’s desire to bolster India as a global power, again reflecting how a core BJP norm had become prominently established into India’s post-NDA security identity.

**Embracing Rapprochement**

Building upon what analysts saw as an ‘Indo-Chinese rapprochement’ (Kundu, 2005: 230) under the NDA, the new UPA government continued with the norm of pragmatic engagement towards China within India’s security identity. Mainly focusing upon economics, maintaining parity in South Asia and de-emphasising their border issues, the Congress-led UPA ‘converged on an approximately similar China policy … (of) engaged balance’ (Zhang, 2006: 95; Interview A13, 2008\(^{139}\)). This policy compounded the normative presence of a pragmatic policy towards China, and embraced a relationship that had become of growing importance under the BJP-led NDA. Of particular significance was the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement of April 2005, reflecting for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) ‘the consensus that bilateral relations transcend bilateral issues and have acquired a global and strategic perspective’ (MEA, 2009). During this visit, Chinese Premier Wen replicated statements made during the NDA that Sikkim is ”an inalienable part of India” (quoted in Singh, 2005b). Table 9.4 lists the major Agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) between the two states in the post-NDA period.

\(^{139}\) Interview with a senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9 2008.
\(^{140}\) Interview with a senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6 2008.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AGREEMENT / MoUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Signing of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity &amp; the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (first-ever on border issues) / India-China Joint Economic Group set up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>India-China Energy Dialogue initiated (repeated in 2007), MoU signed to enhance Cooperation on Oil and Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>China-India Free Trade Area (FTA) ratified (on disputed border)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>MoU signed on strengthening relations and co-operation between the Indian and Chinese parliaments / Nathula Pass opened (closed since the 1962 war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>Joint Declaration on intensifying co-operation (especially concerning energy security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>First annual Defence Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>First joint military training exercise (in Kunming, China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>Shared Vision for the 21st Century joint document released, includes joint global economic strategy (including common action at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), on regional climate change, and on civil nuclear energy cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>Joint counter-terrorism exercises (in Belgaum, India)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.4: Significant India-China Agreements / MoUs (April 2005 - December 2008)

Regular state visits also bolstered relations, in particular by Chinese President Hu Jintao in November 2006 - the first by a Chinese President in 10 years, and by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in November 2008. Against a background of rapid mutual economic growth, analysts began to talk of “Chindia” (Gandhi, 2007; Rahman & Andreu, 2006; Ramesh, 2005; Tan, 2008). India-China trade figures from 2004 to 2008 can be seen in Figure 9.4 below.
These discourses were bolstered by instances of joint India-China cooperation in multinational fora (Godemont et al., 2009: 2; Grant, 2008; Uberoi, 2008), joint military exercises (including Chinese troops in India for the first time since 1962) and collaboration on energy security and climate change. With this growing interdependence, India’s leaders declared there to be a ‘harmony of civilisations’ (Gandhi, 2007) between India and China. In turn, China’s Hu Jintao noted how “China-India bilateral ties are now on a fast track” (quoted in Ruisheng, 2008: 58). Issues still remained however concerning border issues - referred to by a senior Indian security figure as Beijing’s ‘cartographic games’ (Interview, B29, 2008), the Dalai Lama and Tibet, Chinese criticism over the Indo-US nuclear deal and China’s alleged “string of pearls” strategy to encircle the Indian landmass.

**Persistent Regional Domination**

Reflective of the shared norms held prior to 1998 by India’s security identity and BJP policy, which then harmonized during the BJP-led NDA, the UPA continued to regard India as South Asia’s natural hegemon and as the dominant force in the IOR. Concerning India’s neighbours in South Asia, the UPA enhanced relations through

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141 Figures for 2009 were not available at time of writing.
142 Interview with a former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) [India’s external intelligence agency], Delhi, November 6 2008.
greater bilateral trade - referred to by an ex-MEA official as ‘economic connectivity’ (Interview B28, 2008)\(^{143}\), as well as energy co-operation with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (Dutta, 2008a). Such measures were seen by many as a way to improve regional stability (Misra, 2008; Sikri, 2007; Thapur, 2008). With Myanmar, observers noted how the UPA upheld the BJP-led NDA’s ‘new priorities’ (Lall, 2006: 424), especially concerning military ties, economic aid and arms sales. In particular, India signed a series of MoUs on accessing Myanmar’s gas and oil reserves, hydroelectric power and stabilising India’s northeast (see Lall, 2008a: 20-30). In September 2007, New Delhi refused to criticize Yangon’s crackdown on democracy protesters. These developments comprehensively stepped up Indo-Myanmar relations as initiated under the NDA, and reflected the acceptance of new BJP policy norms of pragmatism and realism within the physical source of India’s security identity.

Beyond South Asia, the “Look East” policy became more entrenched as the UPA heightened India’s interaction in the region. Significant events included continued MGC and BCIM meetings and in July 2004 the first BIMSTEC Conference\(^{144}\), as well as India attending the first East Asian Summit\(^{145}\) in November 2005. August 2009 saw the signing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India Free Trade Agreement. For analysts, these developments indicated how India’s “Look East” policy had become ‘institutionalized’ (Limaye, 2005: 157). The UPA also continued to see India’s ‘strategic footprint as a “super regional power”’ (Singh quoted in Zhao, 2007: 138) in the IOR, and helped with humanitarian aid after the December 2005 tsunami and from autumn 2008 protected trade routes from Somali piracy\(^{146}\). From 2004 onwards, Indian navy vessels conducted bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US, China, Japan and Russia, as well as most of the South East Asian states. In 2005 India set up the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which in 2008 became a joint command centre for all three of its armed services. In

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\(^{143}\) Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, November 5 2008.

\(^{144}\) MGC - Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Forum; BCIM - Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar; BIMSTEC - Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

\(^{145}\) The East Asia Summit (EAS) consists of the 10 countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

\(^{146}\) India also joined the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a regional initiative to enhance cooperation against piracy, as well as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
April/May 2007, the Indian Navy participated in exercises in the western Pacific, while in June 2009 it was deployed for the first time in the Atlantic Ocean.

9.3) - CONFIRMING INDIA’S NEW INTERNATIONAL STATUS:

It is within the perceptual source that we see the highest number of substantive changes during the BJP-led NDA from the pre-1998 Indian security identity norms. Although there were two harmonized continuities; great power aspiration with global power / UNSC and autonomy with assertive (whereby the NDA were far more proactive in declaring India’s international independence, for example with Pokhran II), the BJP appeared to have a fundamental effect on India’s security identity. This effect is shown in Figure 9.5 below.

Figure 9.5: The Perceptual Source of India's 1998-2004 Security Identity
Substantive changes were in evidence throughout the perceptual source. Change was most clearly seen via the 1998 nuclear tests whereby the pre-1998 security identity norm of nuclear ambiguity was replaced by one of being pro-nuclear weapons (or which through its overtness could be referred to as nuclear certainty). In West Asia, the BJP norm of being pro-Israel and balanced replaced the pre-1998 security identity norm of being pro-Muslim then balanced, and represented the evolution of what had been a growing trend in the 1990s into an established guiding principle. The BJP-led NDA also inculcated much closer Indo-US relations, as norms of distrust / pro-capitalism replaced that of pure distrust and anti-western sentiments. Finally, pre-1998 security identity norms of ahisma / idealism / non-alignment appeared to be replaced by BJP norms of realpolitik / realism. Reflective of these trends, the NDA’s National Security Advisor stated how “India [now] takes decisions on the basis of national interest and no longer unquestioningly accepts the doctrines of non-violence and non-alignment” (quoted in Arora, 2005: 319).

As we saw with the physical source, what was critical during the BJP-led NDA was a general ascendancy of core BJP norms into India’s security practice, whereby being proactive and pragmatic came to dictate foreign policy through the lens of making India a global power (Arora, 2005: 319; Interview, B4, 2008). It was these norms that were collectively central to improved relations with the US, the 1998 nuclear tests and India’s turn towards multi-directional diplomacy. The BJP-led NDA bought ‘context and substance’ (Kumar, 2008: 1) to the security principles of their predecessors, as Indian foreign policy resolutely moved from (Nehruvian) idealism to pragmatism and practical calculus. Perceived by some analysts as part of something irreversible (see “crossing the Rubicon” - Mohan, 2003), the BJP-led NDA appeared to have produced a gear shift in India’s security practice. Most critically, they ‘radically transformed India’s strategic status in the international community … (and) consolidated the new orientations in India’s foreign policy’ (Dixit, 2004b: 257). The following three sections assess whether these transformations remained in place under the UPA government in the post-NDA period.

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147 Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
Indo-US Relations Transformed

The UPA continued to deepen Indo-US diplomatic, economic and military interaction, based upon a ‘consensus between the Congress Party and … the BJP that US-Indian relations will be one of the central pillars of India’s foreign policy’ (Gwertzman, 2008; Interview B1, 2008; Interview B4, 2008). In turn, US officials accepted ‘India’s exceptionalism’ (Mohan, 2008: 143), a trend which also continued under new US President Obama from 2008. Cooperation continued to focus on counter-terrorism training (especially after the 2006 Mumbai bomb blasts) and military exercises. These links included naval exercises, such as the 2007 India’s newly-formed “Quadrilateral Initiative” with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore. US arms sales to India also increased throughout the post-NDA period, and included warships and Hercules military transport aircraft (Kronstadt, 2008: 150). The pro-capitalist (and non-anti-western) norms of the BJP influenced deeper Indo-US relations (Interview B21, 2008) and their trade levels rose substantially from 2004 to 2009 (see Figure 9.6 below).

![Figure 9.6: Indo-US Trade Figures (2004-2009)](US Census Bureau, 2010)

A critical part of the new India-US relationship concerned India’s nuclear capabilities. Under the 2005 joint US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation announcement, India

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148 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008; interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.

149 Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27 2008.
agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This agreement gave India *de facto* nuclear recognition. After being passed by the US Congress, it was then blocked from scrutiny in the Indian Parliament (after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh survived a non-confidence vote in July 2008). The IAEA then approved the safeguards agreement with India, and in September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted India a waiver to give her access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries - developments that effectively allowed India to sidestep the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In October 2008, the deal was legislated by the US, ending sanctions that dated from 1974.

The Indian diaspora influenced the nuclear debates (Kirk, 2008) as the UPA completed a process that had begun under the NDA (Interview B1, 2008)\(^{150}\). This process was not without its critics, especially concerning a perceived reduction in India’s strategic autonomy concerning Iran, China and Pakistan, and its views on a multi-polar world (Carter, 2006; Mehta, 2006: 157). Close Indo-US relations did however become an established norm within India’s security identity, signaling the formation of a new consensus within India’s strategic community (Interview B24, 2008)\(^{151}\). Conversely, commentators noted the ‘unprecedented’ (Sikri, 2007: 37) lobbying by the US for the nuclear deal with India, confirming the new mutual importance of this relationship. Overall, and as Shiv Shankar Menon\(^{152}\) commented, the improved India-US partnership had a transformational and “positive effect … on our dealings with the rest of the world” (quoted in Kumar, 2006: 27).

Analysts have also noted how India’s greater proximity to the US could also help India-Pakistan relations (Mohan, 2008: 143) and aid India’s long-term UNSC ambitions (Kirk, 2008: 298). That this tilt towards the US continued under a Congress-led UPA (the same Congress who had inspired non-alignment and inculcated anti-Western sentiments since India’s independence), firmly indicated ‘the structural shift in New Delhi’s

\(^{150}\) Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008.

\(^{151}\) Interview with a former Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister], Delhi, October 31 2008.

\(^{152}\) The Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister] from September 1 2006 to July 31 2009.
worldview’ (Mohan, 2007: 152). The various Joint Working Group (JWGs) instituted under the NDA also continued during the UPA. Residual distrust still remains within India’s security identity however, especially concerning US policy towards Pakistan.

### Nuclear Weapons and Elevated Prestige

The Pokhran II tests represented an irreversible development under the BJP-led NDA which pushed India onto the world stage and surmounted the norm of nuclear ambiguity that had been a core part of India’s security identity since 1947 (Gupta, 2007; Mohan, 2008). The tests thus ‘repositioned India in the global scenario … as a strategic power’ (Singh, 2008). Just by purely testing (Interview A11, 2008)\(^\text{153}\), the BJP-led NDA produced a fundamental evolution in India’s relations with the world, a change that the UPA were unable (and unwilling) to overturn. While some observers regarded the tests as being based upon a ‘post-dated image of a major power’ (Interview B31, 2008)\(^\text{154}\), they irrevocably changed India’s international image as a moralistic and ex-colonial state (see Gordon, 1995: 337; Kumar, 2006: 26). Instead, as India became a rising power able to influence international discourses, the new core security identity norm of nuclear transparency came to dictate its ‘foreign policy formulation’ (Lall, 2008b, 46). As Manmohan Singh stated, ‘“[n]othing will be done that will compromise, dilute, or cast a shadow on India’s full autonomy in the management of its security”’ (quoted in Dormandy, 2007: 126). In turn, Indian calls for universal nuclear disarmament lost their pre-1998 moral and idealistic legitimacy and have been surmounted by the new norm of nuclear transparency. Indeed, Manmohan Singh remarked how (India’s) international relations are ‘based on realpolitik, not on sentiment, … (they) are not a morality play’ (Singh, 2005a).

Through the 1998 tests and the subsequent rapid developments in Indo-US relations, under the UPA India become a de jure nuclear state despite being outside of international proliferation controls - all of which gave it a unique international status. India’s domestic nuclear energy programme also benefited from the 1998 tests, as a decade later it had surmounted the international safeguards that had at one time restricted India.

\(^{153}\) Interview with a leading think-tank head, Delhi, May 5 2008.
\(^{154}\) Interview with a leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 7 2008.
Aiding India’s continued economic growth and energy security, the signing of civilian nuclear agreements with the US, France and Russia confirmed the success of this trajectory and firmly placed India in the group of established nuclear powers. Under the UPA, India’s military forces also completed their “nuclear triad” and gained the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, air and sea. This ability put India on a par with the US, Russia and China, and with the latter made her a clear strategic rival. India’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased in the post-NDA period (from 2.9% in 2004 to 2.5% in 2007 - SIPRI, 2010), although it increased in actual dollar terms by 14% (see Figure 9.7 below).

![Figure 9.7: Indian Military Expenditure, Excluding Nuclear (2004-2008)](SIPRI, 2010)

These rises were significant lower than during the BJP-led NDA, which practically doubled military expenditure (see Figure 8.2). Such figures suggest a purposeful limiting of military expenditure by the UPA, although they were probably aided by no lengthy large troop deployments (such as Operation Parakram). India was however still the world’s leading arms purchaser from 1999 to 2006 (Kronstadt, 2008: 46). This increased expenditure also led to advances in space technology and in November 2007 India established an aerospace command. The subsequent simultaneous launch of a satellite and eight foreign nano-satellites in 2008 put ‘India on a par with top international space agencies’ (Tata, 2008: 24). Such technology can be used against

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155 Figures for 2009 were not available at the time of writing.
Naxalites and other terrorists, has a potential weaponization capability and via international collaboration is a source of economic revenue and prestige (Dilley, 2008; Mohan, V., 2008). In turn, for Indian observers, the technical achievement of India’s October 2 2008 Chandrayann moon mission ‘elevated India’s place in the world’ (Laxman, 2008: 15).

**Multi-Pronged Diplomacy**

Building upon India’s elevating international status, the UPA continued the BJP-led NDA’s multi-directional diplomacy. Aimed at achieving an ongoing extension of India’s strategic neighbourhood, the UPA wanted India to play a more active role on the world stage with a ‘commensurate expansion of responsibility … (in) the international system as a whole’ (Vijayalakshmi, 2008: 210). Again, the UPA sustained norms in India’s security identity from the BJP-led NDA of being assertive, proactive and pragmatic - behaviour aimed at giving India ‘unprecedented strategic flexibility’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004: 332). An ex-MEA official also noted a greater degree of synchronization during the UPA between India’s trade and foreign ministries, something that had started to improve during the NDA (Interview B2, 2008).

The NDA’s hierarchical approach to diplomacy also continued, as shown by the chief guests at India’s annual Republic Day parade that reflected India’s 21st century strategic interests (see Table 9.5 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GUEST</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>King Jigme Singye Wangchuk</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz al-Saud</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>President Vladimir Putin</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>President Nicholas Sarkozy</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>President Nursultan Nazarbeyev</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9.5: Chief Guests at India’s Republic Day Parade (2005-2009)**

The UPA continued close Indo-Israeli relations that had become a core norm in India’s security identity during the BJP-led NDA. Thus, the post-NDA period saw increased ties on satellite technology, mutual investment, pharmaceuticals and oil pipelines (Dutta,

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156 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
2008b; Interview B5, 2008) and an overall ‘determination to continue … strengthening relations with Israel’ (Pant, 2004: 62). Israel also continued to be India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia (Riedel, 2008). Importantly, the UPA ‘re-aligned’ (Interview B1, 2008) Indo-Israeli relations away from being their primary focus on West Asia, and instead insisted on a fully balanced position. Hence, ties with Kuwait, Oman and Turkey also increased. In turn, Indo-Israeli ties were rarely reported on and few (if any) senior Israeli officials visited India (in part to assuage the UPA’s Communist allies). A former MEA Foreign Secretary noted how there was little backlash from India’s Muslims concerning these ties, which made the new Indo-Israeli links more acceptable to Congress psyches (Interview B2, 2008).

Reflective of this new balance, India’s ties with Saudi Arabia increased exponentially in the post-NDA period (Pant, 2006). Relations also deepened with Iran, especially concerning gas imports (Lall, 2006: 427), although plans for an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline appeared to be fading (BBC, 2009). Other relationships under the UPA continued to be reflective of the multi-pronged diplomatic approach inculcated during the BJP-led NDA government. With Russia, relations continued to revolve around ‘complementarities in oil and gas, defence, nuclear, space … and technology’ (Sikri, 2007). The two states carried out joint military operations in 2007 and Russia supported India’s 2005 observer status with the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). Their escalating relationship marked a deep continuity between the NDA and UPA regimes (Chenoy, 2008: 59-60). Annual India-China-Russia meetings also remained ongoing. Overall, such international and regional engagement, centred upon economic growth and energy security, came to be known as the Manmohan Doctrine during the UPA.

Strategic partnerships became the lingua franca of India’s international diplomacy under the UPA, and were announced with the EU (2004), Japan (2005), Saudi Arabia (2006), Vietnam (2007) and Kazakhstan (2009). Such partnerships were backed up by regular bilateral summits, as well as agreements to cooperate in international fora and to

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157 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17 2008.
158 Interview with a former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, November 15 2008.
159 Interview with a former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
increase trade levels. By 2008, India was the EU’s largest trade partner (Kavalski, 2008), was attending annual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) and had European support for its UNSC ambitions (Interview A7, 2008). The post-NDA period also saw the creation of explicit defence ties (for example) in South East Asia with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam (Brewster, 2009a, 2009b; Jha, 2007; Suryanarayana, 2008), and with Australia and Brazil (Bonner, 2008; Hirst, 2008; Puri, 2007), including naval exercises. These developments confirmed an acceptance of the BJP-led NDA’s Look East phase two policy. The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) grouping initiated under the BJP-led NDA also became further instituted during the UPA, with the first IBSA Annual Summit Meeting in September 2006. In turn, June 2009 saw the first annual BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) Summit. Overall, Indian diplomacy maintained the gear shift inculcated during the NDA, as India’s ‘bandwidth of engagement … (became) wider than ever’ (Mukherjee, 2006).

Elsewhere, in 2007 India opened its first military base in a foreign country (in Tajikistan), and also carried out military exercises with Mongolia (Nomadic Elephant). Relations with other Central Asian states further intensified and confirmed the UPA’s continued efforts to attempt India’s strategic extension into Central Asia (Interview B4, 2008). India’s influence in Afghanistan also grew through increased infrastructure investment (Khosla, 2007; MEA, 2005), and exposed them to attacks by militants (most significantly on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008). The UPA also initiated the first India-Africa Summit in April 2008 aimed at intensifying trade and energy security. These ties reflected India’s economic need for oil and gas, mimicked steps already undertaken by China, and led to similar relations with Venezuela and Chile. This proactive security practice showed how the harmonized norm of autonomy mixed with assertiveness had continued under the UPA from the BJP-led NDA. In short, India’s new leaders recognized that ‘we must also find ways of using international opinion as a force multiplier in addressing external challenges effectively’ (Singh, 2005).

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160 Interview with a former think-tank head, Noida, May 2 2008. Analysts also noted with pride the EU’s other strategic partnerships (with the US, Japan, Canada, China and Russia) that coupled with India’s multi-polar vision.

161 Pranab Mukherjee was India’s External Affairs Minister from October 24 2006 until May 22 2009.

162 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
CONCLUSIONS

The BJP-led NDA introduced persistent substantive changes to the norms structuring India’s security identity, which then continued in the post-2004 period. While not quite producing a fundamental ‘paradigmatic shift in India’s polity’ (BJP National Executive 27.10.04, 2005: 8), these new norms led to an effective gear shift in India’s security practice. This gear shift was most obvious concerning the new assertive, proactive and (now mainstream) pragmatic norm centred upon making India into a global power. This norm continued to constitute Indian foreign policy even when the NDA had left office, and inspired the establishment of norms concerning the democratic basis of the India state, communalism, foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue, engagement with China and Pakistan, nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, a balanced West Asia policy and the use of realpolitik. While open to interpretation and emphasis (for example how the UPA underplays Indo-Israeli links), these ongoing norms irrevocably changed - and added new substance - to each source within India’s security identity. As such, there was an ‘essential continuity’ between the NDA and UPA governments (Mohan, 2005: 274).

Importantly, because the UPA continued to determine state policy within these normative parameters, both the ascendency and acceptance of these norms into India’s security practice was confirmed. As a senior serving MEA official noted, there was no ‘deceleration’ (Interview B23, 2008; Interview B22, 2008)\(^\text{163}\) of this new normative security practice after the NDA period ended. Indeed, where the UPA accelerated interaction (and thus India’s normative behaviour) - for example with the US and China, or concerning multi-pronged diplomacy - their acceptance of these norms made them even more deeply entrenched. By repeating and continuing with the same types of interaction, the UPA fulfilled the event type, frequency, harmony / dissonance indicators for norm measurement used to explain norm development, solidification and entrenchment (as per Table 2.1). However, the impact of the BJP-led NDA on India’s security identity was far from uniform across the three different sources of India’s security identity. As Table 9.6 below shows, there were clear discrepancies between the

\(^{163}\) Interview with a former MEA spokesman and current Indian ambassador, Delhi, October 29 2008 (by telephone); interview with a senior journalist, Delhi, October 28 2008.
number of harmonized continuities, contested dissonances, substantive changes and new norms identified in each security identity source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY IDENTITY SOURCE</th>
<th>HARMONIZED CONTINUITIES</th>
<th>CONTESTED DISSONANCES</th>
<th>SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES</th>
<th>NEW NORMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHYSICAL:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEPTUAL:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.6: Norm Behaviour in India’s Security Identity during the NDA

In the political source, the meeting of norms from the pre-1998 security identity and BJP policy was the most contested during the NDA and the UPA. While there were some substantive changes, these effectively evolved what had been embryonic prior to the BJP-led NDA. The contested dissonances appear to stem from the fundamentally differing approaches taken concerning domestic and foreign policy by different political parties in India. These dissonances underlie the perennially contested nature of domestic politics whereby different parties must be, by their very nature, primarily in competition with each other. It is thus unsurprising that the BJP were unable to inculcate any new lasting Hindutva-orientated norms, although they did successfully normalize foreign policy as a domestic political issue. Concerning the physical source, we saw that the majority of norms coalesced into harmonized continuities, with only pragmatic engagement becoming a substantive change. Even this one change reflected a trend which had been growing in Indian foreign policy prior to 1998, and which had been prominent at several key junctures (especially in 1965 and 1971). This high degree of agreement emphasizes how India’s location and proximity to other states cannot fundamentally alter, and whose physical “characteristics” produce the most constant interests and threats. The new norm of being overtly assertive and proactive in India’s search to be a global power, effectively complimented the one substantive change.

Within the perceptual source of India’s security identity we can see the different competing pre-1998 norms resulting in several substantive changes and no contested differences. Again, each of the substantive changes can be seen as an evolution along an already indicated trend or path, although with significant momentum and stimulus added by the BJP-led NDA. This high degree of change shows that the norms in the
perceptual source are the most unfixed and flexible, and are not wholly reliant upon the political nature of the Indian state or India’s physical characteristics. Instead, these norms are dependent upon how India is perceived by its leaders (and its constituent security community actors), and how they are able to influence the perceptions of India held by external states. The 1998 nuclear tests clearly fit this categorization, as shown by their subsequent influence on India’s US, Israeli and global relations. In turn, the perceptual source’s new norm of always viewing Indian security through the prism of India as a global power via multi-pronged diplomacy correlates with this perspective, as India’s leaders project their own national and security self-image to the world.

International conditions (such as being post-Cold War and in a globalizing economy) may have aided this evolution, but it was the BJP who were the catalyst and “enabler” that proactively forced the gear shift in India’s security practice and behaviour. In turn, different international events (such as 9/11) can be regarded as reaction points which the BJP’s leaders exploited to facilitate their national agenda for India. The next chapter sums up these perspectives, unveils this thesis’ key findings, outlines avenues for future research concerning India and security identity/ies, and concludes this thesis.
Chapter 10:

‘Conclusions:
(Indian) Security Identity and Future Trajectories’

‘we [India] have by our very practices something that
… can be identified as our cultural indices of foreign policy’
(Interview A19, 2008)\textsuperscript{164}

‘every country is a product of its own history and experience,
the way it behaves is moulded by the way it came into being’
(Sinha, 2003: 41)

‘the world’s perception of India, its capacities
and its strengths has changed irreversibly’
(Mukherjee, 2006)

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government witnessed profound changes concerning the development and evolution of India’s security practice. These changes continued to be reflected in Indian security policy after the NDA left office in 2004 and have been maintained by successive Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments. Through the conceptualization and elucidation of the security identity analytical framework, we have been able to isolate this change (as well as deep-seated continuity) through the presence of specific norms. These norms have collectively structured Indian security and foreign policy since 1947, and became established through India’s international interaction, as well as through the beliefs and experiences of India’s security community. By comparing the pre-1998, NDA and UPA periods, I have shown how ideational constructs of security provide an effective analytical framework of a state’s (India’s) security policy. This framework enabled an analysis across different political generations and structural changes, largely independent of material or structural factors.

\textsuperscript{164} Interview with a leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9 2008. Please refer to the Primary Sources in the Bibliography to see the full list of interviews carried out for this thesis.
10.1) - KEY THESIS FINDINGS:

My research on Hindu nationalism and the evolution of Indian security has led to the following four key findings –

1) there has been a consistent normative approach to how Indian foreign policy has developed since 1947;
2) different ideologies produce different security (domestic and foreign) policy norms;
3) the BJP-led NDA inculcated several substantive changes to India’s security policy;
4) these normative changes shaped security policy into the post-NDA period, and produced an irrevocable gear shift in India’s accepted and evolving security practice.

In turn, these findings make specific theoretical, empirical and research literature contributions.

Theoretical Contribution

In Chapters 2 and 3, I conceptualized a norm-based and identity-driven account of security (security identity) and used this analytical framework to determine a state’s (India’s) security practice. The security identity framework links together the study of foreign policy, domestic identities and political parties in India by showing their shared emphasis on deep-seated beliefs and precedents. This elucidation disaggregates three major sources present within the security identity framework - the political, the physical and the perceptual - in order to produce a compound and temporal appreciation of the target state’s security practice. Using this analytical framework as part of a norm-based and largely (although not exclusively) constructivist research agenda, this research has –

- recorded norm continuity and change in India’s security practice through the inputs, outputs and feedback inherent to the security identity framework;
linked domestic norms to international politics (rather than vice versa);

- demonstrated that security is a holistic, inter-relational and inter-dependent entity that is a product of the interaction *between* the domestic and international, occurring at the “/” between self/other;

- illustrated the importance of self/other perceptions in International Relations (IR); and

- advanced the strategic culture approach in IR away from militaristic (and often deterministic) factors and through access to security-making elites.

**Empirical Contribution**

By isolating the different norms present within India’s security practice, I used the new security identity framework to show both continuity and change within India’s historical foreign policy behaviour. Such an approach allowed for an analysis across wider structural changes and across different political parties and generations within India. I applied this framework (and its incumbent operationalisation strategy) to analyse the development and entrenching of core (foreign and domestic) policy norms in –

a) Indian security from 1947 to 1998 (Chapter 4);

b) the BJP’s *Hindutva* ideology until 1998 (Chapter 5);

c) the 1998 to 2004 BJP-led NDA government (Chapters 6, 7 and 8); and

d) the Congress-led UPA governments since 2004 (Chapter 9).

This analysis of Indian security over time –

- isolated a number of dominant composite norms present within India’s security practice;

- emphasised multiple aspects, sources and locations of security *simultaneously*, and recognised that India’s security exists at the confluence of these sources;

- produced a fuller ideational account of India’s security practice through the normative comparison and synthesis of differing political ideologies;

- underlined how norm development is ongoing and underpinned by social learning; and
showed that ideational factors can have primacy over material factors, especially how norm-based accounts overarch and encompass structural change.

Research Literature Contribution

The research for this thesis has yielded a collective overview of national security and foreign policy-making in modern post-colonial India. Carried out across different political generations, parties and international events, I confirmed that there are different sets of (quite often overlapping) norms driving different identities, and that Indian security practice is absorptive, dynamic and elastic. I also isolated variation across the three normative sources of India’s security identity. These characteristics explained how the BJP-led NDA was simultaneously constrained by India’s pre-1998 security identity but were also a catalyst for substantive change. Thus, while its trajectory was maintained, the BJP produced a long-term gear shift in India’s security practice (on nuclear transparency, a tilt towards the US, greater regional pragmatism and the use of realpolitik). Overall, I have made a contribution to the current literature on Indian security, by –

- producing the first-ever analysis of BJP security policy before, during and after the NDA;
- unveiling the discursive security consensus present within India’s security community (through the analysis of primary sources and extensive interviewing);
- highlighting the multiple, composite and competing norms present within India’s security practice (from the security identity and BJP policy);
- confirming the impact of internal policy sources on India’s external security practice; and
- proving the validity of a norm-based account of India’s security practice.

State versus Structure

While the BJP-led NDA’s overall gear shift of India’s security identity is clearly visible in my analysis, what does this perspective imply for counter critiques that external
factors have determined changes in Indian foreign policy? Internal factors (for example, a political party’s policy norms) are important for how a state constructs its foreign policy, both historically and contemporarily. Through repetition and associated consensus, these factors then become established as core policy norms that influence how a state (India) regards and responds to international events. In a similar fashion at an international level, there are also core shared beliefs (say on the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation or international terrorism), which have also become entrenched over time through repeated events and interaction. Thus, just as a state can have its own normative security practice, there is in effect an external normative structure present within international relations. It is the interaction of these different sets of norms (internal and external) that determines international relations, and in effect produces a global self / other dichotomy between states and the system. The interaction of these inter-perceptions produces “inter-national” relations.

Furthermore, through its co-constitutive basis, a norm-based analysis nullifies agent-structure debates as the self / other dichotomy is co-dependent and based upon mutual causality. We saw this in practice in the security identity framework through the interdependent nature of the three normative sources (especially the domestic / international dichotomy in the political source). Hence, a norm-based research agenda shows that as much as (international) events are the main stimuli for the actions of states in the international system, it is states that are the primary drivers of their security behaviour. Thus, the BJP-led NDA took advantage of confluent international events (such as 9/11), rather than allowing security policy to be dictated by them. In the same vein, the foundations of the BJP’s gear shift were aided in the 1990s by India acquiring more resources as she moved away from a socialist-orientated economy and slowly embraced globalization (analogous to gaining a bigger and more powerful engine). In addition, the decline of Pakistan and the elimination of the Soviet Union helped remove obstacles from India’s path, aiding the Indo-US rapprochement under the NDA. Again, these changing structural factors did not drive policy-making but importantly coalesced with BJP policy norms and helped smooth the pathway to India finding a new international voice (and rearranged security policies) by the turn of the millennium.
These observations underline how foreign policy construction, and its transition to practice, is based upon engrained beliefs, interests and behaviours that primarily reflect the core normative trends associated with a certain specific state, not the wider general international structure. While material factors (economic growth and subsequent military growth) and material concerns (trade and energy security) may inform policy, they do not wholly determine it. Instead policy-making and policy-implementation is reliant upon the dominant narratives coming from multiple various ideational sources within a state. As this thesis’ analysis of India’s interaction and international relations has shown, states do not necessarily have the same interests (even in response to shared structural conditions) but do have their own unique histories and self-images. It is because of these distinctive (but not exclusive) perspectives that international relations therefore come primarily from differences at the state, not the system, level.

**Normative Evolution**

I have highlighted how norms are at once fixed and flexible. This duality is a reflection of the permanent long-term interests of a state (for example for India, maintaining foreign policy autonomy or gaining great power status) but also of how states adapt to contemporary conditions to maintain these same interests. Such interests will be transferred across different generations by a state’s security community, often overriding domestic political changes (Interview B21, 2008; Interview B38, 2008).\(^\text{165}\) As Kissinger notes, “‘what passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future’” (quoted in Chari et al., 2008: 10), as prior interaction forms habits, precedents and expectations. Concurrently, differences in style, nuance or leadership can become increasingly critical as underlying foreign policy principles are achieved. Thus, we saw a greater general assertiveness in the BJP-led NDA’s approach to Indian security but also a simultaneous evolution of existing approaches resulting in, for example, the Look East phase two policy or the extended strategic neighbourhood policy.

In these conditions, there has been essential continuity concerning Indian’s security but with a gear shift in priorities, whereby the menu or hierarchy of Indian security norms

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\(^{165}\) Interview with a former Indian ambassador to the United States, Delhi, October 27 2008; interview with a newspaper editor, Delhi, November 14 2008.
has been changed. This shift shows how security practice is constantly learning and evolving, not just for a state but also for political parties and other identities. Thus, while we saw a number of substantive normative changes occur in India’s security identity - during the UPA, Congress themselves became more accepting of Indo-Israeli relations. In turn, a former Indian Foreign Secretary noted how, nearly all parties (except the Left) now talk of India as a great power (Interview B4, 2008). We also saw how BJP policy norms evolved as a result of being in power (for example, whereby Akhand Bharat lost its original purely geographic emphasis). Such observations fit with Hindutva being viewed as a developing ideology based upon multiple and chosen symbols that is syncretic and strategic (Jaffrelot, 1993). More generally, these observations confirm that norms innately adapt and evolve through accumulated experience and interaction. Further still, when different norms from different identities also interact, some variety of norm / identity synthesis will occur.

This last point not only refers to what we have witnessed concerning India’s security identity, BJP policy and UPA policy. It also applies to individual leader identities too. Such a potential influence is clear concerning the shaping of Indian foreign policy by Nehru’s principles in the first decades of independence but also concerning the BJP’s Vajpayee. Vajpayee (like Nehru) had been a Minister of External Affairs (from March 1977 to July 1979) prior to becoming Prime Minister. This attribute is far from unusual in India, and applies to the majority of Indian Prime Ministers. Such an attribute suggests a shared normative understanding of Indian security policy, and may have been a critical constraining influence between the NDA and previous regimes, especially if Vajpayee is regarded as a more moderate BJP leader (Dixit, 2004b: 296-309). Indeed, an ex-Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson noted internal MEA perceptions of Vajpayee as a Nehruvian (Interview, B23, 2008). Thus, although they inculcated substantive changes in India’s security identity, the positioning of the BJP-led NDA’s Prime Minister within India’s security (consensus-making) community could also explain why more radical changes did not occur.

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166 Interview with a leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17 2008.
167 Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Rajiv Gandhi, VP Singh, IK Gujral and Manmohan Singh all held the Minister of External Affairs post before acceding to the office of Prime Minister.
168 Interview with an ex-MEA spokesperson, Delhi, October 29 2008 (by telephone).
10.2) FUTURE RESEARCH:

My findings have implications for work on International Security and Foreign Policy Analysis. Critically, I have built a new framework of analysis that traces the influence of different beliefs and norms on a state’s foreign policy outlook and security interests. This security identity framework is formulated to show that there are multiple norms (derived from various political, religious and other identities) concerning how domestic and foreign policy is practiced, which then impact upon how a state’s leaders behave. As it deals with norms within a state-specific setting, the framework is readily transferable to other cases. This transferability underlines its added practical importance to researchers in Area Studies and Territorial Studies. Furthermore, the security identity approach deepens normative accounts of security, especially concerning constructivism and, to a degree, classical realism. It thus makes a contribution to IR theory on the impact of domestic norms on a state’s security practice, as well as showing their ongoing and multi-various presence.

Empirical Pathways

If we have been able to determine India’s security identity, do other states also have a security identity? What are the norms structuring these security identities? Given its focus on political, physical and perceptual sources, the security identity framework is readily transferable to any state, and will allow us to ask what is exceptional about that state’s normative security practice. It is the framework’s focus upon normative measurement (Table 2.1) and three empirical loci (Table 2.4) that enables such research. Although this thesis has been comparative of different periods in India’s security practice, future research pathways can also include state-to-state comparison. Such comparisons can be carried out over the same historical period to isolate different state responses to the same (structural) events, and will help to further validate the strength of ideational accounts in IR. This validation can help to further show states as unique, individual entities influenced by their own normative (and non-structural) assumptions. Such an approach would also allow for the comparison of (different) security communities present within different states.
Possible candidates for such potential comparative work could be India and China or India and the EU. The first case could be used by researchers to understand the security practices of two states with vast populations and fast growing economies. Furthermore, it could be used to determine the common normative attributes of aspiring great powers (with possible applications to other cases such as Brazil or South Africa). In turn, an India-EU comparison could be employed to look at two states emerging as important spheres of influence within a multi-polar world, and again indicate the presence of certain shared normative beliefs (especially concerning self-perceptions of their place in the world). Furthermore, the security identity framework can be used to carry out a comparative analysis of states within a certain region - for example how different states (say India, China, Japan, and the United States (US)) regard and contribute to Asian security practice, or how the historical experiences of different EU member states influence the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

**Theoretical Pathways**

Such future research could validate the general transferability of the security identity framework. Using the framework for this new comparative research may also signify how it can be possibly adjusted and refined to be more indicative of an ideational account of a state’s security practice. In particular, given their relative consistency across India’s security practice, the necessity of including norms concerning economic policy (swadeshi) can be debated. Although normative in the sense of being a shared belief about a certain form of behaviour, such norms (especially in the current era) appear to be heavily reliant on external normative structures. Contemporary debates on globalization, and to an extent neo-liberalism, correlate with such perspectives. Although maybe not pertinent to the security identities of all states, the removal of economic policy norms for the major powers (and candidate great powers) may be necessary given the dependence of these states on high rates of economic growth linked to global trading practices. Such changes would only be refinements or adjustments rather than a fundamental overhaul of the security identity framework. The use of
military growth figures could also be discussed, although I would argue that these are useful as behavioural indicators rather than absolutes.

Comparative work can also help to develop the security identity approach by allowing for the analysis of issues specific to each of the three normative sources of the framework. Such research could focus on purely political differences or territorial issues, in order to gain a great appreciation of normative change and continuity in very precise conditions. This approach could enable the framework to be disaggregated further and especially to advance the study of strategic culture away from a purely militaristic to a greater ideational basis. This advancement would not have to weaken strategic culture analysis but can embolden it by focusing more on normative precedents in behaviour rather than long-term projections. Indeed, the better the past is understood, the better prepared scholars can be to understand current actions and future conduct. A greater appreciation of political rhetoric informs such research, and as we have seen with the BJP, election manifestoes do matter - especially for those in opposition. These benefits apply to policy-makers themselves (and a state or region’s security community), particularly concerning system-level responses to state decisions.

* * * * *

This thesis has produced new findings on the development, nature and potential trajectory of Indian security. These findings underline the importance of studying how security is normatively produced and practiced within states, and the ideational factors which critically inform these processes. Furthermore, the security identity framework has opened up viable and exciting pathways for future research. I intend to follow one such pathway to look at China’s security identity. Such research can show the historical experiences that have shaped a currently emergent, modern and developed China. As with India, appreciating the background, roots and rationales of these experiences can lead to our better understanding of what will be a crucial identity for the world and IR in the twenty-first century. It is hoped that such a study can also provide the basis for a potential comparative study between India and China. While the material and economic fortunes of states may fluctuate over time, their national (security) identities will remain as core determinants of how they think, feel and ultimately behave in the world.
**Bibliography:**

1) - INTERVIEWS / CORRESPONDENCE:

**First Round (A) - March / April / May 2008**


Interview A3 (2008) - Interview with former think-tank head and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, April 30.

Interview A4 (2008) - Interview with senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 1.

Interview A5 (2008) - Interview with senior strategic analyst and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, May 2.

Interview A6 (2008) - Interview with think-tank head, Delhi, May 2.

Interview A7 (2008) - Interview with former think-tank head, Noida, May 2.

Interview A8 (2008) - Interview with BJP activist, Bhopal, May 3.

Interview A9 (2008) - Interview with BJP government development officer, Bhopal, May 3.

Interview A10 (2008) - Interview with think-tank head and former Indian Army officer, Delhi, May 5.

Interview A11 (2008) - Interview with leading think-tank head, Delhi, May 5.

Interview A12 (2008) - Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Army General, Delhi, May 5.

Interview A13 (2008) - Interview with senior Indian academic, Delhi, May 6.

Interview A14 (2008) - Interview with leading Indian academic, Delhi, May 6.

Interview A15 (2008) - Interview with BJP spokesperson, Delhi, May 6.

Interview A16 (2008) - Interview with political raconteur / BJP ideologue, Delhi, May 6.

Interview A17 (2008) - Interview with leading left-wing intellectual, Delhi, May 7.

Interview A18 (2008) - Interview with think-tank director, Delhi, May 7.
Interview A19 (2008) - Interview with leading senior strategic analyst, Delhi, May 9.

Interview A20 (2008) - Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, May 9.

Interview A21 (2008) - Interview with senior analyst of the BJP's Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, May 9.

Interview A22 (2008) - Interview with former analyst and ex-newspaper editor, Delhi, May 9.

Second Round (B) - October / November 2008

Interview B1 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and former member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Delhi, October 15.

Interview B2 (2008) - Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17.

Interview B3 (2008) - Interview with senior strategic affairs journalist, Delhi, October 17.

Interview B4 (2008) - Interview with leading think-tank head and former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, October 17.

Interview B5 (2008) - Interview with senior journalist and newspaper editor, Delhi, October 17.

Interview B6 (2008) - Interview with former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, Delhi, October 20.

Interview B7 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, October 20.

Interview B8 (2008) - Interview with think-tank head, Delhi, October 21.

Interview B9 (2008) - Interview with senior journalist, Delhi, October 21.

Interview B10 (2008) - Interview with think-tank head and former senior Indian Army officer, Delhi, October 22.


Interview B12 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and ambassador, Delhi, October 22.
Interview B13 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, October 22.


Interview B15 (2008) - Interview with senior Indian academic, Delhi, October 23.

Interview B16 (2008) - Interview with leading Indian academic, Delhi, October 23.

Interview B17 (2008) - Interview with think-tank research director, Delhi, October 23.

Interview B18 (2008) - Interview with senior BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, October 27.

Interview B19 (2008) - Interview with BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, October 27.

Interview B20 (2008) - Interview with BJP Foreign Policy cell member, Delhi, October 27.

Interview B21 (2008) - Interview with former Indian ambassador to the US, Delhi, October 27.

Interview B22 (2008) - Interview with senior journalist, Delhi, October 28.

Interview B23 (2008) - Interview with ex-MEA spokesperson, Delhi, October 29 (by telephone).

Interview B24 (2008) - Interview with former Indian Minister of External Affairs [also referred to as the External Affairs Minister or the Indian Foreign Minister], Delhi, October 31.

Interview B25 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and former ambassador, Delhi, November 3.

Interview B26 (2008) - Interview with think-tank head and former Indian Army officer, Delhi, November 3.

Interview B27 (2008) - Interview with former head of the BJP’s Foreign Policy cell, Delhi, November 5.

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Interview B30 (2008) - Interview with former think-tank director and strategic analyst, Delhi, November 7.

Interview B31 (2008) - Interview with leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 7.

Interview B32 (2008) - Interview with former senior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Delhi, November 8.

Interview B33 (2008) - Interview with leading Indian academic, Delhi, November 8.

Interview B34 (2008) - Interview with BJP ideologue, Delhi, November 10.

Interview B35 (2008) - Interview with former Indian Foreign Secretary [the most senior diplomat in Indian foreign relations], Delhi, November 10.

Interview B36 (2008) - Interview with think-tank director, November 10.


Interview B38 (2008) - Interview with senior Indian newspaper editor, Delhi, November 14.


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169 Please note that sources accessed via the internet do not have page numbers. For journal articles, maximum effort has been made to include relevant volume, issue and page numbers - although some journals do not follow this system.


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### Appendix 1: Indian Security Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lal Krishna Advani</td>
<td>NDA Home Minister</td>
<td>1998-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moraji Desai</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister</td>
<td>1977-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J N Dixit</td>
<td>Indian National Security Advisor</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Fernandes</td>
<td>NDA Defence Minister</td>
<td>1998-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister</td>
<td>1966-77 / 1980-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahatma Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian political and spiritual leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonia Gandhi</td>
<td>Indian Congress President</td>
<td>1998-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathuram Godse</td>
<td>Assassin of Mahatma Gandhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

170 The images used in this Appendix were sourced via Google Images, see [http://images.google.co.uk/](http://images.google.co.uk/). Hyperlinks are embedded in each image as to their exact source.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M S Golwalkar</td>
<td>Leader of the RSS, 1940-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I K Gujral</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 1997-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB Hedgewar</td>
<td>RSS founder &amp; leader, 1925-30 / 1931-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Jinnah</td>
<td>founding father of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murli Manohar Joshi</td>
<td>NDA Education Minister, 1998-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kautilya</td>
<td>ancient Indian strategic thinker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madan Lal Khurana</td>
<td>NDA Tourism Minister, 1998-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangaru Laxman</td>
<td>BJP president, 2000-01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiv Shankar Menon</td>
<td>Indian Foreign Secretary, 2006-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brajesh Mishra</td>
<td>NDA National Security Advisor, 1998-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narendra Modi</td>
<td>Chief Minister of Gujarat, 2001-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyama Prasad Mookerjee</td>
<td>founder of the <em>Bharatiya Jana Sangh</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pranab Mukherjee</td>
<td>Indian External Affairs Minister, 2006-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>M K Narayanan</td>
<td>Indian National Security Advisor, 2004-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>K R Narayanan</td>
<td>Indian President, 1997-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawaharlal Nehru</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 1947-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K C Pant</td>
<td>Indian (currently BJP) politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P V Narasimha Rao</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 1991-96</td>
</tr>
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<td>V D Savarkar</td>
<td><em>Hindutva</em> ideologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lal Bahudur Shastri</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 1964-66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kanwal Sibal</td>
<td>Indian Foreign Secretary, 2002-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hari Singh</td>
<td>last Maharaja of Kashmir, 1925-51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaswant Singh</td>
<td>NDA External Affairs Minister, 1998-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manmohan Singh</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 2004-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor Rajendra Singh</td>
<td>leader of the RSS, 1994-2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>V P Singh</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister, 1989-90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yashwant Sinha</td>
<td>NDA External Affairs Minister, 2002-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Subrahmanyam</td>
<td>doyen of India’s strategic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deendayal Upadhyay</td>
<td>Hindutva ideologue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atal Behari Vajpayee</td>
<td>NDA Prime Minister, 1998-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Research Notes

This PhD project requires a strategy that effectively interweaves theory, data collection and data analysis through a comprehensive research design (Bechhofer & Paterson, 2000: 52). Epistemologically, my approach is interpretative, underscoring how key to ‘social inquiry is the interpretation of meaningful human practices’ (Little, 1991: 68). This stance clearly fits with my theoretical focus upon the influence of norms and identities on a state’s [India’s] security practice. My research strategy is also iterative, reflexive and deductive (Blaikie, 2001: 25) as I see current (material) explanations of India’s security behaviour as inadequate and I posit an alternative ideational account (security identity). Having this alternative (theoretical) account also helps to operationalise my research design (Yin, 2003: 19). Concerning ontology, my approach is largely based upon idealism which ‘asserts that reality is only knowable through … socially constructed meanings’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 23) and again corresponds to my focus on identity formation, interaction and behaviour.

Data collection mirrored the three empirical loci (see Table 2.4) of political-rhetorical, temporal historical and reflexive-individual. For the first locus, I acquired primary source documentation directly from BJP headquarters in Delhi (resulting in 9 volumes of resolutions, manifestoes and speeches by the BJS and BJP) and from online sources (primarily the MEA, the MoD and various Indian Embassies). Collecting secondary literature, biographies and autobiographies involved using the Edinburgh University Library, as well as extended visits to the National Library of Scotland and the British Library. Exhaustive literature searches using databases such as COPAC and JSTOR, aided this process. Data collection guided and attuned my research to existing work, and provided the empirical (and theoretical) grounding of my research. While undertaking language training in India, I also utilized the extensive library at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie - India’s premier civil service training institution.

Conducting interviews was essential for investigating the dominant discourses concerning India’s security practice. Interviews are generative in their ‘reprocessing and retelling of attitudes, beliefs, behaviour or other phenomena’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:
36) and were an appropriate source of knowledge concerning my investigation of norms and identities in India. Taking a semi-structure approach - ‘intended to combine structure with flexibility’ (Legard et al., 2003: 141) - I initially used contacts from my supervisors and staff at Edinburgh, which I then “snowballed” to gain further contacts. I also made a list of appropriate contacts before going to India and went directly to BJP and Congress Party headquarters when in Delhi. At every stage, I was clear about the objectives and purpose of my research, and the timing and length of each interview in order to garner trust and create legitimacy (Lewis, 2003: 62). Undertaking six months of language training in Hindi also helped me to gain access to interviewees, as did being explicit about issues of anonymity and confidentiality (Grinyer, 2002; Lee, 1993: 102).

The research’s empirical analysis is carried out through a combination of content and discourse analysis. Content analysis offers ‘a means to survey the whole corpus of data’ (Silverman, 2002: 37) and identifies the primary themes (and therefore norms) essential to my project. Discourse analysis helps to ‘examine the construction of texts and verbal accounts’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 35) and to compare text from each of the empirical loci. The coding of data was done manually so as to gain a greater hands-on appreciation of its nuances and complexity. Interviewing with over 60 individuals was carried out in two rounds (May 2008 and October to December 2008), and I analysed first round data before the second round in order to maximize my questioning and to pinpoint any empirical gaps. In turn, triangulating findings from the three empirical loci allowed me to ‘overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-method, single-observer, single-theory studies’ (Denzin, 1970: 313). Suitable research training was gained through undertaking an MSc by Research prior to this PhD.

The project’s theoretical and empirical focus also developed over the last four years. It began as an analysis of “cultural fear” between India and Pakistan focusing on the attitudes of their army officers. As access was deemed to be too problematic (particularly concerning Official Secrets Acts), this idea then developed into analyzing newspapers editors’ attitudes. From here, notions of India’s cultural security identity emerged and led to the current project analyzing India’s security relations and its strategic community as a whole. Appropriate supervision posed initial difficulties through a lack of expertise on Indian security (at Edinburgh and across the UK). This
issue was resolved by developing links with Dr Crispin Bates (a historian at Edinburgh) and Dr Gareth Price (Head of Asia Programme, Chatham House). Presenting papers at various national and international conferences (see the list below), as well as publishing several journal articles and book chapters, helped me to receive further feedback.

- (2008) ‘“Fate has Marked us for Big Things”: India’s Great Power Aspiration’, 20th ECMSAS, University of Manchester, July 10.

I was also rigorous and robust with my research design in order to achieve reliability - ‘consistency of measures’ (Bryman, 2004: 70) - and validity - ‘whether an indicator that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept’ (Bryman, 2004: 73).

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