This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

- This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.
- A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.
- The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.
- When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.
MORAL JUDGEMENT IN THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.

Gerard Magill.

Doctor of Philosophy.
University of Edinburgh.
1986.
Abstract of Thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse moral judgement in Newman's theology by examining his religious epistemology of the judgement of faith which he regularly illustrates with a moral analogy.

Chapter one explains the philosophical and theological parameters of his religious epistemology in the 'University Sermons', and 'The Idea of a University'. This shows the primacy of the implicit reason of faith, and the secondary, but indispensable, function of explicit reason, manifest in Newman's explanation of liberal knowledge.

Chapter two refines this by examining the 'Grammar of Assent', to show the objectivity and normativity of his epistemology in the concrete faith judgement of the illative sense. I show the primacy of personal assent in relation to the indispensable, but secondary, function of inferential investigation.

Chapter three adopts the epistemology of the 'Grammar of Assent' to explain moral judgement. I introduce the term 'illative moral judgement' to show that concrete moral judgement can be a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real assent of the imagination. There is a creative tension between concrete moral judgement and the abstract moral judgement entailed by the objective existence of the moral law; this is indicated by the moral sense of conscience within the context of his theology of a religious imagination. Moral judgement, action, and progress are connected by examining the role of the will and the influence of grace. The religious dimension of moral judgement is explained by understanding conscience's sense of duty in terms of intentionality within a horizon of belief. And his religious epistemology reveals the mode of reversing concrete moral judgement.

Chapter four shows the relevance of Newman's proposals for moral judgement in contemporary moral theology.
Contents.

Introduction.

Chapter 1. Religious Judgement in the Faith-Reason Argument. (p.1)

Introduction.

1. Faith and Reason in religious inquiry. (p.2)
   A). Faith is independent of Reason.
   C). Implicit and Explicit Reason.
      1). Implicit Reason.
      2). Explicit Reason.

2. Liberalism and the usurpation of reason. (p.6)
   B). The Usurpation of Reason.
      1). The moral sense is not the whole truth.
      2). The argument of Benevolence.
      3). The counter-argument of Justice.
         A. Secular reason and explicit reason.
         B. The sense of duty, implicit reason and intention.
            1). The sense of duty and the moral sense.
            2). The instinctive recognition of moral qualities.
            3). Implicit reason.
            4). The sense of duty as intention.

3. Nature and Grace: a clarification of the tension between Knowledge and Religion. (p.16)
      1). Newman's introspection.
      2). The conflict between Nature and Grace.
      3). The harmony between Nature and Grace.
      1). "To see things as they are, to go right to the point".
      2). "The action of our intellectual upon our moral nature".
         A. Knowledge is distinct from virtue.
B. Virtue and conversion.
   1. Ordinary and transcendent virtue.
   2. The moral sense and conversion.

4. The Moral Sense, Philosophical Knowledge, and Wisdom. (p. 25)
   A. Philosophical knowledge and liberal education.
      1) The "philosophical habit of mind".
         A. The whole circle of truth.
         B. The enlargement of mind.
            1. A formative power of system.
            2. Knowledge and reflection.
            3. Abstract vision of reality.
      2) The practical usefulness of philosophical knowledge.
      3) Philosophical knowledge and Religion.
         A. Theology and enlargement of mind.
         B. Theology and religion.
   B. The gift of Wisdom.
      1). Faith and Wisdom are distinct.
      2). Wisdom and Philosophical knowledge.
         A. Knowledge and system.
         B. Analysis and discovery.
      3). A divine gift.
   C). The problem of Error.
      1). Implicit Reason, error and doubt.

Conclusion. (p. 35)

Chapter 2. Judgement, Illative Sense and Certitude. (p. 36)

Introduction.

1. Certitude: the role of explicit and implicit reason. (p. 37)
   A). Assent and Inference.
      1). Conditional and unconditional.
      2). Assent and variation in inference.
      3). The abstract and the concrete.
   B). The reflex assent of certitude.
      1). Inferential investigation.
      2). Certitude and the illative sense.
2. The epistemology of certitude and the will. (p.42)

A). A choice of will or an intellectual process of mind?
   1). Illative judgement as a choice of the will.
   2). Illative judgement as an intellectual process.
      A. A process of personal evaluation.
         1). The example of the expanding polygon.
         2). Nature and experience.
         3). The personal evaluation of the inference.
      B. The perception of the truth.
      C. Certitude and the will.
         1). Certitude as a free act of will.
         2). Certitude is "one complex act".
         3). Speculative certitude.

B). The role of the will.
   1). Certitude as a free act of intellectual deliberation.
   2). Certitude and the critical role of the will.

3. The objectivity and normativity of illative judgement. (p.55)
   A). The objectivity of the illative judgement.
      1). Personal reason and objective truth.
      2). Objectivity and explicit reason.
         A. The accumulation of probabilities.
         B. The coherence of the illative judgement.
      3). The concrete and the abstract.
   B). The normativity of the illative judgement.
      1). Psychological method.
      2). Prescriptive justification.

4. Theology of religious imagination. (p.62)
   A). The religion of philosophy as artificial religion.
   B). Theology and the integration of knowledge.
   C). Theology and Religion: the intellect and the imagination.

5. The problem of error and doubt. (p.66)
   A). Error in assent and certitude.
      1). Assent.
      2). Certitude.
   B). Doubt in assent and certitude.
      1). Assent.
      2). Certitude.
   C). Adherence to the truth, not to certitude.
      1). The justification of a "formal promise".
      2). The demands of a "formal promise".
3). The limits of a "formal promise".
   A. Being open to reversal.
   B. Reversal and reason.
      1. Examples of reversal.
      2. Implicit and explicit reason.
   C. The limits of a "formal promise".

Conclusion.  


Introduction.

1. Conscience and moral judgement.  
   A. Conscience and moral discourse.  
      1). The sense of duty and the moral sense.
      2). The epistemology of conscience.
         A. Newman's epistemological strategy.
         B. The sense of duty and the moral sense.
            1. The sense of duty: moral sanction and divine motive.
            2. The moral sense: recognising concrete qualities.
         C. The indivisible act of conscience.
            1. Newman's prescriptive and descriptive remarks.
            2. The indivisibility of conscience and religious motive.
            3. The importance of the abstraction of explicit reason.
   B. The moral sense and illative judgement.
      1). Aristotle's phronesis and Newman's illative judgement.
      2). Phronesis, illative judgement, and the moral sense.
         A. The judgement of the moral sense and certitude.
            1. Certitude and the illative moral judgement.
         B. Illative moral judgement in given circumstances.
2. Moral judgement and moral code in the context of Newman's "theology of a religious imagination". (p.102)

A). Moral judgement and moral code.
   1). Moral code, probability, and illative judgement
      B). Concrete truth and abstraction.
   2). The objective existence of the moral law.
   3). The moral law and real assent.
      A). The notional and real.
      B). First principles and character.
         1). First principles.
         2). Character, first principles and illative judgement.
            a). Character as benefactor of illative judgement.
            b). Character as beneficiary of illative judgement.
   2). The theology of a religious imagination.
      1). Theological intellect and religious imagination
      2). Conscience and the theology of a religious imagination.
         A). Illative judgement and accumulative probability.
         B). Obedience to conscience and theological truth.
            1). Implicit and explicit reason.
            2). Obedience to conscience.
            3). Theological truth.

B). The theology of a religious imagination.
   1). Theological intellect and religious imagination
   2). Conscience and the theology of a religious imagination.
      A). Illative judgement and accumulative probability.
      B). Obedience to conscience and theological truth.
         1). Implicit and explicit reason.
         2). Obedience to conscience.
         3). Theological truth.

3. Moral progress, moral judgement, and action. (p.116)

A). Moral progress.

B). Liberalism, private judgement, and moral judgement.
   1). Liberalism and dogmatism.
   2). Private judgement.
   3). Moral judgement.
      A). Moral judgement as private judgement.
      B). The primacy of conscience.
   4). Wisdom and Bigotry: the abuse of abstraction.

C). Moral judgement and action.
   1). Imagination and action.
   2). Action and will.
   3). Action and virtue.
4. Moral judgement in the context of Nature and Grace. (p.127)

A). The context of nature and Grace.
   1). Natural and Revealed religion.
   2). Certitude in religious belief and divine faith.
      A). Divine faith as a gift of grace.
         1). The distinction between religious belief and divine faith.
         2). Grace and Christian intentionality.
            a). Fear and doubt.
            b). The intrinsic superiority of divine faith.
            c). Reaching and maintaining belief with grace.
      B). Reversal of the commitment to the gift of grace.

B). Moral judgement and the gift of grace.
   1). Moral judgement and the passive role of the will.
      A). Reaching the illative moral judgement.
      B). Love as the safeguard of faith.
      C). The sense of duty as intention.
      D). Imagination and action.
   2). Moral judgement and the active role of the will
      A). Maintaining the illative moral judgement.
      B). The free choice to act.

C). The reversal of moral judgement.
   1). The reversal of certitude.
   2). The reversal of moral judgement and objectivity.
      A). The law of truth and the law of duty.
      B). Illative moral judgement and objectivity.
      C). The reversal of moral judgement.

Conclusion to chapters 1 - 3. (p.140)

1). Imagination, intellect, and moral judgement.
   A). Imagination and illative moral judgement.
   B). Intellect and abstract moral judgement.
   C). Theology of a religious imagination and moral judgement.

2). The Christian intentionality of illative moral judgement.

3). The Reversal of illative moral judgement.
Chapter 4. The contemporary relevance of Newman's understanding of moral judgement.  

Introduction.

1. Imagination and moral judgement.  
   A). Imagination, aesthetics, and Newman's implicit reason.  
   B). Imagination, self-transcendence, and character.
      1). Self-transcendence and character.
         A). Explicit and implicit reason.  
         B). Comprehensive liberal knowledge.  
         C). Character.  
         E). Conversion.  
      2). The role of character in contemporary moral theology.
         B). Character and Catholic Theology.  
         C). Character and the theory of fundamental option.
            1). Transcendental freedom and fundamental option.  
            2). Negative and positive developments of fundamental option.  
            3). Newman's contribution.  
      3). Moral judgement and moral norm.
         A). Existential ethics and moral discernment.  
         B). Moral norm and natural law.  

2. The christian specificity of moral judgement.  

3. Reversal of moral judgement. 

Conclusion to thesis.

Notes to chapter 1.  
Notes to chapter 2.  
Notes to chapter 3.  
Notes to conclusion, (chapters 1-3).  
Notes to chapter 4. 

Bibliography:  - Newman's works.  
- Other works consulted on Newman.  
- Contemporary theology.
Abbreviations.

Apo. Apologia pro Vita Sua.
D.A. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects.
Ess.i,ii. Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols.
H.S.i-iii. Historical Sketches, 3 vols.
Id. The Idea of a University.
Mix. Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations.
O.A. Birmingham Oratory Archives.
O.S. Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.
P.S.i-viii. Parochial and Plain Sermons, 8 vols.
S.D. Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day.
T.R.R. The Tamworth Reading Room.
U.S. Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford.
V.M.i,ii. The Via Media, 2 vols.
Introduction.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse moral judgement in the theology of John Henry Newman. Newman never explicitly undertook to analyse or explain moral judgement. However, he regularly adopted a moral analogy to illustrate his judgement of faith, especially in the 'Grammar of Assent'. By examining his religious epistemology I propose to analyse the understanding of moral judgement operative in illustrating faith judgement. This presents a twofold result; his religious epistemology reveals his understanding of moral judgement; and this view of moral judgement enlightens a strand in his thought that envisages the mutability of certitude as indicative of the objectivity of faith judgement. In other words, I argue that the judgement of faith and moral judgement are mutually enlightening.

I concentrate on the final expression of his religious epistemology in the 'Grammar'. This centres around his analysis of assent and inference. My first chapter explains that the philosophical and theological parameters for his religious epistemology are established in the 'University Sermons' and 'The Idea of a University'. This chapter analyses the dynamic tension between implicit and explicit reason in the context of understanding a harmonious relation between Nature and Grace; it emphasises the indispensable, though secondary, function of explicit reason by explaining the importance of liberal knowledge, manifest in theology and the gift of Wisdom.

Chapter two explains the refinement of this epistemology in the 'Grammar of Assent'. I explain the complex nature of the personal assent of certitude by analysing the indispensable, though secondary, function of inference for assent; this reveals his objective and normative understanding of the epistemology of the concrete faith judgement of the illative sense.

Chapter three adopts this epistemology to explain his understanding of moral judgement operative in illustrating the judgement of faith in the 'Grammar'. His epistemology emphasises the distinction between abstract and concrete moral judgement in discussing the moral sense of conscience. I introduce the term 'illative moral judgement' to show that concrete moral judgement is a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real
assent of the imagination; and I explain the creative tension between concrete moral judgement and the abstract moral judgement entailed by the objective existence of moral law. By explaining Newman's understanding of the sense of duty (of conscience) in terms of intentionality, I show that, in the horizon of belief, moral judgement is essentially religious without compromising his epistemological strategy. The religious nature of moral judgement, and the dynamic tension between concrete and abstract moral judgement, is manifest in his theology of a religious imagination.

The connection between concrete moral judgement, moral action and moral progress is explained by examining the function of the will and the influence of grace. And I argue that the mutability of concrete moral judgement, determined by personal character in varying circumstances, is at the service of the objectivity of truth. This enlightens the strand of the mutability of certitude of faith in Newman's writings and reveals the religious epistemology for reversing concrete moral judgement.

After chapter three I conclude my analysis of moral judgement in Newman's thought by making three points. My emphasis is upon the epistemology of concrete moral judgement which elicits a real and complex assent of the imagination; the intentionality of moral judgement reveals its religious nature; and the possibility and mode of reversing concrete moral judgement is enlightened by his theology of a religious imagination. In my fourth chapter I show the relevance of these points in contemporary moral theology, concentrating upon the contribution of transcendental theology.

The technical apparatus of the thesis adopts the following procedures. All quotations in the text of chapters 1-3 are from Newman. I use Newman's own text whenever possible to construct my argument and interpretation; this approach seeks to discover and develop his meaning, and to avoid the hermeneutical problem of text-hunting for my own purposes. All secondary source references are contained in the notes. References to Newman follow the abbreviations listed overleaf; other references are to the author and year of publication listed in the bibliography. The divisions of the text, listed in the contents pages, follow this sequence of numbers and letters: 1,A),1),A,1,a.
Chapter I. Religious Judgement in the Faith-Reason Argument.

Introduction.

This first chapter examines the role of religious judgement in the context of Newman's discussion of the relation between Faith and Reason in the 'University Sermons' and the 'Idea'.

I explain the primacy of implicit reason and the secondary, though indispensable, role of explicit reason in religious judgement.

First, I examine Newman's understanding of the primacy of the implicit reason of Faith over explicit Reason. Second, from this context I explain his rejection of Liberalism and his theological and epistemological reservations about the use of explicit reason in religious judgement. Third, I show how his theological reservation is overcome in his understanding of the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace. Fourth, I show how his epistemological reservation is overcome in his view of philosophical knowledge and the gift of Wisdom in religious judgement.

The first three sections focus upon the 'Sermons' which deal with the discussion of the relation between Faith and Reason. The fourth section focuses upon the 'Idea' to explain Newman's understanding of the value of explicit reason in the context of his proposals for Liberal Knowledge.
I. Faith and Reason in religious inquiry.

The Faith - Reason argument provides the context for studying the process of religious judgement in Newman's 'University Sermons' and the 'Idea'. This process deals with the origin and growth of belief in the individual. The 'Sermons' set the theological and epistemological parameters of this tension even though the solutions presented are by no means final. From the time of preaching the sermons, however, Newman never parted from his fundamental thesis. The 'Sermons' provided a lifelong theory of faith and religious judgement.

A). Faith is independent of Reason.

For Newman Faith is "independent of what is commonly understood by Reason", where "by reason is usually meant the faculty of Reason exercising itself explicitly by a posteriori or evidential methods". Faith is not "a moral quality, dependent upon reason"; it is "implicit in its acts, adopts the method of verisimilitude, and starts from religious first principles"; and it is "active" in its "perception" of the "truth".

In this way, "faith is a moral principle"; "faith depends on moral temperament", insofar as it "is created in the mind, not so much by facts, as by probabilities"; thus it is "a test of moral character". Hence, "man is responsible for his faith, because he is responsible for his likings and dislikings, his hopes and his opinions, on all of which his faith depends"; so Faith involves a risk, and is a venture, akin to the intuitive insight of genius.

Faith, then, is "the reasoning of a religious mind", or "what Scripture calls a right or renewed heart"; Newman associated this with 'holiness', 'dutifulness', or 'love', and it was the means of safeguarding faith from falling into superstition or bigotry. However, Faith is a religious principle because of the things believed, and not because of the act of believing them.


It is because of Faith's independence from Reason that Newman rejects "three (improper) senses of the word
'reason'...viz. explicit, evidential, and Secular Reason"; by explicit reason he means, "expertness in logical argument", by evidential reason, "a posteriori arguments" where "reason becomes a faculty of framing evidences", and by secular reason, "a certain popular abuse of the faculty...when it occupies itself upon religion, without a due familiar acquaintance with its subject-matter, or without a use of the first principles proper to it".14

However, there is a proper use of reason as subordinate to Faith. I explain that Newman adopts explicit reason at the service of the implicit reason of religious faith; the "exercises of reason are either external, or at least only ministrative, to religious inquiry and knowledge: accidental to them, not of their essence. That is, useful in their place, but not necessary". Reason, then, is merely subordinate and instrumental to Faith.15 We must never mistake "a critical for a creative power" in using it:16

"Reason need not be the origin of Faith, as Faith exists in the very persons believing, though it does test and verify it".17

Also, Newman applies this role of reason equally to faith and conscience.18 A rational faith "...need not mean more than that Faith is accordant to Right Reason in the abstract, not that it results from it in the particular case"; it is not "the source from which Faith springs"; in this way Newman accords "to the intellect its own excellence".19

C). Implicit and Explicit Reason.

The above summary view of Newman's position has clarified two modes of reason:

"two methods of reasoning - a priori and a posteriori; from antecedent probabilities or verisimilitudes, and from evidence, of which the method of verisimilitude more naturally belongs to implicit reasoning, and the method of evidence to explicit".20

This distinction is between two intellectual styles and not between belief and unbelief.21 And this is directly
relevant for understanding morality as well as faith, which is the work of theology.

"Inquiry and argument may be employed, first, in ascertaining the divine origin of Religion, Natural and Revealed; next, in interpreting Scripture; and thirdly, in determining points of Faith and Morals; that is, in the Evidences, Biblical Exposition, and Dogmatic Theology. In all three departments there is, first of all, an exercise of implicit reason, which is in its degree common to all men; ...This impression, made upon their minds...it is the object of science to analyze, verify, methodize, and exhibit. We believe certain things, on certain grounds, through certain informants; and the analysis of these three, the why, the how, and the what, seems pretty nearly to constitute the science of divinity". 22

1). Implicit Reason.

This is the "original process of reasoning"; it is "unconscious reasoning"; 23 and deals with what is concrete, giving "assent to the reality of... facts". 24 In comparing implicit with explicit reason he is outlining "the difference between the more simple faculties and operations of the mind, and that process of analyzing and describing them, which takes place upon reflection". 25

Implicit reason, then, "is a living spontaneous energy within us, not an art", and its processes are described as "springs of action". 26 This faculty operates "by personal endowment and by practice, rather than by rule", and as such is a skill. 27 Newman insists that this "process of reasoning is complete in itself, and independent"; 28 these characteristics have been mentioned above with regard to Faith. However, there are dangers with this form of reason, exemplified by difficulties faced by a climber. 29

2). Explicit Reason.

Explicit reason is "that process of analysing and describing" the workings of the implicit reason which "takes place upon reflection"; 30 for, "the mind reflecting on itself is able to bring" the implicit reasonings "out into some definite and methodical form"; 31 it makes the
unconscious reasoning conscious, giving the individual a "sustained consciousness...that he is reasoning", and establishing "clearness in argument"; to do this, the individual "traces out the connexion of facts, detects principles, applies them, supplies deficiencies, till he has reduced the whole into order".32

Its task is "to analyze, verify, methodise, and exhibit"; for, as "investigation, or an analysis", its task is "to compare, discriminate, judge, and decide"33. This is the procedure of logic.34 Newman had been well groomed in the importance of the science of logic under the influence of the Noetic School when he was Fellow of Oriel;35 and one of the most distinguishing aspects of this science is that it was a science of reasoning, not of discovery.36 As with implicit reason, so too, expertise in explicit reason varies "in proportion to their abilities and attainments".37

Newman is very clear on the "inconveniences and defects" of this mode of reason with its propensity "to systematize in excess".38 He especially indicates its dangers in theology, and he is concerned with "its fostering formality; its substituting a sort of religious philosophy and literature for worship and practice; its weakening the springs of action by inquiring into them; its stimulating to controversy and strife; its substituting, in matters of duty, positive rules which need explanation for an instinctive feeling which commands the mind; its leading the mind to mistake system for truth, and to suppose that an hypothesis is real because it is consistent...".39

Reason's "insufficiency" is that "no analysis is subtle and delicate enough to represent adequately the state of mind under which we believe". However, my analysis shows that explicit reason has a ministrative role in forming religious judgement, and it is necessary for implicit reason; for when reason presents the intellect with "arguments a posteriori, conviction for the most part follows... upon a number of very minute circumstances together, which the mind is quite unable to count up and methodize in argumentative form".40

The discussion of Faith and Reason is the theological context for Newman's epistemological distinction between implicit and explicit reason.41 The next section explains his rejection of Liberalism's use of explicit reason.
2. Liberalism and the usurpation of reason.

This section explains Newman's rejection of Liberalism, and its usurpation of reason, with its exclusive focus on the argument of Benevolence as determinative of morality. Newman complements this with his argument of Justice. I conclude the section with a clarification of Newman's argument by distinguishing explicit reason, implicit reason and the sense of duty.


Newman pursued a lifelong opposition to Liberalism. In the 'Apologia' Newman offers a short history of Liberalism in his day, as well as a synthesis of its beliefs. He synthesised his epistemological concerns with Liberalism in eighteen propositions; he understood the liberal vision of the exaltation of reason as an illusion which transformed the scientific ideal of reasoning into a philosophical theory of mind. This form of liberal religion, deformed natural and revealed religion; it can be explained under three categories: the view of humanity, the view of the deity, and the view of human fulfillment.

Liberalism looks at the brighter side of Religion where "benevolence is the chief virtue"; this reflects a rationalist approach; and includes a sceptical attitude to authority; and gives private judgement central place.

Liberalism's view of the deity reduces faith to a limited kind of reason that discovers the deity through evidence, thereby reducing it and obedience to abstract principle.

Finally, Liberalism claims that humanity's fulfillment is tied to the primacy of useful goods; Newman rejected this utilitarianism as the extension of rational principles into social life.

Newman rejected Liberalism because it lacked final religious answers and, being unable to fulfill human aspirations, it deformed the human religious potential. Although there was much in Liberalism that was "good and true", its half truths opposed religion; Newman resisted its glorification of the abstract at the price of concrete reasoning, especially in religion.
B). The Usurpation of Reason.

This section explains more precisely what Newman understood as "the usurpation of Reason in morals and religion"; I examine reason's proper context of operation in terms of Benevolence and Justice, in contrast to liberalism's view of humanity and deity. (I examine human fulfillment later in Newman's liberal knowledge).

1). The moral sense is not the whole truth.

The moral sense is the faculty of explicit reason in religious inquiry, and is distinct from the sense of duty. Newman's concern is that if the moral sense is used exclusively in religious inquiry it cannot encompass "the whole truth"; its reductive rationalism usurps religion because it allows reason to be an "independent authority in the field of morals and religion"; this occurs by "reasoning from wrong principles, principles unsuitable to the subject matter reasoned upon". Hence, we are "in danger of being led away into a bottomless liberalism of thought"; and this exemplifies "some of the lineaments of the ethical character which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from the religious principle". Liberalism tends to replace assent with inference and reduce realities to mere abstractions.

2). The argument of Benevolence.

Liberalism's exclusive emphasis upon abstraction resulted in a defense of the "absolute unmixed benevolence of the Divine Government". This reasoning is "an a priori argument founded on an appeal to a supposed instinct in our nature"; from the goodness of human nature "accordingly we are compelled to attribute God's whole government to benevolence". This results in a "superficial view of human nature".

Newman's celebrated portrait of the gentleman offers "an illustration of the ethical temperament of a civilized age" in the "substitution of moral sense or taste for conscience"; we become "victims of intense self contemplation" of our own "moral consistency", thereby "making us our own centre". And the sanction of the sense of duty is reduced to a taste or sentiment:
"the tendency of the intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming".23

Explicit reason tends to deprive the conscience of "its intrinsic authority, and to rest it upon a theory of present expediency", making itself "the court of ultimate appeal in religious disputes, under the pretence of affording a clearer and more scientifically arranged code than is to be collected from the obscure precedents and mutilated enactments of the conscience".24

Hence, "the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but taste";25 virtue becomes beauty, being the merely "graceful in conduct";26 and vice is "a deformity";28 it is "evil because it is unworthy ", and what "pains";28 and "sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature".29 In this liberalism, then, "nothing is left but to pay homage to what is more upon the surface";30 the philosophical religion of liberalism is a mere "hollow sepulchre".31

This "embellishment of the exterior is almost the beginning and end of philosophical morality"; it "aims at being modest rather than humble"; it becomes "the motive principle of the soul", and "the very staple of the religion and morality". Pride is the enemy of religion because it leads to superstition in the ignorant, and scepticism in the educated.32

This pride is described as "wilfullness", manifest in a "perverseness of mind..which shows itself in a reluctance absolutely to relinquish its own independence of action, in cases where dependence is a duty".33 It is a "wilful resistance to God's will", albeit by a "limited and discretionary obedience";34 and is a "deference to our own moral judgement".35 And this "pervasive will easily collects together a system of notions to justify itself in its obliquity", which results in the "removal of true religious principle".36

3).The counter-argument of Justice.

Newman's counter argument against Liberalism defends the argument of Justice as essential to morality. Newman argues that the claim for the infinite, unmixed
benevolence of God as the "original and absolute principle of the moral law", is "nothing but an assertion, and will not stand examination".\textsuperscript{37} He accepts that "the instinct of justice, implanted in us, tends to general good - good on the whole";\textsuperscript{38} but it "does not tend to universal good, the good of each individual; and nothing short of this can be the scope of absolute and simple benevolence", as the "system of Divine Governance".\textsuperscript{39}

Newman claims he is arguing from the facts; we "observe what the world teaches us, in matter of fact, concerning the light in which sin is regarded by our Governor and Judge", for "the visible consequences of single sins" (i.e."incalculable misery" etc,) furnishes "some foreboding of the full and final judgement of God upon all we do" in "an after punishment".\textsuperscript{40}

This argument is combined with a more theoretical comment on freedom:

"For our very consciousness of being free, and so responsible, includes in it the idea of an unchangeable rule of Justice, on which the judgement is hereafter to be conducted; or, rather excludes, as far as it goes, the notion of a simply benevolent governor".\textsuperscript{41}

Newman argues that philosophically the argument of benevolence is misplaced since it is an "arbitrary arrangement of knowledge": it undertakes "to assign and fix, as a matter of fact, the real, primary and universal principles which guide the acts of the mind", from "a knowledge of merely one or two characteristics of His mode of acting".\textsuperscript{42}

His counter argument "in behalf of the intrinsic authority of the notion of justice", appeals to the authority of conscience as natural to us. The "notion of duty to an Unseen Governor", is "implied in the very authoritativeness with which conscience dictates to us (a notion which suggests to the mind that there is, in truth, some object more 'desireable in its own nature' than 'the general happiness' of mankind - viz. the approbation of our maker)".\textsuperscript{43}

Newman rejected the exclusiveness of the Benevolence argument, and combined the principle of benevolence with that of the "notion of duty" on which the argument of Justice is based.\textsuperscript{44}
He proposed a complementarity and a hierarchy between the notions in attempting "to combine the notion of both in their separate perfections, as displayed in the same acts"; but "justice is a primary notion in our minds, and does not admit of resolution into other elements." In my third chapter I explain the complementary relation between these two distinct aspects of the "indivisible" act of conscience.


In opposing Liberalism, Newman at times confuses the distinction between legitimate explicit reason, and illegitimate secular reason which excludes the sense of duty, and between the process of implicit reason and the instinct of the sense of duty. The following remarks are a clarification of these distinctions.

A. Secular reason and explicit reason.

First, the distinction between Benevolence and Justice reflects the distinction between the moral sense and the sense of duty, the latter introducing the religious dimension to the former.

Our "instincts of justice" constitute "the authoritativeness with which conscience dictates to us"; these are the "injunctions" of conscience, and is what Newman means by "man's instinctive judgement upon his own guilt, and his foreboding of punishment"; this is the sense of duty.

The "notion of duty to an Unseen Governor" is "implied" in the instincts of the sense of duty; and "justice" is a "primary notion" because "our very consciousness of being free, and so responsible, includes in it the idea of an unchangeable rule of justice, on which the judgement is hereafter to be conducted".

The sense of duty introduces the religious sense of God to our reasoning. Newman's rejection of "philosophical morality" is precisely because of "the substitution of moral sense or taste for conscience", (as the sense of duty). There is a "tendency of the intellectual culture" of the moral sense to "swallow up the fear" of the sense of duty which "implies a lawgiver and judge"; in so doing it deprives it of "its intrinsic authority" by resting...
upon an abstract "theory of present expediency". The exclusive use of the moral sense is described as "a godless intellectualism", which is "apart from religious principle". 51

Conscience, then, "which intimates a Law-giver" is "superseded by a moral taste or sentiment, which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our nature" as "a standard of life and morals"; this "standard" presumes to replace the role of "conscience in morals" with that of "wisdom in philosophy". This is "secular Reason". 52

Newman distinguishes the abstract reasoning of the moral sense, (the Benevolence argument), from the sense of duty, which upon reflection, introduces the religious dimension to morality, (the Justice argument). The moral sense is inadequate when it excludes the religious instinct of the sense of duty.

However, Newman at times confuses an illegitimate "secular reason" with the legitimate explicit reason of the moral sense. I have explained that Newman associates the exclusion of the sense of duty with "wilfullness" and pride: when the moral sense is understood as "secular reason" this is legitimate. However Newman explains that the "perverse will easily collects together a system of notions to justify itself"; 53 it is important to understand that this does not imply a rejection of the legitimate use of explicit reason, manifest in his view of liberal knowledge.

B. The sense of duty, implicit reason and intention.

1. The sense of duty and moral sense.

In chapter three I explain that the sanction of the sense of duty does not determine the content of moral judgement; the content is only determined by the implicit reason; and I explain that the instinct of the sense of duty is distinct from the "instinctive recognition of the immutable difference in the moral quality of acts", upon which the implicit reason makes its judgement. 54 These distinctions are also present in the 'Sermons'.

Newman describes "Conscience" as "the sanction of Natural Religion" and the "rule of Morals". 55 As a "sanction" it presents an "obligation of acting", and is a "sense of duty". 56 This is tied to a "surmise of a
judgement to come", that is, to "the presentiment of a future life, and a judgement to be passed upon present conduct".57 It "implies a relation between the soul and something exterior" as "superior to itself", and as a "supreme authority", that is, "a principle exterior to the mind to which it is instinctively drawn";58 the "dictates" of this instinctive "inward monitor" demand "our obedience".59

Conscience is also a "rule of morals"; it "implies a difference in the nature of actions", so that obedience to conscience "is attended by a continually growing expertness in the science of Morals".60

2. The instinctive recognition of moral qualities.

My analysis in chapter three will explain that conscience "as a rule of morals" is the abstraction of the moral sense from the instinctive recognition of moral qualities, for example acts of cruelty. However, in Sermon xii, Newman confuses this instinct with the instinct of the sense of duty, or "Love", (as explained below); he explains that, acting "spontaneously and as an instinct", it "will cause the mind to recoil from cruelty..".61

It is this confusion which causes him to think that "the obscure precedents and mutilated enactments of the Conscience "can lead to a "scientifically-arranged code"; (by "Conscience", here, he means the instinct of the sense of duty, whose "intrinsic authority" he is comparing to the "theory of present expediency", that is the abstractions of the moral sense).62 My third chapter distinguishes clearly between the instinct of the sense of duty and the instinctive recognition of moral qualities; it is only by abstraction from the latter that the science of morals is constructed.

3. Implicit reason.

Also, there is a confusion in the 'Sermons' between the sanction of the sense of duty, which is an instinct, and the operation of implicit reason. The confusion arises in the same sermon:
"Nay, so alert is the instinctive power of an educated conscience, that by some secret faculty, and without any intelligible reasoning process, it seems to detect moral truth wherever it lies hid, and feels a conviction of its own accuracy."

The context of the sermon makes it clear that by "Conscience" he means the sense of duty; for he identifies the "usurpations of the Reason" with those who "rejected the supreme authority of the law of Conscience", that is "God's voice within". And in a footnote to the third edition of 1871, Newman explains that "Conscience... can detect moral truth" in the sense of being "an implicit act of reasoning". My analysis in chapter three distinguishes the instinctive sanction of the sense of duty from implicit reason; for implicit reason is "an act of reasoning" upon the instinct of the sense of duty as well as upon the instinctive recognition of moral qualities; because it depends on the "moral character" of the subject, it is "the faculty by which we know the truth... as a moral perception".

4. Sense of duty as intention.

Newman's argument from the sanction of the sense of duty implies "God" as our "Great Governor and Judge"; hence it is the "essential principle and sanction of Religion in the mind". In my third chapter I argue that the function of the sense of duty is to introduce a motive or intention to the operations of the moral sense; and there is evidence of this in these texts. First:

"a mere moral strain of teaching duty and enforcing obedience fails in persuading us to practice... because it does not urge and illustrate virtue in the Name and by the example of Our Lord."

The sense of duty introduces the motive or intention of carrying out duty "towards a Divine Agent", rather than "towards a divine principle" (resulting from mere abstraction). Secondly, in explaining "Justice as a Principle of Divine Governance", resulting from the instinctive sense of duty, his emphasis is upon the intention introduced:
"we must never say that an individual is right, merely on the ground of his holding an opinion which happens to be true, unless he holds it in a particular manner; that is, under these conditions, and with that particular association of thought and feeling, which in fact is the interpretation of it".69

Newman's emphasis is that although a conclusion is "abstractedly true" the person holding it may be "wrong in his mode of holding it"; by this he means "the position in which" the person has chosen "to view it". It refers to his "state of mind".70

The context of the sermon makes it clear that Newman is opposing the abstract reasoning of benevolence to the "notion of duty to an Unseen Governor", insofar as "justice is a primary notion in our minds" and "an original principle of human nature"; and this is essential to our understanding of freedom and responsibility, for "our very consciousness of being free, and so responsible, includes in it the idea of an unchangeable rule of justice".71 Newman, then, is identifying the sense of duty, (with its implications for freedom and responsibility), with intention or motive.

This is also apparent from his explanation that "Holiness, dutifulness or love... is the eye of faith, the discriminating principle...".72 Here he is putting a Christian interpretation onto the experience of sanction; that is the sanction is notionally understood as being not only from God in terms of Natural Religion, but it is also understood as being from the redeeming Christ in terms of Revealed Religion.

This is clear from a closer analysis of his meaning of "Love" being "the safeguard of Faith". In saying that "we believe because we love" Newman explains in a footnote to the 1871 third edition that "this means, not love precisely, but the virtue of religiousness, under which may be said to fall the pia affectio, or voluntas credendi".73

However, in a theological paper of 1853, Newman explained that the "pia affectio, or voluntas credendi" is "determining and commanding the intellect to believe".74 In chapter three I explain that this is the same as the illative judgement after deliberation upon the premisses and evidence; and it entails a passive role of the will,
which I claim reflects the "principle of Love acting... spontaneously and as an instinct". When Newman says that "we believe because we love", he means it as the intention with which Faith operates.

At the end of sermon xii, he explains "Love" as "the Safeguard of Faith" by saying that faith "acts, because it is Faith; but the direction, firmness, consistency, and precision of its acts, it gains from love". In this sense faith "takes its character from the moral state of the agent", for "right Faith is an intellectual act, done in a certain moral disposition". He understands "Love" as "justifying faith", that is "fides formata charitate". In other words, "Love" does not constitute the content of the judgement of faith, of the "perception" of "Truth", but is the motive, or intention, of faith, reflecting the will of the subject.

Newman's defense of "Love" as the "Safeguard of Faith" is simply giving a christian interpretation to the sanction of the sense of duty understood as motive or intention. "Holiness, dutifulness or love", or "religious obedience" is the "eye of faith", or "the discriminating principle" of faith, because it enables faith as "an intellectual act" to be "done in a certain moral disposition". This "moral disposition" is the intention or motive brought to bear upon the content of faith, (determined by the implicit reason); in Natural Religion it entails a religious intention in the sanction of the sense of duty; in Revealed Religion it entails a christian intention in the sanction of the sense of duty.

In conclusion, Newman's opposition to Liberalism demands a clarification of two important points; first, "secular reason", (excluding the religious sanction of the sense of duty), is distinct from the abstraction of explicit reason, (encompassing the sense of duty). Secondly, the instinct of the sense of duty is distinct from the implicit reason which characterises Faith.

Newman's epistemological and a theological reserves about explicit reason are manifest in the rejection of implicit reason and the sense of duty. His view of Liberal knowledge overcomes the former; and his view of Nature and Grace shows that the latter is "not necessary". I now examine Newman's view of the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace.

In this section I explain Newman's understanding of the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace. This is the basis for overcoming his theological reservation: by clarifying the tension between the knowledge of explicit reason and religion I show that the moral sense can encompass the religious sense of duty.


1). Newman's introspection.

Newman's introspection was characterised by the Evangelicals and Tractarians preaching the depravity of the times; they stressed inner holiness, and encouraged discipline of the heart and will. His early "mistrust of the reality of material phenomena" was combined with "the thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator".

Newman rejected the assumptions of Locke about the senses' capacity to accurately perceive material reality, and the authority of reason. Newman had confidence in the senses' capability to communicate reality to us, as a sort of phenomenological base, but what they communicated was not the most important reality:

"The senses convey to the mind 'substantial truth', in so far as they bring home to us that certain things are, and in confusion what they are. For, in whichever respect, whether as in substance or by a shadow, the blind man knows the objects of sight, in the same are those things, in 'which eye has not seen, nor ear heard,' apprehended by us now, 'in a glass darkly', per speculum, in aenigmathe."

There is an epistemological reserve in Newman that is tied to the structure of mental operations. And Newman saw the influence of the Fall in the structure of our minds; for "we can have no real apprehension of the doctrine of our corruption, till we view the structure of our minds, part by part; and dwell upon and draw out the signs of our weakness, inconsistency, and ungodliness,
which are such as can arise from nothing else than some strange original defect in our moral nature.7

The workings of the mind manifests the disobedience of our "sluggish and inert.. corrupt nature" before God; it reveals "some true notion of the depths and deceitfulness of the heart"; and without obedience to God,"we are groping in the dark".8 This constitutes his theological reserve about explicit reason; for man's "perverse will easily collects together a system of notions". The exclusive use of system rejects implicit reason and results in the "removal of true religious principle", that is the sense of duty.9

However, Newman's understanding of the harmony between Nature and Grace allowed this theological reserve to be overcome, (explained below). This manifests Newman's wariness of the spiritual introversion of Evangelicalism, and its openness to subjectivism.10

2). The conflict between Nature and Grace.

Newman holds that the usurpation of reason is the result of Original Sin; for although "reason.. is God's gift", so are the passions; and since the time of Adam, "passion and reason have abandoned their due place in man's nature, which is one of subordination, and conspired together against the Divine light within him, which is his proper guide. Reason has been as guilty as passion here. God made man upright, and grace was his strength; but he has found out many inventions, and his strength is reason".11

This "intellectual counterfeit" of religion, the exclusive use of explicit reason, "appeals to what is in nature, and it falls under the dominion of the old Adam", and as such it "cannot dissuade men from vice".12 In it there is nothing which does not "directly or indirectly minister to corrupt nature and the powers of darkness".13 In this view, Newman deals not with "the natural man", but rather the "man in rebellion" after the introduction of "moral evil into the world".14

An inescapable trait of the Fall, is the wilfulness of the explicit reason.15 However, this "wilfull resistance to God's will", due to the "deference to our own moral judgement", in itself only makes the "character unamiable, without stamping it with guilt" in a personal
sense.\textsuperscript{16} Newman's remarks emphasised "wilfulness .. as a natural principle of disorder";\textsuperscript{17} it resulted from the Fall, and was characterised by a "limited and discretionary obedience".\textsuperscript{18} Certainly this can become morally culpable when the limited and discretionary obedience results in "the removal of true religious principle"; but my analysis argues that Newman understood that this is "not a necessary result".\textsuperscript{19} This is due to the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace.

3). The harmony between Nature and Grace.

Newman explains that "the illuminative reason and true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can aspire in the way of the intellect"; and he acknowledges that this "perfection of the intellect... the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things... has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things".\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the Fall, in terms of "Natural Theology.. a Divine influence moves the will" of man; for, "divine truth is not something separate from Nature, but it is Nature with a divine glow upon it".\textsuperscript{21} Newman considers nature as the indispensable basis for resolving problems at the supernatural level: "Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each other".\textsuperscript{22}

Newman's view of the Fall does not result in a truncated alienation of man from God. "In spite of our original corrupt nature, the essential freedom and accountableness of our will" remains: "The fall of Adam did not abolish it, nor do the provisions of Gospel-mercy supersede it".\textsuperscript{23} For "Divine Grace, to use the language of Theology, does not by its presence supersede nature"; rather, "we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature and directing it towards aims higher than its own".\textsuperscript{24}

Newman understands this influence in a qualitative way. Grace works in and through Nature. Nature, as "God's instrument", is "inspired by heavenly grace", to seek "what is beyond nature" by the aid of its "inward power". The intellectual act of faith when perfected by Grace, "remains what it is in itself.. but it becomes changed in its quality, as being made spiritual".\textsuperscript{25}
Newman adopted the Catholic doctrine of Uncreated Grace, understanding Grace as the gift of God Himself operating within us as "Divine Agent" and "person". This "inward presence", or "indwelling of God within us, whether in the way of nature or of grace", is identified as being the Father, Son and Spirit, or God through the Spirit. Newman's lectures on Justification were an attempt to correct errors in understanding grace by reconciling different tensions, of Protestant and Catholic tradition, within the doctrine of Uncreated Grace. His doctrine of justification is tied to the doctrine of Uncreated Grace, since God justifies us and sanctifies us by His indwelling. It is "not faith, as say the Protestant schools, nor renewal, as say the Roman", but the Divine Presence which justifies.

And just as the Fall did not fully ruin the workings of nature, nor does Grace restore its full innocence. However, Grace enables us to be obedient to God's command discerned in the sense of duty:

"when then we are called to what is supernatural...those extraordinary aids from Heaven are given us, with which obedience becomes possible".

"Faith is a supernatural principle", with the help of grace. And the intellectual act of Faith is "kept in the narrow path of truth by the Law of dutifulness which inhabits it, the Light of heaven which animates and guides it". Here Newman is showing that the intentionality of the "Law of dutifulness" is inspired by divine grace, for it is the "New Life and not the natural reason, which leads the soul to Christ"; that is, "the divinely enlightened mind sees in Christ the very Object whom it desires to love and worship".

Newman's doctrine combines two traditional aspects of the doctrine of grace. First, faith is a human choice entailing an assent of the intellect with a consent of the will; and second, faith is a gift of God rendered supernatural by the inward illumination of grace. He fully acknowledges the "real sufficiency" of the "aids" of divine grace, as well as "the responsibility of those in whom they fail".

Newman also emphasises that there is inherent value in the natural operation of the abstractions of the mind.
There is an "important aid which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will"; the workings of explicit reason, then, are "a match for the besetting power of sensuality", insofar as "it expels the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect". In this procedure, we "employ nature against itself". That is, we can employ the harmonious relation of nature to grace against any conflict therein, even though "it is not the cause or proper antecedent of any thing supernatural", but is merely "materially good". And it is important, again, to note that although these "intellectual employments" may be "from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality", such "is not a necessary result.. a danger which may be realized or may be averted".34 Newman understands this achievement as "the first step" in effecting "the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature". The harmony between Nature and Grace clarifies the relation between intellectual and moral perfection.35


Newman's concern was that the moral sense alone led to abstraction being the beginning and end of religious and moral inquiry; hence, its good work of overcoming sensuality results in pride. That is, "intellectualism.. acts, if left to itself, as an element of corruption and debility".36 However, Newman's understanding of Nature and Grace supplies the context for a more positive view of the moral sense: its dangers are not necessary and are avoidable.37 I now examine the constructive role of the moral sense. First, I explain that its capacity for truth is at the service of religion, and secondly, I explain the action of the intellect upon moral perfection.

1). "To see things as they are, to go right to the point".

The abstraction of the moral sense enables us "to see things as they are, to go right to the point";38 it seeks what is objectively true. It is "an acquired faculty of judgement".39 It presents a "subjective reflection of the objective truth", and lets us reach "true results, as
far as they go, yet at the same time separate and partial. Its function is "to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it." Newman says that the moral sense "professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in duty"; the point is that "its function is intellectual culture." However, this does not exclude allowing the moral sense to turn its attention to matters of "pastoral instruction and moral duty", dealing with "moral and social teaching"; this is explained in the next section.

The power of this faculty of judgement enables us "to seize the strong point" in any inquiry; its "province of judgement" include "religion" and "ethics". This is an abstract judgement whereby the intellect grasps reality in its own rational way. And this constitutes its "servicableness to religion". When in harmony with religion the "cultivated mind" has "its roots in faith and love", In itself "there is nothing really religious in it"; but when "liberal knowledge" is pursued to its "furthest extent and its true limit", it will lead "to the Eternal and Infinite, to the intimations of conscience and the announcements of the Church".

This understanding of the moral sense is far from the "Godless intellectualism" which Newman associated with Liberalism. The moral sense is able to deal truthfully, in abstraction, with ethics, and point us beyond ourselves in the service of religion.

2). "The action of our intellectual upon our moral nature".

Newman's concern with the moral sense pointed to the danger of pride: in seeing the moral sense as a "match for the besetting power of sensuality", Newman feared it "may be from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality". This is concretised in the separation of knowledge from virtue with the resultant claim that knowledge, (the moral sense), "has no tendency .. to mend the heart". That is why Newman explained that "it is a real mistake to burden it with virtue or religion as with the mechanical arts".

However, there is a constructive role for the moral sense in religion and morality. This lies in "the action of our intellectual upon our moral nature", operative in the realm of Nature as well as Grace.
A. Knowledge is distinct from virtue.

Newman's negative view is that "knowledge is one thing, virtue is another", the former being "absolutely distinct" from the latter. This reflects the distinction between knowledge as its own end and knowledge that is useful, explained in the next section; the former is practically involved with the latter. Although the moral sense "taken by and in itself.. as little mends our hearts as it improves our temporal circumstances", nonetheless, "it is ever so much the means or the condition of both material and moral advancement".

This constructive role of the moral sense is manifest in dealing with 'virtue' and 'conversion'.

B. Virtue and conversion.

Newman describes the intellectual knowledge of the moral sense as a "substantial good"; and this "substance has a shadow inseparable from it, viz., its social and political usefulness". This clearly entails moral duty. And Newman understands "the strict performance of our duty in every relation of society" as "the cultivation of virtue". Hence, the moral sense has a bearing on virtue; this seems to be the meaning of claiming that knowledge is "the means or the condition of both material and moral advancement". The relation between the moral sense and virtue is clarified in Newman's distinction between 'ordinary' and 'transcendent' virtue.

1. Ordinary and transcendent virtue.

This distinction reflects the distinction between "the virtues of nature and the virtue of christianity". The ordinary virtues of nature reflect the intellectual knowledge of the moral sense, being tied to "principles which avowedly direct the science of morals to present beneficial results to the community"; thus morals becomes "drawn out into system"; and is a "shallow philosophy".

"Transcendent virtue" does not limit itself to the superficial operations of "probity of conduct and courtesy of manners", but "addresses itself to an unseen tribunal". I have explained that this "unseen tribunal"
constitutes the notional understanding of the experience of the sanction of the sense of duty, which entails the intention of the subject; hence transcendent virtue is characterised by its religious intention or motive.

Ordinary virtue has the same problem as the moral sense with the "perverse freedom of ...will"; however, I have explained that 'wilfulness' is not necessarily moral evil. On the other hand, transcendent virtue, acknowledges the sense of duty and enjoins on the individual "a certain ethical character". True virtue, then, is "the special elevation of Christian holiness", manifesting a Christian motive.

In order to understand the positive role of the moral sense with regard to virtue it is important to note that Newman describes the ordinary and transcendent virtue as "the same in nature", although the transcendent virtue is "immeasurably higher" than the ordinary virtue. Newman's distinction, then, "between natural and spiritual excellence" is not the details of conduct; rather, it is that the sense of duty gives an intentionality to the dictates of the moral sense, entailing a religious integration of the duty by the individual character.

Newman's purpose is not to deny a role for the moral sense in the pursuit of virtue, but to put it in its proper context. His skill lies in holding them in a balanced tension. The tension between moral sense and the sense of duty is concretised in the distinction between 'ordinary' and 'transcendent' virtue. In his sermon, 'Evangelical Sanctity the Completion of Natural Virtue', Newman clearly acknowledges this tension and the need for balance when he explains the duties incumbent upon 'ordinary' and 'transcendent' virtue:

"duties are often divided into religious, relative, personal; the characteristic excellence in each of those departments of virtue being respectively faith, benevolence and justice, and temperance. Now in Christianity these three are respectively perfected in hope, charity, and self-denial, which are the peculiar fruits of the 'spirit' as distinguished from the ordinary virtue".

Newman emphasises the importance of maintaining a healthy balance in the inherent tension:
"It is indeed comparatively easy to profess one side only of moral excellence, as if faith were to be all in all, or zeal, or amiableness; whereas in truth, religious obedience is a very intricate problem, and the more so the further we proceed with it. The moral growth within us must be symmetrical, in order to be beautiful or lasting".  

The "moral excellence" of "transcendent virtue" is characterised by "religious obedience"; Newman insists that this accompanies the abstract reasoning of the moral sense. The moral sense and the sense of duty are needed for "moral growth" to be "symmetrical". The "religious obedience" is what Newman understands by "Love" as the "eye of faith"; and this constitutes the christian motive or intention which is brought to bear upon the content determined by the moral sense.

2. The moral sense and conversion.

This influence of the moral sense on virtue constitutes "the action of our intellectual upon our moral nature". The "first step" which philosophers have "to effect in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature, is his rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state". Hence, "in subduing our evil nature, the first steps alone are in our power".

The moral sense does not have to be under the "dominion of the old Adam", and "drawn down" to indulgent self-contemplation. It can include the sense of duty; and with the "real sufficiency" of divine aid it can serve religion by being "rooted in faith and love".

This positive view of the relation between the moral sense and moral perfection overcomes Newman's theological reserve. Also, it points to the importance of his view of liberal knowledge which overcomes his epistemological reserve; this is examined in the next section.

Section one outlined the tension between Faith and Reason as the theological context for understanding Newman's use of implicit and explicit reason. Section two examined the usurpation of explicit reason in religious inquiry and explained Newman's theological and epistemological reserves about the use of the moral sense. Section three resolved Newman's theological reserve by explaining the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace. In this final section his epistemological reserve is overcome by analysing the comprehensive nature of philosophical, or liberal, knowledge. I explain the practical relevance of this knowledge for moral duty, and the value of its abstract reasoning for religion in terms of Theology, the gift of Wisdom, and overcoming error.

A). Philosophical knowledge and Liberal education.

In 'The Idea' Newman explains the purpose of a university in offering a liberal education.¹ "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge" celebrates "the philosophy of an imperial intellect";² this is centred on the explicit reason. For Newman "all knowledge is a whole"; and "we cannot separate off portion from portion... except by a mental abstraction"; "to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth".³ He distinguished religion, morality, and the intellect, and maintained each in tension with the other. His anti-liberal stance was characterised by being anti-rational, but not anti-intellectual.⁴

1). The "philosophical habit of mind".

A. The whole circle of truth.

Newman's holistic approach does not reduce education to quantitative knowledge; he deals the "whole circle of truth".⁵ This is to do with a "habit of viewing" as a qualitative act, reflecting the integrity of knowledge as truth, since "truth means facts and their relations". This "habit of viewing", or "vision" denotes the cognitive acts whereby we have a rational perception of reality, combining reality with the subject's act of knowing it.⁶
The "human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance"; rather we "progress towards mastering the whole" by the "partial views or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object", and forms a "systematising of them". Newman's central interest was not this abstract truth, but the concrete truth perceived precisely as a whole by the implicit reason; explicit reason is at the service of implicit reason in religious and moral judgement.

B. The enlargement of mind.

1. A formative power of system.

Newman's vocabulary manifests the qualitative nature of this process: it is the "philosophical habit of mind", or the "enlargement of mind". It is "not to load the memory" with "undigested knowledge"; rather, "it is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own".

Liberal knowledge is "a digestion of what we receive into the substance of our previous state of thought", so that "there is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another...and a systematising of them". Illumination occurs when "knowledge...is acted upon, informed,..impregnated by Reason", as a perfection of the mental power of judgement.

2. Knowledge and reflection.

The "enlargement of the mind" is independent of, but not separate from, specific subjects. For "knowledge..is the indispensable condition of expansion of the mind, and the instrument of attaining to it". Newman describes it as "that Architectonic Science"; but he does not intend some separate science. It is a capacity for "comparison and discrimination" that "takes place upon reflection". However, the "enlargement" cannot be reduced to a well-trained mind separate from specific subject matter. Newman claims an independence of the "enlargement" from its subject matter without establishing unqualified separation.
3. Abstract vision of reality

The "enlargement" is attempting to offer an abstract and unified vision of reality, by grasping the "whole truth"; at the same time it seeks to understand and formulate the relationship between the various "partial views or abstractions" by creating some "methodical form". This could be scientifically developed into metaphysics or logic.16

The focal point of Newman's philosophy is the person; this determines the function of explicit as well as implicit reason. Philosophy must be a function of the individual person, reflecting the individual vision of reality, and being hinged on interior personal thought.17

It is an "acquired illumination", a "personal possession", an "inward endowment", and "something individual and permanent". The enlargement of mind "implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character".18 I have explained the relevance of this abstract reasoning for personal religion and virtue.19

I now explain the relevance of abstract explicit reason for practical moral duty and then for religion in relation to theology.

2). The practical usefulness of philosophical knowledge.

The knowledge of 'enlargement' is "an end in itself", being "self sufficient and complete"; it is "considered as a good", being "sought for its own sake".20 The celebrated portrait of the gentleman exemplifies this.21 Newman discussed the practical effects of liberal education on the gentleman's activities, moral and social, to bridge philosophical knowledge as its own end, and its social worth or usefulness.

Liberal knowledge as "its own end", (that is, "good"), must "necessarily be useful too".22 'Useful' means "not what is simply good, but what tends to good, or is the instrument of good". Newman establishes the principle that "though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful". If "a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too"; that is, "liberal education is a real benefit to the subjects of it, as members of society, in the various duties and circumstances and accidents of life..".23
The force of Newman's argument is to make liberal education independent of any utilitarian function but not irrelevant to it. This necessary practical connection made by Newman demonstrates the positive role of the explicit reason in religious and moral inquiry. There is a necessary connection between Liberal Knowledge and Useful Knowledge, and both deal with truth:

"Truth has two attributes - beauty and power; and while Useful Knowledge is the possession of truth as powerful, Liberal Knowledge is the apprehension of it as beautiful."  

Newman's concern with Liberalism focused upon giving an exclusive place to benevolence, or beauty; he maintained in balance the Liberal Knowledge of explicit reasoning with truth as power as found in dogmatic christianity. He emphasised the role of justice alongside benevolence, that is the sense of duty alongside the moral sense. Newman maintained a balance between knowledge as its own end, and knowledge as useful. His explanation that the good generates the useful does not invalidate the distinction between them, but is intended to show a complementary tension. Newman emphasised the hierarchical superiority of liberal knowledge over useful knowledge. However, the whole circle of truths must include religion and its emphasis on truth as power, or justice, or useful for salvation.

3). Philosophical knowledge and Religion.

Behind Newman's vision of philosophical knowledge and truth lies a religious conviction in God's Providence. Between religion and knowledge there is an indivisible connection because religion forms part of the subject matter of knowledge. This claim is crucial to Newman's argument. Just as the abstract reasoning of the moral sense is essentially related to virtue, so too is there an essential relation between philosophical knowledge and religion. Newman's protestations against burdening philosophical knowledge with either virtue or religion is intended to reject the reduction of virtue and religion to abstract reasoning, as occurred in Liberalism.
There is no ultimate conflict between knowledge and religion, but a tension between insisting on the absolute value of knowledge and acknowledging that knowledge is not the highest good.29 This clarifies two functions for theology. It adopts abstract explicit reason, but always at the service of the implicit reason of religion.

A. Theology and enlargement of mind.

Theology is "the science of religion", (both natural and revealed).30 It is "one branch of knowledge", so that its omission from liberal education would be a "philosophical error", since theology belongs to the circle of truths.31 Branches of knowledge "differ in importance", and Newman gave a special place to theology.32

This is not intended to prejudice the interrelationship of the sciences, for theology "does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular science in its own particular department". Despite Newman's anti-rational bias, there is no difficulty in accepting a rational or notional theology as intellectually based.33 And the image of the circle of sciences is intended to imply interdependence and not equality.34

B. Theology and religion.

Newman argues that "religion has its own enlargement", that is by "turning to God" by means of the sense of duty.35 There is a second aspect to the "enlargement" of "religion". Faith operates not by explicit, but rather by implicit reason; it is by the use of implicit reason that "Faith.. is necessarily a principle of mental growth also".36

Adopting Newman's model of liberal knowledge, theology acknowledges both aspects of this "enlargement" of religion. It embraces the sense of duty, and is at the service of implicit reason. The complementary relation between theology and religion reflects the tension between explicit and implicit reason:
"Nothing would be more theoretical and unreal than to suppose that true Faith cannot exist except when moulded upon a Creed, and based upon Evidence; yet nothing would indicate a more shallow philosophy than to say it ought carefully to be disjoined from dogmatic and argumentative statements. To assert the latter is to discard the science of theology from the service of Religion; to assert the former, is to maintain that every child, every peasant, must be a theologian."37

My analysis now considers the role of explicit at the service of religion in examining the gift of Wisdom.

B). The Gift of Wisdom.

1). Faith and Wisdom are distinct.

"Faith and Wisdom, are distinct, or even opposite gifts".38 Faith and Wisdom reflect the distinction between implicit and explicit reason: "both Faith and Wisdom.. are intellectual habits, and involve the exercise of Reason", Wisdom being "the mature fruit of Reason".39 They are "the elementary and the perfecting gift of the Holy Spirit". Faith is "found to lie at the beginning.. of our new life"; Wisdom lies "at the end of our new life", being the "last of the gifts of the Spirit", and the "perfecting gift of the Holy Spirit"; it is the "wisdom of the perfect".40

Wisdom is never separate from Faith, and has a "spiritual nature" and "divine origin".41 The harmony between Nature and Grace is the context of Wisdom using explicit reason to pursue religious truth; for we "gain Truth by reasoning, whether implicit or explicit, in a state of nature", and "we gain it in the same way in a state of grace".42 Newman safeguards Faith by "Love" as the christian intention entailed in the sense of duty;43 this is complemented by explicit reason, which is the religious gift of Wisdom. This spiritual gift is simply to put the natural function of abstract reasoning at the service of religion.
2). Wisdom and philosophical knowledge.

A. Knowledge and system.

Wisdom is the philosophical enlargement of mind. "Philosophy, Wisdom, or Enlargement of mind, has some intimate dependence upon the acquisition of knowledge"; and "Wisdom is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of the whole course".44 In distinguishing Faith and Wisdom Newman is indicating modes of grasping truth and not grades of truth attained:

"whatever be the subject matter and the point in question, sacred or profane, faith has a true view of it, and wisdom can have no more; nor does it become truer because it is held in connection with other opinions, or less true because it is not".45

By this comprehensive "view", wisdom establishes a "firm grasp of principles", and "it communicates the image of the whole body to every separate member"; hence it is able to "form a judgement".46 This "standard of judgement", (or "acquired faculty of judgement, of clear sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom"), has "two habits": "exactness and vigour".47 The former implies being able "to see things as they are, to go right to the point" and grasp the "objective truth".48 The latter implies the "action of a formative power", by "comparison and discrimination", resulting in a "habit of viewing".49

B. Analysis and discovery.

This judgement has two functions, analysis and discovery. Faith is unable to "analyze its grounds, or to show the consistency of one of its judgements with another", because of the nature of the implicit reasoning process; this is done by Wisdom's use of explicit reason. Wisdom has to "test and verify" faith; it is a "critical" faculty, and is "ministrative" to religious judgement.50 Wisdom, then, serves Faith by determining the objectivity of its truth; for "reason has a power of analysis and criticism in all opinion and conduct, and ... nothing is true or right but what may be justified, and in a certain sense, proved by it". Wisdom, or "Philosophy", is "the
arbiter of all truth", in the sense that "the gain of... philosophy" is "to estimate precisely the value of every truth".51

Related to analysis is the function of discovery. Wisdom tries to reach "right judgement in all things"; it recognises "any common principles" through its judgements, and can "apply and dispense the Truth in a change of circumstances", because of its "firm grasp of principles".52 Explicit reason is the means of "advancing from idea to idea", that is "the power of proceeding to new ideas by means of given ones"; it is capable of "developing" one "main idea" into "its consequences", and so it "draws out a whole system". In doing this, Wisdom is "discovering" new "facts" by "the tracing out of inferences".53

This is not inconsistent with Newman's view that explicit reason is not a "creative power".54 It is not "creative" in the sense of grasping facts in the concrete. However, Wisdom can discover knowledge at the level of abstraction.

The relevance of abstract reasoning for concrete truth is developed in chapter two in terms of probability and assent, and chapter three in terms of moral law and judgement. This does not imply that explicit reason is "the origin of Faith";55 nor that moral law is the origin of moral judgement.

3). A divine gift.

Wisdom is the "enlargement" of mind in religious inquiry. It is a divine gift, like faith, but not separate from natural capabilities: "Almighty God influences us and works in us, through our minds, not without them or in spite of them". It is the last gift of the Spirit because it is the "perfecting gift", "at the end of our new life".56

The "enlargement of mind" can usurp religion by an exclusive use of explicit reason. However, explicit reason can be put at the service of implicit reason of Faith and Religion. This implies a formation in faith, for "Wisdom belongs to the perfect, and more especially to preachers of the Gospel".57 Explicit reason then is at the service of implicit reasoning. This overcomes Newman's epistemological reserve that explicit reason would exclude
implicit reason. Theology is the proper use of explicit reason for religious and moral judgement; and when practiced well, it is the gift of Wisdom. I develop this in the next two chapters by explaining Newman's theology of a religious imagination.

Both Faith and Wisdom, however, are open to error. I conclude this first chapter with a brief analysis of error in religious judgement. This establishes the basis for a fuller analysis of error and the entailed reversal of religious and moral judgement in chapter two and three.

C). The problem of error.

Newman accepts that "both Faith and Wisdom. are subject to perversion and error"; this is simply because both are "intellectual habits" which "involve the exercise of reason". 58

1). Implicit reason, error and doubt.

The implicit reason of Faith is capable of error because the antecedent probabilities upon which its judgement is made may be false: "antecedent probabilities may be equally available for what is true, and what pretends to be true". 59

Newman's argument that "Love" is the "safeguard of Faith" is unable to prevent error in the judgement made upon the antecedent probabilities; for my analysis has shown that "Love" constitutes the Christian intention brought to bear upon the judgement.

It is because of the inherent danger of error in implicit reason that Newman admits the possibility of doubt in religious faith. In the third edition to the 'University Sermons' of 1871, Newman explains that in the implicit judgement of faith we must "choose between doubt and inactivity"; he does not mean "formal doubt", but rather "a state of mind which recognizes the possibility of doubting". 60 That is why he explains that "Faith...is a presumption" which "believes...amid doubt". 61 I examine the nature of this doubt, and its significance for the reversal of the judgement of assent in my second chapter.

Explicit reason is also open to error. My analysis has shown that the merely "intellectual way" of reasoning is "favourable to the cause of error" for two reasons. First, the influence of the Fall creates a "wilfulness", or "perverseness of mind", in man which causes explicit reason to be used exclusively. This entails a rejection of the sense of duty, ("the law of conscience"), by focusing only upon "a system of notions".

Second, the use of explicit reason without implicit reason is epistemologically inadequate for the pursuit of truth. It mistakes "system for truth", supposing that "an hypothesis is real because it is consistent"; it thereby makes "general principles upon defective knowledge". This constitutes "Bigotry". It "persists, not in abandoning argument, but in arguing only in one way", and so leading to "great error". Because it has no room for implicit reason it becomes the "application of inadequate or narrow principles".

These reasons constitute Newman's epistemological and theological reserves. My analysis has shown that his understanding of the relation between Nature and Grace presents the basis for overcoming his theological reserve. And his understanding of Philosophical or Liberal knowledge presents the basis for overcoming his epistemological reserve. When the abstraction of explicit reason does not exclude the religious dictate of the sense of duty, and is open to concrete implicit reason, then it is at the service of religious and moral judgement. In this way it contributes to overcoming the implicit reason's possibility of error.

The implicit reason of Faith makes its judgement upon certain "grounds"; it is "conditional" upon these "grounds", although as assent it is an unconditional act. To help avoid error in its judgement, the implicit reason of Faith needs explicit reason to "test and verify it"; in this way the mind can "reason upon reasonings", that is, "reflect truly and accurately" upon the implicit grounds of the judgement of Faith.

In religion and morality this is the task of Theology and Wisdom. Theology uses the abstractions of explicit reason to reflect upon, test, and verify the judgements.
of implicit reason. In this task, the gift of Wisdom allows "the application of adequate principles to the state of things as we find them"; hence, "Wisdom only can apply or dispense the Truth in a change of circumstances". My second chapter examines the epistemological relation between the abstract and the concrete in terms of inference and assent; and my third chapter applies this to the relation between abstract moral law and concrete moral judgement.

Conclusion.

This chapter has studied the 'University Sermons' and 'The Idea of a University' to show that the parameters for Newman's understanding of moral judgement were set from an early stage in his writing. These parameters are constituted epistemologically by his understanding of the relation between implicit and explicit reason, and theologically by his understanding of the relation between Nature and Grace.

Section one explained the relation between implicit and explicit reason in the context of his discussion on Faith and Reason. From this base section two examined his rejection of the exclusive use of explicit reason in Liberalism; this clarified his epistemological and theological reserves about the use of explicit reason for religious and moral judgement. Section three showed that his theological reserve could be overcome by examining his understanding of the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace. Section four showed that his epistemological reserve could be overcome by examining his understanding of Philosophical or Liberal knowledge; this clarified the role of Theology for religious and moral judgement, by showing the critical function of the gift of Wisdom in testing the objectivity of implicit judgement, and in enabling it to deal with error.

Chapter two develops the epistemological relation between implicit and explicit reason in the 'Grammar'. By examining the relation of assent and inference I explain the primacy of the imagination's implicit reason in illative judgement; and I show the essential, though secondary, function of the intellect's use of explicit reason in testing its objectivity. This provides the basis for understanding moral judgement in chapter three.
Chapter Two. Judgement, Illative Sense, and Certitude.

Introduction.

This second chapter examines Newman's understanding of religious judgement by analysing the implicit reasoning of the Illative Sense, and the consequent assent of Certitude; this offers a further clarification of the necessary role of explicit reason for the imaginative judgement of implicit reason.

I first analyse the relation between implicit and explicit reason by examining the relation between assent and inference in the epistemology of certitude. Second, I explain the epistemological reliance of assent upon inference, thereby clarifying Newman's understanding of the role of the will. Third, I explain the objectivity and normativity of his proposals for illative judgement. Fourth, I relate his epistemology of judgement to the function of theology in religious inquiry. And fifth, I explore his understanding of the problem of error and doubt to clarify certitude's characteristic of immutability, and to show that certitude can be reversed.

This epistemological clarification of the religious judgement of the illative sense supplies the indispensable basis for understanding moral judgement in chapter three. My second and third chapters focus upon the 'Grammar of Assent' which presents Newman's final development of his proposals for judgement established in the 'University Sermons' and the 'Idea', (examined in my first chapter).
I. Certitude: the role of Explicit and Implicit Reason.

This section briefly explains the relation of implicit and explicit reason in the assent of certitude.¹

A. Assent and Inference.

The distinction between implicit reason and explicit reason in the 'University Sermons' is developed in the 'Grammar' as the distinction between assent and inference.

1). Conditional and unconditional.

Assent is "the absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition"; to assent to a proposition is to "acquiesce in it as true".²

Inference is "the conditional acceptance of a proposition"; and as "the object of assent is a truth, the object of Inference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude".³

Inference differs from assent insofar as the conclusion of inference is always conditional, even when "it establishes an incontrovertible conclusion on the condition of incontrovertible premisses". But an unconditional assent can be given to this inferential conclusion: "to the conclusion thus drawn, assent gives its absolute recognition". But this does not make assent the same as inference; the assent follows "immediately upon" the inferential conclusion, for "the correlative of ascertained truth is unreserved assent".⁴

2). Assent and variation in inference.

There is a variation in inference corresponding to the evidence available. These inferences, too, can elicit assent; but this does not imply a variation of the assent to the inference, but rather, "assents to a variation in inferences"; the assent is always unconditional, for inference is not entailed in recognising reasons for the assent.⁵ Newman rejected the argument that because reasoning in concrete matter never arises above probability, the assent had to vary according to the strength of the inference.⁶
Assent and inference deal with both abstract and concrete propositions. What is abstract is more suitable for inference: "the nearer the propositions concerned in the inference approach to being mental abstractions, and the less they have to do with the concrete reality, the more suitable do they become for the purposes of inference"; when "inferences are exercised on things, they tend to be conjectures or presentiments without logical force".

What is concrete is more suitable for assent: "an act of assent... is the most perfect and highest of its kind, when it is exercised on propositions, which are apprehended as experiences and images, that is, which stand for things"; and when "assents are exercised on notions, they tend to be mere assertions without any personal hold on them on the part of those who make them".

As the proposition apprehended is concrete or abstract, the assent given is real, (concrete), or notional, (abstract); and "of these two modes of apprehending propositions, notional and real, real is the stronger; I mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible. It is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is either real or is taken for real". And the mental faculty which assents to the real object is the imagination; imaginative and real assent in the 'Grammar' are identical.

Real assent is given to a concrete proposition, and this is determined by "personal experiences"; for, "without experience assent is not real". This is quite different from saying real assent is tied to the visual sense or sense experience, which is not Newman's understanding of the real; for example, the real image of God from the intimations of conscience is not visual, but nonetheless is experienced and vivid.

However, it is true that both the real and the notional, as "two modes of thought", have "one origin" in sense experience; for the "informations of sense and sensation are the initial basis of both of them; but in the one we take hold of objects from within them, and in the other we view them from outside of them; we perpetuate them as images in the one case, we transform them into notions in the other". The image is not to be confused
with a sensory picture-image; but reflects the grasp of the concrete reality of facts by personal experience.

However, real assent can also deal with abstract propositions; Newman has no hesitancy in accepting that what might be "a terse expression of abstractions in the mind of the poet" can also be "the record of experiences... piercing the heart, of a Wallace or a Tell", (referring to the "common-place" "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori"); that is, the "abstract hold" of the words can bring forth a "living image" eliciting real assent.

This process is particularly clear with Newman's first principles. They are "notions, not images, because they express what is abstract, not what is individual and from direct experience"; yet the notional assent is transformed into a real assent "when we apply our general knowledge to a particular instance of that knowledge". Also, dogma may stand "for a notion or for a thing" as it is "appropriated as a reality by the religious imagination", or "held as a truth by the theological intellect"; from the admonitions of conscience "we proceed onto the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then we image Him and His attributes in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained". These are explained more fully later in this chapter, and in chapter three.

B. The reflex assent of Certitude.

Newman distinguishes between simple and complex assent: simple assents are made "unconsciously", and "complex or reflex assents" are made "consciously and deliberately". And "the simple and reflex assent... together make up the complex act of certitude"; and "the reflex or confirmatory assent of certitude always is given to a notional proposition, viz to the truth, necessity, duty, etc, of our assent to the simple assent and to its proposition".

1). Inferential investigation.

Certitude is consequent upon an inferential investigation, because it is a "deliberate assent given expressly after reasoning". This results in "the claim of that proposition on our assent as true; it is an assent to an assent". And the objectivity of the assent is
associated with the reflex nature of the act: "let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively".26

The inferential investigation is the work of explicit reason; it constructs "a number of independent probable arguments", which in logical form is merely a series of probabilities;27 this constitutes Newman's argument of "antecedent probability".28 No process of logic can transform these probabilities into proof; the "methodical processes of inference, useful as they are, as far as they go, are only instruments of the mind".29

2). Certitude and the illative sense.

However, the mind can integrate the probabilities into a synthetic view: this constitutes Newman's argument of "an accumulation of various probabilities", whereby "we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for a certitude".30 The action of the mind which enables this "individual perception of the truth" is the Illative Sense:

"the sole and final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense".31

The judgement of the illative sense is "personal";32 for we "rightly lean upon ourselves, directing ourselves by our own moral and intellectual judgement".33 And this personal judgement is sharpened by "practice and experience".34 It is a "supra-logical judgement", which is "that real ratiocination and present imagination"; and, "while acting through" the inferences, it "reaches to conclusions beyond and above them";35 and it operates "not from propositions to propositions" as in inference, but "from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole to whole".36 It "attends upon the whole course of thought from antecedents to consequents", which is impossible for "verbal reasoning".37 By this operation "per modum unius" there is "a sort of instinctive perception of the
The judgement of the implicit reasoning of the illative Sense receives the assent of certitude; and Certitude is "an active recognition of the propositions as true", and "always is given to a notional proposition".

This is "the intellectual process by which we pass from conditional inference to unconditional assent"; the implicit reason reaches its conclusion in an intellectual and reasonable manner. The next section examines the epistemological status of the illative judgement and the assent of certitude in relation to the inferential investigation of explicit reason; this will clarify the role of the will in the assent of certitude.
2. The Epistemology of Certitude and the Will.

The epistemological difficulty of Newman's proposals for the implicit reasoning of the illative sense is that it is insufficient to justify reasoning by the appeal to personal disposition; for "our reasoning faculty" can "deceive us". My analysis explains that Newman attempted to resolve this difficulty by emphasising the necessary role of explicit reason, or inferential investigation, in reaching and maintaining the illative judgement of certitude.

The illative judgement is "foreseen and predicted rather than actually attained"; I begin my analysis by examining whether this judgement entails a gap between the inferences and the certainty which can only be bridged by a choice of the will.

A). A choice of will or an intellectual process of mind?

1). Illative judgement as a choice of the will.

Newman uses two arguments to explain the change from inference to certainty. The first is the argument of nature:

"It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural". 3

Newman explains the problem of individual failure or error in this natural function by explaining that, "an act, viewed in itself, is not wrong because it is done wrongly", for "the actual mistakes ... have no force whatever to prohibit the act itself"; in other words, if "functional disarrangements of the intellect are to be considered fatal to the recognition of the functions themselves, then the mind has no laws whatever and no normal constitution". 4

There is legitimacy in appealing to the abstract reliability of a natural function, (that is experience allows us to accept it as reliable in most cases); but it does not explain satisfactorily how subjectivism is overcome, because it a a social rather than an epistemological criterion of truth. 5
Newman's second argument in defense of the illative sense is that, because of the accumulation of probabilities, "it is impossible to doubt" the conclusion; "we should be idiots, if we did not believe it", because the conclusion "cannot be otherwise"; in this sense, the "conclusion is inevitable", and there is "a manifest reductio ad absurdum attached to the notion that we can be deceived" by the conclusion. 6

Yet this argument, too, is flawed in the sense that the absurdity of non acceptance of the conclusion is psychologically, rather than epistemologically, grounded. It may be due to a mental inconceivability rather than an evident impossibility; the abstract possibility of error is not excluded, for the mass of evidence may establish the conclusion as the only credible one, but it does not establish it as demonstratively true. 7

This change can be described as a leap, but one that is rationally defensible by the facts; 8 and this leap is made by a choice of the will. In a preparatory paper, (of 1865), for the 'Grammar', Newman explains that "certitude is not the compulsory effect of any process of argument as its proper cause... but a free act (to speak generally), just as the acts of conscience are free and depend upon our will"; this is further developed in terms of duty by explaining that "when it is a duty to be certain, one (we) must do one's (our) best to fulfill the duty". 9

The 'Grammar' adopts this language of duty, explaining that certitude "is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason". 10 Moreover, the 'Grammar' is quite "distinct" in discussing certitude as occurring after the proof of the conclusion: Newman explains "the particular mode in which the mind progresses in concrete matter" as being "from merely probable antecedents to the sufficient proof of a fact or a truth, and, after the proof, to an act of certitude about it". 11 And finally, this change from conclusion to certitude is an act made "consciously and deliberately"; 12 it results both from reasoning and choice by an act of will that is commitment. 13

The need for this choice or decision was well known to Newman, being represented by the Oriel Noetics and the Evidential School of Oxford in their canonisation of the use of explicit reason; that is, any claim to knowledge based on evidence not entailing analytically the
correctness of the claim, implies a logical gulf which has to be bridged. 14

However, it can be persuasively argued that this view where certainty entails a choice of will, conflicts with Newman's description of certitude as a "perception of a truth". 15

2). Illative judgement as an intellectual process.

Newman opposed the widespread Victorian view that held absolute certainty to be impossible, and that practical certainty was all that was attainable; the Victorian view was an indirect expression of the analytic paradigm which implied a logical gulf between inference and certainty, to be bridged by choice. 16 My analysis examines Newman's illative judgement to explain that he envisages an epistemological process of the mind rather than a leap by choice of will.

A. A process of personal evaluation.

When Newman describes the illative judgement as "a simple act, not as a process", his emphasis is that "the process is altogether unconscious and implicit"; it is "a process of reasoning" which "is more or less implicit". 17

1. The example of the expanding polygon.

Newman uses the expanding polygon and its enclosing circle to establish that the illative judgement is not a leap by choice, but an intellectual process in which no ultimate climax can be anticipated. 18 In one sense there is a leap by the will insofar as we pass from inference to conclusion; but from the point of view of the conclusion reached, looking backwards to the inferences, the qualitative change is an intellectual process rather than a leap by the will. 19

The "accumulated premisses. as a result of their combination, approach" the conclusion "more nearly than any assignable difference"; although they "do not touch it logically", it is a matter of "only not touching it". The mind cannot discern the distance between the expanding polygon and the circle, between inference and conclusion. 20

Part of Newman's argument from nature is that we must not change our experience into something it is not:

"There are those, who arguing a priori, maintain, that, since experience leads by syllogism only to probabilities, certitude is ever a mistake. There are others, who, while they deny this conclusion, grant the a priori principle assumed in the argument, and are in consequence are obliged, in order to vindicate the certainty of knowledge, to have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms, and the like, which belong to us by nature, and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself". 21

Here, Newman is making two points. First, he accepts that explicit reason only leads to probability; he accepts the premiss, but not the conclusion of the first group of people discussed; what is "abstract can only conduct to abstract", and the "inferential method" is limited to the "determination of the probable. Newman offers two reasons why "inference.. can only conclude probabilities" when "employed upon questions of fact": "first because its premisses are assumed, not proved; and secondly, because its conclusions are abstract and not concrete". 22

Newman's second point is that our experience, that is, our natural reasoning, can lead to a conclusion of certainty; but he rejects the argument of recourse to intuition.

Newman's rejection of the view that experience cannot give certainty, (either because of the view that experience only leads to probability, or because certainty has to be vindicated by intuition), implies the rejection of the need to bridge inference with the conclusion by a choice of will; that is, he rejects the argument that because the premisses do not logically entail the conclusion, there is a gap to be bridged by a leap of the will. 23
3. The personal evaluation of the inferences.

The inferences themselves are not persuasive to offer a conclusion, and Newman calls this "the bald syllogism"; the inferences, understood as logical proof, that is "when viewed abstractedly", may "seem quite insufficient for certainty"; however, they "may be conclusive when actually embodied or before the individual mind". Newman's proposal is that the personal reasoning is "the sole and final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matter"; it is this personal evaluation on the "bald syllogism" that reaches the conclusion. And this is what Newman calls "reasoning rightly", or "right judgement in ratiocination": "Certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without, by argumentative compulsion, but is an active recognition of the propositions as true".

The certainty of the conclusion reached and certitude are two different types of mental activity; "certitude is a mental state: certainty is a quality of propositions". Although the certainty and certitude coincide psychologically, Newman acknowledges the logical distinction in talking of "the reasonings which carry us on to truth and certitude".

B. The perception of the truth.

The illative judgement is a perception of the truth, rather than as a result of a leap or choice of will; Newman explains that the "objective fact... or what is called evidence, when viewed as a subject of certainty", although "changed in the order of viewing it", is "simply perceived by the mind"; that is, both inference and assent are simply perceived by the mind, although they are different when viewed in relation to the premises. This is an "individual perception of the truth"; the conclusion and the assent are not the result of a choice, just as inference is not the result of a choice; and it is effectively the unconditional acceptance.

I have shown that Newman appears to argue for a "leap" between inference and conclusion, and certitude, because
of our "duty" to be certain; and this leap of the will is in opposition to understanding the conclusion as an "individual perception of the truth". However, Newman in fact combines these two apparently contradictory understandings in explaining his proposal:

"... we have arrived at these conclusions... by the actions of our own minds, by our own individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness".32

This remark helps to clarify the nature of the change from inference to conclusion, and certitude; Newman cannot be attempting to align two contradictory views, that of individual perception of the conclusion, and that of a leap of the will. Rather he is showing that the conclusion is conditional upon the inferences.

It is "after deliberation" that the individual "goes on... to form a definite judgement" and thus "he comes to the conclusion".33 The terms "after", "goes on... to", and "comes to" are not intended to imply a chronological sequence; Newman is adamant that it is not that "reason comes first, and then comes the will and faith";34 if they did, then Newman would have to accept that it would be by a leap of the will that the change was made.

Rather, these terms have the same sense as having "a duty to be certain";35 that is, as I explained earlier, "the conclusion", or the "definite judgement upon them", (the inferences),36 are conditional upon the inferences, (the "bald syllogism"), in the sense that "by acting through them" the illative sense "reaches to conclusions beyond and above them".37

This "mental comprehension of the whole case", then, is what Newman means by the "perception of the truth"; and, it occurs "sometimes after much deliberation", but also may occur "by a clear and rapid act of the intellect". This latter mode makes the process more obviously a "perception" than a "leap"; but it must always be understood as a "deliberation", even if by a "rapid act", for Newman insists that such an act occurs "always ... by an unwritten summing-up".38
C. Certitude and the will.

1. Certitude as a free act of will.

It is mistaken to understand certitude as implying a leap of the will from the inference and conclusion. Newman explains that certitude is "a free act, just as the acts of conscience are free and depend upon our will"; this refers to the act of certitude being made "consciously and deliberately". The conscious and deliberate nature of certitude does not imply a chronological sequence. The conclusion of certainty results "after deliberation", but is not chronologically separate implying a leap of the will; so, too, certitude is deliberate and conscious, in the sense of being given to a notional proposition, and this can only be done with the use of explicit reasoning; it can only be given consciously and deliberately.

This is the sense of Newman's explanation of how "the mind progresses...to the sufficient proof of a fact or a truth, and, after the proof, to an act of certitude about it"; the phrase "after the proof" does not refer to a chronological leap of the will, but rather to the certitude's need for a propositional truth (inferentially grasped by the illative sense), to which it can give unconditional assent; "after the proof", in this case, indirectly points to the unconditional nature of the assent of certitude, which is elaborated by Newman in the subsequent sentences.

This also explains why the duty entailed with certitude does not imply a leap of the will; for when Newman explains that "it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise" certitude "at the bidding of reason", he is not intending a gap to be bridged, under obligation, between the reasoning and the certitude; rather, the duty refers to "the active recognition of the propositions as true", in the sense that the mind unconditionally assents to the conditional conclusion which it knows to be absolutely true.

In the same way, certitude is "our own individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to those conclusions"; the absolute truth of the conclusion results from the reasoning, and the duty with regard to certitude refers to the mind holding this
absolute truth unconditionally. This understanding is all
the more plausible because Newman associates this duty
"with an intellectual conscientiousness"; because of
the earnestness of mind, the absolute truth, inferentially
concluded, is accepted with unconditional assent.

2. Certitude is "one complex act".

There is no leap of the will bridging the change
between inference and conclusion, and between conclusion
and certitude; in "creating a certitude of... truth", the
mind holds this truth in "one complex act both of
inference and of assent"; for it is "the simple and reflex
assent", with the intermediate inferential investigation,
"which together make up the complex act of certitude".45
It is one act, with different stages; it is not a series
of acts bridged by leaps of the will. The inferential
conclusion is appropriated unconditionally through an
intellectual process of personal evaluation.46

As "one complex act both of inference and assent"
certitude "addresses" the mind through the intellect and
the imagination.47 The function of the intellect refers
to the use of explicit reason; the function of the
imagination refers to the use of implicit reason; however,
the implicit reason of the imagination is an intellectual
act, and the distinction of intellect and imagination
merely contrasts the abstract and the concrete mode of
reasoning by the mind.

The perception of truth by the illative judgement
occurs when what is probable becomes credible; and this
occurs when the object becomes real to the imagination,
and is grasped as real by the illative judgement. In this
way, the conclusion of certitude retains the strong sense
of reality characteristic of the (original) assent; and
certitude comes under the imagination. However, certitude
is consequent upon the inferential investigation and also,
then, comes under the intellect.48

Insofar as certitude is "apart from the means by which
I gained it", (that is, it is unconditional assent), "it
is created and maintained, not indeed without the exercise
of the reasoning faculty, but undeniably (still) not by it
alone";49 (the context makes it clear that the "reasoning
faculty" means explicit reason). In this sense, "certitude
then does not come under the reasoning faculty; but under
the imagination". Hence,

"When I make an act of certitude... I am contemplating a fact in itself, as presented to me by my imagination". 50

Newman makes it clear that in reaching certitude "even in abstract" questions, "the mind which judges of it is concrete". 51 It is because of the grasp of the imagination that Newman explains that certitude "is real as we are real"; 52 and certitude is thereby grasped by the whole person.

Certitude, then, entails inference and assent, intellect and imagination. In a paper of 1853 Newman describes certainty as the "natural spontaneous act of the mind", (which is assent), being "under the jurisdiction of the will". 53 I have already explained that this influence of the will refers to the deliberate nature of the judgement of certainty, that is, being consequent upon inferential investigation. So certainty is characterised as being both spontaneous, as an imaginative act of assent, and deliberate, as an intellectual act consequent upon inference, (that is, under the will).

3. Speculative certitude.

The lack of logical proof in Newman's proposals for certitude legitimately raises the question whether he envisages merely a practical, not a speculative, certainty. This is another form of discussing the change from inference to conclusion and certitude. He describes speculative certainty in this way:

"Speculative certainty implies -
1. an earnestness about the subject matter of it.
2. a reflex assent to our possessing a rational assent.
3. hence a deliberation, however rapid." 54

My preceding analysis of certitude as a free act of the will shows that Newman understood certitude to fulfill the above three implications of speculative certainty. The first is seen in his reference to "intellectual conscientiousness"; the second is implied in the "sense of duty to those conclusions", as explained above; and the
third in saying "we have arrived at these conclusions... by the actions of our own minds, by our own individual perception of the truth in question".55 Certitude is a speculative certainty, for "speculative certainty, to be really such, must have a truth for its subject, and it must be a conviction of that truth", that is "a conviction that a thing is actually true".56

Newman calls this "moral" certainty, for in concrete reasoning by the illative sense "... moral evidence and moral certitude are all that we can attain".57 In this, Newman is clear that certitude, or moral certainty, is not practical certainty, but speculative.

Practical certainty is made in reference to evidence that is adequate or sufficient for justifying specific action; it does not claim the absoluteness or the unconditionality of Newman's conclusion of certainty and certitude. Newman understood practical certitude as an "opinion which it is safe and wise to take as true", that is "for what is prudent in action".58 Newman is well aware that at times all we can reach is practical certainty due to the nature of the evidence;59 nonetheless, his proposals in concrete reasoning are for speculative certainty. It was precisely for limiting truth to practical certainty that Newman criticised Butler, for he felt that "the practical effect of his work was to make faith a mere practical certainty - i.e. # taking certain statements of doctrine, not as true, but as safest to act upon".60

B). The role of the will.

Here, I explain that the will does not have an active creative role in reaching certainty, but a critical role in stifling or affirming it.

1). Certitude as a free act of intellectual deliberation.

I have explained the sense of Newman's claim that certitude is a free act dependent upon the will;61 it is an act of deliberation, rather than being an act of the will bridging a gulf between the inference and conclusion, and between the conclusion and certitude. The certitude is a spontaneous act of the mind aligned with the conclusion of certainty, in the sense of being a perception of the
truth, and not a leap of the will to the conclusion and certitude. As a free (that is deliberate) act, "the doer is responsible" for the certitude;\(^6^2\) this responsibility has already been explained in terms of certitude being "the duty of each individual himself to exercise"; and this duty is "at the bidding of reason".\(^6^3\) In other words the conclusion is constraining in the sense that the certitude is not "unfounded":

"It is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusion to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called a certitude".\(^6^4\)

However, the constraint of the conclusion does not imply that the agent is compelled; the assent of certitude is free because the entire evaluation (of the inferences leading to the conclusion) is the personal work of the illative sense; the "active recognition of propositions as true",\(^6^5\) is not compelled, but is a judgement, or decision, just as the illative sense is a "power of judging and concluding".\(^6^6\)

This can be explained as saying that the 'decision that X is certain', is equivalent to 'experiencing X as certain',\(^6^7\) this is so, just as the implication of rejecting any gap between the inference and the conclusion is to say that 'the judgement that I ought to accept a proposition as true without reservation' is 'a de facto experience of it as true without reservation', in the sense that the illative judgement is identified with the actual experience.\(^6^8\)

Newman's point, then, is to distinguish between the personal constraint of the premisses upon the illative judgement's rational evaluation, from any impersonal compulsion of scientific, or logical, argument; that is, "acts of certitude" are of "a personal character" or "personal nature", relying on the active recognition of the illative judgement, and are "not the necessary effect (consequence) (impression upon the mind) of antecedants of the (a) scientific character", and so "not elicited of necessity by the intrinsic force of argument":

"Certitude then is not the passive admission of a conclusion as necessary, but the recognition of it as true".\(^6^9\)
In other words, Newman's understanding of certitude being dependent upon the will does not refer to the need for a choice by act of will to bridge the inference and assent; rather, it highlights the deliberate nature of certitude as being both free (that is un compelled), and yet also constrained (that is determined through the premisses), for it is an active personal evaluation and recognition of the proposition as true, where the judgement and experience of the truth are simultaneous. In reaching certitude, the role of the will, then, is not to construct a leap from inference to assent, but to highlight the deliberate active personal nature of the judgement and experience; that is, the certitude is not against the will, or forced. 70

Newman is emphatic that there is no leap of the will between the inference and the assent; that is, the "will cannot absolutely create" certitude, "for it is the natural and direct result of conviction", that is the spontaneous perception of the truth;71 I have explained the coherence of the deliberate and spontaneous nature of certitude.

2).Certitude and the critical role of the will.

This rejection of a creative role for the will with regard to certitude clarifies his subsequent statement that "the will can hinder that direct result taking place", that is the "certainty... is under the control of the will" in the sense that ("that is") "the will may suppress, extinguish the feeling", or "stifle it".72 The rejection of the creative role of the will disallows the sense of "hinder" as referring to the prevention of the certainty arising; for this would be the reverse form of reaching certainty and certitude by the leap of will, that is by choice, which Newman rejects. Rather, the sense of "hinder" is that of "extinguish" or "stifle": that is we can refuse to abide by the certainty we experience simultaneously with our judgement of its truth. This explanation reconciles the idea of the control of the will with the spontaneous perception of certitude.73

And just as the will may stifle the certitude, so it may affirm it, or abide by it; in either case a deliberate act of the will is engaged; and it is important to explain how this differs from the deliberate act of certitude in
the first place, as already explained. Newman holds that "the will can obstruct and stifle certainty", that is "the will may suppress, extinguish the feeling" of certainty; this means that after reaching certainty the will "can interfere between the perception of the conclusion, the judgement whether it be of opinion or conviction, and the legitimate impression" made "upon the mind".

Here Newman makes a sharp "distinction between conviction and certainty". "Conviction is the logical determination of this or any other fact. It is a decisive judgement formed on sufficient proof", that is, resulting when the inference is "demonstrated" or "really proved"; it is the "objective fact...relative to premisses... or what is called evidence", and thus "it is irreversible", for "once convinced always convinced". However, conviction can be changed into certainty "in the order of viewing it"; for certainty is "the objective fact" viewed as "absolute", not related to the premisses, and so is "a first principle and a starting point" or "a commencement", whereas the conviction, tied to its premisses, is "an ending (conclusion)". The critical role of the will is not employed in reaching the conviction or certainty since both are "simply perceived by the mind"; Newman's point is that while "the will cannot hinder an inference from premisses", that is it cannot detract from the conviction, it can disrupt the certainty given to the conviction.74

The critical role of the will is to abide by, or to stifle, the certitude reached in a spontaneous perception by the illative judgement; however, it is important to recognise that the will operates here as a consequence of certainty, and not a source of it.75

The will has a critical, but not a creative, role in certitude.76 This second section has explained Newman's understanding of the role of the will in the epistemology of certitude; it has shown that the illative judgement is an intellectual process of perception; it does not need an independent act of will to make the qualitative change from conditional inference to the unconditional assent of certitude. My next section proceeds to explain the objectivity and normativity of this epistemological process of illative judgement.
3. The Objectivity and Normativity of Illative Judgement.

A). The Objectivity of the Illative Judgement.

This section will examine the tension between the objective and the personal by explaining that the function of explicit reason is to test and verify the illative judgement of implicit reason; this function is necessary for, but secondary to, the judgement of concrete reasoning.

1). Personal reason and objective truth.

In emphasising the personal and individual nature of the illative judgement of certitude, Newman claims that "the certainty of a proposition does properly consist in the certitude of the mind which contemplates it"; and he immediately adds, that "this of course may be said without prejudice to the objective truth or falsehood of propositions". ¹

The question is whether Newman is confusing what is objectively logical with what is subjectively personal; ² Newman understood a tension and not an opposition between these. ³

It can be argued that personal judgement can also be objective in the sense that the objective truth need not be independent of human judgement. ⁴ This argument adopts Newman's explanation of "Objective Truth... as existing in itself, external to this or that particular mind", so that we hold it "as if we were contemplating what is real and independent of human judgement". ⁵

While it appears at first that Newman is establishing objective truth as "existing in itself" and "independent of human judgement", a closer reading suggests the opposite is the case. Truth is objective because it is "external", but it is "external to this or that particular mind", in the sense of not being independent of all minds, and so is personal; and we hold objective truth only "as if" it were "independent of human judgement", but in fact is not. ⁶

The viability of this second interpretation is substantiated by the context of the discussion, since Newman was opposing his views on objective truth to rationalism in which "private judgement is made everything
to us", and "Nothing is considered to have an existence except so far forth as our minds discern it". Newman wanted to hold the personal and objective in tension, rather than in opposition.

This explanation of objectivity clarifies the meaning of the text referred to at the beginning of this section; the variation in the perception of truth "according to the particular intellect which is employed upon it" does not "prejudice... the objective truth or falsehood of propositions"; that is, the claim for objectivity because the truth is "external" to specific minds which may or may not perceive the truth, is repeated in the claim of the 'Grammar' that "because not all men discriminate" the truth "in the same way" does not "prejudice" its objectivity. Newman's claim is to hold the personal and objective in tension.

2). Objectivity and explicit reason.

Newman deals with the epistemological difficulty of subjectivism in his proposals for his concrete reasoning by explaining the relation of explicit reason to the implicit reasoning of the illative judgement. In my first chapter, I explained that explicit reason was "ministrative to" the implicit reason of Faith in the sense that Newman adopted it to "test and verify it". There are two ways in which this is developed in the 'Grammar'.

A. The accumulation of probabilities.

In the inferential investigation explicit reason examines the inferences, and although none of them individually are persuasive enough for a proof, each of them individually is rationally examined from the point of view of objective truth; in this sense the accumulation of the probabilities is objectively based. For example, in experiments dealing with the laws of motion we take great care "to remove all those impediments which tend to render the conclusion erroneous".

We must carry out "investigations into the argumentative proof of things" by explicit reason; our "intellectual assents", for example to "right and wrong", "have to be tested, realized, and developed by the
exercise of ... mature judgement"; this entails the use of explicit reason to determine the objective base for the subsequent certitude. The "perception of the truth" is reached "with an intellectual conscientiousness", whereby the illative judgement is "based on right reason".

B. The coherence of the illative judgement.

The second sense of testing and verifying deals with the coherence of the implicit judgement with other data of knowledge that is objectively verifiable; explicit reason checks the epistemological validity of the illative judgement against other known data, and so is tangential in nature.

"We see a proposition to be true, when we can make it dovetail closely into our existing knowledge, and when nothing else but it will so dovetail, that is, when we have proofs of it; for a proof is a necessary inference from facts, such that it just fits the proposition they are said to prove."

The implicit judgement must "fit" so well that "nothing else but it will so dovetail", that is it "just fits".

Also, "when the conclusion is assumed as a hypothesis, it throws light upon a multitude of collateral facts, accounting for them, and uniting them together in one whole"; in this way, we find "objections overcome,... adverse theories neutralized,... difficulties gradually clearing up,... unlooked-for correlations found with received truths"; this is exemplified again in physics where "innumerable particular conclusions" are deduced from the implicit truths and "they are all, without exception, consistent with each other and with experiment".

However, Newman acknowledges that "consistency is not always the guarantee of truth"; and so "the validity of proof is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense"; for explicit reason and its "arguments about the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete. They may approximate to a proof, but they only reach the probable, because they cannot reach the particular".

Nonetheless, explicit reason has a crucial
epistemological function; the illative judgements, or "instinctive conclusions", are put into "an objective shape which we can fall back upon, -first for our own satisfaction, then for our justification with others"; this makes clear that Newman is concerned to justify the objectivity of our implicit conclusions. Certainly "such a tangible defense of what we hold" is "inadequate" insofar as it does not prove or demonstrate the conclusion; but "though it does not go so far as to ascertain truth, still it teaches us the direction in which truth lies, and how propositions lie towards each other"; that is "though it does not itself discover the unknown, it is one principal way by which discoveries are made".18

This "tangible defence... fortifies and illustrates" the conclusions "giving them luminousness and force"; "thus inference becomes a sort of symbol of assent";19 since the context of the discussion is centred on the establishment of objective truth, it is the truth of assent to which Newman refers this symbol.

The objectivity of the illative judgement rests upon explicit reason, beforehand through checking the accumulating probabilities, and afterwards through coherence with other truths. This is the meaning of saying,

"Truth certainly, as such, rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demonstrative, but it does not follow from this that the arguments producible in its favour are unanswerable and irresistible".20

The illative judgement is rationally defensible by the facts in the sense that explicit reason can make manifest the epistemological cogency of the implicit judgement. In this sense, the imagination seeks understanding by explicit reason to give it substance and authenticity; and although the imaginative implicit reason can never be reduced to the explicit reasoning of the intellect, it nonetheless falls back upon the intellect for its stay.21
3). The concrete and the abstract.

However, Newman does not accept a one-sided process of checking the objectivity of the conclusion; he establishes a mutual process of testing between the implicit and explicit reasoning. The concrete and real is the test of the notional: in comparing the real with the notional Newman explains that "real apprehension has the precedence, as being the scope and end and the test of the notional". The "concrete", then, is the "test" of the "notional", in the sense that what is "real", that is "particular", is the ultimate "test" of "the probable" of explicit reasoning. And Newman intends no "disparagement of the proper value of formal reasonings" in explaining that "they cannot proceed beyond probabilities", for this "is most readily allowed by those who use them most":

"because, proceeding in the necessary investigation by the analytical method of verbal inference, they find within its limits no sufficient resources for attaining a conclusion".

This complex two-way process of testing between explicit and implicit reason is apparent in the passage:

"Let units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals".

In this way the explicit reasonings of inferences are the "sine qua non conditions" for certitude; for "logic is useful to us in registering" the "aspects and what they imply"; by "aspects" Newman means the "general notions" abstracted from the individual object.

Newman's proposals for knowledge and truth focus on the process of "our own mind, whose informations give us the rule by which we test, interpret, and correct what is presented to us for belief". My analysis shows that Newman's central emphasis on the implicit reason is not at the exclusion of explicit reason; he adopts both, giving primacy to implicit reason, but establishing a mutual process of testing as the key to the objectivity of the resulting certitude. For, "without the apprehension of
notions, we should forever pace round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold on things, we shall waste ourselves in vague speculations".28

Explicit reason tests and verifies the illative judgement by checking the objectivity of its base and the consistency of its judgement against other known data; the result is "a consistency in theory so variously tried and exemplified as to lead to belief in it, as reasonably as a witness in a court of law may... satisfy and assure judge, jury, and the whole court, of his simple veracity".29 The implicit reason grasps what is concrete and real; and this is a test of the truthfulness of what explicit reason offers as consistent and probable.

B). The normativity of illative judgement.

The problem of the objectivity of certitude inevitably raises the issue whether Newman intended his proposals to be understood descriptively or prescriptively. This section briefly explains his psychological method as including prescriptive epistemology.

1). Psychological method.

Certainly Newman handled the problem of assent and certitude from a psychological standpoint:

"my only business is to ascertain what I am, in order to put it to use. It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural. What I have to ascertain is the laws under which I live".30

And Newman's method of "interrogating human nature as an existing thing" was to go "by the testimony of the psychological facts".31

Newman disavowed any interest in "how it comes about that we can be certain", and did not attempt "to form a theory which may account for those phenomena of the intellect", namely inference and assent; he was determined to avoid "falling into metaphysics".32

Newman was determined to avoid "confusing two things very distinct from each other, a mental act or state and a scientific rule, an interior assent and a set of logical
formulas". The latter would be a prescriptive approach, and it would seem that Newman wanted to limit himself to the psychological description of the former. Newman opens the way to being accused of restricting himself to a descriptive epistemology, albeit masterful, of the facts of certitude without evaluating these facts with a critical epistemology.

2). Prescriptive justification.

However, Newman's use of explicit reason to test and verify the objective truth of certitude reveals that his psychological description is not opposed to epistemological justification. In undertaking an epistemological justification Newman's purposes are both descriptive and prescriptive.

This means that Newman's descriptive psychology is not meant to stand in contrast to a normative or prescriptive concern; rather he opts for what he understands the "law of our minds" is in fact, "whether a priori it ought to be or no". He rejects an a priori normative account of the laws of the mind, and explains that these laws do not exist independently of human judgement; that is, these laws do not constitute independent metaphysical data. These laws of the mind are based on empirical judgements, that is on how men in fact generally reason; and Newman claims that these are objective laws in the sense of leading us to objective truth; and they are normative insofar as "it is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural".

The normativity of Newman's proposals lies then in wanting to account for and vindicate certain ways of arriving at truth; and this is particularly true in explaining how the mind passes from inference to assent.

The next section explains the importance of explicit reason for the illative judgement of implicit reason by analysing the relation between theology and religion; this clarifies the role of the intellect and the imagination in religious judgement.
4. Theology of Religious Imagination.

My first chapter examined the importance of explicit reason for the implicit judgement of faith by explaining the relation between theology and religion; and I showed that Newman adopted liberal, or philosophical knowledge, in religious inquiry by highlighting the gift of Wisdom. This section develops Newman's understanding of theology by explaining the importance of philosophical knowledge and intellectual system for his proposals for concrete knowledge; I explain that the epistemology of illative judgement results in a "theology of a religious imagination".¹

Since "dogma is a proposition", there can be "two modes of assent" to it, "the religious and the theological", depending whether the proposition "stands for a notion or a thing". That is, "real assent to it is an act of religion" insofar as the dogma "is discerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious imagination"; on the other hand, notional assent is "a theological act" insofar as the dogma "is held as a truth, by the theological intellect". Newman rejects "any line of demarcation or party-wall between these two modes of assent", so that his proposals result in "religion using theology, and theology using religion", despite recognising that each "habit of mind" is clearly "distinct" from the other.²

To understand the complementary function of the intellect and imagination in the illative judgement of religious certitude I first recall the use of the intellect which Newman rejected.

A). The religion of philosophy as artificial religion.

In rejecting "the religion of philosophy", Newman rejected a "one sided-progress of the mind"; for although "recognizing indeed the moral sense", (that is the use of the explicit reasoning of the intellect in religion), the development "mainly of the intellect" persists in "ignoring the conscience", (that is the sense of duty, or the "sense of guilt and shame", without which there can be "no genuine religion").³

Also, Newman rejects the exclusive use of the intellect because of the inherent epistemological inadequacy of
working "through the exercise of abstraction and inference"; because "arguments about the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete", or, "reach the particular".

These arguments constitute the theological and epistemological reserves outlined in my first chapter; but I also explained that they can both be overcome. I now explain Newman's understanding in the 'Grammar' of the importance of explicit reason in theology, and for imaginative judgement in religion.

B). Theology and the integration of knowledge.

My first chapter explained Newman's understanding of liberal knowledge in using explicit reason to establish system as the means of digesting or integrating knowledge. In the 'Grammar' Newman discusses the "assents" of "liberal knowledge" and acknowledges the value of "a gentleman's knowledge... if used for its proper ends"; but "it is never more than the furniture of the mind", because "it is never thoroughly assimilated with it". This applies to "Theology" which "is always notional, as being scientific".

There is no contradiction in saying liberal knowledge, (that is, digested or integrated knowledge) is "never thoroughly assimilated" with the mind; because by "thoroughly assimilated" Newman means being grasped by the personal reason, in the sense of "mastering" the "notions" with "a real apprehension". On the other hand, my first chapter explained that liberal knowledge is integrated by the abstraction of system; Newman, then, is distinguishing real and notional assent, and not implying that liberal knowledge is not integrated knowledge.

Newman calls these notional assents of liberal knowledge "credence"; although they are "shallow", they give "a broad foundation of thought for ourselves, and a medium of intercourse between ourselves and others"; they constitute the "education" of our "civilized condition" and "give us in great measure our morality" and "social code", supplying "the standards of thought and action", so that they "become our moral language".

This clarifies the role of theology as being systematic, analytic, and creative. First, theology is systematic, because it "has to do with what is notional,
and the notional is the general and the systematic", and it "forms and protects" religious propositions "as a system of truth"; "it examines doctrine and doctrine; it compares, contrasts, and forms them into a science"; "it locates, adjusts, defines them each, and brings them together into a whole". 

Secondly, theology is analytic; it takes "particular aspects or portions" of the "depositum of faith", as notions, and "analyzes them, whether into first principles... or into hypothesis of an illustrative character". Its systematic and analytic characteristics are essentially "generalizations", "deductions", "abstract and notional statements"; just as the gift of Wisdom is a gift of "right judgement", (explained in my first chapter), theology is applying "our intellect.. rightly": that is, its "deductions are true, if rightly deduced".

Thirdly, theology is creative; my first chapter explained the creative aspect of the intellectual gift of wisdom insofar as explicit reason is "the power of proceeding to new ideas", of "advancing" and "discovering". Newman develops this in the 'Grammar', explaining that the "deductions" of theology are "in one sense.. a portion of the depositum of faith", and "in another sense.. additions to it"; they constitute an "indirect creation".

C). Theology and Religion: the intellect and imagination.

Theology is "religion... made a subject of notional assent"; and Religion focuses on what is "personal" and "real", on "facts" and "things concrete, not abstract, which variously excite the mind from their moral and imaginative properties"; it deals with "real assent" which "is in itself an intellectual act, of which the object is presented to it by the imagination": 

"Religion has to do with real, and the real is the particular".

Between theology and religion, between the intellect and the imagination, Newman establishes a harmony; this he calls a "theology of a religious imagination"; and it "has a living hold on truths". There is a "living hold" by the concrete and personal grasp of the imagination; and it
is a hold of "truths" determined by the illative judgement and tested and verified by explicit reason. In this way there is no "contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion". The religious proposition can have "two modes of assent", and so can be "held in either way; either as a theological truth, or as a religious fact or reality":

"The notion and the reality assented-to are represented by one and the same proposition, but serve as distinct interpretations of it".16

In my first chapter I explained that the abstractions of liberal knowledge are necessarily useful; here too, Newman acknowledges that the notional propositions of theology are "useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest".17 Newman is clear that "in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason"; hence, "sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay".18 The imaginative religious judgement, then, depends upon the abstract reason of the intellect; for "we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him".19

However, Newman's central emphasis is upon the imaginative judgement of the implicit reason; the "heart is commonly reached, not through reason, but through the imagination"; hence, "many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion".20 It is the imaginative grasp of truth in the illative judgement that is the root of religious commitment; "Christian earnestness.. will presuppose certitude as the very life which is to animate it", because of its real hold on religious truth.21 That is why "the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion".22

The abstractions of theology must "minister to" the concrete reality of religion; it is "subservient to" religious commitment, as explained in my first chapter.23 Newman's central emphasis is upon the implicit judgement of the illative sense; but its imaginative grasp of truth necessarily depends upon the explicit reason of theology.
5. The problem of Error and Doubt.

This section examines the compatibility of Newman's proposals for certitude with the problem of doubt and error.

Newman opposes inferential investigation to inquiry because "inquiry implies doubt, and investigation does not imply it"; this is because "he who inquires has not found; he is in doubt where the truth lies". Doubt, "is something more than the mere exercise of inference", but is "inconsistent with assent" being "a suspension of the assents hitherto familiar to us". Investigation analyses the grounds for the truth of the assent, in its attempt to justify the assent, as exemplified in Newman's explanation of theology, and use of natural theology; whereas inquiry begins by suspending assent, and this constitutes doubting where the truth lies.

This is not to denigrate inquiry and doubt for these have "a legitimate place among our mental constituents"; for, as there are three ways of enunciating a proposition, (a question, a conclusion, and an assertion), so there are three distinct mental ways of holding a proposition, (doubt, inference, and assent), as "three distinct states or characters of mind", (reflected in the sceptic, the philosopher, and the believer). And although these are each "laws of our nature", Newman is aware that "undoubtedly, it is possible, it is common, in the particular case, to err in the exercise of Doubt, of Inference, and of Assent".

In my first chapter I examined Newman's admission of error, and the consequent "state of mind which recognizes the possibility of doubting". I now explain this admission by examining the possibility of error and doubt in the assent of certitude. I analyse Newman's claim that doubt is incompatible with assent and certitude, for although "we can at once infer and assent... we cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt"; and I explain an alternative interpretation of doubt being compatible with assent and certitude without compromising genuine religious commitment. This supplies the epistemological basis for understanding the possibility of reversing moral judgement in chapter three.
A). Error in assent and certitude.

1). Assent.

Although Newman makes assent quite independent of inference, my analysis has explained that inference offers the sine qua non conditions for assent in the sense that the assent has to be rationally justified by the inferences, for "assent must be preceded by inferential acts"; Newman's description of the "substantiveness" of assent as separate from inference is not intended to be normatively prescriptive, for though the assent does not "vary in strength, as the reasons vary", the assent is not immune to variations in inferential reason.

Inferential investigation of the simple assent can result in the reversal of the assent:

"Certainly, such processes of investigation, whether in religious subjects or secular, often issue in the reversal of the assents which they were originally intended to confirm".

Newman is clear that "our change of mind" is "owing", ("issue in"), to "the accumulating force of the arguments" of the inferential investigation "which bear down upon the propositions"; but, because assent is separate from inference, the arguments, or "objections", as such, have no direct force to weaken assent; that means the "change of mind" is warranted indirectly.

2). Certitude.

If explicit reason is operative in the inferential investigations in order to confirm the simple assent, the question arises whether this also applies to certitude. It would seem that because certitude is a reflex assent there would be no room for subsequent change elicited by further investigation; but there is evidence that this confirmatory, or reflex, assent of certitude is open to subsequent confirmation or rejection; my preceding analysis explained that the will has a critical role after certitude, because "the will may suppress, extinguish" or "stifle" the certitude, because of "objections" which "may be argued against it" by explicit reason.
This implies the defectibility of certitude, and seems to be contrary to Newman's claims for the "indefectibility of certitude." His argument for indefectibility is founded upon certitude's claim to be an objective truth:

"Certitude .. is the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing".12

And even though "certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude", Newman uses the argument of "indefectibility" as "a criterion of the genuineness of the certitude", that is "as a negative test for certitude, or sine qua non condition, so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to have been certain of it. Certitude ought to stand all trials or it is not certitude"; hence, Newman considers certitude as "irreversible".14

However, Newman also employs arguments for the defectibility of certitude. He argues for the objectivity and permanence of the truth of certitude by stating that the truth "will remain", "even though my mind should have the bad fortune to let it (certitude) drop", that is "if it did fail"; in other words, "any conviction true as well as false, may be lost".15 Moreover, in comparing "the sense of certitude" to "the bell of the intellect", he has no hesitation in admitting, "that it strikes when it should not is a proof that the clock is out of order", (though to be relied upon when "regulated"); and he accepts "that, as a general rule, certitude does not fail; that failures of what was taken for certitude are the exception"; and finally, in a letter of 1868 he admits that "there may be abuses and mistakes in particular cases of certitude".18

The possibility of change and error in both assent and certitude inevitably raises the possibility of doubt, which is now examined.
B). Doubt in assent and certitude.

1). Assent.

Newman claims that "we cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt", and that "assent... to a professed truth and doubt of it are incompatible". And yet my preceding analysis of the possibility of change in assent, acknowledged by Newman, implies some sort of dubitability of assent; the resolution of this apparent contradiction is to determine the kind of doubt that is incompatible with assent, and the kind of doubt implied in the corrigibility of assent.

Newman's distinction between investigation and inquiry, examined above, shows that "inquiry implies doubt" because it entails a "suspension" of assent; descriptively, then, doubt understood as the suspension of assent (as a mode of approaching the proposition in quite a different way from investigation), is "incompatible" with assent. However, Newman also holds that "suspension" of assent, as dropping assent, is prescriptively incompatible with assent: because he who inquires cannot "retain the name of believer", for he is "outside of the Church", having "lost faith", and "doubting excludes believing".

The doubt that would seem to be compatible with the reversal of assent is the awareness of the "possibility" of reversal without any "expectation" of this to happen. First, Newman accepts that we have "a vague consciousness of the possibility of reversal" of our assents; this does not "interfere(s) with the honesty and firmness of that belief", because belief does not "imply a positive resolution in the party believing never to abandon that belief" or "an intention never to change". In other words, "a spontaneous resolution never to change is inconsistent with the idea of belief; for the very force and absoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolution. We do not commonly determine not to do what we cannot fancy ourselves ever doing".

Secondly, the awareness of this "possibility of a reversal" is "not to expect reverse", but rather entails "the utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing", "for we have no suspicion of this failure".

Thirdly, a clarification of Newman's point can be found
in an earlier discussion; some writers "have little misgiving about the truths which they pretend to weigh out and measure", yet argue "that since the full etiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied, we must believe those truths at our peril"; Newman believes they are warning us "that an issue which can never come to pass in matter of fact, is nevertheless in theory a possible supposition"; and this seems to be the sense of Newman's comment in the 'University Sermons' that assent entails "a state of mind which recognizes the possibility of doubting". 25

This theoretical possibility could mean one of two things. First, it could refer to propositions which are logically possible, that is, because the conclusion is not logically entailed by the premisses, the conclusion is logically dubitable; this view would make sense of the reference to the "full etiquette of logical requirements". Secondly, it is possible that it does not refer to logical dubitability, partly because of the examples used, and partly because of the references that we are "not moved by a scientific computation of chance, nor .. any law of averages"; 26 the theoretical possibility in this case, then, would encompass not merely what is logically possible, but also what is really possible given the constitution of the world. 27

The force of the argument is that the theoretical possibility, constitutes a genuine dubitability because of the possibilities, (logical or real), entailed; 28 and this theoretical possibility "can never come to pass in matter of fact", in "my particular case". 29 In other words, logical dubitability, or real dubitability, as theoretically possible, do not constitute grounds for reasonable doubt, for we do need a reason to doubt. 30

Certainly, the two interpretations differ on what constitutes reasonable grounds for doubt (i.e. logical or real); but they both accept that assent precludes the recognition that there are reasonable grounds for withholding assent "in matter of fact", or in "my particular case".

The dubitability that is consistent with assent is when we set out "without disloyalty to our convictions to examine their grounds" with the "consciousness of the possibility of reversal", where the possibility refers to genuine dubitability as explained; however, because this
genuine dubitability is not reasonable "in matter of fact", there is no reasonable dubitability present, and hence there is no "expectation" or "suspicion" of "failure" of the assents, "even though in the event they are to fail under the examination". 31

2). Certitude.

The reflex nature of certitude presents a different context for the question of dubitability than the investigation of simple assent; and Newman presents a clear view against the dubitability of certitude:

"no one can be called certain of a proposition, whose mind does not spontaneously and promptly reject, on their first suggestion, as idle, as impertinent, as sophistical, any objections which are directed against its truth". 32

He emphasises that the rejection is "by the spontaneous action of the intellect", for it is "not from any set purpose or effort to reject" the "thought of the fact of its contradictory existing or occurring"; the "revolt of the mind" to any "contradictory proposition" is "equal to this peremptory assertion of negative propositions", in the sense that "their very entering into the mind is the first step of their going out of it"; the rejection is so spontaneous that doubt "fades out of the mind as fast as it enters it". 33

This spontaneous rejection is not contested by his earlier remark that "a spontaneous resolution never to change is inconsistent with the idea of belief", (because "the force and absoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolution"); here Newman is saying simply that the "spontaneous" nature of the rejection does not allow any form of "positive resolution" to the same effect; such a "resolution" or "formal promise" can be made, but by a choice of the will reflecting a deliberate exclusion of doubt, rather than spontaneously. 34 Hence, this spontaneous inability to doubt is quite different from a deliberate exclusion of doubt due to a choice of the will. 35 This refers to the critical role of the will in confirming or stifling certitude examined earlier; and this second form of rejecting doubt clarifies the kind of
doubt Newman found compatible with certitude.36. He admits that "we do not.. lose our certitude if we allow that in the abstract it is possible that we are wrong, or that there is a mathematical chance of it".37 The admission of the abstract possibility of error is an acknowledgement that certitude is not infallibility.38 To explain this abstract possibility of error and implied doubt in certitude, an argument can be made that parallels the explanation of the possibility of error and implied doubt in assent; for as the theoretical possibility of doubt in assent could refer to the logical or the real possibility of doubt, so too with certitude.

Newman allows us to "admit its contradictory into our minds as a mere conception" without compromising our certitude;39 this seems to imply that because the conclusion of certitude is not logically entailed by the premisses the conclusion is logically dubitable, in the sense that to deny the conclusion would not be logically contradictory. On the other hand, Newman also allows "the mathematical chance" of error, and implied doubt; this chance seems to deal with what may occur in reality, and thereby allows genuine dubitability.40 The dubitability which certitude can envisage, then, is the admission of the possibility that the truth could be otherwise.

It would seem that what Newman is insisting on, in rejecting doubt yet allowing these possibilities, is the absence of reasonable doubt rather than of all possible doubt; as with assent, the theoretical possibility of doubt was considered unreasonable "in matter of fact" or in a "particular case", so too with certitude. The point here is that certitude results from accumulative probabilities constituting a "reasonable conclusion", that is, "a real, though only a reasonable, not an argumentative, proof"; and the reasonableness means that there should be no "reasonable doubt" about possible error.41 And this decision can only be made in the concrete particular case, or matter of fact; there is a crucial difference between admitting that we could be wrong, and admitting that it is possible that we are wrong in a given case.42 So, any reversal must be the result of the implicit reasoning upon the concrete case; for reversal cannot occur by degrees, but only all at once.

This explicit intentional refusal to doubt, then, reflects "a disposition of mind relatively to a definite
case", (unlike infallibility which "relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter"). The disposition of mind in the concrete case is very important; for it is "not till I listen to arguments in opposition (to) my present belief in the spirit and the temper of an inquirer" that "certitude in it" is lost. And this intentional rejection of doubt tied to the role of the will after certitude is characterised like assent by the "utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing".

Certitude precludes "the thought of the fact of its contradictory existing or occurring"; in other words, "we lose certitude, if we admit the contradictory of what we have hitherto held as a fact, and that, deliberately". This would include an admission of future doubt: "He who really believes in it now, cannot imagine the future discovery of reasons to shake his faith".

However, this present attitude, as essential for certitude, does not mean the believer repudiates the possibility of the belief ever being invalidated. For it may be possible, both logically and really, to envisage the change, and implied doubt, yet unreasonable to do so in the particular case. Newman's proposals, then, refuses to allow the admission of corrigibility to be made a source of doubt, (which could stifle certitude); and his insistence on reasonableness being the determinative criterion for the legitimacy of doubt in a particular case manifests that his critical role of the will does not militate against the intellectual judgement.

C). Adherence to the truth, not to certitude.

The possibility of change or error in certitude, and its implied dubitability, entails a resistance to doubt that is both spontaneous and explicitly intentional: the intentional resistance of doubt is the work of the will after the certitude, and it may take the form of a "formal promise". This section explains why such a promise of intentional resistance is important, and what its limits are, since consistency will not allow it to contradict the above remarks on dubitability.
The justification of a "formal promise" is rooted in the "consciousness of my own moral changeableness, and a fear, on that account, that I might not be intellectually true to the truth".49

First, our "moral changeableness" acknowledges that "sometimes assent fails" because "our mind changes so quickly", despite the "abiding recognition of the force of old arguments" as to "suggest the suspicion that moral causes, arising out of our condition, age, company, occupations, fortunes, are at the bottom". Our assent, then, "sometimes dies without tangible reasons, sufficient to account for its failure". Hence some "shrink back and withdraw their assent" because they are "biassed by their imaginations, or frightened by a deeper insight into the claims of religion upon the soul".50

Secondly, there are intellectual considerations justifying a "formal promise" to resist doubt, because of the cause discerned for the assents lapsing:

"there may have been some vague feeling that a fault lay at the ultimate basis, or in the underlying conditions, of our reasonings; or some misgiving that the subject-matter of them was beyond reach of the human mind; or a consciousness that we had gained a broader view of things in general than when we first gave our assent; or that there were objections to our first convictions, which we had never taken into account".51

Some "shrink back and withdraw their assent" because they are "overcome by the number of views which they have to confront" and are "swayed by the urgency of special objections". The importance of these intellectual considerations are not to imply that assent varies in degrees with inference; but it does imply the relation of inference to assent, so that "reasons for assenting suggest reasons for not assenting", because "what were realities to our imagination" in simple assent "become little more than notions, when we have attained to certitude"; these result in "involuntary questionings, as if we were not certain, when we are"; and Newman is aware of the doubt this can lead to, for "the litter of an
argumentative habit, may beset and obstruct the intellect". Hence the need for being "intellectually intolerant" of error and implied doubt.52

The "formal promise" to resist doubt acknowledges these moral and intellectual considerations; such "objections and difficulties", then, "call for the exercise of good sense and for strength of will to put them down with a high hand, as irrational or preposterous"; they "must be deliberately put aside, as beyond reason, as (so to speak) no-thoroughfares", because they "hinder the direct course of religious inquiry". This is the sense of rejecting theoretically possible doubt because it is deemed unreasonable in a particular case; and this seems to be the sense of claiming that "certitude must include in it a principle of persistence" allowing it to "endure".53 An active resistance of the mind is intentionally adopted, and this may be expressed in terms of a "formal promise".

2). The demands of a "formal promise".

The "formal promise" means that possible objections are to be "put..down" and "deliberately put aside" by "good sense" and "strength of will".54 Newman expresses a similar view of the nature of resistance to doubt in the 'Idea' when explaining that "we must be patient with such appearances", which "seem contrary to truth", and "not be hasty to pronounce them to be really of a more formidable character";55 the believer should be "content to wait" by giving the error, or doubt, rope enough and trusting in its "strong suicidal propensity". But this must be aligned to the more positive action of "encouraging, in helping forward the prospective suicide", by taking steps to "show it how to handle and adjust the rope". These measures explain what Newman means by a "magisterial intolerance of any contrary assertion".56

This patience reflects the "tranquil enjoyment of certitude"; the state of mind accompanying certitude has no fear or expectation of reversal, and is tranquil in its knowledge of the truth; for certitude "is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose" because of the attainment of what is true.57

And Newman opposes the wilful resistance of doubt, characterised by patience, to "irritation and impatience of contradiction, vehemence of assertion, determination to
silence others”; these constitute an "exhibition of fear", and characterise those who are "alarmed for their own position”. All of this is simply "incompatible with certitude". The positive resistance of doubt argues that it is not necessarily more rational to be totally open to new and contradictory evidence, or to have a constant vigilance for objections; and this is not at the denial of fallibility or corrigibility, but reflects the lack of expectation or fear of reversal, as already discussed.

3). The limits of a "formal promise".

My analysis has shown that Newman acknowledged the possibility of error and implied doubt in assent and certitude; since this did not entail cause for reasonable doubt, according to each particular case, certitude was described as having an intentional and explicit resistance of doubt due to the critical role of the will, (over and above certitude's spontaneous resistance), which could be expressed in a "formal promise" to resist doubt. The "formal promise" cannot be without limit if it is to be consistent with Newman's recognition of change in assent and certitude; I now examine these limits.

A. Being open to reversal.

In a letter to Wilberforce Newman put the question "whether you may or may not rationally keep your mind open to change on a point on which your phronesis has already told you to decide one way", there can be two replies to this which focus attention on the limits of a "formal promise".

First, the "formal promise" insists on a negative response to the mind being "open to change" because of its intentional resistance of error and doubt due to the unreasonableness of doubt in a given case, (despite its real and logical possibility); to be "open to change" would be an admission of "the future discovery of reasons" to shake certitude, which must be precluded.

Secondly, a positive response is also envisaged by Newman to being "open to change"; and it takes two shapes. First being open to the possibility of change, and implied doubt, (which is spontaneously rejected as unreasonable,
as in the negative response). Secondly, we are "open to change" in those particular cases which in fact have found a reversal of certitude, because the change is recognised and embraced by the mind.63 An analysis of this latter point reveals the limits of the "formal promise" by specifying the function of reason in such a change.

B. Reversal and Reason.

My analysis has already examined the textual evidence in favour of the reversal of certitudes; I now offer two further examples in order to clarify what process is operative in reversal; this in turn explains the limits to the "formal promise".

1. Examples of reversal.

First, Newman's conversion: in the 'Apologia', he accepts that a "change of opinion" can be "necessary, if truth be a real objective thing", so much so that "the continuance of a person who wishes to go right, in a wrong system, not his giving it up, would be that which militated against the objectiveness of Truth".64 This example emphasises that the reversal deals with the objective truth of the matter, as well as the mental state of the certitude, (as discussed in my previous examples).

Secondly, in a paper of 1860 Newman admits that "when a friend is accused, you do not let yourself doubt him at all, till he is found guilty".65 Two remarks can be made about this example. First, the qualification "at all" reflects the intentional resistance of doubt discussed earlier; for in a parallel discussion in the 'Grammar', Newman explains that we must act with "caution" when a friend's action "requires explanation", and my analysis has already associated this with the intentional resistance of doubt.66 Secondly, he allows the reversal of the certitude when "he is found guilty", despite the intentional resistance up to that point; in other words, his views on intentional resistance and the implied formal promise, do not unequivocally exclude the reversal of the certitude, and implied doubt.

These examples make clear that Newman considered the reversal of certitude encompassing both the mental state and the objective propositional truth, even with the
intentional resistance of doubt expressed in a formal promise. It is important to identify the process of reasoning envisaged in this reversal in order to delineate the specific limits of the formal promise.

2. Implicit and explicit reason.

The reversal occurs by the implicit judgement of the illative sense; for the awareness of the theoretical possibility of doubt (which had been resisted because it had been deemed as "unreasonable doubt" in the particular case by the implicit reason encompassing all the concrete facts of the case), becomes, all at once, not "unreasonable doubt" but real doubt deemed reasonable by the same process of the implicit illative judgement. The abandonment of certitude occurs only as a whole.67

The reasonableness of this reversal is tied to the data gleaned by the explicit reason of inference upon which the implicit illative reason bases its judgement. In other words, despite the objections being "deliberately put aside" as a source of doubt,68 they nonetheless eventually form the basis, (that is, by becoming accumulative probabilities) of a reversal by the implicit illative judgement.

The reasonableness of the reversal, then, is the result of the explicit reason showing that the certitude does not quite fully "dovetail" with our knowledge,69 this results when we "listen to arguments in opposition" to our certitude, not in the mind-frame of doubting as an inquirer may do, but in the absence of any "suspicion of this failure" characteristic of true investigation and intentional resistance of doubt.70 For, there is a "duty" "fairly to examine" all "objections" to certitude, and this is to be done with the "will determinately fixed" to resist doubt, as explained.71 Nonetheless, the mind is "swayed by the urgency of special objections", and certitude does "fail under the examination" even when fully expected to "bear examining".72 This explains the rationality of the abandonment of certitude.

However, this is not to deny Newman's insistence that "objections...have no direct force to weaken assent", for assent does not "vary in strength, as the reasons vary". Certitude does not have degrees of assent, and is not abandoned by degrees; it is not "gradually created" by the
antecedent reasons, nor is it "gradually destroyed" by them in a way that "each objection would weaken it according to its own force". But, "the accumulating force of the arguments" form the sine qua non conditions for certitude, and so can indirectly justify reversal by the implicit judgement of the illative sense.73

Certitude is reversed by the same process as reaching certitude; that is, by the implicit judgement of the illative sense relying upon the inferential investigations of the explicit reason as sine qua non conditions. There is no abandonment by degrees directly dependent upon the force of the inferences; but there is abandonment of the certitude as a whole and rationally undertaken.

C. The limits of a "formal promise".

Hence, the formal promise to resist doubt is necessarily limited by these proposals for reversal of certitude. Its limits are also acknowledged by Newman's statement that "certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude".74 The sense of any formal promise, then, can only be a commitment to the truth, for while certitude can change as explained, "truth cannot change; what is once truth is always truth; and the human mind is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in falsehood".75 This is Newman's ultimate base in the quest for knowledge; and his subsequent assurance that "once certitude, always certitude" must be understood as applying only when the mind "becomes possessed of a truth"; for "certitude has truth for its object".76 (That is why the importance of examining the reversal of certitude must look not only to the state of mind of the agent, but to the objectivity of the truth entailed, as explained above).

The formal promise, then, can only have universal significance if it is considered to be a-thematic, in the sense of being "intellectually true to the truth";77 its thematic content determined by each certitude is a limited expression of the commitment to "the truth", based on each particular case. My analysis has shown that the accuracy of this thematic expression in a given certitude is examined, (that is, tested and verified as explained in reaching certitude), by the explicit reason; this
determines whether it is rationally justified. When error and implied doubt result, the thematic content of the formal promise is mistaken and must be changed; yet the formal promise continues as a-thematic, newly expressed in the refined content of the changed certitude. Briefly, Newman's "formal promise" to resist doubt can only have consistent sense if understood to be a formal a-thematic promise; the a-thematic content encompasses universal significance; a formal thematic promise is inconsistent with his acknowledgement of the reversal of certitude, and so could not be universally undertaken.

The refinement entailed in this distinction is a necessary part of Newman exegesis, even though it is not the only strand present. In other words, although Newman explicitly argues for the irreversibility of certitude, for the rejection of error and doubt, and for a formal promise to resist doubt, my analysis has acknowledged another important argument encompassing the reversal of certitude, implying the presence of error and doubt and the inadequacy of a formal promise.

These two arguments can be reconciled by understanding certain limits to the formal promise to resist doubt; my distinction between an a-thematic and thematic promise emphasises that Newman's focus is ultimately upon objective truth rationally determined; this in turn manifests that his proposals for the imaginative grasp of truth by the implicit illative judgement is thoroughly dependent upon the inferential operation of intellectual reason; and this dependence is not a compromise of the unconditionality of certitude, (as if certitude would vary in degree according to the force of inference); rather it is an insistence on the rationality of certitude by adopting inference as its sine qua non condition. This supplies the epistemological basis for understanding the possibility of reversing moral judgement in chapter three.
Conclusion.

This chapter has studied the epistemology of religious judgement in the 'Grammar'. My analysis has developed the relation of implicit and explicit reason, outlined in the 'University Sermons' and the 'Idea', in terms of assent and inference in the 'Grammar'.

I explained the epistemological reliance of assent upon inference, thereby clarifying the important passive and active role of the will in the religious judgement of the illative sense. This reliance does not qualify the unconditional nature of the assent of illative judgement; it does, however, reveal the objectivity and normativity of Newman's proposals for religious judgement. I then showed that this complimentary tension between implicit and explicit reason, between assent and inference, is at the heart of Newman's understanding of the relation between theology and religion; religious judgement gives primary place to the imaginative judgement of implicit reason; this relies upon the intellectual judgement of explicit reason, which though secondary, is the indispensable function of theology. Finally, I examined the problem of error and doubt; and I showed that Newman's epistemological strategy entailed the possibility of reversing the religious judgement of the illative sense and certitude.

My first and second chapters supply the epistemological and theological parameters for understanding moral judgement in the 'Grammar'. Chapter one explained the theological parameters of his understanding of the relation between Nature and Grace; it also introduced the epistemological parameters of the relation of implicit and explicit reason. Chapter two developed these epistemological parameters in Newman's theory of assent in the 'Grammar'. Chapter three examines Newman's understanding of moral judgement within these parameters; I explain the primacy of imaginative judgement indispensably related to explicit reason; I explain the consistency of this epistemology in the economy of Grace; and finally, I apply his epistemological strategy to the problem of reversing moral judgement in the context of Grace.

Introduction.

This chapter examines Newman's understanding of moral judgement in the 'Grammar'. My purpose is to explain the primary emphasis given by Newman to the imaginative judgement of implicit reason; I call this the illative moral judgement, and adopt the epistemology of chapter one and two to explain it. His epistemological strategy makes clear that this concrete moral judgement is inseparably connected to the abstract judgement of explicit reason which is formulated in moral law. The complementary tension of this epistemology of moral judgement is reflected in his proposals for a theology of a religious imagination. Also, I explain the Christian specificity of moral judgement by examining the intentionality entailed by conscience; and I examine the possibility of reversing moral judgement in terms of chapter two's analysis of the reversal of certitude.

First, I examine Newman's understanding of conscience to explain the complementary tension of implicit and explicit reason in moral judgement; the nature of the illative moral judgement is enlightened by reference to Aristotle's 'phronesis'. Second, I develop this epistemological strategy by examining the importance of Newman's proposals for a theology of a religious imagination; this shows that the primacy of imaginative moral judgement is inseparably connected with the intellectual abstraction of theology, formulated in moral law. Third, I explain the relation between the illative moral judgement and virtue by examining moral action and progress. Fourth, within the economy of grace, I explain the Christian specificity of moral judgement by examining the role of the will in moral judgement; and I explain the possibility and mode of reversing the illative moral judgement.


1). The sense of duty and the moral sense.

Newman holds that "conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts"; I now analyse the legitimacy of this claim by examining the "feeling of conscience" which is "twofold: - it is a moral sense, and a sense of duty"; the "act" of conscience is "indivisible", but it "has these two aspects, distinct from each other, and admitting of a separate consideration". I begin by outlining Newman's understanding of these two senses.

Newman's understanding of the 'sense of duty' can be summarised in the following points.

1. As a "sense of duty" conscience is a "magisterial dictate"; this is "a judicial office" and "sanction of right conduct", being "the dictate of an authoritative monitor upon the details of conduct as they come before us"; and this is the "primary and most authoritative aspect" of conscience.

2. It "is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions"; Newman explains this by emphasising it deals "with self alone and one's own actions", and is concerned "with others only indirectly".

3. The sense of duty "vaguely reaches forward to something beyond itself", that is it "dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions"; hence "we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice.. imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience".

4. It has "an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions": for it is "an instinct" and deals with "image", and operates by the "imagination". The main emotions involved are "fear" (because of the "commands" by "implicit threat and promise" resulting from the "image" of the "sanction"), and "love" (because the "sanction" is from "the image of One who is good, inasmuch as enjoining and enforcing what is right and good"); also, there are the emotions of a bad conscience, ("self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay", etc.), and of a good conscience, ("self-approval, inward peace,
lightness of heart", etc.). With regard to "immorality", then, the 'sense of duty' has "a lively sense of responsibility and guilt". 7

5. Hence, it is "the creative principle of religion": for its sanction "implies One to whom we are responsible", and the "feelings" of the sense of duty "require for their exciting cause an intelligent being"; so that "the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge", "a Supreme Ruler and Judge", "an external Master", "living, personal, and sovereign", a "Moral Governor", "an Invisible Personal Power", a "Sovereign Lawgiver and Judge", "God, One and Personal". 8

The moral sense can be summarised in the following points, (parallel to the above five points).

1. As a "moral sense" conscience is "a judgement of the reason"; this is "a critical office" and "testimony that there is a right and wrong". 9

2. It "contemplates objects in themselves", and "has no special relations to persons". 10

3. The "moral sense" is "its own evidence, appealing to nothing beyond its own sense"; 11 it is autonomous.

4. The "moral sense", like the "sense of the beautiful", is "attended by an intellectual enjoyment, and is free from whatever is of the nature of emotion"; 12 the "emotions" listed above regarding a good or bad conscience (as "sense of duty") "would...constitute" a "specific difference" "between conscience and the moral sense, supposing these two were not aspects of one and the same feeling, exercised upon one and the same subject-matter". 13 This sense is not in fact without emotion, for Newman acknowledges that the "testimony" of the 'moral sense' is "conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct"; 14 his emphasis was that its emotions are of a more shallow (that is, merely intellectual) nature than those of the 'sense of duty'; this also seems to be his point here, for he accepts that "conscience...considered as a moral sense, an intellectual sentiment, is a sense of admiration and disgust, of approbation and blame". 15

5. The "Moral Sense is the principle of ethics", in the sense that its testimony supplies us with "the elements of morals, such as may be developed by the intellect into an
ethical code". However, it can only deal with "mere notions of God".16

From the basis of this structured distinction between the two aspects of conscience, my analysis proposes to examine the rationality of conscience: I do this by using Newman's epistemology to understand each aspect of conscience, and examining the indivisible nature of conscience. This demonstrates the importance of the role of explicit reasoning in the illative judgement of moral duty.

2). The epistemology of conscience.

A. Newman's epistemological strategy.

Newman's epistemology is the basis for understanding the distinction between the 'moral sense' and the 'sense of duty'.

1. First, Newman makes clear his epistemological strategy in describing our knowledge of the world:

"...from a multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting in particular instances, of something beyond the senses, we generalize the notion of an external world, and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started".17

There are three stages in his epistemological strategy: the instinctive perception, the abstraction, and the application of the abstraction to the concrete.

2. Secondly, Newman uses this strategy to explain his understanding of conscience as 'sense of duty':

"...from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then again we image Him and His attributes in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained".18
3. Thirdly, Newman uses this epistemological strategy to explain his understanding of conscience as 'moral sense'; as with the 'sense of duty', there are three distinct stages.

First, his epistemology begins with our "particular experiences of qualities in the concrete", that is our "instinctive recognition of the immutable difference in the moral quality of acts, as elicited in us by one instance of them"; this is "our natural perception of right and wrong". This "instinctive recognition" can receive a "real assent" which is "confined to the propositions directly embodying those experiences".

Secondly, from these experiences "we proceed to abstract and generalize", for example "the abstract proposition 'There is a right and a wrong', as representing an act of inference, is received by the mind with a notional, not a real assent"; this abstraction, or inference, is the work of explicit reason. And Newman explains further that although "such notions indeed are an evidence of the reality of the special sentiments in particular instances, without which they would not have been formed", nonetheless as "abstractions from facts" they are "not elementary truths prior to reasoning". And these abstractions, "truth, purity, justice, kindness" etc.), constitute "all those distinct elements of the moral law" which are "consciously" adopted, and "developed by the intellect into an ethical code". This process of abstraction uses explicit reason.

Thirdly, the assent given to such an abstraction is notional "because we generalize"; but "that assent may become real,. when we apply our general knowledge to a particular instance of that knowledge"; hence, "as we obey the particular dictates" of the abstract proposition 'there is a right and a wrong', "we are led on more and more to view it in the association of those particulars, which are real, and virtually to change our notion of it into the image of that objective fact, which in each particular case it undeniably is". My analysis will later examine this third stage in more detail, in order to distinguish between the application of an abstract notion to the concrete, (which can only reach the probable), and the concrete judgement of the illative sense which takes cognizance of the abstract notion without a bland deductive application.
B. The sense of duty and moral sense.

Newman's epistemological strategy leads to these distinctions between the sense of duty and the moral sense.

1. The sense of duty: moral sanction and divine motive.

Newman argues that what is peculiar to the sense of duty is its moral sanction which constitutes an argument for the existence of God.

There are quite distinct forms of the first stage of his epistemological strategy: e.g. the "instinctive perceptions" of the material world, the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities based on "experience which is ever recurring", and the "sense of duty" founded on "the recurring instances in which conscience acts, forcing upon us the mandate of a Superior", parallel to the particular acts of that instinct" of sense in the material world. The method in each is the same, but the content quite different.

What is peculiar to the sense of duty is the "sense of moral obligation"; it is quite different from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities in concrete experience. The sense of duty emphasises the sanction or obligation as the means of introducing religious motive into belief and action; for the sanction is not indistinct, but specifically from a "Sovereign Lawgiver and Judge" who is "God, One and Personal"; certainly the thematic awareness of the sanction being from God is determined by abstraction, but the sanction receives a real assent as coming from God in the application to the concrete.

My point here is that to say 'I ought to (do X) because of the sanction from God', is equivalent to saying that 'My motive for feeling that I ought to (do X) is God's command'; that is, the 'sense of duty' is essentially characterised by the introduction of a religious motive. The direction of Newman's argument is from the experience of the sense of duty to the existence of God, the instinctive perceptions of the sense of duty, are determined as being from God by abstract reasoning, or inference, which can then receive a real assent.

This introduction of a religious motive by the sense of duty entails the celebrated discussion of Newman's
proof of the existence of God; his moral argument of God's existence from the sense of duty is descriptively valuable as propaedeutic to a metaphysical argument; but in itself his argument is not conclusive of God's existence.\(^3\) (It is unlikely that his acknowledgement of the possibility of external influences in discerning the religious aspect of the experience of sanction evidences this in his own mind).\(^3\) The introduction of a religious motive by the sense of duty has to be a descriptive remark; it is essentially prescriptively limited to the extent that it lacks metaphysical verification.

In whatever case, it would be seriously mistaken to understand Newman's sense of duty as referring to the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities; that is, to consider the sense of duty as a source of moral knowledge which is built into an ethical code by the moral sense.\(^3\) The direction of Newman's moral epistemology is certainly to abstract an ethical code from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities; but this fully reflects his proposals for the acquisition of knowledge, and is not dependent upon a separate input of knowledge from a transcendent source.

2. The moral sense: recognising concrete qualities.

I have already explained that the abstraction from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities belongs to the moral sense. Newman does not explicitly recognise the "instinctive perception" of moral quality as part of the moral sense; but it is plausible that he envisages this instinct as a first stage of the moral sense for these reasons.

First, it is clear the moral sense is not merely a faculty of abstraction, because he includes in its functions the concrete judgement of the illative sense;\(^3\) secondly, understanding the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities as the first stage in this process fits well with the three-stage epistemological strategy employed in our knowledge of the material world as well as the sense of duty; thirdly, this view accords well with his emphasis upon the distinction of the instinct of right and wrong as quite separate from the instinct of the sanction of the sense of duty.

It is the moral sense, then, which apprehends the
"instinctive recognition" of moral qualities in concrete experience; in doing so it is "an intellectual sentiment...a sense of admiration and disgust, of approbation and blame". 35

This overcomes two serious difficulties for the interpretation of the Newman corpus. First, it avoids interpreting the "instinctive recognition" as a separate source of moral knowledge from the comprehensive picture he portrayed for conscience which he claims is "fully furnished for its office", "requiring nothing besides itself". 36 Secondly, it avoids confusing the sanction of the sense of duty as implying the "instinctive recognition" as though this moral instinct were operative in both the sense of duty and the moral sense; 37 such a confusion of sanction and "instinctive recognition" of moral quality does not do justice to the force of Newman's distinction between them, nor to his epistemological strategy outlined above.

The advantage of my interpretation is that it does "dovetail" with this distinction and his epistemological strategy, and focuses attention on the importance of the natural process of reasoning employed in moral judgement, rather than having recourse to an independent transcendent source of knowledge (by claiming the "instinctive recognition" of moral quality also belongs to the sense of duty). 38 To understand the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities as the first stage of the operation of the moral sense is fully consistent with Newman's acknowledgement of the importance of explicit reason in his proposals for informal reasoning; and also accords well with his harmonious understanding of the relation between nature and grace.

C. The indivisible act of conscience.

The "indivisible" act of conscience encompasses both sense of duty and moral sense. I have argued that descriptively the law of right and wrong, and the notion of a divine sanction are the results of abstraction from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, and from the sense of duty as sanction; when these are received with a real assent the sanction is combined with what is right (or wrong) in concrete experience precisely because conscience is "indivisible". 39
My interpretation of the sense of duty as intentionality is not identified with the voice of God as sanction. By intentionality I mean the religious motive brought to bear upon the moral sense by the subject's context of belief. The metaphysical implication is that intentionality focuses upon the self seeking its transcendental identity in determining its source and fulfillment; from this basis a metaphysics of conscience as consciousness could be constructed.

It is in this context that the sense of duty is a religious "sanction of right conduct"; from this experience of the sanction to "follow the right and avoid the wrong", the image entailed by the sanction is understood as an "image of One who is good, inasmuch as enjoining and enforcing what is right and good"; hence the image experienced is "an image of the good God, good in Himself". This is consistent with my preceding analysis; however, in making these remarks, Newman immediately adds that such an image exists as "an image, before it has been reflected upon, and before it is recognised... as a notion"; and this final comment seems to undermine my prescriptive interpretation of Newman's epistemology of conscience, and thereby imply that the sanction of the sense of duty does constitute a separate transcendent source of moral knowledge.


However, the explanation of this remark lies in distinguishing Newman's prescriptive and descriptive remarks. For the context of this discussion is the experience of a child; and his remark that the "image of the good God" exists "before it has been reflected upon" is a descriptive comment, which is disinterested in examining "how far this initial religious knowledge comes from without" by "extrinsic help", (implying "special divine aid"), or "from within" as being "natural". In fact, a remark in an earlier paragraph echoes the prescriptive epistemology outlined above: for Newman explains that the child "kindles love towards Him, as giving him a good law, and therefore as being good Himself"; that is, the understanding of the goodness of God results from ("therefore") the goodness of the law, which Newman acknowledges explicitly as being determined
by the abstraction of the moral sense from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities.\textsuperscript{43}

Prescriptively, then, Newman argues that the existence of God is the result of the abstraction from the sanction of the sense of duty; and the awareness of the goodness of God is the result of the abstract reasoning of the moral sense from the "instinctive recognition" of what is right and good;\textsuperscript{44} hence within a few pages of his remark about the child's experience he writes: "Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love.. when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions."\textsuperscript{45} I have already explained that his prescriptive intent of establishing God's existence from the sanction of conscience is inadequate; my subsequent analysis shows the prescriptive value of Newman's logic and epistemology of moral experience for moral discourse.

2. The indivisibility of conscience and religious motive.

The "indivisible" nature of conscience may at times make it seem that the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities belongs as much to the 'sense of duty' as to the 'moral sense';\textsuperscript{46} my analysis has shown that when this occurs, Newman is making a descriptive remark which does not compromise the prescriptive epistemological strategy outlined above. And the "indivisible" nature of conscience clarifies two important points.

First, the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, and the abstraction of the moral sense from them, as well as the subsequent application of the "elements of the moral law", are religious in Newman's context of belief; the sanction of the sense of duty exists in and through each epistemological stage of the moral sense; that is, the religious motive entailed in the sanction of the sense of duty influences all the stages of the moral sense. Secondly, the sanction of the sense of duty needs the moral sense to exist and grow; this is explained below in dealing with obedience to conscience.

It may appear that Newman himself makes a case against the "indivisible" nature of conscience; for after making this claim he immediately considers the implications on the other sense were one lost;\textsuperscript{47} this does not constitute the force of a contrary argument, but is a literary
enforcement of the distinction between the two aspects of conscience; this is clear from his insistence that the sense of duty cannot be lost,\(^4\) as well as from the consistency of his argument for two aspects of one "indivisible" act of conscience.\(^5\)

In conclusion, this clarification shows that the experience of the goodness of God is the result of the abstraction from the sense of duty (i.e., the sanction is from God) aligned to the abstraction of the moral sense (i.e., that there is right and wrong); in this way the "moral sense" as "our natural perception of right and wrong" is "the standard for determining the characteristics of Natural Religion".\(^6\)

For Newman religion and morality are intrinsically related;\(^7\) but I have argued that this reflects his context of belief, and is not metaphysically verified by him.

3. The importance of the abstraction of explicit reason.

Newman's understanding of the indivisible nature of the act of conscience is an acknowledgement of the importance of the abstraction of explicit reason.

My first chapter explained the importance of the moral sense understood as explicit reason. Newman's reserve about its use was twofold.

First, he was concerned with an exaggerated use of the moral sense when it excludes the sense of duty, thereby reducing the motive for action to mere intellectualism; the analysis of this third chapter has clarified this reservation by explaining that the motive which Newman sought was the religious motive, supplied only by the sense of duty. However, I have shown that the religious motive entailed in the sanction of the sense of duty is the result of the abstraction of explicit reason.

Secondly, he was concerned with the reductive use of the moral sense to the exclusion of implicit reason. My second chapter explained the legitimacy of this reservation by exploring his proposals for the concrete implicit reasoning of the illative judgement and certitude. However, I explained that the epistemological legitimacy of the implicit illative judgement demands the necessary, though secondary, use of explicit reason.

In this third chapter I have explained the importance
of abstraction for Newman's understanding of conscience; and I have explained that the moral sense is more than mere abstraction, it includes the "instinctive recognition" of concrete moral qualities. I now proceed to show that Newman also understood the moral sense as including the implicit reasoning of the illative judgement.


1). Aristotle's Phronesis and Newman's illative judgement.

Newman referred to Aristotle's phronesis to illustrate and vindicate his proposals for the judgement of the illative sense; and there are three main reasons for this.

First, Aristotle did not limit the judgement of moral duty to mere intellectual calculation; this is rooted in Aristotle's understanding of the limitations of syllogistic reasoning insofar as the conclusion can only reflect the truth of the premisses, which come from sources other than the syllogism.

Secondly, Aristotle considered moral knowledge to be practical in the sense that it dealt with concrete circumstances and was dependent upon the subject's ethical conduct; Aristotle was most insistent upon the latter characteristic, so that phronesis and moral virtue are mutually dependent.

Thirdly, Aristotle proposed that moral education should occur within a well ordered political society, for only by maintaining a close relation between ethics and politics could the mutuality of phronesis and moral virtue continue; for if moral practical judgements depend upon previous ethical behaviour, and this ethical behaviour is determined by the practical intuitions of moral judgement, it would seem that there was a closed circularity in his argument. Aristotle overcame this difficulty by educating youth in the moral patterns of society as an experiential basis for their own subsequent ethical understanding, judgement and virtue; and these proposals were based on determining the philosophy of human nature; he was convinced that ancient and widespread opinions were true because of his finalistic structure of the universe.

Newman adopts each of these three points in his
explanation of the illative judgement; first, he argues against the exclusive use of intellectual reasoning, in favour of implicit reasoning, secondly, he insists on the personal and concrete nature of the illative judgement in which the judgement and the subject's character mutually influence each other, and thirdly he appeals to the common voice of mankind and to nature to indicate the truthfulness of his proposals. The first two points constitute the force of Newman's direct reference to the Aristotelian phronesis as illustrative of his proposals for illative judgement; the third point is a more general point which would reflect Newman's knowledge of Aristotle's writings.

Of course the most significant difference between Newman and Aristotle's proposals is that Newman argued for a speculative certainty, whereas the Aristotelian phronesis dealt merely with practical certainty. Also, it is quite clear that Newman's proposals operated within a context of religious belief; but it is important to recognise that his harmonious understanding of the relation between nature and grace prevented any necessary rejection of the Aristotelian phronesis on grounds of horizon of belief; rather, Newman's proposals for religious and moral certitude transfer Aristotle's phronesis into the higher order of religious belief and divine faith.

Newman's reference to Aristotle's phronesis does not necessarily imply that he adopted the concept of illative judgement (albeit in a speculative rather than a practical sense) from him; it is possible that he merely indicates that he is writing about the same realities as Aristotle. Nonetheless, Newman's acknowledgement of the striking similarity of the illative judgement with Aristotle's phronesis does permit a clarification of moral judgement by "comparing" the "controlling principle in inferences" (i.e. the illative judgement) with phronesis, the next section examines this comparison made by Newman.

2). Phronesis, illative judgement, and the moral sense.

Aristotle "calls the faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct, by the name of phronesis, or judgement"; Newman uses this "practical sense", in a
speculative way, as a judgement "in its general relation to truth and the affirmation of truth". I begin by explaining moral judgement as a judgement of certitude.

A. The judgement of the moral sense and Certitude.

Phronesis is "the directing, controlling, and determining principle" in matters of conduct "personal and social". The meaning of this is that it judges "what is right and wrong in a particular case", "deciding what ought to be done here and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances"; it is a judgement made by "the living intellect", being "seated in the mind of the individual". And this "directing principle in each case is called by the name, - sagacity, skill, tact, or prudence"; it is the "'judicium prudentis viri'". Newman presents two different views about the status of concrete moral judgement; there are texts which imply that it is different from the judgement of certitude; and there are texts which suggest it is included among the judgements of certitude. My analysis proposes that the latter view is more consistent with his general epistemological strategy.

1. Certitude and the illative moral judgement.

Newman is explicit that the "supra-logical judgement" of the illative sense, is certitude both in matters of duty and truth.

"It is often called the 'judicium prudentis viri', a standard of certitude which holds good in all concrete matter, not only in those cases of practice and duty, in which we are more familiar with it, but in questions of truth and falsehood generally, or in what are called 'speculative' questions.."

Newman's focus on truth did not exclude duty: "my aim is of a practical character, such as that of Butler in his 'Analogy', with this difference, that he treats of probability, doubt, expedience, and duty, whereas in these pages, without excluding, far from it, the question of duty, I would confine myself to the truth of things, and to the mind's certitude of that truth".
Here Newman is emphasising that his proposals are for the truth of certitude rather than mere probability, (as in Butler); insofar as he does not exclude "the question of duty", he acknowledges that truth can be achieved rather than only probability; and since the practical certainty of Aristotle's phronesis can only achieve what is probable, the implication is that Newman understood the moral judgement of duty as dealing with the certitude of truth, rather than merely echoing Aristotle's proposals for practical wisdom. 70

Newman, then, insists against Locke that the judgements of certitude, (that is, the judgement of the illative sense on the accumulation of probabilities), "are to be found throughout the range of concrete matter", including "those cases of practice and duty". 71 Newman's quest was to establish "the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete"; certitude operates "in all concrete questions", seeking "as active recognition of propositions as true". 72 For the judgement of "the Illative Sense" is "one and the same in all concrete matters", including the way we reason "in morals or religion"; and Newman identifies this illative moral judgement with the "moral sense". That is why he can talk of the "moral evidence and moral certitude.. that we can attain.. in the case of ethical and spiritual subjects, such as religion": "for there is but one truth". Hence, Newman is "as willing to apply.. to the Evidences of Religion as it properly applies to Metaphysics or Ethics, viz, that in these provinces of inquiry egotism is true modesty". 73

Newman proposes a cognitivist account of moral duty; the illative moral judgement is "a judgement of the reason" and "an instrument for detecting moral truth wherever it lies hid". 74

However, the illative judgement of the moral sense as a judgement of certitude can be contested.


There are three significant arguments used by Newman to imply that certitude did not encompass concrete moral judgement.
a). First, in a theological paper of 1865, Newman denied that there was "a true analogy" between conscience and certitude. This is an important comment since he explicitly explains how he understands the relation between the moral sense and the judgement of certitude. He uses the moral sense "to illustrate the view of certitude" which he adopts; he understands the moral sense as a "parallel... to introduce (recommend)" his "doctrine on the subject " of certitude. The "parallel" is that "certitude" is "an assent to a thing as true, as the moral sense is an assent to a thing as right": the specific points are that "the moral sense is... a natural principle", yet is open to "perversions", and that it adopts "the scientific and the personal" methods of reasoning, the former dealing with the "abstract" and the latter with the "concrete". All of these characterise certitude.75

Two comments can be made about this text. First, Newman admits that "the moral sense is an assent to a thing as right"; he adds that "there are two methods of enlightening and strengthening the mind in the exercise of the moral sense, the scientific and the personal": here are the essential characteristics of what Newman describes in the 'Grammar' as "complex assent", that is an assent made "consciously and deliberately".76 Despite his denial of "a true analogy between them", (the 'moral sense' and certitude), his argument shows that the judgement of the 'moral sense' fulfills the essential characteristics of certitude.

Secondly, in the same context of the discussion on the complex assent in the 'Grammar', Newman again distinguishes the moral sense and certitude in a way that explains why he denies "a true analogy between them"; for "these two parallel sentiments... have no relation with each other".77 He explains that "the enjoyable self-repose of certitude", (an "intellectual security"), which accompanies the "attainment of what is true", (the "perception of a truth"), is "foreign" to the "self-approval", (a "religious peace"), which attends "a conscientious deed", ("a good deed"); the parallel between the two sentiments is nonetheless clear.78

There is no "true analogy" between the moral sense and certitude because their "parallel sentiments" simply "have no relation with each other"; the achievement of what is
true and what is good is simply distinct. But this is not in itself to deny that what is good is also what is true; I indicated that in his theological paper of 1865 Newman attributed to the moral sense the essential characteristics of complex assent; in the 'Grammar' when he compares the two sentiments he emphasises that certitude "does not attach to mere knowing, that is, to the perception of things, but to the consciousness of having that knowledge"; this precisely seems to be the meaning of using the "two methods" of "scientific and personal" reasoning for "enlightening and strengthening the mind in the exercise of the moral sense".

b). The second argument that can be made against understanding the judgement of the moral sense as a judgement of certitude is that in "ethics... it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain to more than an opinion". The explanation of this is tied to Newman's distinction between "indefectible certitude in primary truths", and "manifold variations of opinion in their application and disposition".

By "primary truths" Newman means "truths which are certain" and are "points clear and immutable to start from" in our reasoning. These are "the elements of knowledge", or "elementary points of knowledge"; and as Newman's analysis of conscience shows, the "primary teachings of nature" in terms of religious truth are "the presence of God... and the universal experience... of a sense of sin or guilt" established in our "natural perception of right and wrong". From these "truths or facts" are abstracted "the primary principles, the general, fundamental, cardinal truths", which are "immutable" and constitute our "first principles" of reasoning; the abstraction of these "certain truths" is the work of "the moral sense", as indicated in my analysis of Newman's epistemological strategy. And these abstractions can receive an assent of certitude "for though the reasoning is abstract, the mind which judges of it is concrete" insofar as the mind actively recognises the proposition as true.

Newman then makes it clear that "beyond these elementary points of knowledge" there is a "vast subject-matter" on which we must "determine judgements by what is probable"; and included in this is the "large domain of
theology, metaphysics, ethics, on which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain to more than an opinion". This is because these constitute the "application and disposition" of the abstractions of the "primary truths". This simply reflects the epistemological limitation of abstraction: for "arguments about the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete. They may approximate to a proof, but they only reach the probable, because they cannot reach the particular".

In other words, the limitation of ethics to the probable is not a denial of the certitude of moral judgement; rather it reflects the epistemological limitation of the abstractions of ethics in their application to the concrete; this means that there can be no certitude in merely applying an abstract law of ethics by the deduction of explicit reasoning, for abstraction can merely reach the probable in the concrete. On the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility of certitude in concrete moral judgement when the judgement results not by applying an abstract law, but by the implicit reasoning of the illative sense.

c). The third argument that can be marshalled against understanding the judgement of the moral sense as a judgement of certitude is that duties change:

"In this respect of course the law of truth differs from the law of duty, that duties change, but truths never.. and the assent of certitude is immutable".

Newman seems to be implying that because certitude is immutable, and duties change, our concrete judgement about duty cannot constitute a judgement of certitude.

First of all, there is inconsistency in this position, for my analysis has shown that Newman acknowledged the possibility of certitude changing; a criterion of immutability cannot then be a universal criterion of discerning certitude; but nonetheless, the unexpectedness of change does constitute an essential characteristic of certitude. Secondly, at the root of Newman's comment on the immutability of certitude is the objective truthfulness of the proposition; in other words it is immutable to the extent that it is objectively true;
when a reversal of certitude occurs it is because a different truth has been perceived, not by degrees, but all at once by the judgement of the illative sense, (resulting from the inferential accumulation of probabilities). In other words, Newman's insistence on the immutability of certitude is at root an insistence on the perception of truth by the illative judgement; and this perception is necessarily tied to the concrete circumstances on which the judgement is made. My analysis in chapter two established this. I develop this later regarding moral law.

Within this perspective, it is quite consistent to understand the judgement of duty as a judgement of certitude. Certainly duties change, but this occurs because the judgement is necessarily tied to the concrete circumstances, as explained of certitude above; in other words, the change of duty reflects the perception of different objective truth because of the changing circumstances; at root, then, as with certitude, what is immutable is the necessity of perceiving objective truth, and this is by definition tied to the concrete circumstances. The argument that duties change, then, can be turned on its head to be an argument in defence of the certitude of concrete moral judgement. The next section further explains the importance of circumstances in concrete moral judgement.

B. Illative moral judgement in given circumstances.

The judgement is existential in the sense that it "is a capacity sufficient for the occasion" and is made by an individual "under these given circumstances", and so always deals with "a particular case". It is a faculty of judgement enabling each individual "to learn his own duty in his own case". Hence, "we cannot determine the character of particular acts, till we have the whole case before us out of which they arise"; and it is the function of the imagination's implicit reasoning to be able to grasp the "whole case" in reaching the judgement of certitude. This is the meaning of Newman's explanation that "the event... alone determines whether what is outwardly an assent is really such an act of the mind as admits of being developed into certitude"; the concrete judgement of certitude can only arise by dealing with the
concrete circumstances of a given case, and can never be determined "before the event"; 92 his description of "truth having a reality" is making the same point. 93 Newman's emphasis, then, is that concrete moral judgement is essentially tied to specific circumstances, which must be considered in their entirety; this point is made in the 'University Sermons' when he explains that "duty" assumes "a definite and actual shape, when it comes upon us under circumstance (and it is obvious that it can come in no other way)"; and his emphasis is upon our judgement on the circumstances, for "it is we, not our circumstances, that are, after all, the main causes of what we do and are". 94

Conclusion.

This section has examined Newman's understanding of moral judgement in relation to conscience. First, I explained the distinction between the 'sense of duty' and the 'moral sense' as two distinct aspects of the indivisible act of conscience; this distinction constitutes the parameters of Newman's moral discourse by outlining the rationality of the judgement of conscience within a horizon of belief; my interpretation of Newman's distinction showed that the sense of duty introduces a religious motive to the moral sense; and the moral sense includes the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, as well as the abstractions of explicit reason. Secondly, I explained that the moral sense also includes the implicit reason of the illative moral judgement; and I proposed that this moral judgement is a judgement of certitude. In the next section I explain the relation between the illative moral judgement and moral code within the context of Newman's theology of a religious imagination.


There are two points made by Newman about the relation of the illative moral judgement to the abstract ethical code; these points are the basis for understanding what Newman means by the "objective existence of the Moral Law".¹

1). Moral code, probability, and illative judgement.

A. Probability and concrete truth.

The illative judgement is not a direct application of abstract law or ethical code to the concrete case: my analysis has already shown that Newman rejects such an approach in principle because the abstract cannot reach the particular truth, but only the probable. Hence he insists that in judging "what is right and wrong in a particular case, for the answers in fulness and accuracy to these and similar questions, the philosopher refers us to no code of laws, to no moral treatise, because no science of life, applicable to the case of an individual, has been or can be written."² Later, I explain the importance of moral judgement in the fulfillment of man's progress before God; and in discussing this progress, Newman emphatically rejects, (it "cannot be"), "devising...some sufficient science of reasoning which may compel certitude in concrete conclusions".³ To say that this judgement is "not an obedience to external rules of criticism or science"(that is ethical code),⁴ is only recording the epistemological limitations of abstraction, and is not intended to be a rejection of the value of the abstract reasoning of ethical code; for "an ethical system may supply laws, general rules, guiding principles, a number of examples, suggestions, landmarks, limitations, cautions, distinctions, solutions of critical or anxious difficulties". But the epistemological limitation of ethical code is that "what is written is too vague"; also Newman adds that it is "too negative for our need"; the former points to the limitation of abstraction,(not being able to deal with the concrete, i.e.
"our need"), and the latter is explained by saying "it bids us avoid extremes; but it cannot ascertain for us, according to our personal need, the golden mean".\(^5\)

However, while it is clear that Newman disallows a direct application of abstract code to determine a concrete case, he nonetheless does accept that an indirect application of the abstract code is relevant; for he asks of such laws, "who is to apply them to a particular case?"; and his response is, "whither can we go, except to the living intellect" of illative judgement.\(^6\) In other words, the abstract code is of value in a concrete case, and ought to be applied to it; but his emphasis is that this application is not direct, that is by deductive explicit reasoning, but rather indirect by the implicit reasoning of the individual illative judgement taking cognizance of the abstract truth of the ethical code; this means the data of the moral sense (as abstraction) is relevant to the illative operation of concrete moral judgement. Hence Newman makes a most important observation:

"the rule of conduct for one man is not always the rule for another, though the rule is always one and the same in the abstract".\(^7\)

B. Concrete truth and abstraction.

The concrete moral judgement supplies the abstract reasoning of the moral sense with data for the ethical code; Newman's explanation highlights the importance of the concrete moral judgement or "phronesis, from which the science of morals forms its rules, and receives its complement".\(^8\) The moral sense cannot be exclusively associated with the construction of an ethical code;\(^9\) yet this is an essential feature of it, for the conscience as moral sense "gives us a rule of right and wrong.. and a code of moral duties".\(^10\)

2). The objective existence of the moral law.

These points help explain Newman's understanding of "the objective existence of the Moral Law".\(^11\) Three important observation can be made about this.

First, the "Moral Law" is the "abstract proposition
'There is a right and a wrong', as representing an act of inference"; for "a law is not a fact, but a notion". It is essentially an abstraction; and hence "the rule is always one and the same in the abstract".12

Secondly, moral law has "objective existence" insofar as it is an abstraction from the reality of "particular experiences"; for "truth" is tied to "reality, and "notions are an evidence of the reality of (the) special sentiments in particular instances, without which they would not have been formed".13 I have already explained that the abstraction of the 'moral sense' is from the concrete reality of the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, and from the concrete illative moral judgement; however, the abstraction from the former is athematic, ('there is a right and a wrong'), while the abstraction from the latter is thematic in the sense of constituting what Newman calls "concrete laws"; these are determined by the specific circumstances involved. These, of course, are still abstractions: "all concrete laws are general".14

Hence, the "objective existence of the Moral Law", (including "concrete" moral laws), is essentially an abstraction. This abstraction can be considered as universal in the sense that it is an unlimited extension of the reality perceived absolutely in a concrete act; the universality of a proposition, then, can only reflect the abstract nature of the proposition.15 However, in terms of the abstract proposition being applicable to concrete reality, the proposition must be considered as general, rather than universal; for an abstraction can only reach the probable in the concrete. In terms of the relevance of the abstraction for the concrete, Newman is explicit in saying that "what is called a universal is only a general", because "what is only general does not lead to a necessary conclusion"; "general laws are not inviolable truths; much less are they necessary causes". In this sense "all concrete laws are general" and "persons, as such, do not fall under laws"; and so, "the rule of conduct for one man is not always the rule for another".16

Thirdly, despite this epistemological limitation of abstract law, its probability must still be taken seriously in a concrete case: "Since, as à rule, men are rational, progressive, and social, there is a high probability of this rule being true in the case of a
particular person".  

However, two important qualifications must be added to this; first, Newman insists that in each case we must "be sure of it", that is, we must allow the probability to be transformed into certainty by applying the law "rightly" in the illative judgement. And secondly, to have this respect for the probability of the law in a given case implies that the epistemological strategy of making the law in the first place has been observed; we must "have satisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are", by ensuring that the law is a genuine abstraction from preceding experience.

This discussion is precisely the context of Newman's explanation that we must "let units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals". Newman successfully holds in harmony the objective existence of moral laws (as abstractions from experience) and the central importance of the illative moral judgement in concrete circumstances. Hence "the precepts of a religion" can apply "absolutely" in the sense of being objectively true as abstractions; "but at the same time we ought to be quite sure that, in a particular case which is before us, we have satisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are, and that we apply them rightly", that is by illative moral judgement.

Even when a precept, as abstraction, applies "absolutely", it can only be applied to the concrete by implicit reasoning of the illative moral judgement; the precept cannot be applied directly by the deduction of explicit reasoning to the concrete case, because the abstract can only reach what is probable, and not what is certain. These "precepts", then, as "concrete laws", (for example forbidding us "to lie, or to have a community of wives"), can be said to apply "absolutely" because they are objective; but they are objective because they are abstractions from reality; and as abstractions they cannot apply universally, (that is, the application by the deduction of explicit reason without the introduction of the illative judgement). Hence Newman envisages "precepts" as "concrete laws" which are absolute because they are objective, but cannot be applied universally because they are abstract.
3). Moral law and real assent.

The relation between the abstract moral law and the illative moral judgement reflects Newman's understanding of the relation between the notional and the real.

A. The Notional and real.

His distinction between notional and real propositions is that the former refers to the "abstract, general, and non-existing", and the latter to "things external to us, unit and individual". And the same proposition may express the notional and the real in the same mind at the same time. \(^{23}\) We apprehend a proposition by "our imposition of a sense on the terms", that is by "the interpretation given to the terms". \(^{24}\)

Newman's meaning is ambiguous. On the one hand he seems to argue that the distinction between notional and real apprehension refers to the objective character of the propositions insofar as "the terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things", and if they do not, "they must stand for notions". \(^{25}\) However, Newman's emphasis upon the proposition being able to admit both notional and real apprehension at the same time in the same mind suggests that the distinction refers to the mode of appropriation, rather than to the independent object; \(^{26}\) this view seems more plausible in light of Newman's explanation that the distinction reflects the "interpretation given to the terms". \(^{27}\)

Newman allows for notional concepts to be so vividly realized as to become facts in the imagination, thereby eliciting real assent. This occurs "when we apply our general knowledge to a particular instance of that knowledge"; the distinction between notional and real assent is the distinction between "intellectually recognizing" in accepting a notion, and seeing or feeling the truth by "realizing a fact". The general idea becomes "a living image", not in a visual or sensory way, but as referring to concrete reality in terms of "experience" and the "personal". \(^{28}\)

Newman explicitly discusses this theory of real assent to notional propositions in relation to the doctrine of God, \(^{29}\) and first principles. \(^{30}\) I examine first principles to clarify the relation between moral law and judgement.
B. First principles and character.

1. First principles.

Newman describes "first principles" as "the propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter", and they are "the recondite sources of all knowledge". They are "notions.. because they express what is abstract, not what is individual and from direct experience"; they are "conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences"; and they receive "a notional assent". By their recondite nature they are unconscious; Newman calls them presumptions or assumptions.

First principles are "founded on an instinct", in the sense of being abstractions from individual phenomena; but in themselves, they are included in what Newman calls intuition; first principles, then, are "of a personal character".

In a theological paper of 1885 Newman explains that in terms of religion, the faculty for "the apprehension of first principles" is the "moral sense"; but this faculty has "a wider subject-matter than religion", and it is equivalent to what Aristotle calls "nous, or the noetic faculty". Neither logic nor the illative sense can determine first principles upon which all knowledge is based. They constitute our "pre-existent beliefs", and are "our guides and standards in speculating, reasoning, judging, deliberating, deciding, and acting.. they are the conditions of our mental life"; but insofar as they receive "a notional assent" they belong to "the furniture of the mind" in the sense of not being "thoroughly assimilated with it"; in other words the assent entailed by first principles is "simple and absolute", and awaits the reflex assent of certitude.

The reflex assent of certitude is entailed by the notional proposition of the first principle eliciting a real assent; this occurs "when we apply our general knowledge to a particular instance of that knowledge"; this seems to be what Newman means by "the province of intuition" being "applied and modified" "here, in this man, and under these circumstances". First principles "may be false or true"; the truthfulness is discerned in the application of the first principle to the concrete;
this occurs by the illative judgement, and is explained below in terms of discerning the truthfulness of moral law by concrete moral judgement; for just as first principles are the notional propositions of intuition, so too, "any belief in a moral law is an intuition". 43

There is a crucial complementarity between first principles and illative judgement: I now explain this in terms of character.

2. Character, first principles and illative judgement.

a. Character as benefactor of illative judgement.

First principles are "the recondite sources of all knowledge":

"We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds". 44

Newman establishes an irreducible complementarity between implicit reasoning and the personal character which is the root in each individual of first principles and the illative sense. 45

Each individual has a "particular history", and its many aspects include the "constitution, moral temperament, intellectual outfit, (and) mental formation" of the subject; these "are the accidents which make up" the "notion of a man's person". 46 And what the individual makes of his particular history constitutes character. The "accidents" which form the character or person "are the ground-work or condition of his particular experiences"; and, in turn, "real apprehension and assent... depend on personal experience". 47 In illustrating the illative sense with phronesis Newman explains that personal judgement is "an acquired habit... formed and matured by practice and experience"; we "strengthen and perfect" this faculty of illative judgement by the moral and intellectual qualities achieved by the person; that is by his character. 48

Character, then, is the benefactor of illative judgement:
"There is a certain ethical character, one and the same, a system of first principles, sentiments and tastes, a mode of viewing the question and of arguing, which is formally and normally, naturally and divinely, the organum investigandi given us for gaining religious truth". 49

In the judgement of the illative sense, "our criterion of truth" is "the intellectual and moral character of the person" who assimilates the inferences and makes the illative judgement; "truth there is, and attainable it is"; and "its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual being". 50

b. Character as beneficiary of illative judgement.

Newman also explains that character is the beneficiary of real assent, and by extension of illative judgement. Real assents, beliefs, and certitudes, especially when "given to moral objects", "form the mind out of which they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views"; real assent "leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal". Faith, then, can be considered a moral judgement for "faith, though an intellectual action, is ethical in its origin". 51

There is clearly a danger of subjectivism in the apparent circularity of the complementary relation between first principles and illative judgement. Newman meets this challenge in two ways: first by his emphasis upon the primacy of concrete circumstances in determining objective truth; secondly by the corrective function of explicit reason explained in my first and second chapters. I now focus on the importance of determining objective truth by giving real assent to notional propositions in terms of moral law and illative moral judgement.

C. Moral law and illative moral judgement.

The abstract moral law elicits a notional assent; but we must avoid allowing the apprehension of truth to "dwindle into a mere notion of (the) intellect". 52
Newman's theory of real assent enlightens the relation between the abstract moral law and the illative moral judgement. Just as "the abstract proposition 'There is a right and a wrong' is received by the mind with a notional, not a real assent", so too are the "concrete laws" which are "general", for "a law is not a fact, but a notion". As abstractions "persons, as such, do not fall under laws"; these notional assents "give us in great measure our morality, our social code, the standards of thought and action, our moral language"; they constitute "the furniture of the mind" but are "never thoroughly assimilated with it". 53

The individual person only comes "under" the law when it is applied to the concrete circumstances; the notional law elicits a real assent as if by "realizing a fact". 54 I have explained that the application of the abstract law by means of explicit reason can only lead to probability; this does not elicit a real assent of certainty. Real assent is elicited when the subject makes an illative judgement upon the abstract law and the concrete circumstances in a holistic way; the notional apprehension of the law can only elicit a real assent when it is applied to the concrete circumstances by the illative moral judgement.

This is what Newman means by saying of law that "in proportion as we obey the particular dictates which are its tokens, so are we led on more and more to view it in the association of those particulars, which are real, and virtually to change our notion of it into the image of that objective fact, which in each particular case it undeniably is". 55

I have explained that the moral law has "objective existence" as being an abstraction from the reality of "particular experiences" wherein lies the "truth". 56 Its abstract objectivity applies "absolutely" when the illative moral judgement perceives the "objective fact" of reality; this objective truth is discerned by "this given person, under these given circumstances". It is "to the living mind that we must look for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind". 57

This enlightens Newman's view of natural law. He adopts Aquinas' definition that "the natural law is an impression of the Divine light in us, a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature"; this "Divine Law... is the
rule of ethical truth". Newman explains that "this law, as apprehended in the minds of individual man is called conscience". This grasp of "ethical truth" is the work of illative moral judgement; and it is cognitive, objective, and absolute as explained above; but it is not universal or irreversible.58

Until we have these real assents to the notional moral laws "in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings. Whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religion".59 Newman proposes a dynamic tension between notional and real assent; and this tension he formulates in his theology of a religious imagination.

B). The theology of a religious imagination.

1). Theological intellect and religious imagination.

Newman concludes his observations on conscience by reference to his "theology of a religious imagination",60 which explains the complementary relation between explicit and implicit reason, between theology and religion; this complementarity is manifest in the "living hold on truths" which allows a dynamic bond between the abstraction of "theological truth" and the concrete reality of "religious fact";61 the former emphasises the explicit reason of the intellect, the latter the implicit reason of the imagination. Newman clearly intended that the two aspects of the "indivisible" act of conscience should have the same complementarity; and this is the case, but the complementarity is not as simple as associating the moral sense with the theological intellect, and the sense of duty with the religious imagination.

My analysis has shown that the theological intellect is in operation when the process of abstraction is at work: hence it operates as much with the sense of duty, (in abstracting the concept of God from the instinct of sanction), as with the moral sense, (in abstracting from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, as well as from the concrete illative moral judgement, to obtain the "elements of the moral law", which can be developed into an ethical code);62 the theological intellect is also operational in the application of the ethical code to a concrete situation, for although only the probable can
be reached in this way, it is reached by the deduction of explicit reason from the abstract code.

The religious imagination is in operation when the implicit reason is being used: and, again, it operates with both the sense of duty, (in the instinctive perception of the sanction, and in the real assent given to it as a result of the process of abstraction), and the moral sense, (in the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities, and the real assent to these qualities determined in a given situation by the illative moral judgement).

2). Conscience and the theology of a religious imagination.

The "indivisible" act of conscience is parallel to the "theology of a religious imagination" in terms of moral duty; for in both there is an unreserved insistence on the dynamic complementarity of implicit and explicit reasoning; his central emphasis is upon the imaginative grasp of certitude, but the "sine qua non" condition for this primacy of the imagination is the inferential investigations of the intellect. This dynamic complementarity implies three important observations about moral judgement.

A. Illative judgement and accumulative probability.

The inferential process preceding the illative moral judgement occurs by accumulative probability, and this necessitates the rational examination of any relevant abstract moral law; although the law cannot be applied directly, it does have a significant indirect relevance. This has already been explained. However, the resultant illative moral judgement is always totally independent of the preceding inferences.
B. Obedience to conscience and theological truth.

1. Implicit and explicit reason.

The complementarity of implicit and explicit reason clarifies why "conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge", communicating "that knowledge which is most momentous" to each individual; for conscience is "our great internal teacher of religion" because it "teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is".

His "theology of a religious imagination" is the basis for explaining that "conscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator"; for it is when the abstract notion of God elicits a real assent of certitude, that "the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion". Newman resists allowing the apprehension of truth to "dwindle into a mere notion", that is "an inferential acceptance of the great truth".

In the same way Newman insists that the abstract moral law elicits a real assent from the illative moral judgement.

2. Obedience to conscience.

Newman's explanation that conscience is "so constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range" can be explained by reference to the "theology of a religious imagination". Just as conscience "depends on each of us individually, and on his circumstances", so too does the "theology of a religious imagination"; for its "living hold on truths" is gained by the illative judgement of certitude by "this given person, under these given circumstances". And just as the illative judgement of the "theology of a religious imagination" is "matured and practised by experience", so too does conscience develop "if obeyed"; that is, conscience as sense of duty "becomes clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range"; just as "the image of God, if duly cherished, may expand, deepen, and be completed".

The context of these remarks on the theology of a religious imagination is the illustration of illative judgement by phronesis; and I have explained that the work of the illative judgement is that of the moral sense. It is no surprise, then, that Newman discusses the "rule of
right and wrong" and the "code of moral duties" as part of the package of knowledge determined by conscience. 73

3. Theological truth.

The moral sense and its recognition of what is right and wrong is as important in Newman's understanding of conscience as the divine sanction of the sense of duty; Newman's description of the sense of duty as the "primary and most authoritative aspect" of conscience, 74 is made to emphasise the primacy of the religious direction of conscience, and is not intended to downplay the cognitive content of the moral sense. My analysis of the indivisible nature of conscience is the basis for understanding that obedience to conscience necessarily includes the sanction and the content of the duty.

And as conscience if obeyed makes the injunctions clearer, when obeyed it also "corrects and completes the accidental feebleness of its initial teachings". 75 This refers to the epistemological process of checking the objective truth of the teaching of conscience; it is the work of the explicit reason of abstraction and inference; I have explained this process of testing and verifying the objectivity of certitude. This process applies as much to the abstraction from the sense of duty, (in determining that the sanction is from God as well as determining the divine attributes), as to the abstraction of the 'moral sense, (in determining right and wrong).

Also, this process of checking is twofold; there is abstraction from the "instinctive recognition" of moral qualities and from the concrete illative moral judgement in order to check the objectivity of the "elements of the moral law" through a process of consistency, as described in chapter two. There is also a verification entailed in the application of the abstract moral law to a given concrete situation which tests the adequacy of the law: in other words not only does the notional check the real, but the real also checks the notional, as explained earlier.

Newman is explicit on this matter with regard to the moral law: for he insists that the "lessons of right and wrong" which the child is taught in school "are to be carried out into action amid the good and evil of the world"; and in doing this "the intellectual assents, in which they have.. been instructed from the first, have to
be tested, realized, and developed by the exercise of their mature judgement".\textsuperscript{76}

Newman's point is that the concrete illative judgement (aligned to action which is indirectly caused by the concrete judgement, as explained later), is essential in checking the objective (abstract) truthfulness of the moral law. And here again is seen the importance of the imaginative grasp of the concrete: just as Newman resists the image of God dwindling into a mere notion, so too with our grasp of the truth of moral law; he resists a mere "inferential acceptance" of its truth as a notional abstraction, and encourages its acceptance by the real assent of the illative moral judgement.

However, these "two modes of thought", (the notion and image) have "one origin" epistemologically; so, Newman holds that "they cannot really be inconsistent with each other".\textsuperscript{77} When the illative moral judgement is unable to accept the inferential abstraction of law, because it does not accord with the illative judgement based on experience, then the abstraction of law must be refined accordingly. That is why "real apprehension" is "the scope and end and the test of the notional", and why "universals minister to units".\textsuperscript{78}

A). Moral Progress.

Newman understands man as "a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristically good"; this means "completing his inchoate and rudimental nature, and.. developing his own perfection"; man has to be the "creator of his own sufficiency" and "emphatically self-made", both "individually and as regards the human family". This task is undertaken "by the exercise of those faculties which are his natural inheritance", relying upon "the personal efforts of each individual"; most especially Newman explains that "this law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition of knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments".¹

This "sacred duty" of human progress both reflects and reveals God's "overruling Providence", "especially as regards religious and ethical inquiries".² Inference and assent, then, are at the heart of Newman's understanding of religious and moral progress.

The complementarity of inference and assent led Newman to reject any "one-sided progress of the mind"; that is why he opposed the progress entailed by Liberalism's focus on "the intellect, recognizing indeed the moral sense, but ignoring the conscience";³ such a stance ignored the religious motive of the sense of duty, and was the cause of Newman's theological reserve about explicit reason discussed in my first chapter. His epistemological reserve about the limitations of abstraction is expressed in stating that progress is not a mere "mechanism" whose instruments are the "formulas and contrivances of language". Rather, "progress is a living growth" based on the imaginative grasp of truth by the real assent of illative judgement in religion and morality.⁴

At the heart of human progress, then, is the illative moral judgement; this entails both inference and assent, and in Newman's horizon of belief the sanction of the sense of duty constituted an indispensable religious intentionality.

However, the primacy of the imaginative assent of illative moral judgement is very different from the Liberalism he rejected, as described in my first chapter; this is apparent in his defense of moral law.

Newman rejected Liberalism as rationalistic or antidogmatic. In my first chapter I explained that he opposed the exaggerated use of explicit reason as secular reason, which excluded the religious intentionality entailed in the sense of duty; and he opposed explicit reason when it excluded the operation of implicit reason. In 1887 he re-affirmed his opposition to Liberalism as "the development of rationalism"; he rejected the exclusive measure of "reason and the moral sense" understood both as the abstraction of explicit reason and disassociated from religious intentionality. 5

1). Liberalism and Dogmatism.

The dogmatic principle, or "principle of dogma" is that "supernatural truths" are "irrevocably committed to human language"; it is "imperfect because it is human", and "definitive and necessary because given from above". The "principle of faith.. is the correlative of dogma, being an absolute acceptance of the divine Word with an internal assent"; because faith is "an act of the intellect", this "opens a way for inquiry.. that is, for science in religion, in subservience to itself; this is the principle of theology". 6 The dogmatic principle and theology are linked with the church and ecclesiastical authority for doctrinal definition. 7

Dogma is a proposition which can receive a notional or real assent either as a "theological act" or as "an act of religion"; the complementarity of these has been discussed in his "theology of a religious imagination". 8 Liberalism rejected the dogmatic principle in promoting the exclusive use of explicit reason which Newman identified with private judgement.


My first chapter explained the dangers of private judgement found in the exaggerated argument of benevolence which makes us "our own centre", becoming "victims of intense self contemplation". I explained the danger for moral judgement when reduced to the abstraction of "moral consistency"; in using abstract reason "deference to the
law of conscience. is easily perverted into a deference to our own judgement”; liberalism is anti-dogmatic and relies exclusively on demonstrative reasoning. Newman rejected the utilitarian approach as equally anti-dogmatic in its rationalism by judging revelation by secular standards: "this intellectualism first and chiefly comes into collision with precept, then with doctrine, then with the very principle of dogmatism: a perception of the Beautiful becomes the substitute for faith".

The basis of Newman's concern was that the exclusive use of explicit reason compromised the objectivity of dogma. I examined this concern in terms of moral judgement.

3). Moral Judgement.

I explained that Newman overcame the epistemological and theological reserves entailed by the use of explicit reason; his theology of a religious imagination shows that the religious intentionality of the sense of duty and the operation of implicit reason operate in dynamic tension with the abstraction of explicit reason. And I showed that this tension is operative in Newman's understanding of illative moral judgement.

A. Moral Judgement as private judgement.

Newman acknowledged that his proposals for illative judgement and certitude in natural religion constituted "private judgement"; this is not the private judgement of Liberalism; it is the individual's illative judgement of truth, (by implicit reason), which "rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demonstrative", (by explicit reason).

In the same way, the illative moral judgement is not a private judgement of Liberalism. The illative moral judgement combines the responsibility of the agent in specific circumstances with the perception of objective concrete truth: the "objective fact" of concrete duty is discerned by "this given person, under these given circumstances".

This perception is consistent with Newman's dogmatic principle; I have argued that it is from the experience of illative moral judgement that the objectivity of moral
law is abstracted, (which includes the refinement of moral law, as explained later); and I have shown that the objective existence of the moral law receives absolute application in the concrete by means of the illative moral judgement. This entails the primacy of conscience over ecclesial authority.

B. The primacy of conscience.

The dogmatic principle highlights the importance of the abstract doctrines of moral law. However, Newman insisted upon the primacy of conscience over law; conscience could not be "resolved into any combination of principles in our nature", since it is "the practical judgement or dictate of reason, by which we judge what hic et nunc is to be done as being good".  

Newman argues that "conscience has rights because it has duties"; and these duties are centred in the obligation to "rule myself by my own judgement and my own conscience". I have already explained that the objective duty of natural law is discerned by the illative moral judgement; this constitutes "the supreme authority of Conscience", which should never be transgressed. In this sense, "absolute obedience" cannot be given to a moral law. Nor can it be given to the Pope. This is not to deny the authority of moral law or the Pope implied in the dogmatic principle; it is a concrete expression of the theology of a religious imagination which establishes the hierarchy of real over notional assent. That is why Newman can comment, "I shall drink...to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards".

Newman, however, did not isolate the individual conscience from the communal conscience of the whole church; 'On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine' is witness to this. The second characteristic of the "consensus" of the faithful is "a sort of instinct, or phronema, deep in the bosom of the mystical body of Christ"; this is the communal counterpart of the illative moral judgement, (phronesis), made by individual conscience; and its emphasis is upon real, not notional, assent.

The subsequent three characteristics qualify this 'phronema'. The fifth characteristic is that the "consensus" is "a jealousy of error, which it at once
feels as a scandal”; Newman explains this in terms of his understanding of liberal education which "conflicts with what it cannot assimilate into itself, and is irritated and disordered till it has expelled it"; this "test of uncongeniality" is manifest in submitting "heretical and Catholic principle to the action of the multitude". 24 Just as the illative moral judgement of the individual relies upon the abstraction of explicit reason manifest in liberal education, so too does the communal 'phronema' of real assent. His fourth and fifth characteristics point to the christian specificity of this 'phronema' under the "direction of the Holy Ghost", and "as an answer to .. prayer"; 25 the epistemology of the 'phronema' operates in the economy of Grace as in Nature, as my analysis of the illative moral judgement of the individual has shown.

Newman's proposals for "consensus" is made in the theological context of Grace and the dogmatic principle: it is an ecclesiological comment on the laity's place in the church in combatting liberalism of the day. 26

His theological point is seen in the first characteristic of "consensus" as "a testimony to the fact of the apostolic dogma"; this means that "the sense of the faithful is not left out of the question by the Holy See among the preliminary acts of defining a doctrine", because "the Church teaching and the Church taught, are put together, as one twofold testimony". 27

It is beyond the purpose of this thesis to analyse the theological significance of this "consensus"; my point has been to show that the primacy of conscience lies in the discernment of concrete truth by the illative judgement, both individual and communal. This is consistent with his dogmatic principle, and adopts the epistemology of judgement outlined in the thesis within a theological context.

It is particularly relevant for understanding the relation between illative moral judgement and moral law, or doctrine in our contemporary church. In 1863 Newman regretted in his church the lack of "exercise of the intellect", bemoaning the passing of theological "schools", "private judgement", and "freedom .. of opinion"; his concern was that "the system goes on by the tradition of the intellect of former times". 28 His proposals for the real assent of illative moral judgement was a response to this ecclesial lack.
Illative moral judgement combined with an understanding of the abstract moral law is crucial for the perception of the concrete truth of moral duty. That is why Newman insisted that each individual must "learn his own duty in his own case" by "recourse to his own rule"; and "if his rule is not sufficiently developed in his intellect for his need, then he goes to some other living, present authority, to supply it for him"; the force of Newman's remark is that we must not take recourse "to the dead letter of a treatise or a code".29

Wisdom and Bigotry: the abuse of abstraction.

Newman's defense of the dogmatic principle is not intended to qualify the imaginative assent of the individual, either in the law of truth or the law of duty. His theology of a religious imagination makes it clear that doctrine can receive a notional or real assent; and I have shown that his emphasis is upon real assent.30 If the apprehension of moral truth is allowed to "dwindle into a mere notion of (the) intellect", it becomes "the dead letter of a treatise or code";31 it constitutes "living by the square" rather than "realizing. high maxims in the concrete"; and it reveals an interest in logic, or deductive reasoning, which is more set "upon concluding rightly, than on right conclusions"; this way of reasoning "cannot see the end for the process".32

This is a significant comment because it shows that the dogmatic principle is not a defense of a merely notional assent to doctrine, in faith or morals; it shows clearly that the objective existence of moral law is not sufficient for determining concrete moral duty. Newman does not allow the abstract system of moral code to replace the primacy of illative moral judgement. He opposes "giving to systems which are short of necessary, that authority which belongs only to what is necessary and eternal"; he calls the results of this abstract systematising "so-called intuitions of prejudice, narrow-mindedness and bigotry".33

Newman opposes this bigotry to the gift of Wisdom, which is the proper use of abstract reason at the service of implicit reason in religion and morality. The reduction of moral judgement to a "love of systems" is a "perversion" of the philosophical reasoning of Wisdom.34
Bigotry is also defined as "the application of inadequate or narrow principles" in the sense of enunciating "general principles on defective knowledge"; bigotry "has no element of advance in it" because it is "under the practical persuasion that it has nothing to learn".35

I have explained that the primacy of illative moral judgement is precisely the base from which moral law is abstracted; it is from the objectivity of concrete truth that the objective truth of moral law is abstracted. Wisdom is this gift of learning by abstracting from the concrete. The "narrow minds" of the bigoted are characterised by having "no power of throwing themselves into the minds of others"; they are noted for "the helplessness which they exhibit, when new materials or fields of thought are opened upon them". The "very test" of Wisdom, however, is "that no knowledge can be submitted to it with which it is not commensurate"; it can learn from new concrete truths. With bigotry, however, there is a "conflict between broad fact and narrow principle".36

The distinction between Wisdom and Bigotry in morality clarifies the proper use of abstract moral judgement or moral law; it should be at the service of the implicit reason of the illative moral judgement. When concrete moral judgement is determined only by deductive application of the abstract moral code, the narrow-mindedness of bigotry is the result.

Moral progress needs both abstract and illative moral judgement; the latter has the primacy. I now explain its relation to action.


1). Imagination and Action.

Newman does not relate action directly to the intellect or the imagination; for "the pure intellect does not lead to action, nor the imagination either"; the real assent of illative judgement, then, does not directly lead to action, for "it is in itself an intellectual act, of which the object is presented to it by the imagination".37 Hence, Assent, however strong, and accorded to images however vivid, is not therefore necessarily practical; strictly speaking, it is not imagination that causes action."38
However, Newman also explains that "the imagination has the means, which the pure intellect has not, of stimulating those powers of the mind from which action proceeds". Although real assent "viewed in itself, does not lead to action", nonetheless "the images in which it lives, representing as they do the concrete, have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by means of these indirectly become operative"; "what the imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them" and "leads us along a course of action". The imagination stimulates "those motive powers", of our "affections and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive causes". 39

"Now assent to a real proposition is assent to an imagination, and an imagination, as supplying objects to our emotional and moral nature, is adapted to be a principle of action". 40

Newman offers examples of this. He talks of the of the slave-trade; its "iniquity" was one of the "great truths, practical or ethical" which "float on the surface of society, admitted by all", yet "valued by few" in terms of action; however, eventually it was efforts "to affect the imagination of men" which made "their acknowledgement of that iniquitousness operative". Another example is duelling where the populace "accepted a notion without realizing a fact"; eventually "in like manner", by affecting the imagination, the "governing classes were roused from their dreamy acquiescence in an abstract truth, and recognized the duty of giving it practical expression". 41

I have explained that illative moral judgement is the means by which the notional apprehension of moral truth elicits a real assent. From the real assent of imaginative moral judgement action ensues: "acts of Notional assent and of Inference do not affect our conduct, and acts of Belief, that is, of Real Assent do (not necessarily, but do) affect it". Illative moral judgement always has primacy over the notional apprehension of moral law; this is the sense of Newman's insistence that we cannot make men "moral and religious by libraries and museums"; and
herein lies "the secret of the distrust and raillery with which moralists have been commonly visited. They say and do not. Why? Because they are contemplating the fitness of things, and they live by the square, when they should be realizing their high maxims in the concrete". 42

Human progress demands the use of inference and real assent which leads to action; "life is for action", and "impressions lead to action, and.. reasonings lead from it"; it is only the imaginative grasp of real assent which offers "a stimulus for.. activity and progress". 43

In Newman's horizon of belief the religious intentionality, (that is, "Divine Goodness, future reward, eternal life" entailed by the real assent to the sense of duty), can be the "means of stimulating those motive powers". It is the force of motive or intention which is Newman's emphasis in saying that "when there is that preparation of mind, the thought does lead to the act". 44

2). Action and Will.

In my second chapter I explained the passive and active role of the will in reaching and maintaining certitude. In the relation of illative moral judgement and action two other functions of the will are apparent.

The context of Newman's discussion on the indirect operativity of real assent is simple assent, and not the reflex assent of certitude. 45 Newman explicitly relates the indirect operativity of simple assent with the will: its real assent "is the motive cause of great achievements" because it is "stayed upon a vivid apprehension.. more concentrated in will and in deed for the very reason that it has not been subjected to any intellectual development". 46

Newman's point is that the "intellectual developments" of reflex assent entail an inferential investigation which weakens the "personal hold" on truths and consequent action. 47 His point is not to deny that the real assent of illative judgement is indirectly operative; the characteristics of real assent in simple and reflex assent are the same; the real assent of illative judgement, then, is indirectly operative just as in simple assent.

The indirect operativity of real assent clarifies the function of will entailed in being "concentrated in will". The indirect operativity of real assent is not "to be
relied upon" because "this practical influence is not invariable", for "given images may have no tendency to affect given minds".48 The uncontrollable variability of the indirect operativity of real assent implies a passive function of the will or intentionality; and this necessarily includes the real assent of illative judgement, and, a fortiori, illative moral judgement.

This passive function of the will is distinct from the passive function of the will entailed in reaching the illative judgement and certitude, because it may or may not be operative, depending on the "preparation of mind",49 explained above.

The relation between illative moral judgement and action reveals another function of the will; that is, the will to carry the illative judgement into action; for although the judgement of certainty in the illative moral judgement is the same as the experience or acceptance of the certainty, it is quite distinct from the consequent action.50 The will to act would be subsequent to the active function of the will in confirming the illative moral judgement and assent of certitude; and it would be an active function of the will, in comparison to the passive function entailed by the indirect operativity of assent explained above.

The relation between the illative moral judgement and freely chosen action is essential to Newman's understanding of virtue.

3). Action and Virtue.

Freely chosen action consequent upon the illative moral judgement is kernel to Newman's understanding of virtue. In illustrating the illative judgement by 'phronesis', Newman adopts Aristotle's view: "what it is to be virtuous, how we are to gain the just idea and standard of virtue, how we are to approximate in practice to our own standard" is not determined by an abstract "ethical system" of "laws"; rather, "the golden mean" is established by determining "what is right and wrong in a particular case" by the concrete judgement of 'phronesis', (understood in a speculative, not a practical, way).51 Virtue depends upon the illative moral judgement, and is inseparable from action.52

Newman rejected an understanding of virtue that was
unrelated to action; he opposed those who "profess a sincere respect for Virtue, and then let her starve" by not being active; this is the result of moral truth being "viewed as a system", when there is "nothing of a personal nature". 53 Newman insisted that "moral truth", (both religious and ethical), cannot be discerned "without reference to.. moral character"; 54 and "moral character" is "exhibited in thought and conduct". 55 It is the "performance of our duty" which constitutes "the cultivation of virtue" and contributes to human progress in terms of "moral advancement". 56

The real assent of illative moral judgement is at the crux of human progress; and this progress occurs by the realisation of personal character in moral virtue through action. This manifests the primacy of the imaginative assent of moral judgement; but it also entails the indispensable, though secondary, function of inferential abstraction, both to facilitate reaching the complex deliberate nature of the illative judgement, and to check its objectivity in terms of concrete reality.

In this section I explain that my analysis of illative moral judgement is the same in the economy of Grace as it is in that of Nature. First I explain the fulfillment of Natural by Revealed Religion, adopting the harmonious relation between Nature and Grace explained in my first chapter. Secondly, I explain that the epistemology of illative judgement and certitude, analysed in my second chapter, is the same in Revealed Religion, (divine faith), as in Natural Religion, (religious belief). This is the theological context of faith and moral judgement; and the religious specificity of faith and moral judgement is that of divine intentionality.


1). Natural and Revealed Religion.

Newman understands Revelation as the "complement" to and natural development from Natural Religion; "Christianity... does not supersede or contradict" Natural Religion, but "recognizes and depends on it". Christianity, then, is "the completion and supplement of Natural Religion".

I have explained that Newman's argument for God from the dictates of conscience is not in itself persuasive; but in the context of belief, the complementarity of Natural and Revealed Religion is cogent. The dictates of conscience, then, manifest "two doctrines which are the primary constituents of natural Religion", that is, "the infinite goodness of God" and "our own extreme misery and need".

At the heart of man's genuine religious experience is "the sense of sin and guilt". Newman distinguishes two aspects to this experience; first this experience is tied to "our shortcomings" in "our fulfillment of the duties enjoined upon us", and the "effect is to burden and sadden the religious mind". However, "this sense of sin" is "not only an evil in itself", but in the second place it is "an affront to the good God"; it is in relation to God that guilt is more obvious for "the notion of our guilt" is "impressed upon us by the doctrine of future punishment".

This experience is accompanied with the experience of
"moral impotence", for although "Natural Religion... recognizes the disease" of "sin", it is unable to find "the remedy", despite looking for it. So the "burdened conscience... pronounces without any misgiving that God exists", but at the same time "pronounces quite as surely that I am alienated from Him"; it is an experience, then, of "a quarrel without remedy, a chronic alienation, between God and man".

This experience of the "sense of sin" shows that "man is in a degraded, servile condition, and requires expiation, reconciliation, and some great change of nature"; this is the "corrupt state" of nature, and the "severe aspect of Natural Religion".

However, into this corrupt "realm of darkness" is brought hope of a "realm of light" by the other doctrine of Natural Religion, that is by our experience of "the infinite goodness of God". This experience creates "an eager hope of reconciliation" to God; and so, "one of the most important effects of Natural Religion on the mind, in preparation for revealed, is the anticipation which it creates, that a Revelation will be given".

The alienation of Nature from the economy of Grace was not total; that is why Newman insisted that "the progress of which man's nature is capable is a development, not a destruction of its original state". His understanding of Natural and Revealed Religion is one of harmony and fulfilment, just as his understanding between Nature and Grace, explained in my first chapter. This complementarity is the background for understanding the epistemology of illative judgement and certitude in terms of Grace, (divine faith), as well as Nature, (religious belief).

2) Certitude in Religious Belief and Divine Faith.

The analysis of certitude in my second chapter followed Newman's method of discussing religious belief rather than divine faith, (faith resulting from the grace of God):

"I mean by belief, not precisely faith, because faith in its theological sense, includes a belief, not only in the thing believed, but also in the ground of believing; that is, not only belief in certain
doctrines, but belief in them expressly because God has revealed them; but here I am engaged only with what is called the material object of faith, - with the thing believed, not with the formal". 15

This distinction is enhanced by Newman's discussion of certainty prior to divine belief. In 1853 he explained that our "assent to, or speculative evident judgement of, the credibilitas of Revelation is followed by the act of reflection upon, or recognition of, that assent", and the latter is called "certainty"; but this "certainty" belongs "within the powers of natural reason", so that "a mind which gets as far as this does not yet believe". 16

The epistemology adopted by Newman for the judgement of religious belief, ("the material object of faith", or "the thing believed"), is the same for divine faith, (that is "the thing believed" and "the ground of believing"; so "the object of divine faith is both the revelatio and the res revelata"17). I explain this by analysing the gift of grace and our commitment to it. 18

A. Divine Faith as a gift of Grace.

1. The distinction between religious belief and divine faith.

Newman uses two arguments to distinguish between the judgement of religious belief and that of divine faith.

First, in a paper of 1853 Newman attempts to base the point of distinction upon the fear of reversal; the judgement of "human faith" which "carries on the mind to a distinct judgement of, or assent to, that credibilitas" of Revelation", is essentially "an assent with fear", (but not doubt); on the other hand, the "habit of fides divina" is characterised by a will to believe, a "voluntas credendi, determining and commanding the intellect to believe"; and this "voluntas exerts an imperium, obliging of itself the mind to believe without doubt or fear". 19

In an earlier paper of 1853, Newman explains that when there is an absence of fear "we have a higher degree of certainty"; for there are "two stages of certainty: certainty without doubt and certainty without fear". 20 And it might at first seem that Newman understands divine faith as this "higher degree of certainty". 21
2. Grace and Christian intentionality.

However, a closer analysis of the text seriously questions this view.

a. Fear and doubt.

In an earlier paper of 1853, Newman is adamant that certainty implies "if it be really certainty, not only the absence of doubt, but of fear also"; "certainty is a state where not only doubt but fear is absent". Even in the context of trying to characterise divine faith as excluding fear, Newman admits that in religious belief, ("supposing no grace"), the mind "can go on to a human faith, which does not exclude fear". He claims that "this higher state of moral certainty", characterised by lack of doubt and fear, "is a state of mind very familiar to us, and of usual occurrence". In other words, Newman considers the absence of fear as characteristic of certainty in its natural state, and cannot be claimed as the characteristic distinction of divine supernatural faith.

b. The intrinsic superiority of divine faith.

Newman's second argument to distinguish divine faith from religious belief focuses on the "transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral," and the "special self-protection" which is "beyond the operation of those ordinary laws of thought" considered in the 'Grammar'; there is "a pre-eminence of strength in divine faith" which consists in differing in "degree of assent" and "being superior in nature and kind". This divine faith "follows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace", and constitutes an "intrinsic superiority" over religious belief. This "intrinsic superiority" cannot refer to the material object considered, because religious belief and divine faith have "the thing believed" in common. In the context of making this remark, Newman distinguishes between the material and formal object as being the point of difference between religious belief and divine faith; hence the "intrinsic superiority" must refer to the formal object of our belief, which inevitably entails the same
material object to be considered in a different perspective.

The distinction between religious belief and divine faith, then, focuses upon the formal nature of belief "in certain doctrines... expressly because God has revealed them"; and this encompasses the gift of grace, for divine faith "follows upon a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace". In other words, the distinctiveness of divine faith is the Christian intentionality brought to bear upon the same material object of religious belief; and this is because of the presence of divine grace.

c. Reaching and maintaining belief with grace.

Again, in 1853 Newman drew a threefold distinction in reaching divine faith which helps clarify the distinctiveness of divine faith being tied to Christian intention. He distinguished between "a practical judgment" which he called the "ratio volendi credere", secondly the "voluntas credendi", and thirdly "the act of faith, in the intellect, thus commanded"; this distinction accords well with the distinction adopted in my analysis between the deliberation leading to certitude, the certitude resulting from the deliberation, (entailing the passive role of the will), and the confirmation of certitude, (by the active role of the will).

This text implies that the influence of grace on the process of reaching and maintaining divine faith is manifest in terms of the operation of the will as explained in chapter two. I have explained that in reaching certainty the mind is under the jurisdiction of the will in the sense that certainty occurs after deliberation. Similarly, in reaching divine faith we "require grace" for the "voluntas credendi, determining and commanding the intellect to believe"; this is the sense of feeling we ought to believe after the preceding deliberation, (which constitutes the "ratio volendi credere"). And there must be "a sufficient ratio volendi", (or "motivum credibilitatis") for the "voluntas" to be "supernatural"; this sufficiency is found in the divine announcement. In other words, in reaching divine faith, grace influences the personal appropriation of the arguments entailed; and this influence is upon the passive
role of the will.

We also "require grace" for "the act of faith, in the intellect, thus commanded".\textsuperscript{31} My previous analysis has shown that the act of certitude is accompanied by an affirmation of certitude as an act of will resisting doubt; the "fides divina" of "the act of faith", then, is accompanied by an act of will which is influenced by grace.\textsuperscript{32} This affirmative role of the will, under the influence of grace seems to be the sense of Newman's remark in 1850 that we must not forget that "faith depends upon the will, not really on any process of reasoning, and that conversion is a simple work of divine grace".\textsuperscript{33}

Hence grace influences the entire process of divine faith; this is manifest in its influence of the will in reaching and maintaining faith. The distinction between religious belief and divine faith cannot be made by opposing belief as an act of will and faith as a gift of grace;\textsuperscript{34} the element of the will cannot be used to distinguish them.

d. Christian intentionality.

Rather, the distinction between religious belief and divine faith lies in the Christian intentionality of divine faith; the distinction does not lie in the epistemological structure of each, for the process of reaching and maintaining belief and faith is the same. This relation between belief and faith reflects the harmonious relation between nature and grace discussed in my first chapter. This harmony is acknowledged by Newman at the end of the 'Grammar':

"belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural. Belief is a state of mind; belief generates belief; states of mind correspond to each other; the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than our present, are the very same which we already possess in connexion with the lower state".\textsuperscript{35}

Grace operates in full harmony with the laws of nature. The process of natural (religious) belief is the very basis for explaining the process of supernatural (divine) faith.\textsuperscript{36} The natural and supernatural are not two separate
spheres in Newman's thought; there is only one religious
sphere with various distinctions; so that grace
penetrates and fulfills nature, rather than being an
addition or replacement to it. This harmony between
nature and grace also concerns the possibility of reversal
of divine faith as with the reversal of religious belief.

B. Reversal of the commitment to the gift of Grace.

The harmonious relation between nature and grace makes
it plausible that Newman might have considered the
possibility of reversal of divine faith in the same way he
considered reversal of religious belief. For if the doubt
that is both compatible, (that is theoretically possible
doubt which is not reasonable in a particular case) and
incompatible, (doubt deemed reasonable in a particular
case) with faith is similar to that of religious belief,
the reversal of faith might be as similar to reversal of
belief.

Two significant texts support such a view that the
doubt compatible and incompatible with religious belief is
also the case with divine faith. First, in the 1871
emendations of the 'Via Media' he explains that the
"doubt... implied in a Christian's faith", (that is
compatible with divine faith), is the "recognition of the
logical incompleteness of its proof" and "a sense of
imperfection or incompleteness in the argumentative
grounds of religion." The doubt incompatible with divine
faith is "a refusal to pronounce it true", that is "a
deliberate withholding of assent"; this is tantamount to
saying doubt is unreasonable in a given case.

The second text has already been considered in
examining the doubt compatible and incompatible with
certainty; what is significant here, is that this text
refers to divine faith, and not religious belief. First,
we "have a duty" "fairly to examine" all the "objections
to revelation" if the opportunity "comes in (our) way"; my
analysis has shown that although this fair examination was
aligned to a wilful resistance of doubt, it nonetheless
was open to reversal in the end. This is especially clear
in the subsequent paragraph where Newman explains that
"when a friend is accused, you do not let yourself doubt
him at all, till he is found guilty"; God is considered
"such a friend" in the context of "revelation", and so
Newman is envisaging divine faith.\textsuperscript{42}

The commitment entailed by divine faith, then, can be reversed, just as the commitment in religious belief, (i.e. the willful resistance of doubt).


This section pulls together the various strands of my interpretation of Newman's understanding of illative moral judgement; I summarise the epistemology operative in moral judgement within the theological context of Grace and Divine Faith.

1). Moral judgement and the passive role of the will.

A. Reaching the illative moral judgement.

I have explained that the illative judgement of religious belief is a free act dependent upon the will in the sense of being reached after deliberation by a passive act of will;\textsuperscript{43} in terms of divine faith, the same epistemological strategy is operative, but we "require grace" for the "voluntas credendi, determining and commanding the intellect to believe",\textsuperscript{44} (that is, the certitude after deliberation). In divine faith grace is operative both in the inferential investigation of the deliberation and the assent of certitude; and the characteristic of the influence of grace is the christian intentionality brought to bear upon the religious belief.

I have argued that the epistemology of certitude also applies to moral duty. The assents of illative moral judgement, then, are "free and depend upon our will" in reaching certitude;\textsuperscript{45} hence the "doer is responsible", for the illative moral judgement is "the duty of each individual himself to exercise" at "the bidding of reason". And the ensuing assent of certitude is "an active recognition of propositions as true", and therefore of "a personal character".\textsuperscript{46} But this does not compromise the passive function of the will in reaching certitude; while the "will cannot absolutely create" certitude, the illative judgement is "under the jurisdiction of the will" insofar as the judgement is free and deliberate, yet constrained by the inferences.\textsuperscript{47}

As grace influences the illative judgement of faith, so
too does it influence the illative moral judgement. Grace influences the entire epistemological process; the inferential deliberation, the illative moral judgement and the ensuing assent of certitude; and it is characterised by a Christian intentionality.

B. Love as the safeguard of faith.

In my first chapter I argued that Newman's understanding of the law of love, as the "discriminating principle" and "safeguard of faith", is the "voluntas credendi"; it is "fides format a charitate", being the "illuminating principle of true faith". The law of love, then, constitutes the Christian intentionality, described above; by acting "spontaneously and as an instinct" it entails a passive role of the will.

In this context, faith is the implicit illative judgement of the 'Grammar'. Similarly, then, the illative moral judgement can be said to be influenced by the law of love; the passive role of the will, entailed by certitude after deliberation, and influenced by grace, is synonymous with this law of love; it applies as much to the law of duty as to the law of truth; and is characterised by Christian intentionality.

C. The sense of duty as intention.

The law of love, as the safeguard of faith, seems to be the Christian form of the sense of duty. I have explained that the meaning of the sense of duty is the motive or intention brought to bear upon the moral sense; just as the law of love is faith "in a certain moral disposition", so too is the sense of duty the "mode of holding" the proposition of faith; the sense of duty operates instinctively, just as the law of love; and Newman describes the law of love as "dutifulness".

The sense of duty, then, understood as motive or intention, belongs to the passive function of the will, as described above. Hence, the illative moral judgement of the moral sense receives its Christian intentionality from sense of duty, as the passive function of the will, in the economy of grace.
D. Imagination and action.

I have also argued that the indirect operativity of the imagination constitutes a passive function of the will. Insofar as grace influences the passive function of the will in the above ways, it is reasonable to argue that grace influences the real assent of the illative moral judgement, which indirectly leads to action. This is consistent with Newman's harmonious understanding of the relation between nature and grace.

2). Moral judgement and the active role of the will.

A. Maintaining the illative moral judgement.

I have explained that the illative judgement of religious belief is "under the control of the will" in the sense of confirming certitude and rejecting doubt by an active or critical role of the will. In terms of divine faith, the same epistemological strategy is operative, but we "require grace" for "the act of faith, in the intellect, thus commanded," (that is, the confirmation of certitude); and the characteristic of the influence of grace is the Christian intentionality brought to bear upon the religious belief.

B. The free choice to act.

I have indicated another active function of the will in the free choice to carry the confirmed assent of certitude into action. Newman's understanding of the relation between virtue and action implies that this active function of the will is also influenced by grace. In the previous section I briefly explained that Newman understood virtue as inseparable from action, and both virtue and moral action are determined by the illative moral judgement under the influence of character. I also discussed the influence of grace on virtue in my first chapter by examining Newman's understanding of transcendent virtue.

The virtues determined by the abstract reasoning of the moral sense are called "ordinary" virtues; when virtue "addresses itself to an unseen tribunal" it is "exalted virtue"; my analysis has shown that this distinction
entails the religious intentionality of the sense of duty. "Transcendent virtue" is the name for "the virtues of Christianity" which are the "fruits of the 'spirit' as distinguished from ordinary virtue", and constitute the "cardinal graces of the christian character".\(^{58}\)

However, Newman acknowledges that ordinary and transcendent virtue are "the same in nature", but transcendent virtue is "immeasurably higher".\(^{59}\) My analysis of certitude has shown that divine faith constitutes a "higher degree of certainty" in a qualitative sense of grace effecting an "intrinsic superiority" over religious belief; but this "higher certainty" of divine faith is the christian intentionality brought to bear upon the religious belief.\(^{60}\) Similarly, transcendent virtue is "immeasurably higher" than natural virtue in a qualitative sense because of the "gracious influences of the Holy Ghost".\(^{61}\)

What constitutes the distinction, then, between ordinary and transcendent virtue is divine grace; and this is characterised by the christian intentionality brought to bear upon the freely chosen act resulting from the illative moral judgement.

The specificity of christian morality, then, does not lie in the content of a specific act, nor in the norm or precept. It lies in the principle of love inscribed upon the conscience in a twofold way. First, grace influences the discernment of the illative moral judgement in the sense of being an interior law;\(^{62}\) and grace influences the illative judgement as an exterior law eliciting a christian intention for action.\(^{63}\)

C) The reversal of moral judgement.

I. The reversal of certitude.

I have explained that the assent of certitude can be reversed; there is a dubitability entailed which recognises the possibility of reversal but with "the utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing".\(^{64}\) The assuredness of certitude justifies making a "formal promise" not to reverse the illative judgement; however, because reversal can justifiably occur, the formal promise must be a-thematic in the sense of being "intellectually true to the truth".\(^{65}\) And I have explained
that in the economy of grace it is reasonable to argue that Newman considered that the reversal of divine faith would occur in the same way as that of the certitude of religious belief.66

This epistemology enlightens the possible reversal of the illative moral judgement and its certitude in the economy of both nature and grace.

2. The reversal of moral judgement and objectivity.

a. The law of truth and the law of duty.

On the basis that "duties change", Newman argued that "the law of truth differs from the law of duty"; since the "assent of certitude is immutable", the judgement of duty cannot elicit an act of certitude.67 That is, the mutability of duty compromises the necessary immutability of certitude.

However, I have argued that the mutability of duty does not constitute an argument against eliciting certitude for two reasons. First, because the mutability of duty is in defence of the objectivity of judgement; and at the heart of Newman's proposals for certitude is the grasp of the objective truth. Secondly, Newman did envisage the possibility of reversal, or mutability, of certitude.

Newman adopted the moral analogy of phronesis to illustrate the illative judgement which elicits the assent of certitude; I suggest that Newman could have adopted the analogy fully, rather than partially, by using the mutability of duty in defence of the objectivity of truth in certitude.

b. Illative moral judgement and objectivity.

The moral law is "always one and the same in the abstract"; in applying the law to the concrete, "the rule of conduct for one man is not always the rule for another", because each individual must "learn his duty in his own case".68 I have explained that the application of the law to the concrete occurs by the illative moral judgement, which determines the objective truth by considering "the whole case" in "given circumstances".69

The mutability of duty, then, reflects the objective truth of reality; the mutability of duty serves objective truth
discerned by the illative moral judgement. And it is the quest for objective truth that justifies the reversal of certitude in being "intellectually true to the truth".70

c.The reversal of moral judgement.

The reversal of certitude looks not only to the state of mind of the agent, but especially to the objective truth of the proposition eliciting assent. The process of reversing certitude is precisely the same as reaching certitude. The "objections... have no direct force to weaken" the original assent of certitude; the certitude is not reversed in the sense of being "gradually destroyed"; rather the "accumulating force of arguments" result in another illative judgement, all at once, so that the reversal of certitude considers "the whole case".71 And this occurs because there is a "duty" "fairly to examine" all the "objections"; but the examination takes place with a "will determinately fixed" to resist doubt, even though the certitude "does fail under the examination".72

The reversal of the certitude of the "law of duty" occurs in the same way; and this also applies in the economy of grace. Newman's discussion of the reversal of certitude expressed in a commitment to a friend (human or divine) illustrates this.73
Conclusion.

In conclusion, I highlight three aspects of moral judgement which identify the importance of Newman's contribution to moral discourse.

1. Imagination, Intellect, and Moral Judgement.

The central argument of my thesis has been to explain the primacy of imagination, (implicit reason), and the necessary but secondary function of the intellect, (explicit reason), for moral judgement. The economy of grace does not alter the dynamic tension of Newman's epistemological strategy; this is expressed in his theology of a religious imagination.

A). Imagination and illative moral judgement.

I have constructed the phrase 'illative moral judgement' to express the relevance of Newman's epistemology of the illative sense and certitude for concrete moral judgement. Newman explicitly denied that his proposals for certitude could apply to "the law of duty"; this is because the mutability of duty apparently compromised the immutability of certitude. However, I have shown that his argument is untenable because of the strand in his writings permitting the mutability of certitude; and I have argued that the mutability of duty is at the service of objective concrete truth, which in turn is at the heart of his proposals for certitude. To this extent the mutability of illative moral judgement enlightens Newman's understanding of the the certitude of faith.

The illative moral judgement is the work of the imagination in eliciting a real and complex assent from the accumulation of probabilities resulting from inferential investigation.

This imaginative grasp of truth occurs by implicit reason. My first chapter outlined the epistemological and theological parameters of Newman's understanding of the relation between implicit and explicit reason, in the context of the debate between Faith and Reason. My examination of the 'University Sermons' and 'The Idea of a University' established the groundwork for the development
of assent and inference in my second chapters examination of the 'Grammar of Assent'. Illative judgement is the implicit reasoning of imaginative, or real, assent.

Implicit reason is "complete in itself, and independent", being "unconscious", "spontaneous", and "personal"; it is "exercised upon propositions which are apprehended as experiences and images", and stand for what is concrete. It entails a "mental comprehension of the whole case", achieving a "discernment of its upshot" constituting an "individual perception of the truth", which is "absolute", "unconditional", and "objective". And it is the work of "real ratiocination and present imagination", being "our most natural mode of reasoning.. from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole to whole".

My third chapter explained that this epistemology is operative in illative moral judgement; it is carried out by the moral sense "deciding what ought to be done here and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances". I have argued that the judgement of duty is a judgement of speculative truth, for the "judicium prudentis viri" is "a standard of certitude which holds good in all concrete matter.. of practice and duty". I have shown that the "mental comprehension of the whole case" includes the application of the abstract moral law to the concrete; the application is not made deductively; it occurs by considering the law as part of the accumulative probabilities from which the illative moral judgement imaginatively makes "an active recognition" of the proposition of the duty "as true".

The primary sense of moral judgement, then, is the illative moral judgement as a function of the implicit reasoning of the imagination; this entails a personal and experiential grasp of the truthfulness of a concrete proposition of moral duty. In eliciting a real assent, this judgement is unconditional; yet, as a complex assent resulting from an inferential investigation, it is an "instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premisses"; that is, while "acting through" the inferences, the judgement "reaches to conclusions beyond and above them". "Acts of inference", then, are the "sine qua non conditions" for "acts of assent".
B). Intellect and abstract moral judgement.

Moral judgement can also be understood in an abstract way which is secondary, or ministerial, to the illative moral judgement.

In my first chapter I explained that the function of explicit reason is to "analyze, methodize, and exhibit" the judgements of the implicit reason; this involves creating an abstract system, "some definite and methodical form", thereby bringing "the whole into order". Newman's appreciation of the importance of explicit reason is manifest in his explanation of "liberal or philosophical knowledge" which deals with the "whole circle of truths" in abstraction. The abstraction of system is "an acquired faculty of judgement"; it is a "formative power" with the task of "comparison and discrimination" in order to grasp the "objective truth".

This function constitutes the abstract moral judgement of ethical code. My third chapter explained the importance of the abstract reasoning of the moral sense in constructing an ethical code; insofar as the code of laws is abstracted from concrete reality it can be said to constitute "the objective existence of the Moral Law". The abstraction of explicit reason not only "traces out the connexion of facts", but "detects principles" and "applies them". The function, then, of abstract moral judgement is to systemise concrete moral experience and judgement into an ethical code, and then to apply this code to subsequent concrete experience. This is the gift of Wisdom explained in my first chapter; it tries to "apply and dispense the truth in a change of circumstances" because of its "firm grasp of principles"; however, this is essentially an abstract process.

I have explained that the deductive, or rational, application of abstract law to the concrete can only result in a probability, because the abstract "cannot reach the particular". This probability, or practical, (but not speculative), certainty, may be all that can be achieved when an illative moral judgement cannot be elicited from the inferential investigation. However, I concentrated upon the speculative certainty of the illative moral judgement; and I considered the role of the abstraction of moral law in discerning the concrete moral judgement. Newman resisted allowing the apprehension of
truth to "dwindle into a mere notion"; 16 he overcame this
danger by his theory of real assent, which is illustrated
in the apprehension of the abstract truth of moral law by
the real assent of the illative moral judgement.

Apart from the systematising of knowledge, the
abstraction of explicit reason also has the function of
testing and verifying the objectivity of the illative
moral judgement.

In my first chapter I explained that explicit reason is
"ministrative to" the judgements of implicit reason: this
is to "test and verify" implicit reason, and is a
"critical", but not "creative" function. 17 My second
chapter developed this in two ways; first by testing the
objective truthfulness of the accumulative probabilities
in helping "to remove all those impediments which tend to
render the conclusion erroneous". Secondly by showing the
consistency of the illative judgement with other truths;
it puts the implicit illative judgements "in an objective
shape... for our justification with others"; it "fortifies
and illustrates" the illative judgements, "giving them
luminousness and force", and thereby offers a "tangible
defence of what we hold". 18 The objective truthfulness of
the illative moral judgement is tested and verified by
explicit reason in these ways.

In religious and moral inquiry the epistemological
strategy of implicit and explicit reason is expressed in
Newman's theology of a religious imagination.

C). Theology of a religious imagination and Moral
Judgement.

Newman understood the relation between Nature and
Grace in a harmonious way; 19 in the economy of Grace
Newman adopts the same epistemological strategy as in
Natural Religion.

The concrete has primacy over the abstract or general,
so that "universals minister to units". 20 Newman argued
that "the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by
habits of personal religion"; the real assent of illative
moral judgement has primacy over the notional assent to
moral law. 21

Newman's emphasis on the primacy of the imaginatively
assent of illative judgement is only justified because of
his acknowledgement of the necessary, though secondary,
function of the intellectual inferential investigation of explicit reason. That is why "in religion the imagination and the affections should always be under the control of reason"; so that "sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay"; for "religion cannot maintain its ground at all without theology". The illative moral judgement needs the abstract inferences of theology and moral law.

With this necessary balance between implicit and explicit reason, Newman explains that there is no "contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion". The objectivity of abstract moral law does not conflict with, or compromise, the primacy of illative moral judgement discerned by the imagination; Newman proposes that the "living hold on truths" keeps in dynamic tension the intellectual abstraction of "theological truth" and the "religious fact" of imaginative judgement. And I have argued that Newman's explanation of the moral sense of conscience manifests the tension of implicit and explicit reason in terms of the illative moral judgement and abstraction.

Newman's theory of inference and assent is the epistemological basis for his understanding of moral judgement. I have argued that his proposals for certitude in the "law of truth" also apply to the "law of duty"; the illative moral judgement is reached "both through the intellect and the imagination", and it "elicits one complex act both of inference and assent".

My central argument has been to explain the primacy of imagination in illative moral judgement, and the secondary, but necessary function, of the intellect in abstract moral judgement. The presentation of my argument has clarified two other important aspects of Newman's contribution to moral discourse. First, I have shown that the christian specificity of moral judgement lies in the intention; secondly, I have explained the possibility and mode of responsibly reversing the illative moral judgement. These two aspects are now briefly summarised.

In my second chapter I explained the passive and active role of the will entailed in reaching and maintaining certitude; in my third chapter I explained that the economy of grace does not alter the epistemology of reaching and maintaining certitude. Grace is characterised by a christian intentionality brought to bear upon religious belief by divine faith. I have argued that this applies as much to the "law of duty" as to the "law of truth".

In my third chapter I associated the intentionality of the sense of duty with the passive role of the will in reaching certitude; and I identified a further passive and active role of the will in the indirect operativity of imaginative assent, and the free choice to carry the moral judgement into action. Again, I explained that the economy of grace does not alter the epistemology of illative moral judgement; grace influences moral judgement by a christian intentionality. This is manifest in the law of love being the christian form of the sense of duty, and in the transcendent nature of virtue being characterised by the influence of grace on the will; I concluded that the christian specificity of illative moral judgement lies in the intentionality brought to bear upon the moral judgement by the influence of grace.

3. The Reversal of Illative Moral Judgement.

I have argued that the mutability of duty acknowledged by Newman could have been adopted by him to enlighten his understanding of the possibility of reversing certitude; that is, the mutability of truth and duty is at the service of the objectivity of certitude. In chapter two and three I have explained that his proposals for the reversal of certitude enlighten the mode of the reversal of the illative moral judgement. This is seen in two ways.

First, grace does not alter the epistemology of the reversal of certitude; the reversal of illative moral judgement, then, is not epistemologically altered in the economy of grace. Secondly, the epistemology of reversal entails both implicit and explicit reason; hence, reversal occurs by a subsequent illative moral judgement upon the
accumulation of probabilities determined by the inferential investigation; the reversal does not occur "gradually", but by discerning the objective truth of "the whole case" from the "accumulating force of arguments". 33

Finally, the possibility of reversing the illative moral judgement enlightens the objectivity of the abstract moral law. I explained that the objectivity of moral law depends upon abstraction from the objective truth of concrete experience; 34 and the objective truth of concrete duty is discerned by the illative moral judgement. 35 Newman's epistemological strategy, then, implies a refinement of moral law; this occurs by abstraction from the mutability of duty entailed in the illative moral judgement's discernment of objective truth.
Chapter 4. The Contemporary Relevance of Newman's understanding of Moral Judgement.

Introduction.

In this final chapter I explain the relevance of Newman's understanding of moral judgement for contemporary moral theology; while focusing upon Catholic theology I advert to the ecumenical nature which characterises contemporary moral theology.

This chapter develops the three points made in the preceding conclusion. I concentrate upon the imaginative nature of moral judgement, and then briefly deal with its Christian specificity and possibility of reversal.

1. Imagination and moral judgement.

This first section deals with Newman's imaginative moral judgement. First, I compare Keane's understanding of imagination in terms of aesthetics to Newman's understanding of imagination and implicit reason. Second, I show the relevance of Newman's proposals for the contemporary discussion on moral self-transcendence, and character. Third, I explain the importance of Newman's emphasis upon concrete moral judgement for the contemporary debate on moral norms. Fourth, I relate this to the discussion on conscience and natural law.

A). Imagination, aesthetics, and Newman's implicit reason.

Keane misrepresents Newman's understanding of imagination in concrete moral judgement. His purpose is to balance the "excessively rational or rationalistic" approach of discursive thinking in moral theology by developing a "theology of imagination and ethics which is both systematic and practical" as the complement to discursive moral reasoning by principles.

Keane's analysis offers a valuable insight to the role of imagination in moral judgement by showing the reciprocity of imaginative moral judgement and principled reasoning in morality. By explaining Keane's misrepresentation of Newman I show the relevance of Newman's proposals for the contemporary discussion on imagination in moral theology.
Keane understands imaginative moral judgement as "an aesthetic experience" which is "a form of reflective human learning"; he claims that this "closely parallels the epistemological outlook of... Newman". This "aesthetic experience" is characterised by "direct intuition" and by "moving our emotions"; and he compares this to "theories of moral sense or moral taste such as the approach of Shaftesbury".  

Newman understands imaginative moral judgement as the concrete experiential grasp of reality by the implicit reason of the illative sense. It entails intuition and emotion, but is not characterised by them; and he opposes the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury. The difference between Keane and Newman is more closely analysed in the following points.

1. First, I examine the role of intuition and imaginative moral judgement. Keane's explains his view of intuition by reference to Rahner's "pre-apprehension", the pre-reflexive openness to meaning actuated in concrete human experience. Here Keane is indicating the importance of how we obtain knowledge. Rahner's "pre-apprehension" constitutes the a-thematic transcendental horizon of concrete knowledge as the metaphysical a priori condition of the possibility of knowledge and judgement. Keane connects intuition with imaginative judgement in the sense that intuition gives a direct insight into the meaning of life and its actions. Newman's understanding of intuition is a direct perception of a general, rather than a particular, fact; for example, his perception of first principles are intuitions. He relates intuition to imaginative moral judgement only insofar as these first principles influence the concrete perception of a particular fact. Newman's understanding of intuition is not that of Rahner's "pre-apprehension"; the former has a determined content, the latter is formal. Newman's dynamic awareness of self in conscience presents a more cogent basis for comparison with Rahner's "pre-apprehension".

2. Secondly, I examine the relation between emotion and imaginative moral judgement. Keane associates the emotional nature of moral judgement with aesthetic experience, exemplified in Shaftesbury's theory of moral
sense which connected beauty and virtue. He is correct in saying that "the theme of aesthetics and the teaching of morals has a long history"; however, he seems to be unaware that it was precisely against this tradition that Newman argued, and specifically opposed the theory of Shaftesbury.

Newman decried the association of virtue with beauty as Liberalism; this was the purpose of his celebrated eighth discourse in the 'Idea'. He repudiated the "theoretical form" of "moral perfection" that had been "drawn out" by "Lord Shaftesbury"; Shaftesbury's teaching that "truth and virtue being beauty" resulted in "the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but taste"; so that "this embellishment of the exterior is almost the beginning and the end of philosophical morality". This constituted Newman's theological reserve about the exclusive use of the moral sense in morality.

Newman overcame this reserve not by rejecting the validity of the moral sense, (entailing aesthetic experience), but by putting it in a broader context of implicit reason and the sense of duty. Keane accepts the need for a broader horizon in explaining that "our emotions are not an infallible guide to productive imagining"; imagination and affectivity are not the same, although closely related. Newman connected the affective nature of moral judgement with the sense of duty and the implicit reason because of the power of the imagination to grasp the concrete and personal.

3. Thirdly, I examine the relation between imaginative moral judgement and experiential learning. Keane explains that imagination stems from our human learning experiences; he gives "priority to concrete learning in the make-up of imagination.. in order to develop a theory of imagination which is based on a.. realistic view of the world". He explains that "imagination really does help us understand our nature, does help us find objective or human moral truth", by making "true and objective moral judgement" by the "moral imagination". These "imaginative moral judgements" are "judgements of appropriateness" whereby "our actions and principles fit together; they are judgements of the fitting or of the coherent". Keane understands these imaginative judgements as the "practical reason" of Aristotle's phronesis.
he understands these as the certitudes achieved by Newman's "illative sense" through "converging probabilities". 18

3a. However, Keane misrepresents Newman's understanding of the imaginative moral judgements of certitude. I have explained that Newman understands certitude as a speculative truth and not as the "practical reason" of Aristotle. Newman uses Aristotle's phronesis merely to illustrate the nature of "the controlling principle in inferences", that is the "illative sense". 19 The speculative nature of moral certitude entails its objective truth; and the concrete moral judgement is objectively true because it reflects the reality of the specific circumstances.

Keane's analysis claims to reach "true and objective moral judgement" by the imagination; yet, at the same time, he describes this imaginative judgement as having "creatively achieved sufficient conviction so as to act with true confidence" as with Aristotle's "practical reason". 20 But Aristotle's "practical reason" dealt with what is probably true rather than certainly true.

3b. There is a second confusion made by Keane: he explains "imaginative aesthetic experience as a form of reflective human learning". 21 The key to Newman's proposals for imaginative judgement is the distinction between implicit and explicit reason. Reflection characterises explicit reason; 22 implicit reason is characterised by the imaginative grasp of concrete truth. 23 My analysis has shown that the abstract reflection of explicit reason is a necessary, though secondary, function for the objective grasp of truth by the imaginative judgement of implicit reason. However, it is important to note that Newman clearly distinguished between imagination and reflection, and considered the former had primacy, but was inseparably connected to the latter in order to maintain objective truth. Newman associated reflection with discursive reasoning.

It may be that Keane is not too far from Newman's understanding of imaginative judgement as implicit reasoning; for Keane describes "reflective human learning" as "non-discursive but still rational and natural learning experience". 24 To the extent that Keane's
"reflective...learning" is "non-discursive" it is similar to Newman's natural implicit reason.

3c. Newman's epistemological strategy is an ongoing process of perceiving objective moral truth by imaginative judgement, and thereby refining the abstraction of moral law. It is an holistic process of dynamic tension that includes the possibility of reversing a moral judgement or a moral law. However, this epistemological possibility of reversal does not entail doubt in the sense of "a suspension of the assents hitherto familiar to us"; his proposals exclude "withholding a judgement about propositions".

Keane, however, holds that it is central to the imagination "to suspend judgement in conflict situations". His purpose is the same as Newman's: he seeks "an adequate relationship between the concrete and the universal", that is between concrete moral judgement and abstract moral law, between moral imagination and moral principles. However, his description of the role of imagination is quite different from Newman's.

Keane summarises the role of the imagination in three steps. First, imagination enables "the human person to truly own his or her principles". Second, imagination enables the "deepening of principles" in the sense of "further refinement" of principles, assisted by the first stage. Third, imagination enables the task of "applying moral principles to specific cases or issues"; this entails the "judgements of appropriateness". At the heart of these proposals lie "a deliberate effort to suspend judgement" about how "to unite the concrete and the abstract", in order to "find new meanings in reality". Newman considers this simply as unjustified doubt, resulting in the suspension of assent. Newman's proposals for refinement and reversal avoid the epistemological limbo entailed by Keane's suspension of judgement.

Conclusion.

Although Keane's detailed analysis misrepresents Newman, his general approach is similar to Newman's proposals for imaginative moral judgement. First, Keane's approach is cognitive: he adopts Newman's proposals to
make "true and objective moral judgements". Secondly, Keane gives central emphasis to "non-discursive but still rational natural learning experience", whereby the imaginative "judgements of appropriateness" are made; this reflects the implicit nature of Newman's illative moral judgements. Third, he maintains in tension the relation between imaginative moral judgement, as the concrete judgement of a given situation, and the abstraction of moral law; he argues that "principles need to discipline imagination" and that "imagination will need to revitalize principles". This reflects Newman's proposals for seriously applying the abstraction of law to the concrete, while allowing the imagination the primacy of moral judgement. Keane understands the imagination as "an intellectual function", like Newman; and he takes up Newman's theme that "life is too short" for system, and gives primacy to imaginative moral judgement.

The next section studies the relevance of Newman's proposals for the contemporary discussion on moral self-transcendence and character.

B). Imagination, self-transcendence, and character.

Studies of the transcendental method of reasoning deal with the imagination in determining how we have knowledge; the transcendental method seeks the personal conditions of the possibility of knowing reality. This is especially relevant for theological method, deepening the understanding of doctrine, and relating doctrine to the concrete historical situation. Newman's "organon investigandi" of illative judgement is the forerunner of the concrete, historical and practical inquiry of the transcendental method in theology.

I begin by relating Lonergan's view of self-transcendence to Newman's view of character. Second, I document the importance of the theme of character in contemporary moral theology. Third, I relate this discussion to moral norm and natural law.

1. Self-transcendence and character.

Newman's 'Grammar' had "a profound influence on Lonergan's developing epistemology", especially as a philosophy student.
A. Explicit and implicit reason.

Newman's distinction between explicit and implicit reason is similar to Lonergan's distinction between "systematic unification and imaginative synthesis"; "systematic unification is effected in the logical or conceptual order", and "imaginative synthesis is secured when images, informed by insight, are altered in accord with known laws". This distinction is recalled in the "level of reflection" as a "complementary process of checking", and the "level of intelligence" which is "the level of discovery and invention". My analysis of Newman's proposals has shown the importance of explicit reason for checking the objectivity of the imaginative judgement of implicit reason.

Lonergan has interpreted Newman's relation of inference and assent (by the illative sense) as the "unique coincidence of a complex objective configuration and a complex subjective interpretation and judgement". He acknowledged the importance of the 'Grammar' in explaining that "objectivity is reached through the self-transcendence of the concrete existing subject". The fundamental forms of self-transcendence in Lonergan are "intellectual, moral, and religious conversion"; and he emphasised that efforts to "ensure objectivity apart from self-transcendence only generates illusions". He accepted "Newman's distinction between notional and real apprehension" in making doctrine relevant to contemporary experience. And he especially valued Newman's "shift to interiority"; this entails passing from "the prior levels of experiencing, understanding, judging" to "the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action". This constitutes Lonergan's "transition from the abstract logic of classicism to the concreteness of method".

B. Comprehensive liberal knowledge.

Also, Lonergan adopted Newman's proposals for theology in the 'Idea'; he accepts that "the integration of the sciences that deal with man concretely has to be sought not in philosophy but in theology". My analysis of Newman has shown that human progress involves a view of totality, focused upon the "acquisition of knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments".

153
This comprehensive view included the role of theology and religion, as expounded in Newman's proposals for liberal education.\textsuperscript{46}

Newman rejected Bentham's philosophy because of its partiality which compromised a comprehensive approach. Lonergan reflects Newman's emphasis upon the comprehensiveness of liberal knowledge in explaining that the "elimination of a genuine part of the culture means that a previous whole has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to compensate".\textsuperscript{47} The same point is made in Lonergan's explanation that, without a comprehensive approach, "the dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then stagnation. In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers".\textsuperscript{48}

Newman's rejection of the exclusiveness of the utilitarian logic of Liberalism was because of its emphasis upon the external. Newman countered this by insisting upon the religious importance of the sense of duty, and upon the interior and personal imaginative grasp of truth by the judgement of implicit reason. Lonergan also insists upon the personal appropriation of values in his proposals for conversion; he rejects exclusive emphasis upon the externals of reason which can be elevated to the "role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint".\textsuperscript{49} Lonergan constructs an ethics grounded in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{50}

This dynamic structure reflects Newman's personal and imaginative grasp of first principles.\textsuperscript{51} This view is implied in Lonergan's view of the context of judgement: Lonergan explains that "judgements" by which the individual "assents to truths of fact and of value, only rarely depend exclusively on his immanently generated knowledge, for such knowledge stands not by itself in some separate compartment but in symbiotic fusion with a far larger context of beliefs".\textsuperscript{52}

C. Character.

I have explained that the personal nature of moral judgement for Newman gives central place to the role of character.\textsuperscript{53} This is at the heart of Lonergan's
understanding of moral judgement: "It is... only by reaching the sustained self-transcendence of the virtuous man that one becomes a good judge, not on this or that human act, but on the whole range of human goodness". Hence, "it is in rational self-consciousness that the good as value comes to light".

Newman's distinction between personal judgement and moral code is the same as Lonergan's view: "the content of the moral code is one thing, and the dynamic function that demands its observance is another". For Lonergan, "authentic realization is a self-transcending realization"; his proposals for self-transcendence is utterly concrete, as in Newman. This understanding of "consciousness" by Lonergan is characterised by "deliberation, evaluation, decision"; and it is "the level on which consciousness becomes conscience". This is similar to Newman's understanding of illative moral judgement as an aspect of conscience: it is a thoroughly personal "judgement of the reason" which can detect "moral truth wherever it lies hid", by the judgement of the illative sense after deliberating and evaluating the inferences. Illative moral judgement is "an active recognition" of the truthfulness of moral duty, and is determined by the personal character of the individual.

D. Self-transcendence.

Conn has developed Lonergan's emphasis upon character for moral judgement. Conn explains that character is the personally shaped concretization of conscience, and is central to Lonergan's understanding of moral conversion. This entails a shift from being concerned with specific moral judgements to the personal source of moral value in conscience as the radical drive of the human spirit for self-transcendence; the concrete particularity of the personal subject is of paramount importance.

This emphasis demands a critical moral conversion in the sense of "the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one". Critical moral conversion is self-appropriation through "experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding". (Lonergan's distinction between judging and
deciding is the same as the distinction I made regarding Newman's proposals between a decision-that-X and a decision-to-do-X).

Lonergan explains that "moral conversion changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values". But this conversion can be uncritical. The distinction reflects Newman's emphasis of real over notional assent; he insists that we must resist allowing the apprehension of truth to "dwindle into a mere notion", that is "an inferential acceptance". Lonergan insists that "one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing"; and "knowing is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing". Uncritical conversion shifts from personal interiority as the objective source and criterion of truth to the "stubborn and misleading myth" that the objective and real is "what is out there now to be looked at".

This naive realism takes refuge in an impersonal predetermined program of life characterised by an uncritical conformity with a moral code or set of values given by external authority. The acknowledgement of the objectivity of values specified in moral laws must not detract from the primary and necessary grounding of these values in the self-transcending capacity of the personal subject. This is precisely the point of Newman's emphasis upon the personal "living hold on truths" over the notional apprehension of "the dead letter of a treatise or a code"; this highlights the centrality of character and the personal nature of imaginative moral judgement.

Finally, my analysis has shown that Newman gave central place to the imaginative moral judgement which determined personal character and moral progress; the formation of character is dependent upon both the cognitive truth of judgement and the intentionality entailed. The cognitive truth includes the function of implicit and explicit reason; and the intentionality is determined by the sense of duty and the principle of Love. In this sense the formation of character lies in the imaginative moral judgement with its twofold cognitive and intentional aspects. This presents a way of enlightening Lonergan's understanding of self-transcendence.
E. Conversion.

Lonergan describes self-transcendence as a three-fold achievement: it occurs "intellectually by the achievement of knowledge", "morally" in seeking what is "truly good", and "affectively" by falling "in love", which is "a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts". It may be more fruitful to consider moral self-transcendence as grounded in the cognitive and affective self-transcendence; so that the cognitive and affective are two dimensions of one moral process. Hence, "the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being". This is the basis for a theological method for morality that presents a normative, dynamic structure for creative living, in place of a static set of rules. Lonergan's focus upon "an objectification of subjectivity" is at the heart of Newman's proposals for imaginative moral judgement.

My analysis of Newman has shown that in the economy of grace the religious dimension is operative in and through the imaginative moral judgement; thereby the Christian specificity is characterised by a Christian intentionality. The influence of grace is a dimension which determines the whole process of imaginative moral judgement without changing the epistemological strategy of moral judgement. This clarifies a problem in Lonergan's proposals for the influence of grace in self-transcendence.

Lonergan explains that "religious conversion sublates moral, and moral conversion sublates intellectual"; but this is "not to infer that intellectual comes first and then moral and finally religious". He argues that the opposite is the case. "On the contrary, from a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God's gift of his love"; next, "the eye of this love reveals values" realized in "moral conversion"; finally the "eye of love" leads to "believing the truths taught by the religious tradition" constituting "intellectual conversion". This is very similar to Newman's view that "love... is the eye of faith, the discriminating principle". I have argued that Newman's argument is one of intentionality.

There is a confusion in Lonergan's proposals. On the one hand he argues that "first there is the gift of God's
love" constituting religious conversion, and on the other hand he argues that "religious conversion sublates" moral and intellectual conversion, thereby presuming religious follows upon moral and intellectual conversion.

The confusion can be clarified by Newman's proposals. The economy of grace is for all men, and Lonergan explains that christians interpret it as "God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us". 77 Newman emphasises the primacy of imaginative moral judgement which is characterised with both cognitive truth and religious intentionality, as two dimensions of the one epistemological and personal process. This clarifies the confusion in Lonergan's proposals. God's grace is "first" in the sense of the economy of grace for all men. However, the moral judgement, entailing conversion, must be given central place: this judgement will include an intellectual conversion, (for the moral judgement is characterised by cognitive truth); and religious conversion can sublate the moral judgement, (entailing conversion), 78 by the same process of christian intentionality described in Newman's understanding. In other words, religious conversion will not change or alter the epistemological strategy of imaginative moral judgement.

The advantage of this interpretation is to overcome the confusion in Lonergan's proposals without denying any strands of his thought. It emphasises his understanding of self-transcendence in terms of the dynamism of personal character suggested by Newman.

2). The role of character in contemporary moral theology.

There has been a tendency in Roman Catholic moral theology to concentrate upon what ought to be done rather than upon the personal character of the agent; it has "overstressed decision-making to the neglect of virtue and character", and this demands a "redressing of an imbalance". 79 Newman's proposals for understanding moral judgement, giving primacy to the imaginative grasp of truth by personal character, redress this imbalance.
A. Character and Protestant Theology.

The importance of character is a constantly recurring theme in contemporary Protestant theology; it gives primary emphasis to the ancient ethical categories of habit, virtue, and character, and concentrates upon the sort of person the subject is.\(^{80}\) The studies of Gustafson and Hauerwas have shown that this constitutes the vision within which Christian morality takes place, and emphasises the posture of the individual subject, giving central place to the person of Christ in moral thinking.\(^{81}\)

Gustafson has developed the importance of dispositions and sentiments for moral action.\(^{82}\) Hauerwas has developed the theme of vision emphasising that moral choice is much more than isolated moral judgements.\(^{83}\) He explains this in terms of a narrative understanding of moral life, emphasising the personal character of the individual Christian in a believing community; this narrative understanding consists in remembering and retelling the story of Christ.\(^{84}\)

McIntyre has also stressed the narrative form of moral life, explaining that we cannot evaluate our action outside of this narrative context. This context emphasises the importance of communally based tradition for developing practices for a full moral life; and acquiring these practices is virtue, which is at the heart of moral growth.\(^{85}\) In this sense virtue is the very means of moral reasoning, which constantly revitalizes tradition.

This emphasis by Protestant scholars is consistent with the Barthian position that ethical procedure starts from God's revelation in order to understand humanity and the world; it emphasises the Christian as responder to God's saving action.\(^{86}\) The importance of man as responder has been developed, emphasising Christ's unique relation with the Father; this approach has focused upon a model of responsibility, embracing response, interpretation, accountability, and social solidarity.\(^{87}\)

The Protestant emphasis upon the virtue and character of the moral agent in moral discourse has also been developed by contemporary Catholic scholars.
B. Character and Catholic Theology.

After the Second Vatican Council Van der Mark concentrated upon the relational approach to morality. "Intersubjectivity" is the "most essential matter in the whole of morals"; this implies the centrality of virtue in the context of "community with God and Church". This approach is implied in Maguire's analysis of moral choice in terms of imagination. He argues that his approach necessitates a revival of the importance of virtue in practical reason, following the model of Aquinas; and he gives great importance to the relation between imagination and affectivity.

McDonagh emphasises that discipleship characterises the community of Christ's followers: "discipleship involves first of all a personal relationship with Jesus the Christ", and "disciples answer the call of Jesus". His focus is upon the "person-in-community-in-history" as the base for developing a "moral pneumatology" alongside a "moral christology". McDonagh's emphasis upon moral experience and its intrinsic connection with Christian faith for the believer is similar to Newman's understanding of moral judgement and Christian intentionality.

Curran has focused upon the "stance" for moral theology as an adequate methodology; the "stance" is based upon the paschal mystery experienced in the five mysteries of creation, sin, incarnation, redemption, and resurrection. He does not "accept love as the stance for Christian ethics" because "the stance cannot be equated with any one aspect or any one attitude of the Christian life"; the "stance" constitutes the "posture", "perspective", or "horizon" which "includes both an objective pole and a subjective pole". The "five mysteries point to the five aspects which together form the proper stance or horizon for Christian ethics and for the individual Christian in one's life"; his stance consists of a perspective based on these five Christian mysteries. In this Christological context Curran clearly adopts "a relationality-responsibility model as the primary ethical model". This emphasises that individual acts are significant insofar as they are both expressive of the moral subject and constitutive of the moral being of the subject; this entails the "attitudes,
virtues, and dispositions, which are expressed in action and which also constitute the subject as morally good and form an essential part of the growth and development of the moral subject". 94

Haring has developed the importance of the person in "a vision of wholeness" for moral discourse. His moral theology is also Christocentric. 95 He proposes that the leitmotif of moral theology is personal responsibility as an expression of creative freedom and fidelity; this is at the heart of the human person in a communal, social, historical and cosmic context. 96 He explains moral growth in terms of continual conversion in the Christian life. 97

This section has briefly indicated the importance of personal character in a Christological perspective in contemporary Protestant and Catholic moral theology. Newman's proposals for moral judgement are quite consistent with this contemporary discussion. I have shown that personal character is at the heart of the illative sense in making moral judgements; 98 and that, for the believer, moral judgement is essentially religious, characterised by a Christian intentionality. 99 Also, the contemporary emphasis upon posture, vision, and stance, constitutes Newman's focus upon the comprehensive "habit of viewing", or "vision" as the qualitative context of liberal knowledge within which illative moral judgements are made. 100

The most significant contribution to this discussion on the importance of the holistic character of the moral person has been the discussion on the theory of 'fundamental option'. In Catholic theology this has centred upon Rahner's use of the transcendental method in explaining human freedom. The next section explains the relevance of Newman's understanding of moral judgement for Rahner's explanation of fundamental option in morality.

C. Character and the theory of Fundamental Option.

1. Transcendental freedom and fundamental option.

Rahner's transcendental analysis of freedom explains that the human person determines himself in concrete judgements and actions, but in a way which transcends the particular act: "Freedom is possible, therefore, only as the transition from the open choice of infinite
possibilities to the definite of the finite realization, in which and passing through which the finite destiny of man is gained or lost in a personal manner.\textsuperscript{101} Freedom characterises the transcendence of the personal subject; this constitutes human dignity.\textsuperscript{102} Its realization is a question of moral self-determination, entailing the subject as a whole.\textsuperscript{103}

Rahner explains that this self-determination is a historical and social process.\textsuperscript{104} This is experienced in the concrete encounter of love of neighbour: "the love of neighbour... is really the fulfillment of the total and hence also spiritually transcendental nature of man". "The act of personal love for another human being is therefore the all-embracing basic act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything else".\textsuperscript{105}

In the economy of grace, Rahner insists that this self-fulfillment for Christians is essentially Christological. "Man appropriates this freedom, which Christ is and gives, by obeying the call to this freedom"; "the love of God unreflectedly but really and always intends God in supernatural transcendentality in the love of neighbour as such, and even the explicit love of God is still borne by that opening in trusting love to the whole of reality, which takes place in the love of neighbour".\textsuperscript{106}

This self-fulfillment constitutes a fundamental option made by the personal subject. It is a "knowing self-possession", and the "self-exercise of the man who chooses objectively"; it is "the concrete freedom of man by which he decides about himself as a whole by effecting his own finality before God".\textsuperscript{107}

The theory of fundamental option, then, encompasses these aspects. It is the self-determination of the moral character of the person before God in and through concrete moral judgements and actions; these concrete actions can provoke a change in the fundamental option as a lifelong process;\textsuperscript{108} the fundamental option of freedom "is realised and can be exercised only by means of those individual acts" of concrete moral judgements and actions; yet "this basic act" of fundamental option "cannot be simply identified by an objective reflection with such an individual act"; and the fundamental option does not represent "the moral sum total of these individual acts".\textsuperscript{109} Fundamental option theory, then, highlights the importance of "the heart" and "intention" influenced "by
divine grace"; and this always is considered in terms of the concrete situation of each individual.

2. Negative and positive developments of fundamental option.

The teaching authority of the Catholic Church has accepted that "in reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which in the last resort defines a person's moral disposition". However, there is a serious danger of misunderstanding the fundamental option theory when it is understood negatively in relation to sin. Sin is the context of the above statement, and the same paragraph misrepresents fundamental option theory by implying it as holding "that particular acts are not enough to constitute mortal sin". O'Connell makes the same mistake of using the fundamental option theory to explain the distinction between mortal and venial sin. This negative approach misrepresents the relation of transcendental and categorical freedom, and ignores the positive aspects of fundamental option theory as the response in love to God's gift of grace in Christ.

A positive understanding of Fundamental Option has been adopted by most Catholic moral theologians who are not of the deontology school, (explained later). Fuchs has acknowledged the importance of Rahner's theory for morality, grounding fundamental option theory in transcendental Thomism. Fuchs uses the terms "basic freedom" and "freedom of choice" to explain that "basic freedom is the freedom that enables us not only to decide freely on the particular acts and aims but also, by means of these, to determine ourselves totally as persons and not merely in any particular area of behaviour". Following Rahner, Fuchs understands that love of neighbour is the fundamental moral act of man. And this self-determination occurs under the influence of the Spirit: "Christian freedom, is in fact basic freedom and self-determination exercised in the grace and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit". This self-determination, for the Christian, is essentially Christological.

Fundamental option is equivalent to Lonergan's moral conversion, determining self in and through concrete action: and it is when action follows upon decision that moral perfection accompanies moral conversion.
Curran emphasises the relational aspect of fundamental option, emphasising the presence of God's love "in and with all our categorical acts". It is within this positive view of fundamental option that a relational understanding of sin can be achieved, emphasising the person as agent, rather than the external action itself.

Haring's explanation of fundamental option is not so obviously rooted in the philosophy of transcendental Thomism. He understands personal moral response in light of the theory of fundamental option, emphasising freedom, fidelity, and responsibility in a covenant and conversion relationship with God in Christ. The fundamental option is embodied in the Christian personal virtues which manifest the dialogical nature of Christian life, characterised as worshipping God in Spirit and Truth.


I have explained that Newman's understanding of moral judgement offers a significant contribution to the contemporary emphasis upon character in moral discourse, developed by the fundamental option theory. Fundamental option theory holds two inseparable aspects in tension.

First, it emphasises the central importance of personal self-determination in giving meaning and direction to specific concrete moral judgements and actions. This is at the heart of Newman's proposals for illative moral judgement, cognitively and personally. Cognitively, Newman explained the importance of first principles influencing a concrete judgement; these first principles are the result of previous judgements and experiences; and they are "of a personal character"; the moral judgements of the illative sense are personally influenced by the "intellectual and moral character of the person". Transcendental Thomism emphasises the historicity of the self-determination of the person. Newman's understanding of character reflects the "particular history" of the individual, including the "constitution, moral temperament, intellectual outfit, (and) mental formation" which make up the "notion of a man's person". Newman's emphasis is upon concrete experience; personal history both "depend(s) on personal experience", and is "the ground-work or condition of.. particular experiences".
Newman also emphasises the affective aspect of character upon moral action: "the imagination...leads to practice indirectly by the action of its object upon the affections". The affective dimension of moral judgement has been developed by Haring's proposals for moral discourse.

The second aspect of fundamental option theory is that each concrete moral judgement determines the personal character in ongoing self-transcendence. Newman also emphasised that personal character is the beneficiary of moral judgements: the real assent of moral judgement "leads the way to... the formation of character, and is thus... intimately connected with what is individual and personal". The fundamental option theory again emphasises the historicity of these concrete judgements and actions as means of self-transcendence. Newman put the same emphasis upon the "given circumstances" of each "particular case": the objective truthfulness of concrete moral judgement cannot be perceived "before the event", for "the event... alone determines...certitude". Haring and Maguire have combined the importance of the existential situation and the affectivity of moral judgement in using the biblical term 'kairos'. This term points to the moment of "opportunity" for self-determination in fundamental option.

Newman's understanding of character as benefactor and beneficiary of illative moral judgement is reflected in the tension of basic and categorical freedom in fundamental option. The proponents of fundamental option insist on its Christological context. This too is present in Newman; I have shown the importance of the "indwelling of God within us", so that "the divinely enlightened mind sees in Christ the very Object whom it desires to love and worship".

This emphasis upon personal character and fundamental option is at the root of the contemporary debate on the relation between concrete moral judgement and moral norm. Newman's proposals offer a significant clarification of the discussion.
3). Moral Judgement and Moral Norm.

In this section I examine the relation between concrete moral judgement and moral law or norm by examining Rahner's 'formal existential ethics' and the debate on deontology and teleology.

A. Existential ethics and moral discernment.

Rahner's proposals stem from a dissatisfaction with syllogistic, deductive morality, found in the tradition of manuals of moral theology. In this method the "situation is conceived tacitly"; the "coincidence" of the "objective situation and the general norm" results in the moral judgement, "the concrete imperative in this situation"; and this application of the norm to the concrete situation is the "mental-moral function" of conscience.131

Rahner gives central importance to the uniqueness of each individual person and situation; each person "has a sphere of moral choices which cannot be clearly decided by universal norms and laws alone".132 He supplements universal principles with concrete "prescriptions" which are propositions addressed to the individual conscience enunciating concrete obligation.133 This complementarity constitutes his formal existential ethics; it is "formal" because it only "treats of the basic elements, the formal structures" of moral perception; it is "existential" because it emphasises the central importance of the individual person and situation.134

Rahner explains the mode of reaching existential moral judgement by reference to the Ignatian theory of "election". This occurs by seeking a direct, non-conceptualised experience of God, which entails "utter receptivity to God" by the "drawing of the whole person with the very ground of his being into love... into the infinity of God"; this results in a sense of "divine consolation". The authenticity of this experience is that it "bears its own warrant". Concrete moral judgement results immediately after the transcendental experience by "confronting the object of the election", (the moral judgement), "with the fundamental consolation", (the transcendental experience), under the influence of the Holy Spirit.135

Rahner's focus is upon objective reality, and not
voluntarism: "the object that is being sought as a moral good must be comprised in the facts themselves, and not consist in an ordinance of God transcending them, and freely disposing of them".\textsuperscript{136}

Newman, like Rahner, emphasises the centrality of concrete moral judgement; abstract law and concrete judgement are complementary.\textsuperscript{137} However, Newman's proposals for illative moral judgement surpass Rahner's method of divine consolation. Both methods emphasise the objective reality of the situation. Newman has the advantage of explaining the moral perception by focusing on the "whole case" in a holistic way determined by personal character.\textsuperscript{138} It is an inner-wordly approach.

However, Newman emphasises the religious dimension and experience found in Rahner's proposals; I have explained this in terms of the religious intentionality of the sense of duty and the principle of Love. The "self-repose of certitude" and the "religious peace" accompanying moral judgement and action are suggested by Newman as subsequent signs of right judgement.\textsuperscript{139} These have an epistemological and religious character, and surpass Rahner's understanding of "divine consolation", which appears one-sidedly religious.

Newman and Rahner are concerned with the discernment of concrete moral truth. They both claim that each method bears its own warrant, (the illative sense, and divine consolation).\textsuperscript{140} Again, Newman's proposals have the edge on Rahner's, because I have shown that the implicit reason of illative moral judgement is inseparable from explicit reason; this is precisely to test its objectivity.\textsuperscript{141}

Newman's emphasis is that discernment is determined by the personal character of the subject. The importance of character for moral discernment has been developed by Gustafson: each "particular discernment" is "an exercise of character that has been formed".\textsuperscript{142} Mahoney makes the same emphasis by explaining Aquinas' view of moral discernment in terms of wisdom rather than prudence.

Mahoney explains that for Aquinas "moral discernment is supremely the exercise of Christian wisdom, under the interior influence of the Spirit"; "in his theology of the moral life he accords to wisdom over all other intellectual and moral virtues, including prudence, a primacy which he explicitly recognises as being architectonic".\textsuperscript{143} Moral discernment is essentially
religious, derived from an imparted affinity and connaturality with the Holy Spirit: "the affective union of the heart with God through charity is the cause of the effective knowledge and judgement in the mind through wisdom".\textsuperscript{144} And moral judgement exercised in wisdom is "an exercise in community discernment".\textsuperscript{145} Mahoney argues that moral discernment is "a necessary corrective to an over-rationalistic approach to the mystery of faith"; yet it "includes close rational analysis".\textsuperscript{146}

Newman's proposals accord with this approach to moral discernment; Newman recognises the importance of community discernment in his understanding of "consensus" as "phronema deep in the bosom of the mystical body of Christ";\textsuperscript{147} and his rejection of the exclusive rationalism of Liberalism did not compromise the need for rationally verifying the illative moral judgements by explicit reason.

I now briefly discuss this rational enterprise in the contemporary debate on moral judgement and moral norm.

B. Moral Norm and natural law.

The contemporary debate on moral norms is situated between two opposed positions. The deontological position understands moral life in terms of duty and law; deontological moral norms hold some actions to be always right or wrong. For example, Grisez holds that there are basic human goods which can never be directly violated;\textsuperscript{148} Finnis follows this.\textsuperscript{149} The deontological position is the result of an abstract, a priori, and deductive understanding of natural law, which claims to deal with the universal true essences of human nature; it tends to absolutise the physical or biological structure of certain acts.\textsuperscript{150} This represents the position adopted by the Catholic Magisterium in teaching on matters of life, (e.g. abortion), and sex.\textsuperscript{151} The conflict of values are resolved by the principle of double effect; it has four conditions centred in the prohibition of the evil effect preceding the good effect.\textsuperscript{152}

The teleological position understands moral life in terms of the end to be achieved. This position derives norms solely on the basis of consequences; its pure form is not adopted in contemporary Catholic moral theology.\textsuperscript{153}

There is a third position mediating deontology and
teleology in contemporary Catholic moral theology: it is mixed teleology emphasising that moral obligation includes factors other than consequences, that the good is not separate from the right, and that the mode of achieving the good by the moral agent is significant.\textsuperscript{154} The best known proponents of this view in Catholic moral theology are Curran, McCormick, Janssens, Knauer, Fuchs, and Schuller.\textsuperscript{155}

This middle position understands concrete moral norms as relating several values in a given situation.\textsuperscript{156} It explains that concrete moral judgements and norms result from a historical understanding of natural law that is concrete, a posteriori, and inductive; this view disallows absolutising any one aspect of reality, and considers the concrete reality in its entirety.\textsuperscript{157} This dynamic understanding of natural law emphasises the order of reason rather than the order of nature; the latter reflects the static view of Ulpian, and the former is a dynamic view which is consistent with contemporary transcendental analysis explained above.\textsuperscript{158} The conflict of values is resolved by a new principle of double effect which justifies the evil effect preceding the good effect if there is proper intent and proportion.\textsuperscript{159}

This middle position understands the relation between concrete moral norm and moral judgement in a dynamic and personal way. It has led to a revival of the Aristotelian 'ep"\i aku"\i a' in the form of a theory of exceptions; this respects the abstract moral law but emphasises the central role of ordinary moral discernment as a personal faculty of practical truth.\textsuperscript{160} The middle position understands all concrete moral norms as abstractions from reality for reality.\textsuperscript{161} Conflict between moral norms, then, is not in the moral (that is concrete and personal) realm; to this extent moral compromise between moral norms does not objectively exist. The conflict entails a pre-moral compromise which is morally resolved in concrete personal moral judgement by proportionate reason.\textsuperscript{162}

Proponents of this middle position uphold the necessity of ongoing refinement of concrete moral norms; this refinement of the abstract norm results from the truthfulness of objective concrete moral judgements.\textsuperscript{163}

The contribution of Newman to this contemporary discussion on moral norm is significant. Newman adopts Aquinas's view of natural law: it is "the participation of
the eternal law in the rational creature"; he explains that "this law, as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called conscience"; conscience discovers the "truths which the Lawgiver has sown in our very nature". D'Arcy interprets this as an "objectivist" position where "the standard of right and wrong is absolute and irreversible"; and he compares it to the deontological position of Grisez and Finnis.

Contemporary scholarship has shown, however, that Aquinas's view fluctuated between the Ulpian static view of natural law, and the dynamic historical view emphasizing personal reason. My analysis has shown that for Newman the objective nature of moral judgement is tied to the reality of the concrete situation. He emphasised that the concrete reality of "the whole case" must be considered in making a moral judgement; his reference to Aristotle's "equity" reinforced the primacy of personal judgement over the secondary role of law. Also, I have shown that Newman did not consider the truth of moral judgement, and so also of moral law, as "irreversible" as D'Arcy claims. Most important of all, Newman understood the abstraction of moral law as essentially open to refinement. In Newman's epistemological strategy the objectivity of moral law is precisely its abstraction from concrete experience and judgement. The abstraction of moral law is relevant for each subsequent situation and judgement; but as an abstraction it is "the dead letter of a treatise or code". Law is secondary to concrete moral judgement of "the living intellect" which, alongside the community 'phronema', can apply the law "rightly". Newman's approach grounds the primacy of action in respect of reflection. This challenges the "essentialist, a-historical, deductive" approach to morality of the Catholic church's teaching authority.

Newman's position, then, is more in accord with the contemporary middle position of moral norms, than with the deontological position. This is especially evident in his explanation of lying to Kingsley. He condemns "wilful untruth"; but the "moral sense" has to discern "whether this or that in particular is conformable to the rule of truth". However, "when a just cause is present", he allows a "verbal misleading"; the "'just cause'... is the condition, sine qua non; and this is present for individuals "when there is for them a grave reason and
proportionate ie. to their character". This explanation of lying accords with that of the contemporary middle position on moral norms.

C. Conscience.

The personal historical approach to morality of this middle position rejects the view of understanding conscience merely as finding and applying a norm to a given situation. Rather conscience is understood as the personal subject in moral consciousness making reasoned judgements about conduct and life. This entails a dynamic and historical process of discerning moral duties in and through one's self-awareness; and in turn, the performance of moral duty enhances personal self-transcendence. This is the dynamic relation of character and moral judgement enunciated by Newman. Self-transcendence depends upon perceiving moral truth in the concrete situation; moral consciousness seeks what is objectively right in the concrete by the use of reason; but this reason is not primarily discursive, but evaluative comprehension and judgement. Newman's understanding of the illative moral judgement of implicit reason enhances this transcendental view of conscience; the illative judgement of the moral sense is a cognitive and affective exercise of the imagination. O'Donoghue shows that the mystical imagination is a continuation of the "inner direction and dynamism" of this moral imagination; as with Newman, this heart experience does not exclude the intellect.

Newman's epistemological strategy shows that the abstraction of moral law cannot be universalised, because the objectivity of this abstraction is dependent upon concrete judgements in particular situations. This is not to deny the cognitive truth of moral law, but only to make it answerable to reality, and entailing ongoing refinement. I have argued that Newman understands the objectivity of moral law as utterly dependent upon the objective truth of concrete moral judgement perceived by the moral sense of conscience, and eliciting an assent of certitude.

The contemporary historical-personal approach of moral theology emphasises that, for the believing Christian, this experience of self-transcendence in personal
Consciousness is Christological: this experience has the character of submissiveness and obligation formed in faith, love, and following Christ. I have explained that this is Newman's view of the sense of duty and the principle of Love, bringing a Christian intentionality to the judgement of the moral sense. I now briefly explain this intentionality in terms of the contemporary discussion on the specificity of Christian morality.

2. The Christian specificity of moral judgement.

I now turn to the second point made in the conclusion to my analysis of Newman: the Christian intentionality of the sense of duty and the principle of Love.

Contemporary Catholic theologians who have adopted the transcendental approach to morality identify the specificity of Christian morality with Christian intentionality. Ethical experience is the starting point of personal morality; despite the influence of the Fall, autonomy is considered as a fundamental possibility of achievement given to humanity by God in creation and redemption. Christianity brings an intentionality as motive to this autonomous morality.

This is similar to my explanation of Newman's view of morality. Despite the Fall, Newman adopted an understanding of harmony between nature and grace; and his epistemology of moral judgement was not altered in the economy of grace. Newman's emphasis upon the epistemology of the moral sense is equivalent to the contemporary understanding of autonomous morality; my explanation of the sense of duty as religious intentionality, (that is motive), substantiates this. However, the contemporary transcendental approach adds an important clarification to Newman's position.

Newman identified the sense of duty with the experience of moral sanction and the voice of God. The understanding of Christian intentionality in contemporary writing is not limited to motive. The transcendental approach associates this intentionality with the basic transcendental horizon as source and goal of life; and this is realized in the fundamental option. It is the Christian recognition of God's transcendence in human immanence. Christian intentionality, then, does not specifically determine human moral judgement and action;
but it does pervade it and transcendentally influence it in a way that makes it the most important element of christian morality.\textsuperscript{188} This is called the "theonomy of moral autonomy".\textsuperscript{189}

This enlightens Newman's religious sense of duty. It manifests the essentially religious nature of moral judgement in a horizon of belief without compromising Newman's emphasis upon the essentially human characteristic of the epistemology of moral judgement.\textsuperscript{190}

3. The Reversal of moral judgement.

Finally, Newman's epistemology enlightens the contemporary discussion on the reversal of moral judgement and commitment.

The contemporary transcendental approach emphasises that moral judgement occurs in an inter-personal and historical context of faith.\textsuperscript{191} There is a dynamic relation of transcendence between each concrete moral judgement and the fundamental option of personal character: this freedom shapes personal history, and demands a fidelity to personal commitment in moral judgement characterised by perseverance and tenacity.\textsuperscript{192} But transcendental freedom is rooted in the truth of life, which can never be identified with a specific moral judgement; the historical nature of self-transcendence demands the subsequent evaluation and verification of concrete moral judgements. The transcendental dynamism of person and history includes the possibility of the reversal of concrete moral judgement and commitment, without compromising the moral irreversibility of fundamental option.\textsuperscript{193}

Newman's contribution to this discussion is threefold. First, he emphasised the moral irreversibility of commitment in terms of an athematic formal promise.\textsuperscript{194} Second, he showed that concrete judgement and commitment can be characterised by both tenacity of will and openness to concrete reversal of judgement without entailing doubt;\textsuperscript{195} the justification of concrete reversal lies in the objectivity of historical reality.\textsuperscript{196} Third, he explained the mode of concrete reversal as an exercise of the implicit reason on the whole case, following the epistemological strategy of the initial illative moral judgement.\textsuperscript{197}
Conclusion to Thesis.

This thesis has presented an understanding of moral judgement that is operative in Newman's illustration of the judgement of faith. My emphasis has been upon the concrete nature of moral judgement as a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real assent of the imagination; also, I have explained the religious dimension of moral judgement in terms of intentionality, and shown the possibility and mode of reversing moral judgement.

Every concrete moral judgement cannot reach the certitude of illative moral judgement; the point of my analysis has been to show that Newman considered that certitude could be reached in some concrete moral judgements resulting from an accumulation of probabilities. The objectivity of illative moral judgement is paradigmatic for the objectivity of moral norms; but it is important to bear in mind the abstract nature of the latter, and the imaginative primacy of the former. The role of the imagination is to elicit a real assent to the concrete truth of moral judgement perceived by implicit reason. The imaginative moral judgement is religious, (within a horizon of belief), cognitive, and affective. It is characterised by a tenacity of commitment without excluding the possibility of reversal justified by objective reality. Above all, it is impossible to appreciate the primacy he gave to personal, implicit reason without acknowledging the critical, secondary, function of explicit reason; this dynamic tension is the key to his religious epistemology.

Newman did not intend to present a systematic understanding of judgement, far less of religious or moral judgement. However, his holistic approach, delineated in his proposals for liberal knowledge, results in a broadly based understanding of moral judgement; it is not without inconsistency and puzzlement. Yet there is a basic coherence to his religious epistemology of moral judgement which both accords with contemporary discussion and critically advances it. It would be mistaken to understand Newman's proposals as a system of moral discourse; he was wary of this kind of rational reduction. Nonetheless, his understanding of moral judgement is worthy of systematic presentation and development for contemporary theology.
the 'Sermons' which clarified the meaning of probability, certainty, and evidence; it was not published till 1937, (cf. Tristram (1937) 241, 246). The Latin theses upon faith and reason attempted to show that his theory of faith "was capable of being stated in the traditional language of the schools", (Chadwick (1957) 181-2, 174).


7.U.S. 182; cf.179, note 4, Mozley (1891) i, 54-5.

8.U.S. xvii, 226, 238. The perception of faith is a "calm, deliberate, rational principle", (P.S. i, 23). Newman's epistemological concern" is the case with all faith, not merely religious",(ibid. 188).


11.U.S. 203, cf. 208. The state of the heart was an important evangelical theme which had a strong influence on the young Newman; the basic conviction was that the rational mind can be carefully controlled by the believer, (Vargrish (1970) 5).


20.U.S. xii; cf. 258.


22.U.S. 263.

29. U.S. 257.
34. cf. U.S. 258.
35. A.W. 67, cf. Ker (1976) 593, note 54.36, also Vargrish (1970) 12-16, Collins (1961) 4-7, Culler (1955) 23-45. Although Whately's formal connection with Oriel had ended before Newman was introduced to him, (cf. A.W. 68-9), Sillem believes that the influence of Whately cannot be estimated too highly, (cf. P.N. i, 11), even though Newman was not a theoretical logician, (cf. P.N. i, 1). Evans holds that Whately had a more positive and optimistic view than Newman, (Evans (1979) 183), who had, he claims, a natural disinclination for the rigourously disciplined processes of demonstration of logic, (ibid. 191). My analysis shows that Newman did appreciate the value of logic, and used it in religious judgement.

On the direct influence of Aristotle, Sillem indicates the texts that Newman studied, (cf. P.N. i, 151, note 6), and points especially to the concepts of 'knowledge as its own end', the interconnection between the sciences, and the denial of a standardized, uniform way of reasoning in all subjects, (cf. P.N. i, 160-1); however, he is at pains to make clear that Newman was by no means a pure Aristotelian, (cf. P.N. i, 163). An example of Newman's competence in Logic is seen in Id. 93, (cf. Ker (1976) 599, note 89.17, and 603, note 104.35), and his "Lecture on Logic", T.P. 51-62. His competence was such that he "was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence to moral", (Apo. 116-7).

38. U.S. 263, 275, cf. 266.
39. U.S. 266; this is developed in my third chapter in relation to notional and real assent.
40. U.S. 267, 274.
41. Implicit and explicit anticipates the distinction.
between 'real' and 'notional' in the 'Grammar', (cf. G.A. chap. iv), and between 'idea' and 'aspect' in 'An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine', (cf. Dev. 34-35). Coulson calls the relation between these the principle of limitation, and sees it as probably Newman's most fundamental philosophical presupposition, being the very basis of his philosophy of education in the 'Idea', as well as his epistemology, (cf. Coulson (1970) 220, note 2). By 'idea' Newman did not mean a shadow or copy of a reality, and in this he breaks with the philosophy of Locke and Hume; rather, 'idea' comes as close to reality as possible, (Walgrave (1960) 95, note 2); but it is still an abstraction from it as well as being "that intuition which is the mind's starting point for its abstract functions", (ibid. 95).
Notes to section 2. (pp. 6-15).


4. cf. Yearley (1978) 94, P.N. i, 64.


9. This is developed in section 4 below.


13. Id. 200.
17. Id. 211.
18. cf. L.D. xiv, 45.
20. U.S. 103; this constituted an "imbecile optimism" ignoring the problem of the Fall, (Kenny (1974) 129).
21. Id. 201, 193, cf. 191.
22. Id. 192, 196, 217, cf. Ess. i, 33-34.
23. Id. 191, cf. 192, 200.
25. Id. 198.
26. Id. 193.
27. Id. 200.
28. Id. 192, 201.
30. Id. 201. This "science of morals" reflects "a mere standard of excellence... strikingly illustrated in Aristotle's description of a perfectly virtuous man", (U.S. 28). My analysis of Aristotle's phronesis in chapter three explains that his primary focus is not upon the abstract but upon the concrete. Newman's point here is that Aristotle's virtue is unaffected by the religious dimension, (cf. U.S. 29).
31. Id. 207, cf. U.S. 64.
32. Id. 204, 207, cf. T.P. 8. This is precisely the effect of a merely notional apprehension of doctrinal truth, in faith and morals, explained in chapter 3, (cf. Cons. 106).
33. U.S. 158.
35. U.S. 172.
43. U.S. 109, 105-6.
Yearley explains that the specific difference between Christianity and Liberalism lies in the intention which evaluates actions, (cf. Yearley (1975) 43-57, especially at 48; also cf. Yearley (1978) 124).

This is what Rahner means by man's "cognitive intentionality" which accompanies faith, (Rahner (1983) 180); for "faith is at once an assent of the intellect and a consent of the will, which finds its true fulfillment in action"; and faith "only reaches its perfection... when charity has made it a living faith", so
that the assent of faith "is a prolongation of the free movement of the will", (Rahner (1975) 507).

80.U.S. 238, 47, (cf. 250), 239. Prof. Jay Newman explains that Newman's concept of "Love" means "praiseworthy dispositions" or "virtues", (Newman (1979) 144). Jay Newman understands Newman's concept as a response to the rationalist challenge; but it is an inadequate response because the original difficulty of relativism has not been discarded, (ibid. 149). He considers that Newman's bias against rationalism prevented him from adopting the use of explicit reason, (ibid). My analysis opposes this view, and explains that Newman did adopt explicit reason as a necessary means in the pursuit of concrete truth.

81.Lash makes a similar distinction in reference to the development of doctrine. He believes that Newman shifts his argument on 'implicit reason' in the fifteenth Oxford sermon so that "the notion of implicit reasoning is extended to cover, not only the process of thought, but also the genesis of an idea", (Lash (1970) 49). He explains that the implicit reason has been described by Newman as acting "without a direct recognition, on the part of the mind, of the starting point and the paths of thought from and through which it comes to its conclusions", (ibid. 49, cf. U.S. xi); and the fifteenth Oxford sermon concerns the legitimacy of extrapolating the notion of an "implicit starting point" from the descriptive psychology of the individual to a theory of doctrinal development. Lash accepts that there is little problem in this extension from the point of view of the descriptive psychology of the individual, but is concerned in the extension of such a psychological description as a model for doctrinal development, (ibid. 49, and 52); this is because it weakens the normativity of the primitive formulation of religious belief.

82.Id. 216, cf. Id. 186, cf. 191, U.S. 164. The importance of Newman's theological reservation is enunciated by him in a letter of March 25, 1825, to his brother Charles: "I wish it to be distinctly understood that I consider the rejection of Christianity to arise from a fault of the heart, not of the intellect; that unbelief arises, not from mere error of reasoning, but either from pride or sensuality", (quoted by Vargrish (1970) 8).
Notes to section 3. (pp. 16 - 24).


Cameron argues there is an affinity between Newman and Hume, manifest in Newman's trust in nature and reliance upon impressions tied to the senses, (cf. Cameron (1962) 222, 225, 226-232, also in Coulson and Allchin (1967) 81-2, 87). Although his use of impression is "not precisely that of Hume", it nonetheless represents "an original existence from which everything else is derived", (Cameron in Coulson and Allchin (1967) 80, cf. (1962) 238). However, Vargrish argues that Newman's trust in nature is radically opposed to Hume's, exemplified in their opposing conclusions on miracles, (cf. Vargrish (1970) 19, 21, note 1).

Cameron accepts that Newman "transcends the common empiricist position" in his proposals for judgement and belief, (Cameron (1962) 222, cf. 237-8, and 'Newman Studien', 8, 201); this is particularly noted when Newman adopts the criterion of practice for true faith, (cf. Cameron (1962) 241-2). Newman's common ground with empiricism is that he reaches knowledge from experience,
rather than from the act of cognition; his disagreement with empiricism lies in his defence of the personal mind in rational enterprise, rather than relying upon a metaphysics of knowledge, (cf. P.N. I, 24-29, and Walgrave (1960) 73).


6. Newman described his frustrations of determining an adequate epistemology for religious inquiry as "attempts to get into a labyrinth", (A.W. 270).


9. U.S. 164-5. This is developed in my third chapter.


11. P.S. v, 114 (dated 1838).


13. Id. 80.

14. Id. 228, 225. The 'Grammar' talks of "a chronic alienation, between God and man", (G.A. 399).

15. cf. Id. 228.


17. U.S. 165.


20. Id. 137, 139, cf. 112.
21. Id. 26-7, 39.
22. Id. 219, cf. 430, 446. Flanagan explains this harmony, for although original sin continues to influence man, divine life is nonetheless dominant, (cf. Davies (1978) 17).
23. U.S. 139, 137.
25. Id. 185, 231, 6, 185, U.S. 250.
28. cf. Id. 182.
29. Id. 184.
32. Rahner explains that the "supernatural light of faith (lumen fidei)" allows a "super-creaturely participation in the life of God and therewith it essentially involves a transformation of man that divinizes him"; but this "inward illumination of grace has no objective content", for "Grace operates as a non-conceptual attraction to God in himself, which is prior to the free act", (Rahner (1975) 505). Faith then is "supernatural because it is only made possible by a supernatural interior grace", (Rahner (1983) 171).
34. Id. 185-6.
35. Id. 184. Coulson pursues a less persuasive methodology in arguing that "the distinction between intellectual and moral excellence enables us to grasp the difference between nature and grace", (Coulson (1970) 89). The more important relation is that between Nature and Grace, and it both underlies as well as illumines the relation
between intellectual and moral excellence.
36. Id. 218, cf. 204, 218.
37. cf. Id. 186, 191.
38. Id. 178.
40. Id. 47. By objective, Newman means the reality independent of the subject, yet considered in relation to the subject which determines the content of the act of knowing, (Walgrave (1960) 48, cf. 53). Newman sought objective truth in and through the experience of intersubjectivity, (cf. P.N. i, 8; also Boekraad (1972) 189, and (1955) 128-9).
41. Id. 126.
42. Id. 125.
43. Id. 183-4.
44. Id. 174-5, quoting Mr. Davison.
46. Id. 189, 191.
47. Id. 216-7, cf. 139.
48. Id. 196.
49. Id. 185-6.
50. Id. 188.
51. Id. 120.
52. Id. 190.
53. Id. 120, 123.
54. cf. Id. 164.
55. Id. 120. DeLaura mistakenly explains the dichotomy between knowledge and morality by reference to Newman's theology of Nature and Grace, (cf. DeLaura (1969) 33).
56. Id. 180, cf. 183.
57. Id. 35.
58. Id. 120.
59. U.S. 44.
60. U.S. 42, 40-1.
63. U.S. 42.
64. U.S. 51, 48.
65. U.S. 43.
66. U.S. 44.
67. U.S. 47.
68. cf. U.S. 47, 250, 238.
69. Id. 190, 184, U.S. 145.
70. Id. 202, 184, 185, 191.
Notes to section 4. (pp. 25 - 35).

1. cf. Id. 97-8, 179-181, 214-5, L.D. xv, 226. Newman produced three works on university education: the 'Nine Discourses delivered to the Catholics of Dublin', (1851-53), the 'University Subjects discussed in occasional lectures and essays', (1854-58), and the 'Rise and Progress of Universities', (1856). Newman collected the Discourses and Lectures together for publishing in 1873 in, "The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated"; the third work was published in the 'Historical Sketches', (1872), being more concerned with historical manifestations of the university, than the 'idea' as such, (cf. Culler (1955) 173). For a history of the text cf. Ker (1976) xi-xlii). My interest focuses on the first work, which defines the 'idea' of the university and its embodiments, (cf. Coulson (1970) 93).


5. Id. 456.


10. Id. 134, 111. This is a "universalinity of comprehensiveness", which is opposed to a "universalinity of extensiveness", (Walgrave (1979) 241). Culler understands 'enlargement' quantitatively, (cf. Culler (1955) 206-7). Ker rightly indicates that Newman repudiated this view, (cf. Ker (1976) 607, referring to Id. 127-130, 423). Culler modifies his view in accepting that 'enlargement' is independent of specific subjects, (cf. Culler, ibid. 203).
11. Id. 129.
12. Id. 91.
13. Culler holds that Newman was considering a separate science, (cf. Culler (1955) 185-6); Ker rejects this view, (Ker (1976) lvi, note 6). Culler attempts to distinguish between Philosophy as "a recombination of all the sciences into a unified vision of reality", and the Architectonic Science as a discipline discriminating "the methods, purposes, and interrelationships of the sciences themselves", (Culler, ibid. 183); Ker insists that "Newman himself never makes such a distinction", (Ker, ibid.).
15. Newman's balance is that "knowledge" is the "condition of the mind's enlargement" yet it is "not that very thing which enlarges it", (U.S. 287, cf. Id. 129-130).
16. Id. 72, 46, U.S. 277. Culler explains that Newman was influenced by Aristotle in his use of "philosophy" and the "architectonic science"; however, Newman did not have anything so rigorous in mind as Aristotle's system, (Culler (1955) 307, note 33, also cf. 184-5, with references to Aristotle). Newman did acknowledge the importance of logic for consistency, (H. S. iii, 194-5).
18. Id. 113-4.
19. cf. Id. 114. I have argued against the view that the abstraction of liberal knowledge leads to merely intellectual virtues, (cf. Harrold (1957) xxii).
21. Id. Discourse viii.
22. Id. 111, 114. Newman adopts Aristotle's distinction of 'useful' and 'liberal', (cf. Id. 109).
23. Id. 164, 150.
24. cf. Vargrish (1970) 133. Culler argues that Newman compromised his central thesis that liberal education is its own end, found especially in the fifth discourse, (Culler (1955) 222-3), Ker argues that there is no inconsistency, (cf. Ker (1976) 614, note 154.10).

25. Id. 217.
27. Yearley thinks this invalidation occurs, but adds that the distinction does still maintain the inherent value of certain activities with a view to establishing a hierarchy of values, (cf. Yearley (1978) 118). This hierarchy seems precisely the point of Newman's distinction.

To attempt to understand Discourse viii outwith a religious context puts the reader in the danger of thinking that Newman was repudiating liberal education. The virtue of liberal education is valuable, but is not the highest accomplishment of man, (cf. Collins (1961) 421, note 2, Vargrish (1970) 123). What Newman in fact is discussing in Discourse viii is not the relation between intellectual culture and religion but "the religion of intellectual culture and religion itself", (Ker (1976) liii). He is putting philosophical knowledge at the service
of religion, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 56); hence the 'Idea' can be described as the "epitome of Christian humanism", (Svaglic (1967) 67).

30.Id. 52.

31.Id. 69, 54. The university implied that theology and secular science worked together, (cf. Evans (1978) 253).

32.Id. 47. This was partly because theology "comes from heaven", and partly because of the "important influence, which Theology in matter of fact does and must exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and correcting them", (Id. 52, 98, cf. Appendix I in Ker (1976) 427-8).


34.cf. Ker (1976) lxii. Ker's argument is more persuasive than Culler's, that there are two unreconciled images being used by Newman, that of a hierarchy of knowledge, dictated by Theology, and that of a circle in which there is equality, (cf. Culler (1955) 258).

35.Id. 133.


38.U.S. 179.


42.U.S. 281.

43.cf. U.S. 238.

44.U.S. 286, 293.


47.Id. 147, 152, 134. Faith also "judges and decides" as "a practical principle"; but Faith does not aim "at mere abstract truth", as Wisdom does, (cf.U.S. 298).

48.Id. 178, 47, cf. my preceding section.

49.Id. 134, 174, 75.


51.U.S. 182, Id. 91, 102. In 1871 Newman writes that Faith "is a presumption.. because the mind.. anticipates in its conclusions a logical exposition of them"; Faith is "fortified and regulated by investigation", (U.S. 234, note 3). Here, "Reason is synonymous with analysis", and entails "a laying down of relations", (U.S. 290); however, "the analysis is but an account" of implicit reason, and "it does not make the conclusion correct", (U.S. 259, cf.
52. U.S. 279, 305, 303, 292.
53. U.S. 290. O'Donoghue explains that the explicit reason of the intellect, (seeing, gaining, and acting on principles), is not necessarily of the order of discovery, (O'Donoghue (1975) 14).
54. U.S. 183.
55. U.S. 183. Also, explicit reason is not the cause of action: "Reason analyzes the grounds and motives of action: a reason is an analysis, but is not the motive itself", (U.S. 183). The relation between the judgement of implicit reason and action is explained in my third chapter.

This positive view of Wisdom stands in contrast to Newman's relegation of Wisdom as "no essential service to Divine Truth"; his point is to emphasise the secondary role of Theology as "a homage", (Appendix III in Ker (1976) 502).

The gift of Wisdom is shared by the laity as well as preachers; for "this religious theory or spirit, to which cultivation of the intellect gives rise, may be found among good Catholics"; he is referring to "Theology as one main portion of the truths, which must be received and contemplated by Philosophy", (ibid. 538). The role of the laity in theology is briefly developed in my third chapter.

64. U.S. 266, 300.
65. U.S. 300, 260, 297.
68. U.S. 297, 303.
1. The analysis of my second and third chapters focuses upon 'An Essay in aid of A Grammar of Assent'; all references are to the pagination of the final eighth edition of 1889; the original pagination is found in Ker's edition (1985).

2. G.A. 13-14. Unlike assertion, assent entails the apprehension of the predicate of the proposition, (cf. G.A. 8, 13-14); it is the deliberate avowal of the truth of a proposition, (cf. Pailin (1969) 100). The unconditionality of assent, (G.A. 157) is fundamental to the 'Grammar', (cf. Nedoncelle (1945) 120). Newman acknowledged that the problem of assent had concerned him in writing the 'University Sermons', that is "of cogitation and assensus going together", (quoted by Pailin (1969) Appendix 111, 205). Although it is unlikely that Aquinas exerted any considerable influence upon Newman, Newman clearly understood Aquinas' thought on faith as "cogitare cum assensu", (ibid. 205-6). Evans explains that Newman recognised Aquinas' understanding of the relation between will and thought, and this left him "free to concentrate upon the intellectual aspects of assent", (Evans (1979) 206).

3. G.A. 259. Unlike assent, "inference requires no apprehension of the things inferred", and so "it does not reach as far as facts"; it can only deal with "real objects" "as materials of argument or inquiry", (G.A. 90).

4. G.A. 172, 170. Ferreira explains that the holding or accepting a proposition as conditional or unconditional, (ie. as inference or assent), "cannot be done in part... the argument for the indivisibility of assent applies as well to inference", (Ferreira (1985) 166). Ferreira argues that the "radical distinction" between inference and assent, between conditionality and unconditionality, "is drawn in terms of dependence and independence" (ibid. 167, with reference to G.A. 3, 13, 264). This is further explained in section 2 note 28 below.

5. G.A. 175, cf. Ker (1985) lxii-lxiii. Newman corrected his early view of "conditional assent", (T.P. 11) and a "graduated scale of assent", (Apo. 31); in 1865 he mentioned "an unconditional assent to conditional propositions", (O.A. B.2.6., cited by Ker (1985) 365, note 116. 5). In August 1866 he uses "conditional" assent only
in the sense of being "given under circumstances", (O.A. B.2.6, cited by Ker, ibid.)

6. For an explanation of the misleading language used by Newman on the possibility of degrees of assent, cf. Ker (1985) 351, note 30.18, and 365, note 116.5; as early as 1853 he rejects degrees in assent, while admitting that it may vary in "vigour, keenness, and directness", (T.P. 32).

Newman opposes Locke's argument for degrees of assent, (cf. Bastable (1955) 51-61, and D'Arcy (1945) 95). Locke rigidly proportioned assent to evidence, and Newman considered this to constitute Liberalism, (cf. P.N. ii, 170); he argued that we must not entertain "any proposition with greater assurance than the proof it is built upon will warrant", so that all "surplusage of assurance" over evidence is not rational, (Locke, 'Essay', IV, xix, 1, cf. IV, xvi, I and xv, 5). Newman defended the unconditionality of assent by showing the inadequacy of Locke's use of abstract logic for concrete reasoning; Newman replaced this with his proposals for truth based on the accumulation of probabilities. Collins considers that Newman adheres more closely to the empirical experience of man than Locke, (Collins (1961) 10, 20).

Prof. Newman criticizes Newman's discussion of Locke: he does not think that Newman has explained how inference and assent are different acts, (Newman (1977) 131-147, at 136). Naulty, however, holds that Locke could easily concede Newman's point of rejecting degrees of assent; he argues that Locke held assent as a mental act not admitting degrees, but admitting variation in assurance of the evidence eliciting assent, (cf. Naulty (1973) 453).

However, Bastable argues for degrees of assent in opposing Newman's strong distinction between inference and assent; for he believes that "to infer is actually to assent to the premisses and then to assent to their conclusion under the logical compulsion of consistency", (Bastable (1955) 53-55). Bastable's concern is to establish an epistemological connection between the inference and the conclusion of assent; my analysis discusses the logical coherence of Newman's proposals, and emphasises the importance of consistency acknowledged by Newman in his argument.

8. G.A. 265, (cf. 267, 303), 40.

11. The original distinction in the manuscript sources was between notional and imaginative assent, (cf. Coulson (1981) 82-3). Ker explains that the first time Newman uses 'real' in place of 'imaginative', and contrasts 'notional' with 'real' was in the paper of July 15th 1868, (cf. Ker (1985) xli, with reference to T.P. 137-8; also Ker, ibid. 349, note 13.17). Ker explains that 'imaginative' was not intended as a creative power, (as he had used it in his early essay, 'Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics', Ess. i, 10); he opposes Coulson's view, (cf. Coulson ibid. 82-3); Ker explains that Newman wanted simply to record the "realizing" of truths as in "real faith and apprehension", as used in his Anglican years, (P.S. vi, 263, 348). His argument is made persuasively from amendments in the Newman manuscripts. Walgrave emphasises that the imagination is our entire faculty of knowing the concrete, (Walgrave (1960) 110, cf. note 5 with references to the 'Grammar').

15. G.A. 34.
17. cf. G.A. 26, 37, 89.
18. Pailin mistakenly thinks that "propositions whose terms can denote only what is abstract and general can only be notionally apprehended", (Pailin (1969) 112). And Price criticises Newman for weakening the power of the notional; for he argues that philosophers and mathematicians can be "moved, stirred to their depths, by the contemplation of propositions which have to be entertained in a wholly notional manner", (Price (1969) 335). Ker believes that these critics have been misled into associating real assent only with concrete propositions as a result of Newman's explanation that real apprehension and assent is "more vivid and forcible" because "intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts", (Ker (1985) lix, quoting G.A. 11-12).
Newman adopts "the importance of antecedent probability in conviction" from the 'University Sermons', (L.D. xv. 381, cf. Tristram (1973) 241, 246-7). Newman considered antecedent probability as the most "original" insight of the 'University Sermons', (cf. L.D. xi, 293, xv, 381).

Selby explains that the argument from antecedent probability was Newman's method for proceeding from the known to the unknown; it is "what we may expect from the state of the case, and from a priori considerations", (Selby (1975) 75-6). He identifies the sources of this form of argument as Whately, (ibid., 76-78, cf. Apo. 23, L.D. xv. 176), Butler, and Davison (cf. Selby, ibid. 78); Ker notes Newman's avowal of his debt to Whately in L.D. xiv, 385, (cf. Ker (1985) 388, note 272.20); Evans also mentions Butler's influence, and indicates that "it was Paley who supplied Newman with his technical terms", (Evans (1982) 98). While the intellectual argument had been formed by the time of the first University Sermon of 1826, (cf. Evans ibid. 99), Selby explains that it was not until the tenth University Sermon of 1839 that he brought out the importance of antecedent probability in conviction, (cf. Selby, ibid. 80). Finally, Selby gives three instances of the argument, in the 'Via Media', in the 'Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine', (which constitutes its most extensive use), and in the 'Grammar', (ibid. 82-8). Also cf. Ker (ibid.) for extensive reference to Newman's use of the argument.
31. G.A. 318, 345, cf. 342. The change from inference to conclusion of certainty is qualitative, and not the result of a quantitative gathering of probabilities, (cf. Dessain (1957) 11-12). It is an "actively affirming" concrete truth "by means of a synthetical and intuitive mental act", (Boekraad (1955) 194, 203).


40. G.A. 411, 288. Ferreira considers that Newman's explanation of "natural inference", (G.A. 330-342), is merely a continuation of informal inference; but "his failure to address himself to the possible distinction between informal and natural inference makes it difficult to determine his position", (Ferreira (1980) 39-40). Norris explains that natural inference enjoys a "wider versatility of competence, and is capable of entering and manipulating more complex issues and questions" than informal inference, (Norris (1977) 40); this view is at odds with Newman's claim for the range of certitude in all concrete matters, (cf. G.A. 317).

41. G.A. 344, 214.
Notes to section 2, (pp. 42-54).

1. G.A. 261.
2. G.A. 321; Bastable enunciates the epistemological problem by saying that the illative judgement may be based not on the concrete character of its "part-intuition", but on the "concomitant part-ignorance" of the relevant evidence, (Bastable (1955) 62).
3. G.A. 347.
5. cf. Bastable (1955) 65, 68.
13. Pailin argues that the assent of certitude is "a choice made by the individual and directed to what he has understood" in the proposition of the inferential conclusion, (Pailin (1969) 103, cf. 136, 147, 159, 169-177); "... the actual act of assent is a leap across a gulf...", (ibid. 175); hence, "the absolute or unconditional character of assent ... describes the consequence of a personal commitment to what is thereby described as true", (ibid. 176). Ferreira maintains that this view is implicitly supported by accounts which charge Newman as being a sceptic, (cf. Ferreira (1980) 24, 47-51). Fey also holds that certitude is reached through choice, (cf. Fey (1976) 114, 120, 122, 140, 142, 148, references in Ferreira (1980) 24, note 16). O'Donoghue argues that "the leap into certainty" reveals that Newman's proposals are not "objectively grounded beyond possibility of error", (O'Donoghue (1975) 245); this is further explained below in dealing with the role of explicit reason in determining objective truth.
14. cf. Ferreira (1980) 27-9; Ferreira calls this method of reasoning the "analytic paradigm", of which the Aristotelian syllogism is the full and technical expression, (ibid. 31, with reference to G.A. 263).
15. G.A. 197; this argument is made by Ferreira (1980) 23.

17. G.A. 330 (cf. 259), 292. Ker seems to make this confusion in denying that implicit reason is a process, (cf. Ker (1985) xxvi in reference to P.N. 73, 75, 130).


19. Coulson argues that "in retrospect" we experience the change as precipitated by an accumulation of probabilities; it can be described as a leap looking forward from the inference to the conclusion; but after the conclusion it is conceived as a polygon expanding into a circle. In this way Newman tries "to understand backwards what has been lived forwards in order to show the conditions which, socially, historically, and reflectively, enable us to be certain that our spontaneous leap of faith is a rational act rather than a merely subjective feeling", (Coulson (1981) 71; cf. U.S. xii).

20. G.A. 228; Newman gives two other illustrations of the illative judgement; he talks of judgement in a court of law, (G.A. 324-8), and the determination of the authorship of an anonymous publication, (G.A. 328-9). The moral nature of this judgement is exemplified by Newman's reference to the strength of a cable, (cf. Boekraad and Tristram (1961) 177).


22. G.A. 268. In a letter to Meynell, (Dec. 10, 1869), Newman explains that "experience logically only leads to probabilities".


24. G.A. 94.25

25. G.A. 95.745

26. G.A. 228=1.341-2

27. G.A. 344-5.

28. G.A. 344 cf. 195-6, 355. Lash explains that Newman inherited from Butler the distinction between probability and demonstration; and he "transformed Butler's problem" by distinguishing between certitude, as a state of mind, and certainty as a quality of propositions, (Lash (1975) 30). Collins acknowledges the importance of Butler's influence on the question of probability, (cf. Collins (1961) 12); and Walgrave considers that Newman's defense of the argument from probability, originating with Butler, is the most balanced explanation to date, (cf. Walgrave

In section 1, note 4 of this chapter I explained that Ferreira has shown that "the radical distinction" between inference and assent "is drawn in terms of dependence vs. independence", (regarding conditions), (Ferreira (1985) 167). Inference is characterised by "dependence or conditionality" and "variations in confidence"; it implies "that the conclusion is tied to the reasons in such a way that changes in the probability of the reasons will effect change in a one-to-one manner in the degree of confidence with which the conclusion is accepted", (ibid. 168-9, cf. 170); it is important to note that this varying degree of confidence does not imply that "the degree of confidence is necessarily less than total", (ibid. 174).

The "unconditionality of assent.. is its independence", being considered "as if resting in itself"; it has "no degrees" of confidence because it is "not dependent on evidence.. in the one-to-one manner" of inference, (ibid. 169). This is not to deny that "Newman prescriptively constrains assent" thereby entailing a "proportionality requirement", (ibid. 172, 174); Ferreira argues that "there is a requirement of a proportion between the probability of the evidence and the content of the proposition to which we assent. Here the probability of the evidence is required to be the measure of what we assent to, though not the measure of our assent (confidence)", (ibid. 174); for "the process of appreciating the limit of converging probabilities is still 'conditional'", (ibid. 172, cf. G.A. 293), "and it is with the controlling principle in inference (not with assent) that he compares phronesis", (ibid. 172, cf. G.A. 356).

29.T.P. 14-15. In light of the preceding note on Ferreira's discussion, "the function of assent is not to transform a probability-judgement into a substantive proposition, but to see the inferential conclusion, whatever it is, in a different light or from a different perspective - ie. in a different relation to its reasons, a relation which no longer warrants a one-to-one variation with future changes in evidence", (Ferreira (1985) 173).

Ker takes the view of Ferreira in explaining that in an unpublished paper of 1848 "On the certainty of Faith", Newman uses the word "decision" to explain "what evidence... or motives are sufficient for... certainty", (O.A. B. 9. 11, cited in Ker (1985) 380, note 223.9; also cf. Ker, ibid, 376-7, note 213. 16).

32. G.A. 318.
33. G.A. 291.
34. Pailin (1969) 205, Appendix 111, ("Sixteen extracts from Newman's unpublished private manuscripts concerned with his thought about the logic of faith").
35. T.P. 121.
37. G.A. 316. This process is inferential, (cf. G.A. 293).
40. G.A. 291.
41. G.A. 329.
42. G.A. 345.
43. G.A. 318.
44. G.A. 318.
45. G.A. 492, 216.
46. cf. Ferreira (1980) 44.
47. G.A. 492.
49. T.P. 125-6.
50. T.P. 126.
51. G.A. 344.
52. G.A. 492.
54. T.P. 35.
55. G.A. 318.
56. T.P. 128.
57. G.A. 318. Ferreira notes the problematic usage of the term moral certainty by Newman, due to a conflict in the papers of April 1853, and December 1853, (cf. Ferreira (1980) 49, note 62); Newman claimed that moral certainty is an "unqualified theoretical or speculative certainty, even though it issues from non-demonstrative argument",
Ferreira, in Richardson and Bowden (1983) 90).

58.T.P. 35; V.M. i, 87. Pailin considers that Newman is dealing with certitude as "practically certain" and not speculatively certain, (Pailin (1969) 168, cf. 146); Chadwick also holds this view, (cf. Chadwick (1960) 42-3).

59. cf. V. M. i, 87.

60.T.P. 35, note 1. Pailin acknowledges that Newman is influenced by Butler's views on probability and practical certainty, (cf. Pailin (1969) 92). Meynell confused Newman's concrete certitude with "practical certitude", (Meynell's letter to Newman, Nov. 4, 1869, in Zeno (1957) 260). Walgrave explains that although there is no metaphysical certainty, the convergence of probabilities "rightly" leads us to "a truth which cannot be gainsaid"; there is moral certainty in the sense that it "excludes all positive doubt", (Walgrave (1960) 236). However, Bastable argues that since the conclusion concerns a "judgement of necessary credibility rather than of necessary truth", it is better to describe the conclusion as "probable certitude"; here he adopts the paradoxical phrase of Aquinas, (cf. S.T., 2a-2ae, 70, 2). Bastable explains this by arguing that "reason is entitled to accept a relative sufficiency of evidence in concrete certitude"; in this way, "the demands of theory and practice seem reconciled"; this means that "the extrinsic evidence reaches such a point that further doubt is considered academic and unreasonable", (Bastable (1955) 69-70, including 70, note 1). The unreasonableness of doubt, (Bastable), or the exclusion of all positive doubt, (Walgrave), is the basis of Newman's understanding of the indefectibility of certitude, (cf. G.A. 221-258) which entails the speculative nature of its truth.

61. cf.T.P. 11, 121. In a letter to Froude (1879) Newman explains that "tho' faith is the result of will", it "ever follows intellectual judgement", (Ward, ii, 592): Newman is far from voluntarism, (cf. Nedoncelle (1945) 122-4). Ferreira locates Newman in the 'ethics of belief' discussion by arguing that his passive and active roles of the will "do not entail direct volitionism"; this is because of combining Newman's insistence on the control of the will with the 'spontaneous' nature of assent, which indicates that the assent is not separate from the reasoning process, (Ferreira (1983) 365, 368). It is right to argue "against the conceptual possibility of directly
creating belief by intellectual fiat"; and she explains that Newman's 'free' act of assent "fits in-between the view of belief as coerced and the view of belief as an arbitrary choice", (ibid. 366-7).

63.G.A. 345.
64.G.A. 229.
68."If we judge that we would be idiotic not to accept the proposition without reservation, we have effectively experienced the proposition without reservation", (Ferreira (1980) 55).
70.cf. Ferreira (1980) 60, 71-2; in denying any room for a choice of the will to establish certitude, Ferreira explains that Newman was not thereby forced to have recourse to claiming that certitude was a result of direct insight, as for example in Fey (1976); such a recourse does not do justice to the present point of emphasis, that is the active recognition of the proposition as true, (cf. Ferreira (1980) 73).
72.T.P. 15.
73.cf. Ferreira (1980) 54.
75."The choice to affirm the certitude is neither a source nor a substitute for certainty",(Ferreira (1980) 75). Ferreira uses ambiguous terminology in explaining that this "role of the will is a deliberate act of intending to adhere, in contrast to the non-deliberate or non-intentional adherence that is part of certitude itself",(ibid. 75); my analysis has shown that the genesis of certainty and certitude are dependent upon the will in the sense of resulting "after deliberation" (as being related to the premisses, conditionally and unconditionally); the deliberate nature of the certitude is all the more to the fore given its reflex character; it is ambiguous, then, to differentiate between the roles of the will before certitude (ie. as deliberate), and after certitude (ie. a confirming or stifling) by reference to a non-deliberate and deliberate act. The role of the will in both cases is deliberate; the focal point of difference is
on the intention, or choice, in the sense that the certitude is not a result of a choice of the will, whereas the confirming and affirmation of the certitude does result from a choice of will (as Ferreira rightly indicates).

76. The critical, but not creative, role of the will recalls the distinction between Faith and Reason in the 'University Sermons': in my first chapter I explained that Newman gave a necessary secondary role to Reason, insisting that we must never mistake the "critical for a creative power", (U.S. 183).
Notes to section 3. (pp. 55-61).

1. G.A. 293.
6. "These selections, therefore,... suggest that Newman could have admitted that 'objective' truth need not actually be independent of human judgement as such... The rationality of a judgement of certainty... would be personal because not independent of every consciousness (or human consciousness as such) yet objective because independent of particular consciousnesses", (Ferreira (1980) 64). Newman associates the personal judgement with "having (attaining) a true object", (T.P. 121-2).
7. Ess., i, 34.
11. G.A. 318, 293.
16. G.A. 413.
17. G.A. 278.
22. G.A. 34, 278.
23. G.A. 285. The abstraction of explicit reason has a twofold limitation when compared to implicit reason; it
depends on concepts, and also on words to express them, (cf. Dessain (1957) 19-20).
27.G.A. 389. O'Donoghue is correct in pointing to "the rationality gap" when the accumulative probabilities do not "quite reach to the level of certainty"; this constitutes a logical gap which needs "abstract argument" rather than "concrete evidence" to ensure the certitude is "objectively grounded", (O'Donoghue (1975) 245). He accepts that Newman rightly wishes to avoid "both scholastic formalism and irrational fideism", (ibid. 248); but he insists that the "criterion by which objectivity can be tested" has to be at the "bar of Reason", which ultimately is formulated in "metaphysics or metaphysical logic, or simply logic", applying the "Principle of non-Contradiction", (O'Donoghue (1978) 141-2).

While we ought not to read the 'Grammar' "as though it were a philosophical treatise", (Dessain (1957) 9), especially since Newman shied away from metaphysics, (cf. G.A. 344), it is nonetheless the case that its "arguments are placed in a general logical and epistemological context", (Copleston (1966) 516, note 2); the 'Grammar' is "a philosophical book" and is related to the 'Discursive Enquiries on Metaphysical subjects' explained especially in Sillem's chapter on personal liberalism, (Boekraad, 'Newman Studien', 8, 213-4, cf. P.N. i, 67-148). It is inadequate to simply claim that "there is no question of finding some special 'criterion' or 'element' to guarantee 'objective certainty', (Ker (1977) 68, in reply to O'Donoghue). Ker rightly argues that "it is always ... the illative sense which converts converging probabilities into certainty", (Ker (1985) lxvi, note 2, also cf. Ker (1977) 67); but he does not properly explain the epistemological context of this 'conversion' in terms of the relation between implicit and explicit reason.

Ker acknowledges that the 'Oxford University Sermons' are "Newman's other major philosophical work", (Ker (1985) xxiii); the 1871 preface indicates the epistemological strategy to resolve O'Donoghue's legitimate concern. Newman explains that "the power of analyzing" allows us to pass "from implicit to explicit" reasoning; and he adds that "Reasoning, thus retrospectively employed in
analyzing itself, results in... logic", (U.S. xii). My analysis has explained that Newman held implicit and explicit reason in an inseparable tension; and the criterion of objectivity sought by O'Donoghue lies in this retrospective analysis as the epistemological context of converting accumulative probability into certitude by illative judgement, (cf. Coulson (1981) 71, and Nedoncelle (1945) 106). Ker accepts that error is always in principle possible for Newman's certitude, (Ker (1977) 68); he has not explained that error is discovered and overcome by explicit reason being "ministrative to" implicit reason, (U.S. 67, cf.G.A. 222, 410). O'Donoghue explains that "the rules of logic are prescriptions for the healthy functioning of the mind"; and he is correct in claiming that Newman would wish his work "to be judged strictly in the light of it", (O'Donoghue (1970) 21); logic can and should be used in its "proper province", (Evans (1979a) 190, cf. 187). It is the inherent tension between implicit and explicit reason in Newman which avoids the accusation of 'modernism', (cf. Boekraad (1984) 238, 241-2, 255); however, the analytical function of explicit reason is essentially derivative, likened to the literary criticism of poetry, (cf. U.S. 184, 321-2, and Lash (1971) 97). 28.G.A. 34. 29.G.A. 323, cf. 345. 30.G.A. 347. 31.G.A. 164, cf. 343. Newman's psychological investigation establishes how the mind normally functions, where experience and the reflecting mind work together; Walgrave explains that Newman takes pains not to "pass beyond" his "psychological standpoint", (Walgrave (1960) 74, cf. G.A. 64). This is "practical psychologism", (Walgrave, ibid. 92), and it focuses upon personal consciousness and the retrospective grasp of actions and situations to obtain a comprehension of the whole range of the unity of psychic life, (cf. ibid. 75). However, Walgrave also accepts that Newman adopted this psychological method as "the only way... of obtaining a theory of knowledge at once exact and complete", (ibid. 62). Alone, 'practical psychologism' is a "superficial" way of understanding Newman because it does not point to the depth of Newman's understanding of conscience both personally and socially, (Boekraad (1979) 234); Newman's starting point is "more than a practical psychologism, or

"I am conscious of my existence" is an absolute starting-point for Newman, (Proof, 1, cf. Boekraad and Tristram (1961) 71). This existential awareness of self is experienced in the moral sanction of conscience (as the sense of duty); this constitutes the metaphysical background of Newman's "chosen proof for the being of God", that is "the argument from conscience", (Proof, 18, cf. Boekraad and Tristram (1961) 58, 74). In my third chapter I explain that Newman's 'proof' needs metaphysical verification, being only an "inchoate recognition of a Divine Being", (Proof, 15, cf. Boekraad and Tristram (1961) 71, 77); nonetheless, it is clear that he argues from "man's experience of himself as a person", (P.N. ii, 59, note 2, also cf. Walgrave (1971) 368).

32.G.A.344. Yet Newman had a "metaphysical intuition of the oneness of reality" which is operative throughout the 'Grammar', (Walgrave (1960) 340); and his metaphysics is grounded in the concrete manner of knowing, (cf. Collins (1961) 18-19).

33.G.A. 179.
34.cf. Bastable (1955) 66;"His empiricism is narrowly psychological and reluctant to learn from metaphysics", (ibid.).
35. Dessain argues that Newman "deals with his problem as a psychological one, not as an epistemological one", and so he is not "trying to construct some criteriological theory of knowledge", (Dessain (1957) 16, cf. 7); this could be misleading if it is taken to mean that Newman opposed psychological description to justification; Ferreira explains that Dessain does not make this error, (Ferreira (1980) 64, note 29). When Collins describes Newman's method as being a "phenomenological investigation* he means Newman is concerned with the structure of our cognitional nature, which is sought in our consciousness; and he considers that Newman systematically applies his 'organum investigandi' in gaining religious truth in theological investigation, (Collins (1961) 27-8). Newman's description of the structure of knowledge is "the only way.. of obtaining a
theory of knowledge at once exact and complete", (Walgrave (1960) 62).
38.G.A. 347; "Newman is basing normative judgements on empirical judgements in the sense of claiming both that non-a priori normative inquiry is the only sort possible, and that such an inquiry reveals objective norms", (Ferreira (1980) 70). Newman excludes "philosophical apriorism" in order to achieve as objective a recording of the facts as possible, (Boekraad (1984) 245).
39.In this way Newman passes "from a descriptive to a normative standpoint", (Walgrave (1960) 81). Collins believes that Newman was aware of the novelty of his descriptive analysis of human intelligence and the ways it "establishes principles, weighs evidence, and makes the proofs" for assent, (Collins (1961) 20). This method is "psychological realism" because it focuses on how the natural grasping of truth by the mind, (cf. Dessain (1957) 17-20). That we must use our natural faculties properly is implied in Newman's normative, and not merely descriptive, statement of the nature of the illative sense, (cf. McCarthy (1982) 112-3).
40.Newman is clear that "acts of assent require previous acts of inference.. not as adequate causes, but as sine qua non conditions", (G.A. 41). Ferreira examines whether this is compromised by Newman saying that "inference is ordinarily the antecedent of assent", (G.A. 157); and she argues that Newman requires at least a "covert inference" to justify assents; by "covert inference" she means "an unconscious variety of a process of which all the steps are there but of which steps we are simply unaware"; she considers all concluding as an "unconscious process isomorphic with conscious inference and for that reason justifying our conclusions", (Ferreira (1980) 41-2, with reference to T.P. 90).

Ker takes a simpler approach, but nonetheless in defense of Newman's prescriptive intent. He explains that "the fact of the matter is that reasoning does not always precede assent", because of the brilliancy of the image at hand, (Ker (1985) 352, note 34.5, with reference to G.A. 88); although all that is strictly necessary for a real assent is an image, (cf. G.A. 75-6), Newman is clear that
"when I assent to a proposition, I ought to have some more legitimate reason for doing so, than the brilliancy of the image of which the proposition is the expression", (G.A. 81). In this case, "imagination usurps the functions of reason", (G.A. 81), and while inference should precede assent, this does not always happen. However, "not only is it more usual for inference to precede assent, but it is certainly necessary if an assent is to be a genuine perception and conviction a true certitude", (Ker ibid. with reference to G.A. 195-6).
Notes to section 4. (pp. 62 - 65).

1. G.A. 117. Lash explains that between 1852 and 1878 there was "a shift in Newman's conception of the method of theology", (Lash (1971) 323). This shift is from understanding theological method as deductive, (cf. Id. 223), to understanding it as inductive and tied to concrete reasoning, (cf. G.A. 271, 359, Dev. 337, revised edition of 1878, L.D. xxv, 56). The inductive aspect is not sufficiently noted by Evans (1978) 254.

15. G.A. 117.
16. G.A. 119-120.
17. G.A. 120, cf. 54.
18. G.A. 121.
19. G.A. 120, 120.
22. G.A. 117.
Notes to section 5. (pp. 66-80).

5. G.A. 6; my analysis is indebted to Ferreira's study, (cf. Ferreira (1980) 9, especially chapters iv-vi).
15. G.A. 197, 200, 222.
17. G.A. 221, cf. 255.
27. cf. Ferreira (1980) 93. Ker unfairly says that Ferreira has lost contact with the context of Newman's discussion; his point is that Newman is expressing a view of philosophers, and not his own; Ferreira acknowledges this explicitly, (cf. Ferreira ibid. 91). Ker argues that it can only be the first interpretation which is possible, (i.e. logical and not factual impossibility); nonetheless, he agrees with Ferreira's conclusion that "what can come to pass in matter of fact" is not "ground for reasonable doubt", (cf. Ker (1985) 366, note 119. 26).
28. "Genuine dubitability is an admission based on more than the abstract possibility of error which cannot be
eliminated from human thought and action", (Ferreira (1980) 95).
32.G.A. 197.
34.G.A. 193.
37.T.P. 122; Newman acknowledges the "possibility of error" after certitude, (G.A. 217).
44.T.P. 123.
45.G.A. 193, cf. T.P. 3; also cf. "we see there is no room, no corner, for a doubt, we have no fear at all that we can be mistaken in maintaining it", (T.P. 127); Ferreira uses this text to illustrate the spontaneous rejection of doubt, (Ferreira (1980) 99), whereas I think the reference to "no fear" exemplifies the intentional and explicit choice to reject doubt after certitude.
49.G.A. 199.
51.G.A. 168.
52.G.A. 213, 217-218, 199.
53.G.A. 218, 220.
54.G.A. 218.
55.Idea 461. This patience is not the same as being "intellectually tolerant" of error, which Newman disallows; he understands "patience and gentleness" as "moral duties", (G.A. 199).
56.Id. 467, G.A. 199.
57.G.A. 201, 258.
58.G.A. 201-2.
59. Here Newman opposed Froude who argued for constant vigilance, deliberately maintaining the possibility of error before the mind, and hence holding a residuum of doubt in non-demonstrable matters, (Ferreira (1980) 117-8).

60. G.A. 193.


63. Ferreira seems to entertain only the positive response to Newman's question by examining the dubitability of personal commitment, (Ferreira (1980) 124-6); she seems to miss the important explanatory reference to the role of reason made by Newman in the same passage; my analysis focuses on this reference.

64. Apo. 186. For Newman this change is a development of the truth originally received with certitude place.

65. T.P. 91. Ferreira explains that this reversal applies as much to God, our divine friend, as to a human friend, (Ferreira (1980) 126-7).


68. G.A. 218.


70. T.P. 123, G.A. 194.

71. T.P. 91.

72. G.A. 213, 194, 193. This important tension between intentionally resisting doubt, yet eventually accepting reversal of the certitude is again explained by Newman with regard to lapsing from the Christian faith: he insists that "till such a strong conclusion has overtaken him" the Christian "will by an act of the will reject... all doubts", (Harper (1933) 209; this is a letter of 1879 from Newman to Froude, quoted by Ferreira (1980) 124, note 29).


76. G.A. 221, T.P.121.

77. G.A 199. Ferreira distinguishes between "formal and material promise", (Ferreira (1980) 128); I have used 'athematic' and 'thematic' to avoid confusion with the use of the term "formal" in "formal promise".

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3, (pp. 82 - 146).

Notes to section 1, (pp. 83 - 101).

1. G.A. 105-6.
2. G.A. 105-6.
15. G.A. 109; the sentiments of the 'moral sense' do not imply any heteronomy, any dependence on a transcendent reality; whereas the emotions of the 'sense of duty' do imply "a relation to a transsubjective term", (Walgrave (1960) 151).
17. G.A. 104.
18. G.A. 104, cf. T.P. 95. Newman is not clear whether he considers this process of abstract reasoning by the 'moral sense' as "direct and conscious knowledge" or "indirectly" given, (G.A. 239, 104).
19. G.A. 64-5, 419.
20. G.A. 64-5. Newman clearly distinguishes instinct from intuition, implicit reasoning, and sense. First, by "instinct" he means "a force which spontaneously impels us, not only to bodily movements, but to mental acts", (G.A. 62, cf. 260); also, it is "not a natural sense, one and the same in all, and incapable of cultivation, but a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving", (G.A. 334); these are the two psychological characteristics of instinct, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 109, note 4, and Newman's letter to Meynell of Aug. 18, 1869, in Ward (1912) ii, 258, and Zeno (1957) 241).

When Newman describes this as "indirectly" given, (G.A. 104), he is attempting to explain that the instinct "apprehends in the concrete instance a particular significance not contained in what is directly presented to sense or intellect", (Walgrave (1960) 351). It is not
"immediate", because the "perception" comes through the senses: "I perceive by instinct... without argumentative media, through my senses, but not logically by my senses", (Newman's letter to Meynell of Aug. 20, 1869, in Ward, ibid., 259, and Zeno, ibid., 246; also cf. Ker (1985) xlvi-xlvii with reference to L.D. xxv, 306, 310, 312-4). On the other hand, Newman also holds that this is "direct and conscious knowledge", (G.A. 239), by which he is attempting to explain that "it reaches its object, the reality, in the subjective impression, without the intervention of a logical middle term", (Walgrave (1960) 351, cf. 86); this implies an "immediate" relation, (G.A. 113). When Newman explains that we know concrete reality by perception, both physically and spiritually, (cf. G.A. 62), it is because he calls instinct "the general faculty" and "perception is a kind of instinct", (Newman's letter to Meynell, Aug. 20, 1869, in Zeno ibid., 247.)

Secondly, Newman distinguishes instinct from intuition by the object grasped being concrete or general: "By instinct I mean a realization of a particular; by intuition, of a general fact - in both cases without assignable or recognizable media of realization", (Newman's letter to Meynell, Aug. 17, 1869, in Ward, ibid., 258; also cf. Walgrave (1960) 109, note 3, 351). Instinct, then, rather than intuition, is at the heart of Newman's proposals for reasoning, (cf. McCarthy (1977) 141.

Thirdly, instinct and intuition differ from implicit reasoning because the latter requires a middle term; and when Newman talks of implicit reasoning as instinctive, (cf. G.A. 286-7), he is merely emphasising its immediacy and spontaneity, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 109-110). In my first chapter I distinguished the instinct of the 'sense of duty' from implicit reason because of a confusion of the two in Newman's use; to the extent this confusion did exist, McCarthy has a point in saying that instinct appearing in Newman's early works became the implicit reason of the later sermons, and the natural inference of the 'Grammar', (cf. McCarthy (1977) 148); however, the logical consistency of Newman's position makes a clear distinction between instinct and implicit reason.

Finally, while instinct "emphasises its spontaneity and objectivity in relation to the subjective impression", Newman uses the term "sense" to stress "that this
apprehension takes place immediately in an impression of a specific kind and irreducible nature"; so that, "the primary object of the sense is a specific kind of impression", (Walgrave (1960) 352). Just as bodily senses receive sensible impressions, so the mental senses receive mental impressions, (cf. G.A. 23, 359); and so a distinct mental sense corresponds to each kind of mental sensation, (cf. Walgrave, ibid.). That is why in talking of the "Illative Sense" Newman adopts a "use of the word 'sense' parallel to our use of it in 'good sense', 'common sense', a 'sense of beauty'", and so on, (G.A. 345); the same applies to his use of 'moral sense' and 'sense of duty', (Walgrave, ibid.).

23. G.A. 114, 106.
27. G.A. 65.
29. G.A. 104.
31. This is acknowledged by Newman: "Thus one man deduces from his moral sense the presence of a Moral Governor, and another does not: in each case there may be an exercise, and a sound exercise, of the Illative Sense. We might say that the one man had the Religious Sense, and the other the Moral", (variant reading to the 1870 edition of G.A. 234 in the 'Textual Appendix' of Ker (1985) 341).

Newman's apologetic consisted in reflecting on the data of conscience to enlighten a religious conception of the world. Walgrave explains Newman's apologetic principles in this way: "The first principle of conscience is that all things are governed by the providence of their Creator"; and this primary and supreme principle of Providence "makes use of two others - that of the nature of things and that of analogy", (Walgrave (1960) 221-2).

First, our faith in Providence results from the intimations of conscience, (that is a doctrine of Providence is elaborated by reason from the experience of conscience as sanction): it is the source of our knowledge of an invisible world under divine governance, (cf. Walgrave, ibid. 349); this results in a religious view of
the world, which in turn raises the question of Christianity and the Church to overcome mankind's sense of alienation from God, which is experienced in the sanction of conscience, (cf. Walgrave, ibid. 229-234, G.A. 116-7, 394-403, 389-408).

Secondly, the principle of nature is the same as that of Providence seen from a different standpoint: philosophically, nature is Newman's ground for the critique of knowledge once it is understood that the consciousness of duty, by which we come to know God and His Providence, is part of our nature; for Newman's theory of knowledge, like Butler's, depends on trusting the non-absurdity of nature, (cf. Walgrave, ibid. 91, 337, reference to Butler (1847) 47; cf. G.A. 382).

Thirdly, the principle of analogy is also derived from Butler, (cf. G.A. 319-321) and is closely associated with the principle of Providence in the sense that the basic principles of God's plan are revealed in creation; so that whatever happens according to nature probably comes from God. Butler used this principle to refute objections to supernatural religion on the basis that anyone "who admits the natural order... cannot reject the supernatural on account of the difficulties it involves; for the same difficulties are shared by the natural order". Newman extended this use "to show how certain probabilities and presumptions lead to a given conclusion", (Walgrave, ibid. 223).

Finally, at the heart of Newman's apologetics lies his understanding of conscience as a way to God: he justifies religious belief from the experience of conscience. Newman is akin to the later Kant in holding that "the experience of absolute obligation itself involves an experience of God", that is, that moral experience at least implicitly contains an element of religious experience, (Walgrave, ibid. 217); the sense of duty, like Kant's categorical imperative, is an absolute obligation being an ethico-religious experience, (cf. Walgrave (1982) 207). Certainly, Newman's method of conscience as a way to God is an important "phenomenological investigation of personal experience" insofar the apprehension of divine justice and goodness by abstraction, is no intuition of God's being, (Sillem (1964) 399); in this sense it is a significant descriptive analysis, (cf. Yearley (1978) 6).

However, Cameron considers Newman's method as an
insight or intuition; he argues that Newman intends the connection between conscience and God as "in some sense a logical one", because Newman insists that conscience "implies a relation", (U.S. 18). He admits a circularity in Newman's argument, (also cf. Ker (1985) 360, note 75. 28), but considers that the circularity is overcome by understanding Newman's method not as an argument, (that is, premiss to conclusion), but as an insight or intuition which can be analysed; nonetheless, he admits that Newman's method "carries conviction only to those who share the insight or intuition and recognize the analysis as a true explication of what they already possess", (Cameron (1962) 214-6).

Certainly, it does not constitute a metaphysical argument for the existence of God, and Newman disclaimed interest in such a method, (cf.G.A. 104, T.P. 152 of 1885), under the influence of Butler, (cf.Robinson (1958) 164, 175). For a list of texts outlining Newman's developed argument of conscience as the voice of God, cf. Ker (1985) xxxi-xxxii, and 359, note 73. 2. Walgrave argues that for the moral argument to be conclusive it has to be transformed into a metaphysical argument starting from human contingency, shown specifically in morals; this is because "all consciousness of God is, ultimately, of a metaphysical nature"; yet, Newman's 'proof' has value because the metaphysics of proving God's existence normally lies "hidden within the living body of religious experience". Hence he concludes that "concrete thought, by which we apprehend the reality of God", as Newman argued, "clothes in living tissues the skeleton of metaphysical reason, without whose presence the finely-wrought structure of religious experience would fall apart". (Walgrave, ibid. 361-3, cf. Collins (1961) 18-19). Newman's justification of religious thought is open to a metaphysical proof; that is why Sillem argues that a metaphysical study of God's existence presupposes a phenomenological investigation of personal experience, but is not replaced by it (Sillem (1964) 392, 399-400, cf. P.N. ii, 59, note 2). Negatively this means removing subjective interference with perceiving the concrete; positively it means unifying the knowing person with the known object, (cf. P.N. i, 134-6).

Prof. J. Newman mistakenly understands that Newman's distinction between notional and real entails that "his
phenomenology of religious belief" excludes "traditional philosophical theology", (Newman (1974) 129, cf. 140). Powell rightly explains that the former "includes" the latter, (Powell, 'Newman Studien', x, 69, 79); he argues that Prof. Newman's view incurs the "fallacy of the leading idea", by "seizing upon one idea to the exclusion of the others", which J.H. Newman forcefully opposed, (cf. 'The Development of Religious Error', 466-9, and Powell, ibid. 69, and (1975) 185). The basis of Powell's argument is the "non-reductive" and "complex unity" of Christian discourse employed by Newman where reaching faith, exercising faith, and theology are distinct, (Powell (1975) 188). He argues that the testimony of conscience is not an informative argument for God, but a proposal of a "model for understanding and making understood the nature of religious inquiry", (ibid. 186-7, cf. Powell (1981) 139-142). Yearley analyses conscience from this aspect of being a description of the nature of human experience; (cf. Yearley (1978) 1-31); conscience reveals the human religious potential "that is defined by the pursuit and reception of ultimates". To the extent that Liberalism focuses upon explicit reason alone, it "deforms the human religious potential", (ibid. 142, cf. 93-127, 145-148); conscience reveals "the pursuit of a sacred object and the acceptance of a sacred foundation", (ibid. 144).

O'Donoghue points to the natural intellectual direction in Newman that leads to Christianity; this is an "intellectual dynamism supported by a will to understand". This is rooted in the "religious sense, which for Newman is primarily a sense of sin" or guilt. The "dynamism of the Christian sense" is constituted by "the religious sense and Natural Judgement", (i.e. illative judgement), so that conscience is "the starting point" and the illative sense "the guide" to God and Christianity, (O'Donoghue (1970) 21-2, and (1975) 258). O'Donoghue rightly explains that all of this depends on a "metaphysics of conscience" which is the very "missing keystone of Newman's proof of Christianity"; one could start from guilt to reveal "man's personal metaphysical reality to himself" so that "conscience reveals consciousness", (O'Donoghue (1975) 256-7; cf. Nedoncelle (1945) 52, 64-5). Boekraad develops this in discussing the relation between conscience and being, (cf. Boekraad (1979) 238-9, 241-2, 247).
"how far this initial religious knowledge comes from without, and how far from within, how much is natural, how much implies a special divine aid which is above nature", (G.A. 115, cf.308). And he did not limit external influence to "divine aid", but also included the influence of society: in discussing "conscience... as our guide", he explained that he did not enter "into the question how far external assistances are in all cases necessary to the action of the mind, because man in fact does not live in isolation, but is everywhere found as a member of society", (G.A. 390). The likelihood is that Newman intended these remarks as referring to the normal condition of any human power of the mind,(cf.Sillem (1964) 398); his reference to "divine aid" is in the context of the genesis of the image of God in a child, and is a descriptive remark; equally it would seem that his reference to social influence is also descriptive, and is not intended as a prescriptive reservation about the natural capacity of conscience to lead to God.

33. Yearley runs such a danger in saying that "changes in the content of judgements are based in the ongoing sense of sanction", (Yearley (1978) 11); however, his point is simply to explain the constancy of the sanction despite the variability of concrete moral judgements. Norris more openly adopts such a view in holding that the 'sense of duty' "is the final inspiration and ultimate guide of the moral sense", (Norris (1977) 93); my analysis would accept the 'sense of duty' as the "final inspiration", but reject interpreting it as the "ultimate guide of the moral sense", insofar as these reflect my distinction between religious motive and determination of content. D'Arcy argues that the objective truth of moral duty is discerned by the sense of duty because these are "truths which the lawgiver has sown in our very nature", (Diff. ii, 253, cf. D'Arcy (1981) 165, 179); I later explain that Newman's interpretation of natural law is that these truths are discerned by the illative moral judgement.

34.cf.G.A. 359.
36.G.A. 390; on this basis, Walgrave is justified in rejecting the view that the "instinctive recognition" constituted a third element in our moral awareness, over and above the two elements of conscience, (Walgrave (1960) 347, 353; this view of Lapple is cited in Walgrave ibid.
346, note 3).
37. This view is suggested by Walgrave (1960) 349.
38. The distinction I have made between the two aspects of conscience, whereby I associate the 'sense of duty' with introducing a religious motive for the action determined by the 'moral sense', may imply that Newman combined two different theories: "that of 18th century ethics of sensibility, whose chief exponent was Shaftesbury, and that of popular religious tradition", which emphasised "the voice of God.. in the sense of duty", (cf. Walgrave (1960) 355-6); this is the view of Nedoncelle (1945) 62-65. This view does not detract from Newman's emphasis upon the radically "indivisible" nature of the two aspects of conscience. The distinction of my analysis does not allow the moral sense to be "an independent factor that can be united with or dissociated from the sense of duty without anything being changed in consequence", (Walgrave ibid.); rather the "indivisible" nature of the two aspects might be analogously understood in the way Newman indivisibly unites nature and grace into a harmonious totality; that is why my analysis explains the two senses as existing in and through each other. The indivisible conscience constitutes the Thomistic fundamental natural law 'bonum est faciendum, malum est vitandum', (cf. Walgrave (1982) 208).
40. Nedoncelle holds that "le sens du devoir est ..plus que le propre moi de l'homme"; "il est une voix..c'est Dieu"; the intentionality of conscience is thus religious, (Nedoncelle (1945) 65-6, 73, 134-5). My proposal is that this can only be the case after a metaphysics of conscience has been determined. This is not alien to Nedoncelle's understanding of the central importance of individuality and the knowledge of self as the consequence of the sense of duty, (ibid.65, 52). The intentionality of conscience, then, leads the human spirit to its goal and source, (cf. Walgrave (1971) 377).
42. G.A. 115.
43. G.A. 114; this is the meaning of Newman's statement that "as the moral law is an inference or generalisation from those instincts, the moral law is ultimately taught us from God, whose nature it is", Ward, ii, 257. Walgrave holds a similar interpretation, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 153).
44. Hence "the divine goodness depends upon theology", T.P. 153, note 2.
45. G.A. 120.
46. cf. Walgrave's view (Walgrave (1960) 349).
47. G.A. 105-6.
48. cf. O.S. 64-5, quoted by Walgrave (1960) 357, note 1; Walgrave, however, overlooks the difficult remark that "it is quite the exception" if an individual can "emancipate himself" from the 'sense of duty'.
49. cf. G.A. 117, 389-390, 419; these references are examined in the subsequent sections of my third chapter.
50. G.A. 419, 110. Newman understood conscience as "the corner-stone" of his whole system and meaning of values, (Walgrave (1960) 342); Walgrave's analysis both enlightens and confuses Newman's distinction between the 'moral sense' and the 'sense of duty'. He is correct in saying that Newman "distinguishes, in fact, two aspects... in the act of conscience, one of perception, the other of injunction. The first is the source of moral life, the second that of natural religion", (ibid. 350). However, his analysis of the 'moral sense' ends in confusion when he explains that the 'moral sense' as "the discriminating function of conscience" "has a twofold value, one that is proper to it as such, another that accrues to it by its conjunction with the sense of duty" (ibid. 356); my analysis has shown that what "accrues" from the 'sense of duty' has nothing to do with discriminating cognitive content, for this is determined by the 'moral sense' alone; if Walgrave means that what "accrues to it" is the experience of "merit and sin", (ibid. 356), this would be consistent with his earlier distinction (ibid. 350), and similar to my interpretation that the 'sense of duty' only introduces a religious motive.
52. cf. Verbeke (1978) 184; Aristotle resisted the Socratic moral intellectualism which attempted to reduce moral behaviour to intellectual knowledge, (ibid. 181). My analysis of Newman's use of Aristotle's 'phronesis' adopts the views of this article.
53. cf. Analytica Priora, 1, 46a 18; 11, 68b 14, quoted by Bastable (1955) 57, note 47. It is debated whether Aristotle gave adequate attention to individual reality; Bastable criticises Newman for exaggerating Aristotle's claims for the value of logic and abstraction; he explains
that "the individual reality is the ultimate subject of all operation and predication for Aristotle", referring to Analytica Posteriori, 1, 10, 76b 25, (Bastable (1955) 56, note 46). On the other hand, Verbeke explains that Aristotle held that "intellectual knowledge always deals with universals, which of course originate from sensible experience, but without coinciding with any particular object", thereby justifying Newman's rejection of it, (Verbeke (1978) 179).

54. E.N. 11, 2, 1104, a5-10; by being practical, Aristotle intended to distinguish it from abstract knowledge, (for example mathematics), as well as from technical knowledge (which Newman calls 'useful' knowledge, as examined in my first chapter); cf. Verbeke (1978) 182, 180.

55. "It is clear, then,.. that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, not practically wise without moral virtue", E.N. VI, 12, 1144 b30-32.


57. E.N. X, 9, 1181 b12-15.

58. Verbeke explains this view of Aristotle: "Nature does nothing in vain, the whole evolution of the cosmos is regulated by the Perfect Good, to this final end everything is oriented in our everlasting universe", (Verbeke (1978) 189).


60. "he does not treat of it in that work in its general relation to truth and the affirmation of truth, but only as it bears upon ta prakta", G.A. 354, note 1.

61. Yearley's comment of "a higher order" are to be understood in this religious way, (Yearley (1978) 79). This distinction between Newman and Aristotle on grounds of religious faith is made also by Verbeke (1978) 180, Calkins (1969) 360, Sillem (1963) 183.

62. cf. Boekraad (1958) 143. It is questionable how well Newman knew the Aristotelian corpus: my first chapter explained Newman's early introduction to Aristotle; Verbeke believes that Newman's "knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy was not very profound and his cast of mind, his way of thinking was rather different from Aristotle's", (Verbeke (1978) 192, note 5); he is not persuaded that Newman borrows his doctrine of the illative sense from Aristotle, (Verbeke (1978) 191), as indicated above. Sillem also acknowledges that Newman is not a pure
Aristotelian, despite "the clearly recognizable traces of the fundamental principles and themes of Aristotle's philosophy in Newman's own philosophy", (P.N. i, 163).

63.G.A. 356.

64.cf.G.A. 359.


66.G.A. 354-5. Phronesis unites all relevant arguments and determines their place and worth, (cf. P.N. ii, 163); it discerns how to pass from inference to assent, (L.D. xxix, 115; cf.xxv, 105, xxvi, 40-1, xxix, 119, quoted by Ker (1985) 380, note 228. 13).

67.G.A. 357, 317. Walgrave compares Newman on this point to modern situation ethics insofar as he "passes beyond casuistry to rejoin the phronesis of Aristotle, and the judgement by connaturality which, according to Aquinas, is the specific act of prudence", (Walgrave (1960) 350). For Aquinas prudence proceeds by a judgement 'per modum connaturalis' and is practical and eminently personal, (cf.Summa theologica, 1, q. 1, art.6, ad 3, and Walgrave (1982) 208-9). Newman's theological papers of 1853 examine 'prudentia' as illative judgement, (cf. T.P. 24-30, 36-38); Newman speaks of 'prudence' or 'a prudent judgement' as illative judgement, (Dev. 115, 327).

68.G.A. 317. On the distinction between 'practical certainty', (sufficient for action), and 'speculative certainty', cf. V.M. i, 87, note 9, T.P. 128-9, L.D. ii, 280). By arguing that certitude includes moral judgements I am emphasising that Newman understood these judgements as objective truths; in this sense they can be considered to be 'speculative' truths, that is objective truths of certainty, rather than practical truths that are probable. Hence, I oppose the interpretation that "conscience generates a self-validating perception of absolute moral values", but relies on the "Aristotelian tradition" of "practical wisdom" to apply these values concretely, (cf.Yearley (1978) 12-13). I argue that the so-called application is determined by the illative moral judgement of speculative certitude; hence my argument goes further than Walgrave's explanation: "the mind unites in a single act practical reasoning and concrete moral experience..", so that "real apprehension of moral quality in the individual act and a determinate situation is what corrects the mere application of practical reasoning, and gives the final decision its eminently personal
character", (Walgrave (1960) 350); my point is that the concrete reasoning is practical, because it deals with a specific case, it is personal because of implicit reasoning, and it is speculative in the sense that it is an illative judgement of certitude.


70. Newman's admission that his view on ethics is determined by "the heathen moralists" should not be seen to compromise my interpretation of understanding moral judgement as certitude rather than as probability, (or practical wisdom); for he immediately adds that as far as his "intellectual position" is concerned, "Aristotle has been my master", (G.A. 430, cf. Id. 109-110); that is, his adaptation of Aristotle's practical certainty, (phronesis), for the speculative certainty of certitude can apply as much to judgements of moral duty as religious truth.

71. G.A. 317. He argued against Locke's proposal that cases are few "in which evidence, not sufficient for a scientific proof, is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude", (G.A. 316).


73. G.A. 358-9, 318, 384-5.


75. T.P. 120, cf. Diff. ii, 256. It is important to note that while Newman characterised both the 'moral sense' and certitude as being natural and personal, he did make an important distinction between these two characteristics; by natural he meant that these functions belong to our natural process of reasoning; by personal he considered the individual quality of implicit reasoning that some have and others do not. Hence his comment in the 'Grammar' that, "a proof, except in abstract demonstration, has always in it... an element of the personal, because 'prudence' is not a constituent part of our nature, but a personal endowment", (G.A. 317).

76. G.A. 189. cf. 7. p 120.

77. G.A. 204.

78. G.A. 204. And the parallel is continued: Newman talks
of the "triumphant repose of the mind after a struggle... akin to the thought of a battle or a victory" in the perception of truth,(G.A. 206); and there is the "moral ordeal" when what is "right and wrong" is "carried out into action",(G.A. 192).

79.G.A. 205.
80.T.P. 120.
81.G.A. 239-240.
83.G.A. 236, 417, 419.
84.G.A. 236-9. There does appear a confusion in Newman's mind about the status of these abstractions: for while in this context he associates these abstractions,("the primary principles, the general, fundamental, cardinal truths") with the "elementary points of knowledge",(G.A. 236-239), in an earlier context he holds that these are "abstractions from facts, not elementary truths prior to reasoning",(65). The only explanation seems to be that in the latter case his emphasis is that of abstraction being a form of reasoning, that is, not "prior to reasoning".

85.G.A. 344-5.
86.G.A. 236-7, 239-240.
87.G.A. 278.
89.G.A. 354-5. This is the sense of comparing the illative judgement to Aristotle's epikeia, (or "equity", G.A. 355); epikeia entails knowing moral rules yet also considering the uniqueness of concrete circumstances, (cf. E.N. V, 10). The relation between law and moral judgement is developed later.

90.G.A. 356.
91.G.A. 420.
94.U.S. 141-2. Newman rejected the view that we can rid ourselves of our own responsibility by trying "to shelter ourselves under the original unbelief of our first parents"; that is, because of the "original transgression", there is a danger of "deceiving our consciences" by finding "fault in the circumstances in which we find ourselves" as an "excuse when our conduct is arraigned in any particular"; this leads to the result that actions "are allowed to be intrinsically bad, yet the
agent himself is acquitted of the responsibility of committing them", (U.S. 140, 144).

Notes to section 2. (pp. 102-115).

2. G.A. 354. "...there is a personal conscience, which judges by a sort of instinct derived from moral practice, and reasons without scientific generalizations", (T.P. 121).
5. G.A. 354.
7. G.A. 356; "The rule of morals is the same for all; and yet, notwithstanding, what is right in one is not necessarily right in another", G.A. 420.
This complements Newman's explanation of "intrinsic morality", (Meynell's term) by reference to the Nature of God, (L.D. xxiv, 293-4). Later I explain Newman's view of natural law as rational participation in the divine eternal law; this occurs by illative moral judgement which is objective because it is real. For the Nominalist abstract concepts are purely subjective, (cf. Dessain (1957) 16); Newman avoids Nominalism by rooting his concept of abstraction in the reality of experience, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 83). D'Arcy considers that Newman's disparagement of the notional as compared with the real is influenced by the empiricism of Locke in leaning towards nominalism, (cf. D'Arcy (1945) 92, 114); Sillem explains that this perspective makes "nonsense" of his philosophy, since rationalism is the descendant of Locke, (Sillem (1963) 174). My analysis shows Newman's constructive use of the notional in relation to the real.

The formation of an ethical code is a "slow process", (Boekraad (1979) 244).

In this sense moral law can be considered as a "universal abstract principle", (cf. Walgrave (1960) 87). Hence, Walgrave explains that while Newman accepts the universality and absoluteness of moral precepts, they are also too general to determine concrete duty, (Walgrave (1982) 210).


Collins argues that the difference is a function of the "precise object under acceptance", (Collins (1961) 21); this seems to be the view of Jay
Newman in saying that the distinction "is based upon the nature of the terms in the proposition being apprehended", (Newman (1974) 130). Ker holds this view and explains that Newman is interested in the sense of the proposition as used in different ways; the meaning of the proposition as used by the apprehender is the point of emphasis, and not the subjective apprehension of the objective proposition, (cf. Ker (1985) lviii).

27. G.A. 13. In distinguishing notional and real assent Newman remarks that "the notion and reality assented-to are represented by one and the same proposition, but serve as distinct interpretations of it", (G.A. 119). In practice, Ker seems to understand the distinction between notional and real as interpretation, for he admits that the difference of emphasis between the apprehension as opposed to the object "collapses because, as Newman saw, it is impossible to isolate the meaning from the use of a proposition", (Ker (1985) lviii).

28. G.A. 63, 77-8, 10, 46, 55, cf. Ker (1985) lix-lxi. The distinction between real and notional assent is equivalent to that of Aquinas' 'intellectus' and 'ratio': "each is a cognitive or rational act", and the distinction must not be understood to imply a strong and weak assent, (Coulson (1972) 5, note 13, referring to an 1846 manuscript quoted in Pailin (1969) 205; also cf. L.D. xi 288-9, P.N. i, 178, and Coulson (1981) 57). The personal and real possession of truth cannot be substituted by system as the standard of truth, (cf. Sillems (1963) 180). Powell argues that "real assent did not have uniformly consistent priority over notional assent", because of the importance of the varying contexts of christian discourse in Newman, (Powell (1975) 198, cf. ix, 4-5); this ultimately reflects the importance of the dogmatic principle in Newman. Bastable does not give sufficient importance to Newman's combination of the real and the notional in saying that he "builds the distinction of real and notional apprehension into an opposition" because of his "underlying philosophical prejudice against abstraction", (Bastable (1955) 48-9, cf. 50, 66).

31. G.A. 60, 269, cf. 226, 236-9, 336. For a list of texts
showing Newman's constant emphasis on the importance of first principles, cf. Ker (1985) 355-6, note 45.30. McCarthy explains that Newman's first principles contain two arguments: first, a "regress procedure" going from belief through its warrants to the certain basis of our beliefs; secondly, a "reduction procedure" discovering the minimum number of assumptions from propositions that are certain in order to ground this knowledge, (McCarthy (1982) 116). The term 'first principles' is "highly analogical", and it is not possible to include all Newman says about them "in a single description", (Walgrave (1960) 121).

32. G.A. 60, 64-5.
33. We are "unaware of them" because they are "hidden" and "recondite", (Prepos. 284, cf. U.S. 272).
35. G.A. 61, cf. T.P. 64, 109, P.N. ii, 204. The distinction between instinct and intuition reflects the distinction of realizing the particular or the general, (cf. L.D. xxiv, 309, 311). Artz explains that in practice Newman "uses the terms synonymously" and is "not satisfied" with the distinction, (Artz (1956) 12). Intuition is "assent to a truth on its own account" as "self-evident", (T.P. 71-2, 65, cf. 67, 75, G.A. 269); this does not imply that first principles as intuitions "must be universal or irresistible", (T.P. 68, cf. 69-70, 93). While first principles are "numerous" he also says that "only a few of them (are) received universally", (G.A. 60, cf. Prepos. 287). Walgrave explains that Newman is distinguishing between universal as admitting no exception, and general as admitting exception, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 41); this reflects Newman's distinction between first principles "common to the great mass of mankind", and those "peculiar to individuals" or "to extended localities", (Prepos. 287). The sense of this distinction seems to be that of athematic and thematic or concrete principles, as I have explained earlier.
36. G.A. 413, cf. 60. Boekraad explains that "first principles... will coalesce into a certain unity: our moral and intellectual being", (Boekraad (1955) 249, cf. 240, 242, 250); cf. the third of the 'Stray Essays on
Controversial Points, variously illustrated', privately published, cf. T.P. 140–157. 37. T.P. 152-3, cf. 69; this is distinct from "episteme", or the "faculty conversant with necessary truth", (T.P. 153, note 1). Here Newman is recalling Aristotle's distinction between 'phronēsis', (practical wisdom), and 'sophia', (theoretical wisdom); theoretical wisdom includes 'nous', (intuitive reason), which apprehends first principles, and 'episteme', (scientific knowledge), which is a capacity to demonstrate, (cf. Aristotle, E.N. vi. 3, 1139 b31-3, 6, 1141 a3-5, 8, 1142 a23-30, 11, 1143 a35-b5, b14-17, 3, 1139 b31-3, and Hardie (1980) 221-224). Boekraad explains that we have no means of determining whether the illative sense or moral sense and the 'nous' of Aristotle "are totally equivalent", (Boekraad (1955) 302, note 104). 38. cf. G.A. 268-9, Ker (1980) 381, note 233. 39. G.A. 277, 64, 55. Boekraad explains that "first principles.. will find expression in a certain number of antecedent views"; the truth or falsity of the latter is more easily discerned as "concrete realisations of our particular ethos more explicitly influencing our mode of arguing"; the former are "wholly implicit", (Boekraad (1955) 250, 241, cf. 248). 40. T.P. 64, cf. G.A. 210-211, 215. 41. G.A. 63, (cf. 65), T.P. 76-77. 42. Prepos. 279. Although Newman considers first principles as "self-evident.. because they are evident in no other way", (G.A. 269-270), they are not objective self-evident metaphysical axioms obtained by an analysis of the notion of being. Newman's method is psychological and he considers first principles as forming the lowest psychological stratum of our mental constructions originating in the experience of what is real, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 118, 123). First principles are not intended as metaphysical first principles of being, but religious first principles of conscience, (cf. T.P. 146). They must undergo critical reflection since the truth of implicit reasoning depends on the truth of these first assumptions, (cf. Walgrave (1960) 38, 42, 50, 54). 43. T.P. 64. 44. G.A. 269, 302. 45. cf. G.A. 413; Walgrave considers that first principles and the illative sense are "the two fundamental ideas of the Grammar", (Walgrave (1960) 80).


Newman's comment that "natural law" means "things happen uniformly" is not dealing with the natural moral law, (G.A. 68-9). The natural moral law entails both being subject to the necessity of nature, as well as the dynamic responsibility as a "being of progress" who is self-made", (G.A. 347-349, explained later); in this sense "I am the natural law in concrete", (Boekraad (1979) 248, cf. 239-244). 

It is important to bear in mind that real assent as "an assent to an imagination" is always "an intellectual act, of which the object is presented to it by the imagination", (G.A. 214, 89, cf. Ker (1977) 65). 

My analysis has shown that the notional understanding of the goodness of God results from the abstraction of the
'moral sense'; given the indivisible nature of the two aspects of conscience, it would not be unreasonable to understand the abstraction of the existence of God,(from the sanction of the 'sense of duty'), as also belonging to the 'moral sense'. For the sake of clarity, my analysis keeps these two forms of abstraction separate.


64.G.A. 390, cf. P.N. ii, 63.

65.G.A.110, 389; "man comes to think about God in a way that is personally meaningful to him from the lived and living knowledge he has of his own self. He owes this knowledge of what he really is as a person, as a moral agent, to his conscience..", (Sillem (1964) 386).


70.G.A. 354-5.


73.G.A. 390.

74.G.A. 106.

75.G.A. 390; cf. my earlier discussion of the "natural perception of right and wrong" by the 'moral sense' being the "standard for determining the characteristics of Natural religion", (G.A. 419).

76.G.A. 192.


78.G.A. 34, 279. This refinement of norm is implied by Sillem: "A philosophy is, then, a systematic presentation of the "realized" living certitudes which shape a man's "real" thinking about things", (P.N. i, 145).
Notes to section 3. (pp. 116 - 126).

4. G.A. 350. My first chapter explained Newman's rejection of Liberalism's view that knowledge is virtue, (cf. Id. 120, 123); secular knowledge is "not the principle of moral improvement", (T.R.R. in D.A. 254-268, 277), for it is not "a principle of action", (ibid. 292).
12. cf. Id. 216, 186.
15. Newman insisted that true private judgement must not be disassociated from ecclesial authority, (cf. his essay on 'Private Judgement', in Harrold (1970) ii, 152-3, also cf. Calkins (1969) 364). D'Arcy explains that the cognitive morality is consistent with the objective and propositional nature of church doctrine; however, he overestimates Newman's understanding of the secondary
nature of abstract doctrine when he claims that these doctrines constitute the "greatest living authority" from which we learn, (D'Arcy (1981) 170-1).

17. Diff. ii, 250, 244.
21. cf. Coulson (1961) 33, and Cons. 73. (These are the same work; I refer to 'Coulson', and 'Cons' to distinguish Coulson's introductory remarks from Newman's text); also cf. Coulson (1970) 122.
22. Cons. 73, cf. S.D. 130, Diff. ii, 312-3, Id. 474, Boekraad (1979) 241. Authority resides within the whole church, even though its "propositional voice" is found only in one part, (Yearley (1978) 67); Newman's emphasis is upon the Church as "a communion", (Dessain (1968) 46-49).
23. cf. Coulson (1961) 23; cf. Patterson (1971) 221, note 7. the real assent of illative judgement is experiential, (cf. Patterson, ibid.); the existential consensus is a "discernment" or "judgment", as implied in Newman's adoption of the Augustinian phrase, "securus judicat orbis terrarum", (cf. Apo. 110, Patterson 220-1) which is at the heart of the consensus fidelium, (cf. Coulson, ibid. 33); this points to the infallible prescription of the whole church, (Penaskovic (1983) 358-9). Newman sees the
individual conscience (phronesis) being fulfilled only in the 'phronema', or collective conscience of the whole ecclesial community, (cf. Coulson (1970) 122, 153, and (1981) 398).


25.Cons. 73.

26.cf.Coulson (1961) 21, 36, 43. "Theology is the fundamental and regulating principle of the whole Church system", and "truth is the guiding principle of theology and theological inquiries.. the instrument of theology is reasoning", (V.M.i,xlvii, xli, cf. U.S. 334, Calkins (1969) 360). Coulson uses these texts to explain that the "consensus" of the laity and the dogmatic principle are in harmony; he explains that Newman maintains "a delicate but exact theological balance: in asserting the essential life-giving properties of the laity, he yet resists any devaluation of the prior authority of the magisterium". Theology regulates the "dialectic or conspiratio of pastors and faithful people", and is "the very germ of a dynamic community", both in terms of "personal development" and "institutional conditions", (Coulson (1970) 171-3, 130-1, 93-4; cf. Coulson (1967) 135, and (1981) 400). The "harmonious balance" between the communal, active, and intellectual expressions of the Church, in the context of "authoritative religion","can be met only by theology"; but it is theology "as a form of practical reason", applying principles to situation for action, and thereby forming character, (Yearley (1978) 77-78, 87-8).

The idea of the Church manifests the dynamic idea of reality as an antecedent unity unfolding in a multiplicity of autonomous but interrelated functions, (cf.P.N. ii, 8, Walgrave (1973) 271, 273, referring to Coulson (1967) 123-143; also cf. Bucher (1978) 16-17, Boekraad (1979) 238). This view constitutes a flowering of "the simple sacramental tradition" of his Tractarian period, (cf. Coulson (1970) 179, cf. 225-6); and "the principle of tradition" is the illative sense of the church, (Biemer (1967) 146). This entails a church open to pluralist society and common culture of the contemporary context, (cf. Coulson (1970) 239, 252, and reference to Apo. 499-501). This openness is centred in theology, and a
diversity of theological views and schools is the best protection for the dogmas of faith; this is "the institutional form of 'saying and unsaying to a positive result'", (Coulson (1981) 74-5, (reference to T.P. 102), and 63-4, 169).

The "analogical sense" of theological language, (T.P. 102), also applies to the complex, (though not mysterious), nature of doctrine on moral questions: Newman sought consultation of the laity in the "great practical questions", (May issue, 1859, of the Rambler, cf. Coulson (1961) 8). The theological hermeneutical principles needed for a healthy dynamism between conscience and the magisterium have to focus upon the apostolic depositum and the phronema of the church linked with the theological schools; this entails an understanding of the natural law that gives primacy to conscience, (cf. Calkins (1969) 359, 366-7). It does not allow the church's teaching authority to be the ultimate principle of development, (cf. Lash (1969) 348). Newman's understanding of theology in terms of the "enlargement" of liberal education as a "formative power", (Id. 133-4, cf. my first chapter), reveals its "power of dialogue", (cf. Boekraad (1981) 72-3).

27.Cons. 73, 56, 71, cf. 54-5, 104. Newman promotes the "pastorum et fidelium conspiratio" not in the sense that "infallibility is in the 'consensus fidelium', but that that 'consensus' is an indicium or instrumentum to us of the judgement of that Church which is infallible", (Cons. 104, 67); the consensus of the faithful constitutes an authentic instrument of the Church's infallibility, (cf. Coulson (1961) 24, cf. 30).

28. cf. Coulson (1961) 44, referring to archives at the Birmingham Oratory. Coulson remarks that Simpson, the first editor of the Rambler, made the same point in 1859: "Religion is turned into administration, the clergy into theological police, and the body of thinking laymen into a mass of suspects..", (cf. Coulson, ibid. 18, quoting a letter by Simpson in the Downside Abbey Archives; the letter opposed Bishop Ullathorne's resistance to involving the catholic community in the education debate; also cf. Coulson (1970) 111-113). Newman repudiated a false sense of conservatism constituted by "an over-attachment to ecclesiastical establishment.. to traditional lines of policy, precedent, and discipline - to rules and customs of long standing.. a great Pontiff must be detached from
many kinds of phronesis as there are virtues" does not necessarily imply a multiplication of types of illative judgement; for in the same context Newman is clear that "viewed in its exercise, it is one and the same in all concrete matters", but is "employed in them in different measures". His ambiguous remark seems to be another way of saying that "a given individual may possess it in one department of thought... and not in another", (G.A. 356-9, cf. 339).

Aristotle considered practical wisdom and moral virtue to be inseparable, (E.N. VI, 12, 1144 b30-32); the presence of practical wisdom carries with it all the virtues (cf. E.N. VII, 1, 1145 a1-2). This is entailed by his understanding of the relation between virtue, choice, and action.

He defines moral virtue as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it", (E.N. II, 6, 1106 b35-1107 a2); moral virtue is a state of character manifest in a disposition to desire or choose and includes knowledge, (cf. E.N. II, 3, 1105 a31-2, also cf. Hardie (1980), 94, 104, 114).

The ethical mean considers the mean "in terms of the thing itself" and "relatively to us"; it must be appropriate to the circumstances and the agent, and is not "one and the same" for all, (E.N. II, 6, 1106 a28-32, cf. Hardie ibid. 134-5).

Choice, or will, is "an origin of action": "Choice is either desirative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man", (E.N. VI, 2, 1139 b3-5); in this sense, moral virtue is "concerned with passions and actions", (E.N. II, 6, 1106 b16-17), so that "man is a moving principle or begetter of his actions", (E.N. III, 5, 1113 a17-18). Aristotle distinguishes between the desire to do an action, the decision to do an action, and the initiation of the action, (cf. Hardie ibid. 164). Desire reflects the wish (boulesis) or end sought, (cf. E.N. III, 2, 1111 b25-28), and choice (prohairesis) reflects the means to the end, (cf. E.N. III, 2, 1111 b25, 29-30, 6, 1139 a31-3); choice is defined as a "deliberate desire of things in our power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in
Deliberation is a process of thinking which starts from a desired end and works back to the discovery of a means to achieve it; and the deliberation which terminates in choice, (cf. E.N. III, 2, 1112 a15-16) immediately precedes action, (cf. E.N. III, 3, 1113 a5-7, b3-5, and Hardie, ibid. 162, 180, 224). In this way virtue, choice and action are related: "the choice will not be right without practical wisdom (phronesis) any more than without virtue (arete); for the one (arete) determines the end and the other (phronesis) makes us do the things that lead to the end", (E.N. VI, 13, 1145 a4-6), cf. Hardie, ibid. 181).

Virtue and practical wisdom are inseparable. This can be understood in terms of means and end. Aristotle explains that what we need to know regarding moral virtues is "what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it", (E.N. VI, 11, 1138 b34); the standard is the end to which the virtues contribute, (cf. E.N. VI, 1, 1138 b22-23). Ross explains that the right rule, (although not stated by Aristotle in so many words), is a "rule reached by the deliberative analysis of the practically wise man, and telling him that the end of human life is to be best attained by certain actions which are intermediate between extremes. Obedience to such a rule is moral virtue", (Ross 1937) 221).

Hardie qualifies this by arguing that the activities which manifest phronesis and moral virtue are "worthy of choice" because they can be "desired for their own sake", (cf. E.N. VI, 12, 1144 a1-3; X, 10, 1178 b25 - 1179 a30, and Hardie, ibid. 216-7). Hardie argues that Aristotle considered both the intellectual and moral virtues employed "a rational principle"; the former "in the strict sense and in itself", and the latter "shares in a rational principle.. in so far as it listens to it and obeys it", (E.N. II, 1, 1103 a2; I, 13, 1102 b29-31, cf. b13-14, and Hardie, ibid. 219); both intellectual and practical thought seek truth, for "the work of both the intellectual parts.. is truth", (E.N. VI, 2, 1139 b12). This qualification offers a better understanding of Aristotle's description of phronesis; he describes it both as discerning means to an end determined by moral virtue, (cf. E.N. VI, 12, 1145 a5-6), and as involving a true understanding of an end, (cf. E.N. VI, 9, 1142 b31-32, and
The difference is that the contemplative intellect aims simply at truth, and the practical intellect aims at "truth in agreement with right desire", (E.N. VI, 2, 1139 a27-31); the practical intellect is manifest in the choices made, after deliberation, by men of good character, and the choices are good when "both the reasoning (is) true and the desire right, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts", (E.N. VI, 2, 1139 a23-26); Hardie explains that "reasoning" (logos) refers to the rational principle or rule arrived at by the reasoning of a man seeking to decide what he should do, (cf. Hardie, ibid. 224). Practical intelligence (phronesis), then, is shown in the grasp of "truth in agreement with right desire".

Hardie concludes that practical thinking proceeds by deliberation, and terminates in choice, and is concerned with the particular thing to be done, (cf. E.N. VI, 8, 1142 a23-30; VI, 11, 1143 a35-b5); within the context of end and means, the concrete action is the taking of means to an end, (cf. VI, 12, 1144 a24ff). The thought of ends to be achieved in practical thinking corresponds to the grasp of first principles in theoretical thinking; hence practical thinking must include the intuitive thought of the end as well as the intellectual powers required for the discovery of the means; to aim at an end implies thinking of an end, and "the capacity to think truly of ends is part of practical wisdom", (cf. E.N. VI, 9, 1142 b31-3 and Hardie, ibid. 225, 227, 235). Hence virtue and practical wisdom are inseparable.

It is beyond the specific purposes of this thesis to make a comparison between Newman and Aristotle. This note briefly shows that my interpretation of the relation between Newman's illative judgement and virtue is broadly similar to Aristotle's understanding of the relation between virtue and phronesis. Newman does not enter the debate of ends and means; he adopts Aristotle's view to illustrate the illative judgement; my interpretation of the illative moral judgement in Newman has pointed to the relation between deliberation, will, action, and virtue, in terms of concrete circumstances and the character of the agent in a quest for truth.

52. cf. G.A. 64, 204, 357, 359, cf. Dev 49 (referring to Aristotle's N.E. 1, 8), Cameron (1962) 243.
54. U.S. 85, 78.
55. U.S. 85, cf. 94.
56. Id. 35, 120. This is the theological basis for Newman's understanding of the personification of sin as recognizing "the evil in which this world lies, in your own hearts", (P.S. vii, 40). Despite the harmony of Nature and Grace, sin is still a condition of nature, and of the world; but, like St. Paul Newman personifies sin, being rooted in the heart, (cf. A.W. 224-5, and Barmann (1964) 210, 215, 217, 221); sin entails action and the will, (cf. G.A. 419-420, T.P. 16, Id. 185-6, P.N. ii, 135-7).
Notes to section 4. (pp. 127-139).

2. G.A. 423.
10. G.A. 400.
14. cf. Id. 181, 123.
20. T.P. 5; Newman explains doubt with regard to "arguments" in the sense of inferences, or conclusions from premisses; fear is more fundamental since it deals with the grounds of the arguments, that is "the principles at the bottom" of the arguments, thereby calling into question "the whole process" of certainty, rather than the specific justification of it, (T.P. 4; cf. Ferreira (1980) 134, note 9).
21. This is corroborated by Newman's argument in the 'Development of Doctrine' that "men know God in two manners. By Reason, with entire human certainty; and by Faith, with absolute and divine certainty", and he described the latter as "absolute and consummate certainty", (Dev. 333-4, quoted by Ferreira (1980) 134).
22. T.P. 3-4.
23. T.P. 37.
24. T.P. 5.
25. G.A. 186-7. In 1853 Newman remarked that "Fides humana.. does not necessarily suppose a speaker", (P.T. 38), unlike the "divine announcement" of divine faith.
29. T.P. 37.
30. T.P. 38. Ferreira does not make a case for the influence of grace in reaching divine faith from the texts I have used; she refers to Newman's explanation that "Faith is a gift of God, and not a mere act of our own, which we are free to exert when we will. It is quite distinct from an exercise of reason, though it follows upon it", (Mix. 225), cf. Ferreira (1980) 131.
31. T.P. 37.
32. The understanding of the role of the will as affirming certitude is made clear in letter (1848) by Newman to Mrs Froude: "Faith then is not a conclusion from premisses, but a result of an act of the will, following upon a conviction that to believe is a duty. For directly you have a conviction you ought to believe, reason has done its part and what is wanted for faith is, not proof, but will", (Harper (1933) 77, quoted by Ferreira (1980) 131).
33. Diff. i, xii.
34. "The element of will is a safeguard against the equation of fides acquisita and fides divina", (Powell (1975) 108, also cf. 95; quoted by Ferreira (1980) 138).
35. G.A. 413.
36. Boekraad explains that the "solution of the natural" problem offers "indispensable guidance" for understanding the problem of faith; the natural is "the very basis for the solution" of the supernatural, (Boekraad (1955) 35).
40. V.M. i, 87; 108, note 2; 85, note 4.
41. V.M. i, 108, note 2; 85, note 4. These texts are referred to by Ferreira (1980) 142.
42. T.P. 91.
43. cf. T.P. 121.
44. T.P. 37.
45. T.P. 121.
47. T.P. 14-15.
50. cf. U.S. 34, 101, and my discussion in section 1 of this third chapter (cf. 107-108)

Walgrave explains this as the "mandatum novum" encouraging us to moral action following the example of the 'kenosis' of Christ, (cf. Walgrave (1982) 216).
Notes to Conclusion. (pp. 140-146).

11. Id. 102, 456.
12. Id. 152, 134, 174, 47.
19. cf. Id. 219, 123, G.A. 395.
22. G.A. 121.
23. G.A. 120.
32. cf. T.P. 91.
34. cf. G.A. 64-5, 377.
Notes to Chapter 4. (pp. 147 – 173)

1. Recent studies on imagination in philosophy and theology present an important background for the study of imagination in moral theology. Warnock's, "Imagination", (1976), examines the concept's history from Hume, and explains that imagination is a power in the mind operating in our routine perception of the world, (ibid. 10, 207-8). Lovibond's "Realism and Imagination in Ethics", (1983), proposes a cognitive realism which defends the objectivity and rationality of ethical knowledge by the relation of immanence between imagination and linguistic activity, (ibid. 11, 37, 43, 194-9). Tracy's "The Analogical Imagination", (1981), shows the role of imagination in integrating religious tradition, theological system, and culture, (ibid. 447-8). Coulson's "Religion and Imagination", (1981), explains that belief is held by being credible to the imagination, (ibid. 167). In "Religious Imagination", (1986). Mackey edits and introduces essays inquiring into the cognitive role for imagination in religion's God question, (ibid. 20). The recent issue of The Irish Theological Quarterly (52, 1986) publishes the papers of the 1984 British and Irish Theological Seminar on "Theology, Science and the Imagination"; this includes a paper by I. Murdoch on "Ethics and Imagination", (ibid. 81-95).

13. Id. 196, 198-9, 204.
41. Lonergan (1975) 338, also note 3 referring to chapters eight and nine of the 'Grammar'.
42. Lonergan (1975) 169.
44. Lonergan (1975) 338. Lonergan's "method in theology is to conceive theology as a set of related and recurrent operations cumulatively advancing towards an ideal goal"; this method entails "eight functional specialities", each "intrinsically related to one another". These are: research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications, (Lonergan (1975) 125-7). By this method Lonergan seeks the same goal as Newman: to free theology from superseded systematisation, (cf. Coulson (1973) 806).
45. Lonergan (1967) 120, cf. Id. 54. Lonergan understands theology within a pluralistic context, linguistic, social, and cultural, whereby "the unity of the faith may be conceived", (Lonergan (1975) 326, cf. 276). Lonergan and
Newman are in agreement about the role of theology in a university, (cf. Leigh (1976) 43). I have explained that Coulson understands Newman's proposals for consulting the faithful as indicating the pluralism of the phronema of the whole church, (cf. Cons. 73 and Coulson (1970) 239, 252, and (1981) 74-5); Newman argues for "a plural theology", (Coulson (1973) 810).

46.G.A. 349, cf. Id. 72.

47.Lonergan (1975) 244.


49.Lonergan (1958) 231.


51.cf. G.A. 413.

52.Lonergan (1975) 42.


57.Lonergan (1975) 268.


60.cf. Conn (1978) 335.


65.cf.Conn (1978) 332-3. This constitutes a retreat into a "hand-me-down" morality whose authority is "the way things have always been", (Bronowksi (1973) 436).


67.cf. U.S. 78, Id. 120, G.A. 350.

68.cf.G.A. 41, 389.


70.Lonergan (1975) 289, 240, cf. 104-5. Lonergan's appreciation of the reality of love is more explicit and developed in his 'Method in Theology' than in 'Insight'. Lonergan's understanding of love and its transforming
power is at the centre of morality as affective self-transcendence, (Conn (1981) 187-8).
73. Lonergan (1975) 253.
74. cf. G.A. 413.
75. Lonergan (1975) 243.
76. U.S. 238.
78. Lonergan explicitly stated that "by religious conversion, I understand God's gift and man's acceptance of God's love (Rom. 5:5; 8:38f)", (Lonergan in McShane (1972) 308).
79. McCormick (1982) 91. This tendency was especially noted in the manual of moral theology which broke away from the Thomistic tradition giving central place to virtue, (cf. Curran (1986) 64, and Keane (1985) 7).
86. Barth explains that "the task of theological ethics is that of presenting the claiming of man by the Word of God", (Barth (1981) 45). The "goodness of human conduct" is to be found "in the event of an act of God himself toward man", that is, revelation; "the claiming and sanctifying of man by God, and therefore the goodness of his conduct, really lies in the reality of the divine commanding", (ibid. 49-50). This entails that "we know the commanding of the Creator" the "commanding of the Reconciler", and "the commanding of the Redeemer",(ibid.
57). Gustafson summarises Barth's moral thought in Gustafson (1968) 13-60. Little argues that "Calvin is very far from divorcing natural morality altogether from the fundamental theological premises from which he starts", (Little, in Outka and Ramsey (1968) 183). He argues that Calvin looks at natural law from the perspective of grace, (ibid. 185); natural law is "at best a companion theory, one that is seen in relation to, and complementary with, the norms of Christian Revelation", (ibid. 196). Gustafson explains that the Protestant and Catholic traditions are now moving from different starting points towards a middle ground view on natural law, (cf. Gustafson (1978) 30-137); from this basis he seeks a "greater rapprochement between the traditions", (ibid. 138-9).


100.Id. 75, U.S. 330.
112. Liebhard (1978) 438, Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, no.10.
122. G.A. 413, cf. 64-5.
125. G.A. 83, 86.
126. G.A. 83.
127. G.A. 91.
133. cf. Rahner (1964) 17.
139. G.A. 204.
142. cf. Gustafson in Outka and Ramsey (1968) 35.
143. Mahoney (1981) 67, referring to Aquinas, (ST 1-11, 66,5; 5 ad 1).
147. Cons. 73, cf. ld. 474, Diff. i, 312-3, S.D. 130.
163. cf. Fuchs (1971a) 441, and (1983) 133.
166. cf. Crowe (1977) 141-155, especially 144, 155, Curran (1986) 127-9, Hughes in MacQuarrie and Childress (1986) 413; D'Arcy omits this point of balance in his explanation of natural law in Reich, iii, 1131-7.
171. G.A. 356.
172. G.A. 354, 419, Cons. 172. MacDonald is close to Newman's position when he argues for weighing goods and values by "their fittingness and appropriateness in helping people to live out their Christian lives well in this complex world", (cf. MacDonald (1983) 549). Also, Maguire emphasises affectivity in moral experience, which must be supported by reason, though not the result of abstraction; for the believer, this means that morality is naturally religious, (cf. Maguire (1982) 22-39).
182. O'Donoghue in Mackey (1986) 193, 196. The mystical imagination is rooted in the "experience of the source of man's being and of all goodness", (ibid. 191). This is founded in an ontology of transcendent invitation and concrete, personal response, (cf. O'Donoghue (1979) 12-13, 19); the achievement of freedom and being depends upon "an ever deeper listening" in man's "inner sanctum", or conscience, so that the mystic is "a stern moralist" who favours "development from within (in response to God's gift of himself)", (ibid. 118, 157).
187. cf. G.A. 105-6, 110.
190. Newman's understanding of the sense of duty as guilt can be fruitfully interpreted by the transcendental approach to theology. Bockle undertakes to do so by explaining guilt in terms of sin; this is being captive to categorical reality as opposed to the freedom of personal transcendence symbolising the Absolute, (cf. Bockle (1980) 64-123). Newman repudiated the interpretation of conscience as an irrational source of guilt, (cf. Diff. ii, 249). Surprisingly Kiely's study on "Psychology and Moral Theology" does not discuss guilt. However, he presents a useful context for understanding...
guilt in terms of the tension and aggravations, (internal and external), caused by the personal tension between the "world of desire" and the "world of limits"; he explains the resolution of this tension in terms of transcendental conversion, (cf. Kiely (1980) 173-227).

Bibliography.

I. Newman's Works.

Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects. (1872), Longmans, Green, and Co., London 1885.
Essays Critical and Historical. 2 vols, (1871), Longmans, Green, and Co., London 1885.
Historical Sketches. 3 vols, (1872), Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1885.
Newman the Oratorian. His Unpublished Oratory Papers, ed.


Parochial and Plain Sermons. 8 vols, (1834), Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1891.


The Tamworth Reading Room, addressed to the editor of the Times. (1841) In D. A. (1885) 254-297.


The Via Media. 2 vols, (1877), Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1885.

2. Other Works Consulted on Newman.


Bastable, J.D. 'Newman Publication', *Philosophical Studies* xxvi (1979) 204-209.


Cameron, J.M. 'Newman and the empiricist tradition', in Coulson and Allchin (1967) 76-95.


Coulson, J. 'Newman on the Church- his final view, its origins and influence', in Coulson and Allchin (1967) 123-143.


Davis, H.F. 'Catholic Theology in the University', in Parkinson (1953), 65-76.


de Achaval, H.M. 'Theological implications in the Apologia', in Blehl and Connolly (1964) 125-144.


Dupuy, B.-D. 'L'Autorité de l'église selon W.E. Gladstone


Ferreira, M.J. 'Certainty', in Richardson and Bowden (1983) 90.

Ferreira, M.J. 'Doubt', in Richardson and Bowden (1983) 165-6.


Fey, W. 'Philosophy and Theology in Cardinal Newman',
Laurentianum 17 (1976) 60-81, (noted as 1976a).
Fitzpatrick, P.J. 'Newman's Apologia: was Kingsley right?', in Wright (1983) 28-36.


Holmes, J. D. 'Newman's attitude towards the definition of Papal Infallibility illustrating the significance of History in Christian belief', *Newman Studien* ix, 119-135.

Holmes, J. D. 'Personal Influence and Religious Conviction - Newman and Controversy', *Newman Studien* x, 26-46.


Holmes, J. D. 'Newman on Faith and History', *Philosophical Studies* xxi (1973) 202-216.


Holmes, J. D. 'Newman's reaction to the Development of
Scientific and Historical Criticism in England', Clergy Review lxiv (1979) 280-290
Holmes, J.D. 'Newman's Reaction to the Definition of papal Infallibility', in Wright (1983) 37-44.
Lash, N. 'Can a methodologist keep the faith?', *Irish Theological Quarterly* xxxviii (1971) 91-102.
MacKinnon, D.M. and Holmes, J.D. *Newman's University


Misner, P. 'Newman and Theological Pluralism', in Devine (1971) 234-244.


Murphy, J.L. 'The influence of Bishop Butler on Religious Thought', Theological Studies 24 (1963) 361-401.


Nicholls, D. 'Gladstone and the Anglican critics of Newman', in Bastable (1978) 121-144.
O'Donoghue, N.-D. 'Newman and the problem of privileged access to truth', Irish Theological Quarterly 42 (1975) 241-258.
O'Donoghue, N.-D. 'Does the Grammar really work?', Irish
Theological Quarterly 45 (1978) 140-3.
Potts, T. C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy. CUP, Cambridge, 1980.
Reardon, B. Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Illustrated from the Writers of the Period. CUP, Cambridge, 1966.
Robinson, J. 'Newman's use of Butler's arguments',


Strange, R. 'Newman on the presence of Christ in the Believer', in Cross (1981) 42-58, (noted as Strange (1981a)).


Tristram, H. *The Living Thoughts of Cardinal Newman*. 272


Walgrave, J.H. *'The place of Theology now in the light of the 'Idea of a University' ', Louvain Studies vii (1979) 239-248.*


Ward, W. *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman.* Based on
his Private Journals and Correspondence. 2 vols, Longmans, Green and Co., 1912.


Bronowski, J. The Ascent of Man. Little, Brown and Co.,


Childress, J.F. 'Consequentialism', in McQuarrie and Childress (1986) 122.


Curran, C. Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology. Gill

D'Arcy, E. 'Natural Law', in Reich (1978) iii, 1131-7.


Grisez, G. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the
Hare, R.M. 'Utilitarianism', in MacQuarrie and Childress (1986) 640-3.


Hughes, G. 'Natural Law', in MacQuarrie and Childress (1986) 412-4.


Janssens, L. 'Norms and priorities in a Love Ethics' Louvain Studies 6 (1977) 207-238.


Liebard, O.M. ed, Official Catholic Teachings. Love and
Little,D. 'Calvin and the prospects for a Christian theory of Natural Law', in Outka and Ramsey (1968) 175-97
McCool, G. 'The philosophy of the human person in Karl Rahner's theology', Theological Studies 22 (1967) 537-562
McIntyre, J. 'Imagination' in Richardson and Bowden (1983) 283-4.
McIntyre, J. 'New Help from Kant; Theology and Human Imagination', in Mackey (1986) 102-122.


Rahner, K. 'Principles and Prescriptions' in Rahner (1964) 13-41.

Rahner, K. 'The logic of concrete individual knowledge in Ignatius Loyola', in Rahner (1964) 84-170.


Rahner, K. 'Gradual ascent to Christian perfection', in T.I. iii, 3-23.
Rahner, K. 'Some thoughts on a good intention', in T.I. iii, 105-128.
Rahner, K. 'The 'commandment' of love in relation to the other commandments', in T.I. v, 439-459.
Rahner, K. 'The experiment with man', in T.I. ix, 205-224.
Shorter, J.M. 'Imagination', in Harre and Lamb (1983) 292-3