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Understanding inter-organisational relationships in public-private partnerships

A study of educational PPPs in Pakistan

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PhD in Management
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March 2015
Abstract

Given the increasing proliferation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in both developed and developing countries, and the huge challenges that are often associated with establishing and managing them, and ensuring that they achieve their objectives, it is important to understand multiple aspects of their operation. Whilst the structural and economic aspects of PPPs have long been recognised and researched, the relational aspects of PPPs remain under-researched. This thesis is a contribution to addressing this gap in the literature. It uses a dimensional approach to understand the nature of inter-organisations relationships (IORs) in PPPs and considers the factors that shape these relationships. It also investigates whether a particular pattern of relationships is needed for PPPs to deliver more than could have been achieved by each partner working alone (synergistic benefits).

These issues are studied empirically in three educational PPP programmes in Pakistan. In two of these, not-for-profit organisations ‘adopt’ state schools. In the third, the state funds private sector schools on the condition that they offer free education to students and achieve threshold quality standards. A case study methodology is used and an integrative conceptual framework, derived from a wide-ranging literature review, is used to guide both data collection and analysis.

The research finds that partners’ motives for entering into a PPP play a dominant role in shaping inter-organisational relationships. These motives are, in turn, influenced by a range of contextual and organisational factors. Inter-organisational relationships can be broadly characterised as collaborative, contractual, cooperative or conflictual. Whereas much of the existing literature emphasises that collaborative relationships are a prerequisite for PPPs to deliver synergistic outcomes, this research finds that these outcomes are also present in PPPs characterised by cooperative relationships. However, inter-organisational relationships in PPPs are not static; they develop and change over time. These changes result from a dynamic interplay between contextual factors, organisational factors, partner motives and the perceived outcomes of the partnership.

The research reported in the thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge. It sheds new light on the relational aspects of PPPs and offers a new conceptual framework for explaining and investigating inter-organisational relationships, which integrates insights from the largely separate literatures on PPPs and inter-organisational relations. It counters an apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative relationships. It also offers new empirical evidence on the operation of PPPs in a developing country context, which contributes to redressing the predominance of evidence from developed countries in the existing literature. The insights from the research have theoretical and practical implications for the development and management of PPPs and future research in this area.
Declaration

This research reported in this thesis has been conducted entirely by me and this thesis is my own work. It has not been submitted for examination for any other degree or professional qualification.

Sidra Irfan
March 2015
Dedicated to

…my parents, Fauzia and Malik Iftikhar Ahmed, who worked so hard and gave the best part of their lives to make me what I am today;

…my husband, Irfan Ahmed, for his unconditional love, utmost support and for always being there when I needed him;

…my bravos, Muhammad Abdullah and Areeba Ahmed, to bear with me throughout this tough PhD journey and for cherishing me in difficult times.
Acknowledgements

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Special thanks to the University of the Punjab for providing funding to undertake this research, I hope they will find it a worthwhile use of their money. I express no less a sense of gratitude towards each and every individual who assisted me in collecting data for this research. I would especially like to mention Mr. Sarfraz Ahmed Virk who helped me taking the first step with the collection of data.

I am sincerely grateful to Raja Muhammad Anwar (Chairman of PEF), Seema Aziz (Founder and Chairperson of CARE) and Baela Raza Jamil (Founder and Director Programmes of ITA) for giving me time out of their busy schedules, appreciating the importance of my research and providing me access to their organisations for data collection. My gratitude extends to all interviewees who provided valuable insights to this research.

Finally, I could not have completed this thesis without the duas (supplications) and encouragement of my mother, parents-in-law, husband, children and siblings. They are the great blessings in my life.
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### List of important Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>Inter-organisational relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IORs</td>
<td>Inter-organisational relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Adopt-a-School programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (not-for-profit organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDG</td>
<td>Lahore District Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>District Coordination Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>Executive District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEO</td>
<td>District Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDEO</td>
<td>Deputy District Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEO</td>
<td>Assistant Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Internal Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aaghai (not-for-profit organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSIP</td>
<td>Whole School Improvement Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEF</td>
<td>Sindh Education Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE</td>
<td>Early Childhood Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>School Management Committee</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Education Promoter</td>
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<td>PEF</td>
<td>Punjab Education Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOD</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Foundation Assisted Schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDP</td>
<td>Continuous Professional Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>Education Voucher Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>New School Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>QAT</td>
<td>Quality Assurance Test</td>
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Chapter 1 Introduction and overview of the thesis

1.1 Introduction

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are usually seen as a vehicle for bringing together the resources, including skills and knowledge, of both the public and private sector (Bovaird 2004). In this way PPPs can contribute to tackling ‘wicked problems’ which could not be addressed completely by public sector working alone (Stoker 1998). The rationale for getting involved in PPPs is that they have the potential to create ‘synergy’ or what Huxham (2003) refers to as ‘collaborative advantage’. This refers to the added value of PPPs that could not be achieved with each partner working alone. These synergies are often considered as the ultimate aim of partnership work (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). Despite this positive rhetoric, huge efforts are required to achieve these advantages. PPPs involve ‘dynamic relationships’ that develop over time due to the participation of diverse actors who bring a variety of agendas (Skelcher 2005; Huxham 2003).

This thesis aims to explore these dynamic relationships within PPPs to understand the defining features of the PPPs, the nature of relationships between different partners, the factors influencing the relationships and the implications of these relationships for the outcomes of PPPs.

Despite the global spread of PPPs, the term PPP has remained somewhat vague and slippery involving ‘multiple grammars’ (Linder 1999; Hodge et al. 2010). A lot of scholarly attention has been paid to this phenomenon from many different perspectives. Sometimes efforts to sort out this messiness take the form of matrices and typologies (e.g. Greve and Hodge 2005; Klijn 2010; Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002). At some other times the literature explains PPPs as consisting of several distinct ‘families’ (Hodge et al. 2010) or identifies different ‘approaches’ to understanding PPPs (Weihe 2008). Furthermore, the different forms of PPPs have also been discussed against multiple dimensions such as control, funding and ownership (Zarco-Jasso 2005). The common theme across all these efforts at defining and classifying PPPs is a pursuit to understand how different structural forms, functions and outcomes are related and what form of PPP is best suited for
what function. However, even after more than a decade of scholarly effort to understand these issues, many questions remain unanswered. This is partly because of the hybrid and dynamic nature of PPPs in practice.

In addition to examining the structural aspects of PPPs, another area that has attracted considerable scholarly attention is the economic aspects of PPPs. The focus of this strand of the literature primarily remains on the formal processes and performance indicators of PPPs such as value for money, risk transfer and balance sheet figures (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999; 2003); designing contracts and allocating responsibilities, risks and rewards (Hodge 2004); the various forms of contracts (Evans and Bowman 2005; Martin 2005); the relationship between democratic practices (e.g. public interest, accountability and transparency issues) and the design of partnerships (Skelcher et al. 2005); the outcomes of PPPs (Hodge and Greve 2007; Gazley and Brudney 2007); and the evaluation challenges associated with PPPs (Ghobadian et al. 2004; Hodge et al. 2010).

While the structural and economic aspects of PPPs are important, they are mainly oriented towards the front and back end of PPPs (their set-up and performance). What happens during the course of a PPP is often given insufficient attention. We know relatively little about the unfolding of the relational process in PPPs and what shapes inter-organisational relationships (IORs). Even those who think beyond the structural and economic aspects of PPPs (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn 2009; Steijn et al. 2011; Kort and Klijn 2011) have tended to go straight to managerial issues, paying little attention to understanding IORs.

However, the authors elaborating and explaining different structural forms of PPPs are not unaware of the importance of understanding and managing IORs. For instance, Skelcher after explaining different structural forms of PPPs talks about trust ‘as a medium that cements the exchange between government and private actors’ (Skelcher 2005: 363). He mentions trust as a medium to resolve conflicts between partners and deal with the problems of opportunism. Similarly, in their empirical study of PPPs in social services in the City of Stockholm, Almqvist and Hogberg (2005) have argued that it is important to study the relationships among partners and have emphasised the value of a trust-based approach in order to gain full advantage
of PPPs. There are many other examples of authors recognising the need to move beyond categorising PPPs according to their structural form and instead pay more attention to their IORs.

In a similar vein, this thesis argues that the debate about PPPs can be enriched by paying more attention to understanding the nature of IORs within PPPs and exploring the factors that shape them. It reports empirical case studies of three PPP programmes in the education sector in Pakistan. The focus of analysis is to understand the nature of IORs during different stages of these partnerships and to identify and explain the factors shaping IORs in the three PPP programmes.

The analysis argues that unless we understand the relational as well as structural and economic aspects of PPPs it will be difficult to manage them effectively. In the collaboration literature these relational aspects of partnership are often referred to as a ‘black box’ because of being least understood (Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson and Perry 2006). However, the good news is that inter-organisation relationships have been investigated by scholars working in another related field (the alliance literature). Some PPP scholars have already identified learning potential in this respect. Weihe (2010), for example, has provided a detailed account of the conceptual similarities and differences between the PPP and alliance literatures. She asserts that the alliance literature, broadly referred to as the inter-organisational relations (IOR) literature, has the potential to fill knowledge gaps in the PPP literature and can ‘enrich our understanding of the dynamic and evolutionary nature of cooperation’ (Weihe 2010: 520). The conceptual framework for the empirical research reported in this thesis draws on insights from the IOR literature and uses these in combination with those from the PPP literature. In this way, an attempt is made to transfer important insights across historically divergent lines of inquiry.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, the empirical context of this study is discussed. This is followed by a section that describes my motivation to undertake this research. The research questions are then outlined and some of the key concepts and terms used in the thesis are defined. Finally, the overall structure of the thesis is outlined.
1.2 Contextualising the research

There is widespread agreement that education lies at the core of the whole paradigm of development and that it is a pivotal driver for empowering people and enabling societies to progress. Education systems around the world have experienced shifts from seeing the provision of basic education as a pure government responsibility towards greater participation of the private sector in delivering education for all. According to a United Nations report about progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), about 115 million children are still not in school; the most of these children live in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (United Nations 2005). The situation has improved since 2005 and a recent report by the World Bank (Dundar et al. 2014) notes that South Asian governments have been investing heavily to achieve the education MDGs and accordingly net enrolment in South Asia’s primary schools rose from 75 percent in 2000 to 89 percent in 2010. Whilst this is encouraging, the report documents that nearly 13 million children in South Asia between the ages of 8-14 are still not in school. Additionally, the report raises serious concerns about the quality of education in the region.

These reports raise many concerns about the level of education provided in countries such as Pakistan. Traditionally, the provision of public services has been viewed as state’s responsibility in Pakistan. However, the state itself has failed to provide adequate and comprehensive services under its role as a direct provider (Government of Pakistan 2004a). In Pakistan it is a commonly held belief amongst people that the private sector is better than the public sector in delivering quality education. This belief is supported by the surveys conducted between 2003-2007 under the Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) project. According to these surveys:

Learning outcomes are poor. They have little to do with where you live, and everything to do with whether you go to a public or private school. The differences between public and private schools are so large that it will take government school students between 1.5 to 2.5 years of additional schooling to catch up to where private school students were in Class 3. It also costs less to educate a child in a private school. Putting learning and cost differences together, the quality-adjusted-cost in government schools is three times higher than in private schools (Andrabi et al. 2008: viii).
Moreover there are many state schools which exist only on papers and are used for purposes other than education. These non-functional schools are referred to as ‘ghost schools’. Although no pupils are enrolled in such schools, teachers are still appointed and they continue to get their salaries (World Bank 2002).

Realising that the public sector is unable to meet the educational challenges on its own; the government has taken a series of initiatives to involve the private sector in the delivery of school education. Private sector provision of education services already represents 31% of the total school enrolment in the country (PSLM 2011). Government initiatives include restructuring education foundations into more autonomous institutions and improving service delivery in state schools through PPP agreements with the private sector, including NGOs. As a result the provision of education services has undergone many changes during the last two decades. According to Jamil:

Pakistan illustrates a powerful case study of a paradigm shift in education from a state owned and state managed schooling system which reached a high point in 1972 with nation-wide nationalization of education, to one which is increasingly becoming ‘blended’ across government and non-state partners. The paradigm shift is not just about who owns, who finances and who manages schools, but, also about expanding partnerships (Jamil 2010: 8).

In addition, the role of donors in influencing national policies is quite evident in countries such as Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is an increasing contribution of donors in financing education with estimates around 11% of the total education budget (Lister et al. 2010). Donor funding has had a great influence in encouraging and sometimes obliging the Pakistan’s government to involve the private sector in partnerships. Donors’ emphasis on PPPs has resulted in a policy shift towards the involvement of the private sector in education service delivery (Government of Pakistan 2003; 2004b). Pakistan is also one of the signatories to Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) commitments which emphasise universal access to quality education. These international commitments reaffirm the notion of education as a fundamental human right and have urged participating countries to intensify their efforts to address the basic learning needs of all (World Conference on Education for All Inter-agency Commission 1990).
Strengthening partnerships is seen as one of the main strategies to meet educational needs, and it has played a pivotal role in pushing the government to mobilise both the private sector and communities in order to meet education targets (Bano 2007). The term ‘public-private partnership’ has become a critical component of the education reform agenda and is prominent in many government documents, including the National Education Policy document. The following quote from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) illustrates this point clearly:

Recognising immense contribution of the private sector and NGOs in the social sectors, the ESR (Education Sector Reform) is anchored in development of partnerships between the private sector, civil society organisations and the public sector. **Public-Private Partnerships** are critical to reaching the goals of access and quality at all levels of education creating possibilities for both voice and choice and improved service delivery (Government of Pakistan 2003: 70).

### 1.3 Motivation for research

For over a decade in Pakistan, PPPs have been promoted as a key strategy for increasing efficiency, generating resources and improving the quality of education service delivery, particularly to the poor (Farah and Rizvi 2007). These PPP initiatives seem to promise a way to deal with educational challenges and meet international commitments (UNESCO 2011). However, it is quite frustrating to see that, on one hand, some PPP initiatives in Pakistan are discussed as examples of best international practices\(^1\) while, on the other hand, Pakistan remains on the list of countries still far from meeting the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) (UNESCO 2008; 2010). This somewhat confused and intrigued me and I began reading and researching more into these issues. Accordingly, the broad aim of this research is to extend the research on PPPs in the education sector of Pakistan and to examine whether the promise of PPPs implied in theory and supported by research mostly conducted in the context of developed countries is relevant to understanding educational PPPs in Pakistan.

\(^1\) For example, Quality Advancement and Institutional Development (QuAID) programme managed by Aga Khan Education Services Pakistan in partnership with the government of Pakistan (mentioned as an example of successful Capacity Building Initiatives in LaRocque 2008 and Patrinos et al. 2009) and Punjab Education Foundation’s PPP programmes discussed as successful partnerships in Asian Development Bank’s report (Malik 2010)
At the start of my PhD, I was sure that I wanted to study educational PPPs in Pakistan but the focus of the research evolved iteratively while reviewing the existing literature and making sense of my empirical data. When I started looking into the PPP literature, I initially felt more confusion than enlightenment. The multiplicity and complexity of different perspectives made it difficult to interpret the literature and use it in a coherent framework. More intriguingly, the review of the PPP literature seemed to suggest that educational PPPs in Pakistan would not count as partnerships in the precise sense of that term. The existing literature, much of which is based on empirical evidence from the west, seemed to underplay the partnership aspect of educational PPPs in Pakistan. The analysis left me concerned that the existing literature does not tell the whole story of the inter-organisational relationships within PPPs; does not take sufficient account of how PPPs may play out in the context of a country such as Pakistan and with respect to a goal which is about education not entirely about infrastructure development. All of this led me to investigate IORs in educational PPPs in Pakistan with the aim of contributing to both the theory and practice of PPPs.

The choice of research context and PPP programmes is important for four reasons. First, the developing country context provides an opportunity to consider whether the insights offered by the PPP literature, which have been largely developed through studies of PPPs in the west, make sense elsewhere. Second, the study focuses on understanding the relational aspects of PPPs which are currently underplayed in the PPP literature. Third, the study provides an empirical analysis of the PPPs for service delivery whereas the existing PPP literature is skewed towards studying infrastructure partnerships (e.g. Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001; Noumba-Um 2010; Chen et al. 2013). Finally, the choice of PPP case studies provides an opportunity to study how partnership relationships might vary depending on whether the ‘private’ partner is a for-profit or not-for-profit organisation. This is relevant due to the relative paucity of PPP studies that investigate relationships between government and both for-profit and not-for-profit partners.
1.4 Research questions
The above mentioned gaps in the existing literature and my motivations resulted in following overarching research question for this research:

How can we understand inter-organisational relationships in public-private partnerships?

This overarching question is elaborated into the following research questions:

1. What is a ‘Public-Private Partnership (PPP)’?
2. How can inter-organisational relationships (IORs) in PPPs be examined and characterised? How do different factors influence IORs in PPPs?
3. What are the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes?

Despite the widespread use, substantial volume of work and a great deal of research on PPPs; the term PPPs is used in ‘a multiplicity of confusing and inconsistent ways’ (Wettenhall 2010: 22). Hence, this research aims to make sense of this messiness as its point of departure and provides a review of the PPP literature including problems in defining PPPs and different perspectives on PPPs in the next chapter. Given the dearth of research into the relational aspects of PPPs, the research also aims to review fragmented but related fields of study to develop a conceptual framework to understand IORs in PPPs. In doing so, this research has been able to connect the concepts from the PPP, IOR and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literatures. In addressing the second research question, the research has also sought to understand how different factors influence IORs in the educational PPPs in Pakistan. Since synergistic outcomes lie at the heart of the aims of PPPs, the research also examines the ways in which these outcomes vary across different IORs.

1.5 Definitions of key concepts and terms
Keeping in view that there is no agreement over the usage of many terms that lie at the heart of this research, there is a need to provide some working definitions of key concepts and terms within the context of this thesis. The following working definitions have been developed from the existing literature. By defining these concepts and terms in this way, it is not intended to be dismissive of the variety of
ways in which some other researchers have defined them. Instead, these are the definitions that make most sense in the context of this research.

*Table 1.1: Key concepts and terms*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Working definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public-private partnership (PPP)</strong></td>
<td>Refers to an inter-organisational arrangement that combines the resources, including skills and knowledge, of a public sector organisation with any organisation outside of the public sector (including for-profits and not-for profits) in order to deliver societal goals (Bovaird 2004; Skelcher 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private sector</strong></td>
<td>Whilst the term ‘private sector’ is often associated with for-profit organisations and businesses driven by monetary profit, this thesis adopts an extended definition that includes both for-profits and not-for-profits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural aspects of PPPs</strong></td>
<td>Mainly focus on explaining and classifying the various forms of PPPs with respect to different dimensions; understanding how different structural forms, functions and outcomes are related; and what form of PPP is best suited for what function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic aspects of PPPs</strong></td>
<td>Primarily concerned with the financial issues such as value for money, risk transfer and balance sheet figures; performance indicators; designing contracts and allocating responsibilities; the various forms of contracts and evaluation challenges in PPPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relational aspects of PPPs</strong></td>
<td>Aspects such as the nature of inter-organisational relationships (IORs), the process through which these relationships develop over time, motives to enter PPPs, and factors shaping IORs are referred to as relational aspects of PPPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration</strong></td>
<td>Refers to equality in decision making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of programme activities, and trust in PPPs (Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson et al. 2009; Brinkerhoff 2002a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-organisational relations (IOR)</strong></td>
<td>Represents the name of the field i.e. inter-organisational <em>relations</em> concerned with the study of <em>‘the properties and overall pattern of relations between and among organizations that are pursuing a mutual interest while also remaining independent and autonomous, thus retaining separate interests’</em> (Cropper et al. 2010: 9).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Both of these views of the term ‘private sector’ are prevalent in the existing literature; PPP researchers have often used the extended definition due to the widespread involvement of not-for-profits in PPPs for service delivery.
### Inter-organisational relationships (IORs)

Refers to inter-organisational *relationships* between partner organisations. These are seen as ‘the sequence of events and interaction’ among interacting parties (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 91).

### Inter-organisational arrangement

Used as an umbrella term to represent the organisational forms or inter-organisational entities such as ‘partnerships’, ‘alliance’, ‘joint venture’ and ‘networks’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Huxham 2003).

### Synergistic outcomes

The added value created by a PPP that could not be achieved by each partner working alone; includes qualitative or quantitative outcomes that were not possible without forming a partnership.

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#### 1.6 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of ten chapters. **Chapter 2** begins by reviewing the ways in which PPPs are conceptualised in the existing PPP literature. It provides an overview of the PPP literature and argues that bridging to the broader IOR literature is useful for developing our understanding of IORs in PPPs. This chapter outlines some important insights from the IOR literature that are particularly helpful in the context of this thesis. The discussion in Chapter 2 is carried forward in **Chapter 3** which utilises the PPP, IOR and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literatures to build a conceptual framework that ties many of the key ideas into a framework for this thesis. This chapter discusses the literature relevant to the conceptual framework and identifies the main lines of argument that emerge from the literature reviewed in this chapter.

**Chapter 4** focuses on the methodology employed in this research. A comparative case study approach employing qualitative methods is the research strategy. This chapter explains the research process including the use of the conceptual framework, data collection methods, data analysis and ethical considerations. The chapter also pays particular attention to the issues concerning the use of case studies as a research design, strengths and weaknesses of the methods used to collect data and the steps undertaken to ensure the quality of research.

**Chapters 5, 6 and 7** present the individual case studies carried out for this research. Each case study is discussed in a separate chapter using a similar format. Each chapter starts by introducing the case followed by sections on the PPP set-up;
implementation and management; and outcomes. Based on the descriptions and findings in these chapters, Chapter 8 presents a cross-case analysis which is structured in line with the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. The analysis carried out in this chapter provides the basis for the comparison between the theoretical concepts employed in the conceptual framework and the empirical findings, and this comparison is presented in Chapter 9.

Finally, Chapter 10, which is reflective in tone, concludes the thesis. The research questions mentioned in Chapter 1 are recapitulated with a brief explanation of why these questions were considered important and what has been found in relation to each question. This chapter critically reflects upon the course of the research and suggests areas where future research could usefully focus. In addition to theoretical implications, this chapter also offers some comments on the implications of research findings for the policy and practice of PPPs.

A list of references and three appendices are included at the end of the thesis.
Chapter 2 Setting the foundations for understanding IORs in PPPs

2.1 Introduction
It was noted in the previous chapter that the structural and economic aspects of PPPs have been discussed in depth in the existing PPP literature (see, for example, the collections in Ghobadian et al. 2004 and Hodge et al. 2010) but the relational aspects of PPPs remain under-explored. This limits our understanding of the diverse and dynamic nature of PPPs. It is recognised that huge efforts are required to reap the advantages of PPPs and overcome many actual and potential challenges. In meeting these challenges, it is important to understand the structural, economic and relational aspects of PPPs. No one perspective on its own is capable of explaining all that we need to know about PPPs. There is a need to integrate research from all three perspectives to develop new insights for understanding and managing PPPs.

Given that this thesis aims to understand the inter-organisational relationships (IORs) in PPPs, the main objective of this chapter is to make sense of the existing literature so as to set foundations for the conceptual framework which is discussed in the next chapter. This chapter is divided into four sections which are organised as follows: Firstly, due to a lot of debate and disagreement around the use of the term ‘public-private partnership’ in the existing PPP literature, this chapter begins by reviewing some of the definitional issues and different perspectives on PPPs in section 2.2. The discussion in this section establishes that the slippery and inconsistent use of the term has led to different understandings about PPPs which need to be considered while developing the conceptual framework for this thesis. Keeping in view the context of the empirical study, this section also reviews literature on PPPs in developing countries and in the education sector. Section 2.3 discusses the rationale for integrating the insights from different fields of studies in order to develop a conceptual framework for this research, and explains the relevance of the broader IOR literature for studying the relational aspects of PPPs. This section also introduces the IOR literature. However, it does not provide a detailed review of IOR scholarship, but instead highlights the main contributions this literature can offer in understanding IORs in PPPs. This section also flags up some reasons for caution.
when using the findings and theories in the IOR literature and offers some suggestions to deal with these difficulties. Section 2.4 discusses in more detail the important frameworks and concepts taken from the IOR literature that are helpful in the context of this research. This chapter concludes with four building blocks that are used in Chapter 3 to develop a conceptual framework to understand IORs in PPPs.

2.2 The PPP landscape

The literature on PPPs is large and rapidly-growing. It is multi-disciplinary as well as multi-national and covers a wide range of topics including why PPPs are established, their potential benefits and costs, allocation of risk among parties, what results can be achieved by PPPs, how they can be evaluated and the reasons for the success and failure of PPPs. Although there is no doubt among scholars that PPPs are an important part of the public management agenda, scholars have been divided with respect to what constitutes a PPP. The following review of the PPP literature both sets the scene for this research and discusses some common themes and issues in relation to the first research question outlined in the previous chapter. It is organised in three sub-sections. The first sub-section outlines the problems in defining PPPs. This leads to a discussion of different perspectives on PPPs. Given the context of the empirical study, the last two sub-sections review the literature on PPPs in developing countries and the education sector respectively.

2.2.1 Why is it difficult to move towards a common definition of PPPs?

In the case of PPPs each ‘P’ is controversial and has a long history of debate which makes it difficult to define PPPs in a manner which is generally agreed upon. Taking the first two Ps, there is no clear distinction between public and private realms in the existing literature making them controversial and open to several interpretations. Public-private comparisons have been made in many different areas of research such as strategic management, decision-making practices, leadership etc. Within this type of literature there are some authors, on one hand, who argue that the public and private sectors are converging and they claim that management in the public and private sectors is more similar than different (e.g. Murray 1975). On the other hand, there are scholars who emphasise the importance of the public-private distinction (Rainey et al. 1976; Nutt 2006).
Rainey and Chun (2005) have attributed the difference between these two approaches to the different theoretical backgrounds of the authors. Broadly speaking, economists, political scientists and public administration scholars are more interested in public-private bifurcation whereas sociologists and organisation theorists usually refer to similarities. The public-private distinction becomes even more obscure when not-for-profit organisations (generally referred to as NGOs) are taken into account. These organisations have both public and private orientations. Schaeffer and Loveridge (2002) argue that NGOs have characteristic of both the public and for-profit sectors. They explain:

‘Although they [NGOs] lack the coercive powers of government, they also have fewer constraints than government organizations. NGOs are usually less secretive than private businesses and therefore less concerned about sharing information with the public’ (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002: 183).

There is no consensus or one right answer to the public-private argument despite decades of debate. Nevertheless, due to increasing interdependency between various organisations even the proponents of a public-private distinction now recognise that the boundary between the public and private sectors has been blurred (Rainey and Chun 2005). PPP scholars, despite their diverse theoretical perspectives, also generally refer to PPP as a hybrid organisational arrangement that has characteristics of both sectors (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Hodge and Greve 2007; Skelcher 2005; Wettenhall 2010). Moreover, PPP scholars usually refer to PPPs as a vehicle for bringing together the resources, including skills and knowledge, of both public and private sector (Bovaird 2004).

There is a paradox between these two points of agreement. On one hand, PPP scholars refer to the boundary between public and private sector becoming blurred and situate PPPs on the borders of both the public and private realms. On the other hand, the synergetic outcomes or added value that are often considered as the ultimate aim of partnership work are grounded in a stereotype of the comparative advantage of each sector (Rosenau 1999; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002), strengthening the idea of public-private bifurcation. It seems reasonable to accept Dahl and Lindblom’s (1953) argument, presented more than half a century ago, that while acknowledging the overlapping and blurred public-
private boundaries, there is still the possibility of a clear distinction between agencies (referred to as public sector) and enterprises (the private sector).

Coming to the third P, partnership, this is used to convey several different ideas without any commonly agreed account. Sometimes it is used as a synonym to represent any type of inter-organisational arrangement such as an alliance, a joint venture or a coalition (e.g. Huxham and Vangen 2005). Sometimes a clear distinction between such arrangements is emphasised whereby the term partnership is used to represent a weaker arrangement (e.g. Coston 1998). Yet in some other cases partnership is considered a stronger inter-organisational arrangement than others (e.g. Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; Brinkerhoff 2002b).

In short each ‘P’ in PPP is controversial and has a long history of debate which makes it difficult to coalesce towards a common definition of PPPs. Nevertheless, a lot of scholarly attention has been paid to understand PPPs from different perspectives (Hodge et al. 2010; Wettenhall 2010; Weihe 2008). It is possible to conceptualise these different perspectives on a continuum where at one extreme PPPs are argued to be an efficient solution to wicked problems (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Whereas at the other extreme PPPs are looked upon with great suspicion and are associated with phrases like ‘Problem Problem Problem’ (Bowman, 2000).

In conclusion, there is no agreed definition of PPPs and there is plethora of working definitions in the existing literature. The different working definitions adopted by PPP scholars are influenced by their varied perspectives on PPPs which has led to different understandings of the PPP phenomenon. These different perspectives need to be considered in order to understand IORs in PPPs and they are discussed in the next sub-section.

2.2.2 Different perspectives on PPPs

It is important to look at different perspectives on PPPs in the context of this research because the underlying nature of IORs varies with each perspective. It is not intended to provide a highly detailed analysis, but to highlight the greatest divide between two schools of thought: one of them considers PPPs as a tool of governance and the other thinks of them as a ‘language game’ (Teisman and Klijn 2002; Greve and
Those who consider PPPs a tool of public governance see co-production and collaboration as lying at the heart of PPPs (e.g. Peters 1998; Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; Klijn and Teisman 2005). In contrast, those who see PPP as a language game involving ‘multiple grammars’ consider PPPs to be a buzzword for the traditional practices of contracting out and privatisation through competitive tendering (Linder 1999; Savas 2000). These differences of perspective are sometimes translated into an articulation of two conceptualisations of PPPs. This two-fold categorisation is found under many different labels such as economic (or PFI-style) partnerships and social (or organisational) partnerships (Hodge and Greve 2005); a concession model versus an alliance model (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008); innovative contracting versus partnerships (Edelenbos and Klijn 2009); and cPPPs (contractual PPPs) and iPPPs (institutional PPPs) (Kort and Koppenjan 2013). The distinction between these two categories is illustrated in Table 2.1 by presenting Edelenbos and Klijn’s (2009) schema for differentiating them.

**Table 2.1: A comparison between PPPs seen as innovative contracting (cPPPs) and partnerships (iPPPs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of relation between the PPP partners</th>
<th>PPP Seen as Innovative Contracting</th>
<th>PPP Seen as Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A clear distinction exists between the commissioner (public party) and the contractor (private party).</td>
<td>The government and the private party are jointly involved in the design, construction and operation based on a joint commissioning status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between the two parties is limited mainly to the time before the contract is awarded. The public actor subsequently controls/supervises the private actor with little or no mutual interaction.</td>
<td>Collaboration continues throughout the process. Initially, it focuses on the nature of goals and on the search for connections. Later, it is geared towards the joint realization of goals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of contract in the establishment and running of the PPP</td>
<td>Strong emphasis on (the use of) contracts to inject clarity and certainty into the collaboration.</td>
<td>Less emphasis on (inspecting compliance with) contract. More emphasis on mutual trust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edelenbos and Klijn (2009: 312)
In order to avoid confusion when referring to these two schools of thought, in this literature review they are referred to as contractual PPPs and collaborative PPPs. The advocates of collaborative PPPs criticise the contractual perspective as being too ‘general regarding the form but specific and narrow regarding the purpose of the partnership’ (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002: 170). They are against the widespread use of the term public-private partnership for a variety of public-private cooperative efforts, and argue for a more precise vocabulary to distinguish PPPs from other organisational forms. Dutch public management scholars, Klijn and Teisman (2005: 96) define PPPs from a collaborative perspective as ‘more or less sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared’. On one hand, this definition of PPPs enhances their scope as it adds the feature of ‘sustainable cooperation’ alongside the more traditional benefits of risks and profit sharing envisaged for ‘contracting out’ and ‘privatisation’. On the other hand, this definition rules out organisational forms such as contracting-out or outsourcing being referred to as PPPs. In a somewhat similar vein, Wettenhall (2010) refers to contractual PPPs as ‘so-called PPPs’. He draws on Powell and Glendinning (2002) to define ‘real partnerships’ as those that involve interdependencies, trust, equality or reciprocity.

There are some scholars that use the term PPPs in a more generic way to refer to any type of working arrangement between government and the private sector (Skelcher 2005; Pollitt 2003; Bovaird 2004). Under this perspective PPP is used as a ‘catch-all’ term to cover a wide range of organisational forms and a wide variety of arrangements. For instance, Bloomfield (2006) highlights a range of PPPs:

The appealing ‘public-private partnership’ label encompasses a broad spectrum of creative, intersectoral initiatives. Some rely on private philanthropy to achieve a public objective; others use public funding to support the missions of private, nonprofit organizations; and still others are business transactions, many of which take the form of novel contracting arrangements (Bloomfield 2006: 400).

Whilst the advocates of collaborative PPPs dismiss contracting-out as a type of PPP, those writing from a more general perspective consider contracting-out as a form of PPP and sometimes use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Kettl 1993). This wider view of PPPs is prominent in the literature on PPPs for infrastructural development. The
PPP literature on infrastructure notes a variety of PPP arrangements such as BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer), BOT (build-own-transfer) and many other variants of the generic nomenclature DBFO (design-build-finance-operate). Pollitt (2003) refers to these as forms of PPPs and has organised them on the basis of the degree of private sector involvement. These arrangements typically involve some type of commercial contract whereby the government states its intended outputs and the private sector designs, manages, operates and delivers some of the services (Skelcher 2005; Pollitt 2003).

There are numerous such models, typologies, descriptions and categorisations that can be found in the existing literature on PPPs. For example, in their typology of PPPs based on two dimensions, the nature of organisational and financial relationships, Greve and Hodge (2005: 6) place different arrangements in a 2x2 matrix. Both dimensions are characterised by how tight or loose public and private actors are organised and engaged financially. The tighter forms are broadly referred to as contractual PPPs and the looser forms correspond to collaborative PPPs (see Figure 2.1).

**Figure 2.1: Greve and Hodge typology of PPPs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance/ Organization</th>
<th>Tight Financial Relationship</th>
<th>Loose Financial Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tight</strong></td>
<td>Joint-venture companies</td>
<td>BOOT, BOT, Sale-and-lease-back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>Joint stock companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship</strong></td>
<td>Joint development projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tight</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Greve and Hodge (2005: 6)

Klijn’s (2010: 74) 2x2 matrix resembles that by Greve and Hodge but Klijn goes into further depth by capturing whether the type of relationship between the public and private actors resembles a principal-principal relationship or a principal-agent relationship (see Figure 2.2). There are some others who have developed multi-dimensional models analysing partnerships along more than two dimensions. Zarco-Jasso (2005), for instance, explains the difference between different forms of PPPs along three dimensions, ownership, funding and control, resulting in 2x2x2 matrix.
Figure 2.2: Klijn typology of PPPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of relation/ Organizational form</th>
<th>A principal-agent relation</th>
<th>Partnership relation (equal principal-principal relations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tight organizational form</td>
<td>1. Design, build, finance, operate contracts (PFI like partnerships)</td>
<td>2. Consortium (like Urban Regeneration Companies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loosely coupled</td>
<td>3. Intensive general cooperation between public-private actors (in policy programs for instance)</td>
<td>4. Network like partnership (intensive over a long time but loosely coupled organizational relationship)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Klijn (2010: 74)

Many partnership frameworks and typologies in the existing literature suggest that some types of partnerships are better than others. Generally, these frameworks advocate that the higher the level of collaboration the better. Brinkerhoff (2002b), for example, has categorised different inter-organisational arrangements in her 2x2 framework that defines partnerships as a specific type of relationship characterised by both high organisational identity and high mutuality. Similarly Austin (2000) in his conceptual framework asserts that there are three different types of partnerships – philanthropic, transactional and integrative – which are placed on a collaboration continuum as stages and ‘the strategic value of the alliance increases from minor to major’ as a partnership moves from philanthropic to integrative (Austin 2000: 72).

All this suggests some type of hierarchy of different forms of partnerships (either explicitly or implicitly). Schaeffer and Loveridge refer to a phenomenon where a ‘closer’ form of partnerships may grow out of a ‘weaker’ form:

In real life, a closer form of cooperation may grow out of a weaker form. Cooperation is not static but a process that changes over time. As participants gain experience working together successfully, they build mutual trust that permits them to take on riskier projects, make bigger commitments, and work together more closely (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002: 182).

These perspectives on PPPs promote higher levels of collaboration grounded in the principles of equality, reciprocal accountability, organisational autonomy, continuing interactions and joint decision-making in PPPs. The PPP literature as a whole seems to have been concerned with improving collaboration in PPPs, although those who adopt a broad definition of PPPs have been less focused on the benefits of
collaboration. One reason for the prevailing pro-collaboration disposition in the literature is that researchers have typically approached their investigation of PPPs from the perspective of a public sector that is resistant to relinquish its autonomy and control. As a result there are few studies that have examined the issues from the perspective of private sector partners in PPPs. Given these insights from the literature, this research has investigated the relational aspects of PPPs from the point of view of both public and private sector partners in PPPs.

Whilst there is a substantial amount of literature and a great deal of research into PPPs, much of it is skewed towards the developed countries context. Within this literature PPPs are often discussed with respect to different dominant paradigms, such as re-engineering in the United States, the need for governance in a pluralist state in the United Kingdom or the prominence of the new public management in the New Zealand model (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). It has already been noted by many scholars working from an international development perspective that the study of PPPs needs to be context specific and it is important to study PPPs in developing countries contexts too (Lewis 2000; Parker and Figueira 2010). Some important insights from the existing research on PPPs in developing countries are discussed in the following sub-section.

### 2.2.3 PPPs in developing countries

Although the phenomenon and practice of PPPs has its origins in British and American public policy (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1991), there has been an increasing interest in PPPs in developing countries too. Many of the factors that account for the increased popularity and interest in PPPs tend to be similar across developed and developing countries. These factors include the different strengths and weaknesses of the public and private sector, the potential of PPPs to reduce the burden on strained public resources, access to private finance for expanding or improving public services, and greater value for money for public projects.

Nevertheless, developing countries have specific characteristics that make the study of PPPs significantly different from developed economies (Pessoa 2008). One factor that is particular to developing countries is the added pressure from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and Department for International
Development. Many developing countries depend on these institutions for financial assistance to improve infrastructure and public services delivery. Inspired by the idea – or at least the rhetoric (see Brinkerhoff 2002c for a detailed discussion) - of PPPs the provision of financial assistance by these institutions is ‘often linked to changing the focus and orientation of government from direct involvement and intervention to a role revolving around partnership and facilitation’ (Dima 2004: 415).

Historically, in the context of developing countries, private sector organisations (both for-profits and not-for-profits) have played an important role in filling the gap left by governments in public service provision. However, the role of the private sector has been neglected by most governments (Jütting 1999). Indeed, donor-funded PPPs have contributed to making governments first acknowledge and then support the efforts of private sector in service delivery (Brinkerhoff 2003). Due to donor influence, PPPs have evolved as a significant aspect of public service delivery in many developing countries and have taken a central position in many policy documents (see example of Pakistan in Chapter 1).

The existing literature on PPPs in the context of developing countries rarely uses the term PPPs and refer to these arrangements as ‘partnerships’ or ‘development partnerships’. The coverage of private sector partners in much of this literature is narrowed down to not-for-profits (or NGOs) (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Coston 1998; Batley and Rose 2011). The literature specific to partnerships in developing countries can be broadly divided in two streams. The first stream of literature, which is usually published in journals related to development studies such as Public Administration and Development and Journal of International Development, is occupied with the comparative advantages and criticism of partnership arrangements. The second stream of literature comprises special reports, corporate materials and project documentation published by international donors who describe PPPs in glowing terms (Brinkerhoff 2002b).

Within the first stream of literature, those in favour of partnerships predominantly highlight the ‘striking trend’ towards partnerships based on the ‘comparative advantages’ of governments and NGOs (Najam 2000). This stream of literature takes what Brinkerhoff (2002b: 20) calls ‘the moral high ground…[and argues that
partnership] is the most ethically appropriate approach to sustainable development and service delivery’. Much of the comparative advantage argument in this literature stems from the notion that governments in developing countries are unable to provide adequate public services to the citizens and refers to state failure with respect to an efficient use of resources (Moran 2006; Teamey 2007).

Along with the debates and arguments in favour of partnerships, criticisms and critiques of partnerships are also widely documented within the first stream of literature. For example, Mercer (2002: 6), on the basis of her review of the literature on the role of NGOs in the politics of development across the developing world, argues that ‘the failure to theorize the political impact of NGOs has led to an overly inadequate, explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology’ which has encouraged the tendency to take NGOs’ positive role as axiomatic. Following a critique of this approach, she contends that the role of NGOs in relation to the state is far more complex than much of the NGO literature would suggest.

Similar to the PPP literature in developed countries, the literature in the context of developing countries also tends to focus more on the structural and economic issues, and is concentrated on infrastructural PPPs (e.g. Dima 2004; Pessoa 2008) to the detriment of service delivery PPPs. Yet the PPP literature in relation to developing countries has given more attention to the relational aspects as compared to the PPP literature in developed countries, but is nevertheless dominated by ‘a thin prescriptive, instrumentalist account of factors that make a relationship between government and NSP better’ (Teamey 2007: 8). For instance, MacDonald and Chrisp (2005) argue that whilst the need for trust is emphasised in the partnership literature, it rarely sheds light on how trust can be developed.

Despite these shortcomings, the attention paid towards understanding the complexity of relationships in the PPP literature in the context of developing countries has resulted in many typologies of government-NGO relationships (e.g. Najam 2000; Lewis 1997; Young 2000; Coston 1998). These typologies are helpful in the context of this thesis as they offer possible ways to study the IORs in PPPs which are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
With regards to the second stream of literature, much of this literature considers PPPs as the (only) way forward to meet the challenges of public services delivery in developing countries. These arguments are often based on impact evaluations of PPPs carried out in both developed and developing countries. In his analysis of these documents, Verger (2011) found the World Bank’s *The role and impact of PPPs in education* (Patrinos et al. 2009) as one of the most comprehensive review of PPPs based on 22 academic studies and 92 practical experiences of PPPs. Due to its direct relevance to the area of this research, this report is discussed in section 2.2.4.

### 2.2.4 PPPs in education

Whilst education service delivery lies in the realm of public management, it is surprising to find the relative paucity of research on educational partnerships in the PPP literature. Even if we look at the broader public administration and management literature the emphasis seems to be more on health services rather than education. Hence, this sub-section draws much more on literature from the field of education studies alongside reports published by international donors.

Many different forms of PPPs are currently used in the education sector around the world. According to Patrinos (2009) three main areas in which PPPs can be involved are in delivering inputs, processes and outputs. Some governments buy the services involved in producing education (inputs), such as teacher training, management, curriculum design, or the use of a school facility from private organisations. Other governments contract with private organisations to provide the process of education, for example, by managing and operating public schools. Some other governments contract with private organisations to provide education to specific students (thus, buying outputs).

Different countries have responded to education sector challenges by involving the private sector in education service delivery in different ways. If we adopt a more generic perspective towards what constitutes a PPP (as adopted by most of the literature in the field of education and donors funding PPP projects), there are many examples of educational PPPs round the globe. Some of these examples are summarised in Table 2.2.
### Table 2.2: Examples of PPPs in education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>The private sector is involved mainly through Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) in which educational infrastructure is designed, built, financed and managed by a private sector consortium under a PFI contract that typically lasts for 30 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>The PPPs are mainly carried out for building school infrastructure whereby the private sector is given the responsibility to finance, design and construct public schools under a long-term contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>The Province of Nova Scotia used a P3 model to build 39 schools in the late 1990s. The Province of Alberta and the Province of Nova Scotia initiated P3 New Schools Project whereby a private-sector partner is responsible for the design, construction, finance and maintenance of a specified number of schools for under a long-term contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>The private management of public schools has existed since the early 1990s and takes the form of charter schools. Contract schools remain publicly owned and funded but are managed by the private sector, and students do not pay fees to attend these schools. Under Milwaukee Parental Choice Programme (MCPC) vouchers were provided to poor families to allow them to send their children to private schools at state expense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Colegios en Concesión (Concession Schools) programme, under which the management of some public schools is turned over to private schools with proven track records of delivering high quality education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>The Educational Service Contracting (ESC) scheme enables government to contracts with private schools to enrol students in areas where there is a shortage of places in public high schools. The per-student payment is made to private schools by government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Independent private schools receive government subsidies that are estimated at 25 to 35 percent of the average per pupil cost of educating a child in a government school. Subsidies are enrolment-based and vary with grade level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE), a local NGO, manages government schools (more details provided in Chapter 5). The Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) in the Punjab province of Pakistan operates several PPP programmes where private sector is funded to provide education services to students (discussed in detail in Chapter 7).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from LaRocque (2008) and (Patrinos et al. 2009)
PPPs whereby governments mobilise private investment for the availability and maintenance of infrastructure are usually referred to as Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) (Bing et al. 2005). It is clear from the examples of PPPs in the Table 2.2 that this method of financing is used in many OECD countries. According to Gibson and Davies (2008: 75) many schools would not have been built in the UK in the absence of PFI as ‘public money is often simply not available’.

Weak management is often recognised as a significant constraint to improving the performance of public schools (Patrinos et al. 2009). To deal with this problem, some governments have initiated PPP programmes that invite private organisations to manage non-functional public schools. These PPP programmes aim to improve public schools in four main areas: quality, access, infrastructure and community participation (LaRocque 2008). PPPs where the private sector manages public schools are argued to have the potential to improve quality and increase efficiency because these schools have more autonomy than traditional public schools (Patrinos et al. 2009). However, the extensive review carried out by LaRocque (2006) found that whilst there is evidence of significant performance improvements in some examples, there are cases where private management of public schools either had no impact or resulted in deterioration in school performance. Hence, the findings regarding the impact of private sector management of public schools are inconclusive.

PPPs in which the private sector is responsible for the provision of educational services are referred to as demand-side financing programmes whereby students or schools are directly funded according to demand. The mechanisms for demand-side financing are vouchers, subsidies, capitation grants and stipends (Patrinos 2000). The most common mechanisms for this type of partnership are vouchers or voucher like programmes which are practiced in many countries including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands and Sweden (LaRocque 2008). In voucher based programmes the public sector provides students with vouchers that can be used to attend a school of their choice, thus encouraging student choice and school competition (Hoxby 2000).
Many international financial institutions back the idea of PPPs in education and advocate their potential capacity to deal with a range of education problems that are common in developing countries context. In addition, provision of funding in many cases is tied to working in partnerships because it is considered that governments need to take the private sector more seriously in order to meet the Education For All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (Verger 2011; Rose 2006). These arguments are often based on empirical evidence from evaluation studies of educational PPPs, mostly using quantitative analysis techniques. Most of these studies show that learning outcomes across many countries around the globe are better in the education systems with high levels of public funding and high levels of private provision (Woessmann 2006; Patrinos et al. 2009). In addition, qualitative studies and experiences also highlight lessons learned from a range of successful practices on private sector engagement for the delivery of public education. For example, a report published by Asian Development Bank documents the experience and lessons learned from the Punjab Education Foundation’s PPPs in Pakistan (Malik 2010).

In short, a wide range of PPPs is used in the education sector around the world. Examples of educational PPPs can be found extensively both in developed and developing countries. It is no surprise that educational PPPs are now a ubiquitous phenomenon and the literature on them is expanding. Evidence of the impact of educational PPPs is also emerging from evaluations of various projects mainly funded by international donor organisations. Although much is being learned from these ongoing evaluations, they are also raising more and deeper questions (Patrinos et al. 2009) such as how different types of PPPs can affect education outcomes and which factors support or impede the achievement of outcomes in educational PPPs. These questions need to be explored in both developing and developed countries contexts for theory building and improving the practice of PPPs in order to meet education goals. Consequently, this thesis contributes to better understanding of educational PPPs by investigating their operation in Pakistan.
2.3 PPP and IOR literatures: bridging the ‘silos’

The PPP canvas is broad and multi-disciplinary (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002; Hodge et al. 2010). It is well known that the research traditions, vocabulary, academic interests, epistemic and methodological assumptions of different disciplines vary enormously (Zald 1995). This implies that different disciplines pursue their specific research questions when they look at PPPs through their disciplinary lenses. In the field of accounting, for instance, the focus primarily resides in value for money, risk transfer and balance sheet figures (Broadbent and Laughlin 1999; 2003). In the field of law, the focus is more on the legal and regulatory aspects of PPPs and questions revolve around ‘getting the contract right’ for different delivery models (Evans and Bowman 2005), the role of national regulatory framework to support PPPs and comparing the legal aspects of PPPs across different countries (Arrowsmith 2006; Tvarnø 2010). The economists’ perspective is tilted towards market conditions, transaction costs and efficiency questions. Scholars in political science and public administration are usually interested in governing partnerships and investigating the relationship between democratic practices and the institutional design of PPPs (Bovaird and Loffler 2003; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Skelcher et al. 2005).

The different disciplinary orientations of PPP scholars has resulted in what Cropper and his colleagues have referred to as ‘research traditions that had grown silo-like’ whereby each silo ‘seemed to store unique grains of insight’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 8). It is possible to identify such ‘silos’ both within and across different fields of study. For instance, Greve and Hodge (2005), have identified two research domains within the PPP literature studying the effectiveness of PPPs: one is public policy and public finance, and the second is economics and construction engineering. The authors discuss the limited interactions between these two research domains. Though not untypical in social sciences, limited interactions across research domains and fields of study inhibit the theoretical progress of the PPP discourse. Rather than acting as building blocks to address the concerns and issues often associated with PPPs, lack of interaction produces fragmented ‘silos’ that are governed by specific topics and theories.
It has already been noted that a lot of scholarly attention has been directed at understanding the structural and economic aspects, and that the relational aspects of the PPPs are relatively under-researched. However, there are other research traditions and fields of study that can help us develop a better understanding to explore the nature and dynamics of IORs in PPPs. Some PPP scholars have already identified some learning potentials in this respect. Weihe (2010), for example, has provided a detailed account of conceptual similarities and differences between the PPP and alliance/IOR literatures. She asserts that the alliance literature has the potential to fill knowledge gaps in the PPP literature and can ‘enrich our understanding of the dynamic and evolutionary nature of cooperation’ (Weihe 2010: 520). She argues that although both literatures are concerned with analysing cooperation across organisation boundaries, little or no communication has taken place across these two fields of research. This section discusses the relevance of the IOR literature to studying PPPs, but it also discusses some points of caution to be borne in mind when bridging the ‘silos’ from two different fields of study.

2.3.1 Origins and relevance of the IOR literature

The roots of the IOR literature can be traced in the mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literature. It has gathered insightful knowledge based on ‘rich theoretical and empirical study by multiple disciplines for decades’ (Austin 2000: 70) and comprises theories that focus both on explaining the motives to establish such relationships and on their ongoing dynamics. Scholars in the field of IOR have contributed from some distinct theoretical perspectives such as resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), exchange (Levine and White 1961) and efficiency perspectives (Williamson 1979; 1985). They have sought to investigate the determinants of relationship formation (Oliver 1990; Galaskiewicz 1985); strategic collaboration (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham 1996b; Kanter 1994); developmental processes (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Arino and de la Torre 1998; Doz 1996) and the structures of social relations (Granovetter 1985). The IOR literature encompasses studies of organisations from a variety of institutional backgrounds, such as relationships between organisations within the same sector and cross-sector arrangements. The literature includes the study of government-non-profit relations (Salamon 1995; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002), business-non-profit relations
Similar to the PPP literature, the IOR literature comprises various discipline-based investigations grounded in a specific theory or theories (Cropper et al. 2010). What unites the IOR literature is its aim to examine and understand the ‘pattern of relations between and among organisations that are pursuing a mutual interest while also remaining independent and autonomous, thus retaining separate interests’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 9). This applies to PPPs too. It is somewhat surprising to note that although a PPP is inherently a type of inter-organisational arrangement there is very limited application of the IOR literature in the study of PPPs (Weihe 2010). Transaction costs economics (TCE), as an exception, has received a great deal of attention from PPP scholars (e.g. Martin 2005; Boardman and Vining 2010) due to their interest in the economic and efficiency issues of PPPs. PPP scholars have been interested in what institutional arrangements or types of PPPs are best suited for what function. TCE provides a framework that suits these types of question and this is the reason that we find widespread application of transaction cost theory in the PPP literature.

The benefits of bridging the PPP and IOR literatures are not unidirectional. While there are opportunities for the PPP literature to learn from IOR scholarship, the IOR literature can also be enriched by this integration. Kelman (2005) points out that much of the pioneering work in organisation theory was written about public organisations. However, the attention the field used to pay to public organisations has withered over the last decades (Kelman 2005). He identifies several areas where public management researchers have the potential to contribute to the mainstream organisation theory literature. Examples include the impact of nonfinancial performance measures on organisational performance, eliciting good performance through other than financial incentives and management of obligation delivery. He mentions these examples as issues that are more important in public than in private contexts and ‘arise almost exclusively in a public organization context’ (Kelman 2005: 968).
The IOR literature is more directed towards the study of private-private alliances and the PPP literature is about public-private alliances. Nevertheless, both literatures are focused on working arrangements across organisational boundaries. Hence, it is argued that both the PPP and IOR literatures have some immediate value and learning opportunities for each other.

2.3.2 Reasons for caution
While supporting greater interaction between the PPP literature and the IOR literature it is essential to flag some points of caution. This section outlines three crucial points to be cautious about when utilising the findings and theories in the IOR literature and offers suggestions to deal with some of the difficulties. Firstly, it is important to warn PPP researchers that the IOR literature is ‘analytically messy’ with different perspectives overlapping and intersecting one another (Galaskiewicz 1985: 298). As a result PPP researchers could drown in the deep ocean of IOR knowledge. Nevertheless, the good news is that from time to time scholars have provided helpful overviews and insights of the field (e.g. Whetten 1981; Galaskiewicz 1985; Oliver 1990; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Hibbert et al. 2010) which help researchers to navigate the vast and diverse field of IOR literature.

A second point of caution is the problem of inconsistent use of different terminologies in the IOR literature. This issue has been raised as a problem in defining PPPs too. In section 2.2.1, it was mentioned that the term ‘partnership’ is used to convey many different perspectives. Similarly, as noted by Hibbert, Huxham and Ring (2010) the use of terminologies in the IOR literature and in practice does not ‘coalesce towards any agreed version’ which makes it difficult to transfer the knowledge from theory to practice (Hibbert et al. 2010: 405). For example, at a very basic level the term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ is sometimes viewed as an umbrella term to represent the organisational forms or structures such as ‘partnerships’, ‘alliance’, ‘joint venture’ and ‘networks’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Huxham 2003). The term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ is also viewed from a process perspective (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Thomson and Perry 2006; Levine and White 1961). Here they are seen as ‘the sequence of events and interaction among organisational parties that unfold to shape and modify an IOR over time’
Under the process perspective IORs are seen as a developmental process as opposed to the structural form these relationships take.

In order to address this confusion, as noted in Chapter 1, in this thesis the acronym ‘IORs’ refers to inter-organisational relationships between interacting parties and ‘IOR’ represents the name of the field i.e. inter-organisational relations. The term ‘inter-organisational arrangement’ is used to refer to the organisational form such as partnerships. Moreover, the term ‘collaboration’, which also carries several meanings in the IOR literature, is used to refer to participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of partnership activities and trust (Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson et al. 2009; Brinkerhoff 2002a).

The third reason for caution when linking the IOR and PPP literatures is that the IOR literature is dominated, though not limited, by the discussion of private-private relationships in a competitive setting such as strategic alliance, joint ventures and interlocking directorates. PPP is different in this respect as it involves public-private interaction. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that the models or theories developed in the broader IOR literature ‘do not have automatic relevance for PPPs’ (Noble and Jones 2006: 914). Although it is not possible to dismiss such arguments, it is important to keep in mind that under the prescriptions of ‘New Public Management’, public sector organisations have undergone many reforms involving the adoption of private sector styles of management (Hood 1991). PPPs have different dynamics as compared to private-private partnerships and this feature distinguishes them ‘from the rest of the IOR literature and thus demand a specific and individual analysis’ (Noble and Jones 2006: 914). But, nevertheless, they are inherently a form of inter-organisational arrangement and hence constitute part of the broader IOR literature. The more we cross-fertilize the PPP literature with the IOR literature, the more we can learn about the ways in which PPPs are similar and different to other inter-organisational arrangements.

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2.4 Insights from the IOR literature

After discussing some reasons for caution while utilising the IOR literature as part of understanding and explaining IORs in PPP, this section outlines some key concepts and insights from the IOR literature. It is not an extensive review of the broad IOR literature, nor does it provide an exhaustive list of the ways in which IOR scholarship can complement the PPP literature. Rather, the discussion focuses on the concepts and insights that are particularly useful and relevant to address the research questions set out for this thesis.

The IOR literature encompasses studies of different forms of inter-organisational arrangement and it is also characterised by the diversity of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives adopted and the topics that are investigated. Cropper and colleagues identify two ‘core building blocks’ in IOR research: ‘a set of dimensions describing the relating organisations and a set of dimensions describing the nature of the relationships through which they are linked’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 9). They go on to explain that there are two more ‘building blocks’ which are important but do not have the same status as the ‘core building blocks’ of IOR research. Rather, they add precision to the core building blocks and can help to explain and theorise IORs by identifying factors and processes that shape IORs. These additional building blocks are the ‘context in which both organisations and their relations are embedded, and the processes through which IORs are established, maintained, changed and dissolved, and produce outcomes’ (Cropper et al. 2010: 10).

This suggests that in order to understand and examine IORs in PPPs one needs to study the nature of the organisations involved, the dimensions and attributes of relationships, the context in which they operate, and the developmental stages of PPPs.

With respect to the nature of organisations, both the PPP and IOR literatures draw on the mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literature to examine the internal features and dynamics of the organisations. Amongst the most common dimensions investigated are an organisation’s vision and mission; leadership; organisational culture and structure; and financial autonomy. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the conceptual framework for this research draws on the organisation
theory and behaviour literature to understand the ways in which these organisational dimensions shape IORs in PPPs.

In order to examine the **dimensions and attributes of inter-organisational relationships**, it is important to appreciate the main theoretical frameworks that have underpinned the analysis of these in the IOR literature (and these are discussed in sub-section 2.4.1).

Although the IOR literature emphasises the need to study the **context** under which organisations choose to establish the inter-organisational arrangements, the study of contextual factors is often limited to examining them as initial conditions or antecedents to the formation of inter-organisational arrangements. This thesis takes an approach where contextual factors are not conceived as only antecedents but also examines the ways in which these factors unfold and interplay with other factors during the operation of PPPs and thus continue to shape the nature of IORs (and this is discussed further in Chapter 3).

While both PPP and IOR scholars point out that the formation of inter-organisational arrangements is a multiphase **process** (Murray 1998; Noble and Jones 2006; Ring and Van de Ven 1994), there are many variations in the ways in which this process is explained. IOR scholars usually explain the developmental process as separate stages and argue that it is useful to separate them for analytical purposes (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Arino and de la Torre 1998). The developmental process of inter-organisational arrangements as explained in Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and some other researchers is the subject of discussion in sub-section 2.4.2.

### 2.4.1 Major theoretical paradigms

Most studies in the IOR literature are based on one or more theories. In some cases scholars build their argument on one theoretical perspective, while in other situations they combine elements from different theories for comparison or synthesis purposes. This is particularly evident in the strand of IOR literature that examines the factors that influence an organisation's decision to enter an inter-organisational arrangement. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine all of these (for that, see Oliver and Ebers 1998). Instead, the focus is limited to those theories that are more relevant and
have implications for PPPs. For instance, the strategic choice perspective (though useful to analyse private-private relationships) can be argued as less relevant to PPPs due to its focus on increased competitiveness and market power. Of course, these motives have become less unique to the private-private relationships and one can argue that entering PPPs may be based on partners’ desires to enhance organisational competitiveness. Still, given that pursuing societal goals usually lie at the heart of PPPs, it is reasonable to argue that a strategic choice perspective is not as relevant to PPPs as it is in the context of private-private alliances.

The five theoretical paradigms examined here are:

- Resource dependence
- Exchange theory
- Agency theory
- Transaction costs economics
- Institutional theory

Each theory offers insights into the motives to enter an inter-organisational arrangement and the balance of IORs in these arrangements. Hence, two purposes will guide the discussion of the different theoretical perspectives: underlying motives and the predicted balance of IORs. The analysis of underlying motives draws on the framework developed by Oliver (1990) which integrates the IOR literature so as to offer ‘a set of predictive critical contingencies that are potentially generalizable across a broad range of IORs’ (Oliver 1990: 242). She proposes ‘six critical contingencies of relationship formation’ (hereafter referred to as motives) that persuade the organisations to establish inter-organisational arrangements: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. This framework is an influential piece of work and is widely cited as a useful summary of motives for the formation of inter-organisational arrangements of various types. In relation to PPPs, this framework has a potential to explain and understand the reasons why public and private sector parties choose to enter PPPs. As expected these motives may overlap and interact with one another but it is useful to separate them for analytical purposes. This framework is an important part of the conceptual framework for this research and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
In relation to discussing the resulting balance of IORs predicted by different theoretical paradigms, the main distinction is between a symmetrical or asymmetrical balance. Symmetrical relationships signify that the resulting inter-organisational arrangement is characterised by equality of all parties involved. An asymmetrical balance of IORs indicates that one of the organisations becomes either more dominant or is willing to be subordinate, and thus there is lack of balance in the relationships.

The five theoretical paradigms are discussed separately below and important elements of discussion are also outlined in Table 2.3.

**Resource dependence**

A bibliometric analysis of the IOR literature by Oliver and Ebers (1998) concludes that resource dependence theory is one of the most frequently employed theories in the IOR literature. Resource dependence generally attributes motives of power and control to the formation of inter-organisational arrangements. The idea of interdependence lies at the heart of resource dependence that is a ‘consequence of the open-systems nature of organizations’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 43). It focuses on resources that an organisation must acquire from external sources for its survival or success. The need to acquire resources creates interdependencies between organisations. Although such interdependencies could be symmetric in nature as in the case of reciprocal exchange of resources, a resource dependence perspective argues that organisations must strive to decrease dependence on other organisations by securing control over critical resources. Moreover, an organisation should also acquire control over resources required by other organisations in order to increase their dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).

The formation of a partnership is generally seen as a mechanism to gain access to important resources held by others. In short, from a resource dependence paradigm an organisation enters partnerships to tap the resources of other organisations and gain competitive advantage while striving to acquire power and control over other organisations. Hence, resource dependence suggests that in cases where the formation of PPPs is triggered by the desire to gain power and control in order to achieve own goals, the balance of IORs is likely to be asymmetrical.
**Exchange theory**

The conceptual framework provided by exchange theory is somewhat similar to the resource dependence perspective in one fundamental way. Both paradigms are rooted in the notion of interdependencies and that organisations must interact with their environment to obtain resources in order to achieve their goals. However, both theories are quite distinct in their approach to overcome dependencies. The resource dependence paradigm, as mentioned above, proposes an asymmetric balance of IORs by seeking power and control. Exchange theory, on the other hand, generally refers to an exchange between organisations based on motives of reciprocity whereby ‘the process of linkage formation typically will be characterized by balance, harmony, equity, and mutual support, rather than by coercion, conflict, and domination’ (Oliver 1990: 245). However, this does not necessarily mean that the exchange of resources is always equal and reciprocal. Absolute equality in this sense would be extremely difficult to attain and is not sought for. Instead symmetry signifies comparative rather than an absolute equality in the exchange of resources.

One common reason for the formation of PPPs that fits the tenets of exchange theory is that organisations enter such arrangements to pursue common or mutually beneficial goals or interests. Although the notion of resource scarcity underpins both resource dependence and exchange theories, it is likely to induce cooperation instead of competition in the view of the latter (Alter and Hage 1993). Thus the balance of IORs is likely to be more symmetrical when parties enter from exchange perspective.

**Agency theory**

Agency theory, also referred to as the principal-agent model, is particularly relevant to the study of PPPs. PPP scholars often use this theory as a point of comparison when distinguishing ‘real’ or collaborative partnerships from other partnership-like arrangements. Agency theory usually describes a contracting relationship between two or more parties whereby one party (the principal) chooses to contract with one or more parties (the agent/s) for reasons of cost and expertise. A principal chooses to enter an inter-organisational arrangement with an agent when it lacks the expertise or resources required to produce a good or service within its own organisational domain (Van Slyke 2007). In their frameworks, PPP scholars usually refer to the public
actors as principals and private parties as agents (Klijn 2010; Kort and Koppenjan 2013).

Agency theory is based on two assumptions: 1) goal conflict between the principal and the agent due to the utility maximising behaviour of each party, and 2) information asymmetry resulting in opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989a). As a theory, the focus is on the contract that governs the principal-agent relationship. Hence, the principal and agent(s) agree on the terms of the contract including the inputs, processes, outcomes, quality and satisfaction parameters, monitoring and performance-reporting requirements, how the agent is to be compensated for doing the work of the principal, and the sanctions that will result if the principal detects the agent pursuing his/her own goals above the principal’s objectives (Van Slyke 2007: 162).

Due to the above mentioned assumptions, the principal may use incentives, sanctions, and impose reporting requirements on the agents so as to ensure goal alignment between both parties. It is believed that principals are less likely to experience agent opportunism and goal divergence when they provide ‘clear incentives, such as contract renewal and stability, discretion and flexibility in program implementation, reputational enhancement, and vigilant monitoring through a myriad of formal and informal mechanisms’ (Van Slyke 2007: 163).

Agency theory predicts an asymmetrical balance of IORs in which a principal chooses to enter an inter-organisational arrangement to pursue the motives of efficiency. The theory does not clearly explain the motives of agents entering into these arrangements. One reason for this is that the analysis and application of agency theory is mostly carried out from the principal’s perspective. For example, the principal decides to delegate specific work to an agent and then uses tools such as monitoring to avoid opportunistic behaviour of the agents. However, it should be noted that theory itself is not ‘unidirectional’ (Van Slyke 2007). Similar to agents, principals may also act opportunistically by using information for their own interests. This thesis is concerned with the application of agency theory from both principal and agent perspective to understand the IORs in PPPs.
**Transaction costs economics (TCE)**

Transaction cost economics focuses on matching the different forms of economic institution, such as firms, intermediate structures and markets, for economic interactions so as to most efficiently organise a particular transaction. The choice of economic institution is dependent on the characteristics of the transaction such as the frequency of the transaction, the amount of investment required for the transaction and degree of certainty associated with the transaction (Williamson 1979; 1985). As noted by Barringer and Harrison (2000), Williamson’s early work recognised markets and hierarchies as the two forms of economic structures. It was later in his work that he identified inter-organisational forms as an intermediate economic structure (Williamson 1991).

With respect to inter-organisational forms, transaction cost theory suggests that organisations will choose to enter such arrangements in an attempt to become more efficient and economise on the costs of transactions. Many authors have raised concerns about TCE because explanations are limited to cost-minimising and efficiency rationales (Barringer and Harrison 2000). Moreover, the assumption ‘that everyone involved in a partnership will get along, and that the corporate cultures of the participants will meld together smoothly’ has also made authors critical of this theory (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 372, originally Faulkner, 1995).

Hence, underlying the Williamson’s transaction cost perspective are motives of efficiency and it can be expected that ‘the impetus to pursue mutually beneficial relations may be greater if an organization anticipates that greater internal efficiency will result from the relationship’ (Oliver 1990: 248). There are chances that motives of efficiency will interact with reciprocal motives and hence could lead to a symmetrical balance of IORs. No one writing from a TCE perspective within the IOR literature seems to predict that intermediate structures will be associated with control motives and asymmetrical relationships (Oliver 1990).

Although both transaction cost and agency theory envisage that motives of efficiency will stimulate organisations to enter partnership arrangement, the resulting balance of IORs predicted by both theories is different due to differences in their theoretical
tenets. Whilst the former predicts a symmetrical balance of IORs; the latter suggests an asymmetrical balance of IORs between interacting parties.

**Institutional theory**

Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments force organisations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 1991; Dacin et al. 2007). When institutional theory is applied to the formation of partnerships, the formation of a partnership can be explained by an organisation’s motive ‘to demonstrate or improve its reputation, image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional environment’ (Oliver 1990: 246). Along with the desire to improve reputation an organisation may be inclined to form partnerships simply as a result of isomorphic pressures which involve mimicking or imitating norms for its own survival and acceptance (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Following this argument, institutional theory predicts a more passive role for organisations as they conform to the rules and expectations of their institutional environment.

When organisations enter partnerships for the purpose of increasing legitimacy they are likely to adapt themselves so as to appear congruent to the ways in which the partner organisations operate. In this way isomorphism can encourage organisations to seek support from partners whose level of legitimacy is deemed higher than their own (Oliver 1990).

There are situations when entering partnerships are seen as desirable thing to do. It can also be either encouraged or enforced by the donors and funding agencies (Murray 1998; Bryson et al. 2006). In these cases the motives of legitimacy are intractably linked to those of stability and stimulate organisations to enter into inter-organisational arrangements so as to ensure a reliable flow of resources. From this perspective, enhanced legitimacy is also seen as a resource (Phillips et al. 2000) that helps to reduce uncertainty in the flow of funds. Hence, partnerships ‘serve as coping strategies to forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty in order to achieve an orderly, reliable pattern of resource flows and exchanges’ (Oliver 1990: 246).
Although institutional theory suggests that organisations enter partnership arrangements to enhance legitimacy, which may be linked to ensuring stability in the flow of resources, the theory is not clear about the resulting balance of relationships. It is only when institutional theory is combined with one or more of the other four theories that we can postulate the resulting balance of IORs. So keeping in view a relatively passive role for conforming organisations, we can expect an asymmetrical balance of relationships in situations where the partner organisation with higher legitimacy tends to exert power and dominate (influenced by a resource dependence perspective). Conversely, a symmetrical balance may result where the ‘legitimising partner’ envisages a reciprocal exchange relationship (as suggested by exchange theory).

Just as the scholars using agency theory focus more on the perspective of the principal, those drawing on institutional theory are mainly concerned with the organisation seeking to improve its legitimacy rather than the one which is perceived as more legitimate. This research aims to address this by exploring IORs in PPPs from the standpoints of all of the main parties involved.

This sub-section has introduced five important theoretical paradigms within the IOR literature and has examined their implications for understanding the underlying motives for entering inter-organisational arrangements and the resulting balance of relationships. This discussion is summarised in Table 2.3. Although each motive may be an independent and sufficient reason to enter PPPs, it is not surprising to find that different motives interact with each other both theoretically and empirically. So for example, the motives of efficiency and legitimacy may interact if an organisation anticipates that its legitimacy is enhanced if it becomes more efficient. The situation becomes further complicated if we think about diverse actors entering partnerships with varying reasons, which is the hallmark of a PPP. None of the theoretical paradigms outlined in this section is sufficient on its own to explain the formation of partnerships because each of them ‘explain relationship formation from a narrow point of view’ (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 395). Nevertheless, together these
theoretical perspectives contribute to a useful conceptual framework to understand IORs in PPPs.
### Table 2.3: Major theoretical paradigms and their implications for underlying motives and predicted balance of IORs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Paradigm</th>
<th>Description and main tenets</th>
<th>Motives to enter into partnerships</th>
<th>Predicted balance of relationship</th>
<th>Representative studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource dependence</td>
<td>In situations of interdependence organisations have incentives to work with other organisations to exert power or to gain control over organisations that possess scarce resources.</td>
<td>Asymmetry</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
<td>(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange theory</td>
<td>Motives for exchange are guided by desire to enter partnerships under the objective of pursuing common or mutually beneficial goals or interests.</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>(Levine and White 1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency theory</td>
<td>Agents and principals are driven by opportunities for their own personal gain. Due to information asymmetry both act opportunistically by exploiting information for their own self-interest. Such opportunism needs to be curtailed through some control mechanism, but since controls are imperfect, some opportunism will remain. A principal chooses to enter inter-organisational arrangement with an agent when it lacks the expertise or resources required to produce a good or service within its organisational domain.</td>
<td>Efficiency (for principals)</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
<td>(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989a; Van Slyke 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction costs economics</td>
<td>A theory from neo-institutional economic perspective that focuses on matching the economic institution, such as firms and markets, for economic interactions so as to most efficiently organise a particular transaction. The choice of economic institution is dependent on the characteristics of the transaction such as the frequency of the transaction, the amount of investment required for the transaction and</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>(Williamson 1979; 1985)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
degree of certainty associated with the transaction. ‘A transaction-specific governance structure is more fully developed where transactions are (1) recurrent, (2) entail idiosyncratic investment, and (3) are executed under greater uncertainty’ (Williamson 1979: 259)

| **Institutional theory** | Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments force organisations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms. One way an organisation may respond to these institutional pressures is by entering a partnership relationship with those organisations who have established reputation, image, visibility and/or prestige. Besides enhancing legitimacy an organisation may be inclined to form partnerships simply as a result of isomorphic pressures which involve mimicking or imitating norms for its own survival and acceptance. | Legitimacy and stability (for those are seeking to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms) | Not clear to the partner organisation deemed as legitimate | (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 1991; Dacin et al. 2007) |
2.4.2 Process frameworks

A common approach to explaining the process through which different inter-organisational arrangements evolve is to consider them passing through a set of stages or phases, also referred to as a life-cycle (Hibbert et al. 2010). There are two ways in which scholars have described the evolutionary process of inter-organisational arrangements: as a linear continuum of stages or as a repetitive cyclical process. The linear continuum is a more common approach and scholars have labelled such stages in different ways. To illustrate, Kanter (1994) describes the evolving relationship between companies using the marriage metaphor. Her model consists of five phases: selection and courtship; getting engaged; setting up housekeeping; learning to collaborate; and changing within. Another important process framework is that of Gray (1989) who conceptualises inter-organisational arrangements going through three sequential stages: problem setting, direction setting and implementation.

Similar to the IOR literature there are some linear staged frameworks in the PPP literature too. For example, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) have developed a four-stage partnership life-cycle: pre-partnership collaboration, partnership creation, partnership programme delivery and partnership termination or succession. Similarly, Noble and Jones (2006) have conceptualised four stages during the establishment of PPPs: pre-contact, trawling, sizing up and structuring the partnership. Murray (1998) has also developed a multi-phased process framework consisting of a series of stages: pre-contact, preliminary contact, negotiating, implementation and evaluation.

The successive stages in these frameworks do a fairly good job in understanding and analysing partnership life-cycles from many different perspectives such as which modes of governance are prominent at each stage, what managerial challenges are associated with different stages and what type of managerial interventions are more effective to tackle these challenges. These stages models also help to predict the type of IORs at different points during a partnership life-cycle. However, these frameworks have limited capacity to shed light on the developmental process of IORs and they insufficiently explain the dynamic nature of IORs within different
stages of PPPs (or any other inter-organisational arrangement). Whilst these linear stages provide a description of how partnerships develop over time, they do not explain much how the stages progress or how can we analyse the dynamic nature of IORs within each stage.

A particularly useful and influential framework that conceptualises processes as cyclical rather than linear is that of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) (Figure 2.3). This framework is helpful in understanding how IORs might unfold, develop and modify over time. When this framework is used alongside other process frameworks that conceptualise partnerships as passing through a set of stages, it may address the limited capacity of the linear models to explain the dynamic nature of IORs within different stages.

**Figure 2.3: Process framework for the development of inter-organisational arrangements**

Source: Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 97)
This framework conceptualises the developmental process of inter-organisational arrangements as comprising a repetitive sequence of three stages: negotiation, commitment and execution. These recurrent stages are proposed on the basis that if organisations can negotiate minimal, congruent expectations to undertake a joint action, they are likely to make commitments for an initial course of action. Such commitments are reached informally through a handshake and/or formally manifested in contracts, depending on the degree of risk and the willingness of organisations to rely on trust. However, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose that excessive reliance on either of these increases the likelihood of disintegration of inter-organisational arrangements. This implies that finding the right balance between formal and informal mechanisms is important to sustain these arrangements. Finally, execution refers to the stage where the commitments are put into practice. The authors assume that initially the relationship is likely to be based on the role-based behaviour of the parties which is informed by the formal structural agreements created at the commitment stage. However, after a series of interactions the parties may begin to rely on ‘inter-personal’ instead of ‘inter-role’ relationships.

Due to the cyclical nature of the framework, it is argued that changing expectations and situations may provide an incentive to rethink the terms of the relationship, resulting in a several new cycles of negotiations, commitments and executions. Similarly, if the commitments are not executed in an efficient and equitable manner, it will initiate renegotiations and adjustment in commitments. In the final cycle, the parties may decide to terminate the relationship.

On a closer look, Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) conceptualisation of the negotiation and commitment stages are consistent with the requirements for high levels of collaboration in the PPP literature. Similar to the Ring and Van de Ven’s framework, PPP scholars who distinguish collaborative partnerships from contractual arrangements put emphasis on the importance of negotiations to reach agreement. However, the logic behind the two lines of argument is somewhat different. The proponents of collaboration in PPPs support their standpoint by arguing that it allows partnership to take advantage of the strengths of both private and public sectors in ways that deliver synergistic outcomes (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005;
Peters 1998). Ring and Van de Ven (1994), on the other hand, argue that repeated negotiations provide the opportunity to participating organisations ‘to assess uncertainty associated with the deal, the nature of each other’s role, the other’s trustworthiness, their rights and duties in the transaction being considered, and possible efficiency and equity of the transaction as it relates to all parties’ (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 98). This shows that whilst the focus of most PPP scholars is mainly on outcomes and benefits of PPPs, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) pay attention to the role of process in shaping the inter-organisational arrangements and embedded IORs. The focus in the latter is useful to examine the ways in which IORs develop over time.

Whilst it is clear that the concept of *negotiation* is considered crucial in both the PPP and IOR literatures, Levine and White (1961) in their framework for the study of inter-organisational relationships offer another related concept of *orientation*. They argue that in order to develop an exchange relationship the interacting organisations need to accept each other’s goals, referred to as ‘domain consensus’. They provide a useful framework for thinking about the different ways in which ‘domain consensus’ is achieved and argue that in cases where the functions of interacting organisations are not clearly defined negotiations are required to reach acceptance. However, when the functions are more clearly specified, ‘domain consensus’ may instead be attained by a process of orientation during which one organisation informs other partner organisations about the goals to be achieved and gives them an opportunity ‘to inquire about the specific procedures’ (Levine and White 1961: 599). The process of orientation does not necessarily require the readjustments and compromises that lie at the heart of negotiations.

In sum, the aforementioned concepts and insights from the IOR literature when used vis-à-vis PPP literature can be valuable for understanding and examining IORs in PPPs, and hence will be incorporated in the conceptual framework of this study in the next chapter.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the broad and multi-disciplinary PPP literature and has concluded that whilst there is widespread agreement that PPPs are diverse and dynamic, there is no consensus on what constitutes a PPP and how to differentiate between varying forms of PPPs. The term public-private partnership is often labelled as ‘slippery’, ‘nebulous’, ‘contested’ and ‘ill-defined’ (Weihe 2008; Wettenhall 2010; Powell and Glendinning 2002) and is defined in various ways. Hence, on the basis of the existing literature there seems to be no definitive answer to the first research question about what a PPP is. Put differently, there is ongoing debate in the literature about what PPPs are but there is a consensus among scholars that PPPs are dynamic and diverse. Given that relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the relational aspects of PPPs, this research examines the dynamic IORs embedded in PPPs to help us better understand the PPPs.

The chapter has provided a brief review of the IOR literature and has identified the value of drawing on both the IOR and PPP literatures when studying the relational aspects of PPPs. The review of the IOR literature in this chapter indicates that IORs in PPPs should be investigated during the different stages through which PPPs are established and managed over time. Moreover, in order to understand what influences and shapes IORs in PPPs one needs to examine the context in which interacting organisations are embedded, the nature of the organisations involved and their motives to enter partnerships. Whilst these four aspects serve as building blocks to develop the conceptual framework for this research, what needs to be examined further is the best way of characterising IORs in PPPs which is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 Understanding inter-organisational relationships in PPPs: developing a conceptual framework

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed both the PPP and IOR literatures and suggested that integrating the insights from these two research fields is valuable for both fields of knowledge. This chapter goes into further details to develop the conceptual framework in order to answer the research questions set out for the study reported in this thesis.

The chapter is divided into five main sections and reflects the four building blocks, identified in the previous chapter, that are helpful to address the research questions. The first section discusses the conceptualisation of IORs in PPPs. The first half of this section considers the developmental process of both contractual and collaborative PPPs with particular attention to the IORs at different stages and the outcomes achieved. The second half of this section draws on the insights from the international development and not-for-profit sector literature to enhance our understanding of the complexity of IORs. Section 3.3 focuses on the contextual factors that are often discussed as influential determinants of IORs both in the PPP and in the broader IOR literature. Section 3.4 explains different organisational motives for choosing to enter partnerships and the ways these motives may shape the IORs. Section 3.5 outlines the organisational factors that have been found to be significant in shaping IORs. Section 3.6 integrates the concepts discussed in this chapter to articulate the conceptual framework for the research reported in this thesis.

3.2 Developmental stages of PPPs and the conceptualisation of IORs

Much of the PPP literature is focused on the balance of IORs in two main types of PPPs: contractual PPPs and collaborative PPPs. Scholars note the dominance of one party in asymmetrical relationships (contractual PPPs) versus a more symmetrical power relationship between interacting parties in collaborative PPPs. A common assumption is that the goal of PPPs should be to achieve collaborative IORs and a symmetrical balance of relationships, where no party to the partnership is dominant.
This is supported by some empirical evidence too. Koppenjan (2005), for example, argues that his empirical research on transport infrastructure PPPs in the Netherlands supports the advantages of collaboration and a ‘logic of connection’ as opposed to a contractual arrangement based on a ‘logic of division’.

Drawing on the PPP literature, Table 3.1 illustrates the contrasts between contractual and collaborative PPPs. From an organisation theory perspective, contractual PPPs closely resemble the tenets of agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989a; Van Slyke 2007). Collaborative PPPs, on the other hand, are based on the principles of a participative system (see Dachler and Wilpert 1978; McCaffrey et al. 1995) and notions of cooperation (Alter and Hage 1993). Table 3.1 lists the dimensions of PPPs that need to be investigated and considered in order to understand the embedded IORs. Keeping in view the developmental process of PPPs and IORs, the dimensions in Table 3.1 are grouped under three stage headings: PPP set-up, PPP management and PPP outcomes. Although it is not a common practice to include outcomes as a development stage, they are included in the table and in the conceptual framework because most arguments in favour of collaborative IORs are linked to achieving synergistic outcomes. Hence, it is important to compare contractual and collaborative PPPs with respect to outcomes too.

As discussed in Chapter 2, frameworks aimed at explaining the developmental process of inter-organisational arrangements do so in two main ways: as a linear continuum of stages or as a repetitive cyclical process. The conceptual framework for this research investigates the IORs during different linear stages but also considers the underlying iterations within these stages as suggested by Ring and Van de Ven (1994).
## Table 3.1: Comparison between contractual and collaborative PPPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project set-up</th>
<th>Contractual PPPs (logic of division)</th>
<th>Collaborative PPPs (logic of connection)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project definition</strong></td>
<td>Unilateral: public sector party specifies the problem and solutions</td>
<td>Joint project development: public and private parties involved in joint process of problem and solution specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delineation of responsibilities</strong></td>
<td>A clear distinction exists between the commissioner (public party) and the contractor (private party)</td>
<td>The government and the private party involved in joint decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project content and scope</strong></td>
<td>Scope reduction; subdivision of project into parts; <em>ex ante</em> goal setting</td>
<td>Scope management; integral planning; interweaving of objectives and interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preconditions for success</strong></td>
<td>Clear contract and tendering rules and clearly formulated problems/project requirements</td>
<td>Linking ambitions and goals as an ongoing process rather than clearly defined in advance, focus on jointly determined tailor-made rules for interaction to create commitment and profitable cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private sector involvement</strong></td>
<td>After formal public decision</td>
<td>From the phases of exploration and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk management</strong></td>
<td>Risks are reallocated and transferred</td>
<td>Risks are jointly assessed, reallocated and shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td>Hierarchical: private party held accountable for the terms agreed in the contract and monitored by public sector party to meet the conditions of the contract</td>
<td>Reciprocal: each partner is accountable to others for its actions and potential impact on the partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management principles</strong></td>
<td><em>Ex ante</em> frameworks; strongly based on principles of project management (specifying goals, organising time planning, organising manpower)</td>
<td>Based on the principles of process management (searching for goals, linking and connecting actors’ activities and linking of decisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of co-production</strong></td>
<td>Limited and occurring primarily prior to the tendering process; after that only monitoring; no co-production</td>
<td>Extensive during the whole process; at first primarily regarding the nature of ambitions and searching for linkages, later on more co-production in jointly realising ambitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resulting balance of IORs</strong></td>
<td>Asymmetrical: Public sector party can be seen a client or principal and private sector party as contractor or agent</td>
<td>Symmetrical: More an equal (principal-principal) relationship characterised by joint determination of processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Synergistic outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Usually limited to cost savings</td>
<td>Substantive improvements and innovative products/processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Klijn and Teisman (2000; 2005) and Koppenjan (2005)
The argument underpinning the entries in Table 3.1 is that the developmental process of PPPs varies across the many dimensions of contractual and collaborative PPPs. Contractual PPPs are based on the ‘logic of division’ and hence have a strong tendency for clear distinctions and boundaries between responsibilities of each party. These PPPs are also referred to as concession models in which the government contracts private sector parties to realise public policy goals, and can take different forms such as DBFO (design-build-finance-operate) and its variants (Savas 2000; Pollitt 2003). Such PPPs involve government stating its requirements in output terms and then entering a contractual relationship with the private party (Skelcher 2005). Hence, PPPs are characterised by a clear distinction between the commissioner (public party) and the contractor (private party) in contractual arrangements. The preconditions for success in contractual PPPs are that the public sector devises a clear contract with a focus on subdivision of a project into parts and ex ante goal setting before involving the private parties.

With respect to PPP set-up, the champions of collaboration and an interactive perspective argue that if public and private parties are involved in joint decision-making from the phases of exploration and planning, it results in expansion of the scope of the project. This is because it allows an interweaving of the objectives and interests of both parties and provides an opportunity to look at problems and solutions from various perspectives. Besides scope expansion, interactive processes support collaborative IORs right from the start and link the ambitions and goals of all parties involved, which makes partnerships effective in achieving their goals. Conversely, lack of collaborative IORs between public and private parties at these initial stages results in identification of the solutions too quickly by the commissioning party (public sector) due to which the opportunities for scope expansion are neglected (Klijn and Teisman 2000; 2005; Koppenjan 2005).

The logic of connection and division also varies considerably in the ways PPPs are managed. It is argued that collaborative IORs during project set-up result in high levels of ambition and commitment to intensive co-production during the whole process. On the other hand, IORs with strong emphasis on ex ante goal setting and division of responsibilities through contracts result in limited co-production
occurring prior to the tendering process followed by interactions that are mainly for regulation and monitoring purposes. This is the reason that hierarchical accountability is a main feature of contractual PPPs whereby private parties are held accountable for the terms agreed in the contract and monitored by public sector party to meet the conditions of the contract (Klijn and Teisman 2005; Teisman and Klijn 2002). On the contrary, reciprocal accountability in PPPs characterised by collaborative IORs makes each partner accountable to others for its actions and potential impact on the partnership (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Klijn and Teisman 2000).

In line with the above views, contractual PPPs are characterised by project management and collaborative PPPs by process management (Edelenbos and Klijn 2009; Mandell 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Project management focuses on clear goals and solutions identified by the initiating actor (Mantel 2005) and is primarily concerned with ‘controlling the project internally with less emphasis on the environment (stakeholders) of the project’ (Edelenbos and Klijn 2009: 314). Process management, on the other hand, does not strive to identify clear goals and solutions at the outset. Rather it brings different stakeholders together from the start and is more concerned with managing interactions among different actors throughout the life-cycle of a project (Mandell 2001; Klijn and Teisman 2005).

Due to its focus on a unilateral specification of problem and solution, scope reduction and lack of private parties’ involvement in the initial phases, contractual PPPs are often associated with risk avoidance behaviour from both sides. However, collaborative PPPs and joint project development are argued to be an important opportunity to understand different competing interests and thereby increase the level of coordination between the parties involved. This is seen as an effective way to encourage risk sharing behaviour among parties (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001; Edelenbos and Teisman 2008).

The debate on contractual and collaborative PPPs is inconclusive when it comes to the question about which type leads to better outcomes for a PPP (Edelenbos and Klijn 2009). Not surprisingly, each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. Clear contracts have the advantage of boosting efficiency due to their emphasis on
performance and outcomes (Savas 2000; Martin 2005). Furthermore *ex ante* specification of roles and responsibilities and clear identification of the ways in which performance of each party will be assessed are claimed to improve accountability (Johnston and Romzek 2005) which is raised as an important issue to be addressed in PPPs (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003; Hodge and Greve 2007). The advocates of contracting consider it essential to specify clear goals and obligations of each party so as to avoid the problems of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazards (Hart 2003).

On the other hand, the adherents of collaborative PPPs argue that in complex cases characterised by uncertainty there are more chances that goals and performance criteria change over time and hence *ex ante* frameworks do not work (Osborne 2000; Edelenbos and Teisman 2008). Also collaborative IORs make it possible to increase the commitment of all stakeholders and thus improve the chances of substantive improvements. Not involving stakeholders in the initial stages may result in lack of commitment and opposition to many decisions (Klijn and Teisman 2005).

The advocates of collaborative PPPs argue that collaboration allows partnerships to take benefit of the comparative advantages of both the private and public sectors in ways that deliver synergistic benefits (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). Klijn and Teisman (2005), for instance, identify a rising scale of surplus value from simple cost savings to substantive improvements and innovative products. It is argued that contractual PPPs usually result in simple cost savings only and that substantive improvement and innovative products and services only become possible with collaborative IORs.

The concept of *synergistic outcomes* (also referred to as added value or collaborative advantage) is especially fuzzy when it comes to partnerships. ‘Because each partnership is unique in its composition and programmatic goals’, explains Brinkerhoff (2002b: 225), ‘it is impossible to identify specific cross cutting indicators’. Nevertheless, the literature offers useful indicators that can be utilised to specify the synergistic outcomes of partnerships more generally. In this framework, synergistic outcomes are operationalised using two commonly used indicators. First, the added value created by a PPP that could not be achieved by each partner working
alone. This may include qualitative or quantitative outcomes that were not possible without forming a partnership. This indicator is difficult to confirm because attribution is problematic. Many scholars have dealt with this problem by primarily (though not exclusively) using perception- and consensus-based views about the value added by a partnership (Thomson et al. 2009; Brinkerhoff 2002a; Chen 2010). Using this approach the value added by a PPP is measured by the extent to which partner organisation perceive that the outcomes achieved were possible due to the partnership. The second indicator of synergistic benefits used in this thesis is the extent to which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own organisational objectives through a PPP arrangement. This is especially important given that entering a partnership arrangement requires huge effort on the part of each partner organisation and unless each partner organisation is able to meet its organisational objectives for joining the partnership there is a constant threat to the sustainability of the partnership (Cropper 1996; Gray 2000; Brinkerhoff 2002a).

Although the binary classification of IORs (as contractual or collaborative) in the PPP literature is potentially useful as an initial heuristic and it identifies some useful dimensions to investigate IORs, a need for a richer conceptualisation of IORs remains. In the following discussion the conceptual framework for this research draws on the frameworks and typologies of IORs developed in the literature on international development and not-for-profit sector to enhance the understanding of the complexity of IORs.

**Further conceptualisation of IORs in PPPs**

As noted by Lewis (2000: 253), the increasing interest of the researchers in not-for-profit organisations has resulted ‘in the growth of two parallel worlds of research literatures, one dealing with Western industrialised countries and another with international development work and third world’. Whilst most of the PPP literature relates to the former, the latter has paid more attention towards understanding the complexity of IORs and it offers many typologies and classifications of IORs. Although the main focus of these typologies is to identify dimensions to understand government-NGO relationships (Najam 2000; Lewis 1997; Young 2000; Coston 1998), they also offer possible ways to study IORs in PPPs. In an effort to review the
various typological classifications of government-NGO relationships, Teamey (2007: 54) mentions that most of them are ‘theoretical think pieces that did not refer to specific empirical research’. Using some of these classifications to understand the IORs in PPPs in this research is an opportunity to ground them in some empirical evidence.

Some of the typologies characterise different types of IORs in 2x2 matrices while others arrange them on a continuum across one or more dimensions. For example, Coston (1998) suggests an eight-point typology of government-NGO relationships along a continuum which runs from repression to collaboration. IORs are analysed along three dimensions: the government’s resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism; the degree of formality in relationships; and the balance of power in relationships. The analysis results in eight main relationship types: repression, rivalry and competition (all of which involve government resistance to institutional pluralism); and contracting, third-party government, cooperation, complementarity and collaboration (where government accepts institutional pluralism). Since the formation of PPPs in itself symbolises government acceptance of institutional pluralism to some extent, the type of IORs characterised by government resistance to institutional pluralism are not relevant to this thesis. These eight relationship types are intended to provide a ‘point of reference’ to compare and contrast different relationship types. Coston (1998) proposes that active participation on the part of all actors can cause movement from one relationship to another towards the right side of the continuum.

*Figure 3.1: Model of government-NGO relationships (Coston 1998)*
Najam (2000) proposes four main types of NGO-government relationship – the four Cs of cooperation, co-optation, complementarity and confrontation (see Figure 3.2). Each type is based on two dimensions: the preferred goals (ends) and preferred strategy (means) of the actors involved. Najam argues that we need to focus on the resulting relationship of inter-organisational arrangements rather than looking at the individual attributes of different actors to obtain robust understanding. He does not consider that these types are mutually exclusive, which means that more than one type of relationship can exist within a particular PPP arrangement.

**Figure 3.2: The four Cs of NGO-government relations (Najam 2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Strategies (Means)</th>
<th>Goals (Ends)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred Strategies (Means)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>Complementarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brinkerhoff (2002b) has identified two dimensions for analysing IORs: mutuality and organisation identity. These two dimensions are used to plot four types of IORs – partnership, contracting, extension, and co-optation & gradual absorption (see Figure 3.3). Mutuality refers to interdependence among different organisations in such relationships. When high, it emphasises equality in decision-making and mutually agreed aims and values. It acts as an incentive or motivating factor to enter into partnership and promotes a sense of ownership. Organisation identity refers to an organisation’s unique identity, values, mission and constituencies. Organisation identity also represents the comparative advantage of participating organisations that serves as a basis to prescribe specific roles to different actors working in a partnership.
Following Brinkerhoff, the analysis of IORs in this research recognises that mutuality and organisation identities are useful dimensions to characterise IORs in PPPs. But in contrast to Brinkerhoff, the analysis does not consider only high levels of mutuality and organisation identity as defining dimensions of a partnership relationship.

The typological classifications of Coston (1998), Najam (2000) and Brinkerhoff (2002b), with respect to government-NGO relationship, are useful in making further sense of the complexity inherent in IORs. Drawing on these typologies, the conceptual framework for this thesis recognises the possibility of cooperative and conflictual IORs in addition to the contractual and collaborative IORs. Each is described in more detail below. The resulting fourfold conceptualisation of IORs is set out in Table 3.2.

**Collaborative IORs**

Based on the conceptualisation of collaborative PPPs in Table 3.1 and other dimensions that are often associated with collaborative IORs, the construct of collaborative IORs is operationalised using five indicators: participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of partnership activities and trust (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Thomson et al. 2009). Participative decision-making is manifested through the extent to which partner organisations take other partner organisations’ opinions seriously, brainstorm to find solutions to address the problems faced, and jointly agree on decisions. Shared power arrangement refers to the inherent tension implicit in all
inter-organisational arrangements between pursuing individual organisational mission to maintain own identity and achieving collective partnership goals. The indicators that reflect shared power arrangements are the extent to which organisations in PPP relationships share information and resources, acknowledge each other’s contribution, work together to achieve collective goals and work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions. Reciprocal accountability manifests the extent to which interdependent (as opposed to sequential or hierarchical) coordination exists. It includes regular reporting among partners and access to performance information of the partnership. Joint determination of partnership activities involves clarity of roles and responsibilities, participation of all partner organisations in planning and review meetings, partners’ satisfaction with opportunities to participate according to their agreed roles based on their comparative advantages and well-coordinated programme activities. Finally, trust manifests itself as a belief that other partners will honestly engage in any negotiations to reach agreement, can competently deliver their obligations to the partnership, will make efforts in good-faith to act according to the commitments (both explicit and implicit), and will not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available (Cummings and Bromiley 1996).

These indicators are strongly influenced by the notion of improving equality in partnerships. By promoting collaborative IORs it is assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that the resulting balance of IORs will be symmetrical (a principal-principal relationship) and no one party to the partnership will be dominant.

**Contractual IORs**

In this research contractual IORs are conceptualised as almost the opposite of collaborative IORs (as described in Table 3.1), and hence represent lack of participative decision-making, asymmetrical power arrangements, hierarchical accountability, *a priori* design of partnership activities by one party/organisation and lack of trust. Lack of participative decision-making is reflected when partners perceive that there are not enough opportunities to take part in the decision-making process about the partnership or if they exist their opinions are not taken seriously by others. Moreover, partners feel that decisions are communicated or enforced without
any consideration of whether they agree or not. Asymmetrical power arrangements refer to the dominance of one party over other(s). In these situations the intrinsic tension between pursuing individual organisational mission to maintain own identity and achieving collective partnership goals is resolved by those with less power compromising their organisational identity in favour of the dominating partner, which in turn hinders the sub-ordinate organisations from meeting their own missions and reduces organisational autonomy. Hierarchical accountability is demonstrated through the extent to which one party in a partnership is accountable to the other for its actions and impact on the partnership. In contractual IORs, hierarchical accountability is typically established through monitoring and performance-reporting requirements enforced by the dominating partner. A priori design of partnership activities represents a situation where the specifics of the partnership programme and activities are designed by one organisation which specifies the organisational characteristics and contributions sought in other partners (Klijn and Teisman 2005). There is great reliance on standard operating procedures to coordinate programme activities in contractual IORs. Lack of trust is manifested by the risk of being deceived that the other partners may pursue their own self-interest at the cost of the goals of the partnership (Van Slyke 2007).

Given the initial disposition of distrust, PPP characterised by contractual IORs manifests ‘coercive and compliance-based monitoring and reporting mechanisms and uses incentives and sanctions for achieving goal alignment’ (Van Slyke 2007: 166). This resembles the tenets of agency theory which typically features the asymmetrical balance of IORs (dominance of principal over agent).

**Cooperative IORs**

The literature tends to use ‘cooperation’ in many different ways. In his framework of NGO-government relationships Najam (2000), for example, refers to cooperative IORs when the goals and preferred strategies of the government and NGO are synchronised. To him, cooperative IORs are a synonym for collaborative IORs. He draws on Waddell’s (1998) conceptualisation of collaboration in adopting ‘a more relaxed definition’ of collaboration. This is mainly because he does not consider ‘perfect power symmetry between NGOs and government as a pre-requisite for
collaboration or cooperation’ (Najam 2000: 384). Another view is offered by Coston (1998) who distinguishes between cooperation and collaboration on the basis of balance of power between the government and NGOs. She places much more importance on symmetrical power relationships and thus collaborative IORs have to manifest greater power symmetry. Cooperation, to her, is a milder notion and this is the reason that she places it before collaboration on her continuum of IORs.

Similar to Coston’s conceptualisation, the conceptual framework for this thesis considers collaboration and cooperation as distinct types of IORs. Cooperative IORs are defined as relationships where none of the partners consider that its intentions or actions are challenged by other partners. This means that in cooperative IORs there might be situations when one organisation calls all or most of the shots and is dominant. Nevertheless it is in the interest of others or they are willing to accept the lead of a more dominant organisation due to the importance they place on developing trust. In cooperative IORs, the benefits of choosing to work together are perceived as exceeding the concerns that are particularly related to loss of autonomy and control. This is why the organisations are more willing to adapt and are less concerned about organisation autonomy even in the situations of asymmetrical power relations.

In terms of accepting the lead of the dominant partner, this conceptualisation of cooperative IORs concurs with Brinkerhoff’s (2002b) characterisation of IORs as ‘extension’ or ‘co-optation and gradual absorption’. However, the conceptualisation of cooperative IORs is different to these two in this thesis. Whilst Brinkerhoff argues that these type of IORs result in subtle loss of organisation identity and hence make it difficult to attain any synergistic outcomes, the cooperative IORs described in this thesis manifest a careful balance between willingness to adapt and maintain one’s own organisation identity so as to contribute comparative advantages to the partnership.

**Conflictual IORs**

Conflictual IORs are likely to occur in situations when there is a tendency on the part of one organisation to dominate whereas other organisation/s are not willing to accept the dominance. As expected this results in friction among partners due to difference in preferences about how to manage the partnership. Whilst the one trying
to dominant prefers to maintain contractual IORs, others are resistant to dominance and prefer more collaborative relationships. The result is a situation similar to tug-of-war to gain power and influence so that the partnership reflects the identity of one party. Lack of satisfaction with the decision-making and coordination process, concerns over the loss of organisation autonomy and resistance to relinquishing autonomy and control creates an ongoing conflict between different parties to maintain their own distinct organisation identities.

There is some similarity between conflictual IORs and Najam’s (2000) idea of ‘co-optation’ in that both parties in a relationship attempt to influence each other and that these type of IORs are likely to be unstable. Because in the long run, either one of the parties will convince the other party and the IORs will change into cooperative or collaborative IORs, or the situation will worsen and turn into open confrontation and termination of partnership relationship. However, Najam’s definition of co-optation restricts the concept to instances where both parties have similar preferred strategies but dissimilar goals. Within the context of this thesis, conflictual IORs are not limited to dissimilar goals and instead also include what Najam calls complementarity within conflictual IORs. In Najam’s (2000) conceptualisation, the difference between the two types of relationships is that co-optation represents preferring dissimilar goals but similar preferred strategies and complementarity is a combination of dissimilar means but similar goals. However, in this thesis both these combinations represent instances where conflicts are likely among interacting partners and hence are labelled as conflictual IORs.

The review of the government-NGO relations have furthered the conceptualisation of IORs in this thesis by adding two more types of IORs that are likely in PPPs to the ones suggested by the PPP literature (as described in Table 3.1). Ideally, it would be useful to be able to plot cooperative and conflictual IORs as two new columns on Table 3.1, but the detail within the literature does not permit that. Instead the main features of cooperative and conflictual IORs are summarised in Table 3.2 and for comparison purposes some of the main characteristics of collaborative and contractual IORs within PPPs are distilled from Table 3.1. Accordingly, Table 3.1
will be used as an analytical tool to compare and contrast the case studies presented in this thesis in conjunction with the features from Table 3.2.

**Table 3.2: Further conceptualisation of IORs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IORs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Collaborative | • Participative decision-making  
                | • Shared power arrangements  
                | • Reciprocal accountability  
                | • Joint determination of partnership activities  
                | • Trust                                                                 |
| Contractual | • Lack of participative decision-making  
                | • Asymmetrical power arrangements  
                | • Hierarchical accountability  
                | • *A priori* design of partnership activities by one party/organisation  
                | • Lack of trust                                                                 |
| Cooperative | • Eager to develop trust  
                | • Willingness to adapt  
                | • Lack of concerns about organisation autonomy even in asymmetrical power relations |
| Conflictual | • Lack of satisfaction with the decision-making and coordination process  
                | • Concerns over the loss of organisation autonomy  
                | • Resistance to relinquishing autonomy and control                            |

The above discussion of different possible dimensions and types of IORs and their implications for the synergistic outcomes of PPPs suggests some arguments that can be explored in the selected educational PPPs in Pakistan. If PPPs are set-up and managed through a contractual approach, it is likely that the balance of IORs will be asymmetrical which restricts the achievement of synergistic outcomes. The realisation of synergistic outcomes in PPPs seems to be more likely when PPPs are set-up and managed more collaboratively with the involvement of all partners so that the resulting balance of IORs is symmetrical.

The theories and concepts used to analyse the factors that shape IORs within PPPs are discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter.
3.3 Contextual factors

Contextual factors operate at the macro-level and are said to be beyond a particular case (Batley 2008). They constitute the context in which public and private sector organisations operate. Also sometimes referred to as environmental factors, they are often seen as influential determinants of forming inter-organisational arrangements in both the PPP and broader IOR literatures (Murray 1998; Thomson and Perry 2006; Wood and Gray 1991; Osborne and Murray 2000). Most of this literature focuses on these factors as antecedents to the formation of the inter-organisational arrangements (Oliver 1990; Bryson et al. 2006; Murray 1998; Doz 1996; Alter and Hage 1993). While this offers background insights to the formation of partnerships, it neglects the ongoing connection between the contextual factors and the nature of IORs.

Contextual factors need to be examined not only as antecedents but also as factors that unfold and interplay with other factors during the development and operation of PPPs. For instance, Chen’s (2010) evaluation of inter-organisational collaborations in Los Angeles County’s Family Preservation Program found that contextual factors influenced the outcomes of the partnerships but that the effects of these factors was mediated by different process variables (such as joint decision-making, resource sharing, joint operations, trust building and organisational autonomy). That is, contextual factors not only helped to explain the formation of partnerships but also continued to influence the nature of IORs. Based on the existing literature, the more important and frequently referred to contextual factors are: interdependence; institutional pressures; reputation; and the different backgrounds and identities of public and private actors. In line with the research objectives, this thesis examines the effects of these factors in two ways: 1) the ways in which they stimulate the formation of PPPs, and 2) the ways in which they influence the ongoing nature of IORs. The discussion of each of the above mentioned contextual factors in the remainder of this section considers both of these issues.

3.3.1 Interdependence

Interdependence is widely mentioned as an important contextual factor that facilitates the formation of different types of inter-organisational arrangements (Levine and White 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Alter and Hage 1993; Dyer and
Singh 1998), including those involving public and private sector organisations (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Kickert et al. 1997). Pfeffer and Salancik have defined interdependence as follows:

Interdependence is the reason why nothing comes out quite the way one wants to. Any event that depends on more than a single causal agent is an outcome based on interdependent agents… interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 40).

One of the main reasons that organisations are interdependent is resource scarcity (Pfeffer 1992). In situations where resources are relatively in excess to demand, interdependence is reduced and there are less or no incentives to enter inter-organisational arrangements. Though resource scarcity can facilitate the formation of inter-organisational arrangements of many types, PPPs in particular are often driven by situations where each sector working alone has failed to address a public policy problem (Bryson et al. 2006; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002).

Besides being an antecedent to PPP formation, interdependence and resource scarcity have some important implications for the nature of PPPs and IORs which are often neglected by the PPP literature. The IOR literature notes that interdependencies may induce cooperative or competitive motives (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Cooperative motives are anticipated by exchange theory (Levine and White 1961) whereas resource dependence theory suggests that a power seeking behaviour by partner organisations will result in a desire to compete (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Thus, interdependencies are found to predict the formation of partnerships but they do not straightforwardly predict the nature of IORs, rather they influence them indirectly depending on the motives of the organisations involved (discussed in section 3.4 on motives to enter partnerships).

### 3.3.2 Institutional pressures

Institutional pressures constitute a set of factors related to the context in which partnerships are embedded. These pressures significantly affect the formation as well as the long-term sustainability of partnerships (Sharfman et al. 1991; Bryson et al. 2006). Much of the existing literature pays attention to the ways in which
Institutional forces are seen as a group of pressures that can either promote or impede the formation of partnerships (Murray 1998; Sharfman et al. 1991; Oliver 1990). Under this approach institutional pressures are seen as forces that exert pressure on organisations to conform to prevailing norms and rules in order to achieve legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell 1983).

Institutional theory asserts that institutional environments force organisations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms. One way an organisation may respond to these institutional pressures is by entering a partnership relationship with those organisations that have an established reputation, image, visibility and/or prestige. Alongside enhancing legitimacy, an organisation may be inclined to form partnerships simply as a result of isomorphic pressures which involve mimicking or imitating social norms for its own survival and acceptance (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Oliver 1991; Dacin et al. 2007).

An organisation’s decision to enter a partnership is also influenced by its dependence on funding agencies which are increasingly promoting and requiring partnerships as a condition to receive funding. Such dependency on funding bodies has long been recognised as affecting organisational strategy, including willingness to form partnerships (Oliver 1990; Alter and Hage 1993). With respect to the ways in which funding agencies or donors influence IORs, Chen (2010) found:

> When an organization seeks to build up its legitimacy by complying with funding agency requirements, working with respectable partners and creating opportunity for future collaborations, it may well make investments in collaborative processes for interorganizational coordination, information management, and addressing accountability issues, which help demonstrate such legitimacy. Because of these investments, relation-specific assets would be accumulated by partners, including better shared decision making, operations, resource exchange, and increased trust, respect, and shared values and norms (Chen 2010: 389).

Chen’s findings are a rare example of empirical evidence that sheds light on the influence of institutional pressures on IORs.
3.3.3 Reputation

Before entering partnership arrangements organisations also pay attention to the past performance of potential partners. With respect to PPPs, public sector managers often use reputation as a mechanism for identifying partners and evaluating their past performance (Van Slyke 2007). Parties with good reputation of past performance are more likely to be selected as partners. Applying agency theory, reputation helps public sector managers to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behaviour by private sector partners (Van Slyke 2007). This is the reason that reputation is often referred to as a contract enforcer or bonding mechanism in agency theory literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1992).

As well as facilitating the formation of inter-organisational arrangements, reputation is also a factor that influences the nature of IORs. Working together with partners with a good reputation is found to improve joint decision-making and trust-building processes (Chen 2010), and trust is seen as a central component of collaborative IORs (Huxham and Vangen 2005; Bryson et al. 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006). Bryson and colleagues mention trust as ‘both the lubricant and the glue’ that facilitates collaborative working and holds partnerships together (Bryson et al. 2006: 47).

Van Slyke (2007) has investigated contracting relationships between government and not-for-profits in New York State and found a causal relationship between reputation and trust. He states that reputation is a factor that can ‘transform contractual relationships from a hierarchical and control-oriented principal-agent relationship to a more involvement-oriented principal-steward arrangement’ because of its positive role in building trust (Van Slyke 2007: 174). He goes on to suggest that level of trust and forms of monitoring are also interlinked. Lower levels of trust result in more frequent and demanding forms of monitoring whereas higher levels of trust result in less frequent monitoring thereby influencing the nature of IORs in partnerships.

3.3.4 Sector differences

In addition to the above mentioned contextual factors that affect the formation of all types of alliances and inter-organisational arrangements, cross-sector partnerships such as PPPs are characterised by partners belonging to different sectors. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the debate about whether the public and private sectors are more different or similar has existed for decades with no agreement so far.

The existing PPP literature talks about the sector differences of partners both as a potential benefit and challenge for PPPs. On one side, different identities are seen as beneficial as they allow partnerships to benefit from the expertise of both private and public sectors in ways that deliver synergistic benefits (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). On the other side, different identities are referred to as a challenge and source of complexity in PPPs. From the latter perspective it is argued that public and private sector actors have different values, strategies and core objectives. For instance, based on their analysis of the Dutch PPPs, Klijn and Teisman (2003) found that the different background of public and private partners is a source of tension and a barrier to achieving the added value of PPPs. They draw on Jacobs’ (1992) description of the public and private domains as two ethical systems with different ‘moral syndromes’. In this respect, the public and private domains are characterised by a ‘guardian’ and ‘commercial’ syndrome respectively. The public sector is considered to have values such as respecting tradition and hierarchy, devoted to a self-defined public cause, controllability of process and approach, and emphasis on risk avoidance. The private sector, on the other hand, possesses values congruent to the commercial syndrome such as devoted to consumer preferences, controlled by shareholders on the basis of results, emphasis on market opportunities and innovation, and willingness to take on market risks (Klijn and Teisman 2003: 143). Sector differences are reflected in the vision and mission, and culture and structure of organisations and have implications for the nature of IORs which will be discussed further in section 3.5 on organisational factors.

The discussion of contextual factors in this section highlights that although these factors support the formation of PPPs (as suggested by the extant literature), it is not always possible to predict the effect of these factors on IORs in PPPs. Instead most of these factors interact with partners’ motives to enter PPPs in the process of shaping IORs. For example, the contextual factor of interdependence may stimulate
motives to cooperate or compete, and these motives in turn influence the nature of IORs. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw out some explicit proposals regarding some contextual factors. For instance, it is expected that institutional pressures and partnering with the organisations of good reputation are more likely to support the collaborative IORs, but sector differences are likely to impede collaborative IORs in PPPs.

3.4 Motives to enter partnerships

As mentioned earlier, the PPP literature often mentions contextual factors as an antecedent to PPP formation. What tends to be overlooked in the PPP literature are the different partner motives for entering partnerships, which may affect responses to contextual factors and influence the nature of IORs. For this reason the conceptual framework for this thesis pays particular attention to these motives. The broader IOR literature has paid attention to the motives which influence organisations to establish inter-organisational arrangements (e.g. Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Levine and White 1961). This section uses both the IOR literature and the PPP literature to understand how contextual factors interplay with partner motives and what the implications this are for IORs.

This section mainly draws on a framework developed by Oliver (1990) that was introduced in Chapter 2. In short, she suggests six different motives for the formation of inter-organisational arrangements: asymmetry, reciprocity, legitimacy, stability, efficiency and necessity. Although she focuses on these as motives that persuade organisations to establish inter-organisational arrangements, they also have implications for the resulting nature of IORs.

Oliver’s (1990) uses ‘asymmetry’ to describe a desire to exert power and control over the resources of others. However, please note that the motive of ‘asymmetry’ will be referred to from now on as ‘power acquisition’. This is to avoid confusion with the use of ‘asymmetry’ to explain the balance of IORs.

In the context of interdependence and resource scarcity, IOR researchers have identified two distinct motives to enter inter-organisational arrangements: reciprocity and power acquisition. Oliver (1990: 245) proposes that IORs are characterised by
‘balance, harmony, equity, and mutual support’ in the case of reciprocal motives and by ‘coercion, conflict and domination’ in cases where power acquisition motives are more prominent. Although we have different explanations of motives, there is no indication in the literature which helps to predict which motive will actually manifest itself in particular situations.

The main indicators of motives of power acquisition found in the literature are: 1) attempt to increase control over crucial resources, 2) exerting control over the rules governing exchange, 3) resistance to adapting according to the needs of others, 4) the ability to choose a "do without" strategy, and 5) resistance to relinquishing autonomy and control (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Oliver 1990; Wood and Gray 1991).

In contrast, the main indicators of reciprocal motives are: 1) a desire to cooperate and exchange resources, 2) mutual agreement to abide by shared rules, 3) willingness to adapt according to needs, 4) tolerance for sharing power, and 5) partners’ perception that the benefits of choosing to cooperate exceed concerns, particularly about the loss of autonomy and control (Wood and Gray 1991; Oliver 1990; Levine and White 1961).

Another motive that has received considerable attention by scholars is the need to enhance organisational legitimacy. Chen (2010) identifies three reasons why organisations enter partnerships to enhance their legitimacy: to meet funding agency expectations or requirements; to enhance organisational reputation; and to build future relationships. Partnerships are seen as desirable thing to do that is either encouraged or enforced by the donors and funding agencies (Murray 1998; Bryson et al. 2006), or they serve as a means to build future relationships with respectable organisations which may enhance an organisation’s ability to gain future contracts or to achieve organisational goals. All these reasons to enter inter-organisational arrangements are often described as institutional pressures (Chen 2010).

Following DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) argument, institutional theory predicts a passive role for organisations as they undergo the process of isomorphism in order to conform to the rules and expectations of their institutional environment. This means that the environment imposes constraints on organisations that affect their practices.
It is important to note that although conformity could be argued to be an active organisational response to institutionalisation, it is referred to as passive relative to the active resistance and manipulative behaviour of the organisations in cases of non-conformity (Oliver 1991). This implies that when organisations enter partnerships for the purpose of increasing legitimacy they adapt themselves so as to appear consistent with the ways in which legitimate organisation operate. In this way isomorphic pressures can stimulate organisations to seek support from partners whose level of legitimacy is deemed higher than their own (Oliver 1990), and this is said to facilitate a reciprocal interplay between partners.

The phenomenon of isomorphism is said to pose limits to organisation identity and the added value of partnerships. In their comparison of traditional and radical health sector not-for-profits, Brainard and Siplon (2002) note a significant degree of isomorphism in the case of traditional health advocacy not-for-profits who seek substantial support from government to the point that they were criticised as being indistinguishable from the public-sector health establishment, and hence lost their unique organisation identity. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002) argue that loss of organisation identity, as a side-effect of isomorphism, can lead to a diminished capacity of a partner to maximise its contribution in the longer run; thus affecting the added value of the partnership.

Although it is conventional in the existing literature to ground issues concerning legitimacy in institutional theory, Oliver (1991) argues that organisational motives to enhance legitimacy can be explained by both institutional and resource dependence theories. Resource dependence theorists suggest that motives to enhance legitimacy may also be linked to power acquisition motives based on the expectations that establishing a link with a reputable organisation will increase an organisation’s power and influence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In this perspective, legitimacy is seen ‘as one more resource to be acquired’ through forming inter-organisational arrangements (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: xvi). Oliver (1991) has captured the key differences between the institutional and resource dependence perspectives as follows:
Both proponents of institutional and resource dependence perspectives, therefore, assume that organizational choice is possible within the context of external constraints, but institutional theorists have tended to focus on conformity rather than resistance, passivity rather than activeness, and preconscious acceptance rather than political manipulation in response to external pressures and expectations (Oliver 1991: 149).

Organisations may also enter into inter-organisational arrangements so as to achieve stability in the flow of resources. From this perspective, enhanced legitimacy is seen as a resource (Phillips et al. 2000) that helps to reduce uncertainty in the flow of funds. Hence, entering partnerships serve as coping strategies to forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty in order to achieve an orderly, reliable pattern of resource flows and exchanges’ (Oliver 1990: 246).

Putting together the expectations of institutional and resource dependence theories, it can be proposed that on the one hand entering partnerships may be an adaptive response to achieve stability in the flow of resources, including legitimacy, and it may drive organisations to jostle for more power and influence. On the other hand, environmental uncertainty and interdependence may induce organisations to enter partnerships with reciprocal motives supressing power plays ‘in the hopes that equity, reciprocity, and harmony will facilitate stability’ (Oliver 1990: 247). This suggests the intentions to enhance legitimacy and ensure stability can ultimately be linked to the motives of power acquisition or reciprocity.

While all the above motives to enter partnerships are linked to contextual factors, the motive of efficiency is said to be internally rather than externally driven (Oliver 1990). The formation of partnerships for the purposes of efficiency relates to an organisation’s desire to improve its input-output ratio. The PPP literature refers to it as the ‘make-or-buy’ decisions of government (Skelcher 2005; originally Osborne and Gaebler 1992). From this perspective, governments can either pursue societal goals directly through public employees and infrastructure (the make decision), or choose to interact with the private sector (the buy decision). Skelcher (2005) sees increased efficiency as one of the theoretical rationales for PPPs.

The motive of efficiency is equally relevant to private sector parties too and it is theoretically rooted in Williamson’s (1979; 1985) transaction cost perspective. As
explained in Chapter 2, TCE focuses on matching the economic institutions, such as firms, intermediate structures and markets, with economic interactions so as to most efficiently organise a particular transaction. With respect to inter-organisational arrangements, transaction cost theory suggests that organisations will choose to enter such arrangements in an attempt to become more efficient and economise on the costs of transactions. Thus ‘the impetus to pursue mutually beneficial relations [and hence reciprocal motives] may be greater if an organization anticipates that greater internal efficiency will result from the relationship’ (Oliver 1990: 248). In somewhat similar vein, Chen (2010: 389) argues that when an organisation seeks to reduce transaction costs it is followed by collaborative IORs with ‘lower monitoring costs, easier communication, more joint decision making and operations, and better resource sharing’.

The PPP literature looks at efficiency motives from a different perspective. It looks at competitive tendering and contracting-out as a route towards the efficiency gains which are expected as a result of changes in management practices and working conditions (Skelcher 2005; Edelenbos and Klijn 2009). This process requires the public sector to take the position of a commissioning party that defines project specifications, evaluates bidders’ offers and monitors the performance of the suppliers. This type of arrangement places the public and private parties in the roles of principal and agent respectively (Lane 1993) and they are typically characterised by asymmetrical balance of IORs. The different perspectives offered by the IOR and PPP literatures with respect to efficiency motives make it difficult to come to a clear conclusion about how efficiency motives will affect the nature of IORs in PPPs.

The motives of reciprocity, power-acquisition, legitimacy, stability and efficiency clearly relate to the voluntary interactions amongst partnering organisations but necessity motives are distinct because of their mandated nature. The term mandate generally refers to ‘prescriptions… legally binding obligations and responsibilities’ (Cropper 1996: 87). Necessity motives are particularly important when discussing PPPs because in many cases partnerships are the result of mandates from higher authorities, for example, government and funding bodies (Armistead and Pettigrew
2008). Such mandates make it necessary for organisations to establish partnerships so as to meet legal or regulatory requirements.

Although there is a relative paucity of studies on mandated partnerships, Armistead and Pettigrew (2008) provide a detailed account of the characteristics of a mandated partnership as compared to voluntary partnerships. In nutshell, they have argued: 1) mandated partnerships tend to follow a set of prescriptions or check lists which might satisfy mandating bodies but fail to address the dynamics of partnership performance and the causes of partnership failure, 2) mandated partnerships impede the process of collaboration between partners due to being prescriptive in nature, and 3) the prescriptive nature of partnerships implies hierarchical authority that is often an extension of state power and control.

In summary, the discussion of partner organisations’ motives to enter PPPs suggests various ways of understanding the nature and dynamics of IORs in PPPs. If the organisations are driven by necessity or by a desire to acquire power this is likely to impede the collaborative IORs, whereas a desire to exchange resources (reciprocal motives) is more likely to support collaborative IORs in PPPs. The discussion regarding the motives of legitimacy, stability and efficiency points in two different directions in that they can play either a supportive or restraining role in developing collaborative IORs in PPPs. It is possible to link these motives to either power acquisition or reciprocal motives, which in turn influences how these motives shape IORs.

### 3.5 Organisational factors

This section aims to understand to what extent and how the nature of IORs is affected by the internal aspects of the organisational life of partner organisations. Though scholars studying partnerships and other inter-organisational arrangements often discuss and analyse organisational factors, their focus is primarily on the organisational characteristics of the inter-organisational arrangement. For instance, while theorising collaboration\(^4\) practice, Huxham (2003) discusses leadership,

\(^4\) Here the use of the term ‘collaboration’ is in line with Huxham’s conceptualisation and refers to ‘working across organisational boundaries’ (Huxham 2005: 4).
structures and common aims (along with power and trust) as themes in collaboration and examines them at the collaboration level.

However, a defining characteristic of PPPs (and any other inter-organisational arrangement) is the dual identity that partners share: they have their own distinct organisation identity as well as a partnership identity. While this is widely recognised in both the partnership and IOR literatures (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Thomson and Perry 2006), little attention has been given to analysing organisational factors at the level of individual partner organisations and the ways in which these can influence IORs.

There are two reasons why there is a need to examine organisational factors at the level of individual partner organisations. First, this level of analysis sheds light on dynamics within partner organisations which can help to gain understanding of the ways these organisations are influenced by the contextual factors. Secondly, this level of analysis helps to understand what happens at the partnership level and the reasons underlying various issues.

Scholars within the field of international development have paid considerable attention to understanding the internal dynamics of organisations. But much of this literature is limited to studies of not-for-profits, describing their different types; their governance structure and the role of their boards and trustees (Stone 1996); leadership (Hailey and James 2002); and culture (Lewis et al. 2003). Moreover, within this stream of literature the main focus tends to be on the reasons for the rise of government-NGO relationships (Batley 2006; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Mayhew 2005) and the typologies of government-NGO relationships (Coston 1998; Najam 2000; Brinkerhoff 2002b). Little attention has been paid to the study of organisational factors beyond NGOs. Nevertheless, the NGO studies provide insights into the ways NGOs operate and make decisions to form a relationship with the government, and the possible types of relationships they can develop with the government.

This section discusses some main internal aspects of public and private sector organisations that are likely to influence IORs in PPPs. In the case of some factors it
is useful to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit private sector organisations. The most important organisational factors identified in the existing literature are organisation identity; culture and structure; leadership; and sources of revenue. Each of these is discussed below.

**3.5.1 Organisation identity**

Organisation identity comprises an organisation’s mission, goals, core constituencies and underlying values. As mentioned earlier individual organisations in a partnership have dual identity: partnership identity and their own identity. This usually leads to a tension between pursuing an individual organisational mission to maintain one’s own identity and achieving partnership goals. Thomson and Perry (2006: 26) refer to this tension as ‘the process of reconciling individual and collective interests’ and it is a recurring theme in the existing literature. Brinkerhoff (2002a; 2002b) examines organisation identity at two levels. First is the organisation’s mission, goals and constituencies and with respect to this the ‘maintenance of organisation identity is the extent to which an organisation remains consistent and committed to its mission, core values and constituencies’ (2002b: 23). Secondly, organisation identity refers to the comparative advantages of the sector an organisation belongs to.

Partnerships are often seen as exchange relationships whereby each partner is chosen and assigned responsibilities according to the comparative advantage that each is presumed to contribute to the partnership. These exchange relationships are also discussed in the strategic alliance literature (e.g. Levine and White 1961; Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and from a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Technically, if organisation identity is lost, comparative advantage is lost and there would be nothing unique on the part of that partner to contribute to the partnership. In such a case there is no rationale for justifying the huge efforts required for partnership working (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Brinkerhoff 2003).

The above rationale is said to apply equally to organisations in the public and private sector. Nevertheless, the ways in which each partner maintains its identity differs not only between public and private sector partners but also differences between private for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. Moore (2000) compares for-profit, not-for-profit and government organisations and argues that the concept of value varies
significantly across these three sectors. Generally speaking, the principal value delivered by for-profits is often measured in financial terms. However, value in the case of not-for-profits is measured in terms of contribution to the cause that the organisation embodies. Similar to not-for-profits, the principal value in the case of public sector organisations is defined in terms of mission rather than financial indicators. Due to similar values, not-for-profits are often considered more suitable for partnerships with the public sector (Rosenau 2000; Lovrich 1999). However, not-for-profit organisations are distinct from public sector organisations in some important ways. For instance, they lack the coercive powers of government and usually they have fewer constraints than government organisations (Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002). They also differ significantly with respect to sources of revenue (Moore 2000).

The mission of not-for-profits tends to define the value that they intend to produce for their stakeholders and for society at large and is ‘set out in substantive rather than financial terms’ (Moore 2000: 190). Though they need financial resources to pursue their mission, their ultimate objectives are not monetary. In the case of for-profit organisations, the mission is usually translated in ‘the form of financial targets for the organization as a whole, along with a business plan that describes how a company plans to compete in various product and service markets’ (Moore 2000: 183). Because missions represent what is considered as value to an organisation, they form the basis of individual partner organisations’ course of action in partnerships. Moreover, when the mission of an individual partner organisation is not in line with the partnership goals it becomes a source of conflict between partners (Thomson and Perry 2006).

Since organisation identity serves as a basis to achieve the added value of partnerships, it is considered important to make sure that potential partners possess the comparative advantages required for a partnership. For these reasons organisation identity can be used to assess the contribution that organisations can make as partners, which can have implications for the nature of IORs.
3.5.2 Organisational culture and structure

Organisational culture refers to ‘beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions widely shared throughout an organization regarding what it stands for and how it should operate’ (Murray 1998: 1194). Based on the work of Schein (1992), Murray (1998) argues that organisational culture can influence an organisation’s beliefs about and attitudes to other parties. In this respect, culture may constitute shared attitudes about partners, their trustworthiness and the contributions that they can make to a partnership. Likewise, culture influences an organisation’s readiness and acceptance of the need to make adjustments and changes while working in a partnership. Murray (1998: 1194) suggests that ‘intense pride in the organization’s reputation, traditions, and so on can breed an implicit belief in superiority, which may effectively block any compromises that must be made in developing a joint venture with others’.

The challenges of collaborative working are said to be exacerbated when participating organisations have different organisational cultures. Huxham’s (1996a) theory of collaborative advantage stresses:

Differences in organizational culture and procedures can aggravate the situation further because seemingly straightforward tasks can be carried out quite differently in different organizations. Differences arise because individuals make unwarranted assumptions about the way things are carried out in partner organizations, or because of the time needed to make arrangements for even trivial matters to the satisfaction of all concerned… For these reasons, collaborations, at best, tend to need to spend unusual amounts of time in reaching understandings and agreements compared to other situations, and at worst become embroiled in misunderstandings and conflict (Huxham 1996a: 5).

The above argument suggests that organisational culture has important implications for the IORs embedded within inter-organisational arrangements. This is especially important and challenging in the case of PPPs where public and private sector partners are likely to have quite distinct organisational cultures (Klijn and Teisman 2003).

Another related organisational factor that is an important determinant in shaping the nature of PPPs and IORs is organisational structure. Murray (1998) draws on some influential studies of organisational structure, such as those of Mintzberg (1979) and Galbraith (1973), and suggests that some structural forms have more potential to
facilitate collaborative efforts than others. He mentions ‘professional bureaucracies’ and ‘conventional bureaucracies’ as the ones that impede collaborative work. The former consist of a large group of professionals who are trained to believe that work should not be changed by anyone except their own professional bodies. The latter are characterised by a typical Weberian conceptualisation of bureaucracy with centralised control, hierarchy of authority and high levels of formality (Mintzberg 1979). Public sector organisations operate under the authority of the state and are typically characterised as conventional or professional bureaucracies, they tend to seek dominance within PPP arrangements and are often reluctant to relinquish their power and control. This is mentioned as a threat to synergistic outcomes by the proponents of high levels of collaboration in PPPs (Teisman and Klijn 2002; Klijn and Teisman 2003).

3.5.3 Leadership

The concept of leadership has long been prominent in the business management literature and has been studied in great detail. In much of this work, the role of leadership in coping with change has been given special attention (Kotter 1996; Schein 1992). Within this literature, leadership is defined as ‘a set of processes that creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to significantly changing circumstances’ (Kotter 1996: 25). Historically, leadership has not gained that much attention in public sector organisations (Van Wart 2003) due to a general belief that leadership cannot be practiced to any great extent because of the low levels of control that public managers have over the external forces of politics and regulatory processes (Orazi et al. 2013). However, with widespread public management reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) and a general shift from managerialism to leaderism (O'Reilly and Reed 2010), public sector leadership has become more prominent in the field of public management and administration during last two decades.

Although potential differences between leaders and managers are often discussed and emphasised in the organisation theory and behaviour literature (e.g. Watson 1983; Zaleznik 2004; Kent 2005), this distinction is not made in this thesis. Instead leadership is conceptualised after Vangen and Huxham (2003: 62) who describe leadership as ‘the mechanisms that make things happen… [and] may include both
visionary and more mechanistic aspects’. Hence, the focus is on individuals who *enact leadership and make things happen* in PPPs.

Studies of leadership and change management are relevant in the context of partnerships because entering a partnership arrangement is a change that each interacting organisation experiences. The attitude of leaders towards the need for partnership, their negotiation skills and their perception about the trustworthiness of other parties in a partnership arrangement plays a significant role (Murray 1998). Like any organisational change the inability of leaders to prepare their organisation for partnership process can result in many problems or even partnership failure.

Vangen and Huxham (2003) discuss two sets of leadership activities: *‘the spirit of collaboration’* and *‘towards collaborative thuggery’*. The former involves activities that ‘seem to be highly facilitative and are concerned with embracing, empowering, involving and mobilising members’ (Vangen and Huxham 2003: 66). The latter, however, finds that leaders are ‘adept at manipulating agendas and playing the politics’ (Vangen and Huxham 2003: 70). They argue that both sets of leadership activities can be enacted in parallel and leaders are likely to switch between them as and when required.

The role of organisational leadership in partnerships is important from another perspective too. As discussed above, PPP scholars often emphasise the need to maintain the organisation identities of individual organisations in order to deliver synergistic outcomes (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). In the context of increasing interdependencies developing over time (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) it can be expected that strong leadership within each partner organisation will be important in enabling it to hold on to its own organisation identity. From this perspective, it seems that leadership plays an important role in shaping the nature of IORs and enabling the achievement of synergistic benefits.

According to Schein (1992), leadership and organisational culture are intractably linked and influence each other. He takes a developmental view of organisational growth and argues that founding leaders are much more confident and powerful in instilling their views and assumptions into organisational culture. This is why there is
a close connection between a leader’s ideas and an organisation’s way of operating in founder-led organisations (Hailey and James 2002). Though leaders continue to play an important role once the organisations have matured, at this later stage they are influenced more by organisation design and structure, as well as by interaction with the external environment (Schein 1992).

3.5.4 Sources of revenue
Many IOR scholars have argued that sources of revenue are related to organisational autonomy to make decisions (e.g. Alter and Hage 1993; Moore 2000). The common wisdom has been that it is important to respond to the preferences of those who provide revenues to an organisation. Sources of revenue are typically different for for-profit, not-for-profit and public sector organisations. Moore (2000) explains that the main source of revenues in the case of for-profit organisations are from the sale of products and services to willing customers. Not-for-profit organisations are usually reliant on charitable contributions. Public sector organisations obtain their revenues mainly from taxing the public. Moore (2000) acknowledges that these differences are becoming less pronounced and each sector is increasingly relying on diverse revenue sources, but they are still important. He argues that:

It follows that the strategies embraced by these organizations will be responsive to the expectations and demands of quite different groups. For-profit firms will attend to what customers want. Nonprofit firms will attend (at least in part) to what their donors expect. Government bureaucracies will attend to what citizens and their representatives have mandated them to achieve (Moore 2000: 186).

This suggests that there will be some conflict of priorities implicit in partnership arrangements. Such tensions are acknowledged in the PPP and IOR literatures (Wood and Gray 1991; Brinkerhoff 2002b; Alter and Hage 1993; Thomson and Perry 2006; Huxham 1996b). Some scholars argue that this is why there is a need for high levels of collaboration in PPPs and other inter-organisational arrangements. They refer to collaboration as a mechanism for ‘finding common ground’ (Gray 1989) so that each organisation can justify its participation in partnership in terms of its contribution to their own objectives.
However, what tends to be ignored in this argument is that the organisations vary greatly in their degree of dependence on one or more sources of revenue. Alter and Hage (1993) mention multiple versus single sources of revenue and argue that multiple sources of revenue are more desirable because when resources come from a single source then that source will want to control the organisation and is likely to result in tighter controls on the use of funding than would be the case when there are multiple sources of revenue.

Broadly speaking, the discussion of organisational factors in this section suggest that the fundamental features of public and private parties (such as leadership, organisational culture and structure) tend to differ which pose many challenges in developing collaborative IORs in PPPs. However, when the organisation identities (manifested in organisation’s mission, goals, core constituencies and underlying values) of partner organisations are compatible with the mission of the partnership, the chances of building collaborative IORs may increase.

3.6 Conceptual framework for the research: integrating the concepts

This chapter has thus far reviewed different factors that can help to understand and explain IORs in PPPs and their potential implications for the outcomes of PPPs. These factors are often discussed in the context of different models which serve to highlight their interaction. Murray (1998), for instance, has developed a framework consisting of four sets of factors that affect the probability of success in inter-organisational collaborations in the not-for-profit sector. These are the type of collaboration sought; the characteristics of the organisations entering into the collaboration; the process of developing and implementing collaboration activities; and contextual factors. Similarly, Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have presented a framework consisting of initial conditions; process; structural and governance components; contingencies and constraints; and outcomes to guide the design and implementation of cross-sector partnerships. Thus both frameworks examine what makes partnerships successful and in what ways these factors affect the outcomes of partnership efforts. Some other scholars have also offered similar frameworks that
focus on antecedents, processes and outcomes (e.g. Wood and Gray 1991; Thomson and Perry 2006; Bryson et al. 2006; Chen 2010). These frameworks have focused on the ways in which antecedents and processes influence the outcomes of inter-organisational arrangements. However, the main focus of these frameworks is on the factors leading to the formation of partnerships, and the effects of antecedents and processes on the outcomes.

While the above offer important insights on the formation of partnerships and the factors affecting the outcomes, they underplay the connection between the contextual factors and the nature of IORs. The influence of partners’ organisational factors and their motives for involvement is also often underplayed in these frameworks. They seem to pay more attention to the characteristics of the resulting inter-organisational arrangements rather than the internal dynamics of participating organisations and the effects of these on IORs.

Similarly, frameworks explaining the developmental process of PPPs and other inter-organisation arrangements are useful as heuristic device but they tend to pay insufficient attention to the wider context in which inter-organisational arrangements develop (Baker 2007). They have limited power to explain the impact of contextual factors on the developmental process of IORs. Those scholars studying contextual factors argue that partnerships are significantly affected by external factors and hence partnerships need to be examined within their context (Teamey 2007; Lewis 1998). Contextual factors not only affect outcomes but they also influence the nature of IORs both directly and indirectly via partners’ organisational factors and their motives for entering PPPs.

This chapter seeks to respond to these limitations by integrating the insights from a wide range of literature to develop a conceptual framework that will be used to examine the case studies. Based on the four building blocks that were identified in Chapter 2, this chapter has extended the review of the existing literature to develop the conceptual framework for this thesis. The resulting conceptual framework incorporates an examination of IORs in PPPs over time, the contextual factors that influence these, partners’ motives for entering partnerships, the organisational factors affecting partner organisations, and the outcomes of PPPs. Understanding the ways
in which different factors interact and influence IORs, and hence the nature of PPPs, lies at the centre of this framework. The conceptual framework is summarised in Figure 3.4 and this will be used to examine the case studies presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

**Figure 3.4: A framework to understand the nature of IORs in PPPs**

The broad anticipated relationships between the boxes in Figure 3.4 are shown by the arrows. The existing literature examined in this chapter has suggested some more specific relationships between the detailed factors, motives, IORs and outcomes. These will be examined in the analysis of the case studies.
3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on the existing literature to discuss the nature of IORs in PPPs and the factors that have been found to shape these, along with their implications for partnership outcomes. The result is a conceptual framework that characterises the IORs in PPPs as collaborative, contractual, cooperative and/or conflictual. IORs are envisaged as dynamic and the character of these may well change as a PPP develops and matures. These sets of factors identified as potential shapers of IORs in PPPs are contextual factors (interdependence; institutional pressures; reputation; and different backgrounds and identities of public and private actors); partners’ motives for entering into a PPP (power acquisition, reciprocity, legitimacy, stability, efficiency and necessity); and features associated with partner organisations (organisation identity; culture and structure; leadership; and financial autonomy). The conceptual framework proposed at the end of this chapter suggests that the extent of partnership success (particularly the achievement of synergistic outcomes) will be mediated by the nature of the IORs shaped by the above mentioned factors.

The existing literature offers some limited predictions about how IORs will differ according to partners’ motives for entering into a PPP. If organisations enter into a PPP due to a desire to acquire power or because partnership working is mandated, it is probably not surprising to find that this is likely to impede the development of collaborative IORs. Conversely, a desire to exchange resources (reciprocal motives) is more likely to support collaborative IORs. Partnering with organisations because of their good reputations is also said to be more likely to result in collaborative IORs. However, the findings and arguments associated with most of the shaping factors listed in Figure 3.4 are fairly inconclusive. That is, depending on a combination of circumstances, they can play a supporting or restraining role in developing collaborative IORs.

The emphasis within the literature has been to try and explain the factors associated with collaborative IORs. The reason why there is such a focus on collaborative IORs is because much of the literature predicts that synergistic outcomes are more likely to result from collaborative IORs than relationships that are contractual. Indeed some of
the literature proposes that synergistic outcomes can only be achieved when there are high levels of collaboration and symmetrical balance of IORs (e.g. Klijn and Teisman 2000; 2005).

The next chapter discusses the operationalisation of the conceptual framework developed in this chapter. It focuses on the methodological approach employed in this thesis. It discusses research design, and the methods of data collection and analysis.
Chapter 4 Methodology

4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this research. The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 4.2 is about the decisions made with respect to the overall methodology. It starts with a description of the case study approach as a research strategy and outlines the main strengths of this approach. It is then argued that because of the complex nature of IORs in PPPs and the philosophical position adopted in this research, the case study approach is a particularly suitable strategy. This is followed by the discussion of the methodological issues in qualitative case study research and the efforts of scholars to clarify conventional wisdom and misunderstandings about qualitative research and case studies. The ensuing subsection introduces the arguments around suitable criteria to judge the quality of case study research and outlines the steps taken in order to foster quality in this research.

Section 4.3 is focused on the research design developed for this research and includes sub-sections on the use of the conceptual framework, planning for data collection, the initial and second phases of data collection, and data analysis. Finally, the chapter engages with some ethical considerations for carrying out this research.

4.2 Deciding on the overall methodology
This section is about the main decisions that were taken in relation to operationalising the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter. It is organised in three sub-sections: case study methodology, methodological issues in qualitative case study research and criteria to judge the quality of case study research.

4.2.1 Case study methodology
This study aims to understand the nature of IORs in PPPs and the ways in which different factors affect them along with their implications for partnership outcomes. The review of the existing literature on PPPs and IORs (in Chapters 2 and 3) suggests that in order to understand and explain what influences and shapes IORs in PPPs one needs to examine the context in which partner organisations are embedded. In light of these insights, the previous chapter incorporates contextual factors into the
conceptual framework for this study. This framework serves as a guide in relation to what empirical data needs to be collected to address the research questions.

A case study approach was adopted for this study because it is appropriate for research that aims to investigate a multifaceted phenomenon within its context to gain a rich understanding of the context and process being enacted (Yin 1994; Stake 1995; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). It allows researchers to carry out a holistic treatment of real life events and this is argued to have contributed ‘uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena’ (Yin 1994: 2). This feature differentiates a case study approach from other research strategies such as experiments or surveys which either extract data from their context or have limited ability to investigate context.

A second important strength of the case study approach is that it supports the use of a conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis. Experts on case study research, such as Yin and Stake, have recommended developing a theory about what is being studied and have mentioned it as an integral and challenging aspect of the research process. A conceptual framework bridges from what is established in the literature to what needs to be researched and what type of data should be collected.

Finally, a case study methodology is flexible and offers a palette of methods due to its compatibility with both qualitative and quantitative methods (Stake 1995; Yin 1994). Case studies can be used for various purposes - exploratory, descriptive and explanatory - depending on the nature of research questions, and they can be deductive or inductive in nature (Yin 1994). The approach offers single and multiple case designs both of which have the potential for analytic generalisation (Small 2009; Yin 2014). Although both single and multiple case designs can be successful, Yin (2014) has recommended conducting multiple case studies (even with two cases) unless there are strong reasons for the choice of a single case study. He argues that the findings become more powerful in multiple case study designs and criticism stemming from the uniqueness of single case studies becomes milder when undertaking two or more case studies.
For the purposes of this research, a multiple case design using qualitative methods has been adopted. As pointed out by Bryman and Bell (2011), this research design is very popular and widely used in business and management research. The same is true for public management research too. Within the public management realm, McGuire and Agranoff, for example, have adopted a case study methodology to study network management and have suggested that ‘qualitative research through comparative case studies can provide insight that quantitative research cannot offer’ (McGuire and Agranoff 2007: 37).

The research has been carried out from what Hammersley (1992) has labelled a ‘subtle realist’ perspective. This occupies ‘a middle ground in terms of [an] axis, with [naïve] realism at one end and anti-realism [or relativism] at the other’ (Bryman and Bell 2011: 401). Naïve realism assumes the existence of independent and knowable social phenomenon that is a part of an external reality. Hammersley rejects the notion that researchers can have direct access to such phenomenon and, in effect, can act as a mirror on the social world to reproduce reality for others. Instead, subtle realism retains from relativism (or social constructivism) that all knowledge is based on assumptions and is a human construction, but it disavows the total abandonment of the idea of independent and somewhat knowable social phenomena. Thus, subtle realism rejects the dichotomy between naïve realism and relativism. The accounts presented in this research should be treated as one of the possible representations of social reality, rather than as absolute version of that social reality. The researcher has made efforts to strengthen and support these accounts by using multiple sources of evidence and data triangulation which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

4.2.2 Methodological issues in qualitative case study research
Although the salience of case study methodology is well recognised and it is accepted as a credible form of empirical inquiry, it has long been stereotyped as ‘a weak sibling among social science methods’ (Yin 1994: xiii). Flyvbjerg (2006) has summarised the problems with the conventional wisdom about case study research in terms of five misunderstandings or oversimplifications:
(a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006: 219).

Similarly, Yin (1994) also reviews the issues associated with case study methodology. Both Flyvbjerg and Yin have rejected conventional wisdom about the case study approach and have labelled it as ‘wrong or misleading’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 241). These methodological issues were said to be further exacerbated when case studies employed qualitative methods instead of the quantitative ones. It is not long ago that researchers undertaking qualitative case studies faced huge suspicion and needed to convince reviewers that their research was reliable. Some even tried to establish the legitimacy of their work by presenting qualitative data in an apparently quantitative manner (Pratt 2009). Though there are some fields which have been slow to get over the ‘paradigm wars’, the accepted standards of ‘good research’ have undergone many changes over time (Bryman and Bell 2011; Hammersley 2008).

Scholars, such as Yin (1994; 2014); Stake (1995); Eisenhardt (1989b); Miles and Huberman (1994); Hammersely and Atkinson (1993; 2010); and Glaser and Strauss (1967), struggled hard to establish the legitimacy of qualitative case studies. They sought to uncouple research methods from philosophical positions, making case study and qualitative methods more accessible to budding scholars with different epistemic orientations. It is due to the efforts of these scholars that we can confidently use a qualitative case study methodology without having to write many pages to establish the credibility and legitimacy of our research just because it is based on this method of social inquiry. In this connection, it is worth repeating the insight of Kuhn (1987) quoted in Flyvbjerg (2006):

A discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. In social science, a greater number of good case studies could help remedy this situation (Kuhn 1987 quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 242).
Nevertheless, there is still a need to be systematic and explicit about the whole case study process, from design to data collection, and through to analysis and drawing conclusions. The adaptiveness and flexibility of qualitative research should not compromise the rigor of the research process.

4.2.3 Criteria to judge the quality of case study research

The three concepts of validity, reliability and generalisability are the most prominent criteria to evaluate the quality of research in social sciences, including business and management research (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008; Bryman and Bell 2011). However, there are some discussions about interpreting these quality criteria in social research, especially with respect to qualitative and mixed method research (Bryman et al. 2008). Some scholars (e.g. Mason 1996; Yin 1994) have adapted these concepts according to different disciplinary and methodological conventions but the concepts still remain close to the meaning that they generally have in the quantitative research. Social constructivists, however, have argued for alternative criteria to evaluate research quality in qualitative research. In their seminal work, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have offered a new quality language and have substituted reliability and validity with trustworthiness (comprising of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability) and authenticity.

In accordance with the subtle realist tradition, this research follows Miles and Huberman (1994) who see ‘goodness criteria’ as overlapping and have paired the traditional terms (or tests) with those proposed by constructivist and naturalistic researchers. Miles and Huberman (and others) advise researchers to actively employ strategies throughout the research process (from planning, data collection and through to analysis) to address the threats to these tests (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2014; Maxwell 2013). The four tests commonly used in social science research are:

- Construct validity/ objectivity/confirmability
- External validity/ transferability/fittingness
- Internal validity/ credibility/authenticity
- Reliability/ dependability/auditability
*Construct validity/objectivity/confirmability* encapsulates an appropriate operationalisation of the concepts under study to ensure that the research is actually measuring or examining the concepts it claims (Mason 2002). This has been particularly challenging with case study research (Yin 2014). The conventional view about case studies argues that case study researchers are ‘sloppy’ and ‘subjective’ in the research process and have a bias toward using concepts so as to verify their preconceived notions (Yin 2014; Flyvbjerg 2006). Nevertheless, some useful strategies are identified in the extant literature to address these issues and increase construct validity in case studies such as using multiple sources of evidence and maintaining a chain of evidence. These strategies are employed in this research to ensure construct validity.

The study has developed its understanding of IORs in PPPs from a review of the established literature on PPPs (e.g. Klijn and Teisman 2005; Hodge et al. 2010; Skelcher 2005), inter-organisational relations (also referred to as the alliance literature e.g. Oliver 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Alter and Hage 1993) and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literature (e.g. Schein 1992; Kotter 1996). A conceptual framework based on the literature review is outlined in Chapter 3. In that chapter efforts are made to examine each theoretical construct from different aspects to meet the test of construct validity. For example, the literature proposes that the IORs are shaped by the views of individual actors which are in turn shaped by their formally designated roles in partner organisations and the structure, culture and leadership of those organisations. Accordingly four organisational factors are included in the conceptual framework. Hence, the conceptual framework itself can be regarded as a measure to increase the construct validity of the research. Moreover, construct validity is fostered during data collection by the triangulation of multiple sources of data/evidence providing multiple measures of the same phenomenon, as suggested by Yin (1994; 2014). These sources will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.3 but mainly include documents and semi-structured interviews.

The test of *external validity/transferability/fittingness* is concerned with the question of whether the research findings can be generalised beyond the specific research
context. Although external validity is of interest to quantitative researchers, many qualitative researchers either reject generalisability as relevant to qualitative research or do not pay enough attention to it (Schofield 2000). In quantitative research generalisability is established by selecting a sample which is representative of the population under study and usually consists of a large number of sampling units. As a result an inference is made about the whole population based on a statistically representative sample, a process known as statistical generalisation. Yin (2014) has argued that this type of generalisation is not applicable to case studies because cases are not analogous to ‘sampling units’ and are too small in number to represent the population. However, this does not necessarily mean that the results of case studies cannot be generalised. Rather another type of generalisation - analytic generalisation - is relevant to case studies and should be strived for. Mason (2002) calls this theoretical generalisation and considers it as a distinct way to generalise in qualitative research.

Within this thesis external validity is maximised by using multiple case studies and using the logic of analytic generalisation. The aim is to corroborate, modify, reject or advance the theoretical concepts and relationships incorporated in the conceptual framework for this study. Though the conclusions drawn are essentially based on the analysis of data collected from specific case studies, the generalisations made are at a conceptual level which is fundamentally above the specific cases. Although authors such as Lincoln and Guba (1985) actively reject generalisation as a goal of qualitative research, their suggestion is that researchers should provide rich accounts of the details as a means of maximising external validity, which is also incorporated in this thesis.

Internal validity/credibility/authenticity is mainly a concern for explanatory or causal studies and not for the exploratory or purely descriptive studies (Yin 2014; Saunders et al. 2012). It deals with the question of whether an observed causal relationship is actual or spurious. Based on Yin’s advice, this research has employed the tactics of pattern matching and explanation building to augment internal validity. Additionally, the multiple case study design has further strengthened the internal validity by allowing a cross-case analysis of findings.
The final test of *reliability/dependability/auditability* is concerned with the issue of whether the research process is repeatable with the same results. The main objective of reliability is to minimise the researcher’s biases and errors during the research process. The idea behind reliability criteria is that if a careful researcher conducts the same case study repeating the same procedures as outlined by the earlier researcher, the investigation should yield the same findings and conclusions (Yin 2014). However, this idea is rejected by qualitative researchers conducting social research due to its ‘scientific criteriology’ (Mason 2002). They have questioned the possibility of replicating social research since it is not possible to ‘freeze’ the social setting and circumstances of the initial study (Bryman and Bell 2011; originally LeCompte and Goetz 1982).

Nevertheless, if later researchers analyse the data and feel that there is not enough evidence to support the conclusions, the researcher should seriously question the reliability of the research. As long as the conclusions drawn by the later researchers are not inconsistent with the earlier account, the differences in the reports would not generally subdue the reliability (or indeed the validity and generalisability) of the research (Schofield 2000). This means that although qualitative data collection is often hard to repeat, the researcher can make data analysis possible for other researchers. For this purpose there is a need for what Mason (2002: 186) calls ‘checking up on yourself and showing how you got there’ which requires systematically documenting the procedures followed during the course of research. The reliability of findings is fostered in this thesis by using an interview guide, recording the interviews and producing verbatim transcriptions of most of the interviews. Furthermore, the anonymised interview transcripts and some important documents have been exported into NVivo (a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package). The use of NVivo in this research will be discussed in greater detail later in section 4.3.

### 4.3 Developing the detailed research design

Blaike (2010: 15) defines research design as ‘an integrated statement and justification for the technical decisions involved in planning a research project’. This section discusses the main decisions that have been made while designing this
research and it is divided in five sub-sections: use of a conceptual framework, planning for data collection, initial and second phases of data collection, and data analysis.

4.3.1 Use of a conceptual framework

As mentioned earlier a conceptual framework based on the established literature is developed for this research. The framework highlights several theoretical concepts and factors that can be used to characterise and explain IORs. It directs attention to what needs to be examined within the scope of the thesis. The discussion of the existing literature also highlights some of the theoretical propositions that are embedded within it about the drivers of different IORs and the implications of the resulting IORs for partnership outcomes. For example, the literature suggests that synergistic outcomes can only be achieved in PPPs with high levels of collaboration and a symmetrical balance of IORs. This theoretical proposition provides guidance about an avenue for analysis and some suggestions about relevant empirical evidence.

A grounded theory technique could also have been useful for this research because it investigates complex and under-researched phenomenon, such as IORs in PPPs. The advocates of grounded theory, such as Glaser and Strauss (1967) and more recently Corbin and Strauss (2008), have argued that it is a useful and preferred method for investigating complex, under-researched topics because it allows the development of theory through induction that closely matches the data. Even though grounded theory has changed a lot over years (Bryman and Bell 2011; Saunders et al. 2012), this rationale for the technique seems to remain the same. The reasons why this study has used a conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis rather than adopting a grounded theory approach are discussed below.

The foremost rationale for this choice is that although IORs are not given enough attention in the PPP literature, there is a substantial IOR literature that shares many similarities with the PPP literature and it has investigated IORs in detail. Hence, this research assumes that it is worthwhile using the extant literature to guide investigation of IORs in PPPs. However, it should not be assumed that the use of a conceptual framework inevitably leads to evidence that does not match and focus on
the theoretical constructs in the framework being ignored (Flyvbjerg 2006). The conceptual framework is a device or mechanism to help identify relevant information and provide guidance about the sources and types of data within the scope of study. Without such guidance there is a danger that a researcher might be tempted to collect ‘everything’ (Yin 2014) and can be easily overwhelmed by a huge amount of data (Miles and Huberman 1994; Maxwell 2013). Nevertheless, a conceptual framework and its associated constructs are not meant to be set in stone. Hence, the data collected are not only intended to verify or otherwise constructs and propositions but also to refine them and to understand what these concepts mean for actors operating in practical situations. This requires maintaining an open mind while working with a conceptual framework.

The advocates of grounded theory argue that they are able to produce accounts that are closer to empirical reality by continually referring to the original data. However, the use of conceptual framework does not necessarily obstruct this process. Similar to a grounded theory approach, qualitative findings based on a conceptual framework often evolve through a continuous interaction between theory and data. In line with this, this research has incorporated the idea of progressive focusing as opposed to a deductive-inductive divide. The idea of progressive focusing was first discussed by Parlett and Hamilton (1972), who recognised the need for an approach where ‘researchers systematically reduce the breadth of their enquiry to give more concentrated attention to the emerging issues’ (Parlett and Hamilton 1972: 18). This perspective was later refined by Stake (1981) who described progressive focusing as:

Progressive focusing requires that the researcher be well acquainted with the complexities of the problem before going to the field, but not too committed to a study plan. It is accomplished in multiple stages: First observation of the site, then further inquiry, beginning to focus on the relevant issues, and then seeking to explain (Stake 1981: 1).

The ways in which this thesis has employed the idea of progressive focussing is discussed in sub-section 4.3.5.

4.3.2 Planning for data collection

It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the provision of public services has undergone many changes as a result of public sector reforms in Pakistan. There has been a shift
from pure hegemony of government towards greater participation of the private sector in the delivery of public services (Government of Pakistan 2004a). Despite these changes there is limited literature on PPPs in Pakistan. That is, there is much activity but not much research on PPPs in the context of Pakistan. The Punjab province was chosen as the geographical context for the study, mainly because it is the second largest province and is at the forefront of PPP initiatives in the country (School Education Department 2011). It was also chosen because of the researcher’s access to case study site and competence in the local language, which allowed interviews to be conducted in respondents’ mother tongue.

Given the dearth of research on the education sector of Pakistan and the lack of information about the nature of PPPs it was decided to conduct interviews with the key informants followed by an initial case study. The key informant interviews were carried out between June and August 2011. The evidence from these interviews corroborated the researcher’s understanding gained from reviewing the existing literature on education reforms in Pakistan, that there are two main models of PPP in education prevalent in Pakistan: one is where the public sector supports the private sector to provide access to quality education; and the other is when private sector organisations adopt state schools and take charge of a wide range of responsibilities (sometimes in essence managing and operating state schools in partnership with government staff).

No method of collecting empirical data is without weakness and the choice of methods should be based on their ability to gather data that allows the researcher to answer the research questions. It was decided to conduct interviews with the key informants because an interview allows active interaction between an interviewee and the researcher. Since the main purpose of these interviews was to explore and develop a greater understanding of the field, the interviews were conducted using a semi-structured design (Kvale 1996; Patton 2002). An interview guide was prepared in advance which helped the researcher to remain focused and explore all aspects relevant to the study (see Appendix A). Nevertheless, keeping in view the exploratory nature of the initial interviews, the interviewees were provided with a great deal of flexibility. This allowed the researcher to pick up on the things that
were mentioned by the interviewees which were not a part of the interview guide but were relevant to the study (Bryman and Bell 2011). Some useful contacts were also mentioned during these interviews which made it possible to access important sites. One of these contacts was the Chairman of the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), who made it possible to collect data from PEF and its partners. He advised the PEF’s Director HR to issue a letter of permission to conduct research. This made data collection quite swift by resolving access issues at various schools and partner organisations.

Keeping in view that the aim is to undertake a systematic study of IORs in educational PPPs of Pakistan so as to contribute to a deeper understanding of their key characteristics, what shapes them and what their implications are for outcomes, it was decided to use a multiple case study design and choose at least one organisation from each model of PPP practiced in the Punjab education sector. However, given the large number of private sector organisations involved in the second model of PPP (23 according to the official list of adopted schools made available by the government on the request of the researcher), two case studies (of CARE and ITA PPPs) were selected. These were selected because they were pioneers and had adopted the highest number of state schools in Punjab.

4.3.3 Initial phase of data collection and analysis (June–October 2011)

Interviews were conducted with four key informants (details provided in Appendix B) and later one of the four PPP programmes operated by an autonomous public sector organisation, the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), was selected as an initial case study. The former interviews were mainly exploratory in nature to get to know the field whereas the latter had the main objective of what Wolcott (1990: 47) refers to as ‘make sure all parts [of the research design] are properly in place before tightening’.

PEF belongs to the first model of educational PPPs in the Punjab province. There are similar organisations in other provinces of the country too. The idea of ‘public-private partnership’ lies at the heart of PEF’s working and functions and part of its vision is ‘the promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership’ (PEF 2012). One of its four programmes, Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS), was
selected as an initial case study for this phase of data collection in order to evaluate the effectiveness of data collection methods and to highlight any access, ethical or political issues that might be encountered (Yin 2014; Maxwell 2013).

In all, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 FAS school partners and 8 officials from PEF (full list of respondents is provided in Appendix B). The analysis of the data collected in the initial phase provided insights into conceptual framing of the study and resulted in a revision of the conceptual framework (more is said about this under data analysis). The initial data collection phase provided some important learning points that had to be considered when refining subsequent data collection plans and the research design. These points are summarised below:

- Referral from a senior official within an organisation makes it easier to gain access to the respondents, especially those who are sceptical of research and/or have tight schedules. Both friends and family contacts should be utilised to overcome the barriers to access and establish rapport with a senior official at each case study organisation who is willing to act as a project sponsor. The researcher’s position as a lecturer at a large public sector university in Pakistan undertaking PhD at an established foreign university was useful to build rapport.
- Document collection and analysis is useful not only to triangulate findings from multiple sources of evidence, and hence establishing construct validity, but also to provide information about the things that have taken place prior to the research and hence establishing a retrospective view.
- Although most of the respondents were quite open to sharing their experiences and stories, there were some who seemed to be actively involved in political point scoring and asked the researcher to convey their viewpoints to the higher authorities while conducting interviews with them. This highlights the importance of being reflective during data analysis, to verify statements and to avoid taking words at face value.

4.3.4 Second phase of data collection (November 2011–April 2012)

There are myriad of qualitative methods which could have been used for this research such as participant observations, focus groups and interviews of various types. Many scholars (e.g. Patton 2002; Yin 2014) have advised to use a combination of different sources of evidence because each source of data has strengths and weaknesses. The experience of the initial data collection phase supported these views.
Since the data collected during the initial phase is a part of formal data collection and is included in the final analysis, subsequent data collection will be referred to as the second phase of data collection. As mentioned in the previous section, the initial data collection phase refined the choice of data collection methods and the conceptual framework. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily compromise the comparability of data collected across the two phases of data collection. Data collection from the three remaining PPP programmes operated by PEF (other than FAS) was carried out in the second phase. Due to these continued interactions with PEF in the second phase, it was possible to fill in any data gaps in the initial case study (FAS).

The second phase of data collection was carried out between November 2011 and April 2012. It used a combination of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews as the primary means of collecting data. These are discussed below.

**Documentary sources**

Almost every case study researcher collects some type of documents (Stake 1995; Yin 2014). This research explicitly included documentary sources as a part of the research strategy and has continued to collect documents throughout the period of data collection (and even afterwards via internet). The documents collected throughout the course of this research (see Appendix C for the list of important documents) can be categorised as follows:

*Level 1:* documents that give information about the overall policy framework and approach of the country towards the idea of PPPs. Examples include ‘Pakistan policy on PPPs’ and ‘White paper on PPPs’.

*Level 2:* documents that are especially relevant to the education sector and getting to know the context more precisely. ‘National education policy’, ‘Public-private partnerships in Pakistan’s education sector’ and ‘Education sector reforms (ESR)’ are some of the examples in this category of documents.

*Level 3:* comprises documents relevant to the case study organisations such as printed brochures, information booklets, lists of adopted schools, memorandums of understanding (MoUs) etc.
All these documents were studied both before and during the second phase of data collection. This has been identified as a strength of document collection by Yin (2014: 107) in that they allow researchers to retrieve data at their convenience. It is important to mention that not all of these documents were collected before the second phase of data collection. Further documents, especially the level 3 documents, were collected while negotiating access and conducting interviews in each case study organisation. Some of these documents were publically available while some others such as lists of adopted schools with contact details, official correspondence with partners, and minutes of meetings were made available on request.

Document collection and analysis was useful in many aspects. First, it helped the researcher to situate herself in the context. For example, in the case of CARE the study of information available on their website, some news items and the documents such as ‘The CARE model’ and ‘CARE achievement history’ provided what Patton (2002: 294) calls a ‘behind-the-scenes look’. This helped to look at the process through which the organisation evolved, its mission and goals, and its philosophy towards work. The first interview conducted within CARE was with its Head of Academics who forwarded many of these documents via email prior to the interview and advised reading them beforehand to make efficient use of time. These documents were rich in information and answered many exploratory questions prior to the interview.

This example identifies the second important way in which documents proved useful in that they can help to make efficient use of the available time when interviewing busy people. The study of documents and information available online helped to avoid basic information gathering questions such as how many state schools have been adopted by CARE, in which districts etc. Furthermore, they stimulated several paths of inquiry that could be pursued through the semi-structured interviews. The documents were used alongside interviews to contextualise personal views and focus on themes that might have been ignored if the interviews had been conducted without access to the documents.
The documentary sources helped to identify potential interviewees too. To illustrate, the review of ‘The CARE model’ highlighted that improving the management of adopted state schools lies at the heart of CARE’s partnership model. In order to manage adopted schools, there are three tiers of managers (details provided in the CARE-Lahore District Government (LDG) case study) who are allocated a fixed number of schools and they are responsible for the uplift of education and better management of adopted schools. This information was useful in deciding that the research must take into account not only senior management’s views but also the middle level and school level managers’ views for a more rounded view of the IORs in CARE-LDG PPPs.

Finally, although the type of documents were not necessarily the same for all three case studies, the documentary sources provided valuable data for the cross-case analysis by comparing mission and objectives, type of projects undertaken, organisational structure and MoUs. For example, by examining different MoUs it turned out that they had a different approach both towards partnership and towards allocation of roles and responsibilities to each partner.

Although documentary evidence provides an invaluable source of data, it is important to recognise that it is not without problems. Some scholars have advised that case study researchers should be very critical and act as ‘vicarious observers’ when using documentary sources (Yin 2014: 108). While reviewing documents it is important to keep in mind that they are ‘constructed in particular contexts, by particular people, with particular purposes, and with consequences - intended and unintended’ (Mason 2002: 110). It is, therefore, important to keep reminding oneself that a literal reading of documents should not extend to believing that they are direct representations of ‘reality’ or straightforward ‘factual records’ (Mason 2002).

In light of these suggestions, several questions were kept in mind while carrying out the review and analysis of documents during the course of this study. These involved asking critical questions such as what is the source of the documents, what was the purpose for preparing them, for whom were they prepared, who was involved in the process, how are they used, by whom and so on. Answering most of these questions
required more data to be collected because it is unlikely that all this information will appear in the documents themselves.

**Semi-structured interviews**

Interviews are typically classified as structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Bryman and Bell 2011; Saunders et al. 2012). Structured interviews, sometimes referred to as ‘quantitative research interviews’, are usually associated with positivist and hypothetico-deductive approaches and are seen as similar to the use of a survey questionnaire. Although these involve some degree of social interaction between the researcher and the interviewee, the researcher aims to follow standardised procedures to avoid any bias. By comparison, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, also sometimes labelled as ‘qualitative interviews’, do not follow standardised procedures. Unstructured interviews as the name signifies represent the extreme opposite of structured interviews which are not directed by any list of questions or topics to be covered. Semi-structured interviews can be placed somewhere in the middle of the other two types as they straddle the two extremes. For semi-structured interviews, the researcher typically produces an interview agenda or guide that lists the themes and/or questions to be explored in the interview. Nevertheless, they adopt a rather flexible approach whereby the questions may vary from one respondent to another depending on the flow of the conversation.

This research opted for semi-structured interviews and the majority of the research data was collected by this method. This type of interview is particularly appropriate when the researcher has identified a specific area of study but wishes to be open to explore further propositions emerging from the data. This enables an examination of the areas that are identified as relevant by the literature whilst remaining close to the social reality, what is referred to as ‘bridging the social distance’ by Silverman (2010: 120). In this way, semi-structured interviews retain some degree of similarity between interviews which is useful while undertaking comparisons (Kvale 1996).

Kvale (1996: 6) argues that the research interview is a conversation that has ‘a structure and a purpose’. This perspective undermines the use of unstructured interviews and instead favours semi-structured interviews. Structure helps to avoid data overload and lack of comparable accounts, that often result from unstructured
approaches (Miles and Huberman 1994). This becomes especially important when carrying out multiple case research (Yin 2014).

More or less all interviews were based around a single set of questions that constituted the interview guide (see Appendix A). While preparing the interview guide, Yin’s (2014: 35) logic of linking data to key constructs and propositions was followed. The interview questions were prepared in a manner so that they reflected the relevant concepts and themes identified in the literature review, thus laying the foundations for thematic analysis. For instance, there were six questions in the interview guide that aimed to collect data around the theme of collaboration in PPPs, each of these questions covered the indicators of collaborative IORs identified in the existing literature.

However, in order to avoid premature closure and remain open to any emergent issues not yet covered around any theme, the final question provided an opportunity for interviewees to have the final say (Patton 2002). For example, the final question that followed the theme of collaborative IORs asked respondents: what does collaboration in the partnership mean to you? Such questions either confirmed that all relevant indicators were already covered or led to rich empirical data that could be used for theory development which will be covered in greater detail while discussing data analysis.

The use of semi-structured interviews also enabled the researcher to make sure that the respondents understood the questions (Greener 2011). Given that many respondents had problems in understanding the English language, clarifications were made by the researcher when respondents expressed difficulties in understanding some terms, which helped to foster the construct validity of the research.

All interviews were carried out face-to-face and generally lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. In most cases a prior appointment was fixed and the interviews were carried out within the given timeslot. Building on the learning points from the initial data collection phase, the researcher actively looked for and was successful in identifying a project sponsor in each case study: PEF chairman, CARE chairperson and ITA Director Programmes. Their support helped to overcome access barriers. All project
sponsors assigned a middle-level manager to support the data collection process. This person helped to schedule appointments with the interviewees and provided further details, including important documents.

The issue of research access was however complicated by the fact that each case study organisation has public or private sector partners who must also be willing to be a part of the research in order to examine IORs from both perspectives; otherwise the evidence would be biased towards one party only. This represents the main challenge associated with data collection for this research and is similar to the accounts of others researching PPPs. Johnson (2004), whose research is about the development of coordination and co-governance within three partnership programmes in the UK, has expressed concerns in her PhD thesis which mirror the challenges and approach of this research too. She states:

A major difficulty was the many different kinds of actor present in the partnerships, from mainstream public sector representatives; councillors; council officers, partnership managers; voluntary and community sector representatives and representatives from the community itself. The implementation situation as such has to be reconstructed from this multitude of views. It has to be interpreted through the different ways that people subjectively experience working in this area and the aim has been to show the situation as it is with all its complexity. The narrative is a version of events, not complete but hopefully, full enough to gain sufficient understanding (Johnson 2004: 144).

In a similar vein this research also aims to capture a multitude of views to investigate and understand IORs in the selected PPPs. Individual interviews are treated as an elicitation of the subjective experiences of interviewees (Silverman 2010). Although the critique from social constructivists (or relativists) about how far is it appropriate to think that people attach ‘a single meaning’ to their experiences is acknowledged, it is precisely the variation in the views and experiences of the respondents that the research aimed to surface rather than a single objective 'truth'. The outcome that is sought out of this process is what Kvale (1996: 2) argues as an 'inter view', literally a view created by the interaction between the two persons also referred to as reflexivity.

In practical terms, efforts were made to interview a range of different respondents from many walks of life within each case and a range of different cases. In the first
case study, due to the dominant position of PEF, it was not difficult to arrange interviews with the private sector partners of PEF. One of the programme officers, assigned as the focal person by the project sponsor, was helpful in making contact with the partners that were selected by the researcher from the list of partners to represent variations across factors such as private for-profit and not-for-profit partners, number of years in partnership, and whether partner schools were situated in developed or slum areas.

In the other two case studies, CARE and ITA, some difficulties were faced in contacting the relevant public sector officials at different levels (district and schools). The link persons at both CARE and ITA were the ones who negotiated access at school level. The school level interviews were conducted in the schools. It was decided to conduct interviews with the school head teacher (from the government side) and the CARE or ITA school coordinator (from the private sector side). This choice was because most of the matters related to the PPP management were mainly dealt by these actors. In the case of PEF, the school-level interviews were conducted with the school owner and/or the head teacher, who was typically found to be at the forefront of the PPP interactions.

The interviews with the district education officials posed more difficulties. Each participant had to be contacted individually by the researcher and most of these interviews were made possible only after a couple of cancellations in the scheduled appointment time. This was mainly due to the unstable nature of their work, which required them to attend non-scheduled meetings at the eleventh hour. In some cases, even after several attempts, it was not possible to conduct interviews with some officials, such as Executive District Officer (EDO) for education and District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Lahore District Government (LDG). These interviews, if conducted, would have provided an opportunity to analyse IORs at higher levels of the LDG. Some interviews took place because of opportunism and favourable circumstances - i.e. the individuals happened to be in their office at the time of contact and were eager to get to know the research. As mentioned earlier, the researcher’s position as a lecturer at a large public sector university in Pakistan
undertaking PhD at an established foreign university was the main factor that enabled access, especially in these interviews.

Most of the interviewees were only interviewed once but in some situations the interview had to be stopped until the next appointment due to the emergent nature of some other tasks on the part of the interviewee. This had both a positive and negative impact on the quality of data. On one hand, it allowed the researcher to look into the responses and prepare probes and follow-up questions for the next meeting. On the other hand, it disturbed the flow of conversation and the researcher had to put in efforts to provide a recap of the discussion in the follow-up interview. Moreover, it also incurred more costs to the researcher in terms of traveling expenditure.

Increasingly many scholars have taken for-granted the use of recording devices during research interviews. Silverman (2010: 199), for example, comments ‘it goes without saying that your interviews should always be recorded…the old days of pen and paper recording are long gone!’ The majority of interviews were recorded in order to retain the actual words of the interviewees. However, following Yin’s (2014) advice, recording was not considered as a substitute for active listening. In fact, notes were also taken during the interviews and were used for preparing probes or new questions as they came to the researcher’s mind. Furthermore, note-taking was also useful for recording observations and especially the non-verbal cues (Patton 2002).

Despite many challenges the interviews were considered successful. In all, 90 semi-structured interviews were conducted throughout both phases of data collection. Although a complete list of interviewees is provided in Appendix B, a summary on interviewee numbers for each case study along with a broad indication of the posts occupied by these people is provided in Table 4.1.
### Table 4.1: Summary of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
<th>Designations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEF’s PPPs</td>
<td>Total: 40</td>
<td>PEF’s Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 with PEF officials;</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 with PEF’s private</td>
<td>Deputy Managing Director Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sector partners</td>
<td>Directors of all four PPP programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme Monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partner school managers/owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partner organisations’ managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE-LDG PPPs</td>
<td>Total: 27</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 with CARE officials;</td>
<td>Head of Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 with government head</td>
<td>Head of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>teachers</td>
<td>Area managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic Internal Coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government head teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA-LDG PPPs</td>
<td>Total: 11</td>
<td>Director Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 with ITA officials;</td>
<td>Provincial Programme Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 with government head</td>
<td>District Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>teachers</td>
<td>Education Promoter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDG Education Officials at</td>
<td>Total: 7</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Secondary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district level</td>
<td></td>
<td>District Education Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy District Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Education Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the interviewees were willing to give their time and were enthusiastic in telling stories throughout the course of interview. Most of the time they seemed to give honest opinions even when the researcher expected that they might obscure the truth. Some interviewees were eager to know more about the research and asked many questions before the researcher left. It was during those informal conversations that they expressed their interest in the research. Some of them appreciated the style of the researcher and acknowledged that the questions were designed well ‘to get inside their heads’.

Although the researcher guaranteed anonymity in order to protect them from possible harm, most of the interviewees were not much concerned about concealing their identities. However, a couple of respondents were wary of the research and hesitated to be recorded. One of them was a government head teacher at a CARE adopted
school and the other was a district education official. As a result these two interviews were not recorded and the researcher relied on her memory and note-taking. More detailed notes were taken immediately after these interviews in order to avoid memory lapse.

**Documents and interviews: bringing together multiple perspectives**

Every fieldwork project usually involves more than a single method for data collection (Patton 2002). When a qualitative researcher is in the field it is likely that they talk with the people, observe them and look at the available documents. Multiple sources of evidence are advocated by many scholars because none of them are without weakness and together they help to overcome the pitfalls of one another. Moreover, using a combination of different methods fosters the validity of the research by triangulating the findings.

In the context of this research, only limited participant observation was formally possible and it included observing two meetings of PEF and its partners. However, the research interviews were conducted in natural or real life settings. The researcher visited the PPP schools which provided ample opportunities to observe the participants at work. At times the interviewees had to put the researcher on hold to deal with some other tasks at work and sometimes they referred to those tasks as an example of what they were saying during the interviews.

During the course of the fieldwork the researcher used a research diary to record any observations. The following is one excerpt from the research diary:

> The way people at PEF talk shows their superiority in relationships, it seems as if there is power imbalance in favour of PEF. While taking time for interviews with partner schools, PEF officials say “the school owners will be made available for the interview by PEF” -- this indicates that PEF can give orders to their partners. This is against the non-hierarchical nature of IORs promulgated in the PPP literature.

This excerpt exemplifies how the researcher recorded any relevant observation during the fieldwork. It is clear from the above passage that the dominant position of PEF did not initially fit with some of the propositions from the literature about successful PPPs. Working iteratively between different sources of evidence enabled the researcher to use this information to refine ideas about the necessity of
collaborative IORs in PPPs. This observation was later corroborated by the analysis of the PEF partnership MoUs and interviews with PEF and its partners. Taken together these multiple sources of evidence helped data triangulation and reinforce confidence in the claims made by the research.

4.3.5 Data analysis

It is generally accepted that in qualitative research, informal data analysis starts as soon as the researcher enters the field (Eisenhardt 1989b; Miles and Huberman 1994). The research process with respect to this study confirms these views but this section of the chapter focuses on formal data analysis after collecting most of the data.

Keeping in view the huge amount of data (90 semi-structured interviews and many documents) collected for this research, it was decided to use a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software package (CAQDAS) in order to manage and document the process more efficiently and effectively. NVivo was chosen for this research as a suitable CAQDAS due to its availability and recommendation by colleagues. The literature that reviews the use of CAQDAS (e.g. NVivo, Atlas.ti, NUS*IST, Ethnograph) in qualitative research discusses a number of advantages in relation to both transparency and methodological rigour. CAQDAS such as NVivo is helpful to enhance the trustworthiness and reliability of qualitative research by making the process more transparent and creating an audit trail (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012; Bazeley and Jackson 2013).

The use of CAQDAS, however, is not without criticism. A number of concerns have been raised with respect to employing CAQDAS for qualitative data analysis. Among the more important issues are the distance created between the researcher and data, extensive coding or what Richards (2002: 269) call ‘coding fetishism’ whereby a researcher codes excessively to the detriment of other analytic and interpretive activities due to the ease of coding in a software. There are also fears that computers will take over the analysis process and will make qualitative data analysis more akin to quantitative approaches (Bazeley 2007). These arguments established that the use of NVivo is not without problems and one has to be careful that CAQDAS in itself is not a guarantee to establish the rigour of research findings.
In order to understand the software and deal with the possible issues, the researcher utilised available resources such as workshops, training materials available online and in library and webinars. These were useful to become familiar with the software and they offered some guidance on dealing with the above issues. For example, with respect to the problem of excessive coding, and hence less emphasis on analytic activities, the tools in NVivo such as memos, annotations and ‘see also’ links provide ample opportunities for the researcher to reflect, link ideas and record the ways in which her thinking developed.

Since semi-structured interviews were the main source of data for this research, the formal data analysis started with transcribing the research interviews. As mentioned earlier, almost all interviews are digitally recorded, therefore as a first step the recordings of all semi-structured interviews were imported in NVivo. Transcribing verbal data is time-consuming and sometimes boring too but it provides a good opportunity to get familiar with the depth and breadth of the content (Ritchie and Spencer 2002; Braun and Clarke 2006). Since most of the interviews were conducted in the mother tongue of the respondents, Urdu, there were additional challenges to translate them into English while transcribing. Nevertheless, the researcher’s experience in both languages helped to tackle problems such as sociocultural differences and imposing a foreign culture, that are often associated with translating interview data (Xian 2008).

There was one particular advantage of transcribing the interviews inside NVivo (rather than doing it outside and then importing them) in that it makes retrieval of the actual verbal data easy by automatically recording the time span with respect to transcript sentences making the researcher closer to the actual data. In many cases the researcher listened to important parts of the interview time and again to get a better sense of the context and non-verbal data which are argued to be ‘erased’ when using transcripts (Miles and Huberman 1994). While transcribing the researcher took notes in memos about the key ideas, recurrent themes and any hunches that seemed promising. Most of the interviews were coded for themes immediately after transcription.
All interviews conducted in CARE-LDG and ITA-LDG PPPs were transcribed. However, due to the larger number of interviews in the case of PEF’s PPPs some of the interviews were not transcribed. The themes and codes arising from the 27 transcribed interviews were checked by listening to the digital recordings of the remaining 13 interviews. Additional examples were obtained from these interviews but no new themes or codes emerged which needed to be added to the original analysis.

While most of the interviews were in Urdu, all the documents collected in the course of this research were available in English. Some of the key documents (especially level 3 documents such as MoUs, terms and conditions, minutes of meetings and field notes from process observation) were also imported into NVivo for analysis.

The initial list of codes mainly comprised of etic (outside) issues brought in by the researcher based on theoretical constructs from the conceptual framework and reflected in the interview guide. However, with more and more transcription and analysis emic (inside) issues of the actors in the field also emerged. This resulted in additional codes that were added to the initial list of codes. The list of codes kept growing as the transcription progressed from one interview to the other and from one case to another. In order to keep track of the codes, these were labelled as etic or emic in the description box of each code (referred to as node in NVivo).

The emic codes were both an opportunity and a challenge in themselves. While they helped to expand or adapt the concepts as originally given in the conceptual framework, they required the researcher to move back and forth between analytical insights and alternative theoretical explanations in an imaginative and interpretive manner. For example, the conceptual framework identified some indicators of collaborative IORs in PPPs. In order to examine the level of collaboration in PPPs, the interview guide included questions on these indicators. This resulted in number of codes around level of collaboration which included those suggested by the literature (etic issues) and also other indicators that emerged from the data (emic issues). This resulted in a number of iterations between theory and data which lies at the heart of progressive focussing (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012; Dubois and Gadde 2002).
Although progressive focusing has an advantage in that it combines the use of existing theoretical constructs with the possibility of accommodating surprising patterns, sometimes it becomes difficult to report the *emic* issues in the ways that are consistent with the *etic* issues. Accordingly, whilst the progressive focussing approach has enabled a plausible way to investigate and explain the IORs in educational PPPs in Pakistan, there have been some problems in presenting some inductive themes in this thesis. For example, the culture and structure of partner organisations did not come across from the literature as factors that shape the IORs in inter-organisational arrangements. The existing research often discusses these factors as the characteristics of inter-organisational arrangements rather than of partner organisations. Consequently, partners’ organisation culture and structure were not a part of the initial framework for this thesis. They emerged as the factors that in combination with other factors influence IORs in PPPs. Because they came through inductively, the nature of the comments around these factors in the subsequent chapters of thesis might vary in terms of consistency as compared to some other factors.

### 4.3.6 Ethical considerations

Ethical issues are important throughout the research process in order to establish the ethical integrity of the research and the researcher (Saunders et al. 2012). Concerns about the ethical considerations of qualitative research have commonly focussed around three aspects: the informed consent of respondents; confidentiality and anonymity of interview material; and the consequences of the research (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009).

Informed consent was taken verbally from each interviewee and while doing this Patton’s (2002: 407) advice of keeping it ‘simple, straightforward and understandable’ was followed. The basic message that was communicated while obtaining informed consent is stated as a preamble in the interview guide (see Appendix A). After taking consent, interviews were digitally recorded for subsequent analysis. As mentioned earlier, only two interviewees did not allow recording of the interview and their request was acknowledged accordingly.
In order to ensure the confidentiality of the interviewees, the transcripts of interviews were assigned a code that reflected the case study organisation and the generic designation rather than the specific individual. For instance, the code CARE-CM-01 indicates that this interviewee belongs to CARE, has the designation of Cluster Manager and is assigned number 1 to distinguish it from other cluster managers interviewed for this research. All quotations cited in this thesis reflect these assigned codes to protect the confidentiality of the interviewees. Whilst the use of codes is a useful technique to make quotations confidential and non-attributable, it also provides useful information to the reader about the designation and the corresponding organisation of the interviewee.

Traditionally, researchers are advised to mask the names of case study organisations by giving them pseudonyms. But the presumption to disguise case study organisations and even respondents is increasingly challenged by the research participants who insist on ‘owning their own stories’ (Patton 2002: 411). All three case study organisations (CARE, ITA and PEF) took pride in their identities and insisted on using their real names. As far as the interviewees were concerned most of the private sector interviewees were indifferent towards whether the researcher used their real names or not. Many public sector officials, on the other hand, requested that their privacy be protected. Accordingly, this thesis refers to the case study organisations with their actual names and has protected the privacy of the interviewees by assigning them codes.

In short, there appeared to be no particular ethical problems with this research and the case study organisations gave consent to collecting data both from within the organisation and from their partners. No one was forced into an interview and only a few took the option to refuse. As mentioned earlier, a project sponsor in each case study organisation assigned a middle-level manager to support the data collection process. Whilst this helped the researcher to gain access to different parties, occasionally this created a false impression that the researcher was some kind of managerial or official spy. In such situations, the participants were given further information about the research and its aims. Nevertheless, participants were told that their anonymised viewpoints would be used in research outputs and they could be
communicated to the organisational leadership as recommendations for programme improvement.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the methodology for this research and has argued that a qualitative case study research design has strengths that make it well-suited to the investigation and understanding of IORs in PPPs. Nevertheless, undertaking qualitative case study research is not simple and, at times, it is not possible to specify the time required for different tasks (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994). This study took more time than was originally expected and hence posed some practical issues such as limited funding. Whilst the guidance and advice available in textbooks are helpful in this respect; the process needs to be redefined by individual researchers to suit their particular circumstances. Furthermore, the iterative nature of the research is stressful at times and requires persistence throughout the research. Nevertheless, these efforts are worthwhile because qualitative research allows the researcher to enter unexplored avenues of study. Qualitative researchers need to combine methodological knowledge with intuition in order to carry out a rigorous (but not rigid) dialogue between data and theory, and be flexible in accommodating emerging ideas. Miles and Huberman (1994: 309) have rightly pointed out that ‘qualitative data analysis is a craft… and [it] comes in many varieties and flavours’.

In terms of maintaining the quality standards, the different tactics that have been suggested by Yin (1994) and others (especially qualitative researchers) have been employed to ensure that findings are valid and reliable. The use of documents and semi-structured interviews has enabled a reasonably holistic account of the case studies and a fairly deep exploration of conceptual issues. In line with the advice of scholars (e.g. Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2014), this chapter has provided a transparent account of the research process. It has discussed in detail the reasons behind choices, the situations that were difficult and problematic, and the ways in which practical considerations resulted in changes in the research design. As Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012: 827) state, ‘Transparency is necessary for accountability, as it allows an informed discussion about the analytical process and
helps to ask questions about the congruence between methodology, the data analysis and the findings’.

In the next three chapters the case studies undertaken for this research are discussed. They are the initial ‘fruits’ of the research methods discussed in this chapter. Each case study is discussed in a separate chapter using a similar format. They start by introducing the case, followed by sections on the PPP set-up; implementation and management; and outcomes. The main focus of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is to describe and understand the nature of IORs during different stages of the partnership along with a discussion of PPP outcomes in each case study. The description of the nature of IORs and factors shaping these IORs in the individual case study chapters provides the basis for the analysis in Chapters 8. That analysis addresses the second research question on how we can characterise the nature of IORs and understand the influence of different factors on IORs in PPPs. The third research question on the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes is dealt in more detail in Chapter 9. That chapter focuses on explaining the research findings and links them to the existing literature.
Chapter 5  CARE-LDG PPP

5.1  Introduction
This case study looks at the dynamics of IORs in a PPP arrangement called the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. The partners are the Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE) and Lahore District Government (LDG). The partnership started in 1998 and consists of 210 state schools that have been adopted by CARE to uplift the standard of education services. The chapter is divided into five main sections. It begins by introducing both organisations involved in this PPP in sections 5.2 and 5.3. This is followed by a description of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme in section 5.4. The process through which this PPP was set-up, implemented and managed is explained in the section 5.5 and 5.6. The main focus throughout these two sections is to explain the IORs between CARE and LDG and what factors shape them. Section 5.7 summarises the outcomes of CARE-LDG PPP in order to review the synergistic benefits achieved by this partnership.

5.2  An introduction to CARE
CARE foundation is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) registered as a charitable trust. After the devastating floods in the Sheikhupura district of Punjab, CARE was established in 1988. At that time Seema Aziz, founder of CARE and a renowned industrialist, along with a few other concerned citizens decided to work together for the rehabilitation of the district and help the victims of flood. It was then that the idea of building a school in the area came to them. In 1991 CARE opened the doors of its first school. That school was a huge success with 250 children registering themselves on the very first day (CARE 2012b). Slowly and gradually CARE started building more schools in areas where there was no state school.

Another chapter for CARE started in 1998 when it entered a PPP arrangement with the City District Government of Lahore to adopt 10 schools in the city. This partnership expanded and CARE continued to adopt state schools. In 2012, CARE managed 225 schools comprising 210 state schools and 15 of its own schools. It was educating 150,000 children in partnership with district governments (CARE 2012b). The majority (151) of the 210 adopted state schools were in the Lahore district.
CARE is led by its founder Seema Aziz who is the chairperson and Managing Trustee of CARE. The organisation structure of CARE will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter but at its core, managers at various levels seek to improve and monitor the level of education in CARE’s own and adopted state schools.

The mission of CARE Foundation is to build a nation by ‘empowering children with solid education’. Education is considered to be the only way to break the vicious circle of poverty in the country. The leader of CARE emphasises the importance of an equal education for every child in the country. CARE aims to provide ‘quality marketable education’ in line with the current needs. However, realising that providing education to all children is beyond the resources of any private for-profit or not-for-profit organisation, CARE emphasises working in partnership with government to strengthen the existing system of education. This mission is reflected in the interview with the Head of Academics at CARE:

> We are not going to set up a separate system for us. Our whole aim has always been not to set up a totally different system but to work within the existing system because unless you do that you can’t bring about change from within (stressing). So we are trying to do that, we are trying to achieve that change from within (CARE-HoA).

CARE’s leader and founder, Seema Aziz, is wary about taking donor money. In her interview, Seema raised concerns about approaching international donor agencies for funding. This makes CARE distinct from the broader NGO community who are largely dependent on foreign donor agencies to implement many of their initiatives. As Seema explained:

> We have to understand that we have (stressing) to get away from this wicked foreign donor concept. We believe that foreign donor money, the money which has strings attached, is not what our country needs. I firmly believe that with that foreign charity money the destiny of nations would never change. The destiny of nations changes with the struggles of their own people, with their efforts and with their own sacrifice (CARE-Chair).

Another reason for scepticism towards foreign funding is lack of sustainability. CARE’s Head of Management argued that such funding is usually for some ‘specific projects and for a specified time period which does not suit the mission of CARE’ (CARE-HoM). What makes CARE different from other organisations is the long
term relationship which they maintain with children studying in their schools. They call them the ‘CARE family’ and children who are not able to continue their education due to financial issues are given scholarships to carry on their education at reputable institutes. CARE also operates an alumni society which organises events and nurtures the CARE family.

Seema believes in the capacity of the country and its people to address their needs. She argues that it is not lack of resources that is the main obstacle to quality education for everyone but the mismanagement of resources at different levels. This is the reason that CARE strives to improve the management of adopted schools. She supported her views by giving examples from the lifestyle of people in Pakistan:

See a pizza is at the price of 700-800 rupees and a child’s education is at 500 rupees, what’s problem with us? We have to look inside us, is there any lack of money in this country? See marriage ceremonies, see people's lifestyles, if every one of us thinks that I have to give some of my money back to the nation then (stressing) we will get over our problems (CARE-Chair).

She added:

**Mismanagement mismanagement** (stressing). This country doesn’t have a shortage of money by the way; it’s mismanaged. We can fix everything in the same amount of money, **with the same amount of money** (stressing), may be some will be left (smiling) (CARE-Chair).

She argues that it is the duty of every well-off person in the society to help the underprivileged get the fundamental right of access to quality education. CARE’s sources of funding match these claims as instead of relying on funding by donor agencies CARE actively pursues reaching the people of Pakistan, including expatriates, to generate funds. Moreover, CARE is increasingly involved with the corporate sector, including multinational and local corporations working in the country, to mobilise their funding in order to achieve its mission and goals.

### 5.3 An introduction to LDG

On the government side the organisational set-up comprises three different levels: province, district and school. Although PPP partners interact with the government officials at all three levels, most of the interactions tend to take place at the district and school levels, and these were the focus for data collection. At the provincial
level, there is a School Education Department (SED) headed by the Minister of Education and its core team comprises hierarchically organised officials who are responsible for all matters related to the delivery of education in the province.

The provinces are further divided into districts, and the elected representative, Nazim, is the person in charge of the administration of the whole district. The District Coordination Officer (DCO) works under the Nazim and is responsible for district level administration. The DCO implements and directs the approved plans of the district government, takes actions for improvement in service delivery and to achieve the goals assigned in the approved plans of the districts (UNESCO 2006). Education service delivery is one of the many responsibilities of the DCO. Different service delivery areas are grouped into departments (such as education, health, community development, finance and planning, IT, agriculture, law, literacy and revenue) and placed under Executive District Officers (EDOs). The respective EDOs of all departments are accountable to the DCO.

The EDO Education is the person in charge of education service delivery in a district and he/she is assisted by a team of officials (see Figure 5.1). The number of officials at this level varies from one district to another. In the Lahore district there is a team of six District Education Officers (DEOs) and eighteen Deputy DEOs. Further down the hierarchy is the frontline level which comprises government head teachers and teachers working in state schools.

The present system of district government (Nazim, DCO and EDO) was introduced in 2001 (Government of Punjab 2001). Under this system, administrations are accountable to elected councils and ultimately to the electorate. The purpose of the reform of the system was to take decision-making closer to the people. This should ensure that planning and development are carried out in accordance with local needs. Prior to 2001, it was the provincial government that was mainly responsible for the provision of services. The district is now the operational tier of governance and the focus of all service development activity (UNESCO 2006).
5.4 ‘Adopt-a-School’ partnership programme

The ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme was initiated in Sindh province in 1997 by Anita Ghulam Ali who was the Managing Director of the Sindh Education Foundation (SEF) at that time. The programme was basically aimed at improving the state schools by inviting different sectors of the society such as NGOs, concerned citizens, the corporate sector and educationists to adopt state schools. In 1990 a situation analysis of education in Sindh, carried out for UNICEF, revealed the apathy of government schools in the province. One of the methods suggested in the report for
School improvement was the adoption of these schools. Professor Anita Ghulam Ali presented her proposal to the then minister for education which resulted in the Adopt-a-School programme being accepted at provincial government level. It was launched in the same year with the adoption of some government schools in the district of Karachi (Jamil 2001; SEF 2012).

The programme received national recognition and was replicated in the Punjab province in 1998. Most adopted schools in Punjab province are in the Lahore district. According to the official list of adopted schools provided by the Lahore education department a total of 363 state schools were adopted up to 2009, out of which 162 were adopted by CARE (Education Complex 2009).

In addition to the data collected for this research, it is also useful to draw on some existing studies that have examined the Adopt-a-School programme. One such study that has compared the programme in both provinces, Sindh and Punjab, found that the conception of the programme is different in the two provinces:

In Sindh the program began on an academic note and was initiated by an educationist. In Punjab on the other hand, the program began on an administrative note through a directive issued by the education department to its implementing bodies (Shams 2001: 70).

Shams (2001) documents sharp difference in the way the programme is implemented and managed in Sindh and Punjab:

In Sindh the SEF [Sindh Education Foundation] played a pivotal role in launching the program and maintaining its role as an intermediary as well as leading the initiative at all levels. It is managing the entire program along with support from the education department as well as adopters… Regardless of the measure of success, this seems to be a positive feature. In Punjab the Education Foundation or any other government body had no such role to play and as such the program management is left to the discretion of concerned departments and individuals. The education department officials at various levels in Punjab are not entirely clear about this program and where it will eventually lead. They have been unable to communicate the program concept to teachers, many of whom continue to harbor suspicions, such as that the adopting NGO will take over the school and will privatize it and those in service will lose their jobs etc. (Shams 2001: 70).
Although the comparison of both provinces is out of the scope of this research, it nevertheless suggests some possible reasons for the nature of IORs in the CARE-LDG partnership and it is also useful in developing a retrospective view of the situation. As discussed later in this chapter, the interviews conducted with head teachers of the adopted schools and CARE officials confirm that there were huge suspicions about the programme initially and as a result government staff at adopted schools protested against the adoption of state schools. However, interviewees usually reflected that this was the situation in the first year of partnership. With the passage of time the IORs have changed in many schools and the level of cooperation has increased significantly.

5.5 PPP set-up
The PPP between CARE and LDG was initiated at the district level and commenced with signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that specifies the roles and responsibilities of CARE and the district government. CARE is one of the pioneer organisations adopting state schools in 1998. The strong position of CARE’s leader as an industrialist helped her to gain access to key LDG officials and create a group of supporting people. This enabled her to set up a partnership with LDG and adopt some state schools. The Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All agenda also provided a conducive environment for the formation of educational PPPs.

The CARE-LDG PPP was agreed between CARE’s leader, the Nazim and the DCO of LDG. CARE produced a draft MoU and both parties reported reaching agreement after discussing and negotiating the terms with each other. As CARE’s Head of Management mentioned: ‘It is with mutual consent, we get into discussion and discuss it many times… in a partnership both have to agree’.

The main features of the CARE-LDG MoU are outlined in Box 5.1. The MoU supports a balanced bargaining position between LDG and CARE and it is necessary for both parties to consult each other before undertaking any important action (such as infrastructural changes, transfer of staff, etc.) in the adopted schools. This makes ongoing interaction between the public and private sector partners a permanent feature of this PPP. Furthermore, the terms of MoU are kept flexible and ‘can be
extended or reduced with mutual consents of the parties’ (Clause 1, CARE-LDG MoU).

**Box 5.1: Main features of the CARE-LDG MoU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities of the LDG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>That the DG will deliver complete and habitable school in accordance with mutually agreed criteria and the CARE shall adopt the aforesaid schools (Clause 1, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The utility bills, purchase of Registers, Blackboards, Chalks, Dusters, and Consumables for the science laboratories shall be paid through school funds (Clause 11, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary repairs of buildings shall be the responsibility of the “District Government”, whereas repairs and replacement of installation and fixtures shall be made by the “District Government” from the school funds according to the prevalent practices (Clause 13, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All transfers both in and out of the CARE adopted “District Government schools” would be done in consultation and [with the] prior approval of CARE (Clause 16, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities of CARE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management of the entire affairs of the above-referred schools shall exclusively vest in CARE… subject to the overall supervision and control of the “District Government” within the formalities of this agreement (CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provision of fully equipped science laboratories within each and every adopted school shall be responsibility of “CARE”. Any such item of inventory so introduced by “CARE” shall be marked as “Property of CARE” and [it will] be responsible for its maintenance and upkeep (Clause 12, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CARE may introduce English as a medium of instruction and may also add supplementary books for this purpose (Clause 14, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE may provide teacher-training opportunities for the teaching as well as the management staff of its adopted school in order to raise the standard of education and introduce new teaching methodology (Clause 17, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whereas it is CARE’s responsibility to uplift the standard of education, CARE must evaluate and prepare appraisal reports for all including Government staff. Such performance &amp; evaluation reports about the performance of Government staff would carry reasonable weight and importance both in CARE and [in the] District Government Education Department (Clause 18, CARE-LDG MoU).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 **PPP implementation and management**

During the whole process of the PPP set-up, all interactions were between CARE’s leader and the *Nazim* and District Coordination Officer (DCO). The MoU was signed by the DCO. The EDO Education, who is the person in charge of education service
delivery at the district level, was not involved in the development and agreement process of the MoU. The non-involvement of district education officials at this stage was an important factor in enabling CARE to envision the goals of partnership and take up the roles and responsibilities they wished to pursue to achieve these goals.

The research findings are consistent with previous studies (Shams 2001; Bano 2008b) and there is no evidence of any serious effort on the part of those involved in the MoU agreement process to clarify the scope and objectives of the programme with district education officials. This resulted in lack of understanding about the scope of the programme among education department officials. One of the DDEOs expressed her concerns about not being involved in the process, she argued:

Agreement is done at higher level and even we don't know what it is. We are not involved in setting up the MoU. We have given this suggestion that before doing the agreement we should be asked what we want (Gov-DDEO-04).

It is important to look at the expectations of CARE and LDG from the partnership arrangement. On the government side, it is clear from the interviews with government officials working in the district education department and schools that although they want to improve the educational standards in the state schools, in most cases all they expect from the private sector is to contribute financial (or more generally the material) resources to uplift the quality of education in adopted schools. Most education department officials, including those at school level, do not think it is acceptable to let adopters intervene in matters related to academics and management of schools, such as lesson planning, attendance and punctuality of teachers or pupils, etc. This is why the adopters are typically seen as an interference and as encroaching on the authority of government officials when they try to implement initiatives directly aimed at improving the quality of education and management in adopted schools. The comment below is quite typical in explaining the perceived need for the partnership and especially the role of the private sector partner:

What we need from partnership is that in order to provide quality education we get AV aids, give us multimedia, give us IT lab, give us IT teachers, give us sweepers where required, give learning based toys to children, things like that. We don't need interference, they should give us one trainer who should come after a month or 15 days and train in art and
craft, activity based learning, doing art work and how to decorate the school. That's it! This is what we want (Gov-DDEO-04).

Comments such as this one are consistent with the key indicators used by the federal and provincial governments to measure the quality of education. For instance, the indicators of education improvement at federal level are the number of schools, enrolment figures, number of teachers and availability of physical facilities such as school buildings, condition of school buildings, level of construction work, availability of electricity, drinking water, toilets and boundary walls, and number of classrooms (Government of Pakistan 2011: v).

The perceived need for partnership is different from CARE’s perspective. In line with their mission ‘to empower children with quality marketable education’ and their belief that state schools are mismanaged, CARE looks at the partnership as a means to improve quality of education by improving management at schools. Their main emphasis is on improving the school administration and discipline, monitoring teachers in class rooms, examining the notebook checking done by teachers, ensuring attendance of children and staff, designing and providing curriculum or any other learning material for teaching, providing training to teachers, introducing mechanisms for quality improvement such as lesson planning, monthly exams to assess children learning, keeping a track record of child learning outcomes, and implementing stated rules and regulations.

Hence, the partners had and have different expectations from the partnership. However, given that CARE took the lead in developing the MoU, it is not surprising to find that the MoU reflects the vision of CARE. Contrary to the expectations of the LDG officials in the education department, the CARE-LDG MoU puts the responsibilities for providing the material and financial resources for state schools on LDG or directly on schools (from their allocated funds). There is only one clause (No.12) related to the provision of science labs that makes CARE responsible for the provision of material inputs. The rest of CARE’s responsibilities are related to the provision of professional and managerial support (see Box 5.1).

The lack of clarity about the PPP goes further down the hierarchy and created doubts and insecurities in the minds of head teachers and other staff working at school level.
This obstructed trust and relationship building when the programme was implemented in schools. There are some cases of strong resistance from schools to working in partnership with CARE. One of CARE’s cluster managers shed light on the situation at the time the first batch of state schools were adopted:

Let me tell you the history when CARE started entering government schools, there was great resistance from government schools. Obviously those government schools were there in that area for quite long and so they managed to get the community at their side and tried their best to make CARE leave, why? Because they didn't know (stressing) that for what purpose we are coming (CARE-CM-04).

In this environment of confusion and suspicion, when CARE officials walked into adopted schools for the first time, they were seen as someone who would eventually take over the schools. The suspicions and insecurities of staff at adopted schools were further reinforced when they were subjected to monitoring by CARE officials (a responsibility of CARE under clause 18 of the CARE-LDG MoU). The PPP model devised by CARE comprises a team of managers who are responsible for monitoring the quality of education delivered in adopted schools. This PPP model is explained in the next sub-section and is also summarised in Figure 5.2. The response of head teachers towards CARE’s PPP model and the IORs in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents are described in the sub-sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 respectively.

5.6.1 CARE’s PPP model and points of interaction

After the formal adoption of state schools, CARE usually provides missing facilities including libraries, science labs, furniture and classrooms. Furthermore, in order to address the shortage of teachers CARE hires and provides its own teachers to supplement government teachers in adopted schools. The number of CARE teachers in each adopted schools varies according to the requirements of each school. One of the CARE teachers is designated as head of CARE teachers and is given the title of Internal Coordinator (IC). The CARE IC teaches and has additional management responsibilities in adopted schools. This involves regular monitoring of the school, record keeping and data management including attendance records, movement register and teacher evaluation. The ICs also observe teachers while conducting classes, looking at the lesson plans and reviewing the teaching methodology. Such responsibilities are carried out mainly by the ICs in collaboration with senior staff of
CARE who visit the adopted schools on a regular basis. They undertake a Training Need Analysis (TNA) and arrange training in relevant areas.

The school head teacher is a government employee and is the one who officially controls and governs school affairs. The head teacher is in direct contact with the district education department through District Education Officers (DEOs) and their team (see Figure 5.1 for the details of government structure at district level). Though the CARE IC is supposed to work under the supervision and in collaboration with the school head teacher, there is in effect a dual management structure and this often produces a conflict of control between CARE and school head teachers. CARE teachers and especially the ICs are in direct contact with CARE’s central office. Government head teachers report to the district education department through their own chain of command. The CARE IC has no direct connection with the district government. CARE gives some autonomy to ICs to enable them to handle problems at the school level. In situations where ICs are unable to manage problems by themselves, they report the matter through CARE’s chain of command explained below (see Figure 5.2).
As shown in Figure 5.2, the organisational structure of CARE for managing the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme comprises several tiers of field managers. As mentioned above there are ICs in every adopted school. In some schools, usually big ones with high enrolment figures, ICs are accompanied by an Academic Internal Coordinator (AIC). Formally, AICs are given the sole responsibility for looking into academic matters whereas the ICs perform managerial duties. However, the interviews with AICs and ICs did not confirm this division of duties and they reported having the same type of responsibilities.
The adopted schools are clustered according to their geographic locations and each cluster consists of no more than 6 schools. A cluster manager oversees schools in each cluster and he/she is responsible for all aspects of the schools and for communication between the school and CARE’s central office. A cluster manager usually has no teaching responsibilities and is mainly responsible for the management and monitoring of schools. Several clusters combine to form an area. An area manager is empowered to handle all aspects of schools in the area and deals with any issues as they arise. Then there is the central office with two different departments led by the Head of Academics and the Head of Management who interact with the district government at senior levels.

What comes out quite strongly during data analysis is the consistency of statements across CARE officials at various levels. In some cases the examples they provided in response to some questions were the same as the ones provided by Seema herself. Even the ICs (who are at the lower level of management) quoted her words and sentences, which demonstrates Seema’s influence on managers at different levels in CARE. One factor that explains this consistency is a family like organisational culture at CARE. Most of the area managers joined CARE many years ago as teachers. That was a time when Seema’s involvement with the organisation was at its peak. It was also interesting to see that all four area managers who were interviewed were responsible for schools that they joined as teachers, subsequently getting promoted to cluster and then area managers.

5.6.2 The response of head teachers towards CARE’s PPP model

As mentioned earlier the district education officials were not involved in the process of negotiating and agreeing the MoU. On top of that there are hardly any education officials and head teachers who have read the MoU. They consider it out of their domain, one DEO responded as follows when asked about the MoU:

We are not involved in setting up the agreement, it is done by our senior officials and we don't know much about it (Gov-DEO-01).

One of the Assistant Education Officers (AEOs) commented:

No I have not seen that (the MoU), that is the government’s and CARE’s matter. Our officers must have done it with care, whatever direction they
give we act according to that. The head teachers have no concern with that agreement; they are concerned with directions (from their department) (Gov-AEO-01).

Head teachers provided responses similar to their managers. One of the typical responses is cited below:

No, those agreements are not for us, what is that agreement and on which conditions it is made is all [district] office job, it’s not our task, and there is nothing for us to do in that. So I don’t feel any necessity to look at the MoU (CARE-HT-04).

Given lack of understanding of the MoU, it is not surprising that there are clashes of expectations at the school level. The research found varied responses from government head teachers about the CARE-LDG PPP. Many interviewees expressed concern about the dual management arrangements. At one extreme there are some who consider that there is a clear conflict of control between the school administration led by the head teacher and CARE. They complain that the roles and responsibilities given to CARE’s ICs bring them to a par with head teachers and in some cases they perceive ICs to be trying to supersede them in decision-making. They often raise concerns about the low qualification and non-professional attitude of teachers employed and trained by CARE. They criticise the monitoring practices of CARE as a non-productive intervention in the school’s processes that at times may even be detrimental to a school’s performance. The following is a typical comment that reflects the viewpoint of head teachers who are against CARE’s monitoring:

See CARE teachers are not as qualified as the government teachers who are inducted through a proper process. I’ve seen that the turnover rate of CARE teachers is very high, they come and they leave after three months or so, this doesn’t happen in the government sector. In government sector a teacher is there for 25 years, so there is a proper criteria and process. On top of that CARE teachers think themselves more superior to us; they also observe teachers in classes which disturbs the whole class. At times they think they are superior and know better and we know less which can’t be tolerated (CARE-HT-02).

At the other extreme there are head teachers who consider CARE’s monitoring as the added value of the partnership. They mention that having two types of teachers, government and CARE teachers, creates a healthy competition and encourages each group to improve their performance, which is beneficial for school and pupils. The
quotes below represent the value that these head teachers attach to the enhanced checks and balances in adopted state schools:

CARE is a sort of check on us and we are check on them. If I find something wrong with them I can talk to Mrs. Aziz or can complain to the area manager. Similarly they through their area manager can complain to our higher officials. Due to this double check no one can escape their duties (CARE-HT-05).

Another head teacher added:

Because of the presence of both of us my staff feel his (CARE ICs) pressure and his staff are also conscious that I am sitting here… so they want to do best of the best. You can consider it a sort of a competition between government and CARE teachers which improves the performance of both. They all are very alert (CARE-HT-04).

Given that the head teachers are the main actors from the public sector involved in the partnership relationship on day-to-day basis, they have a strong impact on the IORs in the ‘Adopt-a-School’ PPP arrangement. While previous studies usually report conflicting IORs between CARE and government staff in adopted schools (Shams 2001; Shah et al. 2005; Bano 2008b), one of the main findings of this research is that the IORs vary from one school to another depending on the initiative and attitude of the head teachers towards partnership and school management. This diversity is demonstrated with some typical examples of adopted schools in Box 5.2.

As mentioned earlier, one possible reason for the lack of consistency between this finding and the existing studies is the difference in the time periods for the studies. Drawing on the interview with a CARE cluster manager:

I would say that the relationships have changed a lot with the passage of time, now people have realised what CARE wants, they’ve seen CARE’s work and it’s only due to CARE’s work… see it is natural if we have a guest at our home who says that I would live here and moreover I would check you and all that, then resistance is inevitable. But now they have realised that actually they are in benefit, CARE is giving them benefit and no loss so now they have realised. Now there are only few schools in which there are problems but if you’d have come for this research 5 or 10 years ago the situation was very difficult, there were many problems and lots of efforts were required (CARE-CM-03).
This change in the IORs over a period of time was mentioned by many other CARE officials and some head teachers too who were working in the adopted schools since the time of adoption.

**Box 5.2: IORs in CARE adopted schools**

### Passive acceptance (School-03)

School-03 was amongst the first ten schools which were adopted by CARE in 1998. In this school semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Cluster Manager and the Academic Internal Coordinator (AIC) from the CARE’s side, and the school head teacher and deputy head from the government side. An important theme that emerged from the analysis of all these interviews was a lack of coordination between CARE and government staff due to the passive role of the head teacher. Whilst CARE’s AIC mentioned that the head teacher ‘doesn’t interfere or create hurdles and normally agrees to his decisions’, he emphasised that ‘the head teacher should have an active role for better outcomes’. This attitude of the head teacher results in low levels of conflict in this school. Nonetheless, the Cluster Manager highlighted that ‘whatever I ask him to do he always says okay but takes no initiative to implement those decisions which results in delays and miscommunication between CARE and government teachers’.

The government deputy head explained that CARE is somewhat able to dominate in this partnership because ‘no one takes initiative from the government side, CARE is working as an independent authority and whatever decision CARE officials take is accepted’. He clearly mentioned that ‘although CARE officials are required to work under the supervision of the head teacher but he is unable to lead’. The head teacher expressed his support for the partnership but was reluctant to answer many questions.

When asked about the added value of the partnership, the Cluster Manager said that ‘there could be much more added value if there had been a strong bond between both parties’. He further mentioned that ‘the role of the head teacher is quite central to the whole partnership model but unfortunately he is not performing his role. If it would have been possible all nearby private schools would have closed and this school would have been running in double shift but this is not like this rather we have to bring our children to school with great efforts’.

### Conflictual IORs (School-02)

School-02 was adopted by CARE in 1998. The officials interviewed from this school included the Academic Internal Coordinator (AIC) and the Internal Coordinator (IC) from the CARE’s side, and the school head teacher from the government side. Although this school was adopted by CARE in 1998, the current head teacher was appointed in 2009.

During the interview, the head teacher mentioned that state schools face many problems such as over-crowding in class rooms due to shortage of class rooms and teachers, but she was reluctant to acknowledge the contribution of CARE in this respect. At times when she referred to the facilities provided by CARE (such as provision of furniture, computers etc.), she commented that ‘this was not from CARE but some donors that CARE brought in’. She appreciated the increased interest of the government to raise the standard of state school and claimed that ‘now there is no difference between adopted and non-adopted schools’. She argued, ‘There is no need of partnership, I don't know about the situation at the time when it was adopts but now there is no difference whether CARE is there or not’. She also seemed to be unhappy about the monitoring of teachers undertaken by CARE. ‘Although it is
important to guide the teachers, we do guide them and CARE officials too but there shouldn't be too much interference, sometimes they (CARE officials) criticise a lot and that’s not good,' she stated. She mentioned low levels of trust between both parties and gave an impression as if she is working in partnership as some mandated obligation. When asked about the process of decision-making, she emphasised that ‘whatever decision I have to take, I will take that myself and there is no role of CARE in it. They may be informed later but the decision I have to take, I take that and I consult my EDO and DEO for these’.

An important line of argument that came across from the interviews from CARE’s side was the need to get things done by playing the politics. Both AIC and IC seemed to realise that the head teacher has more power to get things done and that they often have no direct powers to enforce their ideas on government teachers but that they can play a substantive role through the head teacher. They enacted this role by actively convincing the head teacher towards their own agenda while simultaneously giving her the due respect. The AIC shared her experience by narrating an instance when there was an issue on preparing test papers and CARE’s central office decided that the test papers needed to be reset. Since the directive came from CARE and it required the school to do the same exercise twice, the head teacher got upset and considered it as an unnecessary burden. The AIC explained, ‘Initially there was a little conflict but later on she (head teacher) cooperated. Sometimes it happens that she has a difference of opinion somewhere but we motivate her in such a manner that she gets convinced. The main thing is that there should be a proper way to talk’. Elaborating on dealing with conflicts the IC mentioned that ‘when things become impossible to settle at school level, they are taken up by the higher management of CARE. Then they approach district officials and higher authorities to make them (staff at adopted schools) understand and cooperate with us’.

Despite conflictual IORs in some instances, there is evidence of added value in terms of increases in the enrolment levels and improvement in exam results. The head teacher acknowledged, ‘Our results are very good due to special attention on children and this is with the efforts of both CARE and us’.

**Collaborative IORs (School-08)**

School-08 was adopted by CARE in 2004. The officials interviewed from this school included Area Manager and IC from the CARE’s side and the school head teacher from the government side.

The head teacher of the school was supervising this school in the capacity of Assistant Education Officer (AEO) since 2000 and in the year 2011 he was appointed as the head teacher of the school. Hence, this head teacher has a long experience of working with CARE both as an AEO and as a head teacher. He was of the view that there is a need for the private sector to help overcome the deficiencies in state schools and seemed to acknowledge the contribution of CARE with open heart. ‘For example for this school let me tell you that student strength is 1700 and there are 20 government teachers in all and CARE has provided 20 teachers, so in order to overcome such deficiencies the government wants someone to come so that the school can function properly, so that’s the need’, he explained. He seemed to have trust in the CARE’s team and stated, ‘I have trust on them, I know them when I was AEO and if they say something which I feel is for the betterment of the school then I accept it and try to implement it’.

CARE’s area manager, who was managing this school since 1998, was also appreciative of the head teacher and mentioned that it is very important that the head teacher plays an active role in the partnership. He argued, that ‘the head teachers who are not capable and don’t
want to show their incapability show full cooperation with us. They close their minds and say that whatever you say is correct, this is passive role and this is extremely dangerous for us. However, in this school either I convince him (the head teacher) or he convinces me and both of us have the objective to benefit children, which is a healthy attitude’. He talked about the high level of trust in this partnership and did not feels any need for verification or follow-up if something is decided between him and the head teacher. ‘It is not possible that we mutually decide something and he doesn’t do that so this is my trust on him that whatever I have discussed with him will be implemented,’ he explained.

The IC also mentioned the important role of the head teacher in building collaborative IORs. She mentioned, ‘This is the quality of our head teacher that he doesn’t keep any difference between government teachers and CARE teachers. If I complain about some teacher, he doesn’t call him in front of me, he calls the teacher in my absence and make him understand. This makes my job easier and helps to avoid conflicts’. She also talked about frequent meetings that are held in the school in order to cover the syllabus and highlighted team work as a factor to achieve the added value of the partnership.

There is evidence of significant synergistic outcomes in this school. The school is running in double shifts due to increase in the enrolment level which has increased from 600 pupils at the time of adoption to 1700 pupils. The number of class rooms has also increased from 3 to 16, out which 8 have been constructed by CARE. The school was upgraded from a primary school to a middle school and the head teacher mentioned substantial improvement in exam results too.

5.6.3 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents

Although there are examples of joint decision-making and joint determination of programme activities in many CARE adopted schools, the fieldwork shows that it is CARE who mainly controls the relationship. Although CARE officials working at school level get into frequent discussions with head teachers and other school staff to implement their initiatives, these are designed a priori at CARE’s central office. The discussions held at schools usually involve familiarising government staff with the initiatives planned by CARE and seeking acquiescence from them. During these discussions CARE officials stick to their own point of view and put the emphasis on convincing head teachers about the benefits of the initiatives. Head teachers react to this approach differently and this results in varied IORs in adopted schools, as mentioned in the previous section.

The overall approach of CARE officials is to resolve any conflict with the head teachers by discussion rather than confrontation. Seema referred to the policy of no confrontation as:
We have always tried to make everyone a team… and we also made a policy of no confrontation and no criticism right from the start (CARE-Chair).

Nevertheless, she emphasised: ‘but I told them we need to stand in here; we are here to serve our children’ which means that while following a policy of no confrontation, CARE officials need to stick to their point of view. They keep on persuading government officials, via discussions at both district and school levels, about the benefits of implementing CARE’s initiatives. As CARE’s Head of Management added in her interview:

The problems and hindrances keep on appearing but we overcome them with communication. It is not like there are no problems, there are many but we don’t take them as problems and stick to our aim and then they don’t remain a problem for us (CARE-HoA).

The same approach is visible in many instances narrated by CARE’s ICs during their day-to-day interaction with head teachers. Most ICs shared experiences of where things might have led to conflict but they managed the situation through discussion. An IC related an incident when the government teachers and head were reluctant to take ‘zero period’, which was introduced by CARE to give extra time to students before the starting time of school. It was especially aimed at children who were about to take their board exams. She explained:

We handled them very carefully and told them that see if we don’t take zero periods children are so weak and they will fail and the result of your school will be bad which will affect your ACR (Annual Confidential Report). She listens to us but the thing is that we also give preference to ma’am (the head teacher) in every matter; we do ask her and discuss everything with her (CARE-IC-04).

The above comment is an example where CARE IC managed a complex situation by carefully playing the politics (giving preference to the head teacher as she is the one who has the authority) whilst also manipulating the agenda (imposing her own understanding of the issue and setting the agenda about how to improve the exam results). In these type of situations, either such matters are resolved at school level or they turn into major disputes. In the latter situations, CARE officials take matters to the district education office to get them resolved according to their plan. Consequently, some head teachers feel that their opinions and views are not given
any importance in decision-making, which restricts the trust building process in those cases and tends to result in conflicting IORs.

CARE has been active in interacting with the district officials who are in charge of the district administration throughout all stages of the partnership from PPP set-up to implementation and through to management. Although these interactions were limited to the Nazim and DCO during PPP set-up phase, after the formal adoption of state schools CARE management reported having regular fortnightly meetings with the EDO Education and his team and a monthly meeting with the Nazim. The importance of regular communication with district government officials is explicit in the following excerpt from the interview with CARE’s Head of Academics:

We have great coordination with the EDO education, we have had monthly meetings, fortnightly meetings for years and years… the EDOs over the years have given us a lot of time, we have had regular meetings with the EDOs to solve any issues in the adopted schools (CARE-HoA).

Despite several attempts, it was not possible to interview the EDO education of LDG due to his busy and unpredictable schedule of meetings (an issue discussed in Chapter 4) and hence his views on coordination cannot be produced here. Nonetheless, it is clear from the interviews with two DEOs and an AEO that CARE officials keep interacting with the district education department regularly and keep government officials updated on the work carried out in adopted schools.

CARE officials are of the view that active interaction at the higher levels is especially important in gaining respect in the eyes of head teachers. An area manager who has worked with CARE since 1998 was of the view that it becomes easier to implement CARE’s initiatives in the schools if they are reinforced by district education officers. He gave an example of when the participation of government teachers in CARE’s training workshop increased once CARE managed to get it notified from the LDG education department. He argued:

It is a psyche at all government side that if they think that the other person has the authority then all he says is very good but if they feel that the other person doesn’t have the authority then all he says is rubbish and wastage of time (CARE-AM-04).
Besides having a lot of interactions with the district level officials, CARE officials often expressed their frustration regarding the public sector education system. Drawing on Seema again:

There are many internal tussles within the government, the power struggle is huge, they are not able to decide themselves that what matters are to be dealt at the district level and what has to be done by the provincial government, no one takes the responsibility and make crazy. So it’s really unmanaged, they do not know how to manage things, the system is too centralised (stressing). The changes in the government are so unpredictable and there is no connection between those who make policy and those who implement policy (CARE-Chair).

CARE officials take pride in the work CARE has undertaken in the adopted schools and consider it as their main strength. CARE officials seem to believe that the state schools are badly managed and state monitoring system is not targeted on the right indicators. One of the CARE area managers explained:

If you call a DCO and even if you call chief minister he will come and see whether cleanliness is there? Are teachers in the classes? If yes, that’s perfect for them… they are not concerned with what the child has done in the note books and how much he has learnt, they think if cleanliness is there in school and teacher is in the class that’s all (stressing). Whereas CARE says that work starts after all this is done (stressing), like for example you should conduct their training that how to teach and how to move ahead (CARE-AM-01).

In line with the vision of CARE’s leadership, improving the management of adopted schools lies at the heart of CARE’s partnership model. Due to their day-to-day interaction with the adopted schools, CARE officials encountered some practices of the government teachers which were a cause of conflict. A typical example is that of some government teachers bringing their children to schools. These government teachers used to ask some of the school students to take care of these children. CARE stopped such activities in adopted schools which resulted in conflicts at times.

The management initiatives undertaken by CARE were generally considered by government head teachers as stepping into their domain and this became a reason for conflict in most cases during the initial years of partnership. Some of the head teachers at adopted schools complained that CARE officials used to consider
themselves superior and more knowledgeable and did not take into account their vast experience. These views are reflected in the following interview excerpt:

Initially the administrators that were placed here from CARE portrayed themselves as if they have an Aladdin lamp and will force others to work as they wished. Naturally they had to face huge reaction because government teacher is ‘public sector’s son-in-law’ and would not retire before 60 years of age, so that was natural. But the current IC has a very mature attitude and she is taking work from the same teachers in such a nice way (CARE-HT-07).

The term ‘public sector’s son-in-law’ is an analogy used by the head teacher to represent the strong position of the government teachers whose terms of employment give them a lot of job security.

Besides developing collaborative IORs in many schools over time, the attitude of CARE officials that they ‘can fix everything’ is still seen as a barrier to building trust. Head teachers are generally happy about the facilities provided by CARE but certain initiatives directly aimed at uplifting quality of education such as conducting their own exams in addition to board exams, obliging government teachers to use CARE supplements and the monitoring of government teachers are sometimes seen as interference in the domain of school administration. In an interview with an AEO it was clear that he was generally supportive of the idea of partnership and appreciated CARE’s contribution in adopted schools. Nevertheless, he pointed out his concerns:

Actually the thing is that they (CARE) are doing good work but they try to become a parallel administrator which head teachers don’t like, they are happy with the facilities they provide but don’t allow them (CARE officials) to rule (Gov-AEO-01).

5.7 PPP outcomes

There are many examples of the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs which could not have been achieved by each party working on its own. Interestingly, some added value of the partnership was possible even in the schools where there were conflictual IORs. This was possible due to the enhanced checks and balances. However, the added value was not achieved in one school where the head teacher played a passive role (as discussed in Box 5.2). This shows that it is essential for
both parties to actively participate in partnership in order to produce significant synergistic outcomes.

Both CARE and LDG possess some strengths and weaknesses, and these PPPs allow both partners to take advantage of each other’s strength. Interestingly, there are certain instances where the 'weakness' of one sector is usually the 'strength' of the other which makes a very good case for the value added by the partnerships. The first example in this regard is CARE’s use of state infrastructure to pursue their mission. As already pointed out no private sector organisation could ever have resources to provide education services to all. This fact was well recognised by the leadership at CARE and they saw partnership with LDG as an opportunity to pursue their goals. This is reflected in the following excerpt from the interview with one of CARE’s cluster manager:

Madam (Seema) started with her own schools initially and then she realised that rather than spending a lot why not improve the existing ones, if you get a running setup it is far more cost effective to improve, and that was a good decision (CARE-CM-01).

Similar views were given by CARE’s Head of Management:

To provide quality marketable education to underprivileged children is our mission and we are especially focusing on government schools because we know that most of the people send their children to government schools and they have vast infrastructure so we are targeting government schools (CARE-HoM).

So this is an example where LDG’s existing infrastructure is seen as the strength of the public sector. There are also examples where strengths of CARE were adding value to partnership by overcoming weakness in public sector system. For example, it was mentioned by many head teachers that government procedures are slow with respect to the provision of teachers in schools due to the long recruitment process. On the contrary, CARE can provide teachers in a short period of time. According to an AEO, the main reason for this is that the government jobs are long-term and teachers once selected stay engaged for their lifetime whereas the private sector jobs are mostly contract based which is usually on a short-term basis and hence hiring and firing is easier. That is why the government has to be cautious while recruiting and it takes more time. The provision of teachers by CARE, as a main input for education
service delivery, is a synergistic benefit of the partnership and is acknowledged by all government officials both at district and school levels. One of the head teachers voiced her views as:

When they (CARE) work with us, they provide missing facilities, teaching and non-teaching staff which is an advantage. Usually if there is a shortage of teaching staff in state schools, the head teachers write to the government and you know government sector is so big and education department is so huge that they can’t address the needs of every institution instantly. CARE facilitates us with providing staff and by the grace of God we have a lot of staff in our school after partnership with CARE (CARE-HT-07).

Taking advantage from each other’s strengths has resulted in enhanced capacity and influence of both CARE and LDG in this PPP arrangement. There is evidence of enhanced organisation identity of each partner. Working in state schools has enhanced CARE’s organisational identity manifold as it has improved CARE’s image, visibility and profile both in the community and the education sector. This has resulted in increased funding options for CARE which is an added value of the partnership.

The organisational identity of LDG has also been enhanced by entering into PPP arrangement. CARE has contributed to the provision of missing facilities in adopted schools. These improvements helped to increase school enrolment rates significantly so that it became difficult to accommodate the increased number of pupils in the existing buildings. In such situations the adopted schools started accommodating children in double-shifts. This has improved the image of LDG. In many schools there is also evidence of improvements in the exam results.

It is not possible to quantify the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs due to non-availability of relevant and robust data. Nonetheless, according to CARE’s Head of Academics, in Lahore district the enrolment rate of adopted schools has increased by 41.7% since the time of adoption and the exam passing rate is 20% higher in adopted schools as compared to non-adopted state schools (CARE 2012a). However, it would not be fair to give all the credit to CARE as the fieldwork clearly shows that many government head teachers were eager to bring improvements in their schools and looked at the partnership with CARE as a good opportunity to do so.
With respect to partners’ ability to achieve their own organisational objectives, both LDG and CARE official generally consider that they have the same overarching objective, which is to improve access to quality education in Pakistan. The CARE-LDG PPP has enabled both of them to make progress against this objective. The fact that CARE is now expanding and adopting state schools in other provinces is another indicator that CARE-LDG PPP has facilitated CARE in meeting its objectives.

5.8 Conclusion

CARE-LDG PPP has been established in view of the inability of both CARE and LDG to generate enough resources by themselves to pursue their mission and goals. The fact that both CARE and LDG have a common objective of improving access to quality education - albeit with differences in their approach and perceptions - has facilitated both organisations to work in partnership. Differing perceptions of partners towards the goals of partnership is a source of tension in CARE-LDG PPP during PPP implementation and management stage. Nevertheless, CARE was successful to take up the roles and responsibilities they wish to pursue in partnership arrangement due to the non-involvement of district education officials in PPP set-up phase.

As such the development of IORs in the adopted schools was a dynamic process as IORs changed from one stage of the partnership to another and also within one stage over time. The IORs were typically characterised by lack of trust and conflicts in the initial years of the partnership but gradually the IORs changed when partners got to know each other and started building trust. Furthermore, the IORs in CARE-LDG PPPs were diverse as they varied from one school to another depending on the initiative and attitude of the head teachers towards partnership and school management.

There are many examples of the value added by CARE-LDG PPPs which was not possible by each party working on its own. However, the synergistic outcomes became possible only with the active participation of both sides (CARE and government officials) and there is an example where no added value was produced in one adopted school due to the lack of active participation of the government head teacher.
Chapter 6 ITA-LDG PPP

6.1 Introduction
This case study looks at the nature of the IORs and the factors shaping them in a PPP arrangement, called the Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP). It involves Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aaghai (ITA) and the Lahore District Government (LDG). The partnership started in the year 2000 and consists of 12 state schools that have been adopted by ITA to uplift the standard of education services. The chapter begins by introducing ITA in section 6.2. This is followed by a description of WSIP in section 6.3. The process through which this PPP was set-up, implemented and managed is explained in the sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. While explaining the PPP process, particular attention is paid to understanding and explaining the nature of IORs and the factor shaping these IORs. Finally, section 6.6 outlines the outcomes of ITA-LDG PPP in order to review the synergistic benefits achieved by this partnership.

6.2 An introduction to ITA
ITA also known as the ‘Centre of Education and Consciousness’ is a non-governmental organisation registered as public trust. With its head office in Lahore, ITA has branch offices in 23 districts across four provinces of Pakistan and two fund raising offices in the UK and USA. ITA was established in the year 2000 in response to the educational challenges in Pakistan. According to the official website of ITA:

Unfortunately education has consistently failed to be a priority for Pakistani leaders. In 61 years of Pakistan’s existence, Universal Primary Education (UPE) has remained an elusive goal… Chronic lack of resources, shortage of facilities beyond primary level, lack of competent teachers/managers, terrorism and emergencies are severely jeopardizing possibilities for human development and participation (ITA 2012a).

ITA emerged with the ideology that it is the social responsibility of citizens to work jointly with the government to address these challenges. The mission of ITA is stated as:

To actively pursue universal access and standard setting in education as a comprehensive learning experience for human evolution and consciousness by creating contemporary education systems for all children without discrimination due to gender, class, age, religion, color
and ethnicity and, endeavoring to address educational bottlenecks through timely resource mobilization and influencing of public policy (ITA 2012a).

Although very broad, there are three main objectives evident in this mission: 1) *universal access and standard setting in education*, 2) *resource mobilisation*, and 3) *influencing public policy*.

ITA’s leader and founder, Dr. Baela Raza Jamil, is a well-known educationist and a public policy specialist. Baela’s biography helps to explain how her experiences resulted in establishing ITA. Baela is a daughter of a well-known lawyer of Pakistan and belongs to the upper income class of the country. She started working in the field of education at UNICEF where she worked as a programme officer for the education of women and children in vulnerable circumstances. Baela always wanted to be in a position where she could influence policy decisions. In an interview with a local journalist she explains:

> UNICEF was a good place but I wanted to have more say in policy making because that is the real thing... What is the point of researching and working and reaching a conclusion about flaws in a system but not having the power to see they are mended? (Jalil 2011)

Later in 1995 she joined the Punjab education task force ⁵ which provided her with an opportunity to input into policy work. Two years later Baeda joined the Sindh Education Foundation (SEF). At that time SEF was led by Anita Ghulam Ali who first presented the idea of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme in Sindh province. All these experiences encouraged Baela to set up her own not-for-profit organisation. ITA was established with a project based on the Adopt-a-School programme, the idea that Baela learned while working at SEF.

Keeping in view the vision and mission of ITA, it is not surprising to find that ITA is working to mobilise diverse stakeholders in the education sector. This includes the government, community, corporate sector, philanthropists, NGOs (local, national and

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⁵ The Pakistan Education Task Force is a national initiative to support the implementation of the National Education Policy in Pakistan with support of DFID. ‘The initial work of the Task Force was to set key priorities that will establish national standards for schools, improve monitoring of these standards, and harness government, private and charitable resources to increase enrolment and achievement’ (DFID, 2011).

DFID 2011. UK support to education in Pakistan. *UKaid from the Department of International Development.*
international), educationists, expatriates and different types of donor organisations. ITA works with these diverse partners and is involved in many initiatives which are described below.

Inspired by the idea of the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme, ITA has developed the Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP). This is the flagship programme of ITA and it focuses on uplifting under-performing state schools by entering into partnership with district governments. WSIP occupies a central position in ITA’s working. It is the main focus of this study and is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.

In another initiative, ITA worked in collaboration with a multi-national company, Unilever Pakistan, for the promotion of Early Childhood Education (ECE) and developed a National Curriculum for Early Childhood Education 2007. ITA developed learning materials to facilitate the implementation of this National Curriculum. It conducted teachers’ training workshops for 200 teachers from 160 schools (120 state and 40 private) in the district Lahore.

ITA is also involved in professional development programmes for teachers both in Pakistan and abroad. Since 2004 ITA has coordinated a professional training programme for in-service teachers under Pakistani Education Leadership Institute (PELI) project. The project is sponsored by the US Department of State and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Selected public sector teachers and education managers from all over Pakistan are given an opportunity to visit Plymouth State University in the USA for a four to five-week training programme aimed at cross-cultural and educational exchange. ITA’s partnership with Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)6 is also an important part of capacity building. Since 2006, ITA has been working in partnership with PEF on their Continuous Professional Development Program (CPDP) and it conducts training workshops for teachers and head teachers at PEF partner schools all over Punjab.

6 PEF is an autonomous public sector organisation that is involved in partnerships with several private sector organisations. “The Punjab Education Foundation was established under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 1991 as an autonomous statutory body for the promotion of education, specially encouraging and supporting the efforts of the private sector in providing education to the poor, through public-private partnership” (PEF 2012)
In addition to formal education, ITA is also working in the area of non-formal education and literacy programmes. According to an ITA’s brochure there are six different programmes that ITA has been involved in since 2002 under this heading (ITA 2010). These programmes were targeted at specified districts of Punjab for a specific period of time and were supported by Save the Children, the US Department of Labor, International Labour Organization, UNICEF and Government of Pakistan. The main aims under almost all these programmes were to provide education to marginalised working children in order to get them into mainstream formal education.

ITA, since its inception, has actively pursued developing linkages and alliances with organisations working in the same field not only in Pakistan but globally. One of the most prominent ITA’s alliances is with South Asian Forum for Education Development (SAFED). This is an education forum for nine South Asian countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Burma. ITA has played an important role in the establishment of SAFED, and ITA has been assigned as SAFED’s first secretariat to take SAFED forward in its first phase. It is ITA’s responsibility to coordinate among the SAFED members and other partners and affiliates. Under this and other alliances, ITA takes the initiative to host seminars and conferences whereby several leading NGOs, mainly from South Asia, and public sector officials are invited to share their ideas and initiatives.

Under the umbrella of SAFED, ITA takes a leading role in conducting the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), which is a survey of the quality of education in Pakistan. ITA conducts this survey in all rural districts of Pakistan and is working in partnership with several national and international organisations such as DFID, the British Council, the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), Sindh Education Foundation and OXFAM. The survey data is compiled in report form and shared with the government, media, partner organisations and other stakeholders working in the education sector, including NGOs.

The list of programmes does not end here. ITA keeps exploring new ideas and actively pursues opportunities for mobilising resources from diverse sources. An existing study comments on ITA’s objectives as ‘to attack as a platform to synergise
the energies of these diverse actors… its vision involves engaging with all kind of education methods and techniques to optimise the resources to provide education to all rather than choosing a specific path over the other’ (Bano 2008a: 14). ITA’s programmes, with myriad projects funded by diverse sources, endorses this point of view.

6.3 ITA and WSIP

As demonstrated in section 6.2, ITA is involved in many diverse programmes but this case study report is primarily concerned with the partnership between ITA and the LDG through Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP), generally known as ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. Despite being involved in a number of initiatives related to education, WSIP is still the main focus of ITA and all other initiatives are linked to WSIP in some way. The following excerpt from the interview of the Lahore District Manager of ITA reflects the centrality of WSIP, she remarked:

All different programmes of ITA could be seen as streams falling into a big ocean of WSIP and all activities are linked to WSIP (ITA-District Manager).

The birth of ITA and WSIP are closely related to each other. Under the banner of ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme, ITA started adopting state schools by means of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ITA and LDG. Baela adapted the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme from SEF and gave it the name Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP), with the slogan of ‘Regenerating Schools - Regenerating Communities’. This adaption process is evident from Baela’s paper presented at a national symposium on ‘International experiences with decentralization and education’:

This is yet another home grown programme devised in 1990 by the eminent educator and leader of professional teacher association Professor Anita Ghulam Ali… The programme with origins in Sindh was adapted in Punjab in 1998. In one of its more recent versions it is called “regenerating schools: regenerating communities” through the adopt a school approach (Jamil 2001).

Since the inception in 2000, WSIP has been expanded across the country. By 2012, ITA had worked in 280 state schools and reached 350,000 children across all four provinces of Pakistan (ITA 2012a). Although Baela established ITA as an
organisation to support government in the provision of quality education under WSIP, she no longer likes WSIP to be labelled as ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme. She argued in her interview:

No, the thing is that from the year 2000 we have consciously said that we do not want to call it adopt-a-school, we find adopt-a-school a dependency model and it's a lower ordered model (stressing). The adopt-a-school programme should be totally changed... we are not making claims that we are adopting a state school forever, we are saying that this is a partnership for school improvement... adopt-a-school is not the right term and although the notion has stuck on as a most popular notion, but I think it's not a sensible term and I think that the more sensible term is school improvement through partnerships (ITA-Founder and Director Programmes).

It is quite evident from the above quote that Baela’s views about the ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme have changed over time.

Given the focus of research, it is important to understand the partnership process in WSIP because it helps to understand the developmental stages of ITA-LDG PPP, the dynamics of the IORs and the factors shaping them. WSIP is developed as a four phased process as shown in Figure 6.1 and explained in sections 6.4 and 6.5.

**Figure 6.1: WSIP: process and sources of funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WSIP – 4 Phased Process</th>
<th>Partnerships and Donors</th>
<th>Gender Focus</th>
<th>Beneficiaries (Direct)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Identification, Survey &amp; Orientation to the Whole School Improvement Program</td>
<td>INGOS</td>
<td>70% female</td>
<td>Students 2500, Teachers 15,000, Head Teachers 3000, SMC Members 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption/Partnership: People’s Mobilization – Changing Attitudes</td>
<td>OXFAM GB, OXFAM America, Dubai Cares, CSR: Unilever Pakistan Limited, Telenor, Philip Morris International (PMI), ICI, Others: Hersov Family, ITACEC UK, ITA’s own resources, Pakistani Expatriates in UK and USA, And individual philanthropists</td>
<td>33% male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase III</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>School Development Planning &amp; Implementation – Changing Practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase IV</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exit Strategy: Partnerships for Sustainability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: ITA official website (ITA 2012a)
As evident from Figure 6.1, ITA actively seeks different sources of funding for WSIP. In fact it would not be wrong to say that through WSIP, ITA is acting as a focal point to synergise resources from many diverse sources. ITA was among the pioneers of the idea of public-private partnership in education through corporate social responsibility (CSR). Under this banner, ITA works with the corporate sector to implement various WSIP programmes. Consequently, the sources of funding for WSIP include almost every type of stakeholder, including the corporate sector, NGO alliances, and the support provided by different donor agencies. Some prominent names include Oxfam, Dubai Cares, Unilever Pakistan Limited, Nestle, ICI, Telenor, CIDA and UNICEF (ITA 2010).

### 6.4 PPP set-up

During phase I of WSIP, ITA obtains a list of potential schools in need of partnership and support from the education department. ITA gets in direct contact with the district education officers: the EDO education and his team (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5 for more details on LDG organisational structure for education service delivery). ITA officials reported that they introduced district education officers to WSIP by giving them an orientation to the programme and they also arranged a joint visit to the potential schools. The purpose of the joint visit is to introduce WSIP to school staff and observe the site. However, in her interview, the head teacher of the first school adopted by ITA in Lahore said that she didn’t know about partnership until the MoU was signed at the district level.

In the second phase, a decision is made to enter into a partnership by signing the MoU at the district level. In the case of ITA-LDG PPP, the MoU was negotiated and agreed between the DCO and ITA’s leader. The district education officials including the EDO Education, who is the person in charge of education service delivery at the district level, was not involved in the development and agreement process of the MoU. The main features of the ITA-LDG MoU are outlined in Box 6.1.
Box 6.1: Main features of the ITA-LDG MoU

The EDO (Education) under the current MOU in principle agrees to consider initiatives of special programmes by NGO, such as Community Mobilization, Teachers Training, Health, Early Childhood Education, IT literacy, literacy for mothers and siblings, Homework Study Centers, Summer School (Project Based Learning) etc. However, the NGO shall consult with CDG [City District Government] prior to initiating such programmes to ensure that liabilities and responsibilities are clearly established and there is no financial liability for the CDG (Clause 3, ITA-LDG MoU).

That City District Government shall not be liable to any financial liability except payments of emoluments of the CDG staff posted in the adopted school as permissible under the law (Clause 8, ITA-LDG MoU).

That if “NGO” of its own accord engages any additional staff, it shall be at the risk and cost of “NGO”. In this connection, “NGO” shall not be entitled to claim any compensation from the CDG (Clause 11, ITA-LDG MoU).

That the management and other affairs of the school shall be supervised by the School Council consisting of members, from each of the following organizations: a) School-Head Teachers / Teacher, b) Parents, c) Community, d) Adopter (NGO), e) EDO (Education)/ on behalf of CDG, f) Nazim or his / her nominees from the Education Committee. The head teacher would act as the Chairperson of the Management (Clause 10, ITA-LDG MoU).

The provision and maintenance of fully equipped science laboratory and library shall be the responsibility of CDG if money is available, otherwise of the NGO and the school community (parent, teachers and students) (Clause 19, ITA-LDG MoU).

That the annual repairs and white wash of the adopted schools shall be undertaken jointly be CDG and NGO (Clause 20, ITA-LDG MoU).

Training opportunities provided by NGO to teachers and School Council will be supported by CDG. It will be incumbent on the CDG paid teachers to participate in these during the summer break and otherwise at a mutually agreed time and will practice them in school (Clause 25, ITA-LDG MoU).

NGO will submit quarterly / monthly reports to CDG on its performance and also attendance and quality of teaching / assessment methods with positive recommendations for improvement and corrective measures. This will be in the best interest of the school and its students (Clause 26, ITA-LDG MoU).

The staff hired by NGO will be professionally sound. They will be under the joined management of head teacher and NGO. All permissions for leave and or other movement for NGO hired staff will be obtained through the NGO management. A joint review of NGO hired school staff will be conducted by head teacher and NGO representatives (Clause 27, ITA-LDG MoU).

Management of the entire affairs of the above referred school(s) shall mutually vest in CDG and the NGO (through the School Council constituted under clause 10 above) subject to overall supervision and control of CDG within the formalities of the agreement (Clause 28, ITA-LDG MoU).

In case of any dispute between CDG and NGO the matter will be resolved amicably in the spirit of the collaboration and resolution to promote quality education in Lahore through public private
ITA considers WSIP as a ‘tripartite arrangement’ consisting of the government, NGO and community working together as three partners through a formal MoU for school improvement (ITA 2012a). The initial MoU is for five years during which time ITA supports the adopted schools by addressing their infrastructure needs, providing teachers where there is shortage of teachers and improving teaching by training teachers in adopted schools.

The MoU was developed by ITA and was considered very important to ITA’s work in adopted schools because it is essential to get the formal permission of the government to work in state schools. Realising that the government officials are not very comfortable with contributing financial resources, there are several clauses in the MoU that ensure no financial liability on the LDG for any initiatives introduced by ITA (see Box 6.1). At the same time, the MoU provides enough space to ITA to envision the goals of partnership and take up the roles and responsibilities they wish to pursue to achieve these goals. For example, clause 3 of the MoU demands support of the EDO education to implement ITA designed initiatives such as community mobilization, Early Childhood Education and training of teachers in adopted state schools.

The MoU emphasises the importance of jointly determined processes in adopted schools in several ways and makes it necessary for both parties to consult each other before undertaking any important action (such as infrastructural changes, transfer of staff, etc.) in the adopted schools. This makes ongoing interaction between the public and private sector parties a permanent feature of this PPP. Furthermore, the terms of MoU are kept flexible and ‘can be extended or reduced with mutual consent of the parties’ (Clause 1, ITA-LDG MoU).
6.5 PPP implementation and management

While the interactions during PPP set-up are mainly between the LDG education officials, the implementation and management of the WSIP is mainly done at school level and occasionally at the district level with the EDO Education and his team. The non-involvement of the adopted schools’ staff in PPP set-up phase and the lack of any serious effort on the part of those involved in the MoU agreement process to clarify the scope and objectives of the programme resulted in confusions and reservations about WSIP in the minds of head teachers and other staff in the adopted schools. The head teacher of the first school adopted in the Lahore district talked about her fears as:

Actually when we heard about this partnership we didn't want ITA to come to our school, we tried to seek a lot of references to stop them from coming to our school (smiling). We also asked community to come and react against taking over the school, we called parents and asked them to give in writing that this is a government school and this interference should not be there. When ITA’s district manager came here we misbehaved with her out of anger and felt sorry afterwards (smiling) but we thought that they would interfere a lot, would launch the complaints about us in our office, would transfer us to some other school, this and that... we were afraid that it would create a lot of problems for us, so that’s why I sought many references and was able to keep it pending for six months but when there was a lot of pressure from higher level we had to agree (ITA-HT-01).

The above excerpt is an example of school staff insecurities about WSIP. They even thought that ITA had a hidden purpose of taking over the school which could result in their transfers or even the termination of their jobs. Therefore, the head teacher looked for all possible means to stop ITA from entering the school.

ITA was well aware of the non-involvement of school staff in the process of negotiating and agreeing the MoU. Realising the lack of trust and confusion about WSIP in the minds of head teachers and other school staff, ITA conducted a session entitled ‘Hopes, Fears, Expectations and Desires about the partnership’ with students and staff of every adopted school. These sessions helped ITA to make everyone at school level familiar with the WSIP and they were taken as an opportunity to address any concerns or doubts about the programme. In order to develop mutual understanding about the partnership, the orientation sessions included ITA officials.
reading the MoU to school staff. These sessions were a critical step towards developing working IORs in an environment of mistrust and suspicions about ITA and WSIP. The head teacher of the first adopted school appreciated ITA’s approach to make it easier for her and others at the school to overcome their doubts about the presence of ITA in school. She explained:

When ITA came to our school they called all staff and read the MoU before us. This clarified their purpose for being in the school, I still have a copy of the MoU in record, they told us that we are here to do such and such things and if we do something that is not mentioned in the MoU then you can make us accountable for that (ITA-HT-01).

As mentioned earlier, ITA envisions WSIP as a ‘tripartite arrangement’ consisting of the government, NGO and the community working together as partners for school improvement (ITA 2012a). Therefore, ITA makes efforts to build relationships not only with the school staff but also with the community. An important initiative in this respect is the formation of a School Management Committee (SMC). For this purpose, a general meeting of all parents and teachers is called to identify school problems and to select the most appropriate parent and teacher representatives for the SMC. In addition, one nominee from the district education department is required to be co-opted to the SMC and this person is required to attend monthly meetings of the SMC.

ITA takes pride in its ability to establish strong links and relationships with the community. The Programme Coordinator for Punjab explained:

Our strength is that we work together with the government and the community. Whatever we do we plan it and share it with stakeholders and after that we implement it. With this approach we develop links with the community and so we can even reach the parents and we are really working well on it (ITA-Programme Coordinator).

The SMCs help ITA to address two main objectives. First and more obvious, SMCs help to foster relationships with the community thereby pursuing the vision of ‘Regenerating Schools - Regenerating Communities’, which lies at the heart of the WSIP. Secondly, through the involvement of teachers, parents and district officials on the SMC, it serves as a transparent instrument to mobilise the funds that are allocated to the schools by government. This enables ITA to bring improvements in
the adopted schools through state school budgets thereby reducing the financial burden on ITA.

In Punjab, SMCs were already in existence under a formal 1994 directive for the formation/reconstitution of SMCs (Zafar and Khan 2001). However, ITA played a significant role in the formation and activation of community representatives in the SMCs of adopted schools. The second phase of WSIP comes to an end with the opening of a SMC bank account with a scheduled bank.

During the third phase of WSIP a ‘Needs Assessment Form’ is completed in consultation with the head teacher and other staff of the adopted school. During this phase, a School Development Plan is also produced in consultation with the SMC and the school staff and resources are mobilised to implement the plan.

The next sub-section looks at ITA’s PPP model and highlights the points and frequency of interactions between ITA and LDG education officials. The model is summarised in Figure 6.2. The response of head teachers to ITA’s PPP model and the IORs in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents are described in subsections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 respectively.

6.5.1 ITA’s PPP model and points of interaction

The ITA-LDG MoU gives ITA the responsibility to uplift and strengthen the adopted state schools under WSIP. Nevertheless the school head teacher, who is a government employee, is the one who remains primarily responsible for managing school affairs. In order to address the shortage of teachers in adopted schools, ITA provides additional teachers for the schools. The number of ITA teachers in each school varies with the requirements of the school. ITA teachers are accountable to the ITA’s chain of command but work under the supervision of the school head teacher. The head teacher is in direct contact with the LDG education department through District Education Officers (DEOs) and their team (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5).

An Education Promoter (EP) is appointed by ITA who is required to work with the head teacher, other staff of the school and the SMC to ‘facilitate school-based planning, enhance the [student] enrolment and reduce drop outs, engage in TOTs
[Training of Trainers] and support as trainers’ (ITA 2012c). Each EP works in 6-20 schools (depending on the number of adopted schools in a cluster) and each has a key responsibility to report to the district manager on weekly basis. Under this model a district manager is appointed who is ‘responsible to plan, implement, monitor, and report all project activities at district level to meet project targets…[and] Provide guidance and supervision to the team members’ (ITA 2012b). A district manager is given the responsibility for developing contacts with the relevant district government education officials and is responsible for coordinating with them on a regular basis.

The district manager is required to work in close coordination with the provincial programme coordinator of ITA to achieve overall project targets. On top of the organisational hierarchy is ITA’s founder, Baela, working under the designation of Director Programmes and leading the organisation.

**Figure 6.2: ITA’s chain of command for managing WSIP in Lahore district**

ITA commits to provide technical support to the adopted schools in the areas mentioned in the MoU (see clause 3 in Box 6.1). In this regard, the main initiatives undertaken by ITA include:
• capacity building of the staff by providing training opportunities;
• community mobilisation;
• creating awareness and sensitivity about health and hygiene, and environment issues;
• encouraging and involving children to take part in project based learning and co-curricular activities through ‘summer schools’;
• providing technical support on Child Friendly Schools (CFS) and Early Childhood Education (ECE);
• designing and providing supplements to improve pedagogy;
• provision of ECE kit, health kit with first aid box, sports kits, reading kit; and
• promoting literacy for mothers and siblings.

In addition to this technical support, ITA emphasises creating a ‘safe learning environment through school rehabilitation’ (ITA 2012a) and provides missing facilities in the adopted schools, including undertaking construction works, establishing ECE rooms, libraries and science labs, providing furniture, and undertaking maintenance work. These initiatives are implemented by mobilising resources from diverse sources.

6.5.2 The response of head teachers towards ITA’s WSIP

Given the lack of resources at many state schools at the time of the partnership initiation, ITA’s ability to provide missing facilities and additional teachers seems to be a key factor in winning the support of head teachers. They were generally happy about the provision of inputs as indicated in the following excerpts:

At that time there were very scarce resources necessary for the progress of the school… There used to be a lack of furniture and teachers which was addressed by ITA. ITA also constructed this portion of the building. There were no window panes and children shivered due to cold and ITA fixed that, they gave fans too and they cooperated with us a lot (ITA-HT-07).

A similar type of response was given by another head teacher, she explained:

There was a need of partnership because there was no furniture in our school, the building was in bad condition, there was nothing to sit on, and only a few chairs were there for teachers. For these 10 years they (ITA) have fulfilled a lot of our requirements; they provided furniture, repaired the ceilings, constructed this office, got the school painted. At that time we didn't have any funding, it is only now that we are getting funds from the government, at that time we had no money, ITA spent Rs.70,000/ to
get the ceilings repaired, I have all record, they repaired many parts of the school and worked hard for it (ITA-HT-01).

From the above quotes it could be inferred that ITA was successful in winning support of the head teachers due to its ability to provide infrastructural inputs for education service delivery. There are also some instances where head teachers acknowledge the technical support provided by ITA in the form of training opportunities. One of the head teachers appreciated ITA’s support for capacity building and said:

They guided us a lot and taught us lesson planning and conducted many workshops and we learnt a lot. Before that we had our traditional way of teaching to ask children to open books and gave them lesson but they taught us different ways of teaching and conducted subject specific trainings in English, Maths, Urdu and all other subjects (ITA-HT-06).

Contrary to the above mentioned cases, the field research also encountered situations in which the head teachers were of the view that there is not much need of the partnership and that ITA has a limited role in the improvement of the schools. A head teacher with this point of view argued:

There was no need of this partnership, I was managing my school in a first class way… there was not much need but if they come I welcome them. Thanks God there is a teacher in every class and all teachers are doing their work but if they (ITA) are coming we don't have any loss in it (ITA-HT-03).

This sense of difference is usually found in schools in which there are not many missing facilities and they have enough teachers too. The head teacher added:

I personally think that they should go to such schools where there is quite lack of facilities, there is no staff and work is not carried out properly, they should go there and should also place their one teacher permanently in such schools (ITA-HT-03).

Another head teacher reflected the same viewpoint, she argued:

I would say that initially when there were problems in state schools, there was shortage of staff and lack of funds, NGOs supported and played their role then but now our infrastructure needs are fulfilled and now we get funds from the government so at the moment the role of NGOs is minimal… There was no funding at that time and that is why we used to look upon others, but now our own sources are sufficient and we are working better than them. But if they (ITA) keep supporting us in the
same spirit like if we tell them that we need something and they fulfil our demands then it’s okay (ITA-HT-04).

It is clear from the above excerpt that the head teacher felt that ITA is not playing much role in her school and she is able to work even better than ITA. However, she, like many other head teachers and district officials, considered ITA a donor and felt that the partnership could go on if ITA keeps providing the material resources. ITA’s ability to approach diverse organisations for the provision of funding and thus providing the required resources in adopted schools acts as a significant factor in building favourable IORs and winning the trust of the majority of the head teachers in adopted schools.

6.5.3 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents

It is clear from the interviews conducted with the LDG education officers and head teachers of the adopted schools that they consider the main responsibility of NGOs to pump in material inputs and not to intervene much in actual education service delivery. Most of the head teachers in ITA adopted schools appreciated that ITA doesn’t interfere much while it provides resources for the improvement of the school.

The facilitative approach of ITA is reflected in the programme management and implementation of WSIP by ITA. The person having the most interaction at school level is the Education Promoter (EP) who is required to work with the head teacher, other school staff and the SMC. The EP has key responsibility to report to the ITA district manager on weekly basis. The fact that each EP works in quite a number of schools, ranging from 6 to 20, is in line with the enabling role taken by ITA. The weekly or in some cases monthly visits of EP are aimed at solving any problems at schools and implementing the donor-led projects. The Programme Coordinator for Punjab explained that EP visits are to solve any problems that could not be handled by the head teachers. He argued:

The ratio over here is that in South Punjab one EP has 20 schools, in Lahore it is less because there are only 12 schools here but on average an EP has 20 schools and they visit a school monthly. Basically the purpose is not that they go and sit there to see each and everything. Rather our EPs visit schools to see the follow up of the major issues of the schools that were observed in their last visit, what is the result of that and what
are the current problems of the schools. Basically we say that it is the government's responsibility to run the school and we support them in problem areas. For example, if there is some problem with the funds of the school council, that funds are not being transferred in the bank account, then our EP is there to provide support and all other issues of this type where government people feel helpless, we are there to provide support (ITA-Provincial Programme Coordinator).

As is clear from the above excerpt, the Provincial Programme Coordinator was convinced that it is state's responsibility to manage the adopted schools and ITA helps in areas where there is a need for support. The EP while explaining her approach reflected:

Our attitude is not that of a monitoring officer rather we guide teachers not by telling them that you have done this wrongly but in a way that let's try to do it in a different way and if you think it is better then do it this way. We discuss it with teachers after sharing it with the head teacher (ITA-EP).

The above quotation indicates that ITA has a participative and facilitative attitude towards addressing the weaknesses of government teachers, which is a sensitive area of work. Even the most cooperative head teachers don’t like NGOs to point out the weaknesses of their teachers. One of the head teachers mentioned:

I let them visit any class they want but I told them that you shouldn’t say (stressing) anything to my teachers in the class, you can sit back and watch their lesson and note everything and then we can discuss these weaknesses together with the teachers in my office and they (ITA) did accordingly (ITA-HT-01).

ITA’s approach becomes quite clear by an example narrated by the same head teacher, she said:

For example, let’s assume that she (EP) goes to a classroom where a teacher is taking a maths lesson and is doing a question in a wrong way, she (EP) would note that and would report that in ITA’s office that in that particular school the teacher was doing it wrongly. We used to have monthly meetings and in those meetings someone from ITA would explain the right way of doing that question, then we would get to know the right way of doing it and would also come to know our mistakes. They also conduct subject based trainings for teachers (ITA-HT-01).

The above example suggests that ITA takes an indirect approach to address the weaknesses of the government teachers in adopted school. This could be considered
as an attempt to foster trust and favourable relations between ITA and the staff working at adopted schools. Although most head teachers are generally appreciative of the enabling and facilitative approach of ITA to manage WSIP, a head teacher raised concerns about flaws in ITA’s management of WSIP. She explained that in order to assess the performance of schools the EP collects some data from the head teachers about the number of teachers and students in the school. In her experience it is easy to deceive ITA because EPs collect the required information from the head teachers rather than collecting it themselves. She reported that when she was transferred as a head teacher to the school she found that there were 250 fake entries in the enrolment register. She blamed ITA for having a weak monitoring system which makes it easy for the head teachers to keep working in their own way while capitalising the financial and technical resources of ITA. She argued:

There should be a middle way not like someone is upon you all the time but if someone is coming then she should observe vigilantly. If partnership is there for many years and children are not physically present but still it isn't in the knowledge of ITA, then at least this should be avoided. Someone should not be that ignorant about the ground realities, so this is the extreme (ITA-HT-04).

Although ITA involves SMCs in developing and implementing the School Development Plans, most of the initiatives undertaken by ITA are donor funded and ITA is required to work in close consultation with respective donors to decide upon the nature of initiatives in a given project. When it comes to implementing donor-led projects, such as Healthy Pakistan Mission (HPM) or Global Hand Washing Day (GHWD), they are pre-decided with the donors; district officials and school staff have almost no role in designing these initiatives. Nevertheless, ITA keeps district education officials informed about these projects and seeks their formal permission before implementing them in adopted schools. This happens at school level too whereby ITA plans and designs the initiatives with the donors and seeks the permission of head teachers to execute them in schools. This creates a sort of one-way relationship in adopted schools whereby the school heads seem to implement whatever the EP or anyone else from ITA asks them to do. The following example was given by the Education Promoter:
In most of our partner schools whatever we ask them (head teachers) to implement is implemented properly and there are some head teachers that I tell them once that ma’am I think this should be done, like for example there must be soap bars and soap dishes in classrooms so that children develop habit of washing hands, and when I visit next time it is actually done (ITA-Education Promoter).

It is interesting to note that head teachers value the fact that before implementing any project ITA discusses what is going to be implemented and asks for their approval. This is evident in the following excerpt from a head teacher’s interview:

Whenever ITA wants to implement some project in my school, they formally ask for my permission and give me all the required details, it is not like they can implement anything they like but they give a lot of respect and ask for my approval. In most cases it is for the betterment of children and the school and there is no harm in doing that so I give them the permission (ITA-HT-06).

In most cases, ITA faces no resistance from the head teachers or other school staff in implementing their initiatives. ITA’s strategy to build relationships with all stakeholders is a main factor in gaining such support and it has proved beneficial in overcoming resistance and gaining credibility in adopted schools. As a result, the initial resistance to WSIP changed into greater acceptance of the programme.

In conflicting situations, ITA officials go by the policy of no confrontation which is integral to ITA’s working. It would not be wrong to say that this is the most significant factor in building cooperative IORs in the case of ITA. All head teachers interviewed during this research, including those who were quite sceptical about ITA’s contribution, generally reflected positively on ITA’s conduct. Collectively, these include statements such as:

ITA deals with us in a very good way. I used to hate them too much and wanted to throw them out of our school but they dealt us in such a way that we forgot all that and were happy that they were here… I think when someone joins ITA the first policy that they teach is good behaviour (ITA-HT-01)

they do it in a very good and friendly way and give a lot of respect (ITA-HT-06)

whenever I discuss something with the EP or the district manager, they are so polite that I don't like to create any conflict with them and they deal in such a nice way and talk in a very good manner (ITA-HT-07)
ITA mainly interacts with the staff of the adopted schools with respect. Such an approach is a factor to explain cooperative IORs. This view was reiterated by the EP as she explained:

Whenever ITA recruits a teacher (to overcome the shortage of teachers in adopted schools) she is told that ITA is your appointing authority but you have to work according to the management of the school (ITA-EP).

Moreover, ITA’s job descriptions explicitly mention that to be eligible to work for ITA a person should be humble, hardworking and committed and ‘able to develop cordial working relationships’ with relevant government officials (ITA 2012b; ITA 2012c). The policy of no confrontation was visible in many cases during the fieldwork. ITA is quite flexible in changing or even dropping its initiatives when head teachers do not agree. Such an approach is evident in the following example narrated by a school head teacher:

If we don’t like something we tell them and they listen to us and agree with us and also drop it. In the case of ACCESS (English language classes) there was some discussion between me and the district manager which I don’t want to disclose but she dropped the idea of conducting ACCESS classes in my school when I asked her. Whenever I tell her my problem she listens to it with cool mind and open heart… this is trust, I trust her that she won’t cheat me and would listen to me (ITA-HT-04).

As indicated in the above quote, by adopting the policy of no confrontation, and being open to discussion, ITA is successful in building trust among the head teachers which strengthens the IORs in practice. Compromise acts as an effective mechanism in establishing a sense of equality and cultivating cooperative IORs, as evident in the following excerpt from a head teacher’s interview:

No one dominates in this partnership, sometimes we compromise and sometimes they do. They (ITA staff) do it in a very good and friendly way, the district manager talks in such a sweet way (smiling), she gives a lot of respect and we also give her respect (ITA-HT-06).

So there is a sense of reciprocity between head teachers and ITA. Most of the head teachers shared the same views about Baela too. ITA’s policy of no confrontation, engaging the head teachers with respect, and solving minor problems through open-minded discussion helps building trust and cooperative IORs. The district manager of Lahore shared her experience in following words:
I think giving them respect plays an important role in building trust. We try to work in consultation. Whenever there is any problem we try to discuss with them and we never challenge them. We discuss and that is why it doesn't go to the level of conflict and up till now there has never been any such issue which was not resolved (ITA-District Manager).

It is clear from these examples that ITA usually opts to solve any problems locally rather than making it a dispute and taking it to higher levels. This is in line with the MoU for WSIP which also envisages conflict resolution through discussion. If a conflict remains unresolved the partnership agreement is terminated and ITA exits from the school (see clause 31 of ITA-LDG MoU). The fieldwork observed no case of major confrontations of this nature between ITA and the head teachers or district education officers.

6.6 PPP outcomes
WSIP has been a good opportunity for the LDG education department to capitalise on ITA’s technical and financial resources, especially as the LDG is not required to contribute financial resources towards the improvement of the adopted schools under the MoU. The fieldwork finds that ITA has contributed towards the provision of missing facilities and capacity building of staff at the adopted schools. With respect to the former, ITA has contributed libraries, science labs, additional classrooms, furniture and toilets. From a capacity building perspective, ITA has provided several training opportunities which introduce teachers to new styles of teaching. For example, ITA emphasises the importance of Early Childhood Education (ECE) and claims to be the first to introduce ECE into state schools. ITA promoted ECE in government schools and there seems to be enough evidence to support ITA’s claims in this regard. Even one of the head teachers, who explicitly reported no major role of ITA in her school, acknowledged that ITA has emphasised and supported ECE. Many head teachers said it was ITA who gave them the idea of ECE and then facilitated them to implement this idea in their schools.

ITA conducts training workshops, teachers get new ideas from those workshops and then implement them in schools. Certainly we want ITA to be here in our school, they gave us furniture and computers and taught us how to do art work, taught us class arrangement and provided trainings for ECE which was a new idea for government schools (ITA-HT-06).
Another head teacher echoed the same views:

After partnership there was improvement both in the building and in the students. The reason was that they (ITA) spent money, they gave us their teachers and they established ECE rooms, it is only now that kids rooms are being established in the government schools but we had these for ten years especially in my school (ITA-HT-01).

Through WSIP, or ‘Adopt-a-School’ programme in general, LDG is seeking partnerships with the private sector, especially NGOs, to pursue the overarching aim of meeting Education for All (EFA) goals. Therefore, it is generally expected that with the support of the private sector enrolment rates in the state schools would increase.

Although there is no reliable data showing outcomes of the partnership in relation to quantitative indicators - such as exam results, enrolment and dropout rates - most of the head teachers reported improvements. Many head teachers were appreciative of ITA in helping to improve both the facilities and quality of education at their schools. They reported an increase in enrolment as a result of these improvements. There are some head teachers who consider infrastructural improvements and community events responsible for increase in enrolment.

There was much increase in enrolment as the name of the school improved, enough teachers were there, furniture was there and a lot of events were held on all special days in which people saw the school and most of the events were organised by ITA (ITA-HT-07).

Some interviewees thought that the training opportunities provided by ITA enabled them to teach in a better way, which they perceived similar to private schools. One of them remarked:

After partnership the enrolment increased a lot because children experienced new style and new ways of teaching... when children get something similar to private schools then people are happy to send their children. The enrolment at the time of partnership was 96 and now it is nearly 300 (ITA-HT-05).

However, it is important to keep in mind that after 1998 a lot of government initiatives were taken to improve education service delivery in the country. PPPs in education should be viewed as a part of these initiatives. It is hard to say that the improved enrolment rates in ITA adopted schools are only due to the partnership
itself. It is, therefore, important neither to consider all improvements merely the contribution of ITA nor to overstate the role of government behind any improvements. Indeed, all the head teachers interviewed commented on the improved role of the state as an important factor behind increases in enrolment rates. For example, one of the head teachers said:

And now the government has made education free for people and since education is free, it is much better much better (emphasising). When I came to this school there were 65 children and now by the grace of God it is almost 500, so the government has taken interest in education which it didn't use to (ITA-HT-02).

Mobilising resources from different channels is another added value of ITA-LDG PPPs. Entering into a partnership with ITA enabled the government education department to capitalise on diverse sources of technical and financial resources. The partnership with LDG is of benefit to ITA too. Many international donors have changed their funding patterns. They now provide funding to NGOs through the state which obliges NGOs to get in some kind of relationship with the state:

Main donors are now providing funding to NGOs through the government. So, government now has large amounts of development funding available to it. So, the only way is to work with the government in some relationship (ITA-Chair).

Working with the LDG education department also increases the credibility of ITA and enables it to draw on resources from multiple channels including the community, corporate sector, philanthropists, expatriates, and many multilateral and bilateral donor organisations. Baela highlighted that the corporate sector of Pakistan is increasingly aware of their social responsibility and they are more willing to contribute money if is spent on state schools. Hence, working in partnership with the LDG makes more funding options available to ITA, which is one of the three objectives reflected in ITA’s mission.

One of the direct results of cooperative IORs between ITA and the head teachers in adopted schools is the expansion of WSIP. ITA’s strategy of building relationships with all stakeholders, together with their facilitative approach proved beneficial in overcoming resistance and gaining credibility in adopted schools. The head teacher of the first adopted school, who was initially quite apprehensive about WSIP,
subsequently helped ITA expand its WSIP programme by encouraging other head teachers in nearby state schools to get into partnership with ITA. This expansion is an indicator of ITA’s success in meeting its own organisational goals.

ITA has always strived to influence public policy, which is part of its stated mission. WSIP gives ITA knowledge about grassroots education issues which increases its credibility in influencing public policy:

See if you want to do advocacy at macro level you can't do it until you have the knowledge of grassroots level and what people actually do at grassroots level to know their local issues and problems... secondly if we want the government to improve the quality of education in government schools then we need to show government the best practices there and suggest the government to replicate it, so that's the advocacy (ITA-Provincial Programme Coordinator).

For ITA, WSIP has served as a vehicle to travel the distance between service delivery at grassroots level to policy advocacy at the provincial and federal government levels. Baela provided an example where she was able to persuade the state to change the finance structure at schools due to her experience in one of the adopted schools. She argued:

When we started working (in the state schools) we saw an issue in one school and we said that it is rubbish that in every school there are seven accounts and no account is fundable. So every time when you have to spend money you could only spend a specific account like for example if you want money for exams you could only take it from exam fund. So that was simply taking money from children and not spending it for their betterment. There was a lot of money in bank accounts but they were not spending it, so we sent letters to government several times and there was no response. At last I prepared a draft for the government that this exists and this should be done and sent it to finance department and everyone. So it happened, all accounts were merged and we did it (ITA-Chair).

Baela’s sense of achievement was evident in her interview. She took pride in influencing policy decisions such as this one due to the technical expertise gained via WSIP. Traditionally these funds were left unutilised for many years and head teachers were reluctant or unable to spend them due to constraints in the system.
6.7 Conclusion

Missing facilities in state schools and lack of technical expertise within the public sector are the main factors leading to the ITA-LDG PPP under the banner of WSIP. Despite the initial mistrust and huge suspicions about WSIP among the district and school staff, ITA is successful in building cooperative IORs with government officials. This shows that development of IORs in the adopted schools was a dynamic process and IORs changed from one stage of the partnership to another. Besides some diversity in the response of head teachers towards WSIP, the IORs generally remain cooperative mainly due to ITA’s facilitative programme management and willingness to adjust according to the needs of the partners. Compromise acts as an effective mechanism in establishing a sense of equality and cultivating cooperative IORs.

Although ITA-LDG PPP represents the relationship where ITA normally implements donor-led initiatives in adopted schools and does not engage the government officials in the design of these initiatives, ITA emphasises taking approval from both district officials and school staff before implementing these programmes in adopted schools. This typically creates a sense of ownership among government officials which makes it easier for ITA to implement the initiatives in most cases.

ITA-LDG PPPs are reported to achieve value added such as increases in the enrolment rates and improvement in exam results. There is evidence of both partners, ITA and LDG, achieving their own organisational objectives through partnership arrangement. Whilst LDG is able to capitalise on diverse sources of technical and financial resources through ITA’s platform, the partnership arrangement increases ITA’s credibility and enables it to draw on resources from multiple channels. Moreover, ITA-LDG PPPs give ITA knowledge about the grassroots educational issues to influence public policy, which is an important component of ITA’s mission.
Chapter 7  PEF PPPs

7.1 Introduction

This case study report explains the nature of IORs in a PPP arrangement between the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) and its private sector partners. The chapter begins by describing the organisational profile of PEF. Then it discusses the diversity of PEF’s private sector partners and provides an overview of the main characteristics of these partners. This is followed by a discussion of the process through which this PPP is set-up, implemented and managed (in sections 7.4 and 7.5). The main focus throughout these two sections is to explain the IORs between PEF and its private sector partners, and to highlight the factors shaping these IORs. Section 7.6 documents the outcomes of PEF PPPs to review the benefits achieved by this partnership model.

7.2 An introduction to PEF

PEF was established under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 1991 ‘to promote and finance the development of education in the Province of the Punjab’ (Government of Punjab 1991). Under this Act, the main functions of PEF included provision of grants and loans to private entrepreneurs to construct school buildings and to purchase furniture, fixtures and equipment for schools. In 2004 a new bill was passed by the Punjab Assembly and PEF was restructured under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 2004. While PEF’s main mandate, to support private sector initiatives in the education sector, remained broadly the same there were some major changes with respect to the governance structure of PEF. According to the first Managing Director after the restructuring of PEF:

While the PEF Act of 1991 gave the government control over PEF affairs - with the chief minister of the province serving as PEF chair and a senior provincial official as PEF managing director - the PEF Act of 2004 gave the entire control and management of the foundation to its own Board of Directors. Under the PEF Act of 2004, the Board appoints the managing director and other employees of the foundation and determines the terms and conditions of their employment. The restructured PEF was thus an autonomous body, with the executive and financial authority vested in its Board of Directors (Malik 2010: 2).
It is clear from the above quote that the restructuring of PEF resulted in giving greater administrative and financial autonomy to PEF through its Board of Directors (BOD). Section 5 of PEF Act 2004 sets the criteria for selecting the BOD; fifteen directors, including chair, are appointed by the government. Eight directors should be selected from the private sector including NGOs, academicians and philanthropists; five directors are secretaries of government departments; and vice chancellor of the University of Education. The managing director of PEF would also act as the secretary of the Board (PEF 2006).

Another prominent feature of the 2004 Act was the anticipation of closer working between PEF and the private sector. While the 1991 Act mainly involved helping private entrepreneurs by giving loans and grants, section 4 of the PEF Act 2004 promoted a new relationship under the banner of a ‘public-private partnership’ initiative (PEF 2006: 13). This enhanced PEF’s scope from a passive funding body to an active partner working with the private sector to tackle the educational challenges in the country. The idea of ‘public-private partnership’ lies at the heart of PEF’s working and functions, and is explicitly stated as a part of PEF’s vision:

The promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership, encouraging and supporting the efforts of [the] private sector through technical and financial assistance, innovating and developing new instruments to champion wider educational opportunities at [an] affordable cost to the poor (PEF 2012).

The restructuring of PEF can be argued to be a result of a broader push towards the idea of PPPs (as discussed in Chapter 1). In the case of PEF, PPPs were sought as a ‘combination of private sector efficiency and public sector funding’ to meet the ‘urgent need of educational system that provides an affordable quality education to all’ (Malik 2010: 1). PEF especially targets the creation of affordable quality education opportunities for the under-privileged sectors of society. For this purpose it enters into partnerships with private sector bodies that are already targeting low-income segments of society in the field of education (either in the form of schools or capacity building organisations). PPPs offer PEF the prospect of rapidly scaling up the delivery of education, which is the potential added value of partnership.
7.2.1 PEF programmes

PEF launched four new programmes after restructuring and each of them is briefly described below 7:

**Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS)**

Under the FAS programme the private schools in partnership with PEF get financial assistance in exchange for making their education free and more accessible for poor children. Given that the mission of PEF is to create opportunities of affordable quality education through PPPs, the target schools for FAS are those with a low fee structure and these are usually located in the poor urban and rural areas of Punjab. There are criteria for selecting schools set out by the BOD. Schools are evaluated on criteria which include performance in the Quality Assurance Test (QAT) conducted by PEF to assess the quality of education delivered. The partnership between PEF and private schools is formally agreed through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Once in partnership with PEF, the schools are not allowed to charge students fees (including fines, study tours expenses and exam fee).

PEF provides funding to partner schools on a per child enrolled basis. However, the financial assistance provided to participating schools is dependent on the test performance of children. Funding is discontinued if the school fails the QAT twice in a row. The quality standards for passing QAT are set by PEF and are amended from time to time by the BOD. In addition to the QAT, schools are regularly monitored by PEF staff to ensure basic standards and to verify the enrolment figures provided by schools. In the case of any misrepresentation of facts or non-compliance with the terms and conditions agreed in the MoU, PEF reserves the right to impose penalties or even cancel the partnership.

**Continuous Professional Development Programme (CPDP)**

CPDP was launched in 2005 for training school teachers from low cost private sector schools with particular emphasis on PEF partner schools. Currently there are three main CPDP programmes. The Continuous Teachers Development Programme (CTDP) conducts training for primary, elementary and secondary level teachers. The

7 From time to time there have been some changes in the programmes offered by PEF but the basic rationale behind the programmes remained broadly the same.
major focus is on the content knowledge of different subjects - especially English, Mathematics and Science - along with classroom management, pedagogical skills and child psychology. However, over time PEF noticed that teachers who participated in CTDP found it difficult to apply and incorporate innovative teaching practices due to lack of support from school administrators. To address this problem, PEF launched the School Leadership Development Programme (SLDP) which is targeted towards school heads to make them aware about the latest teaching methods.

Both CTDP and SLDP are conducted through a PPP agreement with several private sector organisations. Organisations with experience in the field of professional development and capacity building are selected through open competition and the MoU is signed. Partner organisations are paid by PEF in return for their contribution to the training programmes provided for PEF partner schools. The quality of training workshops is evaluated by PEF on the basis of performance evaluation criteria developed by PEF and approved by the BOD. The partner organisations are subject to penalties if their training does not meet the standards and instructions given by PEF.

In all, CPDP contributes to the overall mission of PEF by supporting quality improvement in low-cost private sector schools through providing technical assistance.

**Education Voucher Scheme (EVS)**

The Education Voucher Scheme is directly targeted at providing education opportunities to children who otherwise could not get education due to financial and social constraints. The project starts with the identification of under-privileged areas or urban slums and household surveys are carried out to identify the number of deserving children in a particular area. The eligibility of children is then determined and they are registered on the EVS according to the criteria approved by the BOD. The registered children are given education vouchers which are redeemable against tuition fees in a private school which is in partnership with PEF under an EVS MoU.

PEF's approach to selecting partner schools and manage partnership is different in EVS when compared with the FAS programme. The criteria for selecting partner
schools are prescribed by the BOD but are not as stringent as in the case of FAS. Another feature that differentiates EVS from FAS programme is that in FAS school owners/heads are free to decide whether to admit a child or not. In EVS the decision makers are the parents as they are the ones who have the vouchers and are free to register their child with any EVS partner school. Whilst FAS partner schools cannot charge fees from any child registered in the school, EVS schools continue to charge fees to non-EVS students but cannot charge EVS children for any aspect of their education. Partner schools get fixed funding from PEF based on the number of EVS children enrolled.

EVS partner schools are regularly monitored by PEF staff to ensure basic standards as well as to verify the enrolment figures provided by schools. As with FAS, the continuity of EVS partnerships is also reliant on performance in the QAT and it is terminated in the case of two consecutive failures in the QAT. PEF also reserves the right to impose penalties for breaches of the terms and conditions mentioned in the MoU.

**New School Programme (NSP)**

The general lack of interest amongst private sector entrepreneurs to set up schools in the rural and remote areas, coupled with a lack of government schools, results in limited access to education in these areas. The New School Programme (NSP) was initiated as pilot project in March 2008 to attract private sector entrepreneurs to set up schools in such areas of Punjab. Private sector entrepreneurs who want to set up a school in an area where there is no public or private school within a 2 Km radius are selected for partnership under NSP. However, there is a relaxation in this criterion to set up a school for girls if there is only a boys’ school within the identified radius. Similarly an elementary or high school may also be established if only a primary school exits within a 2 Km radius.

As in the case of FAS and EVS, the NSP schools are subject to monitoring and the QAT and continuity of partnership is dependent on passing the QAT. However, a grace period of six months is given to build the infrastructure of school. During this period PEF supports private sector partners by giving them Rs.350 per child for 50 students even if there is no student enrolled.
All four programmes sit within the statutory requirements of the PEF Act of 2004 and they are in line with the overall mission of the organisation. All the programmes are striving to ‘promote quality education through public-private partnerships… at [an] affordable cost to the poor’ (PEF 2012). This case study reports the research carried out on all four PPP programmes (for more details see Table 7.1).

### 7.2.2 Organisational structure of PEF

As mentioned earlier, after the restructuring of PEF in 2004 it now works as an autonomous body with financial and executive authority vested in its BOD. The executive body of PEF is led by its Managing Director with three Deputy Managing Directors in the areas of operations, human resource management and finance. The list of PEF departments, along with some details, is as follows:

1. FAS department: manages the FAS programme under the director FAS.
2. CPDP department: manages the CPDP programmes under the director CPDP
3. EVS department: manages the EVS under the director EVS
4. NSP department: manages the NSP under the deputy director NSP
5. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E): an independent department created by the BOD to monitor all four programmes of PEF. The head of M&E reports to the Board rather than the management and gives suggestions for decision-making.
6. Academic Development Unit (ADU): mainly responsible for quality assurance in PEF programmes. ADU comprises subject specialists who are responsible for formulating a test bank, designing and conducting QATs, which is the main determinant for continuation of a partnership in the FAS, EVS and NSP programmes.
7. Finance department
8. Law department
9. Communication department
10. IT department
11. HR department

All PEF programmes were introduced during the tenure of PEF’s first Managing Director (2004-2008). In 2008, PEF’s Managing Director was transferred to another government department and a new Managing Director was appointed by PEF’s BOD. For the purpose of this research, interviews were conducted with both the first and the current Managing Director, Deputy Managing Director for operations, all
four programme directors (deputy director in the case of NSP) and some programme coordinators and officers. A complete list of interviewees is provided in Appendix B.

7.3 Diversity of PEF’s partners

PEF private sector partners vary according to the different PEF programmes. Each partner enters into a partnership agreement with a distinct perspective and set of circumstances, and they then assess the success of the partnership arrangement against those circumstances and their prior expectations. In other words the identity of the partners affects their perspectives about the partnership. These perspectives shape their expectations which have an impact on the nature of IORs. It is, therefore, important to discuss the diverse identities of PEF’s partners before discussing the dynamics of IORs in PEF partnerships.

Interviews with the PEF partners uncovered a range of views about their partnership with PEF. Three distinguishing characteristics of PEF’s partners emerged as explanation for their diverse views. First, perspectives about the partnership varied according to their reasons for entering the partnership. Partners have different reasons for entering into a partnership with PEF such as financial benefits, to be in a better position to pursue their mission and capacity building. Second, the type of focal persons managing the partnership relationship varied. Sometimes the focal person is the owner/entrepreneur whereas in other cases they are employees who are representing the schools (in FAS, EVS and NSP) or training organisations (in the case of CPDP). Third, the scale of work of partner organisations also differed. Some private sector partners relied completely on PEF for the provision of monetary resources while the scale of work of others provides them with alternate sources of income and hence they are less reliant on PEF to meet their expenditures.

Looking at private sector partners’ reasons for entering into a partnership, it is useful to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit partners. Amongst the 23 PEF partners interviewed for this research, 11 were not-for-profits and 12 were for-profit entities (as shown in Table 7.1). The analysis suggests that partners’ reasons for entering into a partnership with PEF can be grouped under two headings: gaining access to financial resources and being in a better position to pursue their own
mission. These two reasons are not mutually exclusive but it was possible to draw out the dominant reason in each case (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Main characteristics of PEF’s private sector partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner code</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Main reason for entering partnership (secondary reason in brackets)</th>
<th>Focal person</th>
<th>Additional sources of income</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEF-Partner 01</td>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Not-for-profit</td>
<td>Mission (financial)</td>
<td>Employee</td>
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<td>PEF-Partner 12</td>
<td>CPDP</td>
<td>For profit</td>
<td>Mission (financial)</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF-Partner 13</td>
<td>CPDP</td>
<td>Not-for-profit</td>
<td>Mission (financial)</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF-Partner 14</td>
<td>CPDP</td>
<td>Not-for-profit</td>
<td>Mission (financial)</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the table above that the most prominent reason for entering the partnership with PEF in the case of for-profits is to gain financial resources. Private for-profit schools used to charge school fees before partnering with PEF. Since they were generally targeting children from low-income families, they faced problems in collecting those fees. This is the reason they were attracted to PEF PPPs as they thought it would enable them to get rid of this tiring process of fee collection. Moreover, many of them took this as an opportunity to engage in ‘a noble cause of
educating the poor’ while getting paid by PEF. For these reasons, comments such as following are typical:

We came into partnership due to two reasons. First, we would not have to put our efforts in fees collection and secondly we would be able to concentrate on our real mission which is to deliver quality education and would be able to educate children in a better way (PEF-Partner02).

Secondly, the types of focal persons managing partnership are essentially different in two important ways. Firstly, employees have a fixed salary and have no personal interest in the financial assistance provided by PEF. Occasionally they did raise concerns about the amount of funding provided by PEF but it did not become a point of contention or serious conflict affecting IORs. However, the attitude of entrepreneurs was rather aggressive about the level of funding provided by PEF primarily because they are the ones directly responsible for meeting the expenditures of school.

Another difference between entrepreneurs and employees lies in their general attitude towards partnership. As discussed later in this chapter, PEF PPPs resemble a contractual form of PPP in which the public sector partner defines the problem and specifies the solution to that problem in a unilateral manner. The dominance of PEF was generally accepted more readily by those focal persons who were employees than by those who owned the schools/organisations, possibly because the former were more used to compliance behaviour. The owners experienced more difficulty with this relationship because they had previously been used to making their own decisions and felt somewhat constrained by PEF’s terms and conditions.

The entrepreneurs tended to look at PEF as a dominating partner and sometimes they even considered the word ‘partnership’ as inappropriate for this relationship. That is why comments such as the following are not untypical in the case of entrepreneurs:

See the building is ours, teachers are ours and by giving Rs.350/ only they rule on the building, on us and on money too… Partnership means to share something, if you come and try to command me that why are you doing this or that? then this is an order, would that be a partnership? It would be superior-subordinate relationship. Basically the way they talk and behave with us is not the way you should adopt in a partnership. So I would say that this is not a partnership, this is like superior-subordinate
relationship. When we go to their office, we know it very well that we are going to see our boss (PEF-Partner03).

On the other hand the focal persons who are in the employee category have quite a different perspective towards partnership. They feel comfortable with the formal rules and regulations and try to comply with these. There are some cases of resistance too but broadly speaking compliance for them is far easier as compared to the entrepreneurs.

All focal persons in the category of employees were not directly responsible for meeting school’s/organisation’s expenditures, and in all cases the employees had the opportunity to cover the budget deficits by some alternative sources, which becomes another factor to explain their perspective towards partnership. The majority of not-for-profit partners were usually members of larger third sector organisations, which provided them with access to additional sources of income. The fact that most not-for-profit partners were not totally reliant on PEF funds influenced their perspective and they were more likely to view their relationship positively with PEF. For-profit partners’ complaints about PEF funding levels were stronger in. It became a point of contention and conflict in several instances, which restricted the development of collaborative IORs.

These three dimensions – reasons for entering the partnership, the focal person responsible for managing the partnership, and the additional sources of income – interplay with one another. It is difficult to draw neat lines between them but together they contribute to shaping partner perspectives about the partnership. The diversity of PEF’s partners is an important factor that explains the diverse IORs in PEF’s PPP and is reflected in different stages of the partnership that are discussed in the following sections of this case study report.

7.4 PPP set-up

The partnership process starts when PEF advertises in national and local newspapers and invites expressions of interest from the private sector. In the advertisements PEF sets out its mission statement and the selection criteria/ basic requirements that private sector parties have to fulfil in order to be eligible for partnership with PEF. The selection criteria are set by the BOD and they are somewhat different for each
programme depending on the programme aims and objectives. For example, the requirements for existing infrastructure are higher in the case of FAS as compared to EVS because the latter is targeted on schools in the urban slums which generally lack appropriate infrastructure. Since PEF spells out its mission in the advertisements, PEF officials at all levels assume that those showing interest in partnership agree to the goals determined by PEF and are ready to pursue them, as reflected in the excerpt below:

See when we advertised we clearly mentioned our goal, they gave expression of interest which means that they want to come and their goal is somehow the same as ours. If not then why would they respond to our advertisement (PEF-Director-02).

Similarly,

In this partnership we give funding on the basis of some terms and conditions and they come into partnership only if they agree to that, if they don't agree they don't come into partnership (PEF-Prog.Officer-04).

Another noticeable point from these quotes is a strong assumed belief in the alignment of partner goals with those of PEF. This, however, is not that simple and straightforward in practice. Different private sector actors enter a partnership with PEF for different objectives (as discussed in section 7.3). The diversity of individual agendas makes the alignment of goals a difficult process.

The selected partners are required to sign a MoU, the contents of which are unilaterally determined by PEF beforehand. The main features of the MoUs are outlined in Box 7.1. The clauses of the MoUs are approved by the BOD and only the BOD has the discretion to make changes in those clauses when required. The content of the MoUs are broadly the same across the FAS, EVS and NSP programmes with some differences in the MoU for CPDP. This is because the private sector partners in the case of all programmes except CPDP are private sector school owners who commit to provide free education under the partnership with PEF. However, in the case of CPDP the partners are mostly NGOs who have experience in the field of professional development and capacity building. Nevertheless the MoUs for all four programmes commit PEF to provide financial assistance in exchange for the services delivered by its private sector partners.
This agreement of partnership is made at Lahore between Punjab Education Foundation 19-Ahmed block Garden Town, Lahore (hereinafter called the first party) and ______________(hereinafter called the second party).

That under the Punjab Education Foundation Act 2004 the executive and managing authority of the Punjab Education Foundation (hereinafter called the Foundation) vests with Board of Directors (BOD) so the BOD shall have the sole authority to take all decisions to run FAS/NSP/EVS program effectively (Clause1-PEF-FAS,NSP,EVS-MoU).

The partnership agreement shall continue and would deem to have been extended from year to year basis till terminated by the first party. The partnership agreement may also be terminated by the first party anytime on violation by the second party of any terms and conditions of the agreement (Clause2-PEF-FAS,NSP,EVS-MoU).

That the amount as financial assistance to be provided to the second party shall be determined/ fixed by the BOD on the basis of per child enrolled per month… At the sole discretion of the BOD of the First Party this amount may be increased or decreased due to any consideration (Clause8-PEF-FAS,EvS-MoU) and (Clause9-PEF-NSP-MoU).

That the second party must abide by the rules and regulations, timings and schedules, formats and methods prescribed by the first party for maintaining the overall school building, educational environment, campus hygiene and passing of bi-annual QATs. The second party will observe all rules and regulations regarding school timings and holidays, failing which the first party may charge the penalties or what so ever. Provision of infrastructure, furniture, light system ventilation etc. will be the responsibility of the second party, failing of which give right to the first party to impose penalties as per its judgment (Clause11-PEF-FAS-MoU) and (Clause12-PEF-NSP-MoU).

In case of any deviation noticed by PEF during the monitoring… penalties shall be imposed and deduction shall be made accordingly (Clause5-PEF-CPDP-MoU).

That the first party will administer bi-annual Quality Assurance Tests (QATs) of the students of the second party to assess eligibility for continued financial assistance under this partnership agreement. In addition to biannual QAT the first party reserves the right to conduct surprise/planned QAT with any partner school… In case of two consecutive failures of the second party in passing of these QATs, the first party reserves the right to immediately terminate any financial assistance or even terminate the partnership agreement without serving any prior notice to the second party (Clause10-PEF-FAS-MoU), (Clause11-PEF-NSP-MoU) and (Clause11&12-PEF-EVS-MoU).

Performance of the second party shall be evaluated periodically, however the second party shall ensure improvements in infrastructure, faculty, academic and co-curricular activities, as per guidelines provided by first party. The second party shall be evaluated on the basis of enrolment-attendance gap, retention of EVS students, promotion to senior classes, and improvements in students’ learning outcomes. If annual performance results are below standards defined by first party, the first party reserves the right to immediately terminate any financial assistance or even the partnership agreement without serving any prior notice to the second party (Clause13-PEF-EVS-MoU).

That the first party may carry out class-wise random inspections to check/verify the veracity of earlier reported enrolment, improvements made in the infrastructure and standard of
cleanliness and hygiene at any time without serving the prior notice during the working hours of the school run by the second party. Students, teachers and other school staff may also be interviewed and must be directly accessible to the representatives of the first party even in the absence of the second party or its representatives (Clause17-PEF-FAS-MoU), (Clause18-PEF-NSP-MoU) and (Clause16-PEF-EVS-MoU).

That by the 5th day of every month, the second party shall communicate accurate figures of the enrolment of the students, on forms supplied by first party, providing class-wise break-up and gender-wise information of enrolment shall be submitted (Clause18-PEF-FAS-MoU) and (Clause19-PEF-NSP-MoU).

The contents of the MoUs are determined in a unilateral manner by PEF but there is evidence of PEF trying to create a better understanding of the MoU by orienting private sector partners to the nuts and bolts of the partnership arrangement. To achieve this, there is an orientation process where prospective partners are introduced to the MOU and their questions are answered. A programme officer at PEF explained the process through which joint agreement on the contents of MoUs is reached:

Before signing the agreement we conduct a seminar to tell all prospective partners that these are your responsibilities. We have already defined their main responsibilities and have also developed FAQs. We always conduct such session and address their questions and after that we ask them to sign the agreement. Moreover, we make our agreement and each and every related material available online so that prior to coming for signing the agreement they should study it and should write down their questions so that they may ask them for their clarity (PEF-Prog.Officer-05).

PEF assumes that partners agree to the partnership goals and programmes are designed and approved by the BOD in such a way as to strengthen PEF’s formal authority over partners (reflected in the MoUs). For example, the MoUs refer to PEF as the first party and the private sector partners as second party which creates an impression of superiority in relation to partners. One of the school owners captured a sentiment shared by some partners:

In the agreement first party was PEF and we're second party although we are the owners (stressing), we are first party and they should be second party, so I don't agree to this thing in the agreement because it is totally wrong. See first party is the school owner who already has an established school for some years. I was very upset due to that and had many doubts (PEF-Partner 08).
So even before entering a partnership some PEF partners are worried about their status and identity within partnership. Such concerns and doubts inhibit the building of collaborative IORs at the outset. However, not all PEF partners were worried about this and some felt comfortable with being the ‘second party’. The diversity of private sector partners discussed in the previous section helps to explain this.

7.5 PPP implementation and management

PEF’s partnership model is designed around the notion of performance and outcomes. Right from the beginning with the advertisements, selection of partners, and the MoU, to the execution and management of partnership, the PPPs revolve around performance and outcomes. This focus on performance rather than the management of the school is highlighted by the following comments from PEF officials:

We won't intervene in their management domain, in what ways they want to run the school, hiring and firing of the staff etc. is all with them...what we are concerned with is that what are the outcomes and what are the results in PEC (Punjab Examination Commission) and Board exam plus the QAT, if they fail two consecutive QATs then our agreement is withdrawn (PEF-Prog.Officer-05).

PEF chairman also expressed this clearly and explicitly:

My task is to ensure high quality education for children from them [PEF’s partners] in any way. Partnership is not permanent unless they show their performance...PEF can be described in only one word (stressing) and that is 'performance', chairman is with performance, MD is with performance, DMDs, Directors and even the person entering data are with performance, schools with performance, children with performance, teachers with performance, our slogan is performance. Technically there are many definitions but practically it is performance from both sides (PEF-Chairman).

The central idea of these quotes is meeting performance indicators in order to sustain the partnership relationship. PEF officials reflected during the interviews that accountability towards achieving the targets is very important for PEF. This occurs partly because of their institutional requirements characterised by high accountability and transparency to various bodies. The Deputy Managing Director (DMD) of operations put this point as:
We have to face both public and private sector. Public sector gives money in its own way (on meeting certain conditions) and we're accountable to private sector to provide funding… and not only we're accountable to them; we're accountable to the donors too (PEF-DMD).

This comment indicates that PEF is a sort of middle man between several parties; government, donors and private sector partners, and has to satisfy all sides. Many public sector organisations in Pakistan are accused of corruption in their processes. Being a public sector organisation, PEF is very careful to maintain its integrity and strives hard for this. Furthermore, there are three statutory bodies which audit PEF’s accounts to ensure transparency (Malik 2010). All this suggests that oversight is a part of PEF’s organisational culture and is crucial to them.

Consistent with their organisational culture, continuous monitoring of partners takes a central position in the PEF partnership model. The financial assistance of PEF is subject to the performance of private sector partners on the pre-defined indicators outlined in the respective MoUs. In order to ensure the desired outcomes of the partnership, PEF monitors and evaluates student learning outcomes through the QATs. Surprise or informed visits are carried out by PEF monitors who are assigned to evaluate schools (in the case of FAS, EVS and NSP partners) and training workshops (in the case of CPDP partners). The details related to the monitoring of partners are outlined in the respective MoUs too (see Box 7.1).

In addition to on-site monitoring by PEF there are some reporting requirements which make partners liable to share information about some indicators. This information (such as enrolment figures, number of teachers, etc.) is verified by PEF during the regular monitoring visits and in cases of any misrepresentation of facts or non-compliance with the terms and conditions laid down under the MoU, PEF reserves the right to impose penalties or even cancel the partnership.

The MoU is designed to strengthen PEF’s formal authority over partners. PEF has rights that are not available to partners, such as decision-making about the partnership. When PEF officials are asked about the participation of partners in decision-making it sounds very strange to them as they consider it somewhat irrelevant. PEF’s chairman explained:
It is written in our Act that no partner can be a member of the Board of Directors where decision-making is done… people who have their vested interests in this institution they can never be the member. So they can't get involved in decision-making (PEF-Chairman).

This excerpt clearly links PEF model to agency theory whereby preventing opportunistic behaviour of the agents lies at the core of partnership relationships. However, partners are not excluded entirely from decision-making. A senior official of PEF outlined three types of decisions involved in the FAS PPPs. First, there are decisions that fall completely within the ambit of the BOD, such as PEF’s determination of the MoU and changes in the policies, goals and targets of PEF. Second, there are decisions that fall entirely within the domain of partner schools, such as hiring of school staff, and day-to-day management. Finally, there are some decisions such as training requirements of teachers that involve both partners working together.

There are defined roles and responsibilities for partner schools and each school is held accountable for these. One of the programme directors at PEF considers it ‘a success model due to non-interference in each other’s domain’. All of this reinforces the impression that the PEF PPP model resembles a contractual arrangement in which the public sector partner defines the problem and specifies the solution to that problem in a unilateral manner, and many PEF officials consider these arrangements to be the key to success in PEF’s PPPs.

7.5.1 The response of PEF partners towards partnership

Although the dominant position of PEF is perceived by all PEF partners, the data analysis suggests a sort of continuum with respect to acceptance of or resistance to PEF’s PPP model. At one extreme there are partners who envision joint determination of activities at the heart of partnership. A CPDP partner considered this a major weakness of the PEF PPP model as it obstructs taking full advantage of the learning and experiences of private sector partners. He argued:

There are some things which lack in this public-private partnership. This is a very good model, while working in the private sector we've learned something and the public sector has its own learning, now our and their learning should come together in this partnership which is not happening, there are some points where it is not happening at all (stressing) like
things are imposed on us, 'you just do it, we're saying you just do it, we
know everything you just do it’, no the thing is that we've our own
learning and when you get together you agree to others too and take a
middle way, but this doesn't happen here, PEF is very (stressing) rigid
and sometimes just stick to one point and say that we won't do it (PEF-
Partner12).

Such partners are against the dominating position of PEF and some even consider the
word ‘partnership’ inappropriate for this relationship.

At the same time there are partners who easily accept the dominance of PEF,
sometimes explicitly and sometimes in a subtle manner. Such partners are not at all
worried about equality in the relationship and consider it their responsibility to
comply with the PEF’s conditions. When asked about equality in partnership they
simply consider the term ‘irrelevant in specific contexts’. Such partners use the term
‘sub-ordinates’ for themselves and consider the label ‘partnership’ a goodwill gesture
of PEF for a relationship that is ‘out-sourcing’ according to their viewpoint. Some
typical comments from this side of the continuum are:

Actually the concept of equality is very vague in some cases, of course
someone is providing budget so if I talk in general terms there could
never be equality. It's a natural phenomenon that if someone is financing,
they have their objectives, they have their goals then of course there can
never be equality. But as far as our dealings are concerned then even if
there is no equality there is mutual understanding for sure. So sometimes
it becomes difficult to use some terminologies in specific contexts
(smiling) (PEF-Partner10).

And similarly,

Obviously PEF is a dominating partner because they provide financial
assistance and we've to work on their parameters, so they are dominating
partner.... we don't feel any need to challenge their dominance, like we
can't provide finances to them, there is a procedure so we have to adopt
that, their dominance would remain and it should remain (stressing)
(PEF-Partner09)

The diversity of PEF’s partners discussed in section 7.3 can be compared to a prism
through which the PEF model passes as a beam of light as shown in Figure 7.1. After
passing through this prism the PEF PPP model can be viewed as an array of different
responses, just as a light beam which passes through a prism is segregated into its
constituent colours. These different responses to PEF’sPPP model reflect the diverse
IORs which result due to the involvement of different partners who vary across many dimensions.

While the PEF PPP model is the same for every partner, it is perceived differently by different partners. Not all partners are looking for collaborative IORs in PEF partnerships. There are some partners (usually not-for-profits with employees acting as focal persons) who are less concerned about their organisation autonomy and are willing to adapt according to partnership needs. They are of the view that they should comply with PEF’s terms and condition because PEF is giving them the money to deliver services. But in doing so they didn’t feel that they are compromising their organisation autonomy because they were free to make decisions specific to their own organisational operations (such as hiring of staff, day-to-day management, etc.). Furthermore, they believed that there are enough channels to participate in the partnership activities, their feedback and suggestions are communicated to the BOD to take into account before taking any decision and there is trust in their relationship with PEF. These are the partners who can be categorised as having cooperative IORs. On the other hand, there is evidence of conflictual IORs in the case of partners who aspire to a more active role in the partnership activities, want to establish equality in IORs and are looking for higher level of collaboration.
Figure 7.1: Prism model: responses of PEF partners towards partnership

- They are the dominating partner but we don't feel any need to challenge their dominance.
- There is no partnership at all, I would rather suggest that they should change this word 'partnership'.
- This is basically a boss-subordinate link but this is their (PEF's) greatness that they call us partners.
- I never find any type of bossy attitude, there is no dominating partner at all.
- PEF is very rigid and sometimes they just stick to their own point and say that we won't do it.
- PEF understands our problems and that is the reason that they have increased funding.
- When monitors come it seems as if some police officer is here and he is about to arrest the offenders.
- PEF monitors are very good people, they do their work without any discrimination.
- Yes there is trust between us and would stay in our relationship.
- There is nothing like trust, honestly speaking.
7.5.2 The IORs in practice: in day-to-day routines and in critical incidents

PEF’s use of monitoring as a day-to-day management tool could be seen as an example of a principal-agent relationship that is essentially premised on mistrust and fear of opportunistic behaviour by agents (Eisenhardt 1989a). Such lack of trust and fear of opportunistic behaviour is evident in the following comment by PEF’s FAS programme coordinator:

Well ahm yes we do trust (hesitant) but it’s not trust in blindness… We ensure trust (laughing) let me put it in this way. We visit them, we monitor them and it’s done three times a year and sometimes it is more than five times and we do ensure that yes (stressing) we should not be deceived. We reward good outcomes and we punish sluggish behaviour or deviations (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-01).

This is a typical response offered by PEF officials when asked about trust. The lack of trust becomes even more explicit when it comes to monetary matters in partnership. This is the point when almost all PEF officials become sceptical about the intentions and motivations of private sector partners.

There are some people who are there just to get money, they make stories and I tell you if I'm not strong and if I'm not vigilant then anybody could easily trap me...so you need to be very vigilant (stressing) (PEF-Director-02).

Primarily their main motive is making profit, it’s not the case of one or two school owners it’s the case of almost every school owner (stressing). They are basically entrepreneurs in actual… let me tell you they are just trying to catch on the potential that a government department has (PEF-Chairman).

Collectively, comments such as above, suggest that a great deal of doubt remains in the minds of PEF officials when interacting with private sector partners. PEF’s responses towards the partners’ concerns about the level of funding are based on their lack of trust and their stereotyping about private sector being led by profit motives.

From PEF’s partners’ perspective the PPP starts with a minimum level of trust (or maybe confidence) on the part of both parties. Partners are confident that being a
public sector body PEF would do what it commits to, as reflected in the following comment:

We trust PEF because if they've said that they would give funding in time, they send it in time and there is no problem in it at all (PEF-Partner07).

Moreover, all partners consider PEF trustworthy even if they are not completely satisfied with the IORs between them and PEF. For example:

Yes there is trust between us and would stay in our relationship. Though their behaviour is quite hard and bossy with us but if we say that PEF is not working or they are involved is some corruption then it would be wrong, they are working 100%, the only thing required from their side is to accept and treat us as partners. The trust we have on them is due to their work (PEF-Partner03).

As mentioned earlier, being a public sector organisation accountable to various bodies, PEF works hard to maintain its integrity and reputation. PEF has positioned itself as a public sector body which has its own organisational culture that is distinct from many public sector bodies. There are two main characteristics that make PEF standout from the other public sector organisations: it is performance oriented and corruption free. These two features are referred to both by PEF and its partners. PEF strives hard to ensure transparency and objectivity in its processes. One example of this is reflected in PEF’s policy whereby PEF’s monitors are not allowed to take any personal benefit, as small as even a glass of water, from their private sector partners. One of the PEF officials commented:

We never take a single glass of water (stressing) from school and when you are not even taking a single glass of water then neither would I be blackmailed by a school nor would I report wrong, wrong reporting is only possible when I take side of the school owners and give them favours (PEF-Prog.Officer-05).

This comment suggests that by maintaining a high degree of objectivity and formality in IORs, PEF aims to promote unbiased and objective decision-making. A programme coordinator when probed about the rationale for this policy explained:

It's really important. Our former MD used to say this and when we asked him why not a glass of water? He used to say very politely that when you go somewhere and eat or drink there then at the time of decision that stops you from taking the right decision, we are human beings and when
you get attached to someone then even if you take decision on merit it is usually thought that they used to eat with them, and this is what is said about government bodies that you’ve to give them something or feed them and only then your work would be done (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-02).

Although this policy may promote objective decision-making, it also restricts PEF officials getting involved in informal interactions and building collaborative IORs based on a spirit of equality (generally promulgated in the PPP literature). However, most PEF officials consider it crucial to seek partners’ suggestions and feedback about programme activities. A programme coordinator stated:

This is a very important aspect, in order to achieve our goals effectively our coordination and collaboration is very essential… if you want to bring some innovation or creativity in your work that is not at all possible without coordination (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-02).

Although direct and equal participation by schools in decision-making is not possible in the PEF’s PPP model, there is indirect involvement of partners through different channels. One of these mechanisms is the District Coordination Meetings (DCMs) that are held to seek the viewpoints and concerns of private sector partners. Most PEF officials believe that school partners are indirectly involved in decision-making via this route since their feedback and suggestions are brought to the BOD and taken into account in their deliberations. The PEF Deputy Managing Director expressed his perspective:

The whole structure of the programme is that we sit together, for example we have our District Coordination Meetings (DCMs) where we invite all the stakeholders, we ask for their opinion, we take their opinions and we give our feedback, then we bring them back to the Board and with their suggestions we try to improve our programmes. We’ve taken a number of decisions based on that, for example how the QAT should be conducted? What should be the format of the QAT? There was a demand from the schools that they need loans for improving infrastructure and to establish computer labs, so we have developed other arrangements to help our schools to provide them loans from banks. As per their requirement we’ve started teacher training programmes for our schools (PEF-DMD).

Some PEF partners expressed their satisfaction with this process because they think it makes their participation in partnership decisions possible. As one partner school head noted:
Whenever any decision or change is going to take place, it definitely involves sitting together and sharing ideas, whenever there is any change there are discussions. It is very rare that they take some decision and then share it with us by calling us and tell us that it is going to be in this way from next time (PEF-Partner06).

As mentioned earlier the MoU empowers PEF to monitor its partners and impose penalties in the case of non-compliance with the terms and conditions. In such incidents PEF calls the partners for a meeting with the director of the relevant programme to discuss the matter and listen to their point of view on that issue. Many partners expressed concerns about this process and sometimes used the term ‘court trial’ to explain the process. Following are the typical comments in this respect:

I agree that check and balance should be there and we should not be left on our own but they have to listen to our problems, all penalties are for us only, they deduct a lot of money from our funding and the penalties are imposed (stressing) without any discussion and then they ask us to sign the statement that we agree to this penalty. We have to sign that, if we don't sign that they would stop the funding and if there is no funding then how can we run the whole set up of the school… If they simply call us only to impose penalties then it is like a court trial that has to be settled (PEF-Partner06).

Some partners considered this process as mere formality as they believed that PEF officials come ‘with their own agenda’ and the decision to impose penalty is ‘set in stone’ and could not be reverted. One school owner argued:

Whatever the monitor writes it is set in stone by PEF which is a cause of conflict, see when we are partners it should be discussed with us but they are very active in imposing penalties. We request quite a lot in such cases that you don't know the problems we face but there is no use. I can't understand what their problem is as they get funding from the government but there is some reason for that, maybe they show their performance by doing this; I don't know (PEF-Partner03).

Contrary to this there are some partners who believe that their suggestions are being heard and implemented by PEF and give examples as:

I had some problems regarding the data of my school. I met director FAS in this regard and explained that these problems are due to the non-availability of internet and change of school administrator. He said that we will go by rules. Later, he gave us access to the internet and we updated all our data. I mean he supported us and didn’t refuse to sort the matter. They try to cooperate with us (PEF-Partner05).
Similarly,

We had a meeting and people asked to change the month to conduct the QAT and they have changed it, all this shows that they listen to us and try to solve our problems. They have changed the QAT dates in response to school administrators who asked to change the dates during meetings. If funding has increased, it’s again in response to the demand of all schools (PEF-Partner04).

One point that could be established from this discussion is that the viewpoints of PEF partners tend to diverge across almost all themes. This is somehow not surprising given the diversity of PEF’s partners which has already been discussed in section 7.3.

7.6 PPP outcomes

PEF’s partnership approach is described as a ‘combination of private-sector efficiency and public-sector funding’ (Malik 2010: 1). Efficiency lies at the heart of PEF’s PPP model and all PEF interviewees considered it as the major benefit offered by all four programmes undertaken by PEF. PEF officials compared PEF partner schools to state schools and took pride in the superior performance and efficiency of PEF partner schools. For instance, the Director of the FAS programme commented that:

The cost of education in public sector [schools] is approximately Rs.2000/ per student per month whereas PEF is delivering quality and the cost is Rs.350/ plus Rs.50/ administrative cost… So the cost is much lower and the quality is better… 30 of the top performing students [in provincial exams] were PEF students… public sector schools have secured no [top] position in [these] exams (PEF-Director-01).

Similar types of responses are offered by private sector partners too and most of them are aware that PEF is able to pursue its mission more efficiently by getting engaged in partnerships. The focal person from one CPDP partner organisation expressed it as:

If PEF arranges these trainings in partnership then their per head cost is approximately Rs.2,600/ and if PEF arranges these trainings on its own then it would be at least Rs.5,000/ per teacher. I am an accountant by background and I look at everything from financial perspective and I know that this is the main reason to promote public-private partnerships. The main purpose of these across the world is to save money… So it is cost effective as if PEF would do it on its own it would be a huge burden
for them as they would have to increase their human resources manifolds (PEF-Partner09).

There are many examples of how PEF partner schools deliver education at low cost and improve the performance of pupils. Some of the partner schools interviewed commented on improved infrastructure, better teachers, and getting rid of the fee collection process as value-added benefits. Almost all of them reported improvements in pupils’ performance results. None of the partner schools interviewed thought that the partnership had added no value to their school.

The dropout rate of students in PEF partner schools is estimated to be close to zero (Malik 2010), whereas overall in Pakistan half of the children enrolled in grade 1 drop out of school before completing their primary education (Academy for Educational Planning and Management 2006). The main reason for this sharp difference is the action taken by staff in PEF partner schools to ensure the presence of children. They do this to meet the QAT requirements and also to guard against surprise visits by PEF monitors to verify enrolment figures. Though occasionally sceptical of these monitoring visits, PEF schools recognise the benefits:

The relationship with parents has strengthened as children used to be absent from school before and now we push them to be regular and it creates pressure on parents too (PEF-Partner07).

Many interviewees expressed that in Pakistan most people would see this as a major benefit because irregular school attendance and high drop-out rates are real concerns.

There are other examples of the synergistic benefits of PEF’s PPPs. For example, one PEF programme officer reflected on the potential of school partners to provide them with access to areas where it is difficult to reach children due to social and cultural constraints. He narrated a story about a rural area in Punjab where people did not want to educate their girls. He explained:

If we would have gone there on our own and have asked parents to send their girls to school, it won't have been possible. It was possible to bring them to school only because the school owner belonged to that community and had a good repute in the area and since parents knew him that is why they sent their girls to school (PEF-Prog.Officer-05).
There are examples of both PEF and their partner schools going beyond the formal MoU agreement. Schools work hard to obtain better results in the QAT and other exams. One school administrator commented:

We are doing very hard work and are here today even on Saturday that is usually off in our school. But we are preparing our children for PEF exam… These days we have zero period for class 9 and 10 that starts at 6 in the morning, teachers come at 6 and teach them (PEF-Partner05).

One of the PEF programme officers reflected that without interfering in their internal management ‘we have developed such system and such mechanism that they (partner schools) are fully engaged’. He mentioned that schools set up summer camps and extra classes to improve the learning outcomes of students. Another PEF official added, ‘there is no clause in the agreement which binds them to conduct afternoon classes but they are going one step ahead of our expectations… this is the main synergistic effect’ (PEF-Prog.Coordinator-01).

There are instances of PEF going beyond the formal agreement too. Giving free text books to partner schools is one such example. In order to encourage good performance amongst partner schools, PEF also gives cash rewards to students and teachers who go beyond the formally agreed MoU. In addition, PEF has made arrangements for partners to access interest free loans from banks to improve the facilities at their schools. Another example comes from 2010 when some areas of Punjab were submerged by heavy floods. Many PEF partner schools in these areas were badly affected. The students in these schools migrated to other nearby schools and the enrolment level of the flood-affected schools fell sharply. Although it was contrary to the MoU, PEF continued to fund these schools at higher enrolment levels and offered them soft loans to restore their facilities.

Overall, the added value of PEF’s PPPs goes beyond simply achieving cost savings; there is evidence of substantive improvements in education service delivery. Moreover, there are examples where PEF’s partners acknowledge that partnership with PEF has also enabled them to achieve their own organisational goals to an extent which was not possible without partnership, and this is another synergistic benefit of the partnership. One CPDP partner, for example, was interested in the
partnership to increase her access to far-off districts of Punjab but was not able to do so without partnership. She explained:

I wasn't able to reach out to so many people, through PEF now I've reached many schools and so many people. On my own I wasn't able to reach so many people, the best we could've done was to adopt a few schools but now I'm able to go out to so many schools... PEF is providing us the funds and even if they're less we do have funds now. PEF has provided us the forum so that we can go to the schools and with PEF's name we don't have any problems introducing ourselves. So they provided us access, they provided us funds and they've provided us a platform to work with other people in the same field (PEF-Partner14).

There are, however, instances where the experience of the partnership has not come up to the expectations of some partners. For example, the owner of one partner school expressed his views as:

When I went in partnership with PEF the main problem was that of funding. This programme was started in the year 2000, after some time they raised funding from Rs.300/ to Rs.350/, with every year the rate of inflation has increased, believe me they have not increased the level of funding accordingly which was our main problem and due to which we entered this partnership (PEF-Partner03).

Similarly one CPDP partner thought that his objective to expand out-reach is not met at all as he was limited to certain districts only by PEF. He commented:

After coming (in partnership) with them we came to know that there is a limited role like for example for the last two years we've been working only in few districts, so our objective to expand out-reach was not met (PEF-Partner10).

Such diverse responses reiterate the argument above that each partner enters into partnership with a distinct perspective and assesses the partnership arrangement on the basis of that pre-conceived notion.

7.7 Conclusion

PEF’s PPPs were launched after the restructuring of PEF under the Punjab Education Foundation Act of 2004. Although PEF’s PPPs represent interdependence and resource scarcity on part of both public and private sector partners to achieve their goals, the balance of IORs is asymmetrical in favour of PEF. Dominance of PEF is obvious right from the inception of the partnership relationship as the programmes
are designed *a priori* by the PEF’s BOD with no involvement of partners. The MoUs clearly state the terms and conditions that partners have to fulfil in order to continue with the partnership relationship. Because the contents of the MoUs are designed *a priori*, the MoUs bestow PEF with formal authority and dominant position in the partnership. There is evidence that PEF takes steps to create a better understanding and conducts an orientation seminar with private sector partners to explain the fundamentals of partnership arrangement and to seek joint agreement on the respective MoU.

The diversity of PEF’s partners results in as an array of different responses and reactions to PEF’s PPP model. Consequently, perceptions of the IORs vary significantly across partners. On one hand, there are perceived to be cooperative IORs when private sector partners are willing to adapt according to partnership needs and believe that there are enough channels to participate in the partnership activities. On the other hand, there are partners who seek more collaboration in partnership and complain about the dominance of PEF. These partners talk about conflictual IORs and want to establish equality in the partnership.

Finally, PEF’s PPPs have delivered substantive improvements in school education – including improvements in school facilities, and pupil access, attendance and performance – that could not have been delivered by either partner working alone. There was no partner interviewed for this study who thought that the partnership relationship has produced no added value for them.

To reiterate, the main focus of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 was to describe and understand the nature of IORs during different stages of the partnership along with a discussion of the PPP outcomes in each case study. The description of the nature of IORs and factors shaping these in the individual case study chapters is carried forward in the next chapter, where a cross-case analysis is undertaken to characterise the nature of IORs and to understand the influence of different factors on IORs in PPPs.
Chapter 8 Cross-case analysis

8.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters the case studies have been presented separately, with a particular focus on describing the IORs during different stages of the partnership and the outcomes of PPPs in each case study. In this chapter, the cases are analysed and compared in the light of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. This discussion provides the basis for a theoretical analysis of the findings in the next chapter. In line with the conceptual framework, this chapter is divided into five main sections: characterisation of the nature of IORs; developmental stages of PPPs; contextual factors; motives to enter PPPs; and organisational factors. The discussion presented in each section is summarised in appending tables to offer a bird’s eye view of the comparative analysis.

8.2 Characterisation of the nature of IORs
Given that PPPs by their very nature are diverse, it is not surprising to find diverse IORs across the three case studies. Moreover, each case study programme comprises a number of individual PPPs which themselves also vary and this adds to the diversity of the PPPs and IORs. This diversity offers an opportunity to compare the dynamics of different PPPs so as to provide a more rounded view of the nature of these and the factors influencing the IORs.

As illustrated in Chapter 7, PEF’s PPPs typically manifest contractual IORs characterised by lack of participative decision-making, dominance of PEF, hierarchical accountability and lack of trust. The balance of IORs is asymmetrical in favour of PEF who control the PPP set-up and management in several ways. PEF’s partners’ views of these contractual IORs vary as conflictual or cooperative; this difference in response shaped by the factors described in subsequent sections of this chapter.

As mentioned in the CARE-LDG case study, the IORs in these PPPs vary significantly from one adopted school to the other. For some schools, there is evidence of collaborative IORs characterised by intensive interactions, brainstorming sessions to find solutions and participation of both public and private sector parties in
planning and review meetings. Nevertheless, there are instances when the IORs became conflictual and working through differences was difficult due to CARE’s lack of willingness to adjust and compromise. CARE has a policy of no confrontation in these situations but stands firm on its viewpoint. When there are conflicts at school level, CARE seeks the support of district education officials to force compliance from the school staff. This approach is sometimes seen as a barrier to building trust with the staff at school level which in turn results in conflictual IORs. However, there are schools where differences of opinion are easily handled and the IORs remain more collaborative.

The IORs in the case of ITA-LDG PPPs embody cooperation and they manifest joint agreement on decisions, willingness to adapt, lack of concerns about organisation autonomy and mutual trust. Unlike CARE-LDG PPPs, the IORs in the case of ITA are broadly similar across all adopted schools. Two main reasons can be given for this. First, ITA adopts a facilitative and enabling role which contrasts with CARE’s authoritative approach. Second, ITA’s policy of no confrontation is coupled with a willingness to adapt. It is due to these two reasons that none of the partners in ITA-LDG PPPs consider that their intentions or actions are challenged by the other partner.

The nature and balance of IORs is outlined in Table 8.1.
**Table 8.1: Nature of IORs: a comparative analysis of the case studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of IORs</th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IORs in CARE-LDG PPPs vary significantly from one adopted school to another. In some adopted schools the IORs are collaborative while in some other schools the IORs are conflictual.</td>
<td>The IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs typically embody cooperation and they include joint agreement on decisions, willingness to adapt, lack of concerns about organisation autonomy and mutual trust.</td>
<td>PEF’s PPPs typically manifest contractual IORs characterised by lack of participative decision-making, dominance of PEF, hierarchical accountability and lack of trust.</td>
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**Balance of IORs**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The balance of IORs remains symmetrical (principal-principal relationship) as there is no evidence where one partner is able to dominate consistently over the other partner.</td>
<td>The balance of IORs is symmetrical (principal-principal relationship) and no one party to the partnership is dominant.</td>
<td>The balance of IORs is asymmetrical (principal-agent relationship) in favour of PEF who control the PPP set-up and management in several ways.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**8.3 Developmental stages of PPPs**

This section of cross-case analysis compares and contrasts the ways in which PPPs are set-up, implemented and managed with particular attention to the changing nature of IORs during these phases.

**8.3.1 PPP set-up**

PPP set-up in the CARE and ITA case studies is quite similar. Both CARE and ITA were amongst the pioneer organisations that entered the ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) programme with the LDG. At that time, PPPs were a new concept for the Punjab School Education Department (SED) and district education officials were not familiar with such arrangements. They relied on their partners, CARE and ITA, to come up with a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU was then negotiated by the respective NGO and the LDG officials to reach agreement.

The goals of the partnership in both AAS case studies are ‘to uplift the standard of education’ in the adopted schools. The partnership goals are broad and in principle provide scope to accommodate the specific objectives of both public and private
sector partners. Having said this, since the private sector partners in AAS model take the lead in developing the MoUs, it provides a greater space for them to envision the goals of partnership as well as the roles and responsibilities they wish to pursue to achieve these goals. For example, at CARE it is a strongly held belief that it is not a shortage of resources but their mismanagement which is the main problem to be addressed at state schools. Accordingly CARE takes on a management responsibility for adopted schools. In contrast, ITA officials are of the view that it is the state’s responsibility to manage the schools and that the role of ITA is to provide technical support to government staff when they are faced with problems. So, although management is considered as a joint responsibility in the MoU, in practice most of the management responsibilities in ITA adopted schools rest with the government’s head teachers; ITA staff are only there to solve any problems that cannot be handled by the head teachers.

In the case of PEF, the PPP set-up is quite different from the AAS model. The PEF MoUs are not negotiated and their contents are decided a priori by PEF’s Board of Directors (BOD) before selecting private sector partners. However, the BOD has private sector representation and hence there is some indirect involvement of the private sector in determining the contents of the partnership agreements. Through the MoUs, PEF defines the problem(s) to be addressed and the solution(s). It specifies the quality and satisfaction parameters that have to be met by the private sector partners and states the mechanism to address shortfalls and incompatibilities. With respect to project content and scope, the partnership model is characterised by ex-ante goal setting and the subdivision of a partnership into parts where each partner is liable for the responsibilities allocated to them. In short, PEF MoUs are characterised by a priori goal setting and a clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of each party, which are the typical features of contractual arrangements.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that PEF is sensitive to ensuring that private sector partners understand the terms and conditions stated in the MoUs and the mission of the PPP arrangement. To achieve this, there is an orientation process where prospective partners are introduced to PEF, its mission and goals, the MoU and the respective responsibilities of each party in the PPP arrangement. The questions and
concerns of prospective partners are also addressed by PEF officials during this process.

### 8.3.2 PPP implementation and management

In the PEF’s PPP model, as mentioned above, there is quite a strong emphasis from the start on clear specification of terms and conditions of the partnership model. The MoUs play a significant role in setting out the ways in which programme will be managed. The management principles in PEF’s PPPs are mainly led by the principles of project management whereby the focus is on the ex-ante frameworks identified by the initiating actor (Mantel 2005).

It becomes evident both from the MoUs and the interviews with PEF officials that the mode of accountability is mainly hierarchical as private sector partners are held accountable for the terms agreed in the MoU and monitored by PEF to meet these terms. Thus, continuous and extensive monitoring is adopted by PEF as a mechanism for goal alignment and to avoid the opportunistic behaviour of the partners. These findings could be described as an example of a principal-agent relationship that is essentially premised on mistrust and fear of opportunistic behaviour of agents (Eisenhardt 1989a). Similar to the doctrine of agency theory, PEF employs ‘a mix of incentives, sanctions, information systems (such as reporting procedures), and monitoring mechanisms’ (Van Slyke 2007: 162) in order to align the actions of the private sector partners with the goals of PEF. The PEF Act of 2004 and the MoUs give PEF some fundamental rights that are not available to PEF partners, such as participation in decision-making.

In managing each PPP, there are clearly defined roles and responsibilities of each partner and PEF holds each partner accountable for that. The Director FAS considers PEF ‘a success model due to non-interference in each other’s domain’. As a result the idea of ‘collaboration’ which lies at the heart of much of the discourse around partnerships is limited in PEF’s model of PPPs. Participation in decision-making, for example, is limited to PEF seeking the suggestions from partners and then implementing them in a centralised way.
Nevertheless, a closer look at PEF’s PPP implementation and management reveals that there are channels of feedback available to private sector partners through which PEF officials can be held to account ultimately by the BOD. There are District Coordination Meetings (DCMs) which seek the viewpoints and concerns of private sector partners. Most PEF officials believe that private sector partners are indirectly involved in decision-making via this route since their feedback and suggestions are brought to the BOD and taken into account in decision-making process. The evidence of both ex ante and post ante management arrangements means that some level of co-production is maintained throughout the process of partnership. The earlier phases of exploration and planning do not involve private partners directly but there are mechanisms for more intensive interaction in the implementation and management phases.

While the project set-up for both CARE and ITA shares many similarities, the management of their PPPs is more different than similar. The seeds of these differences are sowed at the outset during project set-up, and are contained in the respective MoUs. The fact that CARE takes on the management responsibilities of the adopted schools and ITA considers it as a joint responsibility is one reason for the differences in PPP management. The ways in which PPP implementation and management varies across CARE and ITA PPPs is a factor that shapes the IORs as discussed in section 8.2.

The initial disposition of CARE towards staff in adopted schools is to distrust them, but in most cases trust seems to evolve over time. ITA, on the other hand, has an initial trust disposition and places greater value on cooperation to achieve goal alignment. Not surprisingly, given CARE’s initial distrust, it uses monitoring as a tool for goal alignment. An Internal Coordinator (IC) is appointed by CARE for each adopted school and is given both teaching and management responsibilities at school level. Conversely, an enabling and facilitative approach is quite visible in day-to-day programme management and implementation by ITA; an Education Promoter (EP) is appointed by ITA and is allocated 6-20 adopted schools. The EP is given the responsibility of helping the head teachers and other staff to improve the school. This
is achieved through occasional visits to adopted schools (usually once a week as observed during the fieldwork).

Although both CARE and ITA are subject to the same government reporting requirements, the way in which both NGOs conform to these requirements is different. CARE collects the required information through its IC who is given responsibilities such as monitoring, record keeping and data management (including teachers’ attendance records, movement register and evaluation). The IC shares this information with the senior management of CARE who visits the adopted schools on regular basis. The senior management interacts with the relevant district officials, shares information reports and suggests further action if necessary. The ITA’s EP collects the required data from head teachers of the adopted schools. This information is then compiled in the form of a report which is shared with district officials.

Despite the fact that both CARE and ITA introduced initiatives in the adopted schools that were designed *a priori* by the NGOs, they involved government officials in discussions (both at school and district levels) before implementing their initiatives. The CARE case study provides some examples of joint decision-making and joint determination of programme activities in CARE adopted schools, but beneath the surface of these examples there is quite a lot of manipulation as CARE’s staff seek to get their own agenda implemented. There are instances when head teachers are not convinced and such conflicts turn into major disputes. In these situations, CARE officials take matters to the district education officials to get them resolved. Hence, although CARE officials interact with the government staff at both adopted schools and district levels, mostly they seek acquiescence from public sector officials.

ITA involves government officials, both at school and district level, at a point when their initiatives are in the final form to be implemented in adopted schools. The main purpose of involving district education officials is to get their approval to implement the initiatives and to keep them informed about what ITA is doing in adopted schools. The projects and initiatives are then discussed with the government staff at school level to ensure their support. Unlike CARE, ITA officials were found to be
quite flexible to change or even drop their initiatives when there was no agreement on them from the school side. In cases of conflict at school level, ITA opts to solve problems by taking a discussion route rather than making it into a dispute and taking it to district education officials.

### 8.3.3 PPP outcomes

There is evidence of added value being created by all three PPPs that could not be achieved by each partner working alone. With respect to quantitative indicators of the value added by partnerships, there were improvements in exam results, enrolments and dropout rates. As detailed earlier in the case study chapters, PEF’s PPPs have delivered substantive improvements in school education including improvements in school facilities, developing technical expertise through training opportunities as well as increases in pupil access, attendance and performance.

The ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) PPP model has also resulted in positive changes in similar indicators. Both CARE and ITA contributed to the provision of missing facilities in schools including teachers. They also provided training opportunities to government staff which helped to bring improvements in the quality of education. These improvements helped to increase the enrolment rates at adopted schools. In some of the CARE adopted schools it became difficult to accommodate the increased number of children in the existing buildings and some schools started accommodating children in double-shifts. The CARE adopted schools that ran double shifts were those where the IORs were collaborative which supports the view that there is a positive relationship between collaborative IORs and the added value of PPPs. Although many head teachers in ITA adopted schools reported increases in enrolment rates after entering into a partnership with ITA, none of the ITA adopted schools were running in double-shifts. As mentioned in the CARE-LDG case study, the government staff at adopted schools were conscious of being monitored by CARE through the IC. This is seen as interference at times but the continuous presence of CARE’s IC in each adopted school creates a sense of competition between CARE’s teachers and government teachers and this may encourage the latter to improve their performance.
Examples of more qualitative value added by PPPs can be found in all three case studies. There are instances when PEF and its partners go beyond the formal agreement to achieve the goals of the partnership. From PEF’s partners’ side, there is evidence that they go beyond the formal agreement with PEF in order to achieve better results in the QAT and other exams. PEF has made arrangements for its partners to access interest free loans from banks to improve their facilities and has supported them when floods submerged several partner schools. Furthermore, partnership with PEF increases the private sector partners’ visibility and repute in the community which is a qualitative benefit.

PPPs with LDG enhance the legitimacy of CARE and ITA which makes more funding options available to them. From the government’s perspective, partnership with CARE and ITA brings improvements in the adopted state schools which makes these schools popular in the community. Furthermore, improvement in enrolment rates and exam results has a potential multiplier effect: these adopted schools become more visible to the LDG education officials, which in turn results in further improvements in these adopted schools. Both CARE and ITA staff were found to build contacts with the LDG education officials and in doing so they shared the problems of the adopted schools, which accelerated new developmental work in these schools.

Another indicator of synergistic benefits, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the extent to which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own organisational objectives through PPP arrangement. All PEF officials interviewed for this research unanimously agreed that they were able to meet their objectives of efficient education delivery through PPPs. They were of the view that PPPs allow them and their partners to benefit from the comparative advantages of one another. Many of PEF’s private sector partners also mentioned that they are in a better position to pursue their organisational objectives through a PPP. However, there are some instances where PEF’s partners perceive that the PPP has not come up to their expectations and they are not able to meet their objectives.

There is recognition on the part of ITA that entering into PPPs with LDG enables them to better pursue their mission. ITA-LDG PPPs help ITA to pursue three main
objectives included in ITA’s mission statement. First, PPPs allow ITA to improve the quality of education at state schools. Second, working in state schools helps ITA to gain grassroots experience in order to influence public policy decisions. Third, working with the state education department increases the credibility of ITA and enables ITA to capitalise on funding from multiple channels. Similarly, CARE-LDG PPPs help CARE to achieve its mission of empowering under-privileged children with a marketable education. It is well-recognised by CARE that no NGO could ever have resources to do this alone and partnership with the LDG supports them to pursue their organisational mission and objectives.

The main points from the discussion of developmental stages of PPPs in this section are summarised in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Developmental stages of PPPs: a comparative analysis of the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPP set-up</strong></td>
<td>CARE takes the lead in developing the MoU which broadly defines the problem, roles and responsibilities of each partner; the MoU is then negotiated by both parties</td>
<td>ITA takes lead in developing the MoU which defines the problem, roles and responsibilities of each partner; the MoU is then negotiated by both parties</td>
<td>PEF defines the terms of the MoU including the responsibilities of each partner, quality and satisfaction parameters, and outcomes; the MoU is then jointly agreed by both parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPP implementation and management</strong></td>
<td>Based on the principles of process management (managing ongoing interaction among different actors); yet CARE’s style of management is direct and authoritative</td>
<td>Based on the principles of process management (managing ongoing interaction among different actors); ITA’s style of management is enabling and facilitative</td>
<td>Primarily based on <em>ex ante</em> frameworks and principles of project management along with some <em>ex post</em> measures (such as seeking partners’ feedback and suggestions through meetings and feeding these through to the BOD to take into account before taking any decision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPP outcomes</strong></td>
<td>CARE’s provision of missing facilities including teachers in the adopted schools; improvements in the quality of education; increase in enrolment rates; some schools started accommodating children in double-shifts; increased oversight improved schools’ performance; greater visibility of the schools within LDG education department and community; both CARE and LDG are able to meet their objectives</td>
<td>ITA’s provision of missing facilities including teachers in the adopted schools; improvements in the quality of education; increase the enrolment rates; greater visibility of the schools within LDG education department and community; both ITA and LDG are able to meet their objectives</td>
<td>Substantive improvements in school education – including improvements in school facilities, developing technical expertise through training opportunities and increase in pupil access, attendance and performance; evidence of going beyond the formal agreement to achieve the goals of the partnership; PEF’s partners’ enhanced visibility and repute in the community; both PEF and its partners are able to meet their objectives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4 Contextual factors

These are the factors that operate at a macro-level and are beyond a particular case, though they may play out differently in each case. To recap from Chapter 3, among the more important contextual factors are interdependence, institutional pressures, reputation and sectoral differences. In line with the conceptual framework, this section engages with the cross-case analysis of the contextual factors in two ways: 1) the ways in which they stimulate the formation of PPPs, and 2) the ways in which they influence the IORs.

8.4.1 Interdependence

Interdependence is an important contextual factor that facilitated the formation of PPPs across all three case studies. All case study organisations were unable to generate enough resources by themselves to pursue their mission and goals. Virtually all parties including PEF, its private sector partners, district education officials, CARE and ITA had a broad consensus that there is a need to improve the access to quality education in the country, and most parties were involved in contributing towards this need even before entering the PPP arrangements. Nevertheless, individual parties were constrained by resources and were faced with a situation where each party had some resources that were required by others. For example, the state possesses a large infrastructure of schools consisting of more than 57,000 state schools in Punjab (School Education Department 2012) but had failed to provide adequate and comprehensive education services under its role as a direct provider. Private sector schools are generally known for a more efficient provision of education (Andrabi et al. 2008) and they have played a prominent role in filling the gaps in the provision of education services (PSLM 2011). Yet private sector schools lack all the necessary resources to address the educational challenges without the state’s support. Recognition of this interdependence supported the formation of PPPs across all three case studies.

With respect to the ways in which interdependence affects the IORs in each case, the impact of interdependence is mediated through partners’ motives for entering a PPP. PEF and its private sector partners, for example, are dependent on one another to deliver education services. PEF’s primary focus is to enter into PPPs so as to take
advantage of the resources of private sector parties whilst exercising their control over the rules of partnership. PEF’s partners have varying motives to enter into a partnership with PEF. These contrasting motives play a significant role in shaping the IORs in PEF’s PPPs. In the case of AAS PPPs, both public and private sector parties are interdependent and enter into PPPs with diverse motives which affect the resulting IORs. The ways in which these motives shape IORs are discussed in detail in section 8.5.

8.4.2 Institutional pressures

It can be argued that all the PPPs studied in the context of this research faced institutional pressures of different types with varying intensity. Taking PEF first, PPPs lie at the core of its existence under the Punjab Education Foundation Act 2004. PEF receives funding from many different donors such as DFID and the World Bank, who emphasise working in partnerships to meet educational needs. Hence, working in PPPs increases PEF’s access to funding. PEF partners experience somewhat different institutional pressures. Knowing that they would be able to offer free education to children and get paid by PEF for their services was an incentive to work in partnership with PEF. In many cases partners also mentioned that working with PEF, an autonomous public sector organisation, enhanced their visibility, reputation and image in the community.

ITA aims ‘to address educational bottlenecks through timely resource mobilization’ (ITA 2012a) and it acts as a platform to mobilise the resources from various sources. Working with the LDG education department increases the credibility of ITA and enables ITA to capitalise on resources from multiple channels including communities, the corporate sector, philanthropists, expatriates and many multilateral and bilateral donor organisations. It was mentioned by ITA’s leadership that donor organisations and the corporate sector are more willing to contribute money if it is spent on state schools. This becomes an institutional pressure for ITA to work in partnership with government education departments. Although none of the institutional pressures to enter PPPs were directly mentioned by either the LDG education officials or head teachers of the adopted schools, it could be argued that LDG entered PPPs to demonstrate the norms of cooperation in view of the donor
push towards involving all sectors of the society to deal with Pakistan’s educational challenges.

Before getting into partnership with the LDG, CARE had established three of its own schools providing education to more than 3000 children (CARE 2012b). CARE didn’t face institutional pressures with respect to funding agency requirements, because their funding base largely consists of donations by local and expatriate individuals. In the case of corporate donors, CARE’s leadership reported being very selective and choosing donors without strings in order to stay independent. Nevertheless, getting into a PPP with the LDG expanded CARE’s network significantly, and enhanced CARE’s image, visibility and profile in the community and education sector.

**8.4.3 Reputation**

The reputation of partners seems to play a significant role in the case of CARE’s partnerships with the LDG. CARE was one of the pioneers adopting state schools in 1998. CARE’s reputation and experience in providing access to education for many under-privileged children acted as an enabling factor when initiating the CARE and LDG partnership. Due to its good reputation, CARE takes pride in its work and considers it as their main strength. This level of confidence was useful in forming the CARE-LDG PPPs but it is sometimes seen as interference by head teachers in adopted schools. Some of these head teachers complained that CARE officials consider that they are superior and more knowledgeable and do not take into account their own vast experience. Though the LDG education department and state schools are known for their inefficiencies and inabilities to provide quality education, getting into a partnership relationship with a government institution enhances the reputation and visibility of private sector partners, and hence was seen as a favourable factor to establish partnerships.

In 2005 when PEF launched its PPP programmes not many private sector school owners were willing to enter into a PPP relationship with PEF. This was mainly due to a fear that partnerships were a tactic by the government to take hold of their schools, as happened in 1972 when a democratic government nationalised a large number of education institutions run by the private sector (Bano 2007). The
leadership of PEF at the time of restructuring made concerted efforts to develop a trusting relationship with its private sector partners to restore the reputation of public sector. Although the PEF model focuses on pre-defined terms of partnership and formal mechanisms ensuring hierarchical accountability, some of the early private sector partners reported more interactive processes where they were involved in various programme activities which helped in building trust between PEF and its partners. Once PEF gained a good reputation in the education sector, many more private parties were willing to enter into partnership with PEF. The greater availability of willing partners and a change in PEF’s management altered the PEF officials’ perspective towards private sector partners with less emphasis on collaborative IORs.

With respect to PEF’s partners, reputation doesn’t seem to play any significant role either in the PPP formation or on the nature of IORs. PEF selects partners on the basis of pre-defined criteria given by its BOD. The criteria give no weighting to reputation of private parties. The PEF partnership model and its requirements on partners are applied to all partners regardless of their reputation. For example, all partners are subject to the same reporting requirements and same monitoring process irrespective of their reputation.

The inception of ITA was based on the ‘Adopt-a-School programme’. Under the banner of Whole School Improvement Programme (WSIP), ITA started adopting state schools. Hence it was not the reputation of ITA but the reputation of its leader and founder that played an enabling role in the formation of the ITA-LDG PPPs. This is discussed further under organisational factors in section 8.6.

8.4.4 Sector differences

As expected public and private sector differences lie at the heart of the PPPs in all the case studies. PEF officials generally feel that being a public sector organisation they cannot delegate their power to control the PPPs. There is division of responsibilities at the outset and the PPPs are regulated through continuous monitoring, which fits with the value patterns of hierarchy. PEF officials consider it their duty to make sure that the funding provided to the private sector partners is used to fulfil the goals of the PPPs to safeguard the primacy of the public interest. For this
reason, they do not hesitate to spend money on the monitoring of partners. PEF’s controlling stance results in contractual IORs from PEF’s side. Although public interest seems to be important for PEF’s partners too (at least in the case of not-for-profit partners), they seem to be interested in seizing this opportunity to gain financial benefits too. Keeping in view that the target market for most of the PEF’s private sector partners was the lower income groups; they generally viewed PPPs with PEF as an opportunity to serve the underprivileged sectors of the society while getting paid for their services by the public sector. This allowed them to minimize the financial risks of getting involved in the education of children from lower income families. Control by PEF was perceived differently by different PEF partners (discussed in section 7.5.1 of Chapter 7) resulting in diverse IORs.

Sector differences were one of the main causes of conflict in the CARE-LDG PPPs. CARE’s leadership seemed quite upset with the centralized and hierarchical nature of the education department. They were wary of political risks, such as changes in the government and its policies, and argued that the state system restricts innovative solutions. At school level, the role of head teachers is an important determinant of IORs. Due to the hierarchical nature of the public sector education department, the MoU of the CARE-LDG PPP was negotiated between the top management of the district and the leadership of CARE. The staff in adopted schools, who lie at the heart of PPP implementation and management, were not included in this interaction. This is particularly problematic given that PPPs involve various actors at different levels. LDG education officials and head teachers of the adopted schools also had some concerns that could be linked to sector differences. These officials had a strong orientation towards continuity and when CARE tried to introduce changes, such as change in the medium of instruction, it did not fit in with their ways of working. Being public sector officials, they were not willing to relinquish their control, which generally resulted in conflictual IORs especially during the first year of partnership.

Sector differences do not appear to be an issue in the ITA-LDG PPPs due to ITA’s policy of no confrontation and willingness to adapt. This leads to cooperative IORs in almost all schools adopted by ITA.
The ways in which contextual factors influence the formation of PPPs and IORs across all three case studies is summarised in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Contextual factors: a comparative analysis of the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdependence</strong></td>
<td>CARE is unable to pursue its mission without interacting with government education department</td>
<td>ITA is unable to pursue its mission without interacting with government education department</td>
<td>PEF is unable to provide education on its own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government education department is unable to provide access to quality education to every child without the help of the private sector</td>
<td>Government education department is unable to provide access to quality education to every child without the help of the private sector</td>
<td>PEF’s partners generally face lack of financial resources to pursue their goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional pressures</strong></td>
<td>CARE not required to enter into PPP with LDG but partnership with government enhances CARE’s image, visibility and profile in the community and education sector</td>
<td>ITA is required to enter into PPP with LDG (and other district governments) to meet funding bodies’ expectations</td>
<td>PEF’s access to funding is based on working in PPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDG entered into partnership with CARE to demonstrate norms of cooperation in view of broader push towards PPPs</td>
<td>LDG entered into partnership with ITA to demonstrate norms of cooperation in view of broader push towards PPPs</td>
<td>Partnership with PEF enhances partners’ visibility, reputation and image in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reputation</strong></td>
<td>CARE’s good reputation is an enabling factor to form CARE-LDG PPP. The good reputation of CARE cultivates a sense of internal pride which is sometimes seen as interference by head teachers of adopted schools</td>
<td>It was not the reputation of ITA but that of its leader that acted an enabling factor for ITA-LDG PPP</td>
<td>Dubious initial reputation of PEF obstructed PPP formation but resulted in early attempts to develop more collaborative IORs. The good reputation that PEF gained over time facilitated PPP formation but made IORs more contractual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Despite public sector failure in addressing the need for quality education, getting into partnership with government education department enhances the reputation and visibility of private sector partners, and hence was seen as a favourable factor to establish partnerships</td>
<td>Despite public sector failure in addressing the need for quality education, getting into partnership with government education department enhances the reputation and visibility of private sector partners, and hence was seen as a favourable factor to establish partnerships</td>
<td>Reputation of PEF’s partners doesn’t seem to play any significant role either in PPP formation or in the nature of IORs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sector differences</strong></td>
<td>Differences between the public and private sector constrain collaborative IORs</td>
<td>Differences between the public and private sector do not seem to constrain collaborative IORs</td>
<td>Differences between the public and private sector constrain collaborative IORs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8.5 Motives to enter PPPs

The data confirms that resource scarcity and interdependence may induce either cooperation or the desire for control driven by reciprocal and power acquisition motives respectively. With respect to the former, entering into a partnership relationship is led by the desire to exchange resources with one another (reciprocal motives). Whereas from a control point of view, interdependence prompts efforts to exert power, influence or control over the resources of others in order to generate required resources (power acquisition motives).

Taking PEF’s PPPs first, PEF exerts control over its partners; holds partners accountable for the terms agreed in the MoU; can impose penalties on private sector partners in the case of non-compliance with the MoU terms and conditions; is resistant to relinquishing autonomy and control; and is reluctant to adapt according to the needs of the partners. There is enough evidence in the case study to suggest that PEF enters into PPPs with power acquisition motives which leads to contractual IORs.

The diversity of PEF’s partners makes it quite complex to explain the motives with which PEF’s partners enter into PPPs. For example, there are some partners who enter into a partnership relationship with PEF with a clear understanding that PEF is a public sector body which gives them money and they have to perform according to the PEF’s requirements. They are not expecting a relationship based on equality and they enter into the partnership with the motive of enhancing their legitimacy or increasing their efficiency. On the other hand, there are some PEF’s partners who enter into a PPP with PEF with reciprocal motives and want to play an active role in planning and decision-making. They become upset due to the dominance of PEF. This difference in partner motives is an important factor that shapes the varying IORs.

A cross-case comparison can extend this analysis of how interdependence as a contextual factor has different effects on the IORs. The AAS model of PPPs, to which the other two case studies (CARE and ITA) belong, provides a contrast. In this model of partnership, reciprocal motives drive both public and private sector parties, resulting in more symmetrical balance of IORs. Although LDG experiences
interdependence similar to PEF, both public and private sector parties considered inter-organisational exchange of resources as crucial for achieving their individual as well as their partnership goals and there was mutual agreement on the rules governing partnership. However, the motives to enter a PPP interact with some organisational factors (discussed in section 8.6) when seeking to explain the IORs. This is the reason that although both CARE and ITA generally enter with reciprocal motives and operate under a similar model of PPP, their PPP set-up and management is different.

It is found that although reciprocity may be seen as a sufficient reason for entering a relationship with LDG, the organisational factors introduce some other motives for CARE and ITA choosing to enter PPPs. To illustrate, CARE’s management understands that their mission, to empower under-privileged children with a marketable education, is impossible to achieve without working with the government education department. They are well aware that it is more efficient to adopt government schools to pursue their mission rather than building CARE’s own schools. This clearly links the motives of reciprocity with those of efficiency. Similarly, for ITA the incentive to pursue mutually beneficial relations interacts with a desire to enhance its organisational legitimacy and stability. ITA is involved in many initiatives to mobilise diverse stakeholders in the education sector as a part of its mission. Many donors are now providing funding to NGOs through the state which obliges NGOs to get into some kind of relationship with the state. Hence, working in partnership with the government education department enhances ITA’s legitimacy and stability by increasing its access to funding from various sources.

Due to the non-involvement of school staff in the PPP set-up phase, the head teachers and other staff in both CARE and ITA adopted schools enter PPPs with the motives of necessity. This generally results in conflictual IORs in CARE adopted schools especially during the first year and there is evidence of strong resistance from the school staff against the PPPs. Realising the fact that the staff in adopted schools are not involved in the process of PPP set-up, ITA puts in efforts to clarify any concerns and builds trust at the very outset. As a first step, ITA tries to fill the gap left by the LDG education officials by conducting a sessions with students and staff of the
adopted school entitled ‘Hopes, Fears, Expectations and Desires about the partnership’. This helps ITA to make everyone at school familiar with the PPP scheme and it is taken as an opportunity by ITA to address any concerns or doubts in the minds of government staff at school. Conducting such a session is a critical step towards building cooperative IORs in an environment of mistrust and suspicions about ITA and the PPP. The head teacher of the first state school adopted by ITA appreciated ITA’s approach which made it easier for her and others at school to overcome their doubts about the presence of ITA in the school.

The analysis of interaction among different motives to enter PPPs is especially enlightening when explaining the difference in the nature of partnership and IORs in the PPP models of CARE and ITA. Due to its motives to enhance legitimacy and stability, it is in the interest of ITA to build cooperative IORs with the government officials both at district and school level, which is reflected in the PPP set-up and management by ITA.

The comparative analysis of motives to enter PPPs across the three case studies is encapsulated in Table 8.4.

**Table 8.4: Comparative analysis of the motives to enter PPPs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives to enter PPPs</th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both CARE and LDG education department enter PPPs with the motives of reciprocity; the motives of necessity on the part of head teachers in adopted schools resulted in conflictual IORs in the first year of these PPPs. The reciprocal motives of CARE mainly interact with those of efficiency, and legitimacy motives appear to be secondary.</td>
<td>Both ITA and LDG enter PPPs with the motives of reciprocity; the IORs were cooperative despite the motives of necessity on the part of head teachers in adopted schools. The reciprocal motives of ITA mainly interact with the requirement to enhance legitimacy and stability.</td>
<td>PEF enters with power acquisition motives; leading to contractual IORs. The motives to enter PPPs vary across different PEF partners which influence IORs accordingly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.6 Organisational factors

The characteristics of the organisations entering into partnership arrangements have a significant impact on the IORs. Important organisational factors are its organisation identity, leadership, organisational culture and structure, and sources of funding. Together these shape the internal dynamics of the organisations entering a PPP relationship and these in turn have important implications for the IORs in PPPs.

8.6.1 Organisation identity

At a basic level the mission of all public and private sector parties involved in the PPPs tends to revolve around two major themes: increasing access and delivering quality education (see Box 8.1). Nevertheless, it is possible to tease out some important differences under these overarching themes. The data analysis shows that each party has its own operationalisation of the term ‘quality’ shaped by their respective vision and mission. In the case of CARE, for example, delivering quality education primarily means improving the management of adopted schools and enhancing the learning levels of children. This is the reason that CARE takes on the management responsibility of the adopted schools. Whereas for ITA, quality broadly refers to the provision of technical support to the adopted state schools and creating a ‘safe learning environment through school rehabilitation’ (ITA 2012a).

The interviews with the LDG education officials and some government documents suggest that the government education department doesn’t seem to have any distinctive vision and mission apart from a general view of the provision of quality education as a means of developing society and the Pakistani nation. This helps to explain why CARE and ITA are instrumental in shaping the MoUs of the partnerships. With respect to the goals of the partnerships and expected contribution of private sector partners, the operationalisation of the term ‘quality’ varies at different levels of the government. At the provincial level, it seems that private sector partners could contribute anything towards improving the quality of education in adopted schools. Whereas the interviews conducted with district officials and the head teachers of adopted schools suggest that for them improving the quality of education involves undertaking infrastructure improvements; providing furniture,
science labs and computer labs; addressing the shortage of teachers; and providing some training opportunities to teachers.

**Box 8.1: Stated missions of the different parties involved in PPPs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>Our education system must provide quality education to our children and youth to enable them to realize their individual potential and contribute to development of society and nation, creating a sense of Pakistani nationhood, the concepts of tolerance, social justice, democracy, their regional and local culture and history based on the basic ideology enunciated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan 2009: 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARE</strong></td>
<td>To provide a quality marketable education to every child in Pakistan and to empower children with a solid education, with the hope to make them better, more productive members of society and to achieve remarkable results in a cost-effective way’ (CARE 2012b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITA</strong></td>
<td>To actively pursue universal access and standard setting in education as a comprehensive learning experience for human evolution and consciousness by creating contemporary education systems for all children without discrimination due to gender, class, age, religion, color and ethnicity and, endeavoring to address educational bottlenecks through timely resource mobilization and influencing of public policy (ITA 2012a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEF</strong></td>
<td>The promotion of quality education through Public Private Partnership, encouraging and supporting the efforts of private sector through technical and financial assistance, innovating and developing new instruments to champion wider educational opportunities at affordable cost to the poor (PEF 2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For CARE, providing ‘quality marketable education’ and achieving ‘remarkable results’ are the main features of its mission which seems to be the reason that CARE’s PPP model emphasises the learning levels and exam results of pupils. Due to its focus on learning outcomes, CARE takes a direct approach which is sometimes seen as interference by the district officials, especially the head teachers of the adopted schools. ITA’s model of partnership focuses primarily on implementing donor-funded initiatives in adopted schools, which are seen as an opportunity to gain grassroots level experience that could be used for policy advocacy at the federal and provincial level of the state. ITA has quite an enabling and facilitative approach and focuses on building cooperative IORs at all levels. Most of the head teachers in ITA adopted schools appreciated that ITA does not interfere much and provides resources.
for the improvement of schools. While comparing CARE and ITA, a head teacher of ITA adopted school expressed her opinion as:

I know CARE has adopted many government schools but comparatively ITA is far better than CARE, as whenever we heads meet with each other and have discussion, we get to know that ITA is far better than CARE. In CARE's model they have their IC who sticks to the school all the time and even observes teachers while they are taking classes (ITA-HT-04).

The stated mission of PEF also has some implications for the nature of PPPs and IORs. ‘Quality education’ and ‘affordable cost’ are quite important for PEF, and PPPs are sought as a mechanism to achieve these. The effect of these is quite apparent in the way the partnership model is designed around the notion of quality and outcomes. There are many clauses in the MoU which require partner schools to improve the quality of education and PEF adopts monitoring as a management tool to ensure that the terms of the contract are met by private sector partners.

As expected, in view of the diversity of PEF’s partners, the vision and mission varies considerably across different partners. Here, it is useful to go underneath the umbrella term ‘private sector’ because difference in organisational mission can be broadly separated on the basis of for-profit and not-for-profit partners. Generally speaking, the vision and mission of not-for-profits was found to be more compatible with that of PEF, but it didn’t have any significant effect on the resulting IORs from PEF’s side. PEF stresses a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach which undermines the effect of its partners’ vision on IORs and they remain contractual for all private sector partners. Nevertheless, the willingness of PEF’s partners to adapt and their need for collaboration in PEF’s PPPs is coloured by their respective organisation identities (as shown in Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7). This is why despite PEF’s universal approach the resulting IORs between PEF and its partners are different.

8.6.2 Leadership

Leadership is an important factor shaping the nature of PPPs and IORs in CARE and ITA case studies. The leaders of both CARE and ITA are founders of the respective NGOs. They have played a prominent role in shaping the mission of their organisations and their PPP models. Seema Aziz, Chairperson and founder of CARE, strongly believes that it is not the lack of resources but the mismanagement of
resources that is the main constraint in ensuring quality education for everyone. She seems to have faith in the strengths of the country and its people and is against approaching foreign donor agencies for any funding (referring to it as a ‘wicked foreign donor concept’ in her interview). Such an approach is reflected in CARE’s more locally-based funding sources and in the way it capitalises on indigenous human resources by engaging students from reputable colleges and universities to work with the CARE team in its schools.

Baela Raza Jamil, leader and founder of ITA, believes that in order to address the educational challenges in the country it is important to mobilise resources from all possible sources. Therefore, ITA actively seeks different sources of funding. This seems to have a direct link with how ITA perceives its role in PPPs where less attention is paid to addressing educational needs in a manner that is sustainable over time. The difference in the approach of both leaders is one factor to explain the difference in the nature of PPPs and IORs in ‘Adopt-a-School’ model.

From the LDG side, the leadership in adopted schools (i.e. the head teachers) plays an important role in shaping the IORs. Given CARE’s direct role in adopted schools, the IORs are dependent on the attitude of the head teachers towards the CARE-LDG partnership, and vary across adopted schools (explained in section 5.6.2 of Chapter 5).

Leadership is an important factor that influences the nature of the partnership and IORs in the case of PEF too, though not as strongly as in the case of CARE and ITA. One explanation of this is that CARE and ITA are NGOs and the founders are still the leaders. On the other hand, PEF is a public sector body. PEF’s executives are appointed for a fixed period of time and then are moved to another government department. Moreover, they have a limited impact on the ways in which the PPP programmes are managed.

As mentioned earlier, not many private sector partners were initially willing to enter into partnerships with PEF due to the fears of nationalisation. A lot of PEF’s partners from the early days of PEF reported that at that time the leadership of PEF used to visit them frequently and engage with them in many ways to build collaborative
IORs. These PEF partners kept comparing the old and new leadership at PEF, and mentioned that the interactive part of IORs has been lost in this transition. The interviews conducted with the current occupants of the executive positions of PEF seemed to endorse these view. It was found that PEF officials have considerable fears about the opportunistic behaviour of private sector partners that breeds lack of trust. Most of them were of the view that the private sector partners’ main objective is to make profit and they want to take advantage of PEF’s resources to pursue their own objectives. Such views are very typical and could be referred to as shared attitudes about the private sector partners which significantly impede the process of building trust among PEF and its private sector partners.

8.6.3 Organisational culture and structure

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the organisational culture and structure of partner organisations were not a part of the initial framework for this thesis and this emerged as a factor that influences IORs in PPPs. Due to this, the nature of the comments around these factors might vary in terms of consistency as compared to some other factors.

The organisational cultures at CARE and ITA were linked to the vision of their leaders. Nevertheless they varied in terms of how strongly the views were shared throughout the organisation. Taking CARE first, Seema Aziz has been successful in infusing her vision so deeply in her team that even the words, sentences and stories told in response to some questions were similar across the CARE team interviewed for this research. For example, the ICs frequently quoted Seema and her mission and this is indicative of a well-established organisational culture at CARE. Seema takes pride in CARE’s work and capabilities, and so does the rest of the team. Perhaps due to the experience of education provision at CARE’s own schools, Seema strongly believes that ‘we can fix everything’ and this belief was found to be shared by many CARE officials too.

The intense pride in the organisation’s strengths and reputation cultivates a sense of superiority amongst CARE officials which results in lack of willingness to adjust and compromise on their approach towards partnership. This is particularly evident in cases of conflict where CARE officials report to have a policy of no confrontation
but nevertheless stick to their viewpoint during negotiations. As mentioned earlier, this attitude is sometimes seen as barrier to building trust and has direct implications for the nature of IORs.

There are some values and beliefs that are strongly held at ITA too. ITA’s founder and Director Programmes, Baela, also has a firm belief in the policy of no confrontation but prefers solving problems through open-minded discussions. The policy of no confrontation is a significant factor in building cooperative IORs with government staff, especially at school level. ITA’s job descriptions explicitly mention ability to develop ‘cordial working relationships’ with relevant government officials (ITA 2012b; ITA 2012c). There are examples where ITA has changed or even dropped an initiative when there was no agreement on it from the school side. As expected such an enabling and facilitative approach acts as an effective mechanism in establishing a sense of equality and nurturing trust. This helps ITA in gaining cooperation from the grassroots level. All head teachers interviewed during this research, including those who were quite sceptical about ITA’s contribution, generally reflected positively on ITA’s conduct.

The impact of organisational culture of adopted schools is stronger in the case of CARE as compared to ITA. This is mainly due to the nature of CARE’s PPP management in adopted schools. Due to their day-to-day interaction with the adopted schools, CARE officials encountered experiences such as some government teachers bringing their children to schools and some of the school students being asked to take care of these children. CARE stopped such activities in adopted schools which was a cause of conflict at times. The IORs in the case of ITA-LDG PPP, on the other hand, were not much affected by the organisational culture of the government education department or the adopted schools due to its facilitative approach.

In PEF’s PPPs, the organisational culture of private sector partners affects the IORs in some fundamental ways. Some of them tend to believe that PEF is a superior party in this partnership and they should comply with the terms and conditions laid by PEF. To them, ‘it is a great gesture of PEF to consider them partners when they are just delivering services on PEF’s behalf’. While some others consider themselves on a par with PEF and believed that it is necessary to maintain collaborative IORs in
order to call this relationship ‘a partnership’. These differences in organisational beliefs affect the private sector partners’ willingness to cooperate and relinquishing autonomy and hence influence IORs.

Being a public sector organisation accountable to various bodies, PEF seeks to maintain its integrity and reputation. PEF has positioned itself as a public sector body which has its own organisational culture that is distinct from usual public sector bodies. There are two main characteristics that make PEF standout from the other public sector bodies: being performance oriented and corruption free. These two features are referred to both by PEF and its partners as distinct from usual public sector organisations. PEF strives hard to ensure transparency and objectivity in its processes. In order to reduce the chances of corruption, some of PEF’s activities are outsourced too, conducting QATs for example. Not surprisingly, such an organisational culture leads to more reliance on formal rules and detailed contracts to govern the relationship with partners.

This type of organisational culture coupled with a relatively inflexible and bureaucratic organisational structure reinforces professional norms among PEF officials that restrict the development of informal understandings and interpersonal ties. One example of this is reflected in PEF’s policy whereby PEF monitors are not allowed to take any personal benefit as small as even a glass of water from their private sector partners. This restricts PEF officials from getting involved in informal interactions and building IORs based on a spirit of equality. Consequently, even after series of interactions over time ‘personal relationships’ do not ‘supplement formal role relationships’ and IORs remain formal. This creates a communication barrier between PEF and its partners which impedes the development of trust between both parties.

By contrast, a relatively flexible NGO structure supports the development of informal interpersonal relationships between public and private sector actors in the AAS model of PPPs. Accordingly, over time NGO and government staff seem to get familiar with one another as people, and they appear to rely on ‘interpersonal relationships’, rather than ‘inter-role relationships’. This generally supports the building of trust which is directly associated with a lower perceived need for formal
contractual or legal safeguards. Likewise, in the majority of schools adopted by CARE and ITA head teachers did not feel the need to read the partnership MoU.

8.6.4 Sources of funding
Sources of funding affect organisational culture by shaping organisational autonomy and priorities, which in turn affect the way PPPs are set-up and managed. Funding from international development bodies mostly has some strings attached to it which set a framework for partnership working and patterns of interaction, which may or may not be consistent with an organisation’s own mission. This is evident in the case of ITA where reliance on diverse sources of funding becomes a main factor in determining the nature of the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs. By contrast, the reliance of CARE on philanthropic donations as a main source of funding has enabled it steer its own cause as they are not accountable to or dependent on donor agencies. This has an impact on the working philosophy of CARE. Unlike the more short-term, project-based approach adopted by ITA, CARE commits to a long-term relationship with adopted schools.

Given that most of the initiatives undertaken by ITA are donor funded, it is necessary to work in close consultation with donors when deciding on the nature of interventions in a given project. This links with the type of IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs. ITA involves officials from the district government education department and schools at points where the project is already in a final form to be implemented, and hence there is not much input from the government side in project design and planning. The emphasis is on getting approval to implement the projects in state schools and keeping schools and LDG informed about what ITA is doing in adopted schools. The study of the MoU between ITA and LDG also corroborates this idea, although there are quite a few clauses in the MoU which make it essential for ITA to implement initiatives and take decisions in consultation with the state officials, there is no clause in the MoU that requires ITA to design its projects or interventions in consultation with state officials. Nevertheless, ITA maintains cooperative IORs due to its willingness to adapt according to the needs of district education officials and head teachers of the adopted schools.
PEF draws most of its funding from the provincial government and international donor agencies, and hence it is accountable to various bodies for meeting the performance targets. Most public sector organisations in Pakistan are blamed for corruption in their processes. Being a public sector organisation, PEF is very careful to maintain its integrity and strives hard for this. Accordingly, PEF maintains formal and contractual IORs with its private sector partners and PEF officials are restricted from taking any personal benefit from PEF’s partners.

While PEF, CARE and ITA have multiple sources of funding, PEF’s private sector partners vary in terms of single or multiple sources of funding which becomes a factor influencing IORs. Complete reliance on PEF for funding became a point of contention and conflict in several instances, resulting in conflictual IORs. However, the IORs tended to be less conflictual in the case of partners with alternate sources of income who are hence less reliant on PEF to meet their expenditures.

LDG education department gets its budget from the provincial government which is then allocated to all state schools in the district. Though the PPPs with the private sector make additional resources available to the adopted schools they do not include direct provision of funding by private sector partners. Hence, from the government side the sources of funding do not seem to play any significant role in shaping the IORs in schools.

A comparative analysis of organisational factors shaping IORs in three cases studies is summarised in Table 8.5.
### Table 8.5: Organisational factors influencing the IORs: a comparative analysis of the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation vision and mission</th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differences in organisation vision and mission of partners make it difficult to develop collaborative IORs</td>
<td>Compatible vision and mission or partners facilitates cooperative IORs</td>
<td>PEF’s vision and mission makes it difficult to develop collaborative IORs</td>
<td>The vision and mission of PEF partners didn’t have any significant effect on the resulting IORs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Leadership | CARE’s leadership approach and lack of willingness to adapt is sometimes seen as a barrier to build collaborative IORs | ITA’s leadership approach supports cooperative IORs | Leadership is an important factor in PEF’s PPPs but PEF’s executives have a limited impact on the ways in which the PPP programmes are managed, they are appointed for a fixed period of time and then are moved to another government department |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational culture and structure</th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference in organisational culture and structures makes it difficult to build collaborative IORs</td>
<td>ITA’s organisational culture supports cooperative IORs</td>
<td>The organisational culture and structure of PEF make IORs more contractual</td>
<td>Organisational culture affects the private sector partners’ willingness to cooperate and relinquish autonomy which is a factor shaping IORs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of funding</th>
<th>CARE-LDG</th>
<th>ITA-LDG</th>
<th>PEF’s PPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of reliance on donor agencies for the provision of funding makes CARE autonomous and does not become a factor to influence the IORs</td>
<td>Due to reliance on donor agencies for the provision of funding, the IORs are influenced by the requirements of the donors</td>
<td>Due to reliance on donor agencies for the provision of funding, the IORs are influenced by the requirements of the donors</td>
<td>Single or multiple sources of funding becomes a factor influencing IORs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From government side the sources of funding do not seem to play any significant role in shaping IORs | From government side the sources of funding do not seem to play any significant role in shaping IORs |
8.7 Conclusion

The dominance of PEF and contractual IORs, as in principal-agent relations, is supported by interviews, process observation and documentary evidence. The IORs in the two AAS PPPs are characterised by a more symmetrical balance of relationships. However, the nature of IORs is quite different in the two AAS schemes. The ITA-LDG PPPs closely resemble a principal-principal relationship and signify cooperative IORs due to the willingness of both sides (especially ITA) to make adjustments in response to the needs of partnership. The CARE-LDG PPPs can also be referred to as a principal-principal relationship because no one party is consistently dominant over the other and there are intense interactions amongst public and private sectors (both at district and school level) to jointly realise the goals of partnership. Nevertheless, there is evidence that at some critical points CARE tends to be reluctant to adjust according to the views of its public sector partners.

The set of factors discussed in this chapter are interlinked and shape the IORs in an overlapping fashion. All case study organisations were unable to generate enough resources in order to pursue their mission and were faced with institutional pressures of different types with varying intensity. The impact of the contextual factors, however, is mediated through the motives to enter into a PPP arrangement. These motives are influenced by both contextual and organisational factors and it is the interplay between different sets of factors that help to explain the IORs in PPPs. For CARE reciprocal motives interact with those of efficiency more strongly than the need for its enhanced legitimacy (which appears to be secondary). For ITA, on the other hand, the reciprocal motives mainly interact with the desire to enhance its legitimacy and stability. This difference is influenced by organisational factors including organisation mission and sources of funding which are linked to the leadership of CARE and ITA.

PEF and its private sector partners are also interdependent and are subject to institutional pressures to enter PPPs. The interdependence provokes power acquisition motives on the part of PEF whereas its private sector partners enter PPPs with diverse motives which are instrumental in shaping the IORs. The organisational
factors at PEF, such as a bureaucratic organisational structure and a widely shared belief about the need to control the opportunistic behaviour of private sector partners, prevent the development of informal interpersonal relationships between PEF and its private sector partners. This leads to contractual IORs in PEF’s PPPs. Due to the diverse motives and organisational factors of PEF’s partners, their views of these contractual IORs tend to vary as conflictual or cooperative.

Despite the diversity apparent in the IORs, all PPPs have achieved some synergistic outcomes which could not be achieved by each partner working alone. This suggests a need to revisit the established link in the PPP literature between collaborative IORs and synergic outcomes of PPPs. This issue is discussed in the next chapter along with other comparisons and contrasts between the findings and the existing literature.
Chapter 9 Discussion

9.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the conceptual framework developed for this research suggested the key characteristics of IORs in contractual and collaborative PPPs, and proposed that context, motives to enter and organisational factors are the important factors that shape the IORs. It was highlighted that there is a strong thread in the existing literature which argues that in order to achieve the synergistic benefits of PPPs it is important to maintain collaborative IORs. Such IORs are characterised by participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of partnership activities and trust. By promoting collaborative IORs it is assumed that the resulting balance of IORs will be symmetrical (a principal-principal relationship) and no one party to the partnership will be dominant.

It was argued in Chapter 1 that the focus of the existing PPP literature is on the setup and performance of PPPs, to the detriment of their relational aspects (Weihe 2010; Jones and Noble 2008). Due to a dearth of research into the relational side of PPPs, the conceptual framework for this research was developed in Chapter 3 by integrating ideas from the PPP, IOR and the mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literatures. Whilst there are other frameworks which take into account some of the factors included in the conceptual framework for this thesis, to date only limited efforts have been made to integrate these sets of factors in order to explain the nature of IORs in PPPs.

This chapter discusses the characteristics of IORs in PPPs and how different factors interact and shape these. In doing so, it comments on the extent to which findings from the cross-case analysis support or extend the arguments found in the existing literature. The purpose of the discussion is to consider how and why IORs differ in these PPPs and what their implications are for achieving synergistic PPP outcomes. Section 9.2 discusses the nature of IORs in PPPs. The factors shaping the nature of IORs are discussed in the sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5. Based on the discussion in these sections, section 9.6 examines the dynamics of IORs in PPPs, with particular attention paid to how various factors interact in this dynamic process. The
penultimate section reviews the link between IORs and the synergistic outcomes of PPPs. It counters an apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative IORs.

9.2 The nature of IORs in PPPs

The thesis has drawn on a rich variety of typologies of IORs (e.g. Brinkerhoff 2002b; Coston 1998; Najam 2000) and focused on four main types of relationships: collaborative, contractual, cooperative and conflictual. Despite this, characterising the IORs found in the case studies is not straightforward. This is due to the inherently diverse nature of PPPs. Each case study partnership (e.g. CARE-LDG) is made up of many individual, school-level partnerships. Hence, it is hard to precisely characterise the IORs of the overall partnership scheme. The IORs in case of the CARE-LDG PPP, for instance, are sometimes conflictual and sometimes collaborative due to the involvement of different partner schools. In a somewhat similar vein, Coston (1998) and Najam (2000) argue that both governments and NGOs are not monolithic, and on any issue ‘different agencies and actors within the same government can nurture different types of relationships with a given NGO and vice versa’ (Najam 2000: 391). Thus they acknowledge the possibility of different IORs within an overall partnership scheme.

As explained in Chapter 2, there are many partnership frameworks and typologies in the existing literature which suggest that some types of partnerships are better than others. In general, these frameworks advocate that the higher the level of collaboration the better. Collaboration in partnerships is usually conceptualised as intensive interaction between partners as they jointly determine the rules that govern their relationship. Joint determination involves setting up the content of partnership in a collaborative manner, making joint decisions and jointly realising the objectives of the partnership (Klijn and Teisman 2000). However, the findings from this research offer more support for a related concept of joint agreement, drawn from the broader IOR literature (Levine and White 1961).

Joint agreement lies at the core of cooperative IORs. It may include joint decision-making about project scope and content, but it mainly involves seeking acceptance of
a priori defined rules and regulations, division of responsibilities, formal relationships and mechanisms to address incompatibilities. Joint agreement relies mainly on what Levine and White (1961) refer to as a process of orientation rather than negotiation. As discussed in Chapter 3, Levine and White provide a useful framework for thinking about the different ways in which acceptance of each other’s goals (‘domain consensus’) is achieved. They argue that in cases where the functions of interacting organisations are not clearly defined negotiations are required to reach acceptance. However, when the functions are more clearly specified, ‘domain consensus’ may be attained by a process of orientation. Some organisations choose to avoid negotiation and prefer orientation as a mechanism to achieve domain consensus because it requires minimal participation and reduces opportunities to challenge, debate and quibble over the terms and conditions of a potential relationship (Levine and White 1961). The idea of achieving domain consensus through joint agreement shifts the focus from developing collaborative IORs, and thus equality in partnerships, towards attaining agreement on the pre-defined rules that will govern relationships.

Levine and White’s arguments are supported by the empirical evidence reported in this thesis. The cross-case analysis in Chapter 8 shows how the interplay of contextual factors, motives to enter PPPs and organisational factors makes PEF hesitant to engage with its partners in the process of bargaining or negotiating the terms and procedures of partnership. PEF’s MoUs are not jointly determined, instead, PEF pursues domain consensus through an orientation process where they try to ensure that their private sector partners understand and agree to the nuts and bolts of the partnership arrangement. Prospective partners are introduced to the MoU in meetings and their questions are answered. In operating the PPPs, PEF maintains a mix of both ex ante frameworks (such as clearly defined standard operating procedures, expected outcomes, and monitoring and performance-reporting requirements) and ex post measures (such as orienting partners, seeking their feedback and suggestions and feeding these through to PEF’s Board of Directors). These processes of orientation and joint agreement provide opportunities for the partners to complement and interact with each other. This provides the basis for PEF’s Board of Directors to revisit and adapt the scope of the partnership without too
much concern for the loss of autonomy, which is often discussed as a major risk while working in inter-organisational arrangements (Alter and Hage 1993; Oliver 1990).

Loss of autonomy is sometimes seen as inevitable ‘in the face of [a] growing web of interdependencies that emerge with time’ (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 108). However, loss of autonomy is a particular concern for many public sector organisations. Interactive decision-making, which lies at the heart of collaborative IORs, is problematic in PPPs because public sector actors tend to choose the roles that fit with their ‘dominant views about democracy and the role of political primacy’ (Klijn and Koppelen 2000: 375). Orientation and joint agreement processes can provide a means of coping with these concerns in PPP arrangements.

The PPP literature tends to draw a distinction between collaborative and contractual partnership arrangements and IORs. However, the case study evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that there is possibility of different types of IORs within a contractual approach, especially when IORs are analysed from both the principal’s and agent’s perspectives. Taking the example of PEF’s PPPs again, although the IORs from PEF’s perspective are contractual and quite similar across different private sector partners due to its one-size-fits-all approach, these IORs can be characterised as cooperative or conflictual when analysed from the perspectives of PEF’s partners. The data also highlights that the existence of cooperative IORs within an overall contractual approach can produce synergistic outcomes, something that is underplayed in the existing literature.

While orientation processes lie at the centre of cooperative IORs, they can also involve negotiation. Orientation processes are particularly prominent in principal-agent relationships. However, reaching agreement in principal-principal relationships may involve negotiation in the process of gaining acceptance of each other’s goals. This was evident in the ‘Adopt-a-School’ (AAS) PPPs, where negotiation is found during different stages of partnership as partners seek to jointly agree the terms and procedures of the partnership arrangement. Reaching joint agreement through either negotiation or orientation is said to reflect ‘a resolution well within the bounds of acceptability’ (Warren 1967: 413). Conflict or difference of opinion may still exist.
on some matters even though an overall agreement has been reached (Thomson and Perry 2006).

Once general domain consensus is achieved, it is maintained either through monitoring or building trust. The ongoing use of monitoring or trust has direct implications for the nature of IORs. For example, the heavy use of monitoring in PEF’s PPPs makes these IORs more contractual than those found in ITA-LDG PPPs where there is more reliance on trust and IORs are viewed as cooperative by both the public and private sector partners.

Overall, this thesis has found that the concepts of collaborative, contractual, cooperative and conflictual IORs allow us to characterise the nature of IORs in PPPs, but these types of relationship are not mutually exclusive. While PPP schemes may be characterised in general terms using one of these types, that can mask significant variations in the nature of IORs in particular location, occasions and time periods.

Based on the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, there are hitherto largely unacknowledged benefits of cooperative IORs. These relationships can be found in situations where there is an asymmetrical balance of IORs and the dominance of one partner. Having said this, cooperative IORs should not be considered passive or inert relationships where one organisation calls all the shots and the partner merely acquiesces and loses their own independent identity. Brinkerhoff (2002b) and Lewis (2000) refer to this as ‘co-optation and gradual absorption’ and ‘dependent forms of partnership’ respectively. Cooperative IORs are best characterised as an active process, a careful balancing act between being willing to adapt to partnership needs while still retaining one’s own organisation identity, so as to contribute comparative advantages to the partnership.

As discussed in Chapter 2, it is common in the existing literature to arrange different forms of IORs and partnerships along continuums and assume or imply that IORs get better as one moves from one end of the continuum to the other. Rather than suggesting a normative continuum or hierarchy of IORs and PPPs, this thesis proposes that one type of PPP or IOR should not be seen as consistently or fundamentally better than others. It is important to view them as different possible
forms and then to investigate whether and how synergistic outcomes are produced via different forms of IORs. In this respect, I am on the same wavelength as Smith and Wohlstetter (2006), who challenge a hierarchical perspective towards PPPs on the grounds that:

A partnership that is situated at the bottom of a continuum may not be as meaningful a relationship as one that involves ‘cultural integration’, but it may also require less sacrifice from the players involved. A new way to differentiate partnerships is needed - one that assesses the different types of cooperation neutrally, so that participants may shape their partnerships based on their specific needs rather than on a normative perception of the superiority of some partnerships over others (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006: 252).

A further discussion of the implications of different IORs for achieving synergistic partnership outcomes is provided in section 9.7. The next three sections discuss the factors shaping the nature of the IORs in relation to the existing literature.

9.3 Contextual factors

The set of factors identified as contextual factors in the conceptual framework play a key role in supporting or blocking collaborative IORs. The initial conditions of interdependence facilitate the formation of PPPs and also affect IORs. Although it is argued by some scholars that greater dependence on the partner’s contribution leads to better collaborative processes (Chen 2010), it was observed that tight dependency of some PEF’s private sector partners on PEF to provide funding obstructed collaborative IORs. However, in cases when both parties were roughly equally dependent on each other, there were greater chances of more collaborative IORs. This was the situation in the case of AAS PPPs. Both CARE-LDG and ITA-LDG were unable to pursue their own organisational missions without interacting with one another, which facilitated somewhat more collaboration in these PPPs. Whilst PEF was also dependent on its private sector partners to achieve its goals, two conditions made it possible for PEF to sustain its supremacy in partnership relationships: market competition and capacity. The existence of a competitive market where many private sector parties are willing to enter into a partnership relationship with PEF does not always exist when a public sector organisation wants to enter into a PPP (Skelcher 2005). Secondly, PEF acts as what Kettl (1993) calls a ‘smart buyer’ and gets into
PPPs on the terms and conditions decided \textit{a priori} by its BOD. This enables PEF to maintain its dominance during all stages of PEF’s PPPs. PEF’s partners also experienced interdependence which activates different motives to enter PPPs, and this shapes the resulting IORs (an issue discussed in the section on motives to enter PPPs).

While institutional pressures reinforced the formation of PPPs, they did not always support collaborative IORs as suggested by the literature (e.g. Sharfman et al. 1991; Chen 2010). Both PEF and ITA faced institutional pressures in the form of funding agency requirements to work in partnership, however, the IORs in both case studies were different. Whilst these pressures initiated reciprocity and cooperation in ITA-LDG PPPs, they were translated into contractual IORs in PEF’s PPPs. This finding doesn’t fit comfortably with the existing literature that links collaborative IORs to institutional pressures. The analysis shows that this difference is influenced by the requirements of the funding agencies. Funding that is tightly outcomes-based (as in the case of PEF) stimulates clearly defined roles, responsibilities, quality and satisfaction parameters; mechanisms to hold partners accountable for contract goals; and performance-reporting requirements. On the other hand, when funding is tied to the introduction of new ideas that require more of a supportive role (as in the case of ITA), there are more chances for IORs to be interactive.

This research does not provide data which directly supports a relationship between the level of collaboration and institutional pressures, other than funding agencies requirements. Nevertheless, working with respectable partners enhances the image, visibility and reputation of organisations and this makes more funding options available to them. For example, CARE’s partnership with LDG increased the acceptance, visibility and prestige of CARE in the education sector and this, in turn, increased the funding options available to CARE.

The existing literature proposes a positive relationship between good reputation and both the formation of PPPs and collaborative IORs due to its causal relationship with trust (Van Slyke 2007; Chen 2010; Bryson et al. 2006). Good reputation of potential partners is associated with the formation of PPPs in this study but this does not necessarily result in collaborative IORs. In most cases, the good reputation of the
partner organisations breeds self-pride and a sense of superiority, which limits compromise and adjustment. In the CARE-LDG PPPs, due to CARE’s good reputation in providing access to education to many under-privileged children, CARE officials sometimes considered themselves more knowledgeable and experienced in ways that were detrimental to collaborative IORs. A similar trend was observed in PEF’s PPPs whereby the management of PEF sought more interaction with private sector partners in initial phases of the PPP programme but as PEF gained reputation less attention was paid to interaction, resulting in less collaborative processes.

A contextual factor that is perhaps more important and specific to PPPs (and other cross-sector arrangements) are the sectoral differences of public and private sector parties. Since PPPs bring together organisations with different backgrounds and identities, their sector difference are likely to make collaborative IORs more difficult (Klijn and Teisman 2003). The findings from this research support this idea and there are many examples in the case studies which reflect problems due to sector differences. For example, CARE officials were used to quick and easy communication at different levels in their organisation and they got frustrated with what they saw as the ‘overly bureaucratic and too centralised’ organisational structure of LDG education department. They bypassed different levels in the hierarchy and spent more time with the DCO and EDO Education who were more likely to quickly respond to them, and in some cases the DCO and EDO instructed district education officials and head teachers of adopted schools to respond favourably to CARE. This approach had some important implication for the IORs in each school. Top management, DCO and EDO Education, were not the ones who are involved in day-to-day routines. Those involved in the PPPs on daily basis - staff at the adopted schools - saw this as bypassing their authority resulting in conflictual IORs in some cases. PEF’s private sector partners also shared similar experiences and considered PEF as a ‘highly rigid and centralised’ organisation where all powers reside with the BOD. In more abstract terms, sector differences made it difficult for individual organisations to understand the organisational routines of their partners, which often obstructed collaborative IORs. As an exception, sector differences did
not seem to influence the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs due to differences in organisational factors and motives which are discussed in the next two sections.

9.4 Organisational factors

The analysis of organisational factors at the individual organisation level (rather than at the collective partnership level) has enabled insight into why it is especially important for some organisations to maintain their autonomy and how open they are to adapting to the needs of their partners and the partnership. Given that a defining characteristic of PPPs (and any other inter-organisational arrangement) is the dual identity of partners: their own distinct organisation identity and the partnership identity (Wood and Gray 1991; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Thomson and Perry 2006), these questions have direct relevance for understanding the nature of IORs in PPPs.

The organisation identities of partners, especially reflected in their vision and mission, is an important factor shaping IORs in all the PPPs studied. Whilst the PPP literature argues that maintaining the organisational identities of partners serves to preserve one’s ‘own portfolio of assets and skills’ (Brinkerhoff 2002b: 24), the IOR literature pays more attention to the behavioural aspects of inter-organisational arrangements and points out that it is difficult to maintain unique identities due to increasing interdependencies that develop over time (Ring and Van de Ven 1994).

This research found that partners confronted similar dilemmas and tensions with respect to maintaining their individual organisational identities. At times attempts to preserve organisational identities made it difficult to develop collaborative IORs. For instance, in order to safeguard their respective comparative advantages and thereby maintaining their organisational identities, the management of PPPs by CARE and ITA reflected their distinct organisational mission and goals. This affected the degree of collaboration in the partnership and much of the programme management was found to be determined a priori without much participation of the government officials. On the other side, head teachers of the adopted schools, in order to maintain their organisational identities, persisted on doing things in their own way. This was not a problem in ITA-LDG PPPs due to the leader’s policy of no confrontation with the government officials. CARE leadership also reported having the same policy but
while ITA operated the policy mainly *from the spirit of collaboration*, CARE officials were found to practice the policy of no confrontation contingently, combining *the spirit of collaboration* with *collaborative thuggery* at the same time (Vangen and Huxham 2003).

The difference in the leadership approach of the leaders of CARE and ITA influenced the rest of the organisation and this shaped the nature of IORs. This supports Murray’s (1998) argument about the influential role of leaders in affecting the rest of the organisation. The difference in the leadership approach of both NGOs is especially prominent in critical incidents. In such situations, CARE officials interact with the government staff at both adopted schools and district levels; but mostly they seek acquiescence from public sector officials (*collaborative thuggery*). Whereas in cases of any conflict at school level, ITA opts to solve problems by taking a discussion route rather than making it into a dispute and taking it to higher levels (*acting from a spirit of collaboration*).

A somewhat similar pattern is observed in PEF’s PPPs too. PEF is successful in retaining its organisation identity due to *a priori* goal setting and its design of PPPs but this inhibits the development of collaborative IORs. PEF’s partners’ concerns about organisation identity varied across different partners. Nevertheless due to PEF’s lack of interference in the ways partners managed their internal organisational matters, none of the partners interviewed for this research were worried about maintaining their mission, goals, core constituencies and underlying values.

The comparison of data from all three case studies suggests that although maintaining organisation identity may facilitate contributing the comparative advantages that individual organisations bring to PPPs, it can be detrimental to the development of collaborative IORs. This is because it seems to provoke a safeguard mechanism in organisations which makes it difficult for them to adjust in partnerships. However, being willing to compromise and even forfeit organisation identity, as observed in one CARE adopted school due to the passive role of the head teacher (see Box 5.2 in Chapter 5), is not the answer either as it restricts the partnership’s ability to achieve synergistic benefits. In Brinkerhoff’s words:
If organization identity is lost, by definition comparative advantages are lost, the organization loses legitimacy in the eyes of its defined constituencies, and its effectiveness wanes... [This can] lead to a diminished capacity of a partner to maximize its contribution in the longer run. There is no longer a strong rationale to justify the extra effort required for a partnership (Brinkerhoff 2003: 108).

The comparison of data from all three case studies suggests that both too high and too little concern about maintaining organisation identity is problematic and can make it difficult to develop collaborative IORs. Hence as opposed to an emphasis on preserving individual organisations’ identities, this research stresses the importance of fostering a balance between willingness to adapt and retaining one’s comparative advantage.

Differences in organisation culture and structure came out as a consistent theme across all PPPs, whether it was in the form of PEF’s partners’ complaints about rigid and bureaucratic structure of PEF or PEF’s concerns about the profit-making culture ingrained in its partners, or CARE/ITA’s problems in dealing with slow processes at LDG. The problems associated with differences in organisation cultures and structures become pronounced when an organisation is concerned to safeguard its own identity (as in the case of PEF and in some of the CARE adopted schools). These problems have been recognised in the extant literature (Teisman and Klijn 2002; Klijn and Teisman 2005) and are an essential component of PPPs.

Last but not least, sources of revenue are important and these interact with other factors to influence IORs. For example, when donor organisations are the main sources of revenue this interacts with the institutional pressure of conformity. Dependency on a single source of funding affects an organisation’s strategic decisions including its willingness to form partnerships (Oliver 1990; Alter and Hage 1993). The effects of such reliance on IORs are mediated through partners’ motives for entering a PPP which are the subject of discussion in the next section.

### 9.5 Motives to enter PPPs

The research findings with respect to the motives to enter PPPs support Oliver’s (1990) articulation of the interaction between different motives when an organisation decides to enter an inter-organisational arrangement. In addition to the interaction of
different motives, the findings suggest that the motives of legitimacy, stability, efficiency and necessity can be linked to either power-acquisition or reciprocal motives. These two motives, in turn, colour the nature of IORs more strongly than other motives to enter into PPPs. For example, both PEF and ITA had the desire to enhance their legitimacy by entering into PPPs. However, for PEF increasing legitimacy was linked to power-acquisition motives as opposed to ITA where legitimacy motives interacted with reciprocity. This shaped the varying IORs in both cases studies. So, although both PEF and ITA sought legitimacy, the IORs are generally contractual in the former and cooperative in latter.

Although the IORs in PEF’s PPPs are characterised as contractual, some of PEF’s partners view them as conflictual while other partners describe them in more cooperative terms. The motives to enter into PPPs differ across partners and these affect the resulting IORs. The IORs tend to be generally cooperative when PEF partners entered into PPPs mainly with the motive of enhancing their legitimacy or increasing their efficiency. Conversely, conflictual IORs resulted in the cases where partners had reciprocity motives and envisioned themselves as playing an equal role in programme planning and decision-making. Thus both cooperative and conflictual IORs can be seen as possible outcomes of a contractual relationship in the case of PEF PPPs.

Although the efficiency motives of some of PEF’s private sector partners resulted in cooperative IORs, the same motives didn’t have the same effect in CARE-LDG PPPs. CARE entered into PPPs with the LDG to achieve its goals more efficiently. However, CARE was reluctant to adapt according to the needs of others and wanted to maintain its organisation autonomy in all situations. This resulted in conflictual IORs in most of the schools during the first year of the partnerships due to equal concerns to maintain organisation autonomy by head teachers of the adopted schools. This shows the varying effects of similar motives in different situations that can be explained by the interaction of different factors influencing IORs (discussed in section 9.6).

The data analysis supports the argument put forward by Oliver (1990) that contextual factors affect the motives for forming inter-organisational arrangements. However,
she assumes conscious decision-making and the findings reported in this thesis do not totally support this. The conceptual framework for this research also considers the ways in which organisational factors influence the nature of IORs and it is likely that some organisational factors, e.g. culture and structure, do not have a conscious influence on decisions; they are factors which are likely to operate and influence at a sub-conscious level. If we only look at factors that operate at a conscious level and only examine intentional decisions, then we miss the things that never get consciously considered. Some options may be sub-consciously ruled out.

9.6 Explaining the dynamics of IORs in PPPs
The diversity of IORs within each of the case study PPP programmes highlights that it is not the contextual factors but the organisational factors and motives to enter PPPs that have more explanatory power to interpret the IORs. If the contextual factors, such as interdependence or sectoral differences, had more explanatory power then the nature of IORs would not have been as diverse within the PPP programmes. For example, different private sector partners are found to have different IORs with PEF, despite PEF applying its PPP model consistently across all PEF’s partners. This holds true across the other two case studies too. Although both the CARE-LDG and ITA-LDG PPPs share the same policy context and, in theory, operate under the same model of partnership; the resulting IORs are different within and across both case studies.

The interaction between context and different motives to enter a partnership is made clear in Oliver’s (1990) framework. She suggests that the underlying motives of power acquisition or reciprocity are crucial in shaping IORs. For example, given the contextual conditions of interdependence and resource scarcity, an organisation may choose to enter a partnership based on either reciprocal or power acquisition motives. However, there seems to be no explanation in the existing literature of whether power acquisition or reciprocal motives will dominate in a given situation. The findings from this thesis shed some light on this. They suggest that the interplay between contextual and organisational factors is an important part of the explanation. As discussed in Chapter 8, although the contextual conditions for both PEF and ITA were characterised by interdependence and institutional pressures, differences in
their organisational factors resulted in the dominance of power acquisition motives in the case of PEF as opposed to ITA’s reciprocal motives.

To add to the complexity, the IORs in PPPs do not remain static and are subject to change with the passage of time, as suggested by Ring and Van de Ven (1994). In all three case studies, the IORs developed and changed over time. For example, since district and school level officials were not involved in any negotiations in the PPP set-up phases of ITA-LDG and CARE-LDG PPPs, they felt as if the partnership relationships were enforced on them by higher authorities. This restricted their understanding of the goals of partnership, the nature of each other’s roles and responsibilities, and the motives and trustworthiness of partners. As a result the initial IORs in the adopted schools were typically characterised by misunderstandings and conflicts. The IORs at school and district level started changing when the partners started working together and became more familiar with one another. The IORs changed quite quickly in ITA-LDG PPPs and became more cooperative within a short period of time. In the CARE-LDG PPPs it took more time to build favourable IORs. As explained in Chapter 8, this difference can be explained by comparing various organisational factors and partner motives for ITA and CARE.

Whilst the relationship between contextual factors and motives is well-established in the IOR literature (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the data analysis for this thesis suggests that the ways in which different motives interact is also driven by the organisational factors. As discussed in section 9.4, organisational factors such as leadership and organisational culture influence individual actors’ willingness to change and their concerns over organisational autonomy. So for example, in the case of ITA-LDG PPPs, the motives of stability and legitimacy interacted with reciprocal motives mainly due to the leader’s policy of no confrontation and this, in turn, reduced concerns about organisational autonomy and increased the readiness of the organisation to adapt according to the needs of partnership. This interplay between various factors shaped the IORs in ITA-LDG PPPs.

In summary, this research proposes that motives to enter PPPs, shaped by contextual and organisational factors, play a significant role in influencing the ongoing nature of IORs. Contextual and organisational factors operate in the background and
continuously shape motives, but it is motives which play a more direct role in shaping the IORs. The achievement of synergistic outcomes also shapes the ongoing nature of IORs. Partners began to value the educational PPPs when they started realising the value-added outcomes of these, and this influenced their ongoing willingness to cooperate. The next section discusses the link between IORs and synergistic outcomes in PPPs.

9.7 IORs and synergistic outcomes

The departure point for this research was the argument that improving the level of collaboration in PPPs would enhance synergistic outcomes by taking advantage of the strengths of both the private and public sectors (Rosenau 1999; Klijn and Teisman 2005; Peters 1998). The concept of synergistic outcomes (also referred to as added value or collaborative advantage in the existing literature) has been measured across two dimensions: 1) the qualitative or quantitative added value created by a PPP that could not be achieved by each partner working alone and 2) the extent to which partner organisations perceive that they are able to meet their own organisational objectives through a PPP arrangement.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, several conceptual frameworks in the existing literature have contrasted PPPs with contractual arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 2000; 2005; Koppenjan 2005). These frameworks tend to argue that symmetry and highly interactive processes are what PPPs should be striving for. Some PPP scholars go as far to claim that contractual PPPs are not really PPPs (Klijn and Teisman 2005).

Although this research confirms the importance of interactive processes in PPPs, given the hybrid nature of PPPs it seems too harsh a judgement to conclude that partnerships with an asymmetrical balance of IORs should not be labelled as PPPs. None of the educational PPPs investigated in this research exhibited collaborative IORs in the ways identified by the literature. Although the IORs were close to being collaborative in some CARE adopted schools, even in those schools the element of joint determination of partnership activities was absent. However, there was evidence of at least some synergistic outcomes in all three case studies. While PEF’s PPPs are typically characterised by PEF’s dominance and contractual IORs (from PEF’s
perspective), they have delivered substantive improvements in school education – including improvements in school facilities, and the access, attendance and performance of pupils – that could not have been delivered by either partner working alone. As mentioned earlier, some of PEF’s private sector partners were willing to accept PEF as the dominating partner because they still considered that there were enough opportunities within the PEF model for the public and private sector partners to interact and work with each other. The resulting IORs have been described as cooperative and productive, in that they resulted in synergistic outcomes that could not have been achieved by each partner working alone. Furthermore, PEF’s private sector partners who had cooperative IORs reflected very positively on the extent to which they were able to meet their own organisational objectives through the PPP arrangement.

These findings are contrary to the proposition that only collaborative PPPs are able to achieve synergistic outcomes, which raises the question of how synergistic outcomes are achieved in PPPs? The concept of ‘cooperative IORs’ has been found to be particularly helpful in explaining how synergistic outcomes are achieved in the PPPs studied.

The idea of establishing and managing PPPs through joint agreement and orientation is enlightening. For instance, by taking the route of orientation PEF was able to enter into PPPs with diverse partners in ways that allowed it to control decision-making and maintain its organisation identity, mission and goals. The resulting asymmetrical balance of relationships did not prevent PEF’s PPPs from achieving some synergistic outcomes. When the champions of collaborative IORs criticise principal-agent relationships in PPPs, they tend to focus more on the commissioning party (the public sector) and assume that contractual IORs will necessarily limit the ways in which partners can interact and complement each other (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008; Koppenjan 2005). The research for this thesis has investigated the relational aspects of PPPs from the point of view of both public and private sector partners in PPPs and this suggests that the limitation of principal-agent relationships may be overstated.
The research has found that cooperative IORs involve the ability to achieve domain consensus while maintaining a balance between willingness to adapt and retaining own organisational identity. It is this careful balancing in situations of interdependence that makes it possible to achieve the synergistic rewards of PPPs. To continue with the PEF example, although PEF is dominant and demands compromise from its private sector partners in many situations, it doesn’t interfere in the internal matters of the private sector partners. This makes it possible for PEF’s partners to find a balance between complying with PEF’s demands while retaining their organisational identity and a measure of local autonomy. Whilst collaborative IORs assume the maintenance of symmetrical or principal-principal relationships, cooperative IORs are not constrained in this way. Furthermore, it is possible to develop cooperative IORs in principal-agent relationships (such as PEF’s PPPs) as well as in principal-principal relationships (as in the case of ITA-LDG PPPs).

Finally, while emphasising the productive nature of cooperative IORs, this thesis is not arguing that cooperative IORs are the most effective form of relationship. More collaboration and symmetry in IORs might enhance the possibility of synergistic outcomes but this is an empirical question that cannot be answered with the available data. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the relationship between symmetry and partnership performance is not simple and not necessarily linear.

### 9.8 Conclusion

The analysis of educational PPPs in Pakistan confirms previous suggestions that PPPs are not monolithic and the nature of IORs varies significantly even within one case study due to the involvement of diverse partners. Moreover, the IORs in PPPs are not static: they develop and change over time. These changes result from a dynamic interplay between contextual factors, organisational factors, partner motives and the perceived outcomes of the partnership. This chapter concludes that while each set of factors has limited explanatory power, together they help to understand and explain how and why IORs differ in PPPs.

The analysis also reminds us that looking only at the structural aspects of PPPs may be misleading. If contracts are the archetype for asymmetrical relationships and partnerships the archetype for symmetrical relationships, this excludes asymmetrical
relationships from the category of PPPs. When we apply such a framework to the educational PPPs, mostly we end up not being able to label them as either a partnership or a contractual arrangement; they combine elements of both.

The research has also explored the argument that improving the level of collaboration in PPPs is important because synergistic outcomes can only be achieved by improving the symmetry in relationships. The conclusion is that this argument needs to be reconsidered because in the educational PPPs studied the link between relationship symmetry and the realisation of synergistic outcomes was not necessarily linear (i.e. improving the level of symmetry does not appear to result in a similar increase in synergistic outcomes).
Chapter 10 Conclusions

10.1 Introduction
The overarching research question for this research concerns how we can understand inter-organisational relationships in public-private partnerships. This overarching question was elaborated into three detailed research questions that aimed to develop an understanding of PPPs and IORs, the different factors that shape IORs in PPPs, and the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes. These questions have been addressed with the aid of a conceptual framework that integrates relevant concepts and findings from the PPP, IOR and mainstream organisation theory and behaviour literatures.

This chapter draws together the main findings and implications of the research reported in this thesis. The next section revisits the research questions, reaffirms their importance and briefly discusses the main findings of the research in relation to these questions. Section 10.3 critically reflects upon the research design, conceptual framework and methodology employed in the research. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research and its implications for the policy and practice of PPPs in sections 10.4 and 10.5 respectively. The penultimate section of the chapter suggests areas where future research could usefully focus. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks about the conceptualisation of PPPs and the study of IORs in the light of findings from the three cases studies.

10.2 The research questions and key findings
On the basis of the overarching aims of the research, the following three detailed research questions were framed for this study:

1. What is a ‘Public-Private Partnership (PPP)’?
2. How can inter-organisational relationships (IORs) in PPPs be examined and characterised? How do different factors influence IORs in PPPs?
3. What are the implications of different IORs for the achievement of synergistic outcomes?
In analysing the first research question, it became clear that PPPs are diverse in nature and there is no consensus among scholars on what constitutes a PPP and how to differentiate between different partnership arrangements. Some researchers compare and contrast PPPs with traditional competitive arrangements (e.g. Koppenjan 2005; Klijn and Teisman 2005) while others arrange different types of PPP along continuums such as ‘low’ to ‘high’ involvement of the private sector (Pollitt 2003), or from an insubstantial or weak partnership arrangement to something more meaningful or strong (e.g. Austin 2000). These PPP typologies were found to be illuminating and confusing at the same time. It is difficult to read across them in order to understand nature of the PPPs due to a lack of consensus on their defining features.

Generally speaking, the main arguments behind comparing partnerships with traditional competitive arrangements or arranging different PPP arrangements along a continuum can be boiled down to two main (often implicit) assumptions: 1) collaborative IORs are viewed as the relational goal of PPPs, and 2) collaborative IORs in PPPs are considered as a prerequisite for delivering synergistic outcomes.

In a nutshell, on the basis of the existing literature there seems to be no definitive answer to the first research question about what a PPP is. Nevertheless, there is a need to set a boundary at least with respect to what a PPP is not. The working definition adopted in this thesis goes some way to setting this boundary by describing a PPP arrangement in a way that distinguishes it from other inter-organisational arrangements. It describes PPPs as a specific type of inter-organisational arrangement that 1) brings together a public sector organisation and any organisation(s) outside of the public sector (including for-profits and not-for-profits), 2) combines the resources (including skills and knowledge) of these partners, and 3) delivers societal goals (Bovaird 2004; Skelcher 2005). In the light of this definition any public-private interaction which is not intended to achieve a societal goal is outside the PPP realm. Similarly the partnerships between a public sector organisation and government-owned or government-financed NGOs also fall outside this definition of a PPP (Budding et al. 2009). In view of the lack of a widely agreed definition of PPPs, such boundary setting is an essential first step in the process of
studying PPPs as it enables the researcher to identify case study examples of PPPs for further analysis and investigation.

Although there is an inconclusive and ongoing debate in the literature about the detailed defining features of PPPs, there is a consensus among scholars that they are dynamic and diverse. This highlights the need to understand the diversity of inter-organisation relationships in PPPs and how these change over time. This leads to the second research question about how we can characterise and analyse the IORs in PPPs.

Due to the limited research on the relational aspects of PPPs, this thesis has reviewed the IOR literature vis-à-vis the PPP literature to help understand the IORs in PPPs. This led to IORs being examined and characterised as collaborative, contractual, cooperative and/or conflictual. These types of IOR are not mutually exclusive. For example, IORs can be contractual and conflictual or contractual and cooperative. Similarly, IORs that may be characterised overall as collaborative may nevertheless show signs of being cooperative and/or conflictual at times. Furthermore, IORs change over time and may be viewed differently by different partners.

In relation to understanding different factors influencing IORs, the existing IOR literature examines contextual factors mainly as antecedents to the formation of the inter-organisational arrangements (Bryson et al. 2006; Murray 1998; Doz 1996; Alter and Hage 1993) and suggests that contextual factors interact with an organisation’s motives for entering a partnership to shape IORs (Oliver 1990). The empirical evidence reported in this thesis supports this argument but nevertheless finds that it underplays the impact of organisational factors on IORs. The cross-case analysis identifies and explains how the interplay between contextual factors, organisational factors and motives shapes IORs. It suggests that while contextual and organisational factors mainly operate in the background, they influence not only partners’ motives for entering a partnership but also their ongoing actions in the management of the partnership. This in turn affects the resulting IORs in PPPs.

While the PPP literature pays attention to contextual and organisational factors, it tends to overlook the effects of these factors on IORs. With respect to contextual
factors the main focus remains on the factors leading to the formation of partnerships and their effects on the outcomes. While this offers some important insights into the formation of partnerships and the factors affecting outcomes, it underplays the connection between the contextual factors and the nature of IORs. The analysis of organisational factors in the PPP literature focuses on the organisational characteristics of partnership arrangements. It underplays the importance of the organisational characteristics of participating partners and how these influence IORs.

Turning to the third research question, the empirical evidence reported in this thesis questions the pro-collaboration bias found in the existing literature, which assumes that collaborative IORs are needed in order to achieve synergistic outcomes in PPPs. The authors of existing PPP frameworks (such as the composite one presented in Table 3.1) have argued that contractual PPPs usually only result in simple cost savings and that substantive improvements and innovative products and services only become possible with collaborative IORs. The evidence of synergistic outcomes in the educational PPPs investigated despite the absence of collaborative IORs in many instances was intriguing. It identified the need to have a richer characterisation of IORs than the current contractual or collaborative distinction in the PPP literature.

This thesis argues for a classification of IORs in PPPs which moves beyond a binary characterisation (contractual or collaborative; asymmetrical or symmetrical). As a starting point it highlights the importance of ‘cooperative IORs’. Discussion of cooperative IORs in the public administration and management literature usually places these either on a continuum or at least relative to other types of IORs (e.g. Coston 1998; Najam 2000), implying the superiority of one type of IOR over another. This thesis finds that one type of IOR is not consistently or fundamentally better than the others, but rather provides insights into the different options available.

Results from the case studies of educational PPPs in Pakistan suggest that symmetry and collaborative IORs are not essential in order to deliver synergistic outcomes. Instead if partner organisations are able to reach joint agreements during different stages of PPPs (involving interacting organisations accepting each other’s goal

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8 To remind the reader, collaborative IORs were operationalised with five indicators based on the literature: participative decision-making, shared power arrangements, reciprocal accountability, joint determination of partnership activities and trust.
through ongoing processes of orientation), there can be significant synergistic
rewards alongside asymmetric IORs. This finding is especially relevant to PPPs
which (unlike private-private partnerships) are usually characterised by public sector
hegemony, where the government is reluctant to relinquish power and control in
many (if not all) cases (Johnson and Osborne 2003; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).

10.3 Research design, conceptual framework and methodology
The choice of a case study research design has proved to be a suitable approach for
this research because IORs in PPPs are an under-researched and complex
phenomenon and case study design is generally accepted as a viable approach for
studying complex issues (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 1994). It is not possible to isolate
IORs from their context, and case studies are particularly pertinent when the
phenomenon under study needs to be considered in its context (Yin 1994; 2014). The
use of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews as the primary means of
collecting data has also allowed a more holistic view than would have been gained
from the use of a single method and has made it possible to minimise the pitfalls of
each method (Patton 2002).

Given the importance of context in case study research design, it is important to
reflect on the relationship between the cases and context within this research. It may
appear from the conceptual framework that the main focus of this thesis is to
examine the ways in which contextual factors influence the IORs in PPPs in a
unidirectional way. Nevertheless, the choice of case studies also made it possible to
analyse the reciprocal effects of PPPs on the overall context of educational PPPs in
Pakistan. Given that the case study organisations (particularly CARE and ITA) were
amongst the pioneers in establishing educational PPPs in Pakistan, they were also
creating and influencing the context in important ways. For instance, the availability
of donor funding was not simply a ‘given’ feature of the external context but was as
much created by the efforts of the case study organisations as they interacted with
potential donor agencies. Hence, there was an interwoven relationship between the
cases and context in this research, and the influences were more reciprocal than
unidirectional.
Another helpful decision was to use a conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis and to incorporate the idea of progressive focusing as opposed to a deductive-inductive divide (Stake 1981). The conceptual framework helped to identify the most relevant types and appropriate sources of data. Without it there would have been a danger of trying to collect ‘everything’ (Yin 2014) resulting in the huge amount of data and information overload (Miles and Huberman 1994; Maxwell 2013). The notion of progressive focusing ensured that the conceptual framework and the constructs within it were kept flexible. The data collected in the case studies was used not only to verify or reject the constructs but also to refine them, and to understand what these concepts mean for actors operating in practical situations.

The conceptual framework, as outlined in Chapter 3, shares some similarities with what Meyer and colleagues refer to as configurational approaches to organisational analysis (Meyer et al. 1993). Similar to the configurational mode of inquiry, the conceptual framework for this research opts for the holistic analysis of a range of external and internal factors and aims to explain how these factors influence IORs in PPPs. For example, taking into consideration the effects of interdependence as a contextual factor along with the organisational motivations to enter PPPs offers a holistic account of the ways in which IORs develop in PPPs which is valuable both theoretically and empirically in order to understand the IORs. The conceptual framework acknowledges equifinality – the idea that there is no one way to succeed and that different forms can be equally effective in different settings (Meyer et al. 1993). This idea is reflected in the findings where no specific type of IOR is seen as consistently better than the others unless it is embedded in an appropriate pattern of contextual, organisational and motivational factors. This approach is particularly useful in guarding against over-simplified and stereotyped causal explanations between different theoretical constructs whilst reflecting and making sense of the complex relational dynamics in PPPs. The typology of IORs (collaborative, contractual, cooperative or conflictual) is grounded in empirical evidence and synthesises the findings from the interplay of various factors. It is a classification which goes beyond normative descriptions.
Another benefit associated with considering multiple influence factors that can operate concurrently is to guard against over-emphasising the effects of one particular set of factors. Previous research on the formation of inter-organisational arrangement has highlighted the importance of initial conditions or antecedents of relationship formation and have emphasised the ways in which these foreshadow subsequent development of IORs. For example, Doz (1996) found that initial conditions play a key role in blocking or fostering subsequent learning cycles. Although he acknowledges that these effects are not static, the initial conditions remain at the centre of his alliance development path. Considering the multiple dimensions of influence such as contextual, organisational and motivational factors along with the outcomes of PPPs in the conceptual framework of this research endorses Ness’s findings that ‘the imprints from the initial conditions do not foreclose developmental paths’ (Ness 2009: 469). Rather an explanation of PPP outcomes depends on process and interaction patterns that change over time due to the dynamic interplay between several factors. Such insights would not have been possible without adopting a conceptual framework that encouraged the researcher to examine multiple dimensions of influence that occur simultaneously. Hence, this thesis argues that combining multiple dimensions in studying IORs is likely to provide more convincing explanations as compared to ‘the attempts to statistically isolate the effects of each contingent variable’ (Meyer et al. 1993: 1177).

While the conceptual framework is not unique in terms of integrating various exogenous and endogenous factors to understand inter-organisational arrangements of several types, it stands out from the existing frameworks in that it analyses the influence of these factors as part of a holistic examination of IORs. For instance, Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have developed a framework for understanding cross-sector partnerships that takes into account initial conditions; process; structural and governance components; contingencies and constraints; and outcomes. Although this framework draws together a range of influencing factors, it is mainly concerned with an examination of what makes partnerships successful and in what ways do these factors affect the outcomes of partnership efforts, as evidenced by the nature of the embedded propositions. This approach is similar to what Meyer, Tsui and Hinings call ‘quite simple causal assumptions [that] are usually adduced… and seen
as linked by linear relationships involving unidirectional causation’ (Meyer et al. 1993: 1177). This restricts the holistic analysis of multiple dimensions.

Alongside all these benefits of the conceptual framework and analytical approach adopted in this thesis, there are some trade-offs which also need to be considered. First, although holistic analysis of multiple dimensions allows more congruence with practice, it makes the analytical process more complex and cumbersome. Each additional dimension brings with it more complexity and may result in an entangled web of themes that initially makes the analytical process unwieldy and requires much perseverance. Second, taking a multi-dimensional approach is particularly onerous and challenging within a comparative case study design that involves diverse case studies. A critical reflection on the cross-case analysis undertaken in Chapter 8, reveals that the main focus of the analysis is on themes that are common or comparable across all three case studies. This meant that some of the detail that was idiosyncratic to an individual case study (such as the parallel hierarchies of governance in CARE-LDG PPPs) is not pursued in as much analytical depth as would have occurred within a single case study analysis. There are interesting details and analytical strands within the individual case studies that can be pursued in subsequent publications relating to the case study data and in further research of the topic of IORs in PPPs (see section 10.6). Third, many factors cannot be straightforwardly compartmentalised under a single conceptual headings. For example, the reputation of prospective partners and sector differences are treated as contextual factors in the conceptual framework for this thesis. However, they could also be analysed as organisational factors and the future researchers may need to think about how best to treat some of these factors. Lastly, employing the multi-dimensional conceptual framework developed for this thesis has entailed the integration of a range of factors which have different theoretical underpinnings. Hence, the theoretical coherence of the framework would benefit from further examination and development.

Nevertheless, the conceptual framework seems to have face validity in that the factors identified in the framework were relevant in terms of how interviewees talked about the case studies. Hence, there were no particular difficulties in using the
framework as an analytical tool. Moreover, the framework was a useful device to structure the case study material as presented in Chapters 5-7. While the framework offers an adequate vocabulary for discussing the relational aspects of PPPs, one area in which it did not necessarily help was in defining the PPP phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, in view of problems in defining what counts as a PPP in a mutually agreed manner, this thesis suggests an alternative strategy of accumulating practical examples of PPPs, focusing on their relational practices and examining which practices facilitate the achievement of synergistic outcomes, which lie at the heart of the PPP phenomenon. Furthermore there are some aspects of the conceptual framework that would benefit from further development particularly around the characterisation of IORs which is discussed later in this chapter in section 10.6.

The consideration of multiple dimensions in the conceptual framework has allowed a deeper understanding of IORs in the selected educational PPPs and has hopefully guarded against the twin danger of either glib appreciation or unwarranted criticism of PPP practice. In face of the complexity of the phenomenon under study, if a survey methodology had been used instead of a qualitative case study design there is a real danger that it would have underestimated and over simplified the complexity of IORs in PPPs. The findings are considered valid as they have explanatory value within the constructs used in the conceptual framework (Yin 1994; 2014).

While this research was carried out in a particular context, educational PPPs in Pakistan, the use of multiple case study design has fostered the external validity. The aim was to corroborate, modify, reject or advance the theoretical concepts and relationships incorporated in the conceptual framework for this study. Though the conclusions drawn are essentially based on the analysis of data collected from specific case studies, the generalisations made are at a conceptual level which is fundamentally above the specific cases. Furthermore, the level of detail across different factors identified in the conceptual framework is not the same in all three case studies (which is almost inevitable in qualitative case studies) but the comparative analysis of three case studies has offered some important insights that are developed by working iteratively between empirical evidence and theoretical
constructs which lies at the heart of the process of ‘analytic generalization’ (Yin 1994; 2014).

The choice of research methods was not problem-free. There were challenges associated with collecting data from the diverse actors belonging to many different organisations that were involved in the case study PPPs. It took quite a long time to negotiate access and schedule interviews. In some cases, despite several attempts, it was not possible to interview some government officials at higher levels which is acknowledged as a missed opportunity.

Another problem was how to compare some rather different case studies. In PEF’s PPPs it was the public sector organisation that was the driving force whereas in the case of the Adopt-a-School PPPs it was private sector organisations that were central to the initiatives. In view of the diverse case studies, to produce case study reports that did justice to the richness of data and to compile a cross-case analysis was a challenging task. More positively, this diversity increased the coverage of the thesis and served to highlight the importance of different contextual, organisational and motivational factors in influencing IORs. Nevertheless, it added to the complexity of the data analysis. It was only after several iterations between the data and theoretical constructs that it was possible to fine tune the analysis to answer the research questions and draw out the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, some of the aspects of IORs which are described in more detail in the individual case studies were not developed further in the cross-case analysis in order to focus on the common or comparative aspects of the case study IORs. These trade-offs are often mentioned by the comparative case study researchers (such as Eisenhardt 1989b; Ness 2009). Further analysis of some of these individual case study details could have resulted in a more nuanced understanding of relational dynamics.

Operationalising the idea of progressive focussing, to keep a balance between confining the breadth of inquiry and giving attention to the emerging issues (also referred to as etic and emic issues respectively), was not without problems. As expected it resulted in a number of iterations between theory and data throughout the research process which was very time consuming.
To end on a positive note, the idea of progressive focussing facilitates a dynamic and non-linear research process and 'revolves around a central idea of trying to match theory and reality' (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012: 824). It may create difficulties in producing 'marketable' outcomes, which can emerge more readily if one limits the factors to be taken into consideration (Johnson 2004). Nevertheless, a disciplined qualitative mode of inquiry, that appreciates complexity of factors and relationships, optimises the opportunity to gain a holistic understanding of the social phenomenon under study (Stake 1995). It also allows the researcher to enter unexplored avenues of study which is a daunting but rich experience.

10.4 Contribution to knowledge

The research reported in the thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge. It sheds new light on the relational aspects of PPPs and offers an integrated conceptual framework for explaining and investigating IORs in PPPs. This framework integrates insights from the largely separate literatures on PPPs and inter-organisational relations whilst also drawing on the wider field of organisation theory and behaviour. This research finds that partners’ motives for entering into a PPP play a dominant role in shaping IORs. These motives are, in turn, influenced by a range of contextual and organisational factors. Moreover, the IORs in PPPs are not static; they develop and change over time. These changes result from a dynamic interplay between contextual factors, organisational factors, partner motives and the perceived outcomes of the partnership.

As opposed to the existing binary distinction between contractual and collaborative IORs in the existing PPP literature, this thesis argues for a classification of IORs in PPPs which is more detailed in view of the diverse nature of PPPs. It has broadly characterised the IORs in PPPs as collaborative, contractual, cooperative or conflictual. Based on the rich case study data, this thesis argues that the cooperative and conflictual IORs can also be seen as more distinctive forms of what is sometimes painted with one broad brush and referred to as contractual IORs. Whereas much of the existing literature emphasises that collaborative relationships are a prerequisite for PPPs to deliver synergistic outcomes, this research finds that these outcomes are also found in PPPs characterised by cooperative IORs. This finding counters an
apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative IORs.

Although the 4 Cs spectrum developed in this thesis is helpful in that it extends and provides more nuance to the dichotomy of relationships in the existing PPP literature, there is a need for further articulation. Two of these relationship types (contractual and collaborative) are more developed and can be arranged more neatly across different dimensions but the overall relationship between all four is a bit sketchy and needs further development (discussed in section 10.6). However, it does not seem unreasonable to propose that the four relationship types developed in this thesis are likely to be the four main types of IORs that can be found embedded in PPPs.

The research findings are an important contribution to both the IOR and PPP literatures. While motives are given considerable attention in the IOR literature and the link between motives and contextual factors is often emphasised, the relationship between organisational factors, contextual factors, motives and perceived outcomes is under-researched and this research has made a contribution in this respect. As for the PPP literature, it was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the PPP literature often refers to contextual factors as antecedents to PPP formation but underplays the motives of partners for entering partnerships. Given that this research finds an important role for motives in shaping the IORs in PPPs, it has the potential to enrich our understanding of the PPP phenomena by expanding the range of issues examined.

This research also offers new empirical evidence on the operation of PPPs in a developing country context, which contributes to redressing the predominance of evidence from developed countries in the existing literature. The data from a developing country context highlights some indigenous factors such as the influence of donors and measures to guard corruption which affect IORs. With regards to the added value of PPPs, forcing a child to come to school to sit an exam are likely to sound draconian to western ears. In Pakistan most people would see this as a major benefit because irregular school attendance and high drop-out rates are real concerns.

The research findings also suggest several implications for policy and practice and these are discussed in the next section.
10.5 Implications for policy and practice

PPPs are often discussed as an important part of the contemporary public management agenda and their use has grown considerably across the world (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002; Osborne 2000; Hodge et al. 2010). With a lot more emphasis on PPPs and pressures to expand universal access to education as a result of commitment to Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Education for All (EFA) agenda, PPPs have received substantial policy attention as a means to expand access to education in developing countries such as Pakistan. Therefore, the study of PPPs is of particular significance not only for theoretical but also for policy and practical purposes.

The most important implication of this thesis is that PPPs come in many varieties and rather than letting the normative descriptions of PPPs dictate the form of partnerships, they should be customised according to the context, needs and objectives of the stakeholders. This research argues that a PPP is and should be seen as a productive and satisfactory inter-organisational arrangement as long as it achieves its goals which are mutually agreed by partners and provides evidence of synergistic outcomes. A PPP with low levels of collaboration but successful in producing added value is better than the one with high levels of collaboration but which struggles to deliver the expected added value. This insight should help to address potential concerns in the minds of those practitioners who want to engage in PPPs but are threatened by the loss of control and organisation identity which often occur as a result of interactive processes especially joint decision-making. The idea of maintaining cooperative IORs through a process of orientation might also help partners to assess each other’s trustworthiness before making further commitments that would require more detailed negotiation.

Setting up and managing PPPs is difficult and challenging. There are many examples in the existing literature where PPPs did not achieve their goals, or they made slow progress, and some have been prematurely terminated (e.g. Chen et al. 2013; Koppenjan 2005). This thesis has, however, documented case examples where, despite problems, PPPs have survived and have been able to deliver synergistic outcomes. The case studies reported in Chapters 5-7 indicate that behind the
successful stories there were typically comments about the difficulties and frustrations that had to be faced in the initial years of the partnership.

The good news is that in many situations these partners learned how to work together, and early signs of synergistic rewards made partners more enthusiastic and tolerant in their relationship with others. This clearly shows that IORs in PPPs are dynamic and instead of looking at the quality of relationships and trust as static and pre-installed features of PPPs, partners should be prepared to see IORs as an evolving phenomenon. Although this is not a new insight it is worth reiterating. Furthermore, this has implications for both the policy and practice of PPPs. Policy makers must appreciate that policy making is not necessarily an *ex ante* activity but one that needs to be customised according to the emerging circumstances. For practitioners it may be useful to follow the advice of Huxham (2003) who suggests that partners should be prepared for a continuous nurturing process to develop mutual understanding and trust.

Finally, while researching this topic I have noticed a lack of knowledge transfer not only between theory and practice but also between different stakeholders in Pakistan. PPPs in Pakistan have been pushed by a donor agenda. The resulting PPPs have gone some way towards pooling the resources and expertise of different parties. However, there are no serious efforts in Pakistan to learn from the success and failure of different PPP initiatives. This was particularly apparent when I attended some of the seminars arranged by ITA. Whilst many educational NGOs, public sector education officials and policy makers were invited to these seminars to share their experiences, many of them did not arrive much before their scheduled time for presentation and they left soon after making their own presentations. These were not effective forums for learning across initiatives. There is a need for better knowledge transfer and shared learning given the huge educational challenges faced by Pakistan. A more systematic and institutionalised approach to sharing knowledge and experience might facilitate this process.

### 10.6 Lessons for future research

This thesis signals some ways in which future research could be directed to increase our understanding of PPPs. First of all, the thesis suggests that it would be beneficial
to direct more research towards understanding the relational aspects of PPPs. This thesis has taken one step in this direction but there is a need to investigate these issues in PPPs for other public services, such as health care, in order to find out what type of IORs are present in those PPPs and the ways in which they influence synergistic outcomes. Future research should take into account the factors identified in the conceptual framework and should explore those factors that emerged inductively in this thesis, such as organisational culture and structure, in a more systematic way.

Given the lack of research on the motives to enter (and remain in) PPPs, further research is needed to enhance our understanding of the dynamics of these motives throughout different stages of PPPs. This thesis focused on the ways in which motives, along with other factors, influence the IORs in PPPs. It has not investigated in depth the ways in which motives change over time. Further research on how motives and IORs change during the course of a PPP is needed. A longitudinal research design is needed to develop a deeper understanding of these aspects and I would like to undertake future research in this direction.

The typology of IORs developed in this thesis also needs further work. As mentioned earlier the relationship between different types of IORs suggested in this thesis needs further development. Amongst the various ways in which the further articulation and disentangling of IORs can proceed in future is to consider whether these relationship types are best described using cumulative approach as adopted by Himmelman (1996) or a multi-faceted characterisation used by Gulati, Wohlgezogen and Zhelyazkov (2012). However, the best choice is still unclear and this is what I would like to explore in a further study. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the analytical approach adopted while undertaking the cross-case analysis mainly focused on themes that were common or comparable across all three case studies. There is a scope for further analysis of the individual case study data and the researcher intends to consider this in future publications to add more nuances to our understanding of IORs in PPPs.

Lastly, it is important that future research pays attention to integrating the findings from all three perspectives on the operation of PPPs: structural, economic and
relational. Integrating all these perspectives will both increase the sophistication of future research on PPPs and enrich our understanding of the phenomena by expanding the range of issues examined. Some scholars have already identified the value of understanding PPP from different perspectives (Duffield 2010) and there is a need to build on this.

The suggested agenda for this work is daunting. Nonetheless, given the increasing proliferation of PPPs as a policy tool to overcome societal problems, the need for a more comprehensive approach to PPPs is inevitable and the opportunities for learning are abundant.

10.7 Concluding remarks

This study has investigated IORs in PPPs by using a case study research design and employing qualitative data collection methods. The research has focussed on the relational aspects of PPPs which have not received enough attention in the existing PPP literature. A conceptual framework for understanding IORs in PPPs was developed. This comprises a range of contextual factors, organisational factors and motives to enter PPPs that shape IORs. The resulting IORs can be collaborative, contractual, cooperative or conflictual. Contextual and organisational factors influence partners’ motives to enter PPPs and to continue to participate in them. This is an ongoing and dynamic process, such that IORs change over time.

This thesis places no restrictions on the type of IORs that should be embedded in PPPs. Thus there are no a priori stipulations on how often partners should interact with each other, how decision-making should be done, or what should be the balance of IORs. These remain empirical questions but they should not dictate what counts as a PPP. What distinguishes one PPP from another or might make one PPP superior to another is whether it achieves the desired synergistic benefits, which are often claimed as the ultimate goal of getting involved in PPPs or any other inter-organisational arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 2005; Brinkerhoff 2002a; Huxham and Vangen 2005).

Although synergistic outcomes have received considerable attention among PPP scholars, much of the literature suggests that building collaborative IORs is a
prerequisite for achieving these outcomes. This research finds that these outcomes are also found in PPPs characterised by cooperative IORs. This finding counters an apparent pro-collaboration emphasis in the existing PPP literature by documenting and explaining the benefits associated with cooperative IORs in PPPs. Instead of looking at a dichotomous division between contractual and collaborative IORs, this research argues for a richer articulation of IORs. It is crucial to recognise diversity and value it rather than simplifying and generalising PPP practice with normative descriptions, especially when studying PPPs in a developing country context.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview guide

(Please note that these are not necessarily all the questions asked nor were all of these questions necessarily asked from each interviewee)

Preamble (to be read to all interviewees):

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. My name is Sidra Irfan. I am a lecturer at University of the Punjab and currently I am undertaking my PhD studies at The University of Edinburgh. I am carrying out this research as a part of my PhD. You have been approached because this research requires information from people who are working in public-private partnerships in the education sector of Pakistan. I would like to ask you a few questions regarding your partnership. There are no right or wrong answers. If you do not wish to answer a question, please just say so and I will simply move on to the next one. I would like to use a digital recorder to record our conversation but if there is anything you would like to say ‘off the record’ please just say so. Direct quotations from your interview may be used in my PhD thesis or publications from the study but your name will not be attached to them. Having heard about this research, are you still happy to participate? If you have any questions, please ask me now and I will do my best to answer.

1. Can you please introduce yourself (qualification, experience etc.) and briefly describe your main responsibilities in this partnership?
2. What is your organisation’s mission and goals?
3. What are your organisation’s major strengths and weaknesses?
4. Who are your organisation’s primary constituencies? What are the sources of funding for your organisation?
5. For how long are you in partnership with (the relevant organisation)?
6. What is the mission of this partnership? What is this partnership for? (Do your partners understand what this partnership is for?)
7. What are/were your organisation’s motives or objectives for participating in this partnership? (Any interdependencies)
8. Do your partners understand your organisation’s mission, operations, and constraints?
9. Do you understand your partners’ mission, operations, and constraints?
10. What do you contribute to this partnership? (Do you think it is your sector’s strength? Is it acknowledged by your partners?)
11. What does your partner(s) contribute to this partnership? (Do you think it is the strength of your partner(s)? Can your organisation contribute this to the partnership?)

12. Do all partners possess the necessary capacity to effectively participate and contribute to the partnership? If not, what is lacking?

13. Do you feel you and your partners are compatible (e.g., mission and goals, management styles, constituencies, core values)?

14. Are there mechanisms in the partnership to address incompatibilities among the partners?

15. Are there any external constraints that prevent partnership working and success?

16. How are the goals of partnership determined? (Are goals of the partnership mutually determined and agreed?)

17. Do the partners meet regularly to review, revise as needed, and assess progress in meeting identified goals?

18. Do you think that partners in this partnership share a common vision for the partnership?

19. Does participating in the partnership compromise or promote your organisation identity? (please provide examples)

20. What kinds of adjustments have you made in order to participate and promote the effectiveness of this partnership?

21. Have your partners adjusted in response to your concerns about compromising your strengths and identity?

22. Do you feel your organisation has changed as a result of this partnership? If so, how?

23. How far do the standard operating procedures govern partnership’s day-to-day implementation?

24. Within this partnership, does your organisation prefer the predictability of SOPs and written agreements over informal arrangements? Why?

25. How are the decisions made about partnership? Is your organisation’s view considered equally in decision-making?

26. Is there any dominating partner(s) who controls the majority of resources and opportunities in the partnership? (If yes, do other partners challenge dominating partner(s)? Can you give examples)

27. Are partners reciprocally accountable (i.e., each is accountable to all of the others)?

28. Do all partners participate actively in meetings? Are all (representatives) free to speak up and play an active role?

29. Do you think your organisation has an equal opportunity to participate in the programme activities of the partnership?
30. Do you think this partnership is characterised by some degree of trust among partners? (please provide examples)

31. What does collaboration in the partnership mean to you? What would you consider to be the indicators of collaborative relationships in PPPs?

32. What is the degree of conflict within the partnership? (Substantial/inhibiting, Annoying but manageable, Easily resolved)

33. What is the frequency of conflict within the partnership?

34. Do you think that the partnership as a whole embraces (or at least does not discourage conflict), seeking to reveal it in order to do effort to resolve differences and contribute to trust building and learning?

35. Do partners freely express their views and preferences despite the risk of conflict?

36. What do you think the partnership provides in terms of added value, beyond what an independent organisation could provide?
   a. Can you provide any quantitative examples?
   b. Can you provide any qualitative examples?

37. Has the partnership resulted in enhanced linkages with other programmes and actors? If so, please give examples.

38. Is the partnership better able to influence other actors than the individual partner organisations? Please provide examples.

39. Are there any other examples of multiplier effects of the partnership.

40. Has your organisation attained the objectives for participating in this partnership? Is your organisation satisfied with the progress in attaining these benefits?

41. Can you provide evidence of meeting your objectives? How will you know if you have met them?
   a. Quantitative examples or potential indicators.
   b. Qualitative examples or potential indicators.

42. Has your organisation’s performance been enhanced by your participation in the partnership? If yes, please provide examples. If no, can you suggest why?

End (to be read to all interviewees):

Thanks very much for your time. It has been very useful talking to you. Before we finish, is there anything that you think is important about this partnership but I have not asked about it. Can I contact you in future if there is anything I want to ask you? (If yes, take contact details)
## Appendix B: List of interviewees

### Key informants

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<th>Role</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director Punjab Resource Management Programme (PRMP)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Former Directorate Public Instructions (DPI), Elementary Education Punjab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Community Participation Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Projects Planning &amp; Department PPP cell</td>
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### Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)

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<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEF-FAS (Foundation Assisted Schools)</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Both current and former</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DMD Operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAS Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAS Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAS Programme officers and Monitors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAS School owners</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF-EVS (Education Voucher Scheme)</td>
<td>EVS Director</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EVS Programme Officer and monitors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EVS School owners</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEF-NSP (New School Programme)</td>
<td>Deputy Director NSP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSP School owners</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF-CPDP (Continuous Professional Development Programme)</td>
<td>CPDP Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPDP Partner organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education (CARE)

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<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Academics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area managers</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Academic Internal Coordinators (AIC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public sector teacher</td>
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### Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA)

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<tr>
<td>Director Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Programme Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District Manager</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Promoter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Teachers</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### Lahore District Government Education Officials (at district level)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director Public Instructions (DPI), Elementary Education Punjab</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary Secondary Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Education Officer Male Elementary Education (DEO MEE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Education Officer Secondary Education (DEO SE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Education Officer Male Elementary Education (DEO MEE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy District Education Officer Women Elementary Education (DDEO WEE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Education Officer (AEO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total interviews**   **90**
Appendix C: List of important documents

**Level 1**

**Level 2**
1. National Education Policy 2009 (Government of Pakistan 2009)
2. Pakistan Education Statistics 2010-11 (Government of Pakistan 2011)
5. Chief Minister’s School Reforms Roadmap, Government of Punjab
8. Partnerships for Equity in Education in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges, 2011

**Level 3**
1. Public-private partnerships in education: lessons learned from the Punjab Education Foundation (Malik 2010)
3. PEF’s partnership MoUs
5. FAS minutes of meetings
6. Some PEF circulars
7. List of state adopted schools
8. CARE Foundation - Factsheet as on 01-Apr-2012
9. The CARE model: better school management in practice
10. CARE achievement history
11. CARE-LDG MoU
12. CARE rules
13. ITA brochure, Education: a comprehensive agenda for children, youth and adults
14. ITA Job Description: Education Promoter
15. ITA Job Description: District Manager
16. ITA-LDG MoU