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WE LOOK FOR THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD: AN ANALYTIC THEOLOGICAL RETHINKING OF THE INTERMEDIATE STATE AND ESCHATOLOGICAL BODILY RESURRECTION IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

James T. Turner, Jr.
I, James Timothy Turner, Jr., hereby declare that this thesis represents my own composition and work. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

______________________
James Timothy Turner, Jr.

_______________
Date
Many in the Christian tradition accept three theological affirmations: (TA1) That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife; (TA2) There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise; and (TA3) There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings. Many of the same Christians also accept a robust doctrine of The Intermediate State, a paradisiacal disembodied state of existence following the biological death of a human person. I say The Intermediate State makes TAs 1 – 3 an inconsistent set. So, given these TAs, I say that there is no such thing as The Intermediate State and, therefore, it should be jettisoned from Christian theology.

Chapter 1 aims to show that, if the TAs are true, Christian theology should jettison The Intermediate State. This is because The Intermediate State specifically undermines TA1. Along with The Intermediate State, Christian theologians should jettison the metaphysics of substance dualism. This is because substance dualism, a metaphysics that The Intermediate State requires, is either false or unmotivated. Substance dualism is false because, minimally, it conflicts with an argument St. Paul lays out in 1 Corinthians 15. And, even if it did not, it lacks motivation for Christian theology because there is no The Intermediate State. In Chapter 1, I advance theological arguments along these lines. If the arguments go through, Christian theology needs a way coherently to speak about afterlife that does not make use of these errant views. If TAs 1 – 3 are true, substance dualism is either false or unmotivated, and The Intermediate State does not obtain, Christian theology requires an amended metaphysics of human persons and an amended metaphysics of time. I attempt to offer such things in Chapters 2 – 5.

Chapters 2 and 3 are given over to investigating physicalist and constitution metaphysics of human persons. I find the range of views wanting for a number of philosophical and theological reasons. Chapter 4 is an explication and defense of a
hylemorphic metaphysics of human persons and a sustained argument against some leading hylemorphic conceptions that insist the soul of a biologically dead human person can survive the death of the body. Lastly, Chapter 5 offers a theory of time that completes the project’s goal: a coherent metaphysics within which a human person’s death is immediately followed by her eschatological (future) bodily resurrection so that the three TAs are an affirmed and consistent set.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Ph.D. thesis is the culmination of an intense three-year period of formal research and study—as is the case with most Ph.D. theses. But, ideas present herein had somewhat of an earlier germination, an embryonic stage that began in the autumn of 2008. As such, vague ideas and impressions over the course of the last seven years, many of which were quite novice and immature, found their way into the listening ears and thoughtful minds of a host of people. For lack of space, I can only mention a few of them here. But, for anyone who has taken the time to listen to ramblings that, though probably unrecognizable compared to their current form, spurred me to further research, the best I can offer is a sincere “Thank you”!

Specifically, my first thanks—and here the words seem quite hollow—go to the Triune God revealed in Jesus Christ. For it is by Him and through Him I take it that I have been called to this particular line of research. More than that, His constant steadfast love and mercy have sustained me through times in this journey when it was all too obvious that I am a very weak vessel through which to work. Ph.Ds, it is said (and truly said!) are often isolating and lonely work. I can say that the fellowship of the Triune God has been of immeasurable importance to me in this regard. It is in the service and worship of Jesus Christ that I completed this work; it is to Him that this work is dedicated, however flawed.

Second, I thank my supervisor, Professor David Fergusson. He is the principal reason I decided to study at The University of Edinburgh. And, it is only too obvious that this work passed as well as it did because of his thoughtful oversight. Not only is he a keen theological mind—unsurprising to anyone who has interacted with his work—he is a thoughtful shepherd for young scholars. I remember well some comments he made to me on our first meeting: much good and rigorous work is being done in the philosophy of religion; but many of the same thinkers are doing poor theology. I did not understand that comment at the time; I have
since begun to understand. And, it is only from Professor Fergusson’s influence that my appreciation for the theological tradition and properly executing its fundamentals are present in this work (though all mistakes are, of course, my own).

I thank my wife, Bethany. Even though this may come across as cliché, the work here was a team effort. Bethany not only provided financially for our three-year period in Edinburgh through taking up a variety of professional posts, she also provided a comforting and challenging presence. She is comforting in that, of anyone in my life, she fully knew my stresses, worries, and fears. But she refused to let them rule our minds and our shared life. She is challenging in that she is a constant and intimate reminder of the importance of people, particularly the people of the Church and people in need. Bethany is outward focused; research is often insular and self-motivated. She did not allow me to succumb to these aspects of research. Throughout all of my schooling, particularly here, she has been overly gracious and kind toward me, showing always the steadfast love of Christ. Without her help, I could not have done this work (even if she doubts that such is the case).

I thank my parents, both biological and ‘in-law’ (Tim and Wendy Turner; Jeff and Cathy Gilreath). While it is trivially true that, without them, Bethany and I would not be here, in a non-trivial sense, this is true because of their support, and this by way of finances, emotional support, sage advice, and genuine love. Bethany and I are privileged to have wonderful parents who, through the years, have become friends and mentors upon whom we can rely and see the character of the only wise God. We owe them much more than we could ever say or repay.

Our local church, Grace Church Leith, is, aside from Prof. Fergusson, a main reason we are in Edinburgh and not some other university. For it is their loving welcome and outward focused community that drew us to this particular location. And it is GCL that is, with Bethany, responsible for keeping my sights on the real reason for any theological work,
viz., the glory of God and the building up of His Kirk. In particular, I thank my minister and friend, Athole Rennie, for the many coffees, hangouts, prayers, and chats over the three years. I thank, too, Kenny McGibbon for his consistent friendship, amiable and winsome character, wisdom, and exercise accountability (his wife, Heather, also is due a mention for many reasons, not the least of which is proving a helpful resource for our immigration to Scotland). I thank the ‘Meat on The Mound’ crew for the last two years of corporate study of Church history. I mention in particular Joe Hall, Sam Cunnington, Adam Black, Kegan Shaw, and Judson Van Wyk. This reading group was yet another reminder as to the importance of doing theology in and with the local church; edifying friendships and bacon rolls were an added bonus! And, of course, I thank the wonderful people in our community group: Athole and Rosalynd Rennie, Katherine Sced, Laura McGibbon, Stephen Kells, Craig and Bethan Williamson, Peter Laverock, Chris and Anna Hoy, Andrew and Laura Duckering, and Hannah Sutcliffe. All have been a massive source of friendship, encouragement, prayer, and support.

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location in the United States, he’s been a comforting presence and source of encouragement throughout my time here.

Last (but not least), I thank my friends at New College. Here I mention, in particular, Luke Wisely (now at Cambridge), Brad Penner, Tom Breimaier, David Kirkpatrick, Kengo Akiyama, Will Kelly, and Andrew Kelley. Each, in their own particular ways, provided me a real sense of community at New College. Though most of our time was spent over the lunch hour (and a half!), they provided true friendship through meaningful dialogue, prayer, laughs, and more. I will genuinely miss their fellowship.

As I say above, I have many to thank and only room enough to thank a few (I think, in particular, of former professors and my many friends from our former church in Virginia and our former church in South Carolina). My hope is that this work is an encouragement and challenge to all that have helped. But, I hope most of all that the work redounds to the glory of the God revealed in Jesus Christ.
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I. Setting the Scene

The majority of the Christian tradition teaches that the afterlife of a human being is a two-stage process. The first stage of a human’s afterlife is typically taken to be a disembodied state, a state in which a human being and her body are no longer a unit. The human’s soul, it is said, has either gone to Heaven, Hell, Purgatory or otherwise. To this point, in his widely used Systematic Theology, Louis Berkhof confidently declares: “It has always been the firm conviction of the Church of Jesus Christ that the soul continues to live even after its separation from the body”¹. Moreover, according to a large contingent of Christian theology, the redeemed believer is said to go immediately to Heaven after the death of the body. This is all said to occur temporally prior to the eschatological bodily resurrection.²

The eschatological bodily resurrection is said to be the second phase of a human being’s afterlife. N. T. Wright famously calls this resurrection state “life after life after death”.³ This state, too, can be conceived in a number of ways. Some say that there is only a resurrection of the redeemed so that those unfit for the resurrection state do not rise again. Some say there is a general resurrection, a resurrection of all human beings, the just and unjust alike. In any case, all Christian theology that purports to agree with the ancient


³ Wright, Surprised by Hope, 151. His emphasis.
Ecumenical creeds affirm that, at minimum, the redeemed in Christ will experience a bodily resurrection at Christ’s *parousia*. This belief in resurrection is to accord, minimally, with the following foundational Christian creeds:

The Apostles’ Creed (ca. 200 CE): …I believe in…the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Amen.

The Nicene Creed/‘The Symbol of the Fathers’ (381 CE): …We look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.

Of course, the reason that Christian theology largely agrees with these two statements is because they are considered faithful to the teachings of Scripture. Ultimately, the Church grounds its hope in the eschatological resurrection of the dead on the testimony of divine revelation—the Scriptures conceived as the written word of God. Divine revelation seems to say that the eschatological resurrection is prefigured in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, whom Scripture calls the ‘first-fruits’ of the coming *eschatological* bodily resurrection (1 Corinthians 15.20). Moreover, the Church grounds its hope in the bodily resurrection on the action of the divine agent, God. It does not trust in some internal principle in the human

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4 Shirley C. Guthrie, *Christian Doctrine*, Revised Edition (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994), 374; Hans Schwartz, “Eschatology,” in *Christian Dogmatics*, edited by Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984), 566 – 567. Oddly, such a realist view of the resurrection may *not* be in view for the great Catholic theologian, Karl Rahner. He seems to have been singularly unimpressed with what he considered a ‘pictorial’ view of the resurrection, i.e., the idea that bodies actually come to life again. I cannot find in his works on the subject any sustained or clear *argument* against an actual bodily resurrection, but it seems he may have been swayed by modern cosmology’s findings concerning the future heat death of the universe. The idea, it seems, is that if the universe cannot last forever (e.g., it could suffer heat death), then there is no reason to think that humans could resurrect and live forever (an argument that seems easily overcome given Christian theology). Both Bernard Prusak and Peter Phan argue that Rahner, in the end, holds a view in which a dead human person becomes ‘pancosmic’—a state in which a dead human is somehow united with/absorbed by the materiality of the cosmos. I cannot make heads or tails of such a notion; moreover, it seems to me well outside of orthodoxy. So, I will not cover any more of his views in this work. See Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations, Volume II: Man in the Church*, translated by Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1963), 203ff. Bernard P. Prusak, “Bodily Resurrection in Catholic Perspectives,” *Theological Studies* 61, no. 1 (March, 2000): 64 – 105. Peter C. Phan, “Roman Catholic Theology,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology*, edited by Jerry L. Walls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 223.

5 Another historically affirmed creed, the so-called “Athanasian Creed” (ca. 500 CE) teaches, in a more explicit way, that the bodily resurrection is due at the *parousia*.

6 More on this in Chapter 1.
being to ‘wake itself up’, so to speak. As theologians like Karl Barth, Jürgen Moltmann, and Douglas Farrow are wont to remind us: resurrection is a divine act.7

Taking its cue from the Apostle Paul’s warning in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19, Christian theology (with some notable exceptions) considers the doctrine of resurrection as one of the central teachings of the Christian faith.8 This is because, as Paul says, if the resurrection does not obtain, then Christians are, of all people, the most to be pitied (1 Cor. 15.19). In other words, without the resurrection of the dead, Christian faith is futile and hope is vain (1 Cor. 15.15-17). This is for many reasons, but two of which are these: first, Jesus would still be dead, i.e., the Messiah would be lost and a fraud (1 Cor. 15.14-18). Second, based as it was on a particular Jewish hope in God’s justice and the restoration of his good creation through


8 W. Waite Willis, Jr. says:

…but the resurrection is foundational for understanding the work of Jesus, who God is, and for what we human beings can hope. However we may struggle with it, however it may challenge modern presuppositions, however it may disturb our comfortable faith – resurrection still stands as an essential element of the biblical historical witness of the Christian community. Without the resurrection, Jesus is not the living Lord but a dead person held in memory. Without the resurrection, God is not God of the living, not the one who has the power to conquer death. Without the resurrection, humankind has no ultimate hope, for the “last enemy,” death, wins.”

the putting of everything wrong to rights, without resurrection and new creation, God’s people and his world never see justice served. So, it might be said that undermining the doctrine of resurrection is to undermine the Christian faith.

It is no doubt possible that some may reject such an ultimatum. But, for the most part, the doctrine of resurrection is central to Christian faith for the above reasons. This doctrine, though, creates a number of philosophical concerns. For, what kind of a thing is a human being such that it can die, its parts dissolve, spread to the wider cosmos, and come back together again to form a body rising from the grave? Historically, such a question proves a stumbling block to Christianity’s philosophically minded interlocutors. Consider the words of Celsus, a second century pagan philosopher who railed against the Church’s teaching on bodily resurrection:

It is folly on their part to suppose that when God, as if He were a cook, introduces the fire (which is to consume the world), all the rest of the human race will be burnt up, while they alone will remain, not only such of them as are then alive, but also those who are long since dead, which latter will arise from the earth clothed with the self-same flesh (as during life); for such a hope is simply one which might be cherished by worms. For what sort of human soul is that which would still long for a body that had been subject to corruption? Whence, also, this opinion of yours is not shared by some of the Christians, and they pronounce it to be exceedingly vile, and loathsome, and impossible; for what kind of body is that which, after being completely corrupted, can return to its original nature, and to that self-same first condition out of which it fell into dissolution? Being unable to return any answer, they betake themselves to a most absurd refuge, viz., that all things are possible to God. And yet God cannot do things that are disgraceful, nor does He wish to do things that are contrary to His nature; nor, if (in accordance with the wickedness of your own heart) you desired anything that was evil, would God accomplish it; nor must you believe at once that it will be done. For God does not rule the world in order to satisfy inordinate desires, or to allow disorder and confusion, but to govern a nature that is upright and just. For the soul, indeed, He might be able to provide an everlasting life; while dead bodies, on

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10 Bynum, ‘Images,’ 220.
the contrary, are, as Heraclitus observes, more worthless than dung. God, however, neither can nor will declare, contrary to all reason, that the flesh, which is full of those things which it is not even honorable to mention, is to exist for ever. For He is the reason of all things that exist, and therefore can do nothing either contrary to reason or contrary to Himself.  

Celsius has at least two problems with the Christian’s teaching on resurrection. First, he seems to find it disgusting to think that, much like a zombie, the decomposed flesh and body take up and resume living and walking about. Second, he wonders how a body that is fully decomposed could come back to its original form. For Christian theology, the first question is misplaced. It is not part of Christian theology that the self-same quality of body rises again. The body that rises is thought to be a glorified body. While it is not known exactly all that such a ‘glorification’ entails, minimally, a body that is greatly qualitatively improved from the previously dead body is thought to be in view. But the second question is quite penetrating. It has to do with what is, in the analytic study of metaphysics, known as ‘personal identity’. This second question asks: how can a Christian theologian guarantee that the person who dies at one time is the same person who resurrects at some future time?

Christian theology, after all, purports that just this thing will happen. But how can it happen?

There have been various attempts at answering this latter philosophical question throughout Church history. The dominant answer—the answer that is by far the most prevalent—is that the thing we count as a human being is actually two things—two substances—a material body and an immaterial soul/mind. This is a view variously titled, but its most common name is ‘substance dualism’. According to substance dualism, the

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14 Oddly, though, many systematic theology texts seem unfamiliar with the philosophical terminology,
human person is most fundamentally an immaterial soul/mind. This is said to be the seat of emotion, will, thinking, personality, personhood, and the like. Further, and in helping with identity problems from death through resurrection, it is purportedly immortal, either through the action of God or else the kind of thing it is. Either way, it does not die; so the question of identity never arises (so the theory goes). On this view, if a human person, Jones for example, dies at a particular time, only her body dies. She, as a soul, continues to live in Heaven (we will assume Jones is a redeemed person) awaiting the resurrection. Then, whatever body she is given at the resurrection is her body. She never loses her identity because she, as a soul, never ceases to exist. The identity of the body is not an issue on this view, for the body is not essential to Jones. It is an accidental part of Jones (in the sense that Jones can exist without her body, not in the sense that it was a mistake that she ever had it. So, ‘accidental’ in the philosophical/modal sense).


More plainly, I have in mind Platonic/Cartesian notions of substance dualism. Now, some have complained that labeling a dualism ‘Platonic’, in the context of Christian theology, poisons the well against the metaphysical scheme. I do not here mean ‘Platonic’ in the sense that what the view implies is, as Plato seems to, that the body is a hindrance to the soul and is something like a prison for the soul. I only mean ‘Platonic’ in the sense that I mean that substance dualism is a metaphysics, advanced by both Plato and Descartes (and others!), such that a human is essentially one substance, a soul/mind, housed in or connected to another substance, a human body. See Mark Baker and Stewart Goetz: “Introduction,” in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, 2, eds. Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz, (New York, NY: Continuum, 2011). John Cooper does note, though, “that a large portion of the [Christian] tradition is uncritically Platonistic is beyond dispute.” Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 94.

Of course, this is the contemporary way in which this dualist thesis is used. But, in the patristic era, thinkers like Athenagoras argued that, on account of God’s justice, the numerically same body must rise again. After all, so he said, that body is the body in which good or evil was done. So, it is that body which must be punished/rewarded. Athenagoras, Athenagoras, in Ancient Christian Writers, no. 23. edited by Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, translated by Joseph Hugh Crehan. (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1956), 100 – 102, 110, 113.

I will be using ‘accidental’ and ‘essential’ according to their philosophical meanings in this project. An essential property, for example, is a property that a thing has and cannot lack and still be that thing. For example, an essential property of a triangle is ‘being three-sided’. If a triangle loses one side, it is no longer a triangle; it is something else. An essential property of being a bachelor is ‘being unmarried’. If a man gets married, he is no longer a bachelor. An accidental property is like the color of one’s hair. It is a property a thing can have or not have and still be the same thing (Jones could be a brunette or blonde or…)

15 More plainly, I have in mind Platonic/Cartesian notions of substance dualism. Now, some have complained that labeling a dualism ‘Platonic’, in the context of Christian theology, poisons the well against the metaphysical scheme. I do not here mean ‘Platonic’ in the sense that what the view implies is, as Plato seems to, that the body is a hindrance to the soul and is something like a prison for the soul. I only mean ‘Platonic’ in the sense that I mean that substance dualism is a metaphysics, advanced by both Plato and Descartes (and others!), such that a human is essentially one substance, a soul/mind, housed in or connected to another substance, a human body. See Mark Baker and Stewart Goetz: “Introduction,” in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, 2, eds. Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz, (New York, NY: Continuum, 2011). John Cooper does note, though, “that a large portion of the [Christian] tradition is uncritically Platonistic is beyond dispute.” Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 94.

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All of this to say, though Christian theology primarily takes its lead from divine revelation, it often makes use of philosophical tools to help think through some of the puzzles generated by Christian theological affirmations. The history of the Christian tradition is replete with theologians making use of philosophy as a sort of ‘hand maiden’ to help make sense of Christianity’s more conceptually difficult claims.\textsuperscript{17} The idea is that Christian theology ought not make utterly incoherent statements—statements that fundamentally violate the laws of logic (e.g., the law of non-contradiction) and the like. So, if, for example, the doctrine of resurrection were logically incoherent, then it would be false.\textsuperscript{18} Christian theologians and philosophers of religion have done much work in defending the doctrine against these charges. And they do so because of how important the doctrine is. (We will see examples of this in the coming chapters.)

This leads us to the point of this project. The point is \textit{not} to defend the doctrine of resurrection as such. It is not to defend it against charges of incoherence. This is a Christian theology project, even if it is an \textit{analytic} theological project. I will simply assume that the concept of the bodily resurrection is a coherent concept, that such an event is logically and metaphysically possible, and, what is more, that it has happened to Jesus Christ and \textit{will} happen in the future to, at least, redeemed human beings. Rather, my aim is to investigate whether or not the doctrine of resurrection coheres with other Christian teachings. Perhaps a better way to put the question of investigation is this: is what many Christians teach about life

\textsuperscript{17}This is not to say that the relationship between theology and philosophy in the Christian tradition is always well-defined or even always friendly. But it is to say, at many times, and with respect to many Church teachings, the tools of philosophy have been used to help clarify and systematize the Church’s teaching \textit{vis-à-vis} divine revelation. For the complicated nature of this relationship, beginning in the first few centuries of the Church, see Jaroslav Pelikan, \textit{The Christian Tradition: Vol. 1 The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition} (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

\textsuperscript{18}At any rate, false if a Christian agrees that the laws of logic are such that they cannot be violated. Someone who thinks that logical contradictions are possible, for example, will not be bothered by logical puzzles—since there are none (all things are possible if contradictions are possible). My project will be utterly irrelevant to anyone who thinks that there either are not any such things as the laws of logic or else that they are not truly ‘laws’ at all, etc. I will not defend the laws of logic here.
after death internally consistent? Because of the nature of this question, and the various and sundry ancillary metaphysical puzzles an investigation into this question exposes, resources from both Christian theology and analytic philosophy will be used. To set out how this project proceeds in investigating this question, consider the following three theological affirmations. I take it that these are largely agreed upon in Christian theology (and Christian philosophy):

Theological Affirmations (TA):

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Any theologian who denies TAs 1 – 3 is not the audience for my investigation. Let me explain each of these in turn.

II. Theological Affirmations

TA1: That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife.

What does TA1 mean and why is it included? In 1 Corinthians 15, the Apostle Paul suggests that if there is no bodily resurrection of the dead, then Christians are a hopeless bunch vis-à-vis afterlife. Christians would have ‘hope in this life only’, he says (1 Cor. 15.19). If Paul is correct, then the following seems true: if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christians have no hope of afterlife (or, at least, no hope for a good one). If this is true, then bodily resurrection is obviously not superfluous for the Christian’s hope of afterlife. Any teaching, then, that implies (or entails) resurrection’s superfluity should be rejected by Christian thinkers who affirm TA1.
TA2: There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise.

I will say more about Paradise in Chapter 1. For now, think of ‘Paradise’ roughly as one normally thinks of the word, a word denoting an idyllic place and state. The majority of the Christian tradition affirms that, some time after bodily death, a human being reaches a paradisiacal place of existence, often called ‘Heaven’. (More again on the variety of views on this in Chapter 1.) Much of the Christian tradition, too, affirms that at least some redeemed human beings go immediately to Paradise upon the death of their bodies. Such teaching purports to be in accord with Scriptural passages like Luke 16.19-31, 23.43; Philippians 1.21-23; 2 Corinthians 5.1-10; Hebrews 9.27 and so on.

TA3: There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

The Christian’s hope of afterlife relies on bodily resurrection (TA1). But for it to be a proper hope, the one who dies needs to be the one who resurrects. If this does not occur, what happens in ‘resurrection’ is that someone else is alive enjoying the eschatological reign of Christ in the new creation. This is pretty obviously against the Christian story. A cursory reading of the resurrection narratives about Jesus seem to imply that the same Jesus—the numerically identical Jesus—who went into the tomb came out of it. This is not to say that post-resurrection Jesus is qualitatively the same as pre-resurrection Jesus; it is to say that he is numerically the same. Post-resurrection Jesus is not a different human merely being called the same name. In like manner, Christian theology teaches that the Christian should hope that she, too, will come back to life in a resurrected body at the return of Christ. The philosophical way of putting this is that Christian theology affirms that the pre-mortem human, e.g., Jones, and post-resurrection Jones must be numerically identical (i.e., one and
the same object). Moreover, this just seems to be what the word ‘resurrection’ implies. The thing that dies is the very thing that rises again, even if qualitatively changed.

**TAs 1 – 3: Taken Together**

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

I have a suspicion that the way TA1 and TA2 are often fleshed out makes TA1 – TA3 an internally inconsistent set. I say this because TA2 is normally conceived in terms of a disembodied state immediately following bodily death and occurring during the time between death and the eschatological bodily resurrection. This immediate post-mortem disembodied existence in Paradise is known as The Intermediate State—a state of existence I will flesh out in Chapter 1. As I will argue in Chapter 1, The Intermediate State undermines TA1. That is, conceiving of a disembodied intermediate state in a way that accords with TA2 makes bodily resurrection superfluous. But, as I say, I think Christian theology has good reasons for affirming TA2. So, TA2 is not the problem. The way it is normally conceived—that this state is disembodied and prior to the resurrection—is the problem. And the disembodied way in which it is normally conceived implies a metaphysical position, viz. substance dualism. So, I think substance dualism is a problem. Substance dualism is, at best, unmotivated for Christian theology and, at worst, false. A primary task of my project is to theologically demonstrate that this is the case.

The arguments against substance dualism are going to be theological arguments for two reasons. First, substance dualism contributes to superfluous notions of bodily

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19 Wright, *Surprised by Hope*, 36.

resurrection and conflicts with an explicit argument in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (more on this in Chapter 1). Second, as a purely metaphysical thesis, substance dualism seems to me coherent.21

Now, the normal philosophical arguments against the metaphysics of substance dualism largely come in three varieties. One of these arguments suggests that substance dualism violates the ‘causal closure’ of the universe. Another way of putting this objection is that positing a non-physical substance’s (i.e., a soul/mind) causal interaction with a physical body, in a physical system, violates a scientific truism: the conservation of energy. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro explain the objection this way:

What is the principle of the conservation of energy? For purposes of simplicity, the central idea is that the total amount of energy in a closed physical system (one that is isolated from outside interference) remains constant. Hence, if a physical system is closed and the idea of a soul’s causally interacting with something in that system implies the introduction of energy into it, then causal activity involving the soul is impossible.22

But, Christian theists that wish to hold to substance dualism arguably have at least one reason to pay no mind to causal closure critiques (i.e., arguments from the conservation of energy). Christians believe that God is an immaterial being that interacts with the creation and does so, like the soul, in ways not measurable by the physical sciences. The causal closure argument, then, might not have much purchase against the Christian substance dualist.

A second kind of argument against substance dualism is normally couched in terms of a supposed inability to account for how the immaterial soul and the physical body interact.

21 Marc Cortez offers his own theological arguments against the sort of substance dualism I have here in mind. However, he does not seem to dismiss the idea of substance dualism in total—there are nuanced varieties he thinks might sit well within certain theological parameters—mostly from a Barthian Christological perspective. See his Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies (London: T&T Clark, 2008). Barth, for his part, does seem to have held a holistic view of human persons such that Man is soul and body: “simultaneously both, in ineffaceable difference, inseparable unity, and indestructible order.” Karl Barth, CD III/2, 325. How he works this out is the subject of quite a lengthy text and takes us too far afield. Again, for a discussion of this as it relates specifically to the mind/body debate, see the aforementioned Cortez monograph.

One might call such a worry, ‘the interaction problem’. The argument is that two categorically different kinds of substances (i.e., material and immaterial) have no way of causally interacting; therefore, an immaterial soul/mind and material body have no way of causally interacting. Postulating a mechanism for this interaction is not easy. The philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), for example, tried to side step this problem by arguing for a divine ‘pre-established harmony’ whereby God designs the world in such a way that “whenever the soul wills its body to move, the body moves in harmony with the willing”.

But, maybe the Christian substance dualist does not need a divine ‘just so’ story like pre-established harmony. For, given Christian theism, there is a built-in example of the immaterial interacting with the material: God, an immaterial being, interacts with the material cosmos. So, for the Christian substance dualist, there is no interaction problem. The supposed ‘problem’ is a non-starter.

Lastly, in the contemporary philosophy of mind, substance dualism is, by and large, taken to be either a redundant thesis or else patently against what neuroscience now knows about the mind and brain. Nancey Murphy summarizes substance dualism’s purported redundancy in this way: “all of the human capacities once attributed to the mind or soul are now being fruitfully studied as brain processes—or, more accurately, I should say, processes involving the brain, the rest of the nervous system and other bodily systems, all interacting

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with the socio-cultural world”. 25 Positing an immaterial soul above the brain is apparently, then, redundant.

The dualist’s suggestion that the immaterial soul/mind is not redundant, that it actually has genuine functions for which the brain cannot account, is said to be scientifically naïve—even if science has not yet accounted for the sorts of things dualists point to as evidence of an immaterial mind (e.g. the ‘what it is like’ features of mental experiences (experiences known as *qualia*), the unitary nature of mental experience, the ‘aboutness’ of mental phenomena, and the like). 26 In other words, the non-dualist’s hope is that science will some day account for all of these things. More extreme non-dualist accounts consider such ‘mental’ phenomena illusory. 27

This last objection seems weak. Assuming that science will find a way to explain phenomena normally conceived in metaphysical ‘mental’ categories (cf., the list above) might display overconfidence in the physical sciences. And, worse, it might display a tendency toward scientism—the idea that the physical sciences are the ultimate sources for acquiring knowledge. As it stands, the immateriality of the mind and mental properties certainly seems metaphysically plausible. So, even if substance dualism is false (and I think it

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25 Nancey Murphy, *Bodies and Souls or Spirited Bodies?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 56. Murphy is probably the most well known Christian philosopher who advances arguments like this. She has done this various places, but a primary starting point on her position against dualism and for a physicalist position is in the monograph just cited. Even still, even she admits that there is no way philosophically to prove that substance dualism is false. Ibid., 69.

26 The supposed deficiency of physicalist accounts of the mental to accommodate qualia is taken to be most thoroughly exposed by Frank Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’ in Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 83, no. 5 (May, 1986): 291 – 295. The literature addressing this argument alone is nearly inexhaustible. William Lycan opines: “Someday there will be no more articles written about the ‘Knowledge Argument’. That is beyond dispute. What is less certain is, how much sooner that day will come than the heat death of the universe.” William Lycan, “Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument,” in *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*, eds Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 384.

27 See, for example, Daniel C. Dennett, “‘Epiphenomenal’ Qualia?” in *There’s Something About Mary*, ed. Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 59 – 68.
is), it may not follow that the immaterial mind can be reduced to the material brain. So, a dualist may not be persuaded by an argument motivated by the supposed future successes of the physical sciences.

On the other hand, whilst advocating for their position, substance dualists mount what I take to be largely circular arguments. For example, an argument that is widely attested to be one of the stronger arguments for substance dualism (if not the strongest) is the modal argument for substance dualism. Here is a quick version:

1. Identical things have identical modal properties. (The law of the indiscernibility of identicals)
2. Human persons have the essential property of being such that they can possibly exist without a physical body or any body at all.
3. No human body has the essential property of being such that it can exist without a body.
4. Therefore: Human persons are not identical to human bodies.

Now this argument is couched in many different ways, some of which are quite complex and come with a number of thought experiments. Some of these thought experiments are Sorites type puzzles (i.e., puzzles about ‘heaps’) that invite the reader to

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28 In fact, the majority of the literature against physicalist theories—positions that deny immaterial minds—focuses on the problems generated by consciousness. The problem of consciousness is, according to Thomas Nagel, an ‘intractable’ problem for physicalist positions. Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no 4 (October, 1974): 435. For an edited volume rich with arguments focused on ‘the problem of consciousness’ (i.e., the mental), see Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, The Waning of Materialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Michael Tye, a physicalist, (i.e., anti-dualist) identifies ten problems of consciousness and attempts to address them according to a physicalist account. See his Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995. The literature in the philosophy of mind is overwhelmed with arguments for and against the immaterial nature of the mind focusing largely on various aspects of consciousness.

posit a slow whittling away of the individual parts of the human body such that, with the loss of each part, the human person remains. (For example: imagine that a human person, Jones, loses her arm. Jones still exists. Now imagine that Jones loses both arms, then her legs, then her torso, then…and so on.) However, one should easily see that premises (2) and (3) beg the question against the thinker who denies substance dualism. For, contra (2), if human persons are such that they cannot exist apart from their bodies, then one cannot actually conceive of a human that is disembodied. Perhaps, in attempting to conceive of the supposed modal possibility of a human existing without her body, one has conceived of something else entirely (maybe a blumen—a being that can exist with or without a body—rather than a human). Or, just as likely, one has incorrectly described what one has ‘conceived’. For example: Smith, a dualist, reports that she can conceive of viewing her body from above while her body sits in a chair. Maybe this is a mistake. How does a human see without eyes? This purported scenario of ‘disembodiment’ might actually be an instance of Smith’s conceiving of looking upon her doppelgänger as opposed to Smith’s looking upon her own body. Contra (3), if a human is identical to her body, then no human has the essential property of being such than she can exist without her body.

In light of its question begging nature, the modal argument may be invalid. At least, it should not be convincing for anyone who is not antecedently committed to substance dualism. Suffice it to say, I actually take it that most, if not all, arguments for substance dualism (including arguments based on the immaterial nature of mental features) beg the question against those who hold non-dualist positions. Perhaps substance dualism is metaphysically viable. Perhaps it is not. Either way, as I hope to demonstrate, substance dualism is not theologically viable, given theological affirmations TA1 – TA3.

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Substance dualism, though, is used to help account for the immediacy in:

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise.

Substance dualism helps secure the metaphysics needed for the ‘place’—the disembodied paradisiacal state—for dead humans to wait in the time between their death and resurrection: The Intermediate State. Further, substance dualism is supposed to help account for:

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

After all, according to substance dualism, the soul/mind does not die and so problems accounting for pre-mortem and post-mortem numerical identity do not seem to arise. Taking substance dualism away, then, seems to put a large contingent of Christian teaching about afterlife in dire straights. But I do not think denying substance dualism does put Christians who affirm TA1 – TA3 in dire straights. To help show why not, I will attempt to do three things. (1) Demonstrate that, given TA1 – TA3 and Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15, The Intermediate State and substance dualism are false. (2) Explain a metaphysics of human persons such that it provides for the internal coherence of TAs 1 – 3. (3) Provide a way to affirm TA2 couched in the context of eschatological bodily resurrection. The following is how I endeavor to do it.

III. Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1 is a theological argument aimed at demonstrating that The Intermediate State and substance dualism are false. To do so, I give a brief historical trace of the assumption and use of The Intermediate State and substance dualism in the Christian teachings concerning afterlife. Following this, I make a lengthy case against The Intermediate State and substance dualism grounded in an argument set out by the Apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 15.31 Looking

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31 In many ways, the arguments of Chapter 1 fill out what seems to be the tone of the arguments advanced by William Tyndale in his debates with Thomas More and George Joye. See: William Tyndale, *An Answere*
at the 1 Cor. 15 passage does two things. (1) It shows that The Intermediate State renders resurrection superfluous. Since resurrection is not superfluous (TA1), The Intermediate State does not obtain. (2) It shows that substance dualism is unmotivated for Christian theology because The Intermediate State does not obtain. What is more, substance dualism is false because it undermines a key argument in Paul’s 1 Corinthians text. I privilege the 1 Cor. 15 pericope because it is both a clear argument for the truth of resurrection and because most of the Christian tradition’s arguments for the importance of resurrection are centered on this chapter in the New Testament. Lastly, I argue that the only way to ensure that Paul’s argument is sound is to deny The Intermediate State and the metaphysics of substance dualism.

Chapter 2 is the first step in trying to figure out how to fill the gap in Christian theology left by the falsity of substance dualist metaphysics and The Intermediate State. So, Chapter 2 begins the positive investigation into what sort of metaphysical conception of human persons best accords with the three theological affirmations TA1 – TA3. In this chapter, I turn to a more philosophical approach, proper for investigating metaphysical claims. This is done to analyze three popular accounts whereby Christian physicalists—i.e., Christian thinkers who deny substance dualism and think that human beings just are material things—try and provide a way to affirm the possibility of bodily resurrection (i.e., account for TA1 and TA3). I end up finding these accounts wanting.

In Chapter 3, I submit another physicalist thesis to philosophical analysis—but one that deserves its own focused attention. This is a thesis called the ‘constitution view’ and is

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largely advanced by metaphysician Lynne Rudder Baker. Her view purports to account for the physical nature of human beings, deny substance dualism, and account for the identity of human persons by positing that human persons are constituted by human bodies rather than being identical with them. This is a metaphysics that circulates very widely in the literature and it is a metaphysics that, in the end, I find incoherent. So, it fails.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to two things. First, it is dedicated to explicating a metaphysics that sits between substance dualism and physicalism. This is a view known as ‘hylemorphism’, and it is a view first advanced by Aristotle and baptized into Christian thinking by Thomas Aquinas. It offers thinkers a way to envisage a human person such that a given human is identical to her body but is not identical to the metaphysical parts that ‘make up’ her body. These ‘parts’ are, in the hylemorphic jargon, known as ‘form’ and ‘prime-matter’. These are nuanced terms and much time will be given to fleshing them out. The first part of this chapter helps give an account of human persons such that TA1 and TA3 are satisfied.

The second part of this chapter is devoted to arguing against Thomas Aquinas and his current advocates who posit that human souls can exist apart from human bodies. I argue that this is inconsistent with hylemorphic metaphysics. Human souls, if hylemorphism is true, cannot exist apart from their bodies. By arguing thus, I aim to provide a metaphysics of human persons that accords with TA1.

The goal in Chapter 5 is to use hylemorphism in tandem with a theory of time to account for TA2 in the context of the eschatological bodily resurrection. In other words, it is to give an account of immediate resurrection in which, at the moment following a given human person’s death, she finds herself at the eschatological bodily resurrection. This chapter is by far the most tendentious and the most tentative. The aim of this chapter is not to give a definitive account of what happens when a human person dies. Rather, its aim is to try
and provide a way forward for thinking through Christian theology’s teaching on afterlife such that TAs 1 – 3 are internally consistent. Further, it aims to show that one need not simply punt to substance dualism to try and make sense of TAs 1 – 3.

In the end, the hope is that Christian theologians might see that The Intermediate State is not a teaching that works with TAs 1 – 3. Moreover, for Christian theologians committed to TAs 1 – 3, substance dualism is not a metaphysics worth affirming. This project, and its aim, is not merely deconstructive. Rather, I offer a way forward so that Christian theology is not left in a lurch (at least, if my arguments do the work I think they do). Such conclusions may have wide-ranging benefits, benefits to topics not addressed herein. These might include the philosophical mind/body problem, the theological and existential concerns over humanity’s place in the created order, the importance of living in and as part of creation, and so on. I leave such matters for another time. For now, allow me to advance my arguments against The Intermediate State and substance dualism. It is to that task I now turn.
CHAPTER ONE

On the Horns of a Dilemma: Bodily Resurrection or Disembodied Paradise?

A Theological Problem

This is a theological project. More particularly, it is a theological project aimed at certain sorts of Christian theologians, viz. those that hold to particular theological affirmations about afterlife. Recall that these affirmations are:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

One way to think about TA1, for example, is that, for Christians who affirm it, the doctrine of bodily resurrection is a ‘non-negotiable’. It is an essential component of this version of the Christian faith—‘essential’ in the strict philosophical sense. Any metaphysics, theological teaching, or otherwise, that runs counter to this ‘essential’ must be false if a TA1 understanding of the doctrine of the bodily resurrection is true. And, in fact, the above affirmations are the majority position of the Christian tradition. If so, using this set of theological affirmations as guardrails for the forthcoming analysis is not inappropriate for seeking out an internally consistent Christian account of afterlife.

As stated in the introduction, though, the way in which the set of TAs is normally affirmed might render the set internally inconsistent. If so, then it might be the case that the

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1 A brief look at some of the arguments of this chapter can be seen in James T. Turner, “On the Horns of a Dilemma: Bodily Resurrection or Disembodied Paradise?” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology (forthcoming).

2 See, for example, Douglas Farrow’s discussion of the Christian doctrine of resurrection and immortality, particularly in how he implicitly affirms these three as part and parcel of Christian belief, in Farrow, “Resurrection and Immortality,” 212 – 235. The research of this chapter will further bare this out.
way the majority of Christianity parses out teachings about afterlife needs redressing. To begin to see why such redressing might be needed, consider the following two simple deductive theological arguments, what I will call Redundant Resurrection (RR) and Necessary Resurrection (NR). They go as follows:

(RR):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state.⁴ (Premise)
2. The Intermediate State obtains. (Widely held Church teaching)
3. The bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (MP from (1) and (2))

(NR):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
4. The bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Widely held Church teaching)
5. The Intermediate State does not obtain. (MT from (1) and (4)).

The term ‘The Intermediate State’ is used in the following way, a way such that it conjoins the following two states of affairs (i.e., it teaches that both are true and descriptive of the same state):

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and

(PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.⁴

In other words, The Intermediate State is a state of existence that follows a human’s biological death in which a believing human exists without her body and this state of

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³ There are, of course, varying views on the sorts of human persons admitted into the paradisiacal intermediate state. I am inclined to say that it is reserved for believers. However, even if something like universalism is true, the following arguments should still follow.

⁴ For a brief explanation of how The Intermediate State, as outlined, came to be assumed through the Church’s history, see section I. See also the next note. Note that this is a different conception of ‘the intermediate state’ than one that apparently bothered the original Reformers, one that consisted in a waiting place for the dead, e.g., purgatory, between death and reward or punishment. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 681.
existence is paradisiacal in quality. This explication of The Intermediate State does not misrepresent the way in which it is commonly understood; nearly all Christian theologians who assert the truth of The Intermediate State hold to its implied mutual realization of (SD) and (PS).\(^5\) Moreover, the majority of the Christian tradition affirms this version of The Intermediate State. So, the majority of the Christian tradition affirms TAs 1 – 3 and The Intermediate State.\(^6\)

If it is false that the bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state, the (RR) argument is unsound. And, the (NR) argument is sound if premises (1) and (4) are true. Now, I think the majority of Christians through history think the bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. After all, most Christians affirm TA1: that bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife. Notice, though, that, according to the above arguments, two widely held Church teachings,

2. The Intermediate State obtains,

and

4. The bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state,

stand in irreconcilable tension. For (2) affirms the antecedent of

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state,

\(^5\)From now on, The Intermediate State denotes the mutual realization of (SD) and (PS). Cooper notes: “Most traditional Christians would affirm something like Answer 57 of the Heidelberg Catechism: “Not only my soul will be taken immediately after this life to Christ its head, but even my flesh, raised by the power of Christ, will be reunited with my soul and made like Christ’s glorious body” and “[t]raditional views of the afterlife necessarily assume a dualistic anthropology. ... If dualism is mistaken, then so is the belief that we exist with Christ between death and resurrection,” Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 105. In his Benedictus Deus of 1336, Pope Benedict XII taught a view consistent with The Intermediate State. See Peter C. Phan, “Roman Catholic Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, 216, ed. Jerry L. Walls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Also, apparently Eastern Orthodox Christians believe that on the fortieth day of a soul’s release from its body the soul can, depending on a judgment, go to Paradise: “On the fortieth day, the soul undergoes its particular judgment and then is assigned to an intermediate state, a state of waiting in Paradise or Hades...” in Andrew Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, 240, ed. Jerry L. Walls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

\(^6\)See the previous note. More on this anon.
the consequent of which is the denial of (4). This is, obviously enough, the implication we see in the conclusion of the (RR) argument, viz., that the bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (RR)’s conclusion seems to imply that TA1 is false.

The majority of the Christian tradition affirms TA1. But, the conclusion of the Redundant Resurrection argument—what appears to be a denial of TA1—follows deductively from premises (1) and (2). This means that the pertinent issue is why argument (RR) is valid but unsound. If it is a valid but unsound argument, it is not unsound because its conclusion is false by mere fiat. If its conclusion is false, it follows that premises (1), (2), or both are false. Since (2) is a widely held Church teaching,

2. The Intermediate State obtains,
it seems reasonable to guess that theologians in the traditions that teach (2) will deny:

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state.

Contrarily, I take it that (1) is true and (2) is false. Moreover, I will argue that (1) is true and (2) is false precisely because The Intermediate State suggests that (SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and (PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality are the same state of existence.

To begin to see the force of the Redundant Resurrection (RR) and Necessary Resurrection (NR) arguments, note that The Intermediate State is a state of affairs such that a human person, Jones, for example, when she suffers biological death, exists as a disembodied soul in a paradisiacal existence—that is to say, in a qualitatively excellent condition and environment (i.e., an idyllic place and state). Just here is the strength of the Redundant

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7 This movement of Jones from biological death to The Intermediate State may be thought of as immediate or
Resurrection argument (RR). As I hope to show, it is the mutual realization of a true (SD) and true (PS) in the antecedent of (1) that, if true, renders the conclusion of the (RR) argument sound. And, if the (RR) argument is sound, then the Necessary Resurrection argument (NR) is unsound.8

The (RR) and (NR) arguments use ‘superfluous’ in a qualitative and metaphysical sense. Qualitatively, the bodily resurrection is redundant for post-mortem life if The Intermediate State obtains; after all, The Intermediate State is qualitatively paradisiacal (i.e., excellent). Metaphysically, the bodily resurrection is superfluous for post-mortem life if The Intermediate State obtains; after all, The Intermediate State implies that human beings can still be living human beings without bodies. But, the Church seems to deny the bodily resurrection’s redundancy (TA1). Because of this, I wish to take aim at The Intermediate State. Aiming at The Intermediate State in this way is an initial move to protect the internal consistency of TAs 1 – 3.

There is, though, a second move to protect the internal consistency of TAs 1 – 3. As I explain in the introduction, I also aim to falsify—or, at least seriously weaken the motivation for—the assumed philosophical anthropology in The Intermediate State’s conjunct (SD), viz., substance dualism. Doing so keeps the bodily resurrection from being *metaphysically* redundant; in other words, casting doubt on substance dualism shows bodily resurrection to be the only hope for human post-mortem existence. This is so because substance dualists typically posit that a human being exists in a disembodied state at the death of her body; most affirm something like (SD). Even though, as a metaphysical hypothesis, substance dualism only implies that such existence is *possible*, demonstrating that, given Christian theology, such a thing *never* happens—that (SD) is false—might remove any need to affirm substance

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8This follows because, if premise (3) is true, premise (4) is false. The (NR) argument fails if (4) is false.
dualism. Moreover, removing substance dualism’s motivation (at least, for the theologian) helps strengthen the argument against The Intermediate State.

Here, then, are simple deductive theological arguments against (SD):

(RR)*:

6. If (SD) is true, then bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
7. (SD) is true. (Widely held Church teaching)
8. The bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (MP from (6) and (7))

(NR)*:

6. If (SD) is true, then bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
9. The bodily resurrection is not metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
10. (SD) is false. (MT from (6) and (9)).

To be clear, premise (10) does not say that substance dualism is false. It says that it is not the case that there is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind). I argue that, if (10) is true, then Christian theologians lose most, if not all, motivation to affirm substance dualism. I will argue that (10) is true. What is more, I will present arguments pulled from a pericope in the Pauline corpus that show that substance dualism is false.

Now, I wish to affirm, alongside many Christian theologians, that, following a human’s death, a believing human (at least), at some point, enters a paradisiacal existence. That is to say, I affirm, with many in the Christian tradition, that the following state of affairs is true:

(PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.

However, as the (RR) argument concludes, if the paradisiacal state following biological death is conceived as disembodied and in a time intermediate between death and bodily resurrection—i.e., lived prior to bodily resurrection—then bodily resurrection is qualitatively
and metaphysically otiose for those in the paradisiacal state (i.e., premise (1)). Since it is (1) that the defender of The Intermediate State will no doubt deny, my main task amounts to demonstrating that the conditional in (1) is true:

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state.

Doing so is an important first step in trying to establish an internally consistent Christian account of afterlife, one consistent with:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

As such, I hope to argue for the truth of (1) by using the content and argument of a particular chapter in the Bible, namely, 1 Corinthians 15. This chapter in the Apostle Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians features a sustained argument for the truth of resurrection. Not only is Paul’s argument concerned with the resurrection of Jesus, but it is, as well, an implicit argument for the truth of, at least, the future/eschatological bodily resurrection of all believers and resurrection simpliciter. Moreover, it seems that a majority of the Christian tradition founds its doctrine of resurrection and affirmation of TA1 on the argument set up in this passage, so it will be privileged accordingly.⁹ I hope to show that, if The Intermediate State obtains, Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15 is unsound and, ipso facto, the doctrine of resurrection and TA1 are false. If my arguments go through, premise (1) is true.

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To begin, though, in §I, I give a brief historical trace of the development of The Intermediate State teaching in Christian theology. This functions as a bit of scene setting; for the analytic arguments that follow seek to undermine a teaching that seems to have been with Christian theology since its beginning. Additionally, such scene setting helps to see that, though the teaching has been in Christian theology from the beginning, some early theologians seem to sense a palpable tension in the concept of a disembodied existence carrying with it a paradisiacal quality. The rest of the chapter is set up to highlight that tension and hopefully demonstrate that the tension exposes incoherence, not merely tension.

To do this, in §II, I outline Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 and demonstrate that substance dualism, if true, not only denies Paul’s premises but also his conclusion that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies the (not merely biological) death of all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ. Further to §II, I outline a formal argument for the truth of the conditional in premise (1):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state.

The argument for the truth of (1) proceeds from the assumed truth of The Intermediate State to the falsity of Paul’s conclusion that bodily resurrection is necessary for those hoping to be saved from death. In §III, I entertain some objections that an advocate of The Intermediate State and substance dualism might offer against the ways in which I say the arguments in §II go through. In §IV, I provide deductive analytic theological arguments against The Intermediate State and the metaphysics of substance dualism. Baldly stated, I argue that, if Paul’s argument for the necessity of resurrection is sound and the doctrine of resurrection is true, substance dualism and The Intermediate State are false. Finally, in §V, I suggest that, if Christian theism wishes to affirm TAs 1 – 3 and hopes for an internally consistent conception

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10 As Berkhof confidently declares: “It has always been the firm conviction of the Church of Jesus Christ that the soul continues to live even after its separation from the body”. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 672.
of afterlife, it must purge itself of substance dualism and The Intermediate State whilst holding theologically consistent and metaphysically coherent conceptions of resurrection.

I. How Did We Get Here?

This chapter aims to undermine a historically held position within the bulk of Christian theology. On the face of it, this task seems quite arrogant. After all, how is one lone voice so sure about the contradiction of something that the Church, writ large, has affirmed, in one way or another, for nearly the entirety of its existence?\footnote{As we will see, I am not alone in my suspicions, though I am certainly among a small minority.} It must suffice to say that I am not sure about the conclusions of the following arguments. At least, I am not sure that, in the end, even if my arguments are valid that they will report accurately on the truth of the matter under analysis. What is important, though, is that there does seem to be a tension between key aspects of the doctrine of resurrection and the teaching of The Intermediate State, both of which are historically held teachings within the Church. But, before I begin to explicate what I take to be a clear contradiction between the doctrine of resurrection and the teachings concerning The Intermediate State (as defined above), let me first offer a brief historical trace of how Christian theology arrived at its present point.

The development of (what some systematic theologians call) a Christian ‘personal/individual eschatology’\footnote{For example Stanley Grenz in Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1994), 746 and Millard Erickson in Erickson, Christian Theology, 1200.}—doctrines concerning the end of individual human lives—seems, obviously enough, to have its source in Jewish conceptions of afterlife. (I say ‘obviously’ because the Church was born out of and in a Jewish culture.) And, in particular, early development of the issue in Christian circles seems to draw quite heavily from Second Temple Judaism. This is true, apparently, for beliefs concerning bodily resurrection and the paradisiacal intermediate state. For among other reasons, these teachings seem to have been
assimilated into early church teaching precisely because the church arose out of Second Temple Judaism. In particular, as we shall see, the paradisiacal intermediate state seems to have been incorporated into Christian theology from early on due to the influence of the most widespread of the available views concerning immediate post-mortem existence in Second Temple Judaism: Pharisaic eschatology.\(^\text{13}\) And, of course, Christian belief in bodily resurrection is further grounded in the witness of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the very starting point of the mission and purpose of the Christian community.

Now, Jewish anthropology up to the first century CE is largely \textit{prima facie} simple: a human person is a unity of soul and body.\(^\text{14}\) At first glance, at any rate, because thoroughly Western minds might think of this anthropology as a version of substance dualism.\(^\text{15}\) However, ancient Jewish anthropology seems to be slightly more complex. Jan Bremmer explains Jewish anthropology this way:

> There is in ancient Hebrew no term equivalent to our ‘soul.’ From the various words which together correspond to our notion of the soul, the most important one is \textit{næpæs}, which seems to have combined the functions of the \textit{thymos} and \textit{psyche} of the living. It is probably connected with a root meaning ‘breath’ (Exodus 23.12, 31.17; 2 Samuel 16.14) and can often be translated ‘life’ or ‘life-force.’…Unlike \textit{psyche}, it never means the soul of the dead and is not contrasted with the body. Israelite anthropology was strictly Unitarian [sic] and remained so until the first century A. D…\(^\text{16}\)

This is to say, it seems that a human person, in the ancient Hebrew conception, is a


\(^\text{15}\)Wayne Grudem, in his widely read \textit{Systematic Theology}, makes this mistake. See Grudem, \textit{Systematic Theology}, 474.

psychosomatic whole.\footnote{Bauckham, “Life, Death, and Afterlife in Second Temple Judaism,” 87.} The upshot of this particular anthropology is that if a human person loses her psychosomatic wholeness, she ceases to be a human person (at least, this is what a twenty-first century metaphysician might suggest). Bodiliness seems to be essential to the ancient Jewish conception of a human person’s created nature. Further still, as Bremmer indicates, a hard and fast distinction between body and soul is not found in ancient Hebrew anthropology. Body and soul composition is thus far more than simply two separate ‘parts’ tied together. Eric Rust sums this up nicely:

In [b]iblical thought man is regarded as a psycho-somatic whole rather than as an embodied soul. Greek ideas of the body as the prison house of the soul are alien to the Hebrew way of thinking. For one thing, "soul" means "mind" or "reason" for the Greek and this alone is by its nature immortal; whereas, in the [b]iblical understanding, the fundamental usage of "soul" is to describe a personal whole, conceived realistically in bodily form.\footnote{Eric C. Rust, "Interpreting the Resurrection," \textit{Journal of Bible and Religion} 29, no. 1 (January, 1961): 25. Hereafter: Rust, “Interpreting the Resurrection.”}

This fundamental anthropological difference between Hebrew and dualistic thought-forms also appears to be why ancient Jewish tradition takes death very seriously.\footnote{Grenz, \textit{Theology for the Community of God}, 750 – 751.} Although there appears to be hope for life after death in the Hebrew tradition, this hope rests in God’s power to sustain post-mortem existence, not an innate immortality grounded in the substance of human souls.\footnote{Bauckham, “Life, Death, and Afterlife in Second Temple Judaism”, 87.}

However, even with largely opposing views, Hellenism’s encroachment on Palestine and the Jewish people may have brought with it a \textit{more} a dualistic anthropology. Modern scholarship believes this Hellenization of Hebrew culture and thought is due largely to the introduction of the Greek language to the Old Testament text. This Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, composed in third century BCE Hellenized Alexandria,
introduces words like ‘ψυχή’, commonly translated as ‘soul’. Of course, simply introducing a word like ‘ψυχή’ into the Old Testament did not engender an overnight shift in Jewish anthropology; however, it is notable that during the intertestamental, Hellenistic period (after the Septuagint translation), there is a striking rise in Greek influence on Jewish anthropological conceptions. Combining the purported Alexandrian influence with Neopythagoreanism’s (a Pythagoras cum Plato metaphysical view) zenith in the Greco-Roman world at the end of the Second Temple period (CE 70), it makes sense that, during this time, evidence suggests that Platonic sorts of anthropological ideas begin to overtake holism in particular versions of Jewish anthropology. As a result of this Platonic anthropological influence, Pharisaic Jews, at least, begin positing soul and body separation at death, a natural shift given anthropology’s direct influence on conceptions of life after death. In summary, though apparently strictly holistic prior to Greek influence, some, maybe most, Jewish anthropology seems to shift during the intertestamental period through the beginning of the first century CE due to Hellenistic influences.

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22 Ibid. While I do not wish to present a post-hoc fallacy, this does seem to be the agreed upon position in scholarship.


It is apparent, to even a casual observer, that Christianity has something to say about the afterlife. Easter Sunday is evidence of this. Most Christians celebrate Jesus’s resurrection because most Christians believe that, in some sense, his resurrection offers a life after death. One might think that it should follow that because the first Christians were Jews, one should expect Jews to have always held fully developed ideas about the afterlife. However, afterlife, Heaven, and Hell are “all relative latecomers in the ancient world”. So late, in fact, that at the beginning of the Second Temple period, in the late sixth century BCE, there may not have been any such belief at all; and, if there were such a belief, it may well have been a minority position. By the end of the first century CE, however, belief in an afterlife becomes the dominant Jewish view.

According to recent scholarship, the first Jewish belief about post-mortem existence is expressed in the concept of ‘Sheol’. Contrary to how many Christians might read the Old Testament’s use of ‘Sheol’, it is not originally designated as a post-mortem location distinguishing between good and evil people; it is simply a place for the departed. In fact, it seems that Old Testament references to Sheol (at least, those written prior to the Hellenistic influence in the third century BCE) likely do not have in mind a clear concept of life after death at all. Dead human beings are reduced to ‘shades’. Says Richard Bauckham:

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27 Ibid.


This concept of “shades” in Sheol was not a belief in the survival of the human spirit at death—that is, a belief in the spiritual or mental part of a human being continuing to live when the body dies, as much of Greek thought after Plato believed. The shades were not immaterial beings, but shadowy, ghostly versions of the living, bodily persons, who could hardly be said to be alive.30

Sheol, in its original meaning, seems not to line up well with popular versions of either Heaven or Hell. Further still, according to Philip Johnston, in the Old Testament “there is no clearly articulated alternative to Sheol, no other destiny whose location is named, no other fate whose situation is described, however briefly”.31

If it is the case that the original understanding of Sheol neither includes a category for Heaven and Hell nor the separation of the good dead from the evil dead, how did these ideas assimilate into the Jewish paradigm? Perhaps a prior question is: did they become part of the paradigm? Although some suggest that evidence for an Old Testament belief in life after death is minimal, in the post-biblical (i.e., after the close of the Old Testament canon) period by contrast, within Judaism, belief in life after death becomes the predominant view.32

While there may be arguments that demonstrate that Jews did, in fact, have a robust account of afterlife included in the meaning of ‘Sheol’ (e.g., conceptions of Heaven and Hell), the earliest agreed upon instance of a more robust Jewish description of the place of the departed is found in the intertestamental/apocryphal Book of Enoch written in the second century BCE.33 In Enoch one finds something not wholly surprising, but interesting nonetheless. The Book of Enoch has included in it a description of divisions within the place of the dead, divisions segregating the dwelling places of the good and evil dead. These seem to be divisions that, probably not coincidentally, correspond to many features found in the

31Johnston, Shades of Sheol, 199.
33Glasson, Greek Influence, 12.
concurrently developing Greek understanding of Hades.\textsuperscript{34} Besides divisions, another purported example of the growing similarities in Jewish and Greek conceptions of the afterlife in The Book of Enoch is that Enoch’s location of the departed appears to be set in the West, identical to Hades’ location in Greek thought.\textsuperscript{35} So, it is possible, and maybe even likely, that the beginnings of the Jewish notions of Heaven and Hell corresponded with and pulled from Hellenistic influences in the surrounding culture.\textsuperscript{36}

It is, of course, also possible that syncretism is not the case. Jewish beliefs of particular types and Greek beliefs of particular types could have progressed in parallel ways toward an Intermediate State conception, completely independent of one another’s processes. My guess is, though, that this is not likely. Regardless, even if some Hebrew theology borrowed from Greek insights, it is not \textit{automatically} deficient or wrong. It may very well be that certain Greeks were on to something truthful and parts of the Jewish community wanted to use it. In any event, by the end of the Second Temple period, the predominant Jewish belief posits disembodied immortality for the righteous and punishment, after death, for the wicked.\textsuperscript{37} Besides 1 Enoch, J. Edward Wright suggests that one can already see this quite

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\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 12, 19.  
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid. Also, Glasson indicates that Enoch’s Sheol shares a considerable number of other attributes with Plato’s Hades as described in his \textit{Phaedo}. See, too, J. Edward Wright, \textit{The Early History of Heaven} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 121. However, Wright also notes that the eastward travels of Enoch in the Book of Enoch are heavily reliant on ancient Near Eastern cosmologies, particularly so with respect to flat earth notions and the movements of the celestial bodies. Ibid., 122 – 123. Book of Enoch chapters 17-18, 22-23.  
\textsuperscript{36}Glasson adds: “When we consider the possible bearing of all this upon Jewish teaching, we notice that too often recent writers have been inclined to restrict the Greek influence on Jewish eschatology to the immortality of the soul. For other aspects of the future life they have looked elsewhere, especially to Persia…The Jews did not accept the doctrine of repeated re-incarnations and a succession of earthly lives, nor did they regard the body as a prison-house. But some of them accepted the doctrine of punishments and rewards under the ground; while others to the immortality of the soul. One is as Greek as the other.” Glasson, \textit{Greek Influence}, 28.  
clearly in other such intertestamental literature as Fourth Ezra, meaning that “by the late first century CE this originally Greek idea was well known in Jewish circles”.38

More obvious in its influence on Jewish conceptions of afterlife is the Hellenistic anthropological influence. As noted above, the encroachment of Greek thought and terminology in first century Palestine allows for a more dualistic understanding of a human person. Thus, in many Jewish circles, a human person comes to be understood as an entity such that she can survive apart from her body. Following from this, some Jewish theology begins to view the death of a human person as the separation of the human soul from the human body. With Platonic-influenced conceptions in the surrounding milieu, they, particularly the Pharisees, begin to believe that a human person can and does exist in a post-mortem disembodied state between death and resurrection.39 All of this makes perfect sense given a Hellenistic milieu. With the introduction of the Greek language to the Hebrew Scriptures, being under Greco-Roman rule, and being surrounded by Hellenistic philosophy, it is hard to imagine Jewish eschatological anthropology (not to mention many other beliefs) remaining static relative to its Old Testament form.40

To summarize this developmental progression, Glasson states:

Jewish eschatology presents a very similar development to what we have traced among the Greeks. There was of course basic differences: Judaism had no place for repeated re-incarnations; Jews did not seek escape from the body, and with them the final goal came to be regarded as the embodied life of the


40Additionally, the older Greek mysteries (e.g., the general Orphic religiosity, Dionysian mysteries, etc.) were achieving high popularity in the region. Found in: Peter G. Bolt, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in the Greco-Roman World,” in Life in the Face of Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 75-76.
resurrection, to be enjoyed on a renewed earth. But in spite of these differences, with the Jews as well as the Greeks (a) a universal and undifferentiated Sheol was followed by (b) the doctrine of different fates for the good and the evil; and while at first the good were regarded as spending an intermediate period under the ground in a separate section of Sheol (c) later they were described as waiting in “heaven” to which they passed immediately after death.\footnote{Glasson, *Greek Influence*, 38.}

Important to note, besides the obvious parallels with Greek thought, is that there is at least one major difference between Jewish and Greek conceptions of after life: a large contingent of Jews affirmed bodily resurrection. Whereas, according to traditional wisdom, Greek thought absolutely abhors the idea of bodily resurrection, many Jews come to view it as intrinsic to their hope as a people.\footnote{Rust, “Interpreting the Resurrection,” 34. Such a sentiment concerning ‘Greek ideas’ may be oversimplified and a caricature. Matthew Malcolm argues that this might be the case. Malcolm, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reversal in I Corinthians*, 252ff.} Nevertheless, large strands of Jewish theology retain enough Greek influence to posit an intermediate, disembodied, state where the righteous enjoy Paradise and the wicked experience torment, all prior to resurrection. This is the most common Jewish view (the Pharisaic view) in the Second Temple period.\footnote{Bauckham, “Life, Death, and Afterlife in Second Temple Judaism,” 89. Also: N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (London: SPCK, 1992), 324 and *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (London: SPCK, 2003), 424.}

*Apostolic Fathers, Papias, and Early Church Fathers: A Quick Historical Progression*

The details and evidence that explicitly tie together the Pharisaic *cum* Platonic theological milieu of the first century CE and the theological ground on which the earliest of Church Fathers stand are sparse. This is not to say that evidence is not present, it is simply to recognize that reaching back into the Apostolic Fathers in the late first century and progressing into the early second century requires moving piecemeal through small amounts of extant text. Even still, a connection might be made.

*The Martyrdom of Polycarp*, a document apparently written by the church at Smyrna
to the church at Philomelium concerning the death of the Apostolic Father and Bishop of Smyrna, Polycarp [CE 65 – 155], exhibits the use of imagery found in eschatologically charged Jewish and Christian apocrypha.\textsuperscript{44} Important for our concerns is that the writer(s) cite, in particular, Polycarp’s receipt of a “wreath of immortality” and an “incontestable prize” as immediate post-mortem, pre-resurrection rewards, thereby applying “the apocalyptic imagery of the Jewish and Christian apocrypha…directly to the faith and the sufferings of the individual martyr”.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, in Polycarp’s own Epistle to the Philippians, he suggests that those that die in faith “are [now] in their due place in the presence of the Lord, with whom also they suffered”.\textsuperscript{46} So, early on it seems that early church leaders, like Polycarp, and those sitting under the teaching of Church leaders affirm immediate post-mortem rewards. That is to say, Polycarp, like his friends in Smyrna, most likely believed that when he faced the Emperor’s fire, he would immediately experience a state of heavenly immorality apart from his dead body. Charles Hill argues that Polycarp’s views on this matter are influenced by and “easily traceable” to his contemporaries: the Apostolic Fathers Ignatius of Antioch and Clement of Rome, and the Apostle Paul.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, it is a view, according to Hill, from which “Polycarp does not depart…”\textsuperscript{48}

From Polycarp, we can look to his friend, Papias [CE 75 – 155], bishop of Hierapolis


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
What specific theological views the two shared with each other is not certainly known, though they apparently did not share a belief in Chiliastic eschatology (millennialism). It is Papias—not Polycarp, the teacher of Irenaeus the early Church Father [CE 120 – 202]—whom Irenaeus credits with having forcefully established Chiliasm. Irenaeus argues that, not only did Papias make the clearest written expressions of Chiliasm outside of the biblical text, he also argues that Papias received the doctrine of the millennial reign of Christ directly from “the elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord”. At this point, “the elders” apparently told Papias that they heard directly from the Apostle John how the Lord “used to teach in regard to these [end] times”. The implication is that the Apostle John taught Chiliasm to certain church leaders (i.e., elders) who taught Papias whose writings on the matter, in turn, convinced Irenaeus of the Chiliastic position (despite what Irenaeus’s own teacher, Polycarp—a disciple of the Apostle John—might have said). If this is true, granted the sparse nature of the extant sources, it seems quite likely that particular aspects of the Pharisaic cum Platonic personal eschatology, viz., that there exists a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind), which are included in Chiliastic eschatology, may very well have

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49 A. Cleveland Coxe, “Introductory Note to the Fragments of Papias,” in Vol. 1 of Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 151. All that we have of Papias’ writings are that which are cited by Irenaeus and Eusebius. Brian Daley ties this work to apocalyptic Christian and Jewish apocrypha. Hope of the Early Church, 14.

50 Hill, Regnum Caelorum, 78. “…chiliasm, or millennialism, the ancient belief in a thousand-year reign of Christ and his saints on earth between his second coming and the last judgment.” Ibid., 1.


52 Irenaeus, AH, 5.33.4, 563.

53 Ibid., 5.33.3, 562-563.

54 Ibid. My insert.
proceeded from the Apostle John, to Papias and on to Irenaeus. Irenaeus, after all, received teachings concerning a disembodied post-mortem existence from both Polycarp and Papias (distinct though they were).

This is not to say that these are the only possible sources. It could be that these men are in a direct line, but equally it might be that there are several similar trails moving along similar paths that collide into the conceptions of afterlife upon which early Church Fathers, like Irenaeus, build their foundation. Since the amount of sources relevant to the succession is small, it is probably impossible to know exactly how the chronology works. Even still, it is enough to see that a notion of a disembodied state following immediately after the biological death of a human person is ensconced within Christian theology from its very beginning.

What is more, one can easily follow a trail of ‘disembodied state’-affirming theologians from Irenaeus, Origen, the Cappadocian Fathers, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, and so on to the present time. This trail merely highlights the fact that an affirmation of the disembodied state of existence following human biological death is ubiquitous in Christian theology. This is not to say that the history of the Church lacks dissenting voices on this issue; there are a few (e.g., Martin Luther, around whom there was no little disagreement on the matter). But, it is to

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55 The idea is that, prior to Christ’s millennial reign, those who have died reside in Hades—a non-paradisiacal waiting place—awaiting the first resurrection. See the ‘law of the dead’ in the next note. See, also, Hill, Regnum Caelorum, 6 – 7.


57 In the sixteenth century, not too little of a controversy was caused by Luther’s denial of The Intermediate State. Sir Thomas More, King Henry VIII’s Lord Chancellor, wrote a treatise Dialogue Concerning Heresies partly aimed at Luther’s denial. William Tyndale later took up Luther’s defense against More on the issue. See:
say that those voices constitute a small minority. At any rate, for Catholics, the Fifth Lateran Council formalized The Intermediate State in 1513.\textsuperscript{58} For Protestants, though not subject to Catholic sorts of ‘formalization’, it is plausible to suggest, as John Cooper does, that:

Most traditional Christians would affirm something like Answer 57 of the \textit{Heidelberg Catechism}: “Not only my soul will be taken immediately after this life to Christ its head, but even my flesh, raised by the power of Christ, will be reunited with my soul and made like Christ’s glorious body…”

and that “[t]raditional views of the afterlife necessarily assume a dualistic anthropology…If dualism is mistaken, then so is the belief that we exist with Christ between death and resurrection”.\textsuperscript{59} In short, a disembodied intermediate state is the prevailing view in Christian theology.\textsuperscript{60} And this view entails a metaphysics of substance dualism.

\textit{Paradise and Church Teaching}

What about Paradise? Alister McGrath argues, in \textit{A Brief History of Heaven}, that ‘Paradise’, as used in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, connotes the idyllic nature of the original, and now lost, Garden of Eden.\textsuperscript{61} J. Edward Wright concurs:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Footnotes:}
\item 59 Quotes taken from Cooper, \textit{Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting}, 105. A modern Protestant possible holdout to this view is Karl Barth. But, his view is apparently unclear or underdeveloped on the matter. See Cortez, \textit{Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies}, 89 – 92.
\item 60 I again refer the reader to some of the standard Protestant systematic theology texts concerning this statement: Grudem, \textit{Systematic Theology}, 810 – 827; Berkhof, \textit{Systematic Theology}, 672 – 694; Erickson, \textit{Christian Theology}, 1172 – 1190.
\end{itemize}
Several texts describe places in the heavenly realms as verdant gardens…This idea was created by transposing themes about the Garden of Eden from Genesis 1-3 to the heavenly realm. “Paradise” (παράδεισος) is a loan-word from Persian (paridaida, pardez, pairidaeza) meaning “verdant garden.” The Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, used the term paradise (παράδεισος) to translate the Hebrew term for garden…Since this term occurs in the phrase “garden of Eden” in Genesis 2-3 (cf. Neh. 2:8; Ecc. 2:5; Song 4:13), the term paradise became a technical term for the Edenic place of the blessed…Over the course of the Second Temple period this idea came into Judaism in conjunction with Greek and Persian ideas of the immortality of the soul and the theme of the paradisiacal dwelling place of the immortals. Paradise was no longer simply the place where Adam and Eve lived but the place where the deceased righteous will reside eternally.62

Coming from the Hellenized Hebrew culture they did, it seems quite plausible, then, to conclude that those in the early Church who assumed that, following death, there is a state in which a human person exists disembodied and in Paradise, believed that Paradise is an idyllic place or state of existence. In fact, Wright says this is the way Paradise, in heavenly terms, was conceived:

While the vision of a verdant, luxurious garden appeals to the senses, this imagery harkens back to the Garden of Eden not because of its refreshing environment but because this was the place of which God, upon completing and beholding his work, noted “behold, it is very good.” All humans know that our realm is certainly not “very good”; in fact, it can be down right hostile. The longing for a postmortem place in a verdant garden…in heaven, is a longing to return to this “very good” mythical place, the place where humans existed before evil, pain, and suffering were introduced into our existence.63

This seems to me an account of The Intermediate State, a state that suggests that the following two states of affairs describe the same state of existence:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and

(PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.

62 Wright, The Early History of Heaven, 188.

63 Ibid., 189.
Now, at least one early Church Father, Irenaeus, seems to think such a conjunctive view is problematic. In his *Against Heresies* he argues that, if the disembodied existence following bodily death is conceived as ‘super-celestial’ (i.e., extra-ordinarily good), then bodily resurrection is, in a large way, insignificant.\(^6^4\) Such a conception of the post-mortem state is, he says, “derived from heretical discourses...are both ignorant of God’s dispensations, and of the mystery of the resurrection of the just...”\(^6^5\) Charles Hill agrees with this reading of Irenaeus. He thinks Irenaeus adopts Chiliasm to counter paradisiacal claims about The Intermediate State—claims that Irenaeus apparently takes to be Gnostic. Says, Hill:

...the last five chapters in the AH do, in a way, form a fitting capstone to his whole ‘pro-materialist’ polemic against heresy. The doctrine of chiliasm was tailor-made for refuting Gnostics, providing at once a tremendous apologetic for the goodness of the material creation and, with its attendant conception of the intermediate state, an antidote to the aggravating Gnostic pretensions to a super-celestial existence after death.\(^6^6\)

Irenaeus’s position, at least with respect to the history of the Church, goes largely unheeded. Again, this is not to say there are no further dissenters in the history of the Church, many Chilists around Irenaeus’s time seem to have similar worries (e.g., Tertullian).\(^6^7\) And,

\(^6^4\)Irenaeus, *AH* 5.31.1-2, 560 – 561; 5.32.1, 561. The nomenclature “super-celestial,” “heavenly,” “Heaven,” and “Paradise” are used through patristic literature consistent with planes of existence beyond the earthly order qualitatively spanning conceptions of pleasant repose to direct communion with God. Irenaeus, in particular, uses “super-celestial” because the Gnostics seem to have used that term. Origen, though not Gnostic, uses the same term (and others) but not so as to attack Gnosticism; rather, it is to posit an otherworldly existence (a paradisiacal existence) between death and resurrection. See throughout *AH* and Origen, “De Principiis,” in Vol. 4 of *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 1.4.3, 261.

\(^6^5\)Irenaeus, *AH* 5.32.1, 561.

\(^6^6\)Hill, *Regnum Caelorum*, 188. It is important to note, though, that Irenaeus’s ‘intermediate state’, though disembodied, is not The Intermediate State as outlined above. Irenaeus’s is decidedly not paradisiacal (though, his, too, may be problematic).

much later in history, the German Reformer, Martin Luther, thought a teaching like The Intermediate State ill-conceived.68 Still, the history of the Church and its teaching, in Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern traditions, largely affirms The Intermediate State.69 There are likely many reasons for this, but one cannot help thinking that a main reason, at least in the West, is the influence of St. Augustine, an advocate of The Intermediate State. As with much theology for the Western Church, the Church’s stance on the post-mortem state of human beings is largely reflective of whatever Augustine said. And, Augustine said that there exists a state of existence following the biological death of a human person where a human person exists disembodied in Paradise, an idyllic place and state.70 Brian Daley says this regarding Augustine’s teaching on The Intermediate State:

…Augustine suggests that the souls of all the just immediately experience the transforming joy of God’s presence. So he speaks of his departed friend Nebridius…as already “happy without end,” already “drinking from the fount of the divine wisdom.” Arguing from Jesus’ words on the cross to the good thief, “This day you shall be with me in Paradise” (Lk 23.43), Augustine concludes that those saved by God’s grace immediately enjoy the “beatific presence of his divinity” after death…However, Augustine never speaks of this beatitude before the resurrection in terms of vision, or of the “angelic” activity of intuitive contemplation and ceaseless praise – the terms in which he describes the eternal state of the risen saints. Usually, he is content to employ the vaguer metaphors taken from the Bible and the earlier Latin tradition: the souls of the just are in “the bosom of Abraham…”71

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69 See note 4 of this chapter.


So as to not caricature Augustine’s position, it is important to note, as Daley does, that Augustine considers—obviously enough, as a Christian theologian—bodily resurrection to be of immense importance, a thing without which Christian hope would be in vain.72 Daley adds: “Augustine insists that the rewards and punishments experienced now by the souls of the dead are only a hint of their full eternal destinies, a dream of the reality that will come when their bodies have been raised”. (Note also that Daley correctly highlights that Augustine thinks there are particular ways of enjoying the beatific presence of God not available to disembodied humans.) So, while Augustine very much sees the bodily resurrection as foundational for Christian hope, it is clear that he is a loud voice in Church history teaching something very similar to The Intermediate State as outlined above.

All of this said, the theological arguments for or against substance dualism and the teaching of The Intermediate State ought not rest on where and when the doctrine developed or how Christian theology arrived at its current point. To simply argue from those facts alone is, for one thing, subject to disproof through more and more careful historical examination and, worse, to commit a genetic fallacy. So, the point is this: Christian theology today, in large droves, teaches The Intermediate State—the conjoining of these two states of affairs:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and

(PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.

And, as I note above, there seems to be a real tension in holding to this Intermediate State teaching and the doctrine of resurrection. Arguably, one can already feel the tension in Augustine. On the one hand, he wants to affirm that the souls of the biologically dead are in

the divine presence in an exceedingly great quality of life; on the other hand, bodily resurrection is necessary for the fulfillment of eschatological hope and life. And just here is where it seems to me that there is much more than tension; there is incoherence. To hopefully demonstrate this, it is now time to turn to the theological case against The Intermediate State and substance dualism.

II. If Substance Dualism is True, then Paul’s Argument is Unsound.

Here we begin to remove the Christian theologian’s motivation for affirming substance dualism. To begin to see how, recall the following:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind),

(RR)*:

6. If (SD) is true, then bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
7. (SD) is true. (Widely held Church teaching)
8. The bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (MP from (6) and (7)),

and

(NR)*:

6. If (SD) is true, then bodily resurrection is metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
9. The bodily resurrection is not metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. (Premise)
10. (SD) is false. (MT from (6) and (9)).

The present aim is to show that, given a particular Pauline argument, (SD) is false, thus affirming (9): The bodily resurrection is not metaphysically superfluous for biologically dead human beings. And, if (SD) is false, Christian theologians lose most, if not all, of their motivation for affirming substance dualism. Let us now see why (SD) is false.

In 1 Corinthians 15.12-19, Paul says the following:

Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the
dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied.

I take it that a plausible reading of what Paul says here is that the resurrection or non-resurrection of Christ implies something about the post-mortem condition of Christ and of believers in Christ.\(^73\)

A more formal way of expressing the argument in this pericope might go something like this. Call the argument, Dead Christ, Dead-in-Christ (DCDiC):

(DCDiC):

\(P_1\): Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.\(^74\)

\(P_2\): Christ’s being dead implies that of all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.

\(C_1\): Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.\(^75\)


:\(^74\) Given Christian theism, since it turns out that the person of Jesus Christ is identical to God the Son, Christ’s ‘being dead’ can only ever apply *qua* human being. However, the logic of this (DCDiC) argument need not make this explicit since, if \(C_1\) obtains, then, as St. Paul kindly notes in 1 Corinthians 15.14-15a and 17-19, Christian theism is false.

:\(^75\) It is my contention that the argument in verses 12 to 19 is logically equivalent to (DCDiC). That said, Holleman argues that Paul’s argument is “quasi-logical” in that the rhetorical elements take the lead over the logical. Says Holleman:

This premise [‘if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised.’] is embedded in rhetoric. By showing the consequences of not accepting this premise Paul tries to force the premise upon the Corinthians. The denial of the premise would mean that Paul’s message is false (vv. 14, 15); that the faith of the Corinthians is empty and ineffective (vv. 14, 17); moreover, that there is no hope at all of life after death (vv. 18 – 19). These consequences are not related to the premise in any formal logical way; they simply appeal to the common sense of the Corinthian Christians.

Holleman, *Resurrection and Parousia*, 42. My insert. Now, on the one hand, Holleman is correct—Paul’s emphasis on the massive theological implications riding on the prospect of the conditional’s truth is a bit of rhetoric. However, the logic of (DCDiC) still seems implied. The massive rhetorical device—the plea to the emotional gravity—only has any purchase if the logic of (DCDiC) is included in Paul’s argument and is valid.
In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, David Garland outlines Paul’s argument in a simpler manner, though logically consistent with DCDiC. He suggests that Paul’s argument is “…if Christ is not raised (15:17a) [then] the Christian dead have perished (15:18)”.

In light of this, it seems plausible that the DCDiC argument is Paul’s argument (or, minimally, an argument which Paul may recognize from this passage). If so, it appears valid.

Perhaps, though, there is ambiguity with how Paul uses some of his words. For example, it is not obvious what the difference is between a person’s having fallen asleep and her having perished. Murray J. Harris, for example, argues that those who have ‘fallen asleep’,

...are unconscious with respect to our world of time and space but not to their world of spirit: they are ‘alive to God’ (Luke 20.38b) or ‘with (meta) me (Jesus)’ (Luke 23.43). They ‘live spiritually, as God does’ (1 Pet. 4.6), or, in Pauline diction, they are ‘with (pros) the Lord’ (2 Cor. 5.8) ‘with (sun) Christ’ (Phil. 1.23).

So, for Harris, a person who has ‘fallen asleep’, in the sense intended here, is really alive—just not biologically. Similarly, John Cooper argues that,

One must not overlook the importance of the sleep metaphor in I Cor.15:18, 20, and 51. For in I Thessalonians this figure most likely refers to the dead “living together with Christ” in the intermediate state, and there is nothing to suggest that Paul had a change of mind between these epistles.

So, Harris and Cooper, at any rate, think that those who are ‘asleep’ are actually alive in another ‘place’ distinct from our world. This seems to me to be an affirmation of one of the two conjuncts in The Intermediate State, viz., (SD):

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind).

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And, to be sure, there does seem to be something about the ‘fallen asleep’ metaphor that is not identical to ‘having perished’. What is this ‘something’?

Here the language of verse 18 seems instructive; for, whatever else, it seems clear that Paul means ‘fallen asleep’ and ‘perished’ as ways of referring to death. But, if Paul means one’s having ‘fallen asleep’ is one’s being ‘dead’ identically to the way one’s having ‘perished’ is one’s being ‘dead,’ then he has asserted a tautology. He has said nothing more than “those who are dead are dead”. But why think he is speaking tautologically? Rather, a charitable reading sees Paul ascribing a qualitative difference between two senses of death. Simply put, the sort of death he means by fallen asleep is less final than the sort of death he means by perished. I think that the contrasting Greek words, κοιμηθέντες for fallen asleep and ἀπώλοντο for perished, the latter of which is a much more violent sort of word, highlights this difference. If Paul does mean this sort of difference, one can read C₁ in a way consistent with: ‘Christ’s not being bodily raised from the dead implies the finality of the death of those who followed him and hoped to see afterlife’. In other words, if Christ is not raised from the dead (i.e., bodily resurrected), then those who passed from this world trusting in Christ are absolutely dead.⁷⁹

If I am correct in suggesting that Paul intends the reading of this passage in a way logically identical to how I have constructed the argument in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19, then

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⁷⁹To use Paul’s language (ἀπώλοντο), those who passed from this world are destroyed or lost. Anthony Thiselton translates 15.18 this way: “those who were laid to sleep in Christ are lost for good.” Anthony Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 1214. He goes on to add: “…but Paul has in mind the emptiness and waste of irretrievable loss…utterly lost, or, above, lost for good. They will never ‘awake’ from sleep.” Ibid, 1221. Nigel Watson translates ἀπώλοντο in the same way in Nigel Watson, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 2nd Revised Edition (Peterborough, UK: Epworth, 2005), 163. This translation seems consistent with the ἁπόλλυμι verb (of which ἀπώλοντο is the third person plural aorist middle indicative) that nearly every lexicon defines as an utter sort of ruin or loss. It can, though, be used as a synonym for ‘death’. We can see such a case in a passage like Matthew 8.25 where Jesus’s disciples, whilst on the sea in the middle of a storm, rouse Jesus to save them saying “Save us, Lord: we are perishing (ἀπολλύμεθα)”. But, in the 1 Cor. 15 passage, those about whom Paul is speaking are already dead, in the sense that they have been buried or otherwise not biologically alive. So, one should not read Paul asserting a tautology. Rather, as I say above, ἀπώλοντο, in this case, reflects a qualitatively different sort of death than merely ‘falling asleep’ or properly dying in hope of life after death. Nigel Watson likewise concurs with this reading. Ibid.
Paul’s argument is deductively valid. But is it sound? The truth-values of Paul’s premises are, of course, open to investigation and, oddly enough, dubitable given the philosophical anthropology held by the majority of the Christian tradition: substance dualism. To see why, consider an argument in response to (DCDiC) implied by the metaphysics of substance dualism. We can call this argument the Substance Dualist Rejoinder (SDR):

(SDR):

\[ P_3: \text{Human beings do not need bodies to be living human beings. (Substance dualist thesis)} \]
\[ P_4: \text{A human being’s body not being resurrected does not imply a human being’s being dead. (Implication of substance dualist thesis)} \]
\[ P_5: \text{Jesus Christ is a human being (i.e., a person with a human nature).}^{80} \text{ (Christian doctrine)} \]
\[ C_2: \text{Therefore: Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead. (From P}_3, P_4, \text{ and } P_3 \]
\[ P_6: \text{If Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead, then it is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s remaining dead.} \]
\[ P_7: C_2: \text{Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead} \]
\[ C_3: \text{∴ It is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.} \]
\[ (i.e., \neg P_1) \]
\[ P_8: \text{If it is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead, then it is false that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ P_9: C_3: \text{It is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.} \]
\[ C_4: \text{∴ It is false that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]

The conclusion, \( C_4 \), says that, given some essential theses of substance dualism (e.g., \( P_3 \) and \( P_4 \)), Paul’s conclusion in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 is false. For the conclusion to Paul’s argument is that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’

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80 I mean this claim only in the sense that it is stated in the parenthesis. It is a minimalist claim about God the Son, as a person, and his relationship to a human nature (either concrete or abstract) such that the Son’s human nature is enhypostatic (in the being of God) and anhypostatic (not otherwise an entity outside God the Son’s being incarnate). See Jaroslav Pelikan’s helpful discussion in Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. Vol. 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), (Chicago, IL: University Press, 1975), 244ff, 277, and, in particular, 340-341. See also Oliver Crisp’s work on the enhypostatic/anhypostatic distinctions as well as arguments for/against concrete/abstract nature views of the incarnation in Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71ff.
in Christ have perished—the very thing \( \text{C}_4 \) denies. To put the conclusion another way, in a manner more explicitly controversial, the final conclusion of the (SDR) argument says that, given a metaphysics *used in Christian doctrine*, Paul’s conclusion in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 is false. The reason that (SDR)’s conclusion renders false Paul’s conclusion about the implication of Christ’s not being resurrected and the fate of his followers is that (SDR)’s conclusion follows from premises, viz., \( \text{P}_3 \) and \( \text{P}_4 \), that suggest that *there is no implication between a human’s not being bodily resurrected and a human’s being dead*. If that is true, then even Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies *nothing* about whether he has ‘perished’ or is alive (*qua* human being).\(^{81}\)

In fact, defenders of substance dualism, by way of The Intermediate State, of whom John Cooper seems the chief, appear to affirm exactly this!\(^ {82}\) Thus Cooper:

The intermediate state account, entailing a dualistic anthropology, would generate no Christological difficulty...Since human nature is such that persons can exist temporarily without their bodies, Jesus Christ could have existed between Friday and Sunday without his body and yet have been one person with both a divine and human nature. Lacking a body does not entail lacking a human nature completely.\(^ {83}\)

Cooper seems to agree with (SDR)’s \( \text{P}_3 - \text{C}_2 \): there is *no* implication between Jesus’s being biologically ‘dead’ and his being actually—as a human—dead or alive. What follows is that Jesus’s body being in or out of the grave tells us precisely *nothing* about Jesus’s immediate

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\(^{81}\)And is this not something with which theologians and biblical scholars like Cooper and Harris will agree? After all, they both claim that the departed souls of humans are *alive* in some other place. Well, the same could go for a disembodied Jesus. There would be no way to say, for sure. Substance dualism suggests that there is no implication following from the death of the body to the death of the human (i.e., \( \text{P}_3 \) and \( \text{P}_4 \)). Cf. Cooper, *Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting*, 129.

\(^{82}\)I am unaware of *any* contemporary text dealing with a Christian theological/philosophical defense of substance dualism *vis-à-vis* the intermediate state that does not reference Cooper’s book as something like the ‘best’ defense on offer. Joel Green notes that the contemporary literature is riddled with mistakes due, in part, to an overdependence on Cooper’s material. See Joel B. Green, "Eschatology and the Nature of Humans: A Reconsideration of Pertinent Biblical Evidence,” *Science and Christian Belief* 14, 1 (April, 2002): 44 note 34.

post-mortem state. Such a conclusion runs exactly opposite to what a number of theologians might assert. For example, Murray Harris says this:

> Without the Resurrection the New Testament loses its soul and the Christian faith its central pillar. Without a risen Christ, the Christian message becomes meaningless and the Christian’s faith is futile (1 Cor. 15.14, 17). ‘A person cannot give himself to a dead man, nor can he expect anything or receive anything from a dead man’, yet the apostolic proclamation called for personal surrender to a man who had died (Acts 10.39,43; 16.31; 20.21; 25.19) and the Christian claimed to have received eternal life from a man who had died (John 10.11, 28).84

Harris’s logic seems pretty simple. If Jesus did not rise from the grave, he remains dead—and not just biologically. This logic sits well with the (DCDiC) argument, the conclusion of which is that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished. This conclusion should be true if it is the case that Jesus’s bodily death implies his death as a human being. But, on substance dualism, as the Substance Dualist’s Rejoinder shows, this is precisely false. On substance dualism, Harris’s worry, St. Paul’s worry, and the worries of other theologians besides seem entirely misplaced. But, I take it that these theologians share their worry for a reason: Jesus’ remaining not bodily resurrected means something catastrophic for Christian faith.

Garland, in fact, thinks that just this sort of (SDR) thinking is a target for Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15:12-19. He suggests that it is likely, given the way Paul spells out his premises, that some of the Corinthian Christians affirmed life after death but rejected a material resurrection.85 They may have believed in the immortality of the soul, a substance that Garland thinks the Corinthians took to be more fitting for ‘heaven’.86 Paul’s rejoinder to such a view, according to Garland, is two-fold. First, “he rejects any idea of the existence of

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84 Harris, Raised Immortal, 135.

85 Garland, 1 Corinthians, 699.

86 Ibid., 696.
the soul/spirit without a body” and, second, “that God can give a different body to each creature as it suits it environment [e.g., 15:39-49]”.87 In other words, for Garland, it seems that Paul concedes that the body, as it is now, is not fit for eternal life, but neither is one’s soul so fit. Rather, God will make for each a qualitatively new body fit for the resurrection world. And this is because, if there is no resurrection of the body, everyone remains dead in an ‘utterly lost’ sort of way. But this could well be false if substance dualism is true (see: SDR).

In a recent work, Matthew Malcolm disagrees with Garland’s assessment.88 Instead, he argues that Paul’s main focal point of attack—predicated on the entire thrust of the 1 Corinthians letter—is the Corinthian church’s overly celebratory attitude toward the present bodily life.89 Malcolm believes that the Corinthian Christians believed in disembodied immortality, but that it would have been qualitatively inferior to the present bodily life, thereby leading to the sorts of present life indulgences that Paul addresses earlier on in the letter (cf. 1 Cor. 5). The point for Paul, says Malcolm, is that the present bodily life is not the life upon which one should focus one’s hope; rather, the future bodily resurrection is.90 Even if Malcolm is correct pace Garland, the implications seem similar vis-à-vis the (DCDiC) argument and (SDR). If one holds that souls are immortal (either by nature or divine act), the death of one’s body says nothing about one’s post-mortem fate.91 Moreover, bodily

87 Ibid., 699 – 700.


89 Ibid., 265.

90 Ibid., 248ff.

91 What is more, if Malcolm’s understanding of Paul’s argument is correct, then certain Corinthians (at least, those whom Paul is addressing) certainly do not believe in any sort of paradisiacal existence following bodily death outside of the context of bodily resurrection. In other words, they do not seem to affirm anything like The Intermediate State (if Malcolm’s reading is correct). And, if so, Paul does nothing to attempt to tell them that Paradise awaits those who are asleep while they are asleep. Instead, the focus for the qualitatively best life is
resurrection would be, at best, metaphysically superfluous for afterlife—i.e., unnecessary for post-mortem existence.

A contradiction between the implications of a metaphysics often implied by certain Christian doctrines and Paul’s argument is likely problematic for Christian dogmatics. Unfortunately, the tension between Paul’s argument/teaching and the implications of historically held doctrinal positions gets worse.

To see why there is a further, perhaps more devastating, tension between a Christian doctrine and St. Paul’s argument, consider the following statement from the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 32:

I. The bodies of men, after death, return to dust, and see corruption; but their souls (which neither die nor sleep), having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them. The souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Besides these two places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.\(^{92}\)

I take it that the Westminster Divines are saying that the soul of the righteous human being (i.e., Christian believer) purportedly goes to a paradisiacal place between the death of her body and the future bodily resurrection. What the Westminster Confession of Faith teaches is an explicit affirmation of The Intermediate State: the thesis that conjoins these two states of affairs:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and

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\(^{92}\)‘The Confession of Faith,’ in *The Subordinate Standards, and other Authoritative Documents of the Free Church of Scotland* (Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter, and Co., 1860), 98. Hereafter: *WCF*. Of note is that the statement, “…immediately returns to God who gave them” cites Luke 23.43 as its biblical support (“Today you will be with me in Paradise”).

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(PS): There is a state of existence following a believing human’s biological death (e.g., Jones) that is paradisical in quality.

The *WCF*’s affirmation of The Intermediate State seems obvious in statements like: “[t]he souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory.” This teaching entails disembodied existence in Paradise—an idyllic place and state—between bodily death and bodily resurrection.93 Additionally, one can look at Article 12 Section II of *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* to see a similar paradisical claim concerning the disembodied dead in Christ: “This perfect life [i.e., this disembodied Paradise] with the Most Holy Trinity—this communion of life and love with the Trinity—is called ‘heaven’. *Heaven is the ultimate end and fulfillment of the deepest human longings, the state of supreme, definitive happiness*.94

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93 See my *Paradise and Church Teaching* section above. Also, as I say in the previous note, the Westminster Divines use Luke 23.43 to buttress this claim. See Alist McGrath’s *A Brief History of Heaven* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 40ff (especially pg. 43) regarding the biblical use of ‘Paradise’ and its reception through church history. Though the word has been used with some variation, its being understood as an idyllic place and state is, from its earliest use, quite common. At any rate, the language of the *WCF* does not leave much room for doubt about what the Westminster Divines thought about the word. Describing Paradise as a place in which a human person, having been made perfect, beholds the face of God in light and glory seems quite obviously to be one of the better (if not the best) plane of existence. The same is true of *The Catechism of the Catholic Church*. And in this respect, *Catechism of the Catholic Church* stays just in line with Augustine, for he, too, taught that, according to Luke 23.43, the believing dead go immediately to a disembodied Paradise. See his Augustine, “Sermon 232,” in *Vol. 7 of The Works of Saint Augustine*, edited by John E. Rotelle, (New York, NY: New City Press, 1993), 27). For further explanation on the *CCC*, see the next note.

94 *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), 234. My emphasis. My insert. Thus the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* states: “Acc[ording] to Catholic doctrine, these are the souls who, having died in a state of grace…have passed into heaven, where they enjoy perfect bliss…these souls still await reunion with their bodies at the general resurrection of the dead, after which both body and soul together will enjoy the life of heaven eternally.” F. L. Cross, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 613 – 614. Note here that Catholic Theologian, Peter Phan, says …the article “I believe in Life Everlasting,” in the *CCC* deals with six last things: (1) the particular judgment (“Each man receives his eternal retribution in his immortal soul at the very moment of his death, in particular judgment that refers his life to Christ: either entrance into the blessedness of heaven—through purification, or immediately—or immediate and everlasting damnation” [no.1022]); (2) heaven (“the ultimate end and fulfillment of the deepest human longings, the state of supreme, definitive happiness” [no. 1024]);…(4) hell…(5) the last judgment (“the Last Judgment will reveal even to its further consequences the good each person has done or failed to do during his earthly life” [no. 1039]; and (6) the new heaven and new earth (“the final realization of the unity of the human race” [no. 1045], “the profound destiny of material world and man” [no. 1046].

This outline is important because it details the ways in which, *and this is key*, the immediate entrance into the ‘blessedness of heaven’ in point (1) is a separate event from point (6) what seems to be the time of the general resurrection and the revealing of the new heaven and earth. So, ‘heaven’ in Article 12 Section II (in the main
I say that doctrinal teachings such as the above are, if true, potentially devastating to Paul’s argument for the necessary connection between resurrection and post-mortem hope. Why is a doctrine espousing a paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied souls problematic for Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15? To attempt answering this question, consider the following argument:

Christ’s Intermediate State (CIS):

P\(_{10}\): If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true, then, at biological death, Christ \(qua\) disembodied human being went to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.

P\(_{11}\): The doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true. (From, for example, \(WCF\) and The Catechism of the Catholic Church)

C\(_5\): Therefore: Christ \(qua\) disembodied human being went, at biological death, to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.

This argument is surely valid; however, it is not yet clear how, if sound, it might unhinge the argument I say Paul makes in 1 Corinthians 15, the conclusion of which was this: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.\(^{95}\) To demonstrate the calamity for Paul’s argument (or, at any rate, my presentation of Paul’s argument) given the truth of (CIS)’s conclusion, we need to see what the Dead Christ, Dead in Christ (DCDiC) argument should say if one believes the premises of (CIS).

Recall (DCDiC):

P\(_1\): Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.

P\(_2\): Christ’s being dead implies that of all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.

C\(_1\): Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.

But, if a Christian substance dualist assumes that a disembodied existence in Paradise follows any righteous human’s death, then what he should take Paul to mean in (DCDiC) is actually:

Christ in Paradise, Paradise in Christ (CiPPiC):

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\(^{95}\)C\(_1\) in (DCDiC).
P₁*: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies his remaining as a disembodied human being in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.
P₂*: Christ’s remaining as a disembodied human being in Paradise implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.
C₇*: Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.

The first premise of this argument, P₁*, certainly seems true if it is the case that disembodied humans go to Paradise following death and before resurrection. The Intermediate State affirms that disembodied human beings do just this. Further, P₂* seems true if, as Paul indicates, the fate of Christ and his followers are linked; that is, if it is true that the fate of the one (the followers) depends on the fate of the other (Jesus). And, the conclusion follows immediately.

However, for the ‘Christ in Paradise, Paradise-in-Christ’ argument to get off the ground, the Christ’s Intermediate State argument (CIS) has to go through. There are, though, some tendentious premises in (CIS). Consider, first, P₁₀:

P₁₀: If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true, then, at biological death, Christ qua human being went to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.

Does this premise assume too much? Prima facie, it assumes that Jesus is righteous. Jesus’s assumed righteousness might be questionable; at least, it might be questionable when considered divorced from his being resurrected. The dogmatic Christian documents like the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Catechism of the Catholic Church, after all, indicate that only the righteous go to disembodied Paradise. And, according to most exegetes and theologians, one of Paul’s primary points in the 1 Cor. 15 passage is that if Christ did not resurrect, then his claims regarding his identity, righteousness, etc. are unfounded. ⁹⁶ To wit, T. F. Torrance:

⁹⁶See Anthony Thiselton’s explanation in his The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), cf. 1219 – 1220; Watson, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 162.
In other words, it is in the resurrection of Jesus Christ that all that God had to say about our forgiveness, and all that Jesus had said about our forgiveness, became actualized in the same sphere of reality as that to which we belong. The word of pardon was fully enacted in our existence—that is why, once more, St. Paul could say that if Jesus Christ is not risen from the dead, then we are still in our sins, unforgiven and unshriven.  

What Torrance seems to mean is that, if Jesus has not been resurrected, he remains dead and, with him, the hope of forgiveness and justification. Thiselton echoes this sentiment by saying, “that without the resurrection of Christ, Christ’s death alone has no atoning, redemptive, or liberating effect in relation to human sin”. Indeed, claims Thiselton, Jesus’s vindication as righteous is demonstrated through, and not apart from, his bodily resurrection. The implied point here seems to be this: if Jesus is not resurrected, he is not righteous. So, maybe

\[ P_{10}: \text{If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true, then, at biological death, Christ qua human being went to Paradise—an idyllic place and state} \]

is false because it assumes Christ’s righteousness apart from being validated by his bodily resurrection.

Intermediate State defender, Cooper, thinks that it is perfectly consistent with Christian theology to assume that Jesus qua human existed as a disembodied human being (i.e., soul) in a paradisiacal intermediate state. Recall his quote previously cited:

The intermediate state account, entailing a dualistic anthropology, would generate no Christological difficulty. In fact it would solve this problem since human nature is such that persons can exist temporarily without their bodies, Jesus Christ could have existed between Friday and Sunday without his body and yet have been one person with both a divine and a human nature. Lacking a body does not entail lacking a human nature completely.

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98 Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1220.

While it is true that Cooper’s statement nowhere explicitly states that Christ, while in the intermediate state, is in Paradise, Cooper, just earlier in the same monograph, denies the so-called “harrowing of Hell” (the sometimes affirmed teaching that Christ, upon death, went, as a soul, to free the faithful souls from the shackles of Hell). So, it is plausible to think that Cooper might agree with P₁₀:

\[ P_{10} : \text{If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true, then, at biological death, Christ \textit{qua} human being went to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

Matthew Levering, a Roman Catholic theologian, offers a similar understanding of Christ’s post-mortem existence:

As many biblical scholars point out, the eschatology of both Second-Temple Judaism and early Christianity affirmed the existence of a conscious intermediate state in which the dead await resurrection. When Jesus died, then, he entered this intermediate state. Jesus’ resurrection cannot be separated from his solidarity \textit{as a dead man} with those whom Hebrews calls “the great cloud of witness” (Heb 12:1)...Jesus’ entrance into the intermediate state inaugurates the liberation of the holy Israelites who were there waiting for him.¹⁰¹

Further to this, Levering notes that “[b]ecause of his faith, the good thief joins Christ in the intermediate spiritual paradise...this is what Jesus means by telling the good thief, “Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise” (Luke 23:43)”¹⁰² But, one wonders where, if Torrance, Thiselton, et. al. (including, in another place, Levering!) are correct concerning the vindicatory sign of Christ’s righteous status (i.e., the bodily resurrection), theologians like Cooper, Levering, and others find the warrant to believe Christ inhabits the

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¹⁰⁰Ibid., 130 – 131. Or, possibly, he descended to \textit{limbus patrum}. Erickson, \textit{Christian Theology}, 1184.

¹⁰¹Levering, \textit{Jesus and the Demise of Death}, 15 – 16. Here the ‘inauguration’ language plays off the ‘harrowing of Hell’ scenario in which Jesus frees the righteous captives and opens the doors of Paradise. But, the important point is this: Jesus enters Paradise \textit{before} bodily resurrection. If this is true, his vindication and righteousness—if the \textit{WCF} and \textit{CCC} statements about the necessary soteriological condition of those who enter Paradise is to be believed—is likewise prior to his bodily resurrection.

¹⁰²Ibid., 24.
abode of the ‘righteous’ prior to bodily resurrection.103 If the bodily resurrection is the event through which Jesus is vindicated and pronounced righteous, then he cannot have inhabited the place of the righteous prior to his bodily resurrection. This seems to me an objection that neither Cooper, nor any other intermediate state defender, has addressed. And, it seems to me an important objection.

This objection is important because The Intermediate State is not causally related to bodily resurrection in the sense that bodily resurrection causes the paradisiacal intermediate state. It is not through bodily resurrection that one is pronounced righteous and then sent to a disembodied Paradise. Only one person, according to Christian theology, has ever been resurrected: Jesus Christ. So, all those who have not been resurrected, yet are said to be in Paradise, have not been vindicated through their own resurrections. Yet, it seems consistent with The Intermediate State to say some of the dead are, at least in part, pronounced as vindicated by having been given a place in the disembodied Paradise.104

Moreover, as many Protestant stories go, The Intermediate State exists prior to Jesus’s resurrection (e.g., purportedly, OT saints and martyrs exist/live there).105 So, if the doctrine of The Intermediate State is true, what does a bodily resurrection do for Jesus that a paradisiacal intermediate state could not? Levering says this: “Sheol cannot hold the righteous; God rescues from Sheol. Jesus’s resurrection is necessary for faith in God because Israel’s God does not abandon his righteous to Sheol, and Jesus is supremely righteous”.106

103 Ibid., 32. “…had Jesus not actually been resurrected, then a crucified Messiah whose death seemingly changed nothing could hardly have been acclaimed by Jews as victorious over evil and as inaugurating the kingdom”.

104 Though, if The Intermediate State thesis is correct, I argue that the disembodied saints have been vindicated in full. There is simply nothing meaningful left for bodily resurrection to accomplish. See my following arguments.

105 Roman Catholics, of course, may hold something different, e.g., limbus patrum (limbo). See Erickson, Christian Theology, 1184, for example.

106 Levering, Jesus and the Demise of Death, 37.
But, given that Levering agrees that Jesus went to Paradise *qua* human *prior* to resurrection, Levering’s reasoning for the *necessity* of Jesus’s resurrection seems obviously false. For, if Paradise is reserved for the righteous, and Jesus went there following his bodily death and *before* his bodily resurrection, then Christ, *pre-resurrection*, has already been vindicated—he is alive, well, pronounced righteous, and living in a nigh perfect existence—all without resurrection. But, if Jesus’s bodily resurrection is the action *through which* he is vindicated, then a solution to our problem becomes clear: Jesus is *not* vindicated prior to resurrection (i.e., not pronounced righteous and benefitting from all of the privileges that come along with that pronouncement); rather, he is, *qua* human, *dead* prior to resurrection. Here I want to affirm with I. Howard Marshall that, in Christ’s case, to conquer death through resurrection is to be vindicated, and to be vindicated is to conquer death through resurrection.¹⁰⁷ Such a solution is at odds with the widely held teaching of The Intermediate State and, in particular, its implied substance dualism. Substance dualism can only suggest that Jesus’s body is dead, not Jesus *himself* *qua* human. Additionally, The Intermediate State suggests that Jesus is pronounced as righteous without bodily resurrection. I count these as strong reasons to reject substance dualism and The Intermediate State.

If it is true that Christ, *qua* human being, went to Paradise following his biological death, and, if it is true that Christ’s fate and his followers’ fates are linked, then Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state. This is exactly how the Christ in Paradise, Paradise-in-Christ argument concludes. And, with this sort of conclusion, there is a further consequence, namely, that bodily resurrection is qualitatively superfluous for the redeemed dead.¹⁰⁸ Let us call the argument that demonstrates this consequence, Paradisiacal Hope (PH):


¹⁰⁸Recall the (CIS) and (CiPPiC) arguments:
(PH):

\[ P_{12}: \text{Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body, implies not being dead in one’s sins (nor dead at all).} \]

\[ P_{13}: \text{Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body, implies one’s having hope beyond this life (not hope in this life only).} \]

\[ P_{14}: \text{Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body, implies one’s not being the object of pity.} \]

\[ C_6: \text{Therefore: Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body, implies not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity.} \]

Such an argument may seem overly verbose and unnecessary. Perhaps there is a more pithy way of putting the point. But the (PH) argument is given to precisely spell out a conclusion, built on the implications of The Intermediate State, that cuts the legs out from under Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19. After all, in this passage, Paul seems to argue that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that Christians are a soteriologically, eschatologically, and otherwise pitiable lot (cf. v. 19); resurrection is not qualitatively superfluous. But the conclusion of the Paradisiacal Hope argument, with its combination of substance dualism and the paradisiacal disembodied intermediate state, explicitly contradicts such a sentiment. In other words, if one goes, as a disembodied human being to Paradise upon the death of one’s body, one is not dead, let alone dead in her sins, nor eschatologically hopeless, nor the proper object of pity. It seems The Intermediate State renders one of our guiding theological affirmations,

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Christ’s Intermediate State (CIS):

\[ P_{10}: \text{If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true, then, at biological death, Christ \textit{qua} human being went to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

\[ P_{11}: \text{The doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state for disembodied human beings is true. (From, for example, WCF and The Catechism of the Catholic Church)} \]

\[ C_5: \text{Therefore: Christ \textit{qua} human being went, at biological death, to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

Christ in Paradise, Paradise in Christ (CiP PiC):

\[ P_1*: \text{Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies his remaining as a disembodied human being in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

\[ P_2*: \text{Christ’s remaining as a disembodied human being in Paradise implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

\[ C_1*: \text{Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]
TA1: That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife, false.

Here is how The Intermediate State renders TA1 false. I will call the following claim ‘Superfluous Resurrection’ (SR):

(SR): If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state is true, then the bodily resurrection is not the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity.

(SR) implies that if The Intermediate State obtains, bodily resurrection is metaphysically and qualitatively superfluous. But why think that The Intermediate State implies anything like the qualitative superfluity of bodily resurrection? Could it not be the case that, as the Westminster Divines put it, the disembodied souls of the righteous are “…waiting for the full redemption of their bodies…”?\(^\text{109}\) In response, I think it suffices to say that I am not at all sure what one might mean by saying that the righteous disembodied are both in Paradise, an idyllic place and state, and that their position would be improved by bodily resurrection to such a degree that it warrants the sort of impetus Paul seems to place on it: “For if the dead are not raised…we are of all people most to be pitied” (1 Cor. 15.16-19).\(^\text{110}\) In the words of Martin Luther: “That would be a silly soul if it were in heaven and desired its body!”\(^\text{111}\) That is to say, it may be that substance dualism, the paradisiacal intermediate state, and bodily resurrection obtain, but it seems to follow from the arguments I have presented that, if substance dualism and the paradisiacal intermediate state obtain, then, at minimum, not only

\(^{109}\text{WCF, 98.}\)

\(^{110}\text{As C6 in the Paradisiacal Hope argument puts it, going to Paradise implies not being the object of anyone’s pity. Who rightly pities a person in Paradise? In 1 Corinthians 15.12-19, though, Paul seems to paint an ugly picture for the dead sans resurrection. Even if one takes a more qualitatively minimal account of disembodied Paradise, like, for example, N. T. Wright, it is hard to see how one could be, in his words, in “happy rest” and the proper object of pity or the subject of any of the other horrible predicates Paul rhetorically applies to those falsely hoping in bodily resurrection. N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope, 171. As minimal as Wright’s understanding of ‘heaven’ hopes to be, though, he suggests this: “…it is a state in which the dead are held firmly within the conscious love of God and the conscious presence of Jesus Christ while they await [resurrection]. There is no reason why this state should not be called heaven…” My insert. Ibid., 172.}\)

is Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 unsound, but the bodily resurrection of those in Paradise is superfluous—both qualitatively and metaphysically.

Recall that the superfluity of the bodily resurrection for those in Paradise is the conclusion reached by the Redundant Resurrection argument:

(RR):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
2. The Intermediate State obtains. (Widely held Church teaching)
3. The bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (MP from (1) and (2))

I submit that this conclusion is undesirable for Christian doctrine. Further, given the truth of Christian theism, particularly a Christian theism that affirms TA1, I assume that any Redundant Resurrection argument must be unsound.

III. Some Objections and Some Rejoinders

Before we move on to finding a way around The Intermediate State and its rendering the bodily resurrection superfluous, a number of objections and rejoinders should be rehearsed. After all, a lot has been said in a short amount of space. And, much of what has been said is thick with theological importance and assumptions. Let us, then, think through a number of objections to premises and conclusions not heretofore defended.

The most potent and important possible objection could come from those defenders of The Intermediate State who might ask: why believe Jesus was in Paradise as a disembodied human soul? Why not, instead, think that Jesus was in Paradise qua God the Son (as an omnipresent being), but in Hell qua human soul? Thomas Aquinas, in the tertia pars of his Summa Theologica, seems to say something approximating this:

I answer that, As Christ, in order to take our penalties upon Himself, willed His body to be laid in the tomb, so likewise He willed His soul to descend into hell. But the body lay in the tomb for a day and two nights, so as to demonstrate the truth of His death. Consequently, it is to be believed that His
soul was in hell, in order that it might be brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body from the tomb.  

Further, Thomas says, “…it was said to [the thief on the cross]: *This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise*; still as to reward he was in paradise, because he enjoyed Christ’s Godhead just as the other saints did”.  

Thomas’s metaphysics concerning human beings (and their natures) is not simple. So, fleshing out what Thomas means in these two quotes is far from easy. Much more of this will be discussed in Chapter Four. For now, note that Thomas thinks it is simply not true that a human being consists in merely a human soul; human beings require the union of body and soul. So, says Thomas, Christ was not in Hell *qua* human being but *qua* human soul.  

Even though Thomas thinks it is true that Christ was present in Hell between his death and resurrection, he does not think it is true that Christ was in Hell as a human being.  

That said, set Thomas’s metaphysics aside for the moment. Suppose a substance dualist agrees with Thomas’s theological sentiment that Christ’s soul descended and remained in Hell after his death and prior to his resurrection. For a substance dualist this entails that, as a human being, Jesus Christ was in Hell. If such a view is theologically acceptable, the conclusions of the Christ’s Intermediate State (CIS) and Christ in Paradise, Paradise in Christ (CiPiP) arguments appear false. Recall their conclusions are, respectively:

\[ C_5: \text{Therefore: Christ qua disembodied human being went, at biological death, to Paradise—an idyllic place and state.} \]

and

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113 Aquinas, *ST III* 52.4 reply to obj. 3, 368. My insert.

114 See, for example, Aquinas, *ST III* 52.3 reply to obj. 2 and 3, 366.
C1*: Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ remain in Paradise—an idyllic place and state.

If these conclusions are false, then it seems possible that other arguments heretofore presented might be unsound. For, if Christ is in Hell qua human and not in Paradise, and his post-mortem fate has implications on the post-mortem fate of those who died ‘in Christ’, it is plausible that Paradise is not a guarantee (or even a possible hope) for the dead in Christ, if Christ has not been bodily resurrected. And, is this not a conclusion consistent with the argument I say Paul makes in 1 Corinthians 15.12-19? After all, as Thomas’s quote, Paul’s argument, and the possible objection go, it is Christ’s resurrection that opens the doors of Paradise to the faithful among the dead. And this is because, prior to resurrection, Christ qua human was not vindicated.

This is a forceful and formidable argument. For the moment, let us suppose that the argument succeeds. Does this overturn the arguments leading to the conclusion that the bodily resurrection of those in paradise is superfluous, a conclusion that motivates the proposal to jettison substance dualism and The Intermediate State? No, it does not. Consider again the premises upon which the Paradisiacal Hope (PH) argument trade. They entail a conclusion that follows regardless of whether Christ is in Paradise before or after his resurrection:

\[ \begin{align*}
P_{12}: & \text{ Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body,} \\
& \text{ implies not being dead in one’s sins (nor dead at all).} \\
P_{13}: & \text{ Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body,} \\
& \text{ implies one’s having hope beyond this life (not hope in this life only).} \\
P_{14}: & \text{ Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body,} \\
& \text{ implies one’s not being the object of pity.} \\
C_6: & \text{ Therefore: Going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of} \\
& \text{ one’s body implies, not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this} \\
& \text{ life, and one’s not being the object of pity.}
\end{align*} \]

Assume that Christ is in Paradise qua human only after his bodily resurrection. The Paradisiacal Hope argument goes through. This is because The Intermediate State asserts that human beings can exist as disembodied souls and that the plane of existence in which they
live after death and prior to resurrection is paradisiacal in nature. Even if, as some theologians argue, the OT saints were in the prison of Hell prior to being released through the work of Christ’s death and subsequent harrowing of Hell, all theologians who affirm The Intermediate State agree: post-Christ’s resurrection, all biologically dead believers exist in a disembodied Paradise. So, if the Paradisiacal Hope argument goes through, I do not see how the Superfluous Resurrection claim,

(SR): If the doctrine of the paradisiacal intermediate state is true, then the bodily resurrection is not the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity,

is false. (SR) hangs on the truth of the conclusion to the Paradisiacal Hope argument, namely, that going as a disembodied human being to Paradise, at the death of one’s body, implies not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity. Such a conclusion is what The Intermediate State implies. So, if The Intermediate State obtains, the Superfluous Resurrection claim is true.

Because of this, even if substance dualism were true, bodiless humans cannot inhabit Paradise. If the Christian substance dualist wishes to affirm a disembodied post-mortem state, then she will have to deny TA2: immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise. Ones who affirm TA2 cannot simultaneously affirm that human persons will exist without human bodies because of the problems implied by (SR). And if humans never exist without their bodies, given TAs 1 – 3, substance dualism lacks a lot, if not all, of its motivation.

Here is another possible objection. Suppose that Paul’s argument “If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied” is not an argument for the necessity of the bodily resurrection of the redeemed; rather, suppose it is an argument for why Christ’s bodily resurrection is necessary for Christian hope. “Of course”, this objector might reason, “Paul must argue that bodily resurrection simpliciter is possible if Christ’s resurrection is to be thought possible. But, it does not follow from this that a more general
resurrection is a point of emphasis for his argument concerning the pitiable status of Christians who believe in a non-resurrected Messiah’. To this objection there are, at least, two points possible for response. First, and probably most important, the rest of the 1 Cor. 15 chapter (i.e., vv. 20ff) seems to argue precisely for the resurrection of (at least) redeemed humans. This is evident in how Paul answers various and sundry worries concerning the nature of the future resurrection body of all redeemed humans (vv. 35 – 49). Further to that, Paul insists that Jesus’s resurrection is the first-fruits, the down payment, on the future resurrection (vv. 20, 23). So, though Christ’s resurrection is the foundational event upon which Christian hope is placed, the event of Christ’s resurrection seems to entail something further, namely a future bodily resurrection of believers. After all, there are no ‘first-fruits’ of a harvest if there is no harvest. This means that placing hope on Christ’s resurrection just is to simultaneously hope for the future bodily resurrection of all redeemed humans (at least). There is an entailment here: if Jesus bodily resurrects, then, necessarily, so will his followers. Denying the consequent, the future bodily resurrection of Jesus’s followers, is to deny the antecedent, Jesus’s resurrection. Moreover, Paul seems to make an argument in verses 29-32 where the implication seems to be that, if there is no resurrection of the redeemed, then the perils in which Paul and other Christian brothers and sisters toil is utterly vain: “Why are we in danger every hour…If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’” (1 Cor. 15.30, 32). That is to say, if there is no resurrection of the redeemed, then there is no hope of a meaningful afterlife.

The whole of 1 Corinthians 15 does not support the claim that Paul is not trying to establish an argument for the resurrection of the redeemed as a necessary condition for Christian eschatological hope. This is point one against arguments that affirm such a claim.

Point two is this: there is no good reason to think that God’s vindication of Jesus must come through bodily resurrection \textit{if it is true that human beings do not need to be resurrected to be saved from death.}

In Christ’s case, to conquer death is to be vindicated and to be vindicated is to conquer death. This conquering vindication happens through bodily resurrection. But, to argue that Christ’s resurrection is the only resurrection that is required for Christian post-mortem hope is massively \textit{ad hoc}. To see why, consider that, according to The Intermediate State, believing humans do not need to be bodily resurrected in order to be vindicated; they are, \textit{ex hypothesi, alive} in The Intermediate State precisely because \textit{they are vindicated.} Those in the disembodied paradisiacal state seem to have conquered death. Sure, they have not conquered biological death; but, so what? According to The Intermediate State, they are in Paradise. I am not at all clear why one’s body’s being dead would so much as matter whilst one is in Paradise. According to the rehearsed objection, Jesus becomes the only exception to this otherwise universal rule. Why? I submit that, given the metaphysics of substance dualism and The Intermediate State, there is no good answer to this question. Ironically, known defender of an intermediate state, N. T. Wright, warns:

\begin{quote}
To speak, as many Christians have done, of the body dying, and the soul going marching on, is not only a travesty of what Paul says. It has encouraged many to suppose that the victory over death is the escape of the soul from the dead body. That is a dangerous lie. It is resurrection that is the defeat of death...Let us not collude with the enemy.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

I propose that those of us who consider the bodily resurrection to be neither qualitatively nor metaphysically superfluous heed Wright’s warning. To do that, though, one must undo The Intermediate State and the metaphysics of substance dualism. It is to this task I now turn.

IV. If Paul’s Argument is Sound, then Substance Dualism is False.

I take it that Paul’s being unsound in his 1 Corinthians 15 argument and superfluous notions of resurrection are undesirable conclusions for Christian theology. How, then, might Christian theologians who affirm

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,
TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and
TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings

refine Christian doctrine so as to coherently affirm Paul’s being sound in his argument in 1 Corinthians 15 and the necessity of bodily resurrection for post-mortem hope? I think the simplest and most straightforward corrective action is to jettison substance dualism and The Intermediate State.

Step one: get rid of The Intermediate State. To begin to see how theologians might do this, consider the following two arguments:

False Corinthian Claim (FCC):

\[ P_{15}: \] If 1 Corinthians 15.12-19’s claim that bodily resurrection is the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity is true, then it is false that bodily resurrection is not the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity.

\[ P_{16}: \] It is true that bodily resurrection is not the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity.\[ C_{7}: \] 1 Corinthians 15.12-19’s claim that it is true that bodily resurrection is the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins (etc.) is false.

Or

True Corinthian Claim (TCC):

\[ P_{15}^*: \] If 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 claims that bodily resurrection is the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins, one’s having hope beyond this life, and one’s not being the object of pity and is true, then The Intermediate State does not obtain.\[ 117 \]

\[ 117 \]Note that this is identical to the Superfluous Resurrection (SR) claim.
P₁₆*: 1 Corinthians 15.12-19 claims that bodily resurrection is the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins (etc.) and is true.

C₇*: The Intermediate State does not obtain.

The conclusion of the False Corinthian Claim argument is this:

C₇: 1 Corinthians 15.12-19’s claim that it is true that bodily resurrection is the only hope of not being dead in one’s sins (etc.) is false.

The conclusion of the True Corinthian Claim, following from the False Corinthian Claim’s being unsound, says that The Intermediate State does not obtain:

C₇*: The Intermediate State does not obtain.

Given all I have said, the conclusions of (FCC) and (TCC) are conflicting claims. The choice of holding either the conclusion of (FCC), with its inclusion of the falsity of Paul’s claim, or (TCC), with its inclusion of the truth of Paul’s claim, is not a false dichotomy. There is a contradiction in The Intermediate State and a charitable reading of Paul’s 1 Corinthians 15 argument.¹¹⁹ This is because, following on the previous arguments, P₁₆ in The False Corinthian Claim argument can be restated in this way:

P₁₆*: The Intermediate State obtains.

(TCC), then, can be read as a modus tollens of (FCC).

The upshot is that Christian theology cannot hold to a doctrine of the paradisiacal disembodied intermediate state and claim that Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15:12-19 is sound. That simply will not work. To this point, Joost Holleman argues that one of Paul’s key arguments in the 1 Cor. 15 passage is that, for believers, the state of bliss comes only at the parousia (i.e., the return) of Christ precisely because the state of bliss is bound up in the promised general resurrection of which Christ’s is the first-fruits and guarantee.¹²⁰ Given the

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¹¹⁸This follows modus tollens from the (SR) claim. So, P₁₅*, says, in effect, if the (SR) claim is false, then The Intermediate State does not obtain.

¹¹⁹By ‘charitable,’ I mean a reading that does not imply that Paul is implicitly and internally contradictory. In other words, I think Paul is arguing something like (DCDiC).

¹²⁰Joost Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia, 1-2, 49.
qualitatively non-superfluous nature of bodily resurrection, it simply cannot be the case that resurrection is preceded by Paradise. It is, rather, only through resurrection that one reaches Paradise. In other words, if it is true that there is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality (PS), it is only as a result of eschatological bodily resurrection.

The same sort of dichotomy exists, or so I say, between substance dualism’s being true and the conclusion to the Dead Christ, Dead in Christ (DCDiC) argument from earlier in the chapter. So, step two: get rid of substance dualism. Recall that the (DCDiC) argument I say is in Paul’s 1 Corinthians 15 passage (vv. 12 – 19) is this:

\[ P_1: \text{Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.} \]
\[ P_2: \text{Christ’s being dead implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ C_1: \text{Therefore: Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]

Recall also the Substance Dualist Rejoinder (SDR):

\[ P_3: \text{Human beings do not need bodies to be living human beings. (Substance dualist thesis)} \]
\[ P_4: \text{A human being’s body not being resurrected does not imply a human being’s being dead. (Implication of substance dualist thesis)} \]
\[ P_5: \text{Jesus Christ is a human being (i.e., a person with a human nature). (Christian doctrine)} \]
\[ C_2: \text{Therefore: Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead. (From P}_3, P_4, \text{ and P}_5) \]
\[ P_6: \text{If Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead, then it is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.} \]
\[ P_7: C_2: \text{Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead} \]
\[ C_3: \therefore \text{It is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead. (i.e., } \neg P_1) \]
\[ P_8: \text{If it is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead, then it is false that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ P_9: C_3: \text{It is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies Christ’s being dead.} \]
\[ C_4: \therefore \text{It is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
As a reminder, these arguments are not only logically valid, but the final conclusion of the (SDR) argument, C₄, asserts that it is false that Christ’s not being bodily resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished. This explicitly contradicts Paul’s 1 Corinthians 15 argument (or so I say). So, either the substance dualist is correct with (SDR) or Paul is correct with (DCDiC). Therefore, Christian theologians who take Scripture and its writers as, in some sense, serious and authoritative on theological matters should do away with substance dualism.

Perhaps this conclusion is too quick. There may be a problem here for the (DCDiC) and (SDR) arguments. At the end of §III, I rehearse an objection against the (DCDiC) argument to the effect that the substance dualist can affirm that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished, affirm the substance dualist thesis, and reject the (SDR) argument on the grounds that Jesus Christ does need a body to be alive and his body not being resurrected does imply his being dead (i.e., C₂ is false). According to this objection, Jesus, as it turns out, is an exception to the substance dualist thesis. It is through his resurrection, so the objection goes, that he comes back to life, conquers the grave, and is so vindicated. So, the substance dualist thesis need not lead to a negation of Paul’s argument thus outlined.

This sort of maneuver is, as I say above, massively ad hoc. There is no reason to suggest that, if the substance dualist thesis is true, the conclusion of (SDR) does not follow. This is because, if the substance dualist thesis is true at all, it is true for all human beings. According to Christian teaching, Jesus Christ was and is a human being (i.e., a person with a human nature). So the conclusion to (SDR) follows deductively by simply assuming a basic metaphysical hypothesis, the substance dualist thesis. If the conclusion to (SDR) is true, the conclusion to (DCDiC)—Paul’s argument—must be false. One cannot hold to the substance dualist thesis and Paul’s argument in 1 Cor. 15. Anyone in agreement with Paul’s argument
in 1 Cor. 15 should reject substance dualism. I submit that most Christian theologians should agree with Paul’s argument. So, most Christian theologians should reject substance dualism.

Here is one clear way for doing this:

Dualism’s Death (DD):

\[ P_{17}: \text{If substance dualism is true, then Christ’s not being bodily resurrected does not imply that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ P_{18}: \text{Christ’s not being bodily resurrected does imply that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ C_8: \therefore \text{Substance dualism is false. MT}^{121} \]

Or, to rephrase (DD) using the law of transitivity of implication, one gets:\(^{122}\)

\[ (DD'):\]

\[ P_{17}\ast: \text{If Jesus Christ does not need a body to be alive and not being resurrected does not imply Jesus Christ’s being dead, then it is false that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ P_{18}\ast: \text{It is true that Christ’s not being resurrected implies that all of those who have ‘fallen asleep’ in Christ have perished.} \]
\[ C_8\ast: \therefore \text{Jesus Christ does need a body to be alive and not being resurrected does imply Jesus Christ’s being dead. MT}^{123} \]

(DD’) claims that Jesus Christ \textit{does} need a body to be alive (\textit{qua} human, at any rate) and that not being bodily resurrected \textit{does} imply Jesus Christ’s being dead (again, \textit{qua} human). I claim that this conclusion entails the falsity of substance dualism precisely because affirming that Jesus Christ \textit{needs} a body to be alive \textit{qua} human being entails a denial of two truth claims that are \textit{essential} to the metaphysics of substance dualism. This is because, metaphysically speaking, if Jesus, as a \textit{human} being, \textit{needs} a body to be alive, then the

\[^{121}\text{Here is a shorthand way of writing this argument:} \]
\[ P_{17}: \text{If substance dualism is true, } \sim C_1. \]
\[ P_{18}: C_1 \]
\[ C_8: \therefore \text{Substance dualism is false. MT} \]

\[^{122}\text{Here is the transitivity of implication displayed: if } C_2 \text{ implies } \sim P_1 \text{ and } \sim P_1 \text{ implies } \sim C_1, \text{ then } C_2 \text{ implies } \sim C_1. \text{ See the next note.} \]

\[^{123}\text{This argument in shorthand:} \]
\[ P_{17}\ast: \text{If } C_2, \text{ then } \sim C_1. \]
\[ P_{18}\ast: C_1. \]
\[ C_8\ast: \sim C_2. \text{ MT} \]
substance dualist thesis is false. This is because Jesus’s needing a body to be alive qua human denies the following:

P₃: Human beings do not need bodies to be living human beings

and

P₄: A human being’s body not being resurrected does not imply a human being’s being dead.

These propositions, P₃ and P₄—premises in the Substance Dualist Rejoinder—represent essential components of the substance dualist thesis. If just one of these essential truth claims of substance dualism is false, so is the entire conception. But, as it happens, if Paul is correct, both of these claims are false and, therefore, substance dualism is false. Paul is correct; therefore, substance dualism is false. QED.

V. Substance Dualism and the Intermediate State: A Post-mortem and a Way Ahead.

At the beginning of this chapter, I set out to place the advocate of The Intermediate State on the horns of a dilemma. Either she can affirm a Redundant Resurrection argument (RR):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
2. The Intermediate State obtains. (Widely held Church teaching)
3. The bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (MP from (1) and (2))

or else she can affirm a Necessary Resurrection argument (NR):

1. If The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
4. The bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Widely held Church teaching)
5. The Intermediate State does not obtain. (MT from (1) and (4)).

Moreover, I argue that these arguments’ shared premise, (1), is true. Because (1) is true, I further argue that it is false that The Intermediate State obtains. What is true, on Christian theism, is that the bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state (premise (4)). To advocate for premise (1) and show that The Intermediate State does not
obtain, the exercise has been to show that The Intermediate State problematically conjoins the following two states of affairs where both conjuncts are taken as true:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death that is a state in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind) and

(PS): There is a state of existence following a believing human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.

At this point, it seems quite plausible that the (NR) argument is sound. The Redundant Resurrection argument, (RR), in light of the majority of Christian theism, must be unsound. But (NR) is sound and (RR) is unsound precisely at their point of connection: the first premise of each is true. Given Christian theism, (1) is likely true because, if The Intermediate State obtains, then the argument for Paradisiacal Hope (PH) is sound and the Superfluous Resurrection (SR) claim is true. This is so because, if Paradise is conceived as a place that is ‘inhabited’ by disembodied human souls/minds and precedes the bodily resurrection, then bodily resurrection adds nothing of importance to post-mortem human existence. Bodily resurrection would be, and hence the Superfluous Resurrection claim, entirely superfluous for those in Paradise. Thus, the conditional claim “if The Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state” is true. And, if this conditional claim is true, and Christian theism is true (with its claim that bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in Paradise), it follows logically that The Intermediate State does not obtain. If The Intermediate State does not obtain, then the conjunction of (SD) and (PS)—where both are taken as true—does not obtain. So, the Necessary Resurrection argument is sound. Resurrection is necessary for those in the paradisiacal state.

So much for The Intermediate State so conceived. What about substance dualism? I have given the advocate of (PS)—the claim that there exists a state of existence following a
believing human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality—at least one hopefully convincing reason for thinking that substance dualism is unmotivated and the (SD) conjunct of The Intermediate State the conjunct to jettison. This reason is that the untoward consequences of The Intermediate State thesis follow from the conjunction of the (SD) and (PS) states of affairs such that the disembodied post-mortem state is taken to be paradisiacal and preceding bodily resurrection. However, if one simply denies (SD), viz., that there is a state of existence following human biological death that is a state in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind), and its entailed metaphysics of substance dualism, the initial untoward consequences of positing a post-mortem paradisiacal state disappear (i.e., one can affirm (PS)).

(PS), so stated, is not committed to any philosophical anthropology. It is just an ecclesial position that seems nearly universally affirmed (in the Church). What is more, (PS), taken by itself, has no *prima facie* difficulty conjoining with the necessity of bodily resurrection. So, as I say at the beginning of this chapter, I intend to affirm (PS), that there is a state of existence following a believing human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality. But, merely affirming (PS) does not commit one to any particular anthropological conception.

Likewise, I have given Christian theologians (at any rate, those who take Paul as theologically authoritative and agree with the most attested reading of the 1 Cor. 15 argument) at least one hopefully convincing reason that substance dualism should be considered false. This reason is that substance dualism appears to undercut a key Pauline argument in 1 Corinthians 15. It seems so because the Substance Dualist Rejoinder (SDR), the argument assuming the metaphysics of substance dualism, entails that the *necessity* of bodily resurrection for post-mortem life is false. Some objections to this conclusion have been surveyed and found wanting. So, if one wishes to take Paul’s argument as sound (if, that
is, I have set it up correctly), one must reject substance dualism. If substance dualism is false, then so is the idea that there exists a disembodied state of existence following a human’s biological death. And if this is false, then one of the two states of affairs purportedly making The Intermediate State metaphysically viable is false, namely, (SD). This is another good reason to think that the Necessary Resurrection argument is sound. The Intermediate State does not obtain because substance dualism is false.\footnote{I suppose there is a large caveat for this assertion. The caveat is this: another solution might be to jettison the necessity of bodily resurrection in some way. Or, one might try and find another way to read Paul’s argument such that he is not pinning any eschatological or post-mortem hope on the general bodily resurrection. Anthony Thielson and Joseph Fitzmyer suggest there are a number of possible difficulties with which Paul was interacting. It could have been the case that the Corinthians denied the possibility of bodily resurrection, or they could have believed it already occurred in an inner or ‘spiritual’ sense, or they might have denied post-mortem existence as such. It is notoriously difficult to pin down which problem(s) it is that Paul addresses. But, for our purposes, what matters is whether or not Paul might recognize the (DCDiC) argument and whether or not The Intermediate State and (SDR) refute such an argument. I conclude that he would and they do. See Thielson, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians}, 1172 – 1178, 1216; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S. J. \textit{First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 558 – 561. Further, one could bite the bullet and say that Paul’s dreadful language concerning a world in which there is no resurrection is hyperbolic and purely rhetorical. These seem to me moves available to the one who wants to defend substance dualism and The Intermediate State. At any rate, it seems to me that my arguments show at least this: a metaphysics used (substance dualism), and a doctrine taught (The Intermediate State), by the majority of the Christian tradition is beset with problems when set against a further Christian teaching (bodily resurrection). So, one must either jettison these things or revise the way they are used in concert with other Christian teachings. Acknowledging this should advance the discussion. The rest of my project is simply one attempt at moving forward.}

If the preceding arguments against The Intermediate State and substance dualism are sound, theologians in the Christian tradition ought to jettison the doctrine of a paradisiacal disembodied intermediate state and the metaphysics of substance dualism.\footnote{Again, these conclusions are aimed at those theologians who hold the ‘traditional’ understanding of post-mortem pre-resurrection presence with Christ, the authoritative status of Scripture, the importance of bodily resurrection, and the widely agreed understanding of the argument (and conclusion) presented in the 1 Corinthians 15 chapter. For those theologians who do not affirm that Paradise awaits the disembodied human, think that bodily resurrection is a fairy story, or otherwise, the arguments presented here will be unconvincing. A project addressing such theologians would be, on the whole, different.} This is especially true for those who wish to affirm:

TA1: That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope for afterlife.

Moreover, those that think St. Paul’s biblical writing is not internally contradictory—not least in the framing of his own arguments—should likewise jettison The Intermediate State and substance dualism. Now, abandoning these historically held positions is difficult,
precisely because the historic doctrines that I suggest should be abandoned are trying to coherently address questions concerning post-mortem fate. There are almost certainly answers to these questions that Christian theology can provide, but I submit that they are not found in substance dualism or the paradisiacal intermediate state. Rather, I think the answers lie in the hope of bodily resurrection and bodily resurrection alone. This is because the hope of Paradise seems to be the hope of bodily resurrection.126 So, if it is true that there is a state of existence following a believing human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality, it is only by virtue of the bodily resurrection. I, like the majority of the Christian tradition, take it that there is such a state. The task for the rest of the project is now clear: identify and develop a metaphysics that is coherent and affirms, in an internally consistent way:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Chapter Two

Body Identity Physicalism and Resurrection Hope

Introduction

Bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope for Christian theism. This proposition, I say in the introduction and Chapter 1, is a theological truism for many Christians and Christian theologians. Indeed, it seems the majority of the Christian faith affirms this truism. This affirmation I label: TA1. Chapter 1 further argues that the majority Christian position on The Intermediate State, and its attendant philosophical anthropology (i.e., substance dualism), undercuts this theological affirmation. As such, The Intermediate State and substance dualism should be jettisoned. This is a summary of the argument of Chapter 1.

Now, if substance dualism is false, or, at least, entirely unmotivated given the doctrine of the bodily resurrection, then Christian theology needs a metaphysics that accounts for the nature of human beings such that it sits well in Christian theology. At this juncture, then, a slight shift in focus is needed. Finding a coherent metaphysics of human persons, in light of the falsity of substance dualism, requires a more philosophical inquiry into the nature of human beings. I say a more ‘philosophical’ inquiry, but not strictly so. For, consistent with the aim of this project, the guiding presuppositions in the forthcoming analysis are theological rather than philosophical. Even still, the investigation into the metaphysics of human persons is, normally speaking, housed in the discipline of analytic philosophy. So, this chapter will, in many ways, be the outworking of analytic philosophical reasoning. Nevertheless, the reader is asked to keep in mind that, again, the guiding presuppositions are theological: TAs 1 – 3.
In analytic philosophy, the metaphysics on offer that is normally seen as something like the contradictory of substance dualism is physicalism—a monistic view of human beings. Physicalism is the thesis that human beings are essentially physical (i.e., material) things, not immaterial souls. Nor are humans taken to be a combination of immaterial and material. As a monist thesis, physicalism supposes that human beings are made up of one (broadly construed) kind of thing, namely, material. In contradistinction to substance dualism, if physicalism is true, for the post-mortem survival of human beings to obtain, bodily resurrection must obtain. Physicalism, then, has an easy way to satisfy TA1 of the three theological affirmations: that bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife. But is physicalism true?

In order to attempt to answer this question, I will first look at the sorts of physicalism that suggest that human persons and their human bodies are identical (though, some of these theories may have nuanced accounts of this identity claim). This I will call ‘body identity physicalism’ ((BI) physicalism). Because of this project’s guiding theological affirmations, if (BI) physicalism is to be considered a suitable replacement for substance dualism, (BI) physicalism must succeed where substance dualism fails. In other words, (BI) physicalism must be consistent with:

- TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,
- TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and
- TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

It is rather obvious that (BI) physicalist accounts that affirm the future bodily resurrection imply the affirmation of TA1. This is because, on (BI) physicalism, if there is no resurrection of the body, there is no afterlife. But, there are legitimate questions about whether (BI) physicalism can satisfy TA2 and TA3. Here are two such: Can a body identity
physicalist conception give an account of the identity of a human being, e.g., Jones, such that Jones is the numerically same human from before her death and into her post-mortem (resurrection) existence? Further still, can a (BI) physicalist conception of resurrection give an account of human beings such that, when they die, they immediately move into existence in Paradise?

Trying to answer the preceding questions may be difficult for (BI) physicalist theses. To see why, consider first that it is normally taken as axiomatic that ‘whatever begins to exist and then fails to exist, cannot begin to exist again’. ¹ Let us call this ‘Locke’s Axiom’ (LA). Nearly all (but not all!) metaphysicians in the literature—including Christian ones—affirm (LA).² So, if there is a temporal gap between a human being’s death and her resurrection, it seems, given physicalism, that it is not so much as possible to bring the same person back to life. According to (LA), any ‘resurrected’ person would be, at best, a copy.³ And, this is because (BI) physicalists identify a human being with her body (again, the nuances of this vary). So, Locke’s Axiom seems contrary to what a (BI) physicalist thesis might imply for human death and human resurrection, viz., that a human person dies, goes out of existence, and then comes back into existence at the future resurrection of the body. That Locke’s Axiom and (BI) physicalist theses run into each other in this way generates a problem of

¹This axiom has its roots in John Locke. See his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chapter 27, I.1, 328. He says: “When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which ‘twas certain, at that instant, was the same with it self and no other: From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of Existence…” Hereafter: Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

²Notable exceptions include Trenton Merricks and Steven Davis. Additionally, John Haldane offers some insight on a possible ambiguity in (LA) in his John Haldane, "Philosophy, Death and Immortality," *Philosophical Investigations* 30 no. 3 (July, 2007): 262 – 263. He thinks it better to refrain from using the criterion as stated this plainly; rather, he thinks that one might be better served making a distinction between absolute and phasal generation. He might agree with (LA) given absolute generation (something coming into existence for the first time), but not given phasal generation (e.g., a watch being disassembled and then reassembled).

‘intermittent’ or ‘gappy’ existence. This has direct bearing on TA3: can (BI) physicalism account for the numerical identity of pre-mortem and post-mortem human beings?

Suppose, though, that this worry about ‘gappy existence’ is simply a matter of being philosophically impoverished on some level. Perhaps it is the case that God, who is omnipotent, can do what finite humans think is impossible. Suppose, for God, there is no problem of intermittent existence and (LA) is false. Or, even better, if TA2 is true, maybe ‘gappy existence’ is not a problem at all, since, ex hypothesi, TA2 seems to affirm that there is no temporal gap between death and entrance into Paradise. Still, if (BI) physicalism is going to account for immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, it needs to provide a way to do so given that dead bodies are quite clearly (we think!), in the here and now, occupying graves. So, the focus of this chapter will be on whether or not (BI) physicalism can account for:

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Investigating physicalism vis-à-vis TAs 1 – 3 is important because it is delimiting. TAs 1 – 3 are perhaps most delimiting in that the physicalist views I investigate herein must do more than merely give an account of diachronic personal identity. They must do so in the context of death and future bodily resurrection and, what is more, do so whilst giving an account consistent with an ‘immediate’ transition between death and afterlife. Given the narrow scope of my inquiry, taking on all physicalist conceptions available in the literature would be a monumental distraction. So, attention must be given to those physicalists who give accounts of resurrection that aim to provide personal identity through resurrection and might be consistent with immediate post-mortem presence in Paradise.
Briefly, then, to investigative these questions, in this chapter and the next, I will address the four most prominent physicalist afterlife theses (delimited in the above ways): Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Simulacrum Thesis’, ‘The Falling Elevator Model’ (variously held), Trenton Merrick’s ‘Anti-Criterialism’, and Lynne Baker’s ‘Constitution View’. The first three are (broadly speaking) (BI) theories. Baker’s is not. Because the first and second theses hold to similar metaphysics of human organisms, in general, I will give a brief overview of van Inwagen’s physicalist account of human beings/organisms. Then, I will discuss his simulacrum thesis and The Falling Elevator model advanced by (at least) Kevin Corcoran, Dean Zimmerman (Zimmerman when wearing his physicalist’s hat), and the tandem of Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs. I shall find the simulacrum and falling elevator theories wanting for various reasons, namely that they cannot account for affirmation TA3, though they might be consistent with TA2. Since Merricks’s and Baker’s theses hold to similar personal identity criteria in the resurrection (that there really are not any), I will also deal with their respective accounts of identity over time. (Baker’s, as a non-(BI) theory, will be left for Chapter 3.) Only after investigating their accounts of identity over time will I be able to conclude whether or not their conclusions about resurrection identity, in particular, are tenable. I shall find that they are not for various metaphysical reasons.

Let us now turn our attention to the questions of investigation: Can a (BI) physicalist conception of human persons account for the numerical identity of pre-mortem and post-mortem human beings? Can a (BI) physicalist conception of resurrection give an account of

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4 But Baker’s view is reserved for Chapter 3. I take on Baker’s Constitution View, in particular, because she is both the most well known exponent of the theory that ‘constitution ≠ identity’ and because she uses it, in particular, to discuss human resurrection. In the next chapter, one should find that, if her thesis is incoherent, then so are most (all?) theories of constitution vis-à-vis human beings where constitution ≠ identity. Kevin Corcoran, an advocate of the ‘fission thesis’ is a constitutionist of the Baker sort. So, he is technically not a (BI) theorist. However, he does attempt to provide an account of the identity of the body in his fission thesis—so, he is included in this chapter’s discussion. For arguments against his personal identity view, i.e., the constitution view, see Chapter 3. For those constitutionists that hold that constitution is an identity relation (e.g., Michael Rea in M. C. Ren, “Constitution and Kind Membership,” Philosophical Studies 97, no. 2 (2000): 169 – 193), I take it that my forthcoming arguments regarding (BI) theories should suffice.
human beings consistent with immediate post-mortem presence with God in Paradise? We begin with ‘The Simulacrum Thesis’.

I. The Simulacrum Thesis

Peter van Inwagen is a (BI) physicalist. He is a prominent Christian one, at that. In his notable Material Beings, he offers a Lockean account of human identity over time. Now Locke says this about the diachronic identity of a human being: “…the Identity of the same Man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body”. Locke’s statement invites many questions, but, for van Inwagen’s purposes, since a human person is identical to her body, the identity of a human being is such that it consists of the same biological life over time, where what counts as ‘biological life’ is best investigated by the biologist and not the philosopher. Van Inwagen offers this clarification:

The word ‘life’ can certainly be used in such a way that, for example, the phrase ‘Bertrand Russell’s life’ denotes something like the totality of Lord Russell’s adventures or that event the course of which is narrated in his autobiography. But the word also has a perfectly legitimate sense according to which ‘Russell’s life’ denotes a purely biological event, an event which took place entirely inside Russell’s skin and which went on for ninety-seven years. It is in this sense that I use the word ‘life’.

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5Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 83ff. Hereafter: van Inwagen, Material Beings. To be clear, though, it is not precisely Lockean. Van Inwagen offers much more analysis than Locke does concerning what he means by ‘life’ and other possibly contended words. So, it is hard to know if Locke would agree with just the way van Inwagen parses out his account of “the same continued life”. Note also that the following is not Locke’s account of personal identity over time. That, for the most part, seems in accord with a memory criteria account. See Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 331 – 348.

6Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 331 – 332.

7van Inwagen, Material Beings, 84. Further, since van Inwagen thinks human beings are identical with human organisms (i.e., animals), Locke’s account of the diachronic identity of human beings (i.e., Man; human organism) can be counted as something like van Inwagen’s account of personal identity.

8van Inwagen, Material Beings, 83
In other words, for van Inwagen, ‘life’ is a count-noun; and, it is a count-noun that implies something very particular about the thing which it helps count, viz., that it is alive.\(^9\) It is helpful to note, as a good physicalist, that by ‘life’—at least, with respect to human life—van Inwagen means ‘a physical organism’.

For van Inwagen, an organism counts as a life. Organisms are also a particular kind of complex composite entity: a body. They are, says van Inwagen, a bit like “an unimaginably complex self-maintaining storm of atoms…[one that] moves across the surface of the world, drawing…atoms into it and expelling others, always maintaining its overall structure…a homeodynamic event”.\(^10\) Human beings, if van Inwagen is correct, are an instance of this complex self-maintaining storm of atoms. This means that human identity through time can be thought of as constituted by a consistent fluctuation of material simples coming and going through the same storm. So long as the “storm” is the same, the life is the same, and if the life is the same, the human (as organism/body) is the same.

But, on van Inwagen’s account, self-maintenance and sameness of “storm” are not sufficient for a life. After all, there are, quite literally, other storms that plausibly have numerical identity over time (e.g., Hurricane Katrina); and, it would be an odd thesis, indeed, to count such things as lives (in the literal sense). Van Inwagen is aware of the weakness in leaving the definition of ‘a life’ so baldly stated. Again, though he notes that it is the biologist’s duty to inform us of what ‘life’ is, van Inwagen adds one further condition that might help the philosopher come near enough to an account of a life: lives are “reasonably well-individuated”.\(^11\) Thus van Inwagen:

\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^10\)Ibid., 87.

\(^11\)van Inwagen, Material Beings, 87.
...a life is a self-directing event. If a life is at present constituted by the activities of the xs and was ten years ago constituted by the activities of the ys, then it seems natural to identify the two events if there is a continuous path in space-time from the earlier to the present space-time location, along which the life of ten years ago has propagated itself. It is this feature of lives, their seeming to be well individuated, that made it possible for Locke to explain the identity of a man in terms of the identity of a life and thereby to offer something that we can at least take seriously as a possible explanation of human identity.\(^\text{12}\)

To all too briefly sum up, van Inwagen’s position is that the diachronic numerical identity of human beings is defined in terms of material simples coming in, going through, and being appropriately related to an organism (i.e., a living body) in an incredibly complex, reasonably well-individuated, process called a ‘life’.\(^\text{13}\)

Suppose, for argument, that van Inwagen’s physicalist theory of human beings works. That is, suppose it provides for an adequate explanation, not only of human beings as composite substances, but also their personal identity over time (since he thinks that human persons are identical to human organisms). Still, his physicalism and his Christian theism might rub in uncomfortable ways. After all, his theory might run into the problem of ‘gappy’ existence. On van Inwagen’s conception, Jones is identical with her body. And, Jones, as a living body, is explained in terms of material simples coming in and going out of her through an incredibly complex process called a ‘life’. But, when Jones dies, life ceases. At least, this is the way one normally thinks of it; this is particularly so on a physicalist theory since, as medical science is wont to tell us (and one’s normal experience of the world!), human bodies die. Given van Inwagen’s flavor of physicalism, whatever happens to Jones’s body happens to Jones, because Jones is identical with her body.

\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)Van Inwagen says it this way: “…the things called ‘organisms’ or ‘living things’ in everyday life are things that are composed of objects whose activities constitute lives in the sense explained [i.e., atoms caught up in a complex self-maintaining and well individuated storm].” Ibid., 92. My insert.
Physicalists do not posit a soul or mind that keeps living through the death of the human organism. So, how might a physicalist, who holds that a human person and her body are identical, provide an account such that pre-mortem-Jones and post-mortem-Jones retain their numerical identity once the self-maintaining, well-individuated, complex storm of life that is pre-mortem-Jones ceases?

Van Inwagen is no stranger to this question. Even prior to becoming a Christian, he authored a now famous paper attempting to square his particular physicalist thesis with the doctrine of the bodily resurrection.\(^\text{14}\) This paper predates his *Material Beings*, and its complex outworking of his physicalist thesis, by nearly a decade. Nevertheless, what van Inwagen devises in his resurrection paper is what I will call, ‘The Simulacrum Thesis,’ a thesis that purports to reconcile a (BI) physicalist account of human beings with the numerical identity of pre-mortem-Jones and post-mortem-Jones (i.e., bodily resurrected Jones). This theory offers an explanation such that, at the moment of Jones’s death, God spirits away the dead body of Jones—Jones herself—and simultaneously replaces her with a simulacrum on earth. The simulacrum is nothing more than material simples arranged in a corpse-wise fashion.\(^\text{15}\) Meanwhile, Jones (i.e., the true corpse) is now divinely preserved as a corpse, presumably in a location not on earth. What is more, apparently Jones is in something like suspended animation, where suspended is a technical term van Inwagen uses to mean the state of affairs within which “…a life…has ceased and the simples that were caught up in it ceased [but] retain—owing to the mere absence of disruptive forces—their individual


\(^{15}\)This metaphysical novelty is due to van Inwagen’s eliminativism about non-living composite objects. Cf. van Inwagen, *Material Beings*. 
properties and their relations to one another”.\textsuperscript{16} The corpse is, then, in his words, “a living corpse”.\textsuperscript{17} This additionally bizarre thesis is due to van Inwagen’s acceptance of Locke’s Axiom. For van Inwagen, if Jones has any hope of post-mortem life, then there cannot be, even in death, a\textit{ disruption} of Jones’s life. For\textit{ disruption}, in van Inwagen’s metaphysics, describes a life that has ceased \textit{not by virtue of suspension}.\textsuperscript{18} To make the comparison between disruption and suspension clearer, consider this analogy. The suspension of life is to the pause of a movie, as the disruption of life is to the turning off of a movie.\textsuperscript{19}

To fit this with TA2, the affirmation of immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, though, one might simply suggest that there is no reason to posit a ‘living corpse’. This is particularly so if TA2 is taken to mean \textit{actual} immediacy as opposed to merely \textit{felt} immediacy (compare: one who is asleep during surgery \textit{feels} as though she goes immediately from before the operation to the recovery room). If TA2 is actual immediacy, then the body that is spirited away might be said to be alive in Paradise. I take it that van Inwagen’s thesis could be consistent with either felt or actual immediacy.

While there may not be any ‘knock-down’ philosophical arguments against the thesis—it is certainly difficult to show that such a scenario is physically or logically impossible—there have been many that cite one major issue: it seems to implicate God in mass deception.\textsuperscript{20} To see why, consider the following scenario: Smith and Johnson think they

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\textsuperscript{16} van Inwagen, \textit{Material Beings}, 147. He further adds that this explanation of ‘suspended’ is not quite accurate. On his account, up-quarks, down-quarks, electrons, and various other sub atomic particles that make up the corpse “never cease their activity.” My insert.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} van Inwagen, \textit{Material Beings}, 147.

\textsuperscript{19} This is for simplicity’s sake. There are numerous technical differences between the two. But you see what I am trying to say, and that is enough.

are burying Jones. Not so. They only bury a smuggled in duplicate, a look alike, a stand in. God has, at the point of Jones’s death, snatched her away and replaced her with a simulacrum. It seems that Smith and Johnson have been hoodwinked by a being greater than which none can be conceived!

I am deeply skeptical that such a being would or could do this. I am deeply skeptical because the snatching away of bodies looks prima facie deceptive on an incalculable scale. I take this incalculability to include, not just the number of people duped, but the qualitative injury on those whose emotional closure clings tightly to having buried their loved ones. It seems entirely too plausible that Smith and Johnson (assume that they are Jones’s husband and brother respectively) think they said their ‘final goodbyes’ to Jones’s corpse whilst closing the casket and interring her in the ground. If van Inwagen is correct, not only is this false, but Smith and Johnson are completely unaware that it is false. And, it is this last bit— their being completely unaware—that seems the most scandalous. This is because there is no hint of divine revelation in our experiencing the death and burial of loved ones (et. al.) in which God explains what is going on—if this sort of story is going on. If The Simulacrum Thesis is correct, it seems God is involved in an odd shadow operation. I think scandal like this is an untoward consequence of van Inwagen’s theory; it might also make the theory metaphysically impossible. For, if God is incapable of deception, and if replacing dead human beings with simulacra in this clandestine way would be instances of deception, then it follows that God would not be able to replace dead human beings with simulacra in this way.

I say that The Simulacrum Thesis implicates God in deception. But, one who holds to it might offer this possible rejoinder. Smith’s and Johnson’s being unaware is not scandalous. It is simply a matter of epistemic blunder; it turns out that they are poor metaphysicians. For

suppose an alternative scenario. Smith and Johnson are primitive physicalists and, though they believe that when Jones’s body dies, she dies, they also believe that her corpse—her as a dead human—can still hear sounds and, indeed, understand. During their weekly visit to her grave, they assume that she can hear their words to her. They think they can carry on a meaningful one-way relationship with a dead human. So, their ‘closure’ is set on a thanatology whereby they comfort their lost loved one during her death. Though Smith’s and Johnson’s understanding of dead people is horribly flawed, is this not a possible scenario, and a scenario that shows that the ignorance of human beings should not incite charges of deception toward God?

Even better: since I argue in Chapter 1 that substance dualism is false, one who holds to The Simulacrum Thesis might remind me that, if the arguments of Chapter 1 are true, it follows that there are multiplied millions of people whose personal eschatology’s metaphysics is wrong. This seems to mean that, according to Chapter 1, multiplied millions of people falsely ground their emotional closure, just in the way that Smith and Johnson do in the simulacrum scenario. Why not complain that God is deceiving everyone that holds a false metaphysics? If many people hold to substance dualism, is anti-substance-dualism’s being true an instance of divine deception? If so, is the conclusion of Chapter 1 doomed?

Let me answer these questions this way: I shall not complain to God in light of Smith’s, Johnson’s, and substance dualists’ poor metaphysics shown in the counter examples. It is their fault. ‘Fault’ is not meant here in a moral sense, of course. ‘Fault’ is meant in the same sense that it is a student’s ‘fault’ when he incorrectly calculates his sums. The difference between these counter examples and The Simulacrum Thesis is that, on van Inwagen’s theory, God is responsible for the mistaken belief. Bodies being secretly spirited away is not ‘just the way the world works’; rather, on van Inwagen’s theory, it is God decisively acting in the world to bring about the corpse-replacement. In other words, van
Inwagen’s scenario does not imply a mistaken belief about nature, the created order, something humans should (or reasonably could) know about on their own. Rather, it implies that something outside the created order—beyond human empirical investigation—is operating contrary to the ways in which a rational agent in the created order, one who has not been otherwise told by revelation, could feasibly understand the situation. And, it is the fact that God has not told humans that he is spiriting away bodies that makes the possibility of his spiriting them away seem mischievously clandestine. I happen to think that God’s nature and the property ‘being mischievously clandestine’ are incompatible. So, I think van Inwagen is mistaken.

In the literature, The Simulacrum Thesis is an oft-visited and rehearsed view. But, it is telling that van Inwagen, himself, no longer thinks his view is likely.\(^{21}\) His change of mind comes after his conversion to Christianity; nevertheless, if van Inwagen sees reason to think of alternatives to his story, I see no further reason to accept it.\(^{22}\) So, let us consider another alternative.

**II. The Falling Elevator Model**

Kevin Corcoran and Dean Zimmerman offer a thesis remarkably similar to van Inwagen’s, yet it does not (so I say) implicate God in mass deception. As a point of chronology, it is, by Corcoran’s own account, Zimmerman—himself a dualist—who is the first to advance the view for which both of them, in their own nuanced ways, advocate.\(^{23}\) Theirs is a view widely

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\(^{22}\) This is not to say that he thinks his thesis is impossible. He does not agree with the accusation that his original thesis implicates God in mass deception. See van Inwagen, "I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come.”

referred to as The Falling Elevator Model (the reason for this title anon). Nuanced in particular ways, though they are, their views are similar enough to warrant a joint investigation. Like van Inwagen, Corcoran and Zimmerman wish to harmonize the (BI) physicalist thesis, the problem of intermittent existence, and future bodily resurrection. Unlike van Inwagen, Corcoran and Zimmerman both admit skepticism concerning Locke’s Axiom (LA). However, for various reasons, they wish to get around the whole issue. So, too, like van Inwagen, they affirm that, in order to satisfy numerical diachronic identity of a human organism, some sort of immanent causal connection must obtain between the material simples flowing in and out of the life of a human organism. In other words, Corcoran and Zimmerman seem to recognize some need for a principle like van Inwagen’s ‘life’. Such a principle is necessary on their view because the historically well-trod identity condition *sin qua non*, ‘spatio-temporal continuity’, seems hopelessly flawed.

24 For ease, I will just speak of The Falling Elevator Model as a catchall term for a metaphysics of death and afterlife consistent with the theories of Corcoran and Zimmerman. This consistency does not imply that either Corcoran or Zimmerman explicitly states each nuance I claim for The Falling Elevator Model. I only claim that I think they would agree that my picture of the thesis is consistent with theirs and, of course, drawn from their material. Though this thesis relies on a notion of ‘fission’, as we will see, this is not a fission thesis like Peter Forrest’s wherein a growing-block four-dimensionalism is required. See his: Peter Forrest, “The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory,” in *Persons: Human and Divine*, eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 301 – 318.


26 Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 206 – 210. Dean Zimmerman, “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The ‘Falling Elevator’ Model,” *Faith and Philosophy* 16, no. 2 (April, 1999): 198. For clarity, note that Zimmerman is arguing on behalf of the physicalist in his falling elevator model. Additionally, note that Corcoran does not agree that persons and their bodies are identical. He holds to a constitution theory of human persons where constitution ≠ identity. I will say more about this sort of constitution view in Chapter 3. Either way, what is important is that The Falling Elevator Model concerns the identity of human organisms through death and into afterlife. On this concern, Corcoran, Zimmerman, and van Inwagen are mutually focused.

27 Corcoran offers a varied way of phrasing van Inwagen’s ‘life’ and calls it the life-preserving condition (LPC). I take it that these views are, for all intents and purposes, qualitatively identical *vis-à-vis* the biology and metaphysics involved. Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 209.
Here is a reason to agree with van Inwagen, Corcoran, and Zimmerman that spatio-temporal continuity is not a sufficient condition for personal identity: it seems possible for an evil demon to eliminate a body B at time T₁ while God simultaneously creates a copy of B, B*, at the very same time and in the same space that B occupied.²⁸ If that is possible, then spatio-temporal continuity is not a sufficient condition for a human being’s (i.e., human organism) persistence, where ‘persistence’ is understood as the continued existence of a thing and its retention of its numerical identity through time.²⁹ At most, spatio-temporal continuity is probably more like “a consequence of persistence and not its ground”.³⁰ For persistence, something more is needed. And, this is precisely where van Inwagen’s ‘life’ provides a helpful description of the specific sort of connection that obtains between material simples flowing into and out of an organic body to preserve the diachronic identity of the organism. In the literature, phenomena like ‘life’ are referred to as ‘immanent causal connections’.³¹ Let us agree, then, that, minimally, spatio-temporal continuity is not a sufficient condition for diachronic object identity.

Moreover, for the sake of argument, assume that immanent causal connections (of some kind or other), linking the material simples of human organisms over time, are necessary and sufficient for the diachronic identity of those organisms. There still seems to be a problem with (BI) physicalism vis-à-vis resurrection metaphysics—immanent causal

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²⁸ Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 207.

²⁹ Of course, this assumes that Locke’s Axiom is true.

³⁰ Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 208.

connections notwithstanding—and intermittent existence. After all, if one believes that (LA)
is true, then, when a human organism dies, ‘life’ and its immanent causal connections cease;
the human organism is lost. So, eschatological bodily resurrection would then seem to be an
instance of duplication, not continuity.

To get around this problem whilst avoiding implicating God in mass deception,
Corcoran and Zimmerman offer The Falling Elevator Model. This thesis posits something
like this: at the instant prior to the moment of death, God intervenes and miraculously causes
a human body’s simples to fission in such a way that a new and complete body moves to the
afterlife while one stays behind as a corpse. Think of the moment of death a bit like the
moment a falling elevator crashes at the bottom of an elevator shaft. The Falling Elevator
Model asks us to think of the moment just before impact in a way reminiscent of “the
‘physics’ of cartoons” wherein, just before an elevator hits the ground, a character is able to
jump to safety.32 In the same way, according to The Falling Elevator Model, just before
death, the fissioned simples ‘jump’ to the afterlife.33 Importantly, this too, is a thesis
consistent with TA2: immediate post-mortem presence in Paradise. The thesis is supposed to
clear God of charges of deception, pace van Inwagen, because the simples that compose the
corpse really did compose Jones. So, there is an authenticity in the burial of Jones’s corpse
that is wholly missing on The Simulacrum Thesis. Moreover, none of this is done in secret,
even if not plainly visible.

Here is a clearer picture of how The Falling Elevator Model is supposed to work.
Consider candidate substitutions for a human person and a human organism, Jones and Body
respectively. The Falling Elevator Model suggests that “the causal paths traced by the

32 Dean Zimmerman, ‘The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The 'Falling Elevator' Model,’ Faith
and Philosophy 16, no. 2 (April, 1999): 196.

33 Ibid., 196ff.
simples caught up in the life of [Body] just before death can be made by God to fission such that the simples composing [Body] then are causally related to two different, spatially segregated, sets of simples”.

One of these sets would be the simples composing Body persisting in physical afterlife and the other would be the simples composing a corpse in the grave (i.e., what used to be Body).

To make this clearer still, suppose that, in the course of the existence of Body, it is composed of two sets of simples. Body has one set, S, at the time just before death (T_{BD}) and one set, S2, at the time of death onward (T_{DO}). For The Falling Elevator Model, S and S2 are causally connected because they are both caught up in the ‘life’ of Body (in that van Inwagian sense). In fact, according to The Falling Elevator Model, there is no span of life between T_{BD} and T_{DO} such that Body is not made up of either S or S2. If that is the case, the thought is that Body’s persistence from death to physical afterlife is not much different than all of the times through which Body persists prior to death. It is just that, so the theory goes, in this instance, S and S2 are fissioned in an all-at-once switch from S to S2, instead of the gradual sloughing off of the simples that Body experiences through the course of Body’s life up to T_{BD}. In this way, Jones’s loved ones are purportedly able to bury S, that which once was Jones (i.e., once was Body). Meanwhile, Jones, via Body, still lives physical postmortem life in T_{DO}; for, Body is then composed of S2. To satisfy TA2, Zimmerman and Corcoran can just say that Body (i.e., ‘Jones’ for (BI) physicalists) fissions to Paradise.

It seems to me that The Falling Elevator Model is not susceptible to the charge of divine misdirection. While it surely is the case, if the model is true, that Jones’s loved ones have a false belief about burying Jones, their false belief is a result of their metaphysical and physical ignorance, not trickery. And, as it happens, through metaphysical and physical investigation, Jones’s loved ones could, in principle, come to find out that fissioning is what

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happens. Putting it another way, if something like a falling elevator model is true, then it is true that Jones’s loved ones could find this out.\(^{35}\) It seems to me, then, that this model gets around the deception objection to The Simulacrum Thesis.

I still think The Falling Elevator Model is false, though a great philosophical effort.\(^{36}\) It is, in fact, an effort that has pushed physicalist thinking about the resurrection forward in positive ways. Nevertheless, there are at least two problems with the model. The first problem is with respect to the kind of body Jones has at T\(_{DO}\) (i.e., the quality of Body). The second problem is more acute; the identity conditions presupposed by The Falling Elevator Model are \textit{undercut} by the thesis.

With respect to the first problem, given the standard doctrine of bodily resurrection in Western Christianity, the resurrection version of one’s physical body is said to be a \textit{glorified} body. That is, the resurrection body is supposed to be a body that is perfect and fit for life in new creation.\(^{37}\) But, the physics of fission suggests that fissioned bodies would be \textit{half the size of the original}. David Hershenov objects in just this way:

A problem with Zimmerman's account is that when the fissioning of any creature occurs, the result is two beings each half the size of the original. But human corpses are the same size as their living predecessors. So where did all the corpse's extra weight come from? And what about the resurrected being? Is it half the size it was when dying?\(^{38}\)

\(^{35}\)Since this fissioning is often couched in terms of a built-in physical ability of the simples to ‘bud’ just before death (even though activated by God), it seems, at least in principle, plausible that such a thing could even be affirmed by physics and biology. See Dean Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” in \textit{Personal Identity and Resurrection}, ed. Georg Gasser (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010), 36 – 37.


Here Hershenov suggests that there are two oddities. I have already mentioned the first, a half-size resurrection body. Suppose that is not so weird. After all, we do not really know what the resurrection body will be like. Maybe it is the case that half-size is the best size. This still does not account for the second oddity Hershenov identifies: the full-size corpse in the grave. Where does all the extra corpse weight come from? The fissionist might respond that the corpse-weight objection is nothing more than rhetorical arm waving. Maybe one could argue that God provides the additional material.

Kevin Corcoran attempts to provide just such an answer. Here he offers what I will call the ‘double-down’ version of what happens at the moment of fission:

...there would be a last temporal instant at which the simples now composing my body and caught up in its life would be so composed and caught up; and that temporal instant would be, simultaneously, the first temporal instant at which a whole new batch of simples comes to be so caught up. For a temporal instant I would be constituted by more simples than I was at an instant earlier or would be an instant later, and the all-at-once sloughing off would be a sloughing off of all the simples that at the instant before wholly composed my body but now only partially composed my body.39

There are some strange physics afoot in the double-down version. For example, one might suppose that this ‘last temporal instant’ is in this plane of existence (i.e., not in the future resurrection, in the intermediate state, etc.). One wonders, then, in light of this proposed version of fission, why the doubling of the simples is not observable. Or, maybe Corcoran would say that it is—at least, in principle. If so, might it bode well to ask physicists and biologists to set up tests for this sort of phenomenon? This seems a strange request.

Even more alarming is that, on inspection, the ‘double-down’ version does not count as fission. At least, it does not count as fission with respect to simples. After all, ‘double-down’ does not call for the splitting of the simples. What it does call for is Body’s losing half the number of its simples. This is not fission. Fission says that a body’s simples, say, simples S1, S2, and S3, split into some further simples. There is a ‘coming apart’ of the simples.

However, there is no such coming apart on ‘double-down’. In other words, there is no fission. The Falling Elevator Model is supposed to be a thesis of fission. At least, this is how the theory is couched.

The second problem with The Falling Elevator Model, recall, is that the physics described in the thesis—counting the ‘double-down’ version as a failure—seem to cut against the presupposed identity criteria (i.e., ‘life’, immanent causal connection, etc.). For, the proposed fissioning seems to imply an all-at-once assimilation of new simples and dismissal of old ones. It is this ‘all-at-once’ characteristic that seems to stretch the principle of ‘life’, upon which the thesis is built, beyond the breaking point. Hershenov, again, provides the critique:

…is it metaphysically possible for a being to survive the sudden addition of so much new matter? Not if the account of assimilation in the [fission thesis] is correct…this problem has to do with the fact that the new particles immanently caused by those of the dying being were never caught up in the life processes in which the older particles were involved…We human organisms replace all of our matter over time. But this replacement must happen in a certain manner for us to survive it…Consider the science-fiction scenario of an organism being cryogenically frozen. Can it survive part replacement while it is in a deep freeze in which no life processes such as metabolism and homeostasis occur? Assume that the technology exists to remove and then replace every molecule with a new molecule. This process could take as long or as short a time as the reader likes. The new parts have never been caught up in any life processes because the exchange took place in such extremely cold temperatures. They have not been biologically assimilated by the individual's body as were the parts they replaced. The new particles never circulated in his blood, never were caught up in his metabolism, never were involved in homeostatic processes etc. Would it be the same dead body? I expect that a number of readers will share my doubts that it is the same body.40

At first glance, it appears that a van Inwagen-style theorist might agree with Hershenov’s complaint vis-à-vis frozen part replacement. Van Inwagen does, after all,

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concede that, in a frozen organism, life is suspended.\textsuperscript{41} That is, as above, the frozen organism’s ‘life’ process has stopped in such a way that the simples that are, just prior to the moment of suspension, caught up in the life of the organism still retain their individual properties and relations.\textsuperscript{42} Since Hershenov’s thought experiment directly implies that the replacement parts are not, and cannot be, assimilated in a ‘life’ way—because ‘life’ has been suspended—it seems like the thought experiment implies that the organism, itself, will be replaced. And, since The Falling Elevator Model assumes a van Inwagian sort of theory of immanent causation, the point might be conceded to Hershenov.

Before conceding to Hershenov, however, the fissionist might offer a way out. Here is one way a fissionist might do so: claim that the picture of a frozen organism is a false picture. Recall that the in The Falling Elevator, during fission, there is a splitting of Body’s simple set, \( S \), into simple set, \( S_2 \). Well, if simple set \( S \) is composed of the “up-quarks, down-quarks, and electrons—and, perhaps, photon and gluons…” that van Inwagen suggests are, \textit{even in suspended ‘life’}, perpetually in motion, then ‘life’ is still going on in a frozen organism.\textsuperscript{43} Thus simple replacement, says the fissionist rejoinder, would be possible in a frozen life.

Moreover, the fissionist could complain that Hershenov asks the reader to imagine \textit{molecule} replacement. Relative to quarks, electrons, etc., however, molecules are large parts of Body. And, though life is not functioning at \textit{this} macro (molecular) level, Zimmerman and Corcoran might respond that the same is not the case at the level of Body’s physical simples. And, since it is physical simples that duplicate in fission, perhaps there \textit{is} immanent causal connection through ‘life’ going on at the micro (simple) level. If this is the case, then maybe simples \textit{can} fission without paying the metaphysical price of annihilating Body, the

\textsuperscript{41} van Inwagen, \textit{Material Beings}, 147.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} van Inwagen, \textit{Material Beings}, 147.
suspended human organism, and replacing it with a subsequent body, Body*, even in a frozen Body. In this way, Hershenov’s analogy might fail.

This response to Hershenov misses the mark. Hershenov’s real objection is not that fissionists cannot come up with a way to address the taking in and sloughing off of simples in frozen organisms. Rather, his objection seems, in the final analysis, to be about time and graduation. That is to say, the complaint is that the metaphysics in The Falling Elevator Model violates a principle of this sort:

Parts Assimilation (PA): Immanent causal connections obtain between material simple sets S and S2 in an organic body, B, if, and only if, there is a gradual overlapping dismissal of S and assimilation of S2 in a period of time T1 – T_N in the life of B. 44

I take it that (PA) is just another way of describing van Inwagen’s ‘storm of life’. In any case, (PA) gives a principle that accounts for the way in which particular material accidents of an organism can change, viz., the simples, whilst the organism retains its numerical identity. Further, (PA) seems entirely consistent with The Falling Elevator Model’s assumed immanent causal connections persistence conditions of human bodies:

A human body B that exists at t_2 is the same as a human body A that exists at t_1 just in case the temporal stages leading up to B at t_2 are immanent-causally connected to the temporal stages of A at t_1. 45

At least, (PA) is consistent with the above conditions if ‘temporal stages’ can be couched in terms of times between t_1 and t_2 (compare: T_2 is a ‘temporal stage’ in (PA) where

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44 I use ‘life’ here in the special van Inwagian sense that I have been using it. Additionally, I say ‘in the life of B’ as opposed to ‘during the life of B’ to distinguish events contemporaneous with B’s life (i.e., during) and those events that compose B’s life (i.e., in).

45 Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 210. Though this is Corcoran’s expression, I have no reason to think that Zimmerman—as the other notable fission theorist (wearing his physicalist hat, anyway)—would reject it. Suffice it to say that I take it that this statement is consistent with The Falling Elevator Model.
If so, then (PA) gives an account that fleshes out ‘immanent-causally connected’ in a more detailed way.

Hershenov’s picture of the frozen organism highlights a violation of (PA) and so a violation of the physicalist persistence conditions in The Falling Elevator Model. This is because The Falling Elevator Model’s fission thesis is a picture of non-assimilative part replacement. And, while there is no specific account of what time and graduation is necessary (i.e., what amount of time obtains between $T_1$ and $T_N$), ‘zero’ seems inadequate. All of this to say, it seems Hershenov’s picture means to tell us that the following conditional is true: if an organism’s parts are not replaced gradually, then we shall, in the end, have a numerically different organism. And, on (BI) theories, if a different organism, then a different human person.

At bottom, one must adjudicate between what seems more plausible: graduated part replacement (even extremely rapid graduated part replacement) or all-at-once part replacement. The Falling Elevator Model seems to rest on the latter with its insistence on the simultaneous fissioning of S into S2 in Body. But, what I take to be so intuitively powerful about van Inwagen’s ‘life’, indeed what makes it quite a compelling physicalist thesis, is precisely the idea that simples can be immanently causally related to other simples by being caught up in the biological lives of organisms. It is precisely graduated assimilation that paints the strikingly clear and compelling picture of ‘life’. And it is The Falling Elevator’s lack of this feature, by way of it conceiving of an instantaneous fission, which drives in its own fatal dagger. The Falling Elevator Model simply does not have an adequate way of accounting for its lack of graduated assimilation; it has none.

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46 I am, here, neutral on temporal ontology. I take up spatio-temporal ontology in chapter 5. I think the preceding is prima facie consistent with presentism, eternalism, endurance, and perdurance.

47 This is not to say no one has tried. Corcoran tries to head off this objection, I think. Here is what he says:
Finally, there is a problem with The Falling Elevator Model that many involved in the thesis see as problematic. This problem is the problem of ‘closest continuers’. That is to say, The Falling Elevator Model seems to violate a well-known philosophical principle about object identity: the only x and y principle.\(^{48}\) This principle suggests that, whether x is identical to y, rests solely on an account of x and y and no further thing. But, a closest continuer account of human identity implies that identity is contingent in the following way: x’s being identical to y is dependent upon some further thing z. And, really, closest continuer accounts are not, strictly speaking, accounts of identity—they are accounts of closest continuers, i.e., the best plausible candidate to ‘pick up the mantle’, so to speak, of the dead person’s life. Though some philosophers affirm a closest continuer account (e.g., through psychological continuity, et. al.), Stephen Davis rightly notes that a Christian thinker is not so permitted: “This is for the obvious reason that Christian afterlife claims are based on the biblical promise that we, that is, the very persons whom we are, will live again. Moreover, it

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On the second view there would be an instant such that any instant prior to it the simples caught up in the life in question would be just those that came to be so caught up through the ordinary means of continuous, gradual replacement of those originating life, and such that at any subsequent instant the simples caught up in that life would be a wholly new set of simples and those that get caught up through ordinary means of continuous, gradual replacement.

Now, I confess that I do not understand what Corcoran means. I take it that the ‘an instant’ is the moment of fission. But, what more can we say about this? Does Corcoran’s final line suggest that a wholly new set of simples can be caught up all-at-once into the life of a biological organism? Is that not begging the question? Or, is he saying, yet again, that there are two sets of simples, the ones that are gradually added and the whole new concurrently existing set? To make the waters even muddier, he says:

This view elicits an obvious question: What simples are caught up in the life of my body at the instant in question? One plausible answer is this: whatever simples compose the corpse at the next instant. It is those simples that are caught up in the life of my body at the instant of fission. But at the instant in question can we say what simples constitute its life? I think not...After all, consider the case of the direction of a line at any given point on the line. What is the direction of the line at that point?

Again, I profess confusion. Does Corcoran not explicitly tell us which set of simples composes the corpse at the instant of fission? Sure he does. He says that a plausible answer is “whatever simples compose the corpse at the next instant”. If the corpse is made up of simples S4, S5, and S6 ‘at the next instant’, it follows that, at the instant of fission, the body in question is made up of simples S4, S5, and S6. How is that anything like explaining the direction of a point? It seems that it is not. Alas, this sort of change does nothing to get around a violation of (PA) and ‘life’. See Corcoran’s explanation of these views in Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 212 – 213.

is also part of the Christian picture that people [i.e., the very people to whom reward or punishment is due] will be rewarded or punished in the next life”.

Very briefly, here is why The Falling Elevator Model invites a closest continuer account of identity. At \( t_1 \), the moment before death, Body’s simples fission. From \( t_1 \) forward, one set of simples, S2, now composes Body and lives either in an intermediate state or in Paradise. Likewise, from \( t_1 \) forward, one set of simples, S, now composes a corpse (or simples arranged corpse-wise). But suppose that the fission is too successful. That is, suppose that S fissions into S2 and S3 (and so on). Now, ex hypothesi, S2 fissions into some kind of post-mortem existence; perhaps S3 does, too. If all of this is possible, then we either have two (or more) qualitatively identical candidates for Body, or else we have none. And this is because, on The Falling Elevator Model, identity conditions are wrapped up in immanent causal connections. So, here we have a scenario in which S is immanently causally connected to both S2 and S3. Which, then, is Body? Thus, van Inwagen: “Neither or both, it would seem, and, since not both, neither”. Identity, after all, is unitary; it cannot go in two directions. But, then The Falling Elevator Model has not accomplished the task for which it was created, viz., to rescue personal identity, in non-temporally gappy ways, through death and resurrection.

For those holding The Falling Elevator Model, there might a couple of proposed solutions to this problem. The first is to suggest that it is not a problem—simply bite the bullet and accept that Body’s resurrection identity is contingent, that it is based on whether or

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not some further thing has a rightful claim to Body’s identity. I think this option reaps untoward consequences. For consider Jones. Suppose Jones is identical to her human body, Body. Body fissions at t₁; S, the set of simples that make up Body, fissions into S₂ and S₃ (or S₂ into S₃, take your pick). In the afterlife, there are two Jones/Body competitors. Jones₁ with Body₁ made of S₂, and another Jones competitor, Jones₂ with Body₂ made of S₃. Suppose that they came into existence at exactly the same time, they were equally caught up in the ‘life’ of Body at t₁, they have the same psychological states/qualities/memories, and so on. Suppose there is no epistemological way—even via omniscience—to distinguish between the two (save for the locations they occupy in the afterlife) concerning which has the best claim to Jones/Body’s identity. Who is Jones? Which is Body?

If there is an answer to each of these questions, the answer has a truth-value. If it has a truth-value, an omniscient being knows that truth-value. If Jones₁/Body₁ and Jones₂/Body₂ are thoroughly epistemologically indistinguishable, then ‘neither’ can be the only possibly known and possibly true answer to the questions. Since they are obviously not numerically identical (see: they are numbered and occupy different regions of space), they cannot be the same Jones/Body. But there is no way to know which of either ‘Jones₁/Body₁ is the closest continuer to Jones/Body’ or ‘Jones₂/Body₂ is the closest continuer to Jones/Body’ is ‘true’. The only way to assign a truth-value that an omniscient being could know, in light of the candidates’ indiscernibility (differing spatial regions notwithstanding), is to assign ‘false’ to both candidates (i.e., ‘it is false that Jones₁/Body₁ is the closest continuer to Jones/Body’ and ‘it is false that Jones₂/Body₂ is the closest continuer to Jones/Body’).

This way, God does not have to decide which of Jones₁ or Jones₂ is Jones, because he cannot. Rather, neither candidate is Jones/Body. God simply affirms that the competitors are

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51 Zimmerman’s ‘falling elevator model’ suggests as much. It is a closest continuer thesis—though he recognizes this may be an untoward consequence. Dean Zimmerman, “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The ‘Falling Elevator’ Model,” Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 2 (April, 1999): 197.
numerically distinct and that there is no way to answer which of them is or could be Jones.

This is so because it is true that they are both not Jones. So, if identity is based on some closest continuer, then we lose any account of resurrection. There seems no good reason, then, for a person who affirms the identity of pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings to accept a closest continuer account of personal identity.

The only reason I can think of to accept it is an ad hoc reason. Some closest continuer theorist might suggest that acceptable closest continuer accounts (including fission) will include epistemological discernibility between the competitors. But, I see no reason to accept that premise. There is no reason to think that the scenario given above is not just as perfectly plausible given fission-type theses than any theory that suggests that there will be a difference between the fissioned bodies. The only reason to favor the latter over the former is to get The Falling Elevator Model to work in the face of closest-continuer problems.

The second option for one holding to The Falling Elevator Model is to admit that, though a doubly successful fission seems possible, in point of fact, it is metaphysically impossible; God would not allow such a thing in his creation. In all possible worlds in which God exists, such an action might be tantamount to nonsense. Corcoran suggests as much because he thinks allowing a doubly successful fission might violate God’s goodness, since “a doubly successful fission would forever terminate a human life”. If God’s instantiating a doubly successful fission violates God’s goodness, then it really is a metaphysical impossibility (compare: God telling a lie). I submit that, much like The Simulacrum Thesis, this response seems like it has no easy defeaters. But, of course, The Falling Elevator Model would have to get around the other stated objections before one could take harbor in this solution.

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52 Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival,” 215. If identity is necessary and the only x and y principle is true, of course.
So far, I have only noted Corcoran and Zimmerman’s take on The Falling Elevator Model, views whose physicalist theories are based on a van Inwagen-style conception of human organisms. But, there is another, subtle, adaptation to The Falling Elevator Model advanced by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs. They seek to use The Falling Elevator Model, but they do so with a slightly revised view of the human person.

First, though, some similarities: they agree with van Inwagen (and Corcoran and Zimmerman) that, as far as the human body is concerned, its identity is tied up in a complex storm of atoms called a ‘life’ (i.e., immanent causal connections). Additionally, like van Inwagen, they appear to be eliminativist with respect to objects that do not exhibit ‘substantial unity’, i.e., that are not substances. According to this sort of eliminativism, aggregates and other structures, for example, are said to (ontologically speaking) not really exist. What exists are either mereological simples or “those composites that exhibit some kind of objective, substantial unity”. I take it that what O’Connor and Jacobs mean on their view is that what really exists (over and above what the ‘folk’ might say) are mereological simples and organisms (and this is just in line with materialist thinkers like van Inwagen and Merricks). These two things are, typically speaking, paradigmatic instances of substances.

But, while their view of human organisms appears largely the same as van Inwagen’s, their view of human persons as human organisms is not. Personal identity for O’Connor and Jacobs, instead of being one with the human body’s identity as such, is conceived as seated in an ‘emergent individual’ that is a “causal consequence” of the


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complex functioning of the human organism. Confusingly, though, this emergent individual is also said to be the human organism. On O’Connor’s and Jacobs’s view, if I understand them correctly, there exists a human organism and then, with the emergence from the human organism of what they call “holistic mental states”, “a substantial unity as thinking biological [substance]” is conferred onto human-organisms such that what emerges is a person one is required to “treat…as whole”.

In other words, the human-organism-as-person is a substance. This conferral of substancehood, by way of an emerging person, onto the human organism is supposed to imply that the person has a ‘particularity’ or ‘thisness’ all its own. Because of this, their account is supposed to have an added advantage with respect to concerns about diachronic identity. On their view, since the particularity of persons is primitive, a person’s diachronic identity conditions, as a particular, are likewise primitive. In other words, because the person’s identity is supposedly seated in its simple particularity, the person’s identity conditions are unanalyzable (the identity conditions of simples are said to be unanalyzable). Diachronic personal identity conditions are, then, said to be a “metaphysically bedrock fact”.

Because they think this is the case, O’Connor and Jacobs believe that advancing reasons for one’s diachronic personal identity is a non-starter. When they combine this view with The Falling Elevator Model, they think they avoid the closest continuer objection because the identity of the body is not the issue, the identity of the person, as particularity, is. But, since there is no analysis of the identity of the particularity—it is just identical with


56 O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 548.

57 Ibid., 546 – 548.

58 O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals and Resurrection,” 72.
whatever particularity it is identical—the closest continuer problem *vis-à-vis* human persons is thought to never arise.\(^{59}\)

This theory is less than clear on a number of fronts. For example, I note above that O’Connor and Jacobs take it that emergent human persons are human organisms. I quote them here: “The emergent things we are are none other than living organisms, even if we have an ontological status not had by composite things, or perhaps even living things, in general”.\(^{60}\) This sounds as if O’Connor and Jacobs are suggesting that the emergent individual is *identical to* the body. But, if that is right, then closest continuer problems come back in. This is because, even if human bodies are substances—one thing in their own right—bodies are not metaphysically primitive sorts of things. And so, *contra* O’Connor and Jacobs, bodies are not the sorts of things whose identity conditions are unanalyzable. Suggesting that a person emerges from a composite entity—with which the person is supposed to be identical—does not then, as if by magic, make the composite a metaphysically primitive sort of thing. Moreover, even if the particularity of an individual person is metaphysically primitive, a person and her particularity are not identical things. Particularity, if there is such a property, is just that, a property. But a person is not a property. So a person is not identical with her particularity. The ability to analyze or not ‘particularity’ as such, says nothing of whether the identity conditions of a person, as a composite object, are or are not analyzable.

Even more peculiarly, on their view, a human person emerges from the human organism much in the way that a ‘system’ could be said to emerge from the parts and processes that compose the system. O’Connor and Jacobs say the following to this effect: “[the organism’s simples should be] so arranged as to cause and sustain…a system-level

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\(^{59}\)Ibid., 78ff.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., 76.
particularity that does not reduce to the sum of the particularities of the simples”. The human’s identity, relative to this quote, looks as if it is one and the same as the identity of the system-level particularity that emerges from the body. This seems to indicate that a person, on their view, is a ‘system-level’ thing. But, if a person is a system-level thing, then it is not identical to the thing that gives rise to the system. In other words, if the person is a system-level thing that emerges from a human organism, it cannot be identical with a human organism. So, the challenge for O’Connor and Jacobs is to answer this question: Which is it: is a human person a systems-level entity emerging from a human organism or is a human person a human organism? By my lights, they seem to affirm both. I cannot make sense of such a simultaneous affirmation. I see no reason, then, to accept this attempt to save The Falling Elevator Model or its metaphysics of emergent individuals.

(Things get more complicated for O’Connor and Jacobs since they deny substance dualism and the sorts of emergent substance dualism espoused by thinkers like William Hasker. On Hasker’s emergent substance dualism, a bona fide substance emerges from, and in addition to, a human organism (itself a bona fide substance). What results are two substances: an immaterial human person and a human body. Since O’Connor and Jacobs reject this view they are faced with the dilemma I give above.)

In addition to these philosophical problems, there are some theological concerns. Suppose that The Falling Elevator Model works, that it is metaphysically, and physically, possible. What does it imply about the resurrection of Jesus? Jesus, as a human being, should

61 Ibid.

62 In “Emergent Individuals and Resurrection,” O’Connor and Jacobs suggest that perhaps human persons as human organisms have an ontological status not had by any other objects or any other living organisms. They footnote this statement referring the reader to their “Emergent Individuals” paper that, still cryptically, makes the same remark without further explication. What is this ontological status? Is it that human persons are both the system and the body out of which the system emerges? How can such a state of affairs be? They do not say. See “Emergent Individuals and Resurrection,” 76 and “Emergent Individuals,” 549.

have undergone an instance of fission, his old simples fissioning into glorified simples. As a consequence of fission—should it hold true of Jesus—there would have been a body left in his tomb (or simples arranged corpse-wise) even while Jesus was walking about in his glorified body. Instead, though, all four gospel writers report that Jesus’s corpse is gone (Matt 28.6; Mark 16.6; Luke 24.3; John 20.2). The question momentarily hangs in the gospel narratives: where is Jesus’s corpse? If fission occurs, I think there are only two answers. The first is, with a nod to van Inwagen, after the fission, God spirits away Jesus’s fissioned corpse. Again, this seems to involve God in mischievous hijinks. For, if this is true, it turns out the chief priests and elders were correct in their report; someone did hide the corpse of Jesus. But, it was not Jesus’s disciples; it was the triune God! Such a conclusion does not bode well for The Falling Elevator Model.

Even further, if The Falling Elevator Model is true, it is possible that Jesus did not walk out of the tomb. He could have fissioned to any location, so long as there was an immanent causal connection. Given fission, there is no need for an empty tomb. In fact, the tomb’s being empty would only come by way of someone’s removing the corpse, not because Jesus walked out. This is because the fissioned simples, the one’s composing his corpse on resurrection day, did not have the time to dissolve through normal means. Jesus might have walked out of the tomb, but, if he did, it does not explain the tomb’s being sans corpse (or simples arranged corpse-wise).

At this point, falling elevator theorists might suggest that Jesus’s case is an exception. It might be, but I can find no non ad hoc reason that it would be. And, even if a non ad hoc reason could be formulated, there is still the problem of providing for the three-day temporal

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64 The female disciples of Jesus are invited to ‘see the place where he lay’ in Matthew 28.6 and Mark 16.6. In Luke 24, the women ‘did not find the body of the Lord Jesus’ in the tomb. In John 20, the absence of Jesus’s body from the tomb incites a startled and confused reaction (to put it mildly) among his disciples.

65 I take it that this might upset a point the writer of Matthew’s gospel tries to reach with Matt 28.13.
gap between Jesus’s death and his resurrection. And, this is precisely the problem The Falling Elevator Model is supposed to get around.

I submit that The Falling Elevator Model is false. I submit this for philosophical reasons, viz., it is either not an account of fission at all (e.g., the ‘double-down’ hypothesis) and/or it does not meet its own criteria for identity over time (e.g., the problem of no graduated replacement). The closest continuer issues also seem problematic, and I do not think that O’Connor’s and Jacob’s emergentism helps get around this issue. I further think the thesis fails for theological reasons. It cannot provide an account of Jesus’s empty tomb where Jesus’s walking about is the explanans. (I suppose the problem of Jesus’s empty tomb points to a further problem for The Falling Elevator Model. A fortiori, it likely cannot account for the empty tombs of millions of other people that die chronologically close to the eschaton.) With the falsity of The Falling Elevator Model and the falsity of The Simulacrum Thesis, it seems that (BI) physicalist accounts—indeed, ones heralded as the best and brightest physicalist accounts of resurrection—are on poor footing.\(^6^6\)

There is, though, another view on offer. It is a view that rejects a number of the axioms we have, so far, taken for granted. Trenton Merricks denies Locke’s Axiom and the need for ontological criteria of bodily identity over time. So, on his view, there is no problem of ‘gappy’ existence. Moreover, there is no problem of personal identity over time. If his view is correct, then it seems like (BI) physicalism may yet win the day. It is to Merricks I now turn.

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III. Anti-Criterialism

Trenton Merricks says there are no criteria for personal identity over time even though there is personal identity over time.\textsuperscript{67} If Merricks is correct, personal identity in resurrection is, as a species of personal identity over time, without criteria.

Why does Merricks say this? To see why, consider what he requires of The Criterialist (i.e., the philosopher who suggests that there are, in fact, criteria of identity over time for physical objects): The Criterialist’s criteria for necessary and sufficient conditions for identity over time are useful (and therefore actual criteria) only if they are “satisfied without presupposing the identity for which they are said to be criteria”.\textsuperscript{68} In other words, The Criterialist’s proposed criteria must be informative (i.e., non tautological).\textsuperscript{69}

Unfortunately for the criterialist, thinks Merricks, any attempts at describing necessary and sufficient diachronic identity conditions reduce to this: P at t’s being identical with P* at t* is necessary and sufficient for P at t’s being identical with P* at t*.\textsuperscript{70} Such a statement is trivially true and, quite obviously, uninformative. So, it does not count as a criterion.

Now, consider the philosophically well-worn puzzle of Theseus’s Ship—a hallmark problem of material constitution. The puzzle goes something like this: suppose that Theseus’s Ship is a material object composed of any number of smaller pieces (e.g., planks). Now suppose that, while this ship remains in a harbor over some amount of time, it is, bit by bit, replaced with new parts. Every part is taken out of the ship and replaced by a new, numerically distinct, part. Each old part is then discarded on land in a continually growing pile. Over time, as the puzzle goes, every physical part that once made up Theseus’s Ship has


\textsuperscript{68}Merricks, “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,” 107.

\textsuperscript{69}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.
been replaced by a new part. All of the old parts now on land, to make the puzzle go through, are gathered together by a collector of old ships and reassembled into a ship. In the harbor, then, there exists a ship whose material constituents were slowly replaced over time. On land, we have another, numerically distinct, ship made up of the parts that once made up the Ship of Theseus. Which ship then, as the puzzle finishes, is Theseus’s Ship? If it is the one in the harbor, what makes it so? If physical objects are tied up in the identity of their individual pieces, why would the ship on the land not be Theseus’s Ship? What gives the ship in the harbor or the ship on the land its identity as Theseus’s Ship? For materialist/physicalist conceptions, the answer is not at all easy.

How is The Criterialist supposed to solve the puzzle of Theseus’s Ship? Perhaps The Criterialist can offer a reply of this sort: “Theseus’s Ship is whichever is identical to Theseus’s Ship”; or, maybe, “Theseus’s Ship is whichever has the essence of Theseus’s Ship”. Less obviously tautological are possible responses of this sort: “Theseus’s Ship is identical to that which is composed of the planks that have immanent causal connections with the original planks,” or: “Theseus’s Ship is identical to that ship which is composed of the planks that have been caught up in the life of the ship over time”. Will these responses satiate the anti-criterialist complaint? Not obviously, at any rate.

The first two responses, on a quick look, seem to be nothing more than a proposition identical to which the anti-criterialist thinks all criteria claims reduce: p at t’s being identical to p* at t* is necessary and sufficient for p at t’s being identical to p* at t*. But what about the second two responses? It seems to me that the anti-criterialist can argue that they are tantamount to the same claim, viz. that the identity of the ship is wrapped up in the simples that are appropriately identity-related to the original ship. Here ‘identity-related’ just means that the simples flowing in and out of the composite are related in such a way as to preserve the numerical identity of the composite. In other words, Theseus’s Ship at time t is identical
to Theseus’s Ship\* at t* just in case the simples that make up Theseus’s Ship have been a part of a particular kind of process, a process that keeps the ship’s numerical identity intact. But these ‘criteria’, this ‘life’ or these ‘immanent causal connections’—the processes that might be said to keep the ship’s identity intact—appear to presuppose the identity of the ship in question; they do not seem to provide the anti-criterialist an explanation for the identity of the ship. Compare: new players in the history of the Washington Capitals organization consistently and gradually replace players that antedate them as members of the Washington Capitals—i.e., the seasonally new players are ‘caught up in the life’ of, or have ‘immanent causal connections’ with, the Capitals organization. The ability for there to be a ‘life’ of the Washington Capitals in which a player might be caught up, or for there to be an ‘immanent causal connection’ between a new player and the Washington Capitals, presupposes the existence of the franchise, the Washington Capitals. The same seems true of the Ship of Theseus. Change the Ship of Theseus to a human person, Jones, and the equivalent criterialist responses might elicit identical anti-criterialist complaints.

Now, neither Merricks, nor any other anti-criterialist, has offered an analogy between being caught up in the ‘life’ of a composite object and being caught up in the ‘life’ of an obvious non-substance, a sports team.\textsuperscript{71} For clarity’s sake, Merricks will simply deny that Theseus’s Ship is a substance at all—he will say it is a mere aggregation and, in point of fact, does not exist.\textsuperscript{72} Merricks’s ontology is notably eliminativist, much like van Inwagen’s. So, all that exists are material simples, human persons/organisms, and, possibly, all other living

\textsuperscript{71} Though, apparently, some physicalists who deny numerical bodily identity use the analogy to demonstrate that proper names of humans, like the names of sports teams, refer to a collection of parts and the name quantifies over non-identical sets of parts. That is, the object itself keeps changing, even if the name does not. See: William Jaworski, \textit{Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction} (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 8.

\textsuperscript{72} See Trenton Merricks, \textit{Objects and Persons}, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) for an outworking of his eliminativism of macro, non-organic, composite objects. According to Merricks, only the ‘folk-ontologist’ will agree that there is such a thing as Theseus’ Ship. Elsewise, it is just something like simples arranged ship-wise.
organisms. Never mind that, however. The objection still stands: substances cannot be compared with non-substances with respect to persistence conditions. (I am inclined to think that one might say, and correctly, that non-substances do not have persistence conditions, but substances do.) So, the Washington Capitals are likely a poor example of a thing with persistence conditions similar to a substance. Is there a better example on offer?

I think so. Jones is a human person. By most anyone’s lights, Jones, as human person, is a substance. Additionally, human persons are the sorts of substances about which van Inwagen offers his ‘Life’ thesis and various others offer their ‘immanent causal connections/relations’ theses. It seems likely, though, that the anti-criterialist will simply object that the proposition “Jones’s diachronic identity obtains if and only if the simples which come to compose him are caught up in his biological life or are immanently causally connected to the simples that now compose him” presupposes that there is a persisting Jones quantifying over the changing simples. After all, it seems that, with respect to the ‘Life’ thesis or the ‘immanent causal connection/relation’ thesis, ‘biological life’ and ‘immanent causal connection’ are just synonyms for ‘persisting Jones’. Again, the anti-criterialist complaint seems unmet by The Criterialist.

For Merricks, the bottom line is that there really are no non-tautological criteria for personal identity over time. To be clear, this is an ontological claim rather than epistemological; Merricks recognizes that there are two questions with which criteria of

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73 This is not entirely accurate. As Christian thinkers, they both also assume that some non-physical beings exist, e.g., God and the angels.


identity over time might be applied. First, an epistemological question: How does one know Jones at t is Jones* at t*? Second, an ontological question: How is it that Jones at t is identical with Jones* at t*? The former question is easily answered with non-tautological results (e.g., Jones looks the same to me, Jones recognizes me, Jones sounds the same, etc.). But these epistemological reasons cannot give necessary and sufficient ontological reasons. After all, of all the things that one might use to epistemically identify Jones, those same properties, via alien switch or some other bizarre physical occurrence, might result in the appearance of Jones’s copy, Pjones—a person who looks, acts, knows, sounds, etc. just like Jones. The latter ontological question is, as I have stated, an unexplainable—brute fact—for Merricks. According to anti-criterialism, there simply are no informative answers to the question because there are no criteria.

If the inescapability of tautology for The Criterialist is not bad enough, Merricks says that there is no reason to even accept The Criterialist’s main claim:

Criterialist Claim: [n]ecessarily, O at t’s being identical with O* at T* obtains if and only if there is some criterion of identity over time such that O at t’s satisfying the criterion C with O* at t* obtains. The Criterialist Claim is that without any sort of ontological criterion of identity over time, there is no identity over time. Now, admittedly, Merricks says, “[t]hat, necessarily, one contingent state of affairs obtains if and only if another one does is not itself an unusual claim”. He asks us to consider the following five claims of this sort:

A. Necessarily, water's being in the bucket obtains if and only if H2O’s being in the bucket obtains.

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 116 – 117.
B. Necessarily, God's believing that p obtains if and only if p's being true obtains,
C. Necessarily, x's being a three-sided planar figure obtains if and only if x's being a three-angled planar figure obtains, and
D. Necessarily, Clinton's being President obtains if and only if Clinton's being president and 2+1's equaling 3 obtains…
E. Necessarily, the Pacific Ocean's being larger than the Atlantic Ocean obtains if and only if Columbus's sailing to North America at some time or other obtains.  

The Criterialist Claim is just such a claim: necessarily, one contingent state of affairs—O at t’s being identical with O* at t*—obtains if and only if another one does, e.g., if there is some criterion of identity over time such that O at t satisfies the criterion C with O* at t*.

But, if this type of claim is not unusual, the question is, then, to which token instance (A – E) is the Criterialist Claim most similar? Merricks concludes that it is like E; therefore, since there is no reason to accept E, there is no reason to accept Criterialist Claim.  

After all, so goes his argument, because A is clearly true, C is necessarily true, and B and D follow from otherwise accepted propositions—none of which he thinks can be said about Criterialist Claim—the only option left is an E-type claim, a claim-type that does not bode well for Criterialist Claim.

If Merricks is correct, the situation looks quite poor for the physicalist-criterialist’s hope of answering the question “what makes a person, Jones at t, numerically identical to Jones* at t*?” However, (BI) physicalism, as such, might not be so impoverished. After all, Merricks offers this argument consistent with (BI) physicalism:

If the person existing at some later time is identical with me, then he could not possibly be identical with anyone else…what could be less arbitrary than something that could not possibly be otherwise? Why would it bother

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80 Ibid., 116 – 117.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
[anyone] if it turns out that my being identical with myself is a ‘brute and unexplained cause’?\textsuperscript{83}

For Merricks, it seems that a person’s being identical with herself throughout her existence is just a brute fact. No other explanation is required. If things are the way Merricks says, then he is correct and diachronic identity problems are a nonissue. Even better, for the Christian hoping for numerical identity in the resurrection, the lack of a puzzle about one’s future identity seems a bit of a relief—existentially and otherwise. But, alleviating one’s resurrection identity angst in this way only works if Merricks is correct. So, then, is Merricks correct?

I think not. Stephen Davis is instructive on this matter:

[A] problem with Merricks’s argument is that I do not see how the abandonment of criterialism amounts to an advance in the debate. It is true that the critic can no longer use the absence of the satisfaction of a criterion as a club to beat over the head of the defender of physicalist resurrection. But what prevents the selfsame critic from presenting non-criteria based arguments?...Thus a critic might argue against resurrection as follows: (1) propose some statement S not as a criterion but simply as a true statement; and (2) show that resurrection is inconsistent with S. (Let’s say that S is: “Things can come into existence no more than once.”) Since we know that S is true and that resurrection is inconsistent with S (so it will be argued), we know that resurrection is false. Admittedly, this is not an argument to the effect that resurrection is impossible; but one suspects that the critic of resurrection will not mind the result that resurrection is false. (As a believer in resurrection, I reject this argument; but it is a non-criteria-based argument against resurrection.)\textsuperscript{84}

Davis admits, though, that Merricks has a rejoinder ready to hand.\textsuperscript{85} For Merricks will undoubtedly say that asserting the truth of the proposition “things can come into existence no more than once” displays an “overweening confidence in one’s modal intuition, in one’s ability to peer into the space of possibility with a clear and unfaltering gaze and to see that

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., 119. My insert.


\textsuperscript{85}Davis, “Physicalism and Resurrection,” 234.
what seems to be possible, in some sense and to at least some of us, is not really so”.\textsuperscript{86} But, again, as Davis rightly wonders, what is to stop Merricks’s interlocutor(s) from accusing Merricks of doing the same?\textsuperscript{87}

It is admittedly difficult to pin down a precise way around this intuition loggerhead. But here is one possibility. Consider, again, Merricks’s distinction between the epistemological and ontological criteria for personal identity over time. The epistemological criteria, as he rightly admits, provide reasons that justify one’s belief that Jones is Jones throughout all points of her life. The epistemological criteria are, then, set in distinction from the ontological criteria: whatever it is that is supposed to metaphysically explain why Jones is Jones through all points of her life. But even though Merricks sets up a clear distinction between the epistemic and ontological criteria, I think that he perhaps confuses the ontological facts of the matter with the current epistemological lack. In other words, it seems that he is, in a very indirect way, implying that, since we do not know of any explanatory criteria, there are no explanatory criteria. Or, in a way that looks closer to the argument: since we only know of non-explanatory “criteria”, there are no explanatory criteria. But this obviously does not follow. Simply pointing out that physicalists may not have found any non-tautological ontological criteria for a person’s identity over time does not mean that there are none. It seems to me that this sort of move is, in the guise of recognizing the difference between epistemological and ontological criteria, to confuse them once more. That is to say, just because we may not know the ontological criteria does not mean that there are no such criteria. And, I do not assume that Merricks (or any anti-criterialist) thinks that it does. It just happens that this is to what his argument appears to amount.


\textsuperscript{87}Davis, “Physicalism and Resurrection,” 234.
I claim that Merricks’s complaint against criterialism reduces to something like confusion between epistemological lack and ontological absence. It seems to me that Merricks’s argument is really this: we only know of non-explanatory ontological “criteria” of human identity over time; therefore, there are no explanatory ontological criteria of human identity over time. To help this argument go through, recall that Merricks thinks that

Criterialist Claim: [n]ecessarily, O at t’s being identical with O* at T* obtains if and only if there is some criterion of identity over time such that O at t’s satisfying the criterion C with O* at t* obtains

is comparable to token E in the following list:

A. Necessarily, water's being in the bucket obtains if and only if H₂O’s being in the bucket obtains.
B. Necessarily, God's believing that p obtains if and only if p's being true obtains,
C. Necessarily, x's being a three-sided planar figure obtains if and only if x's being a three-angled planar figure obtains, and
D. Necessarily, Clinton's being President obtains if and only if Clinton's being president and 2+1's equaling 3 obtains…
E. Necessarily, the Pacific Ocean's being larger than the Atlantic Ocean obtains if and only if Columbus's sailing to North America at some time or other obtains.⁸⁸

Now, Merricks claims that there are a number of reasons that Criterialist Claim does not fit into tokens A – D. I think, with respect to tokens A and C, Merricks is correct. Criterialist Claim is not obviously true and it is not a necessary truth.

But, I am not convinced that Merricks is correct about Criterialist Claim’s not being something like either B or D. Set D aside since it does not concern propositions related in the way we might think about human identity and a human’s criteria of identity over time. What about claim B? Merricks says that B follows from otherwise accepted propositions (e.g., the proposition ‘God is omniscient’). Fair enough. Why, though, can the Criterialist not claim that Criterialist Claim works in the same way? Criterialists, after all, accept other propositions upon which the Criterialist Claim is based. For example, the Criterialist accepts

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this claim: there are necessary and sufficient ontological criteria for human identity over
time. So, then, Criterialist Claim may follow in just the same way B does from the ‘otherwise
accepted propositions’ on which it is based. To say that a Criterialist must antecedently deny
Criterialist Claim, or that it is not based on antecedently accepted propositions, seems to beg
the question against the Criterialist. I see no reason, then, to accept that Criterialist Claim is a
claim like token E. Perhaps, then, there is a reason to accept Criterialist Claim, and that
reason is similar to reasons one who accepts God’s omniscience accepts a claim like B.

Furthermore, if there is no reason to accept Criterialist Claim, or, at least, that there
are no criteria for identity over time, then metaphysicians might be in real trouble. David
Oderberg warns: “Real individuals must have real identity conditions, and…if the identity
conditions of a thing are circular, it has no fixed identity. And, we can add, if it has no fixed
identity, there is little coherence in supposing it exists at all”.

The latter part of this quote highlights Oderberg’s commitment to what he calls ‘real essentialism’, but, even if one does
not grant him this metaphysical commitment, the argument has some intuitive bite. For it
seems true enough to suggest that if there is nothing essential to Jones’s identity (other than
‘being identical to Jones’ or whatever), then it seems, in principle, impossible to
ontologically miss-desciibe Jones. Jones could be any kind of thing and have any kind of
properties whatever so long as she has the property ‘being identical to Jones’. ‘Being
identical to Jones’—according to anti-criterialism— is the only necessary and sufficient
property Jones must have to be Jones.

This has two consequences. First, it seems to betray the physicalist intuition that
Jones is identical to a particular human organism. So, right out of the gate, on (BI)

89 David Oderberg, “No Potency Without Actuality: The Case of Graph Theory,” in Contemporary

90 For Oderberg’s explication of ‘real essentialism’ see his David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (London:
Routledge, 2007).
(she must be a particular *human* organism/body). Second, as Oderberg suggests, it strains credulity to think that Jones exists *at all* without *informative* identity conditions. How could she if she is not any particular token of a *kind* of thing? Without informative identity conditions, it seems like the name ‘Jones’ could be applied to all manner of *different* things. Existence, though, seems to entail that whatever exists, exists as one kind of thing only. Perhaps, though, we are getting ahead of ourselves. More on this in chapter 4.

Of course, the only *real* way through this clash of intuitions between criterialist and anti-criterialist physicalist thinkers is to provide a physicalist account of identity over time, to provide *genuine explanatory criteria*. This seems particularly important for the Christian physicalist. For, without having any explanation for identity over time, it seems that Christian theology, on physicalism, is left without an *explanation* for identity in resurrection.

Thinkers continue to trek forward in the hope of identifying genuine criteria of human identity over time, not least in physicalist metaphysics. Anti-criterialists are well outnumbered. The same is true among Christian physicalist theologian/philosophers, particularly so with respect to bodily resurrection. However, this is not to say that, if a majority is on a well-trod path, the path is a correct one. Obviously not, to admit this would be self defeating to my overall argument, and a fallacious *argumentum ad populum*. But, it is to say that some criterialist attempts are worthy of attention. Hence, I have already dismissed two leading sorts of criterialist accounts of human persons and resurrection, viz., The Simulacrum Thesis and The Falling Elevator Model. And, I am skeptical of the anti-criterialist position. In the next chapter, I shall tackle another purportedly physicalist thesis (one that also attempts to trade on anti-criterialism at points) that continues to produce a large and varied amount of literature: Lynne Baker’s Constitution View.
IV. Wrapping Up

Physicalist theses seem difficult to square with the possibility of resurrection. The Simulacrum Thesis and The Falling Elevator Model seem to have untoward consequences of both a philosophical and theological nature. Merricks’s view, though perhaps the most slippery, finally ends up with an unsatisfying result. As it turns out, Criterialism and its Criterialist Claim seem plausible and relevantly like other well-regarded token claims. Unfortunately for physicalist accounts of identity through resurrection, I think the philosophical arguments against each view are quite strong. Moreover, the theological consequences might offer clearer defeaters. Though mentioned only briefly above, consider their weight. Here are the choices on offer: God’s being a mass deceiver, and/or Jones does not survive fission (misses on TA2 and TA3), and/or Jesus’s tomb being occupied at his resurrection. So, I submit that there is no good reason to accept any of these views. But, perhaps body identity physicalism does not need these sorts of theories to account for TAs 1 – 3. At the end of Chapter 5, we will see if there is any way in which (BI) theories can possibly work with TA2 and TA3 without resorting to simulacrum or falling elevator theories.

Now, though, I must inquire into another popular physicalist view: Lynne Baker’s Constitution View. The literature on the mind/body problem, puzzles of material constitution, and puzzles concerning physicalist theses and the eschatological bodily resurrection is riddled with references to her work as a plausible explanation of human persons and how human persons retain personal identity in the bodily resurrection. Since we are still trying to find a replacement for substance dualism as an account of human persons consistent with three theological affirmations in Christian theology, and (BI) physicalism has, so far, been found wanting, it is to her thesis I now turn.
The previous chapter was the first chapter in this project that focuses more explicitly (but not exclusively) on the philosophical viability of a particular metaphysics of human persons for the Christian doctrine of the bodily resurrection. That metaphysics is what I refer to as ‘body identity physicalism’, the thesis that a human person and her body are identical (or that the identity of the human person’s human body is in some significant way important for the identity of the human person). The conclusion of the last chapter’s analysis finds body identity physicalism wanting for a number of different, largely philosophical, reasons. I will not rehearse those again here.

This method of investigation in Chapter 2 is distinct to the method of Chapter 1. Though Chapter 1 is analytic in its presentation, the reasons given in Chapter 1 for rejecting a particular metaphysics of human persons are largely theological. Recall that the rejection of substance dualist metaphysics is not motivated by philosophical concerns about whether or not it renders the future bodily resurrection impossible per se. Rather, the motivation to jettison substance dualism from Christian theology (and philosophy) is driven by its incompatibility with a particular Pauline argument and the necessity of bodily resurrection for post-mortem hope. In any case, whether for theological or philosophical concerns, I have not yet found a suitable replacement for the metaphysics dismissed in Chapter 1, viz. substance dualism.

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1The lion’s share of this chapter can be seen elsewhere as James T. Turner, Jr., ‘No Explanation of Persons, No Explanation of Resurrection: On Lynne Baker’s Constitution View and the Resurrection of Human Persons,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 no. 3 (2014): 297 – 317.
In this chapter, the philosophical investigation continues in search of a conception of human persons consistent with the three theological affirmations set out in the previous chapters:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Lynne Rudder Baker’s ‘Constitution View’, another physicalist thesis, will be submitted to philosophical analysis. The reasons for this will become apparent below.

To begin to understand her constitution thesis, think again on the puzzle of Theseus’s Ship. Consider the same puzzle applied to the question of human personal identity over time and through bodily resurrection. Lynne Baker offers a metaphysics to solve these puzzles by way of her ‘constitution view’ such that ‘constitution ≠ identity’. If this view is correct, then the unit of simples that originally constitutes Theseus’s Ship, call the unit ‘Planks’ (i.e., that unit that is slowly but surely replaced over time), is not identical to the ship called Theseus’s Ship. Purportedly, Planks constitutes but is not identical to Theseus’s Ship for the following reason: there are things true of Theseus’s Ship that are not true of Planks. For example, Planks may have different modal properties than Theseus’s Ship. There might be a number of possible worlds in which Planks fails to constitute a ship, worlds without water, say. Theseus’s Ship, though, is essentially and necessarily a ship, so, Theseus’s Ship and Planks

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do not share the same modal properties. Since this is the case, given the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, Theseus’s Ship and Planks are not identical.\(^3\)

Additionally, for Baker, Theseus’s Ship and Planks have different persistence conditions. Presumably, Theseus’s Ship can survive the loss of one part; however, the aggregate, Planks, cannot. Planks is identical to the aggregate of pieces from which it is originally made—or so goes the claim. Again, given the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, Theseus’s Ship and Planks fail to be identical. To apply this line of thought to a human person, simply insert a human person, Jones, and her body, Body.

For Baker, constitution is a relation that sits between two options of what is, in her view, a false dichotomy. This ‘false dichotomy’ suggests that either objects like the human person, Jones, and her body, Body, are identical or else they are two independently separate objects.\(^4\) But, thinks Baker, the story is actually that a person is constituted by her body such that a person and her body are neither identical nor an instance of two independent objects (the same goes for all material objects).

But I am suspicious of this metaphysics. I do not think that Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. And, obviously, if her view cannot account for diachronic personal identity, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection (TAs 1 and 3)—a principal reason for which she gives this account. As such, I will press objections against her constitution view that demonstrate the following problems: First, I address an analogy she attempts to draw between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. I conclude that

\(^3\) Lynne Rudder Baker, “Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23, no. 1 (1999): 146. Hereafter: Baker, “Unity without Identity.” In this paper, Baker uses, instead of the Theseus example, a similar thought experiment with a piece of marble, Piece, and the statue it composes, David. The idea is that Piece and David have different modal properties and so are not identical.

\(^4\) Baker, “Unity without Identity”, 144.
this analogy fails and is untenable. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view (Constitution Problems [CP]). They go as follows, each more problematic than the last:

   CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks any explanatory power because a crucial *definiens* presupposes the *definiendum*. As such, it undercuts the definition and, therefore, the relation between the supposed constituting *relata* is left unexplained.

   CP2: Even if Baker can make a plausible definition of constitution, constitution seems to offer an account of too many persons or no *human* persons at all.

   CP3. Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons.

It follows from her poor analogy and CP1 – CP3 that her constitution view has neither an explanation of personal identity as such, nor personal identity over time; so, she cannot account for personal identity through resurrection. Thus, the Christian has no reason to accept her view (particularly those who affirm TA1 – TA3).

I. Primary Kinds and Constitution

According to Baker, every concrete object is of a particular ‘primary kind’. That is to say, there is a particular *kind* of thing that any particular concrete *individual* thing most fundamentally is. Moreover, every concrete object “has its primary-kind property essentially”. So, for a given object *x*, if *x* has *y* as its primary kind, there are no possible worlds where *x* exists and lacks *y*. This is a similar, if not identical, position to the thesis that there are individual existing things metaphysicians typically call ‘substances’, concrete things that, on account of their essences, exist in their own right (*simpliciter*). Baker notes that this understanding of primary kinds is similar to the Aristotelian notion of substances, though she

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extends her primary kinds thesis to artifacts where, arguably, Aristotle does not.\footnote{Lynne Rudder Baker, “The Ontological Status of Persons,” \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} 65. no 2 (September, 2002): 372.} That Baker’s understanding of primary kinds extends to artifacts is controversial. But, given that my concern is with how her metaphysics explains human persons—things I take to be substances—I leave the debate about artifacts aside.

To recap: for Baker, all concrete objects are members of a primary kind, and they have that membership essentially. If Baker’s understanding of primary kinds, and its members, is true, then, in the more widely accepted metaphysical language, each member of a primary kind is a substance (minimally understood as a property bearer with an individual essence). Since persons are members of a primary kind, viz., the primary kind ‘person’, persons are substances.\footnote{Baker, \textit{The Metaphysics of Everyday Life}, 71.}

Baker explains her primary-kinds thesis to help advance her metaphysics of constitution, a metaphysics that now circulates widely in the literature.\footnote{Baker’s is not the only constitution view on offer. But it does seem to be the most widely discussed in the literature, particularly with respect to resurrection metaphysics. This is particularly so with respect to Christian philosophical views of the human person and the resurrection of the dead. Kevin Corcoran also holds a constitution view; however, his differs in important ways. See Kevin Corcoran, “Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation,” \textit{Southern Journal of Philosophy} 37 (1999): 1 – 20. So does, as mentioned above, Michael Rea. See M. C. Rea, "Constitution and Kind Membership," \textit{Philosophical Studies} 97, no. 2 (2000): 169 – 193.} In general, this metaphysics is supposed to explain a particular relation between concrete things of differing primary kinds. In particular, one of its aims is to help metaphysicians explain human persons by solving the problems associated with personal identity in their synchronic (e.g., what makes $h$ a human person at $t$?) and diachronic forms (e.g., what makes a human person $h$ at time $t_1$ identical to a person $h^*$ at time $t_2$?).\footnote{Baker, \textit{The Metaphysics of Everyday Life}, 25.} With respect to resurrection metaphysics, Baker’s theory of constitution attempts to explain, as a by-product of personal identity through time, personal identity through eschatological bodily resurrection.
The slogan form of Baker’s view is conceived in this way: constitution ≠ identity.

However, Baker’s robust definition of ‘constitution’ is this:

Let ‘F*x’ stand for ‘x has F as its primary kind property’ and likewise for other predicate variables.

(C*) x constitutes y at t = df. There are distinct primary-kind properties F and G and G-favorable circumstances such that:

1. F*x & G*y &
2. x and y are spatially coincident at t, and ∀z(z is spatially coincident with x at t and G*z → z = y), &
3. x is in G-favorable circumstances at t; &
4. It is necessary that: ∀z(F*zt & z is in G-favorable circumstances at t) → ∃w(G*wt & z is spatially coincident with w at t)].
5. It is possible that: ∃t{(x exists at t & ∼∃w[G*wt & w is spatially coincident with x at t]}; &
6. If x is of one basic kind of stuff, then y is of the same basic kind of stuff.12

To briefly see how this constitution view (C*) is supposed to work, consider a person, Jones, a candidate substitution for y in Baker’s definition (above). Now, according to Baker, Jones happens to be a human person by virtue of being constituted by a human organism. We can call this human organism, Body, a candidate substitution for x in Baker’s definition. On this view, Body happens to be a human person by virtue of constituting the person, Jones.

According to the parameters set in Baker’s (C*), Jones is supposed to be non-identical with Body. Jones and Body are concrete objects of differing primary kinds related through constitution where constitution ≠ identity.13

To help simplify matters, allow me to further break down Baker’s (C*). According to (C*)’s (1),

1. F*x & G*y,

x has F as its primary kind and y has G. If ‘person’ and ‘human organism’ denote primary kinds, as Baker thinks they do, then one can, for purposes of our thought project, suppose that

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12 Baker, *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, 161. This definition has been amended from her original version found in Baker, *Persons and Bodies*, 95. Hence the asterisked C.

F stands for ‘human organism’ and G stands for ‘person’. So, (1) reads: Body (x) is of the primary kind ‘human organism’ (F) and Jones (y) is of the primary kind ‘person’ (G).

(2) explains that two things of the same primary kind cannot be co-located:

(2) x and y are spatially coincident at t, and ∀z(z is spatially coincident with x at t and G*z → z = y).

What allows for two non-identical things to be co-located on the constitution view is that they are concrete things of differing primary kinds. For our purposes, these two co-located concrete things of differing primary kinds are Jones and Body, a person and a human organism respectively.  

14 Again, substituting in Body for x and Jones for y, (2) is supposed to read: Body and Jones are spatially coincident at time, t, and anything that is spatially coincident with Body at time t and is a person just is Jones. (2) is an extremely important definiens; for, Baker is often cited with being guilty of multiplying persons or bodies (or statues and pieces of marble, etc.) in one location.  

15 So, (2) is supposed to say that there are not two persons where Jones is, there is only one. Likewise, there is only one body where Body is. Taken together, (2) is supposed to allow for the possibility of precisely one human person when and where Body constitutes Jones.

(3) highlights ‘primary-kind-favorable circumstances,’ in this case ‘G-favorable’.

‘[variable]-favorable circumstances’ is a term that Baker often uses to explain the...

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14 Baker wants clause (2) of (C*) to render ‘spatially coincident’ ‘loosely’ because she thinks it difficult to figure out how to understand ‘absolute spatial coincidence.’ Cf. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 161 note 3. On the same page she says, “Hence, when we require that the constituter and the constituted object be spatially coincident, we cannot be requiring absolute spatial coincidence.” Baker asks the reader to look into her argument in Persons and Bodies concerning this ‘absolute spatial coincidence’ to make her point. In Baker, Persons and Bodies, 209 – 212, she runs some such argument about constituters and constituted objects not being wholly spatially coincident through the example of a Body and an ectoplasmic Ghost. I am not at all sure how it is supposed to be relevant to Body and Jones. How does a person not share the same exact location as the body by which it is constituted? Surely Jones is just at one time and one place only. The ‘Ghost’ story is about two nonderivatively material objects, but presumably Jones qua person is only derivatively material—he borrows his material from Body.

15 See, for example, Eric Olson, “Thinking Animals and the Constitution View,” Symposium on Persons and Bodies, A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind. (Spring 2001) http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersym_olson.htm

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constitution relationship. All ‘[variable]-favorable circumstances’ means is that there are certain factors for any given object that either allow or deny the possibility of that given object to constitute anything else. For example, Body may well exist in worlds where there are no such things as persons. Or, Body might exist in a world that does contain persons, but the particular conditions in which Body finds itself do not amount to the existence of a person (perhaps brain death is such a condition). Brain death, might, on Baker’s account, be an instance of Body (i.e., x) not being in person-favorable (i.e., G-favorable) circumstances. But, according to (3), when Body is in circumstances favorable for persons, then Body will constitute a person. (3) asserts, then, that in the constitution relationship of the person, Jones, Body is in person-favorable circumstances at time t.

(4) is a modal claim that demonstrates the importance of the proposition in (3):

(4) It is necessary that: ∀z[(F*zt & z is in G-favorable circumstances at t) → ∃w(G*wt & z is spatially coincident with w at t)].

Substituting in ‘person’ for G and ‘human organism’ for F, (4) says that, necessarily, if something, z, really is in person-favorable circumstances at time t, then there really will be something, w, that is spatially coincident with z at t that is a person. Substitute in Body for z and Jones for w and one gets: necessarily, if Body really is in person-favorable circumstances at t, then, at t, there really will be a primary-kind person, Jones, and Body will be spatially coincident with Jones.

The fifth definiens,

(5) It is possible that: ∃t{(x exists at t & ~∃w[G*wt & w is spatially coincident with x at t]}},

16Baker uses more variables than ‘G’. But ‘G’ is used here.

17A condition like this seems like a potential candidate for relieving a human animal of the ability to carry on the first-person perspective of a human person, the necessary and sufficient condition for personhood. See, for example, Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 69ff.

18For her explanation of the kinds of conditions within which a human body would not constitute a human person, see Baker, Persons and Bodies, 91ff. The particulars do not matter for the purposes of my current task.
simply explains that it is possible for there to be a time, t, at which x (Body) exists but there is no spatio-temporally coincident thing that is a G (person). In other words, though it could be the case that Body exists, because ‘person’ is not Body’s primary kind, it is possible that Body exist at a particular time without there being a thing spatially coincident with Body at that time that has ‘person’ as its primary kind. Body could, after all, be in non-person-favorable conditions.

Baker’s last definiens,

(6) If x is of one basic kind of stuff, then y is of the same basic kind of stuff, tells us that the stuff of which y is ‘made’ is solely based on the sort of stuff that constitutes it. For our example, this means that Jones is a physical object solely because Body is a physical object. (6), in particular, is supposed to rebut charges that seek to demonstrate that the constitution relationship, at least with respect to human persons, is a relationship between an independently existing immaterial object and an independently existing material object (i.e. Cartesian sorts of substance dualism).

According to Baker, it is through (C*)—her definition of constitution—that one is supposed to see, for example, that it is possible for Jones and Body, by virtue of being in a constitution relation, to together make up exactly one thing: a human person. A human person, on Baker’s view, is another, though higher-level, instance of a primary kind.19

Quoting Baker, here is how she hopes to make this two-make-one claim work:

Then the fully general definition of ‘‘x and y are the same F at t’’ is this: (Same-F) x and y are the same F at t = df.
∀F ∀t{Either: (1) (i) F is an excluded property (i.e., F cannot be had derivatively) and (ii) (x = y & Fxt); or (2) (i) F is not an excluded property (i.e., F can be had derivatively) and (ii) [(x = y or x has constitution relations to y at t) &

So her (Same-F) definition is supposed to tell us that x and y can be one kind of thing, namely F, if x and y are either (1) identical at t or (2) x and y are in a constitution relationship at t. For Jones/Body, this is supposed to mean that Jones and Body are one human person (a kind of thing) at t, if and when Jones and Body are in a constitution relationship at t. (Same-F), thinks Baker, demonstrates how two primary kind things can constitute one primary kind thing.

Constitution is thus purported to be a relationship of unity; Jones and Body intimately share properties because they are one human person. To explain this property sharing, Baker introduces the locutions ‘having a property nonderivatively’ and ‘having a property derivatively’. One can see that these terms play a prominent role in (Same-F). In a more simple way, these two locutions can be thought synonymous with the nouns ‘nonderivative property’ and ‘derivative property’ respectively. Baker explains how something has properties derivatively or nonderivatively this way: “The basic idea of having a property derivatively is this: x has H at t derivatively if and only if x’s having H at t depends wholly on x’s being constitutionally related to something that has H at t independently of its being constitutionally related to x”.

Rephrasing Baker in a more simple way, derivative properties are said to be properties an object has on account of being in a constitution relation. Nonderivative properties are said to be properties an object has just by being itself.

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20 Baker, *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, 170. According to Baker, excluded properties are things like ‘is essentially a G’. So, while an object may have ‘G’ derivatively, it cannot have ‘is essentially a G’ derivatively. See below on ‘derivative’ and ‘nonderivative’ properties.

21 Baker, *Persons and Bodies*, 47.

22 Ibid., 47.

23 Baker, *Persons and Bodies*, 47.
Using our stock substitutions, Jones and Body, we can further flesh out Baker’s distinction between derivative and non-derivative properties this way. By constituting Jones, Body shares the property ‘being a person’, in a derivative way, with Jones. Jones, on the other hand, has the property ‘being a person’ nonderivatively because it is a property Jones has regardless of any constitution relations with Body (or anything else). Likewise, by being constituted by Body, Jones shares with Body, in a derivative way, the property ‘being a human organism’. But, Body has the property ‘being a human organism’ nonderivatively because it is a property Body has regardless of any constitution relations it has with Jones (or anything else).24

Notice that in the constitution relationship, it is supposed to be possible for the two primary kind things to borrow (i.e., have in a derivative way) certain of each other’s essential properties. Body can come to have, in a derivative way, ‘being a person’, a property that is essential to Jones as a primary kind person. Likewise, Jones can come to have, in a derivative way, ‘being a human organism’, a property that is essential to Body as a primary kind human organism. Thus Baker: “So, something may have a primary-kind property contingently when suitably related to something that has it essentially”.25 Note, though, and this is extremely important, Jones, as a primary kind person, cannot have her derivative property ‘being human’ essentially. ‘Being essentially human’ is an ‘excluded property’ in the (Same F) definition because, according to Baker, properties like “is essentially a G” cannot be had derivatively.26 So, because Jones has ‘being human’ derivatively, she has it accidentally.

24I couch ‘Body’ in gender-neutral terms, i.e., ‘it’. But this raises an interesting question for Baker. Are human animals male and female on account of genetic makeup and anatomical physiology or are human animals only designated male and female on account of their constitution relations with particular persons? If particular persons are designated male and female wholly apart from the animal organisms that constitute them, what about a particular person makes one male or female (at least, in a non analogica way)? This seems to me an interesting question, but one for a later time.


26Ibid., 170.
Jones can *never* have ‘being human’ essentially, so long as Jones is not of the primary kind ‘human organism’. Jones, so far as she is of the primary kind ‘person’ can only ever have the property ‘being human’ accidentally/derivatively through her constitution relations to Body. To clarify this property sharing in less novel language, I think it suffices to say that, according to Baker’s constitution view, certain of Jones’s essential properties Body has accidentally and *vice versa*.\(^{27}\) It is also true, given constitution, to say that they can each share accidental properties. Jones may come to have a broken leg derivatively on account of being constituted by Body that has the broken leg nonderivatively, and so on.\(^{28}\)

The constitution view with its definition of ‘constitution’ (\(C^*\)), the (Same-F) definition, and the distinctions between derivative and nonderivative properties is supposed to provide a metaphysical explanation of material things in the world, not least an account of human persons. So, too, the constitution view is supposed to answer the nagging synchronic and diachronic problems of personal identity by giving an account such that a person, like Jones, is a *human* person at time \(t\) precisely because, at \(t\), she is constituted by a human organism, Body. On ‘constitution ≠ identity’, Jones is not identical to Body and Body is not identical to Jones. So, the fate of the one has nothing to do with the fate of the other. In other words, identity claims, whether synchronic or diachronic, must be measured by each primary kind, not by anything else. This is so, according to Baker, because Jones and Body have differing essential properties, and consequently, differing persistence conditions. On Baker’s account, what is necessary and sufficient for a person like Jones’s existence is the property she posits as essential to being a person, namely retaining the same first-person perspective.\(^{29}\)

Meanwhile, Body has biological functions that are essential for its survival. Either way,

\(^{27}\)I take it that properties had derivatively by an object \(x\) are properties accidental to \(x\).

\(^{28}\)Ibid., 169.

\(^{29}\)See, for example, Baker, *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, 69ff.
according to Baker, Jones does not depend on Body for her existence *qua* person and neither does Body rely on Jones for its existence *qua* body. Jones can remain an existing person *sans* Body and Body can remain an existing human organism *sans* Jones.\(^\text{30}\)

**II. Numerical Identity and a False Analogy**

The above suffices for an overview of Baker’s constitution view. If I am correct in the description of Baker’s metaphysics, then, by my lights, her metaphysics seem deeply flawed if not incoherent. To see why, consider ‘numerical identity’.

What sort of identity is *numerical* identity? I take it that numerical identity is as basic as anything can be. It is the sort of sameness that holds between an object, itself, and no other thing. In other words, if there are, for example, six billion instances of a particular type of thing, then the particular numbered ‘three’ is the only particular so numbered in the entire collection of the six billion particulars. Any other particular in the set claiming to be the one numbered ‘three’ makes a false claim. Numerical identity is the strictest form of identity.\(^\text{31}\) Further, it is, too obviously, set over and against numerical *distinction*. If two things are numerically distinct, they are not the same token thing. In other words, if there are six billion tokens of a particular type of thing, then a token \(p_1\) numbered ‘one’ and a token \(p_2\) numbered ‘two’ (where \(p_1\) and \(p_2\) are in the set of \(p\)’s individually numbered from \(p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_{6000000000}\) and neither \(p_1\) nor \(p_2\) is numbered twice) are different particulars individually contributing to the


\(^{31}\)I realize that even this is a contentious claim. However, I simply take it as given that there is such a thing as numerical identity even if the definitions are or appear to be circular. If anything, I think that numerical identity is just the definition of ‘identity’ and is not further analyzable. I do not know what to take as more basic than a thing is identical to itself and nothing else. Identical twins, for example, are ‘identical’ in an equivocal sense. There are obviously two separate things here, hence ‘twin’. What one means by ‘identical’ in this sense just means something like ‘qualitatively extremely similar’ and ‘born at the same time and from the same womb’. In other words, there is at least one quality that identical twins do not share (e.g., location). For further discussion, see: Harold Noonan, “Identity”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/>. 

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collection of ps counted as ‘six billion’. Baker recognizes this sort of identity and distinction and says that constitution gives a *via media* between the two. She says, “The relation of constitution occupies an intermediate position between strict identity, on the one hand, and separate existence on the other. (The fact that ‘‘constitution’’ can be defined using familiar logical and modal ideas by (C*) indicates that the idea is not incoherent.)”

Now, I confess that I am not at all sure about at least one of her terms in this statement. Sometimes, for Baker, ‘strict identity’ means numerical identity. If that is true, then the opposite pole, between which she says there is an intermediate, is numerical distinction. So, we can plausibly couch her ‘separate existence’ in terms of ‘numerical distinction’. But then that would mean that another way to put her quote would be “the relation of constitution occupies an intermediate position between numerical identity and numerical distinction”. Such a conception is incoherent. Baker tries to elucidate her conception further when she says:

> However, many philosophers insist on the following: If x and y are nonidentical, then where x and y are, there are two [separately existing] things. Along with Aristotle (see [a previous argument]), I deny that the inference is valid. In any case, I have carefully defined two ways of being nonidentical. If x and y are constitutionally related, then I would deny that where x and y are, there are two things. x and y are numerically the same; constitution is another species of Aristotle’s numerical sameness.  

This seems to say that, through constitution, x and y are numerically identical things that are not strictly identical, which seems to contradict other assertions she makes, viz. that numerical identity and strict identity are synonymous. Further, on a previous page in the same monograph, however, she says this about x and y (seemingly offering another

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33 Ibid., 169 – 170.


35 See ibid., 170. She states *explicitly* that she does not want to undo the ‘classical notion of identity’. Well, the ‘classical notion’ is that numerical identity is strict identity.
contradiction to her own views):

What constitution-without-identity shows is that there are two ways for things to fail to be identical (two ways to be numerically different, if you prefer). By the term “identity,” I always mean classical, strict identity. But the idea of nonidentity divides into two more fine-grained notions: constitution and separate existence.\(^{36}\)

So, I am slightly confused by what she means. Does she mean that x and y are two things that are numerically identical (first quote purporting to agree with Aristotle)? Or does she mean that x and y are not numerically identical (i.e., “numerically different”) because they are in a constitution relation and not strictly identical (second quote)? If this Baker statement is true: “If x and y are constitutionally related, then I would deny that where x and y are, there are two things. x and y are numerically the same…” then constitution is not a way for two things to fail to be strictly identical. Numerical sameness (identity) is identity in its strictest sense—a point about which she agrees and does not seek to modify.\(^{37}\) If x and y are numerically identical, then they are strictly identical. But, x and y’s strict identity is something Baker wishes to deny. So, I admit confusion here. Baker’s explication of constitution seems to equivocate on important terms like ‘strict identity’, ‘numerical identity’, ‘numerical distinction’, ‘separate existence’, and others.

Confusion aside, I shall attempt to clarify some of the mystery. Even with the above quotes, it seems to me that Baker does not actually believe that x and y are numerically identical to one another through the constitution relation. Rather, I think she is trying to coherently hold two positions, positions that I suggest fit, at best, uncomfortably together: A) x and y, as individual primary kind objects, are numerically distinct and B) x and y, though numerically distinct, can constitute a numerically identical primary kind object and so not

\(^{36}\)Ibid., 169 – 170. Her parenthetical phrase. My emphasis.

separately exist. This odd thesis seeks to redress what Baker considers a false dichotomy in metaphysics: either x and y are numerically identical or they have separate existence. To back this up, she offers one of her earlier, supposedly Aristotelian-based, arguments:

So, although Coriscus is a man and the masked man is a man and Coriscus is not identical to the masked man, it does not follow that there are two men... We can use Aristotle’s notion of numerical sameness without identity to defuse several related kinds of resistance to the idea of constitution (another kind of numerical sameness without identity, different from accidental sameness). The first kind of resistance stems from the doubt that non-identical things can occupy the same space at the same time. Aristotle’s notion of accidental sameness shows that we do not have to suppose that if A and B are non-identical, then A and B are two things. So, we need not suppose that two things occupy the same place at the same time.

Notably, Baker does not cite Aristotle to make this argument; instead, she cites Gareth Matthews’s explication of an Aristotelian text. But, really, it does not matter. While it is true that Coriscus’ case is one of ‘accidental sameness’, ‘accidental sameness’ is in no way similar to constitution. The case of Coriscus appears most obviously as a case of one substance (or, ‘primary kind’ to use Baker’s term) conceived in two different ways. In one way, Coriscus is viewed only in light of his essential properties, Coriscus simpliciter, if you like. The other way views Coriscus with respect to his essential properties and his accidents (e.g., being masked or not). In Aristotelian terms, these two ways of viewing Coriscus are such that one numerically identical substance/primary-kind thing is in view. But the

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38 In an earlier paper, Baker explicitly notes that “…constitution, our target relation, is not identity of any sort. Constitution is rather one of those relations ‘that behave in some respects like identity but do not hold of necessity.’” See Lynne Rudder Baker, “Why Constitution is Not Identity,” The Journal of Philosophy 94 no. 12 (December, 1997): 612. I am unsure whether this statement clarifies her metaphysics goals or not.

39 Baker, “Unity without Identity,” 144.


42 See, for example, Aristotle’s discussion in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Γ, 59 – 64. Also, this is precisely what Aristotle seems to imply in his discussion of Coriscus in Metaphysics, Book Δ, p. 79: “…it is by accident
constitution view considers the primary kind thing (e.g., the human person) in only one way. This one way is with respect to the primary kind thing (substance) and then that same thing with respect to its essential properties/constituents.

To see why, consider the primary kinds in play for the constitution view of human persons. There is the person, the human organism that constitutes the person, and the ‘higher’ primary kind that comes about from the constitution relation between the person and the human organism, viz. the human person. ‘Human person’ will play the role of ‘Coriscus’ in this analogy. But, we cannot allow either ‘person’ or ‘human organism’ to play the role of ‘masked’ or ‘not-masked’. We cannot allow them to play these roles because ‘person’ and ‘human organism’ are not accidental properties of ‘human person’. They are, instead, essential properties. So, the primary kind ‘human person’, considered *per se*, shares all of its properties and persistence conditions with its two other primary kinds (i.e., ‘person’ and ‘human organism’). Coriscus, on the other hand, taken *per se*, does not share all of the same properties with Coriscus-masked-at-t. Obviously enough, Coriscus-masked-at-t ceases to ‘exist’ when he takes off the mask (but Coriscus *simpliciter* does not!). There is simply no analogue between Aristotle’s ‘numerical sameness without identity’ and constitution. To

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43 As Marc Cohen rightly notes on this issue, ‘entity’ in its primary Aristotelian sense means ‘substance’. This is not the kind of entity about which Aristotle speaks in relation to the accidental unity of the masked man and the unmasked man. But, for Baker, the constitution relation is not between ‘entities’ in a nonsubstantial sense, as she makes clear. So, asking for Aristotle’s help will not do. See: S. Marc Cohen, “Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle’s Ontology,” *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 1 (January, 2008): 4–6. Further, it might also be worth noting that, if Alvin Plantinga is correct, certain properties accidental to a particular possible world are still essential to particular persons as ‘world-indexed properties’. So, for Coriscus, it might be the case that ‘being masked at t in world W’, say, is an essential world-indexed property. In W*, then, Coriscus still has the property ‘being masked at t in world W’, even though, in W*, Coriscus it not masked. If something like world-indexed properties is true, accidental differences across possible worlds do nothing to demonstrate anything remotely like numerical distinction or non-identity in the strict sense. Coriscus will have world-indexed properties essentially. So, he will have ‘being masked at t in W’ and ‘being not-masked at t* in W*’ in all possible worlds. Sharing all of these modal properties indicates that Coriscus in W is numerically identical (strictly identical) to Coriscus in W*. See Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 60ff.
consider a substance/primary kind with respect to all of its essential properties just is to
consider the substance. There are not two conceptions here—there is just one. Understood in
this way, Baker’s analogy simply does not correspond with the Coriscus story.

It is just the case that classical identity entails a particular conception of numerical
identity and numerical distinction. For how can one define ‘numerical identity’ without
presupposing a definition of numerical distinction (and vice versa)? Numerical identity just is
strict identity and numerical distinction just is separate existence.44 It is false, on the classical
conception of identity, that choosing between numerical identity and separate existence is a
false dilemma. To help her view, I suggest that Baker deny classical identity—though there is
no guarantee doing so will help constitution.

Putting Baker’s poor analogy aside, her constitution thesis leads to at least three
‘constitution problems’:

(CP1) x and y’s relation is completely unexplained

or

(CP2) overpopulation of persons or no population of human persons

or

(CP3) There are no essential differences between divine and human persons.

These problems are acute. I address them in the following sections.

III. No working definition (CP1)

Allow me to highlight at least one particular reason that (CP1) is a possible
implication for Baker’s constitution: the problem of ‘is’. According to Baker, ‘is’ can be used

44I submit that this statement does not bode well for Trinitarian theology, a theology to which I hold.
However, suffice it to say, in my opinion, Trinitarian discussions are quite distinct from the metaphysics of
concrete physical things (e.g., dogs, humans, statues, ships, etc.). In any case, maybe constitution works for
Trinitarian theology. But, even if it does, it does not follow that it likewise works for the Triune God’s
creatures. This, though, is a topic for a later time. For a recent discussion and use of constitution metaphysics of
the Doctrine of the Trinity, see William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (Oxford: Oxford
in three ways. These three ways are the ‘is’ of predication (e.g., Jones is a student), the ‘is’ of numerical identity (e.g., Jones is numerically/strictly identical to Jones), and the ‘is’ of constitution (e.g., Jones is a human organism where ‘is’ means ‘is constituted by’).

Suppose we grant Baker these three distinctions. I think at least two instances of this copula break her (C*) definition.

Recall again Baker’s (C*):

\[(C*) x \text{ constitutes } y \text{ at } t = \text{df. There are distinct primary-kind properties } F \text{ and } G \text{ and } G\text{-favorable circumstances such that:} \]

1. \(F^*x \& G^*y\)
2. \(x \text{ and } y \text{ are spatially coincident at } t, \text{ and } \forall z(z \text{ is spatially coincident with } x \text{ at } t \text{ and } G^*z \rightarrow z = y), \&\)
3. \(x \text{ is in } G\text{-favorable circumstances at } t; \&\)
4. \(\text{It is necessary that: } \forall z[(F^*zt \& z \text{ is in } G\text{-favorable circumstances at } t) \rightarrow \exists w(G^*wt \& z \text{ is spatially coincident with } w \text{ at } t)].\)
5. \(\text{It is possible that: } \exists t\{x \text{ exists at } t \& \sim \exists w[G^*wt \& w \text{ is spatially coincident with } x \text{ at } t]\}; \&
6. \(\text{If } x \text{ is of one basic kind of stuff, then } y \text{ is of the same basic kind of stuff.}\)

In (C*), ‘is’ is used eight times, six of which are unproblematic, two of which are. Why might the use of ‘is’ be problematic? ‘Is’ might be used in problematic ways because, given constitution, and its counterintuitive notion of the via media between numerical identity and separate existence, the definition of ‘is’ is central to constitution’s explication. For example, a constitution-interlocutor cannot, without begging the question against constitution, simply insist that ‘x is an F’ and ‘y is an F’ asserts numerical identity.

In Baker’s metaphysics, it

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45 Baker, ‘Unity without Identity,’ 151.

46 This is a charge Baker lays against Eric Olson. “(a) Olson takes as a premise in an argument against me that if x is a person and y is a person and x and y are not “numerically identical,” then there are two persons. This cannot be a premise in a non-question-begging argument since it is just a denial of one of my premises (see (P1) on p. 173).” From Baker’s “Reply to Olson,” Symposium on Persons and Bodies. A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Spring 2001). So, here she asks the reader, and presumably Olson, to check the first premise of an argument she has already addressed. That argument, in Persons and Bodies, 173, is this:

\[(P_1) \text{ If } x \text{ is an } F \& y \text{ is an } F \& x \neq y \& x \text{ is spatially coincident with } y, \text{ then there are two spatially coincident Fs.} \]

\[(P_2) \text{ David is a statue, and Piece is a statue, and } David \neq \text{ Piece, and David and Piece are spatially coincident.} \]

\[\therefore (C_1) \text{ There are two spatially coincident statues.}\]

She claims here that (P1) begs the question against the constitution view because it does not take into account the possibility of a constitution relation. It needs, she says, an ‘augmented’ antecedent in this way: “…and
just might be the case that a proposition ‘x is an F’ is the statement ‘x constitutes an F’. The proposition might be one of identity, but it might not. So, in explaining (or arguing) personal identity and the constitution relation, one must be careful about how one uses the term ‘is’. But is Baker so careful? The answer, I think, is ‘no’.

To demonstrate this carelessness, I want only to look at the two problematic uses of ‘is’. They both occur in (6), the conditional claim that ‘if x is of one basic kind of stuff, then y is of the same basic kind of stuff.’ (6) is, perhaps, the central definiens that helps the constitution view count as a physicalist thesis (i.e., non substance dualist). Now, what kind of ‘is’ does Baker deploy in (6)? Baker does not say. It seems obvious that the instances of ‘is’ cannot be ‘ises’ of identity. If they are, (6) says that if x is identical to a particular kind of stuff, then y is identical to the same kind of stuff. But, in the case of Jones and Body, even the most reductive physicalist will not say that the human person Jones—or any object, for that matter—is per impossibile identical to a particular kind of stuff. Jones may be identical to a particular arrangement or parcel of stuff, but Jones cannot be identical to matter simpliciter (i.e., the kind of stuff). So, it does not seem to be an ‘is of identity’ in that sense.

Additionally, the ‘is’ in (6) cannot be an ‘is of constitution’. It cannot be an ‘is of constitution’ because if it is, this supposed definiens, presupposes the definiendum, (C*). Such a presupposition will count against the supposed explanatory power of (C*).

Perhaps, then, both instances of ‘is’ are the ‘is of predication’. Suppose they are. Mutatis mutandis, (6) reads: “if x has the property ‘being made of one basic kind of stuff’, then y has the property ‘being made of the same basic kind of stuff as x’”. Though this gives a more helpful idea of the kind of ‘is’ Baker uses, there lurks a formidable problem.

47 And, of course, it could be an ‘is of predication’ such that ‘x is an F’ just means that ‘x has the property F’.
It seems most plausible that the ‘is’ in (6) is twice used in a predicative way. This means that, as the exemplars of the predicates, x and y bear a property I will call “being made of x-type stuff”. In what way, though, do x and y have this property? Do x and y both have the property ‘being made of x-type stuff” accidentally or essentially? Or does one have the property accidentally and the other essentially? It seems that Baker will want to say that x and y have this property in different ways to avoid the possibility that x and y are two instances of the same primary kind thing. x, for example, may have the property essentially and y may have it accidentally. To flesh this out, let us plug in our stock substitutions for x and y, Body and Jones, respectively. Further, let us use a plausible designation for the kind of stuff that ‘x-type stuff” is, viz. organic flesh. We can then read (6) this way:

(6*): If Body has the essential property ‘made of organic flesh’, then Jones has the accidental property ‘made of organic flesh’.

I think Baker will agree with (6*). How, though, does Jones come to have this accidental property? Baker’s constitution view seems to imply that Jones qua human person comes to have this property by sharing it with Body in the constitution relation. But this implies that, in (6) and (6*), constitution is presupposed. The ‘is of predication’ seems like it implies an ‘is of constitution’. And, if it does, then, as with an explicit ‘is of constitution’, one of the definientia presupposes the definiendum. As a result, (C*), Baker’s definition of constitution, loses its explanatory power. So, the instances of ‘is’ in (6) cannot be the ‘is of predication’. Since they are not the ‘is of predication’ nor the ‘is of constitution’ (for the same reasons), then the only ‘is’ that is left is the ‘is of identity.’ I explained above how the ‘is of identity’ fails to make any sense of (6).

Perhaps, though, we can further amend (6) so that the ‘is of identity’ makes sense (i.e., so that it does not imply that x and y are identical to ‘stuff’ simpliciter). A plausible reformulation might be this:
If Body is identical to a particular unit of organized matter, then Jones is identical to the same particular unit of organized matter.

If one amends Baker’s (6) to (6**), and one holds to the indiscernibility of identicals and the transitivity of identity, as I and Baker do, then it turns out that x and y are exactly the same thing. They are strictly identical—there exist no different modal properties between them. According to Baker’s primary kind language, this means that x and y are not only the same primary kind but are the exact same trope (i.e., concrete instance) of the same primary kind. In other words, (6**) and its use of the ‘is of identity’ denies (1), (4), and (5) in (C*), and makes (3) trivially true (because x has G as its primary kind) by making Body and Jones identical in the strict sense. So, if the instances of ‘is’ in (6) are the ‘is of identity’, then Baker’s (C*) does not define anything like constitution if it defines anything at all.

It appears that there is either no such thing as Baker’s constitution or, if there is such a thing, no working definition of it. Whatever constitution implies, it seems to imply constitution problem (CP1): x and y’s relation is completely unexplained.

IV. Too many persons or no human persons at all (CP2)

I do not think that Baker gives us any reason to consider the constitution view. After all, if my preceding argument is correct, her ‘definition’ does nothing to define anything, let alone constitution. At any rate, it does not appear to explain the relation between x and y. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that Baker finds an appropriate sort of ‘is’ and utilizes it in such a way that a definition qualitatively similar to her current definition (but necessary corrections having been made) allows for the idea that a human person, Jones, is constituted by—and not identical to—a human organism, Body. Suppose there is a way to resolve (CP1): x and y’s relation is completely unexplained. Suppose, further, that Baker can give an adequate account of a middle way between numerical identity and separate existence.

Consider the following from Baker:
I have shown that, on my view, there are two ways to be “numerically different.” If we take “numerically different” in such a way as to imply that there is another person, separate from me, sharing my location now, then my view does not imply that there are two numerically different people where I am. If we take “numerically different” in the other way that allows for constitution, then the question does not arise: I am the (nonderivative) person nonderivatively writing this now. The nonsensical question gets its punch by question-beggingly presupposing that my body is another person in addition to me. Again: no argument that assumes or stipulates that there is no “third way” between identity and separate existence can non-question-beggingly be used against the Constitution View.48

What is one to make of this passage? It seems to me that it is making this claim: if a constitutionist says that Body and Jones both have the property ‘being a person’, this does not mean that Body and Jones are distinct persons. They are one and the same person with the property ‘being a person’ had in different ways (e.g., Body has the property derivatively and Jones has it nonderivatively). So, though Body and Jones are numerically distinct entities, they constitute one numerically identical entity—the primary-kind human person likewise named Jones. This seems to me impossible.

I hope to demonstrate this impossibility—in non-question-begging ways—by arguing for constitution problem (CP2): either that there really are two persons in the nonderivative sense or that there is no human person when and where the constitution relation occurs. To begin to dismantle Baker’s argument consider her following two statements:

On this view, “the constitution view,” something is a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a person is a human person in virtue of being constituted by a human body. (I do not distinguish between human organisms and human bodies; the body that constitutes me now is identical to a human organism.)49

and

A human person could start out as a human person and have organic parts replaced by synthetic parts until she was no longer constituted by a human body. If the person whose organic parts were replaced by synthetic parts


49Baker, “Death and Afterlife,” 381.
retained her first-person perspective—no matter what was doing the replacing—then she would still exist and still be a person, even with a synthetic body.\textsuperscript{50}

Given these statements, it seems obvious that, for a given person, Jones, being a human person is accidental to Jones. We can see this because Baker clearly says that a human person can lose her human body—the very thing that makes her a human—while the person remains in existence. In the case of Jones, then, if being constituted by that which makes Jones human is accidental to Jones, then being a human person is not essential to Jones. It is accidental. This is, as we discussed in §I, precisely because ‘being essentially human’ is an excluded property. It is a property, according to the (Same F) definition, that Jones, as a primary kind person, cannot come to have. And, as we also discussed in §I, a particular human organism’s being a person is accidental to it, for the same reasons. So, in Body’s case, constituting Jones is accidental to Body; therefore, being a person is accidental to Body. I think Baker should agree with this synopsis. After all, what I am pointing out seems to be nothing other than that Jones and Body are of two different primary kinds, Jones has the primary-kind ‘person’, and Body has the primary-kind ‘human organism’.

Following from the thesis that constitution is a relation of two primary kinds that yield a higher primary kind thing, there is a third primary kind in question: a human person—a being that Baker takes to be both essentially embodied and essentially first-person perceptive.\textsuperscript{51} At times, though, Baker seems to conflate the primary kinds ‘human person’ and ‘person’. For example, she says:

On the constitution view, then, a human person and the animal that constitutes her differ in persistence conditions without there being any actual physical intrinsic difference between them. The persistence conditions of animals—all

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., 384.

\textsuperscript{51}Baker, “The Ontology of Artifacts,” 100. “Constitution is a relation between things of different primary kinds [e.g., person and human organism]. Constitution brings into existence new objects of higher-level primary kinds than what was there before [e.g., a human person]”. My inserts.
animals, human or not—are biological; and the persistence conditions of persons—all persons, human or not—are not biological.\textsuperscript{52}

The conflation is obvious because she appears to think that human persons are distinct from human animals in the way that persons \textit{qua} persons are. In other words, she appears to say, and thus the conflation, that human persons are \textit{merely} persons. But, according to her constitution view, that cannot be correct. For Baker thinks that human persons are \textit{human} precisely when human animals constitute persons. That is to say, persons \textit{become} human persons when they come to have the derivative/accidental property ‘being human’ through a constitution relationship with a human organism. She says plainly above that a person could cease to be a human person and become synthetic (or any other \textit{kind} of person through constitution relations).\textsuperscript{53} So, given constitution, it is the case that persons \textit{simpliciter} are distinct from human animals. But \textit{human} persons, given most of what Baker says, should not so be. A \textit{human} person ceases to exist when the human animal ceases to exist.\textsuperscript{54} A human person \textit{qua human} has the persistence conditions of a human animal. Only a person \textit{qua} person does not so share these animal persistence conditions. So, a \textit{human} person and the animal that constitutes her \textit{do not} differ in persistence conditions. Baker seems mistaken.

On Baker’s account, it follows that there are either two primary kinds, one of which is a bare (i.e., \textit{simpliciter}) person in the constitution relation, or there are three primary kinds, two of which are persons (one human and one bare) in the constitution relation. The former option looks like this: there are two primary kind entities, Jones (a person) and Body (a human organism), only one of which is a (non-derivative) person (not a \textit{human} person but the \textit{bare} person, Jones). The latter option looks like this: there are three primary kind entities,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{52}Baker, “Death and Afterlife,” 385. My emphasis.
\item\textsuperscript{53}See the second quote on the previous page.
\item\textsuperscript{54}Notice that I am not committing Baker to the claim that ‘when the \textit{human} person ceases to exist, the \textit{person} ceases to exist.’ I do, though, think Baker is committed to the claim that ‘when a human \textit{person} ceases to exist, the \textit{person} ceases to exist, but the \textit{human} does not’. Thanks to Roger Turner for bringing up this needed clarification.
\end{itemize}
Jones (a person), Body (a human organism), and Sjones (a human person), two of which are (non-derivative) persons, one a bare person, Jones, and the other a human person, Sjones.\textsuperscript{55}

I think one of these two possibilities follows from the constitution view because, on constitution, neither of the two primary kind things, Jones nor Body, is identical to a particular human person. On constitution, Jones cannot be identical to a \textit{human} person because Jones does not have her \textit{human} part essentially and, on Baker’s view, \textit{human} persons \textit{do} have their \textit{human} parts essentially. (Recall that, according Baker, Jones cannot have the property ‘being essentially human’ because it is an excluded property to Jones.)\textsuperscript{56} If two things differ in essential properties, they are not identical. We further know that, given constitution, Body is not identical to a human \textit{person} because Body is not essentially a \textit{person} and a human \textit{person} is. So, it turns out that there are either two (non-derivative) persons in the constitution relation, Jones and Sjones, one of which is human, or else there is no \textit{human} person and human persons are unexplained.\textsuperscript{57}

At this point, Baker will no doubt object. She is quite clear that human persons are essentially embodied. I agree with her here. But there is a problem. According to Baker,

\textsuperscript{55} Eric Olson offers a similar critique in his “Thinking Animals and the Constitution View,” Symposium on \textit{Persons and Bodies. A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind} (Spring 2001) http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersymp_olson.htm. He suggests that, what I refer to as ‘bare persons’ are those who are essentially persons and what I call ‘human persons’ those that are accidentally persons. I think my view is a bit more precise. For Baker can always counter that human persons are \textit{both} essentially person and animal where neither the person nor the human animal is. Because of this possible rejoinder, I offer that there are either no human persons or else there is a person and a human person.

\textsuperscript{56} See section I.

\textsuperscript{57} Perhaps there is one more option. At constitution, Jones is killed and Sjones comes into existence. Then, at the death of the human organism, and the breaking of the constitution relation, Sjones dies and Jones comes back to life. This is an odd possibility, probably one that Baker will not endorse. It seems to imply that Jones can pop in and out of existence whilst retaining identity, among other bizarre features. Notice, also, that if Jones is a mere person and Sjones a human person, they are two distinct primary kinds—this is fundamental to Baker’s constitution. And, since they are two distinct primary kinds, they are substances. Since they are both substances and they are non-identical (they have differing persistence conditions), they are two persons (one with the essential properties of person \textit{simpliciter} and one with the essential properties of both human organism and person \textit{simpliciter}. The question, then, is whether they both coexist in the constitution relation or whether one dies (Jones) or never begins to exist (Sjones).
‘human persons’ come about through constitution relations, relations that are contingent.\footnote{Baker, “Unity without Identity,” 147.}

So, given the metaphysics implied by Baker’s constitution view, Jones, a person, is not essentially embodied; she is only a human by virtue of her contingent constitution relation to Body. Jones is not essentially a human person. Jones is not essentially a human in any way. It might be true that Jones necessarily has a human body when she is a human person, but, given constitution metaphysics, it is logically possible that she never be a human person, so Jones can exist without a human body. And, in any case, if Jones is essentially a human person, then whose essence in the constitution relation between Body and Jones is \textit{qua} person? I submit that this question highlights one of my proposed constitution problems, (CP2):

(CP2): Over population of persons or no population of human persons (set out in three possibilities):

a. There are two persons in the constitution of Body and Jones: a bare person, Jones, whose essence is \textit{qua} person, and a human person, Sjones whose essence is \textit{qua} human and \textit{qua} person. (Overpopulation of persons)

b. There is only one person in the constitution of Body and Jones: Jones, whose essence is \textit{qua} person. (No kinds of persons)

c. There is no person in the constitution of Body and Jones whose essence is \textit{qua} human and \textit{qua} person. (No human persons)

I do not see that there can be any decisive objection against these three possibilities.

What can Baker say? Can she insist that all persons are necessarily embodied? No, she cannot.\footnote{But that does not keep her from trying! She says: “First, according to the Constitution View, I am essentially embodied; although I do not necessarily have the body that I in fact have now, I never can exist without any body at all.” Lynne Rudder Baker, “Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection,” \textit{Faith and}...} She cannot make this assertion because she agrees that there are persons that are not
embodied, God and angels. If God and the angels exist, and are persons (and ‘person’ can be used univocally between humans, angels, and God as Baker seems to think), ‘being embodied’ is not an essential property of persons as a primary kind. It is an accidental property. There is, then, no reason to suggest that Jones qua person, the thing she is essentially, must be embodied.

Moreover, Body and Jones both seem to bear essential properties and essences quite distinct from being in any sort of relationship with one another. Baker says that Jones’s essence qua person is to have a first-person perspective, something that she can have quite apart from any human body. Body’s essence, on the other hand, seems wrapped up in some sort of biological life—however that comes out. Because of this, it seems overwhelmingly logically possible on the constitution view, even metaphysically and physically possible, for Body to exist without Jones. In the same way it seems logically, metaphysically, and physically possible on the constitution view for Jones to exist without Body or any body at

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*Notice that Baker’s constitution implies that persons neither need embodiment for personhood nor existence. Perhaps, though, Baker will insist that ‘Jones’ and ‘human person’ are interchangeable for the variable ‘F’ in the (Same-F) criteria. In this way, Person and Body are the same Jones/Human Person just in case Person and Body are in constitution relations. If so, Baker can say that Jones is identical to a human person because Jones is the product of a constitution relation between a person and Body. But this seems disastrous for Baker. On her view, if a human person goes out of existence by virtue of her human animal going out of existence, the person supposedly continues to exist. But who is this person? Surely it is not Jones for Jones is numerically/strictly identical to a human person. The continuing person would have to be someone else. Might, then, a human person constitute Jones? No, because, if so, this means that a human person—a person in its own right—constitutes Jones, presumably a person in his own right. This leads to the charge of overcrowding. Brian Garrett is utterly dumbfounded by Baker’s notion that “although human persons are not essentially human (they may have [i.e., survive in] inorganic bodies), anything that begins existence as a human person is essentially embodied.” He stresses that he finds no argument for this thesis. Obviously, I share with Garrett (at least!) this confusion. Brian Garrett, “The Story of I: Some Comments on L. R. Baker P&B,” Symposium on Persons and Bodies. A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Spring 2001) http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersymp_garrett.htm
V. There are no essential differences between divine and human persons (CP3)

In addition to all I have argued, there seems to be a worse problem. If constitution is correct, there are no essential differences between divine and human persons (if the primary kind ‘person’ can be univocally ascribed to both humans and divine beings). To help draw this out, consider some purportedly constituted material objects like flags. Now, for Baker, “Objects related by constitution are of different primary kinds”. If it is true that ‘primary kind’ and ‘substance’ are synonymous, then, with a constituted object like a flag there is a primary kind thing ‘flag’, and if a primary kind ‘flag’, then a substance ‘flag’, a flag simpliciter. But what does this amount to? What exactly are flags simpliciter? If constitution is true, then flags are one primary kind and the pieces of cloth that constitute them are another. This constitution relation is supposed to bring about an individual flag. However, it seems like the constitution relation yields not just an individual flag, but an individual flag of a particular kind. The same seems true of persons and human organisms. What ‘emerges’ (or whatever verb you like) from the constitution of ‘person’ and ‘human organism’ is an

62 I take it that, if disembodied things exist in the order of creation (e.g., angels), then ‘physically possible’ is used here extremely loosely just to mean ‘whatever is possible in the order of creation.’ Also, I find that a similar critique can be given to Nancey Murphy’s non-reductive physicalism whereby she insists that personal identity is couched in terms of memory, emotional reactions, moral character, experiences, interpersonal relations (particularly, with God), and perhaps a host more attributes. Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132 – 146. Though Murphy insists that a physical substrate is necessary for the mental identity conditions to obtain (i.e., having moral character, memories, and the like, requires, for humans, a physical body on which to supervene), she does not provide an account of what kind of body. Moreover, she denies numerical identity of the body over time (and through resurrection). So, what is carrying these properties, which are supposed to be sufficient for numerical diachronic personal identity? Also see: Nancey Murphy, “Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically Sound Portrait of Human Nature.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 34, no. 4 (December, 1999): 551 – 572 and Nancey Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Challenges,” in Personal Identity in Theological Perspective, eds. Richard Lints, Michael S. Horton, and Mark R. Talbot (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006.), 95 – 117.

63 For a quick overview of some historical and theological reasons for thinking such univocity is mistaken, see David Fergusson, ‘Humans Created According to the Imago Dei: An Alternative Proposal,’ Zygon 48, no. 2 (June, 2013), 444.

64 Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 25
individual person of a particular kind, viz. a particular human person. But, if there is a primary kind thing ‘person’, then there is a substance ‘person’, a person simpliciter. What exactly is a person simpliciter?

Perhaps we might say that there are ‘flags’ simpliciter and when combined with certain pieces of cloth one gets certain individual flags (e.g., U.S.A. flags). And, in the same way, we might say that there are ‘persons’ simpliciter and, when constituted by certain types of bodies, one gets certain individual persons (e.g., human persons). But flags and persons simpliciter just seem to be abstract objects, not concrete things. There are only particular non-abstract instances of kinds of flags and persons.

It seems that even if one goes Platonic and suggests that flag or person simpliciter is something like The (Form of) Flag or The (Form of) Person, there exists but one of each. In the realm of eternal Forms, there is not a multiplicity of the same kind of Form or (Kind of) Form simpliciter (e.g., The Form of Flag). So, instances of The Flag would be mere copies and so be kinds of flag; the same would be true of persons. What would multiple flags or persons simpliciter amount to? I think that they would amount to not much more than nonsense; so, I do not want to commit Baker to holding this position. But, then, the other plausible option seems to be something Aristotelian. If Baker goes Aristotle’s way, ‘person’ and ‘flag’ simpliciter become nothing but an abstraction—a universal pulled out by the mind from particular things. Person or flag simpliciter, on the Aristotelian sort of view, is just a conceptual thing, not something that has its own existence out in the world. The only option available to Baker, if she wishes for a simpliciter sort of existing thing, is to go Platonic; but then she will lack the multiplicity of existing flags and persons that are not simultaneously kinds of flags and persons (etc.). (The multiplicity comes out in the copies.)

Actually, I just think that Baker has run completely out of room. To say that Jones is a person and not say what kind of person Jones essentially is results in untoward consequences.
I think this is particularly true for Baker as a Christian, and just here is the rub of (CP3).

After all, if persons are persons *simpliciter* essentially (i.e., persons are essentially of the primary kind/substance ‘persons’) and only *kinds* of persons accidentally (i.e., contingently constituted by a further primary kind, e.g., a human organism, ‘divine nature’, etc.), then even God—a person constituted of a divine nature—is a person *simpliciter* essentially and a divine person accidentally (again, if ‘person’ can be univocally ascribed). That means that there are logically and metaphysically possible worlds where God exists and is not divine. Moreover, there are logically and metaphysically possible worlds where God and I are the *same kind of person!*  

I can think of no Christian view that accepts this. I do not think Baker would or should accept this either.

Instead, what I think Baker should accept, particularly given her motivation to agree with physicalist intuitions that bodies are essential to human persons, is that if any person is a human person, that person is essentially a *human* person. The same is true of divine persons; they are essentially divine. Since there are no bare persons, philosophical considerations of the identity conditions of particular persons should begin, minimally, with the *kind* of person under analysis. Moreover, because there are no instances of persons *simpliciter*, it is hard to say whether or not persons *qua* persons have persistence conditions. Instead, persistence conditions should be explored through persons *qua* kinds of persons. In other words, there are no primary kind persons. There are only primary kind *kinds* of persons (e.g., human persons, divine persons, alien persons).

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65 Or, if one wants to quibble, if God is not one person but three (which I take to be true), then ‘divine nature’ is, in some way, said of the three divine persons. At any rate, given Baker’s constitution, it turns out that I, as a primary kind person, and The Father, as a primary kind person, are essentially the same. We just happen to be constituted by different things.

66 If one counts Mormonism as a Christian sect, then it seems like Mormonism might be open to this possibility. I take it that Lynne Baker is not a Mormon.

67 Name any individual person you like. Being a *kind* of person will be essential to her. This will entail a rejection of the idea that constitution, if such there be, is a contingent relation.
VI. Baker and Resurrection

I have just argued that the constitution view is likely guilty of at least one of three things: (CP1) the relation between x and y is unexplained, (CP2) overpopulation of persons or no human persons, and/or (CP3) there are no essential differences between divine and human persons. If (CP1) is true, constitution does not account for any sort of relation at all. So, not only is the metaphysics of human persons unexplained, the insights of metaphysics about material objects, if constitution is the underlying principle, lacks any explanatory power. (CP1)’s being true is very important for the purposes of my project. For, if it is, then Baker’s constitution cannot help Christian thinkers account for at least two of our guiding three theological affirmations, namely:

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Now, Baker claims: “According to the constitution view, we are essentially embodied; so, if the constitution view is correct, there is an obvious explanation of why life after death would be embodied life (since, according to the constitution view, we cannot exist unembodied)” 68

But, if (CP1) follows from Baker’s constitution, then Baker is left without an explanation for why life after death would be embodied life; there is no explanation at all of the relation between a person and her body, let alone her being embodied in resurrection.

If (CP2) is true, then Baker falls prey to charges of overcrowding or else she has no account of human persons. But constitution is supposed to provide a metaphysical account of human persons (at least). If it cannot accomplish an explanation of human persons, the metaphysical scheme is, at minimum, existentially uninteresting. Moreover, if her view

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provides too many persons or no explanation of human persons at all, then, again, constitution lacks the metaphysical resources to account for how the bodily resurrection of individual human beings is possible.

Worse still, (CP3) might indicate that the constitution view implies that human persons and divine persons are essentially the same (if the primary kind ‘person’ can be univocally ascribed). This would be disaster for Christian theism. So, it might be the case that either Baker’s constitution is true or Christian theism is. I think Baker is at a dead end. The problems of (CP1) – (CP3) seem insurmountable.

Unfortunately for Baker, since constitution is likely false, she has no account of personal identity in resurrection. Baker puts all of her personal identity eggs in the basket of ‘first-person perspective’. Unfortunately, given that she denies substance dualism, body-identity physicalism, and the like, it turns out that her carrier of first-person perspective has nothing by which to carry it.\(^{69}\) Since there are no bare persons, her account lacks any substance on which to predicate ‘first-person perspective’. There is only abstraction. And, as far as I can tell, abstract objects neither die nor resurrect.

**Conclusion**

Baker’s constitution view fares far worse than the physicalist accounts in Chapter 2. It seems incoherent. It neither gives a plausible metaphysics of human persons, nor does it account for resurrection (obviously enough since it cannot account for human persons). But, like the previously mentioned physicalist theses, my sympathies are with it. This is especially so given the arguments of Chapter 1. If substance dualism is false and bodily resurrection is a non-superfluous hope of human afterlife, physicalism would seem to be the next best view.

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\(^{69}\) This is a criticism that relates closely with what J. P. Moreland says in Moreland, *The Recalcitrant Imago Dei* (London: SCM, 2009), 133. Likewise, I think this argument works against Nancey Murphy’s views as well. See the note above.
However, the arguments herein show that it likely is not. Though for reasons different from substance dualism, it is equally untenable given Christian theism. So, what else is on offer?

I submit that a properly understood hylemorphic view might be a suitable alternative to the physicalist theses reviewed in this chapter. Hylemorphism captures the identity-physicalist insights that the numerical identity of the body is a necessary and sufficient condition for human personal identity. Additionally, a hylemorphic account captures the constitution-physicalist insights that human beings are not identical to the bits of matter that make up the human being; and, this is possibly in such a way that does not presuppose the identity of the body in question (avoiding Merricks’s anti-criterialist charge; more on this in the sequel). Hylemorphism does all of this by affirming that a human being is a form/matter composite. So a given person, Jones, say, is identical to her body, but her/her body (i.e., form/matter composite) is neither identical to the bits of matter that come and go through her nor her form. With this sort of hylemorphic view in hand, one can continue to reject both physicalism and substance dualism while finding a more plausible way forward in the metaphysics of persons and the metaphysics of resurrection.70

In the next chapter, I hope to provide, among other things, a philosophical account of human beings, consistent with the three guiding theological affirmations, such that:

1. Jones = Body
2. Body = Form/Prime-Matter Composite
3. Jones = Body = Form/Prime-Matter Composite
4. Jones ≠ Form
5. Body ≠ Prime-Matter
6. Body ≠ Form

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70Baker has mentioned, and rejected, versions of hylemorphism that are substantially dual. I agree that these should be rejected. Yet, there are properly hylemorphic accounts that do not see the human person as made of two substances; rather, the human person is one substance made through the formal actualization of prime matter. For more on this, see Chapter 4.
7. Jones ≠ Prime-Matter
8. Jones = Body ≠ Form

However, in the same chapter, I must also deal with the current and prevailing Christian understanding of hylemorphic metaphysics and what it says about dead human beings. Briefly, the common understanding is that hylemorphic accounts—taken into Christian theology—are consistent with the existence of disembodied souls. The theological shoulders upon which this view rests are those of Thomas Aquinas. As such, I address whether, according to principles accepted on Thomas’s own account, there could possibly be such ‘things’ as disembodied human souls. Thomas Aquinas and many contemporary Thomists say there are such things, at least ‘loosely’ speaking. I say this is false. Hylemorphism is inconsistent with disembodied souls.
CHAPTER FOUR

Hylemorphism and Disembodied Souls

In Chapters 1 through 3, I argue against two commonly held metaphysics of human persons: substance dualism and some varieties of physicalism. Because my project is aimed at repairing an aspect of Christian dogma by way of analytic rigor, in Chapter 1 I argue and conclude that substance dualism is inconsistent with the traditional Christian understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. This is because Christian teaching usually assumes these two theological affirmations:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife and

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise.

I argue that one ought not fashion the second of these affirmations, TA2, using the metaphysics of substance dualism such that TA2 is taken to be a disembodied state. This is because doing so implies The Intermediate State. As I show in Chapter 1, The Intermediate State makes bodily resurrection superfluous, a conclusion that renders TA1 and TA2 an inconsistent pair. So, the theologian is placed on the horns of a dilemma. Either one can affirm TAs 1 and 2 or else one can affirm The Intermediate State (or neither, I suppose). One cannot affirm TAs 1 and 2 and The Intermediate State because, if one affirms TA2’s being a disembodied state, one denies TA1.

The information presented in Chapter 1 suggests that most Christian theologians are likely to affirm TAs 1 and 2. They do so because TAs 1 and 2 are traditionally held and biblically supported. It further appears that substance dualism is a metaphysics brought into Christian theology to try and accommodate these claims. By my lights, doing such a thing is not unwarranted—some Christian theological positions cry out for metaphysical explanation.
Even still, it seems reasonable to suggest that the TAs are more important to traditional Christian theology than substance dualism. So, I suggest that theologians reject substance dualism and find a new way to accommodate TAs 1 and 2. And this is because, again, substance dualism helps wreak havoc on the coherence of the guiding set of theological affirmations,

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,
TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and
TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings,

because it provides metaphysical possibility for The Intermediate State. If one rejects substance dualism, one must reject The Intermediate State. Rejecting The Intermediate State keeps TAs 1 – 3 consistent. Moreover, rejecting The Intermediate State removes most, if not all, motivation for Christians to affirm substance dualism. And, if motivation remains, one should direct her attention to the highlighted dichotomy between St. Paul’s 1 Cor. 15.12-19 argument and substance dualist metaphysics. If Paul’s argument is sound, substance dualism is false. Paul’s argument is sound; therefore, substance dualism is false.

Because I rule out substance dualism’s coherence with traditional Christian theology, in Chapters 2 and 3 I take a philosophical look at the opposite end of the metaphysical spectrum, viz. physicalism, and find it wanting. I come to this conclusion because, given the truth of bodily resurrection, the best physicalist metaphysics on offer appear to fail to account for the possibility of resurrection, particularly in light of TAs 1 – 3. As a result, the conclusions of Chapters 1 through 3 take substance dualism and physicalism out of the hands of the Christian thinker committed to TAs 1 – 3 (at least). So, now what?

My proposal, as I state in Introduction, is, in part, for a hylemorphic account of human persons as a way to accommodate the guiding theological affirmations (TA1 – TA3)
in a way that is also metaphysically robust. Though, admittedly, this may not be the way forward when all the evidence and reasoning is in, for now, it seems to me a reasonable and exciting way to walk the line between dualist and physicalist intuition and argument. Further, I think it is currently the best metaphysics on offer that sits well within philosophical anthropology, broadly conceived, and Christian theology, particularly with respect to the doctrine of resurrection. As such, in this chapter, I outline a positive case for a hylemorphic account of human persons. Once that is accomplished, there is a heavier burden for this chapter: addressing the received versions of hylemorphic metaphysics in analytic Christian theology and philosophy and what they say about the immediate post-mortem condition of human persons.

I find the way analytic theology and philosophy uses (and has used) hylemorphic metaphysics vis-à-vis human beings and afterlife unconvincing and, in some ways, incoherent. So, once I explore the positive case for hylemorphism in section I, in the remaining sections, I address the problems I think exist in current Christian conceptions of it. To do that, I turn my attention to Thomas Aquinas, that great Medieval hylemorphicist, his recent defenders, and their opinions concerning the nature of the human person and human soul.

For the most part, the current analytic theological/philosophical literature vis-à-vis Thomistic conceptions of the substantial form of human beings (i.e., the intellective soul) affirms two things: (1) The intellective soul has a nature/essence, and (2) the intellective soul can and does continue to exist after the death of the human organism. ¹ (1) is taken to be true not least because the intellective soul is, on Aquinas’s conception, a subsistent entity (it can exist on its own (and does at biological death)—so, it has its own nature) in virtue of the

¹There are three types of ‘soul’ in Aristotle and Aquinas after him: vegetative (plants), sensitive (animal), and intellective (human). The human (intellective) soul contains, so the theory goes, all of the powers of the vegetative and sensitive souls in addition to its own. Because the intellective soul is just another name for a human soul, I will use them interchangeably throughout.
action that purportedly makes (2) true, namely, that the Thomistic *cum* Aristotelian intellective soul has a particular action not reducible to a material organ, viz., abstract thought. Since action and existence are convertible terms for Aquinas (as a proper Aristotelian), it follows that, even if the soul should lose the body for which it is the form, the soul still exists because (at least) one of its actions is not dependent on being embodied.

Perhaps, though, arguments for the soul’s disembodied existence should not be so simple. After all, it seems possible that the only thing Aquinas’s arguments for the immateriality of abstract thinking resolves is that abstract thought is not a function reducible to physical brain states. Suppose we leave that question aside. Let us simply assume that Thomas is correct: abstract thought is not dependent on the brain nor is it dependent on any bodily organ. This is not to say that Thomas *is* correct in this assessment, it is just to say that we can leave this bit of the argument aside for our present purposes. Still, for a thing to remain in existence (indeed, to be in existence in the first place—whether abstractly or concretely) the thing in question must have all of its essential properties. If the intellective soul has essential properties, then, it must have them whilst informing matter and whilst not informing matter (i.e., when disembodied). If the intellective soul fails to have its essential

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2 See, for example, Aristotle’s discussion in *Aristotle: On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath*, translated by W. S. Hett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), I.IV, 49; III.IV, 165 (Hereafter: Aristotle, *On the Soul*) and Aquinas’s discussion in his *The Summa Theologica*, Vol. 1, in Great Books of the Western World, no. 19, edited by Robert Maynard Hutchins, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Chicago, IL.: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 380 1.75.2 *respondeo*. (Hereafter: Aquinas, *ST*) This is not to say that separate ontological existence is needed for a thing to have essential properties. Accidental forms, like ‘whiteness’ have essential properties, and so do abstract entities (e.g., an essential property of the number 13 is that it is prime). The Thomistic conception of soul goes farther than abstraction, however. It is an ontologically real and separable thing.

3 There is an Aristotelian slogan that says, “for living things, living is existing.” See Aristotle, *On the Soul*, II.IV, 415b13, 87. See also Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 370. Hereafter: Pasnau, *Aquinas on Human Nature*. ‘Existence’ and ‘act’ being convertible is precisely why Thomas must insist that a separated soul has an activity once disembodied; if it did not, it would cease to exist. See, for example, Aquinas, *ST*, 400, 1.77.1 reply obj. 3.
properties at any point during these two purported ‘modes’ of its existence, then the intellective soul, as Thomas conceives of it, fails, at that point, to exist at all. 4

For my present purposes, I am concerned with the latter mode of purported existence. That is to say, the bulk of this chapter is set aside to demonstrate that a disembodied intellective soul lacks at least two essential properties that are consistent with what Aquinas himself says concerning the properties of the intellective soul (i.e., the human substantial form). If I can accomplish this, it follows that disembodied souls cannot exist on an analytic account of Aquinas’s hylemorphic metaphysics and, therefore, analytic Thomistic thinkers (at least) must, on pain of forfeiting logical coherence, abandon their defense of the Thomistic account of the disembodied intermediate state between death and bodily resurrection.

Why make such an argument given the conclusion of Chapter 1? I aim to argue against Thomistic disembodied souls precisely because Aquinas attempts to posit a disembodied condition in which a soul, of necessity, must be re-embodied. That is, resurrection is still necessary on Aquinas’s account. 5 At least, it is taken to be. Moreover, even if it is vulnerable to the arguments in Chapter 1, since the metaphysics undergirding Aquinas’s theory seem to make his theory incoherent, it seems to me a way to make a denial of The Intermediate State all the more convincing. So, to make this argument, I will first (§II), set out essential properties consistent with Aquinas’s conception of intellective soul. This brief summary will not only give Aquinas’s own words, but it will also consist of the generally agreed upon properties discussed in the current literature. Second (§III), I will present arguments attempting to show that, if disembodied, an intellective soul loses at least two of its essential properties. Third (§IV), I take up the Thomistic distinction between

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5 See his thorough argumentation in Aquinas, ST, 935, Supp. III.75.1ff. In particular, see his respondeo in Q.75. A1.
substantial material forms and substantial immaterial forms.\(^6\) This is because, as I will show below, the conclusions of §II and §III seems to entail that human souls are substantial material forms. This is a claim that Aquinas rejects. Thus, in §V, I explain Eleonore Stump’s thesis about human souls as ‘metaphysical amphibians’. This is, as I see it, the most important and clear contemporary analytic explication of (what seems to be) Thomas’s theory about human forms, namely, that they are a hybrid of immaterial and material form. However, in a rather technical argument, I finish §V by demonstrating that, if there are such things as ‘amphibian forms’, human forms do not fit the profile. Instead, human forms are substantial material forms. If these arguments go through, it follows that there is no such thing as a disembodied human soul given hylemorphic metaphysics.

I. Hylemorphism

Perhaps the fundamental question that Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics seeks to address—particularly with respect to existing things—is “what causes the potential to become actual?” Here Aristotle and Aquinas offer four causes, or principles, to answer this question. For any given actual thing, A, there is an efficient (sometimes called ‘agent’) cause of A’s existence, a formal cause of A’s existence, a material cause of A’s existence, and a final cause of A’s existence. Efficient causes are the action of some mover.\(^7\) Think of a statue made of marble. The efficient cause of the marble statue is the artisan’s action in making the statue. The formal cause of a thing is a bit like its blueprint—the plan that accounts for the shape of the thing, perhaps the idea of the statue in the artisan’s mind (however, with very important qualifications in the case of natural substances. More on this in the sequel). The material

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\(^6\)This is pretty standard Thomistic wording. See, for example, ST 1.75.2 reply, obj. 1; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book 2, translated by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 207. 69.4. (Hereafter: Aquinas SCG2, followed by page, chapter, and section); et. al.

cause is the principle of potentiality—it is the ‘stuff’ out of which something is made. Think of the marble of a statue; the marble is potentially a statue. (Though, again, very important qualifications are needed when referring to natural substances.) Lastly, the final cause is the purpose for which a thing is made. Putting this roughly together, an artisan chisels (efficient cause) a lump of marble (material cause—that which is potentially a statue) into a formed shape using the plan in his mind (formal cause) thereby turning the marble from a lump to a statue, a piece of marble fashioned for art (final cause). Minimally, three of these causes (formal, material, and final) do not exist in their own right; rather, they are things that truly account for the existence of any particular concrete physical thing. These three causes are, I think, best thought of as abstractions that account for truthful answers to metaphysical causal questions; again, they do not have existence in their own right.

I note just above that the formal and material causes of natural substances need some further nuancing and clarification. I am not concerned with non-natural substances (if such there be) because this project is dedicated to exploring, among other things, human beings—perhaps the exemplars of natural substance. As for natural substances and their forms, Jason Eberl helpfully clarifies:

For a natural substance, however, there is no analogue to the [artisan] in whose mind the formal cause of the substance is located...Rather, the formal cause must be located in the natural substance itself as it is developing towards its final appearance and structure. Its blueprint is internal to it in a way that a [statue’s] blueprint is not, since the latter has an external efficient cause that brings it from being potentially a [statue] to being actually a [statue]. A natural substance, which has an internal efficient cause of its development, must be guided in its development by the formal cause already instantiated in it as it moves from being, for example, a human being with the potential for rational thought to a human being who actually thinks rationally after having developed the requisite organic structure.8

Natural substances (e.g., living organisms), in other words, develop on their own. Nothing, unlike the case of a marble statue, is structuring a natural substance ‘from the outside’. It is in the natural course of the natural substance to grow into whatever sort of thing it is ‘meant’ to be. So, for a human person, e.g., Jones, Jones develops from a human embryo to an adult human being through its internal formal cause, its form—the principle of actuality that realizes/actualizes those things that are inherently potential in human beings (e.g., being bi-pedal, being conscious, digestion, self-reflection, etc.).

The forms that actualize things that are said to be substances—things that are one in their own right—are called ‘substantial forms’. David Oderberg offers a helpful definition of substantial forms: “Here is standard definition of [substantial] form: it is the ‘intrinsic incomplete constituent principle in a substance which actualizes the potencies of matter and together with the matter composes a definite material substance or natural body’…[it is] the principle of specificity of any [substance], that by which it is what it is”. Hylemorphists call the substantial forms of living substances souls. More on this in the next section. It should be noted, though, that there is disagreement among hylemorphists about whether a substantial form is reducible to an ‘internal structure/causal force’ in the way that Eberl describes. But, suffice it to say, form at least encompasses such activity.

The history of philosophy and science has not been kind to the formal cause—the form of a thing. Forms have been variously called ‘hidden’, ‘occult’, ‘spooky’ and the like. It seems that these epithets are the result of a thoroughgoing scientism, the idea that what can be known can be known only through the means of the hard sciences (i.e., ‘viewed under a

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10 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 16.

micro-scope’). But, this is not the kind of thing a formal cause is; it is a metaphysical thing.\textsuperscript{12} It is an explanation for the question: “what makes this thing the particular kind of thing it is and not something else?” That is, forms are \textit{universals}. So, observation of such things may be thought of as a “species of observation of universals”.\textsuperscript{13} As such, this cause is not in the realm of the hard sciences to discover:

Conceived metaphysically, forms are abstract entities. They account for the metaphysical structure of the world by being that in virtue of which it is true that this clutter of matter constitutes a genuine substance whereas another cluster is merely a heap, or that in virtue of which a substance continues to exist today and tomorrow but on Friday ceases to exist. Such metaphysical entities exercise no causal powers in the modern sense of ‘cause,’ but they explain the way the world is, and are the special province of the philosophers to investigate.\textsuperscript{14}

That said, it surely \textit{is} in the realm of the hard sciences to discover the properties borne out of this formal cause (e.g., that humans are bi-pedal, rational animals).\textsuperscript{15} So, if one posits that metaphysics is a proper avenue for rational inquiry, one should have no problem countenancing the possibility of a formal cause. Robert Pasnau considers the loss of hylemorphism’s supremacy in the history of metaphysics as likely attributable to the later medieval hylemorphists losing sight of hylemorphism as a metaphysical thesis; it seems they tried to conceive it as “a concrete, physical hypothesis about the causal forces at work in the natural realm”.\textsuperscript{16} If one denies scientism and holds that metaphysics is a fruitful area of study, I see no reason to reject hylemorphism without sustained argument.

Forms are tied up with the essences of natural substances. So, a word on essences is here needed. ‘Essence’, in Aristotelian and Thomistic literature, as Aquinas specifies in his

\textsuperscript{12}See Brown, \textit{Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus}, 72.

\textsuperscript{13}Oderberg, \textit{Real Essentialism}, 23.

\textsuperscript{14}Pasnau, \textit{Metaphysical Themes}, 558.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{16}Pasnau, \textit{Metaphysical Themes}, 101.
On Being and Essence, “…signifies that through which and in which a being has its act of existing (esse)”. The essence of a thing, X, is what makes X the way it is, where ‘makes’ is used in the sense of formal causation rather than efficient. In other words, I use ‘makes’ here in a way synonymous with the way a baseball’s shape (design/form) makes it a baseball. The essence of X (or X’s essence) is what makes X to be X in this nuanced meaning of ‘makes’. Understanding essence in this way is different than the prevailing consensus in metaphysics literature, a consensus that hylemorphists can find unpalatable. David Oderberg, for example, thinks that many thinkers have the notion of essences the wrong way round. He suggests that, contra the prevailing conception, essences ought not be explained by means of what exists in particular ‘possible worlds’. In other words, essences should not be thought of as bundles of essential properties where ‘essential properties’ are couched in terms of a substance, A, having particular properties necessarily (i.e., across all possible worlds in which A exists). The fundamental question for Oderberg as to what a thing’s essential properties are is not “does substance A have properties P…Pₙ in all possible worlds in which A exists?” Rather, one should start with the essence of a thing, known through its form, and then, if need be, apply possible world semantics as a heuristic tool—nothing more. For, on Oderberg’s conception, a substance A might fail to exemplify one of its essential properties in a given possible world and yet not fail to exist. But this is precisely against what the

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19 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 12, 23.

20 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 47. See also Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, 51 – 52. Such a thing is consistent with what Aquinas terms ‘proper accidents’. That is, properties flowing from a thing’s essence that do not need to be exemplified for a given thing to exist. See Aquinas, The Soul, Article 12 reply obj. 7, 157.
reigning conception of essences and essential properties implies. The reigning conception
wants to suggest that essential properties are properties a thing has and without which a thing
cannot exist (i.e., if substance A has an essential property P, A has P in every possible world
in which A exists).

It seems pretty straight forward, as Oderberg admits, that the distinction between the
two conceptions is a matter of muddled terminology.\footnote{Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 47 (and throughout).} I think Oderberg is not pleased with
the way the notion of essential property is being used—ripped away from its original
meaning (so goes the claim)—in its current context. But this is not to say that Oderberg
denies that what contemporary thinkers call essential properties can fail to obtain in a
substance for which they are, in contemporary terms, essential. It is just that Oderberg wants
to say that essential properties, rightly understood, flow from a thing’s essence rather than
define a thing’s essence: “what a thing is determines how it is – in the traditional
terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the
characteristic behaviour of a thing”.\footnote{Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 23.} These qualifications are important and the subject of
much debate, but for my present purposes, they should not matter, as we shall see. I will use
‘essential properties’ according to the current nomenclature and, only when relevant, make
any distinctions in the forthcoming arguments (particularly vis-à-vis the essential properties
of the hylemorphic soul).

Finally, a quick word about the notion of material causes of natural substances. The
material cause is the principle of potentiality in a given thing. As an order of logic, for a thing
to be actually an A it had to ‘first’ be potentially an A. Matter, in the hylemorphic scheme, is
what provides this potentiality. It is the ‘yin’ to the form’s ‘yang’, so to speak (at least, for
natural substances). But, matter, in this nuanced sense, is not the kind of thing observable under a microscope, much in the way that a form is not (at least, not in the Thomistic varieties. And this is what I assume herein). What is commonly called ‘matter’ in the sciences is what many hylemorphists would call informed matter—that is to say, a body of some kind or other, an existing compound of form and prime matter. Aquinas and his current followers variously refer to this kind of matter as secondary, proximate, or sensible matter. What can be empirically observed—again, thinking of natural substances—is either the compound of form and prime matter or else it is a physical part of a form/matter composite (e.g., a physical part of a body). It is the outworking of a principle of actuality and a principle of potentiality. We know of prime matter, not because we observe it in its own right, but because it explains and answers certain questions generated by the existence of things we can observe (e.g., natural substances).

Hylemorphism, as the name denotes (Greek: hyle = matter, morphe = form) implies the compound nature of existing natural substances (indeed, even non-natural substances like houses and the like. But that is outside the bounds of this project). The material cause of all physical substances, the prime matter, is pure potentiality. It does not exist in its own right and it cannot actualize itself. And this is obviously the case since nothing can bring itself into existence. But, again, form and matter do not exist in their own right—so, there is no point in time at which prime matter exists by itself and then a later time when form ‘comes to’ it.

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23 Aquinas, though, does posit matter-less substances: pure forms. Aquinas, SCG2., 157, 54.6-7; SCG2., 159, 55.3, among others.


25 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 71ff; E.g., Aquinas, ST, 381, 1.75.4 respondeo.

When considering form and matter in the context of form/matter substances, one is abstracting these causal principles. These are causal principles that are said to exist, but, according to the hylemorphist, they only exist insofar as they exist ‘in’ a compound substance. There is no form without matter and no matter without form (at least, with respect to the physical world). Hylemorphists are quick to suggest that philosophers should not reject such a notion of prime matter as unintelligible or unduly ‘spooky’ any more than they should form.\footnote{Oderberg, \textit{Real Essentialism}, 72.} And, as I note above, if one thinks metaphysics can do real work, one should not \textit{a priori} count out metaphysical principles. And, any way, there must be something with which form ‘unites’, for otherwise we could never account for substantial change, the changing of one substance into a completely different substance. The thing that ‘continues’ through the change—and so makes sure we are not positing absolute creation and annihilation—is prime matter.\footnote{Oderberg, \textit{Real Essentialism}, 72.} It seems to me that, even if in the final analysis better solutions can be offered, this hylemorphic analysis sits well within logical laws governing metaphysics \textit{and} scientific laws governing the laws of conservation of energy (matter is neither \textit{absolutely} created nor \textit{absolutely} destroyed). Moreover, hylemorphism can give us an explanation of synchronic and diachronic personal identity.

Here is how this works for a human person, Jones. As outlined at the end of Chapter 3, hylemorphism can suggest the following:

1. Jones = Body
2. Body = Form/Prime-Matter Composite
3. Jones = Body = Form/Prime-Matter Composite
4. Jones \neq Form
5. Body \neq Prime-Matter

\footnote{Oderberg, \textit{Real Essentialism}, 72.}
6. Body ≠ Form
7. Jones ≠ Prime-Matter
8. Jones = Body ≠ Form

Now, it appears that David Oderberg, on whom I have been heavily leaning, might agree with Trenton Merricks, that there are no necessary and sufficient criteria for diachronic personal identity. He appears to be an anti-criterialist (in that Merricksian sense). I, however, aim to argue that a hylemorphic account can give criteria. Oderberg suggests that, “The identity of substances is primitive in the sense of being unanalysable. A substance is individuated by its matter. Which substance it is (i.e. of what kind) is given by its form, but its identity conditions are not given by those of its form”. Oderberg opines that a substance’s identity conditions are not given to it by its form because the form has no identity conditions (I take it that he means ‘criteria’ of identity). And, the former is supposed to follow from the latter because when one comes to know the form of a substance, one comes to know the substance.30

Surely, though, this argument does not follow. The substance and the substantial form (i.e., the form of the substance) are not identical.31 We know they are not identical because substances are form-matter composites and forms are not. Further, hylemorphists agree that substances have existence in their own right; substantial forms do not. So, substances and their forms are not identical. So much is obvious. But, if they are not identical, then the one’s not having any criteria of identity (the form) does not entail or imply that other (the

29 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 79.

30 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 79.

31 Aquinas is explicit on this front. Just as the syllable ‘ab’ is not identical to either a or b a composite is not identical its form or matter. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Vol. II, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), 616, Book VII, Lesson 17 no. 1674.
substance) likewise does not.

Even still, Oderberg rightly acknowledges that:

The moral of the story is that form is the root cause of identity: another way of putting it is that identity is a formal cause. Since, however, substances are individuals and form is not itself individual, we have to posit a material cause of identity as well: in other words, the identity of a substance is given by the form as instantiated in matter. That matter is not the root cause of identity is shown by the fact that many, if not most, macroscopic objects can and often do change all their matter without ceasing to perish.\textsuperscript{32}

I argue, in light of this quote, and the non-identity of a substance and its form and matter (taken separately), that a substance does have criteria necessary and sufficient for its numerical identity.

Christopher Brown offers the following as consistent with something Aquinas might say on the identity of a particular substance:

(AI): For any material substances x and y, x is numerically identical to y if and only if the substantial form of x is numerically identical to the substantial form of y.\textsuperscript{33} (AI = Aquinas on Identity)

This criterion of personal identity seems right to me. But, for diachronic identity, (AI) needs further clarification:

(AI\textsuperscript{*}): For any material substances x and y, x at time, T\textsubscript{1}, is numerically identical to y at time, T\textsubscript{2} (where T\textsubscript{2} is any time later than T\textsubscript{1}), if and only if the substantial form of x is numerically identical to the substantial form of y.

Note, though, that the numerical identity of the substantial forms of x and y presupposes that the numerically same substantial form exists—and substantial forms only exist in so far as they actualize matter (i.e., in so far as there is a body of which it is the substantial form). So, a body’s necessary and sufficient criteria for numerical identity are such that its form remains the same and the form continues to inform prime matter. That is, there is a formal and material cause to its identity, and its form and material causes are not identical to the body.

\textsuperscript{32}Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 120.

\textsuperscript{33}Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, 119.
This means that the existing substantial form is a necessary and sufficient condition for the substance’s existence/numerical identity.\textsuperscript{34} So, while it may be true that a body’s formal cause does not have any analyzable criteria for identity—if it has any at all—it does not follow that a body does not. What explains the existence of a body is not the body itself, but the formal and material causes of that body. So, no body is presupposed in the explanation, even if the numerical identity of the form is. And, since ex hypothesi a human person is identical to her body, criteria for a human person’s identity is accounted for and not presupposed.

Additionally, Brown helpfully applies these criteria to personal identity at the bodily resurrection:

(I) (1) In order for Socrates at the resurrection to be numerically identical to the Socrates who once lived on earth, the essential principles of Socrates at the resurrection must be the same as the essential principles of the Socrates who once lived on earth. (2) But the essential principles of any human being are a substantial form and matter. (3) Therefore, for Socrates at the resurrection to be numerically identical to the Socrates who once lived on earth, the Socrates at the resurrection must have the same substantial form and matter that Socrates had on earth.\textsuperscript{35} (IR = Identity at Resurrection)

(AI), (AI*) and (IR) all seem to follow on Aquinas’s own defense of numerical identity in resurrection in his \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}.\textsuperscript{36} And, given how hylemorphism is supposed to work, they seem true to me. So, let us assume that these are the proper necessary and sufficient conditions for the numerical identity of a human person (and other material substances) set forth by hylemorphic metaphysics.


\textsuperscript{35}Brown, \textit{Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus}, 119.

\textsuperscript{36}Aquinas, SCG4, 303, 81.6.
Here, though, a quick clarification is needed. I think the term ‘matter’ is used equivocally in (2) and (3) of (IR). The ‘matter’ in (2) should be understood as the metaphysical principle ‘prime matter’. The ‘matter’ in (3) should be read as secondary/sensible matter—i.e., a body. So, (3) reads that, *ex hypothesi*, Socrates retains his identity because of his substantial form and, further, that his body’s numerical identity is required for his own numerical identity (obviously enough, he is identical with his body). But, again, the identity of the body is not presupposed; it is explained by the numerical identity of the form.\(^{37}\) On hylemorphism, what guarantees the identity of the informed matter—the body—is the substantial form of the thing.

I think hylemorphism can account for personal identity over time and through resurrection. For this reason, theologians should prefer it over substance dualist or physicalist schemes. I have not, of course, addressed how hylemorphism accounts for the existence of mind and consciousness. There is a lot of literature on this subject, and it seems to me that hylemorphism is quite consistent with a number of different sorts of views on how the mind works and what it is (if it is, indeed, a thing distinguishable from the brain). I think it is consistent with many different views because I think that, fundamentally, hylemorphism gives an account for the existence of material things, particularly living substances, of which human beings are exemplary.\(^{38}\) How these living substances work, though, is a matter for another project. If hylemorphism can account for what a human being is, I take it that it can

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\(^{37}\) Brown’s own working out of (IR) is not all that clear. He does not, for example, draw out that ‘matter’ is used equivocally. Perhaps he does not think it is. But, given that he rejects that the numerical identity of the prime matter in the compound is required for identity (if there is such a thing as numerical identity of prime matter), he should agree with how I have parsed his account. See Brown, *Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus*, 119.

account for how a human being lives. Or, at least, it will be consistent with whatever can (e.g., biology, neuroscience, etc.).

I agree that hylemorphism provides a plausible account for what human beings are and how they persist through time. I do not agree with how Christian thinkers have used this view to advance theories of disembodied souls. It is to refuting such theories that I now turn.

II. The Nature of the Thomistic Soul

St. Thomas begins his respondeo to the first article of his first question (1.75.1) in his “Treatise on Humanity” in the Summa Theologica this way: “To seek the nature of the soul, we must lay down first that the soul is defined as the first principle of life in those things which in our judgment live…”39 Two questions later, Aquinas puts the definition of the soul another way. Quoting Aristotle, he says, “it is said in the definition of the soul that it is ‘the act of a body having life potentially; which potency, however, does not exclude the soul’”.40 By these and other oft-repeated Thomistic cum Aristotelian statements, I take it that Thomas thinks that the essence of any soul (i.e., the substantial form of a living thing) is to be the thing in virtue of which a corporeal (bodily) thing may be said to be alive.

In sum, the essence of a soul, on the Thomistic account, is to be the principle by which a composite thing exists—that is, acts (since existing and acting are convertible terms).41 Thus Aquinas: “[t]hrough its essence the soul gives being to such and such a

39 Aquinas, ST., 378, 1.75.1 respondeo. This just seems to paraphrase what Aristotle says in Book I.I, 402a5: “…ἐστι γάρ οἶνον ἁρχὴ τῶν ζῴων.” In Aristotle, On the Soul, 8.

40 Aquinas, ST., 400, 1.77.1 respondeo. He quotes here Aristotle’s On the Soul, “The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life…” The Greek reads: “διὸ γινόμεν ἐστιν ἐντέλεσιν ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικῆν δυνάμει ζωῆν ἐχοντος.” Found in Aristotle, On the Soul, II.I, 142a 27, 68 – 69.

41 For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the soul as a substantial form differs from other substantial forms in that it brings life to the composite. Substantial forms of inanimate objects (objects sans anima—without soul), like the forms of bronze and crystal, bring form, structure, and ’whatness’ to a composite object, but not life. Souls are the only substantial forms that bring life and, as such, all living composites (plants and animals) have them.
Here a term needs further clarification: ‘being’. ‘Being’ (esse), here, is an infinitive verb: ‘to be’. So, Aquinas means existence—the act of being. That is, ‘being’ and ‘act of existing’ are, when taken in their verbal form, synonymous.43

Because ‘being’/‘existence’ (as verbs) and ‘act’ are interchangeable, we can rephrase Aquinas this way: what qualifies a substantial form as a soul is that it actualizes such and such a living body. This seems to be an adequate reformulation of what Thomas says above, namely, that “[t]hrough its essence the soul gives being to such and such a body”.44 In a more contemporary analytic way of evaluating Thomas’s statement, I take it that there is at least one property a soul has that is essential to it, viz., that it actualizes a living body. Here I mean ‘essential’ in the sense that it cannot lack this property and remain in existence (pace the Thomistic use of the term ‘essential property’).45 For how can a soul be a soul if it is not the actualizing principle of some acting body—that is, a body that exists? Such is the very definition of what a soul is, according to Aristotle and Aquinas.46 This is a property the soul cannot lack and still count as a soul. A specifically human soul, then, is the principle by which a particular composite thing, namely, a human being, exists/acts/lives. So, the human soul has, as an essential property, functioning in such a way that it actualizes a living human body…”42

Aquinas, SCG2, 208. 69.5.

43 The act of being (esse) and a being (ens) are distinguished since esse is an infinitive verb (literally: to be) and ens a noun.

Aquinas, SCG2, 208. 69.5.

44 Aquinas, SCG2, 208. 69.5.

45 Recall that many contemporary Thomists do not deny that there are such things as essential properties in the way that non-Thomists use the term. All they deny is that the term ‘essential property’ is properly used and that thinking of properties in this way is not as helpful as thinking about essences as such and the properties flowing from them. But, for my purposes, keeping consistent with how I use the term ‘essential property’ I will use it in the more contemporary way.

Aquinas, ST., 400, 1.77.1 respondeo; Aristotle, On the Soul, II.I, 412a 27, 68 – 69.
being. To put it more simply, the human soul has the essential property, ‘actualizing a living human being’.

Perhaps, though, this way of putting the soul’s essential property is not quite correct. Insisting that the human soul has the essential property, ‘actualizing a living human being’, is to suggest that it is part of the soul’s essence to be the second-sense actuality of a composite. Aquinas and Aristotle, however, believe that a soul is a living body’s first-sense actuality and second-sense potentiality.

Allow me to explain. Aristotelians think of potentiality and actuality in two senses. In Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, for example, he mentions that these two senses can be thought of in this way: the first sense of actuality is to the possession of knowledge as the second sense of actuality is to the exercise of knowledge. For example, my knowledge of hylemorphic metaphysics, while I absent-mindedly walk my dog (not actively thinking about hylemorphism), is actual in the first sense. I possess the knowledge, but I am not making use of it. On the other hand, my knowledge of hylemorphism is actual in the second sense whilst I write this chapter. That is, I am using it.

Potentiality, too, has two senses. The first sense is the sense in which, during my undergraduate studies, I had the potential/capacity to understand hylemorphic metaphysics, but I had not yet learned it. The second sense is the sense in which I know hylemorphic metaphysics but do not make use of it whilst absent-mindedly walking my dog. My knowledge of hylemorphic metaphysics is potential with respect to my use of it. This potentiality is potentiality in the second sense. *The second sense of potentiality is equivalent to the first sense of actuality*. This is why an objector to my way of putting the essential

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47 Surely this follows given that Aquinas equates existence/being with act; and, what it is, minimally, for a human being to ‘act’ is for it to be alive. The only kind of human being that exists is a living one.


49 Ibid., II.V, 417a20, 97 – 98.
property might insist that the soul is both a first-sense actuality and a second-sense potentiality.

Now, it is arguably true that living organisms have capacities that admit of a distinction between first and second sense potentiality. For example: eyes have the capacity to see. Defective eyes may not see. If an eye is completely without sight, then sight might be a first-sense potentiality to the eye. But, in fact, Aristotle argues that an eye without sight is not an eye. Since its capacity to see is not actualized in any way, Aristotle suggests that an unseeing eye is an eye only equivocally. On the other hand, a properly functioning eye has actual sight, perhaps, in two ways. In the first sense of actuality, we might think of a properly functioning closed eye. Here the eye has sight but is not making use of it. When the eye is open, the eye is making use of sight (second-sense actual).

I am skeptical about this distinction, however. It seems much more likely that, at all times, a properly functioning eye actively sees (i.e., makes use of its sight—is second-sense actual). It is just that, in the case of a closed eye, the eye sees one’s eyelids instead of the lighted world. A properly functioning eye has actuality in the second-sense. Even though an Aristotelian or Thomist might argue that “In the eye, the primary actuality is the power to see (a function of the eye itself, lacking which the eye is not an eye) and the secondary actuality is actually seeing (a function of the first actuality, the power to see, being activated by light and visible objects so that it actually sees)”, I deny that this is so much as possible. That is, ‘the power to see’ just is ‘seeing’. For to suggest that an eye has such capabilities is a bit like suggesting that it, as an organ, has the power to turn on and turn off. I think it is safe to say that it does not.

50 Ibid., II.1, 412b19, 71.
51 Quote from an anonymous referee.
What is true of eyes and sight is, I think, true of human organisms (ensouled bodies) and life. While a dead body may have the capacity to live (first-sense potentiality), it lacks a human soul. This is why, in the way that Aristotle denies that defective eyes are, in fact, eyes, Aquinas denies that dead human bodies are, in fact, human bodies.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST.}, 398, 1.76.8 \textit{respondeo}; Thomas Aquinas, \textit{A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima}, translated by Robert Pasnau (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 125 (Hereafter: Aquinas, \textit{Commentary on De Anima}); Aristotle, \textit{On the Soul}, II.I, 412b10, 71; Eleonore Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism,” \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 12, no. 4 (October, 1995): 509; Gyula Klima, “Man = Soul + Body,” in Brian Davies, ed., \textit{Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 258 - 259. (Hereafter: Klima, “Man = Soul + Body”.)} A properly functioning human body (i.e., a body with a human soul) has no latent capacity for life. That is, it has \textit{no potentiality with respect to life}. It is simply alive. Life is actual in the second sense. So, I take it that the presence of a human soul entails life \textit{actualized} in the second sense. In other words, while it is no doubt true that we can have a \textit{concept} of a human soul without the \textit{concept actualizing} a living human being, an \textit{actual soul} will always actualize a living human being.

But, Aristotle seems to say explicitly that the soul is actuality in the \textit{first} sense: “The soul may therefore be defined as the \textit{first actuality} of a natural body potentially possessing life”.\footnote{Ibid., 412b25, 71.} Or, to rephrase using our previous distinctions: the soul may therefore be defined as the first-sense actuality of life in a natural body. To back up this definition, Aristotle suggests, as I have above, that the argument concerning the eye can aptly apply to the whole human organism.\footnote{Ibid., 412b25-30, 71.} So far, so good. What is not so good, however, is that, whilst making his \textit{a fortiori} argument, Aristotle makes a mistake. Instead of saying, as I do above, that vision is to the eye as life is to the ensouled body (because the power of sight \textit{just is} to see), he says that vision—the capacity to see—is to the eye as the \textit{capacity} to live is to the ensouled body.\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{On the Soul}, II.I, 412a27, 69. My emphasis.} But this seems obviously wrong. With respect to ‘being alive’ \textit{simpliciter}, human
beings are either alive or dead in the same way that an eye sees or does not. There is simply no such thing as a human being that has life but is not exercising it, just as there are no (unequivocal) eyes that have the capacity to see but do not.

What is worse, an ensouled body’s mere capacity to live is wrong given what Aquinas and Aristotle seem to make plain elsewhere: ensouled composites are alive, not merely capable of living. Robert Pasnau agrees: “But nothing is alive [ensouled] that does not carry out one or more of the operations associated with life (rational, sensory, nutritive)”.

So, with respect to ‘life’, first and second sense actualities are identical. One cannot possess life and not exercise it in the relevant sense of ‘life’ I mean here (i.e., ‘life’ as the noun of the adjective ‘alive’). The exercise of life just is to possess it and vice versa. I take it that this is why ‘being’ and ‘act’ are convertible terms.

To clarify further, note that, for the analogy between eyes/sight and human bodies/life to work, the analogy must be thought of in this way: the blindness of the eye is to the deadness of the human body as the seeing of the eye is to the being alive of the human body. However, some objector to my argument might conceivably suggest the analogy works in the following way: the eye’s mere capacity to see is to the body’s mere capacity to live as the eye’s seeing is to the human body’s “actually engaging in the activities appropriate to that living substance (in the case of a human being, this would include thinking, being happy,

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56 Of course, this only follows for sight if I am correct in my earlier claim, viz., that eyes always see, even when closed.

57 Aquinas, ST, 400, 1.77.1 respondeo; Aquinas, Commentary on De Anima, 124 – 125; Aristotle, On the Soul, II.IV, 415b13, 87. ‘Ensouled composite’ is tautological for effect.


59 As Pasnau notes, it is certainly true that Aquinas allows that certain operations of the soul (e.g., locomotion) are not always active in the composite. However, life is never fully dormant. That is, at least some (or one) function of the soul is always in operation. Otherwise, the composite is dead. There is simply no such thing as a completely dormant living thing (i.e., having only ‘life’ in first-sense actuality). Ibid., 371
etc.)”.\textsuperscript{60} I think the objector’s analogy actually strengthens my point. The first analogy (the way \textit{I} construe the relationship between the eye and the human body) works because it says this: the equivocal ‘object’—defective ‘eye’—is to a further equivocal ‘object’—dead ‘human body’—as the second-sense actual \textit{object} (the \textit{seeing} eye) is to a further second-sense actual \textit{object} (a living human body).\textsuperscript{61} Take care to notice that, on the left-hand side of my analogy, the comparison is between equivocal ‘objects’. However, the left-hand side of the objector’s analogy trades on first-sense potentialities latent in second-sense actual objects: an eye and a human body. Recall, though, that there is neither first-sense potentiality nor first-sense actuality for seeing \textit{simplicity} and living \textit{simplicity}. Defective eyes do not potentially have sight nor do dead human bodies potentially have life; this is because, according to Thomas and Aristotle, they are neither eyes nor human bodies. Living human bodies do not have a mere capacity to live (first-sense potential); they live (second-sense actual). Likewise, functioning eyes do not have a mere capacity to see (first-sense potential); they see (second-sense actual). So, my analogy stands.

I think that Thomas also sees Aristotle attempting to make a poor application of potentiality to ‘human body’, and so he attempts to clarify Aristotle in his \textit{Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima} by saying that ‘body’ in “natural body potentially possessing life” means ‘the \textit{matter in potentiality} (prime matter)’, and not ‘the \textit{composite} (body)’.\textsuperscript{62} Soul/matter composites, says Thomas, do not have a capacity to live; they are \textit{living}.\textsuperscript{63} So,

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\begin{itemize}
  \item An anonymous referee makes precisely this argument and is thus quoted [and says this is the analogy Thomas intends].
  \item I mean ‘object’ here as ‘substance.’ And, of course, in doing so, I admit that an eye, even when functioning, is not a proper substance. But, on that level, eyes and human bodies should not be analogized in this way at all. So, for the argument, I think that Thomas and I both just want to say: “with respect to the argument, pretend an eye is a substance”.
  \item See Aquinas’s discussion in Aquinas, \textit{Commentary on De Anima}, 121 – 124.
  \item Ibid., 123.
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form, when taken as an abstraction (that is, conceptually separate from the composite), stands to matter (potentiality) much like sight stands to a non-functioning eye (i.e., an eye in first-sense potentiality). Sight can be actualized in an (equivocal) eye—a non-eye becomes an eye. Life can be actualized in matter; when matter is informed by a human soul, so the argument goes, it becomes like the eye that sees—it moves from first-sense potentiality to second-sense actuality. The matter and human soul become a composite that lives (actual in the second-sense), a human being. To simplify: the prime matter is the body (i.e., a body equivocally) potentially (in the first-sense) having life and the composite is the body (i.e., a body properly so called) having life (life in second-sense actuality). So, whenever there is a human substantial form, there is a human composite—a living (actual in the second-sense) human being. Is this not just in accord with our necessary and sufficient criteria of identity in section I, (AI*)? It seems it is. So much the better for my argument.

Secondly, and along similar lines, an essential property of a human soul, as a substantial form of a composite material entity (a human being), is that it actualizes matter. Substantial forms are “the complement, the actualizer, of prime matter. It is that which makes a composite substance exist, and makes it exist as a thing of a certain kind”. That is to say, substantial forms take prime matter—stuff in first-sense potentiality—and turn it into a

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64 This is only an eye in an equivocal sense.

65 Aquinas, Commentary on De Anima, 123.

66 Thus Aquinas: “Now Aristotle says “potentially having life,” and not, unconditionally, “having life,” because a body having life is understood as the living composite substance. Yet it is matter, not the composite, that is included in the definition of form.” Ibid., 123. I actually think that this is what Gyula Klima, for example, means to argue in his Klima, “Man = Body + Soul,” 257 – 273. By this I mean that it seems that Klima wants to highlight Aquinas’s intentionally equivocal use of ‘body’ in the sense that body is spoken of as: 1. Actualized form/matter composite (where the matter is ‘prime matter’) and 2. Potential form/matter composite. So, soul is not united to an already existing body; rather, it unites to matter that is, prior to union with the soul, potentially a body (i.e., body in first-sense potentiality). See, ibid., 258 – 261 in particular.

67 (AI*): For any material substances x and y, x at time, T₁, is numerically identical to y at time, T₂ (where T₂ is any time later than T₁), if and only if the substantial form of x is numerically identical to the substantial form of y.

68 Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 552.
composite second-sense actuality. That a form “actualizes matter” can be taken in a couple of ways: First, it can be taken as a capacity to actualize matter. In this way, the actualization of matter can be taken as a first-sense potentiality of a substantial form. Second, it can be taken in a second-sense actuality kind of way, i.e., that this is what a form always does. When I suggest that a human soul has, as an essential property, “actualizing a human being”, I mean that the human soul, as a substantial form, has this essential property as a second-sense actuality. If, given hylemorphic metaphysics, this is true of souls, then it is necessarily true that human souls, in so far as they exist and are like all other substantial forms of composite material entities, actualize prime matter into bodies (matter-form composites).  

Here is why I say this: Thomas, himself, says that a substantial form—indeed, a human soul—is united to its human body, not through an intermediary, but through its essence.  Granted, Thomas’s account of ‘essence’ will be a bit more robust than a contemporary account—after all, it will allow for properties flowing from the essence of a thing to fail to be exemplified even while the thing continues to exist. (For example, not all humans exercise the ability to laugh, a feature Thomas takes to flow from the essence of a rational animal.) But this does not mean that a Thomistic notion of ‘essence’ is completely divorced from a contemporary notion.

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69 As Jason Eberl puts it, “the material body [and] the substantial form are not two separately existing substances. A substantial form is the actualization of a material body.” In Jason T. Eberl, "Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings," Review of Metaphysics 58 no. 2 (December, 2004): 335. My insert. I take it that the ‘is’ here is an ‘is’ of essential predication in the same way that the ‘is’ in ‘Socrates is a human being’ denotes an essential predication.

70 Aquinas, The Soul, Article 9, reply. Obj. 18, 123; Aquinas, ST, 1.76.6 reply obj. 3

Take the essence of a human being (on the Thomistic account): rational animal.\textsuperscript{72} ‘Potentially exercising reason’ is an essential property of a human being—it flows from the essence of the human; a human cannot fail to exemplify this property. This is consistent with a contemporary understanding of essences. So, if a contemporary understanding of essential properties is at all a truthful way of getting at property modalities, and a human soul is not united to its body accidentally, then something like this might follow: a human soul has the essential property ‘being united to a human body’ or ‘actualizing a human body’. All this suggests is that the human soul is a \textit{substantial} form of a human body. Moreover, it establishes the human soul as the substantial form of a composite because human bodies are composites.\textsuperscript{73}

Substantial forms and their composites are properly called \textit{one thing}. On the other hand, if it were metaphysically possible—that is, consistent with \textit{either} ‘part’ of a composite—to separate one from the other (e.g., form from matter) and either survive, then the composite of the two would not be one thing properly so called. On hylemorphism, a composite substance and its accidents are not one thing properly so called.\textsuperscript{74} But, \textit{unum simpliciter}—i.e., one thing considered in itself—is precisely what a human being is supposed to be, and this \textit{with respect to its soul and matter}.\textsuperscript{75} Recall, from section I, that the existence of a substantial form entails the existence of the substantial form’s substance. This is a

\textsuperscript{72}Aquinas, \textit{On Being and Essence}, 41, II.9.

\textsuperscript{73}Formally:

Here is a quick demonstration that human souls are substantial forms of composites.

1. Human souls are substantial forms (given Thomistic hylemorphism).
2. Human beings/bodies are composite objects
3. Human souls are the substantial form of human beings/bodies.
4. Therefore: human souls are the substantial form of composite objects. (i.e., the substantial form of a composite).

\textsuperscript{74}E.g., Socrates and ‘being clothed.’ Clearly, Socrates can exist while being separated from the property ‘being clothed.’

\textsuperscript{75}See SCG2, 54.6 and 7, for example.
necessary and sufficient criterion for the numerical identity of substances Christopher Brown set up in (AI).

\[(AI): \text{For any material substances } x \text{ and } y, x \text{ is numerically identical to } y \text{ if and only if the substantial form of } x \text{ is numerically identical to the substantial form of } y.\] 

If a human substance could exist without its soul, the soul would not be a substantial form of the substance, it would be an accidental form: a form that “configures something which is an actually existing thing…[so that] if we strip away any particular accidental form, what is left is still an actually existing complete thing, and it remains the same complete thing it was before the accidental form was stripped away…”\(^7\) But this will not do, since souls, for Thomas, are supposed to be substantial forms.\(^8\)

Moreover, it is likewise true, according to (AI), that whenever a human soul exists, its substance does, too. For the existence of a substantial soul is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of its substance (this is demonstrated by the ‘if and only if’ clause. It highlights the bi-conditional). And this makes sense if a substance is truly one thing—that is, the substance is not itself a thing and its soul some other existing thing. The soul of a substance only exists in so far as it exists as a metaphysical cause of a substance.

Now, the main difference for souls as a species of ‘substantial form of a composite’ is that they actualize living bodies—living bodies are souls’ substance. Intellective souls, as a species of soul, do this for what becomes, in the form-matter composite, a human being. So, human souls, as substantial forms, are essentially actualizers of (prime) matter; that is, they are substantially unified with material bodies as their form.\(^9\) Soul/matter composites (bodies)

\(^7\)Christopher Brown, *Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus*, 119.


\(^9\)E.g., Aquinas, ST, 383, 1.76.4, *sed contra.*

\(^7\)There has been much conflation in the hylemorphic literature concerning body/matter. I clarify this in sections I and IV. For now, suffice it to say that I do not equate matter and body, though I do equate form and soul. Soul actualizes matter into becoming a formed body.
are *unum simpliciter* (i.e., one in itself, not with respect to anything else) precisely because the soul actualizes essentially.\(^80\) A soul’s *existence* is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a living body, the soul’s substance. Again, so much is just what our agreed upon criteria for numerical identity, \((AI^*)\), says.

I think Aquinas should be sympathetic to the way I have so far couched substantial forms. For he seems to say exactly as I have: “…to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature. For form is the act of matter not by any accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter”.\(^81\) But this quote is taken from an objection in his *ST* against which he is going to, in his typically Scholastic way, respond. His response, though, is not aimed at substantial forms of composites *simpliciter*. The quoted objection is true regarding substantial forms of composites—hence the strength of the objection as it applies to human souls-as-substantial-form and its inclusion in the *ST*. However, as anyone who has done any Thomistic research knows, Aquinas makes an exception for the human substantial form. It, he says, can and does (after bodily death) exist apart from the body; it can exist apart from its substance.\(^82\) However, he does say elsewhere that, “[i]t is also clear from what was said in Book II that the soul is naturally united to the body, *for in its essence* it is the form of the body. It is, then, *contrary to the nature* of the soul to be without the body”.\(^83\) So, regardless of the fact that Aquinas insists that a human soul can exist apart from the body, I take it that he believes that it is contrary to

\(^{80}\) See my preceding argument and, for another analysis, Robert Pasnau, *Aquinas on Human Nature*, 93.

\(^{81}\) Aquinas, *ST*, 386, 1.76.1 obj. 6.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 388, 1.76.1 reply obj. 6.

the essence (*natura*) of a human soul to be disembodied.\textsuperscript{84} And, as I argue above, I think this statement can be made even stronger. Not only is ‘being embodied’ a property that flows from the essence of a human soul, it is consistent with contemporary property modalities to say that, if hylemorphism is true, human souls are essentially embodied.\textsuperscript{85}

I have made two strong claims about Aquinas’s teaching on form, in general, and human souls, in particular. I say that his metaphysics implies that it is true that, necessarily, if a soul exists, it actualizes some living being or other and that means, *vis-à-vis* the human soul, that it is true that, necessarily, if a human soul exists, it actualizes a living human being. I also say that St. Thomas’s metaphysics implies that it is true that, necessarily, if a substantial form exists, it actualizes matter; that is, substantial forms are essentially enmattered and that means, *vis-à-vis* the human soul-as-substantial-form, that human souls are essentially embodied. There are, then, at least two (or so I say) essential properties of the human soul implied by this particular brand of hylemorphism. They are, but are probably not limited to, (a) actualizing a living human being and (b) actualizing potential matter (i.e., are essentially embodied). Both of these, I submit, affirm our identity criteria, (AI*). Further, without them, (AI*) seems false—and with it, any notion of criteria of numerical identity on the hylemorphic account.

Regarding essential property (a), Pasnau has this to say: “The general line of reply that Aristotle proposes (and Aquinas accepts) is that it is form, in the ultimate analysis, that

\textsuperscript{84}Pasnau has a helpful discussion concerning Thomas’s use of *natura* with respect to essence. Pasnau, *Aquinas on Human Nature*, 7.

\textsuperscript{85}One could object that I have not parsed out the nuances of ‘*natura*’ correctly. For example, one might say that sinning is contrary to the nature of the redeemed human person; nevertheless, it does not mean that ‘not-sinning’ is an essential property of redeemed persons. But, I think this objection rests on a mistake. For Aquinas, natures and essences are, for the most part, synonymous—they are the *explanantia* of a given substance such that a substance is what it is and not something else. And, it is out of this delimiting essence and nature that actions of the substance come that are proper to it. But, not all of these properties come to fruition. So, while it is proper for a human redeemed human not to sin, on Thomas’s account, it is still consistent with a redeemed human person that he or she sin—in the same way that it is consistent with a human person to have one leg (i.e., be not-bipedal). The difference is that redeemed humans must have the potential for not sinning. So, ‘not-sinning’ is an essential property in this Thomistic sense. But, it is not an essential property in the contemporary nomenclature. But this says nothing against how Thomas conceives of natures.
makes matter be what it is. Form is ‘the cause of the matter’; it is ‘on account of’ form that matter ‘realizes the nature’ of what it is.”

And since a human being is a living thing, and the human soul is the form of human being, “[w]hat soul is, in fact, is the actuality of a living body”. That is, the soul is a sufficient condition for a living body. Or, if you like, the soul is simply the verbal (as in the part of speech) description of a living body. So, the soul is, on Aquinas and Pasnau’s account—as it should be on any hylemorphic account—a metaphysical thing, but it is a metaphysical thing that has (a) as an essential property.

(b), it seems to me, is a nearly short-hand way of describing hylemorphic metaphysics. In Platonic metaphysics, contra hylemorphism, there is an ontological split between form(s) and matter. Forms do not actualize matter and matter does not individuate forms. On the hylemorphic account, it is necessarily true that substantial forms of composites, so far as they exist, actualize matter—it is what they do. In other words, it is true by definition that substantial forms of composites actualize matter. Pasnau says this concerning hylemorphic substantial forms of composites:

Aquinas rejects any such division. A substance is just one thing, he believes; the matter and the form are conceptually different, but there is no real difference, no way to split the material part off from the formal part. These are simply different ways of describing the same thing. Aquinas does not ascribe to a metaphysical dualism of matter and form, potentiality and actuality. His is a reductive hylomorphism.

Though Pasnau here speaks not specifically of human souls, but substantial composite forms simpliciter, because the human soul is a substantial form of a composite, it too should follow

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86Pasnau, Aquinas on Human Nature, 35.

87Ibid., 29.

88I am grateful to David Fergusson for this helpful point used in conversation with me.

89Ibid. One could object that the existence of a soul is accidental and not necessary and (a) makes it sound like souls necessarily exist. They do not. All (a) asserts is that, whenever a soul does exist, it brings about a living human being.

90Ibid., 44.
that it is true that, necessarily, if a soul exists, it actualizes matter.\textsuperscript{91} That is, the human soul is a jointly necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a particular material composite, a human composite. This is consistent with (AI) and the amended (AI*) above. And, this is so because, whenever there exists a form, F, there exists a thing, X, such that F is its form. In this way, on account of the form of white, the coffee table next to me is white. The form of white’s being in the table is the necessary and sufficient condition for the coffee table’s being white. Furthermore, because an Aristotelian metaphysics contains no realm of eternal forms ontologically separate from the subjects that exemplify them, the form of white does not exist apart from its subject, a corporeal singular exemplifying whiteness. So too, then, there cannot be a form of human being existing apart from a corporeal singular (composite) exemplifying human beingness. This is because, for the human form, its subject is also a corporeal singular, the human composite. We may be able conceptually to divide the form of humanity or whiteness from its corporeal subject, but the form and corporeal subject cannot be ontologically divided. Again, according to Pasnau, Aquinas is likely to agree that form and matter “are simply different ways of describing the same thing”.\textsuperscript{92} Pasnau is sometimes charged with an unsympathetic reading of Aquinas; however, what he says seems right to me. The form and matter are two sides of the same coin—the composite object, i.e., the substance.

I think Gyula Klima, a thinker seen as more sympathetic to Aquinas, writes of properties (a) actualizing a living human being and (b) actualizing potential matter when he states:

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\ldots \text{for a whiteness to exist is for its subject to be white; and for a human soul to exist as the substantial form of this human being is nothing but for this human being to be human, i.e., [(b)] for the matter of this human body to be}
\]

\textsuperscript{91}Of course, ‘forms simpliciter’ here really means ‘substantial form of a composite’. Undoubtedly, Pasnau, who is familiar with the sorts of forms that exist in Thomistic metaphysics, means the same.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.
organized [(b|a)] into a [(a)] living human body [(a)]. By contrast, for a human being to exist is not for anything else to be informed by this being; a human being is not the form of anything, a human being simply exists.\textsuperscript{93}

I say properties (a) and (b) are tightly connected essential properties of the soul, and Klima’s statement suggests as much. In other words, what it is for a human soul to actualize a living human being is the human soul’s actualizing prime matter (i.e., being embodied). The difference between (a) and (b) is that (a) is an essential property of the human soul because it is a \textit{human soul}, and (b) is an essential property of the human soul because it is a \textit{substantial form of a composite}. Following from what Klima says, one could also make the argument that \textit{any} substantial form of a composite substance has essential properties very similar to (a) and (b). The only real difference for a non-human composite form is that it would not bring about a living \textit{human} being (though, depending on what kind of substantial composite form it is, it may still bring about a \textit{living} being).\textsuperscript{94}

It seems, then, that it is consistent with Thomistic hylemorphic metaphysics that (a) and (b) are essential properties of the human soul. And, if (a) and (b) are essential properties of the human soul, then humans souls necessarily have these properties. Additionally, since these properties are realized through performing functions, it follows that if the human soul fails to perform any or all of the functions (a) and (b) at any time, then the human soul fails to exist at any time in which it fails to perform any or all of the functions (a) and (b). The task of the next section is to demonstrate that this failure to function is what happens to a human soul when the human organism dies.

\textsuperscript{93}Gyula Klima, "Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the Human Intellect," \textit{Philosophical Investigations} 32 no. 2 (April, 2009): 169. My inserts. The inserts of (a) and (b) are meant to help guide the reader into picking out where Klima speaks about properties (a) and (b). The reader should, as I say in the following paragraph, notice an obvious overlap.

\textsuperscript{94}Forms that might actualize a living being would be, for example, the forms of frogs, fish, dogs, plants, trees, etc. Forms that would not actualize living beings would be, for example, the forms of rocks, bronze, crystal, etc. Of course, there is still the question of whether non-living macro-objects are composed of a substantial form or whether they are aggregates of a number of form/matter composites. That is a topic for another time.
III. Disembodied Souls and Essential Properties (a) and (b)

I claim above that one essential property of the human soul consistent with hylemorphic metaphysics is (a): actualizing a living human being. I take it that Aquinas agrees that souls—as substantial forms of composites—bring about living composite entities. However, I also take it that he thinks that the human soul is not so bound to this essential (‘essential’ in the current analytic meaning) property of soul-as-form. In his Summa of Christian Teaching II, he says, “[b]ut we have seen that the human soul is a form that does not in its being depend upon matter”. The human soul does not depend on matter, he thinks, because:

...its operation, namely, understanding, cannot be carried out by a bodily organ. Thus it is clear that the intellect has an operation of its own in which the body does not share. Now a thing operates in accordance with its nature (quod est), for things that exist of themselves have an operation of their own, whereas things that do not exist of themselves have no operation of their own...it is evident that the intellective principle, by which man understands, has its own mode of existing superior to that of the body and not dependent on it.

The intellective soul, thinks Aquinas, is separable from matter precisely because it has an essential function that is not reducible to physical processes. Without going into detail on why he thinks the intellective principle is not so reductive, I will, as I indicate in the beginning of this chapter, grant Aquinas and his defenders that this is true (even if it is not). But Aquinas’s claim goes further than merely asserting that one of the human soul’s powers is not reductive to being the product of a bodily organ.

Aquinas’s further claim is that, because of its non-reductive power, the intellective soul has an act of being it retains even if disembodied. Now, the intellective faculty of the

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96 Aquinas, The Soul, Art. 14, respondeo, 182.

97 Remember: ‘act’ and ‘being’ are convertible terms. If a thing x acts, it has being. Likewise, if a thing x has being, it acts.
human soul may not be reducible to corporeal matter. However, it is another question entirely whether or not having a faculty not reducible to organic function(s) provides an avenue for intellective souls to not have (a) essentially or that (a), and its being essential to intellective souls, is irrelevant. The claim that the intellective soul has an act of being (i.e., existence) when disembodied seems to contradict what I say his view affirms with (a). This claim seems to contradict (a) because it suggests that, even when the human soul is not actualizing a living human composite, the soul still exists. In other words, if a human soul continues to exist without (a), then (a) is not an essential property of a human soul.

I say that in §II I establish that it is consistent with Aquinas’s metaphysics that human souls have essential property (a). I also say that Aquinas affirms the human soul’s essential property of ‘understanding’ (i.e., capacity for abstract thought). Let us call the essential property of ‘understanding’, (u). So, then, it is consistent with Aquinas that human souls have essential properties (a) and (u). Now, it seems just obvious to me that, if human souls have essential properties (a) and (u), it follows that if any human soul, H, loses either or both of these two properties, H goes out of existence.

But we have already seen that Aquinas thinks that (u) implies that a human soul can and does exist apart from a living human body when the human body dies. This seems to imply that, if (u) does the work Aquinas thinks it does, there is a point at which H lacks (a). But (a) is an essential property of H. So, H cannot continue to exist and lack (a).

But suppose that (a) is not an essential property of human souls in the way contemporary thinkers couch property modalities. Suppose (a) is just a property that flows from the essence but is not a necessarily actualized (in the second sense) in the soul. Suppose further that (u) is really the only property whose actualization is essential—in the contemporary idiom—for the soul’s existence. Take (u) away, and the soul ceases to exist. If
this is a line of defense that Aquinas or his apologists take, conceivably the disembodied soul maintains its continued existence so long as it has property (u). But at what cost?

To see what cost, consider that, minimally, at the death of a human organism, the human soul loses property (a): actualizing a living human being. This is obvious and trivially true, if I am correct about property (a). But if (a) is not a second-sense actual property of a human soul, then it is possible that a human body have a human soul without the body’s being alive. For St. Thomas, this would be a displeasing conclusion. Given that it is nearly uncontroversial that Aquinas affirms something like the proposition, “necessarily, if a human composite, Jones, has a human soul, then Jones is alive,” I think it is safe to say that (a) is a second-sense actual property of human souls. It is essential in the contemporary sense. If (a) is an essential property of human souls, then human souls cannot exist (nor subsist) without actualizing living human beings. The sixth objection in ST 1.76.1 protests, concerning essential property (b) (actualizing potential matter), along similar lines.

The sixth objection in ST 1.76.1 reads as follows:

Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature. For form is the act of matter not by any accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (Q. LXXV, A. 6), remains separate from the body after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.  

The force of this objection, consistent with my complaint in §II, is carried by the fact that, on Aquinas’s own account, it is true that, necessarily, if a substantial form of a composite exists, it is united with matter. Forms of composites cannot be without their “own proper matter.”  

Anthony Kenny agrees with this assessment:

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98 Aquinas, ST, 386, 1.76.1 obj. 6.

99 Ibid.
The sixth objection is based on the principle that being united to matter is something essential to a form. That is what form is, the actuality of matter and if it were not that, then the union of form and matter would be something accidental rather than essential. Hence, a form cannot be without its own matter…

To this sixth objection, Aquinas replies:

To be united to the body pertains to the soul by reason of itself, as it pertains to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place, so the human soul retains its proper being when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

I take Aquinas to be saying something like this. Suppose there is a helium balloon in a world (like our world) where it is, given the laws of nature, lighter than air. It is ceteris paribus an essential property of a helium balloon that it is lighter than air. So, normally speaking, a helium balloon floats. But suppose I tape a helium balloon to my chair so that it is fixed to the arm and cannot float. Its essential property ‘being-lighter-than-air-in-this-world’ is not thus taken away because some other force is counteracting its predisposition to float. The balloon still retains its essential property, even if the actions that normally demonstrate this property are hampered. The same, thinks Aquinas, is what happens to a disembodied human soul. Souls are, he might say, essentially inclined toward unity with a body (in just the way a helium filled balloon is inclined to float); however, its not being so united (just as the balloon’s not floating) does not mean that it has lost its essential property of being inclined to unity with a body. Or, as Pasnau suggests: the soul’s existing contrary to its nature, without

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101 Aquinas, *ST*, 388, 1.76.1 reply obj. 6.

undergoing a change to its nature, is like a “fish out of water, existing and functioning as best
it can”. ¹⁰³

But Aquinas has done something tricky here and, in so doing, has not adequately dealt
with the objection. ¹⁰⁴ Objection six indicates that an essential property of all substantial
forms of composites is that substantial forms of composites are united to bodies. After all,
how can a principle of actuality, the form, be potentially something (e.g., potentially united
with matter)? And, precisely because a human soul is a species of substantial form of a
composite, as I say in §II, it should have essential property (b). It should be embodied—
united to a body. So, objection six is bringing forward what appears to be an explicit
contradiction in Thomas’s thought. And, I think he sees the problem; hence, the reason he
attempts to address it. After all, if (b) is an essential property of a human soul, it seems
trivially true that it must be informing a body. Indeed, it seems so obvious that Aquinas must
do some fancy footwork to get around the apparent problem that ST 1.76.1 obj. 6 brings.

Unfortunately, I think Aquinas changes the terminology he uses concerning the
essential properties of human forms, precisely to avoid the contradiction. To get around this
contradiction, he, in effect, argues that human substantial forms have the essential property of
being inclined to unity with a body, like a helium balloon’s being inclined to float. ¹⁰⁵ This
argument falls flat. Substantial forms of composites, by his own admission, are not merely
inclined to unity with a body essentially; they are united with a body essentially. That is, it is
true that, necessarily, if there is a substantial form of a composite, it is embodied. But, if it is
true that, necessarily, all substantial forms of composites are embodied, and human souls are
a species of this kind of form, then it follows that it is true that, necessarily, human souls are,

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¹⁰⁴Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 150 – 151.

¹⁰⁵Aquinas, ST, 388, 1.76.1 reply obj. 6.
so far as they exist, embodied. In other words, human souls are essentially embodied. It appears that Aquinas has simply sidestepped the problem, not addressed it. How could he address the problem? As I say, if form is the principle of actuality of some composite, it is not in potential to its composite so far as it exists, because it only exists as part of an actual composite—the composite has actualities (accounted for by form) and potentialities (accounted for by matter, the principle of potentiality).

It is simply not the case that a human soul is like a light body, e.g., a helium balloon. A helium balloon does not lose its essential property ‘being-lighter-than-air-in-this-world’ if I tape it to my chair. It would, however, by being so taped, lose an essential property if one of its essential properties were ‘floating’. If ‘floating’ is an essential property of helium balloons, then, by denying the balloon its floating, I take the balloon out of existence. If helium balloons have ‘floating’ as an essential property, then there would be an analogue to human souls having ‘being united to a body’ as an essential property. But helium balloons do not have ‘floating’ as essential property, so they are not analogous to human souls (at least, not in the way Aquinas uses objects like them).

It being true that, necessarily, if substantial composite forms exist, they actualize matter is just the Aristotelian conception—the conception upon which Aquinas depends—of what it is to be a composite thing. Human souls as forms are “forms embodied in ever-changing matter”.

If human souls do not have the essential property ‘being united to a body’, then they are not substantial forms of composites because, as objection six says (and Aquinas does not take exception with this definition), it is true that, necessarily, if substantial forms of composites exist, they are united with bodies. As Kenny points out,

The impossibility of a form without matter is a logical impossibility, not a matter of physics. Aquinas’ answer is no more credible than that of someone

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who defended the possibility of square circles on the ground that even if a circle became square, it would retain a tendency to circularity.\textsuperscript{107}

Now, Kenny is no friend to Aquinas on this point. But he is correct. Human souls are substantial forms of composites; therefore, they cannot exist apart from matter. That is, human souls cannot exist disembodied. Objection six of \textit{ST} 1.76.1 stands.

Perhaps, though, I have reached this conclusion too quickly. On Aquinas’s behalf, Pasnau offers a possible rejoinder. When faced with objection six of \textit{ST} 1.76.1, Pasnau argues that it is possible that Thomas means to say nothing more than, “[being united to a body…[is] \textit{natural and proper} to the soul, but not \textit{essential}”\textsuperscript{108}. If Pasnau is right about this (using ‘essential’ according to contemporary property modalities), and Aquinas does not wish to say that being united to a body is an essential property of the human soul (in the contemporary way), then this means that being so united is an accidental property of the soul. I am only aware of two kinds of property modalities, accidental and essential. Indeed, I think there are just these two. So, if being united to a body is not essential for a soul, it is accidental. Unfortunately, this undercuts the hylemophlist’s account for personal identity conditions, and, of course, personal identity conditions in resurrection. For, if the soul only accidentally informs a human body, then it is not a sufficient condition for the existence and numerical identity of a particular human body. That is, if a human soul can exist apart from a human body—apart from its principle of potentiality, matter—then the identity conditions we set out in \textit{(AI*)} are false.

Recall \textit{(AI*)}:

\textit{(AI*)}: For any material substances \(x\) and \(y\), \(x\) at time, \(T_1\), is numerically identical to \(y\) at time, \(T_2\) (where \(T_2\) is any time later than \(T_1\)), if and only if the substantial form of \(x\) is numerically identical to the substantial form of \(y\).

\textsuperscript{107}Kenny, \textit{Aquinas on Mind}, 150 – 151. Kenny references \textit{ST} 1.76.1 objection 6. My emphasis.

\textsuperscript{108}Pasnau, \textit{Aquinas on Human Nature}, 379. Emphasis his.
Again, \((\text{AI}^*)\) says that the necessary and sufficient condition for \(x\) at \(T_1\) to be numerically identical with \(y\) at \(T_2\) is for the substantial forms/souls of each to be numerically identical. But, of course, the numerical identity of the soul just is to say that the soul exists (remember: there are no analyzable criteria of identity for a soul). So, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the material substance \(x\) at \(T_1\) to exist at \(T_2\) (i.e., \(y\)), is for the soul to exist at \(T_1\) and \(T_2\). I argue that this is a proper criterion because \(x\) is not constituted by its soul (since constitution is false; see Chapter 3) and \(x\)’s soul is not identical with \(x\). Because this is a proper criterion, it is likewise false that a human soul can exist apart from its body—its substance.

So far, I have argued that, consistent with Aquinas’s own account, human souls have essential properties (a) actualizing a living human being and (b) actualizing matter (i.e., are essentially embodied). Furthermore, I have argued that, since human souls have properties (a) and (b), and have them essentially, Aquinas and his defenders cannot consistently hold that human souls can continue to exist after the death of the human organism. This is because, when the human organism dies, the human soul loses (a) and (b), two of its essential properties. That means, if (a) and (b) are essential properties of a human soul, then at the death of the human organism (i.e., the substance), the human soul goes out of existence.

This should not be surprising. Hylemorphism affirms that forms of composites and matter do not exist apart from one another. The human soul is a form of a composite; therefore, it cannot exist apart from matter. Hylemorphists, then, should abandon the idea that human forms exist apart from matter. Christian hylemorphists should as well. This means, for the Christian hylemorphism, human souls do not continue to exist apart from the bodies they inform (nor do they subsist). In other words—with an eye toward life after death—there is no disembodied existence between death and resurrection given hylemorphic metaphysics.
IV. Material Substantial Forms and Immaterial Substantial Forms

In sections II and III, I argue that human substantial forms (i.e., intellective souls) have at least two essential properties. They are: (a) actualizing a living human being, and (b) actualizing matter (i.e., are essentially embodied). Further, I insist that, if the human composite dies, then the human soul ceases to exist precisely because it loses two of its essential properties, viz., (a) and (b).

Now, (b) is equivalent to the claim that human souls are substantial material forms.\(^{109}\) That is to say, if the human soul is a substantial material form, then, as with all substantial material forms, the human soul is always found in corporeal composites. This is, of course, contrary to the kinds of substantial forms that have their fullness of existence and being apart from matter. The kinds of substantial forms that have their fullness of existence and being apart from matter are, according to Thomistic metaphysics, immaterial forms. Angels, on Aquinas’s account, are this sort of substantial form.\(^{110}\) Substantial immaterial forms are immaterial substances in the strict sense. That is to say, substantial immaterial forms contain, within the form alone, the fullness of the species.\(^{111}\) This is juxtaposed to other beings (e.g., animals) where a being’s species is filled out as a composite of matter and substantial form. In a composite substance, neither the substantial form nor the matter carries “the full nature of the species”.\(^{112}\) So, with respect to composite substances, neither the substantial form of a composite nor the matter of a composite is a substance or the substance. Additionally, on

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\(^{109}\) Again, see Eleonore Stump Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003.) I take it that she borrows her terminology from Aquinas in places like Aquinas, SCG2., 207, 69.4.

\(^{110}\) See, for example: Aquinas, ST, 269, 1.50 introduction; ST. 275, 1.51.1 respondeo; ST. 276, 1.51.1 reply obj. 3; ST., 340, 1.65.1 reply obj. 1; Aquinas, SGC2., 149, 50.1; SGC2., 150, 50.4; SGC2., 152, 51.3; SGC2., 157, 54.6-7.

\(^{111}\) A clear exposition of this can be found in Aquinas, SGC2., 157, 54.6-7 and SGC2., 159, 55.3.

\(^{112}\) Aquinas, ST., 276, 1.71.1, reply obj. 3.
Thomistic metaphysics, substances are never parts of other substances.\textsuperscript{113} That is, substances are never parts of true wholes. This holds for the cells, molecules, and so forth that are said to be parts of the human organism, things that are, other things being equal, normally considered substances in their own right:

The point is that on the Aristotelian hylomorphist understanding, the body is not a collection of discrete particles that maintain their own substantial identity when entering into the bodily composition. The matter composing a human being is only actually a human body because it is in union with the soul, and the physical particles composing the body are only virtually present within the organism.\textsuperscript{114}

Substances may, of course, be parts of aggregates (e.g., hammers, tables, houses, etc.), but substances are \textit{unum simpliciter}. They are one thing. Aggregates are one thing, but only with respect to something else (\textit{unum secundum quid}). So one could say that aggregates are merely one thing \textit{equivocally}. (So much for sorites problems!) Substantial immaterial forms, on the other hand, are \textit{unum simpliciter} in their form. So, in Thomas’s account, for the angelic creatures, their substantial forms are their substance. Conversely, substantial material forms are not \textit{unum simpliciter}. A substantial material form is only a metaphysical part of a composite substance that is \textit{unum simpliciter}. So, in Thomas’s account, for corporeal creatures, their substantial forms are not their substance.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113}See, for example: Aquinas, \textit{SCG}2., 167, 56.14; Pasnau, \textit{Aquinas on Human Nature}, 85 – 88; Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, 40 – 41. Things that were substances (e.g., water molecules) are in other substances (e.g. human bodies) but are no longer substances—they exist virtually. James Madden, ‘Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion,’ \textit{Philosophy Compass} 8 no. 7 (July, 2013): 669; Oderberg, \textit{Real Essentialism}, 70ff; James D. Madden, \textit{Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind} (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2013), 242. Hereafter: Madden, \textit{Mind, Matter, and Nature}.

\textsuperscript{114}Madden, \textit{Mind, Matter, and Nature}, 275.

\textsuperscript{115}To wit, Thomas says: “Accordingly, in things composed of matter and form, neither the matter nor the form nor even being itself can be termed that which is. Yet the form can be called \textit{that by which it is}, inasmuch as it is the principle of being; the whole substance itself, however, is \textit{that which is}. And being itself is that by which the substance is called a \textit{being}. But, as we have shown, intellectual substances are not composed of matter and form; rather, in them the form itself is a subsisting substance; so that form here is \textit{that which is} and being itself is act and \textit{that by which} the substance is. And on this account there is \textit{in such substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and being}, which by some is said to be of \textit{that which is} and being, or of \textit{that which is} and \textit{that by which a thing is}.” So, here humans and other
The terms *material* and *immaterial* need further clarification. After all, on a modern reading, what Thomas means by these terms may not be obvious. Or, perhaps a better way to put the reason for clarification is this: a modern reading of the medieval use of *material* and *immaterial* is likely wrong. That is, the reading is probably wrong if the reader is not previously familiar with medieval metaphysics and terminology. Predicating ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ of substantial forms is a prime example of an opportunity for confusion. As such, the initial reading of Aquinas may make it seem as though he says that, whatever substantial material forms are, they are made of matter. Alternatively, whatever substantial immaterial forms are, they are not made of matter. But, this would be reading Thomas incorrectly. All forms are metaphysical things—some in a strict substantive sense (i.e., substantial immaterial forms) and some in a lesser non-substantive sense (e.g., accidental forms). Some forms that are non-substances are substantial material forms. A substantial material form (not to be confused with forms that are themselves substances) is a metaphysical part of a whole that is always united with some other metaphysical part of a whole, viz., prime matter. Because of this, substantial material forms only exist as the substantial form of (or maybe ‘in’ is a more enlightening word here) composite corporeal objects. Furthermore, when a substantial material form and prime matter unite, they become an actually existing composite corporeal entity; they become a composite *substance*. Obviously enough, ‘unite’ is used in an analogous way. Since prime matter and form do not pre-exist the composite, there is nothing *really* coming together to form something else.

Substantial material forms are the formal cause of composite material things. They answer the question: “why is this thing this particular thing and not something else?”

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116By my lights, though, this is where things get a bit tricky. How can a substance be a metaphysical thing where ‘metaphysical’ is used, in the Thomistic sense, as a *causal* sort of explanation? The existence of full substantive forms is odd, but that is a discussion for another project.
Again, though, clarity is needed. Remember that prime matter is not corporeal; it too is a metaphysical thing that is not physical—at least, not in the way contemporary thinkers think of physicality. Prime matter does not, by itself, have location or extension. Without form, it does not even exist. It is potential in the first sense of potentiality. On a Thomistic proposal, prime matter is nothing like atoms or quarks or whatever is the smallest indivisible component of the material universe. Rather, prime matter is, so to speak, the ‘potential’ aspect of a composite entity where composite entities are defined as the concrete instance of the meeting between formal (actuality) and material (potentiality) causes. Eleonore Stump explains prime matter in this way:

Prime matter is thus matter without any form at all, “materiality” (as it were) apart from configuration. When it is a component in a matter-form composite, prime matter is the component of the configured composite which makes it the case that the configured thing can be extended in three dimensions and can occupy a particular place at a particular time. But by itself, apart from form, prime matter exists just potentially; it exists in actuality only as an ingredient in something configured. So we can remove form from prime matter only in thought; everything which exists in reality is configured in some way.

So, when Thomas, and other hylemorphists (e.g., Aristotle) conceive of the union between substantial form and prime matter, what they do not mean, as I mention above, is a union of a form with some already existing thing. If a material form unites with an already existing thing, it is not a substantial material form. If a form inheres to an already existing rock, for example, the form that inheres must be an accidental form because an already existing thing

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118 But it may be something like (or identical to) energy, that part of the material universe that is neither created nor destroyed and seems, in the end, to be the ‘stuff’ out of which every material thing is made. See, for example, hylemorphists like W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 147; William Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 25, 270ff; Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 87.

119 Stump, Aquinas, 37.

is either a substance already or an aggregate (which has no substantial form). Perhaps the rock’s shape or size changes with the addition of this form. If the rock is a substance, such a change is an accidental change. But, the rock itself cannot be united to substantial form without it becoming something other than a rock. This is because an actual rock already has the substantial material form of ‘rock’. A substantial form’s actualizing an already existing substance is impossible; what really happens is that the ‘coming’ of a new substantial form results in the change of one substance into some numerically distinct new substance. And this is because what is really happening is that the substantial form is ‘uniting’ with prime matter. Thus Aquinas:

A substantial form, on the other hand, unconditionally actualizes existence. Thus an accidental form attaches to a subject that is already actually existing, whereas a substantial form does not attach to an already actually preexisting substance, but only one potentially existing—that is, to prime matter. It is clear for this reason that it is impossible for more than one substantial form to belong to one thing: the first would actualize its being unconditionally, whereas all the rest would attach to the now actually existing subject.\(^{121}\)

An example of this might be the water molecule.\(^{122}\) When a hydrogen atom (a composite substance) and two oxygen atoms (composite substances) bond in the relevant way, a new substance comes to be, namely, a water molecule.\(^{123}\) Water molecules are neither hydrogen nor oxygen. They are a new substance. This means that, if hylemorphic metaphysics is true, the substantial forms of hydrogen and oxygen (if there be such) are replaced in the composite with the substantial form of water.

What I claim with essential property (b), that human souls actualize matter, then, is that human souls are metaphysical parts of wholes. They do not stand (subsist) in their own right because they only have existence at all as parts of composite wholes. Souls do not unite


\(^{122}\) Stump, *Aquinas*, 41.

\(^{123}\) The analogy might not be strict. For example, I think it is possible that hydrogen and oxygen atoms are really aggregates of other irreducible simples.
with human bodies as if human bodies exist prior to prime matter’s being informed by a human soul. If human souls unite to already existent human bodies, this would mean either of three things: 1. human persons are two substances (body and soul) and not *unum simul* (which Aquinas vehemently rejects); 2. the pre-soul-human-body changes into another kind of substance post-ensoulment; or 3. that the human soul is an accidental form uniting to a previously existing substance. Though there seems to be confusion in the literature on this point, Stump accurately picks through Thomas’s thought when she says:

…it is his view that “a human being is not a soul only but rather a composite of soul and body.”…There is something redundant about his description of the composite since Aquinas thinks that there is a living human body only when matter is configured by the form that is the soul. Given his view that the soul is the single substantial form of a living human body, we would expect him to say instead that a human being is a composite of matter and soul, not body and soul. Nonetheless, ‘body and soul’ is a common Thomistic description of the material composite that a human being is.\(^{124}\)

I think Stump’s hint at Thomas’s redundancy is correct. Though there is some ambiguity in the way Aquinas uses ‘body’ in discussing a unity of ‘body’ and ‘soul’, I think there is a determinable, yet subtle, nuance. In fact, I think Gyula Klima explicates this nuance well. He argues that what Aquinas likely means by using the word ‘body’, when discussing the human composite, is to set the human body apart from other kinds of bodies, namely inanimate ones.\(^{125}\) Klima’s sentiment seems to line up well with Thomas’s statement here:

Therefore, we should not understand soul’s being the actuality of body, and body’s being the matter and subject, in such a way that the body is established through one form that makes it a body while, coming on top of that, is the soul that makes it be a living body. Soul is, rather, the actuality of body in such a way that from soul comes its being, its being a body, and its being a living body. But its being a body, which is something less than complete, serves as the material with respect to life.\(^{126}\)

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\(^{125}\)Klima, “Man = Body + Soul,” 261.

\(^{126}\)Aquinas, *Commentary on De Anima*, 124 – 125.
Another way of putting Aquinas’s ‘body and soul’ language is just so say that the body of a human being is a body that is alive in a human way. But, it is not a substance separate from the soul. Rather, the soul is a metaphysical part of the composite substance that is the body.127 Because of this, human intellective souls are, or so I claim, substantial material forms.

Human souls’ being instances of substantial material forms is the thrust behind the argument I discuss toward the end of §III, the argument from the sixth objection in ST 1.76.1. My argument from §III goes through if human souls are substantial material forms. Now, Thomas thinks it is clear that human souls are not substantial immaterial forms.128 They are not species unto themselves by virtue of their form. Says Thomas, “[t]he aforesaid definition [of immaterial substantial forms] is not applicable to the soul in the same way as it is to an angel, for an angel is an incorporeal substance, because it is not a body nor is it united to a body. This cannot be said of the soul”.129 Neither, though, are human souls thought to be substantial material forms. That is, Thomas thinks human souls are not forms totally engrossed in matter. So Thomas would no doubt disagree with my conclusions about the human soul. Says Thomas, “[f]rom the fact that the intellectual substance [the human form] is in matter it does not follow that it is a material form, because that soul is not present in matter in the sense of being embedded in it or wholly enveloped by it, but in another way, as we have pointed out”.130 So, thinks Thomas, human souls are not substantial material forms.

But his “as we have pointed out” refers to an earlier argument in the SCG2. This earlier argument, though, is with respect to the angelic beings or purely intellectual

127 Thomas confirms this in Aquinas, The Soul, 14, Art. 1, replies to obj. 13 and 15.

128 Aquinas, ST., 475, 1.89.2 reply to obj. 2; ST., 483, 1.90.4 reply obj. 1; Aquinas, The Soul, 91, Art. 7, reply to obj. 13.

129 Ibid. My insert.

130 Aquinas, SCG2., 207, 69.4. My insert.
substances. Since the intellect of the human being, or even the human soul, is not a substance, it is not a purely intellectual substance. And, Thomas is explicit that the soul is not of the same genus as the angel(s).\textsuperscript{131} I say in sections II and III that Thomas’s metaphysics end up in a contradiction; one that I think he sees but does not quite know how to get around. At least, the way he attempts seems either incomplete or unclear. I think some of his defenders sense this too. As such, I think that Eleonore Stump courageously argues for a \textit{via media} in Thomas’s hylemorphic metaphysics. In other words, what Stump sees in Thomas’s metaphysics is an attempt to counter the claim that Aquinas is trying to have his Aristotelian hylemorphic cake (souls as substantial forms of material composites), while trying to eat his Catholic eschatology (disembodied souls). That is a bit of a mixed metaphor, of course, but the problem is this: how can one coherently claim that a human soul is a substantial form of a material composite \textit{and} that it can exist apart from a material composite? Stump thinks that Aquinas offers a way around this, namely, that there are substantial immaterial forms, substantial material forms, and then something else, the token member of which seems to be the human form. Stump thusly calls human forms “metaphysical amphibians”.\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{V. Human Souls are Not “Metaphysical Amphibians”}

Couching the human soul as a metaphysical amphibian—a hybrid of material and immaterial substantial form—is a genuinely creative way to work around a central problem that hylemorphic metaphysics raises: can a substantial (non-material) form be the substantial form of a material composite?\textsuperscript{133} Thomas specifically takes up this question in \textit{SCG2} questions 68

\textsuperscript{131}Aquinas, \textit{ST.}, 384 – 385, 1.75.7; Aquinas, \textit{The Soul}, 78 – 92, Art. 7.

\textsuperscript{132}To my knowledge, she first uses this term in Eleonore Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism,” \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 12, no. 4 (October, 1995): 514 – 515. Hereafter: Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism.”

\textsuperscript{133}‘Non-material’ cannot mean here ‘immaterial’. Neither Stump nor Aquinas thinks that human forms are immaterial forms. Those are reserved for the Angels.
and 69, *ST* 1.76, *The Soul* article 8, and other areas. One ought not say of Aquinas that he is
unaware of potential difficulties in positing a hybrid form, *if* this is what he is doing. Even still, if he is attempting something like this, his explication of this hybrid form certainly
seems less than clear. Fortunately, a clear and thoughtful contemporary analytic expression of
how such a thesis might be explicated is in the work of Eleonore Stump. So, it seems only
right to take a look at her argument for the metaphysical amphibian thesis and see if, in the
end, it works. If it does, my arguments from sections II and III likely fail.

To begin, Stump is clear in that she, too, accepts that Thomas is univocal in ascribing
corporeality to human beings. Stump insists that “…the depth of Aquinas’s commitment to
the view that human beings are material objects and the vehemence with which he rejects
what we tend to call ‘Cartesian dualism’” is clear. On the other hand, since Thomas
attempts to account for disembodied post-mortem survival, Stump equally acknowledges
that, though “human beings fall apart at death” and “the disembodied soul which persists is
not the complete human being,” nevertheless, the *soul* can continue to exist because it is
something different from substantial immaterial forms and substantial material forms.

Substantial immaterial forms are forms that are, in Stump’s language, configured
substances. Substantial material forms, at the other end of the spectrum of substantial

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134Eleonore Stump notes that, “[f]or [Aquinas], the great difficulty lies in supposing that a subsistent form
capable of existing and operating independently of matter is also the sort of thing that configures
matter…perhaps the main obstacle to seeing Aquinas’s views of the soul as consistent is the problem he himself
addresses, namely, whether an immaterial mind can also be the form of the body, whether, that is, a configured
subsistent form capable of existing apart from matter can also be a configurer of matter.” Stump, *Aquinas*, 204.
Insert mine.


136Ibid., 211.

137Ibid.

138Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism”, 514.
forms, are merely configurers of substances.\textsuperscript{139} That is, as I noted above, substantial material forms are forms that combine with prime matter in such a way that a composite substance results. And, importantly, substantial material forms are, so far as they exist, always in composite bodies. Then there are human souls. Human souls are substantial forms of composite substances, but, thinks Stump, they are both configured \textit{and} configurers.\textsuperscript{140} So, on Stump’s reading of Aquinas, human souls are substantial forms of composites that are completely configured in themselves. Because of this, human souls can, even though they are substantial forms of composites, exist apart from the composite to which they are normally united. Yet human souls also possess the ability, as substantial forms of composites, to configure prime matter into a composite substance. As such, so the argument goes, human souls are “configured configurers”.\textsuperscript{141} Certainly, if this is true, human souls are metaphysically amphibious.

I will call this proposed third species of substantial forms, “substantial amphibian forms”. The human form, then, is supposedly the only member of this species of substantial form. Perhaps, though, this species of substantial form is not so much as possible on hylemorphic metaphysics. To begin our investigation, let ‘MF’ be ‘Substantial Material Form’, ‘FoC’ be ‘Substantial Form of a Composite’, ‘IF’ be ‘Substantial Immaterial Form’, and let us suppose that Aquinas and Stump accept the following two claims:

(A). $\forall x(MFx \rightarrow FoCx)$

and

(B). $\forall x(IFx \rightarrow (\neg (MFx) \land \neg (FoCx)))$.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid., 514 – 515.

\textsuperscript{140}Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism”, 514 – 515.

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid.
I think it is plausible that Aquinas and Stump accept (A), the thought that anything that is a substantial material form is a substantial form of a composite (e.g., dog souls), and (B), the thought that anything that is a substantial immaterial form is neither a substantial material form nor a substantial form of a composite (e.g., angels).

The upshot for Aquinas and Stump is that (A) and (B) appear to allow logical space for an amphibian form. That is, (A) and (B) are consistent with:

(C). ∃x(¬(MFx) ∧ FoCx) where both of the conjuncts are true.

So long as (C) is true, and with it both of its conjuncts, (A) and (B) appear consistent with it. (C) says that there is at least one thing that is not a substantial material form and is a substantial form of a composite. (A) is consistent with (C), so far as (C) and its conjuncts are true, because (A) can be read like this:

(A*). ∀x(¬(MFx) ∨ FoCx).

(A*) says that for all things x, x is not a substantial material form and/or it is a substantial form of a composite. And, if both of the disjuncts of (A*) are true, which is the case if substantial amphibians forms are actual, then there is an x such that it is both not a substantial material form and is a substantial form of a composite. In other words, if both of the disjuncts are true in (A*), then it seems that a substantial amphibian form fits nicely as an instance of x in (C). Since (C), when it and its conjuncts are true, is consistent with (A) and (B) and is not identical to either of them, it seems to follow that the existence of substantial amphibian forms is, given (A) and (B), possible. Regardless if there are such things, one can easily see the genius in Stump’s move to strengthen Aquinas. If (A) – (C) are appropriate ways to couch Stump’s conception, it certainly seems that she provides logical space for a substantial form to exist as a hybrid of substantial material and substantial immaterial form.

(C) is especially troubling for my argument. If (C) is true, then my arguments for essential property (b), that human souls are essentially embodied, are arguably unsound. This
is true because (C) insists that there is at least one thing that is the substantial form of a composite but is not a substantial material form. And, on Thomas’s conception, only substantial material forms are essentially (in the contemporary usage) embodied. So, according to (C), there is at least one thing that, whilst the substantial form of a composite, is not essentially embodied. It seems that Stump and Thomas, then, could easily suggest that human souls are what fit as x in (C).

Even still, I think there is trouble lurking somewhere behind the scenes in (A) – (C). For example, one possible trouble spot for (A) – (C) is that we do not yet know what happens if x is an FoC—a substantial form of a composite. That is, we know what sort of implications Aquinas and Stump likely think occur for x if it is either a substantial material form (demonstrated in (A)) or a substantial immaterial form (demonstrated in (B)), but we do not know what they think follows from x’s being the substantial form of a composite, FoC. Perhaps the following is an accurate account. Where ‘B’ is ‘embodied’, suppose:

(D). ∀x(FoCx → Bx).

So, (D) says that if anything is a substantial form of a composite, it is embodied. There is also a stronger way to state the relationship between FoC and B. It can be written as this entailment:

(D*). ∀(x)☐(FoCx → Bx).

But (D) and (D*) will be rejected by Aquinas and Stump. It seems obvious that they are going to want to reject (D) and (D*) because (D) claims that, as a matter of fact, all substantial forms of composites are embodied and (D*) claims that a substantial form’s being embodied is true by definition (i.e., it is a metaphysically necessary truth). Aquinas and Stump will reject (D) and (D*) because they want to say that, at least at a certain instance (i.e., the death of a human composite), there is one substantial form of a composite that is not

\[142\] In the same way that it is a metaphysically necessary truth that bachelors are unmarried men. Being an unmarried man is the very definition of ‘bachelor’.
embodied—the disembodied human soul. So, one cannot, without begging the question against Aquinas and Stump, simply claim that (D) and (D*) are true and that human souls are instances of x in (D) and (D*). To make a case for (D) and (D*), one needs to give some convincing reasons. So, to begin to make a case for (D) and (D*), we first need to see what Aquinas and Stump affirm with respect to substantial forms of composites (FoC) and their embodiment (B).

I take it that Aquinas and Stump affirm:

\[(D^{**}) \forall (x) \neg \square(FoCx \rightarrow Bx)\]

and even stronger,

\[(E). \neg \forall (x)(FoCx \rightarrow Bx).\]

(D**), then, is the denial of an entailment relation between a thing’s being FoC and its being B. That is to say, (D**) asserts that the necessary truth claim in (D*) is false. Additionally, (E) is a denial of (D). (E) says it is not the case that anything’s being FoC implies that it is B. For Aquinas and Stump, there is no relationship of implication between being the substantial form of a composite (FoC) and being embodied (B). This has to be so if it is going to be the case that there is at least one substantial form of a composite (the human soul) that is not, at least at some point in its existence, embodied. If I am correct about their likely affirmation of (D**) and the stronger claim, (E), a strength of their position is that it leaves open the possibility that there may be substantial forms of composites that are embodied, *but being the substantial form of a composite does not imply that such will be the case.* This can be demonstrated in the following way, a way consistent with (E), the denial of (D):

\[(F). \exists x ((FoCx) \land (\neg Bx)).\]

(F) is the claim that there is at least one thing that is a substantial form of a composite and is not embodied. This is consistent with (E) because (E) says that it is false that a thing’s being the substantial form of a composite implies its being embodied. So, it seems likely that
Stump and Aquinas can agree with (D**), (E), and (F). They will not agree with (D) and/or (D*).

Now (E) is also consistent with this disjunction:

\[(E^*) \colon \forall x[((\text{FoCx}) \land \Box (Bx)) \lor ((\text{FoCx}) \land \Diamond (\neg Bx))].\]

\((E^*)\) simply says that for all \(x\) it is either the case that \(x\) is a substantial form of a composite and necessarily embodied or it is the case that \(x\) is a substantial form of a composite and is possibly not embodied. It seems probable that Aquinas and Stump, and other defenders of substantial amphibian forms, will affirm that \((E^*)\) is true (because they are committed to the claim that either disjunct can be true). I take it that a claim for the truth of the first disjunct \(((\text{FoCx}) \land \Box (Bx))\) is a way to describe substantial material forms and the truth of the second disjunct \(((\text{FoCx}) \land \Diamond (\neg Bx))\) is a way to describe substantial amphibian forms. Since Aquinas and Stump likely deny the implication in (D) by way of (E), then \((E^*)\) is an accurate description of their position. But I think \((E^*)\) is an odd way to think about substantial forms of composite substances, and human forms in particular.

To see why, let us think more about substantial forms—the sort of thing of which human souls, substantial material forms, and substantial immaterial forms are supposed to be. As it stands, (E) claims that, for all \(x\), it is not the case that, if \(x\) is the substantial form of a composite, \(x\) is embodied. \((E^*)\) is the claim that, for all \(x\), either \(x\) is the substantial form of a composite and is necessarily embodied or else \(x\) is a substantial form of a composite and is possibly not embodied. (E) and \((E^*)\) are denials of the implication between a thing’s being the substantial form of a composite and its being embodied. In other words, (E) and \((E^*)\) affirm that it is accidental to the substantial form of a composite that it be embodied. But this description will not work for substantial forms of composites.

Here is the reason. In hylemorphic metaphysics, a position to which Aquinas and Stump are antecedently committed, substantial forms—forms that actualize substances—are
not accidental constituents of their substances. They are essential—substantial—‘parts’.

Neither is it the case that being a metaphysical part of its substance is an accidental property of a substantial form. In other words, in every possible world in which a particular substance exists, it has the numerically identical substantial form. And, in every possible world in which a particular substantial form exists, it informs the numerically identical substance. This mutual implication is precisely what makes the composite of matter and substantial form unum simpliciter. And this seems to conform to the identity conditions of human bodies, viz., that the necessary and sufficient condition for a body B at T1 to be numerically identical to a body, B* at T2 is that B and B* have an identical form. This is what we affirmed with (AI*): (AI*): For any material substances x and y, x at time, T1, is numerically identical to y at time, T2 (where T2 is any time later than T1), if and only if the substantial form of x is numerically identical to the substantial form of y.

If a form and its substance can be separated and either (not necessarily both!) continue to exist, then, with respect to the relation of form and composite, the form in question is an accidental—not substantial—form. That is, a substantial form of a composite is not accidental to its substance nor is its substance accidental to the substantial form. But if the relation between a substance and its soul is accidental, the existence of a soul is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the numerical identity—the existence—of its substance. (AI*) would be false. But (AI*) seems consistent with Aquinas’s claims and the claims of Aquinas’s supporters.143 Moreover, I find (AI*) to be eminently reasonable given hylemorphic metaphysics. But (AI*) demonstrates a mutual implication between the existence of the soul and the existence of the soul’s substance: the body, that is, the human person.

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143See, for example, Aquinas, SCG4, 303, 81.6 where Thomas suggests that the necessary and sufficient condition for the numerical identity of a material substance is that it has its numerically identical form. This is exactly what Christopher Brown says with his (AI) and (IR) principles in Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, 119.
At this point, the claim that Aquinas and Stump should accept—at least, if they wish to remain hylemorphismists—is obvious. They should accept (D), the claim that, as a matter of fact, all substantial forms of composites are embodied. They should also accept (D*), the stronger claim that a substantial form’s being embodied is true by definition (i.e., it is a metaphysically necessary truth). However, as I say above, I take it that they claim the following:

(E). ¬∀x(FoCx→Bx) and

(F). ∃x((FoCx) ∧ (¬Bx)).

These claims, taken together, say (E): not only is it not the case that whatever is the substantial form of a composite is embodied, but (F): there actually is at least one thing that is the substantial form of a composite and is not embodied. For Aquinas and Stump, the post-mortem human soul is what fits as x in (F) and is an instance of x in (E). If (F) is true, then (E) is true. But, (E) is consistent with the claim that x’s being embodied is an accidental property of x qua substantial form of a composite (FoC). If being embodied is accidental for x qua FoC, then, if x qua FoC is united to a body, it is not united to a body essentially, but only accidentally. But FoC denotes a substantial form, the kind of form that is united to a composite essentially—the kind of form that accounts for the necessary and sufficient identity conditions of its substance. But then (F) states that there is a thing such that it is essentially (i.e., necessarily) embodied and in fact not embodied. This is a contradiction; therefore, (F) is false and metaphysically impossible.

This means that, it is not merely the case that the implication in (D) is true, but that the stronger claim (D*) is true. That is, there is an entailment relation between a thing’s being the substantial form of a composite and a thing’s being embodied. It turns out that, given the definition of substantial forms, the substantial form of a composite’s being embodied is true by definition (this is what (D*) says). It is not so much as a possible that the substantial form
of a composite not be embodied; (F) is metaphysically impossible. And, if (F) is
metaphysically impossible, (E) is false. Instead, it is the case that, necessarily, if anything is
the substantial form of a composite, then it is embodied. Human souls are substantial forms
of composites. Therefore, it follows necessarily that human souls are embodied. That is to
say, human souls are always embodied in so far as they exist.

W. Norris Clarke, a Thomist, thinks that human souls devoid of their material
counterpart make no sense. If there is an intermediate state between death and bodily
resurrection, Clarke suggests that something like ‘ghost’ matter needs to be informed by the
soul/form—giving the soul/form a body. Clarke does not endorse that this is the case, just
that for anything like a ‘disembodied’ state to be a real state of existence for a human soul,
the soul cannot be completely denuded—it must have a body of some kind between death and
resurrection (for all the reasons I mention).

What, then, of Stump’s substantial amphibian forms? I say above that Stump wants to
affirm that substantial amphibian forms are consistent with the conditionals concerning (A),
substantial material forms, and (B), substantial immaterial forms. That is, it is consistent with
Stump’s position that the conditionals for substantial material forms and substantial
immaterial forms stated in (A) and (B) allow space for substantial amphibian forms. This is
because,

\[144\] It will not do to object with the claim that substantial forms of composites essentially have the capacity to be united with their substances. Or, that is to say, one cannot claim that substantial forms of composites have an essential property, ‘being able to actualize a composite’ or some other such thing. Here is why: even if a substantial form of a composite does have this capacity and is not using it, then it is only embodied in fact accidentally. And it is precisely this that is the problem. Again, as I argue in §II, if there exists a logically possible world in which a substantial form of a composite exists apart from its substance (there does exist such a world if being embodied is accidental to the form), then the soul’s existence is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the numerical identity—the existence—of its substance.

\[145\] Clarke, The One and the Many, 105.
(A). $\forall x(MFx \rightarrow FoCx)$ \(^{146}\) 

and

(B). $\forall x(IFx \rightarrow \neg(MFx \land FoCx))$

are consistent with:

(A)*. $\forall x(\neg(MFx) \lor FoCx)$ and

(C). $\exists x(\neg(MFx) \land FoCx)$ (where (C) and both of its conjuncts are true).

It is in (C) that a substantial amphibian form is supposed to be a possible exemplification of x. But, given that an entailment relation for FoC has now been clearly explicated (i.e., (D*) is true), it seems that (C) is, in point of fact, false. For (C) to be true, both of its conjuncts need to be true. As it turns out, though, $\neg(MFx)$ is the contradiction of (FoCx) given (D*). So, the conjunction of $\neg(MFx)$ and (FoCx) cannot be true.

$\neg(MFx)$ and (FoCx) are contradictory because a substantial material form, MF, is a thing that is essentially embodied. That is, given that FoC’s are essentially embodied (i.e., D*), (C) (i.e., $\exists x(\neg(MFx) \land FoCx)$) becomes this proposition: there is at least one thing, x, such that x is both not essentially embodied and is essentially embodied. This is a contradiction, so (C) is false. If (C) is false, though, that means it is inconsistent with (A). As such, I can see no way to argue for amphibian forms, given (A) and (B), such that amphibian forms would be substantial forms. Also, with an antecedent commitment to substantial forms, as Aquinas seems to define them, if amphibian forms exist, they are not substantial forms of composites. In other words, for substantial amphibian forms to be consistent with (A) and (B), (C) and (E) must be true. But, (C) and (E) are false, so substantial amphibian forms are not consistent with (A) and (B). Given the truth of (A) and (B), there are no substantial amphibian forms.

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\(^{146}\)Recall: (A) is the thought that anything that is a substantial material form is a substantial form of a composite (e.g., dog souls), and (B) is the thought that anything that is a substantial immaterial form is neither a substantial material form nor a substantial form of a composite (e.g., angels).
Since (C) is false, it follows that there is no such thing that is both not a substantial material form and the substantial form of a composite. This means that whatever is a substantial material form is a substantial form of a composite and whatever is a substantial form of a composite is a substantial material form. In other words, (A) is really one condition of the bi-conditional (A***):

\[(A): \forall x(MFx \to FoCx) \text{ is true, and}
\]
\[(A^{**}): \forall x(FoCx \to MFx) \text{ is true; therefore,}
\]
\[(A^{***}): \forall x(MFx \leftrightarrow FoCx) \text{ is true.}
\]

To demonstrate that the bi-conditional, (A***), is true, let (A) and (C) be expressed in terms of ‘p→q’ where (A) is ‘p→q’ like this:

1. p→q (i.e., (A)) is true,
2. ¬p ∨ q is true (from 1),
3. ¬p ∧ q (i.e., (C)) is false,
4. ¬(¬p ∧ q) is true (from 3),
5. p ∨ ¬q is true (from 4), and
6. ‘q→p’ is true (from 3-5); therefore,
7. ‘p↔q’ (i.e., (A***)) is true from 1 and 6.

So, (A***), the bi-conditional, is true. Human souls, then, because they are substantial forms of composites, are substantial material forms. Likewise, because human souls are substantial material forms, they are substantial forms of composites. In other words, they have (b) as an essential property. That is: necessarily, if human souls exist, they actualize potential matter (i.e., are essentially embodied). Therefore, human souls, like all substantial material forms, are always embodied. Again, this should not be surprising given hylemorphic metaphysics. Thus Aquinas approvingly cites Aristotle saying, “…Aristotle did
not allow that forms of natural things subsist apart from matter…”\textsuperscript{147} Is man a natural thing?

Thomas thinks yes:

…Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this because some held that the form alone belongs to the species, while matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies, and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality, but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones, so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all individuals contained under a given species must belong also to the substance of the species.\textsuperscript{148}

These remarks indicate that, consistent with fundamentals of Thomas’s own metaphysics, human souls, as the substantial forms of natural things, cannot subsist apart from matter. If this is true, then it seems that human souls are substantial \textit{material} forms. As such, they have (b) as an essential property. This means that Stump is wrong about human souls being substantial amphibian forms and, by implication, Aquinas is wrong.\textsuperscript{149} The arguments from §II and §III stand. The human soul cannot exist apart from a composite body. Further, the necessary and sufficient identity conditions of human persons, (AI*), stand.

Here is one last comment. Stump places an enormous amount of pressure on a soul’s constituting a dead/disembodied human person where constitution ≠ identity. But this constitution thesis, as we see in Chapter 3, is false. Patrick Toner, taking on Christopher

\textsuperscript{147}Aquinas, \textit{ST.}, 416, 1.79.3 \textit{respondeo}.

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid., 381, 1.75.4 \textit{respondeo}, Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{149}He is wrong, at any rate, if Stump has read him correctly. An anonymous referee wonders whether or not it is possible that Thomas wished to say that, though human souls are substantial forms of composites \textit{while in the composite}, they cease to be such when disembodied. I take it that this means that human souls are not, necessarily, substantial forms. So, this means that they are, so far as they exist, accidentally substantial forms. I confess I know not what to make of this claim, other than it just seems false to me. One reading of Aquinas’s \textit{The Soul}, for example, should clearly indicate that souls are, by definition, a species of substantial form. That is, they are a particular kind of substantial form. It seems to me that all souls are like this, human or not, if Thomas’s/Aristotle’s metaphysics are correct. What might a non-form human soul amount to? I do not know of an answer consistent with hylemorphism.
Brown (Stump’s former pupil) on this front, notices a problem straight away—a problem toward which Chapter 3 hints:

…I find the philosophical position he attributes to St. Thomas to be problematical, because I do not see how it can give a believable answer to what ought to be a simple question: namely, what is Socrates identical with after his death? Or, to put this question slightly differently, what kind of thing is Socrates identical with after his death? Notice that when Socrates is alive, there is a straightforward answer to this question. When Socrates is alive, he is identical with an organism.150

Constitution metaphysics are false. So, it seems like a human person, if a human is said to exist, must be identical to something. To what, on a constitution account, is Socrates identical? It seems nothing. And, again, since constitution is false, Socrates’s not being identical to anything implies that Socrates does not exist. Even if one grants that human souls are metaphysical amphibians, the thesis becomes existentially uninteresting. For, if Socrates’s soul is in Paradise with Christ, Socrates is not. On the other hand, if Socrates is identical with his soul, then we are back at substance dualism, which is false given Chapter 1.

VI. Concluding Thoughts

I have one main goal in this chapter divided into several parts. The main goal is to demonstrate that a hylemorphic account can give personal identity conditions over time and through resurrection. The second aspect of this chapter is to, in a way, defend the identity conditions laid out in section I. I do this by denying the possibility of a hylemorphic human soul’s disembodied existence. To do so, I present three lines of argument. The first line of argument, in section II, concludes that hylemorphic human souls have at least two essential properties: (a) actualizing living human beings, and (b) actualizing matter (i.e., are essentially embodied). I defend this by demonstrating that, consistent with hylemorphic metaphysics, (1) human souls are second-sense actual, in so far as they exist, and therefore, actualize living

human beings, and (2) human souls, as substantial forms of composites that essentially, rather than accidentally, actualize bodies.

In section III, I take up my second line of argument. Section II concludes with a trivial truth, namely, that because (a) and (b) are functions of the soul only when it is embodied, if the composite dies, the soul loses (a) and (b). But, since (a) and (b) are essential properties of the human soul (from section II), another truth follows: at the death of a human composite, the human soul ceases to exist by virtue of losing (at least) two of its essential properties.

Section IV seeks to address a possible objection to my argument. To do this, I address matters of clarification in analytic conceptions of Thomistic metaphysics, the distinction between substantial material and substantial immaterial forms. Since it is plausible that Thomas thinks the human soul fits into neither of these categories, yet is still the substantial form of a composite, I outline a possible objection to section III’s conclusion in section IV. Namely, I engage with Eleonore Stump’s thesis that human souls are metaphysical amphibians and, thus, essential property (b) is not an essential property of the human form.

Section V is, admittedly, a bit technical. It is that way so that Stump’s position can be stated in its strongest terms. An upshot of the technicality of the argument is that it is clear that Stump’s position makes a valiant attempt to allow logical space for a substantial amphibian form. However, as the argument in section V concludes, it turns out that a thing’s being a substantial material form and a thing’s being a substantial form of a composite are mutually implied. Since this is so, there is no such thing as a form that is a substantial form of a composite and is not a substantial material form. As such, and because substantial material forms cannot exist apart from their material composites, human souls, as substantial material forms, cannot exist apart from their material composites. In other words, given hylemorphic metaphysics, there is no disembodied existence for a human soul.
Through the first four chapters, I argue and conclude that there is no such thing, given Christian theology, as a disembodied soul. I say in Chapter 1 that substance dualism is false, in Chapters 2 and 3 that physicalism is on shaky footing (though, it is obvious that if physicalism is true, there is no disembodied soul), and, in Chapter 4, that hylemorphic conceptions of a disembodied human soul are false. Though it is, by my lights, conceivable that someone could amend the Thomistic conception of disembodied existence in such a way that it does not entail paradisiacal existence (Aquinas affirms, after all, that the existing souls are not persons, ‘I’, ‘Jones’, ‘you’, etc.), I think cutting the legs off of any talk of disembodied existence is warranted.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{ST}, 936, Supp. III.75.1 reply obj. 2.} I take it that this move is warranted because, as I say above, immediate paradisiacal post-mortem existence is a widely held theological affirmation (TA2). As such, spending the time to demonstrate that Thomas’s account of the disembodied human soul is inconsistent with hylemorphic metaphysics seems a worthwhile venture.

W. Norris Clarke offers a nice summary of this chapter and a hint toward the next:

This [that a separated soul is individualized by itself] is admittedly a…serious problem for a Thomist. But it rests on a supposition commonly taken for granted by early and medieval Christian thinkers, including many still today, namely, that the resurrection “at the last day” will take place “a long time later” than the death of the body in this life. This supposition no longer seems to be a theological imperative…It might well be that the resurrection of each body takes place immediately after death in another time dimension entirely that cannot be correlated with ours. Hence there is no “time” in our sense between death in this life and resurrection in another.\footnote{Clarke, \textit{The One and the Many}, 105. My insert.}

My final argumentative chapter, Chapter 5, with hylemorphism in hand, will try and flesh out a coherent way to think about \textit{eschatological} bodily resurrection taking place immediately after the death of individual human beings. The arguments in Chapter 5 are given in the hope of providing a view that is both metaphysically responsible and accounts for the three theological affirmations:
TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.
CHAPTER FIVE

Sketching a Solution to the Problem of Disembodied Paradise

To begin my final argumentative chapter, let us recall the first arguments set out in Chapter 1: Redundant Resurrection (RR) and Necessary Resurrection (NR).

(RR):
1. If the Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
2. The Intermediate State obtains. (Widely held Church teaching)
3. The bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (MP from (1) and (2)).

(NR):
1. If the Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Premise)
4. The bodily resurrection is not superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. (Widely held Church teaching)
5. The Intermediate State does not obtain. (MT from (1) and (4))

As I argue in Chapter 1, by my lights, (RR) is unsound and (NR) is sound. Because these arguments share the same first premise, their disparate conclusions ride on the truthfulness of the crucial second premises, (2) and (4) respectively. Of course, one would also need to agree that (1) is true. And, this is exactly what Chapter 1 sets out to demonstrate. Since I take it that Chapter 1 does a sufficient job of doing so, accepting the truth of (1), for this chapter, gets us squarely in the middle of the problem I am trying to correct. To see how, consider again the two conjuncts of The Intermediate State set out in Chapter 1:

(SD): There is a state of existence following human biological death in which a believing human (e.g., Jones) exists without her body (i.e., as a substantial soul/mind)

and

(PS): There is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality.
Given the (NR) argument and our rejection of The Intermediate State, is the proper conclusion to jettison both states of affairs it claims obtain (i.e., (SD) and (PS))? I do not think so. (PS) for example, considered alone, does not render the bodily resurrection superfluous. It seems to me that (PS), without being conjoined to (SD), is entirely consistent with the idea that one’s only hope for entering a paradisiacal existence is bodily resurrection. After all, its claim is only that there is a state of existence following a human’s biological death that is paradisiacal in quality. It says nothing about how one enters that state.

Recall that I said that the dogmatic treatises such as the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechism of the Catholic Church use Luke 23.43 to back up their claims concerning immediate post-mortem presence in Paradise. This is the verse wherein Jesus promises to the robber on the cross that: “Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise”. Now, the WCF and CCC use Luke 23.43 to account for the paradisiacal state of existence (i.e., (PS)) Scripture seems to say follows immediately after a human’s death. Think here also of passages like Luke 16.19-30; 2 Cor. 5.6-8; and Phil. 1.23. The idea that the paradisiacal state is experienced in a disembodied way (i.e., (PS) is conjoined with (SD)) is thrown in to account for how Paradise can immediately follow death, given that the bodily resurrection is an eschatological event (i.e., at the ‘end of time’).

Even still, I think (PS) should remain. As I argue in Chapter 1, I think Christian theologians should jettison substance dualism and the notion that the existence following a human’s death is disembodied. Theologians should jettison (SD). Moreover, I think Christians should try to affirm (PS)’s following immediately after a human’s biological death. This is in keeping with the three guiding theological affirmations:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and
TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

But denying substance dualism and The Intermediate State appears to put the theologian committed to TAs 1 – 3 in a bind. For, given that bodily resurrection is an event that occurs at the eschaton, how does one affirm TA2 without assuming a disembodied state of post-mortem existence between a person’s death and the eschatological moment? The aim of this chapter is to try and offer a suggestion.

Though Chapters 2 – 4 focus on differing philosophical theories of the human being, particularly with respect to how each accounts for personal identity through resurrection (attempting to satisfy TA3), this chapter begins with a look at some theories in the philosophy of time. The reason for this is that, with the denial of a temporally interim existence between bodily death and bodily resurrection, one must affirm either one of three things. One could, with Trenton Merricks (looked at in Chapter 2), suggest that temporally gappy existence is possible—that a human dies, ceases to exist, then comes back into existence at the eschatological resurrection. Or, one could suggest, with van Inwagen, Zimmerman/Corcoran, and O’Connor/Jacobs (again, looked at in Chapter 2) that, at death, human bodies are taken to some other physical place awaiting resurrection. The ‘gappy existence’, simulacrum, and falling elevator theses might be consistent with what has been historically known as ‘soul-sleep’. While, of course, these theses deny a soul, as such, the point would be the same. On the simulacrum and falling elevator views, anyway, the human that ‘died’ is actually alive somewhere (presumably not on earth) not consciously taking part in any sort of robust post-mortem activity. On Merricks’s gappy-existence view, the human does not exist at all between death and resurrection and is, thus, unconscious in an absolute sense. Third and finally, one could do as I am going to try and do and deny both soul-sleep (or anything relevantly similar) and The Intermediate State. That is, one could try to account
for an immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise *couched in terms of the eschatological bodily resurrection*.

Such a task requires some understanding of the prevailing views of the philosophy of time. This is for at least two reasons. First, a human’s pre-eschatological death and eschatological bodily resurrection are events in time such that I suggest one (the latter) occurs *immediately* following the other (the former), even though the latter is at a much later temporal point than the former (for most humans, at any rate). (It seems true that a human’s death and subsequent resurrection are events *in time* even if one thinks human existence following resurrection is timeless.) So, something about the timing must be accounted for. Second, if one’s view of time is simply incoherent, one cannot use her theory to account for how a human gets to eschatological Paradise immediately following one’s bodily death. Thus, in section I, I will survey some of the prevailing theories of time on offer and see if there is one that seems most plausible and best helps solve our problem.

In section II, I offer a theory of time to account for the immediate post-mortem placement in Paradise of a dead human person such that immediately following the moment she dies, the next time she exists is the eschatological resurrection—a time that I will suggest is ‘compoundly present’ with each pre-eschatological present moment. This section is an attempt to provide a mechanism for that at which other theologians have only hinted. In a denial of The Intermediate Sate, twentieth-century German theologian, Paul Althaus, for example, once said: “Does not the last day, as it were, surround us so that all of our death[s] place us in simultaneity with the end of history, the coming of the Kingdom, the final judgment?”¹ Yet, he provides no model for this view. I provide a model that makes use of an

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¹Paul Althaus, *Die Letzten Dinge* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1961), 159. My translation of “Liegt der Jüngste Tag nicht gleichsam rings um uns herum, so daß unser aller Sterben uns in die Gleichzeitig mit dem Ende der Geschichte, dem Kommen des Reiches, dem Gerichte stellt?” I originally translated ‘dem Gerichte stellt’ as ‘the [heavenly] courts’. I am thankful to my colleague, Samuel Hildebrandt—a native German—for his suggestion that the translation should read ‘final judgment’ to better capture its more nuanced sense. And, as it happens, doing so accords better with a translation of Althaus’s statement that G. C.
amended compound presentism that borrows from Barry Dainton’s presentation of Compound Presentism in his *Time and Space*. In section III, I defend this view from a critique that homes in on the amended compound presentism’s use of four-dimensionalist ideas. (More on four-dimensionalism below.)

In section IV, I examine the reasons that physicalist theses are not the best on offer to work with my amended compound presentism. Finally, I attempt to explain how using a hylemorphic conception of a human person, in tandem with my proposed compound presentism, allows for the Christian theologian—at least, one who hopes for immediate presence in Paradise following death—to account for the numerical identity of the human person through death and bodily resurrection. In so doing, I hope to offer a way to dissolve the problem of where Jones goes immediately after she dies and affirm the necessity of *eschatological* bodily resurrection for entrance into Paradise. This should go some way in giving a satisfactory account of the three theological affirmations:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.


I. A Quick Summary: Theories of Time

The Intermediate State is intuitive. It gives an easy account for ‘where’ dead humans are *before* the eschatological bodily resurrection. It gives theologians a way to think about

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Berkouwer provides in his *The Return of Christ* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 39. Berkouwer has it this way: “Does not the last day lie round about us, so that our death places us in simultaneity with the end of history, the coming of the Kingdom, the judgment?” In a much more contemporary context, Brian Edgar suggests a similar thing, but provides no mechanism. See his two articles: Brian Edgar, "Biblical Anthropology and the Intermediate State: Part I," *Evangelical Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (January, 2002): 27 – 46; and "Biblical Anthropology and the Intermediate State: Part II," *Evangelical Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (April, 2002): 109 – 121.

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‘where’ dead humans are now. Dead humans are, according to The Intermediate State, in Heaven/Paradise, in the time between death and the eschatological bodily resurrection. What I am going to try and offer is counterintuitive. I am going to try and set before us a way to think about the immediacy of a paradisiacal existence following one’s biological death couched in terms of the eschatological resurrection of the dead. And, I am going to try and do so in a way that does not imply that the immediacy of entering the paradisiacal state following the death of a human person is really only felt immediacy rather than real immediacy. On the view I hope to advance, Jones’s transition from death to bodily resurrection will not merely feel immediate, it will be immediate. So, with David Wilkinson I want to say: “[a]s we look forward to new creation, we must be prepared to allow our view of time not to be rigidly fixed by our everyday concepts…we need to be careful not to be ruled by the tyranny of common sense”.3 Moreover, my hope is that my offering is coherent and that it sits more easily with what seems to be affirmed in most Christian traditions: the necessity of eschatological bodily resurrection for post-mortem hope.

The first thing to do, then, is write briefly about time. What is time? In many ways, it is the one thing of which all humans are most readily aware and is one thing with which many humans are very concerned. People variously ask themselves: ‘What time is it?’ or ‘How much longer until football season?’ But, in many other ways, reflecting on the nature of time delivers many puzzles.

Some ancient Greeks—particularly, Zeno—offered puzzles that still mess with the minds of many philosophy undergraduates—and some graduates, too! Here is one: assume, first, that time is what one intuitively takes it to be—an aggregation of present moments. If time can be sliced up into an unlimited amount of zero-interval ‘present moments’, how does time ever advance? An infinite accumulation of zeros is zero! Or, thought of in another way,

if one can infinitely slice up the interval between two points in time, how does one ever reach the second point? Consider: the sixty seconds that comprise a minute can arguably be infinitely divided along the real number line. If the real number line corresponds one-to-one with instants of time in the sixty seconds, there is no mathematical reason to suppose we ought ever to move from one minute to the next. So, time seems something like a mistake of experience—an impossibility.⁴

More recently, J. M. E. McTaggart offers, in a famous (or infamous) 1908 paper, a novel language with which to think about time and then runs arguments to show that time does not exist.⁵ While I think McTaggart and Greek thinkers like Zeno are wrong about the unreality of time, it is enough to suggest that time might be a rather bizarre feature of our cosmos. Though McTaggart’s novel language suggests more than this, what seems to have come out of his 1908 paper is the generally agreed upon idea that time can be thought of in two ways: as an ‘A-series’ and/or as a ‘B-series’. Debates about time are often debates about whether time can be reduced to an A-series, reduced to a B-series, or if it is necessarily both.⁶ Briefly, time conceived as an A-series posits “events as being in the far past, being in the near past, being present, being in the near future, being in the far future, and changing in respect to these A-determinations. To think of events in [this way] is to conceive of them as becoming”.⁷ On this account, an event, E, for example, is at one time in the future, then it becomes present, and then it becomes past. This morning’s breakfast was, last night, in the future. Now, it is in the past. Time has moved on and with it, so the theory goes, the events of

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the individual times. This is supposed to give us an account of the *dynamism* of time—or, at least, a language within which to think about the dynamism.

B-series language suggests that temporal moments are ordered in relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with. B-series temporal statements are purportedly always true or always false. Whereas the A-series statements are said to change truth-value, e.g., the statement ‘I am presently writing this chapter’ is true whilst I write it; it is false as you are reading it. Conversely, it is usually assumed that it is always true, if it ever is, that the event ‘J. T. writes Chapter 5 of his thesis’ is earlier than ‘J. T. sits for his viva’. Here is where the B-series language might imply a counter-intuitive temporal reality. Because all earlier-than/later-than relations always obtain—that is, they are always true if they ever are—this seems to mean that, if B-series statements are reflective of temporal topology, *all times exist*. The B-series is usually taken to imply that no time holds any ontologically privileged status. For example: 1981 is just as real as 2014 (even though 1981 is not the same time as 2014). A human (I think it is safe to say) does not experience it this way, of course, but if the B-series is reflective of the way time is, it is quite irrelevant what one thinks of it.

In addition to, or, rather, closely following from, the A-series/B-series distinction are three popular ways to view the topology of time. The three most popular views are presentism, eternalism, and growing-block theories. (These will be spelled out below.) Presentism is largely linked with A-series distinctions while eternalism and growing-block theories are largely associated with the B-series. But this is not exclusively so. Michael Rea is right to point out that A-series theories of time are not identical with presentist theories. Thus Rea: “For example, one might believe that only the present exists *and* that there neither
have been nor will be times other than the present. On this view, presentness might be irreducible, but it would not be transitory; hence there would be no A-series”.\(^8\) That said, there is at least this connection between the [presentism/four-dimensionalism debate and the A-theory/B-theory debate]: Common-sense presentism…does imply that an A-theory is true…Thus, the success of various arguments in the A-theory–B-theory debate will have direct bearing on the presentism–four-dimensionalism debate, even if the two debates are not to be identified with one another.\(^9\)

Minimally, presentism and eternalism are normally construed as opposite theories of time.\(^10\)

These views are supposed help figure out what time is like. They are also generally coupled with competing accounts of persistence. That is to say, how a given object, O, existing at any given time, \(T\), continues to exist into and during the next moment (e.g., \(T_1\)). On presentism, the only things that exist are presently existing things. The past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist; all that exists is the present moment (and whatever is at the present moment). So, each thing that presently exists exists ‘wholly’ at the present moment. This is a thesis of endurance.\(^11\) On an endurance thesis, there is nothing of a human person, Jones, which temporally exists ‘behind’ Jones or ‘in front’ of her. She endures by wholly existing at every present moment of her life and no when else. When one meets Jones at time \(T_1\), for example, one meets the whole of Jones. If space-time is four-dimensional (i.e., three dimensions of space and one dimension of time), on presentism, Jones is spread-out

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\(^9\)Ibid. My insert.


across the three dimensions of space, but is not spread out across time.\textsuperscript{12} She moves through time wholly present at each present moment.

Conversely, riding alongside B-series statements, eternalism holds that all points on the temporal line are ontologically on par—they all exist. On eternalism, it is only a matter of perspective that some time or other can be counted as ‘present’.\textsuperscript{13} Four-dimensionalism, is a further thesis that is often used in tandem with eternalism. Four-dimensionalists often say that the way things persist through time is by \textit{perduring}.\textsuperscript{14} This is a thesis of \textit{temporal parts}. To flesh this out, consider a particular substance, Jones. On a perdurance account, Jones, is not ‘wholly present’ at any given time at which she exists. Rather, Jones is ‘spread out’ three-dimensionally across space and one-dimensionally across time—the fourth dimension—in ‘time slices’ (or: temporal parts). So, Jones, a substance, is, on four-dimensionalism, the sum total of all of her time-slices (i.e., her temporal parts). Say Jones exists from times $T_1 - T_4$.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}R. T. Mullins, “Four-Dimensionalism, Evil, and Christian Belief,” \textit{Philosophia Christi} 16, no. 1 (2014): 119ff. (Hereafter: Mullins, “Four-Dimensionalism, Evil, and Christian Belief.”) There are, though, exceptions to this. There is another four-dimensional theory that is not a ‘worm theory’ like perdurantism is. Rather it is a ‘stage theory’. This seems to be the chief difference between the two: on perdurance, the proper name of the object is the object considered with all of its temporal parts taken together—the whole ‘worm’. On stage theory, the proper name is said to apply equally to each individual time-slice/temporal part/temporal stage of the four-dimensional object. Theodore Sider offers a ‘stage theory’ wherein what a worm-theorist calls a ‘temporal part’ a stage theorist calls a ‘person-stage’. See Theodore Sider, \textit{Four-Dimensionalism} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Whether a four-dimensionalist is a stage-theorist or a worm-theorist, the differences seem to me slight enough that the differences will not matter for our purposes. Sally Haslanger argues that stage-theory is not a theory of perdurance. Rather she calls stage-theory a theory of ‘exdurance’ because it purports that the identity of person-stages (i.e., temporal counterparts) through time is to be thought of in ways like a counterpart theory of modal realism counts the identity of persons across possible worlds. Sally Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time,” in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics} eds. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 319. For a paper on the endurance/perdurance distinction see Neil McKinnon, “The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction,” \textit{Australasian Journal of Philosophy} 80, no. 3 (September, 2002): 288 – 206. See also: Dainton, \textit{Time and Space}, 40ff. for a thorough overview of the perdurance account. See also Katherine Hawley, “Temporal Parts,” \textit{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/. Accessed 15 July, 2014. I will not explicate any further the difference. I will simply use the language of space-time worms and perdurance. For the purposes of this chapter, the differences are unimportant.
\end{itemize}
Jones is not, properly speaking, wholly at $T_1$. Jones is the whole of what exists from $T_1 - T_4$.

In four-dimensionalist terminology, Jones could be considered a ‘space-time worm’.\(^{15}\)

A similar thing is true of Jones on the growing-block view of time—again, a view largely coupled with four-dimensionalism. On the growing-block view, like presentism, the future does not yet exist. But, unlike presentism and like eternalism, the present and past all exist in the same way. Eternalism is usually couched in terms of a space-time four-dimensional block within which nothing comes into or goes out of existence. On a growing-block model, as the name implies, the block is not in a static unchanging state; rather, the ‘front-edge’ accumulates as time moves on through present moments. New time-slices come into existence and the four-dimensional block grows.\(^{16}\) Jones, on this view, is still the whole of whatever slices exist from her past to her present. Or, if Jones is no longer alive, then she is the sum total of all the slices that exist at the points in time when she ‘was’ alive. Either way, Jones is never ‘wholly’ present at any one moment of time.

These views are on offer to help solve a particular logical puzzle having to do with time: the ‘problem of temporary intrinsics’. The idea behind this problem is this: according to the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, numerically identical objects must share all of their properties—they cannot differ in any way. So, for example, one object cannot be both left-handed and not-left-handed. This is a contradiction. But, it seems that objects do come to have different properties—that is, it appears that objects change. Suppose, for example, that Jones at $T_1$ has the property of ‘being bi-pedal’ and then, through a horrible accident at $T_2$ (a time later than $T_1$ but earlier than $T_3$), loses her left leg. Now, at $T_3$ she is no longer bi-pedal. She has only one leg. How can Jones be both bi-pedal and not-bi-pedal? If identity entails

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\(^{15}\)But this is not always the case. See the previous note.

\(^{16}\)Dainton, *Time and Space*, 68ff.
indiscernibility, how is it possible for Jones to be one way at $T_1$ and then another way at $T_3$?

It seems like Jones at $T_1$ is discernable from, and, therefore, not identical to, Jones at $T_3$.

Historically, thinkers like Aristotle answer this question by indexing certain properties to times.\(^\text{17}\) It is clearly not a contradiction, so goes the claim, that Jones has the properties ‘bi-pedal at $T_1$’ and ‘not-bi-pedal at $T_3$’. However, for many, this account does not survive a number of objections. For there seem to be acute problems, particularly if Jones is wholly present at both times in question and those times remain in existence. After all, a property’s being ‘intrinsic’ to an object seems to militate against the possibility that a property—if it is \textit{intrinsic}—could be indexed to a time, a seemingly extrinsic sort of relation. That is, \textit{intrinsic} properties are properties that an object is said to have without reference to anything else.\(^\text{18}\) But, indexing properties to times just is to refer to something else, namely a temporal coordinate.

Consider a property typically taken to be an intrinsic property of an object: mass. Katherine Hawley offers: “if the [object] bears different mass-relations to different times, then really it has no mass of its own, and this is false”.\(^\text{19}\) But, she notes:

The supporter of the relational solution [i.e., temporally indexed] has a response to this second worry. If only the permanent is real, the [object] has no real mass according to any solution to the problem of change. But the temporary is as real as the permanent. The fact that the [object] has very few necessarily permanent properties tells us nothing about the reality or robustness of the [object]. Having different masses at different times, by virtue

\(^{17}\)See, for example, Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1966), Book Γ, section 5, p. 67 and Book Δ pp. 79ff. Recall that we discussed this briefly in Chapter 3 §II \textit{vis-à-vis} Baker’s argument about ‘accidental sameness’.

\(^{18}\)Sally Haslanger seems to offer an argument to get around this possible objection to endurance theses by suggesting that all changes are relational changes—they are all extrinsic. See Sally Haslanger, “Persistence through Time,” in in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 330.

of having different relations to different times, is not the same as being massless.\textsuperscript{20}

Trenton Merricks, in his “Endurance and Indiscernibility” seems to say something rather similar.\textsuperscript{21} And this fits for Merricks because, as a presentist, the only properties an object has are the properties it has now. For the presentist, the question simply does not arise about an object’s having conflicting properties at different times because times other than the present time do not exist. The same cannot be said, however, if eternalism is true and Jones wholly exists at both $T_1$ and $T_3$, (because, on eternalism, neither $T_1$ nor $T_3$ ever goes out of existence). On this conception of eternalism, Jones wholly has both properties ‘being bi-pedal’ and ‘being not-bi-pedal’. She either has contradictory properties or is two numerically distinct objects. Either way, on this view of eternalism, persistence and change seem impossible.

This is the principal problem in eternalist theses that four-dimensionalism is supposed to solve. If it is the case that eternalism is true and Jones does not wholly exist at different times, then Jones does not have conflicting properties. On a temporal parts view, at least, she is a space-time worm and a substance having properties a bit like a pole that is painted red on one end and blue on another. The pole is not wholly blue and wholly not-blue; no, it is partially blue and partially not-blue—the non-blue part being different from the blue one. \textit{Mutatis mutandis} the same is true of the space-time worm, Jones. She is partially bi-pedal and partially not-bi-pedal. The properties are had by different ‘slices’ of Jones.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, 213. My inserts.

\textsuperscript{21}Trenton Merricks, 'Endurance and Indiscernibility' The Journal of Philosophy 91, No. 4 (April, 1994): 165-184. This paper also gives a hint at what is to come in his later Objects and Persons vis-à-vis anti-criterialism. He says: "'O at t is identical with 0 at t' can be read 'There is one object, 0, and that object exists at t and t*'. Similarly, 'O at t is identical with 0 at t' could be read as 'There is one object, 0, and it exists at t'. These reformulations are equivalent to their counterparts made in terms of the relation 'is identical with'. Stating the identity claims in terms of there being "one object" makes even clearer my claim that there is no difference in the fact of identity between diachronic and synchronic identity." Ibid.,176.
Of course, what the four-dimensional eternalist gains in overcoming the problem of temporary intrinsics, she loses in trying to account for the ‘flow’ or direction of time. Since all points on the temporal line are ontologically on par, there is no real flow of time—time does not advance, no matter what we think or feel about it. Moreover, some think it quite odd to conceive of temporal objects as four-dimensional space-time worms such that, at any given moment, one never really meets the *whole* of an object. Because of these oddities, four-dimensionalism has been described as a “crazy metaphysic”\(^\text{22}\). Of course, such epithets do not constitute an argument against it. And, as I note above, even if it is the case that four-dimensionalism is wrong, its being ‘crazy’ or counterintuitive is not a sufficient reason to reject it. Time may, indeed, be quite odd. And, if so, that is just something with which temporal beings—particularly conscious ones—will need to deal.

Four-dimensionalism does not *need* to assert a static view of time.\(^\text{23}\) One could be a growing-block theorist and account for the dynamism of time by suggesting that the present moves forward with new instances of time coming into existence even while the past never ceases to exist. Though this view still has the odd space-time worm thesis as a way of getting around the problem of temporary intrinsics, it, at least, gives thinkers heavily motivated by intuition less to complain about. After all, time advances on the growing-block model.

As noted above, the presentist, in contradistinction from the eternalist, has a quick remedy to the supposed problem of temporary intrinsics. Jones is not both bi-pedal and not because Jones does not, in any way, exist in the past. All that exists is what presently exists. If it is the present and Jones is bi-pedal, then Jones is bi-pedal. If it is the present and Jones is


\(^{23}\) At any rate, it is arguable that one could use a ‘moving spot-light’ version of eternalism to account for a moving ‘present’ and a dynamic flow of time. See, for both an explanation of the merits and problems with this view, Barry Dainton, *Time and Space*, 18ff. Incidentally, Dainton claims, rightly, I think, that it is this Moving Spot light account of eternalism against which McTaggart offers his 1908 arguments. Or, one could, as Storrs McCall does, offer a ‘diminishing branch’ view where the real future is ‘pruned’ as the present moves. Storrs McCall, “Objective Time Flow,” *Philosophy of Science* 43, no. 3 (September, 1976): 337 – 362.
not-bi-pedal, then she is not-bi-pedal. She never has conflicting properties. She only ever has
the properties she has in the present.

To sum up: for presentists, space-time is whatever exists at the present moment. The
space-time manifold, if such there be, does not extend temporally in any direction. It consists
of the present moment; that is it. For four-dimensional eternalists, the space-time manifold is
a four-dimensional block that houses all locations and all times, nothing comes into existence
and nothing goes out of existence. On a growing-block account, the space-time manifold is a
growing four-dimensional block that houses all past times, present times, and all spatial
locations in the past and present.

II. Theology and Temporal Topology: A New Theory

I outline above three of the more popular views on time. The reason for this is simple: if there
are good reasons for thinking something similar to any of these positions is correct, then they
must have some impact on how one thinks about accounting for a dead person’s immediately
arriving in Paradise within the context of the eschatological resurrection. The aim, recall, is
to satisfy:

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise.

But, in keeping with the conclusion of Chapter 1, TA2 is to be satisfied only in the context of
eschatological resurrection. This is so that TA2 does not undermine TA1:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife

with the understanding that bodily resurrection is an eschatological event. So, then, the
questions before us are: “which view of time is correct?” and “how do we use it for our
doctrine of the resurrection?”

Before I offer my own theory, let me quickly offer two critiques against four-
dimensionalist accounts of time. These are both theological in nature and, I think, persuasive
(there are many more philosophical points besides). The first critique is this: the eternalist/four-dimensional ontology gives no specific direction for time. There is no time that is ontologically privileged and so, ontologically speaking, there is no proper direction in which time is said to flow. Or, if ‘flow’ is too metaphorical a term, let us agree that, on eternalism, there is no temporal becoming. Events, people, places, and things never come into nor go out of existence because times, and the things at those times, never come into nor go out of existence. I take it that such a conception might cut against theological notions of salvation history and God’s drawing, through time, a people to Himself. Moreover, it may deny anything like an eschaton, a point in time/end-of-time in which God rights all wrongs and establishes a new heaven and a new earth, that is to say: a completely transformed cosmos. There seems to be, to say the least, an arrow – a direction – of time implicit in the biblical narrative. I think Christian theologians are wise not to accept a view that denies this even if “the majority of contemporary philosophers insist that the notion of…the dynamic view of time is “incoherent,” “unintelligible,” “self-contradictory,” and “in principle meaningless”.”

For, consider what might happen if one does deny an ontological flow of time (i.e., denies that there really is temporal becoming). N. T. Wright argues that at the ‘second coming’ of Christ, Christ will see to it that all things are “put to rights”. That is to say, at the parousia, Christ, on the Christian story, rights all wrongs and establishes perfect justice in the cosmos. The curses of sin, pain, and death will be extinguished. Says Wright:


In [Christ’s] appearing [the *parousia*] we find neither a dualist rejection of the present world nor simply his arrival like a spaceman into the present world but rather the *transformation* of the present world, and ourselves within it, so that it will at last be put to rights and we with it. Death and decay will be overcome, and God will be all in all. This means…that a proper shape and balance are given to the Christian worldview. Like the Jewish worldview, but radically opposed to the Stoic, the Platonic, the Hindu, and the Buddhist worldviews, the Christian worldview is a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Not to have closure to the end of the story—to be left with a potentially endless cycle, round and round with either the same things happening again and again or simply perhaps the long outworking of karma—would be the very antithesis of the story told by the apostles and by the long line of their Jewish predecessors.27

Yet, on an eternalist account, this cannot possibly be the case. Now, *pace* Wright’s quote, it may not be true on eternalism that an endless cycle of time is conceived; but what is the material difference *vis-à-vis* the problem at hand? On eternalism, the same evil actions (et. al) are *eternally* real. They never cease to exist. This might be even worse than an ‘eternal return’ story—for, conceivably, in an eternal return scenario, there is a rest between evil actions and their coming about again. Not so on eternalism. So, the best that God can do is establish particular time-slices of the cosmos (given four-dimensionalism) in the future that are perfect. He can do nothing about redeeming past offenses and evils. Past evils are eternally real—they are never conquered. Ryan Mullins suggests that this view makes God, at best, “an evil balancer” as opposed to an “evil defeater”.28 In light of Mullin’s insightful critique, and with Wright, it seems to me more acceptable to have an ontology of time that provides a story within which death and decay are *overcome*. In other words, it seems better to think of time in such a way that death, decay, and evil do not continue to exist, whether eternally or otherwise. If not, we must agree with William Lane Craig’s conclusion that,

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27 Ibid., 142 – 143. My inserts.

“[c]reation is never really purged of evil on this view; at most it can be said that evil infects only those parts of creation that are earlier than” the events of the renewed cosmos.\textsuperscript{29}

The second critique is styled after a critique by Mullins and puts the first into sharper focus.\textsuperscript{30} Here is an ugly thought experiment: suppose Susie is horribly murdered at time $T_1$. Her murder is not painless; it is very painful and drawn out. On a four-dimensionalist account, this is eternally true and eternally real. $T_1$ never ‘goes away’. Even at $T_2$, it is true that, at temporal point $T_1$, Susie is horribly murdered. And, on an eternalist four-dimensional model, $T_1$ eternally exists—even if it does not exist at $T_2$. It is never the case that the murder is over for the temporal part of Susie (or Susie’s person stage) at $T_1$ because $T_1$ exists eternally. Even God cannot redeem this horror; he cannot save Susie’s time-slice at $T_1$. This is so because, on four-dimensionalism, every time-slice is mereologically essential for the substance ‘Susie’. She is the sum of all her temporal parts. I submit that such a conception is at odds with Christian theology and the hope that Christians affirm through Christ’s death and resurrection, a hope that offers a new cosmos that Christ inaugurated and promises to bring fully to bear. The four-dimensional accounts are, at least, problematic given Christian belief. I reject four-dimensionalism and eternalism for these reasons.\textsuperscript{31} The growing-block view is likewise rejected because it falls to both critiques.


\textsuperscript{31}This is not to say that there are no thinkers putting forward positive theological cases for four-dimensionalism. There are. But, that is to say, I take it that the critiques just offered and Mullins’s paper need to be sufficiently countered in order for Christians safely to take four-dimensionalism seriously. See Mullins, “Four-dimensionalism, Evil, and Christian Belief” for both an overview of the ‘positive case’ and a withering critique against them. Patrick Toner offers an interesting critique of perdurance/eternalist accounts through the lens of Catholic theories of judgment. See Patrick James Toner, ‘Divine Judgment and the Nature of Time,’ \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 22, no. 3 (July, 2005), 316 – 329.
What about presentism? It does not suffer the difficulties of the eternalist/four-dimensionalist account; that is true. But, does it help solve our problem set out in this chapter’s introduction? Not obviously. For, the presentist wants to say that what exists is what exists at the present moment. But, if Jones dies at T₁, then she does not exist at T₂ and, given presentism, there is no other place or time for her to be.³² She is completely gone. (These statements assume that the arguments of Chapters 1 – 4 go through.) Now, it may be the case that one can account for Jones’s identity such that she genuinely comes back into existence when the present moment is finally the eschatological moment (ala Merricks), but that is not going to satisfy what I am trying to fix. Recall that the project in this chapter is to try and figure out a way such that entrance into Paradise follows immediately after a person’s biological death and that this is accomplished in the context of the eschatological bodily resurrection.³³ A concern to solve this puzzle, recall, is motivated by TA2 (immediate existence in Paradise) and the conclusions from Chapter 1.

As a possible solution, I aim to offer an amended version of what Barry Dainton calls ‘Compound Presentism’.³⁴ But first, to get an idea of what Dainton’s doing with his thesis, picture a graph with an x- and y-axis. On the x-axis are temporal coordinates (e.g., T₁, T₂, T₃, T₄, T₅). On the y-axis are sum totals of reality denoted by S₁, S₂, S₃, and S₄ [Figure 1.1].³⁵

We start off by assuming that the sum total of reality consists of two coexisting but non-simultaneous very brief reality-slices (each spatially three-dimensional). Suppose A and B are two such, and that A exists at t₁ and B at

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³²Craig Bourne echoes this implication of presentism saying: “I am, therefore, I am present” because, on presentism “it is not possible to be anywhere else.” Of course, by ‘anywhere’ I take it Bourne means ‘anywhen’. Bourne, A Future for Presentism, 24.

³³By ‘follows’ I mean here something more like ‘temporally’ follows. But, as we will see, ‘temporally’ is going to have some specific nuancing.

³⁴Dainton, Time and Space, 95 – 101.

³⁵Figure from Dainton, Time and Space, 96. Note that, as Dainton warns, “temporal dynamism cannot be fully captured in a static diagram.” Figure 1.1 appears to show that all the times co-exist. But that is not correct. Think, rather, that when there is a vacancy at the S and T coordinates, that time does not exist. For example, at T₃, T₁ does not exist—there is nothing at the intersection of T₁ and an S coordinate when T₃ is populated.
t₂. One of these slices, A, is annihilated and a new slice of reality, C, comes into existence, and with it a new time, t₃. Slice B is annihilated and D is created, along with t₄; and so it goes on.⁶⁶

Begin by looking at T₂ in Figure 1.1. Dainton suggests that there are two distinct questions one can meaningfully ask about T₂:

1. What events occur at T₂?
2. What events are real as of T₂?³⁷

He suggests that the events that occur in reality slice B is the answer to (1), while the events in reality slices A, B, and C are the answers to (2).³⁸ The idea is that the ‘present’ is two compounded times denoted by the reality slices existent in the S-series. The present, conceived in this compound way, is AB, then BC, then CD, and so on. This is a ‘slice’ thesis, like four-dimensionalism, but this is a dynamic as opposed to a static temporal thesis because these reality-slices come into and go out of existence. See: at T₃, for example, A no longer exists. Compound Presentism suggests that present realities are spread-out across two adjacent times.

Why does Dainton offer this theory? To see why, consider a possible problem for a normal presentist account that Dainton calls the ‘overdetermination problem’. This problem highlights a purported oddity in presentist accounts whereby a particular time, e.g., T₁, both comes into existence at T₁ and goes out of existence at T₇. That is to say, according to Dainton, there is a problem built-in to normal presentist accounts whereby the same temporal

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⁶⁶Ibid., 95 – 96.

³⁷Ibid., 96.

³⁸Ibid.
moment, e.g., T_1, is both present and not present. This is a problem of temporary intrinsics highlighting intrinsic properties of times rather than objects.\textsuperscript{39}

How does compound presentism get around this supposed problem? Dainton believes that compound presentism dodges this issue by suggesting that, as we see in Figure 1.1, strictly speaking, times and events do not go out of existence at any particular times. It is just the case that, for example, when T_3 and C together come into existence, T_1 and A no longer exist. Dainton argues, “Episodes of absolute annihilation [e.g., T_1 and A going out of existence] and creation [e.g., T_3 and C coming into existence] are not things that occur in time, in the manner of ordinary events; they are better thought of as alterations to time, involving, as they do, variations in the sum total of what exists”.\textsuperscript{40}

I am not totally convinced that non-compound versions of presentism need amendment for a supposed problem of overdetermination. After all, it seems plausible that a presentist could argue similarly to Dainton. A presentist could say that it is entirely true that there is no time at which events come in to and drop out of existence; it is just the case that there are events at times when those events and times are actual. At other times, they are not. So, T_1 is not both the time at which events at T_1 come into existence and the time at which the same events go out. Even still, I think there are merits to Dainton’s view that he further considers. Very briefly, compound presentism seems to offer a straightforward way of accounting for trans-temporal relations. On presentism, one could plausibly argue that, not only can nothing happen at an instantaneous, non extended, present moment, but, even if it could, the presentist’s present moment is so solipsistic that each moment seems completely isolated from prior moments and any future moment. The compound presentist seems to have an immediate remedy for these worries—present moments are extended and causal relations

\textsuperscript{39}Dainton, \textit{Time and Space}, 21ff. He calls this problem ‘the overdetermination problem’. Ibid., 20ff.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 96. My inserts.
carry across adjacent times. Moreover, compound presentism can accommodate the ‘lag’ between one’s experience of the present and the present itself without suggesting that what is experienced by a perceiver is no longer real at the time in which it is perceived.

That said, there may yet be a problem with compound presentism that normal presentism does not have. I note above that Dainton’s suggests that, on his theory, there are two questions that must be kept distinct [ref. Figure 1.1]:

1. What events occur at $T_2$?
2. What events are real as of $T_2$?

Answering (1) on compound presentism seems obvious enough, and the answer seems identical to regular presentism. The answer to (1) is the trivial truth: whatever events occur at $T_2$ [B in Figure 1.1]. But (2)’s answer is odd. Recall its answer: the events that occur in reality slices A, B, and C. This answer seems to imply that A, B, and C are all co-real. If this is the case, just how does this view end up differing from eternalism? ‘Being real to’ seems like a transitive property.

But is it? Maybe not. If one supposes that an intrinsic feature of the passage of time is the annihilation and creation of events, which Compound Presentism affirms, then there is no reason to suppose that A, B, and C all remain in existence through the passage of time. Such ‘annihilation’ and ‘creation’ is even pictured in the graph. Note, for example, at $T_3$, A does not exist (and so on). So, co-existence need not be transitive even if it is symmetrical. To simply assert that co-existence/co-reality is transitive is just to beg the question against Compound Presentism. If this argument holds, there seems to be no problem for compound presentism and its use of co-reality (co-existence). Reality slice A can be real to another

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42 The jury is still out on whether such a lag exists. See, for example, Sean Enda Power, “Perceiving External Things and the Time-Lag Argument,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (March, 2013): 94 – 117.

reality slice B—indeed, they are on compound presentism—but a reality slice A’s being real to reality slice B (or any other) does not imply that reality slice A is real to any other reality slices co-real with B (and the same applies to all reality slices in turn). *Prima facie* compound presentism seems coherent.

Now, if Dainton’s thesis is coherent, perhaps we can amend it to fit our theological needs. Consider, instead of having compoundly present existing reality-slices like A and B at $T_1 - T_2$ as in Figure 1.1, we suggest that, at $T_1$ and $S_1$ (still on the x and y axes respectively), we have reality-slice A [Figure 1.2]. Suppose $T_1$ is our current pre-eschatological present and that we are a part of reality-slice A. Right *now* we are at the coordinates of $T_1$ and $S_1$.

Further, suppose that there is an ‘R’, a reality-slice at the intersection of $T_Ω$ and $S_1$. Consider $T_Ω$ in Figure 1.2 the time of the eschatological resurrection.

If so, *the sum total of reality*, $S_1$, consists of two present times, $T_1$ and $T_Ω$ because something exists in $S_1$ at those temporal coordinates. Better: $S_1$ represents that A and R are one *compoundly present* reality existing at $T_1$ and $T_Ω$. Further, let us say that A and R are jointly necessary and sufficient for $S_1$. (Likewise B and R are jointly necessary and sufficient for $S_2$. And so on.) So, if A does not exist at $T_2$, for example, then $S_1$ does not exist when $T_2$ is present. Let us say that a time is *present* if and only if there is a reality slice at the intersection of a T- and S-coordinate. Finally, conceive of the timeline $T_1...T_Ω$ the way a presentist would. The only time that exists in the $T_1...T_Ω$ time series is whatever time is present.
(To clarify: just above, I use a locution, variations of which will be seen through the rest of this chapter: ‘T_1...T_{\Omega-1} time series’. ‘Time series’, used in this way, does not denote an additional series running along side or ‘above’ the time series that goes from T_\Omega forward. It is not an additional time line. It is a distinction within a time line; ‘time series’ is a locution to note a distinction between the temporal coordinates that lead up to T_\Omega and those that follow after. But, the T_1...T_{\Omega-1} ‘time series’ and the ‘time series’ following from T_\Omega forward are running on the same time line. This should be clear in Figure 1.2. Note that there are not two series of ‘Ts’ in the figure.)

When an individual time in the T_1...T_{\Omega-1} series is present, it is compoundly present with T_\Omega, even if no other point in the T_1...T_{\Omega-1} series is compoundly present with any other. Moreover, on my conception, not everything endures from one time to another (e.g., T_1 to T_2). For example, T_2 is such that some things no longer exist in the time series leading up to T_\Omega. With T_2, reality-slice B exists and so S_2, A, S_1, and T_1, no longer exist. Given how I define presentness, when B exists, T_2 is present and nothing else pre-T_\Omega exists.

Consider how this theory might apply to a particular human person, Jones. Jones can be thought of as a part of the A reality-slice and, as such, existing at T_1. Suppose that at the next moment, T_2, Jones is dead. Jones does not feature in reality-slice B. So, she is not at T_2. Neither is she anywhen else in the time series T_2...T_{\Omega-1}. For, given that my version of compound presentism is a presentist-type hypothesis, when T_2 is present, T_1 no longer exists. And, this entails that A no longer exists because reality-slice A just is the reality-slice that exists at T_1. Likewise, S_1 no longer exists because A is an essential property of S_1. Because of this, as of T_2, Jones does not exist in the pre-T_\Omega time series because all that exists in the pre-T_\Omega time series, when T_2 is present, is B. And Jones is not a part of B or any other post-T_1/pre-T_\Omega non-A reality-slice.\textsuperscript{44} Still, on my conception, even though B does not consist of

\textsuperscript{44} Again, this assumes that my preceding chapters are convincing.
everything that was in A, some things do endure from A to B and T₁ to T₂. Smith, for example, might do this if he is a part of A and survives from T₁ to T₂.

I want to affirm, with the presentist, that all that exists is the present. So, when, for example, T₁ is present, no other times in the pre-T₂Ω future or pre-T₁ past exist. But, contra the presentist, with the eschatological future in view, when T₁ is present in the pre-T₂Ω time series, there is another present, another point in the temporal dimension, T₂Ω, with a reality-slice compoundly present with A, namely, R, the eschatological bodily resurrection. This is what we have in S₁. T₁/A and T₂Ω/R are conjoined as one whole compound present because they are both part of the sum total of reality, S₁. The present is always compounded of, or ‘ranges over’, two times (it is noted by occupied S-coordinates). One can see here that I am trying to borrow from both presentist and eternalist theses.

Here is a central benefit to doing so. I note above that according to this thesis, if Jones is dead at T₂, then she is nowhen else—i.e., she does not exist—in the pre-T₂Ω time series. But, if the eschatological resurrection of all the dead is true, and is identified by R in Figure 1.2, then a person at T₂ in reality-slice B can say there is a ‘when’ such that Jones exists, viz. T₂Ω. Jones is a part of the R reality-slice (since R is the resurrection of all the dead), which is part of the sum total of reality, S₂, whose jointly necessary and sufficient conditions are the reality-slices B and R. The things in B and R are compoundly present by way of T₂ and T₂Ω, but T₂/B and T₂Ω/R are not simultaneous. (T₂Ω is a different time than T₂.) So, after her death, Jones exists in the compound present, but not in the pre-T₂Ω time series; she exists at the resurrection. I think the upshot of this is that the problem of where and when dead Jones is dissolves.

Think again of S₁ in Figure 1.2, the whole compoundly present reality consisting of A and R at T₁ and T₂Ω. In fact, think of the whole compoundly present reality in S₁ as ‘AR’ rather than A and R. Just here care is needed. For, while the whole compoundly present
reality in S1 can be appropriately thought of as ‘AR’, speaking this way about the things in A and R should be handled with a slight difference. Take Jones again. If Jones exists in A and R (i.e., at T1 and TΩ), then the whole compoundly present thing, Jones, can be denoted by ‘Jones-AR’. In other words, Jones is neither wholly in A nor wholly in R; she is wholly in AR. When T2/B is present in the pre-TΩ time series, if Jones exists at T2 and TΩ, then Jones, as of T2, is Jones-BR. And so on until Jones no longer exists at a pre-TΩ moment. Jones can be denoted in this ‘Jones-xR’ way to demonstrate that Jones’s existence consists in those Jones reality slices. Conceiving of Jones’s existence in this way also helps avoid the problem of temporary intrinsics discussed earlier. Jones is not both wholly resurrected and not wholly resurrected; she has a reality slice that is resurrected in R at TΩ and, while she exists in the pre-TΩ series, one that is not. This is different from the Sn as ‘xR’ denotation because the Sn denotation is about the whole compoundly present reality, not necessarily about the individual things that exist at the particular times and in the particular reality slices. So, even after Jones’s pre-TΩ death, if Jones exists at TΩ, she is compoundly present with all pre-TΩ moments, but she can no longer be denoted by Jones-xR. She can only be denoted by Jones-R during pre-TΩ times.45

Does TΩ’s being compoundly present with each pre-TΩ time imply that there is no actual temporal becoming? I do not think so. It is precisely through the passage of time that sum totals of reality (S’s) drop out of existence with the loss of at least one essential property per temporal location (e.g., at T2, A does not exist and neither does S1). This works because, as before, ‘being real to’ is not transitive. Just because R is co-real with A, B, C, etc. it does not follow that A, B, and C are all co-real with one another. This is plainly obvious in Figure 1.2; with the passage of time, sum totals of reality pop into and go out of existence when their

45To allay fears that Jones will no longer be ‘complete’, it may be the case that compound presentism carries on through the resurrection. If so, maybe Jones is, after TΩ, Jones-RΓ, then Jones-ΓΔ and so on. But this puts us well beyond what we can know, I think.
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions exist/cease to exist (e.g., at \( T_2 \), \( S_2 \) comes into existence because \( B \) and \( R \) exist). *Only one* pre-\( T_\Omega \) reality slice exists at any given \( S \) and any given \( T \). So, sum totals of reality (the \( S \)-series) come and go; there is temporal becoming on this modified compound presentism.

This version of compound presentism carries with it a *significant* feature of presentism such that, at a given time (e.g., \( T_1 \)), nothing exists between the given time and \( T_\Omega \) (nor is there anything that exists prior to the time in question). For example, when \( T_1 \) and \( T_\Omega \) are present, reality just is the whole compoundly present reality consisting of those two times, viz. \( S_1 \) (i.e., AR) in Figure 1.2. Past times do not exist and pre-eschaton future times do not yet exist. And, with the passage of pre-eschatological time, the sum totals of reality come and go. Because of this, the time series \( T_1 \ldots T_{\Omega-1} \) *really does* lead *somewhen* and is ontologically significant. So, too, causation works in its normal way, and not retroactively. Without the time- and reality-series leading up to \( T_\Omega \) and \( S_\Omega \), \( T_\Omega \), \( S_\Omega \), and \( R \) do not exist. This is because \( R \), and so \( T_\Omega \), fails to exist without the \( S_1 \ldots S_{\Omega-1} \) reality series whose necessary conditions (jointly sufficient with \( R \)) include the pre-\( T_\Omega \) temporally advancing reality-slices A-D (et. al.).

To simplify: because this is a compound presentist thesis, \( T_\Omega/R \) is *never* solipsistically present. It is never the only present moment. It is always considered within the context of a whole compoundly present reality. When a pre-\( T_\Omega \) time is present (i.e., exists), \( T_\Omega/R \) is compoundly present with it. And, possibly, when the pre-\( T_\Omega \) time series is exhausted, \( T_\Omega/R \) is compoundly present with the first post-\( T_\Omega \) moment (time then possibly looking a bit like Figure 1.1). That said, further questions about what happens after \( T_\Omega \) and \( S_\Omega \) into post-resurrection life are likely well beyond my ken. So, I will not offer any further speculation as to what happens after the omega points in the temporal and reality series. Suffice it to say, in keeping with the arrow of time biblically prescribed, \( T_\Omega \) and \( S_\Omega \) presuppose the temporal and sum-of-all-reality series leading up to them.
III. A Possible Objection

In the eighth chapter of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, Paul says this:

For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the Sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation has been growing together in the pains of childbirth until now. And not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience. (Rom. 8.18-25)

Mullins thinks that this passage creates a special difficulty for four-dimensional eternalists.46

This is for a number of reasons, one of which is that Paul suggests that the creation and the people of the creation anticipate—with good reason—the coming of God’s eschatological renewal. This is a problem for a four-dimensionalist because, on four-dimensionalism, the temporal parts/time-slices of the ‘old’ creation and the persons of that ‘old’ creation never are renewed. They never get to the time of renewal. They are, like Susie above, eternally stuck in bondage to corruption because they are eternally stuck at one particular time. This is not a problem on my version of compound presentism with its insistence that pre-$T_\Omega$ times come and go in the same way a normal presentist suggests. The only moment that exists in the pre-$T_\Omega$ time series that exists is the present moment. And, with the present moment, whole persons endure through the series of compound presents (the S-series).

However, there is a possible problem for the amended compound presentism regarding this passage. This further problem is framed by Mullins in the context of four-dimensional eternalism; since my view does borrow one aspect (perhaps two) from

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eternalism, viz., the concurrent existence of more than one present (and ‘slices’), the possible problem needs to be addressed.

Here is the problem. On the amended compound presentism, the time of the eschatological resurrection of the dead, $T_\Omega$, is on ontological par with each pre-$T_\Omega$ moment whilst each pre-$T_\Omega$ moment is present (i.e., whilst a particular pre-$T_\Omega$ moment exists). But this seems to suggest that, contra Paul’s sentiments in the above passage, the creation does not long for its redemption. It already has it at time $T_\Omega$ and following. And, further, since Jones, for example, exists both in the pre-$T_\Omega$ time series and $T_\Omega$, it appears as though one part of Jones never quite gets to the bodily resurrection, i.e., never experiences redemption. Further still, it seems that the Jones of a pre-$T_\Omega$ reality slice is the one that is doing the work by which Jones will be judged at the resurrection. If $T_\Omega$ Jones receives the reward of Paradise at the resurrection, then it might be the case that the reward is, in some sense, unjust. This is because, prima facie, pre-$T_\Omega$ Jones never receives the reward for which she hopes.

This is a formidable problem. And, admittedly, my forthcoming rejoinder is the most tentative part of an already tentative position. But, here is a possible response. I propose above that, in keeping with the arrow of time biblically prescribed, $T_\Omega$ requires the time series leading up to $T_\Omega$. This is an awkward claim. But, what I take it to mean is something like this: suppose that a necessary condition for the existence of $T_\Omega$ is precisely that there is a T series leading up to $T_\Omega$. That is, what if an essential property (or essential properties) of $T_\Omega$’s existing is that it is compoundly present with at least one pre-$T_\Omega$ time (which, ex hypothesi, is progressing) so long as there is a pre-$T_\Omega$ time? This seems plausible if modified compound presentism is true. For, on compound presentism, present moments do not exist in isolation. So, $T_\Omega$ cannot exist by itself; it is always compoundly present with another time (in so far as $T_\Omega$ exists). And, ex hypothesi, when a pre-$T_\Omega$ time exists, the only other time that exists is the compoundly present $T_\Omega$. If something like this is possible, then the creation’s release (and
Jones’s, et. al.) from bondage requires that time and reality leads up to the time at which creation is redeemed. The whole compoundly present creation, Creation-xR, becomes Creation-R when the pre-TΩ time series exhausts into TΩ. Or, if compound presentism continues through the resurrection, Creation-xR becomes Creation-RΓ, and then Creation-ΓΔ (and so on) where the Greek letters denote reality slices at post-TΩ times. Further, one might quibble with the language of ‘pre-TΩ exhausting into TΩ’. If so, just assume I mean Creation-xR becomes Creation-RΓ when no Pre-TΩ time exists. In other words, Creation-xR is one numerically identical reality that endures through the S-series.

As I say, this is a tentative (maybe tenuous) response. I can only hope here that it is neither incoherent nor a piece of fashionable nonsense (or worse yet, cud for a ‘bull session’). The analytic project in theology, and this project as a token of it, seeks clarity where it can. But, I do not assume that clarity always brings forth exhausted knowledge of a given topic. Certainly this is one prime example. That said, it may be a way of further explaining—providing a metaphysics for—what T. F. Torrance argues:

But what about the individual, and what about the death of the believer? This is where it is impossible for us to think completely together the two times in which we are involved, yet we may discern something of how the two ‘moments’ fall together in our being in Christ. When the believer dies, he goes to be with Christ and is in his immediate presence, participant in him and made like him. That is to each believer the parousia of Christ to him. Yet when this is regarded on the plane of history and of the on-going process of the fallen world, the death of each believer means that his body is laid to sleep in the earth, waiting until the redemption of the body and the recreation of all things at the final Parousia. Looked at from the perspective of the new creation there is no gap between the death of the believer and the parousia of Christ, but looked at from the perspective of time that decays and crumbles

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47 This is not to say that compound presentism will continue. As I suggest in a note above, it seems beyond our ken to know the sort of existence that occurs in the resurrection. Suffice it to say, the ‘classical view’ is that the resurrection existence is, in some sense, atemporal. What that amounts to, I am unsure. See Brian Edgar, "A New Immortality?" Evangelical Review of Theology 23 no. 4 (1999): 376 – 381.

48 See Randal Rouser, “Theology as a Bull Session,” in Analytic Theology eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 70 – 84. ‘Bull session’ is used, roughly speaking, to articulate the practice of discourse whose sole function seems merely for the sake of verbal gymnastics rather than a clear exchange of ideas and a search for truth.
away, there is a lapse in time between them. How do we think these together? Only by thinking them exclusively in Christ, in the one Person of Christ in whom human nature and divine nature are hypostatically united, and in whom our human existence and history are taken up into his divine life.  

Torrance does not give a metaphysics for how one is supposed to “think these things together”. Consider my amended compound presentism as something like an attempt to do so. I suppose I can only hope that this theory of a human person’s going from death to bodily resurrection is an instance of ‘seeing’, even if only as in a mirror dimly (1 Cor. 13.12).

IV. Why Hylemorphism?

This chapter has been, thus far, entirely devoted to advancing a theory of time that allows a human person to move immediately from her time of death to her eschatological bodily resurrection—indeed, the time of the resurrection of all. The view I offer is a modified version of compound presentism and suggests that a human person exists wholly compoundly present over two times.

I suggested at the end of Chapter 3 and the beginning of Chapter 4 that a hylemorphic view is the best anthropological conception on offer to account for the numerical identity of human persons through bodily death and bodily resurrection. I further submit that hylemorphism is the best view on offer to accommodate the numerical identity of a human being through bodily death and bodily resurrection on this version of compound presentism. One reason is this. Substance dualism, if my arguments in Chapter 1 are true, is pretty clearly false. At least, it is false if it is supposed to entail a disembodied state of existence between bodily death and bodily resurrection. The arguments of Chapter 1 explain that such a thing is inconsistent with a number of precommitments in much of Western Christianity (e.g., TAs 1


50 Or, if it is the case that not all are resurrected then time I mean is the resurrection of all those who are to be resurrected.
Since this project is aimed at the sort of theologians committed to these precommitments—as outlined in Introduction and Chapter 1—I will not further address substance dualism. But what about physicalism? Why is it not the case that a van Inwagen or Merricks style of physicalism can work with the amended compound presentism to accommodate immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise?

The short answer with regard to Merricks’s position is that, if anti-criterialism is true, it can. But, as argued in Chapter 2, his anti-criterialism leaves a lot to be desired. That is not to say that it is incoherent, it just lacks any sort of explanatory power. I take it that Merricks is not bothered by this fact. But, as I say in Chapter 2, his anti-criterialism seems to be a case of ‘one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens’. That is just to say, his bald assertion that an object at one time is identical to an object at another time ‘just because it is’ can easily be counter-asserted. Recall the argument from Stephen Davis, cited in Chapter 2, to the effect that, when one runs anti-criterialist arguments for resurrection, one can easily run them against resurrection. Any further ‘debate’ turns on one’s intuitions about whether gappy existence is possible. While this is not a knock-down argument against Merricks—it is not an argument at all, really—for an analytic thinker, such concession to intuition loggerheads leaves a bitter taste. Suffice it to say, it does not bother me if Merricks (or someone like him) finds his view convincing and finds my theory of a compoundly present resurrection an easy bedfellow. With Hud Huson I want to say:

To be fair, [anti-criterialism] has genuine advantages. If there really is no criteria about personal identity, then they are hardly a threat to anyone’s thesis about gappiness, and no one can be properly faulted for not providing an explanation that appeals to them. Moreover, the anti-criterialist can claim to know that [a human person] will be resurrected (on the basis of revelation)

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51 TA1: That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife
TA2: There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise

52 See Chapter 2 section III.
while conceding that there is no hope for (and no need of) an explanation regarding how this miracle will occur.  

But, I just do not think anti-criterialism is the best view on offer.

How about van Inwagen’s physicalist account? It seems to provide criteria of identity over time. And, if it lines up well with my compound presentism, perhaps the van Inwagian can skip The Simulacrum Thesis. I think the same can be said of any sort of falling elevator model. If physicalism of the van Inwagen sort can work with the amended compound presentism, the The Falling Elevator Model is unnecessary (which is a good thing, since I conclude in Chapter 2 that it is false). Of course, one would have to first assume that van Inwagen’s physicalist thesis can account for personal identity over time. Can it?

Here I share a worry with Trenton Merricks. Or, rather, I share a doubt with Merricks. I doubt physicalists, including van Inwagen, can provide criteria for diachronic personal identity. For van Inwagen’s ‘Life’ principle, a biological criterion of persistence, seems to presuppose both the organism and the life in question, rather than give an explanation for how the ‘Life’ and the organism maintain numerical identity. This seems true even given


54 I think van Inwagen would be fine with this suggestion given that his Material Beings seems plainly a work that concerns a particular animalist approach to human persons. Consider: I suppose that such objects—Descartes, you, I—are material objects, in the sense that they are ultimately composed entirely of quarks and electrons. They are, moreover, a very special sort of material object. They are not brains or cerebral hemispheres. They are living animals; being human animals, they are things shaped roughly like statues of human beings (When Descartes used the words ‘moi’ and ‘ego’ he was referring malgré lui to a living animal, a biological organism. When Human looked within himself and failed to find himself, he was looking in the wrong place: like everyone else, he could see himself with his eyes open.) Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 6. My skepticism concerning satisfactory diachronic personal identity criteria also stands against thinkers who hold psychological criteria for diachronic identity. For a defense of a psychological criteria for diachronic identity, in the physicalist vein, see Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132ff. For some additional arguments against the psychological criteria, see Peter van Inwagen, “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person,” in Persons: Human and Divine, eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 207. See also, particularly with respect to resurrection metaphysics, Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 121. Both van Inwagen and Merricks see major flaws in the psychological criteria unless something like four-dimensionalism is true. But they both think that four-dimensionalism is false, and so do I. For more, see Trenton Merricks, ‘Psychological Continuity, and Personal Identity,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, No. 4 (December, 1999): 983 – 997.
van Inwagen’s notion of the “unimaginably complex self-maintaining storm of atoms…[one that] moves across the surface of the world, drawing…atoms into it and expelling others, always maintaining its overall structure…a homeodynamic event” that is said to constitute the life in question.\textsuperscript{55} The sameness of ‘storm’ seems presupposed. In other words, what is the answer to this question: “what makes one ‘storm of atoms’ at a given time the same ‘storm of atoms’ at any following moment?” There does not seem to be any sort of explanatory (i.e., non-trivially true) answer. While van Inwagen’s ‘storm of atoms’ may provide an account for what makes an organism a substance (i.e., not an aggregate or something not one with respect to itself), something’s being a substance and remaining the same substance through time are different things. An explanation of the former is not an explanation of the latter.\textsuperscript{56} And, if that is true, there is no explanation for how the life is the same, even if it is.

How does hylemorphism help solve diachronic personal identity problems? To see how, consider again, the hylemorphism’s claim from Chapter 4: a human person, e.g., Jones, is identical to a form/prime-matter composite—a living human body. Jones is not identical to a form, nor is Jones identical to unactualized prime matter. The hylemorphism can claim these things because a hylemorphism can claim that form and prime-matter are causal principles—principles that neither exist in their own right nor have no existence what-so-ever. They exist all right; they exist as the principles of actuality and potentiality that account for the body/human organism, Jones. Further, the hylemorphism claims that the actualizing principle of Jones, the form, is what provides the essence for Jones. This formal cause is the principle that actualizes the specific kind of thing Jones is: a rational animal, a human being (at least, on Aristotelian/Thomistic versions).

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 87.

\textsuperscript{56}Trenton Merricks, 'There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,' \textit{Nous} 32, no. 1 (March, 1998): 113.
Recall the hylemorphic criteria for identity from Chapter 4, (AI*):

(AI*): For any material substances x and y, x at time, T₁, is numerically identical to y at time, T₂ (where T₂ is any time later than T₁), if and only if the substantial form of x is numerically identical to the substantial form of y.

This hylemorphic thesis provides criteria for diachronic identity precisely because the identity of the body—that is, Jones—is not assumed. Rather, the identity of the form—that is, the formal causal principle—is assumed. And it is the existence of the same form that explains the existence of the same human organism. (Of course, this also requires, consistent with the hylemorphic thesis, that the same form be coupled with prime-matter, otherwise, the form does not exist. See Chapter 4.) Since the existing form of Jones is not identical to Jones, but is a necessary and sufficient condition for Jones’s existence, its existence at time T₁ explains Jones’s existence at time T₁, and its existence at time T₂ explains Jones’s existence at time T₂ (and so on). Thus an explanatory criterion is given for the identity of human beings over time. There are no criteria for the identity of forms over time (they are not concrete entities, after all). Why should one worry about that?

Since, on the hylemorphic thesis, Jones is identical to her body (i.e., form/prime-matter composite), we can couple the hylemorphic thesis easily with the amended compound presentism. If Jones exists at a pre-TΩ time, e.g., T₁, and she is part of the resurrection at TΩ, then she, as a form/prime-matter composite, is ‘spread out’ over two compoundly present times, viz. T₁ and TΩ (i.e., the form/matter composite is Jones-AR). And the same goes for any pre-TΩ present time in which she exists and TΩ (as noted in the previous section).

V. Summary

My aim in this chapter has been to provide a way to accommodate each of the three theological affirmations:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and
There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

Specifically, I have focused much time on TA2. And, given the conclusion of Chapter 1, I have tried to do so in the context of eschatological bodily resurrection. This is done in an attempt to not undermine TA1. But, as I suggest in this chapter’s introduction, this creates a problem for theologians trying to figure out how a dead human person could go immediately from one point in time to the eschatological resurrection (i.e., a future point in time).

To begin to frame a possible solution to this problem, in §I I briefly review some current theories in the philosophy of time. Then, in §II, I try and solve the problem set out in §I. To do so, I offer a modified version of compound presentism. The way I formulate this thesis argues that, contra the eternalist account, all that exists are the pre-eschatological present and the eschatological present. Contra the presentist, I argue that the ‘present’ is actually two points in time compounded. Indeed, reality is always ‘spread out’ over two compoundingly present moments in time. And, so I say, if this is plausible, then we have a possible way for dissolving the problem of where Jones goes immediately after she dies. Moreover, we have a way to affirm the necessity of eschatological bodily resurrection for entrance into Paradise (i.e., it satisfies TA1). Lastly, in §IV, I show that, while physicalist theses might work with my proposal, in the final examination, no physicalist accounts of human persons provide any explanatory criteria of identity over time. Since a hylemorphic view can (and does), the hylemorphic view is to be preferred (i.e., it satisfies TA3).
CONCLUSION

It seems reasonable to suggest that many in the Christian tradition accept three theological affirmations:

TA1. That bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife,

TA2. There is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise, and

TA3. There is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings.

In light of these TAs, I say that there is no such thing as The Intermediate State. This is for two reasons. First, The Intermediate State undermines TA1. So, it does not obtain. Second, I say it does not obtain because substance dualism is false—a metaphysics that The Intermediate State requires. Substance dualism is false because, minimally, it conflicts with an argument St. Paul lays out in 1 Corinthians 15. (And, even if it did not, it lacks motivation for Christian theology because there is no The Intermediate State.)

In Chapter 1, I try and demonstrate, through theological means, that The Intermediate State does not obtain and substance dualism is false. I do this by showing the following: The Intermediate State renders the eschatological resurrection qualitatively and metaphysically superfluous, substance dualism entails that bodily resurrection is not necessary for post-mortem life, and it contradicts a key Pauline argument. Since The Intermediate State does not obtain and substance dualism is false, Christian theology needs a way to coherently speak about afterlife that does not make use of these errant views. If TAs 1 – 3 are true, substance dualism is false, and The Intermediate State does not obtain, it seems Christian theology requires an amended metaphysics of human persons and an amended understanding of time. I attempt to offer such things in Chapters 2 – 5.

In Chapter 2, I review and find wanting leading body identity (BI) physicalist theories of bodily resurrection and personal identity over time. The best (BI) physicalist view I find
on offer is Trenton Merricks’s claim that there are no criteria of identity over time. I agree with him that anti-criterialism is true if physicalism is the correct metaphysics. But, I say physicalism is not the correct metaphysics. This is, in part, because there is a metaphysics on offer, namely, hylemorphism, that gives criteria of identity and seems to account for tenets many physicalists wish to affirm, viz. that humans are either essentially embodied or else identical to their bodies.

There is a very influential physicalist attempt at denying human person/body identity: Lynne Baker’s constitution view, a view she offers in the hope of making physicalism and bodily resurrection cohere. In Chapter 3, I argue that Baker’s account has many problems, all of which show that the constitution relation is unexplained, at best, or incoherent, at worst. Because of this, there is no need for a Christian theologian/philosopher who affirms TAs 1–3 to cling to Baker-style constitution metaphysics.

In the final two chapters I aim to construct an account of human persons and an account of time such that TAs 1–3 are an internally consistent set. Chapter 4 follows much of the extant literature on how hylemorphism satisfies criteria of personal identity over time and through bodily resurrection, specifically. The innovative part of Chapter 4 is the way in which I argue against both the medieval and contemporary Thomistic conception of disembodied hylemorphic human souls. Here I try and identify two essential properties of human souls, properties that seem, given most versions of Thomism, essential—in the contemporary usage—to a substantial form of a material composite. Then I show that these properties belong to the human form and that it lacks these properties when the human body dies. As such, the hylemorphic human soul cannot exist without a body. I argue that this is consistent with hylemorphic metaphysics and that the Thomistic conception is not. This argument is given, even in light of Chapter 1’s conclusion, precisely because Aquinas gives reasons to think that bodily resurrection is necessary for disembodied human souls. So, while
his arguments for the necessity of resurrection still might fall prey to Chapter 1’s arguments, since they also seem inconsistent with his own metaphysics, The Intermediate State’s failing to obtain—even conceived in Thomistic terms—is all the more secure.

Lastly, I try and offer a way forward for thinking about how a human person could possibly find herself at the eschatological resurrection of the dead immediately following her pre-eschatological death. I do this by offering an amended version of what Barry Dainton calls ‘Compound Presentism’. I think my amended version gives the Christian thinker who affirms TA1 – TA3 a coherent way of thinking about and hoping for the resurrection of the dead. Moreover, I think it gives a metaphysics that supplies a ground for which one could really say that God’s new creation proleptically reaches into the old creation. After all, on modified compound presentism, the whole of every individual person is compoundly present with, and ‘spread out’ over, the ‘now’ and ‘not yet’. In the language of Chapter 5, every individual is compoundly present with the Pre-\(T\Omega/Pre-S\Omega\) and \(T\Omega/S\Omega\) time and reality slices in which they exist.

Maybe, in a very real way, even if there is an epistemic veil between the pre-eschatological time and the eschatological resurrection, because the eschatological moment is compoundly present with the pre-eschatological present time, one can feel its presence, even if one does not know exactly what it is. Perhaps this is what theologians like T. F. Torrance, David Kelsey, and others have been trying to say vis-à-vis time and the proleptic future.\(^1\) I leave that for others to decide. At any rate, the amended version of compound presentism allows theologians a way to avoid a metaphysics that undermines the necessity of bodily resurrection, affirms an immediate presence in Paradise (i.e., the resurrection world), and

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accommodates metaphysics that provide criteria of diachronic identity. For theologians who affirm TAs 1 – 3 (myself among their number), we can truly and meaningfully look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. Amen.


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