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Abstract

Although an element of our quotidian existence the manner in which national identity is produced is one of the most contested problems in the contemporary social sciences. One method of examining the production of national identity is to study the mechanism through which such identities are constructed in discourse. This study considers the use of historical narratives in the construction of differing formulations of national identity in the Russian Republic of Karelia.

Using the tools of critical discourse analysis this study surveys the production of varying historical narratives in the Republic of Karelia and the fashion in which such narratives contribute to producing or deconstructing competing conceptions of national identity. This thesis uses an analysis of both mass media discourse and interview data to provide a thorough illustration of the production of narratives of Karelian history on public and private levels and their use in engendering or refuting opposing notions of Karelian identity. It shall examine how various historical events and tendencies are incorporated into contrasting narratives of the historical development of the Karelian people and their Russian, Finnish and Vepsian counterparts and how such narratives are used to justify or invalidate current political and social realities.

The relationship between such narratives of history and other aspects of identity production is investigated alongside the difficulties of ethnic Karelians in producing and promoting such narratives to sustain an image of Karelian national identity. It shall also demonstrate the manner in which Karelian identity can be positioned through the use of such historical narratives as closer to or more distant from Russian or Finnish national identity. The narration of a history of Karelia as an area and the manner in which this can be deployed to incorporate or distance the region from conceptions of Russian or Finno-Ugric identity is also made evident.
Introduction

Examination of the phenomenon of national identity often encounters the problem of an apparent dichotomy between our conceptual understanding of the nation and its actuality; that is to say, between theory and reality. Our ideas of the nation state and theories of ethnic or civic nationalism often do not seem readily applicable to the reality of the nation as it exists around us. When addressing the phenomenon of national identity it is also important to attempt to understand how the construction of identity on an individual level relates to the production of group identities. Arguably our Western conceptions of nations and nationalism are particularly ill-suited to the examination of the Russian term национальность and the manner in which it is understood and articulated by members of that society. It is arguable that the term ‘nationality’ within the former Soviet Union is more akin to what Western researchers would term ethnic identity than the more politically driven nationalism that is familiar in a Western context. In an examination of national identity within the Russian Republic of Karelia these difficulties are particularly acute. Karelia has been divided, reimagined and reinvented by both Russians and Finns in a manner almost unparalleled in the modern age; it has been both the birthplace of Finnish identity and the westernmost outpost of Russian identity as well as a homeland for the eponymous Finno-Ugric minority. The relationship between ethnic, political and other understandings of nationality and how this sense of identity is produced are thus exceptionally complex in a Karelian context. The complicated history of the area known as Karelia and the multitudinous, politically driven conceptions of ‘Karelian’ identity this has spawned, together with the modern marginalisation of self-identified Karelians and their language in a society overwhelming dominated by a Russian minority make a very interesting social context for the potential production of variant national identities.

The starting point for this study is a contention that identity is a social construction, constituted discursively by its performance, its production and reproduction in social interaction. In particular it is argued that narratives of history are a particularly important strategy by which individuals can perform and produce their sense of national identity. On an individual basis narrative
identity allows an individual to integrate change, that is to say all that is unstable, contradictory and variable, and the perceived constancy of the individual. The narration of a ‘national history’ performs an analogous role for an individual’s sense of national identity. This construction of national identity is therefore contingent but rooted, as is the individual, in social reality; it is thus tied to a repertoire of potential identities constituted by apparent objective linguistic, geographic, political and historical ‘facts’. Consequently the next chapter of this study shall examine the history of Karelia as a region and its modern demographics in order to survey the potential historical referents available for use in the construction of narratives of Karelian history. It shall also review the main sources available within Western, primarily Finnish, and Russian historiography on this subject.

Researchers, in the main from a Western intellectual background, have already explored the usage of historical narratives in the construction of national identity. Indeed the link between history and the production of national identity in the former USSR has been quite extensively studied by Abedlal (2002), Bagger (2007), Kuzio (2002, 2006), Uldricks (1998) and more generally by Bhabha (1990), Megill (1998), Ricoeur (1985) and Wodak et al (2009) to name but a few, hence the examination of this particular relationship is hardly innovative in and of itself. The conception of identity as socially constructed is also not exceptionally contentious having been explored in a number of fields. The dynamics of social construction are not universally agreed and there is room for considerable debate on the mechanics of this process. This study is intended to examine these mechanisms and hopefully shed further light on this interesting field whilst also revealing certain aspects of the processes at work within the Republic of Karelia today. The second chapter of this study shall therefore outline the particular theoretical underpinnings of this research and the exact methodology used in the analysis presented here.

The starting point for this study is therefore an attempt to apply these ideas to the Karelian context and examine their relevance. The tools of Critical Discourse Analysis were utilised to examine how historical narratives were created and exploited both within mass media and private contexts through analysis of newspaper and interview material. A qualitative analysis of mass
media texts complied from an official publication, *Kareliya*, and an independent newspaper, *Karelskaya Guberniya*, has been undertaken to examine the manner in which the Russian-language press of the Republic of Karelia produces narratives of Karelian history and how these narratives relate to the construction of national identity within the region. It shall be argued that, although there are differences in presentation and focus between the official and unofficial publications, as a whole the Russian language press produces a hegemony or orthodox narrative in which Karelians and other Finno-Ugurs are either marginalised or associated with the Russian majority. The interview data comprises material collected during fieldwork in the Republic of Karelia in 2010. These interviews were conducted, in the main, with representatives of what might be termed the Finno-Ugric intelligentsia of the region and therefore illustrate the manner in which the narratives of Karelian history they construct differ from the mainstream Russian-language consensus and support a more distinctly Finno-Ugric conception of identity. Taken together these two sets of data illustrate the manner in which narratives of the history of ‘Karelia’ or the histories of the Karelian, Russian, Finnish and Vepsian peoples are utilised to promote or subvert orthodox notions of Karelian identity. It demonstrates the manner in which these narratives position such conceptions of Karelian identity closer to or more distant from other formulations of national identity and established nationalities such as Russian or Finnish.

The ideas of Stuart Hall and Lesek Kolakowski, which differ in the detail, on the production of national identity through the narration of five key elements shall also be examined. It shall be argued that whilst some of the elements of the narration of the nation they identify are present and relevant to the Karelian context others are much weaker. The attempts of the local authorities to constitute a form of ‘civic’ Karelian nationalism shall be examined with regards to the commemoration of the foundation of the Karelian Trudovaya Kommuna. These attempts are, as shall be demonstrated, frustrated by the lack of resonance of both this date within Karelian society and also this form of nationalism within the Karelian context. The primary form of national distinction employed within Karelia is, it shall be argued, centred overwhelmingly around the usage and survival of the Karelian language.
The analysis also reveals the manner in which the Finno-Ugric minorities of the Republic of Karelia are marginalised through this process in a variety of ways, and how understandings of ‘national’ identity in Karelia are often localised to the level of the district or village. It highlights the complexity of the relations between special understandings of ‘Karelia’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Finland’ and ideas of national identity. The manner in which both the Finno-Ugric minorities and the Russian majority seek to propound understandings of Karelian ‘space’ and the continuity of their place within it to bolster their sense of ‘belonging’ as a group to the area shall be detailed. This includes the use of the construction of Karelia as part of a Russian cultural sphere and its constitution as a ‘model’ Orthodox territory. The ritualised, commemorative discourse of the war years within the mass media and its usage to cement conceptions of Karelia as Russian, including the areas annexed from Finland in 1940, and the unity of Karelian and Russian identity shall also be revealed. This can be placed alongside the usage of such narratives more broadly to incorporate Olonets, in particular, but also the Karelians as a group as part of the Russian state and the eternal allies of the Russian people against outside aggression; in this manner Karelians are again associated with Russia from time immemorial. The role of intertextuality in this context shall be examined as the mainstream media discourse reacts in opposition to its Finnish counterparts; it shall also be glimpsed in the manner in which Karelians invoke this narrative to refute unspoken questions over their loyalty when they address a Russian audience. These narratives will be contrasted with the more heterodox constructions found in the interview material which subvert this unity and posit an alternate association with Finnish identity or simply a more distinctly ‘Karelian’ identity which rejects aspects of this Russifying agenda. In particular the narratives used by those who are active in organisations campaigning for more rights for the Finno-Ugric minorities to state their claims to such concessions and to distance their group from the dominant Russians shall be explored.

This study underlines that although historical narratives are a key tool for the production of national identity they must be understood in their broader social, political and linguistic context. The discursive strategies employed to facilitate the production and reception of these narratives will also be explored
and analysed with regards to this social context. This shall include a consideration of the sources Karelians use to produce narratives which are in opposition to those produced within the media and the limitations of this process. The study shall also demonstrate that such narratives are often employed by Karelians in association with negative self-presentation, the narration of a dead or dying national group and the increased appropriation and commercialisation of such narratives and symbols of such narratives and symbols of national identity to promote a de-ethnicised Karelian identity; in other words the increasing use of Karelian identity as a ‘brand’. The relatively weak ability of Karelians themselves to produce such narratives is also identified in comparison to other more dominant national groups and the potential reasons for this weakness are analysed.
Chapter One

The Historical, Linguistic, Legal and Institutional Background to Problems of Karelian Language and Identity

1.1 A Short History of the Republic of Karelia

To examine the manner in which Karelian identities are produced within discourse and the role of the narration of history within this process it is necessary to first examine the broader social context. The history and historiography of The Republic of Karelia must be analysed as they form the background from which historical narratives may be derived. An examination of the development of Karelian history is necessary to illustrate the possible range of historical narratives which can be created to assist the development of differing conceptions of national identity. A cognisance of the general trends in the historiography of the area is likewise of importance as it impinges on the production of potential competing ‘national’ or ‘regional’ histories of Karelia and the Karelans people. It is also of importance to detail linguistic, institutional and other related factors which may play a role in establishing this broader social context. As shall be discussed further below the actual administrative framework of the area, both in spatial and more general organisational terms can contribute directly to the development and propagation of varying conceptions of national identity.

Firstly some basic facts about the area in question must be established. The Republic of Karelia is one of 21 semi-autonomous republics of the Russian Federation (if Crimea is excluded) differentiated from the 46 oblasts and 9 krais by being, in theory, the territory of a specific ethnic group. The Republic of Karelia is, therefore, officially recognised and indeed constituted as the homeland of an indigenous people, the eponymous Karelians. The Republic itself, however, does not in fact cover the entire territory of what has historically
has been termed Karelia, nor does it cover all areas where Karelian populations have historically been known to reside. Two of the most south-eastern provinces of modern Finland bear the title Karelia, and the name ‘Karelian Isthmus’ is still generally applied by geographers to refer to that area of present-day Leningradskaya Oblast’ which was historically considered to be part of ‘Karelia’. The contemporary Republic of Karelia unlike this more general conception of ‘Karelia’ can be said to have very definite boundaries; in the north this border divides it from the Kola Peninsula and Murmanskaya Oblast’ until the land meets the White Sea, which sweeps across Karelia’s eastern border until both meet Archangel’skaya Oblast’; in the extreme south-east Karelia shares a short border with Vologodskaya Oblast’ and is bounded to the south-west by that part of Leningradskaya Oblast’ once reckoned a part of Karelia and once legally a part of Finland. The boundary with Finland encompasses the entire western edge of the Republic. The Republic of Karelia to a large extent covers the area once commonly termed Karelia, yet certain parts lie in other Federal Subjects or in another state entirely. Furthermore, the present Republic of Karelia also incorporates areas which were, arguably, not at certain points considered historically to form parts of ‘Karelia’. The adjective ‘Karelian’ is also rather ambiguous in that it may be used to refer both to the actual language and people and also in a broader sense anything to do with the Republic of Karelia. It must also be noted that a large population of Karelian speakers historically resided in what is now Tver’skaya Oblast’, which is quite distant from the modern Karelia. It should also be borne in mind that Karelian as a language does not have a standard literary form. Speakers of Karelian are divided into those who speak ‘Proper Karelian’, predominantly in the northern half of the modern Republic of Karelia, and those who speak the Ludic and Livvikovian Dialect, who predominantly reside further south. Ludic is spoken in the areas around Lake Onego and is considered closer to Vepsian whereas Livvikovians (лйввики or livgilaeizet in Russian and Karelian respectively) traditionally inhabit the areas around Olonets; this dialect is considered to be more influenced by Russian. The northern Karelians, those who inhabit Vienan Karjala, are considered to have a dialect closer to modern Finnish.

The scholarly literature on Karelian history in English is notable by its
paucity. Much of that which exists is devoted to study of the interwar period of 1917-1940 and follows two broad thematic concerns: spacial and linguistic policies and planning. In this regard the theme of identity is often an important if not primary concern to the researchers involved. In terms of spacial histories the work of Paasi (1996) and Baron (2007a, 2007c) are concerned with the development of ideas of ‘Karelia’ as regards conceptions of space, boundaries and the centre-periphery dichotomy, in particular during the initial period of Soviet power. Soviet regionalism has been tackled more broadly by Rees (2002) and Harris (1999). In addition to such studies there has been some scholarly interest in Karelia as an example of the implementation of Soviet nationalities policy, in particular as it related to the development of linguistic policies. In large part this has been due to the somewhat anomalous implementation of such policy as it was developed more broadly across the remainder of the USSR. Most such studies follow the seminal work of Austin (1981, 1987, 1992) which charted the various stages of the development and implementation of language policy with Karelia during the 1920s and 30s as it related to the ideological and administrative goals of both local and central authorities. Schrad (2002) has followed Austin in his analysis of the linguistic policies of the Soviet authorities in Karelia and the manner in which they were utilised to construct conceptions of Karelian identity, although his analysis is somewhat brief and mainly comparative with other areas of the USSR. Soviet nationalities policy in general has been examined by Martin (2001), Hirsch (2005), and Smith (2001), which have examined the manner in which such policies were formulated and implemented more generally across the Soviet Union, as shall be discussed below. A related study is the work of Gleb (1993, 1996) which has examined the experience of the Finnish diaspora within the USSR, but particularly within Karelia. This work has also touched upon the manner in which such immigration acted to alter the social-linguistic background of the then KASSR and is thus invaluable as a resource when considering the formation of national identities within this period, although this is not the primary concern of the research. The Finnish researcher Kero (2001) addresses this question more directly in an examination of the period, although both works are more descriptive than analytical and rely primarily on the Soviet archives of the period, in the case of
Kero in particular the contemporary Karelian press.

A much larger volume of material has been devoted to this topic from within Finland, and thankfully some of this has been translated into either English or Russian and hence is accessible to this researcher. This literature examines Karelian history and linguistic, ethnographic and cultural identity from a variety of viewpoints and is extremely complex. Useful studies include Laine and Ylingklas (2002), Sihvo (1989), Kangaspuro (1998, 2002), Lahteenmaki (2007) and Suutari (2010) which have examined the links between the evolution of spacial and cultural conceptions of Karelia. These works have also investigated the use of such conceptions to bolster or subvert conceptions of Finnish and Karelian identities. The development of the linguistic situation and language policies within Karelia have also been examined by Poyli (1998) and Saarhima (1996), in particular as regards the correlation between differing language policies and levels of Karelian language use. Kangaspuro (1998) in particular has also examined Karelia as a case study of the impact of Soviet nationalities policy on language development and demographic change. Since 1991 Finnish and Russian researchers have increasingly cooperated on the examination of such themes. The main conduit for such research has been collaboration between the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozavodsk and various Finnish institutions, in particular the Karelian Centre at the University of the East of Finland (formerly the University of Joensuu). This has led to a sharing of data and methodological approaches between these institutions and the publication of a number of volumes of joint work including those edited by Kababova (2009) and Suutari and Shikalov (2010) which contain the work of both researchers in Russia and Finland. Suutari has examined Karelian identity from an ethnographical and cultural studies standpoint, an approach also followed by some researchers within Petrozavodsk, however much of the work in these collaborations has focused once again on issues of language policy.

Russian research on Karelian themes is also heavily slanted towards an ethnographic or language based examination of Karelian identities although this is not universal. Research from the Soviet period tended, in accordance with the prevailing ideology of those times, to seek links between the development or
dissolution of differing identities and developments in material and political culture; this approach was not always explicitly or indeed intrinsically Marxist but did follow aspects of Soviet ideology. This approach to the subject has persisted to an extent even after the collapse of the Soviet state by which it was promoted. This tendency is exemplified in the work of Klement’ev and Kozhanov (1998), Barantseva (1988), and Dubrovskaya (1991). One important aspect of this research which has persisted within the scholarly approach to identity within the Republic of Karelia, and arguably to an extent in contemporary Russia society, is a fundamental reliance on a Stalinist conception of national identity. The theoretical implications of this approach will be considered further below, however here it is important to note that this approach views a distinct language (amongst a range of other factors) as an essential qualifying characteristic of any putative national group. To this end much scholarly attention is devoted to the problems of language policy and the past and future of the Karelian language itself in any examination of ideas of Karelian identity; indeed the development of the language and its prospects are often synonymous with that of the very idea of Karelian identity in such studies. There is therefore much attention to the problem of the decline and in the language and subsequent perceived Russification. Since 1991 there has also been increased historical attention to issues that were implicitly ‘off-limits’ to researchers during the Soviet period. Given the preoccupation with the Karelian language mentioned above much of this work has concentrated on critical examination of language policy issues, however it has also (see Dubrovskaya 2009, Chukin (1990), Ivnitskii and Makarov (1991)) examined others historical issues of relevance such as the Civil War and Stalinist Terror which were not previously given much if any attention and has used archival material not previously available. The development of ethnic Karelian civil society itself has become another key area of research endeavour within Petrozavodsk. Much attention has recently been devoted to ethnographic and political theory based examination of the emergence of various groups advocating increased attention toward the minority groups of the Republic of Karelia. To this end the various collections of material prepared by the Karelian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the direction of Klement’ev are invaluable resources for the study of
Karelian identities.

To appreciate the potential historical resources which might be commandeered for the production of various narratives of Karelian history some attention must be paid to this history itself. As alluded to above there are a number of schools of researchers with differing backgrounds and research interests which have attempted to examine the history of ‘Karelia’. A general outline of this history and associated historiography shall be given below in order to develop the main facts of the subject. This is necessary to serve as a reference against which the narratives analysed in the following chapters may be critically examined. It shall also illustrate the complexity of Karelian history and its potential for the creation of opposing narratives of history and thus identity. Indeed it is hoped it will become clear how its contentious, disputed and in no small measure ambiguous nature provide an exciting arena for the testing of the putative use of such narration in the formation of national identities. It is also necessary to examine how the Republic of Karelia came to exist in its current form and state, and the background to the linguistic, administrative and political development of the area and the Karelian people.

In terms of recorded history the Karelians first appear through references to a tribe of ‘Korela’ and the town or fortress of Olonets in Novgorodian chronicles from 1137, although some modern authorities actually date the reference to 1228 (Kochkurkina 1994: 48). As Pöyli (1998: 128-30) has pointed out it is virtually certain the ancestors of this tribe had been resident in the area around Lake Ladoga since around the fifth century and Slavic settlers must have had some contact with these peoples from the sixth century onwards. It is not possible to make an accurate assessment of the territories held by these Finno-Ugric tribes or their relations with one another in this prehistoric period. There is some evidence that Vepsian settlement in some arrears of what is now the Republic of Karelia predates that of the Karelians, as evidenced in some areas, particularly around Lake Onego itself, by toponyms derived from the Vepsian language (see Agapitov (1989: 91-5) and Mullonen (1989: 84-91) for an examination of this evidence) and archaeological data (Kochkurkina 1989: 64-76). Indeed it would appear from such place-name evidence that the Sami were the original settlers of the area between the Onego and Ladoga (Mullonen 1989: 85-91).
and that they were displaced by Vepsian settlement. At some point the Vepsians themselves appear to have been partially displaced by the Karelians as they in turn moved northwards. This northward movement appears to be linked to the almost incessant fighting between Russia and Sweden, the emerging great powers of the region, between the 12th and 19th centuries. Despite the long duration of this conflict the essential division between Russian and Finnish Karelia was established in 1323 when the treaty of Noteborg delimited the border between Sweden and the Novgorodian state. This had two very important effects on the development of the region. Firstly the language of the elite, the language of administration and the clergy in Finland was to be Swedish, whereas Russian would increasingly come to dominate in Karelia (Baron 2007a: 10-11, Poyli 1998: 130). What impact this can be said to have on the internal development of the Finnish and Karelian languages, and for that matter other languages of the region such as Vepsian or Votic, is a matter for further research, however it must be pointed out that it prevented the development of written forms of these languages, which became the preserve of the predominantly rural poor rather than the more urbanised elites. Secondly the areas under the control of Sweden received Swedish clergy and administrators and eventually developed a Lutheran church in opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church which took root in Karelia. Evidently even if there was not much essential linguistic difference between Finland and Karelia the border, however arbitrary, by the very fact of its imposition, would start to create different conceptions of identity. As Bourdieu (1991: 222) has argued, “the frontier, that product of a legal act of delimitation, produces cultural differences as much as it is produced by it.” It may be noted that the actual frontier in this remote and rugged region may not have been at all clear, or a matter of great concern, to much of the relatively isolated population during this period. It is not certain as to when precisely much of Karelia fell under the control of any Russian authority and to what extent in the medieval period this control could be realised. In fact Korpela (2007: 45) points to this isolation and the lack of influence church and state had upon the local Finnic tribes of medieval Karelia to contend it is meaningless to speculate as to their nationality or ethnicity; these Finno-Urgic forest dwellers had little contact with the outside world and thus no developed sense of supra-local identity.
Sweden continued to push the border eastwards, with a new treaties in 1595 and 1617 recognising this advance. These advances also brought Finnish settlement in the annexed areas, increased taxation and attempts at conversion to Lutheranism which caused Karelian populations to flee to the remainder of Russian Karelia or the Valdai Hills area of Tver’ (Klement’ev 2008: 35-38). Russian interest in Karelia deepened from the era of Peter the Great onwards. In accordance with his desire to advance the frontiers of his empire westwards he began the process which ultimately incorporated Finland into the Russian Empire. There certainly had been, as Laine (2001: 53) has noted, Russian settlements in the modern Republic of Karelia, particularly around the White Sea and Lake Onego, but from this period onwards the area became more firmly incorporated in Russian state. In 1703 Peter founded the city of Petrozavodsk on the Onego which was at a later date to surpass Olonets as most important administrative centre in the area. It must be stressed, however, that a good deal of the area had been at least nominally under the control of the Russian government prior to this, and that the actual frontier in large areas of Karelia must have been rather obscure. Most of what is now the Republic of Karelia was then administered as Olonets Guberniya, the remainder being administered from Arkhangel’sk, and was administered in the manner usual to an ordinary Russian province and received little of the autonomy Finland was to achieve as a Grand Duchy of the Empire. During this period Karelian as a language was rather ignored by the Tsarist government, and a process of passive Russification can be said to have been fostered. Karelians were generally assimilated into Russian life through commercial, educational, religious and personal contacts. As Pöyli (1998: 129-31) contends the only medium of exchange in most contacts between Karelians and Russians would have been the Russian language. Finland was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1809 and this further obscured the boundary between Karelia and Finland, although the frontier was retained for customs purposes. The new Grand Duchy was also ceded certain areas in the Karelian Isthmus and ‘Old Karelia’ which led to the rapid assimilation of local Karelians into the new Finnish administration (Lahteenmaki 2007, Klement’yev 2008). The 19th century was also the period of the flowering of Finnish nationalism itself, a movement in which Karelia or at least the idea of it was to prove of
primary importance. Karelia was seen by Finnish nationalists as being a repository of purely Finnish cultural values untainted by Swedish or, especially Northern Karelia where the dialect was closest to Finnish, Russian influences. This region in particular was the destination for Elias Lonnrot on his many field trips during the 1830s to collect the folk-poetry he would turn into the epic *Kalevala*. The role Karelia played in creating notions of Finnish nationalism can be glimpsed in Sihvo (1999), Homen (1921) and Passi (1996). As a consequence of this ‘Karelianism’ Finnish nationalists undertook cultural and educational work within Karelia, a movement which was characterised at the time as ‘pan-Finnic propaganda’ by the Russian authorities, and was at least in part motivated by a desire to unite the area with a broader Finnish state at some future date (for the Finnish influence in Karelia in the early 20th century see Vitukhnovskaya 2009). These dreams of a ‘Greater Finland’ including Karelia did receive some support from Northern Karelians in particular; in 1906 a ‘Union of White Sea Karelians’ was founded after a conference in Ukhta (now Kalevala) (Baron 2007b: 56) which subscribed to the idea of a closer union of some sort with Finland. They also however engendered something of a backlash from the authorities who sought to counter any such nationalist feeling from the numerous minority nationalities of the Russian Empire.

The first attempts to provide any kind cultural and political autonomy to the area date from the period immediately following the Russian revolutions of 1917. Although there is much controversy about many aspects of this period, most historians can agree on certain fundamental points regarding Soviet policy towards the area. As shall be seen, relations between the local and central administrations were often fraught with misunderstanding and tension resulting in two very different conceptions of what Karelia was or should become. These conceptions were also always heavily influenced by Finland and the aspirations of both communist and nationalist Finns. Finland declared independence from the emerging Soviet state in December 1917 and was soon immersed in civil strife as pro-Soviet Red Guards and White Finnish forces vied for supremacy (for the Finnish revolution see Upton 1980). Aided by their German allies the White forces soon managed to expel their Red adversaries who naturally sought and found refuge within revolutionary Russia, with around 6,000 political
refugees arriving in the new Soviet state. These Finnish émigrés were to prove a highly influential force in Karelian politics for decades to come.

In Karelia itself the Revolution and Finnish independence generated a range of differing political responses across the region. The border villages of Repola and Porajarvi held votes which led to these settlements announcing a wish to join the new Finnish Republic (Vitukhnovskaya 2009: 71). In Olonets the new authorities took the decision not to join Finland, although some Karelians did cross the border to join the Finnish forces. In Ukhta the provisional authorities decided to offer support neither to the Finns nor the Bolsheviks (Dubrovskaya 1991: 228). The new Finnish government then offered substantial support if not official sanction to a volunteer movement called the Olonets or Aunus expedition which attempted and failed to seize Petrozavodsk (Vihavainen 2007: 176). The situation in the north was complicated by the presence of British forces of intervention during the period 1918-19 (for a study of this period see Baron 2007b). The Entente powers were by summer 1918, as Dubrovskaya (2009: 254) contends, the real power in the Kola peninsula and northern Karelia. They had little interest in Karelian national aspirations but were concerned by Finnish reliance on German assistance during their civil war and also by the possibility of the Germans or their allies seizing Murmansk with its stores of war materials. They had also been tasked with assisting the White Russian forces who controlled Murmansk in the struggle with the Bolsheviks, who were esteemed to be German agents (see Baron 2007b: 57-62). An unlikely alliance of Entente forces, Karelian volunteers and Red Finnish refugees then together fought off a White Finnish column at Uskozero and then chased them back to and beyond Ukhta. Around 4,000 Karelians then formed a ‘Karelian Regiment’ under British command which throughout 1918 and 1919 fought against the Bolsheviks; the Entente forces with their aid advanced as far as the shores of the Onego (ibid: 75). The military success of the Karelians did not translate, however, into political capital; the allies were entirely unwilling to consider the idea of Karelian independence and autonomy. In January 1919 they attempted to petition the British government for protectorate status, however their request went unheeded; the British instead began introducing White Russian officers into the Karelian regiment, much to the Karelians’ chagrin. The
Karelians then attempted to arrange a National Committee in Kem’, in order to arrange elections to a National Assembly of Karelia; this step was seen as deeply worrying by the Russian and British authorities, who then accelerated their efforts to assimilate the Karelians with White Russian forces. Karelian demands for some degree of political independence from Russia were seen as Bolshevism and the regiment was reformed and kept away from the front, while the rate of desertion increased markedly. The military situation for the White Russian forces deteriorated rapidly upon the evacuation of the Entente forces at the end of 1919 and they were soon routed by the advancing Bolsheviks, with Murmansk falling by February 1920. The Karelians had, meanwhile, been left with little option but to attempt to secure Finnish support against both factions in the Russian Civil War; by 1919 many Karelians were openly backing the Finnish incursions into southern Karelia (ibid: 99). In this rather hopeless situation the last flowering of an independent Karelian political movement took place; in July 1919 a Provisional Government of White Sea Karelia was declared in Ukhta, and it declared Karelia independent in January 1920. This government was highly dependent on Finnish aid, and although it managed to survive whilst Bolshevik attention was directed elsewhere it was soon under intense pressure; in March 1920 the Red Army occupied Ukhta. An assembly of 120 Karelians from across the area initially persisted in their demands for independence pending a constitutional settlement and prevailed upon the Bolsheviks to temporarily withdraw; their patience was exhausted by the 18th of May, however, and the government fled to Finland. In a somewhat farcical coda to these events some Red Finns then retaliated against their nationalist fellow-countrymen by raiding Finnish Karelia and proclaiming a Soviet Republic to a group of astonished lumberjacks. They then retreated across the border to the USSR, having achieved nothing more than provoking some consternation in both Helsinki and Moscow (Upton 1973: 144-5). The Karelians, who had hoped to maintain a political course separate from that envisaged by White or Red Russians and the warring factions of Finns, had attempted and failed to assert their political independence.

Finnish refugees displaced from their mother country after defeat in the Finnish Civil War, in particular the figure of Edvard Gylling, managed to
persuade Lenin to create the first autonomous area for the Karelian population (Baron 2007a: 20-23). Gylling and his deputy Rovio were close personal friends of Lenin and were thus allowed a large degree of lassitude to organise the region’s government as they saw fit (Upton 1973: 210). The Karelian Worker’s Commune (KTK) was created in 1920 across much of what is today the modern Republic of Karelia. The idea of founding the KTK was that of these Finnish immigrants, as neither the Petrozavodsk nor Arkhangelsk local authorities had any interest in Karelian autonomy and the Karelians involved in previous attempts to create it were not Bolsheviks (Takala 2009: 110-114). It must be noted, however, that large areas of what is commonly termed Karelia were excluded from this new creation. The Karelian speaking population around the city of Tver’ (later Kalinin) was excluded, although in pure numerical terms this was largest area of Karelian settlement, with 127,000 speakers recorded here in 1933 (Austin 1992: 21). Also excluded from the new autonomous area were those areas of Karelia within the new Finnish Republic, including most of the Karelian Isthmus and the area to the east of Lake Ladoga. Gylling had envisaged a much more extensive territory for his autonomous area, incorporating the Kola Peninsula (Baron 2007a: 21). The creation of this autonomous area could be seen as a natural outcome of Soviet policy of the period. It had always been Bolshevik policy to offer cultural and linguistic autonomy to the minority populations residing on the territory of the Russian Empire, an issue which became more pressing following the failure of the German revolution and Polish war (Smith 1999: 21-22). Gylling’s vision of his autonomous region also found favour in Moscow due to the delicate relations between the Soviet state and its Finnish neighbour. During this period the nascent Soviet state was still vulnerable to armed intervention even from the relatively weak Finnish state, and hence the question of Karelia had to be resolved as a matter of some urgency. Whilst the Red Army opposed autonomy in case it compromised the defence of the border, Narkomindel argued it would be a good way to appease popular Finnish sentiment whilst avoiding the cessation of territory (Baron 2007: 22). Therefore when Gulling and other Red Finns presented their plans to Lenin they met with a much more favourable reception than they may otherwise have expected (Kangaspuro 2002: 28-33). Once other armed interventions had been
defeated, the Finnish negotiators of the Tartu treaty of 14th October 1920 dropped demands for a plebiscite on Karelian autonomy or the annexation of the entirety of Karelia, including Petrozavodsk, and both sides agreed to peace with merely the addition of a formal statement guaranteeing Karelian autonomy (ibid 32-22 and Lahteenmaki 2007: 155-9).

In this period the new Soviet state offered political autonomy to, in theory, all of the various national minorities that had been denied such freedoms within the centralised, Russifying imperial system of governance (see Smith 1999: 19-29 and Bassin and Kelly 2012: 3-4). In this context it is not at all surprising that such autonomy was granted to Karelia despite the apparent reluctance of some of the new regime’s officials. In line with the Bolshevik theoretical understanding of what nationality actual meant, as developed by Stalin in Marxism and the National Question, any group which fulfilled certain critical criteria had the right to be considered a national group and thus gain political autonomy. These criteria were, broadly speaking, a distinct territory, language, culture and economy. The Karelians could claim to meet these criteria and thus should have been automatically entitled to such autonomy. The implementation of such an ideal system of national delimitation unsurprisingly proved more complicated in practice than Stalin’s apparently neat theoretical summation of national identity appeared to suggest. In a number of cases, including arguably the Karelian, although a minority met these criteria it did not necessarily possess a developed sense of national identity. Whilst in other areas there existed a national intelligentsia eager to seize this opportunity to develop their nationality within Karelia the impetus for political autonomy came from without. The main leadership of the Karelian autonomous area came from the Finnish émigrés in Petrozavodsk, whose arrival in Karelia had increased the Finnish population greatly, leading to it rising from just 990 in 1920 to 2,500 in 1926, although this was still merely 0.9% of the population of the Republic. The Finns formed an educated, literate and pro-Bolshevik elite, particularly as they tended to be from more proletarian backgrounds than the Karelians, and quickly established themselves as the leadership of the region. As Austin argues the Finns had all the advantages except numbers. Although they constituted only around 1% of the population they occupied most of the important positions in the
administration due to the fact they tended to be more literate in both Russian and Finnish than the less-educated Karelians (Austin 1992: 19-20). They were also an urbanised population, unlike the Karelians who generally occupied rural areas, and were better positioned to exercise control over the Republic. Initially these Finns viewed their stay in Karelia as temporary, pending an inevitable revolution in Finland itself and the creation of a communist Greater Finland incorporating Karelia. To this end Gylling envisaged an autonomous area that was economically as well as politically self-sufficient, and for this reason obtained the inclusion of Petrozavodsk as well as other areas of majority Russian, rather than Karelian or Finnish, population, whilst ignoring and excluding some Karelian and all Vepsian populations in the area.

Unsurprisingly, ethnic Karelians in the area were upset at their exclusion from power and what they saw as the ’dilution’ of their ethnic area (Baron 2007a: 36-7) and the dominance of a Finnish leadership which, as Laine argues, “did not remotely represent” their interests (2002: 11), and there were similar complaints from the Russian areas transferred to the jurisdiction of Petrozavodsk.

The Bolshevik policy of ‘korenisatsiya’ had the aim of allowing minority groups to develop their own culture, language and administration with the minimum of interference from Russians or other ethnic groups. In Karelia this policy was inverted by the Finnish influence into a policy of active ‘finnicisation’, rather than a policy of ‘karelianisation’ The Finns in Petrozavodsk decided to use Finnish as a literary language for Karelians as they saw no essential differences between the languages and indeed viewed Karelians as the Eastern part of the Finnish ethnos (Klement’ev 2009: 149). No attempt was made to create a literary Karelian language, as had been attempted in similar situations in Central Asia for example, as Moscow accepted the Finnish ‘expert’ opinion and implemented a policy of encouraging the use of Finnish across the Republic (Kangaspuro 2002: 31). Standard Finnish was adopted as the official language despite, as Austin contends, the fact that a literary Karelian ’would have been the most sensible solution on purely linguistic grounds’ (1992: 19).

The existing Russian bureaucracy in Petrozavodsk, supported by certain Olonets Karelians, proposed the development of a Karelian language for at least the White Sea Karelians alongside the retention of Russian and took this proposal to
the central authorities: they were, however, overruled and the Finnish project adopted (Takala 2009: 115-6). This resulted in Finnish schools (Ilukha 2002: 51-2) being provided for where no schools existed, and all existing schools in Karelian areas, and also many in predominantly Russian-speaking areas, which were Russian given the non-literary nature of Karelian, being converted into Finnish schools. In 1929 all instruction given to Karelian children was to be given in Finnish only, although this could not be implemented due to a lack of qualified Finnish speakers (ibid: 52). Dozens of Finnish periodicals were launched and a large-scale Finnish publishing industry was created in Petrozavodsk. The adoption of Finnish rather than a standardised Karelian is also a matter of some dispute. Schrad, for example, contends that the adoption of Finnish rather than make any attempt to create a Karelian language was ‘the more practical option’ for a ‘Finnic population’ (2004: 465) Austin (1992: 29) has also acknowledged that given the close relationship between North Karelian and other Finnish dialects it may well have been possible over a period of time to integrate these Karelians into a Finnish-speaking society, and contends that the Soviet government had little interest in creating a bespoke language for the 25,000 or so North Karelians themselves. Finnish was of some use in eradicating illiteracy, as Takala (2009: 130-1) has noted, within the Karelian population, however she also notes the adoption of Finnish was not welcomed and indeed was resisted by Karelians in many areas (ibid: 138). From these disputes it can be noted that those scholars who see little essential difference between Karelians and Finns are generally supportive of this attempt at integration. Schrad in fact views the Karelians as exemplifying a ‘rag-doll’ nation, an artificial, somewhat unnecessary construct that has divided an essentially unified population for unrelated geo-political reasons.

The ambitious plans of Gylling were partially stymied by the fact, as he himself was aware, that the most able and ambitious Finnish émigrés tended to remain in Moscow and Leningrad, immersing themselves in the affairs of the SKP or Finnish Communist Party and its underground work in Finland itself. Karelia was somewhat of a backwater and became a “dumping ground for the misfits and failures” of the exiled Finnish community (Upton 1973: 211). Speakers of the southern dialects of Karelian appear to have struggled with the
Finnish language however; in fact it was claimed educated Karelian speakers in general could not understand Standard Finnish by the academic Bubrikh (1932), and that Karelian and Finnish vocabulary were almost entirely different. It is not at all certain that speakers of other Karelian dialects, who were by far the majority, could actually fully understand Standard Finnish, nor would it seem that the new Karelian administration was overly concerned by this. It was assumed that these Karelians would soon in turn become a minority in a larger Finnish-speaking state, if much attention was paid to them at all. The Finnish community in Karelia had basically attempted to create a Finnish Karelia that would one day be reunited with Finland proper, and had for the most part disregarded the status of Karelians themselves and their language.

This policy of ‘finnicisation’ can be contrasted to the experience of the Karelian population of Tver’ Oblast’, who were allowed a great deal more influence in their own cultural and linguistic development (Baron 2007: 97). There were few Finnish émigrés in this area and it was of little interest to the Finnish elite in Petrozavodsk, lying as it did outside their political control and also, it may be argued, outside of their conception of a greater Finland-Karelia. In these circumstances the local Karelian population and also linguists from central Soviet institutions were allowed more freedom in their efforts to achieve korenisatsiya. No effort was made in this area to promote the speaking of Finnish, in complete contrast to the situation in the KTK, and therefore it must be assumed that the Karelian population and, perhaps more critically, the professional Soviet linguists of the day were by far from convinced of the essential unity of Finnish and Karelian. In this area the academic Bubrikh and others created a Karelian language based on the local dialects and the Latin alphabet (for the history of this language see Anttikoski 2010). This language was used for a newspaper and some other publications, and education for the Karelian population was done in this new, Karelian language. There was no interest from Gylling and his Finns in adopting this language in the KTK, indeed there was open hostility towards the language and the Karelian population in this area, whom, they considered, ought to have been resident in the KTK (Austin 1992: 30). In line with the general withdrawal of korenisatsiya the programme was terminated in 1933, although there does seem to have been some continued
publication of newspapers and journals in this Karelian language. The later experiment in a Cyrillic Karelian was applied to this area also, and failures in this scheme together with the growing official antipathy towards the Finnish and, by extension, the Karelians, led to the liquidation of any political and cultural autonomy for this area altogether with the dissolution of the Karelian Autonomous Okrug in the Tver’ area.

The Karelian Worker’s Commune, which Gylling insisted must have complete control over its own economy, almost achieved this in 1921 (Baron 2007a: 43). To protect this status and also to counter Finnish accusations the autonomy of Karelia was a fiction, the Karelian Workers’ Commune was expanded into the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR) on the 25th of July 1923. Already, however, the ‘national’ nature of the autonomous area was something of a fiction. Gylling had wished to exclude Pudozh region from the new republic, swapping this for Murmansk region in order to roughly balance out the numbers of Karelians and Russians. This was denied, and the Karelians and Finns became a minority in their own national area. A further setback was the cessation of 15,000sq km of Karelian territory to the Murmansk railway as ‘colonisation territory’ which the Karelian authorities subsequently had little control over. Ironically Soviet policies of industrialisation, of which the Karelian leadership were in full support, the completion the railway from Murmansk to Leningrad and the exploitation of Karelia’s natural resources undermined the ‘Finnishness’ of the young Republic. Thousands of workers, which the rural Karelian population and the small Finnish elite could not provide, were required for these new undertakings, and these were provided by other areas of the USSR. These immigrants were mainly Russian, although there were also thousands of Byelorussians and Ukrainians. The construction of the White Sea Canal project also involved a large influx of labour from outside Karelia, but much of this was involuntary and hence not necessarily of a long duration. Due to this large number of newcomers the proportion of self-identified Karelians dropped from 67% in 1897 to just 39% in 1926, and fell to 23% in 1939 despite there being an actual increase in pure numerical terms over the same period. To maintain or enhance the Finnish character of the Republic Gylling persuaded Moscow to allow the immigration of thousands of Finns from inside the USSR.
into Karelia and also the large-scale immigration of Finns from outside the USSR, starting from 1931 onwards (see Takala 2007, 2009 for more details on this Finnish immigration). As Gleb has argued it is likely this was also seen as an opportunity to offer an example to disaffected minority groups of enlightened Soviet policy towards their minority groups (1993: 1091). The number of Finns who moved into Karelia during this period is hard to determine with any exactitude. Up to 25,000 Finns may have emigrated to Karelia during this period, however not all ended up staying for very long, after having become disillusioned with the actual economic situation in Karelia. Laine, for example, estimates only around 5,000 Finns from North America out of ‘several thousands’ (2001: 54) who initially emigrated to Karelia in this period actually stayed in the USSR, adding to this around 8,000 immigrants who came direct from Finland. Ironically the SKP in Finland, which was more interested in building a revolutionary party in that country than socialism in another, actually dissuaded workers from crossing the border to the ‘paradise’ of Karelia to conserve its own forces (Upton 1973: 212). What can be said with certainty is that these influxes of Finns were not enough to provide anything like a Finnish majority in the area or even provide much of a counterbalance to the increasing waves of economic migrants from other areas of the Soviet state. These immigrants added to the Finnish dominance of political and cultural life. The impact of this immigration and the adoption of Finnish as an official language are highly controversial. Gleb maintains that the Finnish immigrants enriched the cultural life of Soviet Karelia, he does also admit, in passing, that they enjoyed a privileged status regarding supplies and were not as badly affected by the hardships of the initial five-year plans (1993: 1092).

The influence of the Finns over the fate of Karelia was not fated to last, however. With the growth of a more authoritative, repressive, and Russified Stalin-centred Soviet administration there came increasing pressure on the various minority nations to adopt a ‘Soviet’ nationality rather than persist in attempting to assert their autonomy. Across the USSR national minorities experienced a curtailment of their political autonomy and a growing compulsion to abandon what were seen as the anti-Soviet, bourgeois trappings of national differentiation. National culture and autonomy had been tolerated by the regime
to the extent that it was compatible with overall central political control. From the beginning of the Stalinist period pressure increased to develop a national culture ‘national in form but socialist in content’ (see Bassin and Kelly 2012: 60). In practice this meant an increasing pressure to adopt Russian norms and the Russian language even if the ideas of national autonomy and cultural development were never explicitly renounced by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The various national intelligentsias which had been encouraged to develop by the policies of the 1920s, alongside their associated cultural and political products, were subject to increasing repression. This pressure was particularly dangerous for the Finns, as they were a nationality mostly resident outside the Soviet Union, they occupied a border area and spoke a language that was not purely a ‘Soviet’ one. As Austin has noted, the fact that Finnish was the main language of a ‘bourgeois’ state led to accusations it was in fact a ‘bourgeois’ language (1992: 21). The Finnish notion of unification between Karelia and Finland could be seen as a nationalist project, rather than a purely revolutionary one if there were suspicions that the actual union was more important to some of the elite in Petrozavodsk than how it was accomplished. The creation and expansion of the Karelian gulag system also contributed to the dilution of the ‘national’ population, as forced labour was brought in from across the RSFSR. The camps were also under the control of the OGPU, who operated with little regard for the Karelian authorities (Baron 2007a: 83-88). Gradually the growth of this apparatus, which culminated with the establishment of the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii Kombine (BBK) which was given authority over large areas surrounding the new canal and was able to operate with almost total disregard for the desires of the local administration. Karelia’s economic autonomy was also severely compromised by the advent of the Five-Year Plan.

In 1928 the Karelian-Russian opposition to the Finnish administration had attempted to take control, but had been defeated with the aid of the Leningrad party leadership. By the early 1930s the hostility of many local Karelians and Russians, who had throughout the 1920s felt disenfranchised by the Finnish leadership, was utilised by the centre. There was also some concern amongst the authorities about the growing discontent amongst the Finnish immigrants to Karelia who were becoming disillusioned and the growth of
attempts to leave the USSR (Gleb 1993). The Tver’ Karelians had already, in 1931, unsuccessfully, attempted to get Finnish replaced in the KASSR by Karelian, arguing that the use of Finnish was an example of chauvinism (Baron 2007a: 97-8). It has been noted above also that it was in 1932 Bubrikh (see Bubrikh 1932) asserted that Karelian and Finnish were separate languages and therefore, according to Stalinist linguistics, must be separate peoples. It cannot be ascertained whether this change in academic thinking was made on the merits of the evidence alone; as we shall see Bubrikh was certainly malleable enough with his views regarding Karelian later on. In fact Bubrikh made several far-reaching and rather surprising statements related to the Karelian language. Whilst dismissing Finnish as a language ‘not suitable’ for use in the USSR at all, and inferring it was in and of itself a ‘fascist’ language, he also stated that Russian was the source of future development for Karelian and even that the richness of Karelian grammatical structure was an impediment to this development, stating it was overly complex and, most importantly, entirely different from Russian. Bubrikh also alleged that the language policy of the Finns was motivated by ‘White Finnish’ plans to found a greater Finland (see Takala 2009: 128-30). In 1932 there appeared a series of articles in Pravda which attacked Finnish nationalism and a perceived Finnish chauvinism towards Karelians (Austin 1992: 23). As Karelian was now considered to be a separate language in accordance with policies of korenisatsiya the Karelian population ought to have their own language as a literary language rather than a foreign tongue imposed upon them. The Finnish administration in the KASSR around this time looked at trying to implement a process of ‘karelianisation’ of the Finnish language used in the Republic by using more Karelian words. In 1935, after the Finns had lost political control, attempts were made to ‘Sovietise’ Finnish, which was still the official language of the KASSR, and also to create a ‘dialect literature’ based on Olonets Karelian.

In January 1934 the central committee had declared that, in contrast to previous declarations, Finnish and not Russian chauvinism and nationalism was the primary concern in Karelia. This opened the door for a widespread purge of the Finnish influence in the Republic. This purge must be set in the context of the broader political landscape of the period in the USSR. At this time the
Stalinist state began to consolidate its power through increasing centralisation and standardisation. Elements considered to be inimical to this process were brutally purged from society by either dismissal from office, arrest, incarceration, execution or a combination of these measures. In terms of policy towards national minorities much of the local intelligentsia and administration that had flourished during the first years of the Soviet regime was now not only hindered in its work but actively repressed and removed from office and influence. In Karelia this process saw the almost complete destruction of Finnish influence.

From 1935 onwards Finns were systematically removed from almost all positions of authority within the KASSR and the USSR in general. Both Gylling and his close associates in the Karelian leadership such as Rovio were summoned to Moscow and shot. In January 1937 A. Zhdanov attacked Finnish nationalism in a closed meeting in Leningrad and this opened the door for the extension of the terror of what was termed the Yezhovschina to the Karelian population. Gelb (1993: 1100-10) and Schrad (2004: 470) contend that up to 20,000, or 80% of the immigrants to Karelia were shot, jailed or exiled together with large numbers of the indigenous population, although it may be noted this is more than some figures for the actual numbers of immigrants in the first place. Laine gives a figure of 8,744 convictions of ‘enemies of the people’ by the NKVD in Karelia for the period March 1937 to April 1938, which was the height of the terror (2001: 54). Of this number 3,771 are identified as Karelians and 1,929 as Finns. Takala estimates that Finns comprised 40% of those repressed in the KASSR, whilst the Karelians and Russians comprised 27% and 25% respectively (2007: 202-3). Regardless of the exact figures what can be said with certainty is that the design of these purges was to remove all Finnish influence from the KASSR and that whilst in statistical terms the losses amongst the Russian and Karelian populations, whilst tragic, were a small proportion of the entire population, almost all Finnish families were effected and virtually all Finns of any note in the administration were denounced and arrested. Together with this repression of the actual Finnish populace the authorities embarked on a policy of repressing the Finnish language. In October 1937 the Karelian Commissariat for Education had entrusted Bubrikh with the creation of a Cyrillic Karelian to facilitate the cultural and linguistic development of the Karelian
population in their own language. Concomitant with the promotion of this new language was the elimination of Finnish from the life of the Republic. From January 1st 1938 Finnish was abolished as an official language in the KASSR and all books in the language, including those of Marx, Lenin and Stalin were publicly burnt. All Finnish schools were closed and all instruction in Finnish was forbidden. Finnish was now assumed to be a ‘fascist’ language in reference to the Finnish relationship with Nazi Germany, and a further purge of Finns was undertaken from all state institutions. In fact the 1939 census in Karelia failed to discover any Finns resident there whatsoever, presumably as those remaining were either too afraid to identify themselves as such or were officially prevented from so doing. The repression went so far that it proved difficult to find Finns to fill the ranks to the KFSSR in 1940; aside from Kuusinen almost all Finns of any influence had been purged.

Despite the associated repression of Finns and Finnish culture the adoption of a literary Karelian might have been the chance to finally allow the indigenous population to influence their own cultural and linguistic development. This does not ever really seem to have been the intention. The language created by Bubrikh was based mostly on the Olonets dialect, which had more borrowings from Russian than other Karelian dialects, and he assiduously added more of these. The political reasons also influenced the morphology of the new language; in 1932, Bubrikh had distinguished 13 cases in Karelian, revising this down later to 12 in accordance with the then prevalent Finnish practice, and in 1937 deciding on a mere 9 cases. Bubrikh characterised this as the elimination of archaic features found only in North Karelian, but the motivation was primarily political, as Austin argues:

“In political terms this was seen as striking a blow against bourgeois Finland and Greater-Finland nationalists. At the same time it emphasised Russian and allowed for the introduction of many Russian words into the vocabulary. Since the southern dialects, Olonets and Lude, had been less researched, there were fewer accepted phonemic or morphological norms and so the creators of the new language had a carte blanche in their development of a language that would suit their political prerequisites (1992: 21).”

Finnish words were systematically excluded from the new language as
were many words of common Finnish and Karelian derivation in order to ‘cleanse’ the language of negative influences (Belikova 2009: 170-2). The Cyrillic system poorly represented Karelian sounds, however, and the new language was basically heavily based on Russian vocabulary, particularly at higher levels of education, and grammatical rules that were hard for most Karelian speakers to understand. The introduction of such a strange form of Karelian and the overnight total abandonment of Finnish led to a great deal of confusion, as education and administration in general had to be carried out without appropriate resources in a language not understood by most Karelians. In some districts there were no textbooks for schools at all, nor qualified teachers, as the Finnish ones had been disposed of and no new Karelian alternatives had been provided. In 1939 yet more purging of Finnish borrowings was undertaken from Karelian, as well as the borrowing of yet more Russianisms, although the chaos still continued. As Austin puts it, “no Karelians could actually understand their literary language” (1992: 25). The language thus created was useless for the purpose of the development of the Karelian population, and was rather merely a hurried, ill-conceived attempt to destroy Finnish influence and reorientate linguistic development towards Russian.

This failed attempt to create a literary language had been embarked upon for political motives and was abruptly dropped in 1940 for much the same reasons. In November 1939 the USSR had in fact offered a segment of Karelia to Finland in return for the border between the states being moved 25km back from Leningrad. This offer was, predictably, refused, as the area of Karelia was mostly uninhabited and of little value compared to the piece of territory the USSR had demanded. The refusal of this demand initiated the ‘Winter War’ of 1940 between the USSR and Finland. That it was the initial aim of the USSR to occupy Finland can be seen from the ‘reconstitution’ of the Finnish Democratic Republic under Kuusinen in Zelenogorsk (Terijoki), purporting to be the legitimate government of Finland, as a continuation of the Finnish Socialist Workers’ Republic of 1918. Soviet military efforts were not very successful, however, and attempts to break Finnish defences proved costly and prolonged. A belated victory was obtained, however, and as a consequence the Moscow Treaty of the 12th of March 1940 ceded large areas of Finnish Karelia, around
10% of the area of pre-war Finland, to the USSR. This area was almost immediately merged into the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (KFSSR), a full Union Republic of the same status as areas such as the Ukraine, Georgia or Russia (RSFSR) itself. Although areas such as Kandalaksha region which had been transferred to the RSFSR from the KASSR during the purges were not returned, the area was expanded to include Vyborg and most of the area around Lake Ladoga. This new Union Republic was the only such in which the titular nations were a minority in their own republic. More notably, Finnish was now readopted as an official language together with Russian, and the Karelians were once again left without a literary language of their own. Ironically the same arguments used in the 1920s by the now-purged Finnish Bolsheviks were resurrected to justify the imposition of Finnish on the Karelians: the languages were similar therefore the Karelians would be able to learn Finnish, a ready-made literary language, and integrate the two peoples in their new Union Republic (Austin 1981: 171-7). As most of the Finnish population had been evacuated from the occupied area, around 400,000 individuals in total, immigrants had to be brought in to populate the newly-acquired territory. Most of these would have been ethnically Russian, however Laine (2001: 54) has noted a few thousand Finns being moved from Murmanskaya Oblast’ to the KFSSR to bolster its Finnish credentials. A faculty of Finno-Ugrian studies was established at the State University of Petrozavodsk and Finnish schools were reopened across the Republic. It must be noted, however, that the KFSSR was almost certainly intended as an interim solution, and that ultimately Soviet ambitions were directed towards the incorporation of Finland within the USSR at a later date.

The promotion of Finnish during this period was not given a good deal of time to work any effects. On June the 25th 1941 Finland allied itself with Nazi Germany and attacked the USSR. Large areas of Karelia, both that which had been ceded to the USSR a year earlier and areas which had never been part of the Finnish state, were occupied by Finnish forces and, to a lesser extent, their German allies, a total of roughly 70% of Soviet Karelia. Petrozavodsk was occupied, together with most of Karelia to the West of the Onego, and the Soviet administration removed to Belomorsk on the White Sea. As Laine has
acknowledged the area was administered with a view to its inclusion in a ‘Greater Finland’ should the war come to a victorious conclusion (2001: 55). Ironically the occupying Finnish forces adopted much the same policies as had been pursued by the fellow-countrymen during the 1920s, advocating schemes of ‘finnicisation’ and ‘dekarelianisation’, aimed at stressing the shared heritage of Finnish and Karelian populations, and constructing a shared identity. All education was now in Finnish once more, and the populace treated as future citizens of a new Finnish state. It must be noted, however, that due to evacuations only around 30% of the pre-war Soviet population was under Finnish occupation. The attitude of the Karelians and other Finno-Ugrians under Finnish occupation is difficult to gauge and quite controversial as shall be seen below. The divisive policies of the occupiers are adjudged to have failed by Lahteenmaki (2007: 163) who contends the Karelians did not waver in their loyalty to the USSR as had been hoped. This period ended in 1944 with the launch of a large Soviet counter-offensive, which pushed the Finns back to pre-war borders. Finland sued for peace and managed to secure a treaty which did not move the border westwards a great deal further than that of 1940. The Karelian population, however, was once again devastated. It seems some of the population evacuated to other areas of the USSR was either forbidden to return by local authorities who were desperate for labour or chose to remain in their new homes. Certainly they much have not had much to return to, as much of Karelia had been devastated by the recent fighting. These factors, and also the simple fact that unfortunately many Karelians had been killed during the conflict, meant there was a ten-year delay before Karelia regained its former level of population.

During the remainder of the Stalinist period the KFSSR continued to function and Finnish was at least theoretically promoted as an official language although there seems to have been little enthusiasm in these efforts. A final immigration of Finns took place when Ingrian Finns, or those Finns who had been resident in the area surrounding Leningrad, were encouraged to relocate to Karelia. These Finns and others who had been resident in the USSR were now regarded as being part of a ‘suspect nationality’ which had fought on the fascist side during the war. Most of this Finnish population had been evacuated by the
Finns and Germans to Finland in 1943/4, but were however repatriated in 1944/5. As this made them of dubious loyalty in the eyes of the authorities restrictions were placed on their residency, and that of Finns in general, in various areas of the USSR including their former home of Leningrad and its environs and also Karelia. Gennady Kupriyanov, the First Secretary of the Karelian Communist Party, recognised that there was a shortage of skilled labour in Karelia and that these Finns would help alleviate this. To this end he managed to persuade Moscow to allow the restrictions on their residency in Karelia to be lifted, hoping to attract around 60,000 of these Finns. In the end only 21,000 emigrated before Kupriyanov was purged and his replacement, Yuri Andropov, rescinded the order and all such immigration was halted. Immigrations continued into Karelia from other ethnicities throughout the USSR, further diminishing both the Finnish and Karelian nature of the area. Finnish influence was declining in any case as the prospects for a union between a communist Finland and the USSR receded. As Finland pursued a careful policy of neutrality and diligently paid its reparations Stalin lost interest in the area. The teaching of Finnish was abandoned in all but 27 schools and it seems although it was retained as an official language little effort was made to promote it.

With the death of Stalin and the decline in influence of Kuusinen there next to no enthusiasm in Moscow for the continuation of the KFSSR and it was promptly dissolved in 1956 as part of the general wave of de-Stalinisation. Those areas around Vyborg and the Karelian isthmus annexed from Finland were incorporated into Leningradskaya Oblast’, and all further promotion of Finnish was ceased. The KASSR was re-established within the RSFSR. From 1958 all education was to be in Russian only, and the department of Finno-Ugric studies in Petrozavodsk was closed. Finnish was retained in theory as an official language (Austin 1981: 176-7) however it could only be used in special schools and only then with the consent of the parents. In numerical terms it was variously estimated that during the 1980s 27-30 such schools catering for between 2,000-2,700 pupils existed in the KASSR. In terms of demographics the abolishment of the KFSSR was entirely logical. The entire population of the area in 1954 was only 606,300, which was considered too small for a full Union Republic. The proportion of self-identified Karelians in 1959 had dropped to
merely 13%, or 85,000 individuals, and that of Vepsians had dropped to just 1.1%. In contrast the immigration of Ingrian Finns actually increased the proportion of Finns to 4.3%, which was ironically the highest proportion of Finns ever achieved in the Republic. This small Finno-Ugric population was dwarfed by the 78% of the population of Slavic origins. What went together with the abandonment of the political aspirations of a Soviet Greater Finland, however, was the almost total abandonment of any political attention towards the Karelian population for the remainder of the Soviet period. During this period the KASSR was unique in being the only autonomous area where the titular minority held no rights regarding their language, which did not have a written form, was not an official language in any sense and did not exist within the educational system. The situation was similar for the Veps language and as stated Finnish enjoyed a marginal position in the educational system at least.

Partially as a consequence of this educational and institutional neglect the Karelian language and population steadily declined throughout the remainder of the Soviet period. By 1979 the percentage of the inhabitants of the KASSR defining themselves as Karelian dropped to 11.1% or 81,274 individuals, of whom only 61.8% claimed to be native Karelian speakers. The Finnish population, although also declining and numbering a even smaller percentage of the population (2.7%) did however enjoy continued if rather limited educational rights and access to its own newspaper, journal, theatre and some television programming, however at least some of this may have been more to do with potential of earning foreign currency from Finland than catering to the needs of this minority (Austin 1981: 175-7). Due to a lack of opportunities for its development Karelian as a language and identity increasingly became marginalized, and subsumed under their dominant Russian counterparts. This lack of administrative enthusiasm for the development of minority languages in Karelia must be seen alongside the broader trend from the Khrushchev period onwards to emphasise the creation of a general ‘Soviet’ identity over that of the various constituent nationalities of the USSR (see Bassin and Kelly 2012: 4).

The late 1980s and 1990s were a period of profound social change across the former USSR. From the beginnings of Gorbachov’s glasnost the increased
openness of Soviet society allowed the promotion of ideas that had previously been outwith the limits of acceptable discourse. Such ideas included a revitalised sense of national identity amongst the minorities of the Soviet Union, which in turn contributed immensely to the collapse of the state itself. In this period the politics of identity and relations between the federal centre and the regions were subject to much debate and rapidly evolved through a number of phases. In the initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union much emphasis was placed, both within the emerging post-Soviet societies and within scholarly examinations of the same, on the inversion and destruction of prior political symbols and national myths. The unifying mythology of Bolshevism and the Soviet ‘nation’ had been upturned and new unifying narratives and symbols were required to replace them. It was assumed by many that Soviet symbols and myths would no longer be applicable to an emerging Russian society and that they would need to be substituted for a new ‘national’ mythology. In a similar fashion it was assumed that existing Soviet institutions, spacial geographies and centre-periphery relations would similarly need to be radically revised or entirely abandoned. This process also forced Russian society to confront the question of what Russian identity should mean with an unprecedented urgency. It formed as argued by Ryazanova-Clarke what Bourdieu would have termed a ‘heretic break’ from the existing linguistic order and forced the revaluation of existing norms (2008:224). It has been convincingly argued (see for example Six 2008, Pantin 2010, Ohan 2008, Solovei 2008) that the collapse of a sense of Soviet identity was experienced by most Russians as a somewhat traumatic event; the sudden destruction of the USSR and its attendant identities and symbolism was expressed in Russian society as a ‘loss’, an event that left the Russian nation ‘orphaned’ or somehow diminished. Within this apparent void new identities, or at the very least newly-negotiated understandings of existing identities, would have to formulated and propagated.

At the outset there was little consensus as to what the Post-Soviet form of Russia should be. In political terms the ruling class were split between a clique of liberal reformers centred around Yeltsin who wished to shape Russia in the mould of Western capitalist states and a more authoritarian group including Zuganov, the new Communist leader, who wanted to preserve more of the old
Soviet system (for an examination of the two groups see Chafetz 1997). The politics of the liberal politicians who had influence in the early years of Yeltsin period had significant implications for questions of Russian identity. Their attempts to mould Russia after the form of its Western competitors has been seen by some commentators such as Solovei (2008:70) as fostering a sense of Russian inferiority and to have marginalised Russian culture as inadequate or substandard. During this early period the ruling elite unsuccessfully attempted, as described by Pantin (2010: 4-20) to develop a kind of civic nationalism for the Russian Federation, partially by the use of the term российский, a term which denotes ‘Russian’ by citizenship in opposition to the more ethnically charged term ‘русский’. This initial period was characterised, however, like the developing Russian state itself, by a large degree of disorientation and confusion in the expression of Russian identity. Even the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War, identified by Ohan (2008: 70) as the key defining historical myth in Russian discourses of national identity was characterised by the fragmentation of meaning and a lack of a clear narrative of national history (see Ryazanova-Clarke 2008: 227-230).

The opening up of the Soviet system during the period of reforms initiated in the 1980s offered the population of the KASSR the first opportunities to demand enhanced rights in a variety of respects. As Tsygankov (2002: 252-3) has contended the foundation in November 1988 of the Popular Front of Karelia, sometimes called the National Front of Karelia, was the first direct challenge to the authority of the CPSU. It must be stressed that this organization was not campaigning necessarily for any sort of settlement of issues of Karelian sovereignty; the adjective ‘Karelian’ seems here to be more geographical than ethnic. The Popular Front of Karelia managed an unprecedented victory in Petrozavodsk in 1989 by defeating candidates selected by the local administration in elections to the Supreme Soviet. It did not, however, represent a serious challenge to the authorities in the manner of similar movements in the Baltic states. The movement had no clear programme beyond opposition to the ruling elite, and as it did not have a broad base of support outside the local intelligentsia of Petrozavodsk failed to succeed in its attempt at mass organization. As Liikanen argues it also did not have access to the same
resources in terms of culture and identity as its counterparts in the Baltic states (2002: 191), and was not able to organize around a single issue but instead splintered into its respective components. The number of individuals involved in the Popular Front is estimated by Tysgankov at no more than 400 at any one time (2002: 255-6), although this would be slightly more than estimates for similar regions in the north of the RSFSR such as Murmanskaya Oblast’, and the Republic of Komi. On 17th March 1991 88.6% of the population of the KASSR voted to preserve the USSR. In June of the same year, however, 53.3% of the population voted for Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation, with only 18% backing the Communist candidate Ryzhkov. Evidently voters in the KASSR were not in favour of continuing with the rule of the Communist Party nomenklatura even if they did wish to maintain a common political and economic space with the remainder of the USSR. Events elsewhere were making the continuation of the USSR increasingly unlikely, however, and on November 13th 1991 the Karelian parliament voted to rename the area as the Republic of Karelia.

The liberalising clique around Yeltsin managed to assume power and push through a series of economic and political reforms despite strong opposition which culminated in the political crisis of 1993. Inspired by the apparently more democratic and liberal agenda of the Yeltsin period some of the constituent areas of the new Russian Federation attempted to assert a larger degree of political autonomy up to and including full political independence from the new state. Certain autonomous republics declared their independence, including Tartarstan and Bashkiria. Even in Russian-majority areas some researchers found an increased detachment and alienation from the federal centre and an increased ‘parochialism’ (see White 2004 and Petersson 2001). The limits of such moves for autonomy were, however, quickly established by the federal centre which quickly moved, albeit at the time unsuccessfully, to uphold its authority by force in the case of Chechnya. The Republic of Karelia remained relatively stable during the tumultuous years of the 1990s and was not involved to any significant degree in any tensions with the federal centre. This may be partially explained by the fact the former Communist head of the region, the Karelian Viktor Stepanov, succeeded in retaining power in the region until 1998, which as
Alexandrov (2001: 11) has ventured no doubt helped integrate the area into the new system somewhat more smoothly than elsewhere. Stepanov successfully managed to create a new administrative and economic structure in Karelia whilst not compromising the position of the traditional elite. During the early part of the 1990s the republican authority also devolved a significant amount of power to local authorities; the Chairman of the Government of Karelia did, however, become the supreme position, directly elected and therefore not as responsible to subordinate power-structures. In fact this local constitutional arrangement was a mirror of the emerging federal system in which executive power was concentrated in the hands of the president, even if the Karelian system was to a degree one of the least centralised in Russia (Alexandrov 2001:12-13).

In a Karelian context the first groups advocating a particular ‘national’ agenda were founded at this time (for this period in general see Klement’ev 2002 and Tsygankov 2002, for the Karelian ethnic movement see Shananina 2009). In 1989 the Ingrian National Revival movement or League of Ingrian Finns was established in the KASSR. Although such movements had appeared at an earlier date in other areas of the USSR, notably Estonia, this was the first challenge to the status quo in terms of nationalities policy in Karelia. It was followed shortly afterwards by societies for Vepsian and Karelian culture. The demands of these groups were generally not particularly radical and for the most part were limited to extensions of cultural and linguistic rights. A more radical approach was advocated, from 1991, by the leaders of the Karelian Movement, later the Karelian Congress. Led by A Grigoriev and O Bobin this group advocated various types of national sovereignty for the Karelian people. In 1990 Bobin proposed Karelia become an autonomous area of Finland as opposed to Russia, whilst Grigoriev proposed the joint administration of at least parts of Soviet Karelia by both countries. It must be stated that although their group was registered as a political party in 1991 it has gained little support amongst the population of Karelia, presumably due to the fact that only around 10% of the population are actually now ethnically Karelian. In fact even the ethnically Karelian population was distinctly lukewarm to the ideas of Grigoriev; in June 1991 the Republican Congress of Karelians, held in Olonets and including delegates from Finland, Tver’ and Leningardskaya Oblasts rejected a proposal by
Grigoriev to establish ‘Karelian autonomy inside the Republic of Finland’. Writing, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in Kareliya, the official newspaper of the Republic, the academic Zinadia Strogal’shchikova argued that the Finns, Karelians and Veps were the indigenous peoples of the Republic and ought to enjoy special status (see “Непростая история Карелия: кто есть кто на данной земле” Kareliya no.22 1993). This provoked some debate within the Karelian media, however no official measures were taken at this time to increase the status of such groups and indeed Alexandrov (2001: 24-5) notes much of the ensuing debate was critical of Strogal’shchikova’s ideas. Unlike certain other federal subjects of the Russian Federation such as Tartarstan or Chechnya there has therefore never been a strong political movement for greater autonomy or outright independence within Karelia. It should be noted, however, that this situation is by no means unique to Karelia and is mirrored in a number of other autonomous republics such as Udmurtia or Komi.

In 1998 however a power struggle took place in Karelia which led to the replacement of Stepanov by the then head of the administration of Petrozavodsk, Sergei Katanandov. He retained his post in elections in 2002 by gaining more than 60% of the votes available, and was reappointed as governor of Karelia in 2006 by Vladimir Putin following the abolition of direct elections to such posts. The constitution of the Republic of Karelia explicitly stated the head of the government must be directly elected and had to be amended to accommodate this. Katanandov had previously supported the strengthening of the ‘vertical’ of power through this measure and presumably expected to benefit from it (see “Чем сильнее вертикаль, тем строже порядок” Kareliya 116 2004). These local developments mirror in a broad sense the increasing centralisation of power which has taken place across Russia since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000 and the reduction in power of regional elites (see Godzimski 2000:24). Katanandov’s authority was seriously undermined by his perceived inefficiency and negligence surrounding the response of the Karelian authorities to the Kondopoga affair. The town of Kondopoga lies approximately 50km to the north of the republican capital Petrozavodsk and is a relatively large town in Karelian terms and functions as a regional and administrative centre. It boasts a
population of 30,000, the majority of whom are ethnically Russian or of other Slavic origin. Although the town is home to a large pulpwood, paper and cellulose plant and other forestry-related enterprises which are considered to pay above-average wages, the level of unemployment is also above the republican norm. Although not generally considered of much importance in national terms the town achieved a level of regional, national and indeed worldwide notoriety in August-September 2006. On the night of August 29th/30th, a scuffle between two ethnic Russian customers and an Azeri barman at the ‘Chaika’ restaurant degenerated into an armed brawl between Russian youths and a number of individuals of differing Caucasian nationalities resulted in the deaths of two ethnically Russian men. A mass meeting was called on September 1st at which it is reported anti-Chechen sentiments were expressed and demands were voiced for the removal of all non-Russians from the town. This was followed by mass civil unrest during which the ‘Chaika’ and other businesses not owned by ethnic Russians, in particular the market, were destroyed. Most ethnic Chechens and other families of non-Slavic origin fled the town to Petrozavodsk. Order was generally restored by the authorities by the 4th-5th of September, with the support of soldiers and Militsiya reinforcements from elsewhere in Russia.

The Kondopoga affair must be set in the broader context of increasing ethnic tensions and discrimination within the Russian Federation as a whole. As Solovei has noted what he terms ‘ethnophobia’ has increased dramatically within the Russian Federation since 1990 (2008: 56-67). An increase in racist and radical nationalist discourse and ideology within Russia has also been documented by the work of the SOVA centre, which has produced several authoritative reports on the phenomenon including the work of Kozhevnikova (2008) and Kozhevnikova and Verkhovskii (2005). Solovei has noted that this intolerance is not restricted to the fringes of society but is in fact incorporated in mainstream discourse and is uniformly present across the political spectrum (2008: 67). The reasons for the rise in xenophobia are complicated and a complete analysis of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study. It has been argued (see ibid: 56-70) that this discrimination is not a general enmity towards all minorities but is instead directed towards certain particular groups such as Chechens. Other studies have found that, at least amongst organised
groups of militant nationalists, this discrimination can be directed at a large variety of minority groups including Russians who are deemed to have unacceptable political views or lifestyles although individuals from the Caucasuses are still the primary target (see Alperovich and Yudina 2013: 5-12).

Attacks on minority groups such as those witnessed in Kondopoga are the work of a comparatively small minority of violent radical groups and individuals and it must be noted that ‘extremist’ groups are banned under Russian law and that the authorities do make some effort to proscribe and prosecute such formations. Solovei has argued that the rise in intolerance towards certain groups is an ‘ethnic mobilisation’ from below that reacts against the internally-colonising, patronising discourse of the political elite which belittles and undervalues manifestations of ‘Russian’ ethnic identity (2008: 70-73). Other commentators have, however, argued that the Russian state itself has fostered such intolerance by promoting an ‘imperial’ view of Russian identity which both rejects the western example and promotes Russian exceptionalism whilst at the same time disregards ethnic minorities. Condee (2012: 37-50) views this process as the ‘imperial’ state muting civil society and abrogating to itself the creation of a Russian identity.

The Kondopoga affair was not the first indication of ethnic tensions or intolerance within the Republic of Karelia, even if it appeared to take the authorities by surprise. An examination of the manner in which prior manifestations of inter-ethnic tension or hatred within the Republic of Karelia had been covered by the local press shall be made below. It is sufficient to note here that sporadic instances of criminal activity directed toward minority groups had been recorded in the area prior to 2005. Indeed in 2003 a smaller scale altercation between what Karel’skaya Guberniya described as "десантниками" и торговыми" (K.G.11 20.08.2003) had already taken place within Kondopoga itself. It is clear therefore that the Kondopoga affair did not arise spontaneously or indeed necessarily without warning but was the product of longstanding tensions between differing groups within the town. As shall be further explored below it is also clear this phenomenon was not restricted to Kondopoga itself. Nevertheless the scale and notoriety which the Kondopoga affair gained had far-reaching impercussions within the Karelian political scene.
and across Russia more broadly. It is not possible to discuss here the broad implications for Russian society as a whole but cognisance must be made of the fact the incident was widely seen, as Kozhenikova states, as “an obvious and probably the biggest victory won by right-wing radicals, in particular by the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), not only in the current year, but over the last few years (2006)”. Relitavely little scholarly attention has been directed towards the question of what the Kondopoga affair tells us about civil society, identity and ethnic tension within Karelia itself; most analyses have concentrated on wider questions of the situation across the Russian Federation as a whole. As discussed below the incident did force the local government to concentrate more attention on such issues. In immediate political terms, as illustrated in the local media coverage of the event analysed below, the fallout of the incident caused increased tensions between federal authorities and their Karelian counterparts. Indeed the perceived poor showing of the local government may have contributed to the decline in influence and prestige of the local head of government, Katanandov, whose position was questioned by non other than president Putin.

Katanandov was not immediately dismissed, however his apparent power had diminised considerably and he was eventually replaced in 2010 by Andrei Nelidov who held the post for a mere two years before resigning to be replaced by Aleksandr Khudlainen who currently holds the position. Katanandov and Nelidov were both Russians by ethnicity; whilst Katanandov was born in Petrozavodsk Nelidov was brought in from Leningradskaya Oblast’ prior to his appointment and had few previous connections to the Republic of Karelia. Khudilainen is an Ingrian Finn from Tver’skaya Oblast’ and is thus the first Finno-Ugric head of the region since Stepanov was ousted in 1998. Until his appointment he also had, however, spent his entire career within the confines of Leningradskaya Oblast’ and had no direct connections with the Republic of Karelia. As of yet the appointment of a Finno-Ugr as head of the Republic of Karelia seems to have had no real influence on questions of minority representation or rights in other parts of the Karelian government.
1.2 The Contemporary Karelian Political System

That Karelian politics is generally in ideological terms indistinguishable from Russian politics would seem to be proven by the persistent victories of the ruling party in Karelian and Federal elections. The Karelian political systems is, however, at least somewhat more pluralistic than the majority of regional political systems within the modern Russian Federation. At the last elections to the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia in 2011 candidates for Edinaya Rossiya, the party most associated with Vladimir Putin, took 19 out of the 50 seats available. This makes Karelia, alongside Amur Oblast’ and the Federal city of St Petersburg one of only three Russian regions in which Edinaya Rossiya does not command an outright majority in the local legislature. The Republic of Karelia is also one of only three areas in which the liberal opposition party Yabloko has any representation at all, with three four deputies being elected to sit in Petrozavodsk. Yabloko, the left-leaning Spravadlivaya Rossiya (12 deputies), the Communist Party (8) and the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (5) alongside two independents can in principle combine to form a collation government and at times they have indeed united in various combinations to pass or block legislation. Although the appointed Head of the Republic actually wields most of the executive clout of the local administration this above average level of political plurality does indicate that the political culture of the Republic of the Karelia is more arguably more open and transparent than that of the typical autonomous area of the Russian Federation. This is important as it indicates that Karelian society may hypothetically be more accepting of identities and historical narratives which potentially challenge or oppose the orthodoxies promoted by the central

It has been noted however that nationalist movements do exist in Karelia and hence there must be consciousness of nationalist ideology amongst Karelian society, amongst Karelians, Finns, Veps and Russians. These never seem to have enjoyed majority support. It has been noted above that the majority of the KASSR voted against the dissolution of the USSR, and studies by Klementyev have noted that a minority of all nationalities in Karelia now assess this as
positive. Interestingly however recent studies have shown that amongst all these groups support for separatism is fairly low but not insignificant. Louk Hagendoorn et al (2008: 364) discovered support for separatism was not as high in Karelia as elsewhere, but that the Russian population of Karelia was much more sympathetic towards separatist ideas here than in other autonomous regions. Around 50% of Karelians expressed support for such ideas together with 45% of Russians interviewed. Russians in Karelia also had a more positive view of the titular minority and perceived less competition from them than in other such republics. It must be recalled however that the study was conducted in urban areas only and the sample size perhaps not sufficient to determine how typical such views are. Furthermore although around half of ethnic Karelians may support separatist ideas an absolute majority of the population would not appear to do so. It would also appear that this support is not translated into political capital for the exploitation of nationalist groups. The Karelian Congress headed by A. Grigoriev which at one time proposed Karelian autonomy within Finland is not now above offering its support to Putin’s administration. The main activity of the Karelian Congress now appears to be the defence and promotion of Karelian culture; any political ambitions appear to have been shelved for now. Klement’ev’s study (2002: 245) also demonstrated that 56.7% of Karelians viewed Karelia as their ‘motherland’, however 30%, 58.2% and 42.9% of Karelians, Russians and Finns respectively named Russia instead. Clearly there is some ambiguity in contemporary society in the Republic of Karelia as to what the ultimate political future of the area should be; however there seems little appetite for any immediate or dramatic change. It is important to note however that both of the above studies show that there is at least a low level of consciousness of alternate identities to Russian or the resources upon which such identities could be created.
1.3 Institutional and Legal Factors

Karelia as an autonomous region is not administered in entirely the same manner as the remainder of the Russian Federation and there are several important legal and institutional differences. Firstly Karelia possesses a constitution of its own, which guarantees certain rights for its citizens and, more importantly, powers for the administration which most subjects of the Russian Federation do not enjoy. Most importantly the constitution affirms that the Republic of Karelia is a state in itself, the borders of which cannot be amended without the consent of the Republic and its citizens, and it is stated that the republic is distinguished first of all by the historical and contemporary presence of the Karel...
must be admitted that not only do these populations have the right to demand official support for their communities but that the Karelian state has explicitly set itself the task of providing this support and achieving some sort of ‘revival’ amongst the indigenous population. These observations may be tempered by the fact that all nationalities residing in Karelia are meant to receive equal treatment, a contradiction the Karelian constitution does not seek to address, and also the explicitly stated fact in the Karelian constitution that the constitution of the Russian Federation is of equal validity and indeed that Karelia possesses autonomy only insofar as local laws and rights are compatible with their federal counterparts. It will be noted, for example, that direct elections to the post of governor were a constitutional right in Karelia, but that the constitution was overruled by federal law and was therefore amended.

Although the constitution does not specify which languages in particular are to receive state support other than Russian, a law of March 2004 does guarantee the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish languages a special status. This law provides some legal, financial and social support for these languages however it must be stated once again that it does not go so far as to declare them official languages, which could not be done without a referendum. Two previous attempts at passing a law that would declare Karelian an official or state language did not achieve a sufficient level of support. The Karelian state commits itself to a number of provisions designed to offer support to these languages below the level of complete official sanction however. Firstly these languages, and it must be noted no one of these languages has a right to a larger amount of support than any another, are to enjoy a ‘widening and strengthening’ of their social and cultural functions, although it is not specified what this shall entail. Support for mass media in these languages is explicitly promised, however, as is the organization of a system of study for the languages in educational establishments. To this end support is promised for the study of the languages and the creation of educational literature, textbooks, children’s literature and dictionaries to facilitate this. In the case of Karelian particularly this is an important step given the current paucity of such material and indeed its complete non-existence in Soviet times. Specialists are also to be developed in these areas and those who already exist, together with speakers of these
languages already extant in the spheres of culture and media, are to be supported. Importantly funds are to be provided for all these measures from republican budgets. Limitations are however observed in the uses of these languages. Individuals are guaranteed the ‘free choice’ of language in education and the bringing up of children (a constitutional right in any case), however the choice of language of instruction in any educational establishment is determined by that establishment’s assessments of the ‘needs and interests’ of the local population, hence it is not necessarily possible for parents to demand and receive education in any of the minority languages in any given school. Official acts and orders may or may not be printed in these languages depending on the choice of the institution issuing the information, and then only in publications which are already printed in such languages. Also the electoral commission may print any ballot paper in these languages, but only if it chooses to do so and in areas where a linguistic minority is ‘densely-settled’. Local authorities and cultural, artistic or educational organizations are permitted to use these languages but only in addition; in all of the above cases Karelian, Finnish or Vepsian cannot be the *only* language used; Russian must be utilized alongside the chosen language. Furthermore the use of these languages is optional; there is no question of there being an obligation on the part of such bodies to do so. Road signs for example can be in Karelian or Vepsian but only alongside Russian; furthermore the orthography in such signs must be in accordance with federal regulations, meaning that it must be rendered in the Cyrillic alphabet. It may be said therefore that whilst Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish do enjoy a special status in the Republic of Karelia, they are currently very far from the status of official languages.

The Karelian government is divided into 11 ministries as well as a certain number of committees and administrations. These include the Committee for Questions of Nationality Politics and Links to Religious Societies which is the main administrative strategy for fulfilling these constitutional and legal obligations. This committee was briefly elevated to the status of a ministry in November 2006 as part of the official response to the Kondopoga affair, but was re-designated a committee in 2010. It is a direct descendent of the Committee for Nationality Politics and Interethnic Relations which was founded in
December 1991 and functioned until 1994 when it was reorganized along very similar lines as the Committee for Nationality Politics, the changes being seemingly mostly cosmetic. Similar small changes to the title of the committee were made in 1997, 1998 and 2002, and the number of members was expanded gradually from 7 to 21. With these resources it is responsible in accordance with Order 34 of the 24th of May 2008 for the coordination of all government activity in the sphere of nationality politics, religious affairs, and the relations between ‘fellow-countrymen and necessary immigrants’ and the adaptation of immigrants to Karelian society. As far as its activities relate to the indigenous peoples of Karelia (be these Karelians, Finns, Veps or Russians) it is tasked with protecting the rights of ‘indigenous minority peoples’ and ‘peoples traditionally resident in our territory’, their way of life, culture, language, the study of these languages and ‘other aspects of national culture’, traditional industries and environment and support for organizations of such groups and their initiatives. It is also tasked with preventing any inter-ethnic conflict between these or any other groups.

1.4 Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish in Contemporary Society in the Republic.

The latest data available gives the total population of the Republic of Karelia as 643,548 individuals (all figures unless stated from the 2010 Russian Census). The population of the republic has been steadily declining, in line with much of the Russian Federation, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly this decline did not affect all ethnic groups. According to data from 1997 since 1989 to that date the Russian population had declined from 582,000 to 572,000, with the number of Belorussians also declining from 56,000 to 52,000 and Ukrainians from 28,000 to 24,000. This may indicate increased mortality but also perhaps emigration from Karelia to other areas. Surprisingly the number of Karelians actually increased in this period from 78,000 to 90,000, with the number of Finns moving from 18,000 up to 22,000. Only the Vepsian population remained stable at 6,000. It is not entirely clear what is responsible
for this numerical and proportional increase; it may be that Karelians and Finns were more comfortable with identifying themselves as such in censuses after the collapse of the Soviet Union, or possibly Karelians and Finns moved to the Republic of Karelia from other parts of the former USSR, although there does not seem to be direct evidence of this. The figures, as mentioned below, might not be entirely reliable however. One factor which may explain the rise in Finns would be the possibility of emigration to Finland. In 1990 the Finnish government had offered the possibility to Finns in the USSR of emigrating to Finland as ‘remigrants’, which may have tempted some people of Finnish descent in Karelia to try and avail themselves of this opportunity (see Virtanen 1996). The latest figures which give a breakdown of the total population into its national components is the 2010 census; in this survey 507,654 individuals claimed to be Russian, 78.8% of the total, of whom almost all (507,540) could speak Russian. Karelians made up the second largest ethnic group with 45,570 individuals registering themselves as Karelian, a large drop from the previous census in 2002 when 65,651 individuals were recorded, which again would appear to be a significant decrease if the figures for 1997 and 2002 are accurate. This would indicate a mere 7% of the population is now Karelian. Almost all Karelians (45,529) claimed to be proficient in Russian. The next largest ethnic groups are the Belorussians and Ukrainians who muster 23,345 (3.6%) and 12,677 (1.99%) individuals respectively. Finns comprise only 1.33% of the total (8,577), including 152 Ingrian Finns, and Vepsians were a mere 0.5% of the total (3,423). There are over 100 different nationalities represented in total however the remainder are present in generally insignificant numbers, the largest other group being 1,888 Tatars, whilst there are also over 1,000 Azeris, Armenians, Poles, and Gypsies as well as 25,880 individuals who did not indicate their ethnic origin, an inexplicably large increase from the 4,886 who declined to do so in the last census. If the 1997 and 2002 figures are accurate therefore we have a large numerical drop in the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish populations, although it must be noted a large drop in the Russian population as well. Certainly these trends would seem consistent with the general demographic decline in the Russian Federation; it also seems likely however that at least many Finns have chosen to emigrate from the Republic of Karelia whilst it is quite possible that
there has also been a more general internal emigration to other parts of the Russian Federation. Across the entire Russian Federation there are 60,815 Karelians in total, again a large decline from the 93,344 recorded eight years previously; over two-thirds of all Karelians are resident in the Republic of Karelia. Just under half of the total population of Finns (20,267) are also resident in the republic, together with more than half of all Veps (there are 5,936 in total).

In the Russian Federation as a whole 25,605 individuals claim to speak Karelian (a decline of around 50% since the last census), 38,873 to speak Finnish and 3,613 to speak Vepsian. In the Republic of Karelia itself there are now 19,100 individuals who claim to be able to speak Karelian: 16,876 Karelians claimed proficiency in the language, or only 37% of the total Karelian population. There are also 1,764 Russian speakers of Karelian (0.34%) indicating very few ethnic Russians in Karelia have any proficiency in the Karelian language, whilst 163 Finns (1.9%) also claim to speak the language together with 33 Veps (0.97%). Altogether only 2.97% of the total population in the Republic of Karelia speak Karelian. Finnish fares as badly as Karelian with only 14,630 speakers registered in the republic, of whom 2,901 are ethnic Finns. This means fewer Finns than Karelians (33%) are proficient in their own language. Russians tend to be better able to communicate in Finnish, with 6,013 speaking the language; however this is still just over one percent (1.18%) of the Russian population. Karelians are actually reasonably proficient in Finnish, with 5,087 being able to speak the language (11%). Altogether 2.27% of the population of the area can speak Finnish. Of the 1,179 speakers of Veps almost all are Veps themselves (919), the remainder being mostly Russians (213), Karelians (25) and Finns (11). A mere 0.18% of the population of the Republic of Karelia speaks this language. Altogether it is certain that far less than 10% of the population of the Republic of Karelia is able to speak any of the languages which are to be officially protected and promoted.

Karelians are not uniformly distributed across the Republic of Karelia: there are certain areas of the republic recognised as more ‘Karelian’ than others. A large group of Karelians (13,527 according to the 2000 census) lives in Petrozavodsk itself; here however, they make up a mere 5% of the population.
In the appropriately titled Kalevalskii National District there are 3,820 Karelians however this is 35.9% of the total population, and Pryazhinskii Raion boasts a similar (36.8%) percentage of Karelians. The main bastion of the Karelian population is Olonetskii District and the town of Olonets itself. Olonetskii District is the only area in the Republic of Karelia where Karelians are actually the majority group. There are 16,402 Karelians in the area which is 60.7% of the population, as opposed to only 8,748 Russians. In contrast other areas have distinctly low populations of Karelians; in Kem’skii Raion the proportion of Karelians is a mere 5.8%, and in Pudozhskii Raion it is just 0.9%.

The implications of the decline in Karelian and other minority language usage for questions of ethnic and national identity shall be explored in depth below. It should be noted here that the above figures demonstrate the general decline in the self-identification as Karelian has been mirrored by a general decline in the usage of Karelian as a language. It is also important to note the dominance, in statistical terms at least, of the Russian language and also self-identification as Russian within the contemporary Republic of Karelia. Clearly the complicated historical background of the area as sketched out above, including the multitude of historical attempts to manipulate ideas of Karelian identity as closer to or more distant from Russian and Finnish identities, provides a rich background for this type of study. The contemporary Karelian situation of relatively dynamic demographic change, insofar as Karelian identity would appear to be rapidly declining, coupled with the contentious nature of this identity in historical terms should produce interesting results if the hypothesis of the centrality and utility of historical narration in the production of national identity is to be validated.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Introductory Remarks

Before embarking on an examination of the potential usage of historical narratives in the production of national identities in the Republic of Karelia it is necessary to clarify the theoretical basis of this study. Evidently any study which seeks to address the question of how a particular identity is created must first undertake to understand how identity in general is produced. As it is the contention of this analysis that this is a social, discursive phenomenon a survey of the scholarly literature which supports such a position must be carried out together with an acknowledgement of the criticism of such theories. The chapter below will attempt to demonstrate the relevance and validity of such a theoretical framework to the questions raised by this study. To this end it is of particular importance that the phenomena of the nation and national identity be examined together with the scholarly literature on these subjects. Attention must also be directed to theories which attempt to describe how national identity is constructed, in particular those theories which advocate it is constructed discursively and upon which the main analysis undertaken here shall be based.

The relevant factors determining the production of national identity are numerous and, indeed, by no means inherently limited to any particular set of variables. Nor do these factors act in isolation; rather it is their interaction which produces and reproduces identity. Nevertheless it is possible to identify certain strategies which are commonly employed to perform national identity. No study could exhaustively document these strategies nor could any study conclusively identify a definitive order of importance by which these strategies could be ranked. It is my contention that the production of national identity is a process unique to each nationality or putative nation in question; it would be futile to attempt to isolate and explain national identity production per se without reference to concrete processes, at least in anything beyond very general terms. Despite this it is possible to examine common strategies employed in the production of national identity and how they are used to further particular
agendas. Simply put this study shall not seek to explain why national identity is created but how individuals and groups seek to perform and propagate their own conceptions of these identities.

Some terminological clarification is perhaps in order. There is in fact some debate, as noted by Ivanic (1998: 10-11), as to the use of the term ‘identity’ itself to refer to the problem of ‘people’s sense of who they are’. Indeed in this analysis several differing terms will be used to try and conceptualise the various elements which it shall be argued constitute any given identity. An explanation of these terms and how they are intended to relate to the overall concept of identity or an identity shall be provided which, it is hoped, shall provide something of a coherent overall scheme. Given the purpose of the analysis however is both to highlight the social construction of identity and gain a sense of how this leads to the particular phenomenon of ‘national identity’ it would seem perverse to utilise another term for identity in general such as the ‘self’, ‘ego’ or ‘persona’ preferred in some other analyses.

i) Identity and the Individual

To begin an examination of the concept of national identity it is necessary to first investigate the concept of identity itself. In purely formal terms and in terms of logic identity is a relational term asserting a sameness or equality; however identity in practice is somewhat more difficult to explain. Clearly whilst our concept of identity can relate to a quality of sameness in an object it must also encompass more subtle and dynamic nuances to enable us to apply it successfully in the real world. A useful starting point for this investigation is the theory of identity advanced by Paul Ricoeur (1985, 1992). This theory articulates the existence of two related types of identity, the existence of which aids the mind to relate to the outside world. The first of these types of identity is *Idem* identity, which is a conception of identity as sameness. This consists of
three different elements. Firstly numerical identity, or two occurrences of a thing designated by an invariable noun, is expressed by this type of identity. *Idem* identity allows the re-identification of the same thing, or as it may be expressed the same thing, $n$ times. This is linked to the second element of this type of identity, namely the idea of qualitative identity, which Ricoeur defines as the ‘operation of substitution without semantic loss’. This is essentially the criterion of extreme resemblance; Ricoeur gives the example of individuals wearing the ‘same’ clothes, which would be interchangeable without it being possible to discern difference. Evidently, as Ricoeur acknowledges, with the increase in temporal distance between a recollection of the past and present reality, or indeed any sustained break in perception a problem may arise whereby an object or individual is recognised despite having been subject to perceptible change. In such instances the third element of *Idem* identity is utilised, namely the element of uninterrupted continuity whereby despite dissemblance a thing can be recognised as the same or rather re-recognised. This conception of a kind of essential immutability, a structure, undermines and removes the potential threat to any identity that the reality of temporal change poses. In terms of the individual this can described as that part of identity Motyl describes as “a persisting quality or dimension of me, as I am, and not as I am defined by others or as I appear to others in different contexts” (2010: 69). Evidently such a consciousness of continuity must be present to allow the construction of a coherent and stable idea of personal identity.

Identity, in Ricoeur’s view, does not however merely consist of the components of *Idem* identity detailed above. He also develops a conception of another kind of identity which he terms *Ipse* identity. *Ipse* identity is identified as ‘Selfhood’ by Ricoeur, which is similar to the 'Ego' of Goffman (1963: 106). Ipse identity is rather more difficult to define in exact terms and can be understood as 'uniqueness', as it is for example by Martin (1995: 5-10), meaning singularity. Wodak et al. (2009:11-12) have cautiously noted the similarity to Goffman’s (1963: 56) conception of ego identity where that identity is the individual's subjective feeling of their situation and uniqueness. This selfhood or ego would allow the ability to direct behaviour in accordance with perceived needs, roles, expectations and desires, to avoid a purely mechanical,
deterministic view of identity. Essentially these concepts, in a basic sense, could be seen as equivalent to a sense of ‘consciousness’ of oneself as a discrete individual with the capacity to direct behaviour towards a particular end. It would perhaps be unwise to attempt to push this conception any further than this basic consciousness of the self, or to assert a sense of individual identity arises from this faculty in isolation. As shall be discussed below it cannot be conjectured that consciousness operates independently of the process of social interaction, as a result of the exchange of ideological signs. Furthermore it would not be helpful to extend the concept of ‘Selfhood’ or *Ipse* identity beyond the individual. It would seem implausible for any group, and certainly impossible for an abstract entity such as the ‘nation’ to have any concept of selfhood. Although such a collective ‘self’ is evidently often evoked in nationalist discourse and indeed the idea of such a national ‘soul’ is at the heart of certain theories of the nation (e.g. that of Ernest Renan, see Renan 1996 [1882]), there does not seem to be any possibility of such consciousness in any meaningful scientific sense.

Ricoeur views *Ipse* and *Idem* identity as operating in a dialectical relationship with each other, with 'narrative identity' operating as a conduit between the two, a *personage*, or basically the identity of a character. This identity or basically narrative has to be able to integrate “what seems to be its contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability” (1992: 40). This scheme allows for the imagined or perceived constancy of an individual to be squared with the unexpected variables, contradictions and changes which threaten this temporal unity, thus allowing a coherent identity. This allows an individual to communicate their identity to others and give meaning to acts which would otherwise be potentially meaningless, unless set against this narrative. An important aspect here is that this allows the possibility of variations or revisions to the narrative being made to allow the integration of dissonance and disparity introduced by changes to the *Idem* identity of the self or indeed others and how these impact on the interior *Ipse* identity without inducing a crisis. It shall be argued, however, that this ability to reconstruct the self through reconstruction of the *personage* is not infinite. The construction of the narrative identity although in many senses a
powerful cognitive resource is embedded in a system of societal norms and also
cognitive structures which somewhat curtail the ability of the individual to
construct their identity. As shall be seen the more or less objective perceptions
which could be seen as constituting the Idem identity are structured according to
a set of dispositions which are themselves structured by such perceptions. Thus
the individual, although given the capacity to develop their sense of self, does not
have unlimited capacity to develop their personage. Another part of the
construction of identity which must now be raised here is that the construction of
identity is not something which happens in some kind of egocentric vacuum.
Humans are a social species, and hence a great deal if not in fact all of the
cognitive processes that go towards the constitution of the identity of any
individual must necessarily take into account society, or put another way the
identity of an individual is constituted as much socially as it is through individual
caprice. The personage Ricoeur identifies is constructed for and by others rather
than being the product of some kind of closed mental process.

A useful theoretical conception which, I shall argue, may be closely
related to the ideas advanced above is the idea of the habitus as advanced by
Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu the habitus is the set of dispositions
which incline any agent to act in a particular way. Not only that, however, as it
is not only the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements but the
system of classification of such practises. As Bourdieu notes it is “in the
relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to
produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and
appreciate these practices and products that the represented social world is
constructed” (1989: 170). The habitus is conceived of as a structured and
structuring structure; the principle whereby social reality is divided into what
may be termed logical classes, or identities, which constitute the social world, is
made possible by the internalisation of the division of the world into such
classes. As Bourdieu advances “each class condition is defined, simultaneously,
by its intrinsic properties and by the relational properties which it derives from
its position in the system of class conditions, which is also a system of
difference, differential positions, i.e. by everything which distinguishes it from
what it is not and especially from everything it is opposed to; social identity is
defined and asserted through difference” (1989: 172). With this in mind it is then clear that the structure of social conditions as it can be apprehended within the perception of a subject is thus an intrinsic aspect of the habitus occupying any particular position in that structure. The habitus thus recognises differences between given conditions and understands these through the prism of the differences between the products of any other habitus according to the principles of differentiation which are the product of such differences and thus are perceived as objective and natural. It is through this internalisation of the structure of social space, producing this classificatory system, that the individual perceives the world and classifies themselves and others within it. This should not however be taken to mean that the subject is bound by this habitus to act in a predetermined, mechanistic way, although this may also in fact be the case is some circumstances; this theory is above all reliant on a cognitive approach to the world which allows the individual the possibility of attempting to manipulate social reality as shall be discussed.

The concept of the habitus could be compared to the *Ipse* identity, conscious of the narrative identity and attempting to act in accordance with it, or occasionally choosing or having to accept an action, impression or experience that must then be accommodated with the narrative identity and thus alters the habitus insofar as it perhaps alters the dispositions of the individual to a greater or lesser extent. This would allow us to accept the idea of the habitus determining the actions of an individual but also allowing a place for individual action to alter these dispositions and thus possible future actions. Here we are already venturing towards the social aspect of identity production; noting the dialectical relationship between the production of identity, the individual and society.

In terms of the dispositions of the individual towards the adoption, production and negotiation of any particular identity it is worth further examining the dispositions of the individual and the way the effect this process. We can readily compare the idea of the habitus with the ideas of van Dijk on the cognitive basis of identity production. Van Dijk advances the idea of the ‘K-device’, a set of knowledge shared by members of a particular community. This set of shared knowledge, which could be obtained through a variety of methods,
notably education, is conceived as “general world knowledge shared by the epistemic communities of which the language user is a member” (2010: 613). This world knowledge does not need to be construed as mechanically imbibed but can be critically reflected upon; it will however help constitute the dispositions of the subject. Such a set of knowledge constitutes a set of symbolic resources at the subject’s disposal for the interpretation of the outside world. The presence of such knowledge influences the evaluation of the outside world by the subject; hence their semantic understanding of discourse will include both the explicit semantic meaning of the given text but also a range of referential meanings. This leads to what van Dijk calls the phenomenon of semantic comprehension; the individual relates to their discursive surroundings not merely on the basis of what is explicit in any given interaction but also with reference to a range of nuances both speaker and listener are assumed to share. Furthermore in certain circumstances, especially amongst individuals from differing communities, the nuances attached to a certain word, or to rephrase, the ideological content of a particular sign, shall vary according to the dispositions of the habitus or the collective knowledge they possess; that is to say the individual shall evaluate and respond to a stimulus according to their particular social position and background.

A further refinement of this model of individual identity production might be found in the optical model proposed by Kaufmann (2008). This model envisages the production of identity to be akin to the production of an image on the retina. The process involves an initial population or territorial referent passing through a series of interpretive lenses to focus on a series of ‘facts’. Some form of territorial or population referent would appear necessary in the especial case of national identity given this must be related to a putative ‘nation’; in a Western context where the conception of a ‘nation state’ is dominant this idea seems particularly useful but it should also be possible to apply this idea to the Karelian context. It will be argued below that the idea of nationality has somewhat different connotations within societies that have developed from the Russian and Soviet intellectual traditions but both understandings of the concept do attempt to delimitate national groups in territorial terms and with reference to apparent objective characteristics. This process then produces an image of the
‘nation’ for the subject concerned. This model is quite attractive as an attempt to
describe the range of factors which combine to produce what appears to be, on
face-value, a quite straightforward concept such as national identity. The model
is also quite useful as it presupposes, as Kaufmann contends (2008: 452) that the
initial referents are based on apparently objective facts such as a common
language, territory or shared ‘national history’. This is an important point to note
as whilst some analyses, as discussed below, would contend that national identity
is entirely constructed and synthetic this would be to overstate the ability of the
individual or any institution, including the state, to manipulate the social world.
Clearly the ‘image’ of the nation may be heavily distorted after filtering through
the various lenses of ideology and interests an individual may possess but no
such identity can be accepted as potentially valid without reference to concrete
facts. In terms of national identity any identity produced would normally seek to
correspond to certain definite historical, geographical or linguistic facts. These
facts are of course subject to the same dialectical pressures as the individual (in
terms of differing historical interpretations, borders and language shifts) but will
tend to appear at any given moment as objectively true. Symbolic resources, that
is to say the set of knowledge or dispositions ingrained in the subject, are also
constantly being renegotiated and refracted by these processes. Indeed the
subject may actively attempt to reinterpret such resources to advance an alternate
plan of their national identity. Whilst the freedom of the subject to do so is in a
certain sense infinite, however, the reception of such attempts will be bounded
by the same set of symbolic resources at the disposal of the subject’s audience.
That is to say we possess a certain ‘identity repertoire’ as Motyl describes it,
“identity is thus situational, but rooted in certain intrinsic characteristics that are
not situational” (2010: 70). We must here place the caveat however that the
characteristics which are not situational are not immutable in the sense that their
reception may change, thus the status of being, for example, an English-speaker
or born in New Delhi are non-situational characteristics of an individual, but the
symbolic values associated with either may be subject to change or may be
renegotiated by the individual within a certain likely range of possibilities.

The optical model with its multiple layers of refraction of any concept is
also useful in highlighting that no one single factor need to be emphasised as
producing a given identity. The refraction of the referent through layers of both symbolic resources and ideologies underscores the fact that national identity in any individual is not merely the result of one key process. The prevailing allocation of nationalisms into either the ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ categories is not readily applicable to real individuals. The model Kaufmann proposes avoids the temptation to use such categorisations. As shall be discussed further below such a categorisation is not necessarily helpful when dealing with discrete manifestations of particular national identities. Despite this caveat it is also worthwhile recalling that:

“Even if all the interpretive frameworks could be eliminated, identity cannot function without our inbuilt cognitive machinery which reduces the infinite complexity of our sense-impressions down to a manageable focus. For this reason no more than a handful – perhaps as few as two or three – genealogical-historical components can remain central to one’s national identity.” (Kaufmann 2008: 451)

We should like to interpret this as the recognition of the fact that whilst a multitude of ideological and social factors combine to produce any given individual’s identity an individual can only focus consciously on a number of these. Evidently more broadly within a putative group or state more such ideological and social factors are at work, producing a broad range of potential identities which any individual can subscribe to or reject as they accord with their own dispositions and beliefs. A state in particular may promote certain ‘facts’ and attempt to create an ideological representation of the ‘nation’ which can be particularly influential given its propagation through education and the banal nationalism of quotidian administration as discussed further below; whilst this is especially effective given the role of education in forming the initial dispositions or habitus of the individual and constitutes an attempted hegemony heterodoxies nevertheless can be and are posited by individuals and oppositional groups as the analysis of Karelian identities will show. Thus whilst the factors themselves and the subject’s perception of these factors is constantly altered in a complex and constant dialectical fashion the subject chooses an number of key
ideological or symbolic resources upon which to base their identity. These resources may readily change or be reinterpreted, but they provide a semi-stable basis, a form of *Idem* identity, for that individual to narrate their identity.

The purpose of the above is to indicate the complex dialectical process of individual identity formation. The complexity of social identity formation is quite apparent but if we are to successfully apply our principles to this field we must recall that:

“If man is made the measure of all things, and if with the aid of that assumption all transcendence is to be eliminated without man himself being measured against this criterion, without applying the same standard to himself or – more exactly – without making man himself dialectical, then man himself is made into an absolute and simply puts himself into the place of these transcendental forces he was supposed to explain, dissolve and systematically replace” (Bourdieu 1990: 187).

ii) Identity, the Individual and Society

To begin an examination of the relationship between identity production, the individual and society a useful starting point is an examination of the relationship between individual consciousness and social interaction. A key component of this relationship, it can be argued, is linguistic. It is of particular importance to establish the relevance of this concept as the analysis to be undertaken depends upon an examination of an corpus of data derived from press and interview material. Language use is not merely communicative, as by no means all or even perhaps the greater part of the meaning of any statement is its propositional content. If we begin our analysis from the starting point of Ferdinand de Saussure’s (see Saussure 2011 [1916]) contention that language is a system of signifiers and signified which is ultimately arbitrary then, as Joseph (2004: 48) notes identities are 'conventional labels for culturally conventionalised categories'. Such an analysis is clearly quite inadequate, however. To further
understand the relationship between language and the production of society we
must refer to the work of the Bakhtin Circle (see Todorov 1984 for a discussion
of whether these ideas are attributable to Bakhtin himself or other members of
the group). As Voloshinov (1973 [1929]) has pointed out to merely follow a
Saussurian account would give rise to a system in which reality was not
reflected, i.e. no account would be made of how these categories and labels were
produced but merely the “relationship of sign to sign in a closed system”(ibid:
52). As Voloshinov argues reality is refracted in the sign and therefore language
itself becomes a medium for the expression of social differences. Reality is not
reflected mechanically in the sign but rather the sign itself, the utterance or text
in question, becomes the nexus of the struggle for control over the social reality.

“Every sign, as we know, is a construct between socially organised
persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore the forms of signs are
conditioned above all by the social organisation of the participants involved and
also by the immediate condition of their interaction. When these forms change,
so does the sign.” (ibid: 21).

Rather than following an idealist pattern of locating ideology merely in
consciousness Voloshinov argues consciousness arises in the material
embodiment of signs. Such signs emerge only in the process of interaction, thus
consciousness is consciousness only when filled with semiotic content through
social interaction. Therefore we see that individual consciousness is in fact a
social-ideological fact. Language use is consequently inherently political in the
most basic sense of the word. Evidently in the scheme advanced by Voloshinov
the struggle over social reality that is conceptualised as being refracted and
shaped through this mechanism is the Marxist class struggle of the bourgeoisie
and proletariat, however if this view of language’s constitutive social function is
adopted it becomes clear that it can and must be applied to the construction of
any society in general and the position of the individual within it. As Voloshinov
and Bakhtin (1981, 1994) argue language is also dialogic, with any utterance
being formulated with a particular audience in mind; as van Dijk has also
emphasised we need to consider not merely the utterance but the intent of the
speaker (van Dijk 2010: 683). The utterance is dialogic even with regards to the internal monologue which seeks to help the self position itself in the social world. In fact this concept can be related to the concept of narrative identity, with internal utterances offered up for the acceptance or rejection of the Ipse identity, for incorporation into the narrative identity and in fact to facilitate its operation. The narrative identity is in fact this internal dialogue or dialectic in operation, the dialogue of the ‘self’ with itself which integrates or rejects aspects of the perceived social reality into its conception of itself. This dialectic leads to the phenomenon of heteroglossia, or the constant presence of differing manners of speaking or discourses which are perpetually reacting to one another and indeed are generated explicitly for this interaction. Language then is not merely an independent faculty which allows for the expression of social reality but the key component in the constitution of social reality. This is a point developed at great length by many academics since Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s ideas were first advanced within the USSR, and it may very well be argued that much later theorising is either heavily indebted to or in fact somewhat derivative of these ideas; although many of these ideas were developed apparently independently by Western scholars at a later date.

This view of the nature of language would accord with the ideas of Bourdieu who does not envisage the habitus as a passive agent, rather as an agent engaging in the exchange of symbolic power with other agents. Relations between habitus and various fields are the site of struggle for capital of various forms, such as symbolic capital, creating various markets and providing a link between actions and interests; these are not narrowly economic in the ordinary sense. Linguistic utterances produced in various contexts are valued at varying rates, thus speakers can produce and possess varied amounts of linguistic capital, this results in a variety of expressions from speakers depending on their relative positions in this market and their access to various sorts of capital. To operate successfully (with the acceptance of other members of a group or to be recognised as contributing to a certain discourse) a speaker must be aware of what is or is not permissible in any discourse. The standardised ‘official’ or ‘technical’ language and competence in this language permits individuals to create groups and restrict or permit other individuals from being part of these
groups or making an acceptable contribution to any discourse. The lack of a
certain sort of linguistic capital denies dominated individuals (or ‘non-experts’,
the ‘unqualified’ etc.) from access to certain groups and restricts their ability to
contribute to a discourse or in fact renders them silent.

Thus as Voloshinov opines language is the medium for the expression of
social difference (or one of the mediums) and cannot be seen as anything other
than political in a very basic sense. Also it must be noted that utterances are
always produced with their reception in mind, thus identity reception is at least
as important as identity production, and indeed is inseparable from it. It is of
course possible for any individual to wilfully assert any identity as much as it
possible for any individual to attempt to undercut the established markets of
linguistic and cultural capital with a non-standard contribution, however if their
contribution is rejected as not measuring up to the accepted forms and norms it
shall be rejected, and in much the same manner an identity asserted must also be
assessed by society in accordance with the accepted norms. Hence whilst any
individual actor has theoretically unlimited freedom to construct an identity,
identity is also constituted socially and thus the individual will always be
perceived in accordance with the dispositions of those around them and accorded
a place in the perceived position in the network of social structures and
hierarchies which are based on the struggle for cultural capital and its
distribution.

Further to the above it then becomes necessary to examine the manner in
which the properties of the habitus and the struggle for cultural capital create and
dissolve group identities. This process can be viewed as being accomplished
through Rites of Institution and Authorised Language; unlike Austin (1975),
Bourdieu does not contend that the substance of speech is key to efficacy of
speech. Language represents authority, and symbolises it in discourses of
authority. It must be recognised that the ‘symbolic efficacy of words [is]
exercised only in so far as person subjected to it recognises the person who
exercises it as authorised to do so’ (1991: 116). The creation of institutions and
thus divisions in society is accomplished through the creation of arbitrary limits
and their inculcation in society, as they can only exist if socially valid. In any
given moment the social world is in the throes of a struggle between what may
be termed Orthodoxy (Doxa) and Heretical Discourse. The Doxa or orthodox may be conceived as the current principles of group construction, that is to say the current set of dispositions within the habitus which regard a certain subject position as valid and another as invalid. These accepted dispositions, or accepted structures, allow the habitus to treat as legitimate any claim to a particular identity. As has been seen above it is the natural tendency of the habitus to seek to classify the social world and indeed be classified by it, but the principles by which this operation is affected are objectively open to alteration. It is possible for a new system of classification to be proposed, or alterations proposed to an existing schema, which if accepted then becomes a new orthodoxy. At first this newly proposed classification or schema is put forward as a ‘Heretical’ discourse, and its efficacy depends directly on the linguistic resources available to the subject, which is to say the amount of linguistic capital they possess. As Bourdieu proposes ‘every group is the site of a struggle to impose a legitimate principle of group construction‘ and therefore there is a constant struggle in discourse between the dominant who wish to conserve orthodoxy and those who wish to create a new social identity. This struggle is almost always and most effectively carried out through discourse, linguistically, through the use of cultural capital as stated above. The manner through which the struggle is advanced is the exploitation of symbolic power:

‘Symbolic power - as a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent if what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilisation - is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognised, that is misrecognised as arbitrary (ibid: 170)’.

Thus symbolic power results from belief in legitimacy of the words uttered, but this cannot be produced merely by the utterance itself. The entire structure of social reality as perceived by the habitus which receives the utterance will tend to confirm or deny the perceived truth of any utterance, which
will then possess a greater or lesser degree of ‘objective truth’ as it conforms to
the structures of the social reality perceived by the habitus and is incorporated
into these structures. The symbolic power exercised by the speaker is also
directly relevant to the position they occupy within the recognised hierarchies
which the habitus uses to construct the social reality and by which it has been
constructed. Thus it becomes perfectly clear why, for example, the utterance of a
‘thief-in-law’, for example, must and would be assessed and valued at varying
rates by a judge, member of the public or another such criminal. In one instance
the utterance may be despised or ignored, or indeed in the other if uttered in
criminal argot simply not understood, whereas for the final category it may be
given, depending on the position of the individual criminal within the relevant
hierarchy, respect and authority. The utterance, furthermore, would have clearly
differing levels of effect given particular situation in which it was made, for
example within a court or prison cell, providing a large measure of its potential
symbolic power before the propositional content is even considered. Thus any
utterance must be considered within the full context of its creation if its potential
and actual symbolic power and thus its potency for the alteration or consolidation
of the social world can be assessed. As Bourdieu puts it “a language is worth
what those who speak it are worth, so too, at the level of interactions between
individuals, speech always owes a major part of its value to the value of the
person who utters it” (1977: 652).

This scheme of symbolic power accords very well with our model of the
production of individual identity detailed above. We can now propose a coherent
scheme of identity production where various identities are proposed and received
according to the apparently objective dispositions of the habitus in conjunction
with the communal knowledge and symbolic resources at our disposal. Such
identities are proposed and received in accordance with both these symbolic
resources and our ability, our stock of symbolic power, to aid their reception.
This scheme of identity production acknowledges both the potentialities and
limitations of our freedom to proclaim any particular national identity. It
recognises both the manner in which social facts influence our identities and the
manner in which we can interpret and shape social facts. This method shall
allow us to analyse the manner in which different groups attempt to discursively
‘set the limits’ of what various forms of Karelian identity should be and the relation between this process and the broader social context of Karelian society. This method is, it is to be hoped, a demonstration of a conceptual system within which as Lukacs described:

“The knowledge that social facts are not objects but relations between men is intensified to the point where facts are wholly dissolved into processes. But if their being appears as a becoming this should not be construed as an abstract universal flux sweeping past, it is no vacuous duree reelle but the universal production and reproduction of these relations” (1968: 168).

2.2 National Identity and the Nation

i) What is the Nation?

Before considering questions of how national identities are constructed within the Republic of Karelia it is necessary to consider what is meant by the terms ‘nationality’ or ‘nation’ themselves. As has been stated above this analysis presupposes that nations and therefore national identity are discursively constructed. That is not to contend, as we have noted, that nations and national identities do not appear to have a certain objective reality. We have already argued that the ability to produce any particular national identity is limited to a certain extent, and limited by what appear to be objective factors. Nations and nationalisms are constrained by their ability to appeal to referents such an apparent shared language, history, culture or geography. As a consequence of this much thinking on the nation has traditionally accepted that either nations must be a kind of natural fact or that nationalism must be a definite and perhaps inevitable process. Despite this academic study of the nation has yet to satisfactorily provide any definition of what a nation is that can be generally
accepted, and has significantly failed in determining a point from which we are able to actually speak of ‘nations’ historically. It is my contention that such a definition is intrinsically impossible, nor can a firm date ever be placed on the genesis of the ‘nation’ historically. Despite this nations are recognisably part of our modern world; despite my insistence on the constructed nature of the identity I would not deny that I myself consider myself to possess a national identity and to live in what would be termed by most people, including myself, a nation, if not a nation-state. The idea of the nation itself and its construction is therefore worth considering.

Much debate has traditionally centred around two differing conceptions of how nations are formed, the civic or political nation and the ethnic or cultural nation. The Romantic notion of the nation advanced in the eighteenth century by the likes of Fichte (see Fichte 1968) which determined nations to have ‘natural’ boundaries exemplifies a common view of the ethnic or cultural nation. Those arguing for a particular cultural nation emphasise a shared language or culture which is distinctive enough to merit the existence of a discrete ‘nationality’. In terms of the civic nation a particularly key contribution was made by Ernst Renan who formulated the idea of the cultural and political ‘types’ of nation; the political nation (such as supposedly France) was formed by a voluntary union of people who decide to live together as a nation due to a desire to preserve a common past and share a common future (Renan 1996: 53-55). Such a constitutionalist view of the nation relies heavily on the idea of the state acting as a unifying factor by combining together different individuals on the basis of their shared belief in certain political principles. Renan’s model uses similar terminology to the earlier Romantic conception of a nation by appealing to a shared ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, but as Joseph (2004: 112-3) contends by locating such a soul within the shared memories of the community involved he passes beyond Romantic conceptions towards a view of the nation as a mental construct or act of consciousness. Such a model has been favoured by Kohn (1944:12-16) amongst others as explaining the constitution of certain nations which may not necessarily coincide with linguistic or cultural boundaries.

Both the conception of a nation as constituted by an act or continuing process of political will or as constituted by cultural or linguistic boundaries can
be readily criticised for a variety of reasons. The concept of a nation as defined by political will readily conflates nationality with citizenship; it is clear from our own experience that nations apparently formed on the basis of a shared set of political values, such as say the United States, also display the characteristics of nations supposedly formed by ‘natural boundaries’. The idea there are natural principles of division is also flawed on the basis that we can clearly also determine that such natural principles (i.e. language, culture etc.) do not always give rise to nations. There are communities who possess, say, a shared language but are clearly not considered to be part of the same nation just as there are communities who possess these characteristics but which are not considered to be nations at all. Furthermore state boundaries are not the same as linguistic boundaries and the linguistic unity of a nation can be the result of deliberate or chance intervention by a range of factors. Hobsbawm has also noted (1990: 6) that there are nations which would be recognised as such by the majority of observers which do not apparently meet any of the criteria proposed by either theory. All of these considerations highlight the dynamic nature of nation-formation and recognition; the principles by which any given nation is defined or defines itself can vary immensely and can be subject to change. Indeed as Hroch (1996: 79) has pointed out some factors may be of vital importance in a particular nation-building process and almost irrelevant in others. The manner in which the French or Russian nation might be conceptualised, for example, is inevitably dependent on the period concerned and the subject involved in the conceptualising.

This is not to argue that the nation is entirely contingent. As has been discussed above the ability of any individual to claim any particular identity or to propose or alter the dynamics of group construction is not entirely limitless. Kedourie’s (1993) argument that nationalism and the nation is an entirely contingent phenomenon is clearly unsustainable. Gellner is clearly correct when he proposes that nationalism is “neither contingent nor accidental” but “the necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions”, he is also correct when he notes that it is “not the destiny of all men” (1997: 10-11). The rise of the nation as a principle of group construction must be sought in the particular set of social circumstances within which it appeared. Once nationality
had become a recognised principle of group construction it would inevitably appear to be a natural fact of human existence; this is clearly incorrect, however once it had become such a symbolic resource it would inevitably appear to have a ‘reality’ in the same manner of any other such resource. As has been argued above to have efficacy it would have to rely on certain referents which appeared to have an objective social reality, thus the nation itself gains an objective social reality in the eye of the beholder. As a consequence of this process the nation, socially constructed as it may well be in the final analysis, is the product of definite social processes and possesses an objective reality which belies its origins.

What a nation is precisely thus defies definition. Ultimately a nation is a nation if a certain group claims it is and that claim is generally recognised. This may seem a rather facetious answer to the question posed above but it is the only accurate answer. Any attempt to formulate a universal template for the nation will ultimately founder on the difficulties of applying such a model to the real world. Evidently however these templates are not entirely useless. The nation may well be a socially constructed concept and thus ultimately subjective but the reifying effects of our contemplation of this concept affect our understanding of the world and change our actual interaction with it. By seeking to understand the genesis and actuality of the nation and nationalisms through the prisms of such theorising we inevitably influence the manner in which we construct both these concepts and social reality. To give a concrete example Light has demonstrated that “nationalism did not lead to the creation of nation-states in Central Asia; rather state narratives are one way to legitimise control over people within a bounded territory” (2011: 33). This example demonstrates that once the idea of nations and nationalisms becomes current there is a certain reifying tendency to seek and create nations where none existed previously. The resulting nation may well be contingent in the sense that another nation might very well have been created instead or none at all, but if accepted it will gain a certain actuality.

It has been stated above that it is not my intention to explain why such ‘imagined communities’ are created nor is it my intention to provide an answer to the question of when nations became a valid principle for the construction of such communities. Some comments on these two issues are however necessary
to understand the aspects of the nation and national identity we shall examine. In terms of the theoretical basis outlined above it shall be clear that the struggle to assert or deny any group identity is political in a basic sense and therefore has to do with the perceived interests of the individual concerned. In this sense therefore clearly the assertion of a national identity must be seen to have certain perceived benefits. It is my contention that the particular perceived benefits involved in any particular manifestation of national identity will be as unique as the circumstances associated. Clearly differing groups at differing historical points in time shall have differing motivations in asserting one particular identity over another. Many excellent analyses of various nationalisms have been produced, for example by Hroch, Smith (1985, 1987) and Hobsbawn (1983, 1990) to name just a small selection demonstrating the particular socio-historical factors which gave rise to certain national movements. It would however be a mistake in my view to extrapolate from these analyses and attempt to form a model of nationalism and nation building that would be valid for every instance and for all time. In very basic terms it is clear that all nationalism are an articulation of perceived interests, insofar as the creation or maintenance of any particular group must correspond to perceived benefits to be received from the membership of this group. It is also true that in the final analysis much of this benefit is material; a recent study has noted the particular material benefits sought from the EU by certain Czech politicians from maintaining one particular version of Czech historical identity (Gledwell 2011: 487). It however would be a mistake to contend as Silverstein has proposed that we should only consider political and economic factors in the production of nationalism (Silverstein 2000: 130-8). In the dialectical production of national identity the promotion of identity can become a means in and of itself, as Kaufmann notes:

   Individuals national identities when codified into collective representations can become ideologies – lenses influencing individuals’ subsequent interpretation of symbolic resources (2008: 468).

The key point here is to remember that the identity produced by these factors is not just a product but a part of this dialectical process. Thus whilst
dependent upon social, political and economic factors the production and promotion of national identity becomes a factor in the interpretation and production of social, political and economic factors, thus as Joseph notes

This ‘we-ness’ and the national identities and imagined communities founded upon it are neither more or less real than ‘the dialectical workings of political processes’ or ‘political economic conflict’, because they are in fact an inseparable part of them (2004: 125).

Nationalism or the nation may also provide certain other benefits, such as Cohen has suggested, by providing a mechanism for the individual to advance aspects of their own identity; a national identity may provide a shared space for the realisation and performance of personal identity (1994: 157-166).

As for the question of when nations can be said to have come into being, it is generally held that the beginning of the age of nationalism was the start of the nineteenth century. It would seem to inappropriate to attempt to apply the terminology of the nation prior to this as the idea of a nation can only be sensibly understood in its own terms; that is to say prior to the consciousness of the idea of the nation and attempts to use nationalism to create or dissolve such groups nations qua nations did not exist. Different principles of group construction were used to comprehend and create different types of groups. This may sound like sophistry, a kind of extreme philosophical relativism, but simply put a nation cannot sensibly have said to have existed prior to national consciousness. Many of the historical, linguistic or territorial referents which would later be utilised in the creation of national consciousness undoubtedly would have existed, in some if not all cases; the point is that these referents were not combined with our contemporary ideological and symbolic notions of nationhood to produce national identity. The beginning of this process is inevitably a distinct event in the construction of each discrete nation.
ii) Constructing the Nation

The construction of the nation has been a subject of intense debate ever since the natural and organic existence of the nation was called into question. It has been noted previously that the construction of groups involves certain individual psychological process, albeit processes intrinsically social in nature. Nevertheless the nation is a group which has an existence far beyond the limited social experience of any one individual. It is in this sense, as Benedict Anderson famously termed it, ‘imagined community, as “the members of even the smallest nation will never know of most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them; yet in their minds each lives in the image of their communion” (1983: 15). It is therefore necessary to examine in greater depth how exactly such a community can be formed and maintained. Clearly powerful symbolic resources must be mobilised in order to bring about the existence of the nation; thus begins the process of forming national myths through which to unite an otherwise disparate group of individuals with their own interests. Anderson believes the fall of Latin as the sacred language and the advent of the printing press as key events in the transformation of local languages into national languages with enhanced symbolic power (1983: 40). The creation of a marketplace for books in these languages created languages of power as certain dialects replaced outdated sacred languages as symbols of learning and status, thus opening the door for the process of nation-building, the written language thus creating nationalism (1983: 48 and 122). The creation of a national language is certainly a very potent tool in creating nationalism and national consciousness; however Anderson goes too far in attempting to conflate the creation of such a language with the creation of the nation. National languages, indeed the notion of a codified, pure form of any language are artificial; they are Kantian constructs which do not exist in reality any more than the ideal form of the nation exists in reality. As surely as Voloshinov demonstrated that it was futile to attempt to reason about language in the abstract without reference to the actual utterance
any attempt to found the nation or nationalism on a conception of an idealised national language shall be found wanting. As Hobsbawm has noted such languages “are in fact the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be” (1990: 51). A national language is itself a synthetic idealised form derived from actual spoken language, rather than the basis for spoken language itself. Despite this the symbolism of a national language, once created, can be an extremely powerful tool for the nationalist. The idea of a common national language may serve to mobilise national sentiment regardless of the number and varieties of dialects actually spoken in a given nation. In the context of the states of the former Soviet Union the idea of ‘national’ languages is of particular importance in the creation and reproduction of ‘national’ groups, as shall be discussed further below.

If language is not the basis of the construction of national identity then what is? An important part of the construction of national identity is in fact the rather more mundane repository of national symbolism termed ‘banal nationalism’ by Billig (1995). This refers to the reinforcement of a particular nationalism by the presence of national symbolism in our everyday lives. Through the constant presence of national symbolism on stamps, banknotes and the like we are inculcated in the belief we are part of the community those symbols represent. This mundane symbolism is an important aspect of the construction of the community of the nation. By surrounding us with this sea of small symbolic references the state (ordinarily if not necessarily exclusively) attempts to predispose us to considering these references part of our own symbolic resources and thus a part of the community which shares these resources.

Such banal nationalism clearly cannot sustain or produce national identity by itself, however. It may seek to help maintain a certain identity but clearly more effective methods of construction must be employed to persuade us to adopt one or other nationality. After all, the dollar is a common currency of exchange across the world yet has hardly influenced individuals in Taipei or Nairobi to consider themselves Americans regardless of how often they handle a dollar bill; likewise most patriotic US citizens are not prepared to fight for their nation merely because they are constantly surrounded by the symbolism of the
US state. Clearly this banal symbolism, effective as it may be, must relate to certain more resonant symbolic resources which can mobilise national sentiment to such extremes. An important aspect of this type of nationalism must be the employment of national myths. As suggested by the Hobsbawm quote above such myths play a large role in the creation and maintenance of national identity.

iii) Narrating National Identity

The concept of narration as a key cognitive resource in the production and reproduction of individual identity has already been discussed. Nationalisms, that is to say the principles by which national groups are perceived and recognised, are not constant. A further objection to theories which would seek to conclusively define this or that nationalism is that nationalisms are subject to the same dialectical forces outlined above. As Na Thalang has noted in connection with certain Indonesian nationalist movements that:

Not only can the ideological basis of nationalism transform over time, but also the form nationalism takes is not always a constant. The use of the term ethnic nationalism should be no means imply that the term ethnic is biologically fixed or primordial (2009: 322).

Nationalisms are constantly evolving in response to the changing development of the societies within which they are ensconced, much as they aid the changes within these societies. Nevertheless one common feature of nationalism is that it attempts to view this development as a continuum. Most nationalisms consider their nation to have a definite history which stretches back far beyond the advent of the particular political nationalism in question. That is to say the narration of the nation plays an important part in the construction of any national identity. By reference to a shared heritage nationalisms can appeal to a set of particular symbolic resources which in theory are unique to that nation. The interpretation of historical events commonly leads to the narration of
a ‘national story’, a story of the realisation of the nation in question from a proto-
nation state to national self-consciousness and fulfilment.

Various researchers have attempted to provide an analysis of this process
which identifies key elements present in the narration of national identities. One
of the aims of this study has been to examine the relevance of these ideas to the
production of national identities within the Republic of Karelia. Stuart Hall
(1996: 615) and Leszek Kolakowski (1995: 33-54) have both presented schemes
which categorise national identity as characterised by five elements, although
they disagree on the exact composition of these elements. An outline of the
elements is given below:

Stuart Hall’s Five Elements

1. Narrative of the nation
2. Emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness
3. Invention of tradition
4. Foundation myth or myth of origin
5. The idea of a pure original people

Leszek Kolakowski’s Five Elements

1. National spirit or Volksgeist
2. Historical memory
3. Anticipation and future orientation
4. The ‘national body’
5. A nameable beginning

Both agree that a foundational myth or nameable beginning (essentially
the same thing) is one of these aspects present in the narration of any nationality.
As I shall discuss further below I do not agree such a foundational myth is
present in all nationalism or national identities, at least not always in a coherent
and identifiable sense. The other aspects are similar in certain regards if not by any means identical. To discuss each in turn it Hall’s idea of the narrative of the nation would appear to be a very useful formulation. Such a narrative presented (not necessarily in anything other than fragmentary form) with inevitable regularity through media, literature, education and in almost all discourse relating to the nation provides a coherent and reassuring scheme for the individual. By narrating the nation the individual and society provide the illusion that the nation is not created; by reaching back into history and mobilising certain symbolic resources the individual can provide a narrative which apparently proves the objective and almost eternal existence of the nation itself.

Both Hall’s emphasis on tradition and timelessness, the idea of the invention of tradition (as per Hobsbawm) and Kolakowski’s ‘historical memory’ can be related to the ‘K-device’ of van Dijk discussed above. These invented traditions and apparent shared memories are the collective store of symbolic resources and empirical ‘facts’ which enable disparate individuals, who may never have met, to claim a share of a collective narrative. Through the medium of education in particular such a collective store of knowledge can be created in the community for ready access by those seeking to construct a national narrative that will be effective through its appeal to apparently shared memories. This is similar to the concept of ‘collective memory’ advanced by Halbwachs (1980, 1992), an interactive phenomenon which is a reconstruction of the image of the past in order to define a group’s identity in relation to other groups. Halbwachs envisages this as a process deeply embedded in the sociocultural surroundings reconstructed in accordance with the ‘predominant thoughts of society’ (1997: 40). Collective memory is a useful concept in that it can be used to differentiate from formal history, as Wertsch and Roediger have noted (2008: 320-326), in that it tends to ignore ambiguity and heterodox interpretations of events for established narratives. In terms of the narration of the nation such narratives can indeed almost be viewed as sacred, and the attempts to alter them, impinging as they may on the key facets of the constitution of a given group, regarded as sacrilegious. Such an effect has been noted, for example, in the reactions towards the attempted reconfiguration of the narrative of the Red Army’s role in liberating or occupying Estonia (Lehti 2003: 402-5). This collective memory is
not abstract group memory but distributed as Tileaga (2009: 339-41) has contended by various cultural vehicles, such as textbooks, museums and commemorative rituals.

In terms of collective memory it is useful to recall the fact that the act of remembering itself is the important aspect here. Collective memory, knowledge or symbolic resources, whichever terminology is used, do not exist in the abstract but are subject to the same dialectical pressures as any other resources. As signs they are constantly subject to refraction in the course of social interaction. Ter ‘communicative memory’ of Assmann (1995: 126-8) must be construed as being constantly refracted by the act of remembering itself; as Ollick and Robbins have suggested ‘collective memory’ must be viewed as a process rather than a ‘thing’ (2009:127). Furthermore these memories represent an orthodoxy, as Bourdieu might put it, or a hegemony to use Tileaga’s phrase (2009: 339) which is constantly being challenged by the heterodox or polemic. If contributions to the discourse are threatening in terms of the established principles of nationalism, that is to say if they threaten the national narrative, then they face delegitimisation in the face of the established orthodoxy, as Vihamlem and Jakobson (2011; 478-80) have demonstrated with regards to the narration of Estonian history.

Kolakowski’s conception of narration of the nation having an anticipatory aspect is also quite a key insight. Evidently any individual who subscribes to a particular national identity must consider the future of that nation as well as its past. Unlike Kolakowski we cannot personify the nation and adopt the view that the nation itself is concerned with its future (1995: 54), nor can we agree with him that the end of the nation cannot be conceptualised. On the contrary the very concern that the nation may indeed be under threat of extinction is a key element of the narration of the nation for many smaller national groups. Indeed this study shall demonstrate that the ‘death’ of the nation is a matter of central importance and real concern for many individuals in Karelia.

No systematic analysis shall be made here of the remaining aspects of the narration of the nation identified by Kolakowski and Hall. In fact it will be contended that to limit the potential number of such aspects would be fallacious and unwarranted on the evidence of this study. Different national groups may or
may not for example deploy the idea of a *Volksgeist* or the idea of a pure original people or folk; the evidence for such phenomenon in the current study is inconclusive at best. Certainly there are nations which would not seem to make use of such concepts; conversely it may be argued other strategies could be added to the above schemes. The key reason for referencing the work of the above two authors is to highlight the role the narration of the nation plays in constructing national identity. It would be erroneous to claim it was the only mechanism through which national identity was constructed and performed; clearly as stated above banal nationalism plays an important role amongst other factors. Nevertheless the narration of national identity is a key conceptual device which allows individuals to reconcile their changing and contradictory everyday experience of the nation with their idealised conception of the nation as an unchanging, natural phenomenon.

iv) National Identity and Multiple Identities

It should be noted here that there is no reason to assume, as Mandler has noted, that national identity ‘trumps’ other forms of identity or indeed that “one national identity must trump others” (2006: 297). The dynamic scheme of identity production outlined above provides room for any one individual to claim multiple identities or identifications at any one time, given the individual is presented with a range of potentialities, symbolic resources and referents upon which to base their own identity, albeit constrained by the ‘identity repertoire’ their particular position in society and the exact range of resources presented to them. Any individual therefore may be in a position (and indeed depending on the changing of their social position) to profess several identities either consecutively or contemporaneously. Evidently this ability is also constrained by the fact that identification with one group can imply a simultaneous exclusion from another group; to claim to be Jewish, for example, invariably implies a rejection of or non-inclusion in other religious groups. Claims to hold one type of identity, by the nature of the principles of the construction of that group, may also exclude the possibility of successfully claiming another type of identity. Nevertheless it is perfectly possible for an individual to claim simultaneous
membership of what would ordinarily be considered two separate national groups (i.e. a dual-citizen claiming to be both Canadian and Iranian). These claims may not always be successful however there is no *a priori* reason why they cannot be. Indeed certain national claims such as Swiss, German or British may in fact either by definition or in certain circumstances be considered to contain multiple, equally valid, claims to a particular national identity. To a certain extent as Wodak et al. (2009: 16-17) claim such multiple identities can offer a certain corrective element to the intrinsically divisive nature of national identity production. In the context of the Russian Federation, as in the USSR before it, the situation may be viewed as potentially quite complex. It is perfectly possible to view the USSR and its successor state as a type of ‘civic’ nation containing the various minority nationalities (or ‘ethnic’ nations’) within its geographic and conceptual borders. The implications of the conception of ethnic and civic nations shall be discussed further below but at this point it should be noted the idea of multiple identities is of importance in a Karelian context; Karelians could potentially view themselves as ethnically Karelian but part of a broader Russian civic nation. It is also possible for Russians to conceptualise Russian identity as inclusive of groups such as the Karelians in a *national* if not an *ethnic* sense.

National national identity has not always been the key principle by which humanity has divided itself and there is no evident reason why it should always continue to be a particularly important aspect of human existence. It is difficult to conceive of a world without national identity given how reified the concept now is however there is no fundamental reason why it should not be dispensed with at some future date. Certainly before the nation was conjured into being other forms of identity were self-evidently far more important to the individual and socially. Even in the contemporary world certain nationalisms and nations are seen to be ‘weaker’ than others. As a case in point the nation of Belarus is viewed by many commentators to possess a particularly feeble nationalism; Marples for example has noted the very weak position of the national language in Belarus and also the apparent lack of a unifying ‘national idea’ to the extent that the ruling elite have practically negated the idea of a Belarussian ‘nation’ (1999: 54). Pershai has also noted the fact that nationalist discourse of the Belarusian
intelligentsia has a very limited resonance amongst the Belarusian populace at large, suggesting that at present such a form of national identity does not or cannot fulfil the social roles expected of it and is thus not utilised (2006: 628-30). Perhaps Belarusian nationalism is simply not seen as a credible form of group construction; in the absence of strong symbolic resources around which to construct such a nationalism or indeed in the shadow of other national narratives with more credible or powerful resources it is relegated to the margins of society. Other forms of identity, be they national, transnational or other are evidently more resonant in that particular society.

The futility of attempting to define what a nation is per se is also evident if we try to demarcate where exactly national and regional identity differ. Many of the hallmarks (territoriality, language and history to name but a few) of any putative national identity can be found in what we would term regional identity. The ‘jumping off point’ at which an identity ceases to be regional and becomes national are not conceptually clear. As a result of this what one individual may term a national identity can appear to another to be just a regional identity depending on their particular set of symbolic resources and collective knowledge and the manner in which it is interpreted. What is a deeply cherished national identity to one individual or group can be construed as a relatively trivial regional nuance by another group.
2.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

As the above view of identity has been taken the most suitable manner of approaching this issue would seem to be Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA. Discourse is here understood as social practice, which is to say everyday communication, assuming a dialectical relationship between discursive acts and the institutional and social environment in which they occur in the tradition outlined by Bakhtin and Voloshinov. These discursive acts are socially constitutive in the manner outlined by Bourdieu, and hence the analysis of these acts allows the exposure of the power relations prevalent in a given group and thus the principles through which such groups are constructed. In this work the general principles followed shall be those of the Vienna school of CDA or the Historical Method, particularly with regards to the emphasis placed on background of any utterance to the analysis of the text produced. As has been explained above discourse is seen as socially constitutive, however as has also been noted it is not the sole factor in the constitution of any given social reality. To fully explain the role of discourse in the constitution of society a range of other factors must be acknowledged. Clearly the constitution of the habitus takes into consideration as stated the whole range of learned experience that the subject is aware of, which shall take into account factors such as the material conditions of existence. It also must be noted that there is a finite point beyond which pure linguistic analysis cannot go. In terms of the current research for example it would not be possible to fully understand expressions relating to historical events and narratives, such as, for example, the particular resonance of ‘фашист’ or ‘бело-финны’ by reference to linguistic analysis alone, it is the application of historical analysis which can unlock, as it were, the full discursive baggage of these terms and expose the actual semantic intent behind their utilisation. Furthermore without cognisance of the particular ethnographic situation in the Republic of Karelia much of the discourse would be unable to be adequately explained from a discourse analysis standpoint alone. The principle of triangulation, whereby discursive acts are approached from a variety of
methodological and theoretical perspectives, in particular a combination of historical, social-political and linguistic approaches, and also utilising various methods of data collection to allow as detailed a picture as is possible of the subject studied shall be utilised here. This method is seen as avoiding the potential pitfalls of the examination of any one of these aspects in isolation. As has been argued above the particular cognitive processes through which identity is negotiated, that is to say the process of the production of discourses, their acceptance and rejection through the actions of the habitus is ultimately a complex process that requires the entire social reality to be considered, as it is this reality which dialectically constitutes itself in terms of the structures through which life is understood and ordered, and then reproduced or altered.

I will also note that although this school of CDA and indeed CDA in general proclaims an emancipatory and socially critical approach, this is not deemed appropriate in the current work at this time. Certainly the examination of the way groups are created and dissolved shall serve to expose the ultimately arbitrary divisions imposed by the existence of these groups, however with certain exceptions in the current study it is not clear what emancipatory function this would serve. Whilst the exposure of the creation of negative 'other' group images and the necessity of this for the perpetuation of certain political agendas could only be seen in a positive light (if this proves possible), it is not possible to find any one valid 'Karelian' identity nor indeed does one exist, and the possible 'negative' assessment of any outcomes of these identities changing or disappearing are to entirely determined by the subjective views of the individual.

The just comment of Fairclough must be acknowledged that no researcher is entirely neutral and hence it would be hypocritical and dishonest to assert that no preconceived ideas or prejudices were brought to a given piece of research (Fairclough 1989: 138-9). It must also be advanced however that should research be carried out effectively the hidden or implicit political agendas in any piece of discourse should be exposable without recourse to an aggressively political research agenda. As Voloshinov has pointed out language use and the very sign, that is to say language itself, is the site of struggle over social reality. Evidently CDA can uncover how language is used to advance any given agenda as the sign is the nexus of the social struggle over reality, thus the ambivalent
and contested nature of the most evocative words such ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and suchlike. Also it would have to be noted that whilst the language of the dominant class is full of such manipulative strategies, the language of the opposition to the dominant class is by definition and of necessity as full of similar strategies, as Bourdieu’s analysis of orthodox and heretical discourse should illustrate. Finally it might be contended that the position of an ideal neutral observer is not in any case possible, given all individuals are the products of the same process of conditioning which produces the individual habitus. It is therefore possible for any researcher to attain this idealised state of complete neutrality and objectivity. Indeed as the stated aims of this research show it was partially undertaken as a response to the dearth of research, in the English language in particular, into aspects of identity production within the ethnic Karelian population.

Paul Chilton (2005: 19-53) has also criticised CDA on a number of accounts. Firstly and perhaps most importantly is the issue of the relations between CDA and psychology and cognitive science, or the perceived lack of such relations. There is a problem, as Chilton has identified, that to see discourse as constituting social reality can cause the apparent problem of discourse causing itself. It has been argued thus far that there is a cognitive element to the production of discourse which eliminates this concern. Language as used in social practice, and I would argue social practice in general, which could include non-verbal communication, is produced by the dialectical interaction of individuals and in fact the cognitive processes of the individual at any given time. Thus language and communication, which must be produced in the human brain (as it would seem impossible to contend it was produced elsewhere) and therefore discourse has an important cognitive element, in fact it can only be taking place through cognition. Chilton alleges CDA has been successful as a descriptive process whilst not being able to identify the cognitive processes at work which lead to certain types of behaviour and the production of certain discourses, which is to say CDA can explain what is going on but not why, or at least not completely. There are a number of possible objections to this view. Firstly certain practitioners such as van Dijk certainly have been concerned with the cognitive aspects of how discourses are produced. It is contended here that
the conceptual apparatus of the habitus and its functioning provides a general scheme for how the mind conceptualises and ultimately constructs and is constructed by social reality. This shows how learned experience interacts with current perception, or rather how current perception is squared cognitively with a framework of past experience which influences the way in which current events are perceived and is shaped by current events. If we are allowed to integrate Ricoeur’s idea of *Idem* and *Ipse* identity and the *personage* we can see how the *Ipse* identity or habitus perhaps, can take past experience, or the ‘full life-history of existential experience’ if this is preferred and through the dialectical operation described arrive at a seemingly unitary, unproblematic *personage*. As has been seen above with reference to van Dijk (2008, 2011) knowledge, and various assumptions and types of knowledge, are very important to the ability to function in a discursive environment. This cognitive scheme, which is of necessity somewhat abstract and perhaps insufficiently detailed, is preferred to the alternatives proffered by Chilton as shall be discussed below. Secondly as has been mentioned above CDA has not generally claimed, or at least not all practitioners have claimed, that such problems can be explained only though linguistic analysis alone. To explain the issue of xenophobia or racism, the problem raised by Chilton, a linguistic analysis alone would not suffice to explain why the issue was happening, but a linguistic analysis coupled with a historical or ethnographic and social analysis would certainly be able to offer some ideas. In fact it might be argued that this would be more successful than cognitive model offered which seems extremely problematic for a variety of reasons.

The notion of the social construction of society and identity has been criticised for the use of concepts and terminology which are not used by the subjects studied. Specifically Motyl has argued that:

“Constructivism claims that agents construct reality in their language, but the assertion of this claim and the demonstration of this claim can only be effected by the use of constructivist language, which by definition is alien to the language of the agents concerned and could not possibly have figured in their construction of social reality” (2010: 64).
Criticisms of this nature are rather beguiling as it is inevitably true that in our quotidian existence we do not use the terminology of social constructivism to conceptualise and understand our behaviour. Beyond that self-evident observation however to object to the idea of social constructivism in such terms is to an extent merely sophistry. The fact that we do not use the terminology of economic theory to conceptualise and understand our everyday behaviour in terms of our economic interaction does not lessen the value of economics. As has been argued above to rigidly separate theory and practice does not lead to an understanding of the totality of the problem, which is the only method through which to understand any element of the totality. The fact that subjects are not in the habit of referring to symbolic resources, the habitus or the like is no indication that these are not useful conceptual devices for the researcher.

A more relevant criticism of CDA may be made on methodological grounds. Certain commentators, for example Widdowson (1995, 1996) have argued that due to the nature of CDA it may be overly subjective as the selection of texts, and therefore ultimately the result of the analysis will depend on the researcher. This is an issue which will have to be addressed individually by each researcher. To a certain extent the problem is unavoidable insofar as no selection of texts can be considered entirely objective. No analysis can cover the entirety of texts potentially relevant to any an issue as vast as that of one of national identity which by definition encompasses literally thousands of individuals all producing and reproducing that identity. The issue of a potentially small and perhaps unrepresentative sample is also raised by Fowler (1996: 9-10) as a limitation to the effectiveness of CDA in this area. There are a number of ways in which such problems can be minimised if not entirely eliminated. Should a plurality of sources be obtained the potential problem of bias should be minimised to an acceptable level. Hopefully any researcher would attempt and be in a position to acquire a variety of texts from differing sources, and cross reference these sources to acquire as objective an impression of the field as possible. In this regard the principle of triangulation should also serve to minimise the distorting effect a reliance on one method alone might induce. With regards to the small size of any particular sample, and when dealing with
the production of national identity the number of potential sources that could be referenced is evidently gigantic, we must appeal to our notion of cultural and symbolic capital advanced above. By seeking contributions from those most influential in terms of negotiating the production and reproduction of national identities we should gain the most value possible from even a relatively limited sample. As not all contributions shall be valued at equal rates the focus of the researcher is best aimed at analysing those key contributions made by those with the greatest access to symbolic capital. In this instance that would appear to indicate an approach which combined media discourse with the views of those individuals occupying the most influential roles in society. A certain balance and indication of the efficacy of their contributions can be achieved by the inclusion of contributions from those less well placed to influence and shape debate. In such a manner although a complete picture will not be obtained (and indeed it is in the nature of the production of national identity perhaps impossible to obtain such a picture) a fairly accurate and revelatory analysis is possible.

2.4 Methodological Considerations

As stated previously this study shall broadly follow the methodological outlines drawn up by the Vienna school of Critical Discourse Analysis. In particular it shall follow the methods outlined in Wodak et al. 1990, 1994 and 2009. In this regard it shall utilise three layers of analysis, namely:

1. Content
2. Strategies
3. Means and forms of realisation
These are dealt with in turn below.

i) Content

The content of the study relates to the thematic concerns of this particular piece of research. Specifically this involves the discursive construction of varying Karelian identities. The first and major aspect of this theme is the narration of Karelian history as a basis for the construction of a putative Karelian national identity. It was the intention of this study to apply the conceptual framework of the narration of the nation to the contemporary state of Karelian national identity to judge its efficacy and relevance. As such the study was involved with attempting to identify narratives of the Karelian nation in the source material. No presumptions were made as to the relevance of this concept in terms of the contemporary state of Karelian national identity; rather the intention was to test its relevance.

A further thematic concern of this research was to demonstrate the dynamics of the construction of the historical discursive ‘space’ in Karelia. This research was intended to delineate the various tendencies within the narration of the history of Karelia and the Karelian people and to relate these to the varying narratives of the nation (not necessarily narratives of the Karelian nation) current within the Republic of Karelia. This was intended to demonstrate the variety of competing potential identities and narratives of the nation at work in the area today. Through the narration of either difference, exclusion and separateness or a shared historical legacy and inclusion differing conceptions of ‘Karelian-ness’ can be constructed. Such narratives utilise various historical myths, interpretations and symbols.

Another thematic aspect closely related to the above is the construction of either Russians or Karelians (and indeed Finns) as either victims or perpetrators of various alleged historical wrongs. This is closely connected to the spatial narration of Karelia, and the highly important symbolic role of the border.

Another related consideration is the temporal narration of Karelia and the construction of differing Karelian presents and most importantly futures. This revolves around various threats imagined around the continued viability of
Karelian identity and language, and future social and political goals related to these topics.

Finally the narration of the nation is compared to other relevant sources of national identity in terms of value and importance. From this analysis the discursive construction of Karelian identity and the manner in which history is utilised to narrate the nation, and the manner in which it interacts with other sources of identity should become visible.

ii) Strategies

The interpretation of strategy used here relates directly to the conception of the habitus outlined above. Strategies are envisaged as not directly voluntary in the sense of the subject having unlimited action, but neither are they to be envisaged as entirely mechanistic. The strategies referred to are part of the relation between the habitus and the social milieu in which it is located; hence the employment of such strategies is conditioned by the milieu and also by the habitus involved; thus strategies are employed without necessarily a large degree of calculation but in response to certain stimuli. The employment of such strategies is therefore an action which is at best semi-conscious, entailing as it must a great deal of symbolic ‘baggage’ only half acknowledged by the subject involved. Here strategies are defined as ‘actions orientated towards goals’ (Bourdieu 1993: 90). These actions may be more or less automatic and conscious depending on context. Strategies are the intent behind the utterance, that is to say by analysing a discursive act we may determine certain strategies which attempt, more or less consciously, to configure the understanding of a sign, to influence its reception in the listener and thus influence their understanding of its semiotic content and therefore the world.

There are several different types of discursive strategies of particular relevance to this study. Constructive strategies, which seek to promote a certain definition of national identity through unification, cohesion, inclusion and continuity were the most marked in the data studied. They were also employed
to differentiate various putative groups as well as to establish unity between separate but apparently related groups. One of the most prevalent strategies, and indeed one that could be termed almost an official strategy, was that of perpetuation which narrated a history of positively evaluated political and social continuity between Russians and Karelians, for example. This is also related to the strategy of unification as expressed through the construction of shared heritage and character. The supposedly model character of aspects of Karelian society could also be invoked as a strategy of singularisation which emphasises the unique or exemplary character of certain aspects of Karelian history and culture. Related strategies were those of relativisation and justification which assign the blame for perceived historical mistakes or abuses to various parties whilst declaiming, downplaying or minimalizing the apparent responsibility of another group. This is also closely associated with the use of strategies of avoidance which refrain from assigning such responsibility to a particular group.

Not all the strategies discovered were of this constructive type; the use of constructive strategies was generally associated with the promotion of the status quo or identities which might be considered to be part of an established orthodoxy. For the production and promotion of less orthodox or potentially heretical identities transformative or destructive strategies were more generally employed. Such macro-strategies could also use the strategies of assigning responsibility as described above, but could also emphasise discontinuity, discreditation or negative presentation of the other group or even in certain circumstances that of the purported ‘we’ group. Perceived existing narratives could be questioned or declared invalid or indeed inverted to recast the ‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’ paradigms established elsewhere. The use of ideas of continuity could also be invoked in strategies of either legitimisation or de-legitimisation. In assessing the current state of Karelian identity a negative strategy of presentation as a ‘disaster’ or ‘finality’ which evoke an image of the identity or its components as ‘dead’ or ‘dying’ was occasionally invoked. Heteronomisation was also an important strategy in the presentation of Karelian identities as shall be discussed below; this strategy emphasises the lack of free will or possibility of free action associated with a particular event or phenomenon.

In summation the number of minor strategies employed within the data
studied was sizeable and for reasons of space not every one can be analysed in
detail here. All such strategies however could be classified into one of the three
main groups described above: constructive, transformative or destructive. One
minor strategy may be employed to assist any one of these three macro-
strategies; for example the strategy of continuity may be used in a constructive or
a destructive strategy to posit differing conceptions of Karelian identity. Most of
these strategies are relatively straightforward, however should a more than
usually complicated example be encountered in the course of this study it shall
be further examined in the analysis.

iii) Means of Realisation

In discussing strategies the focus has been on the more or less automatic
or semi-conscious ‘schemes of argumentation’, to use Wodak et al’s term (2009:
34), which are used by subjects towards the realisation of particular ends.
‘Means of realisation’ in this context simply refers to the lexical and syntactic
devices which are utilised within the text to fulfil the strategy involved; that is to
say they consist of those discursive tools which create or de-legitimate
conceptions of national identity. There are innumerable such tools in the data
collected for this study and as such no systematic overview of each and every
one can be provided; furthermore such means of realisation can be used perfectly
easily for any chosen strategy and to support or criticise almost any given
national identity. The manner in which each particular means of realisation is
utilised will be analysed with reference to the concrete example, that is to say the
text under analysis, in each individual case. The purpose of this study is not to
demonstrate exactly how, in linguistic terms, a given lexical device contributes to
the realisation of a given strategy but to analyse the production of such strategies
and the manner in which the realise various national identities in a particular
context. Some general comments on certain issues are necessary at this juncture,
however. In this study what Wodak et al. term the “phenomenon of vagueness”
(2009: 35) is of especial interest and importance; this relates to the use of
euphemistic language, omission, allusions, hesitation and other forms of
uncertainty and ambiguity in the texts in question. The manner in which ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups are created in the discourse is also of key importance (see ibid: 36-47 and van Leeuwen 1996 for further discussion of this phenomenon) as is the synecdochial substitution of referents to expand or contract the boundaries of a putative social group. As stated above the manner in which such tools are implemented shall be demonstrated and analysed in further detail throughout the analysis of the data itself.

iv) Mass Media, Cultural Capital and the Karelian Press

It has already been noted that symbolic power and cultural capital are utilised in order to aid in the construction of the nation by individuals and groups. Furthermore the concept of the narration of the national ‘story’ has also been identified as one of the key manners in which conceptions of national identity are advanced and perpetuated. Clearly, however, as Bourdieu’s ideas of symbolic power and cultural capital suggest the contributions various actors make to this process are assessed at varying rates. The position of the mass media in industrialised societies places it in an exceedingly favourable position with regards to the reception and influence of their contributions in shaping the social world. Such influence is furthermore cumulative, as Fairclough has pointed out (2001: 45), as the repetition of themes of discourse in media outlets aids its efficacy in reproducing the intended discourse. Indeed Anderson (1983: 87) has proposed that the growth of the ‘national’ press following the industrial revolution was a major factor in the rise of the nation itself. Certainly the influence of the mass media in shaping discourse has been widely studied and acknowledged, for example by Bell and Garet (1998), Fowler (1991), Fairclough (1995). It is important to note the notion of heteroglossia as advanced by Bakhtin (1981 [1934]) when examining the role of the press. The utterances of any speaker are layered with information and ideas assimilated from previous utterances. Within any dialogue speakers choose or reject parts of the proffered discourse and go on to incorporate it within their own. In media discourse there is an evident distance between the producer of the text and the unseen imagined
interlocutor. Furthermore media discourse often undertakes to inform and educate; the producer of the text can, but not always, assume the role of an authority on a particular subject. In such text production the speaker still enters into the dialogic task of convincing their imagined reader or viewer of the semantic content of their utterance with the various linguistic strategies available to them; in this manner of text production however the producer may appear to have a perceived power or right to have such utterances accepted almost unquestioningly. Such authoritative discourse may include that of the mass media. As Li has suggested therefore:

media representations understood in this way, are reconceptualisations of observable linguistic markers according to the specific intentions of those involved in the process of media production (2009: 92).

It is therefore important to consider media discourse not merely with the semiotic content of the utterance in mind, but with the intent of the producer and the manner in which it relates to previously expressed utterances and information that is considered ‘common knowledge’; the imagined ‘K-device’ or ‘habitus’ of the intended interlocutor. Heteroglossia is therefore a key consideration when examining mass media discourse. The relationship between media discourse and consumer is also as has been noted above a relationship between an actual producer and an imagined reader. As Lindgren has noted:

The relation between the press and the public is characterized by the action of information. In contemporary societies we are dependent upon mediated texts, which means that face-to-face interaction between ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ is often precluded. This leaves the institutions or individuals who can control or influence processes of mediation with a considerable amount of power. The relationship between the media and their informants – and that between informants and readers – are similarly structured. In broad terms, we have relations between someone who knows and someone who does not (2009: 72).
This act of informing is key to understanding the potential for media discourse to aid in the construction of narratives of national identity. In terms of the construction of such narratives in Karelia the media by choosing and filtering its informants and the information they provide can strongly influence the perceptions of its readers as to the validity of competing claims to national identity. As this is what Fairclough would term a “knower-initiated” (2003: 108) exchange of knowledge, with the media assuming a position of authority, it can issue ‘statements of facts’ which can evaluate and determine the acceptable bounds of a putative identity or historical narrative. It should be noted, however, that media discourse does not create such narratives in a vacuum; these are narratives produced and reproduced within the society in question. The continued prevalence of one or other particular narrative in any corpus of data derived from the mass media is often attributable to the objective conditions under which it was produced. That is to say that the standardisation of the individual described by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) by substituting a stereotyped, universalised image is a consequence of the nature of the modern mass media; the dominance of the elite and their control of the mass media industry tend to promote the reproduction of similar standardised narratives in media discourse. As Molina has also described:

Another problem which text contents face in the media, particularly in television, is the prevalence of the discourse genre. Through its permits and prohibitions (which are not only linguistic), a type of language that causes discourse genres to have primacy over contents has been positively established (2009: 186).

As a consequence of this standardisation and consolidation of genre the actual content of the discourse can become repetitive and standardised. There is a tendency, therefore, for existing narratives to be reproduced through the use of conventionalised language by producers of discourse in the media. By relatively uncritical adherence to the rules of a perceived discursive genre, for example newspaper journalism, the prevailing narratives of identity can be reproduced in a fairly mechanical form. It is important therefore as stated above to consider the
context in which the text is produced when examining the role it may place in the production or reproduction of a given narrative.

Given the ability of the press to influence the narration of the nation a study of this issue in a Karelian context is a rewarding way in which to approach the question of how the process of the construction of national identity is being undertaken in the area. In the next chapter I shall therefore examine the manner in which the Russian-language press treats topics relating to the history of the Republic and the various peoples of Karelia to determine in what manner they may impact upon the development of national identity. By advancing various notions of Karelian history such articles shall reinforce, develop or undermine competing narratives of Karelian history and hence Karelian identity. There are some particular concerns to address however with the Karelian press before considering the topic in detail. Firstly it must be noted that the Karelian press exists side by side and in competition with the Russian press. Anderson’s notion of the national press operating to create national identity has already been found problematic in states with potentially competing national identities. This issue has been examined for example in the context of the United Kingdom, specifically from a Scottish perspective by Higgins (2004), Law (2001) and Rosie et al. (2004, 2006). In these studies it is contended that Scottish and British identities are influenced by both a ‘national’ British press and a competing ‘national’ Scottish press. There are similar issues in Karelia insofar as the Karelian press is a regional affair which exists alongside larger ‘national’ Russian media outlets. The Karelian press cannot therefore been seen in isolation but reflects the discourse on identity and nationalism available in its Russian counterparts. Its reception by the reader is also influenced by their exposure to and awareness of the discursive products of the national media. To a lesser extent there is also a degree of influence from the Finnish media within the Karelian press itself; it is not uncommon for articles in major Finnish newspapers to be quoted by their Karelian counterparts. Quite clearly therefore Karelian media outlets cannot solely act to construct national identity in isolation from their Russian counterparts. Nevertheless as publications dealing specifically with Karelia they can be very influential, and perhaps more so than any other
source, in the construction of a Karelian identity. It should also be noted that in general terms ‘local’ newspapers are slightly more popular than national publications in Russia, with 27% of Russians regularly and 40% occasionally reading a local paper as opposed to 18% and 38% reading the national press (Oates & McCormack 2010: 128). National television networks are however much more popular than the printed press, and internet-based media is also increasingly influential and popular. Circulation figures for the Karelian press are not readily obtainable, nor is it possible to determine the circulation of ‘national’ publications with the Republic of Karelia. There are a number of ‘Karelian’ publications, i.e. those produced with Karelia and targeted at a local audience. The majority of these are ‘local’ papers published in and dealing with the affairs of one particular municipality or region. As has already been stated there are a number of ‘republican’ papers which purport to cover the Republic of Karelia as a whole. For the purpose of this analysis two of these papers have been examined. Although there are a number of publications in the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish languages publications in the Russian language have been preferred, both for ease of analysis and availability to the researcher but also due to the low circulation numbers of the papers in the Finno-Ugric languages. It is also the case that the Russian-language press is available to all the inhabitants of the Republic of Karelia, and therefore can influence the production and reproduction of historical narratives and national identity amongst the broadest possible sphere, whilst by its very nature the Finno-Ugric press can do this only amongst those who speak one of the minority languages.

v) The Interview Material

As has been noted above discourse is dialogic in nature; the mass media is but one side of the dialogue. To ascertain the reception of the orthodoxies and putative national identities found within the initial part of this study it was felt prudent to compare these results with a second set of data. Consequently it was decided to record a series of interviews with various inhabitants of the Republic
of Karelia in order to provide a further set of data for analysis. As this was conducted after the compilation and initial analysis of the mass media corpus the questions asked in the interviews could be directed towards the exploration of certain key areas of interest which had previously been identified. There was also the distinct advantage that the interviews could be tailored towards the object of this study in general, hence providing a large amount of specific data on the topic in hand.

The methodological technique utilised in this study was that of the semi-structured interview. As Miniciello et al. (1990: 164) note interviews may be formally structured with a particular list and categories of expected questions and answers or unstructured, in which the dialogue and interaction between interlocutors provides the data to be analysed. Between these two extremes a researcher may choose to use a list of questions as an aid to help form the structure of the interview in order to attain the require results (see Briggs 1986, Minichiello et al, 1990, Wengraff 2001). Rather than devise a set of fixed questions in the manner of a survey or interrogation the use of a semi-structured interview format, wherein the subject had the maximum possible ability to offer narrations of the topic under consideration was considered ideal for the purposes of this study. Using a general set of questions to broach a range of topics of interest and then utilising supplementary questions to develop points of interest would test the assumptions developed from the analysis of the mass media material. By pursuing a semi-structured interview format this material could both be tested and other aspects of the narration of national identity which had not occurred in the previous data or had not been considered by the researcher could be explored. As a relatively flexible dialogue such types of interviews, as Patton (2002: 343) has noted, allow the researcher to react to situational changes and also take account of the fact that as an individual dialogue the discourse produced is by definition individual. Considerations of power and constraint within interviews conducted for research purposes are as valid as they are in any discursive field, as Briggs has indicated the interview also provides an alternate arena for the negotiation and expression of alternate discourses. As Patton also makes clear the researcher must also be careful to avoid, insofar as is possible,
manipulating the conversation in order to achieve a desired set of responses (2002: 343). Conversely the researcher must attempt to maintain a degree of control over the process to stop the interviewee from directing the dialogue in an unproductive, irrelevant direction; the researcher must maintain awareness of the purpose of the interview and steer the conversation in that direction as required (Fife 2005, Patton 2002).

The questions utilised as a framework for these interviews are listed below:

1. В этом году отмечают 90-я годовщина основании Республики Карелии, что эта годовщина означает для Вас?

2. Расскажите короткую историю Карелии с древности до наших дней.

3.(a) Какие разницы, если таковые вообще есть, Вы думаете, есть между историей Карелии и другими частями России?

(b) Посылек вашего ответа на предыдущий вопрос, какие факторы способствовали формированию таких разниц.

4. История Республики Карелии, важная для Вас или нет?

5. Должны ли история Карелии влиять на ее будущее развитие? Если да, то в каком образе?

6. Какие по-вашему самые важные аспекты истории Карелии?

7. Какая роль, по-вашему, играет эпос Калевала в истории Карелии? Калевала — важная для вас лично?

8. Почему, по-вашему, Карелия стала частью Российского
9. До 1917 главный язык в Карелии был Карельский, зачем, по-вашему люды перестали говорить на Карельском? Как вы оцениваете этот процесс?

10. Карельское правительство считает Карельский, Вепский и Финский языки коренные языки Республики Карелии, вы считаете что это правильно?

11. Какая роль играли конфликтов 40-ых годов в истории Карелии? Как эти конфликты влияют на современную Карелую?

13. Карельское правительство считает Карельский, Вепский и Финский народы коренные народы Карелии. Вы считаете что это правило? Должен ли какие-нибудь другие народы считать коренные?

As has been noted the interview process was semi-structured hence multiple additional questions were asked depending on the responses made to the initial questions; should a prior answer have sufficiently answered one of the questions it was not led unnecessarily. The questions listed above were selected after the compilation of the corpus of media data and its analysis and were hence selected to investigate trends identified in this material. They were also formulated to provoke, as far as possible, narration of historical periods and themes rather than straightforward affirmation or negation of a point. It was also hoped they would be perceived as neutral and would not induce the participant a particular narrative. In general participants were allowed as much lassitude to interpret the question as they desired, leading to some interesting findings. Unfortunately in once case however (D5) the interviewee consistently
It has been argued above that the social position of the interlocutors in any given discourse influences both discourse production and reception; at the same time as such discourse contributes to the creation and reproduction of such social relation between the participants. It is therefore worth considering the particular position occupied by the researcher in this set of interviews. There is in fact some basis for proposing that the particular social position of the researcher in question may have been of some assistance in obtaining a more complete set of data than might otherwise have been possible. The construction of potential ‘we’ or ‘other’ groups within Karelia has been noted in the discussion of mass media discourse. It was perhaps advantageous for the purpose of this study that the interviewer in question was not a potential member of any of these potentially competing ‘we’ groups. As the interviewer was neither Karelian, Russian nor Finnish, or indeed from anywhere in the immediate geographical vicinity of Karelia, participants may have felt more able to openly discuss their opinions without fear of potentially offending their interlocutor. Furthermore being a complete ‘outsider’ in this sense participants to some extent may have felt obliged to include more exposition of their opinions in order that these would be understood by someone potentially less well informed than they would generally expect about certain issues. This very quality of exposition is especially useful when addressing questions related to the development of differing narratives. As Burgess (1984: 12) has proposed if the interviewer positions his or herself as simultaneously not only less well-informed than the interviewee but also willing and interested to learn the process will be more productive. In this instance the interviewer was introduced as a foreign student conducting research, hence participants may have included further detail than they may otherwise have felt required if discussing such issues with a resident of the area. As a caveat to the above however, it should also be noted that some participants treated the interviewer more as a researcher or specialist who would therefore already possess relatively detailed knowledge of the history of Karelia,
perhaps even more so than the participant themselves. This can be demonstrated by such comments as:

Знаешь к моему стыду много не расскажу, но и думаю что ты уже знаешь и можешь найти уже. (A8)

Although this may have led to a certain reticence in discussing the topic participants were assured, if necessary, that the interview was designed more to gauge their own opinions and views than as an exam of their historical knowledge.

It is also perhaps worth remarking that many participants were extremely keen to put forward their views and appreciative of the fact that a foreign researcher was interested in issues surrounding the minority groups of the Republic of Karelia in general. Although it has already been noted above that despite the fact that in general Critical Discourse Analysis proclaims an emancipatory approach this has not been invoked with this particular study the social position of the researcher is open to varying interpretations by individual subjects; it was found during the course of the fieldwork undertaken for this study that the position of the researcher as a self-identified Scot was interpreted positively by some participants. It would appear that as a representative of another ‘small nation’, moreover a small nation united with a larger, more dominant neighbour, certain participants constructed the interviewer as a particularly sympathetic interlocutor, which may have had some impact on the responses given.

The issue of the size of any given corpus of data and the potentially limited value of analysing a small, restricted set of data has already been noted. Conducting semi-structured interviews, which by definition may last an indeterminate length of time and in practice would tend towards being lengthier than a formal questionnaire style process, also limited the total number of interviews undertaken. There were also time constraints and organisational difficulties which acted towards restricting the number of interviews in total. Despite these issues 24 interviews are analysed here which should provide an adequate corpus of data. Furthermore it has already been noted that the
contributions of some participants in any given discourse will be valued at a
greater rate than others; some individuals are in a more advantageous position to
manipulate the field of group construction than others as Bourdieu would have it.
In this respect the relatively small sample is more than adequately compensated
for by the nature of many of those who participated. The fieldwork was
conducted in accordance with the Research Ethics Framework of the College of
Humanities and Social Science of the University of Edinburgh and Code of
Practice for Research; the majority of subjects interviewed were ordinary
Karelians or Russians who were not involved in political activities and hence to
safeguard their anonymity they have been assigned random alphanumeric
designations such as A1, B3, D6 etc., A number of participants are worth
identifying individually due to the potentially key roles they play or then played
in the production of Karelian national identity. These individuals were
interviewed as representatives of their organisations and hence are identified. In
particular this includes: participant D13, or Anatolii Grigoriev, head of the
Karelian Congress; participant A1, or Natalia Sinitskaya, editor of the Karelian-
language paper *Oma Mua*, participant A2, or Natalia Antonova, then head of
the Karelian youth organisation Nuori Karjala and currently a member of its
board; D3, or Zinaida Strogal’shchikova, member of the Karelian branch of the
Russian Academy of Science and prominent commentator on issues surrounding
the Vepsian population in particular. In the case of Grigoriev and Antonova in
particular this offers the added advantage of being able to cross-reference their
contributions in the interviews with articles which quote them either indirectly or
directly in the mass media. This offers a direct examination of an element of
intertextuality between the narratives of Karelian history provided in the
interviews and their contributions to the media discourse in which these
narratives may only be partially revealed or inferred. All the participants were
advised of the nature of the study and consented to the recording of the interview
for research purposes.

Quite aside from the participants named above several of those
interviewed are or were at the time of the interviews in potentially influential
positions within society in the Republic of Karelia. Including Sinitskaya five
journalists participated in the process, participants A1, B1, C1, D10 and D11, with the first four listed working in the Karelian and Vepsian language press or television and D11 in the Russian-language media. Participants A5 and A8 worked at the National Theatre of the Republic of Karelia and participant A6 is an artist and theatrical director. Three participants including Strogal’shchikova were lecturers or researchers at either the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences or the Petrozavodsk State Pedagogical University (A3, D3 and D16). Clearly therefore many of those interviewed would be regarded as belonging to the local ‘intelligentsia’ of the Republic of Karelia and in particular its ethnic Karelian component. As has been discussed above access to cultural capital and the perceived ‘symbolic power’ of any utterance is dependent on the position any individual holds within the social hierarchy. Consequently these individuals in influential and prestigious positions within Karelian society possess a greater ability to potentially mould the discourse on Karelian identities than their counterparts in other positions. Evidently in terms of the interview process itself this process is not ongoing in the sense that their responses are delivered to a foreign researcher not Karelian society; the interview process does however sample the historical narratives they produce and presumably help disseminate through their activities in education, journalism or other cultural activities. The participation in particular of many of those working in Karelian and Finnish language media may also help provide some balance to the data derived from its Russian-language equivalents.

The number of participants surveyed may be regarded as relatively small and thus a potential weakness of this study however it is argued that the influential position of most of those interviewed within the Karelian intelligentsia at least partially compensates for this issue. It should also be noted that the relatively long duration of each individual interview, the majority of which lasted more than forty minutes and in several cases over an hour, made the collection and analysis of further data problematic. As the researcher involved had no significant connections to the Republic of Karelia prior to conducting the fieldwork required for this study the assistance of the Karelian department of Petrozavodsk State University and the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy
of Sciences was invaluable in identifying and contacting the initial participants of
the interview process. From the outset interviews with self-identified Karelians
were prioritised over interviews with self-identified Russians due to the relative,
as shall be seen, paucity of material available in the Russian-language press
produced by Karelians. Further information on the demographic composition of
the interview material shall be provided below. A smaller number of interviews
with Russians were conducted however partially in order to ascertain how
resonant the prevailing narratives of history and identity discovered during the
analysis of the media material were within Russian society itself in the Republic
of Karelia. Although the relatively small sample size perhaps cannot provide any
definite conclusions to this question together with the data derived from the
Karelian participants it can offer some indications in this direction. It had been
intended to include as many Vepsian participants in the process as possible
however it did not prove feasible at the time to include any significant number at
all and the only Vepsian participant in this study is Strogal’schhikova as noted
above; despite her very influential position in the relatively tiny Vepsian
population it is unfortunately not therefore possible to draw any broad
conclusions solely from the interview data on the views of the Vepsian
population.

As the potential relative importance of the local intellectual ‘elite’ in the
production and reproduction of putative national identities has been outlined
above it was felt important to include as many representatives of this group in the
interview process as possible. To this end attempts were made to secure
interviews with representatives of the press, television and radio media,
academic class and the local administration. The process of identifying,
approaching and interviewing such individuals extended and complicated the
process itself and hence limited the absolute number of those interviewed. It
should also be noted constraints of time and budget were also a limiting factor.
Most of the interviews were conducted within Petrozavodsk for similar reasons,
however with the assistance of the local Karelian society and the local library it
was possible to undertake a small number of interviews in Olonets. Whilst as
stated above the participation of the local Karelian intelligentsia was prioritised it
was also determined useful to include a number of participants in relatively less influential positions to determine if there were substantial and significant differences between the narratives of this elite group and broader Karelian society. Once again due to the relatively small sample size involved in this study it is not perhaps possible to reach a definitive conclusion on this question however it is possible to draw some interesting inferences which may point the way to such an answer.
Chapter Three: Constructing the History of ‘Karelia’: Territories, Boundaries, and the Narration of Nationality in Karelian Newspapers.
This chapter shall examine the manner in which historical narratives are constructed within a section of the mass media of the Republic of Karelia and how these narratives are then exploited to produce and reproduce conceptions of ‘Karelian’ identities. The usage of potential historical referents associated with putative Karelian identities such as religion, various conflicts and the Karelian language have been identified and the manner in which such referents are utilised to produce historical narratives in the mass media is examined. This process has also revealed the predominant discursive strategies utilised to create conceptions of identity in the corpus of data. The manner in which groups are created and dissolved discursively in the media through the opposition of putative ‘we’ groups and the image of the ‘other’ shall be examined; this is related to the construction of an ‘imagined reader’ of the Karelian press which excludes certain groups and focuses on a ‘we’ group of ethnic Russians. It shall be argued that this includes the continuation of a Soviet-era form of discourse in which the Karelians and other Finno-Ugurs are represented as the ‘younger brother’ of the Russian majority. The analysis shall then focus on representations of Karelian space and the presentation of Karelia as a ‘national territory’ of the various groups resident in the area, both Karelian and Finnish or Russian. This includes the examination of the construction of strategies of continuation and colonisation which seek to exclude or justify the claims of differing groups to Karelia as their ‘indigenous’ territory. It shall also examine the contentious issue of those territories annexed to the former USSR from Finland in 1940. Narratives which seek to exclude or diminish the Finno-Ugric character of ‘Karelia’ shall also be examined alongside their necessary collobary: the incorporation of Karelia within an almost exclusive Russian cultural sphere and thus identity. This shall also be related to the construction of Karelia as a ‘model’ Russian-Orthodox territory and the implications of this for ideas both of the Russian character of the region and ethnic Karelian identity itself. It shall be argued that this process and the discursive strategies employed posit a ‘Karelian’ identity that is heavily associated with Russian identity itself. The narration of the process which has taken the Karelian language from a position of dominance to that of marginality
shall also be examined with its important implications for Karelian identity; it shall be argued that as language is a key component of Karelian identity the narration of this process is of utmost importance in understanding the representation of modern Karelian identity. The role of the various conflicts in Karelian history shall then be examined to unearth the manner in which their narration is employed, much like that of Karelian Orthodoxy, to position Karelian identity closer to Russian influence and to exclude or diminish Finnish influence. Finally an examination of the recent growth in discourses of intolerance and ethnic discord shall be examined in the light of the Kondopoga Affair and the implications of this event shall be considered for ideas of ‘Karelian’ identities.

3.1 Karel’skaya Guberniya and Kareliya

The first paper chosen for analysis is the independent commercial paper Karel’skaya Guberniya, which is printed and published in Petrozavodsk. The paper prints news from within the Republic of Karelia alongside articles on a variety of social and ‘lifestyle’ issues and local politics. Karel’skaya Guberniya has often taken a distinctly critical stance towards both the republican administration and the central government, and offers an outlet for opposition political groups such as Yabloko and other political parties generally considered hostile towards the governing elite which do not often receive much media attention in the mainstream, government-owned press. In fact it often claims (see for example “Кому выгодно закрыть "Губернию?" KG 13 27.03.2002) that the paper is subject to a certain amount of hostility from the authorities or their supporters. The paper is published weekly and therefore averages around 51 issues a year. To obtain a potentially contrasting view the second paper chosen for analysis is the paper of the republican government, Kareliya. This publication plays an analogous role with the Republic of Karelia to that of the Rossiiskaya Gazeta on a national level; published by the local government its primary purpose is the publication of the various acts and orders passed by the
authorities: i.e. it functions as a newspaper of record. Much like its national counterpart however it also publishes news articles on a variety of topics, usually but not exclusively concerning the activities of various local officials and initiatives. As shall be discussed further below it would appear that its non-commercial, official nature can in fact occasionally offer the opportunity for minority groups to find column space that may not otherwise have been available. *Kareliya* is published on average three times a week; however midweek editions are often limited in size to just a few pages consisting for the most part of official announcements. Both papers are also available in a web version, *Karel'skaya Guberniya* from its own website and *Kareliya* via the website of the republican government. These two publications were chosen for analysis to examine the potential differences in the treatment of historical narratives and minority issues in general between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ publications. Given *Kareliya*’s close association with the local administration it was posited it would propagate officially sanctioned narratives of Karelian history and identity. In contrast it was expected *Karel'skaya Guberniya* would offer an outlet for more heterodox views which might not be permissible within the state-controlled press. As discussed below the actual situation in the Karelian press is somewhat more nuanced, as the official nature of *Kareliya* has the perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive effect of providing minority groups with at least a limited platform for the expression of their views; this opportunity is less readily available in the commercial *Karel'skaya Guberniya* which is almost exclusively the preserve of the ethnic Russian majority. Actual readership figures from the Karelian and Russian populations for these papers are not readily available so it is not possible to determine if there is any significant disparity between either group in terms of their exposure to either paper. Unfortunately there are no figures available on relative levels of income, education or urbanisation between Karelians and Russians within the Republic of Karelia which would suggest any especial difference in the likely exposure of either group to newspaper discourse or their potential preference in terms of paper selection; it is to be expected that at least some Karelians read the Karelian-language press but given the infrequency of publication and circulation of such papers and the fact that not all Karelians actually speak the Karelian language it
is not likely they entirely ignore the local Russian-language press. It should also be noted that whilst, as noted below, Karelians often appear to construct an image of their identity which closely associates it with ideas of ‘the village’ they are actually a relatively urbanised group; around a fifth of all Karelians actually live in Petrozavodsk itself, alongside around half of Vepsians. Kovaleva gives the percentage of Karelians resident in urban areas in 2009 as 76.4% (2010: 31), suggesting that the overwhelming majority of Karelians are urban dwellers, although she suggests the proportion of Vepsians resident in towns is much lower.

The corpus of data for analysis has been derived from issues of both papers printed between 2000 and 2012. The chronological boundaries selected for this study are somewhat arbitrary in nature; a twelve year sample was selected as the maximum practicable amount of data which could be analysed in the time available. The data thus selected however covered an interesting period within which, as noted above, many studies have identified a centralisation of the Russian state and dynamic changes within narratives of Russian and broader post-Soviet identities. The sample also encompassed the time period of the interview process and hence the two sets of data are contemporaneous in that sense. The analysis which has been undertaken is qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. That is to say that each individual issue of the paper has been examined for relevant material rather than searching the corpus to determine the prevalence of certain keywords or particular expressions. The primary reason for adopting this approach was determined by the nature of the topic under investigation. As any article, even those on seemingly unrelated subjects, might contain certain traces of a particular historical narrative close examination of each text would aid in the recovery of such data. An approach which listed the frequency of certain key phrases would not aid in the understanding of how these were employed; the term фашисты, could, depending on the broader context within which it was situated, be nuanced in such a way as to contribute to reproducing or undermine a particular historical narrative. There is also a minor terminological issue to consider insofar as the term карельский is employed to refer both to the Karelian people in particular
and also any topic or object associated with Karelia as an area; it would therefore potentially be misleading to think any topic described in this manner had anything to do with Karelians as an ethnic group or nationality without carefully considering the broader context in which it was used.

As Pietikainen (2003: 604-5) has discussed in the context of the Sami minority in Finland access to mass media coverage is crucial to minority groups seeking to be heard in the larger community; it is also, conversely, much more difficult for such groups to obtain such coverage. Indeed, one of the most important aspects of the issue is that such groups are rarely direct contributors to such discourse or even indirectly quoted. In the Karelian context, Karelians themselves are most often the subjects of discourse not direct participants within it. The special form of media discourse means that it is produced with an imagined recipient in mind, an imagined reader. It shall be argued that the imagined reader in both the case of Karel’skaya Guberniya and Kareliya is Russian not merely linguistically but by perceived nationality. In the case of Karel’skaya Guberniya the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish minorities are constructed as the ‘other’ by not merely by the method by which they are referred but also by the complete lack of any direct contribution by the minorities themselves. In all articles dealing with issues relating either to the history of the Republic of Karelia or with the affairs of the minorities in general they are only ever quoted indirectly, and that infrequently. Almost no articles within the newspaper are explicitly written by a Karelian, Vepsian or Finn. Whilst members of these minority groups may perhaps be on the journalistic staff of the paper in no article do they write as a Karelian or Finn; that is to say that there are practically no articles claiming to be written from the perspective of the minority in question. This leads to a situation in which the views of the ‘other’, the minorities, are presented on their behalf, selectively and with attached commentary, by the dominant group. Below are a number of excerpts from Karel’skaya Guberniya which illustrate the construction of the minority nationalities and the nationality of the imagined reader:

A) Вепсская волость — это несколько деревень на юге Карелии.
Население — около двух с половиной тысяч человек. Жизнь
здесь течет мирно и неспешно. А управляет ею в меру сил и возможностей местный Совет из одиннадцати депутатов, в каждой деревне — по управляющему. Центр волости — деревня Шелтозеро, где в здании школы размещается волостная администрация. На другой стороне деревни стоит покосившееся здание музея вепсской культуры. Это, пожалуй, единственное напоминание о том, что ты находишься на вепсской земле. Правда, в последние годы туристы проявляют интерес и к местному вепскому хору. Финнов да москвичей сюда автобусами возят: от Петрозаводска всего 80 километров. В музей сходили, хор послушали — и обратно. А в остальном все здесь как и везде: дороги чистят редко и не все, домики одинаково неухоженные (KG4 23.01.2002).

В) Карелы за "русский"

Малые народы опасаются конфликта

Возмущение финно-угров вызвало сокращение количества русскоязычных радиопередач в эфире "Радио Карелия". “Из эфира в неделю должно исчезнуть 350 минут: такова директива московского руководства, и связана она с убыточностью карельской радиостанции. Передачи на национальных языках трогать не стали: пожертвовали русскоязычными. Что не осталось радиослушателями незамеченным, но больше всего взволновали перемены непосредственно носителей национальных языков. Да так, что написали письмо Катанандову и в прочие высокие инстанции.

– Многие карелы, особенно молодые, не знают своего родного языка. Поэтому они слушают передачи на русском языке, – считает лидер общественного объединения "Карельский конгресс" Анатолий Григорьев. – А во многих русских передачах рассказывалось о карелах.
По мнению Анатолия Григорьева, урезание нарушает конституционные права, а также наносит вред "моральной атмосфере в республике" и может привести даже к национальной распре, поскольку ограничивает русскоязычное население в информации. Всего в Карелии проживают 10% карелов и всего 0,8% вепсов. Согласно же госпрограмме, принятой в Карелии, до 2010 года на поддержку национальных языков предусмотрено выделить больше 22 миллионов рублей. А теперь, похоже, и на поддержку русского придется подкинуть. Не допустить, так сказать, гонения на карелов (KG52 24.12.2008).

С) "Карельская Губерния" попробовала выяснить, для чего нужно петь на языках, которые почти никто не знает.

На финно-угорском фестивале Ropivo вокальная группа Anna Tulla представила первый диск собственных песен на вепском, карельском и финском языках. Музыканты не пытались создать нечто псевдофольклорное. Наоборот, композиции нарочито современные, насыщенные электронным дискотечным звучанием.

Главный вопрос, который возникает у людей, не имеющих отношения к проекту, – зачем? Кому нужна попса на языке, который почти никто не знает?

– Если мы этим занимаемся, значит, это нужно. Хотя бы нам. У нас не было цели сделать популярную группу и продать диск, – рассказывает Наталья Антонова, директор общественной организации "Молодая Карелия". – Мы рассчитывали на резонанс в финно-угорском сообществе. Пусть молодежь поймет, что можно сочинить современную музыку и на других языках.

По словам Натальи, молодежь уже начала это понимать, судя по тем отзывам, которые слышат в "Молодой Карелии". Чего стоит один только звонок от ухтинских карелов Калевалы, которые затеяли
провести летом этнодискотеку. Однако, по большому счету, аудитория, которая услышит музыку Anna Tulla, довольно ограничена. Это 200 человек организации "Молодая Карелия", а также студенты "финского" факультета ПетрГУ и учащиеся финно-угорской школы. Поэтому диск, созданный на деньги гранта, выпущен тиражом всего в 500 экземпляров (KG4 21.01.2009).

In example A the author of the article clearly feels the need to inform his reader at the very start of the piece of a few basic facts about the Vepsian National Volost' that was then in existence; the inference that can therefore be drawn is that he or she believes the reader will be unaware of these facts. Clearly the Vepsians themselves, who would presumably not need reminding of such basic information, are not the intended recipients of this discourse. In fact the imagined reader is constructed as a (presumably Russian) ordinary citizen of the Republic of Karelia; the actual apparent national pretensions of the Veps aside life in the area is как и везде, and apart from the museum, we are told, nothing would remind you that this was supposed to be a Vepsian area. In fact we are informed that the museum itself is a place to where ‘Finns and Muscovites’ are bussed in and out to see displays of Vepsian culture. Here we see a strategy of trivialisation or minimisation in which the Vepsian claim to a ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ culture is downplayed. As will be seen below aside from suggesting the author views his imagined interlocutor as disinterested in and somewhat ignorant of Vepsian issues. There are also other implications for the construction of national identities which will be further examined below.

Examples B and C illustrate how Karelians are talked about in Karel’skaya Guberniya rather than to. In example C the reader is informed of the small numbers of Veps and Karelians actually resident in the modern Republic of Karelia; again it is unlikely a Karelian or Vepsian reader would need to be reminded of basic facts about their national group. The small numbers of the minorities are introduced using the adverb ‘всего’ or ‘altogether’, which highlights their position as an absolute minority and serves to further diminish their status in comparison with the almost 90% of the population not part of their
minority group. Their minority status is recalled in a discussion on the withdrawal of support for Russian-language programmes on Radio Karelia; the inference clearly is that the minority group are being favoured over the majority ‘we’ group. Interestingly the use of пожертвовали русскоязычными can be interpreted by the reader in two ways, either as the victimisation of Russian-language programming or the victimisation of Russian-speakers. The author treats the ‘problem’ under discussion somewhat light-heartedly; the closing comment inferring that the issue is not worth persecuting Karelians over is clearly intended as a joke. In framing the discussion of the problem in this manner, however, the author again appears to construct his imagined interlocutor as Russian or at least as non-Karelian; the Karelians are the subject of referential dissimilation by description as ‘speakers of the national languages’ and ‘Finno-Ugurs’. No other group is explicitly named in opposition to this group; the author appears to assume his or her reader does not fall under one of these designations. It should be noted however that although not directly contributing to the discourse Karelians are, as on this occasion, allowed to make indirect contributions as the quotation by the journalist of Anatolii Grigoriev demonstrates.

Example C also illustrates the points made above. Natalya Antonova is again allowed to contribute indirectly by the paper here through quotation, and indeed the article goes on to quote two more Karelians on the topic of Karelian music. In speaking to the journalist however, and by extension the readers of the newspaper, Antonova appears as a spokesperson for the Karelians talking about a non-inclusive ‘we’ group of Karelians. This is partially a result of the manner in which her comments are presented by the journalist, and presumably the manner in which the journalist elicited the comments in the first instance. The journalist clearly constructs the Karelians as an ‘other’; the article itself begins by claiming it will attempt to answer a problem: для чего нужно петь на языках, которые почти никто не знает. Indeed this question is repeated on a number of occasions in the opening paragraphs:
Главный вопрос, который возникает у людей, не имеющих отношения к проекту, – зачем? Кому нужна попса на языке, который почти никто не знает?

The idea that ‘almost nobody’ speaks Karelian is repeated twice at the very beginning of the article; once again the newspaper is constructing a picture of modern society in the Republic of Karelia in which the usage of Karelian is unusual and ethnic Karelian identity is somewhat marginalised. The question of ‘why’, or as it might be better translated in English in this context ‘why bother’, is assumed to be the main reaction of людей, не имеющих отношения к проекту, which as the author knows will be almost all his or her readership. The journalist then details the small audience such music has by listing the small numbers of those involved in its production; once again by detailing their small numbers the relevance of Karelian identity is questioned. The author furthermore declines to use the Karelian ‘Nuori Karjala’ as the name of the organisation throughout, choosing to use the Russian equivalent of ‘Молодая Карелия’. Presumably ‘Anna Tulla’ and ‘Ropivo’ were retained as the author could not find a Russian equivalent. In this context the ‘we’ group constructed by Antonova in reply is both through her lexical choice and the manner in which it is presented non-inclusive of the reader. In defending her project she claims:

Если мы этим занимаемся, значит, это нужно. Хотя бы нам.

Her defensive reply of “хотя бы нам” appears in its presentation in the article to refer only to those involved in creating the project or to those involved with Karelian organisations in general. She also makes no attempt to justify the importance of the project in terms of the broader Russian-speaking society; she is interested in what Finno-Ugric society makes of the project, rather than attempting to provide an answer which will satisfy the journalist.

In summation therefore we can clearly glimpse from the above examples the manner in which the imagined reader of Karel’skaya Guberniya appears to be constructed as an ethnic Russian. The validity of Karelian or Finno-Ugric culture and consequently identity is often questioned by its presentation in the paper, either through its presentation as somewhat alien and artificial or through
presentation as a minority, ‘special-interest’ phenomenon. The imagined reader is conceived of as being relatively uninterested in Karelian or Vepsian affairs and relatively poorly informed about them. The use of synecdochial anthroponyms (i.e. ‘the Karelians’, ‘the Finns’ etc.) and other such referential dissimilation such as that described in example C is routine within the publication when the minority groups are under discussion. In this manner the generally unstated ‘we’ group of Russians is disassociated from the explicitly referenced Karelians and others. Basic information and ‘reminders’ to the reader of the presence of the minority groups frequently preface any discussion of their affairs in a manner which presupposes ignorance of and lack of interest in such matters on the part of the reading public. The situation must not be overstated, however; Karelians and Vepsians are far from being negatively portrayed in the paper. Indeed they are at least indirectly quoted by the publication, giving them some limited ability to influence the manner in which they are presented to the reader. The general tendency, however, is towards marginalisation. Karel’skaya Guberniya is a Russian ‘editorial voice’ speaking to a Russian imagined reader. This discourse is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse which represented the various minority groups of the USSR as the ‘younger brother’ of the Russian majority. This phenomenon will be examined further below and potential reasons for its persistence in the Karelian context examined.

The situation in Kareliya is somewhat different as not only is there indirect quotation of the minority groups but individuals from these groups have contributed articles which are explicitly written as expressions of their views as Karelians, Vepsians and Finns. Although such articles are relatively infrequent this does provide an outlet for these groups to contribute to the discourse in question expressly as representatives of the minorities of the Republic of Karelia rather than their views being presented by the dominant group. The paper also regularly reports the proceedings of such events as the Congress of Karelians reproducing in some instances addresses made at such events by Karelians to a Karelian audience. In such articles in particular, especially those concerned with the fate of the Karelian language, the authors appear to conceive of themselves as
addressing their fellow-Karelians. In the main however despite being allowed to address the imagined reader directly in *Kareliya* it would appear that the Karelian contributors often appear to conceptualise their addressee as Russian by nationality. This may be due to a number of factors. Firstly it may simply be due to their own perceived status as a minority; i.e. that the Karelians in question construct their own identity in opposition to a perceived Russian identity and thus are comfortable constructing themselves as an ‘other’ in the Russian-language press. It may also be, in a related manner, due to the fact they consider the Karelian-language press to be ‘their’ press and hence again construct the Russian-language press as being the preserve of the ‘other’ group of Russians. The construction of an imagined other has been identified by Bhabha (1990) and Hall (1996a) as an essential component of identity construction itself; the Karelians appear to construct an image of their identity at least partially in opposition to that of the dominant Russian group. Given the dialogic nature of the utterance they may consider the imagined reader shall construct them as an ‘other’ also. Perhaps more likely it is a combination of all three factors. It must be stated, however, that the preponderance of articles talk *about* Karelians rather than giving them an actual direct voice in the discourse.

L) “Карелы обиженны на депутатов

Встреча представителей национальных объединений с парламентариями, состоявшаяся в день открытых дверей в Законодательном Собрании, выявила рост недовольства со стороны карел.

Обострение напряженности в отношениях представителей объединений карел с депутатами Законодательного Собрания вызвано, напомним, позицией народных избранников по вопросу о статусе карельского языка. При принятии новой редакции Конституции Карелии они отказались присвоить ему статус государственного, что вызвало бурю негодования со стороны карельских национальных организаций. Удар был тем более болезнен, что карелы не ожидали такого исхода событий. Об этом напомнила депутатам заместитель председателя Комитета по
национальной политике Татьяна Клеерова на встрече с парламентариями в день открытых дверей в Законодательном Собрании. По ее мнению, готовность общества к принятию положительного решения была очень велика. "Мы были уверены в успехе", - говорит Татьяна Клеерова. После третьего чтения законопроекта карелы праздновали победу, уверенные, что на этой стадии повернуть вспять уже нельзя. Но депутаты рассудили иначе. Во время четвертого чтения статья о статусе карельского языка была изъята из текста Конституции.

Более того, народные избранники сделали еще и "контрольный выстрел" в виде пункта о том, что вопрос о статусе должен решаться только на основании решения республиканского референдума. Эта оговорка окончательно похоронила надежды карел. Большинству населения Карелии судьба карельского языка безразлична, поэтому исход референдума предрешен. (К 49 04.05.2001)."

М) “Однако вероятность того, что депутаты передумают и пойдут навстречу карельским национальным организациям, сомнительна. Это выяснилось в ходе разговора. Нелицеприятные эпитеты, которыми гости сразу же начали награждать депутатов, не могли не вызвать раздражения у народных избранников. Их обвинили в "нечистоплотных методах работы", заподозрили в том, что они "чего-то боятся" и вообще "увлечены не совсем добрыми намерениями". Председателю Палаты Республики Владимиру Шильникову неоднократно пришлось призывать выступавших к корректности, а те в ответ заявили, что депутаты на страницах прессы позволяют себе и не такое в отношении национальных организаций. Атмосфера постепенно накалялась и, наконец, взорвалась, когда слово взял лидер карельской организации ЛДПР Михаил Максимов, который является одним из главных инициаторов отклонения поправки о статусе карельского языка. Он обвинил карел в том, что они не знают своей истории, а именно того, что их предки, как утверждает М. Максимов, появились в Карелии всего 350 лет назад, а значит, карелы не имеют права называться "титульной" нацией со всеми вытекающими для статуса карельского языка последствиями. Возмущению представителей национальных организаций
не было предела. Владимиру Шильникову пришлось утихомиривать, кричавших со всех сторон гостей, словами: "Вы в парламенте, а здесь каждый имеет право говорить то, что хочет (К 49 04.05.2001)".

N) “ЗЕМЛЯ КАРЕЛЬСКАЯ. Специальный выпуск
Государственного комитета Республики Карелия по национальной политике

ОТВЕТСТВЕННАЯ ЗА ВЫПУСК НАТАЛЬЯ АНТОНОВА

Предлагаем вашему вниманию доклад заместителя председателя Государственного комитета Республики Карелия по национальной политике Татьяны КЛЕЕРОВОЙ, прозвучавший на IV республиканском съезде карелов 23 июня

И это очевидно: пока жив язык, жив народ, его самобытность, его душа.

Все 10 лет, с I съезда в Олонце, мы последовательно добивались, чтобы отношение к карельскому языку было уважительнее не только со стороны внешнего окружения, но и в среде самого народа. Усилиями ученых, учителей, журналистов, художественной интеллигенции карельский язык стал возрождаться из полузабвения. (К 94 28.04.2001).”

О) “Карелы, ходатайствуя о государственном статусе для своего языка, искали прежде всего моральной поддержки. Если бы господа оппоненты захотели вникнуть в суть проблемы, то поняли бы, что ни о каких "больших материальных затратах" речь не шла, поскольку предлагалось самое деликатное внедрение функций карельского языка в жизнь. Ни о каких "массах" переводчиков и о "насильственном изучении карельского языка" не было даже мысли, так как карелы все двуязычны, многие владеют тремя языками или многоязычны, поэтому в любой государственной структуре они в состоянии решать свои проблемы не на родном языке. Что касается выдуманных "опасений" относительно
национальной розни и параллелей с Прибалтикой, то здесь полезно было бы познакомиться с историей, чтобы убедиться, что карельский народ всегда тяготел к России, веками являлся ее северным форпостом и в сложнейшие моменты своей истории выбирал именно ее. Высказывания же относительно "насилия меньшинства над большинством" вызывают улыбку. Неужели не очевидно, что карелы - сдержанный и деликатный народ?! Они не приняли тон дискуссии противников карельского языка и продолжают отвечать им в высшей степени интеллигентно, как, например, Е. Клементьев в статье "Получит ли карельский язык конституционную защиту?" (газета "Карелия" от 20 декабря 2000 г.), где свои суждения он строит вокруг двух вопросов: надо ли защищать языковые интересы русскоязычного населения в странах Балтии? и надо ли защищать языковые интересы народов России внутри нашей Федерации? (K16 10.02.2001)."

In examples L and M which are taken from the same article the Karelians are clearly constructed as a distinct group from the actual author of the article and the imagined reader. In fact two opposing groups are constructed, the ‘Karelians’ and the ‘deputies’ (in this case of the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia; the deputies, however, are actively constructed as representing the majority of the populace of the Republic of Karelia whereas the Karelians are portrayed as a small minority. Contributions are made directly in the article by Karelians, although only one is directly attributable to a named individual, the Tatyana Kleerova who gives voice to the Karelian’s expectations of success in achieving official recognition for their language. Aside from this the only direct quotation of the Karelians in the piece is of their angry reaction to this recognition being denied such status. In contrast to the Karelians, who are negatively portrayed as ‘crying from all sides’ in outrage at the decision and the rhetoric of the parliamentarians, the deputies are constructed in a somewhat more positive light. Not only do they clearly represent the reader, being as the author would have us believe ‘народные избранники’ i.e. ‘chosen by the people’ in general, they are allowed to make far lengthier contributions to the discourse and these contributions are more often attributed to a specific individual. They are also portrayed as reasonable people, having рассудили, or carefully considered
the problem before arriving at a final, incontrovertible judgement. Their intention to use a "контрольный выстрел" depicts them as metaphorically ‘killing off’ the idea of the use of Karelian as an official language; critically this is not presented by the author in a negative light. The fact they are quoted more often is not merely due to the fact they are deputies of the legislative assembly; the Karelians present were representatives of various organisations and could presumably have been quoted if the author had chosen to do so. Furthermore the outrage of the Karelians is contrasted to the calm and democratic conduct of the deputies, who allow the minority to have their say, but insist on their right to authoritatively inform them of their own history. The most telling aspect of the article, one which links the construction of the imagined reader directly to the objective context in which the article is produced is the statement that any referendum on the question of providing official status to Karelian will fail. As the author reminds his reader, he or she is most likely indifferent to the fate of the language in any case and so the outcome of any referendum is predetermined.

Example N is a speech delivered by the Tatyana Kleerova we encountered earlier to the 4th Congress of Karelians reproduced in Kareliya. The editorial responsibility for reproducing this speech in the paper falls to the Natalya Antonova we encountered above, who was at that time working for the Karelian State Committee for Affairs of National Politics, the organ of the Karelian government responsible for dealing with matters relating to the minority nationalities. It is a relatively rare example of a text in the corpus studied which can be definitely attributed to a Karelian voice produced with a Karelian interlocutor in mind. In her address, the opening remarks of which are reproduced in the last paragraph of this example, Kleerova uses an addressee-inclusive form of ‘we’, conceptualising herself and those present as being the group of interested activists who have fought for the revitalisation of the Karelian language from the very first Congress of Karelians. By being reproduced in the paper of course her address is removed from its immediate discursive context, the Congress of Karelians, and placed into another. As a consequence the original text is ‘framed’ for its new audience by the editor, who ‘invites’ her reader’s attention to the text and takes responsibility for its contents.
Of course ordinarily the responsibility of a journalist for any article is assumed by the reader without question; we do not ordinarily find in Kareliya or other papers such an explicit assumption of responsibility by the journalist in question. This together with the manner in which Antonova introduces the piece with an invitation for attention may indicate a feeling of marginality or vulnerability on behalf of the Karelian contributor to their interlocutor; the attention of the reader is not assumed but requested.

The marginalisation potentially perceived by the Karelian contributors in the mass media discourse is perhaps best illustrated by example O. In this excerpt the Karelian contributor feels the need to refute various objections she clearly feels will be raised against the adoption of Karelian as an official language by the majority (i.e. Russian) population. The imagined reader is reassured that the Karelians are not seeking unfair advantages over the remainder of the populace, nor are they going to demand increased rights in an undignified or aggressive manner. Most tellingly perhaps the reader is assured that there is no ‘danger’ inherent in granting Karelians more language rights; the author is at pains to assuage their worries by informing the Russian reader that the Karelians have always been loyal to their Russian allies. A strategy of trivialisation is employed which undermines this concern by using the polite/impolite paradigm to represent its supposed absurdity. Apparent concerns amongst the Russian population, which the author clearly feels constrained to address, of a ‘Baltic’ scenario are dismissed as unfounded. At the same time she appeals to her reader to be as sympathetic to the plight of the Karelians as to that of the Russians in the Baltic states; clearly, therefore, the interlocutor she is trying to convince must be a Russian suspicious of the motives of the Karelians in demanding more recognition for their language.
3.2 Constructing the History of a ‘Karelia’, or Who is Who on this Land?

As has been discussed above upon establishment the Karelian Workers’ Commune included various areas which did not at the time have a majority Karelian population and its later expansion into the KASSR increased the extent of the republic at the expense of its national composition. The Finno-Soviet conflicts of 1940-44 also altered the boundaries and the ethnic composition of the KASSR. It is evident therefore from a strictly scientific point of view it would be problematic to say the least to conflate the idea of ‘Karelia’ as the national and ancestral homeland of the Karelian people with the modern Republic of Karelia. Indeed the narration of the history of the Republic of Karelia in the corpus of data studied highlights this issue. Various national groups can and do claim to be ‘indigenous’ inhabitants of the territories now part of the Republic. This allows these putative national groups to claim a share in some form of genuine ‘Karelianess’ from their long-standing or indeed apparent immemorial residence within the boundaries of what is understood to be in contemporary terms Karelia. Denying the claims of any group to the status of indigenous or at least long-standing residence also delegitimises their claims to a share in this constructed ‘Karelianess’; this can also therefore exclude the group from consideration as legitimate current or future residents of Karelia in some narratives.

i) Karelia as the Karelian homeland

As the titular nationality Karelians are legally considered to be the indigenous inhabitants of the Republic of Karelia; this idea is also therefore one prevalent in narratives of national identity connected to the area. The Republic of Karelia or at least certain areas of it can be claimed as the native or ‘родной’ territory of the Karelian people, a status which can be invoked not merely to aid the construction of a proposed Karelian identity but also to claim rights and privileges for the Karelian people and language as a whole. The narration of the idea of Karelia as the Karelian homeland can also aid the legitimisation of the current political
structure of the Republic of Karelia itself. A number of discursive strategies appear to be employed to convey this narrative of Karelian history, including emphasising the continuity of Karelian occupation of the area and the idea of the Republic of Karelia as the birthplace or incubator of Karelian culture. As a consequence of the rather arbitrary, in historical terms, nature in which the current autonomous area came into being there remains a tendency for such narratives to become somewhat localised. This may also be a consequence of the current status of the Karelian minority, who tend to be clustered in a number of locations rather than dispersed across the republic. This tendency towards localising the historical narrative, tying the historical narrative of the supposed ‘Karelian nation’ to certain locales, can perhaps also act to marginalise the narrative by denying it the possibility of referring to the Republic of Karelia as a whole; this allows space in the discursive arena for other competing historical narratives.

In terms of narrating Karelia as the homeland of the Karelians an important strategy employed is a constructive strategy which emphasises the continuity of Karelian occupation and residence of the area. The antiquity of Karelian residence in the general area of what would become the modern Republic of Karelia is emphasised in the example below:

Наука сегодня, к сожалению, не обладает абсолютно точными данными, когда племя древней корелы начало самостоятельное развитие, но достоверно известно, что в первой половине I тысячелетия н. э. древняя корела уже существовала. Первые ее поселения располагались на побережье Ладожского озера, в частности на Карельском перешейке, и отсюда она начала двигаться в разных направлениях. Миграция древней корелы завершилась в XII веке, тогда она достигла побережья Белого моря. (К 94 28.08.2001)

This continuity of Karelian history in the area is extremely important to the author of the article, for it demonstrates in her mind that Karelians are:
Факты говорят об одном: мы - птенцы общего родного гнезда, испытывшие на себе, как и носители любого другого языка, влияние времени. И это естественный процесс. Основа языка у нас одна, но "наслоения" могут быть разными (ibid).

The common origins that the Karelian people share, in the author’s view, play a vital role in uniting them as a group. Despite the differences which are apparently evident in modern dialects of the Karelian language the basis of the language remains, in the author’s view, unchanged. Importantly the experience of the Karelians is far from unique; it is the same as that gone through by any other (linguistic) group. This of course helps legitimise Karelian identity as valid by demonstrating that it has undergone processes which are common to other identities the reader will already consider to be valid. It also allows her to claim the unity of the Karelian nation despite its current fragmented state in geographical and linguistic terms, which is important as shall be seen below. The idea of Karelia being the Karelian homeland is quite common amongst Karelian contributors to the mass media discourse. Karelia can fulfil this role not merely for the Karelian language, although this is often seen as the most important aspect of the question by Karelian contributors, but also in terms of culture in general. By ‘giving the world’ the Kalevala, for example, as is often claimed in the data studied, the area also serves to incubate and develop Karelian identity. The narration of the Republic of Karelia as the ‘birthplace’ of Karelian identity is exemplified by the example below:

Калевальцы гордятся не только тем, что их родная земля дала миру знаменитый карело-финский эпос, но и тем, что здесь, на берегах озера Куйто, выросли и впитали в себя вековые традиции языка, литературы, культуры нации многие народные писатели и поэты, цвет карельской литературы.. (К 117 21.20.2003)

The родная земля in question is Kalevala, formerly Ukhta, one of the areas of the current Republic of Karelia with the greatest proportion of Karelians by nationality. Here the area is credited not only with having дала миру the
epos *Kalevala* itself, an expression which of course places the creation of the work firmly within a Karelian context and excludes the influence of Finland, but also with the nurturing on centuries of linguistic and literary tradition writers who are the ‘flower’ of Karelian literature. A similar tendency to associate the idea of the area as the ‘motherland’ of Karelian literature is seen in the example given below:

Здесь Родины моей начало:

В Олонце прошел заключительный этап IX Республиканского фестиваля карельской литературы имени Владимира Брендоева Тдс [*sic*] synpunrannan minun algu (Здесь Родины моей начало) (K107 26.11.2009).

Again Karelia is described as the birthplace of Karelian literature, as the article goes on to describe the manner in which several famed Karelian authors will be commemorated in Olonets; by associating these writers with the town in a festival entitled ‘my motherland began here’ the organisers are clearly proclaiming the area as the ‘motherland’ of Karelian literature and therefore Karelian identity itself. Both the above excerpts are again very reminiscent of Soviet-era discourse on the national question. The framing of the nation and the language chosen to conduct this process are very redolent of Soviet texts on this theme; it would appear that this traditional manner of constructing an image of the ‘Karelian-ness’ of the area in question has been retained, almost entirely unaltered, in the journalistic discourse of the Republic of Karelia. Here we see an important continuity in the treatment of the Karelian minority by the Russian-language press. It may be the case that this rather patronising Soviet approach has been maintained as the Russian dominated press has not perceived any particular change in the social relations between Karelians and Russians since the fall of the Soviet state; the Karelians are still represented using the same formulaic appeals to ancient culture, traditions and literature employed in the Soviet era. This tends towards an ethnographic construction of ‘Karelian’ identity in which it is produced through reference to such ancient traditions rather than anything more contemporary and thus marginalised as a curiosity or
relic. As has been seen above this tendency appears to be quite stable; this top-down construction of ‘Karelian’ identity as rooted in folkloric practices by the Russian-language press does not seem to be on the wane throughout the period of data analysed.

ii) Local and National Identity: From the Village to the Nation

Expressions of Karelian identity are often linked to specific localities with the modern Republic of Karelia; simply put, some areas seem to be considered ‘more Karelian’ than others. The town of Kalevala, formerly Ukhta, and its surrounding district is one part of the Republic of Karelia in particular which is often depicted as being particularly ‘Karelian’.

Калевальский район — родина всемирно известного эпоса "Калевала". Именно в деревнях и селах Калевальского района была собрана и систематизирована большая часть рун эпоса. В настоящее время некоторые из деревень находятся под охраной Юнеско. Для любого карела Калевала — это земля обетованная, святое место... Калевальский район надо не ликвидировать, а возрождать в совершенно новом качестве — как культурно-исторический, рунопевческий, туристический центр, способный в будущем привлекать в республику тысячи туристов и инвестиции...(KG 14 31.03.2005).

Once again in the example above we have an area of the modern Republic of Karelia described as being the ‘birthplace’ of the Kalevala, in this instance Kalevalskii District. This excerpt from Karel’skaya Guberniya is derived from a letter sent to the newspaper by the residents of the district protesting about its putative liquidation into a larger area which would dilute the percentage of Karelians in this ‘national district’. Given this context it is important for the letter-writers to attempt to convince their addressee, the editorial staff of the paper and also the newspaper reader, of the innate ‘Karelian’ nature of the area. This is attempted once again by constructing the district as the native soil from which the greatest expression of Finno-Ugric identity, the
Kalevala, was derived. The implication is that it would be, or at least should be, unthinkable to dissolve what little national autonomy Kalevalskii District now has in the light of its past as incubator of Karelian identity. Indeed the area is sanctified as земля обетованная, святое место to любого карела; such use of ecclesiastical language is intended to legitimise this viewpoint to the imagined reader.

This use of the idea of Kalevala the town as the birthplace of the Kalevala itself, and hence ‘sacred ground’ for the Karelian people is also employed in the examples below, which are taken from one of the very few articles in Karel’skaya Guberniya written explicitly by an ethnic Karelian journalist:

Известный калевальский журналист Андрей Туоми прислал в "Карельскую Губернию" свои размышления о том, как власти привели к гибели район, и о том, чем чревата для всех жителей республики такая политика правительства.

Калевала: между гетто и резервацией

О нас, жителях многострадального национального района, говорят, как об узниках гетто. Тех — туда, этих — сюда. Похоже, в правительстве Карелии плохо знают историю республики. А жаль. Новым карельским демократам надо бы помнить, что демократия на нашей северной земле зарождалась как раз в Ухтинской республике. И даже медведь на гербе республики заимствован из ухтинского герба. Надо бы поуважительнее относиться к той святой для карелов земле, что дала миру эпос, национальную литературу, культуру и традиции.

И последнее. Родина "Калевалы" переживала и худшие времена. И не только в новой истории. Даже в эпосе мы находим строки, повествующие о трудных днях:

Не восходит больше солнце,

Золотой не светит месяц
Ни над Вяйнёлы домами,
Ни над полем Калевалы.
Охватил мороз посевы,
На стада болезнь напала,
Птицы все затосковали,
Люди чувствовали скуку
Без сиянья солнца в небе
И без лунного сиянья.

Руна 49 (KG12 17.03.2005).

In his article Andrei Tuomi once again uses the idea of Kalevala as the birthplace of the Kalevala, and goes so far as to actually quote from it; this is an attempt at a negotiation of history in which the area is constructed as the birthplace of Karelian identity itself. Indeed the work is invoked not merely to remind the reader of its origins but also to establish the idea of the continuity and resilience of Karelian residence and identity in the area. Once again the area is described in terms of being ‘sacred’, the origin of the epos and by extension Karelian culture and tradition. The birthplace of the epic, we are informed, has seen worse days, and this is then apparently demonstrated through quotation from the piece itself. The negative portrayal of contemporary Kalevala as a ‘ghetto’ for the Karelians is contrasted to the role the town placed in forming the Ukhtinskaya Respublika, as the author describes it the first attempt at ‘Karelian’ democracy; by drawing a comparison between that period in history and the contemporary situation Tuomi clearly intends to send the authorities a warning. This construction of the topos of the ‘ghettoisation’ of the Karelians also seems to be deliberately intended to contrast with the formulaic presentation of Karelian identity employed by the Russian-language media; here the influence of the ‘big brother’, or ethnic Russians, on this ancient Karelian culture is explicitly its marginalisation and neglect. Whilst Tuomi also uses the concept of the antiquity
of Karelian culture through a strategy of continuation to produce an image of Karelian identity he also subverts the mainstream narrative by rejecting the supposed benign interest and influence of the Russian majority and inverting it into a negative, restrictive force. By recalling the formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika, which was an expressly ethnic Karelian attempt at autonomy he recalls a narrative of history where Karelians themselves attempted to solve their political problems. The local authorities clearly надо бы помнить this fact, in the author’s view, and pay more attention to the problems of the area. This creates a topos of the Karelians as the ‘original’ democrats within the region; the traditions of democracy and ‘correct’ political development are attributed implicitly to the Karelians and not any other group. This idea is then used in a strategy of discontinuation and dissimilation which does not recognise the modern Republic of Karelia as the real inheritor of these traditions of democracy which the Karelians themselves have preserved.

Kalevala is one of the towns generally seen as most ‘Karelian’ in the narratives of identity and history which were discovered within the newspaper discourse, however this opinion was not universal. Occasionally the area is constructed as not being genuinely ‘Karelian’, as in the example below from an interview with Nina Serebryakova, a Russian filmmaker from Saint-Petersburg making a documentary on the Finno-Ugric peoples of Karelia:

Мы были в Калевале, которая, к сожалению, произвела на нас печальное впечатление, потому что, как мне показалось, там очень мало карельской души осталось, хотя это центр национального района Карелии.
- Там, наверное, преобладает финская душа:
- Финская душа преобладает в значительной мере. Но ведь она присутствует во всей Беломорской Карелии. (К 136 05.12.2006)

Here the ‘Karelian-ness’, literally the ‘Karelian Soul’ of Kalevala is minimised by the interviewee, who interestingly in the same article notes that to find this sense of genuine Karelian identity she travelled to Olonets District:
Конечно, Петрозаводск - это смешанное население, но, когда мы оказывались в деревнях, например, в Шокше, Шелтозере, Рыбреке, Другой Реке, перед нами было уже совсем другое. Там чаще встречали вепсов и карелов. Мы решили расширить финно-угорскую тематику и сделать фильм о карелах. Поэтому мы приехали сюда, в Олонецкий район (ibid).

This interview is interesting as both the interviewee, an outsider with presumably no pertinent qualifications for deciding which district is more ‘Karelian’ other than her own impressions and presuppositions as to what ‘Karelian-ness’ may be is allowed, unchallenged by the local journalist, to determine the Olonets District the true centre of modern Karelian culture. Kalevala, as stated, may be the centre of the National District but lacks ‘Karelian Soul’ in the opinion of the Russian filmmaker. The interviewer does not challenge her on this, despite in other instances interpolating in brackets further exposition when he deems it necessary; for example when she lists the places where Veps live he adds his own experience of meeting some from Irkutsk Oblast:

Если говорить о вепсах, то этот народ волею судеб оказался разделенным на три административных региона. Это Ленинградская, Вологодская области и Карелия. Волею судеб и нас занесло сюда, в Прионежье, к шелтозерским вепсам. (Кстати, вепсы живут и в Иркутской области. С ними я познакомился на международном конгрессе финно-угорских писателей. Уехали они туда еще во времена Столыпинской реформы. - В.В.) (ibid).

Furthermore, rather than questioning her assertion he suggests to her that Kalevala and indeed the entirety of White Sea Karelia is actually more Finnish than Karelian, a suggestion with which she concurs. It might be suggested, therefore, that even within Karelia there are those who see the Northern Karelians as being too closely influenced by Finnish culture to qualify as ‘genuine’ Karelians, a suggestion that will be examined more closely below.
As seen above Olonets is also often incorporated in various narratives on Karelian identity as an ancient stronghold of Karelian identity, both cultural and linguistic and therefore potentially national as well. The role of Olonets is somewhat more nuanced, however, as it is also used to link Karelia and therefore Karelians to the Russian state in certain narratives. In 2008 an exhibition in Petrozavodsk examined the history of Olonets:

Федеральное учреждение культуры музей-заповедник «Кижи» в партнерстве с Олонецким национальным музеем представляет жителям и гостям города Петрозаводска выставку «Олонец - посад старинный», повествующую об истории старинного города и особенностях традиционной культуры его жителей - карелов-ливвиков. (К 62 10.06.2008)

Olonets is clearly in this article constructed as an ancient town with a rich and valuable history, a town moreover inhabited by Karelians and a history at least partially belonging to these Karelians:

На выставке представлены разделы, рассказывающие о Рождественском Олонецком погосте, о рождении города Олонца и строительстве крепости, о материальной культуре олонецких карелов (ibid).

The history of Olonets is not merely the history of the Karelians themselves, however:

Олонец - старейший город Карелии, письменным свидетельствам о котором уже более восьми веков. Возникнув как форпост Российского государства на его северо-западных рубежах и получив 360 лет назад статус города, Олонец в свое время дал название одной из крупнейших губерний России и был ее административным, экономическим, торговым центром более ста лет.

Сегодня Олонец имеет статус исторического города, а Олонецкий район является национальным: 62 процента его жителей составляют карелы-ливвики (ibid).
Although Olonets and its District are viewed in this historical narrative as a centre of Karelian culture, a historical centre of the Karelian people, it is also strongly linked to the historical narrative of Karelia as the ‘форпост’ of the Russian state. Olonets ‘arises’ or ‘springs up’ as the outpost of the Russian state; the actual agency in the sentence is undetermined, it being unclear as to whether the Karelians themselves founded the town or if in fact the Russian state took action to create the fortress. The town instead ‘arises’ almost organically in the desired position to be an outpost for the Russian state, and equally organically ‘obtains’ the status of a town without reference as to who was granting such status. The idea of Olonets as having been created as a stronghold of the Russian state and safeguarding Russia against foreign attacks is also demonstrated in the example below:

1649 По указу царя Алексея Михайловича под руководством воеводы окольничего князя Федора Волконского и воеводы Степана Елагина строится Олонецкая крепость - ключевой форпост России на ее северо-западных рубежах (К 15 08.02.2001).

Once again the term ‘форпост’ is employed to denote the relation of Olonets, and by extension Karelia, to the remainder of Russia. This representation of Olonets as a bulwark against foreign invasion incorporates the town into the body of the Russian state. It also minimises or indeed entirely removes its potential to act as independent centre of a specifically Karelian history; its existence is always tied to that of Russia itself.

The continuity of Karelian residence in the modern Republic of Karelia can also be invoked alongside the absence of other nationalities; Karelia or at least areas of it can be constructed as having been exclusively Karelian. The example below is another article from Kareliya by Anatolii Grigoriev about his native village of Lambisel’ga:
Lambiselia - a small village in southern Karelia. In winter, there are only three families - all Karels.

During the revolution, Lambiselia had practically no Russians. The tax collectors and other officials visited it occasionally. During the conscription, the Karels interacted with the Russians (K71 03.07.2008).

Here Grigoriev clearly constructs his native village as being historically settled by Karels alone to the almost total exclusion of Russians. Although apparently in sporadic contact with Russia at times through the visits of various officials, the impression given by the author is of a territory relatively uninfluenced by Russian culture. In contrast to this lack of Russian influence, Grigoriev continues his article by detailing the greater influence of Finland on the daily lives of the local Karels:

Do 1939 года граница Финляндии от Ламбисельги была всего в 12 километрах, и многие деревенские до революции ходили в Финляндию: кто на заработки, кто по другим делам. Да и из Финляндии приходили люди, коробейники, например. Близость Финляндии сыграла в судьбах некоторых ламбисельжцев роковую роль. И в Гражданскую войну некоторые ушли в Финляндию, и перед Второй мировой (ibid).

Grigoriev clearly constructs an image of Lambiselia as having been more closely connected to and influenced by Finland rather than Russia. Whilst the Karels of Lambiselia have only occasional contact with the Russian authorities they are in much more regular contact with the Finns who are only a short distance away over the border. Although the border has now been pushed back from the village along with the influence of the Finns, Grigoriev still manages to convey the impression that the historically Karelian village remains that today by noting that the only inhabitants of the modern village to remain there through the winter are three Karelian families; thus Lambiselia is portrayed as having been and remaining at heart an exclusively Karelian territory. In contrast therefore, to the historical narrative which ties Karelia to Russia there are opposing narratives which seek to establish Karelia as the
province of Karelians exclusively, or at the very least do so for certain areas of Karelia.

As has been seen in the examples above the process of establishing the ‘Karelian-ness’ of an area is often done at a very localised level: Kalevala, Olonets, or the village of Lambisel’ga. There is a possibility therefore that Karelian identity itself can be associated with these localities rather than the Republic of Karelia as a whole. Indeed the example on the town of Kalevala demonstrates that on occasion the ‘Karelian’ nature of a locality can be diminished. We will examine below further, competing narratives of Karelian history in which the ‘Karelian-ness’ of some or all of the modern Republic of Karelia can be denied entirely. There are however attempts made in the discourse to claim the whole of the modern Republic, or at least the greater part of it, as a Karelian homeland. Almost as a reaction to the fragmentation and localisation of Karelian identity there are contributions made to the discourse which seek to unite these scattered threads into a common sense of Karelian identity:

The localised nature of expressions of Karelian identity can be glimpsed in this example as the author lists various local groups of Karelians each
attempting to preserve their ethnic identity in their own way. The impression
given, however, is that they are isolated not merely from Petrozavodsk but also
each other; the author describes them using strategies of marginalisation and
trivialisation. Despite this the author wishes to have us believe there is a certain
unity amongst them; they are all attempting to safeguard their national culture in
the expectation of ‘good news’ from Petrozavodsk, which is after all, as the
article informs us, the capital of Karelia and Karelians.

iii) 1920: A Foundational Myth?

From the examples above we have seen how the idea of the continuity of
Karelian residence in the modern Republic of Karelia can be invoked to
construct a narrative which depicts the area as the ‘homeland’ of the Karelian
people. As certain of the examples have also demonstrated this idea can be
invoked for a definite political purpose. Karelians can claim the status of being
the indigenous inhabitants of the republic in order to claim certain
political or
linguistic rights as well as to foster their own and their community’s sense of
national identity. This idea of continuity can and is also employed to a degree to
legitimise current political arrangements in the Republic of Karelia.

The creation of the Karelian Workers’ Commune in 1920 has recently
been promoted by the government of the current Republic of Karelia as an
important anniversary. The anniversary of the foundation of the first
autonomous area in for the Karelian people was celebrated by the authorities as
an important landmark in the history of the area. An example of this tendency
can be viewed in the example below which was published in Kareliya in honour
of the 85th anniversary:

Октябрьская революция 1917 года провозгласила лозунг
самоопределения народов России. Формы решения национального вопроса
не были определены, каждая нация самостоятельно пыталась выбрать свой
статус. В конце марта 1920 года создается так называемая Ухтинская республика, принявшая решение о независимости Карелии.

8 июня 1920 года ВЦИК (Всероссийский Центральный Исполнительный Комитет) принимает декрет об образовании в составе Советской республики Карельской автономной области, которую назвали Карельская трудовая коммуна (КТК).

В декрете, в частности, говорилось: "Образовать в населенных карелами местностях Олонецкой и Архангельской губерний, в порядке статьи 11 Конституции РСФСР, областное объединение Карельскую трудовую коммуну". Карельский народ, который на протяжении веков был разобщен, соединился в общих национальных границах. (K 60 07.06.2005)

The narrative of the foundation of an autonomous area for the Karelians constructed here is very interesting. The revolution of 1917 is stated to have promoted the idea, literally in fact the slogan, of national self-determination for the peoples ‘of Russia’. The form, it is claimed, which such self-determination could take was left up to the nation in question itself. The Karelian ‘nation’ itself, therefore, is the agent which presumably then forms the ‘so-called’ Ukhtinskaya Respublika which then takes the decision to declare Karelia independent. The agency in the sentence is generalised, however, and the lexical choice employed in the sentence casts some doubt on the validity of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika itself, which vaguely takes a decision sometime at the end of March 1920. In contrast to the uncertainty constructed around the actions of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika itself, which vaguely takes a decision sometime at the end of March 1920. In contrast to the uncertainty constructed around the actions of the Central Committee of the CPSU are portrayed as clear and unambiguous; a decree is issued on an exact date which creates an actual vehicle for Karelian self-determination: the KTK. This is the step which unites, as the article would have us believe, the scattered Karelians for the first time within common political boundaries. This act not only gave the Karelians self-determination in 1920 in this narrative, but also through the continuity of this self-determination as now expressed in the current Republic of Karelia guarantees their future:
Одной из важнейших задач руководства республики является сохранение коренных малочисленных народов как уникальных самобытных этносов мирового сообщества. Принимаются конкретные меры по поддержке и развитию их языков и культуры. Во многих общеобразовательных школах дети охотно изучают карельский, вепсский и финский языки. Специалистов готовят Петрозаводский государственный университет, Карельский государственный педагогический университет, Петрозаводская государственная консерватория (ibid).

The modern Republic of Karelia, however, is also constructed as being more than just an autonomous area for the benefit of Karelians:

Государственное устройство Карелии отвечает современным требованиям, способствует экономическому, социальному, духовному и культурному возрождению северного региона России. Трудом, опытом и знаниями многих поколений обустраивается республика, укрепляется ее экономическое и финансовое положение. Край "Калевалы" стал общим домом для всех народов, живущих в этом прекрасном крае (ibid).

In this example the ancient traditions of the Karelian people are recognised and claimed by the regional authorities; this is after all as the author reminds us the land of the Kalevala. Modern Karelia, however, is also a multi-national ‘home’ for all those who live within its boundaries. The Republic of Karelia and its predecessors are clearly constructed here as having been formed for the purpose of providing a homeland for the Karelian people and satisfying their wishes for self-determination. This continuity legitimises the current authorities, who are still, apparently, acting to safeguard the future of the Karelian people whilst at the same time acknowledging that modern Karelia is not mono-cultural. This narrative of the historical basis of the Republic of Karelia is therefore, in terms of identity, quite fluid and contradictory; the creation of the KTK is carried out for the Karelians but not necessarily by them, but the modern Republic of Karelia, established on this basis, now serves an
entirely different function. The KTK, an explicitly Karelian formation, has become an общи дом for non-Karelians; this is a reversal of its apparent original function but is depicted as being in continuity with these initial aims. This excerpt is also very redolent of Soviet discourse on the nationalities question; it would appear that, within the pages of Kareliya in particular, this quite patronising approach to the construction of ‘Karelian’ identity has persisted to the present day. It would seem likely that this has been facilitated, as the above excerpt demonstrates, by the construction of the modern constitutional settlement by the contemporary authorities as a direct continuation of that of 1920, existing for much the same ideological purpose. The continued existence of an autonomous area in Karelia, a source of great perceived benefit it would appear to the regional elite, is justified by the continued need of such a power structure to protect and nurture the Karelian minority; that it has apparently surpassed these aims to nurture the entire local populace is portrayed as a great achievement and assurance of future success and prosperity. More prosaically it would appear that this Soviet-era discourse has been maintained as the regional elite see no lack of continuity in relations between the Russian majority and the Karelian minority from the end of the Soviet Union to the present day.

The date can also be selected for use by those with alternate viewpoints on Karelian history and narrated in a manner not so favourable to past and current authorities. Anatolii Grigoriev, leader of the Karelian Congress, also uses the anniversary of the foundation of the KTK to narrate an alternate history of the period and draws sharply contrasting results from his review of this history:

А что мы собираемся отмечать 8 июня - День Республики Карелия? Если быть объективным, то на сегодняшний день 8 июня - это всего лишь день памяти тем карельским патриотам, которые в 1920 году создали Карельскую трудовую коммуну, а затем Карельскую республику. Наши предки-созидатели надеялись, что потомки сохранят и разовьют Карельскую республику, национальную самобытность карельского народа. А в итоге все оказалось наоборот.
Известна позиция законодателей Карелии, которые накануне нового года отвергли законопроект Карельского конгресса о предоставлении небольшой квоты для коренных народов в парламенте. Подобные законы уже давно действуют в ряде зарубежных стран и некоторых субъектах Российской Федерации. Часть русскоязычных политиков поддержала законопроект, но этой поддержки оказалось недостаточно.

В нынешней политической системе Карелии карелы, финны, вепсы не смогут сохранить себя как национальные общности. Получается, мы не нужны государству со своими самобытностью, языком, культурой, традициями.

Результаты выборов говорят - государственная система Карелии пока не отвечает важнейшим интересам коренных народов. Эту систему надо изменить в рамках закона и Конституции России (K50 23.05.2002).

In sharp contrast to the ‘official’ history of the foundation of the KTK Grigoriev ascribes the creation of autonomy for the Karelians not to officials in Moscow but to ‘Karelian patriots’. This narrative of the foundation of the KTK therefore gives no credit to the authorities for the establishment of self-government for the Karelians in 1920, but describes it as being brought about by the Karelians themselves as an attempt to secure the future of their ethnic identity. In contrast to the manner in which the local authorities attempt to legitimise their modern position by reference to their provision, past and present, of autonomy for Karelia Grigoriev portrays them as having subverted the legacy of the politicians of the 1920s. Instead of supporting contemporary Karelians they are accused of disregarding them entirely, thus the original purpose of the KTK and hence the current Republic of Karelia is not being fulfilled, at least in Grigoriev’s view. In contrast to the constructive strategies employed by the authorities Grigoriev uses deconstructive, dissimilative strategies to create an alternative narrative around the topos of a ‘broken promise’ to the Karelian people.
The political history of Karelia or the Karelia before 1920 is not widely discussed in the corpus of data studied. That is to say that the idea of any kind of Karelian political movement or any sort of independent, explicitly ethnically Karelian political formation before this date is extremely uncommon in the discourse. Karelian autonomy, in the form of the KTK, generally seems to appear almost unheralded in 1920, and even then only in connection with international events. Discussion of what actually took place in the confused period between 1917 and 1920 is almost entirely absent for the mass media of the Republic of Karelia. One such example is given below:

А вот история про карелов и петицию английскому королю Георгу V – реальное историческое событие, о котором до последнего времени ничего не было известно. Петиция была составлена в январе 1919 года, после того как войска Антанты очистили Северную Карелию от большевиков, а сами карельские добровольцы под командованием британских офицеров вытеснили финские отряды с карельских территорий. Британия в то время была ведущей мировой державой, и в голодную зиму 1918-19 г. именно англичане кормили Северную Карелию. Поэтому за помощью карелы обратились именно к Британии. То есть речь шла не совсем о присоединении, а о получении статуса протектората в составе Британской империи. Вроде того, что был в то время у Палестины или Египта. Увы, Карелия оказалась Британии неинтересна.

Эти факты стали известны благодаря историку Нику Барону, доценту Университета Ноттингема, который раскопал дневник британского офицера Филиппа Вудса. В его бумагах ученый нашел оригинал петиции карелов Георгу V. Он опубликовал этот дневник вместе с биографией Филиппа Вудса на английском языке в 2007 году. Карельский историк Алексей Голубев в 2008 году перевел книгу на русский язык, и она получила название «Король Карелии». Правда, пока так и не нашла своего издателя (KG21 25.05.2011).
In this example *Karel’skaya Guberniya* does, briefly, touch on some of the issues of the 1917-20 period. It will be noted however that the paper is only aware of some of the facts of the period thanks to the work of Nick Baron, the British historian. Indeed the paper notes that Baron’s actual work, although translated, has not been published in Russian. The fact that the newspaper and, it presumes, its readers were unaware of the activities of the Karelian volunteer forces during the post-revolutionary period indicates that this is a historical narrative with little resonance in contemporary Karelian society.

The formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika is not often referenced within the mass media discourse within the Republic of Karelia. In fact the term is used only four times within *Kareliya*, for example, in the period studied, almost exclusively within the practically identical official announcements celebrating the foundation of the KTK. The term is virtually never used in *Karel’skaya Guberniya*, with Tuomi’s article quoted above the only reference to it found whatsoever in that publication in the corpus studied. In contrast the foundation of the KTK on the 8th of June 1920 is an official holiday. Certainly in official terms this appears to have been selected as a ‘foundation date’ for the current Republic of Karelia. It is doubtful whether the date plays the role of a ‘named beginning’ such as anticipated by Hall (1996), Kolakowski (1995) or Wodak et al. (2009). It might be argued that this is not altogether unsurprising as it is debatable to what extent officially or otherwise the actual Republic of Karelia itself is considered to have an actual ‘nationality’ attached to it; certainly although there may well be conceptions of Karelian, Vepsian, Finnish and Russian ‘national’ identities current at some level with the republic the extent to which any of these mesh with the conception of the republic itself is debatable. The 1920 date has clearly however been chosen to express at least the political realisation of Karelian autonomy by the authorities. It is as has been seen above commemorated as the beginning of the political history of the Karelian people at least in the official narrative. Anatolii Grigoriev also appears to accept this idea at least insofar as the creation of the KTK is narrated by him as the start of Karelian attempts to decide their own future. Tuomi’s article offers some indication that this may not be accepted at least in some quarters of Karelian society where the foundation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika may be preferred as
a starting point for a Karelian political movement. The main issue, as illustrated in the examples given above, is that there is a consciousness of a Karelian identity predating 1920 by hundreds or thousands of years. Consequently it is difficult to accept the idea of 1920 as being viewed as anything more than the foundation of Karelian political autonomy. The idea of other possible ‘foundational myths’ for the Karelian people will be discussed further below.

3.3 The Position of Vepsian History Within the Mass Media Discourse

Narratives of Vepsian history in the Russian-language mass media discourse in the Republic of Karelia are notable for their almost complete absence. This is not perhaps greatly surprising when the relatively small numbers of Vepsians within the area is considered. If the Russian-language press do not consider their average imagined reader to be Karelian by ethnicity there is little doubt it is extremely unlikely they attempt to construct an imagined Vepsian interlocutor. It is also the case that although Vepsians are legally considered to be one of the indigenous nationalities of the Republic of Karelia and therefore there is a duty for Kareliya at least to report on their affairs their small numbers make it difficult for them to contribute much themselves to the discourse. Nevertheless certain tendencies can be identified from those articles which do deal with the Vepsian population. As previously stated the Vepsian population is generally considered to be indigenous to the Republic of Karelia, however in practice only the area which was previously the Vepsian National Volost’ is generally considered to be a Vepsian ‘national territory’. In particular the village of Shylotozero is considered to fulfil the function of a Vepsian ‘homeland’ within the Republic due to the presence of the ethnographic museum of Vepsian culture established there by Rurikh Petrovich Lonin. In general, however, the attitude towards Vepsian history and the Veps themselves on the part of the Russian majority as reflected through the mass media discourse would best be described as indifference. Whilst some information is available to a Russian readership through Kareliya the Veps are hardly ever mentioned at all by Karel’skaya Guberniya and practically nothing is said about their history. The Karelians, Russians and Finns (albeit often constructed as foreigners) are the
nationalities whose history is being produced, reproduced or even deconstructed and denied in the discourse. The Veps are generally conspicuous by their absence.

It has been noted above that Karel’skaya Guberniya feels constrained to give basic information on the Vepsians to its readers when the discussion touches on issues relating to the now-defunct Vepsian National Volost’. In Kareliya the situation is somewhat different as at least a low level of discussion on Vepsian issues is always on-going in the publication due to its official nature. As one of the named ‘indigenous’ nationalities in the Republic of Karelia the Vepsians are often included in the discussion even if only in the formulaic constructions ‘Karelians, Veps and Finns’ or ‘Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish’ which are often used officially when discussing issues related to these named minorities, as exemplified below:

By constantly being associated in this group of indigenous minorities together with the Karelians and Finns there is at least an official attempt to construct an image of the Vepsian minority as indigenous to the Republic of
Karelia. This indigenous status however is also, in a similar fashion to the manner in which Karelian history is often related, closely linked to the village or local area. Due to limited number of Vepsian villages within Karelia this results in the construction of a very limited ‘Vepsian homeland’ clustered around Shyoltozero in the Prionezhkii District:

A) Праздник вепсского края

6 лет назад день памяти святого Ионы Яшезерского, уроженца деревни Шокша, стал национальным праздником вепсского края. Депутаты волостного Совета, а затем и глава Прионежского района поддержали инициативу настоятеля Благовещенского Ионо-Яшезерского монастыря игумена Досифея считать этот день национальным праздником (K110 05.10.2010.)

В) На родине древнего народа

22 сентября Глава Карелии Андрей Нелидов посетил село Шелтозеро Прионежского муниципального района. В этот день в старинном вепсском селе впервые проходила межрегиональная краеведческая конференция <Лонинские чтения>, посвященная 80-летию легендарного собирателя вепсского фольклора Рюрика Петровича Лонина (K 106 25.09.2010).

С) Путешествие в "Страну вепсов"

В Карельском государственном краеведческом музее открылась выставка "Страна вепсов"

В Петрозаводск выставка приехала из Финляндии, где она экспонировалась в рамках мероприятий Года вепсской культуры, объявленного в 2002 году финским фондом Юминкеко и Обществом
вепсской культуры Республики Карелия. Подготовлена она на средства программы Евросоюза "Интеррег Карьяла". "Страна вепсов" представляет культурное наследие трех регионов, где проживает этот маленький финно-угорский народ, - Карелии, Ленинградской и Вологодской областей. Здесь предметы из собраний Шелтозерского и Карельского государственного краеведческого музеев, деревенских музеев Курбы, Винницы, Тимошино и частных коллекций села Пяжозеро (K122 22.10.2002).

D) В селе Шелтозеро Прионежского района прошла очередная встреча в рамках реализации проекта Tervhen tulda vepsan male – «В гости к вепсам» (K98 29.12.2011).

In the above examples the area around Shyoltozero and its surrounding villages are variously constructed as the centre of Vepsian culture, occasionally in a manner which would appear to restrict the application of the idea of Vepsian identity much beyond the immediate area. The idea of an undefined 'Vepsian territory' is used in example A in discussing the history of a monastery near the village of Shoksha in the Prionezhskii District. In examples B, C and D the visit of officials to Shyoltozero or the viewing in a museum setting of exhibits from the area are described in terms of a journey; the officials in example B are in (having presumably travelled from Petrozavodsk) the ‘Veps homeland’, whilst in example E similarly they are ‘visiting’ the Veps by travelling to Shyoltozero. Example C is a further indication of this tendency as visiting an exhibition in Petrozavodsk on Vepsian culture is constructed as a ‘journey’ into the Vepsian land by the organisers and the journalist who reproduces their text in the media. In this manner the ethnographic or tourist discourse in constantly incorporated into the discourse on identity when it refers to the Veps; in this fashion something akin to Orientalist or tourist discourse in invoked, a curious external view from outside which regards the Veps as particularly exotic. This example also notes the broader context of the Vepsian territory; it is not exclusively Karelian but also encompasses other areas of the Russian Federation.
The possibility of a larger historical homeland for the Veps is hinted at in one article in Kareliya. The article is actually a letter from a student of history from neighbouring Arkangel’sk Oblast’ investigating the history of the former Andomskii Pogost of Tsarist Russia part of which is now incorporated into the Pudozhskii District of the modern Republic of Karelia. The author presents his research as of potential interest to the reader due to it being part of the history of the modern region:

Андомский погост - это не только крупное прионежское селение, но и центр древнего округа, располагавшегося на территориях севера Вытегорского и юга Пудожского районов, один из 17 заонежских погостов, часть истории Олонецкой губернии и исторической территории нынешней Карелии. Поэтому информация о его истории и культуре, как мне кажется, может быть интересной для жителей республики (K105 03.10.2002).

Clearly the editorial staff of Kareliya were of the same opinion as the article together with the author’s introduction was duly published. In his article the author offers a rare account of the antiquity and previous extent of Vepsian settlement in an area not now generally regarded to be part of the ‘Vepsian territory’ described above:

Наиболее ранними сохранившимися письменными источниками по данной территории являются писцовые книги XVI в. При анализе писцовых книг Обонежской пятины 1563 и 1583 г. на территории Никольского Андомского погоста мною было выделено не менее пяти десятков имен-прозвищ дворохозяев и названий деревень, которые этимологически восходят к прибалтийско-финским языкам, в частности к вепсскому. Выделенные названия и имена были мною этимологизированы с привлечением современного вепсского языка (ibid).

By describing the place-name evidence available from medieval texts on the area the author can detail the extent of Vepsian settlement in the area. The author in fact then goes on to list the place names in question and their derivation from Vepsian. As such analysis would be beyond the average reader lacking a specialisation in Vepsian or linguistics this is a very convincing manner in which
to demonstrate what are presumably previously unknown facts to the imagined interlocutor. In this manner he is able to justify his concluding assertion that:

“Широкое распространение вепсских имен, прозвищ, названий деревень наряду с ныне сохраняющимися особенностями местной культуры, языка, архитектуры говорит о большой доле старожильческого вепсского населения, проживавшего на территории земель Андомского погоста в XVI-XVII столетиях и сохранявшего на то время свой родной язык. Под влиянием межнациональных браков, с переходом на русский и утратой вепсского языка андомская часть прибалтийско-финского населения постепенно стала осознавать себя частью русского народа.”

This article, however, from a specialist outwith modern Karelia, is a relatively isolated contribution to the discourse on history and identity found in the corpus of data sampled. It does prove, however, that alternate understandings and narratives of Karelian history are present within the modern republic even if they are not widely-propagated. It also hints at the existence of a narrative in which the inhabitants of the modern Republic of Karelia are still largely descended, at least in part, from Finno-Ugric roots, even if they have become almost fully russified.

3.4 A Special Case: Ingrian Finns

Although the status of Finns in general as indigenous to Karelia is disputed and often rejected in the narratives of Karelian identity prevalent in the Karelian press the status of the Ingrian subgroup of the Finnish nationality are generally accorded a special status. Originally most of these Finns did not live within the territory of what is now the Republic of Karelia, but they could have been considered to reside within the broader boundaries of the much more ill-defined area of ‘Karelia’ itself. This group of Finns evolved from Finnish immigrants who arrived in the 17th Century in Ingria, the area on the Karelian Isthmus between modern Estonia and Finland, and their assimilation with the Finno-Ugric Votians and Ingrians who inhabited the province at the time (Kurs,
During the 20th century and in particular in the aftermath of the wars between Finland and the USSR these Ingrian Finns were deported from Ingria to other parts of the USSR and a significant number were resettled in Karelia. Even within Karel’skaya Guberniya these Finns are given a special status. The author of the article below, for example, does as in the case of the Vepsians feel constrained to provide his or her reader with a short history of the Ingrian Finns before discussing their modern plight. Both the historical experience of the Ingrians and their current difficulties are presented in a sympathetic light, however:

In this article, one of the very few on the Ingrian Finns published in the paper, this particular group of Finns is accorded the status of being indigenous if not in Karelia itself, by which the author clearly means the modern Republic of
Karelia, then at least in its general vicinity. Furthermore their resettlement within Karelia is clearly narrated as having been involuntary, a result of their unfortunate political persecution during the 1940s. It is not possible to deduce from this one article the general attitudes towards Ingrian Finns within the Republic of Karelia but it does hint at certain differences in the manner in which they are viewed in comparison with other groups of Finns. These attitudes will be further examined in the analysis of the interview data in the next chapter.

3.5 Russians in Karelia: Indigenous or Immigrant?

i) Karelia as a Centre of Russian Culture

The somewhat haphazard nature in which the boundaries of the Republic of Karelia were decided led to the inclusion of certain areas which were never inhabited by large numbers of Finno-Ugric people. In particular the inclusion of the area around the town of Pudozh was at the time of its incorporation into the KASSR inhabited for the most part by ethnic Russians. Evidently since 1917 the large scale Russification of the KASSR and the immigration of many Russians to the area has made Russians the dominant national group across almost all of the modern Republic of Karelia. It is not therefore unusual to find attempts to present Russians as equally indigenous to certain areas of Karelia as the Karelians themselves, or even, in certain extreme examples, even more so. The area around the White Sea is often imagined as a centre of Russian culture from time immemorial; this process of mythologisation is well illustrated by the example below from an article entitled “Страна за Онегой”:

Там, за Онегой, в Заонежье и Заволочье - за новгородскими волоками, по рассказам бродячих людей, светили чистой водой несметные озера, и путь туда был труден, - кони падали, ломали ноги, скользили от налипшей на копыта давленой ягоды - брусники и клюквы. Такой древней
"новгородской пятиной", лежащей за краем обжитых земель, и была некогда Карелия - старинное Заонежье. Сейчас это название исчезло с наших карт. Оно сохранилось только за большим лесистым полуостровом, вдающимся с северо-запада в Онежское озеро. Полуостров этот населен потомками новгородцев. Они сохранили чистый новгородский язык, сохранили старые сказания, песни, былины. Пушкин советовал учиться русскому языку у московских просвирен. С полным основанием можно учиться подлинному русскому языку и у жителей Заонежья.” (К 106 25.09.2003)

Here we have a clear attempt to construct an area, ‘Zaonezh’e’, which is explicitly not and never has been, according to the author, part of ‘Karelia’, despite clearly now being part of the modern Republic of Karelia. Instead it is conceptualised as a centre of Russian culture, specifically that of Novgordanian Rus, distant and isolated from outside influence. The area is constructed as a place of myth and wonder, having been almost beyond the known world (за новгородскими волоками, по рассказам бродячих людей), almost magical, as светили чистой водой несметные озера suggests. The article throughout uses archaic and folkloristic language to build an image of historical primacy and antiquity for the area, thus emphasising the continuity of Russian identity in these locales. More importantly it is not only Russian rather than Karelian, but emphatically Russian, the epitome of Russianess; with the reader advised that he or she can learn ‘genuine’ Russian language from the locals. The almost fairy-tale-like quality of the area is further developed:

Старик помолчал и добавил:

- Монастыри были у нас знаменитые. Северные монастыри. Может, слыхали? На озерах. Трава под самые стены. Колокольный звон над водой. Церкви деревянные, таких церквей ни в одной стране нету. Сооружали те церкви мужчики с аршином, да с отвесом, да с кружкой квасу. Так-то! А теперь люди разные ездят, на пластинки эти церкви снимают, восхищаются ими безмерно.
Из этого короткого разговора со смолокуром стало ясно, как органичны и глубоки в этом краю истоки народной поэзии, народного зодчества (ibid).

Once again the area is constructed as a unique and valuable centre of national (presumably Russian) culture; a strategy of singularisation is employed which emphasises its model national character. Much as Kalevala was claimed above as nurturing Karelian culture here we see another part of the Republic of Karelia provide the basis for the development of Russian culture; even a short conversation with an old tar-extractor, that is to say a relatively uneducated and unrefined individual, apparently provides the author with a clear picture of how national culture is deeply rooted in the area. The author clearly uses a strategy of continuation, tracing a link from the ancient monasteries and culture of the area down through the old tar worker through himself and down to the reader, in attempt to show the continuity and therefore validity of Russian culture in the area. Pudozh is also portrayed as an ancient Russian town in the article “Край Пудожский былинный” (К 123 04.11.2006). By connecting Pudozh to the idea of Russian ‘bylina’ or epic folk poetry the antiquity of the area is established as well as its deep connection to traditional Russian culture in a similar example to that given above.

The idea of Karelia as a centre of Russian зодчества, or wooden architecture, mentioned already in the example above, is further developed in the extract below with reference to one of the main cultural icons of contemporary Karelia, the Kizhi museum:

Самый старый памятник — церковь Лазаря Муромского — построена в XIV веке и является самым древним из сохранившихся произведений деревянного зодчества в России.

“Кижи” — это еще и центр Заонежья, сокровищницы древнерусской культуры, — уточнил старейший научный сотрудник музея Борис Гущин (KG29 18.07.2001).
One of the problematic issues surrounding the construction of the image of Kizhi as an exclusively Karelian, in ethnic terms, cultural shibboleth is the fact that it was created artificially as a site by the Soviet authorities. Although the most famous church on and therefore image of Kizhi, the Church of the Transfiguration, is in its original location many of the others were moved to the island from other parts of the region. In particular the Church of Lazarus mentioned in the above quote was relocated to Kizhi in the 1950s from the Pudozhskii District, an area we have already seen above constructed as part of an exclusively Russian cultural landscape. The museum complex therefore represents not merely the local area or the culture of the Karelian minority, but can also be represented, as indeed it is by the employee of the museum quoted, as a representation of Russian culture. Thus one of the most recognisable images of the modern Republic of Karelia, the Kizhi museum, can be incorporated into the narration of Russian history. By attribution to an expert this opinion is given extra weight in the discourse. Indeed not only is Kizhi portrayed as being a centre of Russian culture it is in fact we are informed the repository of the oldest example of Russian woodworking of its sort remaining in Russia; in this manner Kizhi itself and Karelia as a whole can be depicted as having been a centre of Russian culture for centuries.

The examples above depict a particular narrative of Karelian history which constructs at the very least the ‘Zaonezh’e’, a vague, indeterminate area around the Onego, as having been and remaining one of the most ancient centres of Russian culture. This area is depicted as having nurtured some of the greatest Russian folkloric and woodworking traditions in the same manner as White Sea Karelia and Kalevala orOlonets and its district are narrated by Karelian contributors as having given birth to Karelian culture or the Kalevala. In this manner the Russian majority can claim to be at least as entitled to consider Karelia or, at a minimum, part of the modern Republic of Karelia as their homeland or part of their homeland.

The idea of Karelia as being a centre of Russian culture is also narrated in the discourse by referencing to the idea of ‘spirituality’ or the idea that the area is
part of or somehow connected to the idea of a ‘Russian soul’. Below is an example of the manner in which this idea is relayed:

Карелия, как и Русский Север в целом, — это край, полный неразгаданных тайн и удивительных загадок. Разгадать их — значит понять наше прошлое и настоящее. Величие и историческое бессмертие народа определяются духовной культурой, которую представители даже самых малочисленных этносов сумели сохранить и донести до своих потомков. Разве духовная культура древних народов, издавна проживавших на огромной территории современной Карелии, менее древняя, чем культура любого из западно-европейских народов? Разве карело-финский эпос "Калевала" менее поэтичен, чем скандинавская "Эдда", французская "Песнь о Роланде" или германские "Нибелунги"?

В 1916 году Николай Константинович Рерих — выдающийся художник и мыслитель — прибывает в город Сердоболь, нынешний Сортавала. Это была уже не первая поездка Рериха в Финляндию и Карелию. Интерес Рериха к Северу был неотделим от его интереса к прошлому России, к ее истории. Он живо интересовался изучением древнего магического Знания, существование которого в стародавние времена связывалось с северными территориями.

Северные старцы-богомольцы предсказывали: в треугольнике, отмеченном тремя храмами Преображения — Валаамским, Соловецким и Кижским, — начнется очищение России. Это место, где как бы сгущается благодать, становится явной для чутких сердец. Здесь душа Русского Севера, средоточие его гармоний (KG3 12.01.2005)."

The example above relates a history of Karelia which places it firmly within the cultural and supposedly spiritual boundaries of the ‘Russian North’ and hence Russia in general. The Kalevala is invoked once again, described here as being a representation of ‘spiritual culture’ passed down to the present. This ‘Karelo-Finnish’ epos is however mentioned alongside a description of what the author deems to be the ancient history of Russia. The trip of an artist in 1916 to Sortavala, then part of Finland and now part of the Republic of Karelia, is
described as part of his studies into the history of Russia; Sortavala is incorporated in this manner into the general area the author is trying to construct of the ‘Russian North’; it should be noted that in articles on the town the old Russian name of サードボル, which has a transparent, folkloristic derivation, ‘heart-ache’ is referenced by the author. It is often depicted as the ‘original’ name of the town, emphasising its primacy in contrast to the obscure, foreign-sounding Sortavala. By describing a pre-revolutionary Russian taking an interest in the supposedly Russian aspects of the area’s culture the author is clearly attempting to demonstrate that validity of current conceptions of this culture. We are furthermore informed that, in terms of folklore at least, the ‘north’, presumably including what is now the Republic of Karelia, was incorporated into the intellectual world of centuries of Russians. By stressing the antiquity of the idea of Karelia as the Russian North and comparing it to the ‘spiritual’ heritage Karelians derive from the Kalevala the article attempts to give the impression that Russian identity is of equally long standing in Karelia as that of the Finno-Ugric peoples.

This idea of Karelia as being part of Russian territory is further emphasised in the final paragraph. The author lists three famous Orthodox Churches of the Transfiguration which apparently have a significant role to play in his or her rather esoteric view of the spiritual life of Russia. It should be noted that whilst the port for the Solovetskii Islands is the town of Kem’ they are not actually themselves within the boundaries of the current Republic of Karelia unlike the islands of Kizhi and Valaam. These three locations are identified by the author as the very ‘soul’ of the ‘Russian North’. By referencing these three famous Orthodox sites the Russian character of Karelia can be established, at least in the opinion of the author. This narration of Karelia as part of the Russian Orthodox world and hence part of the Russian world in general is examined in further detail below.

The idea of Karelia as being an area of Russian settlement of long standing, if not indeed from time immemorial, is developed in a similar manner to that of the indigenous status of Karelians. Karelia is often constructed as having been an area in which Karelians and Russians lived together for centuries much as they do today. In this manner the current situation in the Republic of Karelia where Russians are present across all of its territory alongside the Finno-Ugric minorities is constructed as being merely a continuation of hundreds if not thousands of years of tradition:

Известно, что народонаселение нашей северной республики никогда не было этнически однородным. Издревле просторы таежного края вместе с племенами финно-угров (карелов, финнов, вепсов) осваивали новгородские славяне, тоже по праву считающиеся коренными жителями Русского Севера. (К 28 19.03.2005)

В нашем древнем крае издавна рядом жили русские, карелы и вепсы. Жили в мире и согласии. Многое перенимали друг от друга, многому научились друг у друга. В русских говорах Карелии немало карельских включений, в южнокарельских диалектах карельского языка много русизмов (К128 17.11.2005).

In both examples above the Russian people are described as having been resident in what is now the Republic of Karelia alongside the Karelians and other Finno-Ugric peoples from ancient times. Both the temporal adverbs издревле and издавна give this sense of ‘time immemorial’; the authors cannot give an exact date for Russian settlement. Indeed in the first example the use of известно at the start of the sentence seeks to appeal to an apparent pre-existing body of knowledge which would automatically recognise the ‘objective’ fact that the populace of the Republic of Karelia has always been multi-national. By invoking this shared store of knowledge the Russian populace, in this example, can lay claim ‘by right’ to having been resident in the area since time
immemorial alongside the Finno-Ugric peoples. The second example attempts to assert the antiquity of Karelian and Russian contact by demonstrating that both languages have been strongly influenced by each other. In both examples, particularly the second, there is no hint of any conflict whatsoever between the two ethnicities; in fact in the second example we are advised that they have always lived together в мире и согласии. This narrative of history justifies the modern Russian presence in the Republic of Karelia by claiming that this has always been a feature of the area. It also begins to demonstrate how the Karelians and Russians can also be depicted as to some extent sharing a common historical past which serves to unify them in the present. By narrating this idea of Karelians and Russians having always lived ‘side by side’ it is possible to construct an idealised image of the past which the modern situation is meant to reflect. By narrating the historical past in this manner the current situation where the Karelian minority is influenced by and under the political control of the Russian majority can be depicted as the norm; it is after all, in this narrative, merely a continuation of historical tradition. Conversely this narrative can also be employed by Karelians. The second of the examples above is written by a Karelian journalist describing the history of the Karelian-language paper Vienan Karjala. Clearly by referencing the centuries of Karelian and Russian cooperation and mutual tolerance the Karelian speaker is hoping to persuade his Russian addressees of the need to continue this tradition and respect the rights of Karelians. This historical narrative, using a strategy of continuation to depict the long standing peaceful relations of Karelians with Russians, can be used to appeal for maintenance of this supposed mutual understanding and acceptance.

iii) Russians as the Coloniser

Although Russians are often narrated as having an equally long history as the Karelian minority within the Republic of Karelia there are occasionally alternate narratives which depict the Russians as having been immigrants or colonisers of at least some parts of Karelia. This attitude has already been examined above from a Karelian perspective by Anatolii Grigoriev who narrated a history, of his own native area at least, which excluded Russian influence to a
marked degree. A similar narration of a history of Karelia which, until modern
times, excludes the influence of Russians and portrays Karelia as having been
almost exclusively ethnically and linguistically is also given by some Russian
contributors to the discourse.

The importance of the narration of the history of the Karelian language
for Karelians themselves shall be examined further below. Karelians often
narrate the history of pre-revolutionary Karelia as that of a ‘golden age’ for the
Karelian language in which its use was almost universal amongst the Karelian
population. Russian contributors do not view this widespread usage of Karelian
as inherently positive, but more as a historical curiosity. This tendency is
exemplified by a series of articles in *Karel'skaya Guberniya* on the history of
pre-revolutionary Karelia entitled “сто лет тому назад”, which began in January
of 2008 and ran increasingly intermittently until early 2009. This series of
articles were produced by the journalists involved perusing copies of the
*Olonetskoe Gubernskie Vedomosti* of the appropriate date and selecting passages
which they assumed their readers would find of interest or amusement. As a
consequence much of what was reproduced was fairly trivial or irrelevant
material to the purpose of this study, however some of the articles chosen for
discussion and their presentation are revealing of both historical and
contemporary attitudes. The question of the Karelian language in 1908
apparently revealed information the journalist and his addressee were unaware of
or had not previously appreciated:

А) Самая большая и серьезная статья, растянувшаяся на несколько
первых номеров газеты, была посвящена школьному
образованию. Написала ее учительница русского языка,
подписавшаяся "А.С.", – она сетует на "нравственное положение
учителя", которому приходится либо "бичевать", либо выпускать
в жизнь неподготовленных к работе молодых людей. А учеников
приводили в школу вот каких: "Они приходят в гимназию без
умения говорить, часто выражают свои мысли отдельными
словами, притом неправильно произнося их. Бывали случаи, что
dети, приехавшие из деревень, прибегали при объяснении к
карельскому языку, или на вопрос учителя отвечают недоумевающим "Мида сана?" (Что ты говоришь?) Отказ в приеме, вследствие незнания русского языка, удивляет родителей: зачем же и школа, как не для того, чтобы учить? Не так давно на экзамене горько рыдали мать и дочь. Все педагоги сбежались их успокаивать, достигнуть чего было трудно, так как дочь еле-еле говорила по-русски, а мать вовсе не знала этого языка. Мать объясняла по-своему, что для них большая обида" (KG2 09.01.2008).

В) В следующем номере – откровения еще одного учителя. Он рассуждает не о школе, а о том, как важно знать карельский язык всем, кто работает в Карелии. Автор рассказывает о том, как 24 года назад он приехал в Карелию, в Святозеро, и обнаружил, что без знания карельского языка обходиться здесь трудно. Приводит примеры из жизни, удивляющие своей наивностью: "Когда, например, при уходе из школы новым ученикам нужно втолковать, чтобы они помолились, учительница сказала несколько раз: помолись, перекрестись, — видит, что толку мало. И сейчас же сказала эти слова по-карельски. И дело наладилось".

Далее – наблюдения в кабинете фельдшера. Просто комическая миниатюра:


Нет, ну как с индейцами! Вот она – колонизация "русских" земель во всей красе: каких-то сто лет назад русских в Карелии
Both examples above detail examples of the use of Karelian rather than Russian as the everyday language of the majority of the inhabitants of prerevolutionary Karelia. In example A the experiences of a Russian schoolmistress and her struggle to teach Karelian children are recounted; we are informed that her pupils almost without exception either spoke no Russian at all or very little, being instead monolingual Karelian speakers. In fact the schools of the period are related as having attempted to exclude children due to their inability to speak Russian. The teaching of Russian to these children is not negatively evaluated; in fact the Karelians themselves are depicted as wanting to learn Russian and being ashamed at not knowing the language. It appears the opinions of the original schoolmistress, refracted as they are through the journalism of 1908 and 2008, are still reported relatively unchallenged. It is her assessment of the willingness of Karelians to learn Russian that is directly quoted by both papers. In the second example the original letter writers of 1908 are still quoted but now their comments are framed to a greater extent by the contemporary journalist’s presentation. The modern journalist presents their contributions in a humorous, somewhat comic light; indeed he or she explicitly refers to one excerpt as a “комическая миниатюра.” Despite their presentation as amusing anecdotes the quotations do serve to narrate a history of Karelia where, in the Tsarist period, only the educated classes appear to have spoken any Russian at all, whilst the masses of the population were ignorant of the language. It constructs an image of Karelia which has very little Russian about it at all; Karelia appears as an almost ‘foreign’ land, with an alien (i.e. non-Russian) culture dominating everyday life. Indeed in the second example this is clearly stated:

Нет, ну как с индейцами! Вот она – колонизация "русских" земель во всей красе: каких-то сто лет назад русских в Карелии было значительно меньше, чем карелов (ibid).
This statement explicitly undermines the idea of Karelia as a Russian territory, instead drawing an analogy with the American West. Such an analogy conjures up images of ‘civilised’ Russians dealing with ‘savage’ or ‘barbarous’ Karelians in a similar manner the depiction of Russian professionals struggling with ignorant Karelian peasants. Karelia is represented as a ‘colonial’ territory of the Russians, at least in the past; the author reminds us this was around a hundred years ago and that today the situation is different. This narrative is reminiscent of the idea of Orientalism and the other as expressed by Said (1995). The comparison of Karelians to American Indians is made again in another article from the paper from 2003:

Here the depiction of the Russian ‘colonisers’ is not perhaps as positive, as they are portrayed as having brought the Karelians, constructed earlier in this article as being unused to the consumption of alcohol, into the habit of regular drinking. The Karelians again are compared to American Indians, having similarly fallen in love with ‘fire water’. Once again the depiction of the Karelians is somewhat patronising and perhaps even somewhat offensive; they are represented as a simple, unsophisticated people being tutored and exploited by Russian incomers. Nevertheless the articles do narrate a history in which the Russian influence on and settlement in Karelia was minimal. Importantly in this instance this image of Karelia as being on the margins of or indeed not really part of a genuine Russian cultural sphere in the relatively recent past is constructed by ethnic Russians themselves rather than by Karelians. Clearly not all Russians
feel they have as much right to consider themselves indigenous to Karelia as the Karelians themselves.

iv) ‘Pan-Finnish’ Propaganda: A Historical Threat?

In its examination of the history of Karelia in 1908-9 *Karel’skaya Guberniya* also touches upon the issue of the ‘Pan-Finnish’ agitation undertaken at that time by Finnish nationalists within Karelia. The paper, through sampling the output of its historical counterpart naturally reproduces attitudes which are very hostile to this agitation and see it as a threat to the then Russian Empire. The reproduction of these views places the Finns in a particular light and reproduces a historical enmity towards them and a historical concern over the loyalty of the Karelian population to their Russian masters. In a modern context these texts further reinforce the narration of pre-revolutionary Karelia as an area lacking in Russian influence and offer up a history of a competing Finnish influence.

A) В декабре 1907 года в Петрозаводске собрали чрезвычайное заседание в Земском собрании. Обсуждали важный вопрос: опасность панфинско-лютеранской пропаганды. Требовалось принять "самые энергичные меры": построить железную дорогу по Олонецкой Карелии, при непременном условии "проведения ее из сердца России – Москвы". На железную дорогу возлагались большие надежды, ведь именно она должна была посодействовать повышению культурного уровня в Олонецком крае. Правда, каким именно образом – непонятно (KG2 09.01.2008).

В) Финская угроза

Тема так называемой "панфинской пропаганды" в начале XX века для Олонецкой губернии была крайне актуальна. Это и понятно: жители карельских деревень, в
большинстве своем не знавшие русского, легче находили общий язык со своими единоплеменными сородичами из Финляндии, чем с русскими. О вредном влиянии финнов на карелов говорилось в свете необходимости изучения карелами русского языка, религиозного просвещения и даже строительства дорог.

В одном из февральских номеров "ОГВ" читаем наконец, в чем именно заключалась "панфинская пропаганда". Автор заметки "Финская тревога" рассказывает о том, что пишет финляндская пресса: "Мы, финны, устраиваем здесь библиотеки, строим молитвенные дома и причтовые помещения, читаем газеты, имеем читальни и даже общество трезвости. Население сознает себя и свое племя и потихоньку распространяется к востоку". В самой Финляндии собирают деньги "в пользу русских карелов". Но кроме этого, утверждает автор, "финляндцы хотят переселять в Карелию финнов из западной и центральной Финляндии". Противостоять пропаганде намеревается недавно образованное "Карельское братство".

Его цель – читаем в другой заметке – "сознательное усвоение православной веры" карелами. "Если мы пройдем теперь мимо них (карелов), то финны возьмут на себя роль самарянина и окажутся "ближними" карелам более, чем мы", – говорит архиепископ на открытии съезда. – "Братство имеет целью… показать, что Россия им мать, которая любит карелов как своих и никому не даст отторгнуть их от своей груди (KG07 13.02.2008)."

С) Меня скоро можно будет обвинить в непатриотичных, профинляндских настроениях. Но я не нарочно. Действительно, в "ОГВ" 1908 года с постоянной периодичностью появлялись тревожные статьи о том, что
братская Финляндия манит к себе русских карелов гораздо сильнее, чем Россия, которая не спешит искать с ними общий язык. В православных церквях карелы стоят, не понимая, о чем говорит батюшка, а школ не хватает. Отсюда и преступное соседство икон с трафовым королем и примитивное, губительное для лесов подсечное земледелие. Как будто не прошло тысячи лет со времен Киевской Руси.

"Правда, на устройство школ понадобятся деньги, которыми не особенно богата наша государственная казна. Но ведь устраивает же наше министерство народного просвещения школы в Финляндии. А спрашивается, для чего? Финнов нам не обрусить, тем более их просвещать: они и без наших школ просвещены. Не лучше ли было эти деньги употребить на просвещение нашего родного темного уголка – Карелии?"

Насчет финнов автор оказался прав – не обрусили мы их. Зато вот карелов русскому языку за годы советской власти научили. Да так, что повыбивали из их голов даже желание говорить по-карельски (KG27 02.07.2008)."

In example A the historical viewpoint of the Russian authorities is reproduced by the contemporary Russian journalist without much modification; nevertheless its very reproduction narrates, in contemporary terms, an unusual history of Karelia. Once again Karelians are depicted as being far from the influence of Russian culture; in both examples the construction of railways and roads is recommended to strengthen Karelia’s links with the ‘heart’ of Russia. Although in 1908 by using this lexical choice the authorities and journalists of the time hoped to, in a similar fashion to the modern examples detailed above, depict Olonets Karelia as part of Russia by incorporating it into the imagined body of which Moscow is the heart, the reproduction of this text in a modern Karelian newspaper has a different effect. It recalls a past in which the links
between Karelia and Russia were significantly weaker than they are today, and highlights the competing influence of the Finns on the Karelian population.

The links between the manner in which the Russian press of 1908 narrated Russian and Karelian history and identity and the manner in which this is done today are quite striking again in example B. Here the nefarious plans, in the opinion of the tsarist journalist, of the Finnish nationalists and the solutions offered by his contemporaries to this threat are again reproduced with little editorial comment by the modern journalist. The depiction of Russia as the ‘mother’ of the Karelians offered by the churchman of 1908 is strikingly similar to the manner in which the colonisation of the primitive Karelians by their Russian allies is represented by Karel’skaya Guberniya itself in the examples presented above; the Karelians are portrayed as a simple, guileless people under the tutelage and protection of the Russians. This idea of the primitive nature of Karelian society is also reproduced in example C, in this case not only by the historical but also the modern journalist. The journalist of 1908 talks of Karelia as a backward, unenlightened place; his modern counterpart agrees with this assessment not merely by quoting him but by comparing Karelia of the period to Kievan Rus. Indeed as shall be seen elsewhere the idea of the Russians protecting the Karelians from threats from over the border is often related in various narratives of Karelian history. It is also interesting to note that even in 1908 the Karelian Russian-language press was intently following its Finnish counterpart in order to detect supposed ‘threats’ to Russia and Karelia.

The tone is somewhat more ironical and sceptical in example C. Here the contemporary journalist offers more comment on the text produced by his 1908 counterpart and uses the reproduced text to make observations on the current state of the Republic of Karelia. Example C is two excerpts from one article on the ‘Pan-Finnic’ threat. In his introduction to the topic the author offers critical comment on the problem by opining that it was unsurprising that the Finns found it easier to deal with the Karelians than the Russians; they actually attempted to understand and educate them, unlike the Russian authorities. The author humorously notes that this opinion may cause him to be accused of pro-Finnish sympathies; clearly as this is intended as a joke the author feels no actual danger
in proffering such an opinion, but the presentation of the comment in this manner does indicate perhaps the consciousness of committing a minor heresy. Any appreciation of Finnish influence over and above that of the Russian community in Karelia or on Karelians can be seen as mildly controversial, as shall be explored further below. This example is also noteworthy as it confirms that the author in discussing this issue is talking from a Russian perspective to Russian interlocutors: he or she depicts the Russians as the ‘we’ group which fails to russify the Finns. In both examples the success of Tsarist regime in actually dealing with the ‘problem’ of Russification is viewed with some scepticism; in fact it is explicitly stated that it was the Soviet period which thoroughly Russified the Karelians.

In all of the above examples a history of the Karelian people is narrated in which their exposure to Russian influence is diminished if not denied altogether. Karelia is constructed as a territory on the periphery of Tsarist Russia, subject to the competing influence of Finland. In these narratives the Karelians are depicted as an unsophisticated, colonised people subject to the opposing influences of two more developed nations. Karelia itself as a territory is depicted as almost a ‘new world’ for Russian settlers, inhabited by an underdeveloped set of natives. The Russification of this native population is generally depicted in either neutral or positive terms; the labours of the schoolteachers of the period to teach the inhabitants Russian are often depicted as heroic struggles in these narratives and the teachers themselves lauded. Only in example C was any negative assessment of this process detectable from a Russian contributor in the entire corpus of data; even then it must be noted that the idea of the Soviets having повыбивали из их голов даже желание говорить по-карельски is probably intended to be somewhat humorous. It must be noted that these narratives are produced by Russian journalists for a predominantly if not exclusively Russian audience. Although it is not possible to extrapolate from one set of articles the idea that these narratives of Karelian history are widespread amongst the Russian population of the Republic of Karelia it is clear that they do have some currency. They also point to the narration of the image of the Finn as the ‘historical enemy’. In these articles, both from 1908 and 2008,
the Finns are conceived of as a threat to the unity of the Karelian and Russian peoples, even if the modern journalists occasionally take a somewhat sceptical view of the historical reality of this unity.

3.6 A Town Without a Past? Disputed Territories and Forbidden Histories

One particular part of the modern Republic of Karelia has a particularly problematic past and the differing manners in which this is narrated can cause significant controversy. The loss of the territories annexed by the USSR from Finland in 1940 and again in 1944, in particular the town of Sortavala in the context of the Republic of Karelia, is still the subject of some resentment in contemporary Finnish society. Before 1991 the topic of the history of these towns was off-limits for discussion within the USSR; it is now possible for this subject to be openly discussed and evaluated. Consequently attempts are now made to narrate the history of these areas for the purpose of either legitimising or delegitimising their current political status.

The absence of a historical narrative for the areas annexed to the KFSSR in 1940/44 is sometimes perpetuated in the modern discourse. In a similar fashion to the manner in which the topic was dealt with in the Soviet era some contemporary contributors choose to limit the ‘history’ of such areas to the post-Soviet period:

Название Питкяранта в переводе с финского языка означает буквально "длинный берег". Городом Питкяранта официально стала в 1940 году, хотя по словам Онеги Федоровны Власовой, председателя городского совета города в 1965-1985 годах, после войны здесь уцелело всего пять зданий. Долгое время люди ютились в бараках, а первые благоустроенные жилые дома появились только в начале шестидесятых (KG44 31.10.2001).
Although in the example above a Finnish derivation for the name Pitkyaranta is provided the town apparently has no history at all before 1940 when the town is described as having been officially founded. No comment whatsoever is made by the author about the fact that the area around Pitkyaranta was part of Finland prior to 1940. In fact we are advised on the authority of a former chairperson of the town council that there was practically nothing there at all until the 1960s; in this narrative the town of Pitkyaranta is built from scratch and therefore the rightful property of its current inhabitants. The Soviet period of comfort, as established by the благоустроенные жилые дома, is contrasted to the barbaric lack of development of the Finnish period.

This strategy of omission, which simply ignores the Finnish past of the areas annexed in 1940 or any of the history of the area at all before that date, is seemingly becoming much less frequently employed since the fall of the USSR. In fact several articles reference the fact that the history of these areas is now open for discussion and debate:

Недавняя, не говоря уже о глубинной, история Северного Приладожья и Карельского перешейка в силу причин чисто политических (до 1940 года эта территория входила в состав Финляндии), пожалуй, самое большое и самое белое пятно в истории всего Русского Севера. Краеведческое движение, появившееся здесь в начале 60-х годов теперь уже прошлого XX века, постепенно, со срывами, но начало заполнять эту брешь фактами, что и по-человечески необходимо ("На какой же земле я живу?") и исторически оправданно (с XIII века до 1918 года, со столетним шведским перерывом в XVII-XVIII веках эта территория была естественной частью Руси - Московии - России) (К96 01.09.2001)."

The above example acknowledges that in the relatively recent it was almost forbidden to discuss the history of those areas annexed to the KFSSR in 1940. Clearly this tendency appears to be disappearing and the problem of the history of the area is now being freely debated. The opening up of the topic is used by the author not as an opportunity to construct an inclusive picture of the
ownership of the area but to justify its inclusion in a solely Russian sphere. It is through the renewed study of the history of the area, the author claims, that it is possible to justify the inclusion of the area within a Russian state. The Finnish claim to the territory is mentioned only in passing and in parentheses, whilst the history of the area is included in that of the ‘Russian North’; the absence of discussion of its history is depicted not as the absence of a ‘Finnish’ history but as a gap in Russian history. The author then claims that despite a number of intervals the area was an integral part of Russia from the 13th Century through to 1918; in this manner the current inclusion of the territory in Russia is depicted as being wholly justified.

The manner in which newspapers in the then Olonets Guberniya were aware of and responded to texts published in the Finnish press has already been observed above. It is therefore unsurprising that their modern equivalents in the Republic of Karelia and Finland are similarly engaged in the selection and reproduction of texts across the border and the consequent reproduction and refutation of narratives of Karelian history and identity. Any perceived assertion in the Finnish media or society in general that runs counter to the accepted narratives of Karelian, Soviet and Russian history is vigorously countered by the Russian-language press in the Republic of Karelia. The issue which is most often the subject of this international intertextuality is that of the territories ceded to the USSR in 1940. The demands of certain sectors of Finnish society for the restoration, as they would term it, of these areas are seen as unwarranted provocation by the Russian media. The inclusion of these territories within the Russian Federation is seen as justified either by the victory over the forces of fascism gained in the Great Patriotic War, or by the narration of a history of these areas which places them firmly in the historical boundaries of Russia. As has been seen from the example above it is possible to narrate a history of Sortavala and the other areas in question which excludes all but the most minimal Finnish influence. Demands for the return of ‘Karelia’, as they are generally portrayed, are often interpreted as meaning the ceding of all of the modern Republic of Karelia to Finland; once again the ubiquity and ambiguity of
the term ‘Karelia’ causes confusion within the discourse. The examples below illustrate certain aspects of the discussion on this matter:

А) Финские реваншисты требуют от России и "утраченные территории", и деньги на их восстановление

Недавнее издание в Финляндии книги Вейкко Сакси "Возвращение Карелии" ("Karjalan palautus") раскручивает очередной виток общественной дискуссии о добровольном возврате Россией тех земель, которые отошли к СССР по итогам Зимней советско-финской войны 1939-1940 годов и последовавшей затем Великой Отечественной. Прежде всего речь идет о части Карельского перешейка и Северном Приладожье, входящем сейчас в состав российской Республики Карелия. Потому эта тема и поднимается под кодовым названием "Карельский вопрос".

Спонсором издания выступила известная общественная организация "Про Карелия" ("Pro Karelia"), настойчиво придерживающаяся реваншистских позиций. Теперь ее идеологи требуют возврата уже не только "утраченных территорий", но и полной суммы контрибуции, которую Финляндия вынуждена была выплатить Советскому Союзу после Второй мировой. Напомним, что в 1941-1944 годах финские войска в тесном союзе с немецкими фашистами вели активные боевые действия против Красной Армии, дошли до Свири, Онежского озера и линии Кировской железной дороги, оккупировав большую часть Советской Карелии и создав на ней сеть своих концентрационных лагерей, замкнули кольцо блокады Ленинграда на севере и вышли из войны только после принятого СССР своевременного предложения финляндского правительства о перемирии. Потерпевший поражение агрессор без возражений заплатил тогда наложенную на него контрибуцию и подписал в 1947 году условия Парижского мирного договора, в том числе определившие современные границы между странами-соседями.
Нелепая идея возложить на Россию материальную ответственность за оккупационную политику собственной страны, игравшей роль германского сателлита, запущена в начале марта на обсуждение широкой общественности через трибуну общенациональной финской газеты "Хельсингинг Саномат". Вейкко Сакси скрупулезно подсчитал, что в современном исчислении Россия должна выплатить Суоми в порядке возврата контрибуции 4 млрд евро, а за все потери финляндской экономики в войне компенсировать ей не менее 30 млрд евро.

Любопытно, что примерно в такую сумму оценивается размер инвестиций, которые потребовалось бы вложить в восстановление и поднятие до европейского уровня тех самых "возвращенных территорий", которые ловкие реваншисты уже готовы делить между желающими переселенцами как шкуру неубитого медведя. Такого безумного коленца в мировой истории, пожалуй, еще никто не выкидывал. Получается вроде того: отдай свое да еще и заплати за чужой разбой.

По словам главы Лахденпохского района Михаила Максимова, к посещающим Северное Приладожье финнам там "относятся очень дружелюбно, но напоминают им, что изначально территория древней Карелии была под властью Новгорода".

- С XII века люди в этих местах платили налоги Новгороду и были под его защитой. В XVII веке Карелию захватила Швеция, и православные карелы ушли за Ладогу и в Тверскую землю. Это была гуманитарная катастрофа. Территория от Выборга до Сортавалы - это земля карелов. Нынешний Приозерск, который при шведах назывался Кексгольм, - это Корела, столица древней Карелии, город, который вместе построили русские и карелы, - подчеркнул М. Максимов (К29 22.03.2005)."

В) Но подлинным открытием для участников конференции стала тема реваншизма в современной Финляндии, которую представил
финский социолог Йохан Бэкман. По его мнению, государственные органы соседней страны навязывают населению мысль о том, что русские люди генетически неполноценные, они не имеют права жить на территории, когда-то принадлежавшей Финляндии. Как утверждает социолог, официальные лица считают, что через 20 лет Россия распадется на 10-40 государств, следовательно, Финляндия должна поучаствовать в перекраивании государственных границ (KG12 20.03.2002).”

C) В одном из прошлых номеров мы обещали опубликовать высказывания финского социолога Йохана Бэкмана о реваншистских настроениях в Финляндии. Однако интервью оказалось настолько "горячим", что редакция попросила карельского журналиста Андрея Лося, имеющего хорошие связи в соседней стране, прокомментировать сказанное.
Когда на недавнем военно-историческом соборе в Суоярви свое мнение по проблемам современных российско-финляндских отношений высказывал некто Йохан Бэкман, то присутствовавшим там его соотечественникам было крайне неудобно. Один из финнов потом рассказывал, что просто не знал, смеяться ему или плакать, слушая откровения Бэкмана, и боролся с желанием по возвращении домой позвонить в службу госбезопасности (SUPO), чтобы рассказать про странного социолога-политолога, который, чего добrego, перессорит два соседних государства.

Эхо речей этого господина находим и в финской прессе: в прошлый вторник в газете "Карьялайнен", издающейся в Йоэнсуу, было опубликовано мнение Каарло Нюгрена, одного из участников сuoярвского сбора, который сказал, что выступление Бэкмана звучало явным диссонансом в общей дискуссии и слушать его было просто неприятно.”
Впрочем, бывали случаи, когда некоторые известные финские политики пытались использовать "карельскую карту" в своих тактических целях в ходе предвыборных кампаний. Что же касается настоящих, радикальных реваншистских настроений, то, конечно, есть в Финляндии публика, впрочем, достаточно немногочисленная, для кого такие настроения являются нормой жизни — достаточно вспомнить такого одиозного персонажа, как Сеппо Лехто и его организацию "Suur Suomi". Есть и организация под названием "Про Карелия", которая упоминается в интервью Бэкмана. На Интернет-сайте этой организации опубликованы многочисленные материалы, в которых приграничные территории Карелии не называются иначе, как временно оккупированные Россией, которые необходимо вернуть.

Но какая часть населения Финляндии готова подписаться под такими формулировками? 5 процентов? 10 процентов? (KG15 10.04.2002)."

D) Михаил Гольденберг, историк, директор Государственного краеведческого музея РК:
— Любую территорию можно сделать спорной. Даже за Арктику уже спорят. Надо измерять любую территориальную проблему сегодняшними законами. Разговоры о всякой исконности — это сложные разговоры. Что такое "исконно русская" или "исконно финская" земля — большой вопрос. Великий российский историк Ключевский сказал: "Россия — страна, которая сама себя колонизует". Россия состоит из территорий, которые завоеваны и присоединены. Даже Новгород и Псков были присоединены силой. Начни заниматься этими паззлами — и весь рисунок рассыплется. Не думаю, что Ельцин думал о продаже части Карелии. Все-таки в его команде были вполне вменяемые люди (KG36 05.09.2007)."

In the examples above the manner in which the Karelian press follows its Finnish counterpart and selects certain texts for reproduction is quite clear; it also
demonstrates that Finnish voices, albeit those selected by the editorial staff, are quoted indirectly on occasion. The activities of those Finnish organisations and individuals, in particular ProKarelia, which advocate reclaiming the territories lost in 1940 are reported on in some detail. These individuals and organisations are consistently described as ‘revanchist’ in the Russian language press of the Republic of Karelia. Often these demands are presented as a genuine threat to Russia and the Republic of Karelia, necessitating their refutation by other Finnish contributors the Karelian media has selected or the expert opinion of other Russian contributors. In example B the Finns are depicted as seeking to ‘regain’ Karelia following a complete collapse of Russia into dozens of separate states; example D quotes a Karelian academic similarly presenting the collapse of Russia ensuing from the removal of one part of the whole. Not infrequently suspicion is directed towards the Finnish state itself:

Однако российские эксперты уверены: появление подобной карты – это не что иное, как попытка выдать желаемое за действительное (KG35 29.08.2009).

In the article from which the above excerpt is taken the use of a pre-1940 map of Finland on the website of the Finnish Land Survey is implied to be evidence, as attested by unnamed experts, that the Finnish authorities themselves harbour designs on Karelia. Occasionally these claims are merely seen as somewhat insulting, as in example A where a strategy of criminalisation is deployed in order to characterise these claims as amounting to “отдай свое да еще и заплати за чужой разбой.” The claims are generally presented as invalid through a number of strategies which relate the history of these areas in a manner which undermines or minimises their validity.

The contemporary Finns who are depicted as demanding the ‘return’ of Karelia are often constructed in the discourse as being something close to fascists; there is an opinion that the territory gained in the wars of the 1940s was gained by fighting fascism and those who represent its annexation as unfair are depicted as being the ‘heirs’ of the fascists of the last century. In example B for instance the Finnish academic seeking the return of the annexed territories is
quoted as having pronounced the Slavic population of Russia ‘genetically inferior’ in language reminiscent of fascist rhetoric. Organisations like ProKarelia are described as ‘radical’ as well as revanchist and generally portrayed as being on or beyond the margins of acceptable politics. Indeed those Finns who are directly quoted by the paper generally also seek to depict those Finns interested in the return of the annexed territories in an unfavourable light. Example C appeals to the authority not of a Finn but of a ‘Karelian journalist’ (hence the actually ethnicity is unclear) to relay the opinions of more ‘reasonable’ Finns who disagree with the idea of reoccupying these lands. The journalist even informs us that one Finn was so disgusted with the ‘provocative’ rhetoric of the revanchist speaker that he was tempted to report him to the Finnish security services. The article concludes by posing a rhetorical question, using the topos of small numbers, which diminishes the importance of revanchist ideas in modern Finland:


In these excerpts we can clearly see how there is a clear awareness within the Russian Republic of Karelia of ‘revanchist’ ideas expressed within modern Finnish society. The groups which have adopted such ideas are clearly constructed as threatening the peaceful coexistence of the Russian and Finnish nations; both more moderate Finnish contributors, selected as they are by the newspapers, and the Karelian papers themselves through their editorial voice do however generally depict such groups as being on an extreme fringe of general Finnish society.

As stated above the idea of ‘returning Karelia’ to the Finns, as expressed in certain parts of Finnish society, is often interpreted or represented in the Republic of Karelia as meaning the entire area rather than just the areas annexed after 1940. The Finns are occasionally presented as demanding “карельские земли, некогда принадлежащие Финляндии (KG2 13.01.2010)”. Examples B and D do state that the Finns are demanding the return of territories once held by Finland, but also imply that they may be seeking to expand their borders in other
ways at the expense of Russia. Even where the discussion is expressly limited to
the annexed territories the idea that these areas rightfully belong to Finland is
generally refuted. The first manner in which this is achieved is related to the
characterisation of the revanchist organisations themselves; the annexation of the
territories is narrated as the rightful consequence of the war against fascism. In
example A the author does initially relate the annexation of the areas as being
partially a result of the 1939-40 Winter War; the conflict is however linked in the
same sentence to the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War as well. The author uses
‘напомним’ to appeal to the ‘common knowledge’ of his addressees that Finland
took part in the Great Patriotic War в тесном союзе с немецкими фашистами.
Finland is narrated as having taking part in blockading Leningrad, established
concentration camps and in general as having behaved as a German ‘satellite’.
The actions of the Finns during 1941-44 are portrayed as those of a fascist
aggressor or at the very least aggression in support of fascism. In this manner
the annexation of the territories in question from Finland and the related
compensation the Finns paid to the USSR is justified by the author; the Finns are
depicted as having been allied to and just as culpable as Nazi Germany. By
associating the Finns with the Germans, even to the extent of laying the blame
for concentration camps and the brutal blockade of Leningrad on their shoulders,
the author depicts them as part of the evils of fascism heroically defeated by the
USSR in 1941-45. The implication clearly is that the annexation is a result of
this victory, and the consequences of such a great victory over a fascist invader
cannot be questioned. Although the Winter War is mentioned initially we are not
given any further details; it is the Finns who are described as the
aggressors, and it is the aggressors, we must assume, who should pay the price
for their actions.

Another strategy we have already seen deployed above in the discussion
around these areas is to depict them as having always been part of Russian
territory. Sortavala and its surrounding area are often depicted as having been
Russian or part of some sort of Russian state for almost all of their recorded
history; by narrating a history of the area in which Russians or their allies were
the original owners of these lands their current ownership is justified and the
Finnish claims undermined. In example E for instance the question of where exactly the original boundary lies between Russian and Finnish settlement lies is stated in a deliberately ambiguous fashion by the expert quoted; the reader is therefore invited to draw their own conclusions as they see fit, especially as, the expert assures us, Russian lands have always been united by force in any case. Example A reproduces another narrative we have already encountered of the Karelian Isthmus having historically part of a Russian state. In this example the local politician is quoted as ‘reminding’ his Finnish friends that the territory in question, conceived of here as part of ‘ancient Karelia’ has been part of a Russian state изначально. Indeed the annexation of the area to the Swedish authorities, the forerunners of the modern Finnish authorities, in the 17th century is narrated as a гуманитарная катастрофа. The occupation that is depicted in this narrative as unjust is that of the Swedes and Finns from the 17th century until 1940; the territory remains, in the politician’s view, part of the original territory of the Karelian people rather than the Finns. As the Karelians are always linked with the Russians of Novgorod, down to the Russians also taking part in constructing the capital of ancient Karelia, the events of 1940-44 are imagined more as the rightful owners taking back their own historical homeland from Finnish occupation than as forceful annexation of foreign territories.

Occasionally however there are glimpses of an alternate, somewhat heretical narrative that views these areas as being part of Finland or Finnish territories rather than Russian or Karelian. The annexed territories are infrequently described as being ‘Finnish’ or at least less ‘Russian’ than the remainder of Karelia; a narrative interesting in itself for highlighting the manner in which the remainder of Karelia is considered to be a ‘Russian’ territory. It would seem that for some Russian contributors at least these districts, annexed after 1940, are the only areas of Karelia they feel are not part of an integral Russian territory. It would also appear that the ‘Finnish’ nature or heritage of these areas is often narrated for a very specific purpose; to contrast the apparent neglect of these areas by their current Russian caretakers compared to that of the previous Finnish occupants. The manner in which this status is conveyed is exemplified in the extract given below:
Загадочная все-таки Сортавала. Город-легенда. Город, который упрямо, по инерции, считается самым нерусским из карельских городов. Старая финская архитектура, фантастические ладожские красоты. Плюс к этому город долгое время был закрытым, что прибавляло ему загадочности и мифологичности... Оказавшись здесь, задаешься единственным вопросом: какой же степенью варварства надо обладать, чтобы так изничтожить данную природой и отобранную у финнов красоту? (KG43 22.10.2003).

The author describes Sortavala as the ‘least Russian’ of all Karelian towns. Given that in fact more than 80% of the residents of Sortavala and its district are Russians in terms of ethnicity the town is actually one of the most Russian towns in the Republic of Karelia. Only 3.2% and 1.2% of the population of the area are Karelian or Finnish respectively. The author clearly does not have the contemporary national composition of Sortavala’s inhabitants in mind when he describes the town as lacking in Russian character. It appears in fact it is the town’s Finnish past, as represented by its architecture, that the author feels gives Sortavala the status of being the ‘least Russian’ part of Karelia. Moreover this Finnish past is being highlighted to convey a particular political point; the author clearly feels that the potential or past beauty is being squandered by the current authorities. The use of ‘отобрать’ to describe the manner in which the town was gained by its current owners is also useful as it hints at a narrative of the annexation of the area which, somewhat heretically, considers its seizure unjustified. The main purpose of the author, it would seem, by intimating that the town may not rightfully be Russian is to shame the current authorities into doing more to regenerate the area by restoring its former beauty.

Using the idea of Sortavala being by right a part of Finland for political purposes is occasionally expressed in even more radical terms. Although not directly advocated in the media, some more ‘extreme’ narratives of the status of Sortavala and Lakhdenpokh’ya in particular are certainly present in the Republic of Karelia and are reproduced at least partially in the Russian-language press. In 2010 a series of failures of the communal heating systems in both towns, alongside other perceived failures of the local authorities, led to the distribution of leaflets calling for the areas to be ceded back to Finland. The appearance of
these leaflets was quickly investigated by the FSB on the grounds of their ‘inciting extremism’ indicating that as far as the authorities are concerned such statements are heretical to the point of illegality. *Karel’skaya Guberniya*, while not openly advocating such a step or indeed openly supporting the right of the unknown individual to produce such a text did narrate these events in a sympathetic light:

В замерзающих карельских городах Сортавала и Лахденпохья появились листовки с призывами присоединиться к Финляндии. Может, хоть геополитическая угроза заставит карельскую власть услышать мерзнувших людей? (KG5 03.02.2010)

Evidently it extreme circumstances the idea of these areas being rightfully part of Finland can be and is used to coerce the local authorities to take action over the perceived inadequacies of the current inhabitants situation. Interestingly the above article appeared in *Karel’skaya Guberniya* only two issues after another piece decrying the continued threat of Finnish revanchism. Clearly whilst the paper tends to conform to the orthodox position of the areas in question as rightfully Russian it is not above using the ‘геополитическая угроза’ as a topos of threat with which to cajole the local authorities into action over perceived problems. Nevertheless the use of such narratives which consider these areas to be rightfully Finnish rather than Russian remains taboo; the main presentation of the idea of such areas belonging to Finland is as an impermissible heresy.

The idea that the Finns at least consider Karelia as a whole to be rightfully part of Finland is also encountered within the Russian language media. As the below excerpt demonstrates Finns interviewed within the Russian language press are often assumed to hold somewhat ‘pan-Finnish’ opinions:

– Нет!.. В Финляндии не поддерживают эту точку зрения! – почти что хором отвечают актеры. – Все знают, где проходит граница.

– Приятно, что кое-где можно услышать финскую речь, что многие названия написаны на финском. Но как Финляндию мы это не воспринимаем. Это все-таки Россия, – говорит Пану.

– К тому же Петрозаводск так далеко от границы. Может быть, Сортавала еще может вызывать такие ощущения… – добавляет Яакко (KG2 09.01.2008).

Although the Russian journalist attempts to gain a more ‘honest’ picture of his Finnish interlocutor’s views by assuring them that there is нет никакой политики in his posing the question of Karelia as a Finnish territory to them the Finns interviewed are presented to be inclined to carefully shy away from any such assertion. Only one of them tentatively, qualifying his statement with может and может быть, offers an assertion that Sortavala is perhaps something of a Finnish town. The other Finns are depicted as fully supporting the idea of Karelia as part of Russia, stating it is common knowledge где проходит граница. Nevertheless despite the article representing the status quo as being accepted almost without question by the Finns the fact that the question was posed to them and the article reproduced in the paper at all denotes a certain continued suspicion towards Finland on the part of the Russian-language media. Undoubtedly whilst Finland is generally perceived in positive terms some lingering misgivings remain over their attitude towards not only the territories annexed in 1940 but Karelia as a whole.

3.7 Heretical Narratives? Karelia Without the Karelians

The claim of the Karelians to being the indigenous national group within the modern Republic of Karelia is occasionally questioned in the discourse. As has been seen above the Karelians are very often marginalised and the validity of their culture and identity questioned or diminished in the Russian-language press. This can be pursued to the extent of attempting to deny their claim to being the legitimate original inhabitants or titular minority of the modern Republic of
Karelia at all. This is important politically as has been noted above as the status of titular minority grants the Karelians, at least in theory, certain definite rights from the authorities. An example already quoted above shows how their claim to be indigenous and therefore their political rights is linked:

In this example the idea of the Karelians as indigenous to the modern republic is explicitly denied together with the associated political rights of such status. The LDPR politician quoted here attempts to delegitimise the idea of political rights for the Karelian minority by asserting the ‘real’ history of the area, as opposed to that propounded by the Karelians themselves, is that the minority has resided in the area for only a few centuries. By attacking the narrative of continuity of Karelian residence in the area the politician puts forward an apparently heretical, to his Karelian audience at least, construction of the Republic of Karelia. This particular historical narrative is exceedingly rare; it would appear that it is considered to be ‘heretical’ by at least the majority of those authorised to contribute to mass media discourse. It is possible to deny the ‘Karelian’ nature of the area in other, somewhat more subtle ways, however, without explicitly denying the Karelian claim to being the original or indigenous inhabitants of the area. The history of parts of Karelia can be narrated as the history of constituent parts of the greater Russian political world. In this narrative the idea of Karelia as being in any way different from the remainder of Russia is denied simply through it not being mentioned. This is a much more common strategy within the corpus of data studied. A good example of this tendency is given in the below extract:
Кемь — город особый. Он даже внесен в реестр исторических городов России наряду с Петрозаводском, Олонцом, Сортавалой и красавцем Пудожем. Ровно 220 лет назад тогдашний губернатор Олонецкой губернии старик Державин Кемь заметил и в свойственной для себя манере, в гроб сходя, благословил. В смысле, по всемилостивейшему повелению императрицы всея Руси матушки Екатерины II объявил Кемский острог уездным городом. Нынче в честь этого знаменательного события Центробанк даже выпустил юбилейную десятирублевую монетину с изображением Кеми и надписью "Древнейшие города России.

Вообще же о Кемском поселении известно уже лет 600 (KG11 10.03.2005).

In the above description of the town of Kem’ no indication is given of the fact that the town of Kem’ itself or the remaining four towns listed are within Karelia. In fact all five, we are informed, are listed as being внесен в реестр исторических городов России. Kem’ is furthermore associated with the Russian poet Derzhavin and Catherine the Great by the author, and we are reminded of the fact it appears as an ‘ancient’ town of Russia on ten ruble coins. The description of the ‘Russian-ness’ of Kem’ is almost hyperbolic; the fact Kem’ can be listed amongst the ancient towns of Russia is stated twice within one paragraph. By narrating a history of the town which excludes the use of any reference to Karelia and locates the history of Kem’ as being that of part of Russia exclusively the area is firmly associated with Russian rather than Karelian identity. The article in fact goes further by associating Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Sortava and Pudozh all with this idea of ancient Russia; all four are listed as being ancient Russian settlements or at least settlements ‘of Russia’ without any indication that they were ever at any time not inhabited by Russians. In the case of Sortava it is included as an ancient Russian town despite not having been part of the RSFSR until 1956. This example is typical of narratives which incorporate the area into Russia as a whole by referring exclusively to the Russian aspects of its past. This narrative uses a strategy of avoidance to suppress the subnational differences evident in Karelia in favour of a unifying, singular Russian identity.
The idea of Karelia and the Karelians themselves as sharing in the common religious and historical traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the most important historical narratives found in the discourse on history and identity in the modern Republic of Karelia. By emphasising the shared religious traditions of the Karelian and Russian people it is possible to emphasise their shared past and associate the idea of being ‘Karelian’ with aspects of Russian identity. By being portrayed as steeped in the religious traditions of their Russian brethren the Karelians can be constructed in this narrative as being the natural allies of the Russian people in contrast to the Lutheran Finns. As shall be examined further below this religious opposition can also be invoked in the construction of the image of the ‘other’ and the construction of a ‘we’ group that includes both Karelian and Russian in opposition to those of another faith.

The association of Karelian and Russian can also be achieved through a strategy of perpetuation which emphasises the unbroken unity, in religious terms, of the Karelian and Russian peoples in the Orthodox faith. In fact a strategy of positive self-presentation is sometimes used to construct a picture of the Karelians as ‘model’ Orthodox believers. The narration of Karelia itself as an Orthodox territory also serves to incorporate it within the boundaries of the ‘Russian world’; by reciting the history of the various Orthodox monasteries and churches of Karelia the antiquity and tradition of the Orthodoxy of Karelia is established. As Orthodoxy and its history may also be constructed as one of the key markers of Russian identity the narration of Karelia in this fashion also connects the area to ideas of ‘Russian-ness’ and identifies it as a ‘genuine’ Russian territory. This process is illustrated by the examples below:

А) Христианское учение о Церкви как о единой вселенской общине позволяет объединять верующих вне зависимости от их национальной принадлежности. Это было особенно важно для многонациональной Древней Руси, в частности Новгородского

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княжества, где проживало множество финских племен (карелы, вепсы, воль, ижора и др.). Экспансия русской культуры и "русской веры" (православия) велась на территориях, заселенных финскими племенами. Одним из самых крупных племен была упоминающаяся в летописях "корела", предок сегодняшних карел.

Древнерусские и европейские источники рассказывают о нескольких племенах, объединенных общим названием "корела" и проживавших на Карельском перешейке и северо-западном побережье Ладожского озера. С Х - XI веков карельские земли попадают в зону политических, экономических и религиозных интересов Великого Новгорода. С этого же времени начинается история карельского православия, определившего в дальнейшем судьбу этого народа.

Впервые карелы были насильно крещены посланниками новгородского князя Ярослава Всеволодовича в 1227 году. Скорее всего, первыми в православие обратили восточных карел, на земли которых претендовал и Великий Новгород, и Швеция. Карелы, жившие на западе, уже начинали устанавливать к тому времени вассальные отношения со шведами. Трудно судить об успехе православной миссии среди языческого населения, но первые находки археологов в карельских захоронениях предметов православного культа относятся уже к XIII веку.

Когда Карельский перешеек стал ареной борьбы за влияние православной Руси и католической в то время Швеции, карелы сумели извлечь из своего двойственного положения некоторые выгоды. Православные священники более спокойно и терпимо относились к некоторым древним традициям финских племен, поэтому принятие карелами православия может объясняться и стремлением к сохранению привычного уклада.
Толерантность православной культуры хорошо иллюстрируется примером из позднейшей истории: знаменитый финский фольклорист Элиас Леннрот (1802 - 1884), создатель "Калевалы", записал большую часть песен древнего эпоса у беломорских карел-старообрядцев. В то же время у карел, живших на западе и принявших сначала католицизм, а затем лютеранство, древняя эпическая поэзия уже не бытовала. (K28 19.03.2005).

В) Я побывала в Кемском монастыре св. Новомучеников и Страдотерпцев Российской. Обители чуть более года, что по сравнению с 300-летней историей города одно мгновение, однако в нем спрессован весь опыт древней карельской земли, впитавшей в себя и духовную благодать Соловецкой обители, и кровь тысяч репрессированных.

В первые десятилетия советской власти Кемь была пересыльным пунктом на пути репрессированных в соловецкие лагеря особого назначения, а в самом городе располагалось управление этими лагерями (УСЛОН). И доныне история не дает забыть о минувшем, постоянно напоминая о великом противостоянии богоотступников Богу. Монастырь расположился в двухэтажном здании бывшей гостиницы для работников НКВД "Прибой", в двух десятках метров от здания УСЛОН. И на таком же расстоянии от оскверненного ими Благовещенского храма. Величавую каменную церковь освятили в 1905 году. Большевики в первые годы своей власти попытались взорвать ее, ничего не вышло - храм устоял. Сняли крест и колокола, устроили здесь склады, но церковь терпеливо ждала своего часа. И в начале 90-х годов он настал.

Вот еще городская достопримечательность - Успенский собор, построенный подобно знаменитым Кижам без единого гвоздя.
Освятили его в 1714 году. Как памятник архитектуры он находится под охраной государства и до сих пор является музеейной, а не епархиальной собственностью. Несколько лет назад здесь разрешили проводить богослужения, возобновилась приходская жизнь.

Здесь, в трапезной собора, Гавриил Державин огласил Указ императрицы Екатерины II о присвоении Кеми статуса губернского города (К50 23.05.2002).

С) <В этом году исполняется 780 лет, как карельский народ был крещен в Святую православную веру. Карельская земля очень богата своими святыми угодниками Божиими, в числе которых следует вспомнить преподобных Александра Свирского, Сергия и Германа Валаамских и многих других святых, которые своей богоугодной жизнью, трудами и молитвами несли Свет православной веры народам, населяющим карельскую землю. Всему миру известны такие памятники христианской культуры, как древний Валаамский монастырь, Соловки, Кижский ансамбль.

Страшная трагедия 1917 года в корне изменила жизнь карела, разрушила его духовно-нравственные устои и традиции. Сама Православная церковь, ее священнослужители да и просто верующие подверглись невиданным доселе невероятным жестокостям, цинизму и масштабам гонений. Итог - народ утерял свои народные обычаи, свою веру, себя потерял. Последствия всего этого мы видим воочию на всей территории нашей Карелии.

Карельский народ утерял то, что во все времена являлось центром и средоточием культуры любого этноса - ВЕРУ В БОГА.
Но при всех этих добрых качествах народ калевальский, ухтинские карелы практически полностью утратили церковную, христианскую традиции, взамен которых часто можно встретить самые дикие, непонятного происхождения, суеверия, которые к карельской народной обрядовой культуре не имеют совершенно никакого отношения.

Близость Финляндии, дружественные, а порою родственные отношения, сходство местного наречия с финским языком, помимо того что приносят большую пользу местному населению, таят в себе немалую опасность превратного понимания ухтинским карелом своего <идентитета>, своей национальной и культурной принадлежности. Не секрет, что на территории Калевальского района помимо Православной церкви функционируют и другие конфессии, приехавшие из Финляндии и Америки, которые ведут активную работу, особенно среди молодежи, используя для этого свою огромную материальную базу за границей.

В чем опасность? В том, что вероучение протестантских, а порою и явно сектантских конфессий, насаждаемое ими, мягко говоря, не способствует правильному восприятию и пониманию народом христианской традиции, не несет оно и патриотического воспитания.

В-четвертых, тесное сотрудничество, скорее, дружба с православными верующими Финляндии. Не секрет, что в подавляющем большинстве православные Финляндии являются карелами по национальности, и, что самое важное, они сохранили те православные традиции, которые мы, русские карелы, утратили (K81 26.07.2007).”

D) Пять веков духовности
Располагается святая обитель на юге Карелии, недалеко от Олонца. Без малого пятисот лет назад пришел в эти дикие и безлюдные места на берег Важеозера монах-пустынник Геннадий. Был он учеником и сокелейником преподобного Александра Свирского. Вырыл себе пещеру, в которой и прожил один до конца своих дней. Затем сюда пришел другой ученик Свирского: монах Никифор. А потом у него появились последователи. Написали они челобитную тогдашнему царю Ивану Грозному с просьбой закрепить землю за святой обителью. Так появился Важеозерский монастырь.
По преданию, мощи преподобных Геннадия и Никифора покоятся в основании одного из храмов монастыря — Всех Святых. И хотя во времена советской власти монастырское кладбище сравняли с землей, а в храмах устроили спортивный и кинозалы, эти мощи никто не тронул.”

В 1612 году на монастырь напали литовцы, убили настоятеля и пожгли постройки. Все отстроили заново. В конце XIX века сильный пожар снова уничтожил деревянные монастырские строения.
А в 20-е годы XX века он и вовсе прекратил свое существование. Монахов расстреляли, а на месте обители сначала два года был концлагерь, затем лагерь для военнопленных, а после войны — лагерь для детей.”

Example A illustrates how the shared religion of the Karelian and Russian peoples can be constructed as having determined the manner in which Karelia and Karelians became drawn into the Russian sphere of influence. Here the manner in which the conversion of the Karelians was brought about is clearly linked to Russian interests of the time; the author is relatively unsentimental regarding the motives of the Russian authorities of the time for seeking to bring their religion to the ancestors of today’s Karelians and the methods which were employed. Nevertheless the Karelians are portrayed as being under Russian influence since the 10th and 11th century and Orthodox since the 13th; this influence and that of the Orthodox Church is characterised as being benign and even beneficial for the Karelians themselves. Whereas the Karelians who fell under Swedish influence are depicted as having lost their cultural traditions those who adopted Orthodoxy are able, the author relates, to retain these traditions to the extent of bequeathing the world the *Kalevala*. Although there are hints of force being employed against the Karelians the author generally constructs the process of adoption of Orthodoxy as being to the Karelian’s advantage; in fact the position of the Karelians between Sweden and Russia is even described as ‘privileged’, allowing the Karelians to profit from the tolerance offered to them by Russian priests.

Example B is a selection of excerpts from a ‘special report’ in *Kareliya* on the monasteries and churches of the northern Karelian town of Kem’. The link made in the article between any national group and the history of the monasteries is quite weak; there is merely one reference to the re-founded monastery having somehow incorporated something of the ‘ancient Karelian land’ despite its relative youth. Nevertheless the article attempts to narrate a history of the town in which the ancient religious traditions of the Russian Orthodox faith have survived for centuries despite political repression. One church in particular is described as having survived a Bolshevik attempt to destroy it, waiting until the collapse of the USSR for ‘its moment’. Buildings are evidently incapable of waiting for anything, but the author uses this personification to give the impression of a territory steeped in religious tradition that could not be destroyed by the atheistic Soviet state. Kem’ is characterised as
being intimately connected with the Russian Orthodox Church; even the declaration, by the acclaimed poet Derzhavin, of its status as a town is made in one of the town’s churches we are informed. In this example the state itself is associated with the church in a manner which is interesting given the increasing connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the current Russian government, with Orthodoxy assuming a role as almost a ‘state ideology’ (for the connections between church and state in Russian see Papkova (2011), Knox (2005) and Mitrokhin (2009).

Example C is a series of excerpts from one of a regular series of articles in Kareliya entitled “Православие на карельской земле” which are generally produced either by the clergy of the local Orthodox community or by its lay members. Consequently it represents a narrative in which the Orthodoxy of Karelia and in this example explicitly the Karelians themselves is the key marker of their identity. Once again the antiquity of Russian Orthodoxy within Karelia and in this instance also specifically the Karelian people themselves is highlighted right at the start. Furthermore the importance of this Orthodox culture in Karelia is demonstrated by the author by reference to the ‘world-famous’ sites it has produced in the territory; Karelia is represented not merely as a part of the Orthodox world but a ‘model’ part of it. The article then explicitly equates Orthodoxy with Karelian identity, identifying the loss of this faith after 1917 with a loss of Karelian identity itself:

народ утерял свои народные обычаи, свою веру, себя потерял. Последствия всего этого мы видим воочию на всей территории нашей Карелии (K81 26.07.2007).

The author then appeals to the common knowledge of his addressees, stating they will all be able to note the negative consequences of this development across ‘our Karelia’; by leaving the actual consequences for the addressee to determine he invites his interlocutor to project whatever it actually is they consider to be ‘negative’ into this blank space. The actual aspects of Karelian culture he finds objectionable in the period since 1917 are left unstated once again in the following paragraphs; the loss of the Orthodox faith is
constructed as catastrophic for Karelian identity but beyond the actual loss of faith itself the supposedly negative connotations for the Karelian ethos are left undeveloped. The article is interesting from another angle however as it once again narrates a history of the White Sea or Northern Karelians as being too closely influenced by Finnish culture and in danger of losing that which identifies them as intrinsically Karelian. Evidently in this instance the clergyman has, as he describes, the influence of Finnish Lutherans and other denominations on these Karelians however it does illustrate once again the view in some quarters of the northern part of the Karelian nation being ‘too close’ to Finland. Their proximity to Finland both in geographic and linguistic terms is explicitly constructed as a threat to their Karelian identity by the author. Indeed this influence apparently:

не способствует правильному восприятию и пониманию народом христианской традиции, не несет оно и патриотического воспитания (ibid).

The author here narrates another aspect of the ‘Finnish threat’ seen in the discourse on the annexed territories above; the idea that the Finnish are detaching at least part of the Karelian population from their true cultural traditions and faith and thereby detaching them from the remainder of Russia. The only positive Finnish influence the author can detect is that of the Finnish Karelians who have retained their Russian Orthodox faith who are in fact depicted as a consequence as being ‘more Karelian’ than those Karelians in the Republic of Karelia who have moved away from Orthodoxy.

Example D narrates a history of a particular monastery surviving despite the repression of the Bolsheviks to that we have seen in example B and example C to an extent. Once again despite destruction and persecution the ancient Orthodox site, in this case we are informed dating back to the time of Ivan the Terrible, has survived. As in the previous examples this does construct a picture of Karelia as an ancient Orthodox territory. Unlike the previous examples however this article approaches the subject with a certain amount of scepticism. The journalist in Karel’skaya Guberniya treats the topic of the church with a certain sensitivity and respect; the article after all does narrate the history of the
monastery since the medieval period as claimed by the church as a genuine continuity to the present day. On the other hand the destruction of the monastery during the Soviet period is narrated without the emotive language seen in the previous examples; it is related without being denoted a ‘tragedy’ as in example C or without being depicted as futile in the manner of example B. In fact although the narrative of Orthodoxy having a long history in Karelia is reproduced without much alteration in this article the author does seem to have a somewhat sceptical view of its current manifestation in Karelia, or at least of the attitude of the local inhabitants towards this ‘spiritual revival’. The inmates of the monastery are all denoted as приезжие, the local population are depicted as having nothing to do with the place whatsoever. In this narrative although the historical heritage of Orthodoxy in Karelia is not doubted its modern relevance is questioned.

3.9 The Past and Future of the Karelian Language

The idea of continuity is a key constructive strategy for the Karelians in terms of their approach to the question of the Karelian language. By constructing a past in which Karelian flourished demands for the future development of the language are advanced. The current use of Karelian, which appears to be the single most important marker of Karelian identity in contemporary Karelian society, is often justified (although by no means exclusively so) by reference to the fact it was once the dominant language in the area. By idealising the past of the language and harking back to a time when its usage was widespread demands can be made for more attention to be paid to its current and future development. The history of the language is also constructed to a large extent as the history of the Karelian people themselves; the history of its suppression and later renaissance is therefore constructed as the oppression and rebirth of the Karelian identity itself. As shall be examined on further detail below this almost ever-present connection made in the discourse on the past of the Karelian language aids in the creation of a certain self-image of the Karelians
themselves; the top-down management of the language and its negative effects is also seen as the management of Karelian identity. By apparently relinquishing or being unable to exert any control over the development of their language the Karelians construct themselves as unable to control their own destiny as a nation.

The antiquity of the Karelian language is often part of historical narratives of its use, for example:

Если ливвиковский и людиковский диалекты сложились в начале 2 тысячелетия н. э. в результате взаимодействия древневепсских и карельских этнических групп населения на Олонецкой равнине, то возникновение собственно карельского диалекта связывают с племенем корела, проживавшим в 1 - 2 тысячелетии на побережье Ладожского озера. Такой вот древний язык! (K122 30.10.2007).

The idea of the continuity and antiquity of Karelian residence seen above in the modern Republic of Karelia is often directly linked with this continuity of the Karelian language:

Да, мы – карелы

Спасогубская школа с 2006 года работает по утвержденному республиканскому базисному плану для школ, реализующих программы с этнокультурным компонентом.

Старинное карельское село Спасская Губа, расположенное на берегу живописного озера Мунозеро, ведет свое летоисчисление с конца XVI века. Учить детей в селе начали с 1869 года. Сегодня можно говорить о том, что именно с того времени были заложены традиции школьного образования, которые и сегодня преумножает Спасогубская средняя школа.

Школу вполне можно назвать национальной. Половина детей, которые в ней обучаются, - финны и карелы. Проведя опрос среди школьников и их родителей, руководство школы приняло решение дать возможность детям изучать родные языки, на которых говорили и говорят
их бабушки и дедушки. С 1991 года в школе начали преподавать карельский язык - ливвиковское наречие.

Уже через 8 лет школа стала базовой с этнокультурным финно-угорским компонентом образования. В школе решили, что, имея такое число детей, для которых карельский язык родной, они просто обязаны сделать все, чтобы сохранить самобытность карел, возродить их язык, культуру и традиции.

Культуру невозможно сохранить, не сохраняя язык. (К 147 27.12.2007).

Here the antiquity of the ‘Old Karelian’ village of Spasskaya Guba, which we are informed stretches back to the end of the 16th century, is invoked by the author in a discussion on the teaching of Karelian in the modern village school. This fact is presumably thought to have some relevance to the relatively modern decision to teach the local children Karelian which was taken only in 1991. The continuity of Karelian language and therefore identity however is established by the idea of the language being the children’s native language, spoken by their ‘grandmothers and grandfathers’. Critically it is apparently the ability of the children in question to learn their ‘native language’ which then allows them to retain their Karelian identity. We are explicitly informed by the author that it is the teaching of the language which leads to the teaching of other aspects of Karelian culture and traditions; in fact we are advised that the culture cannot be saved without saving the language. In this example clearly the history of the Karelian language is an important justification for its present use; however it is the continued usage of the language which is seen as the key to the continued validity of Karelian identity.

This strategy of invoking the long history of the Karelian language in debates on its future prospects is further exemplified by the example below:

Карельский язык - это живой язык, прекрасно выполняющий все присущие ему функции, прежде всего коммуникативную, эстетическую и
познавательную. Если на карельском языке говорили и говорят, то осуществлялась и осуществляется коммуникативная функция; если имеется карелоязычная художественная литература, то, без сомнения, выполняется эстетическая функция; если есть карелоязычные издания, значит, есть и читатели (кстати, литература на карельском языке на полках книжных магазинов не залеживается), а стало быть, реализуется познавательная функция.

Корни карельского языка уходят в глубь веков. На нем издревле не только говорили, но и писали. Здесь не предполагается изложение истории карелоязычной литературы, насчитывающей столетия, упомянем в качестве примера лишь некоторые факты. Из древних письменных памятников на финно-угорских языках вторыми по древности (после венгерских) являются карелоязычные тексты; молитва "Отче наш" на карельском языке была опубликована в 1544 году; карельский язык присутствует среди 272 языков, представленных в "Сравнительном словаре всех языков и наречий" под редакцией П. Палласа, изданном в XVIII в. по указанию Екатерины II; в течение веков выходила в свет карелоязычная литература (К 15 10.02.2001).

In the continuation of the article from which this sample is taken the author goes on to plead for further support for the Karelian language and its development. To appreciate the usage of this strategy it is as ever necessary to appreciate the context in which the text is placed. There is a view in some quarters that the Karelian language is inadequately developed and/or old-fashioned and incapable of fulfilling the role of a modern literary language. By detailing the extensive history of the Karelian language, in particular its literary form, the author clearly hopes to counter arguments which might claim the Karelian language was underdeveloped and incapable of fulfilling the functions of a modern language.

The impact of changing political priorities on the development of the Karelian language is often cited in discussion on its history and current status:

А) Проблема карельского языка существовала с времени создания Карельской Трудовой Коммуны (1920 год). Начало ее решения
было положено в 1937-1940 годах, когда было запрещено использование финского языка и еще 96% карелов говорили на родном языке. Этот процесс был прерван, и не потому, что плох был язык, а в связи с созданием Карело-Финской СССР.

1 сентября 1940 года детям карелов вновь стали преподавать все предметы на финском. Массовые репрессии, оккупация и эвакуация, <закрытие> деревень, завоз из других регионов рабочих для вырубки лесов и запрет использования карельского языка привели к необузданной ассимиляции, сокращению численности карелов в республике со 109 тыс. (1933 год) до 79 тыс. (1989 год), из которых владели родным языком лишь 51,1%. Сохранение языка переросло в проблему существования народа.

В то же время продолжает угрожающе ухудшаться демографическая ситуация. С 1989 по 2002 год численность карелов в России сократилась со 125 до 93 тыс. человек, то есть на 25%, из них в Карелии с 78,9 до 65,6 тыс. человек, на 18%. Близится черта, за которой процесс ассимиляции примет необратимый характер. Лишь менее половины карелов знает свой язык. При темпах сокращения численности 2 - 2,5 тыс. человек в год - легко подсчитать, когда последний карел уйдет в небытие. Уже через 5 - 6 лет нас в республике останется менее 50 тыс., мы в соответствии с законом РФ пополним ряды малочисленных (читай: исчезающих) народов.

Сможем ли мы сделать из сложившейся ситуации безотлагательные выводы?

Сейчас многое зависит и от самих карелов, и от позиции избранных и назначенных властей, ученых, писателей, учителей, журналистов, юристов и, конечно же, от понимания проблемы и
поддержки со стороны всех братских народов, живущих вместе с нами на карельской земле. (К 36 06.04.2006).

В) В силу исторических обстоятельств в 20-е годы карельский язык не был допущен на историческую арену. Многие десятилетия деятели разного рода упорно доказывали, что карельский язык не имеет права культурного развития. Его считали непоспособным адекватно отражать сложные политические, экономические, научные явления. Преданный забвению, он все же выжил сам и помог выжить народу в дни тяжких испытаний, сомнений, господства полуправды.

Как известно, в предыдущем десятилетии в соответствии с традицией в использовании карельского языка в республике сложилась практика применения двух диалектов -- ливвиковского и собственно карельского, поскольку, по данным переписи населения 1989 года, из 79 тысяч карелов, проживающих в республике, более 40 тысяч - это ливвики, около 30 тысяч - собственно карелы, 5-6 тысяч - людики.


С) Книгопечатание на карельском языке прекращается в России в связи с событиями первой мировой войны. Не возобновилось оно и после Октябрьской революции, а начиная с 20-х годов судьбу карельского языка и карельской национальной культуры решал уже не здравый ум и смысл, а политика. Правда, в 30-е годы XX столетия была предпринята попытка восстановления
исторической справедливости относительно карельского народа, но она потерпела неудачу. (К 16 10.02.2001).

In example A from Kareliya the starting point for discussion of the ‘problem’ of the Karelian language is selected as the 1920 formation of the KTK. Once again this point appears to have been selected as the ‘beginning’ of Karelian history by the author of the article, who appears in this instance to be a Karelian (from his appeal to the “fraternal peoples living together with us on the Karelian land”). The author is careful not to determine the agency at work behind the problems of the Karelian people during the Soviet period. The actual authority behind the various decisions or lack thereof taken on the Karelian language and the responsibility for the repressions and subsequent decline in the Karelian population is not identified at any point either in this article nor the other two examples. It is possible this is due to self-censorship on the part of the authors who wish to gloss over this troublesome period in Karelian and Soviet history. It is clear, however, that the Karelians are constructed in all the examples as passive victims of the process, with decisions on their future taken by some distant and unclear agent without regard for the negative consequences for the Karelian population. As a result of these decisions the Karelian population declined and continues to diminish; the author clearly locates the cause of this decline in the incorrect language policies of the Soviet period. From a position of strength, with 96% of the population speaking Karelian, these policies place the language and therefore ethnos itself, in the view of the author, on the verge of extinction. Thus a strategy of discontinuation is used which highlights the negative historical trajectory of the Karelian language; this is linked to a strategy of shifting the blame for this change from the Karelians themselves to the unnamed authorities, thus creating a topos of persecution and neglect of the language. This is used by the author to attempt to demand more action to right these historical wrongs.

Example B is from the speech delivered by Tatyana Kleerova to the Congress of Karelians quoted earlier. As an address to a Karelian audience it is especially invaluable as an indication of how Karelians themselves construct the
history of their language and the manner in which the consequent narration is used in the discourse. Here once again the Karelian language, and consequently the Karelian nation itself, are portrayed as the victim of circumstances beyond its control. Again the agency behind the persecution of the language is left unstated; beyond a vague attribution of these actions to деятели разного рода the mechanism by which this process was allowed to occur is not described. In contrast the rebirth of the Karelian language is described as a reawakening of the Karelian people themselves; their inferior status is suddenly found to be a lie and they assert themselves равным среди других народов. It is unstated again which nationalities had been exercising a superiority over the Karelians during this period, although the audience is clearly expected to ‘fill in the blanks’. Example C similarly ascribes the current undesirable state of the Karelian language to the political decisions of the 1920s. As in the previous examples the pre-revolutionary period is narrated as a ‘golden age’ of the Karelian language. Example C constructs a picture of this enlightened period by informing the reader of the fact that the printing of books in Karelian, interrupted by the First World War, was never restarted under Soviet power aside from a brief, unsuccessful interval in the 1930s.

All the examples above are typical of a very commonly encountered narrative amongst the Karelian contributors to the Russian-language press. When discussing the Karelian language most narrate a history of the Karelian people and Karelia itself in which in the pre-revolutionary period, and indeed within living memory for the older contributors, Karelian was spoken almost exclusively within Karelia. Indeed as we have seen above this is a historical narrative encountered even to a more limited extent when examining the narratives of the history of Karelia produced by Russian contributors. Unlike their Russian counterparts the Karelian speakers idealise this period of widespread Karelian usage and view the current state of the Karelian language as being in comparison wholly lamentable. The blame for this decline in Karelian usage is firmly disassociated from the Karelians themselves; they are depicted as being the passive victims of political processes far outwith their control. The responsibility for these harmful political decisions is not, however, actively
ascribed to another group in most instances beyond vague attributions to ‘politics’ or indeed ascribed to anything at all; in most instances the agency behind a particular change is unstated, it merely comes to pass that Karelian is ‘banned’.

Occasionally the language policies of the 1920s and 30s can be used by the Russian language press in a manner which seeks to unite Karelians and Russians however, rather than express the uniqueness of Karelian identity:

Коренная карелка, родилась под Олонцом. Образование Ирина Ивановна получала на финском языке, поэтому она до сих пор говорит по-русски с легким акцентом, а вот по-фински и по-карельски чисто.

– Во времена моего детства так было принято, – объясняет женщина. – Детям карелов запрещали в школе учиться на русском языке. Но мне в школе все предметы давались легко. С финским языком я дружила, хотя в Финляндии ни разу не была. Не хотела я туда ездить. Не люблю финнов, потому что мы воевали с ними (KG22 02.06.2010).

Example E represents a somewhat less common but discernible tendency within narratives of the linguistic policies of the time to find no real fault with the teaching of Finnish to Karelian children in the 1930s. The journalist reports that the individual in question speaks ‘pure’ Karelian and Finnish, if not Russian, as a consequence of her Finnish-language education. The interviewee herself has no issue with the Finnish language, unlike the Finns themselves who are, as will be seen again below in narratives of the war years, depicted as the ‘enemy’. The article is unusual as the ban on teaching the ‘correct’ language, usually construed to be Karelian, is in this case applied by the unstated authorities to Russian instead. The policies of the time seem to be depicted as an attempt to divide the Karelians from their Russian neighbours, although the interviewee does not appear to esteem her education as having suffered greatly from a lack of instruction in Russian. Nevertheless the impression given by the journalist is that a ‘коренная карелка” should have received some education in the Russian language. In the example there appears to be two competing narratives of the interviewee’s education in Finnish rather than in Russian; the journalist appears
to find it unacceptable and the Karelian herself seems to have found it perfectly adequate. After all, she recalls that в школе все предметы давались легко.

3.10 Victims, Aggressors and Enemies: War, Conflict and the Other in Mass Media Discourse in the Republic of Karelia.

i) Ancient Enmities and Modern Identities: The ‘Bulwark’ of Russia

The idea of the town of Olonets acting as a ‘bulwark’ for the Russian state against foreign invaders has been discussed above. By incorporating the town into this narrative of Russian resistance against foreign aggression it is also incorporated into the historical Russian homeland by virtue of its long service as a stronghold of Russian power. In a similar fashion the narration of the idea of Karelians and Russians jointly struggling against a foreign invader serves the purpose of uniting the two peoples together in a ‘we’ group of long-standing. By referencing their supposedly long history of common struggle against common enemies the continued cooperation and unity of the Karelian and Russian peoples is explained and justified. Whilst descriptions of more modern conflicts are of key importance to this particular historical narrative the ancient history of the area is also invoked to explain the current ‘alliance’ between Karelian and Russian. The long history of conflict between Russia and Sweden, much of which took place within the boundaries of modern Karelia, is described as the history of the Karelian and Russian peoples struggling against Swedish aggression.

А) 1656 Россия начинает войну со Швецией за возвращение потерянных западнокарельских земель и выхода к Балтийскому морю. Отряд воеводы Пушкина, состоящий из 1000 "пашенных солдат", карел, бежавших от шведского владычества, а также 200 новгородских стрельцов, двигаясь от Олонца, занимает Соломенский
острог (Салми), Имбалакшу (Импилахти) и Сердоболь (Сортавалу). Отряд воеводы Силы Потемкина, наступая от Невы, занимает Волочек Сванский (Тайпале) и осаждает крепость Корелу. Местное карельское население восстает против шведов, всячески содействуя русским войскам. (K15 08.02.2001).

В) Тесные политические, экономические, культурные связи карелов с русскими складывались в многовековой совместной борьбе с иноземными врагами. Вместе с русскими карелы участвовали в битвах Александра Невского против немецких рыцарей, вели борьбу со шведами, отражали нападения польско-литовских наемников в начале XVII века. Вплоть до наших дней сохранились предания об успешных походах карелов под предводительством крестьянина из деревни Большая Тикша Ивана Рокаччу против шведов. Известно, что в те же годы отряд Максима Рясанена из района деревень Реболы и Лиексы (территория современной Финляндии) совершал рейды против шведов в направлении Куопио (K122 30.10.2007).

С) Издревле Россия складывалась как государство многонациональное, Многонациональными были и ее вооруженные силы. И нам, жителям Карелии, особенно интересно то обстоятельство, что еще более чем 800 лет назад плечом к плечу с русскими доблестно сражались с иноземцами наши карельские воины. Темой военного дела средневековой Корелы по-настоящему еще не занимался никто - главным образом из-за недостатка письменных сведений. Однако, кроме летописей, в нашем распоряжении имеются материалы археологии, а главное, бесценные строки эпоса "Калевала". В соединении с
данными истории о военном устройстве других народов на той же ступени общественного развития мы получаем не только интересную картину военных обычаев Древней Корелы, но и любопытный и во многом неожиданный портрет карельского воина (К1 04.01.2001).

In example A the war launched by Russia to ‘recover’ its lost territories in western Karelia is fully supported by the Karelian population. Indeed a leading role in the fighting is undertaken by Karelians ‘fleeing Swedish domination’. The local Karelians are described as having spontaneously risen up against the Swedes in sympathy with the Russian forces. Examples B also narrates a shared history of Karelian and Russian forces struggling with the Swedes, as well as other foreign invaders such as the Poles and Lithuanians. Example C once again constructs a picture of Karelian and Russian cooperation against foreign enemies, in this case bringing both together as part of a ‘we’ group which доблестно сражались с иноземцами. In this fashion a constructive strategy is deployed which conceives of both Karelians and Russians as united by their common purpose in fighting against unspecified foreigners. Interestingly the author of the article claims that despite the acknowledged lack of historical documentation on this period it is possible to use the Kalevala as a historical source. This use of the Kalevala as a historical record rather than as a cultural artefact of the Karelian people is somewhat unusual; the Kalevala is normally regarded not as history as such but a heroic epic, which records folk traditions rather than facts. In this article the author seeks to use the work as a historical basis for his contention that the medieval Karelians fought together with the Russians against their Swedish and Finnish neighbours. A further extract from the article demonstrates how this point is expounded:

Судя по рунам "Калеваль", походы на соседей, ближних и дальних, северных и западных, "на поля сражений в Лаппи" или "на войну в Суоми" совершались порой три раза за лето. Кстати, "традиция" набегов на
соседей-финнов, с XIII века иноверных, хотя и одноязычных, сохранялась в карельском пограничье на протяжении веков и возобновлялась с каждой войной со Швецией до присоединения Финляндии к России в 1809 году. В свою очередь крестьяне-финны вкупе со шведами также разоряли деревни карел своими партизанскими рейдами. И здесь "горячие северные парни" ничем не отличались, скажем, от жителей Кавказа. Крестьянские предания об этой героической эпохе записал создатель эпоса "Калевала" Элиас Леннрот (К1 04.01.2001).

In the author’s view the Kalevala can be interpreted to record the traditional raiding between Karelians and Finns; in fact it is this tradition which Elias Lonnrot recorded and turned into the Kalevala. By using the Kalevala in this fashion the author can then claim an unbroken tradition of Karelian and Finnish conflict all the way down to the modern era and the union of Finland and Russia in 1809. In this manner the Finns can be portrayed as the ‘traditional enemy’ of the Karelians, whereas the Russians are the ‘traditional allies’.

All of the examples above are indicative of a very common narrative of the medieval history of Karelian and the Karelian and Russian peoples in which they are depicted as united against a common Swedish/Finnish enemy. The Swedes in particular are normally portrayed as having been aggressive invaders who persecuted the Karelians and attempted to seize parts of Karelia which had always been jointly settled by the Russians and Karelians. They are also often depicted as having been a threat to the religious faith of the Karelians, which they also shared with the Russians, and are often described as attempting to forcibly convert the Karelians to Catholicism or later Lutheranism. In this manner it can be seen how this narrative of Karelian history is linked to those already examined of the Orthodoxy of the Karelian people and the shared continuity of settlement of both Karelians and Russians within what is now the Republic of Karelia. Indeed it is generally the case that traces of all three of these constructive strategies, emphasising a shared heritage of religion, conflict and settlement are narrated simultaneously to illustrate the supposedly common origins of the Karelian and Russian peoples and justify the current political and social situation within the Republic of Karelia. These narratives and strategies
have been examined separately for the sake of clarity, but it is important to recognize they are often intertwined to provide a more comprehensive and internally consistent narrative of Karelian and Russian unity.

ii) The Sacred and the Heretical: Memories of the Conflicts of the 1940s

The usage of narratives of the so-called Great Patriotic War in the modern Russian Federation and its neighbouring states has been well documented. The very term ‘Great Patriotic War’ in fact gives ample clues as to the prominence the conflict has assumed in narration of Russian history and identity. The Republic of Karelia as part of the Russian Federation is therefore incorporated by the local press into these narratives of the war and is conceptualised as having played its part in this common struggle for survival. Most narratives of the conflict in the Republic of Karelia are very similar to those popularised within the remainder of Russia as a whole. In general the war is portrayed as a heroic triumph of the Russian (and to an extent Karelian) population against overwhelming odds. The conduct of the war is described a desperate fight against a pitiless and brutal aggressor in which the virtues of the Russian people shone through despite horrendous losses on a national and personal scale. The status of the veteran is unassailable in official discourse; their personal sacrifice is generally represented as entitling them to an unrivalled respect in contemporary society. An example of the manner in which the usage of the image of the veteran in an ‘inappropriate’ fashion can lead to outrage is given below:

Ветеранам намекнули

Циничный рекламный плакат компании, оказывающей ритуальные услуги, появился в центре Петрозаводска.

Название фирмы "Ветеран" на фоне георгиевской ленточки оскорбило многих горожан, которые тут же звонили в редакцию "Карельской Губернии". Ведь получается, зарабатывает ритуальная
company na tom, что провожает в последний путь именно ветеранов. Да, действительно, люди, некогда проливавшие свою кровь за Родину, – уже в преклонном возрасте, но зачем же так явно указывать на близкий конец?

– Позор! И это накануне великого праздника 9 Мая! – возмущались люди (KG11 17.03.2010).

The usage of the title ‘veteran’ for advertising purposes, particularly in what is seen to be an insensitive fashion, is apparently so outrageous as to lead to ordinary people complaining directly to the paper Karel’skaya Guberniya. This somewhat trivial example of the misappropriation of the image of the veteran shows the reverence in which their status is held; clearly actual criticism of those who некогда проливавшие свою кровь за Родину could be expected to provoke an even stronger reaction on behalf of the paper’s readership.

Despite being the victors in the conflict, however, one of the most common self-images of the Russian people for that period is of their victimhood; the suffering and privation they endured is cited as well as the fact of invasion. As a consequence of this the commonly accepted narrative of the war has attained a mythic, almost sacred status and challenges to it are commonly viewed as absolute heresy.

In Karelia there are, however, certain other factors which complicate the narration of this period. Firstly there is the question of the Finno-Soviet war of 1940, the so-called ‘Winter War’. This conflict which is much less well-known, or at least much less celebrated, in modern Russian culture than the 1941-45 war is much more problematic. It is generally accepted that in this war the Soviet Union was the aggressor rather than Finland. As part of the conflict took place in what is now the Republic of Karelia and it resulted in the temporary annexation of areas which would finally in 1944 be ceded to the USSR by the Finns it can be difficult to incorporate these events in the standard narrative of the period. Furthermore this war can and is used within Finland to present the Finns as the victims of aggression rather than the Soviets. This further complicates the narrative of the 1941-44 conflict in Karelia, as the fighting here was between Finnish forces and their Soviet counterparts. The fact that in
Karelia it is the Finns who were the invaders rather than reviled German Nazis creates certain potential difficulties with the application of the ‘usual’ historical narrative of the period as will be seen below. Nevertheless the actions of the Finns are often related to those of their fascist allies by the use of similar terminology and strategies; thus although there may be objective differences between the manner in which the Finns acted to that of their allies they are incorporated into the over-arching narrative of Soviet resistance against brutal occupiers.

A further complicating factor is the question of the position of the Karelian people themselves during this period. As has been noted previously the Finnish occupiers of parts of the then KFSSR had a different attitude towards those deemed to be of a Finno-Ugric background than towards their Slavic neighbours. The attitude of the Karelians towards these occupiers is therefore a potentially problematic issue in modern narratives of the period. As shall be seen the prevailing narrative is to stress the unity of the Karelians with their Soviet fellow-citizens against the Finnish invader; however there does occasionally seem to be a certain lingering suspicion attached to their conduct, a suspicion that the Karelians themselves appear to be at pains to dismiss when addressing their Russian audience through the prism of the Russian-language press.

The Winter War of 1940 receives relatively little attention within the Republic of Karelia as elsewhere in the Russian Federation. In fact selections from an article “Вспомним всех поименно?” (K106 25.09.2003) in Kareliya demonstrate this fact:

В ходе осуществления совместного российско-финляндского проекта "Монумент Зимней войне" поставлена задача установить имена всех советских и финских солдат, погибших в боях под Суомуссалми. В открытом 14 марта нынешнего года мемориальном комплексе на Раатской дороге, ведущей в Суомуссалми, вокруг памятника "Раскрытые объятия" раскинулось Каменное поле, где 20 тысяч камней символизируют павших воинов. Появятся ли на каждом из камней имена погибших? Ответ на этот
вопрос и пытаются найти участники совместного проекта. Задача финской стороны практически выполнена: имена около тысячи солдат, погибших в оборонительных боях, уже высечены на досках, вывешенных в музее "Раатская дорога".

Задача российских участников сложнее: точное число погибших красноармейцев до сих пор не установлено.”

Должен признаться, что привели меня на родину, в Тулу, и личные мотивы: мой отец в 1939 году был, как и многие другие запасники из нашего небольшого поселка Огаревка Тульской области, призван в армию и воевал под Суомуссалми в 365-м артиллерийском полку 163-й дивизии. Мне повезло: мой отец оказался в числе тех немногих, кому удалось вернуться из-под Суомуссалми живым. "Нас командир батальона вывел озерами, - рассказывал отец, - а соседний, Белевский, полк погиб полностью".

Война, которая по точному определению поэта Александра Твардовского была "незнаменитой", оказалась сегодня и почти забытой, заслоненной событиями большой войны 1941-1945 годов. И словно вычеркнутыми из истории оказались жертвы Зимней войны.

The author of this article clearly feels that there is a large contrast in the way the Winter War is remembered within the Russian Federation and Finland. Interestingly although the author appears to be from Tula or Tul’skaya Oblast’ the article has been printed within the Karelian press; neither the engagements at Suomussalmi nor at Raate actually occurred within the then KFSSR or the modern Republic of Karelia. Clearly the editors of Kareliya felt the topic to be of interest to their readership and related to ‘Karelian’ history despite the fighting taking place and presumably the bulk of the Soviet forces involved being from outwith the Republic of Karelia. If the article and therefore topic is assumed to be of some interest to a Karelian readership it is clear it is not of much apparent interest to a general readership in Russia. In contrast to the importance of the topic to the Finns, who the author notes have ‘practically completed’ their studies of the engagements and can name almost all their casualties, the Russians
involved cannot yet determine even a figure for the total number of Soviet soldiers killed. From this difference in the information each side has the contrast in importance to Finns and Russians respectively of the Winter War is demonstrated by the author. In fact he acknowledges that the conflict is 'practically forgotten' by modern Russia, overshadowed by the larger war of 1941-45, with the names of the fallen left unknown to posterity.

The theme of the Winter War is not, as has been stated, often broached within the Russian-language mass media of the Republic of Karelia. This fact is also illustrated by the example given below, an interview with an academic specialising in history printed in *Karel’skaya Guberniya*. In this text the interviewee agrees with the journalist that the Winter War is a topic that was little discussed within the Soviet period and thus has given rise to a number of myths. The interviewee however seeks to narrate a history of the conflict which absolves the USSR of as much responsibility for the war itself as possible, and links it to the impending 1941-45 Great Patriotic War:

– Тем не менее нельзя не согласиться и с тем, что в советский период было придумано много мифов. В их плену мы находимся до сих пор. Один из таких мифов – зимняя советско-финляндская война 1939-40 годов.

– Действительно, эта 105-дневная война до последнего времени была покрыта тайной. Сегодня многие документы рассекречены. И стало ясно, что не финны напали на нас, а мы выступили в роли агрессора. Но почему? В 1939 году стало ясно, что Вторая мировая война неизбежна. Поэтому то, что граница с Финляндией проходила всего в 25-30 километрах от Ленинграда, представляло опасность. Сталин предложил Финляндии, кстати, союзнице фашистской Германии, отодвинуть границу от Сестрорецка и Зеленогорска (тогда Териоки) до Выборга. В обмен мы предложили территорию Северной Карелии, в два раза больше. Местные карельские жители об этом, понятное дело, и не ведали. Финляндия отказалась. Вот тогда и было принято решение о войне. 12 марта 1940 года граница была отодвинута даже дальше Выборга. Приладожье и Ладожское
озеро полностью стали нашими. Это было важное политическое решение. Только благодаря ему стало возможным отстоять Ленинград в Великую Отечественную войну.

Сегодня Финляндия к нам никаких претензий не имеет. Если там и раздаются призывы к возврату потерянных территорий, происходит это не на государственном уровне, а по частному телевидению или в неофициальных газетах. Другое дело, что и поньне Финляндия официально отрицает, что была союзницей фашистской Германии. И вот это уже как раз и есть искажение исторических фактов (KG37 15.09.2010).

The interviewee here acknowledges that “мы выступили в роли агрессора” against the Finns contrary to the received wisdom of the Soviet period, but the remainder of his contribution is an attempt to deploy several strategies of justification to explain the necessity of this aggression as he sees it. A topos of threat is created in which it was clear to the then Soviet authorities that the Second World War was неизбежна. As a consequence of this and the ‘danger’ posed by the proximity of the Finno-Soviet border to Leningrad the USSR is depicted as not having any choice but to take action. The Finns are also portrayed as being allies of the Nazis even before the Winter War. The choice given to the Finns of war or an exchange of territory is therefore in the face of this threat represented as entirely reasonable. In this narrative the USSR had ‘no choice’ other than to declare war on Finland and gain the territory it needed to secure Leningrad; indeed it is only as a consequence of the Winter War and the gaining of the Priladozh’e that the USSR was able to defend Leningrad in the Great Patriotic War. Consequently despite the earlier acknowledgement by the interviewee of the USSR being the aggressor in the Winter War a picture is painted of the Soviets as actually being the victims of Finnish unreasonableness. In fact by noting that modern Finland к нам никаких претензий не имеет, at least on the official level, the interviewee gives the impression that in 1940 they actually did and were therefore at least on some level culpable for the war. This excerpt is a very good example of the prevalent attitude expressed towards the Winter War in the Russian language media; it is depicted as an unfortunate necessity that the Finns in many ways brought upon themselves by their apparent
alliance to fascist Germany and their lack of consideration for the USSR’s strategic needs. The article also indicates, as will be explored in greater depth below, the idea of the Finns as partners of the Nazis and hence bearing at least some taint of the historical guilt associated with the Germans.

Karelia is generally incorporated into the prevalent narratives of the history of the Great Patriotic War found elsewhere across the Russian Federation. As stated above the war years are narrated as the triumph of a heroic people against almost impossible odds. The below examples demonstrate how the conflict in general is narrated in the Karelian media:

А) Сформированная в начале Великой Отечественной войны в городе сибирских шахтеров Анжеро-Судженске 69-я морская стрелковая бригада в ходе летней наступательной Свирско-Петрозаводской операции освобождала от врага Святозеро и Пряжу, Киндасово и Эссойлу, а также целый ряд других населенных пунктов не только в Пряжинском, но и в соседнем, Суоярвском, районе.
За участие в кровопролитной Петсамо-Киркенесской операции по освобождению городов Заполярья и, в частности, города Печенги, бригада удостоена почетного наименования "Печенгская".

Ветераны у обелисков

По местам боевых действий в Суоярвском и Питкярантском районах совершила поездку группа ветеранов Карельского фронта из Москвы и Петрозаводска.

"Экипаж машины боевой" - так можно было бы назвать пассажиров мирной "ГАЗели", что отправились утром 21 августа в долгий путь по местам боевой славы воинов Карельского фронта. Обелиск за обелиском, поселок за поселком, встреча за встречей...(К 24 28.08.2001).
В) Лейтенант Н.Д. Капустин, командир катера, вошедшего в Петрозаводскую губу первым, так вспоминал об этом событии:

<Мы видели горящие дома, пристань и другие сооружения...
Улицы были безлюдны. И вдруг мы увидели множество людей, которые бежали в сторону порта, к горящему пирсу... Нас обнимали, целовали, дарили цветы. Стоящие у пирса катера были засыпаны живыми цветами. Каждый стремился хотя бы дотронуться до нас и убедиться, что все это не сон...> Спустя полчаса начался стихийный митинг, и был произведен артсалют из 21 залпа в честь освобождения Петрозаводска. В этот же день моряки-десантники подняли красное знамя над освобожденным городом (К68 27.06.2009).”

C) В это время местные власти решили создать отряды народного ополчения. Женщины с винтовками дежурили у магазинов и складов, а мужчины в лесу "в секрете" наблюдали за движением противника. Когда до Ведлозера финнам оставалось преодолеть 9 километров, правительство Карело-финской республики приказало эвакуировать оставшееся население. По дороге в Крошнозере она вместе с заключенными, направленными на оборонные работы, рыла траншеи и делала противотанковые рвы. Когда же наконец добралась до Пряжи, то увидела, как на обочинах дороги спали обессиленные долгим переходом люди. “Когда начали поступать первые раненые, в штате Пряжинской больницы были всего два врача и одна медсестра. Прасковью Кошелеву из райкома сразу определили в полевой госпиталь, который располагался в школе. "Я дежурила палатной сестрой у тяжелораненых, — вспоминает Прасковья Яковлевна. — Когда солдатиков привозили — рыжих от дымовой завесы, обросших, — они все на старики были похожи. В одном из таких "стариков" я узнала своего 17-летнего соседа Егора. Он-то мне и рассказал, как их собрали в клуб в
Ведлозере, выдали винтовки 1895 года выпуска и отправили воевать. Никто из этих мальчишек даже не знал, как пользоваться винтовками, а финские "кукушки" (снайперы) метко стреляли".

— считали многие штабисты и влюблялись. На глазах Пани медсестры, буфетчицы становились женами генералов. Практически все начальство штаба было обласкано представительницами прекрасного пола. Прасковья устояла перед чарами высших чинов. Со своим возлюбленным, старшиношей, она познакомилась еще в 1939 году. После долгой разлуки их пути почти пересеклись в Беломорске. Они жили в домах по соседству, ходили в одну столовую, но, увы, ни разу не встретились. И только в 1942 году в Сегеже, куда перебрался штаб Карельского фронта, судьба их свела вместе. Он, уже лейтенант, мирно спал на диванчике после дежурств у ее кабинета.

"Многие из наших девчонок начали жить семьями. Но я знала, что через месяц забеременешь и отправят в тыл. Нас проверяли тщательно, — рассказывает Кошелева. — Мне же некуда было эвакуироваться: Петрозаводск был занят, Белоруссия, его родина, тоже под немцами. Поэтому мы с ним договорились: как только освободится какая-нибудь из наших местностей, мы поженимся. Однажды он прибежал радостный: "Оршу освободили!" 23 февраля 1943 года мы отметили свадьбу (KG19 08.05.2002)."

D) Любовь, рожденная во время Великой Отечественной войны, живет и по сей день

Когда Родина-мать звала воевать с фашистской силой темною, отцы поучали своих дочерей: "Доченьки, берегите себя и от нашей "саранчи", скромными будьте". Но как сейчас, так и тогда девчонки не всегда слушали своих родных. Влюблялись. Причем
нередко всерьез и надолго. Ну а кто сумел превратить свое сердце в неприступную крепость, уж после войны капитулировал безоговорочно. Именно любовь излечила многих от контузий и тяжелых ранений. Многие петрозаводские ветераны знают об этом не наслышке (KG 09.05.2004).

E) С каждым годом участников тех далеких событий становится все меньше. Сейчас многие перешагнули возрастную отметку 80. А ведь были молодые, юные, полные планов на будущее... Но война все круто изменила. Наши бабушки и дедушки сражались за свою Родину, исполняли свой, казалось бы, скромный, но святой долг перед ней. Не боялись заглянуть смерти в глаза во имя свободы своей страны. Многие не дожили до 61-й годовщины Победы. Недолговечный, давайте же беречь тех, кто не берег себя ради нас! Будем помнить о подвиге человеческом, ведь забвение страшнее всего (KG 10.05.2006).

F) Победительницы
"В победе над врагом есть и частичка нашего труда", – вспоминают жительницы Карелии

"Война – дело мужское". Звучит почти как аксиома. Так получилось, что все наши представления о войне связаны с образом мужчины-солдата. Однако нельзя забывать, что в годы Великой Отечественной в армии служили 800 тысяч женщин (а просились на фронт еще больше). Они сделали все, что могли, для Победы (KG 05.05.2010).

The above examples give some idea of the almost ritualised language of commemoration employed to mark the events of the Great Patriotic War. In example E for instance the reader is reminded that ‘our’ grandparents fulfilled their святой долг before the motherland. The addressee is therefore included in the ‘we’ group who owe a debt to the wartime generation who faced up to terrible hardships and death itself yet saved ‘our’ country. The very idea of
neglecting to commemorate their triumph, that is to say reproduce this historical narrative, is represented as heretical: ведь забвенье страшнее всего. The actual production of these narratives is somewhat ritualised; it will be noted that they generally are reproduced on or around the 9th of May. In fact it seems almost obligatory for newspapers to prepare a series of articles on the war in the weeks before and after Victory Day; it may indeed not be obligatory in a legal sense but appears to have become part of the conventionalised journalist genre in Russia. This is reminiscent of the official state narrative of the Great Patriotic War and its use of the commemoration of Victory Day in particular, which has undergone a good deal of transformation through the Soviet and Post-Soviet period (for an outline of this change see Ryazanova-Clarke 2008). Within the immediate Post-Soviet period under Yeltsin narratives of the war period often adopt strategies of discontinuity to challenge the then-ossified Soviet orthodoxy. Since Putin came to power, however, this orthodoxy has been reasserted, albeit in differing manners in different stages, until now the events of the Great Patriotic War and in particular the commemoration of Victory Day have adopted the same unifying significance as signifying the triumph of the centralised state and its loyal subjects (see also Hutchings and Rulyova 2009). Example A demonstrates how the conflict in Karelia can be incorporated into the narrative of the war across the USSR; the exploits of soldiers from Siberia in liberating Karelia is described alongside the shared commemoration of these events by veterans from Petrozavodsk and Moscow. Their procession from memorial to memorial is described almost as a sort of religious ritual. Example B commemorates the liberation of Petrozavodsk, concluding with the symbolic raising of the red flag over the liberated city. The description of the advancing Soviet troops covered in flowers by the relieved citizens of the city clearly adds to the narrative of the great victory over occupying forces won by the people of the KFSSR and the USSR as a whole.

Example C is typical of the narratives of personal participation in the Great Patriotic War found in the contemporary Karelian press. In general these are narrated by women as given their shorter life expectancy it appears most of the male participants are now no longer available to contribute to the discourse.
It is also increasingly common for the reminiscences of those who were children during the conflict to be reproduced in lieu of those who actually took part in the fighting itself. Whilst example C also dwells on the grim realities of the conflict as narrated both by the manner in which the journalist frames the introduction and the reminiscences of the interviewee herself both it and example D also illustrate the tendency to romanticise the conflict. Both talk of the wartime romances of the men and women involved alongside their sufferings in the fighting. In example C the sacrifice of the wartime period is even extended to this personal sphere by the narration of the self-sacrificial manner in which the couple involved put aside their personal feelings and refrained from marriage until at least one of their hometowns had been liberated from the invader.

The context of example F will further demonstrate the manner in which this narrative of heroic victory over the invader is reproduced. The article itself ‘quotes’ the women of Karelia as recognising their contribution to the victory over fascism. The journalist themselves has of course invented the phrase attributed to these women, the “победительницы” of the title, which together with the text itself constructs this group in the article. It is clearly expected however that the idea of such a group existing and expressing such a sentiment will not be disputed by the addressee however, given the manner in which it is stated in the sub-title of the article. The reader is then ‘reminded’ of the contribution these women played для Победы by the recitation of some facts but also by appeal to the pre-existing knowledge of the reader. The capitalisation of ‘победа’ is best considered together with the image displayed beside the article; this is a hammer and sickle superimposed upon a red star superimposed again upon a ribbon of the ‘St George’s Cross’. The text around the hammer and sickle reads “Великая Отечественная война.” By displaying such an image beside the text the article is plainly conceived of as being commemorative; the images of the Soviet triumph are reproduced both visually and through the text itself.

Despite the great similarities in the manner in which the conflict in Karelia and that in the remainder of the USSR is narrated there are some elements of the historical narratives which are explicitly and uniquely Karelian.
This extends beyond the mere substitution of Finn for German when building an ‘enemy’ picture of the foe against whom this great victory was obtained. It is also the case that elements of the manner in which the conflict as a whole is narrated colour the manner in which events in Karelia are recounted. The manner in which this is accomplished shall be examined further below.

The use of concentration camps by the Finnish forces during their occupation of parts of the KFSSR in 1941-44 is often recalled in narratives of the period. The idea of concentration camps is clearly very evocative as it recalls the suffering inflicted upon Soviet citizens and others in the camps created by Nazi Germany during the same period. Clearly the very use of the term концлагерь or indeed лагерь in any narrative surrounding the Great Patriotic War will conjure up those images of Nazi concentration camps which are part of the shared discursive resources of the majority of the inhabitants of the modern Russian Federation. That is to say that the use of the term will imply aspects of the Nazi system even when applied to the camps ran by Finnish forces, which were not extermination camps of the Nazi type. The manner in which these camps are described is therefore of particular interest. They are often explicitly described as ‘concentration’ camps:

A) Уже в конце июля началась резакуация из Петрозаводска населения, вывезенного в начале войны из Ленинградской области и районов Карелии и помещенного финнами в переселенческие (концентрационные) лагеря. (Кб8 27.06.2009).

B) Не так давно "Карельская Губерния" рассказывала об инициативе одного из депутатов установить в Петрозаводске монумент финскому генералу Карлу Маннергейму. Сразу после публикации в редакцию стали обращаться люди со своей точкой зрения на установку подобного памятника. В нашей семье из семь человек в концлагере №5 Петрозаводска от голода умерли трое – в первый же год войны, – рассказала в своем письме малолетняя узница Ленина Павловна Макеева. – Деда Илью запороли до полусмерти за то, что он подошел на
недозволенное расстояние к ограждению лагеря. Через неделю он умер. Как же можно после этого устанавливать в Карелии памятник маршалу Маннергейму, человеку, который в период финской войны и Второй мировой войны воевал против Советского Союза на стороне фашистской Германии?!” (KG21 23.05.2007).

C) "Почти все русское население оккупированных районов республики заключено в концентрационные лагеря. Белофинны собрали женщин с маленькими детьми, стариков и старух и поместили их в дома, специально отведенные на окраине города и обнесенные колючей проволокой. Это дома смерти. Во всех лагерях голод и тиф уносят много человеческих жизней. Только в Петрозаводске имеются 6 концлагерей, в которых заключено свыше 20 тысяч человек", — вспоминает одна из жительниц столицы Карелии. (Из книги "По обе стороны Карельского фронта") (KG17 21.04.2005).

D) Недавно газеты сообщали, что Союз бывших малолетних узников Карелии готовит иск к государству Финляндия. Предмет иска — денежная компенсация за понесенные страдания. Сейчас члены союза собирают по 500 рублей на судебные издержки, и как только наберутся необходимые 200 тысяч рублей, адвокат повезет документы в уездный суд города Хельсинки. Бывшие узники финских лагерей уже получали компенсацию — в 1994-м и 1999 годах. Оба раза — от правительства Германии наряду с заключенными немецко-фашистских лагерей.

Суммы зависели от времени нахождения за колючей проволокой и составляли порядка 1200-1300 немецких марок в 1994-м и 350-400 — в 1998-м.
С 2001 года начали выдавать третью компенсацию, самую значительную. Бывшим узникам концлагерей и гетто выдавали по 5750 евро, узникам иных мест принудительного заключения, приравненных к концлагерям, — 1530 евро... И тут те, кто находился не в немецких, а в финских лагерях, оказались обойденными. Немцы вежливо пояснили, что выплаты эти положены только пострадавшим от немецких войск, а все 13 концлагерей, существовавших на территории Карелии, были созданы финнами.

Уважаемая госпожа Халонен!
Тогда узники обратились к Финляндии. "Мы оставили дома, скот, имущество, — писали они в апреле 2004 года президенту Тарье Халонен, — и не получили никакой компенсации. Правительство Германии взяло на себя ответственность по моральному и материальному возмещению убытков... кроме граждан, находившихся на территории Карелии, оккупированной финскими войсками. Мы, бывшие узники финских концлагерей, теперь пожилые, больные люди, считаем, что и финляндское руководство должно проявить справедливость и изыскать средства для компенсационных выплат..."

Тарья Халонен ответила, что Финляндия выполнила все условия, обозначенные в Парижском мирном договоре 1947 года, выплатила СССР огромный объем репараций.
Любопытно, что как только бывшие узники предъявляют требования Финляндии, там начинает муссироваться вопрос о возврате территорий.
Так было в 1998 году, когда в ответ на обращение бывших узников финские официальные деятели предложили создать постоянный международный суд, который бы судил за военные преступления. И первыми предлагалось привлечь бывших советских партизан, которые совершали рейды на территорию...
Финляндии, "грабили хутора, убивали мирных жителей". В прокуратуру Карелии даже пришли списки таких партизан с требованием выдачи их финским властям. Скандал тогда удалось замять.

В феврале 2005-го узники объявили о намерении судиться с Финляндией, а в марте газета "Хельсингин саномат" обнародовала претензии общественной организации "Pro Karelia". Суть их — возмещение ущерба финским гражданам, оставившим в 1940 году родные земли, возврат контрибуций, навязанных Советским Союзом Финляндии, заплатить за восстановление разрушенного хозяйства. Общий счет — 4 миллиарда евро.

Вообще "Pro Karelia" многими воспринимается как организация националистическая и реваншистская. Официальный Хельсинки старается от нее дистанцироваться (KG16 14.04.2005).

In all the above examples the Finnish camps are explicitly described as concentration camps. In both examples B and C the Finnish camps are portrayed as being places of great suffering in a similar fashion to the German camps; in example C one part of these camps is actually described as being the дома смерти. Although there is little suggestion that the Finns were actually executing any of the inmates of these camps they are clearly held responsible for the deaths which did occur there. The descriptions given of the flogging of inmates to the point where they then died shortly afterwards, typhus, hunger and barbed-wire entanglements are also evocative of the general image of the concentration camp conjured up by narratives of those established by the Germans. Of course even without the possibility of this broader reference given by the use of the term concentration camp the narratives of the suffering endured within these camps reproduced here in the discourse paint a very negative picture of the Finnish occupation. This memory of Finnish oppression is so strong for the relation of former camp inmates in example B that she categorically refuses to accept any narrative that would view Marshall Mannerheim as worthy of
commemoration in Karelia; this is a man, we are informed, who fought alongside fascist Germany. By reproducing the narrative of the suffering of the concentration camp inmate the Finns are once again associated with and seen as just as culpable as their German allies.

It should be noted that these narratives of suffering associated with the concentration camps established by the Finns apply to the Russian population of the Republic of Karelia only. As Karelians were generally not interned in such camps they are excluded from the group who were persecuted in this manner. As shall be examined further below the difference in the historical experience of the Karelians under Finnish occupation is often discussed in various narratives of the period for various purposes.

Example D illustrates another method in which the use of concentration camps by the Finns is used to compare them to the German fascists and also how historical narratives of the 1940s in general are used on both sides of the border for political purposes. In this article Karel’skaya Guberniya sympathetically relates the plight of the former inmates of these camps who have, it opines, not been sufficiently compensated for their sufferings at the hands of the Finnish occupiers. After the failure of the Germans to pay a third round of compensation to those imprisoned by the Finnish authorities the former inmates applied to the Finns for recompense, only to be refused. Their address to the Finnish president is reproduced for the reader by the paper, whilst the Finnish reply is paraphrased briefly; before the paper goes on to note the scandalous, in its view, manner in which the Finns then appeared to compare the sufferings of the people of the KFSSR under their occupation to alleged Soviet war crimes. These accusations are directly called a ‘scandal’ by the paper, and are referenced in quotation marks to reflect that they are not the views of the paper and also to imply their apparently dubious validity. The further relation of the views of ProKarelia as apparently, in the view of Karel’skaya Guberniya at least, expressed in ‘retaliation’ for the demands of the former inmates shows the manner in which, on an unofficial level at least, accusations of alleged war crimes are employed both in Finland and the Republic of Karelia to construct either side in the 1941-44 war as the guilty party.
The idea that the Finns were responsible for much hardship and suffering during their occupation of Karelia is not only expressed with reference to the concentration camp issue. The occupation in general is seen as an incredibly destructive period for which the Finns bear primary and indeed often sole responsibility. The manner in which the suffering inflicted on the local inhabitants of the KFSSR during this period by the occupying Finnish forces is presented is further exemplified by these excerpts:

A) Мы тоже узники оккупации

Когда обратят внимание на тех, кто детьми страдал под оккупацией? В судах наши заявления о признании нас малолетними узниками отклоняют. Почему - непонятно, ведь в то же время удовлетворяются иски граждан, которые жили в оккупированном Заонежье. Мы жили в деревне Сельга Сегозерского, ныне Медвежьегорского, района. Хочу поведать как. А если кто не поверит, приезжайте в Сельгу, спросите у стариков, еще остались очевидцы и свидетели.

В деревню тайком пробирались партизаны, бабушка все три года помогала им чем могла (а финский полицейский участок находился через четыре дома от нас, узнай про это враги, уничтожили бы всю семью). Вокруг Сельги оккупанты натянули колючую проволоку.

Помню, как тайком приходил к бабушке из леса двояродный брат матери Евгений Меккелев в финской форме. Мы, дети, думали, что он финский офицер, и только после войны стало известно, что был он партизаном, подпольщиком. (В мирное время Евгений Ильич Меккелев стал Героем Социалистического Труда.) В нашей деревне погиб Филипп Федоскин, тоже связанный с партизанами. Он спросил у финнов разрешения сходить на рыбалку, пошел и не вернулся, финны выследили и
убили. Тело привезли в санях домой и сказали, что убили русские.

Моего одноклассника Петю Чаккиева полицейские забрали из дому, привели в школу, на наших глазах привязали к скамейке и стали по очереди избивать березовыми вицами. Петя страшно кричал, кровь его брызгала и заливала скамейку, мы закрывали руками уши, глаза, а полицейский отнимал руки и говорил:

<Смотрите!> За что мальчика истязали, мы тогда так и не поняли: (K123 02.11.2003).

В) Финны забирают у жителей советские паспорта и взамен выдают свои удостоверения без фотографий, причем у карелов и русских удостоверения разных цветов. Позже появляются паспорта с фотографиями. Красные — у русских, голубые — у остального населения. Вход в Петрозаводск осуществлялся только по специальным пропускам с цветными полосками. Кстати говоря, на этом попадались многие наши разведчики: им доставали пропуск с полоской одного цвета, финны же через несколько дней могли цвет полоски поменять. Патрульный останавливал на улице человека, находил у него "неправильный" пропуск и...

Дальше, думаю, рассказывать не обязательно. Кроме того, русское население обязали носить на руках красные повязки. Захватчики изо всех сил стремились привлечь на свою сторону карелов, вепсов и других народов своей языковой семьи, но это им плохо удавалось.

Петrozаводск отныне именовался "Яанислинна" (дословно: Крепость на берегу Онего). Финны переименовали не только сам город, но и его улицы: проспект Карла Маркса превратился в "Валтакату" (Главный проспект), улица Ф. Энгельса — в "Кескускату Пуистокату" (Центральная Садовая), улица Ленина — в "Карьяланкату" (Карельская), Кирова — в "Калеваланкату" (Калевальская). Многие названия были очень необычными. Так,
улицу Дзержинского финны почему-то назвали улицей Вяйнямейнена, а улицы Гоголя и Горького — улицами Воина и Воина-соплеменника соответственно.

Вскоре в "Яанислинне" появляются газеты, магазины, два кинотеатра (один все в том же университете, другой — в нынешнем кинотеатре "Сампо", который во время войны назывался "Укко" — "Дед"). С виду жизнь выглядела почти нормальной, если бы не дома, огороженные колючей проволокой, и не концлагеря для переселенцев и военнопленных... (KG15 07.04.2005).

C) Как только у финнов появлялось малейшее подозрение, что жители деревень помогают партизанам или сами являются членами партизанских отрядов, режим резко ужесточался. Иногда могли сразу все население перевезти в концлагерь в Петрозаводске. Многих расстреливали, пороли плетями. Финны практиковали увод на каторжные работы в Финляндию.

Например, из села Паданы были вывезены 23 девушки, всех их продали финским кулакам.

Колхозы во время войны продолжали существовать. Финны выделили жителям не самые лучшие клочки земли, за которые колхозники должны были отрабатывать барщину. Чтобы получить свою собственную лошадь в аренду, крестьянне платили 4 марки за час ее работы. Кстати, карелам за одну и ту же работу платили гораздо больше, чем русским. Люди в деревне голодали и, чтобы хоть как-то прожить, примешивали в хлеб древесную кору и мох.

Вскоре сами финны устали от войны. "Почему человеку суждено воевать, хотя он любит мир? Как охотно я пошел бы сейчас на сенокос. С каким удовольствием бросил бы все это барахло, оставил бы эти карельские леса, забыл бы навечно тяжелые походы..." — размышляет в своем дневнике финский солдат.
In example A the author recalls the suffering she endured under Finnish occupation and the atrocities she witnessed as a young child in an apparent attempt to receive an enhanced legal status as a ‘victim of the occupation’. Although it appears no official recognition of her claim has been given she appeals to the reader, should they feel any dubiety over her claims, to visit the village of Sel’ga where these events are apparently common knowledge and they will find ready testimony to the sufferings of the locals. The Finns are presented as brutal occupiers, mercilessly beating a local child for no apparent reason and executing local people for with little or no provocation. Sel’ga at that time was also most likely inhabited by Karelians or at least had a significant Karelian population; the supposed attempt of the Finns to claim the Russians had killed the executed man would appear, although no real analysis is made of the event or their explanation by the author, to be an attempt to discredit the Russians to the local Karelians. The local Karelians, however, are clearly constructed as resisting the Finns, joining or aiding the partisan movement despite the evident danger. It is interesting to speculate on the reasons why the inhabitants of the more Karelian area of rural Medvezhuèorskii District have been refused recognition as victims of the occupation whilst the presumably more Russian inhabitants of ‘Zaonezh’è’ have been so honoured. It is possible that a perceived lack of ‘loyalty’ during the period, or the perception on the part of the author as to this being the attitude of the authorities, is behind the decision or her decision
to defend the conduct of her fellow villagers and insist on their having suffered as much as anywhere else occupied by the Finns. Certainly her impassioned challenge to those who might not believe her testimony suggests she assumes some of her imagined interlocutors may harbour some sort of unspecified doubts.

The apparent attempts of the Finns to turn Petrozavodsk into a ‘Finnish’ town are also referenced in example B. The names which the Finns gave to the various streets of Petrozavodsk and their attempts to provide a ‘normal’ atmosphere to the town are described; this attempt at normality is depicted as a fiction, however, by reference to the concentration camp system in operation at the time. Examples B and C also reference the attempts made by the Finns to separate the Karelian and Finnish populations; again it is only the Russian population that is specifically accorded the status of having suffered under the occupation. It is the Russians who are depicted as being forced to wear red armbands; the Finns are narrated as having been more sympathetic to the Karelian and Vepsian communities in line with their political ends. The Karelians and Vepsians are portrayed here, however, as is common, as having resisted the advances of their fellow Finno-Ugrians and remained generally loyal to the USSR.

Example C does highlight the differences that do exist in the narration of the occupation of Karelia by the Finns compared to that of the remainder of the USSR by the Germans. Although the article does present a picture of the Finns reacting harshly to the suspicion of collaboration with the partisan movement and also depicts them as responsible for hunger and other suffering it also suggests not all Finns were wholly bad. The unwillingness of the average Finnish soldier to take part in the war and their desire to return home is referenced through quotation from the diary of such a soldier; this provides a sympathetic portrait of an ordinary enemy soldier removed from the general depiction of a faceless fascist monster. The article indeed advises the reader, on the authority of unnamed historians, not to "ровнять всех финнов под одну гребенку". The very idea that the conduct of the occupying forces in Karelia is a ‘difficult’ or ‘complex’ as the article suggests rather than a one-sided litany of horror does point to the fact that the Finns, whilst generally constructed in the discourse as
the enemy, are not always caricatured as inhuman fascists. Although they are often, as we have seen, associated with the Nazis in the narration of the war and occupation, and certainly are depicted as being the aggressors and to blame for a good deal of suffering, Finns are also recognised as being ‘not as bad’ as their German allies.

Occasionally dissonant voices can be heard however which proffer alternate narratives of the period in opposition to at least elements of the general accounts of this period. These alternate narratives are often vehemently condemned by those who adhere to more orthodox narratives of the period; in particular the views of certain Finnish authorities, reflected in the Karelian press, are regularly denounced by journalists and interested parties such as veterans and their representatives. Nevertheless the reproduction of these views and the fact that there is a perceived need to refute them shows that they are current within Karelian society even if they remain a minority opinion. Clearly the reproduction of the sacred narrative alone is not enough; challenges to it must be met and defeated to ensure its continued consecration as a key part of the historical narrative of Russia and Karelia. More infrequently opinions which challenge part of the accepted historical narrative originate from within Karelia itself. In particular the historical experience of the Karelians under Finnish occupation, a problematic topic as seen above, recurs as a bone of contention within the discourse. The orthodox narrative of the manner in which the Karelians acted under Finnish occupation is exemplified by the example below:

Захватив Карелию, финны лелеяли мечту о "Великой Финляндии" с границами от Ладожского до Онежского озера и по Беломорканалу до Белого моря. Но карелы не хотели быть в подчинении у Финляндии. В Краеведческом музее хранится щепка, на которой члены карельского батальона, сформированного финнами, писали о своей невиновности. Они уверяли, что попали в батальон не по доброй воле, и обещали уйти к русским партизанам, как только получат оружие. Кстати, именно так и поступили (KG17 25.04.2005).
In this narrative as the example illustrates the wishes of the Finns to entice the Karelians into a union with Finland were frustrated by the Karelian’s loyalty to their Russian allies. The text above relates a common narrative of the period; the Karelians were forced to cooperate with the occupiers but at the first opportunity deserted to the partisans. The Russian partisans appear in the above example to never have doubted the loyalty of their Karelian comrades. Generally the Soviets are depicted as having had faith in the reliability of the Karelian population and having trusted them to fight the Finns as actively as the remainder of the local population. Occasionally however there are hints of narratives in which the loyalty of the Karelians was viewed with some uncertainty by the central authorities, to the extent that repressive measures were planned against them:

Зато известно, что когда в 1944 году встал вопрос о выселении карелов в Сибирь и ликвидации Карелии как республики, то отстоял ее тогдашний первый секретарь ЦК партии КФССР Куприянов, а Куусинен промолчал (KG37 15.10.2010).

This narrative of the allegiance of the Karelians being questioned and their deportation being arranged is relatively uncommon in the mass media discourse in the modern Republic of Karelia. It is, however, present in society in general and will be encountered in the data gathered from the interviews examined below. It is a somewhat controversial narrative, however, and subject to vigorous denial from those who adhere to the official Soviet narrative:

Не плюйте в прошлое

От века доброй памяти людей заслуживали ратники - защитники Отечества, на острее меча несущие славу своего народа. Особой благодарности удоставлялись воины от тех людей, которых они защитили в лихую годину, изгнали врага из родных пределов. На этом зиждается справедливая историческая память. По словам поэта Кондратия Рылеева, напоминать юношеству о подвигах предков - верный способ для привития народу сильной привязанности к Родине...
Для жителей Карелии таким человеком, организатором ее защиты в 1941-м и освобождения от оккупантов в предпобедном 1944 году, является Маршал и Герой Советского Союза Кирилл Афанасьевич Мерецков.

Документами, воспоминаниями очевидцев, исследованиями, в том числе и финскими (см. Юкка Куломаа "Город на Онего"), подтверждается, что финские оккупационные власти заигрывали с местным населением, натравливали "братьев по крови" - карел и вепсов на русских, предоставляя повышенный паек, смягчение режима проживания и так далее.

Оккупантами были сформированы подразделения так называемой "Карельской освободительной армии" (КОА) - местный вариант власовщины: три национальных "братьских" батальона и особый вепсский полк, воевавшие против Красной Армии.

Что касается небольшой части незакулисного мирного населения, находившегося на восточной оккупированной территории КФССР, совершивших так называемые компрометирующие действия, то количество их было невелико. По данным наркомата госбезопасности КФССР, таких лиц в 1943 году насчитывалось всего 126 (см. "Неизвестная Карелия. Документы спецорганов о жизни республики 1941-1956 гг.". Петрозаводск, 1999).

По фактам выявленного нелояльного по отношению к Советской власти поведения части местного населения по установленному порядку докладывалось в Москву по линии контрразведки СМЕРШ, НКГБ и армейских политорганов. По словам Г.Н. Куприянова (цит. по "Заговор генералов", стр. 294), Сталин "возражает против применения к карелам тех же мер, какие были приняты к калмыкам, крымским татарам, кабардинцам... Вопрос о карелах был решен.". По-иному и быть не могло, а уж тем более - после решения Сталина. Секретариат ЦК ВКП(б) принял постановление от 31.8.1944 г. "О недостатках политической работы среди населения КФССР, освобожденного от финской оккупации" (см. "По обе стороны Карельского фронта". Док. N 376). В этом постановлении нет ни слова о репressиях против карел.
Как последний и решающий козырь в подтверждение домыслов о "заговоре генералов" с участием К.А. Мерецкова, Сергеев приводит документ, адресованный секретарю Коми обкома ВКП(б) Тараненко: "В республику направляются спецпереселенцы из Карело-Финской ССР. Подготовьте лагеря для их приема. Л. Берия. 14.10.1944 г.". Однако выступить против решения Сталина было абсолютно немыслимо даже для Берии.

Совершенно очевидно, что в распоряжении Берии говорится не о коренном населении Карелии, а о переводе в Коми ранее высланного в Карелию контингента "спецпереселенцев".

Но Сергеев, задавшись целью во что бы то ни стало разоблачить "генеральский заговор против карельского народа", раз за разом обращался в различные учреждения за документами, подтверждающими его версию. При этом он не стеснялся, что называется, "брать на арапа", утверждая, что "...в архивах ЦК КПСС имеется решение Политбюро о высылке народа Карелии..." и "...у нас есть документы заседания Секретариата ЦК ВКП(б) по карельскому вопросу от 31 августа 1944 года. На нем стоял вопрос о выселении народа Карелии в Сибирь...". ("Заговор...", стр. 278, 279).

Допускаем, что в обстановке гласного сокрушения прежней идеологии и общественного строя, низвержения прежних кумиров могли быть высказанными любые взгляды.

Но нельзя не заметить бьющие в глаза несуразности и прямую безграмотность, которыми изобилует книга И. Сергеева (K16 12.02.2002).

In the above example the publication of a book implying that there was an 'anti-Karelian conspiracy' amongst the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership is portrayed as a gross distortion of the historical facts, to the extent it is described as 'spitting' on the past. The final paragraph also uses colourful language to emphasise the total disagreement of the authors of this article with the historical narrative advanced by the author Sergeev; the idea that there was anti-Karelian feeling amongst the Soviet hierarchy is dismissed as utter nonsense.
and offensive. The authors of the article, which was produced by representatives of veteran’s organisations, consider that even if the post-Soviet period where many previous historical narratives and ‘icons’ have been overturned to accuse the Soviet authorities of having doubted the loyalty of the Karelians is utter heresy. Aside from pouring scorn on the author and his theory the article by using strategies of trivialisation and downplaying to delegitimise the heterodox narrative the article also offers an exposition of the standard narrative in an effort to refute what its authors consider to be untruths; once again the loyalty of the Karelian populace is asserted in the face of Finnish attempts to draw them to their side. The small number of Karelians who collaborated with the Finns is detailed, alongside official sources which supposedly prove that the central authorities had no concerns over this collaboration.

Another historical narrative which can cause great offense amongst certain sectors of the population of the Republic of Karelia is that of the supposed war crimes carried out by Soviet partisans against Finnish civilians. This has already been glimpsed in one of the texts above where such accusations were supposedly deployed by the Finns in a tit-for-tat manner to counter the claims of those who consider themselves to have suffered under Finnish occupation. This narrative of the Karelian Front, which accuses the Soviet Partisans of having carried out brutal and unjustified attacks on peaceful Finnish villages, is not generally produced within the Republic of Karelia itself. As we have seen with regards to the question of the annexed territories narratives presented in the Finnish press are reproduced by the Russian-language media of the Republic of Karelia alongside competing narratives which seek to refute the Finnish claims. The below example is particularly interesting however as although initially published in *Karjalan Sanomat*, a Finnish paper, the text in question which accuses the partisan movement of such crimes is apparently the work of a Russian author:

В редакцию "Карельской Губернії" поступило письмо от десяти петрозаводчан, бывших партизан Карельского фронта в годы Великой Отечественной войны. В частности, они пишут: "14 января 2004 года в
газете "Карьялан Саномат" была опубликована корреспонденция Суло Кириллова, претендующая, по словам автора, на "рассказ о войне на территории Карелии против Финляндии в 1939-1940 и 1941-1944 гг.". Однако главное место в ней занимают измышления о действиях карельских партизан в годы войны на оккупированной немецко-финскими захватчиками советской территории.

Приходится только удивляться, как мог господин Кириллов, называя себя "законодателем", даже не потрудиться заглянуть в материалы государственных архивов республики, где хранятся все материалы о партизанском движении в Карелии. Впрочем, это ему и не нужно, важно другое — подпустить побольше очернительства в адрес тех самоотверженных людей, которые в невероятно трудных условиях, не щадя своей жизни, защищали свою Родину, кстати, и его, Кириллова, в ту пору малолетнего парнишку.

А теперь о том, в чем голословно обвиняет Кириллов партизан. Он пишет:

"Предназначенные на смерть, наши солдаты были вооружены гранатами, чтобы себя взорвать". Грязная ложь. Гранаты были, чтобы бить врага. "Финнами был разгромлен партизанский отряд, шедший по ругозерской дороге". Опять ложь. Видимо, автор выдает желаемое за действительное. "Партизаны убили пожилого человека топором". Ложь, которую трудно придумать. "С территории Финляндии партизаны уводили в плен гражданских людей". Какая пакостная ложь! Партизаны уводили на советскую территорию только взятых в плен солдат и офицеров. "В Финляндии партизанами проводились ураганные наступления на населенные пункты, можно было видеть только их следы: трупы стариков, детей и пепелища". Трудно придумать более откровенную ложь! Партизанские отряды не штурмовали населенные пункты на территории Финляндии. "Партизаны расстреливали своих раненых". И опять изуверская ложь. Партизаны именно тем и были сильны, что в их среде торжествовали великая братская дружба и взаимопомощь.
Газета "Карьялан Саномат", широко читаемая в Финляндии, дойдет до воинствующих, непримиримых националистов и поможет им лишний раз попытаться "ловить рыбку в мутной воде". Но подумайте, господин Кириллов, пойдет ли это на пользу мирным добрососедским отношениям между Россией и Финляндней?

Бывшие партизаны Карельского фронта в годы Великой Отечественной войны, проживающие в Петрозаводске". Всего 10 подписей (KG26 23.06.2004).

The article above was produced as Karel’skaya Guberniya states by former partisans outraged that their conduct was being called into question in the Finnish press. This of course implies both that the editorial staff of the Karelian paper found their letter worthy of publication and that there is some cognisance of what is printed in Finland even amongst the ordinary citizens of Petrozavodsk; at the very least articles in mainstream Finnish papers on such subjects are very quickly brought to the attention of interested parties in the Republic of Karelia. The accusations levelled at the partisans, here narrated in accordance with the norm as тех самоотверженных людей, которые в невероятно трудных условиях, не щадя своей жизни, защищали свою Родину, are once again depicted as being gross distortions of ‘historical fact’; indeed it is stated that had research been done in the correct manner and had the author in question consulted the archives he would have found ample material which disproved his accusations. The official body of knowledge, as exemplified by the archives, is appealed to in order to witness the absurdity of the author’s attacks on the partisan movement. Each one of his accusations which is found so offensive by the former partisans is then listed and denoted a ‘lie’, with a more detailed refutation in the next sentence. This article once again demonstrates the manner in which the ‘official’ or at least standard narration of the war in the then KFSSR has been enshrined and sanctified; any questioning of its validity is treated as offensive and an attempt to tarnish the reputations of those veterans who are, in the mainstream narrative, responsible for guaranteeing the freedom of modern Russian citizens. This article of course is produced in the first instance by such
veterans themselves, however the newspaper clearly feels that their text is worthy of reproduction with no critical comment.

Apparently unjustified accusations against Soviet Partisans from within Finland are also dealt with within the article below, again from Karel’skaya Guberniya. In this instance the journalistic staff of the paper itself produces an article as a reaction to narratives of partisan misdeeds from within Finland:

Карельские партизаны гордятся собой и не боятся гнева финнов

"Я готов, как верный сын своей родины, с оружием в руках действовать во временно захваченных районах, создавать невыносимые условия для врага и всех его пособников" Из присяги партизана.

О партизанском движении нынче много всего написано. И хвалят его, и ругают. В последнее время даже политическая подоплека у этого дела появилась. В Финляндии создали общественную организацию "Гражданское население — ветераны войны-продолжения", которая представляет интересы финского мирного гражданского населения, пострадавшего от советских партизан. По их подсчетам, в результате рейдов партизан в тыл Финляндии погибли 176 мирных граждан. Члены организации рассматривают все действия карельских партизан как военное преступление и требуют суда. О количестве человеческих жизней не принято говорить: "много" или "мало", но все-таки в финских концлагерях на территории Карелии погибло куда больше наших граждан.

— Когда бой идет, не считаешь, сколько убил или ранил, — говорит Дмитрий Александров. — Да и как можно говорить такие вещи? Нас же никто в отряд не гнал, сами пошли. Не отсиживались в тылу, Родине помогали. А чтобы без выстрелов вообще — не было такого никогда!

Что же касается привлечения бывших партизан к ответственности финнами, тот тут мнения партизан еще более категоричны.

— Они что, имели право на нашу территорию вторгаться? — возмущается Михаил Захаров. — Сколько наших поубивали, не
The very title of the article indicates it is narrating a history of the events sympathetic towards the ‘Karelian’ partisans, which the author presumably intends to reference a geographical rather than ethnic understanding of the term. This is further demonstrated by the quotation of the ‘partisan oath’ at the very start of the article; the reproduction of this text is clearly intended to invoke an image of the faithful and fearless service of these veterans towards their motherland. Once again the accusations of the Finns towards the Soviet partisans are refuted by analogy with the Finnish use of concentration camps; the author indeed diminishes the validity of the Finnish claims by comparing them directly with these camps and accusing the Finns in turn of killing “куда больше” Soviet citizens. Yet again a strategy of equivalence or the lack thereof is deployed in which apparent Soviet crimes are compared to the apparently much more heinous deeds of the Finns themselves. In this manner the actions of the partisans are seen as justifiable in comparison and the Finns are invited to reflect more on their own conduct than that of their neighbours during the conflict. This is demonstrated again by the quotations employed by the journalist from former partisans themselves; not only does the partisan quoted portray himself and his comrades as having aided the motherland but he also dismisses the Finnish accusations by asking if they имели право на нашу территорию вторгаться?

The attitude of the Finns towards their fellow Finno-Ugrians during the 1941-44 conflict has already been seen to be a delicate issue within certain narratives of the period. We have already examined above the manner in which Anatolii Grigoriev constructs the village of Lambisel’ga as an authentically Karelian village. In a further excerpt of this article below he contrasts the behaviour of the Soviet authorities towards his fellow-villagers to that of the Finnish authorities during the occupation:
У семьи Владимира Яковлева тоже непростая судьба. Его дед, отец матери Михаил Зайцев, здорово пострадал от советской власти уже после войны.

В начале Великой Отечественной войны, в 1941 году, многие жители Карелии не смогли уйти в эвакуацию. Вот и Ламбисельга почти вся осталась. Пришли финские войска. У карелов с финнами больших проблем не было. Финны предложили выбрать из числа деревенских старосту. Михаил Зайцев и стал старостой. После окончания войны Зайцеву все припомнили и сослали в лагеря на 10 лет в Красноярский край, и не только его, но еще нескольких деревенских.

Вернулся он после 1956 года изможденным и больным. Некоторое время еще проработал сельским почтальоном. В 60-е годы он в деревню привозил на лошадке почту. Очень добрый был человек и душевный.

Яковлевы - настоящая карельская семья. Таких бы надо всемерно поддерживать и морально, и материально. (K71 03.07.2008)

In this article Grigoriev contrasts the relatively benign conduct of the Finnish forces, who are described as not having created any real problems for the Karelians, with the vindictive conduct of the Soviet authorities after the war. For having cooperated with the Finns a Mikhail Zaitsev, described explicitly as a ‘very good man’ by the author, is unjustly sentenced to ten years in a gulag alongside certain other villagers. This supposed collaborator is portrayed as an innocent man, moreover as from a ‘real Karelian’ family. Grigoriev here presents the Soviets rather than the Finns in a negative light, subverting the usual narrative of the war, and proposing an alternate viewpoint in which the Karelians were not harmed by the Finns but instead victimised by the Soviets. It may be argued this could be construed as an attempt once again, as earlier in the article, to link the Karelians more closely with the Finns rather than the Soviets or Russians.

As has been demonstrated by the examples above, however, the manner in which the history of the KFSSR during the war is narrated in the main
comparable to that of the USSR in general. The Karelian and Russian peoples are normally depicted as having fought side by side despite the Finnish attempts to turn one against the other and thus having gained a great victory against brutal invaders and occupiers. The differences between the general narrative of the Great Patriotic War in Karelia and the USSR in general are the most interesting elements and are worth noting. Firstly the very fact it was the Finns who, for the most part, were engaged along the Karelian front and in particular in the KFSSR by the Soviets does entail the construction of a somewhat different ‘enemy’ picture than that encountered elsewhere; although generally portrayed as fascist invaders and harsh occupiers, up to and including the use of concentration camps, there is some sense that the Finns were somewhat less inhuman and brutal than their Nazi allies. Indeed in some very marginal narratives the Finns are seen as behaving in a perfectly reasonable manner at least towards the ethnic Karelian population. Certain Karelians do not appear therefore to narrate the occupation in an overwhelmingly negative fashion although this is a minority view. It appears most Karelians and most Russians prefer to narrate the history of the occupation as that of shared suffering and resistance. The idea that the Russian authorities harboured any doubts over the loyalty of the Karelians is also viewed as heretical; it does appear that at least some Karelians are of the opinion that their Russian neighbours did and may still do have doubts over whether the Karelians suffered at the hands of and fought against the Finns as much as they might have. In general however the narrative of heroic resistance against the invader is sanctified and consecrated as the inviolable truth; it is for the most part from Finland that challenges to this narrative are perceived and such challenges are energetically countered.

3.11 The Kantele, Kalitki and the Kalevala: Karelian History as a Brand

A further tendency in the presentation of the history of the Republic of Karelia and the Karelian people themselves is a somewhat more recent propensity to view it as a resource to be exploited for economic benefit. This is hardly a phenomenon unique to Karelia, for as Huyssen (2003: 4) has noted the
dynamics of cultural globalisation are weakening the links between the historical past and the sense of nation or community to the extent that these histories and traditions are deprived of their geographic or cultural ‘groundings’. This commercialisation of Karelian history and traditions is linked to the development of the Republic of Karelia as a centre for tourism. Certain Karelian traditions are being developed into a Karelian ‘brand’ to market the region to visitors from other parts of Russia and overseas. In this manner the semiotic content of certain symbols of Karelia is being changed or distorted to match new commercial requirements. The impact of this process on the narration of national identity itself is hard to gauge. It is possible that conversion of certain aspects of Karelian culture and certain historical sites, in particular Kizhi, into ‘tourist attractions’ may impact on the manner in which they are perceived within Karelia. There is also the potential for these sites to be adopted as a ‘regional brand’ rather than an ethnic Karelian ‘brand’. There is an awareness of this tendency within the press of the Republic of Karelia itself:

Сегодня общественное мнение относительно культуры карельского народа у жителей Республики Карелия в сравнении с периодом конца 1980-х годов изменилось в лучшую сторону. Брендами карельской культуры жители многонациональной Карелии гордятся - это эпос <Калевала>, карельская кухня (особенно калитки и кевятти), музыкальный инструмент кантеле, история карелов. При опросе жители региона причисляют к таким же знаковым этнокультурным явлениям и профессиональные коллективы - Государственный Национальный театр и государственный Национальный ансамбль песни и танца Карелии <Кантеле>, национальные костюмы, ремесленные изделия и (даже!) карельский язык.

Но эта гордость наших соотечественников от знакомства с брендами культуры карельского народа носит в большинстве случаев <экстравертный>, номинальный характер. Людей зачастую привлекают не собственно явления этнической и национальной культуры карельского народа, а их необычность, загадочность, экзотичность. Эксплуатация <этнокультурной экзотики> на основе брендов карельской традиционной
культуры создала почву для возникновения множества творческих коллективов, деятельность которых год от года становится все агрессивнее к явлениям собственно культуры карельского народа, вольно или невольно вытапливая подлинник на периферию культурной жизни нашего региона и <эрзацем> представляя регион за его пределами. Специалистам известно, что в подлинной этнической культуре темперамент и творческая харизма имеют иной, глубинный, а не броский внешний имитационный характер.

Сегодня в Республике Карелия свыше 120 творческих коллективов разной ведомственной принадлежности используют в своей деятельности этническую культуру карелов. Заметим, что степень погружения в область подлинной культуры карельского народа разнообразна. Хорошо это для культуры карельского народа или нет - покажет время.

Надо отметить, что сам карельский народ никогда не относится и не относится к своей культуре как к явлению <напоказ>. Отношение всегда было, есть и остается самым серьезным. Карелы искренне поддерживают свою культуру не по подсказке извне, а в соответствии с изначально высоким ее предназначением в карельском социуме. Культура оценивается представителями этноса как достояние и непременная часть жизни каждого карела. (К 122 30.10.2007)

In the rather lengthy excerpt above several important issues are revealed. Firstly the author lists ‘brands’ by which Karelia is recognised as a region and of which its inhabitants are proud. The inhabitants taking pride in these manifestations of Karelian culture are not exclusively ethnically Karelian; in fact it is explicitly stated by the author that these ‘brands’, including the history of the Karelians and their language are a source of pride to all of the inhabitants of ‘multi-ethnic’ Karelia. The use of ‘даже’ in parentheses and with an exclamation mark does indicate some surprise or scepticism on the behalf of the author to the use of Karelian as a marker of regional identity by non-ethnic Karelians. In fact the use of the traditions and culture of the Karelians as a marketing tool in general seems to be viewed by the author with a degree of scepticism. The author describes the usage of Karelian culture by non-Karelians
as a brand as differing in a fundamental way from its usage to express Karelian identity; the usage of these ‘brands’ to market Karelian is described as an ephemeral gimmick compared to the deeply meaning way in which Karelians use their culture to express their own identity. Unnamed ‘specialists’ are invoked to confirm the author’s opinion that genuine ethnic culture is fundamentally different from the pale imitation of national culture offered up to tourists. In fact the author explicitly asks us to take cognisance, through the use of ‘надо отметить’, of the fact that Karelian culture is of value in and of itself to Karelians. It is described as a part of Karelians themselves, valued for the reason it is part of and constituent of identity for each Karelian rather than because of its potential economic benefit. It is clear that the author feels that Karelian culture is being used in some quarters as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In particular it would seem the author feels its use by non-Karelians as a marketing tool could have negative repercussions for Karelian identity.

The use of Karelian culture and history as a potential source of economic growth is not always negatively evaluated, however:

A) Все знают, что "Кижи" — это музей памятников деревянного зодчества под открытым небом. Однако одновременно это место является туристической меккой, гордостью и надеждой республики на то, что она когда-нибудь сделает туризм важной частью своей экономики (KG29 18.07.2001).

B) Во время летних полевых исследований научный сотрудник Карельского краеведческого музея Вячеслав Фролов обнаружил, что группа изображений на правом берегу устья реки Волга на полуострове Кочковнаволок (Онежское озеро) сильно повреждена и изуродована. Значительная часть изображений перебита каким-то инструментом и по сути уничтожена, рядом со скоплениями на скальных рисунков выбиты надписи "Дима. Весна 2002 г", "Максим", "Игорь". И хотя по данному факту заведено уголовное дело, памятник истории уже не вернуть. Не так давно Вячеслав Фролов вынес
официальное заключение, что "эта группа наскальных изображений полностью утрачена как объект экскурсионного показа, потому что памятник культуры в значительной части уничтожен (KG43 09.10.2002).

C) Говорят, что Кжи — это достояние республики. Только многие жители этой республики ни разу в именитом музее-заповеднике не были. Вместо нас чаще любуются красотами Кижей иногородние туристы, для которых северный пейзаж — экзотика (KG30 20.07.2004).

The above examples demonstrate how sites associated with Karelian history, in particular the museum complex on Kizhi, are often viewed primarily as potential marketing and tourism opportunities. In example B vandalism which destroys ancient rock carvings is presented by the expert quoted as a disaster, not merely because of the destruction of an ancient relic but because they are now worthless as the objects of экскурсионного показа. Examples A, and C both depict Kizhi as primarily a source of potential revenue from tourism rather than as a historical site. In example A the status of Kizhi as a ‘tourist Mecca’ is in fact the reason it is declared to be the ‘pride’ of the republic. Example C further undermines the value of Kizhi as a marker of ‘Karelian’ identity by noting that although it is commonly (говорят) viewed and narrated as one of the treasures of the Republic of Karelia many of the actual residents of the republic have never in fact visited it “ни разу.” It is in fact, the reader is informed, not ‘us’ who visits Kizhi but “иногородние туристы”. These tourists are presumably “иногородние” in terms of Karelia as a whole rather than just Kizhi. For these visitors, we are informed, the museum serves the purpose again of providing something ‘exotic’. Clearly Kizhi is constructed here as being of marginal importance to those who actually live in the Republic of Karelia as an actual cultural and historical object; its true purpose is to provide a taste of the exotic for visitors from elsewhere.
This tendency to view such Karelian historical sites as primarily important for their potential economic benefit is also opposed in the media of the Republic of Karelia; these sites are also sometimes depicted as valuable for their own sake. Indeed the press is often hostile to the plans of the regional authorities to use such sites to generate income:

Между тем петроглифы украшают официальный Интернет-сайт карельского правительства. С помощью этой приманки правительство хочет найти деньги инвесторов для создания международного туристического маршрута "с использованием археологического комплекса "Беломорские петроглифы". Отдать петроглифы власти готовы на срок не менее 25 лет за 250 тысяч долларов. Инвестор получит эксклюзивное право на организацию туристской деятельности. По неофициальной информации, потенциальные инвесторы в сопровождении представителей местной власти уже неоднократно приезжали смотреть петроглифы (KG13 26.03.2003).

Кижи: достояние или кормушка?

Уже много месяцев в Петрозаводске и по всей Карелии висят огромные рекламные щиты, на которых изображена Преображенская церковь и надпись "Достояние республики". У тех, кто вырос здесь и кто любит наш край, нашу природу, наше неповторимое зодчество, нет сомнения, что Кижи — это достояние. Но не все разделяют патриотичные чувства по отношению к уникальному объекту этнографии. Мы уже не раз писали о том, как часть земли на острове пытались продать в частные руки под видом инвестиционного проекта. Мы не раз писали о том, что музей зарабатывает большие деньги за счет туристического обслуживания, но эти средства не идут на развитие и реконструкцию ветшающих объектов, а уплывают в неизвестные карманы (KG52 24.12.2003).

The above two examples demonstrate that the use of historical sites as a brand or nothing more than an opportunity to generate revenue by the local
authorities is seen as unacceptable by the Karelian press. The first example is an excerpt from a series of articles written on the fate of rock carvings of great antiquity which are found around Lake Onego. Karel'skaya Guberniya ran a series of articles on this question seeking to expose plans to sell the carvings or at least the rights to ‘admittance’ to see them to private interests. Although these glyphs are not associated with any particular ethnicity they are deemed by the paper to have some sort of inherent value. The republican government, by using them to украшают its website may also be seeking to use them as a ‘brand’ for the area beyond merely marketing the carvings themselves to potential investors. Kizhi is most certainly used in this fashion as a ‘brand’ by the authorities as the paper reminds its readers; it is also the case that the paper views Kizhi as important for a sense of ‘Karelian’ identity itself. The identity itself is ‘Karelian’ in geographical rather than ethnic terms, including by the invitation of the author all ктo вырос здесь и ктo любит наш край, which is presumably most of his readership both Karelian and Russian. For this group of ‘Karelians’ Kizhi is constructed as being a key marker of their identity to the extent it induces патриотичные чувства; its value as such is apparently so great for there to be нет сомнения of this fact amongst this constructed ‘we’ group of Karelian citizens. These ‘Karelian patriots’ including the imagined reader are opposed, however, by the journalist against an unnamed group of speculators seeking to make money out of the museum. The proceeds of tourism to the site are, it is alleged, going not to the museum itself but to these speculators as they are synecdochially exemplified by the в неизвестные карманы.

There are clearly therefore, both amongst ethnic Karelians and elements of the Russian press, misgivings over the manner in which these aspects of Karelian history and culture, both as claimed by Karelians themselves and by the Russian community, are being exploited as a ‘brand’ to attract tourism and investment. This is however the stated policy of the republican government as the article reproduced below relates:

ЧУДО, да и только!
Основная цель работы «Инвестиций в будущее» – привлечь инвесторов в республику. На площадках форума, сконцентрированных на площади Кирова, будут обсуждаться разные темы: развитие туризма, утилизация отходов, доступное жилье, развитие технопарков и инновационных технологий, молодежная политика, сохранение и воспроизводство лесных и водных ресурсов, экологически чистые источники энергии. Но, несомненно, одна из главных проблем, которую считает необходимым затронуть карельское правительство, – это духовность.

«Карелия, которая находится в окружении трех великих островов, трех храмов Преображения Господня, самым естественным образом оказывается в центре уникального пространства Русского Севера, выступающего в качестве духовной опоры и одного из источников современного единства и обновления России. Поэтому Карелия заявляет о готовности выступить своеобразным духовно-нравственным аналогом Сколково» – торжественно сообщает нам официальный сайт форума.

Чтобы понять, какие же суперперемены готовит нам мегaproект, вы, вероятно, вспомнили давно забытый предмет – философию, в курсе которого понятие «духовность» трактовалось как объединяющее начало моральных ценностей и нравственности. А если не вспомнили – то, возможно, не поленились достать с полки толковый словарь и прочитать там, что духовность – это, оказывается, свойство души, состоящее в преобладании духовных интересов над материальными. Впрочем, если вы не сделали ни того, ни другого – не беда, потому что у правительства Карелии для этого слова есть свое, особое значение.

– В Приладожье, Поморье и Заонежье создается план центра православной культуры, – рассказал Евгений Шорохов, поясняя, в чем же суть мегапроекта Андрея Нелидова. – В Заонежье, например, планируется построить православный храм. А еще конгрессо-деловой центр, гостиничный комплекс и туристские центры. И, конечно, этнодеревню с домами, построенными в стиле Заонежья.
– И там будут жить представители малых национальностей? Карелы, например, вепсы?.. – наивно поинтересовались мы.

– Не-ет, – ответил Шорохов, – не карелы, а туристы. За счет этого шедевра мы же оживим туристическую индустрию! Это наше стратегическое направление (KG47 23.11.2011).

The article above shows the manner in which the authorities have adopted several of the narratives of Karelian and Russian unity already examined above: that of the shared ‘spiritual’ history of Karelia and Russia as a whole and that of Karelia as constituting a part of the ‘Russian north’. It also demonstrates how the exploitation of this supposed heritage is the стратегическое направление of the local authorities. Both the Orthodox legacy within Karelia and the history and culture of the minority nationalities are presented by the authorities as being opportunities to attract tourism and investment. The journalist somewhat sarcastically asks the official interviewed if the этнодеревня is being constructed for the benefit of the Karelians and Vepsians. The official involved, with of course the aid of the journalist who represents his answer in this particular fashion, essentially sums up the manner in which the authorities view the value of the historical legacy of the Karelian and Vepsian, and indeed to an extent even the Russian, culture of Karelia. This policy is, as he states, aimed at benefiting не карелы, а туристы.

3.12 The Kondopoga Affair: Racism in Quiet Karelia?

The Kondopoga Affair of 2006 appeared to take the local authorities and their federal counterparts by surprise. This outbreak of inter-ethnic tension seems to have been completely unanticipated by the government of the Republic of Karelia and indeed Katanandov initially attempted to deny that there was in fact any ethnic or racist element to the violence:

Мы расцениваем ситуацию в Кондопоге как локальную, которая возникла из-за того, что молодежь вернулась с каникул и ничем не была
занята ("Беспорядки в Кондопоге оказались неожиданностью для властей" Stolitsa Na Onego 04.09.2006).

This assessment of the situation was quickly undermined by the facts of the situation and already by the 9th of September Kareliya was using the term ‘pogrom’ to refer to the events in Kondopoga, although the title of the article concerned, “Не в наших традициях” (K 100 09.06.2006), already suggests the use of a strategy of discontinuation to deny that such events were truly part of ‘Karelian’ identity. In fact the presence of racist and intolerant discourses within the Republic of Karelia ought to have come as no surprise to the local government; indeed a particular problem within local marketplaces had been identifiable within the mass media discourse for some time prior to the events in Kondopoga. Perhaps tellingly little of this is to be discovered within the pages of the official paper, Kareliya, but rather it is found within Karel’skaya Guberniya. As far back as 2001 a limited number of articles hint that there was some resentment or prejudice amongst certain sectors at least of Karelian society towards specific minority groups:

“— Многих жителей Петрозаводска пугает наплыв кавказцев. Они — временные или постоянные жители?

“— Многие из них — давно наши сограждане. Хотя есть и те, кто вовремя не оформил вид на жительство, не зарегистрировал своих родственников (KG45 07.11.2001)”.

In the above excerpt the journalist seeks to convey the apparent ‘fear’ of the socially denoted ‘locals’ or ‘we group’ of a ‘flood’ of immigrants from the Caucasus. This provides a topos of threat, using a strategy of differentiation to place the majority of ‘residents of Petrozavodsk’ in opposition to the supposed inundation of immigrants. The immigration official who is being interviewed does not attempt to completely refute the opposing groups that the journalist has created but does so in part: they attempt to use a strategy of unification by reminding the journalist that at least part of the group being discussed are also in the ‘we’ group by being давно наши сограждане. Nevertheless the excerpt shows that the paper considers immigration to be a mainstream concern, one
upon which the local authorities should be held to account. More importantly it suggests, despite the weak attempt by the official to include the people concerned in the ‘we’ group of local residents, that individuals from the Southern autonomous republics of the Russian Federation are considered by at least a section of Karelian society to be ‘immigrants’.

In fact this idea that people of Chechen or other Muslim background were not considered to be ‘legitimate’ residents of the Republic of Karelia was apparently so pronounced in 2003 that when interviewed by the paper the Imam of Karelia, Visam Ali Bardvil, remarked:

“— Мы чувствуем, что к нам относятся, как к чужакам. Черные — они и есть черные... Меня в Петрозаводске, слава Богу, милиционеры не останавливают. Знают, наверное. А в Москве останавливают, и только из-за внешнего вида. Хорошо еще борода есть, так иногда путают со священником православным. "Здравствуйте, святой отец, — говорят, — идите с Богом!" Я и иду... А жена моя как страдает! Она ведь носит платок и почти ежедневно слушает всякие замечания, издевки: "Аллах Агбар!" Хватает в Петрозаводске людей неграмотных и нецивилизованных (KG11 12.03.2003).”

Bardvil had prior to this interview led a campaign which attempted unsuccessfully to gain permission for the construction of a mosque in Petrozavodsk; plans for the building of such a structure were voted down at the municipal level amid an apparent public outcry at the idea. Indeed the paper notes in the article that since this event the local Islamic organisation had “фактически ушла в подполье” whilst the affair had supposedly stoked a good deal of resentment on both sides. Both the events themselves and the article, as the above excerpt demonstrates, reveal the presence of intolerance towards expressions of Muslim identity within a significant proportion of society within the Republic of Karelia. Bardvil openly opines that the majority, the unnamed group synecdochically expressed by those who “к нам относятся”, do not include Muslims within their society but regard them as “чужаки”. He also reverses the topos of threat expressed in the article above to portray the Muslims of Karelia as
the group at risk; in this case the threats are portrayed more directly as intimidation both from the authorities and society in general. This treatment of Muslims is contrasted directly with that of the Russian Orthodox: he contrasts his own treatment as someone who “иногда путают со священником православным” with the apparent constant harassment of his wife, whose appearance is unmistakably Muslim.

It should be noted that whilst Muslims and people from Caucasia more generally are the main groups singled out for such abuse incidents of intolerance towards other groups have been recorded within the Republic of Karelia:

Перед дверьми общества еврейской культуры "Шалом" кто-то нарисовал несколько фашистских свастик и присовокупил к ним "изящный" экспромтик: "Гитлер был не виноват, евреев отправляя в ад"

Не прошло и недели, как подобное высказывание появилось на еврейском кладбище. В данном случае неизвестный автор сетовал, что 6 миллионов убитых во время войны евреев — недостаточная цифра, и высказывал пожелание увеличить ее вдвое. Формальности были соблюдены — уголовное дело возбудили. Но оптимизма, надо сказать, это не прибавило.

Можно, конечно, радоваться, что по сравнению со многими другими регионами России наша республика в плане национальных отношений выглядит более-менее благополучно. За 11 лет существования "Шалома" — "всего" три или четыре надругательства над могилами и примерно столько же нападений на офис общества. Кавказские погромы в День десантника. И тихо тлеющая, в принципе пока не агрессивная, но стойкая антипатия ко всему смуглому и не курносому. Стоит ли из-за таких "пустяков" волноваться? Специалисты из следственных органов сообщили, что, как правило, они не находят в подобных фактах признаков разжигания национальной розни, а рассматривают их просто как хулиганство или вандализм (КГ50 27.11.2002).
This article demonstrates that anti-semitism is present within at least a section of the population of the Republic of Karelia. It is of course not possible to determine how widespread this prejudice or intolerance towards Muslims is within society as a whole in the region from such incidents of vandalism or the anecdotal evidence of Bardvil. The author of the above article does however attempt to use the desecration of Jewish sites within Petrozavodsk as a synedocial representation of what they perceive to be the general mood within the Republic of Karelia. The perceived apathy and indifference of the local authorities towards the issue of racism in the area is sarcastically castigated by the journalist with their sardonic assurance to the reader that they can take joy in the fact that compared to other parts of Russia “наша республика в плане национальных отношений выглядит более-менее благополучно.” The author uses an inverted strategy of trivialisation, listing the worrying manifestations of such intolerance as ‘proof’ that there is no problem with racism in Karelia to make the opposite point. The title of the article is the ironic "Мелкое хулиганство", but the journalist actually portrays intolerance as a growing threat throughout society in the region: а “тихо тлеющая, в принципе пока не агрессивная, но стойкая антипатия ко всему смуглому и не курносому” which seems general. The use of the adverbial qualifier “пока” suggests that the journalist is convinced violence is inevitable, in contrast the local authorities are depicted as treating such issues with all the cynical triviality the journalist mocks so forcefully.

In fact the regional authorities of the Republic of Karelia themselves used discourses of intolerance and exclusion to refer to groups from the Caucasus area. Indeed they openly used the language of such discourses to address problems within the marketplaces of the Republic of Karelia in the years preceding the Kondopoga Affair and its immediate aftermath. In 2003 the mayor of Petrozavodsk attempted to ban ‘immigrants’ from trading in the city’s markets:

Овоши по-русски
Петрозаводский глава считает, что карельскими овощами должны торговать карелы

На очередной планерке в мэрии глава петрозаводской администрации во всеуслышание дал понять, что националистические взгляды ему не чужды. Во всяком случае, говоря об открывающейся в начале октября сельскохозяйственной ярмарке, городничий отметил, что не потерпит у продавцов "никакого другого акцента, кроме финского и карельского (KG38 17.09.2003).

The above article is revealing on a number of levels. Firstly it reveals that the local administration in Petrozavodsk were quite openly advocating that participation in local commerce be restricted on ethnic grounds; the construction "во всеуслышание дал понять" indicates both the forcefulness of the intervention and the attributed intent of the speaker for his remarks to reach as wide an audience as possible. Secondly and more importantly it illustrates the construction of a ‘we’ group that includes Russians, Karelians and Finns but excludes the “националистические взгляды” of other unnamed groups. Nowhere in the brief article are the constituents of this unacceptable ‘other group’ named, but we are left to surmise whom they may be from comparison with the legitimised ‘we’ group. Most interesting is the superficially baffling and contradictory manner in which this ‘we’ group is constituted. Whilst the article states the apparent intention of the mayor that “карельскими овощами должны торговать карелы”, it is quite clear from the rest of the article that ‘Karelians’ in this sense is not intended to mean solely Karelians by nationality or ethnicity. In fact the title of the article, “Овощи по-русски”, actually suggests the exclusion of all but Russians from the market. Indeed Karelian and Finnish language is apparently not anticipated as being used either; the mayor will “потерпит” Karelian and Finnish accents, suggesting he expects Karelians and Finns to be trading in Russian. Clearly in this example not only are Karelians, Finns and Russians constructed as a ‘we’ group in opposition to supposed immigrants, but the very term “карелы” has been appropriated by the paper and possibly also the authorities, although the construction of the article leaves this unclear, as denoting all the ‘legitimate’ residents of Karelia.
Warnings of potential violence against ethnic minority groups, in particular Muslims, were made prior to the Kondopoga Affair in 2006 as has been noted above. In 2004 the then head of the Republic of Karelia Katanandov used the recent Beslan terrorist attacks to cast doubt on the loyalties of the local Chechen and other Muslim diasporas with the region:

В частности, Сергей Катанандов призвал национальных лидеров самим наводить порядок внутри диаспор, причем не только за их официальных членов, вовлеченных в культурные мероприятия, но и за всех остальных. В противном случае было обещано закрыть республику для гостей из южных регионов.

— Мы ждем официальных заявлений об отношении к происшедшей трагедии от представителей национальных кавказских диаспор. Мы рассчитываем на то, что эти люди хотят жить с нами в мире и согласии, — сказал Сергей Катанандов.

Председатель Духовного управления мусульман республики Висам Али Бардвил оценил эти высказывания как выражение недоверия и подозрения ко всем людям неславянской внешности, проживающим в Карелии (KG39 22.09.2004).

In this article we clearly see Katanandov create another topos of threat regarding these ethnic groups within Karelia, using strategies of casting doubt and shifting of blame and scapegoating to depict a need for the leaders of such communities to “наводить порядок внутри диаспор”. By calling upon these groups to offer an official assurance of their revulsion at such terrorist attacks and that they “хотят жить с нами в мире и согласии” this topos of threat is bolstered; there is an insinuation that such assurances are necessary or may not be readily forthcoming. This further acts to create a division between the legitimised “мы” group of ordinary, law-abiding citizens of the Republic of Karelia and the potentially dangerous, delegitimised “эти люди”. Once again the idea that these groups have any natural right to reside in Karelia is questioned through the formula “гостей из южных регионов”. As the final paragraph demonstrates the reaction of the local diaspora and Muslim groups was one of
outraged offence rather than apologetic submission and reassurance, and indeed the paper itself was critical of Katanandov’s language, noting that the sceptical and hostile reaction of many other political figures in the region to his remarks.

Katanandov did not initially moderate his language on such issues, however, and indeed in the immediate aftermath of the Kondopoga Affair he and other local officials persisted in placing the blame for poor inter-ethnic relations squarely at the door of the minority groups concerned. Katanandov for example in remarks to Kommersant that were then reprinted in Kareliya on the 7th of September reflected the language of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in his assessment of the situation in Kondopoga:

Главной причиной беспорядков стало то, что на наших глазах группа представителей другого народа вела себя дерзко и вызывающе, игнорируя менталитет нашего народа. Северных людей нужно долго доводить. В общем, я понимаю чувства тех людей, которые вышли на улицу (K99 07.09.2006).

Thus the issue as constructed by Katanandov was the presence of ‘other peoples’ who did not follow the norms expected of them in Karelian society. In articles printed in Kareliya at this time it was further inferred that the rioters had legitimate concerns. Language such as “приезжие не уважали наши законы” was used by Katanandov himself in further articles (see K100 09.09.2006), along with further inferences that the ‘immigrants’ did not behave ‘morally’. He also identified problems with the “адаптации приезжей молодежи к местному укладу жизни (ibid)” and further inferred they did not respect local traditions. There was a general tendency towards negative description of those persons residing in Kondopoga of Caucasian ancestry. In Kareliya and Karel’skaya Guberniya they are described as ‘immigrants’, ‘kavkavtsi’, ‘incomers’ and so forth, whereas the Russian participants are described consistently simply as ‘locals’. The impression is given that at least part of the blame for the problems arises from an inability or unwillingness amongst those of Caucasian descent to adapt to the ‘norms’ of a Russian society which is paradoxically portrayed as incredibly tolerant of their provocations. It will be seen therefore that despite
being Russian citizens the victims of the pogroms in Kondopoga are not accepted within the media discourse of the Republic as being ‘local’ or even ‘Russian’ in the same sense as ethnic Russians or Karelians. Relatively quickly after the events in Kondopoga a new market was established in the town, which was set aside for the use of the ‘local’ population only. Once again the Head of the Government of Karelia, S. Katanandov, willing adopted strategies of scapegoating, delegitimisation and criminalisation to justify the measure, referring to the previous traders in the market as ‘перекупщики’ (see “Базарные разговоры” Stolitsa na Onego 04.11.2006), and inferring criminal activity. These he contrasted with the ‘grandmothers’, ‘veterans’, ‘our citizens’ and ‘ordinary people’ who were worried about this situation (ibid). When reminded by the Karelian Minister of Economic Development that the ‘immigrants’ he wished to exclude were also Russian citizens he openly stated this was immaterial ‘есть ли у нас рынки, которые контролируются криминальными структурами’ (ibid). Thus the immigrant communities in Kondopoga, or more accurately the so-called immigrant communities, were not accorded any rights or sympathy in this official discourse, but were instead made responsible, at least in part, for their own predicament. The supposed discriminatory regime towards the ‘locals’ prevalent in the markets, which was attributed to administrative failings and corruption as well as the activities of ‘speculators’, were also noted at a Federal level. During the ‘telemost’ of October 2006 Putin devoted some of the discussion to questions of trade in such markets and promised action, linking this issue, despite the question not being openly couched in such a manner, to issues of migration.

The official response to the Kondopoga incident sought to localise the issue, attributing failings steadily downwards from federal, regional and ultimately to a local level, with many articles seeking to suggest the problems of Kondopoga were just that and were not reflective of any broader issues in Russian or Karelian society (see for example the article “Кондопога: уроки, выводы, перспективы” K131 23.11.2006). The journalists of Karel’skaya Guberniya were more willing however to see the events as representative of a pattern of intolerance towards certain groups:
В Кондопоге произошел конфликт, обнаживший серьезные межнациональные проблемы, существующие как в России вообще, так и в Карелии в частности. Мы, по традиции продолжая считать себя гостеприимным народом, на поверку являемся нетерпимыми ко всему чужому. И нетерпимость эта пронизывает все слои нашего общества. К примеру, хозяева большинства петрозаводских клубов не пускают к себе кавказцев. Не тех, кто как-то плохо зарекомендовал себя во время предыдущих визитов, а всех без исключения. А некоторые интеллигентные, добрые и образованные работники мэрии уверены, что это правильное решение, и сетуют на то, что кавказцам, в принципе, разрешают приезжать в Петрозаводск.

Бывший военком республики требовал у мэрии лишить людей права торговать овощами рядом с военкоматом только потому, что у них были явные признаки кавказской национальности. Мэр же, вместо того чтобы объяснить военкому, что его требования противоречат Конституции, потребовал от своих подчиненных решить проблему. С азербайджанцами была расторгнута аренда, а военком ушел на повышение и стал генералом (KG38 12.09.2006)

In the above excerpt the paper explicitly refutes the idea that the Kondopoga Affair was an isolated incident and instead declares it representative of a more general intolerance in Karelian and Russian society. The strategy of positive self presentation used in the official discourse of society in the Republic of Karelia being tolerant and welcoming is inverted: as the journalist constructs the Kondopoga affair as a ‘test’ which has revealed the true nature of local society as “нетерпимыми ко всему чужому”. The singularity of the Kondopoga Affair as constructed in the official discourse is denied by comparison to the discriminatory policies of Petrozavodsk clubs which will not admit ‘кавказцы’; a strategy of unification is used to highlight that this is not merely an attitude found amongst the fringes of society but that it “пронизывает все слои нашего общества”. Most dammingly the journalist accuses the authorities of being just as prejudiced towards such groups as the remainder of society and indeed accuses them of fostering such prejudice; as the experience of
the military official related shows the expression of intolerance towards these
groups is not only permissible but appears to be rewarded.

In summation it is clear from the above texts that there is an issue with
intolerance and outright racism within the Republic of Karelia. No firm
estimation can be made of the depth or scale of this prejudice across differing
groups from the material in the corpus of data to hand; it is not at all clear if
ethnic Russians, Karelians or Vepsians are any more or less tolerant of certain
minority groups. What can be ascertained is that any prejudice against the
Finno-Ugric inhabitants of the area is clearly formulated and conceptualised as a
separate issue from that which is directed towards groups of Muslim heritage. In
fact when intolerance towards ‘incomers’ or ‘immigrants’ is expressed the
Finno-Ugric populace appear to be included in the ‘we’ group of legitimate
residents who are allotted the right, in this discourse, of residence in the area. It
should also be noted that through the use of strategies of exclusion,
delegitimisation and negative presentation such groups such as Chechens or
Dagestanis, despite being legally Russian citizens, are not conceptualised as
legitimately part of either ‘Russian’ or more especially ‘Karelian’ identities.
These groups are almost always viewed as immigrants within the media
discourse studied regardless of citizenship or length of residence. It is clear that
the increase in intolerance towards these groups noted across Russia is a
phenomenon to which Karelia has proved in no way immune. The analysis
above shows that from the early years of the last decade there was at least a low-
level awareness of a problem with intolerance within the Karelian press,
although it appears not have been expressed at all in the official media. General
indifference towards this issue, especially on an official level, was however
shattered by the dramatic events in Kondopoga in 2006; this period seems, at
least in terms of media coverage of these issues, to have marked the high-water
mark of racist prejudice. Since 2007, when another killing in Olonets threatened
to spark more minor tensions, coverage of such issues and expressions of such
intolerance have become less marked; the Karelian authorities in particular since
their initial reaction to the crisis appear to have been careful to moderate their
language and avoid accusations of formenting inter-ethnic discord. Nevertheless
this does not mean the problem itself has necessarily in any way disappeared or even moderated; clearly at least within sections of society within Karelia intolerance towards certain groups is present, and the above evidence would suggest it is present within the governing elite of the region itself.

Conclusions

The representation of ‘Karelian’ identity within the mass media has several notable features which may be related back to our theoretical discussion of the usage of historical narratives within the construction of national identity. Firstly it can be argued that there exists a conventionalised, traditional approach within the Russian-language mass media to the production of ideas of Karelian identity which is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse of the ‘younger brother’. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the official discourse on national identity as exemplified by Kareliya. This may be in part due to the standardising and conventionalising effect of the genre of newspaper discourse itself as identified above which has facilitated the persistence of this method of constructing ‘Karelia’. It is argued above however that this persistence may well be in large part due to the perceived persistence of the same social relations and structure within the Republic of Karelia, with the Russian majority continuing to dominate at the expense of the Karelian minority and thus the Russian-language press perceiving no need to moderate or alter their method of constructing ‘Karelian’ identity. It would also appear that the continued usage of this discourse is linked to the strategies of continuation utilised by the local authorities to legitimate the survival of political autonomy within Karelia and their own relations with the Finno-Ugric minority groups. This presentation of Karelian identity as more ‘ethnic’ than ‘national’ and the location of Karelian identity with the distant, folkloric past also has a marginalising effect; this can be related to the construction of the imagined reader in the Russian-language press which contains referential dissimilation and trivialisation and minimisation to portray the Finno-Ugric groups as insignificant and emphasises their minority status. As the discourse on the Vepsian population also demonstrates the
employment of ethnographic or Orientalist type discourse on such matters also has the effect of limiting conceptions of Finno-Ugric territory to a very restricted area.

As noted above the foundation of the KTK appears to have been selected by the local authorities as a ‘named beginning’ or ‘foundational myth’ for the Republic of Karelia. This also appears to be an attempt to construct a form of ‘civic’ nationalism or identity, albeit on rather ethnicised terms to justify and legitimate the continuation of Soviet-era power structures. The usage of this narrative appears to have increased in the official media since 2005, with a potential peak in 2010 around the 90th anniversary of the KTK; it should be noted however that this narrative is opposed by certain groups within Karelian society and in general outside of official rhetoric its influence is arguably weak, as shall be explored further in the interview material. Certainly it is opposed by Karelian activists as their conceptions of ethnic identity are produced with narratives which seek to clearly predate 1920 by hundreds if not thousands of years. Their conceptions of a more ‘ethnic’ Karelian identity are also based on a strategy of continuation but use historical referents of much greater antiquity. It should be noted however that they do not generally appear to select any one ‘myth’ or date for the foundation of Karelian identity. They do also use the foundation of the KTK to narrate an alternate conception of Karelian identity in which the Karelians are marginalised and exploited by the Russian majority. In this sense a topos of the ‘broken promise’ is often created to oppose the official narrative with a sense of the disenfranchisement of the Karelian people and the need for some form of recompense. In rare instance the Ukhtinskaya Respublika is also offered as an alternate ‘foundational myth’ however the event appears to be conceptualised more as the start of political autonomy rather than national history.

As noted above both Stuart Hall and Leszek Kolakowski considered a consciousness of the past, expressed variously as historical memory or emphasis on continuity, to be an important facet of the construction of national identities. Certainly in the material studied both Karelians and Russians extensively used strategies of continuation to construct conceptions of Karelia as a homeland or
centre of culture for their respective groups and thus legitimise their sense of national identity. In both cases, as discussed above, the continuity of residence in various localities was used to construct narratives which depict Karelians and Russians as the ‘indigenous’ peoples of Karelia. One of the most striking aspects of this process was the manner in which this tended to be extremely localised to certain regions, towns and especially villages. Both Russians and Karelians offered narratives which depicted a particular locality as ‘purely’ Karelian or Russian, for example Grigoriev’s Lambisel’ga, Tuomi’s Kalevala or the Russia Za’Onegzhe; these narratives which tend to fragment and localise ‘real’ manifestations of Karelian and Russian identity are often simultaneously juxtaposed with representations of other areas which are depicted as lacking this ‘model’ national character. This idea of an ideal ‘pure’ community is also heavily related to the representation of Karelian language and its subsequent decline. There is therefore a tension present between the narration of the exemplary, almost ‘pure’ ethnos or national group resident in some areas and the representation of its absence or debasement in others. A rather peculiar patchwork of Karelian identities is thus depicted with certain areas identified as ‘more Karelian’, and occasionally ‘more Russian’, than others. For putative ethnic Karelian identities this seems a problem as it is unclear how a unified Karelian identity can be created which elevates ‘Karelian-ness’ from the village to the nation. Conversely this is much less of an issue for ideas of Karelia as a ‘Russian’ area, and indeed as has been noted certain narratives construct Karelia as almost entirely a preserve of Russian culture from time immemorial with very little Finno-Ugric influence. It is difficult to discern what trends may exist in either phenomenon; indeed it would appear both are relatively stable. The idea of Russian influence being colonial in nature does appear but is very rare in the Russian-language media; aside from the contributions of Grigoriev only isolated examples could be found in the data studied, mostly from Karel’skaya Guberniya in one particular series of articles from 2008.

Strategies of continuity and legitimisation are also the key resources utilised in the representation of the territories annexed from Finland in 1940. This issue demonstrates one of the clearest discernable examples of a change in
the narration of a historical issue as a result of social and political change. The topic of Sortavala and other such areas appears to have been taboo to the point of being entirely off-limits within the Soviet period, and indeed even in the immediate post-Soviet period little discussion seems to have been present on the issue within the Karelian press. Silence on the matter has now been replaced by the delegitimisation of perceived Finnish ‘revanchism’. This is achieved once again by strategies of continuation which emphasise the continuity of Russian occupation of the area; interestingly the idea of Karelian residence in the locality seems to be viewed by certain contributors as equating to ‘Russian’ residence rather than being a point in favour of the Finnish claims. This narrative is also bolstered by the delegitimising and discrediting strategies which seek to equate Finnish claims with Nazi aggression. The image of the Finn as the fascist aggressor is deployed to justify current political realities. It should also be noted, however, that the former Finnish status of the towns can be utilised to lobby the local authorities for improvements to current political realities; this narrative remains taboo however, to the point that its open espousal is grounds for arrest.

The history of Russian Orthodoxy within Karelia is also used to promote Russian claims to legitimate residence within Karelia and the idea of Karelia as a genuine ‘Russian land’. As noted above this is achieved through the narration of Karelia as a ‘model’ Orthodox territory, a status which again associates it closely with more general conceptions of Russian identity. This process is not unique to Karelia by any means, and must be viewed, as discussed above, within the context of the increasing association of the Russian political elite and the Orthodox church. In general this association of Russian (and thus Karelian) identity with Orthodoxy seems to be uncritically promoted by the official media whereas the unofficial media are somewhat more sceptical. Orthodoxy also plays an important role in the construction of Karelian identity itself by being used to divide Karelians from the Lutheran Finns and associate them more closely with a broader Russian identity. Karelians are routinely, in the official media, either presented as ‘model’ Orthodox believers or as having neglected part of their own ‘national’ identity by failing to adhere to the Orthodox faith.
This positioning of Karelian identity as closer to Russian than Finnish identity was also a marked feature of the historical narratives which addressed various conflicts. In such narratives Karelians are routinely portrayed as the loyal allies of the Russians against foreign aggression, be it by the Swedes, Finns or Germans. The Karelian experience of such conflicts is regularly wedded to the ‘national’ experience of Russia as a whole, both in official and unofficial media. This creates a ‘collective memory’, as discussed above, in which Karelians and Russians are constantly united as a ‘we’ group in opposition to a menacing ‘other’. This process is especially marked in the fairly constant commemorative discourse of the Great Patriotic War; every year, especially around Victory Day in May, this discourse is ritualistically reproduced as thus are these conceptions of national identity. In contrast the more problematic issue of the Winter War is almost entirely neglected in both official and unofficial media and is commemorated in any significant way. The ubiquity and discursive ‘weight’ of narratives of the war however, elevated as they have been throughout modern Russia to a position of extreme importance in the relation of a ‘national story’, make it of extreme importance to counter any heterodox interpretation of these historical events. As also exemplified in the discourse on the annexed territories the Karelian press is acutely aware of such heterodox narratives produced in the Finnish press and actively attempts to counter them. The Finns, whilst not treated as harshly as the Germans, are almost universally depicted as the oppressive invader. Any challenge to this picture of the Finns as the enemy is robustly countered, as is any attempt at establishing any equivalence between Soviet and Finnish misdeeds.

Despite the general predominance of unifying narratives which seek to use the apparent shared historical experience of Karelians and Russians to create a ‘we’ group in opposition to the enemy picture of the Finns occasionally glimpses can be caught of a narrative that positions the Karelians closer to the Finnish occupiers than the Russian ‘liberators’. This narrative suggests either that the Karelians did not really suffer under the occupation or, in its most taboo form, that they may have collaborated with the Finns. A related narrative revolves around the potential repression and deportation of the Karelians for this
supposed collaboration in the post-war period. As has been seen these narratives are generally held to be taboo to the point of active refutation, and are marginal at best compared to the overwhelming predominance of the unifying, commemorative narratives which seek to unify Karelians and Russians. There does seem to be a consciousness of such narratives amongst the Karelian contributors however and this affects the manner in which they present themselves. In the context of contemporary Russian society a narrative which portrayed Karelians as ‘allies’ of the Finns would present them negatively and would exclude them from the ‘we’ group of the majority of Russian citizens. Consequently to avoid this potential exclusion it is evident from the analysis above that Karelians, when contributing to the Russian-language media, often proffer narratives which reassure their Russian interlocutor of the continued, unbroken loyalty of the Karelians to the Russian state. They thus actively seek to deconstruct this imagined, generally unspoken, topos of threat which they must perceive to be current within ethnic Russian society. This can also be observed within the discourse on the Karelian language when this same implicit topos of threat is refuted by contributors in debates upon the adoption of a second language; it is thus clear that Karelians themselves understand there to be a narrative within which their loyalty is questioned even if this narrative is not generally openly reproduced in the mass media discourse.

The only directly heterodox contribution noted to the discourse on the Great Patriotic War was that of Grigoriev. Whilst other texts acknowledged heterodox narratives from the Finnish press or appeared to argue against an implicit heterodox narrative without its open espousal Grigoriev does construct an alternate narrative of the Karelian war experience. His narrative, again localised and indeed personalised down to village and personal family experience, does challenge the orthodox view. Once again he inverts the established historical narrative and asserts the essential unity of the Finns and Karelians in opposition to the Russians. In his narrative it is the Russians who inflict the greater damage to the ‘real’ Karelian population whereas the Finnish influence is generally benign. In the same manner as his construction of
Karelian space this history of Lambisel’ga places Karelians nearer to Finnish influence than Russian.

In all of the above narratives Karelians, when contributing directly to the discourse themselves, offer an interesting method of self-presentation; their contributions are striking for the levels of passivity and helplessness that they attribute to their ‘nation’. This heteronomisation is marked in all the various historical narratives sampled but is particularly striking in discussions on the Karelian language and its decline. As shall be argued further below this is of extreme importance as the usage of Karelian appears to be the fundamental defining characteristic of Karelian identity for a large section, if not the absolute majority, of self-identified Karelians. Karelians appear to use historical narratives to create an idealised version of a ‘pure’ Karelian territory as noted above and the former dominance of the Karelian language is an important aspect of this narrative. This topos of a ‘golden age’ of Karelia is strongly linked to monolingualism in Karelian. The loss of this linguistic dominance is strongly negatively evaluated by Karelians as shall be explored further below. At this point it is sufficient to note the manner in which this loss is narrated in the mass media discourse is marked by high levels of heteronomisation; Karelians themselves are almost invariably depicted as passive victims of the machinations of unnamed ‘others’ who preside over the decline in their language without the Karelians themselves being able to intervene to halt this process.

The discourse on language loss peaked in 2001 as at that time debates around the potential adoption of Karelian as a second official language were at their peak; although these efforts failed attention has been paid to the problems of the minority language on a fairly consistent basis in the following period. The commercialisation of symbols of Karelian identity is a phenomenon which appears to have increasing resonance in Karelian society. As shall be seen from the texts sampled above the usage of Kizhi as a ‘brand’ for the region is nothing new and has potentially limited implications for Karelian identities; as noted above most of the structures on the island of Kizhi were relocated there from across Karelia within living memory. Nevertheless it is important to note the potential devaluing effect, as stated above, of the usage of potential national
'symbols' as a means to earn tourist dollars. In the Republic of Karelia the usage of symbols of the Karelian people in particular, and to a lesser extent also the Russian population of areas such as the Za’onezh’e, is actively being pursued by the local government in an effort to ‘sell’ the region to tourists and investors. It is not possible to determine if any such devaluation has occurred from the data studied given the relative novelty of this process and the consequent relative lack of texts on this subject. The texts do indicate however an awareness of this possibility and a hostility to this process amongst certain sectors of the Karelian population.

Another more recent phenomenon is the apparent increase in hostility towards certain minority groups within the Republic of Karelia, in particular people from Caucasia and those of an Islamic background. This is certainly not unique to the area and is reflective of broader developments across the Russian Federation as a whole. Over the period sampled this issue grew from a trivialised concern of the minority groups themselves to a pressing issue that demanded immediate intervention from the local authorities as the Kondopoga Affair made headlines both nationally and internationally. From the texts above it can be seen how the local authorities helped foster this climate of intolerance through the promotion of narratives using strategies of exclusion, discontinuation, discreditation and deligitimisation which excluded the possibility of these groups from ‘legitimate’ residence within the Republic of Karelia. Even in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events in Kondopoga such strategies were still employed to exclude these groups from the ‘we’ group of ‘genuine’ Karelian residents. It is not possible to determine from the corpus of data if ethnic Karelians themselves are any more or less antipathetic to these groups than their ethnic Russian counterparts, nor is it possible to attempt to gauge how widespread this intolerance may be. What can be determined is that such intolerant views are held by a significant section of the region’s population and that these views are at least tolerated by the local authorities and indeed on occasion promoted by them for their own political ends. Importantly it can be seen from the discourse on the excluded groups that the Finno-Ugric minorities are not rejected by the Russian majority in the same way but are accorded the
same legitimation as residents of the region as the Russians themselves. Indeed Karelians and Russians are incorporated in the ‘we’ group in opposition to Muslims and ‘immigrants’ from Caucasia. It is also instructive to note that Karelia itself is constructed in this discourse, as in many of the other narratives analysed above, as a part of ‘Russia’ itself, in contradistinction to areas such as Chechnya which appear to be constructed as beyond the boundaries of a ‘real’ Russia; in this narrative as in others sampled above Karelia is Russia.
Chapter Four: Narrating National Identity in Private Discourse:
Interview Material
Following on from the analysis of the mass media discourse in the preceding chapter an examination shall now be made of the interview data to determine both the manner in which the participants constructed and used historical narratives to advance differing conceptions of Karelian identities and to investigate the relationship between this process and the mass media material. Firstly further demographical information on the participants involved shall be presented in order to further clarify the particular context within which each excerpt is located and the potential discursive ‘weight’ of each contribution. The analysis shall then focus on the creation of differing conceptions of Karelian ‘space’ as exemplified by the interviewees’ responses to questioning on the status of differing national groups within the Republic of Karelia and the extent to which these groups may be seen as indigenous to the region. This includes the examination of the construction of strategies of continuation and marginalisation which seek to exclude or justify the claims of differing groups to Karelia as their ‘indigenous’ territory. Narratives which associate Karelian identity with the Russian cultural sphere and thus identity shall be examined together with those which seek to diminish this influence or exclude it altogether. This shall also be related to the construction of Karelia as a ‘model’ Russian-Orthodox territory and the implications of this for ideas both of the Russian character of the region and ethnic Karelian identity itself. The manner in which the supposed shared historical unity of the Karelians and Russians is constructed in opposition to enemies both ancient and more modern shall also be examined; it shall be argued that this phenomenon is less marked in the interview material, although still present, and is related to a a much less pronounced ‘enemy’ picture of the Finnish ‘other’. The role of familial experience and recollection in altering or refuting the mainstream mass media narrative of this period shall also be explored. It shall be argued that this alternate source of knowledge is used to construct narratives which make the position of the Karelians more ambiguous in relation both to their supposed allies and enemies. A further examination of the usage of the foundation of the KTK as a ‘foundational myth’ or ‘named beginning’ and thus a basis for a form of ‘civic’ identity in the Republic of Karelia shall be made. It shall be argued that this effort has limited resonance in ethnic Karelian society and can be opposed by a number of other narratives.
based on alternate historical resources; this includes, for a small group, the foundation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika. The usage of the *Kalevala* as a potential alternate source of such a ‘mythic’ beginning shall be examined together with its possible limitations. The extremely important issue of how the decline in Karelian language usage is narrated and the implications of the narratives and strategies used for putative Karelian identities shall also be addressed. The format of the interview process also allowed a direct examination of the importance of historical narratives for the production of identity as perceived by the participants themselves; the interviewees were asked to evaluate the importance and role of history for themselves and more broadly within society in the area. Through this process the importance of history to the production of potential Karelian identities was indicated not merely by the positive evaluation of its significance by those surveyed but by the manner in which this was expressed. Finally the very marked heteronomisation identified in the data is analysed in more depth and its significance explored.

4.1 The Composition of the Interview Data

During the interview process participants were asked to self-identify their nationality, a question which unsurprisingly caused some difficulty for certain participants. Although some had reservations about choosing one particular over another, for example A6 who declared:

Я вообще человек без национальности.

This was due to his mixed heritage, a problem which led him to decline providing any answer to this question. Participant A7 answered by noting he had both Karelian and Russian heritage:

Дело в том что по матери я прихожусь с карельской семьи, но там тоже смешаный то есть русские и карелы, а отец мои он чисто русский.

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This resulted in the interviewee freely interchanging between using the terms ‘we’ or ‘us’ to describe both Karelians and Russians.

Nevertheless despite most participants were able to provide a national identity, which if the two individuals above are excluded provides a sample of 18 Karelians (including one Tver’ Karelian), 1 Vepsian and 3 Russian interviewees.

All but 5 interviews were conducted in Petrozavodsk with individuals currently residing within the city. The remaining interviews were all conducted in the town of Olonets with current residents of that town. Organisational difficulties precluded the conducting of interviews outwith these two locales. Nevertheless many of the participants were originally resident in or self-identified as being ‘from’ a diverse array of different towns within the Republic of Karelia:

- Petrozavodsk: 7
- Olonetskii Raion: 6
- Kalevalskii Raion: 4
- Pryazhenskii Raion: 3
- Segezhskii Raion: 1
- Prionezhskii Raion: 1
- Suoyarvskii Raion: 1
- Outside Karelia: 1

The sample of participants is therefore representative of the Republic of Karelia in general terms to the extent that many interviewees although resident primarily in the main urban centre had strong links to the provinces also. As shall be discussed below some small differences in attitudes across the regions may perhaps be discernible. As discussed above the data has been partially
anonymised hence the exact ages of the participants were not recorded; they were however placed into three age groups as below:

18-35: 5 participants (N Antonova, A3, 4, C1 and D 14)

35-55: 12 participants (A1, 5, 6, 7, 8, B1, D1, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 11)

55 +: 7 participants (A Grigoriev, Z Strogal’shchikova, B2, D2, 7, 15, 16)

These age groups divide the participants into those who had little or no experience of living within Soviet-era Karelia, those who had spent at least their formulative years under the Soviet system and those who had spent most of their life in the USSR. The grouping is quite broad hence there is the potential for some relatively significant differences in historical experience yet it was felt they were adequate to determine any general divergences between those raised and in particular educated under different systems. The educational experience of any individual is, as discussed above, of key importance in determining the structure of their habitus and thus critical to understanding how differing national identities may be generated. It should be noted that the interviewees who participated in this study were almost uniformly very well educated. Only four of the subjects had completed only a secondary school level education; and of this three it should be noted one was currently undertaking university education and another had completed extensive technical education in the field of mechanical engineering. All the remaining participants had completed a university education to the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree and five had also subsequently gained doctoral or other higher academic or professional qualifications. Further information on the particular qualifications or other material which may be considered of relevance in elucidating the production of certain narratives identified in the texts below shall be adduced as required. It shall suffice to say at this point that the data gathered represents a very highly-educated and thus potentially influential section of the population of the Republic of Karelia.
4.2 Indigenous or Immigrant? The Interview Data

i) Narratives which exclude the Vepsians

The interview participants were asked to give their opinions on the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish peoples and languages being officially recognised as ‘indigenous’ to the Republic of Karelia. The basis of this recognition and its legal and administrative implications are discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The idea of one or more of these groups or indeed others as indigenous is also used to support and reject various historical narratives and associated conceptions of identity in the mass media as examined above. It was therefore considered important to test the conceptions of Karelian space constructed in the mass media discourse and official rhetoric with those produced by the interview participants. A number of participants agreed with the official position without reservation:

Да, да, хотя...исконными, исконно-историческими титуальными нациями являются Карелы и Финны и Вепсы (A7).

Это историческая правда от которой не возможно уйти (D2).

Despite participant D2 describing this formulation of the indigenous groups of the Republic of Karelia in positive terms as an actual historical ‘truth’, thus imbuing it with the status of fact, most other participants sought to negotiate an alternate list of indigenous peoples which excluded one or other of those on the official list or included an alternate contender for this status. As has been seen in the mass media discourse discussion on the Vepsian population often marginalises them as a group by limiting their ‘legitimate’ territory to the small area around Shyoltozero. A similar tendency to restrict the territory of historic or indigenous Vepsian settlement to this area can be seen in the examples below:

Ну да, коренные. Но нет коренные дело в том что как бы я не могу сказать точно про вепсов потому что я, то есть историю вепского народа я знаю так, не очень хорошо, то есть потому что я знаю на данной момент

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есть в Карелии в Шёлтозеро где проживают, ареал проживание вепсов, и такой же ареал проживание вепсов есть и на территории Ленинградской Области (D4).

Коренные народы Карелии, Каряла, Карелы и Финны, а Вепсы они здесь если будет объективно, две деревни есть, Шёлтозеро, и всё. А остальные Вепсы южнее, в Вологодской Области вот так понимаете (А. Grigoriev)

In both the examples above although the Veps are not totally disqualified from making a legitimate claim to being indigenous within Karelia the claim is restricted to one small area. Both participants locate the broader homeland for the Veps outside the boundaries of Karelia, or indeed the even more Finno-Ugric Karjala as Anatolii Grigoriev denotes the area. Interestingly both participants D2 and D4 are from the Olonets region which is geographically relatively close to the Vepsian area thus created however D2 seems more inclined to grant Vepsians the title of indigenous to a broader Karelia whereas D4, although qualifying her statements with an acknowledgement of an apparent lack of expertise, is more inclined to restrict Vepsian identity to a more limited area.

ii) Narratives Which Exclude the Finns

Aside from the two examples mentioned above however most participants did not seek to question the claims of the Vepsian minority to indigenous status within Karelia. A much more common phenomenon was the rejection of the idea of the Finns as indigenous within the modern Republic of Karelia as exemplified below:

Лично я считаю что Карелы и Вепсы коренные да, коренные народы Карелы. Вепсы даже раньше появились а Финны наверное просто пришли сюда к нам, да? Наверное в конце 19-го века, Финны появились вот здесь (D6).
Нет но Финны не является коренным народом, нет в законе прописано что коренным народами являются Карелы и Вепсы, но и Русские в смысле если говорить о коренном народе поскольку Заонежье, и если говорить о Финно-Угорских там то есть коренными народами являются Карелы, Вепсы и Русские. Финны они не могут не мой взгляд считаться коренными потому что они приехали и появились только в 30-х годах прошлого столетия (D15).

Я бы изключил Финнов по той простой причине что вот я же говорю что вот они моменты когда начились 19-20-й век, потом революции, приход к власти Коммунистической Партии, решение чисто геополитических вопросов, когда важно было найти союзников среди Финляндии, для того чтобы...(D7).

In the examples above the idea of the Finns having a legitimate claim to be considered as one of the indigenous peoples of the area is explicitly denied; in fact participant D15 goes as far as to state (incorrectly) that only the Karelians and Vepsians are legally recognised as indigenous. The first two examples refute the official narrative by offering an alternative in which Finns appear within Karelia only relatively recently, in the 19\textsuperscript{th} or 20\textsuperscript{th} century; indeed participant D15 is of the opinion that the Finns arrived in the area as late as the 1930s and not before. In both examples the Finns are also further presented as an ‘other’ group by the use of verbs which describe their appearance in Karelia in terms of them ‘arriving’ from elsewhere. Their refutation of the idea of the Finns as indigenous is made somewhat tentative however, by their usage of cautious language; D6 for example prefices their comments by redundantly informing their interlocutor that what follows is their personal opinion, and by using a linguistic marker of uncertainty such as ‘наверное’ to highlight their hesitancy in making such a claim. Although D15 is to some degree more strident in their rejection of Finnish claims to indigenous status they also inform the interlocutor that this is ‘their view’. It would appear that there is some imagined ambiguity over this issue and that both participants feel that the rejection of such Finnish claims must be presented as a personal opinion rather than a bald statement of fact. The final example from participant D7 exemplifies an alternate strategy
through which the claims of the Finns to indigenous status are rejected by the depiction of such claims as being a political fabrication; the idea of the Finns as indigenous to Karelia is linked to the political manoeuvrings of the leadership of the USSR. In this way the claims of Finns to be indigenous to Karelia are disparaged by a strategy of equivalence that compares them to the artificial manipulation of boundaries for strategic political ends. All the above participants are Karelians from the southern areas of the Republic of Karelia, either from Olonets Raion or the neighbouring Pryazhenskii Raion. This group of Karelians have traditionally been seen as more remote from Finnish influence and certainly the above samples seem to demonstrate a reluctance to include Finns within the ‘we’ group of traditional residents in Karelia amongst these Karelians; interestingly as D15’s contribution indicate they may be more willing to acknowledge Russian residence in certain areas, although again this is restricted to a specific named locality.

As has been glimpsed in the media discourse however one group of Finns are accorded special status in this debate, at least by certain participants. Although an outright dismissal of any suggestion Finns are indigenous in the area was more common it was also not unusual for Ingrian Finns to be constructed as having a particular claim to residence in the modern Republic of Karelia:

A) Исторический то коренными народами чисто Карелии являются три, Русские, Карелы и Вепсы. Вот это вот чисто коренные народы. Что касается Финнов-Ингерманландцев да, и Финнов, то что в нашей территории...Финны-Ингерманландцы они из Ленинградской Области вокруг Санкт-Петербурга это на их исторической территории. А Финны они жили, жили у нас но очень, можем сказать в незначительном количестве...но поскольку, значит, да что политика особенно после 20-х годов прошлого века у нас была построена да, то сегодня после вот 50-х годов у нас уже преобладает точка зрения что у нас 4 да кореные народы то есть Карелы, Русские, Вепсы и Финны-Ингерманландцы (B2).
B) То что Карелы и Вепсы коренные народы это точно, вот а Финны не коренные, эти Ингерманландцы это Ленинградская Область, там их родина. Это 49-м году их выдали, вначале в Сибирь сослали все, всех Ингерманландцев, а потом после войны потому что рабочая сила не хватало Куприянов бывший секретарь обкома партии, или ЦК партии, Республика была Карело-Финнская, он обратился к Сталину, он обратился куда он обратился я не знаю, и попросил разрешение этим приехать сюда. Потому что рабочих не хватало. И тогда я помню 56-м приехали сюда, порядочные приехали, и они работали и многие здесь осели. Но они не коренные, не коренные в Карелии, а именно вот оттуда. А так вот Финнов, Финны это не коренное население (D16).

Although both examples above from Karelian contributors explicitly exclude Finns in general from the recognised group of indigenous peoples, which in example A also includes Russians, both also accord the Ingrian Finns a special status. In example A the method through which this comes about is left unspecified; once again as has been seen in the media discourse ‘politics’ synecdochically replaces any actual recognised agency through which a change has occurred. Example B is similarly vague when it comes to attributing the blame for the removal of the Ingrian Finns from their ‘motherland’, as Leningrad Oblast’ is described. By contrast the mechanism by which the Ingrian Finns were allowed to settle in Karelia is definitely attributed to the efforts of Gennady Kupriyanov, who is as shall be seen below often constructed as something almost approaching a hero by certain Karelian contributors. Although Kupriyanov has to again appeal to Stalin or authorities of which the participant claims to have no knowledge he does bring about the immigration of the Ingrians. The settlement of the Ingrian Finns, who are positively assessed as “порядочные” in example B, is therefore definitively attributed to a specific period, the 1950s; in fact in the latter example the participant actually claims to have witnessed their arrival firsthand. The Ingrian Finns are depicted in both examples however as being
unwillingly resettled from their historic homeland to Karelia, and thus are constructed in a sympathetic light. In example A in particular the fact that they were forcibly removed to Karelia is narrated as having given rise to a popular opinion “у нас” that the Ingrian Finns at least could be considered worthy of being denoted ‘indigenous’. It would appear therefore that at least for some participants the historic persecution of the Ingrian Finns grants them some special status within the modern Republic of Karelia even if Finns as a whole are not considered to be one of the indigenous peoples of the territory. It should be noted that both participants belong to the eldest group of participants, indeed D16 is a pensioner, and thus perhaps for this group of Karelians the idea of the ‘arrival’ of the Finns is associated with this specific event; being able to identify a period when many Finns arrived in what would have been, following the purges of the 1930s, their almost complete absence, may equate for these participants with the ‘beginning’ of Finnish residence in some areas. D16, although a keen amateur historian, has only a secondary school education and thus has not completed the same amount of education as the doctoral graduate B2 and thus may be unaware of any Finnish residence in Karelia prior to this point; B2 is aware of this fact but again seeks to diminish and trivialise it to an insignificant quantity.

iii) The Status of Russians

As has been glimpsed in the discussion on the Finns above the Russian population is accorded the status of indigenous to the modern Republic of Karelia by certain Karelian contributors alongside the Karelians themselves.

А) Они всё время здесь жили, особенно вот Заонежье...вот и Белое Море, Поморье, эта территория Карелии но там тоже жили люди там столько же сколько мы...поэтому правильнее было писать Карелы, Вепсы и Русские (D7).
In the examples above Karelian contributors are prepared to acknowledge Russians as indigenous to at least parts of the modern Republic of Karelia. Both examples date Russian settlement within Karelia to time immemorial ("изначала" or "всё время"), indeed in example A Russian settlement in certain areas is constructed as having been of equal duration to that of the Karelians themselves. In both examples however this history of settlement is narrated as having been confined to the area around the White Sea or the Pomor’e; it is therefore implied that the remainder of Karelia is the original territory of the Karelians and Vepsians. Indeed in example B the Karelians and Vepsians are described as being the ‘local’ or ‘местное’ inhabitants of Karelian in opposition to the Russians, despite these very Russians being in supposed “постоянным контактом” with their Finno-Ugric neighbours. The idea of Russians being indigenous to Karelia is therefore acknowledged by the Karelians but at the same time diminished: only some Russians in certain areas are accorded this status. In fact in example B the actual ‘Russian-ness’ of these indigenous Russians is played down; they are depicted as being Russian but at the same time both adapted for life in the harsh climate of the north and also constantly influenced by their Karelian neighbours. As noted above D7 is a participant from Olonets and the putative willingness of Karelians from this area to accord at least some recognition as indigenous has been noted. Participant D10 although born and resident in Petrozavodsk is a self-described ‘Northern Karelian’ with strong links to the Suoyarvskii Raion; again the participant is willing to accord recognition to Russian claims of indigenous status but he attaches even more caveats to this recognition.
The number of Russian participants who took part in interview process was quite small, thus the data derived from their interviews could not on its own provide a meaningful sample of their views on whether or not their national group can claim to be indigenous to Karelia or the manner in which these views are expressed discursively. A survey of the mass media discourse however has already provided us with a clear indication that Russians frequently do depict their national group as having a legitimate claim to be considered indigenous within the modern Republic of Karelia. The Russian participants interviewed tended to advance similar views as exemplified below:

Русские также составляют коренные в Карелии но только те скорее...
Заонежский район, Пудожский, Поморье, Беломолрский в котором там же Поморы живут...но естественно что необходимо не только Карельский язык развивать но и местные диалекты поддерживать (D11).

In the above excerpt the Russian participant again cites the heritage of the Zaonezh’e and Pomor’e to narrate a history of Karelia in which at least some parts of the region can be claimed as part of a historical Russian homeland. This interview was especially interesting as the participant then developed the idea of Russian settlement in what is now Karelia in an unusual fashion; the idea of this ancient Russian territory and its history was invoked as representative of another aspect of Russian identity and culture in opposition to that which the participant felt dominated contemporary Russian society:

Понимаете исторический это возможно это действительно так и есть учитывая как бы местную Русскую культуру и Заонежскую, Поморскую и так далее, но у нас сейчас просто идётся такая вот новая волна вот этой да имперской унификации да и говорят что все Русские всюду одинаковые вот и люди иногда эту слушают и начинают вот слишком себя упрощать что есть, они как бы сводятся себя какой общеrusской идентичности которая на самом деле большой миф. Потому что действительно Русские разных регионов разные, и тех то здесь на севере живут это как бы такие наследники Новгородских республиканских традиций да? (ibid).
In the above excerpt the Russian participant appeals to the supposed more independent and democratic heritage of the Russian population of Karelia in opposition to the centralising, ‘imperialist’ politics of the current Russian authorities. The current Russian population of the Republic of Karelia are constructed as the descendants of the Pomor’e and Zaonezh’e, the “наследники Новгородских республиканских традиций”. In this narrative therefore the local Russians are constructed as having been remote from the authority and traditions of the Tsarist state; they are narrated as having descended not from the acquiescent serfs of central Russia but as free citizens of a Novogordian, not Muscovite, Republic. The participant here uses a deconstructive strategy, citing supposed ‘Karelian’ exceptionalism to deconstruct the usual ‘we’ group of Russians and promote his idea that “Русские разных регионов разные”. The idea of a single Russian identity is in fact dismissed explicitly with a direct statement that it is in actual fact a “большой миф.” This particular participant was a relatively young (in the 35-55 group) journalist from Petrozavodsk who sought to promote a consistently ‘regionalist’ discourse, as discussed further below, which distanced the Republic of Karelia from the federal centre but did not attempt to dilute its essential Russianess; Karelia is allotted distinguishing features but Russia is characterised by this regional diversity.

A somewhat more typical contribution from a Russian participant, which is also very reminiscent of those narratives found in the mass media, seeks not to divide the ‘we’ group of Russians but to create a broader ‘we’ group of Karelians, Russians and others as part of a single unified people:

И тут они стались вместе с Карелами с Вепсами с Финнами перемешаться, жениться пережениться и тут прошла, произошёл вот этот братский народ уже. И уже не разбирёшь что и где. Ну никакие здесь, как сказать, каких-то разговоров то "вы Вепсы, вы Карелы вы Финны вы Русские" тут такого нету. И кстати мой пример это поддерживает то есть я ещё повторю что да это уже всё нормально (С2).

In this narrative the Karelian, Finnish, Vepsian and Russian peoples are depicted as having all already assimilated with each other into one “братский
The internmarriage of individual Karelians, Veps and Finns with each other and Russians and other incomers, is synecdochial shorthand for the creation of a single ‘fraternal’ people. The interviewer is advised that one cannot now even determine which nationality an individual may be; this constructive strategy is further emphasised by the interviewee’s statement that the question of an individual’s nationality is never raised in this unified society. This situation is insisted upon by the participant as the norm: “я ещё повторю что да это уже всё нормально.” This participant was a Russian married to a Karelian which may account for their formulation of a ‘fraternal people’ through analogy to their own personal situation.

The idea of Russians are indigenous to the modern Republic of Karelia is however occasionally refuted by the Karelians themselves. In particular Anatolii Grigoriev and Natalya Antonova were sceptical of the idea of Russians being considered an indigenous group alongside the Finno-Ugric minorities:

A) Что касается Русские поимаете, и нас сейчас комитет по национальной политике...вот и там некоторые говорят «и Русские Заонежья» такой термин тоже коренные. Знаете что во первых Карелы, Финны, Вепсы, Эстонцы там, Венгры Поволжские, не Финны, это особая языковая группа, Финно-Угорская группа. А Русские, Англичане, потом Украинцы и так далее, Индо-Европейские. То есть понимаете, вот и всё. Это я же, этнография понимаете? Совершенные другие языковые группы (А Grigoriev).

B) Ну вообще это и правда и не правда, потому что если как бы понять из каких территорий состоит Республика Карелия в целом, то по большому счёту это конечно же неправда. Если смотреть конституцию Республики Карелия и сходит от того что мы должны чего-то отталкивать и как-то себя позиционировать, то это правда. Да здесь есть такие районы и здесь есть такие территории где Карелы проживали исконно, и где Вепсы проживали исконно. Здесь есть такие районы где очень уже
давно проживают например Финны-ингерманландцы, причём проживают компактно особенно те кто выгнали из Ленинградской Области. Вот, здесь также проживают...большие группы этнографических Русских, учёные полагают конечно что земля которая населённая Русскими например Поморьями или Пудожьяными или Заонежьскими, они всё равно имеют пра-Финский и пра-Саамский аспект. И это в принципе даже я не учёный даже я понимаю хотя бы если взять то что название, топонимы говорят о многом, даже название топонимов там где живут Русские имеют Финское начале. И даже не Финское а пра-Финское начале в этом пра-Финском есть также и Карельское да, просто как пра-Финское племя. То есть понятно то эта территория сначала была населенный не Русскими этнического исконно как бы не Русскими и может быть где-то параллельно от своей шло как Новгородцами так как и Финно-угорцами но всё равно большая часть территории Республики Карелия была охвачена пра-Финским (N. Antonova).

In example A above Grigoriev is somewhat dismissive of the idea of non-Finno-Ugric nationalities being considered indigenous to the Republic of Karelia. The usage of the term “Русские Заонежья” is attributed by him to unnamed colleagues within the Committee for National Politics and is immediately decried; Grigoriev uses a strategy of delegitimation noting that Russians belong, alongside the English, to the Indo-European language group not the Finno-Ugric. Although the point is not fully developed the inference made is that Karelia is a Finno-Ugric territory; Russians cannot therefore put forward a valid claim to be considered indigenous within it. In example B Natalya Antonova uses a different strategy to delegitimise the idea of Russians being indigenous to parts of Karelia by narrating a history in which these Russians themselves are actually descended from Finno-Ugric roots or are at the very least inhabiting lands which were originally settled by Finno-Ugric tribes. By claiming that even the supposedly most Russian areas of the modern Republic of Karelia can be shown to have toponyms of a Finno-Ugric rather than Slavic
derivation Antonova seeks to deconstruct the idea of these areas as being the indigenous territory of the Russian people. The entirety of the modern Republic of Karelia is constructed using a strategy of continuation in this narrative as having been the territory of Finno-Ugric peoples from time immemorial. In both examples both Grigoriev and Antonova construct an image of Karelia as being the indigenous territory of the Finno-Ugric peoples. Interestingly in both the Finns are accorded some kind of legitimate status as indigenous; this is achieved by their inclusion in the Finno-Ugric ‘we’ group of legitimate indigenous peoples by Grigoriev and by Antonova’s insistence on the ‘Proto-Finnish’ derivation of almost all Karelian place-names. It must also be noted that Antonova is somewhat equivocal about what being indigenous might mean; it clearly for her has both a ‘factual’ and a ‘political’ aspect.

4.3 The Indivisible Narrative? Links Between Karelian and Russian History

i) Karelia as Russia From (Almost) Time Immemorial

Participants in the interview process were asked to identify, if possible, what differences they felt existed between Russian history and Karelian history and to describe how, in their opinion, Karelia became part of a Russian state. The purpose of this exercise was to determine to what extent the tendency in some narratives to depict Karelian history as indivisible from that of Russia as a whole found in the media discourse was present within the manner in which ethnic Karelians in particular approached the history of the area. Certain participants did construct an image of Karelians as always having been associated historically with a Russian state:

Сказать чтобы Русские ну то есть вот Новгородцы да вначале, или Московские Русские они занимались какое-то уничтожение в Карелии или мы чувствовали, Карелы чувствовали себя не титуальной нации и ещё, нет.
То есть, как-то, никакого особого притеснения не было, или борьбы, на самом деле не было большие борьбы за самоидентификацию Карельского народа, никогда было если в истории посмотрим да? Были крестьянские бунты но крестьянские бунты они во основном были против строя, как бы, и не против государственной устройства или, отделение (A7).

In the above example we see a unifactory strategy within which both Karelians and Russians are depicted as never having been in conflict with each other. The Russians are narrated as having never attempted to forcibly dissolve the Karelian people and the Karelians in turn are narrated as having never attempted to forcibly remove themselves from Russian over-lordship. In this manner the current relationship between Karelians and Russians is narrated as the result of centuries of peaceful coexistence. The actual method through which Karelians came to live under Russian rule is unstated; it appears in this narrative as this has always been the case, as if it were a natural fact. As noted above the participant involved freely switches between usage of ‘we’ and ‘the Karelians’ whilst relating the narrative which is indicative of their own mixed heritage; it also indicates the potential possession of a ‘multiple identity’ of both Karelian and Russian. This individual was the only participant to offer any real indication of such a mixed or shared identity in the data collected.

In the example below respondents from the town of Olonets reference the narrative, which we have encountered previously in the mass media discourse, of the town as being the ‘bulwark’ of the Russian state:

История Карелии и история России они взаимосвязанные, то есть это получается что здесь…наверное если бы уходил в глубины то есть как образовалось племя Корела то там немножко да эта история расходиться самого образования племени Корелы, а потом уже то есть так как Карелия была то есть как бы Новгородская Губерния поэтому здесь история взаимосвязанная, что Олонец был форпостом, защищал границу России наверное здесь как бы связанно (D4).

Сейчас есть очень много публикации по этому вопросу, и понятно что нельзя утверждать что, всему говорим о том что первое упоминание
1137 год Олонца, 1137 год. Но у нас есть археологическое доказательство, что здесь люди жили 5-6 тысяч лет до нашей эры, так что надо исходить из тех времен. И сложно говорить о том, кто к кому привыкнул, Карелы Русским или Русские Карелам (D7).

Although the interviewee in the first example hints at a potential history of Karelia which does exclude Russian influence they are unable to develop this beyond the merest of sketches; they tentatively identify the ‘foundation’ of the tribe of ‘Korela’ as being a period before Russian and Karelian history became intertwined. This historical moment is located in the “глубины”, however, that is to say it is constructed as being almost beyond historical record, in the extreme distant past. Beyond this initial foundational moment the history of the Karelian people is narrated as being inseparable from that of Russia itself; in fact Karelia is directly equated to a ‘Novgorodskaya Guberniya’ from this point onwards, and therefore incorporated into the familiar narrative of Olonets District defending the Russian border. The second example also invokes a period of extreme antiquity, 5-6,000 B.C., with reference to the Olonets area; the interviewee however is reluctant to draw conclusions from this about a period of Karelian history which excludes Russian influence. The narrative of history is pushed back from 1137, a date in which Olonets is mentioned in Russian historical sources, to ancient prehistory, thus potentially hinting at an exclusively Karelian or Finno-Ugric period. The participant is unwilling to construct such a narrative, however, and relates their inability to determine whether Karelians were more attracted to the Russians or vice versa; Karelian history is thus once again tied to Russian history from an extremely early date. It is interesting to note that both participants are well-educated to degree level; D4 has both a degree within the field of Karelian studies and is employed as a tour guide in the Olonets area whilst D7 is a teacher at the local school. Despite this level of education and interest in local lore neither can relate a historical narrative of Karelia without some before Russian influence in anything but the vaguest of terms. D7 is in the older age group whilst D4 is in the youngest age group. This would appear to indicate that despite the changes in education since the collapse of the USSR little information on the early history of the Olonets area is available and hence it is...
very difficult for Karelians to offer any coherent historical narrative which excludes Russian influence.

The idea of the border playing a critical role in the development of Karelian identity is also present in a somewhat different form in the excerpt below:

У нас, Карелы сами да, оказались разделёнными между двумя культурами. Одна культура эта культура будем так называть значить да может быть российская, и вторая культура западная да скажем протестантская финская, вот эта страна. То есть Карелия у нас появляется разделённой границей, государственной границей, большая часть Карелов на сегодняшний день живёт сейчас в Российской Федерации притом в Российской Федерации мы тоже разделённые ещё да, административными границами да? Вот есть Карелы в Карелии и Карелы Тверские. Поэтому если говорит о Карелах которых, российские Карелы да, то надо сказать что...что мы исторически так сложилось что эта часть карельского населения искона веков тяготела к Российской государственности да? Поскольку была включена в систему политических, экономических отношений да? Военных отношениях на этой территории (В2).

The above example is representative of the manner in which a large proportion of the participants narrated the manner in which Karelia or Karelians themselves became part of the Russian state. In this narrative the Karelians are passive subjects of a process which takes place entirely outwith their control; as in this text where for example the Karelians “оказались разделёнными” with the agency by which this process was achieved and the attitude of the Karelians to this process left unstated. The division of the Karelian people and Karelia as a territory is presented as a fait accompli: the inclusion of the Karelians within a Russian state is presented as something which “исторически так сложилось.” In this manner a sort of strategy of inevitability is invoked in which the Karelians cannot influence their fate and are therefore resigned to being incorporated into one or other of the larger competing nations either side of the border. Once
again this is indicative of the heteronomisation displayed within the process of identity construction by Karelians. As in the mass media discourse the Karelian population is depicted using a form of negative self-presentation, similar to the manner described for the Russian population by Oushakine or Gudkov noted above, which constructs the Karelians as helpless bystanders unable to positively influence events.

Occasionally participants narrated a history of Karelia or the Karelian people in which Russian influence is limited to one particular period rather than being present from, or almost from, the very beginnings of the narrative. Participant A7, for example, did opine that there were differences between Karelian and Russian history, but that after the 1917 revolution:

In this narrative it is the 1917 revolution that severs the thread of independent Karelian development, in the interviewee’s mind, and ties the fate of the Karelian people together with that of the USSR as a whole. The participant does not clearly state in what way Karelian history actually differed from Russian history prior to 1917, but nevertheless clearly formulates this period as the time when Karelian history ceased and the Karelians were subjected to the same historical processes, which the interviewee lists, as the remainder of the Soviet people. In this narrative the 1917 is constructed as a topos of ‘diaster’, which leads to a litany of negative consequences including, significantly, the loss of the Karelian language; once again the Karelians themselves are also constructed as passive throughout these processes. A somewhat similar narrative was offered by Zinadia Strogal’shchikova, an academic and leading authority on Vepsian issues. Although she did not advance the idea that Karelian and Russian
histories were identical at any period, she did offer a narrative in which until the
fall of the USSR the Finno-Ugric minorities were unable to influence the
development of their own history:

Это уже последний период когда мы сами могли влиять на эту
историю, и сами формулировать как-то её. В частности например мы в
1989-м году в апреле мы утвердили, здесь документом ещё, свою
письменность это для нас важно. Или мы создали 90-м году орган который
занимается национальными политиками, то есть такие даты которые
связанные с нашим национальной историей (Z. Strogal’shchikova).

In the excerpt above Strogal’shchikova not only denies the ability of the
Finno-Ugric minorities to influence the manner in which their history developed
prior to 1989 but also their ability to ‘formulate’ this history; that is to say to
narrate their history for their own ends. In this narrative the Karelians and
Vepsians, whilst evidently possessing a different culture and different traditions
to their Russian counterparts, are unable to influence their own affairs until
relatively recent history. The real political history of the Karelians and
Vepsians, therefore, within which they are able to determine the own affairs, is
constructed as a recent phenomenon; prior to this date these affairs were, we
must assume, being managed by unnamed others, presumably Russians. In this
narrative, therefore, almost all Karelian and Vepsian history is associated with
Russian history, but without positive connotations; once again throughout this
history the Finno-Ugric peoples are depicted as being powerless over their own
destinies.

Some Karelian contributors were willing to construct a history of Karelia
in which parts of the territory had been associated with Russia since time
immemorial whilst denying that status to certain other locales:

Ну знаете сейчас тяжело судить потому что поскольку я знаю эта
часть Карелии она была всё время в составе России. Значит наш район
никуда не переходил, если мы говорим о южной Карелии тут вот район
Сортовалы там, вот этот район то он переходил то был под […] Финнов,
Although the interviewee is prepared to construct their part of Karelia as having been part of Russia since time immemorial (“всё время”), they also determine that there are areas which were never part of a historic Russian state. Whilst their local area is described as having never changed hands and thus a legitimate part of the modern Russian state, the area around Sortavala is recognised as having been once under Swedish and Finnish rule. The modern inhabitants of the area are denoted “переселенцы” or incomers as opposed to the Karelians and Finns the participant appears to view as the genuine inhabitants of the land. The illegitimacy of the current settlement of the land is further reinforced by the statement that in these areas “никого нет”; it would appear that in the interviewee’s mind the absence of Karelians and Finns is the absence of real and permanent settlement of the area.

The Russian participants also often narrated the history of Karelia that of Russia in general. Participant C2, for example, found it impossible to narrate a history of Karelia separate from that of Russia itself:

- Очень трудно, история Карелии и России как-то разрывать потому-что всё одно целое. И на мой взгляд вот это самая важная события есть победа в Великой Отечественной Войне потому-что на, могла вообще государственность российская прекратить своё существование. В случае поражение в этой войны не только Россия а вся Европа бы перестала своё существование. Поэтому на мой взгляд самая важная и знаковая события двадцатого века это победа в Великой Отечественной Войне.

- Понятно, что вы не видите...

- Вне Россий Карелии нету, что это одно целое (С2).

The interviewee was unable or unwilling to conceive of a distinct ‘Karelian’ history, instead affirming that Karelia was an inseparable part of Russia. Indeed the very idea of Karelia was considered to be impossible outside of Russia; the interviewee twice repeats the phrase that Karelia and Russia is
“одно целое”. In this rather extreme example the possibility of a discrete Karelian history and therefore identity in opposition to Russian equivalents is described as actually impossible; Karelia and Karelians cannot exist in isolation from Russia as a whole. This excerpt is very reminiscent of the strategies of unification and continuation sampled from the mass media discourse and thus demonstrates the resonance of these narratives within at least part of the Russian population of the Republic of Karelia.

ii) The Role of Orthodoxy

As in the mass media discourse the apparent role of the Russian Orthodox Church in unifying Karelians and Russians is a major thematic concern in narratives which seek to depict a shared cultural and political heritage and thus identity for these two nationalities. The supposed long history of the Orthodoxy of Karelians and Karelia was also used to explain the mechanism through which Karelia became part of a specifically Russian state by certain of the participants in the interview process. Once again by stressing the apparently innate Orthodoxy of the Karelian people these participants firmly associated an important part of Karelian identity with Russian identity itself. The example below is typical of this process:

Главное что нас обединило с Русским народом и с Русским государственным это православие. Это мое глубокое убеждение...если вот взять всей территории России, православный ортодоксальный, то на территории Карелии среди коренных жителей, Карелов и Вепсов, больше всех местных чтимых святых....и естественно что народ ориентированных на своих святых и православие как государственную религию уже не отделял себя от Московского государство (A7).

The excerpt above is typical in the manner in which it constructs an image of Karelia as the archetypal Orthodox territory; not only are the Karelians and Veps constructed as Orthodox we are informed that they are the most
Orthodox ethnicities in all Russia, with the potential exception of the Russians themselves. Once again Karelia is constructed as a ‘model’ Orthodox land and the Karelians and Veps as ‘model’ believers, as identified in the mass media material. The interviewee uses deterministic language to narrate a situation in which the Karelians could not do anything other than orientate themselves towards the Russian state. In fact the idea of Orthodoxy was so influential that the Karelians “уже не отделяли себя” from the Russian authorities; in this example the Orthodoxy of the Karelian people is narrated as having been so profound as to have removed the very possibility of their independent existence outside of the Russian world. As in the excerpt from the participant quoted above this creates a strategy of inevitability in which Karelians are drawn into the Russian cultural sphere; again given the form of multiple identity proffered by this participant the process, although inexorable, is not narrated as being undertaken against the Karelians’ will although without their direct participation.

Many of the participants were of the opinion that it was the religious affiliation of the Karelian people which determined their affinity for Russian culture. As in the media discourse the Orthodoxy of the Karelians is also narrated as having led them into a military alliance with the medieval Russian state; this military and spiritual alliance is seen as directed against an Finnish/Swedish ‘other’ in opposition to the Orthodox ‘we’ group of Karelians and Russians:

Но я думаю в многом зависило о том что всё-таки в древние времена Карельские племена всё-таки больше поддерживали скажем так, то же самый Новгород, и так далее потому что, насколько я помню, в Новгородских дружинах служили Кареы. Потому что Финляндия это была, но это лютераны, в том что Финляндия была долгие годы под владычеством Швеции, а у России Швеции скажем так да не в коем отношении не всегда были гладкими...Карелы успели обратить своё время в православие, они православный народ, Карелы Вепсы точно также как и Русские (D10).
In the example above the Karelians and Vepsians are explicitly equated to Russians in terms of their religious faith, they are Orthodox “точно также” like their Russian counterparts. Indeed the Orthodoxy of the Karelians is depicted as something which they chose themselves rather than having been imposed upon them. The participant narrates this shared religious feeling as dating back to time immemorial; the Karelians are depicted as having been allied with the Novgorodian Russians since ‘ancient’ times in a shared enmity towards the Finns and Swedes on primarily religious grounds. In this manner a narrative is produced using a unificatory strategy which represents Karelians as being the willing allies of the Russians in fighting for the Orthodox church and thus positions the idea of Karelian identity close to that of Russian identity itself.

4.4 Karelia as a Finno-Ugric Territory

Certain participants, however, in particular the Karelian interviewees, narrated histories of Karelia as an area and of their ethnic group which played down or excluded Russian influences. In these narratives Karelia is constructed as having been an exclusively or almost exclusively Finno-Ugric territory. Such narratives tend to locate this period of autonomous cultural development in the relatively distant past, often with reference to the pre-history of the area prior to the recorded arrival of the Russian state. In the excerpt below, for example, participant A4 narrated a history of the area prior to the creation of political boundaries which emphasised common Finno-Ugric elements:

Раньше не было такого, ну, разделения Карелии то есть если говорить про, из начала земли когда мы даже не под русским были то была земля Карело-Финская, я точно не помню как она тогда называлась…то есть эта была в принципе более менее одна земля и одна народность то есть не была никакой определенной границы просто были жили на каких-то, определённых, земле как говорится. Вепсы, как назывались раньше Вепсская Олонецкая там волость, то есть где-то Карелы больше, скажем,
где-то Финны, но это было, соответственно было более менее одна земля и очень похожий образ жизни, быта, язык (A4).

In this narrative the supposed common origins of the Finno-Ugric peoples of the region are emphasised; the interviewee constructs an image of an ancient Finno-Ugric area in which Finns, Vepsians and Karelians live almost identical lives and are essentially “более менее” one group. The interviewee depicts a land in which division between the Finno-Ugric peoples is non-existent to the extent that there are literally no borders. This commonality between the Finno-Ugric peoples is traced back to time immemorial; these peoples are living this common existence at the ‘beginning’ of Karelia, before the arrival of the Russians. Indeed the implication is that it is the arrival of these Russians which ends this Finno-Ugric unity; this ‘golden age’ is explicitly dated to a time when “когда мы даже не под русским были”. This narrative unifies all the Finno-Ugric peoples to a certain extent by emphasising their common origins, and therefore associates the Karelians much more strongly with the Finns than the Russians. It should be noted that the interviewee in this case was from the northern group of Karelians. This group were more inclined to narrate a history of Karelia in which the border between Karelian and Finn in literal terms and in terms of identity appeared at a much later date. In contrast to their southern counterparts Russian influence is depicted as arriving much later and of being of much less importance to the area and their sense of identity. These differences shall be examined in greater detail below. The interviewee was also one of the younger and less well-educated participants which may account for his relative lack of concrete historical information; the topos created of a Finno-Ugric ‘golden age’ is somewhat indistinct in nature due to the use of vague, qualified language.

An interesting perspective on the construction of Karelia as a Finno-Ugric territory was offered by a ‘Tver’ Karelian who had moved to Karelia from her native area. She constructed a narrative of Karelian history in which Karelians, although not the actual original inhabitants of the area, nevertheless inhabited a Finno-Ugric territory rather than a Russian one; in this manner the Karelians are
depicted as having, in contrast to their situation in Tverskaya Oblast’, developed a more secure Finno-Ugric identity:

Я думаю что разница конечно есть довольно большая. А чем я бы обяснил это...в первых территория Карелия эта территория, которая...постоянно происходила смена коренного населения, это лапландцы, потом приходят карелы потом приходят русские конечно это влияет на историю, и на самосознание, как на карелов как на русских которые здесь проживают. Я думаю что как с другой стороны в Тверской Области эта та же ситуация, жили славяне, потом пришли Карелы, потом славяне вернулись, на данную территорию. Но по сравнению с остальной Россией какая разница наверное есть. И также вот это приграничное положение рядом с Финляндией и учитывая что карелы это, родственный народ с финнами поэтому здесь большинство людей всё-таки считают себя немножко как-то, на мой взгляд даже отрезанными от остальной Россией, они ближе к Финляндии. Так как вся остальная Россия относится к Карелии, у меня есть много знакомых которые считают что Карелия это другая страна (А3).

In the above example the Karelians are not acknowledged as the ‘original’ indigenous inhabitants of modern Karelia; in contrast to any other Karelian interviewee the Tver’ Karelian did not think Karelians were the first residents of the area; instead she allotted that distinction to the Saami. Karelia is instead described as an area in which the population is continually changing. Nevertheless Karelia in contrast to Tverskaya Oblast’ is imagined as being intrinsically less Russian; Karelians within Karelia are depicted as living beside their “родственный народ” whereas in Tverskaya Oblast’ they are living on a previously Russian territory surrounded by Russians. Indeed the interviewee considers Karelia and the Karelians within it to be closer to the Finns than to ‘the remainder of Russia’. If identity is negotiated reciprocally, as we have suggested above, it would appear that, in this interviewee’s opinion at least, this apparent affinity with the Finns has resulted in other Russian citizens not acknowledging the Karelians as part of their own ‘we’ group; according to her “вся остальная Россия” considers that Karelia is not a ‘real’ part of Russian territory. In
contrast to her own native area this Karelian narrates a history of Karelia in which Finno-Ugric, in particular Finnish, influence is so great as to almost, but not quite entirely, negate the ‘Russian-ness’ of the territory. It should be noted however that as she is a Karelian from the Tver’ region her opinions may not be representative of those of Karelians from within Karelia itself; also as a then doctoral student at the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences specialising in matters related to Karelian culture she also has access to historical information that will not be readily available to most inhabitants of the Republic of Karelia. It seems unlikely, therefore, that this narrative which assigns the status of indigenous people to the Saami rather than the Karelians has much currency in broader Karelian society within the region.

One participant in particular emphasised Finnish influence to the extent that it not only negated the Russian influence on the Karelian people but undermined the idea of a distinct Karelian people in opposition to a more general Finnish identity. Anatolii Grigoriev constructed a narrative of Karelian history in which, once again, the border is represented as having played a key role in the creation of the idea of a distinct Karelian people. His narrative went somewhat further than those we have examined above, however, which merely represented a rather vague and indistinct pre-historical period of common Finno-Ugric origins for both the Karelian and Vepsian peoples, however. Nor does, in Grigoriev’s narrative, the creation of this border thereafter link the Karelian and Russian peoples. Instead the border is a historical accident which masks the fact that Karelians are actually just a subset of the Finnish nationality:

Вот и ещё моя позиция личная…моя позиция такая, то карелы одно из финских племён. Знаете. Вот, и никакой-то там самостоятельный народ. Вот потому что некоторые тут у нас рассуждается но в частности Зинаида Строгальщикова и другие что Финны нам чуть ли не, вообще, никто. Но моя позиция не такая. Дело в том что каждый народ имеет местечковые особенности…также Карельская, так скажем, племя, по сути это Финны, но значит особенности в силу того что значит от центра Финляндии да? Ещё было отделено границей, пусть вначале Шведы там и так далее. Вот, вот
такая позиция. Хотя вот признаю карельский народ один из финских
народов (A. Grigoriev).

In this narrative Karelians are part of a more generalised Finnish identity,
merely possessing regional rather than national differences from their Finnish
neighbours. Pre-history is cited once again, in this case by denoting Karelians as
one of a number of ‘Finnish’ tribes rather than by, as in for example the excerpt
from the interview with participant A4 referenced above, imagining a pre-history
in which Finns, Karelians and Vepsians lived side-by-side but still in discrete
groups. The Karelians are artificially separated from the remainder of the
Finnish people in Grigoriev’s narrative by the border, which is the responsibility
of the Swedes in the first instance and then the euphemistic “и так далее.” This
narrative therefore completely denies any legitimate Russian influence over
Karelians and by extension Karelia by incorporating Karelian identity into the
broader Finnish identity. This is a controversial opinion as Grigoriev
acknowledges; he is careful to note several times that this is his view, and indeed
acknowledges that others, including the academic Strogal’shchikova, are of a
markedly different opinion.

Karelians were not alone in constructing a history of the area in which
Russian influence had been minimal for at least periods of the historical past.
Strogal’shchikova may not, as Grigoriev intimated in the example above, go so
far as to construct a picture of Karelia as a Finnish territory, but she did narrate a
history of the area in which Finno-Ugric influences had been dominant in the
more distant past:

Вся проблема и том что вот например, первоначально когда
создалась Карельская Трудовая Коммуна, с первыми границами, туда
Вепсы не входили, в 20-м году. А их отнесли только в 24-м году, через
несколько лет. И они отнесли почему? Потому что эту территорию, раньше
исторический она входила в административной единице так-называемый
Петрозаводский уезд. Который от Петрозаводска и дальше шёл по
Онежскому озеру...все развитие этого региона было связанно с
Петрозаводском. Потому что первые исследователи пишут что, это 1723-й
год, то Вепсские деревни начинают от самого города, Петрозаводск это наверное Вепсская территория. Поэтому они взяли то что, как бы, в сознании тогда, приближали к Петрозаводску (Z. Strogal’shchikova).

In the excerpt above whilst explaining the reasons for the inclusion of predominantly Vepsian areas in the expanded KASSR of 1924 Strogal’shchikova narrates a history of these areas which emphasises their Vepsian heritage. She references the very earliest available authorities to witness the fact that in 1723, and therefore presumably prior to this, Vepsian villages were to be found “от самого города” outside Petrozavodsk. In this manner she constructs an image of the relatively ancient history of the area in which Vepsian, rather than Russian, influences are paramount. Indeed she then ventures a more hesitant statement that Petrozavodsk itself is “наверное” originally Vepsian territory. This is important as the idea of Petrozavodsk itself is clearly intimately connected with Russian identity; not only is the name of the town quintessentially Russian it evokes the creation of the town by Peter the Great in 1703. Strogal’shchikova is here insinuating that the area was Vepsian before the arrival of Russian settlement; Petrozavodsk thus appears as an outpost in 1723 of Russian culture in a predominantly Finno-Ugric landscape. In this manner both a strategy of continuation is used to emphasise the antiquity of Vepsian claims to the area whilst a strategy of discontinuation is employed to deny the Russian population the same status; Petrozavodsk is depicted using a topos of the ‘foreign body’ appearing in an originally ‘pure’ Vepsian area.

The idea of Russian settlement, in particular Petrozavodsk, as being something alien to Karelia and in conflict with its Finno-Ugric heritage was expressed by several other participants. A good example of this tendency were the views expressed by participant A8, a Northern Karelian, towards the foundation of Petrozavodsk:

Сам Петрозаводск это не Карельский город и как карел не сказал бы что это Карельский город это ваш город, Русским, вашим Петром, вашим Русским царём он создан...не говорит о Петрозаводск как Карелия это,
In this excerpt the participant strongly refutes the notion that Petrozavodsk itself has anything to do with the legitimate historical heritage of Karelia; in fact he opines that it is impossible to “говорить о Петрозаводске как Карелия”. He explicitly rejects Petrozavodsk “как карел”, and attributes the town, its foundation and everything associated with its history to ‘you Russians’. In this manner a strategy of attribution is used which ascribes all these historical figures, dates and events to the ‘other’ group of Russians whilst denying their relevance to the Karelian population. Furthermore the actual creation of Petrozavodsk is depicted as a “чудовищный” process, in which the Russians are depicted as having arrived from somewhere outside Karelia and decreed the town be founded; in this manner Petrozavodsk is seen as alien to the Karelian people, as something unnatural and forced. This assertion of a primacy of Finno-Ugric heritage and history and the rejection of Russian claims to be considered ‘indigenous’ in Karelia seems to be more sustained and forceful amongst Northern Karelians such as this participant than amidst the Olonets Karelians as referenced above.

The above examples are particularly useful excerpt as they help place into context the mass media material written by Grigoriev referenced above and reinforce the argued placement of Karelian identity in those pieces closer to Finnish identity than Russian. In this interview excerpt Grigoriev actually goes further than he permits himself or is permitted within the pages of the Karelian press and openly asserts, albeit with an acknowledgement of the potential heterodox nature of his views, the essential unity of Karelian and Finnish identity. Interestingly he is aware of and notes the opposition of the Vepsian Strogal’schikova who is related as taking an almost opposite stance. These excerpts indicate that there is an active debate amongst the Finno-Ugric intelligentsia of the Republic of Karelia as to the positioning of Karelia identity closer to or further away from Finnish identity. Both Grigoriev and Strogal’schikova are influential figures within the Finno-Ugric movement within the Republic of Karelia however and the fact that both seek to narrate
histories of the region in which Russian influence is minimalized or excluded completely is surely of great importance. Clearly those Finno-Ugurs most active in the promotion of rights for their respective minorities use the idealised image of a past without Russian influence to argue for the promotion of their own conceptions of identity and associated political rights.

4.5 Karelians and Russians: United Against a Common Enemy?

The historical legacy of mutual antagonism towards the enemies of Orthodoxy has as described above been used both in certain participant’s contributions and certain media texts to narrate a history of the Karelian and Russian peoples which unites them from the very earliest periods of recorded history. As has been examined above past conflict with the Swedes and Finns more generally is also used in certain historical narratives to construct a picture of Karelian and Russian unity in the mass media discourse. Somewhat similar narratives were advanced by some of the Karelians interviewed for this study, as the excerpt below exemplifies:

Потому что Карелов всегда были, защищали свою родину, и в этом отношении конечно второй вот такой этап, всё-таки мы сохранились как этнос, я считаю конечно борба с шведами. Всё-таки вот это Православие, и свою, свою культуру язык сохранили даже вот те, те же Карелы которые вынуждены были бежать в центр России это вот Тверская Областные, конечно и Ленинградская они всё равно же сохранились...(D15).

In this example the Swedes threaten the Orthodoxy and culture of the Karelians to the extent that the struggle against them is depicted as a struggle for Karelian identity itself. This Swedish threat is so great as to necessitate the flight of some Karelians to the heart of Russia, where they are represented as having survived as a distinct ethnic group. In this narrative the alliance with the Russians actually protects the Karelian people from dissolution into some other, unnamed ethnicity. The Karelians are represented as having from time immemorial (“всегда”) defended their native land, a struggle against not merely
invasion but also the disappearance of ‘Karelian-ness’ itself. Not only is Orthodoxy represented as a key part of Karelian identity but Russia itself is constructed as a refuge for the Karelians within which they can protect their identity from those who would seek to destroy it. The participant involved was a lecturer at the State Pedagogical University in Petrozavodsk who had been involved in the preparation of cadre for the various schools which use some element of Karelian language within teaching in the region and hence can be seen as part of the local Karelian ‘intelligentsia’. In contrast to Grigoriev or Antonova, however, she constructs a narrative using unificatory strategies which link the Karelians and the Russians as allies against foreign aggression. It is clear therefore that the mass media discourse which uses similar narratives and strategies to position Karelian identity closer to Russian identity in opposition to foreign aggression has some resonance even amongst well-educated Karelians.

The idea of Olonets as a bulwark against Swedish or other foreign invasion has already been noted in the examples above in relation to the manner in which parts of Karelia are constructed as having undergone Russian influence from time immemorial or at least the beginning of recorded history. In the below example whilst Karelia is constructed as having been initially an exclusively Karelian territory the Russians are depicted as having arrived in the area in order to aid the Karelians in its defence from invaders:

Потому что земля была богатая, край лесов и озёр, богатой в то время, богатая конечно же в то время России, и Российского государства земля была нужна. На эту землю много раз сюда приходили к нам и немцы и литовцы и шведы на Карельскую землю. Поэтому конечно поскольку Карелы сами защищаться не могли, к нам сюда на помощь пришла Русь, и вот были построены первые форпосты России, как Олонецкий, Олонецкая крепость, конечно вот я считаю что это самое главное что Карелия была интересна и выгодна для России. Поэтому они пришли сюда. Хотя вот Новгородцы в то же время они сделали много хорошего и они сделали много такого негативно для карельского народа. Потому что вот начал смешиваться язык начал смешиваться народ то есть конечно было положительное и было отрицательное (D6).
Somewhat paradoxically the territory is depicted as having been rich enough to be coveted by foreign invaders and too poor to be able to defend itself against them. Nevertheless the important aspect of this excerpt from another Olonets Karelian is the manner in which the Karelians and Russians are depicted as having come to be unified in opposition to such invaders; the Russians are incomers but they are incomers who arrive “к нам сюда на помощь”. This narrative depicts the arrival of the Russians as beneficial to the Karelians, who were unable to defend themselves. In fact the Russians and Karelians are to an extent represented as deriving a degree of mutual benefit from the experience. It must be noted however that the interviewee appears to imply it was the Russians who decided to defend Karelia for their own interests rather than merely as a favour to the Karelians; the most important reason for this unity is ascribed to Russian self-interest: “Карелия была интересна и выгодна для России.” This unity of Karelian and Russian, brought about by struggle against a common enemy, is also evaluated somewhat ambiguously; whilst it allowed the Karelians to defend themselves in this narrative it also is depicted as beginning the process of assimilation which threatens the independent existence of the Karelians as an ethnic group. The two examples above thus demonstrate two conflicting narratives of this alliance between Karelian and Russian; one the one hand as we have also seen in the mass media narratives Karelians and Russians are often narrated as having defended their common interests and homeland against foreign aggression and thus defended their own future, on the other this very alliance is depicted as having threatened the existence of the Karelians as a discrete ethnicity.

A somewhat anomalous narrative of these conflicts was offered by one participant in particular from the northern group of Karelians who related an unusually detailed narrative of one particular event in this period:

Ну всё что связано может быть, с таким это, войнами связано с Руси если начинать сначала, те же самые Шведы когда шли, не помню как назывались но сейчас скажем Архангельские земли то есть Шведы […] Карелия терпела какие-то тоже, удары на себе брала.
Даже в истории моей деревни с этим связано то есть почему на самом деле называется «пролив костей» потому что, то есть я могу рисовать? Вот это получается Куйто это в Карелии четвёртая по величине озеро оно состоит из верховного озера, потом соединяется с системой протоков, проливов с среднего и потом здесь с нижем Куйто, здесь тоже вот пролив такой, большой. А деревня как раз находится здесь...раньше, по моему столетию 17-м, 18-м сейчас немножко не готовился не посажу, давно мне рассказывали информацию, проходили как раз Шведские войска, соответственно Шведские через Финледию на Архангельские земли как раз проходили через Карелию...и соответственно вот они шли отсюда и шли как раз вот и у них был такой вот, удобный путь через вот этот пролив, чем он был, удобен, он был здесь как бы, ну не то что он был удобен наверное больше подходит слово неудобен, он там был очень мелко, то есть очень мелко ну на узком пространстве...и могли там пройти соответственно только вот чтобы более менее безопасно это вариант пару всадников. Соответственно шведы там в то время они уже были таких обычных войн, с шлемами со всеми доспехами а Карелов никогда не было никаких не войск не войн они были просто земледельцы. А Карелы как раз здесь вот на этом проливе очень сильно как сказать потрепали войска Шведов потому что им можно пройти колоннами и они здесь встречали толпа с такими там простыми топорами, мотыгами, палками и соответственно очень много на этом проливе даже мы в детстве играли здесь в этом, на этом берегу с одной стороны деревни и проливе много похороненных человеческих останки.

Шведы положили конечно всё там население мужское потому что всё-таки они не (...) были, и ни чем, но как так, я уже говорил был русский поход, карелам тоже мало-численная, как кучка Карелов неорганизованных, не обычных, всё-таки Шведские войска потрепать удалось. А4

This example is notable for a number of features. Firstly it is unusual for its extremely positive self-representation of the Karelians involved in the defeat of the Swedish invading force; the interviewee is at pains to note the apparent
mismatch between experienced Swedish troops and ordinary Karelian peasants. The Swedes, we are informed, were fully-equipped regular forces whereas the Karelians were locals armed with простыми топорами and other tools. Despite the unfavourable odds the Karelians are depicted as having inflicted such a defeat on the Swedes as to force their opponents to recognise their courage and to have made them incur such losses that children can easily turn up their bones whilst at play. This representation of the Karelians as brave, cunning and successful warriors is somewhat unusual as the Karelians usually represent themselves in historical narratives as peaceful to the point of total passivity and entirely unable to influence historical events. The excerpt is also unusual in that the Karelians are represented here as fighting the Swedes entirely unaided by their Russian allies; although the interviewee does locate this event in the more general context of Swedish and Russian conflict, with the Swedes represented as going через Карелию, presumably on their way into Russia proper, it is nevertheless a narrative of a battle between Karelian and Swedish forces only. To a certain extent therefore the usual narrative of these conflicts as being a joint and therefore unifying enterprise between Russian and Karelian against a Swedish foe is minimised. In this narrative the emphasis is not on a joint struggle between Karelians and Russians but on the heroic exploits of the Karelians themselves; it is thus to an extent a narrative of an independent, Karelian conflict with foreign invaders in which their Russian allies play an almost invisible role. Interestingly once again this narrative which minimises Russian influence is presented by a Northern Karelian, furthermore one of the youngest and least well educated participants with only a secondary school education. Clearly such narratives of local history are current within a large section of the Karelian population of these areas as it appears to have been derived from ‘common knowledge’, according to the participant. It should also be noted however that this narrative is, as is quite common with narratives of Karelian history in general, quite localised. Although the interviewee initially describes these conflicts in general terms, with Karelia as a whole under attack from the Swedes, the main narrative is the history of his own village. This is representative of a tendency already discussed in reference to the mass media discourse for Karelians to construct historical narratives which are extremely
localised, as a rule to their native village or district. This tendency shall be discussed in greater detail below.

4.6 The Sacred and the Heretical in Private: 1940-44

i) Private and Public: Personal Recollections and Official Narration

The almost sacrosanct nature of the main historical narratives of the Great Patriotic War has already been examined in reference to the mass media discourse. It has been noted that the standard picture of heroic resistance against brutal fascist invasion and oppression, and Karelian and Russian unity in the face of such oppression, forms a kind of orthodoxy which it is extremely controversial to attempt to alter or undermine. The existence of such heterodox views, however, albeit in the main either marginalised or reproduced from outside, mainly Finnish, sources, has also been demonstrated. The manner in which narratives of this period were related in the interview data, however, was one of the most informative and interesting aspects of this method of research. The narratives recorded were produced in a private setting; albeit not an entirely natural one given they were produced in the given context of an academic study rather than a private conversation between two acquaintances or the like. Nevertheless in this more private setting it would appear that participants felt able to produce narratives which would have been controversial to say the least had they appeared in print within Karelia. The narratives were similar to those found in the printed media in the sense that they were often based upon or referenced personal family experience or that of the interviewee’s local area during the war years; this local or familial experience however was often referenced to refute rather than bolster the ‘official’ narrative of this historical period.
It must be stated that not all participants were in any way critical of the general narrative of heroic Soviet triumph against fascist invasion. One participant in particular was, in general terms, supportive of this narrative:

- Ну это угроза гозударственности да? И поэтому я считаю что это очень важный момент. Если бы мы проиграли войну, что история совсем другая бы началась. И государство я думаю, такого, ну во-первых не был бы государство Советский Союз там и я думаю даже не было государство Россия, Я думаю что вообще Славянские народы они вообще государственность потеряют. То есть они бы прекратились там вот, наций которые то скажем так были даже Эстонцы, там Литовцы, Лативцы эти все были нации которые государственности не имели они входили в составе других государств. Наверное такая бы история была потому что, а, немцы видели Славянские наций возле своего мирого господста, мы бы, исчезают фактический, поэтому я считаю что этот, повторяю самое главное событие (C2).

Participant C2, a Russian in the median age category, considered the triumph in the Great Patriotic War to be the single most important event in Karelian and Russian history by recreating the topos of the ‘averted catastrophe’ constructed in the mainstream media discourse on the event. This is not surprising given that he volunteered his time on a regular basis to aid in the location and reburial of Soviet soldiers who had fallen in the conflict and whose graves had not been recorded at the time. For him the efforts of these soldiers prevented the complete disappearance of the USSR and therefore Russia and perhaps even the Slavic peoples as ethnic groups. Clearly, therefore, there are those within Karelia to whom the importance accorded to the Great Patriotic War in the media discourse and the reverence in which the victory is held is entirely appropriate. As shall be explored further below, however, even this participant appeared to think the official narrative somewhat lacking and offered a more nuanced narrative of some elements of the conflict.

It must also be stated that, in general, the Karelian respondents evaluated the triumph of the Soviet forces over the Germans and Finns in 1941-45 in a
positive manner. The main differences which were noted in the interview data to the narratives derived from the mass media were in the presentation of certain aspects of the war. In particular the conduct of the war by the Soviet forces was occasionally portrayed as inefficient or even to a degree incompetent and counter-productive. The ‘enemy-picture’ of the Finns created in the mass media discourse, whilst not as negative as that ascribed to the Germans, can still be quite damning; in the interview data the Finns are often depicted quite sympathetically. The excerpt below exemplifies some of these tendencies:

In the above example the burning of Karelian villages during the war, which is narrated as having had the negative effect of essentially completely destroying such communities and preventing their post-war re-establishment, is ascribed not to the Finns but to the Soviets. The Finns, we are informed, in explicit contrast to the Germans did not burn villages; had they been left untouched the Finns would, in the opinion of the interviewee, have been removed and the villages reoccupied by their previous inhabitants. The local Karelians are instead provided with a не самый разумный приказ by the unnamed authorities, and forced to burn their own houses including that where
the participant’s отец родился и вырос. In this narrative it is the Soviet authorities who are constructed as being responsible for the most damaging destruction rather than the Finnish forces; furthermore the Finns appear as competent, adaptable northerners whilst the Soviet authorities order the reluctant Karelians to follow orders of dubious military value. The Karelian participant involved was again in the median age group and this narrative of Soviet incompetence is in stark contrast to that of the Russian participant quoted above; this shows the potential power of familial knowledge in the creation of alternate, heterodox narratives of Karelian history. Both participants had gone through similar educational experiences and grown up within a similar cultural milieu, however access to his father’s recollections has conditioned the Karelian participant to be somewhat more ambivalent about the meaning of the local war experience.

The idea of familial recollections undermining the ‘official’ narrative of the war period is also illustrated in the excerpt below:

В Советской литературе писали о том что это было очень сложный период, вот, хотя опять на примерах знакомых наших и моей семьи я могу сказать что Финны, но Карелов, Карелов, они не обижали, они не обижали и они сделали всё чтобы Карельские семьи жили хорошо, но конечно же не просто так вот подачками чем-то там но они заставляли работать, но для этого они давали всё что можно было там и нашим людям и семьям и всё. И у моей мамы её сестра вышла за муж за Финна во время оккупации, всю жизнь жила в Финляндии...Карелы которые здесь были под Финнами в оккупации они не жаловались, а с Русским населением конечно было сложнее (D6).

In the above example the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian, directly compares the official narrative, as exemplified by Soviet literature, to the примерах знакомых наших и моей семьи. The interviewer is therefore invited to evaluate what has been codified as the official narrative of the Finnish occupation against the actual ‘real-life’ experience of the interviewee’s friends and acquaintances. The interviewee clearly uses a strategy of de-legitimisation
with reference to the official narrative by citing her own family experience and eye-witness testimony. She uses such testimony to prove that the Finns behaved well towards the Karelians; the claim that the Finns gave всё что можно to the Karelians is witnessed by the fact her aunt married a Finn during the occupation and therefore lived the remainder of her life in Finland. In fact a number of participants in areas which had been occupied talked of relatives either marrying and therefore emigrating or otherwise choosing to leave for Finland with the occupiers upon their retreat from Karelia. Such family histories were often apparently a taboo subject in the Soviet period; it was only after 1991 and then with some reticence that such narratives of the Finnish occupation could apparently be related.

In the last example the Finnish occupation was assessed positively, but the participant did acknowledge that the situation for Russians was “сложнее”, thus introducing an element of ambivalence into the narrative and suggesting that there were negative aspects to the manner in which the Finns behaved. More rarely the Finnish occupation is depicted as either entirely positive or far better than the alternative of evacuation to Russia:

Как это повлияло знаешь я опять же не историк, ну это конечно Финские концлагери и всё такое, это наверное имеет место быть потому что есть свидетельство есть источники я не спорила тогда как бы да? Но эта Гитлеровская кампания и Финны были как бы в этом в том числе, но я могла об этом хотя бы исходя из своей семьи. Мой папа сейчас семьдесят-пять лет, и пережил Финскую оккупацию. А мама в период Финской оккупации была с своей семьей значит она была тогда очень маленькая их эвакуировали на Урал, очень далеко. Так вот моя мама одна выжила из всех детей своих, будучи в бегах на Урале, они убежали от Финской оккупации. А семья папы остались в своей деревне жить. Так вот мой папа жил благополучно, он получил образование на Финском языке он каждый день питался хорошо, он был воспитан, у него был Финский учитель в школе, его никогда не били, ему выдавали витамины и я в полном серьезном […] об этом разговариваю. То есть например это чисто из частных
In this excerpt Natalya Antonova indirectly queries the validity of narratives which equate the Finns to the Germans; although she is careful to preface her comments with a declaration that the interviewer is aware that “я опять же не историк”, and therefore is not claiming her remarks should be taken as authoritative, she does query the relevance of narratives which paint the Finnish occupation in a negative light, using a downplaying strategy which minimises the negative aspects of the period. Although she acknowledges that there is evidence for Finnish concentration camps narratives of such camps are still only, in her eyes, at best marginal, as they merely “наверное имеет место быть”; it is further suggested that they existed against the will of the Finns who were only tangentially “как бы в этом в том числе” allied to the Germans. She appeals instead to her own familial experience and in particular the contrasting fates of her parents under Finnish occupation and Soviet evacuation. Her mother is evacuated to the Urals, “очень далеко”, where she alone out of all the children who fled with her survives to return to Karelia after the war. In contrast her father whose family elected to stay under the Finns lives “благополучно” to the extent that he receives an education and a daily dose of vitamins. In this manner Antonova compares the treatment of her parents and thus the treatment of the Karelians as a whole under Soviet and Finnish rule during the war years; after narrating such a positive personal account of her own family’s experience she then expands the context of her comments to conclude that the Finns in general когда были в Карелии ничего плохого не сделали. This narrative inverts the orthodox narrative of the war period and achieves this through the partial inversion of the usual strategies employed to create an ‘enemy’ picture of the Finns; responsibility for the negative effects of the war is redistributed in this narrative from the Finns to the Soviets who are constructed as the force actually oppressing the Karelians. Once again these strategies delegitimise the conventional narrative and position Karelian identity closer to Finnish identity than Russian.
ii) Further Narratives of the Occupation

As has been seen from the brief excerpts above one of the major areas in which narratives of the war period differ in the private as opposed to the public arena is in the manner in which the Finnish occupation is narrated. The Finnish use of concentration camps has as discussed above a particular potential resonance in narratives of the occupation period. The existence of such camps was referenced by certain participants, however even the Russian participant quoted above who reproduced in large part the standard narrative of the heroic war period seemed to feel it was important to draw distinctions between the Finnish model of concentration camp and its Nazi equivalent:

Ну сто восемьдесят тысячи суда Финнов приехали с Финляндий, захватили этой земли, сто восемьдесят тысяч приехали. Они действительно стремились за то что эта территория осталась за ними и государственная политика стали проводить за то что вот то что сто восемьдесят тысяч приехали, Финны-Карелы сюда к нам, и Славяне всех в концлагерях это было. Эти и есть исторические факты.

- И концлагери Финнов они конечно были...

- Но они естественно никто там никого не жёг с огнемётом, ну работали, заставали работать. Ну и естественно несвобода, но зверство таких фашистов не было (C2).

In the above example the interviewee does depict the Finns as aggressors and occupiers; the interviewee by informing their interlocutor of the actual size of the Finnish occupying force seeks to convey the seriousness of their intent. This is associated with their establishment of concentration camps for the Slavic inhabitants of the area; the interviewee declares that these are the исторические факты. This narrative therefore seeks to establish the actions of the Finns as clearly aggressive and evaluates them in a negative light; moreover the interviewee presents this as not merely his opinion but an objective assessment of what actually happened. Nevertheless even in this narrative the Finns are depicted as being less culpable than their German allies. The interviewee asserts
that никто там никого не жёг с огнемётом; although acknowledged as
несвобода and therefore evidently assessed as a negative phenomenon the very
worst war crimes are not ascribed to the Finns. Clearly the term concentration
camp does, in the mind of the interviewee, conjure up images of such atrocities
and the presence of таких фашистов; the Finns are explicitly pronounced as free
from any such taint.

If Russian participants generally assessed the occupation of the KASSR
as having been disastrous albeit not to the extent of that of other parts of the
USSR Karelian participants, as has been glimpsed in the examples above, tend to
have a more ambivalent attitude. This ambivalence is well exemplified in the
excerpts below:

A) Потому что больше трех лет оккупации этой территории,
не все были эвакуированы, в силу разных причин да,
они опять открыли финские школы изучали финский
язык....Финны воспринимались, то есть и среди Карел
произошло разделение, кто-то считал финны друзьями
называли товарищами да, и даже незначительный, мог
Карел уехать в Финляндию 44-ом году. Часть из них
было возвращено потом но часть так осталась. Разные
точки зрения да, даже в одной Карельской семье один
считал что финны они чисто врагами чуть не там,
фашистами а другой нет значит сказали что они не такие
(B2).

B) Бабушка проживала в годы войны в Мегреге, посёлок
Мегрега где ...то есть квартировался батальон или
dивизия вот этих финских солдатов. Бабушка работала
в столовой, да то есть кормила, и потом другая бабушка
которая к сожалению в годах войны, то есть были
сильные бомбежки и молодой девушки 17 лет, 17-18 лет
получается…(…) что есть мой бабушки
сестра...переправляется в Финляндию и остаётся жить.
Она рассказала, что были Финны, которые хорошо относились к Карелам, то есть как бы, но также рассказала о зверствах, которые происходили с партизанами, то есть. Советские партизаны, которые вырезали звезды на живом теле, она тоже этого видела, но она долго молчала...

Финны, да вот к партизанам относились сурово, но к местным жителям, особенно Карелам, более, более менее лояльно то есть...

Не жгли деревни, здесь, не убивали народ целыми деревнями...(D4).

С) По поводу Финской оккупации, да тут конечно их концлагеря существовали, и это известно как говорится не только из Финских, но из наших источников, что Финны более лояльно относились к местному населению вот и конечно более жёсткое, жестоко, скажем так, не Карелам, не Вепсам, не Финнам-Ингерманланцем. Но всё равно они не поступали как поступали Немцы, всё-таки концлагеря, которые они располагались, как на территории Петрозаводска и Карелии их все равно нельзя сравнивать с немецкими, например. Но на севере Финское население например, да не только на севере на юге они организовались здесь даже как сказать народные школы, учили население по крайней мере Финскому языку, способных людей и желающих, но это конечно ещё дети и молодежь, даже приглашали на учёбу на Финляндию или работать там, потом вывели обратно. Но эта как говорится, одна из сторона просветительская, с другой стороны никак не отрицает от того что эта была война и они воевали против нас (D10).
In the above examples various Karelian interviewees narrate histories of the occupation period, often with reference to familial experience, in which the Finns are depicted in both a negative and positive light. In example B once again the Finnish occupation is seen in ambivalent light due to the fact that the interviewee has a relative who departed for Finland with the occupying forces in 1944; in example A the interviewee does not relate such a personal anecdote but nevertheless acknowledges that certain Karelians did retreat to Finland with the occupying forces. Examples A and C both relate a history of the period when the Finnish forces undertook the work of educating and assisting the Karelian population. In these examples a narrative of the period is produced where the aggression of the Finns is mediated by their positive attitude towards the Karelians. Such narratives are interesting in contrast to the predominant narratives of the war and those of the Russians under Finnish occupation; the most positive narrative a Russian appears to be able to produce of the period is that Finnish occupation was not as bad as that of the Germans. In these examples the Karelians appear to use both a strategy of downplaying and minimising the negative aspects of the period and also a deconstructive strategy which undermines the orthodox narrative in which the Finns are portrayed as vicious aggressors or fascists. The ‘other’ picture created of Finnish aggressors is therefore somewhat blurred in these narratives for at least some Karelians. In examples B and C, for example, the attitude of the Finns towards the Karelians is described as “лояльно”; the connotations of the word vary somewhat from its direct English equivalent, in this instance it could be translated as the Finns behaving ‘correctly’ or ‘properly’ towards the Karelians. Indeed the context in both examples mean the word could be interpreted strictly in this fashion only; nevertheless it does have some connotations of political loyalty in the English sense which would infer some sort of intrinsic affinity between Karelian and Finn. It should be noted that the two examples are from individuals with connections to the Southern and Northern groups of Karelians respectively thus indicating this narrative is present throughout Karelia. It is also interesting in example A that the interviewee informs his interlocutor that some Karelians view the Finns as чисто врагами чуть не там, фашистами. This can be seen as referencing the stereotyped ‘enemy picture’ of the USSR fighting off the attacks
of ‘фашисты’, the same enemies that are accused by participant C2 in the example above of committing, outwith Karelia, all kinds of atrocities. It would appear that even those Karelians with the most negative opinion of the Finns, however, in the eyes of participant B2, view them as almost but not quite ‘фашисты’ in this sense. In all examples the narrative of the Finnish occupation is related in an ambivalent manner. In excerpt A for example the interviewee portrays the split in Karelian opinion by synecdochial reference to a typical Karelian family; the Karelian nation is split in its approach to the period in the same manner as the family which cannot decide if the Finns are almost as bad as the Germans or не такие. In examples B and C the Karelians, whilst narrating the experiences of their own ethnic group under the Finns as almost uniformly positive, do feel the need to acknowledge that for non-Finno-Ugrians the situation was completely different. In example B for instance the interviewee relates the gruesome details of the manner in which the Finns punished partisans, although interestingly these partisans are represented as having been from outwith the local area or at least the ‘we’ group of “местным жителям” that the interviewee creates. In example C the participant directly constructs the Soviet forces as the ‘we’ group that the Finns attack, noting that despite their good conduct “эта была война и они воевали против нас”. These narratives therefore do undermine the standard narrative of the Finnish occupation through the relation of a more ambivalent assessment of the period within which the Finns are both praised and condemned in almost equal measure.

We have already seen above that a narrative within which criticism of the Finns was almost entirely absent for the period of the occupation was produced by Natalya Antonova. Another individual who produced a narrative of the period which was generally favourable to the Finns was Anatolii Grigoriev. In his view during the occupation:

Никаких проблем не было, но были партизаны слышали там предположено, Мария Мелентьева там погибла, но это понимаете это такое, как сказать, там подожгли, в силу военного времени раз подожгли там, диверсию совершили, вот расстреляли, вот такой. А проблема не была, абсолютно (A. Grigoriev).
It is worth remarking here that Maria Melent’eva was a Karelian partisan (by nationality) who was executed during the war by the Finns for her resistance activities and was later declared a Hero of the Soviet Union. A street was named in her honour in Petrozavodsk and there is a museum dedicated to her in her native town of Pryazha. The narrative Grigoriev offers here is therefore potentially, if aired in a public arena, quite controversial to say the least. Melent’eva’s actions and fate are not described in terms befitting a national hero; her task is depicted as somewhat mundane, she is credited merely with having “диверсию совершили”, as is her fate. The execution of the young woman, the act which led to her being elevated to the pantheon of war-time heroes in the Soviet period, is narrated by Grigoriev as simply вот расстреляли, вот такой. By narrating the death of a Hero of the Soviet Union in this manner Grigoriev normalises the attitude of the occupying Finns who are depicted as having no other option, в силу военного времени. In this narrative it is Melent’eva who appears to provoke her own demise by attacking the Finnish forces; the ordinary Karelian civilians, after all, are represented as having никаких проблем with the Finnish forces. In this manner once again Grigoriev, in a similar manner to Antonova, presents a narrative of the Finnish occupation in which the Karelians and Finns, as fraternal peoples, are able to exist without any issues. Once again a strategy of shifting blame is employed and a strategy of downplaying which invert the orthodox narrative of heroic Karelian and Russian joint resistance and create instead a topos of a benign occupation which is threatened more by Soviet belligerence than Finnish aggression. Such narratives undermine the idea of Karelians and Russians jointly oppressed by and resisting the Finns, and offers an alternate view in which the Karelians seem to be almost better off under Finnish than Soviet rule.

iii) Responsibility for the Conflict

As has been discussed above the usual narratives of the period depict the Finns as being part of the more general unprovoked aggression of various fascist powers towards a peaceful Soviet people. In the interview data collected, however, a number of participants queried this narrative of events, producing an
alternate narrative in which the Finnish invasion and occupation of 1941-44 was a response to the Soviet attack on Finland in the Winter War:

In the above examples the Karelian participants construct a narrative of the conflict in which the USSR rather than Finland is held responsible for the conflict; in fact participant D4 actually contrasts this narrative to the official representation of the war as purely defensive. In her interview she describes the orthodox view of the conflict; the Finns are accused of having attacked first and of coveting territories that had never belonged to them. This orthodox view, represented by the construction нам говорили, which presents these ideas as reported speech attributed to unnamed but presumably influential and authoritative ‘others’, is contrasted with другие книги which the interviewee has been able to obtain which level the blame towards the USSR instead. The context of these comments can be discovered in the remainder of her interview in which she reveals that as a fluent Finnish speaker she is able to directly access Finnish publications and converse with Finnish acquaintances who have, it would appear, influenced her opinions. This example demonstrates therefore the manner in which their relative competency in Finnish provides Karelians in particular with direct, unmediated access to Finnish texts and the manner in which such access can influence the historical narratives they therefore produce.
The second excerpt, again from Grigoriev, goes even further in constructing the USSR as the aggressor in the conflict: not only does he acknowledge that the USSR attacked first this is directly stated to be “агрессия, более того.” In narrating the history of the period in this way Grigoriev not only ascribes responsibility for the war to a different party, he also identifies the USSR as culpable, один из главных виновников, in a manner which associates the USSR with other unnamed countries responsible for the very worst aggression in the period; the context is left unstated but this would presumably refer to the fascist powers.

The behaviour of the Finns during the occupation is as has been described above generally narrated rather ambiguously by the Karelian interviewees, with a certain emphasis in some accounts on their relatively positive behaviour. Occasionally this positive assessment is applied more broadly to their actions in general. A number of the Karelian participants narrated a history of the war in which the Finns had no intention of doing more than recovering their former territories, and were drawn into a wider conflict by Soviet complicity or incompetence:

В 40-х годах их целью было то что они дойдут до реки Свири, вы знаете да? Это не далёк, это десяти километров от Олонца, что они дойдут до реки Свири и остановятся на, то есть на нашем берегу, то есть ещё на территории Карелии, и дальше они не пойдут...но Сталин решил что Финны всё-таки пойдут через реку и тогда было большое сражение и была большая бомбежка реки Свири и гидроэлектростанции которую стоит на реке (Д4).

The above example is a good illustration of this narrative, in which the Finns are portrayed as being unwilling to advance much beyond their former borders, or as the interviewee describes it их целью были то что они дойдут до реки Свири. The line of the River Svir’ is not that of the former border between the USSR and Finland, being as the interviewee describes “ещё на территории Карелии”, but it is not far distant from it. In this narrative however the Finns are not allowed to halt their advance at this point; Stalin is directly credited with having решил что Финны всё-таки пойдут beyond this point. In such
narratives the Finns are drawn unwillingly into further aggression by the
machinations of the Soviet authorities, in this instance generally attributed to the
named personage of Stalin. In other such narratives the Finns are forced into
occupying an abandoned Petrozavodsk or refrain from participating in the
blockade of Leningrad or launching further offensives after 1941. These
narratives use a strategy of minimalisation to once again downplay Finnish
responsibility for the conflict and its negative effects; this has the, generally
implicit, effect of reassigning at least some responsibility to the Soviet Union.

This relatively sympathetic assessment of Finnish involvement in the
1941-44 war was not limited to the Karelians alone. It would appear that at least
some of the Russians in Karelia have a fairly nuanced picture of the manner in
which the conflict came to pass; the sample size is too small to determine if such
views are generally prevalent however one participant offered a narrative quite
similar to those offered by the Karelians above. Although not questioning the
more general narrative of the war, which the participant as described above
found to be in broader terms the single most important historical event in
Karelian and Russian history, he did draw some distinctions between Finnish and
German conduct as has been seen with regards to the existence of concentration
camps. It should be noted that the participant was married to a Karelian and had
access through knowledge of Finnish to texts produced for a Finnish audience.
Nevertheless the below example illustrates the fact that not all Russians narrate
the events of 1940-45 as unprovoked Finnish aggression:

- Ну вы знаете что у нас отношение к войне с Финнами оно не такое
categoricheskoе как война с Немцами, потому что Немцы, они значит
dействительно напали на нас, вот, а по отношение к Финнам не тут такая
неоднозначеная ситуация, потому что в тридцать- девятом году на Финнов
первые мы напали.

- Да, Зимняя Война...

- Вот, и у Финнов значит, есть вот то что у нас называется Зимняя
Война, и Великая Отечественная Война, а у Финнов называется talvisota,
Зимняя Война, вы знаете Финский? Знаете Финские слова?
- Немножко, но...

- Ну *talvi* зима, *sota* война так что *talvisota* называется как у нас. А Великая Отечественная Война у них называется *jakosota*, Продолженная Война, знаете да?

- Да.

- И поэтому здесь, Финны как бы они пошли вместе с Немцами даже не союзниками они им называли они как-то там братья по-оружию, да. И значит они не нападали на Советский Союз а они как бы, пытались вернуть свои земли. Другой вопрос когда они дошли до территорий, до границ, и они потом дальше [...] здесь небольшой нюанс, то там же было даже увольнение Финляндии по этому поводу там даже Маннергейм там уже как бы я не знаю как дальше вести войска, ну и Финны высказали всё мы свою землю отбили больше не пойдём никуда. Они даже там в Ленинградской Области дошли до своих территорий они даже Маннергейм [...] Петербург даже не обстреливал. И поэтому Маннергейма, когда в сорок-шестом году сдано был председателем комиссии по военным преступлениям, он в Португаль уже отпустили, Маннергейма улетел на самолёт в Португаль отдыхать и его не судили, потому что был моменты конца Маннергейм как бы понимал что тут вроде, здесь свою землю отвоевали, может быть и [...]. Поэтому у нас такое жесткое отношение к Финнам как к Немцам нет у, в обществе у нас (C2).

The participant above does link the Finnish invasion of 1941 to the Winter War of 1940, and is aware of the fact that the Finns consider the two wars to be separate parts of a continuous conflict. Whilst the Germans are accused of having quite straightforwardly “действительно напали на нас”, the participant presents the actions of the Finns in a more ambiguous light, to the extent that whilst involved in the attack on the USSR the interviewee feels it is incorrect to label the Finns as actual allies of the Nazis with all the associated negative connotations of such status. Once again an alternate narrative is presented, potentially at least partially derived from access to Finnish narratives of the period, in which the Finns are explicitly absolved of the crime of aggression and
are depicted as having a relatively just cause. Once again the participant also narrates a history in which the Finns, in this case personified by Marshal Mannerheim, are depicted as being unwilling to advance beyond their former borders. As a consequence the interviewee constructs a picture of Karelian society in which the Finns are spared the sort of antagonism which it is indirectly expressed is directed towards the Germans. As stated above this participant did in other remarks generally reproduced the unifying narrative of resistance against foreign invasion which characterised the mass media discourse; it appears that direct access to Finnish language material has provided alternate narratives which have added to his knowledge base or habitus and thus promoted the production of a more nuanced narrative which disassociates the Finns from aspects of the ‘enemy picture’ created in the mainstream media discourse.

iv) Karelian and Russian Relations After the Occupation

A) Если не были бы эти конфликты, России с Финляндией я думаю что ситуация, хоть Карельская, хоть Вепсская, хоть ижорская, хоть Ингерманландского, она была бы лучше, она бы не была хорошая но она была бы лучше. Не было бы этих, специально заведённых […] НКВД дело шпионских связь с Финляндией, не погубили бы наших учёных…(Strogal’shchikova)

B) Ну и потом, но были такие мнения что почему язык скажем бывших наших врагов у нас вторым языком? (D16)

C) Карелов действительно иногда называли предателями и думаю что раз как мы родственный Финнам народ что мы можем повернуть оружие против своей же
власти, на самом деле этого не произошло потому что просто скажу что читая много литературу про войну и как раз малые национальности тогдашнего Советского Союза порой боролись против оккупации ещё по [...] чем русские (D10).

D) - Что мы ненадёжные? Да да, такие есть, и всегда считались как бы негласно среди Финно-угоров, всех Финно-угоров в России, самые не благонанёжные Карелы, всё из того как мы близко к Финландии, и Коми народ, не знаю почему Коми но, всегда считали что мы самый обструктивный, самый не благонанёжный, самый ненадёжный да так всегда считалось (A1).

The examples above demonstrate the manner in which a significant section of the Karelian and Vepsian participants viewed the historical legacy of Finnish involvement in the wars of the 1940s. These participants narrated a history of the post-war period in which the Finno-Ugric inhabitants of the USSR, in particular the Karelians who had been under Finnish occupation and spoke a very similar language to Finnish, were the subject of heightened suspicion from the Soviet authorities. In example A the war with Finland is related as having led to an even greater loss amongst the Finno-Ugric identity within the USSR than would otherwise have been the case. The legacy of the war is not glorious triumph in this narrative but NKVD repression of Finno-Ugric academics. In a similar fashion example B relates the abandonment of Finnish language instruction as being the direct consequence of ‘their’ view that Finnish was the language of бывших наших врагов; once again a strategy of avoidance used which in both examples refrains from attributing these negative actions or opinions to any named group. In example C the interviewee similarly relates the suspicions of an unnamed group of Karelian loyalty and the feeling in some, presumably Russian, quarter that the Karelians were always liable to повернуть оружие против своей же власти. This example is interesting as it demonstrates
the manner in which, certainly for many of the participants, such apparent accusations are considered to be unjustified; the interviewee represents the minority groups as actually having done more for their country than the Russians themselves. Finally example D demonstrates that certain interviewees believe that this imagined lack of loyalty amongst the Karelian population is a contemporary as well as a historic issue; in her eyes the modern authorities show the same amount of distrust to the самый ненадёжный Karelians. In all of the above examples a narrative of the post-war period is produced in which the Karelians and Vepsians, rather than benefitting from the victory over Finland, are suspected of not having been sufficiently loyal and are thereafter punished or subject to suspicion. In this manner a deconstructive strategy is deployed, similar to that used when discussing the conduct of the Finns themselves, which subverts the orthodox narrative of Karelian and Russian unity and posits a unique Karelian and Finno-Ugric experience of the war years. Three of the above participants, Strogal’shchikova and D10 and A1, occupy influential positions within Finno-Ugric society; D10 and A1 both hold important posts within the Finno-Ugric language media of the region. This perceived resentment towards Karelians and Vepsians on the part of the authorities is thus held by a large section of the local Finno-Ugric intelligentsia; indeed we have seen an implicit recognition of this supposed antipathy in the mass media discourse from those Karelians such as Tanya Kleerova who sought to counter unspoken suspicion of their minority group when agitating for more political concessions. Participant D16 however was one of the oldest and less well educated interviewees and appears to be drawing from personal experience of the post-war years to formulate his narrative.

A number of participants considered the legacy of the war in a different manner, however, and constructed a narrative in which it alienated Karelians from the Finns in the post-war period:

Может быть какая-то лишняя ненависть появилась к Финнам, к соседям.

И со стороны Карелов?
Ну да...были случаи когда учёные приезжали, после войны, в деревни, и те же которые были, которые служили в Финской армии, были на территории Карелии, и жители сознали, ну и даже говорят что бросались там с лопатами, что их назад разгоняли (D14).

In this example the legacy of the war is to divide the Karelians unnecessarily, by means of лишняя ненависть, from their Finns neighbours. The interviewee could not have witnessed such things himself, he was one of the youngest participants, but it is apparently common knowledge (“говорят”), that such was the antagonism towards Finns that they were chased out of Karelian villages. This demonstrates that there is a residual resentment towards the Finns in some sectors of the Karelian community, who narrate the post-war period as being filled with anti-Finnish rather than anti-Finno-Ugric sentiment. It is not possible to determine if this apparent redistribution of resentment towards the Finns rather than from the Russians towards Karelians is a generational issue; this would appear not to be the case, however, as the other participants in this age group did not reproduce this narrative whilst others, such as Antonova, were firmly in opposition to any narrative which sought to divide the Karelians from their Finnish neighbours.

v) The Potential Deportation of the Karelian People

Whilst the idea that the Karelians were in danger of deportation to Siberia or Central Asia occurs only sporadically in the mass media discourse, and is treated for the most part within such texts as heretical, a distortion of the historical truth, it was much more prevalent in the interview data. Many of the Karelian participants were able to relate a narrative of this potential event:

А) На уровне, чуть ли не Сталина было принять решение о насильственном переселении с территории Карелии Карелов, это то же самое что в 40-х было предприято с Чеченским народом. Но благодаря Геннадию Куприянову который в то время стоял как бы во главе
республики он, не то что он возмутился но он выступил против этого и как то это решение удалось, но замять не замять отменить чтобы таких репрессий в отношении к Карелам не было (D10).

В) Все документы были подготовленными для переселения Карелов, и был такой, он был член военного совета, был такой Куприянов, который в 49-м году попал в большой упадок в так называемом Ленинградском деле, в своё время я даже пару раз видела...исторические записки есть что если был бы нет его влияния, нет его вмешательства...то вполне могла быть и в Карелии депортация (D2).

C) В 90-е годы открылся тот факт что Сталин хотел действительно нас вывести как Чеченцев от территории Чеченцкого народа, так и Карелов. Это вот историки открыли архивные документы этого в Советском времени не говорилос, об этом как то старались не говорить. И только руководитель Куприянов, руководитель республики, ему удалось отстоять от Сталина судбу Карельского народа и доказал что Карелы стояли как всегда на форпосте то есть люди которые не по своей воле оказались в оккупации и они не виноваты что Финны относились к ним как родственным народам. Там всё равно конечно репрессия если кто то занимался партизанством, партизанскую борьбу, то есть всё равно от Финнов погибал. Даже Мария Мелентьева и Анна Лисицына которые Вепсы, одна Вепска, представитель Вепского народа другая Карелка они всё равно как бы погибли (D15).
Whilst as we have seen in the mass media discourse the idea of such a deportation is ridiculed and discredited, in the interview material it is generally presented as an objective fact, only the interviewee in example D is unsure as to its authenticity. The decision to deport the Karelians is directly attributed in examples C and D to Stalin himself, the highest possible authority, and in example A it is ascribed to almost as exalted a level, чуть ли не Сталина. The genuine nature of the threat to the Karelian people is represented in example B by the representation that документы были подготовленными; the interviewee constructs an image of an imminent threat on the cusp of execution. In examples A, B and C it is only the intervention of the aforementioned Gennady Kupriyanov which saves the Karelians from this fate. In example D the interviewee somewhat confusedly attributes this intervention to Sergei Kirov, nevertheless there is still a narrative of one man able to somehow как-то мешались and save the Karelians from deportation. In example C this intervention is made possible by the representation of the fact that Карелы стояли как всегда на форпосте; the strategy of continuation is invoked once again in defence of the Karelians to witness their unbroken loyalty. The interviewee also invokes the memory of Melent’eva and another Hero of the Soviet Union, the Vepsian Lisitsnyna, in this case to witness the loyalty of the Finno-Ugrians and the injustice of the charges against them. In all the above examples the orthodox narrative of Karelian and Russian unity is undermined and juxtaposed against a narrative in which the Karelians, despite their demonstrated loyalty and courage in some texts, are unjustly threatened with repression by their supposed Soviet allies and are only saved by the principled resistance of one man. The range of participants who referenced this narrative
shows its ubiquity amongst both the Karelian intelligentsia and somewhat less educated Karelians; it was produced by university lecturers, journalists, actors and hotel employees. All of the participants who reproduced the narrative were in the upper two age groups which may be accounted for by the fact that the documents which detailed this potential deportation were uncovered shortly after the Soviet period, an event which they may personally recall. Whilst in example C this supposed threat is countered by a unificatory strategy which again seeks to witness the shared wartime sacrifice of the Karelians and Russians once again the striking feature of the narrative is the constructed heteronomisation which prevents the Karelians from saving themselves and leaves them dependent on the whims of those in charge in the federal centre.

vi) The Annexed Territories

The status of those areas annexed to the USSR from Finland as a result of the Winter and Continuation Wars was not often brought up by the interviewees; those participants who did broach the topic brought up the issue in a number of different ways, as illustrated below:

A) Сложный вопрос вернуть ли территория к Финляндии...это не нужны на самом деле, и есть конечно те Финны которые требуют эти территории но это, это не как японцев с Курилами да? Есть люди которые хотят что, не вся Карелия вернуть, им вся Карелия не нужна, нужно вот Карельский Перешеек, то что 41-м их оттяпали. Понимаешь, это вот им надо вернуть (А8).

B) Когда я веду экскурсии честно говоря если есть такая возможность пропустить тему то есть высказывание своего мнения о истории именно вот этого конфликтов то лучше её пропустить потому что многие Финны очень болезненно реагируют. Я конечно понимаю зачем они
болезенно реагируют потому что от них забрали часть Финнской территории да? Это то что, территория Сортавалы, территория Питькяранты (D4).

C) До Октябрьской революции, то есть до 17-го года, вот это наш Октябрьская Железная Дорога, вот Мурманск-Москва, всё что западнее это всё Карельская территория, что есть там не было Русскоязычное население буквально, 100% там были а сейчас получается что после войны практически всё приграничье оно всё буквально было очищенно, Карелам там не разрешалось то есть, и те особенные районы то есть Сортавала, Лахденпохский, западное побережье Ладожского Озера...то есть исконная территория Карелов то есть где были племена Корела, отсюда мы пошли (D15).

In example A the Finnish claims to these areas are presented relatively sympathetically; the interviewee, a Northern Karelian, is careful to note that the Finns ‘require’ only the return of those areas they lost in 1941; the fact that all of Karelia is not in question is directly stated. The relative modesty and justice of these demands and the relative modest number of Finns involved is illustrated by comparison with the situation in the Russian Far East; это не как японцев с Курилами, whose demands are represented as being, for unstated reasons, beyond the pale. The interviewee, an Olonets Karelian, in example B is also relatively sympathetic to Finnish sentiment on the issue, and also recognises the areas as territory that was от них забрали, although once again the agency behind the action is unclear. Nevertheless the main strategy demonstrated is one of avoidance; she would far rather avoid if at all possible discussing the matter with her Finnish guests as they apparently react in a manner she is uncomfortable with to the topic. This demonstrates that even when raised the issue is apparently considered somewhat taboo; the interviewee was prepared to briefly touch on the matter with the researcher but attempts to avoid as much as possible discussing
the matter with Finns to avoid controversy. Example C illustrates a somewhat
different approach to the topic; for this Karelian contributor the offensive issue is
not that the territory is under Russian and not Finnish control but that it has been буквально очищенно of Karelians. The interviewee constructs a picture of
these areas as having been the birthplace of the Karelian nation; it is the
homeland of the original Karelian tribe. Until the post-revolutionary period and
in particular the post-war era the area is “100%” Karelian and free of Russian
influence. Finnish influence in the area is not referenced or recognised. In this
narrative the negative consequence of the war is not that the Finns were
displaced from these areas, but that the Karelians were replaced by Russians. It
should be noted that none of the interviewees in the data collected resided or
claimed to be originally from the areas in question; for that reason it is not overly
surprising that discussion of the topic was minimal. It would appear from the
examples above and the narratives of responsibility for the war itself examined
above that there is a certain sympathy for the Finnish position on the areas; at
least some Karelians, however, regard the areas in question as genuinely
Karelian rather than Finnish. In contrast to the mass media discourse this
Karelian claim to the territory does not seem to be used to bolster that of the
modern Russians, indeed rather the reverse seems to be the case.

4.7 The Foundation of the KASSR: A Named Beginning?

The apparent official use of the 1920 foundation of the KASSR as a
foundational event for ideas of Karelia in general has been noted with reference
to the mass media discourse above. The interviewees were asked what this
anniversary meant for them in an effort to gauge its effectiveness as a potential
‘named beginning’ for the Republic of Karelia itself and Karelian identity in
general. One of the participants, a Karelian and involved in the Congress of
Karelians and also a civil servant, had actually been involved in organising commemoration of the anniversary:

- Ну, ...это год, 90 лет республики, но это год не карелов а, как скажем, государства, образования нашей республики...исторический так получилось да что, пока нет письменных каких-то исторических доказательств на что когда-то на этой территории, было самостоятельно государство каких-то финских народов. Вы знаете. Поэтому, пока не черта. Хотя есть упоминание что вроде на этой территории было такое государство [...], который может стать государство, но было это государство карелов подходить не возможно. Поэтому так случилось что, в начале двадцатого века, силу различных исторических, политических и все других проблем да которые были на севере Европы да?

- Да

- Вот была создана такое автономное образование в составе Российской Федерации, Карельская Трудовая Коммуна, да? И для нас, для карелов да...наша Карелия, вот эта территория, а для всех карелов, в мире которые есть да, это создавилось чего-то пробразом государственно. Поэтому мне эту дату, как сказать, с чем уважаем, это нам позволяет по крайне мере на сегоднящий день заявить не только на а, что мы еще живы, но заявить о наших проблемах, значит их поднять. Да, сказать о том что, эти проблемы мы будем решать, значит поэтому эта дата в нашей жизни является, ну как скажем, значительная. И мы когда изучался вопрос, [...] это было десять лет тому назад, на какую же дату [...] взять, республики дата, памятная дата да? Было много вариантов, но мы остановились на этом варианте и решили что это самый такой значимый вариант, который призван на сегодняший день, и внутри нашей страны, и самое главное что это призван и в международной арене. Поэтому для нас дата значительная, для карелов, и мы, и, но еще раз надо подчеркнуть что всё-таки дата республики, да? Всех здесь живущих а не нас только карел. Я так бы на этот вопрос...(B2).
In this excerpt the participant clearly explains the motivation, at least on his part, for the selection of this date in particular for official commemoration. In his view it is the first manifestation of any form of Karelian political statehood, as prior to this date he is unable to identify the existence of any sort of самостоятельное государство каких-то финских народов; that is to say before the KTK no Finno-Ugric, let alone Karelian, national group had achieved political representation. In this narrative the KTK arises rather inorganically, “в силу различных исторических, политических и все других проблем да которые были на севере Европы”, and is again organised apparently from above for the benefit of the Karelians rather than by the Karelians themselves. Nevertheless the interviewee views the date as the beginnings of Karelian politics if not the Karelian people; it is the progenitor of their own state. The historical importance of this fact for the interviewee is that it provides a starting point for the Karelian political movement and endows them with certain political rights. By narrating the foundation of the KASSR as the political recognition of the Karelian people he uses a strategy of continuation, as we have seen in the media discourse, to demonstrate to the wider world that “мы еще живы”; this allows the Karelians to narrate a history of their own political action and posit future political solutions. In his eyes this date is representative of the Karelian people across Russian and internationally as the beginnings of their political existence if not their actual existence as an ethnic or national group. It is important to note, as he does, however, that it is conceived of as strictly speaking a political rather than national landmark; he extends its importance to not only Karelians but all здесь живущие, and therefore infers it can be used as a unifying rather than divisive factor in national politics.

Certain participants did refer to this anniversary in a positive fashion as intended by the authorities, and used it to narrate a history that associated the beginnings of at least some form of Karelian autonomy and political self-realisation with this date:

А) Безусловно важно в своё время было создание государства....конечно было важно создание Трудовая Коммуна тогда Карельская Трудовая Коммуна. Пусть это было
большевистский лозунг, но это был момент объединения, это был момент когда, думаю что проживающие на этой территории почувствовали себя в конце концов нация, какой-то народности, какой-то, единый, общий (D2).

В) Ну возвращаюсь к созанию Карельской Трудовой Коммуны, думаю что это всё-таки одной из самых важных событий, потом всё таки думаю что важное событие было конечно в конце 20-х, 30-х годов когда сюда приехали очень много Американских и Канадских Финнов, но, потому что всё-таки с их помощью, не только с помощью Советской власти скажем так а с их помощью здесь начали развиваться многие отрасли промышленности, особенно лесной промышленности, думаю что строительной промышленности, потому что я ни в коем разе (...) достойство, умение, местного населения Карелов устроить, вести хозяйство, но у Американских Канадских Финнов приехавших сюда было более современное оборудование, техники, они не привезли не только топор и пилы они привезли целый агрегат и станки сюда, то есть этот дал толчок, какой-то толчок, новый шаг к развитию производства, промышленности (D10).

С) Ну это как бы официальная, официальная годовщина, государственности скажем так Карелии поскольку вот [...] от создания Трудовой Коммуны, ну лично для меня это вот определённый век в истории Карельского народа поскольку, всё-таки решение о создании было принято на таком государственном уровне с участием Карелов, Карелы. Карельская Трудовая Коммуна представители Карел из районов собравшись 90 лет тому назад они как бы давали своё согласие на создание вот отдельный, скажем так, республику отдельный...республики Российской Федерации. Поэтому такая вот историческая дата, но не более того (D16).
The Karelians interviewed above produced a somewhat similar narrative
to that offered by the initiators of the anniversary, narrating the foundation of the
KTK as an important step in the development of the Karelian people. Example B
is interesting as a representative of a relatively prevalent narrative amongst the
interview data which portrays the foundation of the KTK as leading to an influx
of Finnish workers and specialists. Although other aspects of this Finnish
influence are often narrated in more ambiguous or even negative terms their
contribution to the development of Karelian industry is generally represented in
wholly positive terms. In this narrative the foundation of the KTK brings about
the arrival of these Finns and the consequent industrialisation of Karelia; the
American Finns are literally represented as having brought the first modern
machinery to Karelia in opposition to the relatively primitive tools used by the
locals: “привезли не только топор и пилы они привезли целый агрегат”. In
this manner these Finns are also associated with the idea of American modernity
and progress. Although the interviewee is careful to note that he does not think
the local Karelians were in any way inferior to these Finns the narrative
nevertheless constructs an image of the foundation of the KTK as being the
beginning of a new, modern era for the Karelians, it is a “новый шаг к
развитию” for the Karelian people.

The interviewee in example A is somewhat sceptical of the foundation of
the KTK or at least the circumstances which attended it; it is somewhat
pejoratively denoted a большевистский лозунг, which infers that the
interviewee does not accept that it was created by the local Karelian populace
itself. The actual moment of creation of the KTK is nonetheless narrated as
having been the creation of a sense of Karelian nationality; it is this moment
which the interviewee constructs as the “момент объединения” of the Karelians
as a nation. This narrative of events is probably the closest example found in the
interview data to the ‘official’ narrative of the foundation of the KTK and of its
use as a ‘named beginning’ for the Karelian people; this narrative does construct
this date as the point at which the Karelians first felt themselves to be a nation
and recognised their essential unity. Indeed in this interview the participant also
described the commemoration of the date as important for the contemporary
Karelian people as a further “толчок” to their sense of identity.
Example C also narrates the event in terms of it being the starting point for Karelian unity on a political level at least. In this narrative the Karelians are at least involved with the unnamed authorities on the “государственном уровне” in the creation of the KTK, although it appears that they only do so in order to ratify or “давали своё согласие” to a decision taken by others. This contribution however also identifies one of the main issues with commemorating this date in particular as a ‘foundational’ date for the Karelian people: although it is important on the political level as the creation of autonomy for the Karelians the participant does not think it important beyond this. The appearance of the KTK is narrated as having been of some importance, but the Karelians appear to be involved only somewhat passively; thus the interviewee thinks it important in a limited political sense but “не более того”.

For the representatives of Karelian cultural associations the commemoration of the 90\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the foundation of the KTK had important contemporary political connotations. Both Anatolii Grigoriev and Natalya Antonova approached the anniversary of the creation of the KTK by comparing the aims behind its creation and the then political situation with the current societal realities of the Republic of Karelia:

A) Ну вот, потом Советская власть когда пришла прозвучали хорошие лозунги, право народов на самоопределение то есть и до отделения будет знаете, да, и в конституции. Вот создали республику, […] хотя в то время уже Карелов было большинство в 20-м году, хотя Карельская Турдовая Коммуна на этой территорий это не сейчас меньше была чем, 60 с лишком процентов Карелов было. А теперь 10%, знаете, и даже вот может быть меньше будет когда перепись сейчас была, и уже меньше. Две причины значит во первых, главная причина того что мы стали меньшинством экспансия из федерального центра, из союзного центра, вот индустриализация привезли много людей потом в 40-м году захватили Финские земли или назову Западная Карелия, все Карелы ушли в Финляндию 400 с лишком тысяч знаете да? А эти территории селили выходцы, даже первые
годы не давали Карелам из Восточной Карелии там селиться знаете да? Украинцы там и всё. Вот Сортовала, Лахденпохья, Суоярви это всё настоящие Карельские земли но они русифицированные полностью (А. Grigoriev).

В) Я считаю что это было празднование в таком духе в котором мы привыкли праздновать. Да хорошо где-то ремонтировали дороги, где-то ремонтировали фасад улиц, то есть была такая внешняя уборка, была привидена, и это тоже хорошо, это тоже должно обязательно быть, но наше участие как такого...что какой-то национальный фактор был, это что-то дал новое карелам или какой-то отдельный проект был бы организован, ничего подобного не произошло (Н. Antonova).

С) Для меня, для меня это значит что...что к сожалению 90 летие Республики встретили не так, как хотелось, потому что Республика формально существует но Карелов с года в год становится все меньше, нас меньше 10% общего населения и...а...все, что нам обещало государство 90 лет назад: широкая автономия, что язык будет везде использоваться, мы видим что этого нет. Что мы не участвуем, а, не в принятии каких-то важных законов в Республике Карелии - очень мало депутатов карелов в законодательном собрании. А...очень мало, а...очень умников высокого ранга, там министров, заместители министров карелов. Поэтому мы не можем активно влиять на...не на политическую не на экономическую жизнь республики, а что касается языка что это вообще отдельная тема (А1).

In example A Grigoriev composes a very similar narrative of these events to that which we have already seen him produce in the mass media discourse; the status of the Karelian people in 1920 is compared unfavourably with their current situation. This is a transformative strategy of discontinuation in which the
differences between ‘then’ and ‘now’ are emphasised to stress the plight of the Karelian people. Although we are informed that in principle at least the Soviet authorities promoted “хорошие лозунги” about political rights for the minorities the situation has in fact become much worse in the intervening period. This creates a kind of topos of the ‘broken promise’ to the Karelian people, who have been denied the political rights they were promised in 1920. In a similar fashion thanks to policies which are attributed to the Federal or Soviet authorities the Finno-Ugric nature of the territory has been undermined, to the extent that there are areas of “настоящая Карельская земля но она русифицированные полностью”. Example C also uses a very similar narrative strategy of juxtaposing the supposed aims of the KTK and the modern Republic of Karelia with the actual course of events. In this example the interviewee, the editor of a Karelian-language publication, uses the same topos of the ‘broken promise’ to narrate these events, in fact stating that “нам обещали” that Karelians would have autonomy but that “мы видим что этого нет”. The interviewee appeals to common knowledge to witness that as Karelian is not used “везде” and that as the minorities do not have a weighty political voice the potential of the KTK has been unfulfilled. This example demonstrates that this narrative of Karelian history which uses strategies of discontinuation to construct the idea of a ‘broken promise’ is not confined to the more radical fringes of Karelian activist circles but is current within the Karelian intelligentsia as a whole. Example B from Natalya Antonova approached the anniversary in a slightly different but related manner; although she did not dwell on the disappointing, from a Karelian viewpoint, performance of the KTK in terms of honouring the commitments of its founders she criticised the use of the anniversary by the current authorities by employing a slightly different strategy of discontinuation. In her view the national or ethnic component of the anniversary was underplayed to the extent that her organisation and Karelians in general could derive little benefit from it; in this narrative the commemoration is merely a “внешняя уборка” that does not address the real historical legacy of the event or the current social and political problems of the Karelian people.
Many of the Karelian participants however were unimpressed by the manner in which the foundation of the KTK was presented in the official narrative; the view was often expressed that it did not adequately express the duration of Karelian history:

A) Потому что история то Карелии на самом деле она насчитывает не 90 лет она насчитывает столетие и может быть тысячелетие на самом деле. Когда здесь постепенно начали приходить племена, скажем так, в том числе и карелов, постепенно теснят саамов на север. Это процесс длился, поскольку я знаю тысячелетие, так что...

- Что можно сказать что 90 лет Карелии это немножко искусственный?

- Искусственный да, немножко искусственный праздник. Либо пусть она тогда бы, он бы пусть назывался 90, но пусть бы на этом году 90 лет со дня образования Карельской Коммуны, а не 90 лет Республики Карелия. Но это вот моё мнение такое (D10).

B) Но на самом деле это а, коммунистический праздник, я считаю так, потому что...и двадцатом году коммунисты объявили да? Но тогда это была, ты знаешь историю этого праздника? Трудовая Коммуна Карельская. Это наш коммунистический праздник, я удивлен что так широко […] сейчас, потому что глупо говорить 90 лет Республики Карелии да? То что Карелии, карелам больше лет намного да? (A8).

The above excerpts exemplify the manner in which many Karelian participants evaluated the usage of the anniversary of the KTK as a foundational event for Karelia in general terms as inadequate or even somewhat offensive. In both examples A and B above the interviewees appraised the selection of the foundation of the KTK as unrepresentative of the extent of Karelian history. In example A the interviewee narrates an alternate view of the history of Karelia which the development of the territory is represented as taking place over a much longer period, “столетие и может быть тысячелетие”. The commemoration of the foundation of the KTK is not seen as offensive in and of itself; the participant
would rather the anniversary was presented in a manner which made the context of the event clearer and did not give the impression that the Republic of Karelia as representative of Karelia in general had a mere 90 years of history. The participant in example B also objects to a narrative of Karelian history which appears to limit its duration to the 90 years since the foundation of the KTK; indeed such a narrative is pejoratively assessed as “глупо”. This interviewee also proffered an alternate narrative in which the KTK, the foundation and commemoration of which is ascribed to “коммунисты”, is contrasted with the more meaningful, in the interviewee’s mind, formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika:

Тесно связанно, тесно связанно да...нет не очень тесно но ты знаешь вот вчера говорили допустим о, не знаю если знаешь о Ухтинской Республике. Там немножко, здесь 90 лет назад...что там по-моему 23-й или 22-й год, наверное это было важное событие на мой взгляд, в Республике Карелия, я был счастливый если прожил там на самом деле.

Но если было бы эта Ухтинская Республика, оно важное какое-то событие но не случилось.

Знаешь к моему стыду много не расскажу, но и думаю что ты уже знаешь и можешь найти уже, из книг которых Финны уже много писали, много об этом написано о Ухтинской Республике...я знаю что была Ухтинская Республика, знаю есть, был свой символ, флаг, а то есть сейчас неофициальный флаг Северных Карелов да, примерно там границы, правительство, я честно говоря много не знаю.

Ты знаешь ничего, что происходило, не знаю. Олонецкая Губерния была, там на севере Ухтинцы да, как сказать эти бело-финны прибыли, какие которые были против власти и ещё пытались и сражались, не знаю если они были финансированные на счёт Финляндии, это где-то читал, ну по-моему финансировали часть за счёт Финляндии, но самая революция эта на счёт немцев финансировали, да (A8)?
Although the interviewee, as he admits at various points in his contribution, is not very well-informed on the actual details of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika he does assess its formation as much more important than the foundation of the KTK. A topos of a ‘lost chance’ for the Karelian people is constructed, in which there was for a short period the possibility of creating an independent Karelian state. The narrative of this period is exceedingly vague and confused; the manner in which the Ukhtinskaya Respublika came about is not described in any detail at all and the interviewee has little more knowledge of what happened beyond the mere fact of its apparent existence. Nevertheless the interviewee describes the period as having been exceptionally important to the extent that he would have been счастливый если бы прожил там на самом деле. The symbolic value of this attempt at apparently genuine self-determination is important to the extent that even though it did not succeed the interviewee considers it to have been of the upmost importance. The ‘banal’ nationalist, symbolism of its flag, as Bilig (1995) would recognise it, is appropriated by the interviewee and, apparently, northern Karelians in general as their contemporary неофициальный flag; the interviewee himself is a Northern Karelian, the group for which this narrative appeared to have by far the most resonance in general. The interviewee here uses a strategy of dissimilation and discontinuation to reject the orthodox narrative which locates the beginnings of Karelian autonomy in the KTK and instead proffers a narrative in which it is the Ukhtinskaya Respublika that provides the starting point for Karelian political independence. The idea that it was a ‘White-Finnish’ plot is countered by the comparison of the rumour that the Karelians were financed by the Finns with the well-known accusation that the Bolsheviks were themselves financed by the Germans; if taking money from abroad is acceptable for a Russian political movement it is acceptable for its Karelian equivalent. This also demonstrates a strategy of equivalence which not only legitimises Karelian actions but also elevates the formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika into the pantheon of notable historical events alongside the Russian Revolution itself.
References to the Ukhtinskaya Respulika were relatively rare, but they were made by other Karelian contributors including Olonets Karelians, who also assessed it as the actual first manifestation of Karelian political autonomy:

В двацатых годах, я думаю, то что прошёл, была создана вот эта Ухтинская Карелия, вот первый союз, впервые наверное в 20-х годах заговорили о самосознании Карелии...(D6).

In most of these contributions, however, detail of what actually occurred in this period was notably lacking; beyond being able to state the mere fact of its existence many were unable or unwilling to narrate an actual history of this period. In particular those Karelians without higher education and those who were from the Olonets group tended to be somewhat less able to narrate a history of its formation or had not heard anything substantive about it at all. Anatolii Grigoriev presented a narrative of the period in which the choice offered to Karelians in the 1920s was not between independence and the KTK but between Russia and Finland:

Почему в Финляндии так живут сейчас, лучшая страна в мире, а тут рядом под боком такой же климат, такая же география, такие же люди, живём так?

То невольно возникает сомнение, а правильно ли поступили карелы в 20-м году? В 1920-м году, когда значит остались в России и не присоединились к Финляндской Республике, потому что если бы тогда территория Восточной Карелии вошла бы в Финляндию мы же бы жили как живут финны (D13).

In this narrative the Karelians choose to remain within Russia rather than unite with Finland; the Karelians are for once here presented as having determined themselves to take a course of action rather than being dictated to from above. Their actions in 1920 are, however, evaluated as an error; had they joined Finland they would now be enjoying a much better standard of life. Karelia is presented through a unificatory strategy as being essentially the same as Finland, down to being inhabited by “такие же люди”. This narrative is
somewhat tentatively expounded by Grigoriev who appears to appreciate its heterodox nature, however it is presented as being so obvious as to “невольно возникает сомнение” even if one should seek to avoid it. This narrative deconstructs once again the image of the foundation of the KTK as providing Karelians with the required autonomy and other benefits promised by its creation and offers an alternate narrative in which the Karelians made a historic mistake by not joining their Finnish brothers. Once again Grigoriev uses a historical narrative, as has been seen above in the mass media material and in other interview excerpts, which positions Karelian identity closer to Finnish than Russian.

The most common response of the interviewees to questioning on the value of this anniversary was, however, a degree of indifference:

A) Дело в том, что для меня, как интеллектуальный человек имеющий университетское образование и знающий историю России, я считаю эти даты абсолютно искусственные, не отвечающие исторической правде, и в [...], 90 лет тому назад, а, была сформированна Карельская трудовая Коммуна. Это абсолютно большевистское образование которое к национальному вопросу в Карелии не имеет никакого отношения. То есть вот так. Это абсолютно искусственная дата которая по-моему под собой исторической базы не имеет (A7).

B) -Нет ничего особенного (B1).

C) Но для меня только понимание того, что 90 лет назад, скажем как просто...дали имена, звания республике, не какой-то, вот, земли вепсские, волость [... ], карельские, а именно республика... этого звания. Ну...как бы, какой-то, сверх...такого важного понятия, не [... ]...не интересно просто (A5).

D) - Наверное ничего
- Ничего, нет?

- Ну сами, как бы, понимаете, 90 лет, я наверное…но не была там, (laughs), ну и сколько, (laughs) создание республики. Поэтому живу себе и живу, то есть как бы, ну, от политики далека (D8).

In the above examples the level of irrelevance attributed by the participants to the anniversary of the KTK is quite marked; for many interviewees the event held no particular significance for themselves that they were able to identify. In example A this indifference appears to stem from the interviewee rejecting the historical narrative they consider the event to represent. The interviewee presents themselves as an informed, ‘university educated’ individual and thus represents themselves as possessing the required knowledge and authority to determine the validity of any such commemorative event; the foundation of the KTK is therefore represented as failing this test. Both the foundation of the KTK and its commemoration are presented as “абсолютно искусственный”, as outside the real historical narrative of which the interviewee, through their knowledge of history, is apparently aware. Participant A5 struggled, as shown by the many lacunae in the transcript, to identify the significance of the date; the pauses and inaudible muttering were representative of their hesitancy. The date is represented as commemorating merely the declaration of the KTK rather than its foundation, and indeed the interviewee appears somewhat confused as to the actual title that was bestowed on the area at the time. It is represented as a political move from ‘above’, which for the ordinary citizen of the modern Republic of Karelia is “не интересно просто”. It should be noted that this individual, although possessing a higher education, was a Russian who had spent a large period of their life outside the Republic of Karelia; although further data would be required to make a definitive conclusion it would therefore appear that for Russians within the Republic of Karelia the anniversary of the KTK is of no real interest. This apparent lack of resonance around the foundation of the KTK and its usage as a putative ‘named beginning’ for at least a sense of civic ‘Karelian identity’ clearly seems to indicate the ethnic Russian population have little need for this form of identity and relate their sense identity to other narratives or social facts. Example B, C and D all exemplify an
attitude of complete disregard for the commemoration of this date; in each example the interviewee clearly does not feel the date to have any particular resonance in terms of the manner in which they themselves narrate their own national history and thus identity. Interviewees B and D were both Karelians and both had a higher level of education; B was employed as a journalist and D as a teacher. Their absolute indifference to the date shows that even for a large section of the Karelian intelligentsia the idea of the formation of the KTK as a ‘foundational date’ has no resonance whatsoever.

One of the Russian participants interviewed also assessed the commemoration of this particular date as ‘artificial’ in a similar fashion to the Karelian contributors sampled above:

Я к этому отношусь очень иронично потому что, я уже сказал что само слово Карелия это встречается на средневековой карте, четырнадцатом-пятнадцатом веке, долго..и почему-то сейчас говорят что это 90 лет. Причём в плакатах были некоторые очень смешные...там силуэт Кижей, да? Там и церкви, на Кижах, и написано там "90 лет". То есть как эти (laughs) это не понятно совершенно. Потому что, так, гораздо древнее да? И тут 90 лет. Что она в советское время появилось? Я полагаю знаете что, ну всё у нас сейчас в политике очень примитивно, да? Я думаю что вот тот господин Катанандов который был губернатор, он решил эти годовщины просто, чтобы каких-то личных дотаций получить. Он не получил, правдо, наборут он (laughs) убрали но...конечно полагаю что праздники республиканские нужные, но и более естественные да? Не [...] вот эти мы искусственные праздники, годовщины. А праздники нужные, вобщем нужно забирать власть, нормальная, но к сожалению система пока власть вертикали и она немножко подавляется нормальной становление этносамосознания, и тех же региональных брендов и так далее. То есть если занимались брендинг, профессиональный да? То это действительно бы придавать регионом свое новое лицо и характер и так далее. Вот, и вертикаль власти этого опасается, боится что страна [...], и выгоднее что мы все были одинаковые но вот, я думаю что они наборот, что приведут к этому, негативному финалу, распад. Я думаю что у нас
повторится история Советского Союза, когда тоже однопартиная система, все были одинаковые и потому в конце концов всё просто разворачалось потому что это не соответствует уже...характеру и принципам современного мира, раздуманной развития. То есть в мире как бы растёт оригинальное многообразие, а у нас они пытаются искусственно подавлять. Вот, но они подавляют-подавляют, но потом, может разоваться. То есть если вы сейчас всё сделали так дипломатично так и..., вот позволяли бы, скажем, регионом...обрбит [...], всё будет бы нормально, Россия бы ставала своей федерацией какая она является по констуции (D11).

In a similar fashion to some of the examples analysed above the interviewee rejects the commemoration of the founding of the KTK or at least the manner in which it is presented. To this interviewee as with certain of the others it appears that the date is being represented as the ‘foundation’ of Karelia; the use of the image of Kizhi together with the date of the anniversary is presented as implying the absurd suggestion that “она на советское время появилось”. The interviewee presents this clumsy narration of Karelian history as a direct effect of the “очень примитивно” political system that he considers to be in operation in Karelia and across Russia as a whole. This lack of political nous is represented by a transformative strategy which presents the current situation in a negative light; it is stated that this lack of attentiveness to ‘real’ regional and ethnic feeling will lead to a disastrous conclusion. The inability or unwillingness of the local authorities to create a coherent, rational narrative, as the interviewee sees it, of Karelian history, is presented as symptomatic of an overly-centralised political system which will induce the very thing it seeks to prevent: “распад”. Russia is also negatively compared in this regard to other, ‘normal’ states internationally where these centralising tendencies are less pronounced. The participant is not necessarily here in any way advocating Karelia is less ‘Russian’ than any other are; as we have seen above in the same interviewee’s construction of a ‘Novgorodian’ past for Russian Karelians this seems to be intended to establish an image of regional Russian identity.
4.8 The History of the Karelian Language

Most of the Karelian participants interviewed viewed the most important element of their ‘Karelian’ identity to be linguistic; many of them offered the opinion that it was the fact they spoke Karelian that established their status as genuine Karelians. This is somewhat significant as they were not actually required by the interviewer to assess which factor they considered as of primary importance in the creation of their national identity. These declarations of the importance of the Karelian language cannot, for reasons of space, be related here but are available within the interview data presented in the appendices. The importance of the Karelian language was stressed by some participants to the extent that it was declared that should the language disappear, the Karelians as a discrete group of any sort would cease to exist. The manner in which the history of the language is narrated is therefore of key importance in terms of how Karelians construct broader narratives of their own history. Indeed it would appear that for many of the interviewees historical events were evaluated primarily in terms of how they impacted upon the Karelian language; this is not surprising given that if the language itself is the determining factor in Karelian identity its promotion or suppression is therefore seen as the promotion or suppression of the identity itself. One of the most important periods of Karelian history is therefore that between 1920 and 1956 in which, at least in theory, a second official language existed alongside Russian. The complexities of the actual language politics of the period have been examined above, however it is important to analyse how these politics are presented by the interviewees and how they are assessed. In general the Karelians interviewed did not offer positive assessments of the language politics of the period, presenting them as artificial or unsuccessful:

А) Я даже когда-то в раннем детстве у бабушки видела эти книги, они были написаны на кирилице, и даже я когда читала мне было смешно...потому что это настолько становилась как глупый язык. Поэтому я знаю, что эта попытка была, ограничена и не удачна (D2).
В) Эта трудовая книжка, он получил его в 37-м году когда, значит, было принято решение о карельском языке. И тогда финский вобщем, значит, отменили и на эту книжку...значит, там написано по-карельски, да? Но его поймёт любой русский, значит, поэтому если по-русски депутат то по-карельски «депутату», районом - «райкому», и вот в таком образом (D16).

In example A above the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian in the older group of participants, has some personal acquaintance with the ‘Soviet’ Karelian language, presumably in this context that of the later 30s devised by Bubrikh; the books concerned which the participant has seen were printed in Cyrillic. This Karelian language however is presented as having been so awkward as to make the interviewee laugh; it appears to the child as a kind of “глупый язык”. In example C the interviewee, also from the older group but this time a Northern Karelian, is also acquainted through familial experience, in this case that of his father, with the Karelian language implemented in 1937; it is somewhat unusual that the interviewee, a non-specialist without a higher education, can name the actual date of its introduction and this again may be due to having access to eye-witness accounts and documentation. The language is again presented, however, as being an artificial and clumsily formulated parody of the real Karelian language; it is presented as having been devised in order so as to be understandable to “любой русский”, with Karelian-sounding endings merely mechanically affixed to the end of every word. These examples are typical of the manner in which the interviewees who had some knowledge of this period narrated the brief period in which an actual Karelian language was adopted within the KASSR; it is presented as having been an almost laughable imitation of the real language. The interviewees clearly interpret this period as a crude attempt to Russify the Karelians through the Russification of the Karelian language itself.

Most Karelians who were interviewed, if they were aware of the events at all, considered the ‘Karelian’ language of 1937-39 to have been an experiment of little relevance to the genuine linguistic needs of the Karelian people themselves, and introduced without their consent. The various attempts to use the Finnish
language to satisfy the cultural and social requirements of the Karelian and Vepsian peoples are also generally narrated in a similar fashion:

А) Здесь вот в принципе и политика как раз Гуллинга была направлена на то, чтобы создавать финские школы, чтобы обучать людей, особенно карело-язычное население, грамота с помощью финского языка. То есть шла некоторая финнизация конечно.

То есть, естественно, указанние сверху через репрессии, этот процесс как бы прекратился или сошёл почти на нет (D10).

В) Никакой возможности, никакой, потому что с того времени, 37-го года, когда здесь у нас запретили использовать и карельский и вепсский языки, ну карельский попозже запретили использовать, естественно когда нету, и даже то что было...это всё было прекращено, то никакой культуры, кроме на финском здесь могла бы развиваться. И всё это восстановленная уже начиная с 1987 года самостоятельно.

Карелия как раз очень специфическая республика была потому что её когда организовали, то не сами карелы её организовали, её организовали финны, которые приносили, даже финны которые не жили в России. Если брать Эдвард Гуллинг и всех его, и у них был очень сложное отношение к карельскому, вепсскому языкам, поскольку они не видели они как самостоятельные языки (Z. Strogal’schikova).

С) Они работали на финском языке. Потом было вид попытка в тридцатых годах ввести карельский язык, и сейчас, например, грамматика того же Бубриха, но попытка не увенчалась успехом, он как бы, там всё было такое что русский язык с карельским окончаниями, и подсчитали что язык вообще невыгодный для использования в деле производства, и стали пользоваться финским языком. Вот, то есть на том этапе, как бы, да я так полагаю что...вот этот вот финский фактор и то что Финляндия была, под Россией, Карелия была периферийным регионом как бы, конечно повлиял иного языка. Вот поэтому карелы под этим конечно же только пострадали,
In the above examples the use of the Finnish language is narrated as having been either actively harmful for the cultural development of the Finno-Ugric peoples of the KASSR or as having merely been entirely unsuccessful. In example A the interviewee does not necessarily narrate the use of Finnish as harmful in and of itself, but opines that the policy of using the language “сошёл почти на нет”. Once again the decision to introduce Finnish, as well as the decision to reverse the policy, is depicted as having been taken without the input of the Karelians themselves; Finnish is introduced by Gylling, who is then dispensed with alongside his policy by the somewhat euphemistic “указанние сверху через репрессии”. The policy is nevertheless denoted “финнизация”, thus establishing that it was intended to promote Finnish rather than Karelian identity. In example B Strogal’shchikova also offers a narrative of the period in which the usage of Finnish, again attributed to Gylling and the Finnish immigrants, is implemented with a view to ensuring that “то никакой культуры кроме на финском здесь могла бы развиваться”. In this narrative these Finns are directly represented as not having viewed Karelian and Vepsian as distinct identities and attempting to assimilate the Karelians and Vepsians with the Finns through promotion of their own language at the expense of those of the local inhabitants. Once again in contrast to Grigoriev, and to some extent to Antonova, the Vepsian Strogal’shchikova uses a strategy of discontinuation to reposition the Karelians and Vepsian population further away from Finnish identity. The usage of Finnish is also seen as harmful for Karelian by Antonova in the last example; she however offers a narrative which mitigates the harmful effects of these political decisions and rationalises them in a more sympathetic manner. In this narrative the Finns adopt Finnish (once again) after the so-called Karelian language of Bubrikh is discovered to be inadequate and deemed a failure; the Finns are presented as having to adopt Finnish as it is a language “выгодный для использования в деле производства”. The damage to Karelian caused by the decision is recognised but is minimised by being described as not “на том этапе”; consequently this past negative experience with
Finnish should not, her in eyes, stop the Karelians from taking what they can from contemporary Finnish culture as necessary. All three examples above offer a narrative of the adoption of Finnish which depicts it as having been a negative factor in the development of Karelian. In the first two examples this narrative is quite negative, particularly that of Strogal’shchikova which uses a strategy of implied threat to accuse the Finns of attempting to dismantle and dissolve other Finno-Ugric identities other than their own; clearly this also has the effect of positioning contemporary Vepsian and Karelian identities at a certain distance from Finnish. Antonova also assesses the impact of the policy in a negative fashion but seeks to rationalise it and minimise its effects in order to avoid such an alienation of Karelian from Finn; historical cooperation, no matter how ill-conceived or poorly-executed, between the two groups has to be sympathetically narrated to ensure future cooperation.

Certain participants did not, however, negatively evaluate the usage of Finnish as an official language for the Karelian population. Although such opinions were somewhat rare narratives were nevertheless produced which were, if not necessarily overly positive towards the adoption of Finnish, at least not entirely hostile towards it. One participant in particular, Anatolii Grigoriev, offered a narrative in which the adoption of Finnish was an entirely justified decision:

Дело в том что карельский язык это язык как скажем деревенский, потому что настоящие карелы деревенские жители. И как такой литературы не было, то что “Калевала” это скорее как бы сказание, понимаете. Вот, поэтому когда Советская власть начала, в 20-м году, коммунисты понимали что карельские диалекты вот три диалекта знаете, да? Они не могут выполнять функции современного языка, на уровне там управления там на уровне экономики, и правильно решили что финский язык готовый, и вот он был фактически государственным основным языком. Мои родители, отец, мать учили в школе там, в Ламбисельге, все предметы были на финском языке, кроме русского языка, и математику и всё. Поэтому они знали и русский язык, и финский язык, и карельский язык, проблема не была. А потом 38-й год когда, это началось после вот
этот расстрел, то решили ну финский язык отменить и перешли на карельский и даже с латиницы перешли на кириллицу, правописание. Но видите что всё там запутал потому что снова вернулись когда ещё территорию захватили от Финляндии снова к финскому языку. И как такового карельского и диалектов не развивили, он был народным говором в деревне, сельской местности. И когда 56-м ликвидировали Союзную республику вот и стал вопрос, потому что у союзной республики всегда был свой официальной государственный язык и у автономных не было, такого статуса понимаете? И формально по некоторым претензиям ещё развивали финский язык, вот до, как сказать, до 80-х конца 80-х годов. А карельские диалекты нет. А потом что получилось? Но тут виноваты может быть сами мы, карелы, что финский язык он такой, ну рассуждали там, то надо развивать карельский, а его как такого нет, он не годится для 21-го века, и мы оказались без языка (A. Grigoriev).

In this narrative the adoption of Finnish is seen as fully justifiable given the “деревенский” status of Karelian, which is described using a dissimilative strategy which emphasises its division into dialects, a status which apparently prevents its use as fully-fledged contemporary literary language. Even when an attempt is made to create such a language it remains a “народным говором”, and, albeit for generally political reasons, does not advance beyond the level of the ‘village’; indeed Karelian is still presented as being even now unfit for the modern world. Finnish is presented in contrast as a ready-made modern language capable of fulfilling all appropriate functions. Once again familial experience is referenced to justify a historical narrative; Grigoriev relates that his parents had no difficulty using Finnish at school. The failure to maintain provision of Finnish in a meaningful way is identified by Grigoriev as one of the main reasons for the decline in the Karelian language itself; without any form of official Finno-Ugric language during the later Soviet period the Karelians are left, by the late 80s, “без языка”. As in his narration of the apparent historical failure of the Karelians to join the Finnish Republic in 1920 the non-adoption of Finnish is narrated as being, at least partially, the fault of “сами мы, карелы”. As in previous contributions Grigoriev uses a strategy of discontinuation in
which ‘historical failures’ of the Karelian people and ‘lost opportunities’ are used as rhetorical techniques to emphasise the essential unity of the Karelians and Finns. Once again had the Karelians followed the Finnish example they would have been better off; indeed it might be argued Grigoriev, here and elsewhere, appears to limit ‘Karelian’ identity to the level of the village and see a necessity for Karelians to embrace a broader ‘Finnish’ identity if they are to succeed in the broader world. At the same time, however, the actual possibility of the Karelians determining their own future then as now is downplayed by a strategy which constructs the Karelians as powerless and shifts responsibility onto generally unseen, unnamed forces; aside from one reference to “советская власть” and associated communists the agency behind the various sudden changes in language policy is unclear; thus the correct choice for the Karelian people is highlighted alongside their inability to make it.

This strategy of constructing the Karelians as powerless to influence language policy and attributing such decisions to vague and nebulous political forces is one of the major elements of narratives which address the history of the Karelian language. In such narratives the changing language policies of the Soviet period are generally attributed to either topoi of external constraint or force or other heteronomous influences:

A) С языком была такая ситуация что в школах изучали и карельский, потом был такой период когда на первый план вышёл финский язык, затем вот снова перешло карельском языком, там ситуация была очень сложная, поэтому, вот, ну я не знаю, хотя наши родители тех кто занимались в школах в то время они хорошо знают и карельский и финский языки, изучались. Такая была вот сложная ситуация конечно с языком. Может быть это послужило тому что после 39-го года даже скорее всего во время Великой Отечественной Войны отошли на второй план и все перешли на обучение на русском языке. Поскольку Олонец и Олонецкий район, много, большая территория Карелии были оккупирован финнами и такое вот неприятие карельского языка и финского языка, карелы, финны народ одного племени, финно-угорского племени, вот я думаю что это была главная причина отторжения от языка (D6).
В) Да, но я объяснила это всё-таки приграничное положение, рядом с Финляндией, и...а в Тверской Карелии, которая находится за тысячи километров от Финляндии и Карелии таком особняком стоит над всех не столь важно не было. Если бы...попытался провести образование на финском языке он был бы непонятен всё-таки никому, а здесь, в Карелии, большое количество финнов же, тогда же было.

- И...так что можно считать что тверские карелы в тех годах получили с точки зрения языка более, более...автономии, чем у карелов в Карелии?

- Да я считаю что да, так...

- Несмотря на то что в Карелии, в принципе Карелия эта была автономная республика?

- Да (A3).

C) Самые важные собитие для меня наверное связанные с языком, потому что в своё время, то есть это после кампании, Финской кампании, после войны то есть Зимняя война или Финская война, когда, когда преподавание языка было запрещено, как финский язык так и запрещался карельский язык, вот это очень страшно потому что, то есть я могу сказать что даже сейчас что язык умирает. Язык умирает потому что хотя, я по своей специальности то есть своей профессии я тоже филолог, но филолог финно-угор. Фино-угорский, потому что я преподавала карельский язык, восемь лет, в финно-угорской школе города Петрозаводска, плюс в педагогическом колледже города Петрозаводска. Я преподавала карельский язык,...и получается очень печальная картина, когда сокращается число часов преподавания.

Получается, что я работаю на этой работе, моему государству усилию, но она никому не нужна (D4).

D) Я до школы по-русски не разговаривал, то есть я жил в карельской семье и у нас всё вокруг были карелы. Мы всегда общали друг
к другом только по-карельский. В школе я начал изучать по-фински, даже не по-карельским.

По карелам да и по вепсам да если мы будем об этом двум народам говорит то языковая политика была, в течение 19-го, 20-го века очень, противоречивая, так скажем, помягче (laughs)...и это была связанно с разными взглядами тех руководителей, которые всилу всяких причин руководили эту территорию. Я хочу сказать что не было однозначными позиции среди карел...(B2).

In all the above examples the adoption or rejection of Finnish or Karelian as official languages is attributed to forces beyond the control or even the influence of the Karelians themselves. In a number of the above examples the changes are not even ascribed to a definitive source; in examples A and C for instance the changes in language policy merely occur without any hint of the particular political figures or groups taking these decisions. In example B they are euphemistically termed “тех руководителей”, whose own appearance in positions of authority is obliquely explained as the result of “всилу всяких причин”. Despite having previously constructed an image of the Republic of Karelia as an intrinsically more Finno-Ugric territory than her homeland of Tverskaya Oblast’, the interviewee in example B narrates a history of this period in which Tver’ Karelians appear to have more cultural autonomy than those in Karelia by virtue of their distance from the border; the “приграничное положение” of Karelia is invoked once again to explain the relative lack of autonomy suffered by the Karelian populace. In example C this heteronomy is applied not merely to the past but also the contemporary status of the Karelian language. The interviewee recounts a history of language politics in which the Karelian language is neglected and manipulated for political purposes and links this directly with the current status of the language. The historical persecution of the Finno-Ugric languages is narrated as continuing down to the present day, with the interviewee outraged that despite its, to her mind, intrinsic worth her work teaching Karelian is “никому не нужна”.

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In general terms the historical experience of the Karelian language was presented in very negative terms by most of those interviewed. As can be seen from the examples presented above most participants narrated a history of the Karelian language in which it flourished, at least within the village environment, prior to the revolution or up until the 1940s and 50s. The decline in the usage of Karelian and consequently the idea of Karelian identity itself is generally attributed to the negative consequences of the language policies of the Soviet government. As the examples below demonstrate, and as indeed many of those above also demonstrate, many of the interviewees felt that these had been directed with the express aim of suppressing the Karelian language and thus destroying notions of Karelian identity:

A) Естественно, естественно, разница колоссальная, потому что я, например, помню то время, когда детям не разрешалось говорить по-карельски, не разрешалось говорить по-карельски не потому, что вообще разрешалось говорить, а был очень хороший мотив, «вы говорите по-карельский, значит вы будете хуже» то есть все дети которые, у которых очень сильный карельский язык, вот их родной, и они начинали ходить в школу, у них всегда была проблема безударная гласная, они сделали очень много ошибок...и когда наши кто-то приежал в школу говорили «почему ваши дети говорят по-карельски? Вы хотя бы на переменах разговаривайте с ними пусть они по-русски говорят?» То есть, эта Россия все она пережила (D2).

В) Много сделали господа коммунисты и компартия, грамотный сделали да, грамотный, они вытеснили язык, вытеснили это, вот, национальное самосознание, тогда это действительно стали стыдно быть, непрестанно быть карелом (A8).

These examples demonstrate the very common opinion amongst the interviewees that the failings of the language policies, as they would perceive them, were part of a conscious effort, particularly in the post-war period, to promote the Russification of the Karelian population. Tellingly the examples are...
from an Olonets Karelian and a Northern Karelian respectively, indicating both groups appear to perceive this process of Russification and evaluate it as a negative. In many of the examples we have already examined above where the negative consequences of the language policies are described they are depicted as being driven towards the dilution or dissolution of Karelian identity without the agency behind such policies being made clear. The two examples above illustrate the less common tendency to at least partially ascribe the desire to destroy Karelian identity to a particular group. Example A is typical of narratives which relate personal experience of the usage of the Karelian language in official contexts being deemed unacceptable by the Soviet authorities. It exemplifies a perceived attitude on the part of the authorities that “вы говорите по-карельски, значит вы будете хуже” and narrates active efforts on the part of the educational system in particular to remove the Karelian language and thus Karelian identity from younger generations. This narrative is still somewhat incongruously related in a rather ambiguous manner; in example A there is at the same time an example of agent deletion, with Karelian ‘banned’ by unnamed forces, and the parents of Karelian speaking children are still euphemistically scolded by “кто-то приезжал”, yet the negative politics of the period as a whole as described as being “эта Россия”. There is thus at least a weak sense that the dissolution of Karelian identity is being directed by Russians for the purpose of Russification. In example B the blame for such policies is directly attributed to the “господа коммунисты и компартия” who are narrated as having been determined to destroy Karelian language and thus identity. Regardless of the manner in which blame is or is not attributed what such narratives have in common is the construction of a historical period in which the Karelian language was directly attacked and thus Karelian identity itself was under direct assault.
4.9 *The Kalevala*: Foundational Myth or Irrelevance?

The possibility of the foundation of the KTK as a form of ‘named beginning’, at least in certain narratives of Karelian history, has already been examined. One of the reasons for the rejection of such a strategy by some interviewees was the perception that it did not adequately reflect the much longer history of Karelia and the Karelian people themselves. The epos *Kalevala* is occasionally put forward as an alternate foundational point, if not quite a named beginning given that the events supposedly related in the *Kalevala* could not, even by its staunchest proponent, be considered dateable to any particular period of recorded history. The response of the interviewees to the *Kalevala* was in general much more positive than to the foundation of the KTK; almost all of those who were interviewed thought it was of importance to Karelian identity in one way or another. For many of those interviewed the *Kalevala* did play the role of a foundational myth or mythological past of the Karelian people in some manner:

A) Я не бы сказал, что это исторически, это, наверное, всё-таки более такой, часть былин, былина часть и историческая, ну и имеет какой-то но только с той стороны подоплёки что, там может быть передаётся какой-то, может быть, какой-то дух тех карелов (A4).

B) Ну. во-первых. этот эпос играет не только в истории Карелии. а сыграет роль в мировой литературе. как один из многочисленных источников этнической исторической памяти, творчество и...я вот люблю. Для меня есть две книги Библия и Калевала (A7).

C) Это очень важно, очень важно, эпос, карелы его знают и очень много, что написано в эпосе, оно подсознание людей, оно как-то есть.
Бывает что ты открываешь книгу и у тебя ощущение что ты это где-то даже как будто проживал.

Это исторический документ и я думаю что это документ, как бы вам сказать, это документ больше всё-таки...то что касается

Эта не сказочка, это рассказ о наших каких-то предках, о наших каких-то корнях (D2).

D) Калевала эта история жизни карельского народа, от рождения до сегодняшнего дня, Калевала эта история жизни карелов. Мы гордимся, конечно, там написано буквально всё, все традиции, все традиции карельского народа (D6).

E) Во принципе, для меня Калевала эта история моей земли, причём не сто лет назад, не двести лет назад, даже не тысячу лет назад, это, с момента рождения земли. Хотя вот официально там происходило восемь-семьсот лет назад, крещение карелов, я думаю, что всё-таки что карелы были христианами намного раньше. И это история христианства на нашей земле (D7).

The Kalevala is described in the above examples as containing in some form or another something of the most ancient past of the Karelian people; in examples D and E it is narrated in metaphorical terms as being derived from the very “рождения” of the Karelians and Karelia, whilst in example C the interviewee views it as containing information “о наших каких-то корнях”. For the participants sampled in examples B, C, D and E the epos is constructed as having some kind of genuine historical value, although the exact historical value of the text is unclear in some of the statements. As a mythological beginning the Kalevala would seem to function quite well for these participants, however as such a concept of a mythological foundation by its very nature would tend to be located in the very depths of history; the vague and somewhat poetic language employed to talk of the “дух тех Карелов” or feelings of innate ‘Karelian-ness’ in “подсознание” of modern Karelians is to be expected of such a mythic event. The importance of this use of the Kalevala is in its potential to provide a
conception of Karelian identity which itself therefore stretches back into the
mythic past, to a point where conventional history cannot follow. Examples B
and E also interestingly equate the \textit{Kalevala} with Christianity, in the first
instance directly with the Bible and in the latter with the “история христианства
на нашей земле”. Both individuals therefore elevate the \textit{Kalevala} to the highest
possible importance, in their eyes, by either equating it to a sacred text or
imbuing it with religious meaning. In this manner the \textit{Kalevala} is presented as
itself sacrosanct, associating Karelian identity with the interviewee’s religious
identity and presenting the Karelians once again as inherently Christian. The
participants quoted above span all age ranges, educational levels and
geographical groups of Karelians, indicating the importance of the epos across
Karelian society.

As can also be glimpsed in example B many of the participants identified
the possession of a ‘national epic’ as part of the fundamental attributes of any
national group; possessing the \textit{Kalevala}, therefore, elevates the Karelians to the
same level as any other widely-recognised nationality:

У всех народов мира есть определённый эпос, эпическое
произведение да, которое стоит в основе свой национальной
идентичности....могет быть у американцев, канадцев это немного по-
другому. У нас, поскольку нашу территорию, мы были долгие годы без
письменного языка, хотя в истории доказано да, то есть найдёны
официальные документы...которые [...] 1242-м году в Новгороде где
официально написан текст на карельском языке. Это официально
установленный факт, от которого никто не может уйти, что есть это язык,
уже давно существовал....народ сохранял свою историческую культуру в
эпических песнях. Поэтому Калевала как собрание эпических рун
эпических песен да,...в этих эпических песен собрана душа народа и
культура народа (B2).

The narrative above also addresses one of the major potential
shortcomings of the \textit{Kalevala} as a mythological beginning for the Karelian
people; the fact that it was produced from the poetic material assembled by Elias
Lonnrot in the 19th Century. The interviewee in the example above both points to the recorded use of Karelian in 1242 and the continuity of tradition amongst Karelian folk artists who were unable to read and write to establish the essential antiquity of the *Kalevala* itself. As the epos is based on the work of generations of Karelians dating back to the very earliest history of the people it is an “официально установленный факт, от которого никто не может уйти” that it is also a source of the very essence of Karelian identity. A strategy of continuation is thus employed to trace the antiquity of the Karelian language and Karelian epic poetry which simultaneously proves the antiquity and power of Karelian identity itself. As noted above this participant was involved in the selection of the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the KTK as a ‘national’ holiday for the Republic of Karelia, however as hinted above even this individual distinctly separates the idea of the political autonomy of Karelia from the antiquity of Karelian identity, which is once again constructed as having very ancient roots.

The Karelian nature of the epos is established in another manner by a further interviewee, again with reference to the accustomed strategy of reliance on familial experience:

Я нашёл своих родственников, пра, пра, пра которые были рунопевцами, и даже в 1872-м году, в те времена когда финны ездили, собрали эти руны, значит, от него было написано несколько рун, и о них опубликованы книги...поэтому Калевала им надо использовать для того чтобы не больше туристов ездили, там есть что-то показать, есть о ком рассказывать, потому что эти вот рунопевцы....(D16).

For this participant the *Kalevala* and other such folk poetry is intrinsically Karelian; it may have been written down by Finns but he can trace the origin of a particular piece to his own ancestors. This interviewee, despite being one of the less well educated participants, has once again been able to draw on familial knowledge to construct a narrative using a strategy of continuation that locates the production of these texts within the historical experience of the Karelian ‘we’ group as exemplified by his direct ancestors. The use of the *Kalevala* in the
modern context is somewhat problematic for this interviewee, however, as it would appear that he views its contemporary use as being directed, by the ambiguously constructed “им”, more towards ensuring “больше туристов ездили” than promoting Karelian culture. This example demonstrates that although the Kalevala appears important to the average Karelian it is also used within the Republic of Karelia as a regional brand, something with which at least some Karelians are uncomfortable.

Some interviewees were more sceptical about the use of the Kalevala as a pseudo-historical text or mythological basis for ideas of Karelian identity. For a few interviewees the circumstances within which it had been compiled were an issue, for some participants its contemporary relevance to the ordinary Karelian was questioned:

На самом деле, я знаю, много карелов эпос не знают, только слышали, что там кто там... я считаю что да, если так говорим немножко, о том что это нам действительно какой-то фундамент, для всей культуры...действительно как будто бы Библия которая описывает как создали этот народ,... я считаю что он важен, конечно, другое дело, что...не все даже читали (A8).

The interviewee in the excerpt above does construct a strong case for the epos to be considered a foundational myth, using the three of the main strategies already examined above: equation to the bible, equation to the usage of similar mythic histories across the world and the narration of the Kalevala as comprising some kind of story of which “описывает как создали этот народ”. The interviewee, however, despite recognising in this manner the potential uses and importance of the epic seems to harbour doubts as to whether it is in actuality a source of Karelian identity: most Karelians are narrated as having at least heard of the work, but “не все даже читали.” Another participant, the Tver’ Karelian, constructed an image of the Kalevala in which it was not regarded as important for feelings of national identity at all, at least for Karelians outside of Karelia itself:
я пока не приехала в Республику Карелию, об этом не слышала
вообще, вот, однако более старшее поколение, то есть поколение моих
родителей, они с этим знакомые, в то время, когда они учились в школе...

- Так что для, но особенно для молодёжи, ну может быть и в целом
для тверских карелов это не является главный источник национальности?

- Нет, нет конечно, значение не играет практически никакого,
особенно постольку-поскольку никто даже незнаком (А3).

The interviewee here deconstructs the importance of the Kalevala to
Tver’ Karelians at least by informing the researcher that it is practically unknown
to Karelians in her native area. She illustrates this from her own personal
experience by advising that until she arrived in Karelia she had “не слышала
вообще” of the epic. Even for the older generation of Tver’ Karelians the
Kalevala is depicted as somewhat of an introduction, a text they only became
acquainted with through school education. It would appear therefore from the
above examples that whilst most Karelians within Karelia consider the work
important and something equivalent to a mythic history of foundational myth
such a feeling is absent in Tverskaya Oblast’. In Karelia itself it seems that
although some may not have actually read it, all Karelians are expected, by the
majority of their counterparts, to be at least aware of the Kalevala; it is not
possible from one interview to determine if the idea that “никто даже
незнаком” with the Kalevala amongst other groups of Russian Karelians is an
accurate reflection of the truth. It does however highlight that whilst it would
appear important to most Karelians a sense of Karelian identity can be
maintained very well without reference to such a ‘mythic foundation’ at all.

Those Russian participants interviewed were generally respectful of, if
somewhat disinterested in, the Kalevala. They did occasionally treat the work as
if it could be regarded as a source of regional identity rather than national; that is
to say as a source of identity for the Republic of Karelia as opposed to the ethnic
Karelians themselves. One such example is illustrated below:
The interviewee was sceptical about the role the epos played in the formation of identity in contemporary society in the Republic of Karelia; he constructed a strategy of devaluation which depicted the Kalevala as obsolete, in need of translation into a “современный культурный контекст.” Rather than constructing an image of the work as a sacrosanct Karelian shibboleth it is referenced as being merely the name of a cinema; it should be noted that ‘Kalevala’ and ‘Sampo’ are in actual fact both the names of cinemas in Petrozavodsk, alongside the equally symbolic ‘Pobeda’. The Kalevala itself however is still regarded as a potential source of “регионального сознания” by the participant; in this context it would appear that the identity thus formed would encompass all the inhabitants of Karelia. The potential symbolic value of the work is proposed without its ethnic component, thus proposing a Karelian identity that is inclusive of any group within Karelia that would wish to claim it.

4.10 Does it Matter Anyway? The Importance of History

Given the nature of the interview process it was possible to not merely ask the participants for answers to specific questions on Karelian history but to ask them to assess the importance such a history held for them personally and to gauge the broader influence of history, if it existed, within society in the Republic of Karelia as a whole. One of the major theoretical underpinnings of
this research project in general was that historical narratives played an important part in the production and reproduction of national identities; clearly had the majority of those interviewed pronounced themselves wholly uninterested in the history of the area and its people this would have weakened the theoretical backbone of this research. It should be stated that, unsurprisingly, some participants were much more interested in discussing the topic than others. Indeed the relative length of the interviews recorded, from around twenty minutes to well over an hour, alongside the relative paucity of examples cited from some of the interviews, demonstrates the comparative lack of interest in the subject evinced by some participants. The great majority of those interviewed however did engage positively with the process and produced complicated narratives of historical events and answered the questions as fully as they were able. Questioning of their attitude towards the importance of history in general also revealed that the majority did think it of importance to themselves and society more generally:

A) Это не маловажно, что это осталось и кто-то не бы смог вычеркнуть этот язык, и этот народ, и эту культуру, потому что, ну хотят да? Правительство хочет, чтобы всё было попроще и полегче (A8).

B) Если я называю себя карелом, или карелкой, значит пусть не всю историю, но какую-то часть истории своего народа человек должен знать. И из этого как бы формируется мировоззрение и как бы отношение к своему народу (D4).

C) Ну конечно важно, и мне кажется, для каждого человека историю надо знать.

Но это мое мнение, но если ты живёшь в Карелии, то ты должен знать и уважать культуру, даже если ты не родился а приехал, допустим (D14).

D) Это важно для меня, но самое интересное, что это важно для карелов, для всех. Я вот работаю здесь в библиотеке, и мы понимаем, что
это важно и для молодёжи. Они очень, с большим удовольствием послушают нас в библиотеке, педагогов, сами приходят, изучают эту историю и, но конечно важно, без прошлого нет будущего (D6).

For the interviewee in example A the history of Karelia and the Karelian language was important as it demonstrated to the authorities and society more generally that Karelian identity still existed; it is constructed as one of the barriers which prevent the authorities from carrying out their intention to assimilate the Karelians with the remainder of the populace. The interviewee again identifies a threat against which Karelian history can act as a defence; a strategy of unification which warns against a topos of threat and dissolution. For the participants in examples B and C knowledge of Karelian history is constructed in differing ways as being a requirement for inclusion within a legitimate group of Karelians or residents of Karelia. Both participants construct a picture of legitimacy to reside in the area or be considered Karelian as conditional on knowledge of Karelia; those coveting such status “должен знать” the history of the Karelian people. Both participants appear to conceive of Karelians themselves requiring such knowledge, but for the interviewee in example C in particular such awareness is demanded even of those who “не родился а приехал” if they are to be permitted to reside in Karelia. In example D the possession of such historical awareness is narrated as being important to all Karelians, even the ‘youth’; this generation of Karelians, which might, the interviewee seems to imply, be expected to be less interested in the past than their elders, is depicted as willingly, “с большим удовольствием” seeking out such authorities to learn of their history. In this narrative the future itself, more particularly a future for the Karelian people, is conditional on knowledge of the past. Example C is from one of the youngest, least-educated participants showing that interest in history was not limited to the older or more educated group of interviewees.

The interviewees often also identified historical narratives as being of direct importance for their own personal sense of national identity; this was not only exemplified by the wealth of narratives based on their own experience or
that of their immediate family but also articulated as a concept by the interviewees themselves:

Ну, я бы так сказал, да, что поскольку я 100%-ный карел, в моей семье все мои родственники карелы, как со стороны моей материнской линии, так и со стороны моей отцовской линии, значит вот на этой земле находятся могилы всех моих предков......поэтому, конечно, для нас, моего возраста, постарше моего возраста...наших детей наших внуков, это культура, этой территории, жизнь этой территорий, не безразличны, представляет большой интерес (B2).

При всех обстоятельствах, какая она ни была, она моя история, концлагерь сталинский - это моя история, финская оккупация - эта моя история, нашествие мамая - это моя история, Олонецкие полки были на Куликовском поле, 1812, нашествие Наполеона - эта тоже моя история, потому что там Олонецкие полки тоже участвовали, историю надо просто знать и самое главное, я считаю, не надо делать, повторять ошибок (D7).

In the first example above the interview deploys a strategy of perpetuation which depicts the continuity of his own personal Karelian heritage and identity; his ancestors are referenced as having been Karelians back to the beginnings of time to the extent that within Karelia “находятся могилы всех моих предков”. An appreciation and respect for Karelian history and culture is depicted as being unavoidable in these circumstances, as such a storied personal history of Karelian identity cannot be ignored and must be valued. The second example also uses a similar strategy to personalise a perceived historical heritage and thus depict it as an intrinsic part of the individual’s own personality. In both examples the historical narrative is interwoven, for the participant, with a personal, familial narrative which emphasises the importance of such histories to the sense of identity of that individual.

As we have already seen above the importance of Karelian history can be viewed as its potential value in safeguarding the Karelian people from putative negative consequences. Unsurprisingly Anatolii Grigoriev, as head of an
organisation with political goals, also presented a picture of Karelian history in which it was useful in the political arena:

For Grigoriev the history of the Karelian people is important as it witnesses the political neglect of the Karelians by the authorities and reminds them of the promises that were supposedly made and left unfulfilled by previous governments. Historical narratives which present the Karelians as having been mistreated by the forbearers of the current authorities allow those such as Grigoriev and the organisation he represents to “им напоминаем” of what was promised to the Karelians in the past. In this manner the responsibility of the modern Republic of Karelia to assist the Karelians is established by a strategy of continuation which depicts it as inheriting the duty to implement, for example, the “право Карелов” apparently awarded to them by the Tartus Peace Treaty of 1920. This also recollects the topos of the ‘broken promise’ to the Karelian people on the part of the Soviet authorities and their Russian successors which Grigoriev, as noted above, created in his articles within the mass media discourse.

For Zinadia Strogal’schikova the history of the Finno-Ugric peoples of Karelia is potentially important for another reason:

Я думаю, что если больше как бы, люди информированные, население Карелии да? О том, о карелах о вепсах, и здесь очень большая часть населения это карелы-вепсы, которые обрусели...просто сейчас они считают себя русскими. И конечно, это, но для этого у нас есть пресса, но национальная пресса - очень мало читают. И если бы, конечно, русская
In this narrative much of the ‘Russian’ population of Karelia is identified as Karelians and Vepsians who have been Russified and “просто сейчас они считают себя Русским”. Such individuals are imagined as having lost their Finno-Ugric heritage and thus identity at least in part due to the lack of information available to them on this heritage and culture. Strogal’shchikova appears to believe that if these individuals were able to access such information the situation “было бы лучше”, although how this would manifest itself it unclear. It can be inferred, however, from these comments that she considers knowledge of Karelian and Vepsian history to be a key factor in preventing the loss of such identities to assimilation with the Russian majority. It is also interesting to compare her perception of the attention given to Karelian and Vepsian history by the Russian-language press as inadequate with the study of the mass media material made in the previous chapter; it has been argued that this discourse is marked by the marginalisation of the Finno-Ugric minorities and this is clearly a phenomenon perceived by the intelligentsia of these minorities themselves. Strogal’shchikova explained why she believed such a situation had arisen in some detail:

Можно сказать что вообще история Карелии для большей части населения она конечно неизвестна. Потому что основной части населения Карелии, значительная часть, она начала формироваться вообще после войны. Много здесь люди которые здесь приехали. И это конечно большое упущение. Если бы, ну сейчас у нас руководство тоже не местное. Если у нас было местное руководство, то есть, люди, которые родились здесь, и они были во главе республики, то эта другая ситуация, совершенно. Сейчас когда у нас только что поменялось руководство, мы видим, что есть люди, которые приехали вообще из других регионов. Я думаю, что хотя новый руководитель говорил, что для него это интересно и важно и что он будет поддерживать, и мы видели что он приехал на конференцию...системы не такой, конечно работа как бы по воспитанию регионального как бы патриотизма, региональной истории не ведётся.
Используя старые книги наших историков, они никогда не затрагивали этнической аспект. То есть для них население Карелии это население без этнической принадлежности (Z. Strogal’shchikova).

In this narrative a large part of the population of the Republic of Karelia are identified as those who “приехали”, for the most part after the war. These individuals are depicted as wholly uninterested in the traditions and culture of the Karelian and Vepsian peoples. In particular the leadership of the area is denoted as “не местное” and thus not concerned with the propagation of ideas of Finno-Ugric history. She also accuses previous historians, in this context those of the Soviet period in particular, of neglecting the Finno-Ugric heritage of the area in their work; they are portrayed as having “никогда затрагивали этнической аспект” of Karelian history. In this manner the historical narratives available to the majority of the population of the modern Republic of Karelia are represented as being narratives which omit all reference to the actual Finno-Ugric heritage of the area; Karelia is presented as just another Russian province.

Strogal’shchikova is here attempting to dismantle what she sees as the prevalent historical narratives available within the Republic of Karelia by presenting them as avoiding and omitting reference to the most important aspects of this history. It is interesting to note here and from the contributions of Grigoriev analysed above that two individuals who were actively demanding increased political rights for the Finno-Ugric minorities in the 1990s are still, at least in private, of the opinion that the political system of the Republic of Karelia does not answer their needs. As we have seen from the mass media discourse analysed, in particular from Grigoriev’s texts but also from Antonova’s, activists in the Finno-Ugric communities often use narratives and discursive strategies that position Karelian identity further from Russian identity or closer to Finnish. It has also been noted however that this conception of Karelian identity is rarely directly stated but is indirectly inferred; certainly nothing in the data is as heterodox as an outright denial of Russian influence and an associated claim for political priority if not outright superiority such as characterised Strogal’shchikova’s and Grigoriev’s newspaper articles in the 1990s. The interview data demonstrates however that these political ambitions still remain as
the basis of their contributions to the discourse; both Grigoriev and Strogal’shchikova remain of the opinion that the leadership of the Republic of Karelia should pay much more attention to the problems of the Finno-Ugric minorities and indeed would like to see these minorities more involved in the power structures themselves.

This layer of Finno-Ugric activists are not alone in presenting an image of contemporary society in the Republic of Karelia in which narratives of the Finno-Ugric history of the area are lacking or almost altogether absent. Several of the other interviewees thought that their own historical knowledge or that of society in general was somewhat inadequate:

A) Ну, не знаю, знаете? Во первых, я как бы выросла в России, да? И вот вам говорю, что когда было мое детство когда вот ребёнок [...] и объясняем вот...я была как русская, хотя дома говорила по-карельски но я себя вот, больше к русским относила. И когда началось там в девяностых, когда немножко возрождение, я это, считаю, что теперь это как мёртвым припарки, бесполезно потому что у нас большинство уже не говорит на карельском языке (D8).

B) Я думаю, что у нас не всё в порядке, что историю знают слабо...что у нас один только вот, одно имя есть только вот Рокаччу, который вот упоминает что в борьбе с Шведами провел себя героизм и мужественно и в Музерском районе есть памятный знак, там написано об этом. И больше всех со старинных времён ни одного, карелов нигде ничего нету. Поэтому, поэтому, но может быть потому что не было тут таких сражений, как, скажем, Полтава и Куликовская битва и прочее и прочее. Но здесь мало населённое...но я считаю, что это не достаточно, того что мы, у своих героев карелов [...] только единственное Рокаччу знаем, и даже не всех спроси любого школьника и он сказать «кто он такой?», так что он не национальный герой скажем так (D16).

C) К сожалению, история Карелии у нас только [...] и неизучимый, даже вот по официальным данным...и если мы посмотрим тут же средневековую историю, у нас была Обонежская пятиня Новгородской
In example A above the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian within the median age group and thus educated in the Soviet period, narrated a personal history in which she had been educated on narratives of Russian history exclusively to the extent that “я была как русская”; for her the only distinguishing factor which identified her as a Karelian rather than an actual Russian was that she “дома говорила по-карельски”. She uses a strategy of marginalisation to address the issue of contemporary Karelian identity; she opines that the attempts to narrate alternate histories of the Karelian people are useless as Karelian identity itself is “как мёртвым припарки”. In this narrative the damage to Karelian identity has already been done throughout the Soviet period in which Karelians such as herself were reared on Russian historical and cultural traditions; the older generation has no other Karelian heritage left to pass down aside from the language itself, and in her opinion “у нас большинство уже не говорит на карельском языке”. As in example A the interviewee in example B identified the 1990s as the period in which it was possible to produce distinct narratives of Karelian history rather than Russian or Soviet history. Although he was much more positive about the re-emergence of the possibility to produce such narratives he also considers that “не всё в порядке, что историю знают слабо”. He exemplifies this tendency by citing the fact, as he sees it, that Karelians have next to no national heroes to commemorate. He can identify only one such character, Ivan Rokachchu, a Karelian who fought against the Swedes in the 16th century. Even this figure is commemorated by just one memorial and is unknown to a large proportion of the Karelian people themselves; we are
advised that “любого школьника” would not know who he was. The interviewee, within the older age group, evidently does not perceive any positive change towards a greater role for Karelian history in the school curriculum since the collapse of the USSR. A topos of ignorance is constructed within which Karelians do not know their own history very well and lack historical narratives which they can take pride in; further in the interview the participant actually described his efforts to organise a memorial to a Karelian Olympic skier for the express purpose of creating another “национальный герой” for the Karelian people.

In example C the Russian participant who we have seen attempt to narrate a history of Karelia which emphasises its supposed Novgorodian roots laments the fact that this aspect of history is minimised in more orthodox and widely-propagated historical narratives. The Novgorodian past is described as practically “неизучимый”, with the ‘official’ narrative of history being viewed as a deliberate attempt to replace this apparent historical legacy with a unifying “имперской истории” which emphasises not the democratic traditions of Novgorod, as the participant sees it, but the role of the central state. In this narrative the fortress of Korela is renamed Priozersk not to diminish its Finno-Ugric heritage but to diminish the supposed Novgorodian heritage of the area.

All of the examples above agree that during the Soviet period the history of Karelia was either ignored or related in a manner which downplayed its differences from that of the history of Russia as a whole. Karelian participants in particular viewed the manner in which the Soviet authorities narrated history as an attempt to dissolve conceptions of Karelian identity either by actively promoting Russian historical narratives or by passing over in silence those aspects of history which could be seen as promoting a sense of a distinct Finno-Ugric identity. Anatolii Grigoriev also narrated a history of the Soviet period in which the official narratives of Karelian history were altered to diminish Karelian feelings of identity or political aspirations:

Действительно, когда была Гражданская война, 20-е годы, вот сейчас и потом советские историки говорят, что большинство карелов не
хотели к Финляндию уходить, они хотели быть вместе с Россией, но так говорила советская историография. Вот, но если брать вот ситуацию конкретную из деревень, как мне рассказывали старики, вот деревень которые жили вот, я помню эти разговоры, конкретные, карелы хотели жить самостоятельно. И чтобы от русских не зависить, но с финнами был постоянный контакт, многие, наши из моей деревни, Ламбисельги, ходили на заработки и в Питер и в Финляндию, и из Финляндии приходили, 12 км. И прекрасно знали и финский язык, вот русский, хуже знали, очень, многие, вобщем, не знали русского языка, понимаете? Вот, поэтому вот такая ситуация (D13).

In the above excerpt the Karelians are once again positioned closer to the Finns than the Russians, this time by comparison of their supposed fluency in Finnish with the fact that “многие, вобщем, не знали русского языка”. The main aspect to examine here however is the manner in which Grigoriev contrasts the orthodox Soviet narrative, that the Karelians were given a choice between Finland and Russia and “они хотели быть вместе с Россией”, to information he obtained first hand “из деревень как мне рассказывали старики”. These eyewitness accounts, which are described as “конкретные”, are invoked to prove that “карелы хотели жить самостоятельно”. In this manner Grigoriev attempts to discredit the orthodox Soviet narrative by showing that rather than the choice supposedly offered to them the Karelians themselves actually wanted a third course of action: independence. The validity of the “советская историография” is denied by recourse to the supposedly irrefutable weight of eyewitness testimony that Grigoriev possesses. This strategy also attempts to demonstrate once again the manner in which the authorities attempt to note only associate the Karelians with the Russians rather than the Finns but also the manner in which they have attempted to suppress Karelian identity in general.

This idea of the Soviet authorities suppressing narratives in which the Karelians seek to express an independent identity in opposition to and distinction from Russian identity is also expressed in the example below:
Тоже исторические данные об Ухтинской Республике, они буквально по-другому трактовались в советское время, то есть, когда вот смотришь, открываяшь документы, то, чего хотели представители Карел, организуют эту Ухтинскую Республику, это были вот действительно не с целью не столько политической, но сколько направленной на сохранение народа, на образовательные цели, то есть, образование народа, создание школ на родном языке, то есть, в принципе того, о чём сейчас в 90-й годы говорили любой в России, [...] право на преподавание в школах на родном языке, право на газеты, на средства массовой информации, то есть, вывести язык и культуру на более высокий уровень. Поэтому этого мы например не знали, и сейчас...в принципе в образовательной системе нет такого вот упора что, в принципе, на мой взгляд, через историю своего народа мы начали бы уважать историю в целом государства, и ещё историю мировую.

В школе, когда мы изучали, я лучше знала наверное историю Англии, Война Красной и Белой Роз, и Франции и так далее, чем историю родного народа (Д15).

In this excerpt the interviewee alleges that the Ukhtinskaya Respublika was deliberately misrepresented by “они” during the Soviet period to delegitimise its apparent actual aim of the “сохранение народа”. Unlike certain other participants she does not represent the Ukhtinskaya Respublika as having been an actual threat to the unity of Karelians and Russians, or at least not necessarily so; this also implies that were the Karelians to be allowed to learn more about it there would not be any immediate reduction in their loyalty to the Russian state. The demands of the Karelians in the 1920s are represented as nothing more than those of the Karelians today, the chance to “вывести язык и культуру на более высокий уровень”. It would appear however that any education on this period or Karelian history in general was deemed politically dangerous in the USSR, however, as the interviewee alleges that she “лучше знала, наверное, историю Англии” than that of Karelia itself. Once again the interviewee appears to narrate a history of their own youth in which narratives of Karelian history were excluded in order to foster a sense of unity with the
remainder of the state and to preclude the development of strong feelings of Karelian identity.

The neglect, deliberate or otherwise, of Karelian history within the Soviet period was often seen by the interviewees as having left the Karelian people with an inadequate reserve of historical knowledge. As alternate, Karelian historical narratives are, as we have seen, often derived from personal or more often familial experience rather than through the educational system or mass media the inevitable attrition of those with first or second hand knowledge of events is a real threat to their production. Many participants were worried that the loss of older generations was a threat to the idea of Karelian identity itself:

Потому, что я общаюсь с людьми, и умирает старое поколение, старое поколение которое не передаёт свое знание новому поколению. Потому что новое поколение этим не интересуется, ему не интересно. Нет мотивации, то есть я считаю, что не создаётся, не создаётся ситуация которая была заставила молодёжь и мотивировала молодёжь изучать язык и говорить на родном языке (D4).

As evidenced in the above excerpt this steady loss of the older generation and the failure of this generation to hand down its knowledge to the next was seen as one of the main threats to the future of the Karelian language. It was also identified by the interviewees as a threat to the future of Karelian culture and identity in general; with the younger generation not learning Karelian and being reared on narratives of Russian history and Russian traditions there remains nothing to stop their complete assimilation into Russian identity.
4.11 Karelian Self-image: Heteronomy and Helplessness

The image of the Karelian people themselves constructed by the interviewees was quite instructive in and of itself. In general, with one or two exceptions which have been noted above, the Karelian participants constructed an image of their own identity which was peaceful to the point of total passivity. Karelian identity, as evidenced by the historical narratives themselves, was associated with a chronic inability and also to some extent an unwillingness to influence events. In this regard it was surprisingly similar to the manner in which Oushakine (2009) and Gudkov (2004, 2007) have determined Russians to construct ideas of their own self-image and identity. Karelians tend to view their history as having been a narrative of tragic events, almost as a litany of disasters in certain cases, over which they as a group have had little or no control. Even those interviewees who did not assess Karelian history as having been entirely negative tended to depict the Karelians as either unwilling to assert themselves or as having been marginalised or assailed by stronger powers or political forces they were unable to contest:

A) Я думаю, что карелы на самом деле, ну, по крайне мере, раньше, когда они, может быть, не были в составе, они были достаточно такой, ну народ мирный, спокойный, простые земледельцы, охотники рыболовы, и соответственно, нашлись определённые народы там, которые захотели этим пользоваться. И естественно, требовал защиты, и раньше все эти, князья, так сказать, Руси, они как раз на постепенно [...] эти территории как раз как они могут взять под защиту...то есть пользоваться эти территории но в то же время и защищать, то есть, чтобы простой народ может спокойно жить и трудиться (A4).

B) Честно я на этот вопрос я затрудняюсь ответить. Почему? Может быть...это такой, вот более миролюбивый народ, народ который могли подчинить, который не будет, то есть который не восстаёт, как французы во Франции восстают (laughs).
Я думаю, что вот такого стремления быть отдельным государством у карелов не было. То есть хоть у финнов было (D4).

C) Я думаю что в основе, сути своей характера карела, эта была, это было восприятие всех других народов как свободных и равных тебе... вот отличие может быть, в чём, вот каких-то других наций, были нации которые считали - да ты равен, но я это я, вот это есть в многонациональной семье есть такие, я главный. Карел по сути своей очень миролюбив, очень терпим, и в силу этого я думаю что все процессы какие, ассимилиционные идут они очень серьёзные влияют на карелов (D2).

D) Карелов тоже в степени как и русским... терпеливости в крайней степени и подчиняемость (A7).

In all the above examples the Karelians are portrayed as having been and indeed, as these are the self-portrayals of the interviewees, as being utterly passive. In examples A the Karelians are depicted as having been “простые земледельцы” and thus entirely able to defend themselves against external enemies; they are therefore required to ask for Russian protection in order for them to continue their peaceful life. Interestingly this excerpt is from the participant who gave the narrative of Karelians defending their local area sampled above which was least marked by these features of heteronomisation; clearly the interviewee constructed a general picture of Karelian identity as a whole marked by a lack of self-determination. Although he does attempt to construct a narrative within which the Russian presence is tolerated and beneficial to the Karelians he again characterises the local population as simple peasants who are politically unsophisticated and thus require protection from a third party. In all of the examples the Karelians depict themselves and their ancestors as patient and peace-loving, a people the interviewee in example B explains “который не восстаёт”. In examples B and C the Karelians are compared to other nationalities which do assert themselves, such as the Finns, French or unnamed others who might be willing to declare “я главный”. This easy-going and accommodating nature is depicted as the reason why in the one example the Karelians did not wish to gain political independence and in the
other as the reason they happily live as junior partners in a “многонациональнай семьёй”. Examples A, B and C all use the narrative of Karelian singularity, as an exceptionally peaceful and tolerant people, to rationalise the manner in which the Karelians failed to develop as an independent nation. Although in example A there appears to be a certain reciprocity in the arrangement by which the Russians come to defend the Karelians in examples B and C there is some sense of the tolerance of the Karelians being ‘taken advantage of”; it is because of their extreme peacefulness in example C, for instance, that the “ассимилиционные” processes are allowed to occur, presumably because the Karelians are too easy-going to object. Interestingly the interviewee in example D, whom it is worth repeating had Karelian and Russian heritage, constructed both ethnic groups as being equally submissive and tolerant to an extreme degree:“в крайней степени”.

Aside from asserting the docile and subservient nature of the Karelian people the interviewees also tended to use a strategy of heteronomisation, or attributing the agency behind changes to factors outwith the control of the Karelians themselves. This strategy has been encountered throughout our examination of both the media and the interview data, and is worth examining in a little more detail here:

A) Тут, я думаю, не спрашивали никого...они просто как бы, многие может быть считают что лучше бы были с Финляндией, но мне кажется, что в те годы рядовой карел, не думали - присоединили или не присоединили (D14).

B) Но сейчас я рассказываю собственное мнение, вот мне кажется что территория была, но дикая, будем говорить. И как бы центр России пошли в Сибирь, пошли в Карелию, и знаете, просто карелы жили маленькими группами, они вот на берегу озёр, и были как бы сами по себе. То есть они, ну как бы жили и жили по себе (D8).

C) Дело в том что Карелия как регион маргинальный, пограничный, история карельского языка, карельского народа, карельской культуры, она не могла, по-моему убеждению, развиваться отдельно от
какого-то крупного государства, будь то Россия или будь то какое-то, северное в Европе, шведское, финское, но шведское да? И поэтому то что мы, то есть карельский народ оказались полностью с раннего Средневековья связаны с народом русским, это исторический факт. Мы не можем говорить о том, что было если было, да? (А7).

Д) Потом ещё стратегически, ты знаешь как мы находимся, здесь вот эта Финляндия, находимся да...потому что стратегически надо был охранять Питер.

Да не было выбора у карелов, абсолютно то, что я думаю ни у карелов, ни у чувашей ни у кого не было выбора потому что, большая, большая Россия, княжество [...] нет, не было выбора, никто не спрашивал, и никто не спрашивал в 90-х да, когда из коммунизма перешли, к якобы демократии, тоже никто не спрашивал, хотите, может быть там, самостоятельной республикой, тоже...не спрашивают нас (А8).

Е) Здесь пытали сделать в общее изначально, здесь было очень много красных финнов, так называемых, которые, там их Маннергейм разгромило и все убежали сюда. Вобщем, изначально было ещё и в сталинское время был проект...что есть здесь создавали как бы плацдарм.

Но это был чисто такой как знаете идеологический, коммунистический проект...Но сейчас как раз надо думать, надо разработки уникальных региональных брендов которые были бы действительно с одной стороны отличать Карелию и от там Москвы, да, и с другой стороны, всё-таки отличали бы и от Финляндии (Д11).

In the examples above a number of different means of realisation for this strategy are exemplified. In all of the above the ability of the Karelians to influence their own fate is denied or downplayed by referencing external factors or actors which shaped events. In examples A and D the Karelians are constructed as having not given, nor indeed been asked for, their consent to the various political changes. Both examples once again feature agency deletion insofar as the authority that might be expected to ask for this consent is not
named. The important feature of these examples is the narration of a history of the Karelian people in which they are continually ignored. In example A it is considered possible that Karelians may have preferred to be united with Finland rather than Russia, however their opinion is not sought. The interviewee also uses the negative self-presentation analysed above by then imagining that the “рядовой карел” of the period was uninterested in such questions; in this manner not only do the authorities not ask the Karelians their opinion the Karelians are depicted as quite possibly not even having one. In example D the interviewee uses a strategy of continuation to narrate a history of Karelia, and also the Finno-Ugric minorities of Russia in general, in which they have never been and still are not asked for their consent to the political changes which occur. This constructs a history in which “не было выбора у Карелов” at any point in time, constructing a topos of ‘continual oppression’ in which the Karelians are always forced to do as they are instructed. Example D also invokes the idea of the Karelians as ‘cursed’ by their strategic location. As we have already seen above in this narrative, as also exemplified in example E to an extent, the position of Karelia and the Karelians on the border between Russia and Sweden or Finland leads to the manipulation of the normal development of Karelian identity for strategic political ends. In example E the Russian contributor views this process as having interfered with the development of “unikальных региональных брендов” rather than Karelian identity but the process involved is much the same. Excerpts B and C exemplify another means through which this strategy is realised; the narration of Karelia as having been a poor, remote and underdeveloped marginal area which cannot successfully develop in isolation. In this narrative the Karelians, who “жили маленькими группами”, are unable to either defend themselves or maintain their independence even had they been so inclined. In example C in particular their incorporation into some form of larger political entity is described as being so inevitable that “мы не можем говорить о том, что было если было”.

All of the above narratives exemplify a discursive strategy of heteronomisation which denies the possibility of the Karelians influencing their own development. This can be due to their perceived comparative
backwardness, a lack of political power or leverage or, as further demonstrated by the prevalent construction of Karelian self-image, simple unwillingness to get involved. Very occasionally however an interviewee did allude to this phenomenon being a result of direct political oppression:

Выбор всегда у человека есть, или в Соловки или дома оставаться (D7).

In this short statement the interviewee elliptically inferred that some Karelians may have desired to influence their political destiny but were unable to do so as a result of actual repression. In this sentence the participant narrates a history in which it was possible to attempt to alter the Soviet political landscape but also infers that, once again, it would have been impossible to succeed. The Karelians, and indeed Soviet citizens in general, are narrated as having had the choice between passive acceptance or arrest. There is also some weak sense, in the usage of the present tense, that this is still the choice on offer.

It is also worth noting that whilst not a particularly common concern certain Karelian participants were concerned that their heritage and identity was being expropriated by contemporary Russian society as potential economic resource. These participants clearly though this somewhat offensive and narrated it as a potential threat to their sense of Karelian identity:

Естественно что Республика осознаёт, новый глава Республики, они всё-таки осознали, что карелы всё-таки являются как сказать, брендом, брендом Республики. Но любой бренд нужно, конечно, экономически подпитывать и люди должны понимать, что не, но я вообще против такого, выставления своего этноса на продажу. То есть люди ведь не для того говорят по-карельски, чтобы продать себе под туристическим, как туристический продукт, но говорим просто поскольку мы карелы (D15).

For the interviewee in the example above the idea of Karelians themselves being designated a “бренд” is presented as being quite objectionable; the interviewee is offended by the idea of the “выставления своего этноса на продажу”. Karelians are depicted as not speaking Karelian for the purpose of
earning money of tourists but because it is an intrinsic part of their identity. The appearance of the idea of marketing various symbolic markers of Karelian identity as attractions for tourists is quite new and is not yet as developed as the authorities in the Republic of Karelia appear to envisage. It would seem as if it is already, in certain quarters at least, stirred resentment amongst the Karelians themselves. The idea of Karelian identity as a brand is here depicted as an outright assault on the true, deeper meaning of that identity, which is the sense of self it gives to the Karelians as a people.

Conclusions

The manner in which differing conceptions of ‘Karelian’ identity were constructed within the interview data shows a number of important similarities with the mass media data but also an equally significant number of divergences. As noted above the composition of the interview data means it is a perhaps more representative reflection of the views of the ethnic Karelian intelligentsia and to some extent ethnic Karelian society as a whole and can therefore be seen as somewhat of a ‘corrective’ to the data derived from the more Russian-dominated mass media discourse. In both sets of data attempts to negotiate and define ‘Karelian’ space through establishing or denying the right to be held as ‘indigenous’ for certain groups in certain areas acts as a powerful strategy of continuation and legitimisation. The tendency identified within the mass media discourse to localise this sense of ‘indigeneity’ to specific areas was also marked in the interview material. Once again Vepsian identity tended to be restricted to a very limited area on the extreme southern fringe of the Republic of Karelia; the only real exception to this rule was, perhaps unsurprisingly, given by the Vepsian contributor Strogal’shchikova who constructed a much larger historical territory for her people which encompassed much more of the modern region. As noted above Strogal’shchikova was the only Vepsian interviewed and hence it is not possible to draw any conclusions as to the resonance of this narrative within the broader Vepsian populace as a whole solely from this one statement. Only one text supporting this idea of much wider Vepsian settlement in the historic past
was identified in the mass media material but taken together these two texts do demonstrate the existence of a narrative, albeit perhaps an extremely marginal one, in which Vepsian identity was once much more pronounced. Despite the general marginalisation and localisation of Vepsian indigeneity however it should be noted it was rarely if ever completely rejected.

The status of Finnish identity within the Republic of Karelia was far more controversial. The rejection of the idea of Finnish presence within the modern Republic of Karelia until quite recent times was most marked amongst those interviewed who belonged to the Olonets group of Karelians. This group of Karelians most often used strategies of discontinuation to deny any Finnish claim to the status of an indigenous people; indeed as noted above a strategy of equivalence which related their presence to political manipulation of borders was often present. As has been noted from the analysis of the mass media discourse Ingrian Finns are accorded a special status within the region by certain participants; once again they are awarded an ‘honourary’ right to settle within Karelia as they are excluded from their own historical homeland. The influence of these Finns was generally constructed as benign or actively positive; it is interesting to note that those participants who touched on the question of these Ingrian Finns were in the eldest age group and hence had some personal recollection of their arrival which appears to have conditioned them to be more sympathetic of this particular group of Finn’s status within the area. It is also interesting to note that the circumstances by which this group of Finns comes to settle in Karelia is narrated using strategies of heteronomisation in a similar manner to the way Karelian history in general is narrated; these Finns are forced to relocate to Karelia by the Soviet leadership rather than choose to come there of their own accord. This clearly distinguishes them from Finnish immigrants of the 1920s and 30s who not only choose to come to Karelia but then take over the leadership of the area at the expense of the existing inhabitants. It is possible therefore that Karelians perceive the later group of Finnish immigrants more sympathetically as ‘fellow victims’ of the authorities whilst earlier immigrants are more ambiguously constructed due to their active participation in the then power structures. Younger participants tended not to mention the Ingrian group
of Finns whatsoever and thus may not necessarily have any information on their history or be aware of their existence as a specific group.

Russians are the other group whose status as indigenous to Karelia is a matter of contention within the interview material collected. Those narratives discovered in the mass media discourse which attempted to use strategies of continuation to construct a picture of almost unbroken Russian residence within the Republic of Karelia were reflected in the contributions of all of the Russian participants interviewed. As noted above one participant in particular reproduced the Soviet-style discourse characteristic of the mass media by constructing the Finno-Ugric minorities and Russian majority as part of one ‘fraternal people’ which all had equal right to live in the area and amongst which there was no inter-ethnic discord. The antiquity of Russian presence in Karelia was also utilised by a marginal ‘regionalist’ discourse, not noted in the mass media, which sought to establish a more decentralised, less homogenised ‘Russian’ identity based on the ‘Novgorodian’ past of the region. The respondent who produced this narrative is a journalist and thus potentially this construction of a more autonomous, regional Russian identity has a reasonably significant discursive weight; its absence from the mass media material analysed would suggest however that it does not have significant resonance within Russian society as a whole within the Republic of Karelia.

The non-Russian participants addressed this idea in a number of different ways. Narratives were produced which did recognise the Russians as indigenous to Karelia; indeed amongst the Olonets group of Karelians and other southern Karelians this phenomenon seemed particularly marked. The manner in which these Karelians associated Russian identity with Karelian identity shall be discussed further below, however it should be stated here that the manner in which they constructed the history of Olonets itself in particular strongly associated the area with the Russian state from the beginning of at least recorded history. Indeed recorded history often seems to begin with Russian presence at the foundation of Olonets; by being included at this ‘foundational’ point Russians and Karelians are constructed as being allied almost as far back as time immemorial. It should be noted that even these participants did relate a vague,
pre-historic Finno-Ugric past in which the Russians appear not to be involved; nevertheless the connection between Russian and Karelian identity thus established is of extreme duration and thus narrative significance. Most Karelians interviewed also constructed a version of Karelian space in which certain peripheral areas were inhabited by Russians from time immemorial, in particular the Zaonezh’e region or other areas around the White Sea. In contrast, however, to those narratives analysed in the mass media which sought to construct these areas as exemplifying ‘model’ or ‘pure’ Russian culture those Karelians which did identify these areas as zones of traditional ‘Russian’ settlement often qualified this judgement by diminishing this very ‘Russian-ness’; the inhabitants of these areas are related as being adapted to a different way of life and influenced by Karelian or more generally ‘northern’ culture.

In contrast to the media discourse, in which narratives which constructed Karelia as a wholly ‘Finno-Ugric’ territory were relatively rare, two main groups of interviewees constructed conceptions of Karelia which minimised or excluded Russian influence. The first group which tended to construct such narratives were the interviewees from the Northern Karelian areas. These individuals often rejected the idea of Russians being considered to be an ‘indigenous’ group and offered a narrative which used a topos of colonisation, rejecting Russian presence as an ‘alien’ element introduced into Karelia at a much later date. This was related to the construction of a topos of a ‘pure’ Karelian area which had existed since time immemorial; in this sense it can be related to the ideas of Hall and Kowakolski noted above. The second group to use this discursive strategy were those individuals, Grigoriev, Antonova and Strogal’shchikova, who might be described as ‘activists’ in the various Finno-Ugric societies of the Republic of Karelia.

As described above certain Karelians, in particular those from the Olonets group, had difficulty relating a history of the Karelian people which differed in any significant way to that of Russia as a whole. In the mass media discourse as analysed above Karelian and Russian historical experience was often related as indivisible, thus positioning Karelian identity extremely close to Russian identity as a whole. The narration of Olonets as a ‘forepost’ of the Russian state
identified in the mass media was also strongly present in the interview material collected in Olonets and had much the same unificatory effect. Even well-educated Karelians as a whole appeared to find it difficult to construct historical narratives which minimised or excluded Russian influence or narratives of a period before Russian influence. As in the mass media discourse the role of Orthodoxy was stressed as a unificatory factor; once again through strategies of unification and continuation Russian influence on Karelia was stressed and Karelian identity positioned close to Russian identity as a whole. Orthodoxy was identified as a key factor in uniting Karelians and Russians by most of the interviewees and indeed it would appear to be perceived as perhaps more important to Karelians themselves in uniting them to a Russian state than might be appreciated from the mass media material. Karelia was once again constructed as a ‘model’ Orthodox territory and Karelians, by most participants, as ‘model’ Orthodox believers.

The supposed shared historical experience of Karelians and Russians as united against foreign enemies in defence of Karelia has been noted within the mass media discourse as another unifying narrative which allies the two groups in opposition to an enemy picture, generally that of the Finns. The interview material generally cleaved to this pattern but some very important differences were also noted. Firstly the enemy picture of the Finns constructed by almost all the interviewees was much more nuanced and ambiguous than that offered by the mass media. Even some of the Russian participants constructed an image of the Finns which did not equate them with the general enemy picture of unspeakable fascist aggression and brutality but rationalised and downplayed their culpability for the conflict and their conduct within it. As noted above it would appear that knowledge of the Finnish language was the key factor at work behind the production of this moderated enemy picture for at least one Russian participant; through competency in Finnish this individual had access to alternate historical resources and thus his habitus or store of collective memory was able to offer an alternate picture of the war years. The Russian participants selected for this study however were generally very well educated, and knowledge of Finnish is not widespread amongst the Russian population of the Republic of Karelia.
outside of this most educated strata; it remains to be seen, therefore, if this more nuanced narrative of the war is common outside of anything more than a small section of the Russian population.

The Karelian participants were also generally well-educated and most had either a good knowledge of Finnish or an ability, through knowledge of a Karelian dialect, to at least understand some of the language. The main resource which conditioned the Karelian participants to produce narratives of the war years which were at variance with the mainstream narratives of heroic, shared resistance to a brutal invader were their access to familial memory. It would appear that many Karelians can construct heterodox narratives of this period due to access to the recollections of their families who had lived through the war and occupation. Together with, at least among some Karelians, study of Finnish material this has provided the Karelian participants with a somewhat different ‘K-device’ in relation to the war years. This appears to be the case for all age groups, educational levels and geographical groups of Karelians, although evidently the youngest group of Karelians does appear to have access to somewhat less information, presumably as a consequence of the gradual loss of ‘first-hand’ witnesses. Consequently the narratives produced by Karelians relating to this period are characterised by a far greater ambivalence compared to those seen in the mass media. This ambivalence was often synecdochically conveyed by the image of division within the Karelian community or family itself over whether or not the Finns were fascist invaders or a beneficial influence. Karelians either tended to construct themselves as passive observers of a war between two ‘other’ groups, the Soviets and the Finns, or as allied with the Soviets but with both sides inflicting damage to the Karelian population. This split loyalty was also synecdochically related by familial experience of certain relatives retreating with the Finns or having fought against them with the Soviets. The triumphalism of the media narrative is replaced by a much more ambiguous narrative in which Finnish guilt is downplayed or minimised.

It should be stated that the only individuals interviewed to completely refute the mainstream narrative on these issues were Grigoriev and Antonova; both of these individuals offered a narrative in which the Soviet Union bears the
greater responsibility for the damage inflicted during the war years and the Finns are related as having aided rather than harmed the Karelians. As we have seen in his article on Lambisel’ga Grigoriev has openly subverted the established narrative in the past, however in the interview process he also deconstructed the hero-status of Melent’eva and opined that the Finns did nothing wrong in their treatment of Karelians. Such a narrative is arguably too taboo for publication in the Karelian mass media and is certainly strongly in opposition to the majority of the data collected for this study. This narrative clearly positions the Karelians as natural allies of the Finns rather than the Russians with all the implications of their national identity that follow. It would appear however that heterodox narratives in general are quite common within the Karelian population. The potential deportation of the Karelian people, ridiculed or discredited in the media discourse, for example, was treated seriously and constructed as a real threat by most of the Karelian participants. Post-war relations between the Karelians and the Russians, an issue not addressed within the media material, are generally narrated as having suffered due to suspicion towards the Finno-Ugric minorities after the occupation on the part of the authorities. Thanks to their ability to draw on an alternate source of information through this resource of familial recollection Karelians produce narratives which have the effect of undermining the unity between Karelians and Russians posited by the mass media discourse.

The manner in which the foundation of the KTK in 1920 has been selected by the modern authorities in the Republic of Karelia as a form of ‘foundational date’ has been explored in the analysis of the mass media material above. One of the interviewees was involved in this process and his contributions reinforce the idea of the anniversary being utilised as an attempt at the creation of a foundation for a kind of ‘civic’ Karelian nationalism, based on the solution of the problems of a specific ethnic group but now more broadly applicable. There is a considerable tension, however, even within his remarks between ethnic identity and this putative civic identity; the participant, a Karelian, clearly also wants to use the date to give a sense of the persistence of an ethnos, the Karelians, and as a rallying call for the solution of their contemporary problems. A limited number of participants did view the
anniversary as significant, at least as the foundation of political autonomy for the Karelians, however it was rejected more broadly on a number of levels. Certain participants, in particular the Northern Karelians surveyed, would rather use the formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika for this purpose, as a more ‘genuinely’ Karelian formation. It would appear these efforts are mostly stymied however by a lack of historical information in broader Karelian society about this event. A number of other participants felt that the anniversary inadequately expressed the continuity of Karelian presence in the area and the antiquity of their ethnos; indeed this lack of an ‘ethnic’ component seemed to reduce the significance of that date for many Karelians to practically zero. The most common reaction, as indicated above, was that of simple indifference. Even amongst well-educated Karelians it would appear that the selection of 1920 as the anniversary of ‘Karelia’ has not real resonance or meaning. Russian participants were equally indifferent and indeed the supporter of ‘regional’ identity viewed it as an example of ‘primitive’ branding. Clearly the foundation of the KTK cannot function as a foundational date for ethnic Karelian identity and appears to be little regarded as a foundational date for any putative ‘civic’ version.

The Kalevala appears to be much more relevant to any discussion of a potential ‘mythic beginning’ for ideas of an ethnic or national Karelian identity. It would appear that most Karelians, across all ages and groups, identify the epos as their ‘national myth’ or ‘national epic’, and actively equate the work to other such recognised epics to elevate Karelian identity to the level of a properly constituted national identity. Possession of such a national epic appears, to the interviewees, to ‘normalise’ Karelian identity as a recognised national identity on a level with any other. The Kalevala was generally constructed as in some fashion containing part of the essence of Karelian-ness, as the ‘soul’ or ‘bible’ of Karelian identity in the interview material. The actual historical value of the epos was generally not admitted by the interviewees, especially those with higher academic qualifications, due to the circumstance of its composition by the Finn Lonnrot, although some of the less well educated participants did view it as a ‘historical document’. Those who viewed it as a work of literature did find its use as a historical basis for the Karelian people unsustainable as such, but
nevertheless tended to argue it did contain some form of kernel of Karelian identity if only as a compilation of genuine Karelian epic poetry; as noted above even one of the less well-educated participants was able to do this by the accustomed strategy of familial recollection and connection to the actual circumstances of its compilation, although it should be noted he was one of the oldest participants. The Kalevala would thus seem to fulfil, with certain caveats, the basic criteria of a ‘mythic beginning’ for the Karelian people. A number of participants expressed some doubt about this, noting that outside of better educated circles few had actually read the epic; arguably this lack of actual acquaintance with the text does not necessarily preclude the idea of the Kalevala from operating as a foundational myth. It would appear, however, from the limited data gathered, that Tver’ Karelians construct a sense of Karelian identity without any regard for the epic whatsoever.

The key role of the Karelian language in the formation of conceptions of Karelian identity has been discussed above. In terms of the historic usage of Finnish within the Republic of Karelia this was a matter of at least indirect personal experience for a small number of the eldest participants who narrated this period using strategies of delegitimisation which viewed the imposition of Finnish as harmful to the development of Karelian. This can be contrasted to the discourse employed by Antonova and Grigoriev who, in different ways, seek to position Karelian identity closer to Finnish and thus either justify the usage of the language as entirely appropriate or seek to minimise its perceived negative effects. Antonova constructed a narrative which, in common with most of those sampled from amongst the Karelian population, used strategies of discontinuation and delegitimisation to attack Soviet language policy; she did however attempt to use strategies of minimisation and downplaying to convey her appreciation of Finland and the Finnish language in general. Grigoriev sought to use strategies of discontinuation in a different way to present a topos of a lost opportunity or failure for the Karelian people to transcend the limitations of the localised Karelian dialects to embrace a broader Finnish identity.

The interviewees almost universally agreed that history was important. This rather bland assertion might be expected and is of little interest on its own,
but some of the broader statements made in its justification are of relevance here.
Firstly most Karelian participants appeared to view the possession of some form
of specifically ‘Karelian’ history as a safeguard against the threat of the
dissolution or disappearance of the Karelians as a group. Although the Karelian
language was generally identified as the defining factor of Karelian identity
knowledge of history was generally constructed as an important factor in
motivating the retention of this language and thus identity. In this sense the
continuity of history equates to the continuity of identity; the importance in many
of the narratives above of strategies of continuity is thus highlighted once again.
For those Finno-Ugurs, including but not limited to Antonova, Grigoriev and
Strogal’shchikova, who wanted to obtain more attention from the local
authorities for their minority groups, history is also very useful as a political tool.
The topos of the ‘broken promise’ is the most striking aspect of this usage of
history but many other historical narratives, such as the essential loyalty of the
Karelians to the Russian state or the antiquity of their residence in the region or
language, can be and are employed as leverage on the local authorities in the
attempt to gain benefits for the minority communities. Despite this there is a
clear perception amongst the interviewees that there is a lack of historical
knowledge within the Republic of Karelia related to the Finno-Ugric minorities.
The existence of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika, for example, is mentioned by a
number of participants but detail, which is extremely useful in order to construct
a coherent and convincing historical narrative, is clearly lacking.
Strogal’shchikova and a number of the other participants identified a lack of
knowledge about the minority groups within the ethnic Russian elite as a
negative factor; as this information is absent in the educational system and the
media it is not reproduced, hence the associated identities are not easily
reproduced. Many of the participants were of the opinion that the paucity of
information on Karelian history within the media and educational system was a
deliberate assimilative tactic on the part of the state; indeed Strogal’shchikova
again opined that this had led to an accelerated rate of assimilation into ‘Russian’
identity once language had been lost. The ability to draw on an alternate source
of information through the recollections of previous generations and to a limited
extent Finnish-language media is a small corrective to this tendency and, as
shown above, allows the production of heterodox narratives which do position Karelian identity as at least more distinct than the generally assimilative narratives of the mass media would tend to suggest. This resource is available to Karelians of all educational levels, and as the above analysis shows is utilised by both the least and best educated Karelians to construct narratives in partial or full opposition to the orthodox media narratives. That the Karelian intelligentsia produce these narratives also offers the strong possibility of their dissemination through at least the Karelian-language media. This resource, essentially amounting to ‘oral history’ is however fragile; as noted by certain of the participants it depends on the older generation passing its knowledge to the younger. The younger participants within this study did seem to be in possession of at least some of this oral history and therefore some of this ‘collective memory’, which allowed them to articulate narratives in opposition to those discovered in the mass media analysis. As the number of self-identified Karelians continues to fall, however, the longer term viability of this process must be brought into question.
Conclusion

The corpus of data collected from the Russian language press of the Republic of Karelia and the data collected through the interview process demonstrate the manner in which historical narratives are employed in both arenas to produce and reproduce competing notions of national identity in the region. It is worthwhile reflecting at this point on the main historical narratives which were encountered in this study and how these were deployed to achieve bolster or diminish one putative identity or another. As has been described in the previous chapters one and the same historical event or process can be related in a number of ways, using a variety of strategies, to construct pictures of Karelian identity and Karelia itself which are entirely at variance with one another. It is also worth considering how the production of such narratives appears to relate to the broader context of their construction; that is to say to examine why it would appear certain actors develop and deploy a given strategy, how it is presented and how it would appear to be received.

The creation of historical narratives must be related back to the social context within which they are produced in order to fully understand their potential role in making and unmaking various putative groups. It is necessary to understand the discursive resources upon which these narratives are constructed and the social position and background of those producing such narratives. The position of the Russian-language press within Karelia clearly does not regard itself, as this study has shown, as speaking to or for the Finno-Ugric minorities. This is shown by the existence of a conventionalised, traditional approach within the Russian-language mass media to the production of ideas of Karelian identity which is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse of the ‘younger brother’. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the official discourse on national identity as exemplified by Kareliya. This may be in part due to the standardising and conventionalising effect of the genre of newspaper discourse itself as identified above which has facilitated the persistence of this method of constructing ‘Karelia’. It is argued above however that this persistence may well be in large part due to the perceived persistence of the same social relations and structure within the Republic of Karelia, with the Russian majority continuing to
dominate at the expense of the Karelian minority and thus the Russian-language press perceiving no need to moderate or alter their method of constructing ‘Karelian’ identity. It would also appear that the continued usage of this discourse is linked to the strategies of continuation utilised by the local authorities to legitimate the survival of political autonomy within Karelia and their own relations with the Finno-Ugric minority groups. One of the most striking phenomena present both within the mass media data and the interview data is that of the marginalisation of the Finno-Ugric minorities. In terms of the Vepsians it has been discussed above how their apparent legitimate territory or homeland is often restricted by the Russian language press and by some of the Karelians interviewed to a relatively small area in the south of the Republic of Karelia. In general terms they are marginalised by being constructed through the use of Orientalist or semi-colonial language which constructs an image of them as a quite exotic ‘other’. The Russian-language press also uses such language to approach the Karelian population itself, and offers historical narratives of the Tsarist period in particular in which the Karelians are depicted as natives or semi-civilised in constrast to the Russians, who are the bearers of European progress and enlightenment to the region. The Finnish minority is generally not marginalised in this manner, however it is subject to construction as the ‘other’ in a different fashion by being accorded the status of ‘historical enemy’, as shall be discussed further below. Only the Ingrian Finns are accorded some right to be considered legitimate residents within Karelia; it must also be stated that they are almost entirely absent from discussion within the press and are little regarded within the interview material. In general historical narratives are employed to reproduce an orthodoxy within which Russian identity is almost hegemonic and Finno-Ugric identity only reproduced as a peripheral phenomenon outside mainstream experience.

This marginalising approach to the Finno-Ugric minorities appears to be deeply engrained within the Russian-language press and it is therefore reasonable to assume it is common to Russian society within the Republic of Karelia as a whole. The interview data was compiled in order to obtain a more representative reflection of the views of the ethnic Karelian intelligentsia and to some extent
ethnic Karelian society as a whole to provide a possible ‘corrective’ to the data derived from the more Russian-dominated mass media discourse. In analysing the interview data it is important to consider the mechanism by which such narratives may be produced by the respondents. As noted above the apparent ‘official’ and ‘orthodox’ narratives of Karelian history produce an image of ‘Karelian’ identity which is marginalised and heavily associated with a more dominant Russian identity. The interview material demonstrates, however, the production of alternative narratives of history which distance Karelian from Russian or, in rarer instances, reject the orthodox narrative outright and propose a formulation of Karelian identity much more distinctly Finno-Ugric or even almost analogous to Finnish. To produce such narratives the habitus of the individuals concerned clearly draws on alternate resources than those which propound the orthodox narrative. It would appear that the ‘K-device’ of these individuals, the ‘general world knowledge’ on which these narratives are constructed is not that derived from the educational system or mass media; several participants openly rejected the ideology reproduced in these organs as overly russified or inaccurate and incomplete. The primary source of these alternative resources would appear to be access to familial recollections or at least a form of local ‘oral history’ which provides, to use Kaufmann’s term, an alternate set of ‘referents’ upon which these Finno-Ugric minorities can construct their historical narratives and thus advance an alternate conception of national identity. The very localised nature of some of these identities thus produced and the regional differences perceived between Northern and Southern groups of Karelians may in large part be down to the source of referents used to construct these narratives.

One of the main group of discursive strategies encountered throughout the corpus of data, in particular within that of the mass media studied, is that of unificatory constructive strategies. It would appear that within the Russian language mass media of the Republic of Karelia there is a pronounced tendency to use such strategies of unification, cohesion and continuity to narrate the history of Karelia and the Karelian people in a manner which emphasises its supposed links with that of the Russian majority. These narratives stress the
duration of Russian-Karelian cooperation in a number of spheres but particularly in their joint history of apparent enmity towards their Western neighbours. These narratives are important as exemplifying the idea of historical memory and continuity identified by Hall and Kowakolski examined in chapter two; by emphasising this shared historical continuity the contemporary social context, in which Russians and Karelians are associated together as a ‘we’ group, is legitimised as the natural order of things. This narrative is also closely linked with that of Karelian orthodoxy, which places Karelia itself within the Russian cultural and spiritual world; it should be noted that this strategy of stressing the orthodoxy of Karelia itself can also be used to boost ideas of the region as an innate part of the ethnically Russian world to the partial or complete exclusion of the Karelians themselves. The use of Orthodoxy as a key repository of Karelian or Russian identity in the press may be, to an extent, symptomatic of the increased usage of Orthodoxy as a state ideology in general within the Russian Federation (Papkova 2011, Knox 2005), however as the interview process showed a number of the Karelian participants themselves identified the shared history of Orthodoxy as being a key factor in uniting Russians and Karelians, as well as distinguishing Karelians from their Finnish neighbours.

A related aspect of the usage of unificatory strategies to position Karelian identity closer to that of the Russian majority is the marked tendency within the mass media discourse in particular to portray the Karelians as the eternal allies of the Russians against foreign aggression, be it by the Swedes, Finns or Germans. The Karelian experience of such conflicts is constructed as an element of the ‘national’ experience of Russia as a whole, both in official and unofficial media. Karelians and Russians are thus forever united as a ‘we’ group in opposition to a menacing ‘other’. This process wedds the Karelian war experience with the almost sacrosanct war experience of Russia as a whole and thus has a great discursive weight and significance in the construction of conceptions of Karelian identity. As a consequence it must be vigorously defended from heterodox narratives, such as produced in the Finnish press, which might undermine this essential unity.
Strategies of unification are also employed, as evidenced particularly within the interview data, to position Karelian identity closer to another putative ‘fraternal’ nation: the Finns. This strategy manifests itself within the contributions of Antonova and Grigoriev in particular who often employ narratives which stress the supposed shared experience, heritage or characteristics of the Karelians and Finns to dissolve the orthodox ‘we’ group of Karelians and Russians and establish an alternate Finno-Ugric group. It is arguable from the data analysed above that these individuals, involved in the political side of the ethnic Karelian movement, posit a conception of Karelian identity much closer to the Finnish variant than the orthodox narrative would allow. Grigoriev in particular would appear to conceive of Karelian identity as essentially merely a regional subset of a broader ‘Finnic’ identity. It would also appear that this strategy of conceptualising Karelian identity as essentially related to Finnish is not universally accepted within the Finno-Ugric intelligentsia. Although particularly concerned with Vepsian issues Strogal’shchikova does not appear to wish to strongly associate the Finno-Ugric minorities of the region with either Russian or Finnish identity, preferring instead to promote their existence in their own right. These tensions within the narratives and strategies analysed here seem to reflect debates within the minority communities about the usage and development of the minority languages. As noted above Grigoriev in particular had no issue with the historical usage of Finnish; hardly coincidentally he proposed its adoption by the Karelians as a ‘ready made’ written language in the contemporary context. Antonova, whilst more sceptical of past language policy was at pains to use strategies of minimisation and downplaying when considering the historical harm it may have caused due, it would seem, to a desire to at least use Finnish as a model for the development of Karelian without going so far as to adopt the language itself. Strogal’shchikova, as a Vepsian and thus arguably a member of a group more linguistically distinct from the Finns, was more critical of the historic use of Finnish and coincidentally position Karelian and Vepsian identities distinctly away from that of the Finns. The potential symbolic power of these utterances is important as they represent contributions from individuals who may be said to represent ‘leaders’ within the Finno-Ugric community of the
Republic of Karelia. They are indicative of the manner in which historical narratives are produced to construct and dissolve ‘Karelian’ identities in an important political context.

Russians also lay claim to a share in a form of ‘Karelian’ identity, however, by using such constructive strategies to narrate a history of the region in which their residence is of just as long duration as that of the Karelians themselves. The ideas of Kowakolski (1995) or Hall (1996) on the ‘body of the nation’ or ‘narrative of the nation’ if understood as pertaining to ideas of territories and landscapes are readily applicable here and indeed quite pertinent to the data analysed; for all groups under examination within Karelia the idea of the region as being their ‘historical homeland’ or ‘indigenous territory’ appeared to be quite important. Whilst Karelians themselves used the idea of Karelia as a historically Finno-Ugric or Karelian ‘space’ to bolster their idea of national identity Russian participants were just as keen to use these strategies to advance narratives in which they laid claim to be considered as native to parts or all of the current Republic of Karelia. Both groups, especially within the media data, advanced an inclusive narrative in which Russians and Karelians had both been resident in the modern region since time immemorial, or at least the beginning of recorded history. The manner in which the town of Olonets is represented in these narratives by both Karelians and Russians often produces an image of Karelia in which both groups play a role, cooperating to defend and develop a shared space. Olonets Karelians in particular, both from the mass media and interview material, would appear to associate themselves and be associated with the Russian state through the usage of historical narratives which construct their native territory as an intrinsic part of the Russian state. Although within the interview data there was a weak sense of a purely Karelian ‘pre-history’ the constant association of the ‘founding’ of Olonets by the Russian state produces a narrative within which the Karelians are associated with the Russians from (almost) time immemorial to the present day. In this manner Karelian identity for the Olonets Karelians is always associated with the Russian state. A lack of alternate referents, even from oral history, deprives these Karelians of any ability to construct narratives which would bolster any conception of a more
‘independent’ narrative. For this group of Karelians in particular language usage becomes the fundamental distinguishing factor between Karelian and Russian identity as the historical narratives available tend towards assimilation with the Russian state and thus identity. It may be argued that the Northern group of Karelians, who came into contact with the Russian state at a later date and less intensively until relatively modern times, have alternative referents which can be used to provide a more distinct conception of Karelian identity. In particular the usage of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika and the *Kalevala*, which they construct as a product of ‘their’ area, provide alternative referents which position Karelian identity outside the Russian state and cultural sphere. More broadly however, and across all groups of Karelians, the historic lack of Karelian statehood does appear to impair the ability of Karelians to narrate a distinctly Karelian history that would help support a uniquely Karelian identity; historical association with the Russian state is generally used, by Karelians and most importantly within the mass media, to conceptualise Karelian identity as part of a broader Russian social framework.

The notion of constructing ideas of historical space is often used for different purposes, however. Certain Karelians, in particular Antonova and Grigoriev in the interview data but also other participants, constructed an image of historic Karelia which excluded all non-Finno-Ugric influence. Conversely this tool could be and is used by Russians, particularly within the press, to advance a notion of the historical range of Russian settlement which depicts much of Karelia, and on occasion the entire region, as having been inhabited by Russians from the earliest historical periods. In particular this strategy is employed with regards to those areas around the White Sea and the Eastern shore of Lake Onego which are claimed to be the heartland of Pomor or Novgorodian culture. As hinted at above the idea of continuity of settlement and the putative status of one or more group to be considered indigenous is also related to the narration of a particular location as the ‘birthplace’ of a nation or national culture. This is most strongly exemplified by the manner in which the town of Kalevala is presented as the birthplace of the eponymous epos and hence Karelian culture in general. To a lesser extent Russian speakers also appear to
present the somewhat amorphous ‘Za’onezh’e’ as the nexus of Russian culture or at least certain manifestations of it. The most interesting aspect of this phenomenon identified in the current study was the contribution made by one interview participant (see chapter four above) in which he narrated the history of this area as comprising Novgorodian traditions of autonomy in opposition to the apparent overly-centralised Muscovite heritage of central Russia. This was an isolated example and no similar instances of such a narrative being produced and such strategies employed could be discovered in the interview process or the media data. Nevertheless it is important as it illustrates the manner in which a putative heterodox national identity can be wrought from almost any historical narrative in opposition to a perceived orthodoxy. Clearly there are limits to this process; the participant could hardly have claimed, in any meaningful manner, that the local Russian population has imbided democratic traditions from the American Revolutionary War of 1775-1783. It does demonstrate, however, the manner in which the narration of history can be used to produce a conception of national identity contrary to the orthodoxy; the continuity of Russian authority in Karelia is here not used to bolster the credentials of the current political system but to subvert them.

The modern unity between Russians and Karelians was justified in the media data not merely by the fact that they had supposedly lived side by side with each other for millennia but by their apparent shared heritage of mutual enmity with various ‘other’ groups. The creation of an ‘other’ is key to the construction of any national identity (see Bhaba 1990), and in this regard the data analysed here has been no different. Although the Swedes are of some importance in narratives which address the medieval history of Karelia the Finns are the nation most commonly constructed as being the ‘common enemy’ by some distance. Within the newspaper material the Finns are strongly associated with the Great Patriotic War and are thus commonly depicted as being aggressors and, to a certain extent, fascists in line with the image of the Germans which is narrated within the orthodox discourse on this subject. As the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War currently plays a key role in the narration of national history and official attempts to create a unified, inclusive Russian national
identity so it is also of primary importance in Karelia. Firstly the apparent aggression of the Finns is used to justify the annexation of Sortavala and other areas which were ceded to the KASSR in 1944, although this is also commonly justified by reference to their apparent Russian heritage prior to 1917. More importantly their shared exploits and struggles against the Finnish invader is used to associate Russians and Karelians together into a common ‘we’ group; just as importantly of course it divides Karelians from the potentially attractive, on linguistic grounds and in terms of their economic wealth, putative ‘we’ group of Finno-Ugurs which could be constructed from Karelians, Vepsians and Finns. The Finns are generally not represented in as damning terms as the Germans are depicted when this period is narrated, however the use of terms such as концлагерь when employed with reference to the occupation and the relation of their supposed atrocities does build an enemy picture of the Finns which, in the press, is almost universally damning. As the Finns can be, as we have seen, potentially constructed as an alternate ‘we’ group together with the Karelians in opposition to their putative alliance with the Russians there is clearly a strong motivation within the social context of the Republic of Karelia to isolate Karelian identity from Finnish as well as promoting the ‘Russian-ness’ of Karelian space; Karelia itself, as a border region, must be constantly reconstructed as an integral part of the Russian, not Finnish, cultural and political sphere.

The narration of Karelian and Russian unity against this other group is also of note as it is used by Karelians themselves to assure the Russian readership of the newspapers of their loyalty to the Russian state; it is often invoked to bear witness of such loyalty as a demonstration that giving more language or other political rights to the Karelians does not threaten this apparent unity or risk the Karelians ‘defecting’ into the Finnish camp. Within the media data studied Karelians often appear to be reacting to an implicit perception of disloyalty which would accuse them of betraying their allegiance to their Russian allies and fraternising too closely with the Finns. This demonstrates heteroglossia in action as the Karelians are clearly producing texts in reaction to ‘utterances’, perhaps unwritten but at some level current, within Russian society.
which cast doubt on their role in the war. Karelians who present themselves within the Russian language media seek to reassure the authorities that this speculation is unfounded by relating historical narratives which prove their unbroken loyalty. This topos of threat or disloyalty is also clearly evidenced in the interview data where the participants also narrated histories of the post war period in which Karelians were further victimised by a suspicious state. Once again this putative victimisation demonstrates the marginalisation of Karelian and other Finno-Ugric identities within the modern Republic of Karelia. There is clearly some suspicion that the profession of a Finno-Ugric identity makes an individual somehow of dubious loyalty to the Russian state as a whole. Arguably the production of non-Russian identities within the modern Republic of Karelia must, to be accepted within the orthodox discourse, be done in a manner which associates that identity with a broader Russian identity.

The interview data is of great interest as it demonstrates that the narrative of the Finns as aggressors and brutal occupiers is often subverted or completely rejected by the Karelians. In contrast to the narratives offered by the Russian-language press, which tend to use a strategy of avoidance to omit reference to the Winter War, the interview participants, including those Russians interviewed, mentioned this conflict. Certain of the Karelian participants were even prepared to offer a heterodox narrative in which the USSR was constructed as the aggressor. The Karelian participants often deconstructed the official narrative by delegitimising Soviet claims of Finnish aggressive intent or offering alternate narratives of the occupation period in which the Finns are represented in a sympathetic light. The interview process also revealed the manner in which certain narratives had been, and to an extent still were, considered unacceptable and thus had been repressed; although entirely absent in the media data in the interviews narratives were offered in which individual Karelians collaborated with the Finns to the extent of having resettled in Finland after the war. In this fashion a picture of Karelian identity was offered which was closer to that of the Finns than allowed in the orthodox narrative. Most Karelians continued to view the period as having been that of occupation and related familial experiences of their parents or grandparents having fought the Finns; nevertheless the
participants tended to view the Finns as having acted decently towards the Karelians and many represented the Finns as being unwilling victims almost to the same degree as the Karelians themselves. The most outspoken individuals on this issue and many others were those Karelians who represented political and cultural organisations; they offered narratives in which the Finns were presented as having acted in an entirely proper manner, as opposed to the Soviet authorities who were depicted as reckless and uncaring. In this manner these Karelians, who are attempting to lead a regeneration of Karelian identity, offered a representation of Karelian history which moved their identity away from unity with the Russians to affinity with the Finns. Once again this ability to construct a heterodox narrative of the war years appears to rely on the ability to access alternate ‘referents’ and thus an alternate collective memory. Partially, in particular for the Russian participants interviewed, this would see to be through familiarity with Finnish language texts and thus the narratives of history reproduced within Finnish society. Most importantly this is again a product of a store of ‘oral history’ within Karelian families and communities which reproduces narratives of taboo or heterodox phenomena such as deportation, cooperation with the Finns or Soviet repression which are either rejected within or completely intolerable to the orthodox media narrative.

The impact of the war is also of primary importance to Karelians as it appears to be conceived of as having had a particularly pernicious influence on that aspect of their identity to which they would appear to attach most importance: the Karelian language. Narratives of the history of the Karelian language, in general produced by Karelians themselves, are of primary importance in the mass media data in attempts to advance ideas of Karelian identity. The majority of articles which deal with the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish languages within the Russian-language press of the Republic of Karelia are produced by members of the respective minorities; as has been seen above in chapter two when Russians do produce articles on the languages their attitude appears at best indifferent and occasionally outright hostile. In their narratives of the history of Karelia and their people the Karelians often create a topos of the ‘golden age’ of the language and thus their identity in which Karelian was used
everywhere, constrasting it to the current linguistic situation. In this manner the clearest approximation within the data studied to the idea of a ‘pure’ ethnos or people, as proposed by Hall or Kowakolski, is seen; Karelians very positively evaluate this era of monolingual Karelian communities and view the increased dominance of Russian entirely negatively. The loss of Karelian language is the loss of Karelian identity and thus the historical dominance of Karelian is narrated as the apogee of the Karelian people themselves. The continuity of language use from ancient times down to the modern era also provides another constructive strategy for creating a sense of Karelian identity in opposition to Russian identity. In narrating a history of the Karelian language in which incorrect political decisions, neglect or open Russification is responsible for its decline Karelians either in the press or in private create an argumentative strategy in which they are not culpable, or at least only partially so, for the language’s slow decay. By using such a historical narrative not only can the responsibility for this language shift be placed on the historic authorities the onus can be placed on their modern equivalents to make good this supposed historic debt. The representatives of Karelian social and political organisations in particular create a topos of the ‘broken promise’ of the KTK or other associated Bolshevik policies of the 1920s which is used to lobby for more resources and attention to Karelian problems from the local authorities. The perceived history of deliberate Russification that some Karelian participants in the interview process identified also would appear to be important to their current political situation and their sense of identity; by narrating such a history of Russification these Karelians using a strategy of continuation the Karelians present an image of contemporary Karelia in which the same processes are at work and can accuse opponents of the usage of Karelian of continuing this history of discrimination. It is therefore clear that historical narratives of this language shift are of an immediate political use to Karelians and also help provide another element of their sense of self.

Both Hall (1996) and Kowakolski (1995) identified foundational myths or a named beginning, concepts which would appear essentially identical, as central to the narration of the nation. The material analysed here has not unambiguously confirmed or refuted this proposition. Certainly there does
appear to be a definite attempt by the current authorities in the Republic of Karelia to establish the foundation of the KTK in 1920 as a foundational event in some form; certainly this event is narrated by the authorities as the genesis of the current political structure and also the beginnings of cultural and political autonomy for the Karelians themselves. Somewhat confusingly the narrative employed is, as has been demonstrated above, very fluid and also seeks to present modern Karelia as the rightful home of all nationalities currently resident there at the same time as tracing its heritage to the autonomy granted to one specific national group. In this manner the current authorities of the Republic of Karelia appear to be attempting to build a form of civic Karelian identity which incorporates all the current national groups of the region around this historical narrative. It has already been stated above that those Karelians engaged in active civic work within the Republic of Karelia have managed to subvert this narrative with an alternate construction which uses the date to demand restitution for the supposed failings of past and present administrations. In general however the foundation of the KTK is a failure as a foundational myth or named beginning as it does not address the contradiction of attempting to play this role for both Karelians and all the other national groups of the modern Republic of Karelia. Firstly it appears to have, based on the examination of both sets of data, virtually no resonance amongst the Russian population, who do not view it as especially significant and have little to say on the subject. For both Russians and Karelians the selection of this date is also seen as inadequate as it cannot address the thousands of years of the history of Karelia prior to this relatively modern event. In the interview process in particular whilst some participants did view the date as important as the start of the autonomous political history of the Karelian people they did not find it of significance in any broader sense; for many it was also narrated using the strategies of heteronomisation seen above with attributed its foundation to outside, non-Karelian forces. As a putative brand of ‘civic’ nationalism it also does little to advance conceptions of Karelian nationality for the Karelians themselves whose nationalism, such as it exists, appears to be based more on the ‘ethnic’ referents of their language and culture. It was also juxtaposed by a small number of Karelians with the foundation of the short lived Ukhtinskaya Respublika. This political formation can, and clearly for a minority
does, offer the chance to narrate the beginnings of political self-realisation amongst the Karelians in a manner which excludes all Russian, and to a degree, Finnish participation and instead emphasises the demands of the Karelians themselves, thus formulating a more positive and proactive conception of Karelian identity.

As a political event encompassing both Karelians and other groups, and also as an attempt to provide a foundational date for a regional political formation, the foundation of the KTK seems ill-suited to the role of foundational myth or named beginning. One potential source of such a phenomenon could be the epos *Kalevala*. Although the heritage of the *Kalevala* is on occasion appropriated by the modern Russian residents of the Republic of Karelia, particularly as shall be seen below as a regional ‘brand’, its most important function appears to be as a source of Karelian national identity. It has already been observed that it plays such a role for the Finns and the data analysed in this study, particularly that obtained in the interview process, would seem to show that for many Karelians it has just as much significance in their sense of self. It should be noted that what little data that was obtained with regards to the Tver’ Karelians appears to show it has next to no significance for their sense of national identity; a further examination of this area would be required to definitively answer this question. Despite an apparent poor knowledge of the work all Karelians appear to have at least some sense of the *Kalevala* as important as some kind of repository of information on Karelian history or culture. For some Karelians the work is elevated to a level of significance equivalent with that of the Bible, and is therefore viewed as of primary importance in their construction of their idea of personal and national identity. The actual perceived historical value of the work is somewhat more ambiguous, with respondents being divided as to whether it was merely an artificial assemblage of poetic verse or contained genuine historical fact. Clearly the *Kalevala* does approximate to something like a foundational myth or named beginning for some Karelians, however it is also evident that far from all are as enthusiastic in identifying it as having any historical relevance. The epos itself is hardly characteristic of being a foundational myth or named beginning as it does
not claim to explain, in the manner of a history, the beginnings of the Karelian people. It would appear a better term for the role the work plays is that of a national mythology, in which certain folk tales and customs of the Karelian nation are purportedly enshrined.

As has been noted above Karelian identity is often marginalised within the mass media through the narration of histories of Karelia which use a strategy of heteronomisation to exclude the possibility of the Karelians themselves influencing the historical development of Karelia or their own people. This is not only evidenced within the Russian language press by contributions from Russian journalists but even more strongly by Karelian contributors and within the interview material by Karelian participants. A common refrain within these texts is the perceived inability of the Karelian nation to influence its own destiny, whether with regards to the formation of various variants of the border, its political destiny or the fate of its language. Karelian participants very rarely did anything other than use this strategy when constructing narratives of the history of their people; furthermore they often employed strategies of shifting responsibility to justify perceived negative outcomes. Despite often constructing narratives within which the Karelians could not avoid a negative fate or bring about a more positive outcome they also generally used strategies of avoidance to refrain from attributing these negative processes and decisions to any other group; either referential vagueness or synecdochial constructions such as ‘the war’, ‘the border’ or ‘political decisions’ are used which do not assign the blame to a specific group. This avoids apportioning blame to the Russian group in particular and thus also avoids potential discord or tension; in the media discourse in particular Karelians can thus avoid distancing themselves from the Russians or appearing disloyal.

In this fashion Karelian participants avoid assuming or attributing blame for a history which is often presented as a litany of disasters; very few positive events were identified by the interview participants, especially after 1917. Very few figures were put forward in either corpus of data by Karelian participants who could be identified as ‘national heroes’; the closest such figure may be that of G.I. Kupriyanov who is almost universally credited with averting the
threatened deportation of the Karelian people to Siberia. In the main the historical narratives offered by the Karelians were those of decline, in both linguistic and demographic terms. There is even a sense expressed that Karelian identity is somehow ‘dying’ or even functionally ‘dead’ and that it will soon be dissolved by ongoing Russification. To a certain extent this method of self-presentation is similar to that employed by Russians as described by Gudkov (2004) and Oushakine (2009) in which the ‘we’ group is associated with negative characteristics and also deprived of the ability to assert a more positive past or present. In the Karelian context this leads to the narration of a Karelian history in which they are marginalised and oppressed, powerless to avert catastrophe. In this sense the fate of the Karelians is often contrasted with that of the Finns, especially those such as Grigoriev who posit a close association with Finnish identity, who are narrated as having struggled and succeeded. If Kolakowski’s idea of ‘anticipation and future orientation’ is applied to the Karelian context it can be seen that the Karelians do look to the future of their nation; they posit this future based on the tribulations and failures of the past, however, and see nothing but decline and dissolution as the future of their ethnos.

In general there seems to have been little perceptible change in the manner in which historical narratives were used to create potential national identities within the Karelian context over the period studied. Certainly since the early 1990s the advocates of Karelian identity in the political arena have moderated their rhetoric, at least in the public arena, however this change was not greatly noticeable over the particular time period analysed. A more radical conception of Karelian identity than that offered in the media discourse was discernable in the interview material but it would appear that this has not been fully articulated in the public arena over the period studied. It is difficult to get a sense of changes over this period from within the interview data as it represents one particular episode of fieldwork. It would seem that since 2001 little has changed; Karelian identity is positioned in the orthodox narrative in close association to Russian identity, and Karelia itself is incorporated into a ‘Russian’ historical space. The most noticeable change over the period studied within the mass media has been an apparent rise in intolerance towards those from Caucasia
or who adhere to the Muslim faith. As stated above any differential in levels of such intolerance between Karelians and Russians is not quantifiable from the data obtained for this study. A clear progression can be seen however in the media data from a trivialisation and minimisation of the issue to its emergence as a significant problem in the aftermath of the Kondopoga Affair of 2006. In both official and unofficial discourse the presence of these particular minority groups was delegitimised and criminalised; indeed the official narrative evolved from denying the existence of a problem to conceptualising these minorities as the problem. This phenomenon is not isolated to Karelia alone; in fact it is reflective of the broader rise in such intolerance across the Russian Federation.

In summation the tool of historical narratives was used, in the data analysed, to posit a variety of potential ‘Karelian’ identities. These identities were not mutually exclusive, and the manner in which Karelians and Russians in particular were associated together through certain narratives, and to a lesser extent Karelians and Finns, must represent the phenomenon of multiple identities. Certainly through their Orthodox faith Karelians and Russians were often presented as having much in common and, on some level, a shared identity which united them in opposition to those ‘others’ who possessed a different faith. Conversely for at least one of the interview participants, Anatolii Grigoriev, the Karelians could be presented as being part of a broader Finnish identity. It would appear one of the major roles of historical narratives in the Republic of Karelia are to position ‘Karelian’ identity itself as closer to or more distant from the competing dominant identities and nationalities of the Russians and Finns. As has already been stated above the Vepsian minority appears not to be subject to these pressures, being regarded as an exotic other and thus unclaimed at least by the Russian language press of the region.

A related point is that the tool of historical narratives is employed to negotiate understandings of the idea of ‘Karelia’ and the ‘correct’ position of state, cultural and linguistic borders within the broader region. Narratives which seek to establish one or more of the competing nationalities as ‘indigenous’ are
important as they are used to legitimise or de-legitimise current political and social realities, such as the presence or dominance of one national group or the proclamation of one or other identity in a given setting. Narratives of the historical conflicts in the area and the attribution of responsibility to one or other of the competing groups also aids in the legitimisation of current boundaries or their subversion. In this manner the Russian press in particular justifies the annexation and retention of former Finnish territories on the basis of prior right to these areas or Finnish war guilt. Russians also attempt to establish their right to be resident in the modern Republic of Karelia and thus possess an authentic ‘Karelian’ identity through this narration of continuity of settlement at the same time as this strategy is employed by some Karelians to deny this right. It should also be noted that the representation of ‘Karelian-ness’ in particular was often associated with the village or rural district within both the interview and media data. In this fashion this analysis concurs with Suutari (2010: 225) that the performance, in this case by narration of history, of identity by Karelians is often extremely localised. Karelians are more likely to provide a narration of their own village or district when asked for historical narratives and are also more likely to associate their own sense of self, as evidenced through familial experience for instance, with reference to the past of their village. This may be due to a lack of knowledge, as a consequence of certain factors examined below, of historical information beyond this very personal or local level; it does however hinder these Karelians from being able to construct narratives of a history of ‘Karelia’ or the ‘Karelian nation’ as a whole, as all experience is refracted through the narrow prism of the village.

One interesting phenomenon identified in this research was the increasing commercialisation of markers of Karelian identity and indeed this identity itself. The heritage of the Karelian people, and to a lesser extent that of those Russians historically resident within the modern Republic of Karelia, is increasingly being viewed by the authorities as a potential ‘brand’ with which to entice tourists and investment to the region. This is a relatively modern phenomenon and its long-term impact on ideas of Karelian identity is not possible to judge at this juncture. It is possible that the use of deeply cherished
facets of Karelian national and ethnic identity as a marketing tool will lead to their devaluation and inability to perform the production of such identity in the future. Aside from identifying that this was a new threat to Karelian identity and the intent of the authorities to embark upon such initiatives this thesis cannot offer much more comment on this issue. It is clear, however, from what limited data was obtained that at least some Karelians are concerned that their history and other symbols which help produce and reproduce a sense of distinct, ‘Karelian’ identity are threatened by this development.

Karelian identity itself, however, would appear to be threatened by a variety of existing issues. The data collected for this study would support the contention of Kovaleva (2010: 36) that Karelians self identify as such predominantly through their ability to speak the Karelian language. As the number of Karelian speakers has declined the number of individuals thus identifying themselves as Karelian has also declined. The reasons for the decline in the language cannot be examined here, but a number of factors can be identified to ascertain the manner in which competency in Karelian is identified with Karelian nationality. Firstly it must be recognised that Karelians do not live, for the most part, in isolated, ethnically homogenous groups but alongside Russians and other ethnicities, and indeed the number of multi-national marriages in Karelia is quite high. Secondly Karelians are not distinguished by any other evident factor than their language from the surrounding Russian majority; the economic and social way of life of the modern Karelian is practically indistinguishable from that of the neighbouring Russians. Karelians also undergo and have throughout the Soviet period undergone an assimilative educational experience in which they have been taught the Russian language and also Russian cultural norms and historical perspectives. Many of the interview participants identified their own reasons for why Karelian language and identity had declined and these can be accessed on the appendix provided. The interview process also ascertained, however, that many Karelians felt they had not had an adequate education on their own history or the history of Karelia itself and thus were unaware of many historical facts. It is also clear from the interview data that aspects of the occupation and other historical events, for instance the
potential deportation of the Karelians to Siberia or Central Asia, were until the 1990s considered taboo; it can be seen from the mass media data that indeed such historical narratives are even now quite heterodox and subject to rejection as invalid. In this manner Karelians are, especially those who do not possess access to alternate information through their profession in the higher educational establishments or through access to Finnish material, frequently relatively poorly educated with regards to their knowledge of Karelian history. As a consequence much of the information they are aware of appears to be derived from familial or local knowledge and is thus highly localised to their own district or even village.

Historical narratives are, as has been demonstrated throughout this study, of major importance in the construction of national identity within the Russian Republic of Karelia. They can be employed to legitimise or de-legitimise the current boundaries of the area, to establish one or more national group’s apparent ‘right’ to reside in an area or across the whole republic and are utilised to maintain or subvert existing political structures and social realities. Such narratives are employed within the Russian language press to legitimise, in the main, Russian presence in Karelia and to associate the Karelians and Russians together in opposition to the Finns across the border. The most important aspect of identity production as expressed through the creation of historical narratives within both the media and the private sphere in the Republic of Karelia is that of the marginalisation of the Karelians themselves. Not only is this expressed through the semantic content of their narratives and the linguistic strategies they choose to employ in their creation, but in their relatively weak nationalism. Karelians, with a number of strident exceptions, often narrate their history as that of a helpless people, forever fated to exist within one empire or another. They can identify few differences between the history of their own nationality and that of the dominant ethnic group. With a number of exceptions they cannot offer narratives of history within which Karelians play an active and decisive part, potentially due to the fact there has never been a Karelian nation state. If the Karelians as a national and ethnic group disappear over the next hundred years, which would appear to be a possibility, it will not be due to this
lack of historical knowledge alone. Clearly the decline in competency in the Karelian language, if not reversed, would at present appear to have the inevitable consequence of dissolving any trace of Karelian identity. Part of the reason such a loss of linguistic identity would lead to such a cataclysmic, for the Karelians, end is surely due to their relatively weak sense of national history. Karelians clearly can offer narratives of their history which could be used, and indeed to an extent are used, to construct an image of Karelian identity which would not be dependant on either Russian or Finnish identities; such narratives would not, however, appear to be propagated through media exposure or education within the modern Republic of Karelia. In such circumstances the outlook for ideas of Karelian identity as a distinct, Finno-Ugric, national identity would appear to be as bleak as that of the language itself.


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