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Joyce, Philosophy and the Drama of Authorship

Mary Raffan

PhD in English Literature
The University of Edinburgh
2014
Declaration

This is to certify that this thesis has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Mary Raffan
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Abstract

This thesis will examine the representation, consequence and transformation of the idea of authorship in the work of James Joyce and suggest a way of re-addressing the contentious question of authorship. While postmodern criticism has emphasised the “revolutionary” cultural and political ramifications of Joyce’s response and the ways that his work has helped to deconstruct this question for modernity and postmodernity, this thesis will trace the ideas and ideologies, individuals and characters, historical, cultural and biographical circumstances that contributed to both the prominence and the hermeneutical consequence of the question of authorship in Joyce’s work. Highlighting Joyce’s awareness of and fascination with the multivalency of a question shaped by theological, historical, political, philosophical, philological, epistemological, methodological and hermeneutical ideas as well as literary representations, it will examine Joyce’s reformulation and response to this question through four pervasive models of authorship in his work: critic, philosopher, bard and theologian. While each chapter will make a distinction between these models in order to analyse their characteristics and significance, as a way of tracing not only the evolution of these models but also the complex network of interrelation that is established between these distinctive but also intertwining ideas of authorship, the thesis will be structured historically, biographically and “ergographically” (in Barthes’ definition of an ‘ergography’) as well as thematically.

As a way of approaching the ideologically overdetermined concept of authorship, but also avoiding another postmodern “renaming” of this concept, these models will be proffered in order to examine the construction, fabrication and invention as well as the deconstruction of the idea of authorship and the representation of the role of the author in fiction, culture, society and history in the work of Joyce. The “drama” of authorship will be interpreted in terms of Joyce’s fictional and hermeneutic dramatisation of the role and idea of the author, but also in terms of the consequence of Joyce’s interest in and early idealisation of the genre of drama. This thesis will finally suggest that Joyce’s “failure” to become a dramatist and engagement with philosophical analyses of this genre contributed significantly to his deconstruction, reconstruction and dramatisation of the role and “exagmination” of the author.

The thesis as a whole will delineate how each of these four models gradually becomes more distinctive but simultaneously also inextricable from a variegated template that is only methodologically divided into four parts; the four exegetes in *Finnegans Wake* inconspicuously multiply. The first three chapters will follow the attempt outlined in Joyce’s
early draft of the *Portrait* ‘to liberate from the personalised lumps of matter that which is their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts’- the growing self-consciousness of the artist’s understanding of his role(s) as an artist and of the idea(s) of authorship. In the last two chapters that will look at *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* these four models will be more clearly differentiated although the growing theatricality in their portrayal and widening nexus of relations will complicate and indeed undermine the idea of a “model”.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Publisher(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAJ</td>
<td>Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement</td>
<td>Kant, Immanuel</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Oxford: Clarendon Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>De Anima</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Harmondsworth: Penguin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW</td>
<td>Finnegans Wake</td>
<td>Joyce, Joyce</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>London: Faber and Faber, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Nichomachean Ethics</td>
<td>Ross, W. D.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Internet Classics Archive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
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Introduction

Joyce’s views on the role, characteristics and temperament of the artist were from the beginning of his writing career distinctive and emphatic, but also largely antagonistic. He defended his own artistic premises against assaults real and imaginary, and delineated the features of his ideal artist - most frequently through a negative foil - implicitly and explicitly, exposing at the same time the errors and shortcomings of both past and contemporary authors. But as a consequence of the polemic declarations echoed also by Joyce’s artist-heroes and the prominence of the endeavour to redefine a wide and frequently abstract field of aesthetics prior to any creation of works of art, the role of the literary author appears to be confused with that of the philosopher. Artist and philosopher are related in their mutual quest for an “epiphany” of the truth and even share the same vocabulary. The persistence and relentless dramatisation of this alliance has puzzled, troubled, divided and multiplied Joyce’s critics. Indeed, just as the artistic compositions of Stephen Dedalus pale in comparison to his endless philosophical ruminations and theories, and Shem’s “alshemical” production ‘through the bowels of his misery’ of ‘a no uncertain quantity of obscene matter’ is a bewildering and unsettling creative act, ‘The false pretence of eliminating the genre distinction between philosophy and literature’ that Joyce’s work appears to share with deconstruction, led his early critics to question whether the honorific title “artist” could be ascribed to someone who so impetuously and disrespectfully disdains the rules of art (FW 184; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* 210).

The question “is it Art?”, which was posed by Joyce’s early critics with growing urgency and frequency, assumed a modulating significance. The question was first voiced in a rather disparaging unsigned review of the Portrait in the *Irish Book Lover* in 1917. The reviewer confesses that the ‘pseudo autobiography of Stephen Dedalus, a weakling and a dreamer, makes fascinating reading’, but complaining that Joyce’s ‘unsparing’ realism ‘jar[s] one’s finer feelings’, he begins to doubt its value as Art (*CH* 102). Despite the fact that ‘Mr. Joyce is a master of brilliant descriptive style’, ‘no clean-minded person could possibly allow it to remain within reach of his wife, his sons, or daughters’. The scandalous morality of Joyce’s work is silenced by refusing his work the honorary title of ‘Art’: ‘Above all, is it Art? We doubt it’, the reviewer sighs with relief. Art is here defined not by formal and technical standards, but rather disappointing for Stephen Dedalus, aesthetic judgement is determined through the sacrifice of beauty to the morally “good”.

What is a question of value and morality among reviewers who highlight the “obscenity” of Joyce’s work and worry about the sanity of its author, gradually becomes a
question of genre and hermeneutics: the question “what is Art” emerges out of the derisive doubt ‘is it Art?’, as the mockery turns against the mocker, and Joyce’s critics find themselves trying to answer this “metaphysical” question. This theoretical enigma does not trouble the Irish Book Lover reviewer for all his professed doubt; for him the particular example of Joyce’s art does not fit the rule, whereas the rule itself becomes increasingly ambivalent among reviewers following the publication of Ulysses. The anonymous critic from the Dublin Review who recommends in 1922 that Ulysses should be placed on ‘the Index Expurgatorius’, does not fear for the ‘general reader’: ‘it is, as it were, so much rotten caviare’ that ‘the public is in no particular danger of understanding or being corrupted thereby’ (202). Once again, the enigmatic interpretation of art safeguards the corrupting force of his work. In order to grapple with ‘the dreary muck-ridden tide’, the critic attempts to place Joyce within a specific tradition, and goes through the Irish literary movement, ‘a French sink’, ‘a Cuchulain of the sewer’, ‘an Ossian of obscenity’, the English tradition of the controversial Samuel Butler, a Paris or London dilettante, an errant Catholic, even Satan himself (201). Failing in this enterprise, he examines a passage from “Cyclops” and admiring Joyce’s ‘rare or new words’, concludes that, ‘This may, or may not, be literature. It is certainly good cataloguing’ (202). Joyce’s work is not only obscene, but also violates the formal rules of art. In the difficulty of disengaging his work from the broad field of “art”, Joyce’s deviance from the more specific field of “literature” begins to be questioned.

Critics find that his work deprives them of the very ability to criticise: ‘Our opinion is that a gigantic effort has been made to fool the world of readers and even the Pretorian guard of critics’; the book is ‘unreadable and unquotable, and we must add, unreviewable’ (207). ‘It should be companioned with a key and glossary like the Berlitz books’, recommends an American reviewer (222). Edmund Wilson seems to prophetically discern and define the “genre” of the all-encompassing text of deconstruction when he responds to this critical bewilderment by saying that the 730 pages of Ulysses ‘are probably the most completely ‘written’ pages to be seen in any novel since Flaubert’ (227). Similarly, the great modernist critics Eliot and Pound, distinguish their reviews through their ability to interpret the nature of this original form: ‘If it is not a novel, that is simply because the novel is a form which will no longer serve’, Eliot explains; it is the very idea of literature and our genre distinctions that are at fault (268). ‘Ulysses is not a book everybody is going to admire, any more than everybody admires Bouvard et Pécuchet, but it is a book that every serious writer needs to read in order to have a clear idea of the point of development of our art’, Pound argues; the work appears significant in terms of the history of art, it is not a book to be simply aesthetically admired as a work of “art” in itself (266).
But if Joyce’s work is not art, ‘not sane enough to be literature’, not a novel, not readable, not language, not invention, what is it? (397) ‘Mythos? Metamorphosis?’ (497) Is it ‘a new mode of art’, or simply ‘a fundamental assertion of it’, as Edwin Muir argued in 1925? (334) Joyce is a ‘craftsman’ rather than a genius, Wyndham Lewis explains, reproducing Plato’s distinction between techne and inspiration: ‘there is not so much an inventive intelligence as an executing’ (359). He has misunderstood the role of the artist: ‘What stimulates him is ways of doing things, and technical processes, and not things to be done’, and he has fallen in with the wrong crowd of modern ‘time-philosophers’, finding in ‘the mental world of time’ a solution for his dissatisfaction with reality. This time-philosophy, a ‘mechanistic’ ‘system of abstract truth’ that ‘overshadows all contemporary thought’, potentially ‘destroys our human arts’. Joyce’s dialogue with philosophy has a detrimental effect on art (Time and Western Man 110). Not only is Joyce’s work influenced by philosophy, but further requires a philosophy to be explained: according to Padraic Colum, his innovations ‘would require the exposition of a theory to be properly explanatory’ (CH 390).

The inexhaustible metacritical compulsion of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, begins to make critics wonder along with Stanislaus Joyce whether the books were written ‘with the deliberate intention of pulling the reader’s leg or not’ (387). The relentless reflection upon ‘ways of doing things’, upon the craft of art and questions of aesthetics seems to breach the domain of art and claim the critic’s and philosopher’s role for the artist (359). In an autotelic work like Finnegans Wake such a drive seems perverse: ‘He is doing an intellectual and imaginative labor gigantic in its proportions, obdurate in its persistence, with no practical end in view whatever, not even that of communicating experience, but solely to perfect himself in the art of playing by himself in public’, according to the reviewer of Harper’s Magazine (418). Self-interpretation closes the hermeneutic circle and denies communication.

‘In his effort to bring together the interior life with a simple series of terms, Mr Joyce succeeded in confounding entirely the psychic language with the social language; or at least, does not take enough account of their difference’, complains a critic from the Revue Anglo-Américaine in 1924 (318). There is no “outside” to the circle; all interpretations are “groundless”.

His work seems suspended between total critique and meaninglessness. This cataclysmic drive is seen as an attack against not only critics, but also the very idea of art. Work in Progress is seen not so much as innovation and experimentation, but as an attempt by Joyce to explode the very idea of art, literature and language: a ‘witless wandering of literature before its final extinction’, as Stanislaus laments (387). Few are willing to accept
with Beckett that ‘His writing is not about something; it is that something itself’ (14). That “thing-in-itself” appears to require prodigious philosophical and theological analysis in order to penetrate its essence. For Sean O’Faolain, Joyce keeps the promise made to his mother in 1907 to publish an ‘Esthetic’, as the *Wake* raises almost every possible kind of problem in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetics’, while a writer from the *TLS* wonders whether ‘As in *Ulysses*, the key to the new work may be found in a philosophical concept’ (*Letters II* 38; *CH* 411).

This critical indignation is both anticipated and thematised in Joyce’s work, but also increasingly dramatised. The quest to discover what kind of ‘metandmorefussed’ ‘Leaper Orthor’ this ‘hybrid’ and ‘tuttut toucher up of young poetographies’ who ‘laid low’ the ‘mothersmothered model’ and exposed the ‘horrible poverty of mind’ ‘for the boob’s indulligence’ [the pope’s rather unflatteringly] rather than his lay audience’s is, is reflected in the cornucopia of ‘poette[s]’ in Joyce’s work who seem to have ‘mardred’ the true ‘Arthor’ (*FW* 513, 8, 169, 242, 191, 192, 531, 232, 517, 52). The apparent confusion between poetry and philosophy and its consequence for the role of the artist and the nature of his art are explored and interrogated, but also explicitly exploited. The philosophical ruminations of Stephen Dedalus, a victim of the philosophical predilections, enthusiasms and eccentricities of his author, for all their ardour and fervour, do not elevate his cultural standing, but distance him from reality and from his peers who view his philosophy as ‘Intellectual crankery’ (*P* 215). The inexorable demand to outline and expound the configuration and meaning of art prior to any creative composition seems to bring the downfall of Stephen’s career who increasingly resembles a ‘tragic jester’ rather than a philosopher, while Joyce himself relinquishes the promise to publish an ‘esthetic’ and appears to avoid the pitfalls of abstract speculation and ‘danger of perishing of inanition’ the dean of studies warns Stephen of in the *Portrait* (205).

However, Joyce’s work bears the marks of his continuous engagement with “philosophy”, a prescriptive but also equivocal term that needs to be defined in terms of Joyce’s own understanding, interpretation and application of it as both a metaphysical “love of wisdom” and nebulous world of thoughts, and as a specific discipline defined academically and historically through individual schools of thought and thinkers. The history of Joyce’s reception indicates the lasting impression of philosophical ideas and specific philosophical traditions in Joyce’s work and on the conception of Joyce’s role as an author. Most influentially, Joyce’s work has been presented as the arch paradigm for and of the philosophical tradition of deconstruction. The identification of Joyce’s work with this particular philosophical tradition has distinguished both the work and its author as
“philosophical”, an epithet that is not always complementary and has reinforced the preconception of Joyce’s work as unliterary, obscure and elitist.

Although wary of hierarchies and prescriptions - Alan Roughley highlights that deconstruction denies the ‘pigeonholing’ of such ‘categorizing and classification’ of genres - this school of thought has nevertheless linked Joyce’s work with specific philosophical traditions most pertinent to its ideas and concerns (xii). Jean-Michel Rabaté’s ‘attempt to place Joyce within the philosophic tradition of scepticism’ is qualified with his assertion that ‘Joyce is no ‘philosopher’ in the classical sense, but a writer concerned with letters, words and languages’ (Joyce upon the Void xiii). Cheryl Herr’s tentative confession ‘These days I view Joyce as a philosopher’ is conversely substantiated by locating Joyce in the tradition of the pre-Socratics and Heidegger’s separation of epistemology from ontology (Joyce and the Art of Shaving 3).

Whereas Don Byrd’s quest to evaluate whether Joyce is ‘a philosophic novelist’ ends with the conclusion that while ‘Ulysses is a myth of a self-conscious, educated age’, ‘Joyce uses the methods of the myth-maker, not the philosopher’, deconstruction has not wanted to allow the critical perspective of Joyce’s work to be lost through such identification with myth (9, 20). ¹ Wary of identifying his work with specific philosophies or philosophers, deconstruction nevertheless emphasises the world-disclosive capacity of Joyce’s work. “Philosophy” (deconstruction) emerges as the consequence of Joyce’s work, while philosophical ideas, traditions and philosophers are just another text in the web of intertexts.

The quest of deconstruction to deliver ‘rhetoric (or writing) from its age-old subjugation at the hands of philosophic reason’, moreover, has not only complicated the bifurcation of literature and philosophy, but also brought to the forefront their shared ground of textuality and corresponding ‘textual activity’: the “coincidence” of artist and theorist in their shared role as ‘functions of the traverse of the material of language’ (Norris, The Contest of Faculties 73; MacCabe, Revolution 165). As ‘the only locus for this neutralization of differences in an ontological sense is language’, however, this function is haunted by what Nietzsche in 1869 described as the ‘sham monarchy’ of the ‘wholly different scientific and aesthetico-ethical impulses’ that ‘have been associated under a common name’- philology (Rabaté, Joyce upon the Void 17; Homer and Classical Philology 1).

The figure of Vico, who ‘himself could not resist the attractiveness of such coincidence’, is key to this new vocation ascribed to the modern artist, as it is Vico who facilitates Joyce’s elusion of the Hegelian theoretical predicament for Rabaté: ‘Vico brings

¹ Byrd’s inference was echoed in Goldberg’s Classical Temper, published in 1969. Joyce’s work, Goldberg argued, is an ‘affirmation not of any doctrine superhuman or supernatural, but of the mythopoetic imagination itself” (203).
the dynamics of language lacking in Aquinas and Hegel’, while his ‘historical philosophy allows Joyce to dispense with (not overcome, his move is much more economical) the speculative system altogether and to advance toward the dialogism of interpretations’ (Beckett 6; Authorized Reader 179). The ‘shift from Hegel to Vico’ ‘authorises’ ‘the reader’s divinisation’: ‘The philosopher transformed into a philologist, equipped with a sound theory of language, now engaged into the hermeneutics of human reality, can become the Creator of the History he narrates. The “divine pleasure” is not set aside for the end of history as in Hegel’s apocalyptic progression toward absolute knowledge; it is available to any reader, who must only superimpose his interpretive action onto the creative gesture in order to become god himself’ (179, 182). The ‘death of the Artist … in the name of the birth of language’ not only sanctions, but also consecrates the ‘systematic dismemberment’ of criticism: the reader becomes ‘the hero’ of a drama involving the editing and deciphering of texts’ (Politics of Egoism 125, 194; Authorized Reader 191).

Genetic criticism has indeed allowed the philologist to become the sole “subject” of Joyce’s text; in order to be a legitimate heir, the new reader ‘has to approach [the Wake] less with hundreds of glosses and annotations than with the material evidence of the notebooks, drafts, corrected proofs reproduced by the Archive’ (Rabaté, “Pound, Joyce and Eco” 495). While ‘Any theoretical aloofness meets its own dissolution in the tide of puns’, the critic must nevertheless develop ‘a sound theory of language’ (Authorized Reader 128, 182). Deconstruction paved the way for this new philological function by reconfiguring ‘The peculiar mode to which artistic production and works of art belong’ (Hegel, Aesthetics 12). The inauguration of a different type of “act”, a new “method”, an oxymoronic “theory”, signalled the displacement of ‘an infinite accumulation of meanings’ by ‘the mechanisms of its infinite productivity’; not only of the text, but also of the critic: ‘the infinite productivity of interpretative activity’ (Post-structuralist Joyce 10, 7).

Deconstruction’s focus on ‘an activity of assemblage … in which activity the writing subject itself is dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions’, an ‘activity of reading’ that Joyce’s text ‘demands’, is reflected in ‘the acts of writing’, ‘the writing processes’ and the ‘procedures of the writer and the text’ that necessitate and legitimise genetic criticism’s focus on the ‘author’s method’ (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 39; MacCabe, Revolution 16; Fordham, I do I undo I redo 60, 7; Hayman Genetic Studies 5, 10). Sharing with deconstruction the ‘notion of reading as a textual activity which stresses how a text is materially produced’, genetic criticism’s ‘practice of editing dispels any transcendental illusion as to the connection between meaning and the material but unstable nature of texts’ (Rabaté in Hayman and Slote eds. 77-8). Lernout’s ‘radical philological
approach’ distinguishes itself from genetic criticism in its refusal to view the notebooks ‘as a literary text which is at the same time a record of the creative process and that process itself’, emphasising instead the significance of ‘correcting misprints’, but similarly signals ‘the end of a certain type of theory and the beginning of a practice’ (48, 33, 45, 48).

Introducing Genetic Studies in Joyce, David Hayman warns that while ‘it would be wrong to think that simply by discovering printed sources for materials in the notes and manuscripts, we can unlock the secrets of creation’, genetic criticism nevertheless allows the disclosure ‘by the scrupulous use of evidence and theory what manuscripts have to tell us about the composition process and hence the creative procedures’ through ‘a method that approximates scientific procedures in that it generates and discards hypotheses’ (7, 10). The subject of creativity is broached with vigilance, with the aid of a scrupulous methodology to avoid deception by the ‘mirage in a mirror’ of representation (FW 310). Mindful of Laurent Milesi’s call to pay ‘heed to the specifically Joycean exempla, which not only ‘oblige’ us to devise methodological tools from the Irish writer’s own verbal arsenal (rather than the stock-in-trade of academic ‘-isms’) but also empower us to do just that to creative and critical ends for theory ‘itself’, in ways that overreach the usual osmotic moulding of one’s critical language on the chosen writer’, Finn Fordham argues that practice elucidates theory in Joyce’s work, insofar as it reveals that modernist and postmodernist ‘Representations of the self and theories of the self issue from the processes behind textuality and they often take their form from processes of composition’: ‘the work is a determinant for the shape of the life – and produces therefore what we might call, using Barthes’s phrase, an ergography – a study of the nature and the effects of work’ (Lots of Fun 10, 16, 28). ‘Joyce’s risk’, Fordham argues, ‘was to generate a new method of writing: not what, but how’ (6).

Undertaking Foucault’s ‘much more modest task’ of determining ‘the functional conditions of specific discursive practices’, the model of authorship that Joyce has proffered for postmodern criticism is that of an “initiator” ‘of discursive practices’: ‘The distinctive contribution of these authors is that they produced not only their own work, but the possibility and the rules of formation of other texts’ (114, 131). Like the Kantian genius, Foucault’s initiators “give the rule to art” even though their own practice is unrepeatable: ‘the initiation of a discursive practice is heterogeneous to its ulterior transformations’, in contrast to ‘the founding of any scientific endeavor’ that is ‘on an equal footing with its future transformations’ (133). Calling for the study of ‘not only the expressive value and formal transformations of discourse, but its mode of existence’, and for ‘the subject (and its substitutes)’ to ‘be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse’, Foucault dispels the mystery of the creative act through this
“initiation” (137-8). The ‘murmur of indifference’ ‘clear[s] a space for the introduction of elements other than [the initiators’] own’ (138, 132).

While deconstruction has celebrated the ‘infinitization of fictions, of possibilities’ that Joyce’s writing facilitates, his role as an ‘initiator’ of the philosophical and philological practice of postmodernism and sacrifice for the birth of the reader have indicated the rebirth of the author in the likeness of the critic (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 39). Whereas, as Hugh Kenner has emphasised, ‘Joyce spent his life playing parts’ and his ‘perpetual assumption of roles is central to his work’, the ‘ideal reader’ of Joyce’s text, ‘the one who accedes to the play of this incompletion, placed in ‘a situation of writing’, ready no longer to master the text but now to become its actor’, is rather the ideal postructuralist reader (Dublin’s Joyce 354; Heath 32). Rabaté’s “ideal genetic reader” who is ‘offered a choice between varieties of error, and typologies of pathological readings’ is open to philological possibilities (“Pound, Joyce and Eco” 494). The ‘pervasive sense of sin or faute’ that haunts this reader may contrast the ‘“ideal reader” who arrives at a single truth’ or ‘final algorithm’, but like Barthes’s “scriptor” resembles the Holy Writer who accepts his scholarly role with humility (499; Lawrence 7).

Barthes’s objection that ‘Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader’ as ‘for it, the writer is the only person in literature’, rhetorically exaggerates the disregard of the reader in the history of literary criticism (Image-Music-Text 148). This history is not only deliberately ambiguous as ‘classic’, but also suggests the danger of the reader’s comparable delimitation following the scrupulous scholarly quest to demarcate his position and delineate his role, despite the insistence that he is ‘simply that someone’. Rather than ‘dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions’, the ‘writing subject’ is confined to the function that the most influential reader or critic ascribes to it (Heath 39). The role of the philologist as it features in Joyce’s writing is neither “inevitable” for the modern artist nor an ideal to aspire to; the critic is not an antithesis of the Poet nor does the ideal union of the critical and the creative spirit give birth to the ideal artist. Following the death of author, however, the monopoly of the reader-critic has suppressed the various models of both authorship and readership in Joyce’s work, in favour of a position suggestive of sublimation rather than deconstruction.

The ‘positions offered to the subject within language’ are locked up in philology. Symptomatic of this monopoly is that whereas the significance of Vico’s philosophy in Joyce’s poetics has been emphasised, that of Bruno who scathingly satirizes grammarians who draw ‘on the sap of words’, has largely been dismissed as simply structural (Cause, Principle, Unity 52). While Joyce’s reference to ‘a trellis’ is used to describe the significance
of Vico’s cycles in the *Wake*, MacCabe associates Joyce’s structural use of theories with Bruno’s philosophy: ‘Bruno is important insofar as he provides a philosophical trellis on which the philosophical and linguistic presuppositions of identity can be unpicked’ (*New Perspectives* 34). 2 ‘In 1903’, Rabaté argues, Joyce ‘was still intent on delineating Bruno’s destruction of Aristotelian categories, and his heady ‘mysticism’ appealed to his sense of ‘creative intoxication’ with a concept unifying the entire universe, rendering it available for creative digestion and regurgitation’; ‘Twenty years later’, however, ‘Vico’s convoluted puns have become the real text to be studied closely; Bruno is closer to a blurred memory; and monism can be seen as inverted dualism, as long as the preeminence of ‘indifference’ in the identity of the contraries is asserted’ (*Joyce upon the Void* 17).

In order to disentangle this association of the significance of philosophy and philology in Joyce’s work with deconstructive premises, we must take a detour through the ruptures of history, and examine how Joyce understood and interpreted these concepts and their consequence for the role of the artist and the nature of his work. Philosophy is never allowed to stand on its own in Joyce’s work (a criticism that Joyce frequently directed towards contemporary writers, but was also accused of himself), and both the philosophical and the scholarly aspirations and theories of characters are frequently parodied and criticised. However, Joyce’s aspiring artists from *Stephen Hero* to *Finnegans Wake* assert the necessity for a philosophy, which moreover has or intends to have a “revolutionary” consequence. They are embroiled in the contradictions and antagonisms of philosophical traditions through the claim of these traditions to a vocabulary that they want to wrest for their art. Stephen’s explication of the meanings of truth, beauty and the good is an example of this need to “translate” philosophical concepts that are delimited not only through their philosophical implications, but also theological, historical, cultural, and in the context of Irish nationalism, political. These artists lack not only divine inspiration, but also a stable form of community that will receive, legitimize and preserve their work. It is a predicament of the modern author who feels in the midst of ‘heaps of dead language’ and lacks a living tradition, but also a specifically Irish predicament of a servant of the Catholic Church and England; and further in the case of Joyce, of the constrictions imposed by Irish nationalism and the Irish Literary Revival (*P 193*).

The alienation, melancholy and theoretical predicament that distinguish Stephen as an artist, who as Wyndham Lewis remarked ‘does almost everything ‘wearily’’, was

2 In contrast, ‘What Vico’s theory offers is both an initial articulation of language, sexuality and society and, more importantly, a theory to oppose the dominant historicist accounts of history’ (*New Perspectives* 35).
avoided- or at least masked, by Joyce’s leading contemporary Irish artists and intellectuals united in the endeavour to stage a Revival of Irish culture, through their resurrection of the figure of the bard as a model for the modern artist (95). Inspired by a ‘tumultuous life’ and emblem of a collective memory, the bard held the promise of the revival of the nation’s divided, weary and bedimmed consciousness in his ability to effect a coincidence of the one with the many (Collected Works of W.B. Yeats Volume IX 348). Joyce, however, identified the metaphysical foundation of this desire for coincidence and exposed its theological, political and cultural exploitation. ‘The metaphysical desire’, as Levinas has argued, is insatiable: it ‘desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness - the Desired does not fulfil it, but deepens it’ (34). Positing, an artificial “whole” that would extinguish rather than quench this desire, most conspicuously in art through the ideal of beauty and in theology through the ideal of perfection, is presented as a precarious sublimation.

As Finnegans Wake dramatises and deconstruction has highlighted, Joyce emphasises the inadequacy of language as a medium of expression to indicate the nature of this desire, which results in the renewal, however, rather than renouncement of metaphysical questions. But as the survey of Joyce’s early writing and Stephen’s theories will reveal, the allure of such metaphysical questions for Joyce springs not only from his interrogation of philosophical, theological, philological and political ideas and ideals, but also from his own early idealisation of the genre of drama and his delineation of a dramatic theory heavily influenced by German Romanticism as well as Naturalism. Drama indeed appears to hold the promise of resolving the ‘paradoxes of Joyce’s esthetics’ that are also, as Rabaté argues, ‘esthetic paradoxes of egoism’ (Politics of Egoism 70-1). Insoluble esthetical but also ethical and metaphysical questions are repeatedly dramatised in an antagonism of forces that seek the annihilation of the individual whose refusal of sacrifice exposes the drama to be a farce; in Finnegans Wake, more convivially, a comedy.

The bardic model is not dismissed in Joyce’s work; Joyce indeed brazenly presents himself as a modern Homer, but reconfigured through the Romantic Bard, Shakespeare. The question of authorship is approached through the accusations of forgery that have plagued both the modern and the ancient bard. Implicit in Joyce’s interpretation of the idea of authorship, the leading philological and critical debate and “myth” of Western culture, the “Homeric question”, that had for centuries divided the scholarly world in an interminable debate between the one bard and the many, moreover, further complicates the Irish debate on the identity and characteristics of the ideal national bard, and simultaneously opens new possibilities for the modern author. In contrast to the delimited representation of the role of
the bard in the Revival, Joyce reflects in his work and in his depiction of the role of the artist that the ancient bard ‘had been at once poet, musician, historian, and philosopher’, rather than simply a poet and performer (Thuente 57). Exploiting the popular appetite for scandal, gossip and what Yeats had called ‘The antagonist of imaginative writing in Ireland’—‘our interest in matters of opinion’, Joyce turned to this protean personality, detectable only as ‘a hollow, shaky name’, according to Nietzsche, who referred to the law of gravity to highlight the difficulty of locating him (Explorations 197; Homer and Classical Philology 11). He deployed this polytropic figure as a commercial as well as a literary device to raise the interest in and of his work by appealing to an audience both erudite and “popular”, united in their common quest for the discovery of the “true Author”.

In his staging of an almighty quest to answer what Nietzsche had called the ‘question of the personality of Homer’ (‘Was the person created out of a conception, or the conception out of a person?’), Joyce criticised the narrow conception of personality that Yeats considered lost in modern literature (6, 11). Like Nietzsche, moreover, he highlighted ‘both the insufficiency and the ineluctability of the subject (the philosophical category and fiction of the person)’, ‘against the modern and philological ‘quasi-demolition of this entity’ (Bishop 19). Examining and dramatising the idea of authorship through its historical, philosophical, philological, political and theological “mysteries”, the paradoxes of authorship did not only expose their metaphysical underpinnings, but also allowed Joyce to reinterpret the idea of authorship and the role of the author.

‘Historia’, Gadamer argues referring to the humanist tradition of Vico, ‘is a source of truth totally different from theoretical reason. This is what Cicero meant when he called it the vita memoriae. It exists in its own right because human passions cannot be governed by the universal prescriptions of reason. In this sphere one needs, rather, convincing examples as only history can offer them’ (21). It is through this distinction which Gadamer ascribes to the study of history and distinguishes as most germane to the human sciences that the significance of various models of authorship in Joyce’s work will be explored, in an attempt to broach both the subject of authorship and the idea of ‘theory’ in our understanding and interpretation of works of art and the role of the artist.

Through reference to the humanist tradition of Vico, but also to the schematism of Kant, Gadamer gives the example of the relation between a painter and his model, to define the artistic ‘model’ as ‘a disappearing schema’: ‘The relation to the original that served the painter must be effaced in the picture. […] The interpreter who reads works of literature in terms of their biographical or historical sources is sometimes no better than the art historian who examines the works of a painter in terms of his models’ (139). He explains the
consequence of this disappearance by emphasising the ‘occasionality’ of art; the work of art, he argues, ‘experiences a continued determination of its meaning from the “occasion” of its coming-to-presentation’ (141). The ‘models’ of authorship that will be examined and the detour through various traditions- critical, philosophical, theological and bardic, will be exemplary in this sense of a ‘disappearing schema’, while inquiring about ‘originals’ will allow the hermeneutic implications of the multifocal intersection of traditions in Joyce’s work to emerge.
Chapter 1: The Age of Criticism

i. A blind patch in his mind: Joyce, Moore and the temperament of the artist

The association of Joyce’s work with philosophy in the early reception of his work was rarely complementary; at best it was proffered as an apologetic. Having fallen away from the Romantic ideal of the philosophical poet of Shelley, the title “philosopher” bears the negative associations of the Aesthetic tradition of the Victorians in the beginning of the twentieth century. The complex relation between art and philosophy in Joyce’s work was most compellingly addressed in a private review of Ulysses by one of Joyce’s compatriots and fellow author, George Moore. In a letter to Louis Gillet, he expressed his admiration of Gillet’s review of Ulysses in “La Revue de Deux Mondes”, which required on the part of Moore ‘thought and consideration and reading and re-reading to disentangle Joyce’s metaphysics’ (CH 566). Moore explains the meaning of his use of ‘metaphysics’ by distinguishing his own role as an artist from that of the metaphysician:

I say metaphysics for Joyce’s book has nothing to do with art, nor yet science, so I suppose it must be metaphysics. Art is concerned with what the eye sees and not with the thinking mind. To the mind life is but the dreaming of a shade, but our actions arise from the belief that it is a great deal more than a shade and history will continue to be written notwithstanding Mr. Joyce’s protest. I am by temperament an artist, that is to say by temperament one who is interested in appearance; a metaphysician only in the belief that the appearance may be illuminated faintly by a moral conception, but oh so faintly! With Joyce it is just the opposite. There are no appearances in Joyce; it is all syllogism… I always heard of him in Dublin as one of the most garrulous of men. Now, he sits as silent as a mummy. […] I received a primer explaining all the mysteries of Ulysses and learnt from it that when Bloom smokes a corpulent cigar the reader is obliged to think of the Greek wanderer who blinds Polyphemus with a fire-hardened stake. I wrote to Joyce telling him that up to the present I had looked upon myself as a competent judge of art and failing completely to discover the literary effect aimed at in the analogy of Bloom and his cigar and the wanderer’s fire-hardened stake, I concluded that one of us had a blind patch in his mind somewhere. Which of us it is would be an affection for me to decide… (566)

The theoretical drive in Joyce’s work, the fissure between symbol and meaning which the necessity of a ‘primer’ suggests, is interpreted by Moore as metaphysics. Famous for his portraits of Dublin artists, Moore depicts the transformation of a garrulous bard into an Aristotelian deity, silently thinking the world into existence. For the realist and painter George Moore, this obscure world of thought is philosophical rather than artistic. The sombre figure of Joyce betrays for Moore his alienation from the world. Deprived of his
ability to “judge” in a world ruled by a confused and gloomy scholastic deity, Moore regrets the detrimental effect on art and aesthetics of Joyce’s philosophy.

**ii. The Man of Letters: Joyce, Yeats and the cult of art**

In a letter to Stanislaus in 1905, Joyce had distinguished his role as an artist and the objectives of his art in remarkably similar terms with the contrast that Moore had drawn between his own work and Joyce’s. Protesting against the censorship and constrictions imposed upon his freedom to express himself as an artist by the tyrannical stronghold and intellectual and moral authority claimed by journalist critics and Celtic philologists upon the work of artists, Joyce relates to his brother how while out for a walk in Trieste, he broke out into a supplication to an obscure deity (“O Vague Something behind Everything!”), requesting ‘a pen and an ink-bottle and some peace of mind’ in order to ‘write tiny little sentences about the people who betrayed me’ (*Letters II* 110). Mimicking Renan’s prayer to the Acropolis, his polemic invective is turned against the constrictions imposed on him by this *deus ex machina* in coercing him to perform pre-set roles: ‘Whomever the hell you are, I inform you that this [is] a poor comedy you expect me to play and I’m damned to hell if I’ll play it for you’. In a calmer mood he explains the characteristics of the role he assigns to himself:

It is possible that the delusion I have with regard to my power to write will be killed by adverse circumstances. But the delusion which will never leave me is that I am an artist by temperament. Newman and Renan, for example, are excellent writers but they seem to have very little of the temperament I mean. Whereas Rimbaud, who is hardly a writer at all, has it. Of course Renan is an artist and must have the temperament but it is balanced by the temperament of a philolo[lo]gist. Newman must have it too but balanced by the temperament of theologian. I am neither savant nor saint. (110)

Like George Moore, he claims for himself an artistic ‘temperament’, which he distinguishes from the theological and philological temperaments of Newman and Renan. Neither scholar nor an inspired mouthpiece for the gods, he is the “pure artist”: ‘my nature is artistic and I cannot be happy so long as I try to stifle it’, he told his brother in a letter dated a few days earlier (107). His artistic temperament is disassociated from his competency as a reader and critic- as Moore’s is when he doubts his capacity to judge Joyce’s work, as he requests from his brother to read some English ‘realists’ for him: ‘I can read very little and am as dumb as a stockfish’ (111). His idea of what it means to be an artist precludes both a
scholarly and a theoretical aptitude, while his polemical engagement with his worldly adversaries and disparagement of metaphysical abstractions ground him firmly in reality.

The role of the artist is critical and revelatory in a different sense. In the same letter, claiming originality in his choice of Dublin as the subject matter for his short stories, Joyce proclaims his surprise at having landed this role of innovator: ‘it seems strange that no artist has given it [Dublin] to the world’ (111). No doubt this would not please George Moore who with equal conceit described his own collection of short stories The Untilled Field in the preface of a new edition published on the same year as Dubliners, as ‘a landmark in Anglo-Irish literature’ and ‘portrait of my own country’ (Roberts 305, 317). Indeed, the whole Irish Literary Movement is disregarded as Joyce nominates himself the first author of Dublin. What allows Joyce to claim this title is his characterisation of the audience that would receive this gift as ‘the world’. This presentation of Dublin, as he explains in a letter to a potential publisher dated the previous day, would not be ‘a collection of tourist impressions but an attempt to represent certain aspects of the life of one of the European capitals’ (Letters II 109). It would be a European Dublin, its world modern and cosmopolitan, rather than rural and antiquated. His audience would not be limited to a group of Irish intellectuals or the romanticised peasantry of the Revival, but would be anonymous, impersonal and international. An audience, however, implies participation; there would be no interaction between this god-like creator and the world, only a one-way bestowal.

At stake here, as in Moore’s criticism of Joyce’s representation of life ‘as the dreaming of a shade’, is a complex understanding of “realism”. It relates not only to the literary tradition of realism (that profoundly influenced also Moore’s career as a writer), but also to the dramatic Naturalism of Ibsen, who Joyce singles out as a “heroic” artist, and to the philosophical context of Nietzschean and Fichtean ideas about truth and lies, freedom and necessity. In these traditions realism is understood not only as a mimesis of reality, but principally as an exposition of false ideologies. The artist must remain unencumbered by allegiances to particular traditions and philosophies, and maintain like a scientist an open mind to new discoveries, keeping a distance from the objects examined, in order ‘to give Art – by a pitiless method – all the precision of the physical sciences’, as Flaubert declared (qtd. by Baron 46). Like Flaubert’s ideal author, he must be detached ‘like God in the universe, present everywhere and visible nowhere’; however, the truth that art will expose will not be “metaphysical”, but resembling rather anatomical dissection, will deal with beings in the world (WD 248).

Such an enterprise will be “heroic” and combative, free from moral and didactic constrictions, as the reference in the same letter to Lermontoff’s Hero of Our Days betrays.
Claiming a ‘likeness in the aim and in the title and at times in the acid treatment’ of this book to *Dubliners*, Joyce, with his characteristic superstitious fascination for coincidences, relates to his brother how the duel that takes place at the end of this book was repeated in real life and brought the end of Lermontoff (111). Joyce gleefully imagines a similar imitation of art by life in a quarrel with Gogarty. Life will imitate art, therefore, not to distance art from life as in the aesthetic tradition, but because art and life will share the same unfathomable mystery and exert the same powerful influence on their “actors”. A Wagnerian Necessity rather than a novelistic plot will compel the fate of events, as in tragedy inspiring “divine awe”.

This heroic venture transforms the hermeneutics of art, in a subversion that appears hostile to the spirit of art. The notion of “aesthetics” understood through its Romantic and Victorian interpretations assumes negative connotations. The drive for truth is so demanding and requires such sacrifices that the quest for this ‘*bonum arduum*’, an Absolute Spirit, seems to turn even against art itself and claim with Plato and Hegel the supremacy of philosophy (*SH* 185). Reason and knowledge rule over the imagination; Joyce indeed repeatedly stressed the “weakness” of his imagination.³ His aim as an artist is greater than merely delighting and entertaining his audience: ‘I seriously believe that you will retard the course of civilisation in Ireland by preventing the Irish people from having one good look at themselves in my nicely polished looking-glass’, he tells Grant Richards who would eventually publish *Dubliners* after nearly ten years of persistent objections (*Letters I* 64). The work of art would compel the spectator to both look *through* it and reflect upon it, and as in drama there would be a transformation at the end as a result of this experience- a recognition (*anagnorisis*). The Irish people would “recognise” themselves, in an Enlightenment call for “*Sapere aude!*”, for freedom through revolt against the tyranny of the authority of dogmas and institutions: ‘The points on which I have not yielded are the points which rivet the book together. If I eliminate them what becomes of the chapter of the moral history of my country? I fight to retain them because I believe that in composing my chapter of moral history in exactly the way I have composed it I have taken the first step towards the spiritual liberation of my country’, he declared to Grant Richards in response to a previous request for editing (62-3). In contrast to the cyclical patterning of history in *Finnegans Wake*, here history is seen as progress towards Enlightenment and the artist is the philosopher who will lead the way towards liberation.

³ ‘My imagination is so weak that I am afraid all the things I was going to write about have become uncatchurable images’, he complained to his brother in 1906, and regretfully remarked to Pound in 1917, ‘Unfortunately, I have very little imagination’ (*Letters II* 202; *I* 101).
Artistic form and genre are questioned from the very beginning, as the looking-glass of art must be ‘polished’. Form must not obscure the “truth” communicated. Modern forms must be created, and going beyond Stephen’s delineation of his theory of genres, Joyce invents “new” artistic genres. The *Dubliners* stories are named ‘epicleti’, as the material “accidents” of the artist must be transformed through a spiritual invocation-an epiclesis, into the eternal body and soul, again without any encumberance on the part of the artist (55). These ‘epicleti’ would ‘betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis which many consider a city’ (*Letters I* 55). The artist is a mere translator; his task is the hermeneutic one of a scribe and scholar. He does not change the meaning, but allows it to be revealed in “common sense”. The artist is cast as a humble scholar, as a scribe simply “copying” the Word. But it is in this role of the scholar that according to Kant man has ‘complete freedom, even the calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well meaning thoughts’, as ‘Caesar non est supra grammaticos’; through his learning he triumphs over authority (*What is Enlightenment?* 288, 290).

As a man of letters he assumes a dignity, knowledge and proficiency which the artist lacks in the modern world, particularly in the Dublin sense of the “artist” according to Gogarty as ‘a quaint fellow or a great cod: a pleasant and unhypocritical poseur, one who sacrifices his own dignity for his friends’ diversion’ (*WD* 7-8). ‘I feel that I should be a man of letters but damn it haven’t the occasion yet’, Joyce told his brother in a letter in February 1905, but feared even for the reputation of the man of letters, wondering in a letter in July of the same year whether ‘it is possible that, after all, men of letters are not more than entertainers’ (*Letters II* 83, 99). The significance of the ‘man of letters’, the relation of this philologist scribe and scholar, but also sage and custodian of culture to the ‘artistic temperament’, and further, the extent to which he might be called “philosophical”, will therefore need to be examined.

Throughout the course of Joyce’s career, this man of letters repeatedly threatens to usurp the authority and dignity of the role of the artist, and the struggle significantly impacts on the hermeneutics of authorship. For Scholes and Kain, the ‘man of letters’ is not the artist: ‘To call the Epiphany a “form” is perhaps to dignify it beyond Joyce’s intention, since

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4 Even if these stories were in fact named ‘epiclets’- small epics, rather than ‘epicleti’, as some critics argue, it would still betray a dissatisfaction with form (see Fargnoli 2004). The detachment of the artist in this case however, would send us to Stephen’s *Portrait* genre theory and the relation between artist and audience in epics, where Stephen says there is mediation between the two. His familiarity, however, with the Eastern Orthodox liturgical term ‘epiclesis’ can be supported by his confession to his brother that the English teacher at the Berlitz school says I will die a Catholic because I am always moping in and out of the Greek Churches and am a believer at heart’ (*Letters II* 90). This letter is admittedly dated a year later than the letter describing the stories as epicleti.

5 Italics my own.
Stephen believed that “it was for the man of letters to record these Epiphanies with extreme care”, indicating that this was not a matter of artistic creation but only of apprehension and recording – to be done not by an artist, necessarily, but by “the man of letters” (3). This indeed seems to be confirmed by the declaration of Joyce in the letter to his brother that he is ‘neither savant nor saint’.

The distinction between the artist and the man of letters is further confirmed in another dialogue between Joyce and one of the most distinguished men of letters in Dublin at the time Joyce was mapping out his artistic career, W.B. Yeats. Yeats’s account of his introductory meeting with Joyce, published by Richard Ellmann in 1950, highlights the prominence, urgency and controversy surrounding the question of what it meant to be an artist in the beginning of the twentieth century in Ireland. Yeats himself was a key figure in this debate, and is famous for his experimentation with various artistic “roles”. A poet, a dramatist, an exponent of the Irish literary Revival, an organizer of literary societies, a founder of the Abbey Theatre, a hermeticist, a magician, a bard, a folklorist and a troubadour, are only some of the titles he laid claim to. The diversity and complexity of his interpretation of the artist’s role had a profound influence on Joyce’s own interpretation(s) (and parody) of this role. In Yeats’s description of the first meeting between the two great Irishmen, however, Joyce’s response to Yeats’s perception of the role of the artist was negative and dismissive, and his dismissal was founded on a distinction between the “man of letters” and the artist. Moreover, the criticism of Joyce’s “metaphysical” interpretation of the role of the artist by George Moore in 1931, was a few decades earlier implicit in Yeats’s first impressions of Joyce.

Yeats’s account of their encounter begins with his regret over the public perception of his image and role in the Dublin press: ‘I was wondering how long I should be thought a preacher of reckless opinions and a disturber who carries in his hand the irresponsible torch of vain youth’ (Ellmann, “Joyce and Yeats” 624). His intellectual allegiances had made him an outcast in a society with strict moral codes. Instead of a great orator and leader of an intellectual, cultural, national and political movement which seeks to unify and give an identity to this society, he is seen instead as a “heretic”: he creates ruptures in the social fabric, dividing the young generation from the old. He is a preacher to an indifferent audience; Stephen Dedalus’s ideal ‘church without worshippers’ is for him a grim reality (P 172). Like his great visionaries Robartes and Aherne, he is an outcast and martyr as his spiritual allegiances run counter to the ideals promoted by ‘those enemies of life, the
chimeras of the Pulpit and the Press’, who challenge the artist’s position at the centre of culture (Explorations 119).

He follows this regretful realisation with an example of an encounter with one of these vain youths who appeared to him epiphanically, as Joyce had to George Russell: ‘Yes, I recollected his name, for he had been to my friend who leads an even more reckless rebellion than I do, and had kept him up to the grey hours of the morning discussing philosophy’ (Ellmann 624). The Irish artists, at least those in Yeats’s circle, are shown to lead a spectral and underground existence on the periphery of established culture and society; although Yeats’s position is here shown to be ambivalent, as he is not quite hermetic or hermetic enough. His ambivalence towards the mystical beliefs of this group was registered in his essay on Shelley in Ideas of Good and Evil in terms of his own ideal relation between poetry and philosophy, which the volume of essays as a whole tries to negotiate with great irresoluteness: ‘When I was a boy in Dublin I was one of a group who rented a room in a mean street to discuss philosophy. My fellow-students got more and more interested in certain modern schools of mystical belief, and I never found anybody to share my one unshakable belief. I thought that whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is alone permanent, and that one should begin to arrange it in some regular order, rejecting nothing as the make-believe of the poets’ (90). Yeats, like Moore and Joyce, distinguished his role as an artist through his unqualified homage to art, and for him too this ‘belief’ marked his role as an artist and the nature of his art.

Allegiance to or abstinence from philosophical ideas defined in many ways the literary scene in Dublin in the beginning of the century. Yeats himself was poised between this mystical philosophical group and the Revival’s bardic endeavour to inspire and be inspired by the mythical folk imagination, but also between a private and a public role. The contest between reason and imagination, moreover, is intensified as the mythical world of ancient Ireland does not only claim the primacy of the imagination over the reasoning faculty, but demands forgetfulness; it does not only entail a “metaphysical” or scholarly effort to “remember” the past, but also the repression of history and its analysis through art and philosophy. The mythical world demands the poet’s surrender to the claims of tradition, in contrast to the detached “scientific” interrogation of philosophy.

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6 The impression Joyce made on this famous Irish mystic is reflected in a letter addressed to the Dublin artist Sarah Purser by Russell on the 15th of August 1902: ‘I expect to see my young genius on Monday and will find out more about him. I wouldn’t be his Messiah for a thousand million pounds. He would be always criticising the bad taste of his deity’ (Letters I, 13).
In order to reclaim the critical authority of the artist, Yeats turns in “The Symbolism of Poetry” to the tradition of German Romanticism that had reconciled poetry and philosophy and enabled Shelley to place the ‘civic crown’ on the heads of poets (94). Amending Goethe’s aphorism, ‘a poet needs all philosophy, but he must keep it out of his work’ by adding ‘though that is not always necessary; and certainly he cannot know too much’, he denounces once again journalists who threaten the authority of the role of the artist (239). These newspaper critics paint a romanticized but also crude portrait of the artist as genius based on a misguided historical reconstruction of Shakespeare’s time through ‘formulas and generalizations’ heard in ‘comfortable dinner-tables’, in order to claim that the true artist does not theorize about art: ‘no one, who had a philosophy of his art or a theory of how he should write, has ever made a work of art, that people have no imagination who do not write without forethought and afterthought as he writes his own articles’ (238). The journalist will indeed emerge in Ulysses as the “antithesis” of the artist.

To vindicate the doubtful ‘poet’s right to exist’ in modernity, Yeats proffers Wilde’s argument on the supremacy of criticism (supported also through reference to Goethe) and his dissolution of the antithesis between the creative and critical faculties, in order to contrast the ideological autonomy of Ireland to England ‘where journalists are more powerful and ideas less plentiful than elsewhere’ (1; 239). As in Kant and the German Romantic tradition that he influenced, moreover, philosophy is made synonymous with critique: ‘All writers, all artists of any kind, in so far as they have had any philosophical or critical power, perhaps just insofar as they have been deliberate artists at all, have had some philosophy, some criticism of their art’ (239-40). The continental heritage of Symbolism, although like myth dependent on the cryptic “symbol”, reminds Yeats of the significance of the critical force of art.

In Yeats’s account of his encounter with Joyce, this critical force is shown to be discredited by his successor. Following Yeats’s invitation to a restaurant, Joyce read to him some of his verses which Yeats describes sympathetically as ‘a beautiful though immature and eccentric harmony of little prose descriptions and meditations’ (Ellmann 624). To Yeats’s surprise, Joyce, we are told, responded by claiming impudently that it made no difference to him if he liked them or not. As well as being an example of youthful arrogance, there are many instances of Joyce’s dismissal of the value of criticism throughout his career, which appear to manifest his ‘anti-intellectualism’ (Block 174). He repeatedly stressed that he was a ‘bad critic’, presumptuously advised Grant Richards in 1906 to ‘Buy two critics’ to make Dubliners appealing to the public, and repeated in his early essays that drama ‘transcends criticism’ and that ‘it is doubtful if any good purpose can be served by
applying to criticise it’ (Ellmann 488; *Letters I* 101; *Letters II* 140; *OCPW* 26, 48). Particularly when faced with one of ‘the world’s great men’ like Ibsen, criticism ‘can make but a feeble show’: ‘Appreciation, harkening is the only true criticism’ (48).

In response to Yeats’s ‘Appreciation’ and ‘harkening’ however, Joyce listed his own scathing assessment of Yeats’s work: ‘*Why had I concerned myself with politics, with folklore, with the historical setting of events and so on? Above all why had I written about ideas, why had I condescended to make generalizations? These things were all the sign of the cooling of the iron, of the fading out of inspiration*’ (625). ‘Formulas and generalizations’ are not made by poets, Joyce appears to agree with the journalists. Moreover, Yeats’s efforts to create a “popular” culture and tradition were censured by this vain youth. Yeats is cast as a political exponent, folklorist, historian, and philosopher, while Joyce is shown to reserve for himself the ideal of an aloof inspired genius, as described also by Russell. This impression was confirmed for Yeats when Joyce proclaimed to him that ‘*his own little book owed nothing to anything but his own mind which was much nearer to God than folklore*’ (625). As the unsuspecting reader of Stephen Dedalus’ theories might conjecture, Yeats thinks that he is in the presence of a hubristic theologian: ‘*He is from the Royal University, I thought, and he thinks that everything has been settled by Thomas Aquinas, so we need not trouble about it*’ (625). Yeats too surmised that for Joyce philosophical ideas had been settled metaphysically, and that he was a representative of dogmatic institutions; but when Joyce mentioned his regret about Aubrey Beardsley’s conversion to Catholicism before his death, he saw in Joyce a fellow heretic.

In his defence, Yeats presented Joyce with a lengthy exposition of ‘*the dependence of all good art on popular tradition*’: the superiority of folk imagination full of ‘*endless images*’ to the ‘*world of ideas pure and simple*’ of the individual artist, the civilization of the country to that of the town (625-6). The plight of the artist in modernity and the idea of tradition in modern society were for Yeats linked to a problem of community- the lack of any community in the towns. In towns there are ‘*a few highly cultivated, highly perfected individual lives*’ grossly imitated by uncultivated ‘*multitudes*’ who ‘*cheapen them*’, whereas in the country there are instead ‘*what old writers used to call the people*’. In the towns the multitudes are distinguished by their technical proficiency in a world of mechanical reproduction- by their ingenuous ‘*capacity for doing all kinds of things*’, whereas in the country the people are endowed with an ingenious imagination and possess the art of telling tales. The artist is in danger of becoming a mere “craftsman”, a “producer” like Benjamin prophesied, with this emphasis on “*techne*” rather than “*episteme*” (“The Author as Producer”).
The “aesthetic” problem for Yeats is linked to a fall from nature, tradition and community which gave birth to the great national artists and art ‘of Homer, and of Shakespeare, and of Chartres Cathedral’, into the ‘ugliness of the modern world’ (626). Yeats laments the fragmentation and loss of tradition, whereas Joyce, through his emphasis on the supremacy of the illustrious ‘individual mind’, rejects the influence of tradition altogether. The artist’s role is modelled on a Godlike ex nihilo creativity rather than the national bard’s dependence on community and tradition. Joyce’s response to Yeats’s fervent apology distances the artist from his role as a custodian of culture and from the scholar’s dedication to the analysis and preservation of tradition: ‘I looked at my young man. I thought, “I have conquered him now,” but I was quite wrong. He merely said, “Generalizations aren’t made by poets; they are made by men of letters. They are no use”’ (626). This ‘man of letters’, however, is not the dilettantish journalist; by warning Yeats against the danger of becoming a ‘man of letters’ following Yeats’s dualist analysis of culture, Joyce is implying that he has been seduced by the role of the sage. The most contemporary historical manifestation of this wise man was the Victorian cultured scholar and public spokesman who was guardian and apostle of nationality and civilisation, and who under the guise of detachment, impassivity and asceticism concealed moral, racial, nationalist and ethnological generalisations, and created a religion of art.

This role is not philosophical or critical in a radical sense, as the man of letters consolidates his ideas with the ideologies of institutional and state structures and absorbs their authority to enhance his role in society and the value of his art. The struggle for the autonomy of both literature and philosophy had been fought in Germany and France by Romantic writers who cast doubt on the idea of an aristocratic republic of letters, while in Britain the Kantian method of philosophy as “critique” was introduced by Coleridge who exhorted the writer in Biographia Literaria to ‘be not merely a man of letters! Let literature be an honourable augmentation to your arms; but not constitute the coat, or fill the escutcheon!’ (138). According to Jon Klancher, ‘understanding modernity as a process of differentiation entailed forging an idea of ‘vocation’ distinct from the market-based ‘man of letters’ who was fast losing whatever philosophical credentials he had acquired in the mid-eighteenth century’ (M. Brown ed. 315). In Victorian society, however, the isolation of the artist was viewed with suspicion, and the conflict ‘between the public conscience of the man of letters who comes forward as the accredited literary spokesman of his world, and the private conscience of the artist who conceives that his highest allegiance must be to his own aesthetic sensibilities’ was dramatised in both literature and the press (Johnson ix-x).
In the beginning of the twentieth century this conflict was still very much in existence and was polarised between the examples of the figures of Arnold and Wilde, as the extremes of a nationalistic and individualistic impulse respectively. The great modernist men of letters Eliot and Pound found a solution in the doctrine of impersonality, while nation and culture were transfigured into a universal and transhistorical “tradition”. It is indeed the overwhelming endeavour to interpret this term that differentiates modernist writers from their predecessors, and their interpretation and positioning in relation to this term transforms in turn the idea of authorship. In modern philosophy too there was a concomitant reaction, with Nietzsche at the close of the nineteenth century calling for a ‘Revaluation of all values!’ and Heidegger at the outset of the twentieth urging the necessity of the investigation of our “prejudices” - the ‘sclerotic’ tradition that has ‘ensnared’ *Dasein* (Twilight of the Idols 199; Heidegger 42, 66, 65). The endeavour threatened the very legitimacy of both art and philosophy, and it is in his sense of the gravity and precariousness of this struggle - but also its creative and parodic possibilities - that distinguishes Joyce as a modern writer and reflects his philosophical and historical understanding of art and of the concept of modernity.

Yeats was keenly aware of the Victorian artist’s conflict and of his perception by the public as a man of letters rather than poet in his efforts to revive Irish culture, but felt that the situation in Ireland demanded the creation of such a republic of letters. It is in defiance of this republic, created as an alternative to Victorian culture, but seen by Joyce as repeating some of its worst offences, particularly in their shared emphasis on morality and ethnography, that Joyce maps out his career as a writer. The ghost of Arnold appears in “Telemachus”, a chapter swamped by the ideals of Hellenism and the Celtic Revival, masked as a gardener of the “Untilled Field” of Irish culture; but the ghost of Shakespeare in “Scylla and Charybdis” will proffer through Wilde’s deviant critical paradigm and Coleridge’s “myriadminded” bard, a different style of criticism.

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7 In an early letter to Joyce offering him again his praise and guidance, Yeats tells Joyce that ‘The work which you have actually done is very remarkable for a man of your age who has lived away from the vital intellectual centres’ (*Letters II* 13).
iii. The quest for certitude: the artist and ‘what is called modern philosophy’

In his denunciation of this model of the author as a man of letters, Joyce reserves for himself a more critical philosophical model that aims to transcend the impediments of tradition. The ‘cooling of the iron’ is not only synonymous to ‘the fading out of inspiration’, but is also a warning against complacency: ‘The iron hand crush’d the Tyrant's head / And became a Tyrant in his stead’ (Blake, “The Grey Monk”). Joyce censures Yeats’s docility, his uncritical acceptance of tradition and imitation of ‘popular poetry’. The scientific language that Joyce uses to describe his art: the ‘nicely polished looking-glass’, the ‘style of scrupulous meanness’, the ‘lance’ of Stephen’s art, his ‘struggle against conventions’ and concern voiced to his brother ‘Is it possible that, after all, men of letters are not more than entertainers?’, cast him in the role of an Enlightenment philosopher striving for truth in a battle against ‘old idols’ (Letters I 64; U 6; Letters II 134, 99, 187).

These are of course characteristics of the literary traditions of realism and naturalism, but it is in his understanding of the philosophical foundations of modernity and its link to the ideal of freedom that Joyce distinguishes both his role as an artist and the nature of his art. His critical theories regulate and define the yet uncreated art of his heroes (and his own) in terms of philosophical rules and ideas, and distinguish his “aesthetic” from the ineptly or inaptly formed art of his contemporaries. Most conspicuously in his early years, this philosophical tradition enables him to assume a polemical and sceptical stance, but also to scrutinize his role and his art, and recognise, dramatise and satirise his and others’ predicament as modern artists. Although his admiration of the dramatist Ibsen is most pronounced during this period, it is predominantly through figures of philosophers, enactment of philosophical postures and embodiment of philosophical ideas that Joyce and his artist-heroes distinguish their position.

The era of the Enlightenment has a distinct significance for the Irish artist, as although individual Irish thinkers played a pivotal role in the debates that marked this era, its defining philosophical, political, economic, social and cultural movements and ideas were conspicuous in their absence in Ireland, as scientific investigations were being pursued through ‘The cracked looking-glass of a servant’ (U 6). As the situation is dramatized by the young Joyce, the artist must not only revolt against romanticism and bourgeois society like

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8 ‘[T]he issue of modernity originally came to be not so much a cultural or social or political but a philosophical problem’ (Pippin 8). This distinction would be inadmissible in the work of Joyce as modernity is not a single historical event of the past, but a constant process that requires perpetual renegotiation. Joyce understood moreover that there were many “modernities” with an overdetermined series of causes. Nevertheless, philosophical ideas and problems are definitive in Joyce’s interpretation of the notion of modernity.
the French and English realist writers, but must inaugurate an enlightenment revolution which gave birth to that society and precipitated the Romantic movement that was both its continuation and its antithesis. In the exclusion of Ireland from this ‘feast of the world’s culture’, ‘The Irish proletariat’ that would generate a counter-revolution, ‘has yet to be created’ (P 194; Letters II 187). The Romantic Mangan is portrayed by Joyce as a victim of this exclusion; he inherits ‘a legend’ which he accepts ‘with all its griefs and failures’, unable to revise it, having to rely simply on a swelled imagination (OCPW 58).

Joyce identifies the need for an insurgence against the forces and authorities which denied the Irish subject, and more specifically the Irish artist, spiritual, political, philosophical and literary enlightenment. This ostracism that prohibited the Irish subject to develop as an individual and understand the progress of continental literary and philosophical movements, left them, as Joyce described George Moore and Edward Martyn, ‘struggling in the backwash of that tide which has advanced from Flaubert through Jakobsen to D’Annunzio [sic]’ (51). The ‘two masters’, Britain and the Catholic Church, were the ideological, political and geographical barriers to Ireland’s access to the political, philosophical and literary revolutions of the continent (U 24). The ideas that did reach Ireland, reached her “secondhand”; filtered through English culture, but also as the figure of Mulligan betrays, tainted by Nietzsche’s violent counter-Enlightenment.

The return to the Enlightenment era and its ideas ‘in the original’, however, is untenable, precarious, regressive and idealistic (U 3). The genealogical endeavour will identify in Ulysses its resemblance to the archaeology and anachronisms of the Revival, and the search for “origins” will itself be questioned. The overbearing character of Mulligan will betray that radical critique and ‘ineradicable egoism’ suggest after Nietzsche a “will to power”- the inflated individual as “superman” (SH 39). Having reached what Habermas calls the ‘peripeteia or turning point’ of ‘the drama of Enlightenment’, ‘the critique of ideology itself is suspected of no longer producing truths’; the meaning of critique changes: ‘For Nietzsche the only legitimate meaning of critique is that of the value judgment which establishes a hierarchy, weighs things, and measures the powers with which they are endowed. All interpretation is valuation: the “Yes” expresses esteem, the “No” expresses contempt’ (27; The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment 20, 25).

The consequence of the questioning of the notion of “judgement” and the reinterpretation of the idea of criticism and philosophy instigated by this age is dramatized in Joyce’s work, and is significant for Joyce’s interpretation of the role of the artist and the nature of his art. Aesthetic and more generally philosophical problems and questions inhibit Stephen from being an artist at all. Far from criticism being ‘superfluous’, the critical
impulse is simultaneously all-consuming (OCPW 48). In all of his appearances in Joyce’s work, Stephen casts himself in the role of a spectator, a *theoros* rather than a creative artist. If this is part of a revolt against the idea of the Romantic inspired genius, it is an extreme stance and detrimental for his art. Moreover, from *Stephen Hero* to *Ulysses*, this philosophical stance undergoes significant transformation. The polemicist and ‘heaven-ascending essayist’ of *Stephen Hero* becomes dramatically more passive in the *Portrait*, before turning into an involuntary performer of his own sceptical and doubtful theories in *Ulysses* (85).

Following his expulsion of metaphysics, prejudice and tyrannical Authorities, the quest for truth, certainty and freedom of the young Joyce and Stephen of *Stephen Hero* is suffused with the spirit of the Enlightenment. Philosophy and criticism are synonymous for the Enlightenment intellectual. The philosopher is truly a critic in this period; criticism is not however moralistic or didactic, but implies above all the autonomous use of reason and emancipation from traditional structures of signification: ‘The eighteenth century is very fond of calling itself the “century of philosophy”, but it is not less fond of calling itself the “century of criticism”’, Cassirer explains; ‘The two phrases are only different expressions of the same situation, intended to characterize from diverse angles the fundamental intellectual energy which permeates the era to which it owes its great trends of thought’ (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 275). Knowledge is not acquired ‘with the aid of the lantern of tradition’, as Stephen cautions in *Stephen Hero*; ‘The function of criticism, people say, is to educate one's readers! Whoever wants to be educated, let him educate himself. This is rude: but it can't be helped’, declares Schlegel with similar defiance (SH 190; 153).

The humanist’s reverence for the incontestable authority of great authors that guarantees the unity of culture is subverted by the scientific ambition of the Enlightenment philosopher: ‘The structure of the cosmos is no longer merely to be looked at, but to be penetrated’ (Cassirer 8). The idea of “theory” is transformed into “method”, as the man of letters is not content to be a mere spectator; in order to be more than entertainer, he must assume a more rigorous, “scientific” approach. He must “transmute” ‘the weapons of the prosecution against his accuser’ as Giordano Bruno is shown to have done, in order to expose the ‘ill-written, morally obtuse formless caricature’ that is contemporary Irish writing, but also awaken an ‘indifferent public’ (OCPW 188; Letters II 98-99, 134). His allegiance must lie on the side of truth: ‘he is a very bold man who dares to alter in the presentment, still more to deform, whatever he has seen or heard’, Joyce warned Grant Richards.
The ambivalent status of the man of letters in Joyce’s letters and works that seems to be both denounced and upheld as an ideal the artist must aspire to, can therefore be interpreted as exemplary insofar as it reflects the demand for self-knowledge and self-cultivation, which is one of the trademarks of the Enlightenment. The individual ‘Mind of the Enlightenment’ becomes itself sublime: ‘For this age, knowledge is its own activity, intellectual examination, and foresight are the proper function and essential task of thought’ (Cassirer 4). The ‘unity and immutability of reason’ of Enlightenment thought entails an egoistic element which is both cause and consequence of its approach (4-5). This is indeed the principal charge laid against the Enlightenment- ‘the absence of genuine otherness’ (Dupré 15). Whereas ‘For ancient and for most medieval thinkers, reason had involved a dialectical relation between the universal and the particular’, the Enlightenment mind is characterised by its infinitude (15).

Cassirer’s interpretation of the mind of this age highlights, however, an element that links it to its Romantic successors. The quest for knowledge in this age is not only “scientific”, but has also a psychological and an aesthetic dimension, insofar as the self-centred delight of thought with ‘the form of the process’ rather than its results, entails what will come to represent for the Romantics the utmost freedom in the aesthetic education of man, the element of play (5). As one of Kant’s most enthusiastic followers, Schiller, explains, ‘In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred empire of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where she emancipates man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all that is named constraint, whether physical or moral’ (C. Eliot 310). This Romantic trinity appears in Joyce’s criticism of Mangan, where the idea and quest for truth is examined through a different temperament.

Analysis begins with the characteristics and genesis of this temperament, as the self-legitimating subject requires psychology to play a pivotal role in its epistemology. The vindication, preservation and expression of the ego is the overriding objective of Joyce’s artist-heroes - above even the creation of art - and characterises Joyce’s early declarations on his role as an artist: ‘The struggle against conventions in which I am at present involved was not entered into by me so much as a protest against these conventions as with the intention of living in conformity with my moral nature’ (Letters II 99). Morality does not have a social function but rather sanctions the self-determination of the subject. The trope of the Incarnation dramatises the role of the author; his organic relation to his work makes his role vital for the life of the work, and the emphasis on psychology heightens the sense of his significance. The subject, the artistic subject in particular, therefore comes under pressure to
accommodate an expanding web of relations and divisions that it is called upon to embody and represent.

iv. A mind like Spinoza: Joyce, Synge and the posture of the philosopher

Joyce was delighted in March 1903 to discover that he had come to embody the revolutionary and critical spirit of this philosophical modernity through one of its key figures. He proudly announced to his brother the impression he had made on Synge: ‘I told him part of my esthetic: he says I have a mind like Spinoza’; and he was keen to find out how his brother perceived his role: ‘Tell me what you think of all this’ (Letters II 35). The request was repeated a few days later to his mother: ‘You will oblige me very much if you will write to me and tell what you think of me’, after announcing to her with greater enthusiasm Synge’s presentiment: ‘Synge was over here selling out and gave me his play to read – a play which is to be produced by the Irish Literary Theatre. I criticised it. Synge says I have a mind like Spinoza! (Spinoza was a great Hebrew philosopher)’ (35, 38).

But Spinoza certainly had no ‘esthetic’, and so Joyce’s “wonder” at Synge’s evaluation is understandable. The fact that his esthetic reminds Synge of Spinoza must therefore say something about both or either the nature of the esthetic and the manner of its presentation and character of the young philosopher. Thinking of Joyce’s esthetic in terms of a Spinozian Ethics is perhaps surprising, as criticism has been on its guard about discussing moral ideas in relation to Joyce’s work, particularly in the wake of deconstruction’s (anti)hermeneutic authority over the Joycean corpus that has emphasised the “mystical” ethics of Joyce- an Other that is either ‘transcendent’ or the Reader (Rabaté, Politics of Egoism 122). However, an ethical commitment that has a political resonance is apparent in Joyce’s early years in his mission to compose a ‘moral history’ and concern about compromising his ‘moral nature’ (Letters I 63; II 134, 99).

Synge’s verdict on Joyce’s redefinitions of desire, beauty, the good, pity, terror, joy, proper and improper art, has been overlooked by critics who have instead associated the esthetic theory with German Romanticism, Aestheticism and a misguided interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas to negatively characterise Stephen Dedalus. However, as Synge’s

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9 Rabaté examines Joycean ethics in terms of an “‘othering process’” that he argues ‘has replaced the issue of authority’, but the relation it establishes is ‘silent’: ‘Like Wittgenstein, Joyce tends to affirm the salvation of ethics through silence, since with the loss of any metalanguage, one can only show, not enunciate, the possibility of direct action or of mythical contemplation’ (Authorized Reader 11, 46). Marian Eide has examined the Ethical Joyce through Derrida’s dialogue with Levinas, highlighting also, however, the difference of Joyce’s ethics from their modern theories.
association of Joyce with the figure of Spinoza reveals, Joyce’s theory has also links with the Enlightenment tradition – with rationalism, monism, universalism, the methodological model of the natural sciences, emphasis on perception, reflection and sensation, and the prominence of ethical questions. The influence of this tradition can be seen in the holism of Joyce’s genre theory whereby each genre “proceeds” from one genre to another forming ideal “wholes” between the author and his work, his definition of rhythm as a ‘first or formal relation of part to part in any whole or of a whole to its part or parts, or of any part to the whole of which it is a part’, the organic relation between art and nature (‘the artistic process is like the natural process’), the task of setting up universal rules as a standard of appropriate reaction and inaction (“stasis”) on the premise of art being a ‘human disposition’, the intellectual bias of this theory whereby contemplative thought in a state of ‘rest’ is privileged in the ‘arrest’ of desire and loathing for an accurate ‘apprehension’ of art (WD 54, 53). It was indeed the Enlightenment that gave birth to “aesthetics”, as Hegel notes, and Joyce seems to use the term with the same apprehensiveness as Hegel who complains that the term ‘means more precisely the science of sensation or feeling’ and wishes it to designate instead ‘the ‘Philosophy of Art’, or, more definitely, ‘Philosophy of Fine Art’’ (Aesthetics 3).

Joyce was clearly delighted with the name, role and characteristics ascribed to him, and indeed he regularly assumed the posture of a freethinker: ‘Gogarty wrote to me a day or two [ago] and tells me that ‘John Eglinton’ said the other day (Stannie will tell you who he is) ‘There is something sublime in Joyce’s standing alone’” (35). Rationalist philosophers like Spinoza as Maritain portrays them, are of opinion that truth is easy to attain, and therefore undertake to bring all things within the compass of reason, a human reason which has no need to submit humbly and patiently to discipline, whether of reality itself, a teacher, or a God. In the first case they tend to subjectivism, which takes as its criterion of truth the knowing subject, not the object to be known; a position which is the dissolution of knowledge. In the second they tend to individualism, which calls upon each philosopher to work out a philosophy entirely his own, and create an original and novel view of the universe (Weltanschauung). In the third, they tend to naturalism, which claims to attain to a perfect wisdom by the unassisted powers of nature, and rejects all divine teaching’ (Introduction to Philosophy 182-3).

It is easy to see how these negatively portrayed traits would have delighted Joyce as they succinctly summarize the characteristics of his work and character(s) during his early years. Famous for his zealous and indefatigable commitment to his work, the attainment of truth was not exactly “easy” for Spinoza, but it was accessible to mankind. Divine revelation is shown to be made possible with man: ‘Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions
explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine revelation’ (13). This mind too ‘was much nearer to God’ (Ellmann 624).

The calculation of the distance between man and God is a subject of intense preoccupation for the aspiring artist Stephen Dedalus whose confusion of ‘a possibility of ever approaching nearer’ with ‘a possibility of ever reaching’ God leads to his accusation of heresy (P 83). Joyce could indeed see in Spinoza not only a great philosopher, but also a great “heretic”; Spinoza was not only Jewish, but had been excommunicated, and later in his life even pronounced - perhaps for the first time in the history of modern philosophy - the “death of the Author”. As a Hebrew scholar, he set out in Tractatus Theologico-Politicus a radical exegetical principle that would outrage even postmodern critical theory: ‘the intention of the author(s)’ (Dupré 232).

Having defined the mind as the locus of divine revelation, Spinoza presents this as a principle of literary exegesis: ‘Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from Scripture; for what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what is told us by the words or writings of prophets? And since there are, so far as I know, no prophets now alive, we have no alternative but to read the books of prophets departed, taking care the while not to reason from metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do not themselves distinctly state’ (13-14). For Spinoza as for Stephen Dedalus, history is a “nightmare”; delimited by the individuality and prejudices of the figure of the historical author who interposes between the reader and God, ‘we have no alternative’ in our want of prophets but to try to understand the incomprehensible historically.

For the philosopher history is an enemy of reason: ‘For Mendelssohn and typical Enlightenment philosophy as [Spinoza] embodies it, it remained to the last inconceivable that the attainment of the highest human goal could be entrusted to so unreliable a guide as history with all its irrationalities, its constant vacillations and errors’ (Cassirer, Symbolic Forms 195). The heresy of Stephen Dedalus follows his awareness of his carnal desires and enchainment to historical reality: ‘He was conscious of failure and of detection, of the squalor of his own mind and home, and felt against his neck the raw edge of his turned and jagged collar’ (P 83). The mind of the author is distinguished from the mind of the Author; the human author is a cause of heretical contamination, deception and disguise. Analysis of the Bible with the aid of this scientific method and emphasis on the historicity of its authors exposes the implausibility of their authenticity and “reality”, and ultimately undermines the authority of Scripture. Whereas ancient and medieval exegetes had excused the sinful nature of these authors by claiming that ‘they sinned as men, but spoke prophetically when inspired
by God’, or reassigned to them authority through the gateway of penitence, no such dualism or pardon was granted by the rationalist Spinoza (Boldrini 34; Minnis 109).

Joyce’s criticism of Synge’s play, ‘Riders to the Sea’, was also mentioned in his letter to his brother, where he gives more details about his critical method: ‘I am glad to say that ever since I read it I have been riddling it mentally till it has [not] a sound spot. It is tragic about all the men that are drowned in the islands: but thanks be to God Synge isn’t an Aristotelian’ (Letters II 35). He examines the play in his ‘nicely polished looking-glass’ ‘till it has [not] a sound spot’, and measuring it against the rules laid down by Aristotle, he presents his philosophical judgement that contradicts that of Yeats who had said it ‘was quite Greek’. Such ambiguous historical interpretation is censured by Joyce; in the absence of historical certainty, in the disfigurement of historical facts, ‘Greek’ denotes a set of formal rules that Synge (regrettably) breaks. His brother explains that Joyce ‘objected that, owing to the lack of action, it could not be called a tragedy. It did not fit in with the Aristotelian definition of tragedy’ (S. Joyce 215-6).

Joyce indeed shared the scientific outlook not only of the Enlightenment philosophers, but also of Aristotle, and indeed prior to his Spinozic performance for Synge, he had been diligently studying Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He proudly proclaimed to his mother his proficiency as a Greek scholar: ‘I am at present up to the neck in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and read only him and Ben Jonson (a writer of songs and plays)’ (38). The figure of Aristotle will be examined in more detail at a later stage, but his influence as a scientist through the complexity of Aristotle’s interpretation of “science” must here be mentioned, as it explicates and transforms the Enlightenment ideal. For Aristotle science as “episteme” is a comprehensive term that means broadly “knowledge” - both physical and metaphysical - and is indeed two-fold: ‘For knowledge, like the verb ‘to know’, means two things, of which one is potential and one actual. The potency [dynamis], being, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality [entelecheia], being definite, deals with a definite object, being a ‘this’, it deals with a ‘this’ (Metaphysics XIII.10). It is a dynamic concept that must account for change; but it is always knowledge of essences, of ‘first principles and causes’ and will offer Stephen in Stephen Hero the much prized ‘gift of certitude’ (I.1; SH 81).

The scientific ideal of detachment is truly represented in Aristotle, as he is free from the modern problematics of subjectivity. The Greeks ‘did not try to base the objectivity of knowledge on subjectivity. Rather, their thinking always regarded itself as an element of being itself’, Gadamer explains (456). Aristotle facilitates therefore knowledge of both the subject and the object, of “truth”, while allowing Joyce to avoid the pitfalls of the
subjectivism of the Enlightenment. This “anti-subjectivism” is indeed evident in the primacy accorded to action in his definition of tragedy that Joyce upheld: ‘most important of all is the structure of the incidents. For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality’ (*Poetics*).

Although this interposition of Aristotle seems to compromise Synge’s verdict and Joyce’s link to the Enlightenment, it is through the dialogue between the two traditions that is set up in Joyce’s work that a complex understanding and interpretation of modernity is developed. Despite Joyce’s enthusiasm for his likeness to Spinoza, however, it is not Spinoza who is shown to personify for him the freedom and rebellion that characterises this modern era, nor the renowned Descartes. Instead, as with the choice of Ibsen as a precursor, he lays claim to an unorthodox genealogy - or at least he makes sure it appears to be so. Spinoza’s name reappears in October of the same year among Joyce’s journalistic writing for the *Daily Express*, where Joyce (with the help of McIntyre) identifies Spinoza’s forerunner-Giordano Bruno.

v. A heroic fable: Bruno and the modern “hero”

From an early age, Joyce, like Stephen, was keen to exhibit his proficiency as a philosopher. In the same year that he spent his days in the Bibliothèque Nationale and his nights in the Bibliothèque Saint Geneviève, compiling with the aid of Aristotle’s “lamp” notes on aesthetics, he undertook the review of J. Lewis McIntyre’s book on the life and philosophy of Giordano Bruno as part of his venture into journalism. As the author and co-publisher of “The Day of Rabblement” that had opened with a foreboding warning to Dublin’s “men of letters” in the words of a figure that Joyce hoped would puzzle his compatriots- the Nolan, he must have felt equipped to undertake this review for Dublin’s *Daily Express*. In yet another polemical opening statement in this review, after briefly corroborating his proficiency as a reader and scholar, ¹⁰ Joyce condemns the neglect of Bruno in the English history of philosophy and regretfully remarks that McIntyre’s overdue compensation ‘cannot but seem somewhat belated now’ (*OCPW* 93). This alleged neglect, as with Joyce’s presentation of Ibsen as an unknown author in Dublin, is slightly misleading, as according to Hilary Gatti the nineteenth century witnessed a surge in “Brunomania”: Bruno was ‘one of the figures most discussed and commented on during the final decades of the

¹⁰ ‘Except for a book in the English or Foreign Philosophical Library, a book the interest of which was chiefly biographical, no considerable volume has appeared in England to give an account on the life and philosophy of the heresiarch martyr of Nola’ (93).
century’ (232, 229-30). Admittedly, however, Gatti notes that this interest had in fact obscured the significance of Bruno’s philosophy, and given birth to what Joyce calls in this essay a ‘heroic fable’: ‘in the final decades of the nineteenth century, Bruno in England became less part of a properly philosophical discourse, to be assumed as a seductive figure, image, or narrative model in a primarily literary context’ (OCPW 93; 240).

The consequence of Bruno’s philosophy for modernity is emphasised by Joyce in his presentation of this Renaissance ‘heresiarch martyr’ as a harbinger of the Enlightenment rather than the mystic of theology, theosophy, or aestheticism, or the dualist of Romantic idealism: ‘More than Bacon or Descartes must he be considered the father of what is called modern philosophy’ (OCPW 93). He is a modern “scientist”- an ‘independent observer’, inventive but critical: ‘His active brain continually utters hypotheses; his vehement temper continually urges him to recriminate’. ‘Casting away tradition with the courage of early humanism’, he rejects the canonical ‘philosophical method of a peripatetic’ and relies instead solely on his own ‘active brain’. Joyce follows McIntyre who emphasises Bruno’s modernity in giving a ‘rational basis’ to his ‘mystical’ beliefs inherited from the Neoplatonists; but whereas McIntyre examines Bruno’s influence on various modern philosophers, Joyce’s emphasis on Bruno’s absence from philosophical history in addition to promoting the significance of McIntyre’s book and Joyce’s review of it, is used to cast doubt on the form and very notion of history - specifically English history - and ‘what is called modern’ (110). Modernity, like Stephen’s definition of the classical, is here presented as ‘not the matter of any fixed age or of any fixed country’ but as ‘a constant state of the artistic mind’ (SH 83).

The modernity of Bruno in McIntyre’s book is revealed in his impudence, rationalism, and egoism: ‘His perfect self-confidence and belief in the power of human reason (especially his own reason) to penetrate the mysteries of things, was accompanied by contempt for the argument from authority in philosophy, contempt for humility, submission, obedience in the speculative life. To believe with the many because they were many was the mark of a slave’ (101). It was this “heroic” ‘radical principle of artistic economy’ of an “enlightened” scientific philosopher, that Joyce had appealed to (rather anachronistically) in “The Day of Rabblemnt”, in order to expose ‘the sterility and falsehood’ of the Irish literary theatre in its cowardly retreat from treatment of “modern” themes and ideas (OCPW 50). Bruno’s defiance and rebellion- his rejection of authority and tradition, are symptoms of his modernity for McIntyre who casts him as a precursor of Enlightenment philosophy: ‘Bruno, before Bacon, before Descartes, insisted on the need of first of all clearing the mind from all prejudices, all traditional beliefs that rested on authority alone, before attempting the pursuit
of truth’ (101-2). In Joyce’s review, however, Bruno is modern as ‘an independent observer’- an indifferent theorist, and these rebellious elements of his philosophical method are largely subdued and pushed back historically, linked instead with ‘the courage of early humanism’ and with Bruno’s ‘heroic’ character: the ‘honourable’, ‘sanctified’ and ‘ingenuous’ ‘legend’ of ‘a great lover of wisdom’ (OCPW 93).

Bruno’s revolt against prejudice, authority and tradition is intimated in Joyce’s description of ‘his attempt to reconcile the matter and form of the Scholastics’, a reconciliation that Bruno proposes as ‘an hypothesis’ in the face of the ‘formidable names’ of the Scholastics. Redirecting the focus of the philosopher’s inquiry from metaphysics to physics - ‘in his system as spirit and body [they] retain little of their metaphysical character’ - he resembles a modern natural philosopher and appears to be ‘a curious anticipation of Spinoza’ (93-4). Linking Bruno’s ‘hypothesis’ with Spinoza’s monism and questioning Bruno’s association with Romantic philosophy, Joyce finds it ‘strange’ that Coleridge saw him as a Romantic dualist.11 McIntyre’s description of the relationship between Bruno and Spinoza, can explain why the dualist Bruno of Finnegans Wake was presented at this stage as ‘strange’. McIntyre points out that there are ‘two kinds’ of coincidences: ‘some “subjective” in the modern sense, e.g. the coincidences of directions in the globe; any one may be taken as depth according to the spectator's standpoint; others are “objective”, e.g. when in God the one and the many are said to coincide. According as the stress is laid on one or on the other, the theory may be regarded as either dualistic (as Cusanus’ really was) or as pantheistic’ (179). ‘There is no doubt, however’, McIntyre argues, ‘that it was in the latter sense that Bruno held the coincidence of contraries’.

Joyce’s early writings and the character of Stephen Dedalus emphasise and dramatise (and later satirise) the need and significance of objective truth, of avoiding the scepticism of subjectivism, while also asserting the preeminence of the freedom of the subject. Unlike Yeats who was searching for a connection with the native ground of the homeland, Stephen seeks a philosophical “ground”, having rejected both the fatherland and the spiritual Father. For this ideal of certainty Bruno is indeed superior to Spinoza: ‘It is not Spinoza, it is Bruno, that is the god-intoxicated man’ (OCPW 94). Although the chain of

11 This declaration appears to be subverted in 1925 as he then describes Bruno’s philosophy to Harriet Shaw Weaver as ‘a kind of dualism’ (Letters I 224). This early ‘monist’ Bruno, has concerned deconstructive critics as monist indifference seems to deny “difference”. Jean-Michel Rabaté excuses ‘Joyce’s perfectly logical repudiation of the Romantic view of Bruno, which made him appear as a precursor of Hegel’ and credits Molly’s ‘indifference’ for the fortunate fall from this One in the later Joyce: ‘monism can be seen as inverted dualism, as long as the pre-eminence of “indifference” in the identity of the contraries is asserted’; ‘the sense of cosmological “indifference” is entirely necessary to create, by a strange twist, a new language in which one observes a multiplication of semantic “difference”’ (Rabaté, “Bruno No, Bruno Si” 32, 36).
relations in Bruno’s system is infinite, they find unity in God; but even though this ground is metaphysical, as ‘all in all’ his God is within all things rather than ‘beyond or above his handiwork’ (P 233). Joyce indeed views Bruno’s philosophy not only as a sceptic or fellow “heretic”, but also as an artist, and sees a novel paradigm for the creator.

Having followed McIntyre’s extensive analysis of the parallels between Bruno’s philosophy and Spinoza’s, Joyce questions the “modernity” of Bruno’s monism; his system that enables the “inevitable” collapse of matter and form is compared to what Joyce in a later essay describes as ‘the immense (and in many ways admirable) system of philosophy that had its fundamental origins in Aristotelian thought, cold clear and imperturbable’, and his monism to the Scholastic ‘Materia Prima’ (OCPW 94). His questioning of Coleridge’s assertion of Bruno’s dualism is therefore a reminder of the theological and historical position of Bruno, who was not the Romantic that Coleridge wished him to be nor the rationalist that McIntyre’s emphasis of his relation to Spinoza implies.

The radical proposition in Bruno’s philosophy is presented instead in terms of his denial of the fallen nature of man: ‘The death of the body is for him the cessation of a mode of being, and in virtue of this belief and of that robust character ‘prevaricating yet firm’, which is an evidence of that belief, he becomes of the number of those who loftily do not fear to die’ (94). Certainty for this early humanist comes not only from ‘belief in the power of human reason’, but also from his insolent denial of death and replacement of an eternity of hell that awaited fallen man with an eternity of possibility. It is Bruno’s “heroism” in his fervent belief in man that distinguishes his philosophy from medieval theology: ‘Inwards from the material universe, which, however, did not seem to him, as to the Neoplatonists, the kingdom of the soul’s malady, or as to the Christians a place of probation, but rather an opportunity for spiritual activity, he passes, and from heroic enthusiasm to enthusiasm to unite himself with God’.

Spirit and body are indeed united by him as he is driven not only by an intellectual desire, but also a religious “irrational” fervour. Reason is not enough, or at least not the only means for access to the truth; ‘enthusiasm’ or “will”- a term rendered dubious by German Romanticism and Nietzsche, is also paramount. This ‘mysticism’ that sustains and propels him on his mission - ‘strong, suddenly rapturous, and militant’ - for the ‘vindication of the freedom of intuition’ rather than reason, makes him a “heretic” like ‘Averroes’ and ‘Scotus Erigena’ more than a rationalist like Spinoza (94). Intuition for the god-intoxicated Bruno,

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12 McIntyre highlights the significance of this theory as ‘one of the cardinal points of his philosophy, and one in which he differed most widely from Aristotle, as interpreted by him, and from the Aristotelians’ (153).
13 Italics my own.
however, is not equivalent to the *a priori* imagination of the Romantic genius, or divine inspiration, but is above all divine contemplation, “intuitio”.

The ‘ardent sympathy with nature as it is’ that Joyce describes as ‘the breath of the Renaissance’, dissolves the dualism between man and nature, thinking and being: ‘thought is a complex of elements, which are to it as the letters of the alphabet are to a printed book; but thought and reality or nature are not opposed to one another – they are essentially one. The elements of thought when discovered will accordingly give us the constitutive elements of nature and the connections in, and workings of, nature will be understood from the different complications of these simple elements of thought’ (McIntyre 54-5). The secret of nature lies within man; man reads in nature like Mallarmé’s Hamlet ‘the book of himself’ (*U* 239). The life of the mind gains both dignity and reality, but avoids the scepticism Kantian subjectivism through theology—through the alterity of God.

Having replaced hypostasis with hypotheses, modern man must struggle to preserve and assert his identity and integrity: ‘The infinity of the cosmos threatens not only to limit the Ego, but even to annihilate it completely’ (Cassirer, *Individual and the Cosmos* 190). Renaissance theology explored exhaustively the paradoxes and perils of infinity as the testimony of Bruno’s cellmates illustrates: “He said that God needed the world as much as the world needed God, and that God could be nothing without the world, and for this reason God did nothing but create new worlds” (Rowland 60). This philosophy of “Being and Nothingness” is indeed very modern—post-modern even for deconstructionist critics who have emphasised Joyce’s link to this tradition to claim a shared heritage. 14 Joyce celebrates, in this early review, however, not a postmodern dissolution of the subject among an infinity of ‘modes and accidents’ of being (or language), but rather the pre-modern ‘chaosmos’ of Bruno: his ability to remain ‘a consistent spiritual unity’ despite the chaos of the modern cosmos (*OCPW* 93; *FW* 118).

By the end of the review, Joyce reconciles what McIntyre had identified as the ‘two very distinct sides to Bruno’s philosophical character’: his rationalism and mysticism (109). It is indeed not only Bruno’s philosophical method that interests Joyce, but also his character, the ‘heroic fable’, paradoxically, of this proto-rationalist. Bruno is shown to embody his monist philosophy; through his ability to comprehend contradictions in a

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complex and dissimulating identity he is truly a “coincidence of contraries”, “all in all”: ‘A Dominican monk, a gypsy professor, a commentator of old philosophies and a deviser of new ones, a playwright, a polemicist, a counsel for his own defence, and, finally, a martyr burned at the stake in the Campo dei Fiori – Bruno, through all these modes and accidents (as he would have called them) of being, remains a consistent spiritual unity’ (93). The “temperament” of this Renaissance polymathic artist is indeed compromised- Bruno is both ‘savant and saint’. He is not only a philosopher but also philologist, theologian and dramatist. He maintains, however, his integrity like the God of the negative theology of Cusa and Eriugena who is both ‘the nothing of all things’ and ‘omnia simul, all things simultaneously’, being both a host of personas and the ‘No man’ of Joyce’s earlier revolutionary essay “The Day of Rabblement” (Hankins 184).

He is a modern “author”; his pronouncements do not rely on the unity and structure of the Scholastic worldview and system of thought, but gain strength and validity through his own personality, his ‘enthusiasm’. His “heresy”, his detachment from the authority of tradition makes him modern. Bruno is modern, moreover, through his conspicuous and exuberant personality; as Umberto Eco notes, ‘The medieval thinker’, in contrast, ‘knows that art is the human way to reproduce, in an artefact, the universal rules of the cosmic order. In this sense art reflects the artist’s impersonality rather than his personality’ (7). The convivial atmosphere in which Bruno’s Socratic-like dialogues take place, the revelry that interrupts the structure of philosophical arguments in these boisterous symposia and the profusion of personas he employs to disseminate his argument, reveal the pre-eminence of the speakers amid the communication of abstract theories.

For medieval thinkers, ‘Auctoritas’, according to Minnis, ‘entails unity: the singularity of the authorship of the Psalms, the unity of the diverse materials within the work, and the unity of the Psalter with the rest of the Bible’ (46). Lack of unity indeed threatens the modern author who is not supported by a body of tradition and community or tireless exegetes who piece together his fragments through analysis and search for the common truth. This modern author, however, revels in a profusion of roles and positions ‘within or behind or beyond or above’, without fear of extinction (P 233). Unity in the face of the heterogeneity of roles and disguises- ‘modes and accidents’, is sustained by that mystical locus of widening horizons, his singular ‘spiritual unity’; his selfhood that is understood as a unity only in a mystical sense.

The implications of Bruno’s (and Cusa’s) disruption of the teleological medieval cosmos for the nature of the artwork that “imitates” this cosmos are not fully explored until later in Joyce’s career, but in these early years Joyce sees the consequence of the novel
model of authorship Bruno submits, and problematises the idea of the “system” that for Joyce betrays Bruno’s debt to Scholasticism. Nevertheless, Bruno’s ‘mentality that is restless and somewhat amorphous’ and his ‘fascination of the unknown’ are shown to threaten the unity of Authorship and the culture it consolidates (OCPW 188, 187). This impulse, moreover, is not self-destructive for Renaissance man as it is for post-modernism: ‘The highest energy and deepest truth of the mind does not consist in going out into the infinite, but in the mind’s maintaining itself against the infinite and proving in its pure unity equal to the infinity of being’, Cassirer argues (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 37). ‘Giordano Bruno, in whom this new climate of opinion first appears, defines the relation between the ego and the world, between subject and object in this sense. For him the infinite process of becoming, the great spectacle of the world forever unrolling before our eyes, is the guaranty of that deepest meaning which the ego can find only in itself. The power of reason is our only access to the infinite’. The subject is not alienated from the world but is exalted by this new relation. As a “theorist”, Bruno is aware that this infinite journey is predominantly ‘inwards’ (OCPW 93). The world, however, is becoming increasingly alien and incomprehensible; only ‘the power of reason’ confirms the subject’s link to the world. The philosophical weapon of infinity used against the “rabblement” will lead to martyrdom for the modern artist too, as infinity is not only heretical, but also “inhuman” without the reflection of an infinite god or the faith that will support the artist’s upward journey.

vi. An insidious theory: Joyce, Wilde and the nation of art critics

Joyce’s early writings are marked by repeated gestures of rejection and detachment. The need for the devastating expulsion of all “prejudices” and traditional structures of signification that characterises the driving force of the political and intellectual revolutions of the Enlightenment, necessitates the self-discipline of a ‘voluntary’ exile on the part of the artist (Letters II 83). Through his first (self)publication, “The Day of Rabblement”, Joyce makes a simultaneous dramatic entrance and exit from the Irish literary scene, by proffering his ideal of a ‘radical principle of artistic economy’: ‘No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true or the good unless he abhors the multitude; and the artist, though he may employ the crowd, is very careful to isolate himself” (OCPW 50). Through the words of warning of an excommunicated heretic and martyr of philosophy referenced in order to awaken his listeners from their stupor, Joyce presents his own ‘protest against the sterility and falsehood
of the modern stage’, through examples of the dull-witted intellectuals of ‘the most belated
race in Europe’ that is ‘making terms with the rabblement’.  

Joyce is truly a “critic” in this essay, scathing and unforgiving of the idealising
romanticism of Irish artists in particular, but censuring the entire scaffolding that supports
and authorizes the work of these artists: the directors, the sponsors, the censor, the morality
of the church and the nationalist ideologies of politicians. Both producers and consumers
come under attack; the artist, in order to be ‘a lover of the true or the good’, must therefore
paradoxically ‘abhor the multitude’ and step outside the field of culture in order to realize a
Brunian coincidence of contraries. The guise of the philosopher is a polemical stance
intended to expose ‘the hosts of prejudice and misinterpretation and ridicule’, as revealed in
the pioneering Norway, through another disguised reference to Ibsen - the dramatic expositor.
Even though the hidden reference is philosophical, the intent is artistic: the project of
‘producing European masterpieces’ is ‘absolutely necessary’.

The enemies of art and the artist are many, but also indistinct, and so the essay
wavers between a critique of culture and a catalogue of sufferings. The tyranny of authority
is identified with a nameless and amorphous ‘vulgar’ crowd, while ‘the forces that dictate
public judgement’ have ‘surrendered to popular will’ rather than shaping it. The censorship
in Dublin is ‘powerless’, Joyce claims. His aim in this essay is above all to expose the
cowardice of the Irish Literary Theatre, its ‘flattering influence of vanity and low ambition’,
and this is highlighted by exposing the enemy as mythological rather than a real threat: as ‘la
bestia Trioufaute [sic]’ of Bruno’s philosophical fable (51).

Halfway through the invective, however, the criticism of a nameless crowd turns
into a defamation of individual artists. The artist who is ‘making terms with the rabblement’
cannot conceal himself with anonymity. An enormous burden of culpability is placed upon
the artist who is held accountable for allowing the tyrannical rule of the rabblement and
weaving a treacherous web of influence by cultivating ‘the favour of the multitude’. Yeats,
Martyn and Moore form Joyce’s unholy trinity of artists. He not only disputes Yeats’s
‘genius’, brands him an ‘esthete’, berates his ‘treacherous instinct of adaptability’, accuses
him of turning the stage into an oratorical ‘platform’ and challenges the ‘originality’ of
Martyn and Moore, but by the end of the essay he deprives them of the title of artist: ‘Until
he has freed himself from the mean influences about him – sodden enthusiasm and clever
insinuation and every flattering influence of vanity and low ambition – no man is an artist at

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15 He intended that the readers of his article should have at first a false impression that he was
quoting some little-known Irish writer ... so that when they discovered their error, the name of
Giordano Bruno might perhaps awaken some interest in his life and work. Laymen, he repeated,
should be encouraged to think’ (S. Joyce 146).
all’ (51-2). Above any acquired skill or inborn genius, the artist is distinguished in terms of his autonomy and his allegiance to ‘Truth’. Fittingly, therefore, the warning is sounded in the words of a philosopher; philosopher and artist - the dramatist in particular, are both “theorists”, witnesses of truth.

The reference to Bruno’s work *The Expulsion Of The Triumphant Beast* indeed links Joyce’s criticism with another such martyr who had challenged the art-life polarity; the most famous Irish “individualist” and proponent of criticism as an artistic ideal, Oscar Wilde. The critic in “The Critic as Artist” is “inspired” by this ‘placid and intensely moral’ ‘bestia Trioufaute’ (misspelled fittingly to include the word ‘fault’):

[T]he true critic can, if it be his pleasure so to direct or waste his faculty of contemplation, produce work that will be flawless in beauty and instinct with intellectual subtlety. Why not? Dullness is always an irresistible temptation for brilliancy, and stupidity is the permanent Bestia Trioufans that calls wisdom from its cave. To an artist so creative as the critic, what does subject-matter signify? No more and no less than it does to the novelist and the painter. Like them, he can find his motives everywhere. Treatment is the test. (*Intentions* 138)

The ‘hosts of prejudice and misinterpretation and ridicule’ in Joyce’s article have provoked the wrath of the disguised Thinker whose words are sounded by the artist. Joyce is indeed at this point an artist in potentia and reveals glimmers of his creativity through his criticism. But the art too is intended to be critical as his early pronouncements on his artistic ideals reveal: the antithesis between the creative and the critical faculties, as Gilbert argued, ‘is entirely arbitrary’ (121). In contrast to Yeats who had deplored that the imagination in the modern world was ‘laid in a great tomb of criticism’, and prophesied that ‘this age of criticism is about to pass, and an age of imagination, of emotion, of moods, of revelation, is about to come in its place’, Stephen will foreground the construction of a critical “theory” that will both gesture towards the art not yet created - or the life of the ‘uncreated conscience’ - and serve as a weapon against these hosts by exposing their “faults” (*Ideas* 308, 310; *P* 276). ‘Art is a revelation, and not a criticism’, Yeats argued; but the theory of an epiphany in *Stephen Hero* is appended to an esthetic theory, a theory that analyses and “demystifies” art, and later subsumes the epiphany in the *Portrait* (310). Criticism is both imperative and inescapable for the modern artist, and we see Stephen feeling increasingly constrained by this compulsion. The modern artist, an increasingly suspect marginal figure, must repeatedly vindicate not only the significance, but also the very legitimacy of both his role and his art in society.

The critical skill, the ‘treatment’ of Joyce’s artist separates him from the “estheticism” of the Irish literary scene and its ideal of the Romantic genius that Joyce
dismisses as an ‘unsafe’ critical principle (OCPW 51). ‘It is Criticism that makes us cosmopolitan’, Gilbert argued, and like an Enlightenment philosopher saw the egalitarian and emancipatory potential of criticism: ‘It is only by the cultivation of the habit of intellectual criticism that we shall be able to rise superior to race-prejudices’ (212-3). It is through ‘the development of the critical spirit’, he argued, that ‘we shall be able to realise, not merely our own lives, but the collective life of the race, and so to make ourselves absolutely modern, in the true meaning of the word modernity. For he to whom the present is the only thing that is present, knows nothing of the age in which he lives. To realise the nineteenth century, one must realise every century that has preceded it and that has contributed to its making’ (172). It is not surprising that history becomes a nightmare for Stephen. Modernity compels the critic to ‘bear within himself the dreams, and ideas, and feelings of myriad generations’; the detachment from tradition comes at a great price (175). For Pater, it is language that is the ‘Product of a myriad various minds and contending tongues, compact of obscure and minute association’, and the critic as a scholar is an ‘impersonal’ medium that must ‘purify its very elements’ through the sacrifices Yeats also extolled: ‘Self-restraint, a skilful economy of means, ascêsis’ (Style 108, 112-3; Ideas 149). For Wilde, however, the critic is a fecund medium of heterogeneity; his personality is splintered and multiplied rather than sacrificed.

This diversity indicated for Yeats the regrettable rootlessness of modern man, the ‘weariness’ of the modern artist that he admitted could not be overcome through art alone: ‘now he must be philosophical above everything, even about the arts, for he can only return the way he came, and so escape from weariness, by philosophy’ (Ideas 303). ‘The arts’, he advised would need ‘to take upon their shoulders the burdens that have fallen from the shoulders of priests’, in order to resurrect the unity of tradition represented by the figure of the inspired bardic genius of Homer and be able to write another Odyssey: to ‘learn again how to describe at great length an old man wandering among enchanted islands, his return home at last, his slow-gathering vengeance, a flitting shape of a goddess, and a flight of arrows’ (304-5).

The unity and completion that art both strives for and surpasses, exemplified for Yeats by art’s symbolic character and the unity of the community, and for Wilde by the formal characteristics of Platonic beauty and the unity of the individual, appears as an increasingly impossible but also dubious ideal for modern man. This suspicion, moreover, has an impact not only on aesthetics, but also on the creative artist: ‘To the aesthetic temperament the vague is always repellent. The Greeks were a nation of artists, because they were spared the sense of the infinite. Like Aristotle, like Goethe after he had read Kant, we
desire the concrete, and nothing but the concrete can satisfy us’ (Intentions 171-2). The insertion by philosophy and science of infinity into the cosmos threatens to annihilate the unity of art - of ‘an entire word, the signature or symbol’ of beauty and Form - and of man as an individual (Ideas 305).

The dualism of artist and critic in Wilde’s dialogues and his attempt to find the coincidence between two, not least through the use of the dialogue form itself - a form both literary and philosophic that ‘creative critics’ like Bruno employed according to Wilde, allowing them to ‘both reveal and conceal’ themselves - betrays the threat to the critic that the public voice of journalism posed, but also to creativity: ‘creation is doomed’, Gilbert warned (208). Wilde admits, however, that the contemplative life, the theoretical ideal of ‘disinterested curiosity’ doesn’t satisfy modern man: ‘we who are born at the close of this wonderful age are at once too cultured and too critical, too intellectually subtle and too curious of exquisite pleasures, to accept any speculations about life in exchange for life itself’ (175, 170). As for Yeats, moreover, it is Ireland that bears for him the promise of a rebirth of art: ‘though the mission of the aesthetic movement is to lure people to contemplate, not to lead them to create, yet, as the creative instinct is strong in the Celt, and it is the Celt who leads in art, there is no reason why in future years this strange Renaissance should not become almost as mighty in its way as was that new birth of Art that woke many centuries ago in the cities of Italy’ (197).

There was indeed a more contemporary “age of criticism” for Joyce, of the great Victorian art critics more famous for their criticism than their artistic creations. ‘[T]he main effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort’, Matthew Arnold famously declared, ‘the endeavour, in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is’ (3). It is the influence of this age and its scientific ideals that Yeats was attempting to overcome by inaugurating ‘an age of imagination, of emotion, of moods, of revelation’, and Wilde was responding to by reminding the disinterested scientific critic of that dubiously mysterious obfuscating medium, the individual; that art is ‘a veil, rather than a mirror’ (Ideas 310; Intentions 29). Arnold ‘was rather a propagandist for criticism than a critic, a populariser rather than a creator of ideas’, Eliot would complain and gain success as a modern critic by casting doubt on the religious veneration of culture by Victorian critics (1). The critic’s aim, Wilde argued, ‘will not always be to explain the work of art. He may seek rather to deepen its mystery, to raise round it, and round its maker, that mist of wonder which is dear to both gods and worshippers alike’ (153-4). But the worshipper for Wilde, as for the modernists, was deviantly isolated.
The temperament of the modern “man of letters” is suspended between the ideals of creativity and criticism. But in contrast to Yeats’s retrogressive outlook, Gilbert argues that ‘It is to criticism that the future belongs’ (207). To be a critic is to be modern; ‘creation is doomed’ because ‘It springs from too primitive, too natural an impulse’ (208). In contrast to Ernest’s (and Yeats’s) idealist impression of the Greek artist’s inspiration from his organic relation to nature and religious faith, Gilbert argues that ‘the Greeks were a nation of art-critics’ (110). The critic usurps the laurel - and the mask - of the creative genius; although he surpasses the artist, he becomes his mirror image. This is achieved by Gilbert through his reinterpretation of Greek art. Gilbert exploits the confusion between nationality, geography and history of idealism (‘the details of history’, he says, ‘are always wearisome and usually inaccurate’), to identify ‘Greek’ not with ancient Greece and Athens, but with the Alexandria of the third century, through the link with ancient Greece that Aristotle provides as a proto-literary critic and according to Wilde, first aesthetic philosopher:

There is really not a single form that art now uses that does not come to us from the critical spirit of Alexandria, where these forms were either stereotyped or invented or made perfect. I say Alexandria, not merely because it was there that the Greek spirit became most self-conscious, and indeed ultimately expired in scepticism and theology, but because it was to that city, and not to Athens, that Rome turned for her models, and it was through the survival, such as it was, of the Latin language that culture lived at all. (125, 124)

The historical and national upheaval is further intensified as Gilbert credits the Greeks not only with having ‘invented’ criticism, but also with being the first “moderns”; modernity is identified with Hellenism: ‘Whatever, in fact, is modern in our life, we owe to the Greeks. Whatever is an anachronism is due to medievalism’ (112, 119). The cosmopolitan Alexandrians were indeed the first “moderns” of Western history by instituting the first Renaissance of ancient Greek culture; Gilbert simultaneously provides a critical analysis of Western culture by tracing the various rebirths of Greek art. The Greece that modern man idealises is an amalgam of these culturally, historically and geographically diverse “rebirths” in the Hellenistic period, the reign of the Roman Empire, the Renaissance, Romanticism and ‘in future years’, Wilde prophesies, the ‘strange Renaissance’ of the Celt will succeed these (197).

The modernists indeed found, as Edwyn Bevan remarked in 1923 in his overview of the ‘popular philosophy’ of this age, ‘that the decadent Greco-Roman world shows strange analogies to the world to-day’, listing among these ‘the sophistication of life, the craving for sensation’ and ‘the credulous attraction to the occult’: ‘If a European of today were precipitated backward through time by a sorcerer's spell into some Hellenic town of the past
he would much sooner get used to his new surroundings, if they were in one of the great Greek cities founded by the Macedonians, Alexandria or Seleucia or Antioch, than if he were cast into the Athens or Syracuse of a hundred years further back’, J. B. Bury adds (100, 4-5). The centre of a vast empire, Alexandria was a multinational and multicultural city, and it was during this time that a Hellenised Semite (Jews along with Greeks and Egyptians were the three largest ethnicities) ‘introduced the idea of cosmopolitanism transcending patriotism; of the whole world, the oecumene, as a man's true fatherland; of a community embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or of freeman and slave’ (26).

The Alexandrian scholars were the first systematic custodians of culture, having inherited and needing to preserve the ancient Greek culture that Alexander’s empire had disseminated and made renowned, but which was under threat of contamination in this society. It is to these scholars and their society that Wilde looks for a model of his ideal of the creative critic, as even ‘the inartistic temperaments of the day busied themselves also in matters of literature and art’ in Alexandria (118). This collective implication with art, however, had two grave consequences; firstly, as not everyone is naturally creative ‘accusations of plagiarism were endless’, and secondly, as a result of the exhaustive reflection upon artistic matters, art ‘ultimately expired in scepticism and theology’ (118-9, 124). It was in Alexandria that the artist first met his antagonist. The critic, while seemingly at his service, both purloined and corrupted his- and his nation’s, intellectual property: ‘Hellenism – European appendicitis’, Joyce remarked in an early notebook (WD 91).

The Alexandrian philologist establishes his authority over the “matter” of art-language, as the Victorian critics would try to: ‘That living authority which language needs lies, in truth, in its scholars, who recognising always that every language possesses a genius, a very fastidious genius, of its own, expand at once and purify its very elements, which must needs change along with the changing thoughts of living people’ (Pater, Style 108). Genius is not the attribute of an individual, but is made instead the property of language by Pater, the mastery of which authorises the critic. By taking control of language, the critic is also master of and privy to the secrets of history: ‘Prehistoric history belongs to the philological and archaeological critic’ (Intentions 211). This critic, moreover, fractures the unity of art not only by an unphilosophical historical analysis, bringing into play ‘the dreams, and ideas, and feelings of myriad generations’, but also by dividing artistic form into a multitude of genres:

16 ‘See what happens when your somatophage merman takes his fancy to our virgitarian swan?’, Shaun declares with dismay at Shem’s appetite for “birdgirls” (FW 171). ‘He even ran away with hunself and became a farsoonerite [a father, a son and atoned in Roland McHugh’s “Danish” translation], saying he would far sooner muddle through the hash of lentils in Europe than meddle with Irrland’s split little pea’. 
in addition to the trinity of lyric, epic and dramatic art, the Alexandrians subdivided and multiplied these genres, according to Wilde, into ‘burlesque, the idyll, the romantic novel, the novel of adventure, the essay, the dialogue, the oration, the lecture, for which perhaps we should not forgive them, and the epigram, in all the wide meaning of that word’ (175, 125).

Humanism and its ideal of ‘self-culture’ that each “renaissance” of Greek culture endorsed, is a prerequisite for Wilde’s prospective Renaissance: “Individualism”, as Wilde renamed it (180). It was by becoming ‘self-conscious’ that the Alexandrians were able to perfect the various art forms (124). ‘The new Individualism’ was to become ‘the new Hellenism’ (Soul of Man Under Socialism 62). Both the creation and the appreciation of art is impossible without the individual, forgotten by science and nationalism, and fetishised by journalism’s ‘tyranny’ ‘over people’s private lives’ that cultivates the public’s ‘insatiable curiosity to know everything, except what is worth knowing’ (41). There is no contrast for Wilde between myth: ‘the primitive, anonymous collective poems’, and the art of the modern author; even these myths were ‘the invention of a single mind’- the one and many coincide: ‘The Critical Spirit and the World-Spirit are one’ (Intentions 122-3, 216).

vii. The most impractical of theorists: the ‘ineradicable egoism’ of the artist and Wilde’s Individualism

Joyce’s cosmopolitanism and indifference to tradition link him to Wildean aestheticism- a resemblance that he will ironically both accentuate and subvert through the character of Stephen Dedalus. The significance of tradition in “The Day of Rabblement” is implicit only through reference to another unnamed luminary whose tradition too is under threat of extinction and needs preservation by men ‘Elsewhere’ (OCPW 52). The Wildean critic, like the Nolan and Joyce, can survive on a ‘radical principle of artistic economy’: ‘the highest Criticism, being the purest form of personal impression, is in its way more creative than creation, as it has least reference to any standard external to itself, and is, in fact, its own reason for existing, and, as the Greeks would put it, in itself, and to itself, an end’ (Intentions 139). This type of ‘intellectual strike’ where the artist is permitted to masterfully ‘employ the crowd’ but ‘is very careful to isolate himself’ does not seem consistent with the views of a ‘socialistic artist’ (Letters II 187, 89).

Extolling Joyce’s “revolutionary” writing, Colin MacCabe regretfully concedes that his texts are ultimately ‘politically ineffective because they lack any definite notion of the audience to which they are addressed’ (Revolution of the Word 156). MacCabe’s criticism
sidelines, however, the debate on the “ideal audience” that Joyce responds to by questioning the links contemporary writers were attempting to forge with their audience through recourse to the bardic tradition. ‘The value of the bardic tradition for Synge’, Declan Kiberd argues, ‘was that it reconciled this conflict – the awful disparity between the poem as imagined by the poet and the poem as recited by the performer’ (84). Through the restlessness, roles and rituals of his protagonists, Joyce criticises this ideal of an ‘enchanted audience’ that ‘having become, in Yeats’s words, “a single mind, a single energy”, are moved to “murmur” these shared rhythms after the poet or reciter’, ‘linking the mind of the people to the mind of the poet, which is itself linked to the mind of Nature’ (Schuchard 217).

As Yeats found out in 1899, the artist idealises his audience at his own peril; Joyce’s “ideal” audience in 1906, ‘The Irish proletariat’, had ‘yet to be created’ (Letters II 186). The ‘unsteady and ill-informed’ socialism of Joyce (by his own admission), the ideal community of which in “The Day of Rabblement” is made up of other individual(ist) artists shares, however, remarkable similarities with Wilde’s interpretation of socialism (Letters II 187). In the characteristically paradoxical version of socialism of Wilde, ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain to’ (Soul of Man under Socialism 33). The exemplary model of this coincidence of contraries is the artist in Wilde’s comprehensive definition of this title:

At present, in consequence of the existence of private property, a great many people are enabled to develop a certain very limited amount of Individualism. They are either under no necessity to work for their living, or are enabled to choose the sphere of activity that is really congenial to them, and gives them pleasure. These are the poets, the philosophers, the men of science, the men of culture—in a word, the real men, the men who have realised themselves, and in whom all Humanity gains a partial realisation. (6)

The limited display of Individualism in society betrays for Wilde the oppressive exercise of authority that impedes the development of personality. Only artists ‘have been able to realise their personality more or less completely’ (12). But even their personalities have been ‘wasted’, as most of them ‘have been obliged to be rebels’; ‘The note of the perfect personality is not rebellion’, however, ‘but peace’ (15, 16).

Art and Individualism are defences against the ‘popular will’ and for Joyce, the ‘floating will’ of Yeats (OCPW 51). In contrast to Yeats’s attempt to recuperate the idea of “popular” art, for Wilde ‘Art should never try to be popular’; instead, ‘The public should try to make itself artistic’ (30). When the artist yields to the claims of the public, ‘Art either entirely vanishes, or becomes stereotyped, or degenerates into a low and ignoble form of craft’ (29). This is what distinguishes journalism from art for Wilde as for Yeats: its
‘tradesman-like habits’ that urges the public to ‘desire the direct logic, the clear rhetoric, of ‘popular poetry’’ (29; Ideas 14). Art is instead given birth to by the individual genius: ‘A work of art is the unique result of a unique temperament. Its beauty comes from the fact that the author is what he is’ (29).

The answer therefore to the question “What is an author?” becomes inseparable from that of the meaning of art, and both Wilde and Joyce exploit in their fiction the paradoxes and hermeneutic complications that result from what appears to be a reductive principle of an artistic economy; but as the “myriadminded” Shakespeare of Stephen’s theory in Ulysses will demonstrate, ‘Personality is a very mysterious thing’ (20). The problematics of authorship become embroiled in the dilemmas and incertitudes of subjectivity that reveal the modernity of Joyce’s “subject” and make his work paradigmatic for postmodern philosophy. ‘The true artist is a man who believes absolutely in himself, because he is absolutely himself’ for Wilde, and Stephen’s predicament as an artist will accordingly be presented as inextricable from a question of “belief”. A parallel between the artist-hero’s crisis of faith and quest to become an artist is set up in the Portrait that will persist in Joyce’s later work; although in “Scylla and Charybdis” it will hinder rather Stephen’s career as a theorist (35).

Individualism for Wilde, moreover, is not a mirror for narcissistic self-reflection, but a political weapon: ‘Art is Individualism, and Individualism is a disturbing and disintegrating force. Therein lies its immense value. For what it seeks to disturb is monotonity of type, slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the level of a machine’ (33). Wilde’s socialism is founded on an ideal of humanism that for Wilde as for Joyce is a modern concept, as it is born as a response to - and “heroically” in spite of - the dehumanising features of the modern metropolis. Joyce’s ambivalence towards the significance of the Renaissance in his essay on this period reflects the dual heritage of humanism and the dehumanising ‘tangle of machines’ this age imparts to modern man and society (OCPW 187). Like Joyce, Wilde reads modernity through the Renaissance, but also argues that this era bears a promise for modern man and the modern artist in particular, as it illustrates the interdependence of the rebirth of the arts and the flourishing of individualism: ‘the Renaissance was great, because it sought to solve no social problem, and busied itself not about such things, but suffered the individual to develop freely, beautifully, and naturally, and so had great and individual artists, and great and individual men’ (Soul of Man 53).

From the ‘collective force’ of impersonal workers, according to Wilde, although ‘Humanity gains much in material prosperity’, ‘it is only the material result that it gains, and the man who is poor is in himself absolutely of no importance. He is merely the infinitesimal
atom of a force that, so far from regarding him, crushes him: indeed, prefers him crushed, as in that case he is far more obedient’ (7). Bruno’s philosophy had illustrated both the threat to man in the boundless modern cosmos and the urgency of the endeavour to rescue him from nihilistic despair. Wilde, like Bruno and Joyce, understands the “redeeming” power of the ‘ineradicable egoism’ that Stephen ‘conceived converging to him the deeds and thoughts of his microcosm’ (SH 39). Individualism is a ‘disturbing and disintegrating force’, but also forms a new whole by allowing man to develop ‘the full expression of a personality’, giving meaning and significance to man’s existence and reconciling him with the world that seems increasingly alien (26).

The humanism of Wilde, however, is not an essentialist ideology; the new whole the ‘complete and perfect man’ represents is dynamic and volatile: ‘The only thing that one really knows about human nature is that it changes. Change is the one quality we can predicate of it. The systems that fail are those that rely on the permanency of human nature, and not on its growth and development’ (15, 54). Like Wilde who searches for a model of ‘the complete and perfect man’ in history, Joyce took pride in having discovered the fictional embodiment of the ‘complete man’ in the figure of Ulysses- or Bloom: ‘It will be a marvellous thing—the true personality of man—when we see it. It will grow naturally and simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows’ (Budgen 16-17; Soul of Man 16). But the perfection of this complete man springs from the ‘mysterious’ nature of personality: ‘A man cannot always be estimated by what he does. He may keep the law, and yet be worthless. He may break the law, and yet be fine. He may be bad, without ever doing anything bad. He may commit a sin against society, and yet realise through that sin his true perfection’ (20). ‘There can be no reconciliation’, Stephen will repeat in “Scylla and Charybdis”, ‘if there has not been a sundering’ (U 249).

With the rebellion against the concept of the original sin, the Enlightenment also eradicated this mysterious element of man’s being, thereby objectifying man, Cassirer argues: ‘The irreducible dualism of human nature is resolved only in the mystery of the fall. Human nature becomes comprehensible only by virtue of the incomprehensible mystery which underlies it. Thus all the standards of logical and rational knowledge are reversed’ (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 143). It is indeed through this mystery rather than a philosophical theory that Joyce tries to reconcile the warring twins of Finnegans Wake. Through a paradoxical coincidence of contraries, man could regain a prelapsarian integrity, Joyce remarked in an early notebook entry on Stephen: ‘He came to knowledge of innocence through sin’ (WD 95). Only crime for Wilde rivals art’s distinction as ‘the most intense mode of Individualism’, and from an early age the artist in the work of Joyce is distinguished more
by his “crimes” than by his artistic creations; the artist and the recidivist are related if not identical in *Finnegans Wake* (29).
Chapter 2: The Age of Enlightenment

i. An inhuman theorist

The characterisation of Joyce’s artist-hero through his interest in “theory” rather than art, both preserves the “mystery” of artistic creation and casts doubt on the very notion of authorship. Theory, moreover, does not give way to art, but assuming a modulating significance and defining the role of the artist, suggests that Joyce is either heralding with Hegel the end of art or is presenting a bitterly satirical portrait of the artist. While Stephen is famous for his esthetic theory in the Portrait and his Hamlet theory in Ulysses, it is in Stephen Hero that his interest in theories is most conspicuous and diverse. The words “theory” and “criticism” are used repeatedly to describe his artistic endeavours, whereas in the Portrait his idealised poses of aloofness and indifference render him distinctly “uncritical”, while “theory” is only used three times: twice to refer specifically to his ‘esthetic’ theory, and at the end of the fourth chapter to signal the impotence of theory in the face of Emma- of desire. In Ulysses, “theory” is used solely with reference to Stephen’s “heretical” interpretation of Hamlet, while criticism is overshadowed by ‘moody brooding’.

For Rabaté, who has methodically analysed and categorised the different meanings of theory, Stephen’s absorption in the construction and presentation of theories betrays his problematic relation to authority that is also an impediment to his development into a rightful author: ‘Stephen’s heroism consists in the ardour and candor with which he strives to reach his goal of artistic self-generation through the egoistic production of a theory ... His “ordeal” consists in serial negotiations with figures of authority who can validate his “theories” and also recognize their marginal-or subversive-status’ (Politics of Egoism 78). His theories are a passing stage in his career; “theory” is a privative term that needs to be corroborated by the practice of authority. Both theory and practice are negative terms for Rabaté;

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17 Hugh Kenner has influentially argued that Stephen’s theory ‘is a fake’, suspecting that it was another ‘colossal leg pull’, as Gogarty was to describe Finnegans Wake (Dublin’s Joyce 98; JJ 722). Deconstruction has echoed Derrida’s qualified reference to Joyce as ‘the most Hegelian, perhaps, of modern novelists’, a perspective that Rabaté contrasts with the ‘radical otherness’ of Levinas (Authorized Reader 154-5).
18 ‘His mind emptied of theory and courage, lapsed back into a listless peace’ (P 234).
19 Vicky Mahaffey, who has also examined the idea of authorship in Joyce’s work in terms of the artist’s relation to and understanding of different types of authority, sees Stephen’s suppression of his desire for acknowledgement and validation as an impediment to his development as an artist: ‘Stephen’s discoveries can never be more than recoveries as long as he overlooks his own desire for authority, refusing to see that the basis of authoritarian power is not the person wielding it, but the mental habits of those who respond to it...’ (56-7).
‘performance’ is related to desire for domination, ‘the hysterical contagion of the performative power of authority and orthodoxy’ (Authorized Reader 41). The theories reveal the “egoism”, immaturity and insecurities of Stephen that are related to his rejection of authority and his desire for freedom and independence - literary, philosophical, political and social - but also to his contradictory longing for validation and commendation: ‘The real “sublime” moment occurs when the author of the theory can renounce the paternity of the discours, cutting as it were the umbilical cord linking the words to their enunciator, thus letting the theory follow its own course’ (Politics of Egoism 72). This sublime moment can only come after the theory- with art: ‘The theory will vanish only insofar as it teaches him how to “give birth” to art’ (71). But art for Rabaté is identified with ‘the performative power of language’; art is a drama in and of language (Authorized Reader 77).

After the extinction of theory, the author as an emblem of the philosophical subject is next in line for execution in Rabaté’s serial progression; in Ulysses, ‘the death of the Artist … is in the name of the birth of language’ (Politics of Egoism 125). This sequence of disappearances is presented by Rabaté to highlight the significance of “silence” in Joyce’s work. Joyce is never tempted by the role of the bard, by the “metaphysics of presence” of speech; the theoretical philosopher gives way to the philologist, or ‘the reader-as-writer’ (152). Following Derrida, ‘The death of speech’ is presented as ‘the horizon and origin of language’ (Of Grammatology 315). The author relinquishes altruistically his theory, his self, his name, and his authority for the deliverance of the scholar. Art is as dubiously metaphysical as the Artist. But although Stephen certainly feels hampered and oppressed by the claims of various figures of authority and tyrannical ideologies, are the role of the author and the idea of authorship defined by their relation to and rebellion against authority? Does the theory of esthetics have a “didactic” function- does it teach the author how to make art? Does the fault lie, moreover, with Stephen who remains “untaught” by the principles of his own theory?

**ii. The burgher notion of genius**

Stephen Hero differs from the Portrait not only in terms of the emphasis that Stephen places upon the need to construct a theory and the sense of gravity which accompanies his endeavours to construct and communicate his theories, but also in terms of Stephen’s certainty regarding his calling and confidence that characterises his pursuits as an artist. Whereas in the Portrait Stephen has a sudden and questionable conversion to the life
of the artist, in *Stephen Hero* his ordination as an artist is indubitable and all his attention is focused on the pursuit of this “career”. But he also scrutinises the conventional and contrived attributes and characteristics of the author; he has to destroy and reinterpret the preconceptions and prejudices of the public regarding the role of the artist, and discover through his own experiences and those of exemplary authors the fundamental components of this role.

The most prevalent image that he has to try and challenge is that of the Romantic genius that had been contemporarily revived and reinterpreted by nationalist movements across Europe. Genius, defined by Kant as ‘the innate mental aptitude (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art’, had been attributed to the primeval and mythic bard: ‘the mouthpiece for a whole society, articulating its values, chronicling its history, and mourning the inconsolable tragedy of its collapse’, in an amalgamation of myth and philosophy that was indeed a heritage of the Romantic period (*CAJ* 168; Trumpener 6). Both the bard and the genius create “unconsciously”: ‘no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, so rich at once in fancy and in thought, enter and assemble themselves in his brain, for the good reason that he does not himself know, and so cannot teach others’ (*CAJ* 170). But even though the nationalist bard possessed boundless creativity, in contrast to the originality and independence of Kant’s genius, he was indistinguishable from his nation and owed his creations not so much to an inborn talent or inspiration from nature, but to a tradition that had been identified with nature; he calls upon the gods to help him recall the history of his people. His work glorifies his country and he is venerated in return. He is a mere “mouthpiece”, a medium. He sacrifices his identity in order to consolidate that of the nation. He is a historian rather than a poet; he is distinguished by his prodigious memory, not his originality.

For Irish nationalism, David Lloyd argues, the recall of history played a pivotal role in the creation of a distinct identity: ‘Where the German nationalist’s identity is guaranteed by his language, revitalized by the philological tracing of the sensuous origins of his supersensuous ideas, the Irish nationalist revitalizes a relation to history that might have represented only death and division, finding in it both the lesson and the promise of unity’ (*Nationalism and Minor Literature* 68). The Irish artist must relinquish his claim to fame in order to aid the recall and recreation of a ‘Glorious, pious and immortal memory’: ‘Total immersion of the writer’s identity in that of the nation was seen as the first condition of a process that sought to fabricate a foreshortened literary history in which the development that had hitherto been thwarted might speedily be made up (*U* 38; Lloyd 76).
Stephen refuses to surrender his independence, talent, personal identity, and the contemporaneity that distinguishes him from his illustrious predecessors. But he has to dislodge the seductive image of the Romantic genius that haunts the popular imagination in order to be recognised as a legitimate artist:

He was not convinced of the truth of the saying \[\text{Poeta nascitur, non fit}\] ‘The poet is born, not made’ but he was quite sure of the truth of this at least: \[\text{Poema fit, non nascitur}\] ‘The poem is made not born’. The burgher notion of the poet Byron in undress pouring out verses [like] just as a city fountain pours out water seemed to him characteristic of most popular judgements on esthetic matters and he combated the notion at its root by saying solemnly to Maurice – Isolation is the first principle of artistic economy.

He is uncomfortable with the genetics of this ancient (and theologically suggestive) aphorism; the idea that the poet is ‘born’, however, is not exactly the ‘innate mental aptitude’ of Kant, even though it is simultaneously a translation of the \textit{ingenium} of the genius. Kant speaks of a ‘talent’, a ‘natural endowment’, but through the reference to the genesis of the poet, Stephen seems to be resenting rather an ancestral bond and Trinitarian bond to the Father, not his bond to nature; to be upholding the originality that Kant bestowed to the genius by rejecting his origins. The artist is \textit{sui generis} for Stephen; he creates his self, his identity, at the same time as he creates art.

Moreover, although the metaphor of the fountain symbolises nature, its position at the centre of a city makes it a political (bourgeois) and cultural emblem. Although his author will later explain that for Stephen ‘the artistic process was a natural process’, Stephen will by no means take this likeness for granted and will persistently search for the differences as well as the similarities between art and nature (176). Giving birth to art is not a natural process for the male artist. So acute indeed is Stephen’s awareness of the artificiality of art – a vigilance that could be seen as both a consequence and a criticism of the Revival’s return to nature – that the genius of nature appears to curse him, depriving him of “inspiration”, hindering his development as an artist, and leaving him to wrestle with the construction of philosophical theories in a mental world.

Stephen, however, is also rejecting the notion of creativity that is implied in thoughtless “spontaneous generation”. As well as betraying his anxieties regarding his creative abilities, the ideal of intuitive creation that he is rejecting would only further ‘the spiritual paralysis’ of Ireland; the poet would simply nurture bourgeois myths and become a symbol of bourgeois ideologies (151). Stephen, therefore, is compelled to seemingly do violence against nature by uprooting buried prejudices like a natural scientist, and like
Dante’s sodomites risk the punishment that will befall his successor Shem of walking eternally round in circles (‘Tossmania’, or exile in Tasmania) (FW 416).

This ideal, moreover, is endorsed not only by the uncultivated populace, but also by his learned Jesuit masters. The surviving manuscript of Stephen Hero opens with an introduction to Father Butt, a ‘philosopher and scholar’ with literary expertise: ‘He read a series of papers at a total abstinence club to prove that Shakespeare was a Roman Catholic: he had also written against another Jesuit father who had very late in life been converted to the Baconian theory of the authorship of the plays’ (31). Seduced by the romantic idealism of the portrait of the inspired genius, he beguiles in turn his listeners, emulating the bard through his oratorical talent and turning the author into a religious symbol and a hero of his own art.

It appears that Stephen is following (and later exploiting and satirising) the contemporary fashion for “theories” by assiduously constructing literary theories. But in contrast to these fanciful theories that nurtured popular preconceptions about authorship and promoted specific ideologies, the intention of Stephen’s theories in Stephen Hero is to expose such misconceptions by uncovering the mechanics of art and aesthetics. Following this introduction to Father Butt, we are told that Stephen had constructed a ‘theory on verse’; although the manuscript is unfortunately fragmentary and the details of the theory are missing, it is introduced with the assertion that ‘The beauty of verse consisted as much in the concealment as in the revelation of construction but it certainly could not proceed from only one of these’ (31). The artist, therefore, must not enchant his audience like a bard, but find instead a balance between concealment and revelation. Both processes, moreover, must be deliberate and calculated; siding with techne rather than physis in this ancient debate, Stephen’s model author is distinguished as a skilled craftsman.

iii. The incessant labour of art

As a scholar and scientist Stephen hopes to lead by example and recreate the image and role of the artist that had itself become fictional; the ‘extravagances’ of his theories are disregarded as ‘it was supposed probable that he represented really the artistic type’ (43). Stephen keeps his mystical and rapturous moments private, while his public appearances are distinguished by his ‘quiet deliberative manner’ (49). He becomes ‘a lover of the deformations wrought by dusk’, knowing that his peers ‘regarded his manifestations of spiritual activity as something more than unseemly’ and that his superiors were hoping ‘that
Art and aesthetics are distinguished by Kant from scientific knowledge; the judgment of taste is defined as ‘pure disinterested delight’: it ‘is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic - which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective’ (43-4, 41-2). Rejecting tradition, regarded as the only true reality by the nationalists, and ranking the necessity of self-expression higher than the advancement of society, Stephen indeed alienates himself from reality, and comes to resemble, ironically, a ‘demagogue’ in his speculative declarations about art:

It was not part of his life to undertake an extensive alteration of society but he felt the need to express himself such an urgent need, such a real need, that he was determined no conventions of a society, however plausibly mingling pity with its tyranny, should be allowed to stand in his way, and though a taste for elegance and detail unfitted him for the part of demagogue, [in] from his general attitude he might have been supposed not unjustly an ally of the collectivist politicians, who are often very seriously upbraided by [believers] opponents who believe in Jehovahs, and decalogues and judgments [for] with sacrificing the reality to an abstraction. (151-2)

The “science” and “labour” involved in the creation and judgment of art are repeatedly highlighted by Stephen in an effort to convince his society that his work is valuable and plays a significant role in society, and more importantly, that he deserves to get paid for it. He tries in vain to reconcile convincingly the paradox that he presents to Lynch that his role requires his detachment from society, but society ought to pay him for his “service”: ‘I do not want to sell my poetical mind to the public. I expect reward from the public for my verses because I believe my verses are to be numbered among the spiritual assets of the State. That is not a simoniacal exchange’ (207). The invocation of simony reveals the perplexity of the artistic economy, and his author casts doubt on Stephen’s financial prowess: ‘The economic aspect of the affair did not present itself to him very vividly and, indeed, was only vivid enough to make him deplore the fact that the solution of
moral problems should be so hopelessly entangled with merely material considerations’ (208).

To defend his paradoxical display of his art as both spirit and matter, Stephen presents a highly contentious example of the transaction between the state and a woman’s body: legitimate when sold ‘as a harlot or as a married woman or as a working celibate or as a mistress’, but a simoniacal exchange when the woman is considered as a free human being (207). It seems that Kant’s difficulty with ascribing objectivity to art, was not unjustifiable. But Stephen wants to advertise both the value and the rationality of his art, while simultaneously claiming that it is invaluable: ‘As an artist he had nothing but contempt for a work which had arisen out of any but the most stable mood of the mind. Was it possible that he would exercise less rigour on his life than he desired to exercise on his art?’ (209) For MacCann, art is “necessary”, but only because it is identified with the need of man for relaxation and entertainment: ‘he was of the opinion that amusement is necessary for the bodily welfare of mankind’ (49).

Even though the idea of the genius is alluring, it belittles the ‘work’ and accomplishments of the artist, and exiles him from modern society where his effortless creations are seen as signs of indolence: ‘A man might think for seven years at intervals and all at once write a quatrain which would immortalise him seemingly without thought or care - seemingly. Then the groundling will say: “O, he could write poetry”: and if I ask “How was that?” the groundling will answer “Well, he just wrote it, that's all”’ (190). Stephen tries persistently to show the poet in action: he enacts philosophical dialogues, gives speeches, performs at the Donnybrook house- singing, playing the piano, acting, always with a ‘composed’ and ‘quiet deliberative manner’ (49). Having no role in society, however, he risks becoming an actor of his own theories, simply a performer. ‘There should be an art of gesture’, he tells Cranly; ‘I would like to go out into Grafton St some day and make gestures in the middle of the street’ (188-9). He certainly succeeds in dispelling the stereotypical image of the artist in his attempt to construct ‘the enigma of a manner’; ‘A poet according to you, is a terribly mixed-up fellow’, Cranly responds to his unconventional portrayal of the role of the artist (32, 190). ‘I don't believe that beauty is fortuitous’, Stephen insists, and he invokes the trusted figure of Aquinas to help him make beauty “good”- necessary, “interested”, by arguing that both ‘the true and the beautiful were desirable’, in contrast to Kant’s aesthetic disinterestedness and differentiation between the agreeable, the beautiful and the good (189-90, 175). But he has to legitimize his desire: ‘He desired for himself the life of an artist’, but ‘feared that the Church would obstruct his desire’ (209). Both the state and the church are antagonistic to the suspect role and objectives of the artist.
Kant’s dissociation of aesthetics from ethics, moreover, and the more contemporary nineteenth century Aesthetic movement, had rendered the artist and art amoral and precarious:

‘the young men in the college regarded art as a continental vice and they said in effect, ‘If we must have art are there not enough subjects in Holy-Writ?’ – for an artist with them was a man who painted pictures. It was a bad sign for a young man to show interest in anything but his examinations or his prospective ‘job’. It was all very well to be able to talk about it but really art was all ‘rot’: besides it was probably immoral; they knew (or, at least, they had heard) about studios. They didn’t want that kind of thing in their country. Talk about beauty, talk about rhythms, talk about esthetic – they knew what all the fine talk covered (38).

Stephen’s criticism of ‘the antique principle that the end of art is to instruct, to elevate, and to amuse’ as one of the chief ‘profanities’, and his reinterpretation of the idea of ‘classical’ art in his essay causes an uproar in the ‘Literary and Historical Society’: ‘The essay was pronounced a jingle of meaningless words, a clever presentation of vicious principles in the guise of artistic theories, a reproduction of the decadent literary opinions of exhausted European capitals’ (107). Art for art’s sake, Pater’s love of words for their own sake and Wilde’s perverse veneration of beauty are detected behind’s Stephen’s rejection of tradition, nation and religion as the “end” of art. ‘[Y]ou must first have a nation before you have art’, his Irish class teacher retaliates to what he sees as an assault against the Irish nation by a ‘renegade’: ‘the moral welfare of the Irish people was menaced by such theories. They wanted no foreign filth. Mr Daedalus might read what authors he liked, of course, but the Irish people had their own glorious literature where they could always find fresh ideals to spur them on to new patriotic endeavours’ (108). The authority of nationality, morality and tradition give the rule to art: ‘Ireland would be on her guard against the insidious theory that art can be separated from morality’. The examples of art are regulative and its authors representative of the laws that govern her. As a mouthpiece of these authorities the artist bears a great burden of responsibility.

iv. The idea of the classical

The task that Stephen is faced with is not only critical, but also hermeneutical. He has to reinterpret and reformulate, destroy and rebuild the relation between symbol and sign, otherwise his theories risk being as unintelligible as the ‘thayology’ of the church- the words ‘that you nor me can’t intarpit’ the congregation admires unconsciously because they have
been uttered by figures of authority (126). The exemplarity of the models that art provides has been confused with the dogmatism of authority. The gravity of the hermeneutical task is much more prominent in the Portrait and in Ulysses; Stephen’s character in Stephen Hero is distinguished by his disregard of the task of interpretation and preference for a religious veneration of Words. In Stephen Hero he allows himself only the humble role of the exegete; he does not yet exploit the creative possibilities that the hermeneutic task will afford him in his later literary appearances, focused as he is on the ‘science of esthetic’. ‘I have not changed the terms. I have explained them’, he defends himself to the President; although he discovers, particularly through his identification with heretical figures, the precariousness of this endeavour (102). The novelties of Stephen are threatening not because they are antagonistic to the old symbols, but because they subsume the old, they are the old, as Joyce will insist throughout his career with increasing faith in the multivalency of symbols- in the coincidence of the one and the many.

The boldness of his enterprise is exhibited in his reinterpretation of the concept of the “classical”. ‘A great contempt devoured him for the critics who considered “Greek” and “classical” interchangeable terms’ and in his essay he argues that ‘Classicism is not the manner of any fixed age or of any fixed country: it is a constant state of the artistic mind. It is a temper of security and satisfaction and patience’ (38, 83). The classical is for Stephen a stylistic and methodical concept, a quality that aids the artist in the construction of the work of art. It is a term that is pertinent to the artist: ‘a constant state of the artistic mind’, rather than a critical standard. In contrast to the romantic ‘insecure, unsatisfied, impatient temper’, the classical temper is analytic, “scientific” and hermeneutic: ‘ever mindful of limitations, chooses rather to bend upon these present things and so to work upon them and fashion them that the quick intelligence may go beyond them to their meaning which is still unuttered’ (83). The romantic temper, like Schiller’s, is theoretic and idealistic: it ‘sees no fit abode here for its ideals and chooses therefore to behold them under insensible figures’, whereas the classical temper is practical and concrete: ‘ancient art was plastic and … modern art was pictorial’, Stephen argues (83, 38). But even though he rejects Lessing’s Kantian twofold forms of intuition- nacheinander and nebeneinander, his division resembles another Romantic differentiation- Hegel’s more “scholarly” distinction between classical and romantic art. 20

20 The classical type of art … finds adequate realization in sculpture, while it treats architecture only as furnishing an enclosure in which it is to operate, and has not acquired the power of developing painting and music as absolute forms for its content. The romantic type of art … takes possession of painting and music, and in like manner of poetic representation, as substantive and unconditionally adequate modes of utterance’ (Aesthetics 97). The ideas of substance and adequacy that Hegel uses to describe romantic art that seem to contradict Joyce’s definition of romantic art, are contradictory also
‘In the Jena period’, Tilottama Rajan explains, ‘Classical’ and ‘modern’ ... become critical approaches rather than historical categories, with the modern being at once the symptom, the cause and the corrective for Schlegel’s failure to work out a ‘classical’ approach to ancient poetry. The ‘classical poetical genres’, he writes, ‘have now become ridiculous in their rigid purity’ (in M. Brown ed. 234-5). Stephen denies the historical aspect of the classical, seeing it as a critical and stylistic model. The classical is an obstacle to Stephen’s Enlightenment project against ‘ancient superstitions and prejudices’, as its historicity links it to specific traditions (180). ‘The spell which the classics of the ancient world cast upon the spirit of later times was first dissolved with the ideals of the French Enlightenment’, Habermas argues (“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 4). The idea of modernity that had previously signified ‘a renewed relationship to the ancients - whenever, moreover, antiquity was considered a model to be recovered through some kind of imitation’, ‘changed with the belief, inspired by modern science, in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment’ (3-4). The Enlightenment’s revolt against authority manifests itself in this emptying of the significance of the classical’s value in its inviolable preservation of tradition, and shift in emphasis on ‘classical style’, a “method” that benefits the “advancement” of the modern writer.

Stephen repeatedly distinguishes himself as “modern”, and finds a model of such aspiration towards infinite knowledge in the figure and philosophy of Bruno, who is the herald of the Enlightenment according to Cassirer (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 38). He insists repeatedly on the difference between ancient and modern; the distinction for him is not simply ‘a trick of words’ as it is for Cranly: ‘Stephen tried to sustain against him that though humanity may not change beyond recognition during the short eras known as the ages of man yet these ages are the preys of different ideas in accordance with which every activity, even the least, which they engender is conceived and directed’ (179). This insistence once again links him to the German Romantic theorists of the Jena period for who, Rajan notes quoting Schlegel, ‘there is an ‘absolute difference between ancient and modern’, which are structural and epistemic, not simply thematic, terms’ (234). It is precisely as ‘structural and epistemic’ that Stephen sees the historical distinction between different eras, and he uses this antithesis as a weapon against the romanticising tendencies of the Revival to emphasise an unbridgeable gap with the past.

“Romantic” is no longer equivalent to modern for Stephen, however, as it was for the German theorists, and for him “modern” seems to imply a separate third era.
Nevertheless, his essay does not refer to a third era, and in his evident partiality for classicism, he appears to conflate the classical with the modern. This implicit link between the classical temper and his own modern temper allows him to defend the validity of the ‘modern method’ (190). Even though Stephen’s essay is presented ‘with a naïf air of discovering novelties’, the significance of art for him is not merely a matter of style; he understands the significance of the role of the artist as bringing to the world ‘spiritual renewal’ and preserving ‘the eternal images of beauty’ (81, 197, 218). ‘Art’, he explains to his mother, ‘is the very central expression of life. An artist is not a fellow who dangles a mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does that. The artist affirms out of the fullness of his own life, he creates’ (90-1). The artist has to beware of accepting the flattering divine ordination that the public seems eager to bestowed on him- at a high cost, as we saw.

The artist reveals something enduring that the classical represents. In contrast to the ‘curiosity’ of the rabblement that journalism cultivates - ‘The London public will flock to see anything new or strange’, Stephen tells the President - the artist’s loyalty lies with “Truth” (102). The dissociation of the classical with history and tradition that the Enlightenment instigated gave rise to this fascination with the “novel”; but this novelty is not what distinguishes the “modern”, Habermas argues: ‘while that which is merely “stylish” will soon become outmoded, that which is modern preserves a secret tie to the classical. Of course, whatever can survive time has always been considered to be a classic. But the emphatically modern document no longer borrows this power of being a classic from the authority of a past epoch; instead, a modern work becomes a classic because it has once been authentically modern’ (“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 4). To be truly modern Stephen must avoid the temptation of seducing his audience by means of stylistic curiosities that suggested, moreover, aestheticism after the legacy of his Victorian predecessors.

v. The ideal of scholarship

Kant’s description of the role of aesthetics, ‘taste’, as ‘the discipline (or corrective) of genius’ that ‘severely clips its wings, and makes it orderly or polished’ and ‘gives it guidance directing and controlling its flight, so that it may preserve its character of finality’, suggests the necessity, but also the temptation of substituting- or at least amalgamating, the role of the artist with that of the critic (CAJ 184). When accused by his brother of drinking excessively and neglecting his writing, Joyce replied, ‘I may perhaps employ my sober moments in correcting the grammatical errors of the more illiterate among the rugged
geniuses’ (S. Joyce 248). Although this claim was voiced in a moment of frustration, the state of Irish art appears to demand such wing clipping (that Stephen suggests through his name) rather than the crowning of a young Irish bard with ‘that queer thing genius’ that dominates the discussion in the library in *Ulysses* (250). ‘Would you be surprised if I wrote a very good English grammar some day?’ Joyce asked his brother in 1905, in the period when his role as a reader and a critic of art was paramount in his “aesthetic education” (*Letters II* 86).

Stephen’s apprenticeship as an artist indeed begins with philological study: ‘People seemed to him strangely ignorant of the value of words they used so glibly’; and in his fascination with words and their meanings, ‘he read poetry as one would read a thesaurus and made a Garner of words’ and ‘Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary by the hour’ (32). As part of ‘that little known tribe’ of artists, Stephen typically ‘educat[es] himself’ (43). His educational methods, however, are peculiar: ‘He sought in his verses to fix the most elusive of his moods and he put his lines together not word by word but letter by letter’ (37). Not only words, but even single letters are imbued with extraordinary value and meaning to which others are blind. But Stephen is not as isolated as he thinks; both this belief and his dedication link him to distinct Irish traditions. Vicky Mahaffey observes that ‘Ireland’s linguistic traditions feature the letter as worthy of being celebrated in its own right, whether that letter is conceived as part of a sacred tree, or whether it is an initial letter, elaborately illuminated by the monks at Kells’ (*States of Desire* 13). Flood, illustrating the dedication of the Irish scholars, quotes the remark of a German critic that ‘there is not a single letter of the entire alphabet which does not give evidence, both in its general form and its minute parts, of the sound judgement and taste of the penman’ (109). And in the Book of Revelation, Christ identifies himself through the first and last letter of the Greek alphabet.

Stephen’s role as a scholar is simultaneously humble and presumptuous, as he imagines himself as a Holy Writer: ‘the saint who formerly was chary of speech in obedience to a commandment of silence could just be recognised in the artist who schooled himself to silence lest words should return him his discourtesy. Phrases came to him asking to have themselves explained. He said to himself: I must wait for the Eucharist to come to me: and then he set about translating the phrase into common sense’ (36). His role is hermeneutic rather than creative. He also combines the two roles, however, and appears to contradict his rejection of artistic inspiration, as ‘He spent days and nights hammering noisily as he built a house of silence for himself’ in order to ‘await his Eucharist’ (36). But in contrast to the ingenuity of the Romantic genius, he receives his inspiration from God, manifesting the theological roots of this philosophical and literary notion that has become a
bourgeois myth. He finds roles for himself as a workman, humble scholar, celebrant and servant of God. And the reception of his inspiration dramatically casts him in the role of the Virgin Mary: ‘he would suddenly hear a command to begone, to be alone, a voice agitating the very tympanum of his ear, a flame leaping into divine cerebral life’ (36).

Stephen transgresses the limits of the roles of both philosopher and the philologist; ‘the intellect had great trouble keeping him within bounds’ and he becomes “inspired” by language: ‘his mind, which had from the first been only too submissive to the infant sense of wonder, was often hypnotised by the most commonplace conversation’ (35, 32). This does not seem to be the wonder that according to Aristotle compelled men to philosophise, but the trance-like states of artistic inspiration and initiation that Yeats had described. His habit of repeating words to himself ‘till they lost all instantaneous meaning for him and became wonderful vocables’, seems rather a parody of the role of the philologist in Stephen’s extraordinary love of the logos even when hollow, but also of Yeats’s fascination with incantation, chanting, ‘rites, rituals and esoteric practices’, and his design for the Abbey theatre to become ‘a theatre of musical speech and chanted verse’ (36; Schuchard 135, xxii). Stephen finds words ‘for his treasure-house’ from Skeat’s dictionary and ‘haphazard in the shops, on advertisements, in the mouths of the plodding public’, in contrast to Yeats’s search for them in the idyllic countryside and pure and original language of the people (36).

Stephen’s words, moreover, are hoarded for his ‘treasure-house’ rather than employed for the creation of a common culture and consolidation of tradition. Whereas Yeats sought a revival of oral poetry and the bardic vocation, Stephen’s chanting leads to meaninglessness- or at least an esoteric meaning, and he ‘schooled himself to silence’ (36). Words for him ‘are simply receptacles for human thought’; divorced from discourse and communal tradition they are indeed “silent” (33). Rather than manifesting his proficiency as a scholar or rejection of the idealism of Yeats, his collection of recycled words is driven by his desire to distil their essence. His ideal word is the ‘inner word’ of Scholasticism: ‘the mirror and the image of the divine Word’, that ‘says what the thing is, is nothing by itself and does not seek to be anything’ (Gadamer 420). The ‘inner word’ that Scholasticism appealed to in order to explain the mystery of the Trinity, is ‘not related to a particular language, nor does it have the character of vaguely imagined words that proceed from the memory; rather, it is the subject matter thought through to the end (forma excogitata)’ (421). It has a processual and mystical character like the Trinity: ‘It is not utterance but thought; however, what is achieved in this speaking to oneself is the perfection of thought’, Gadamer explains (421-2).
Unlike the divine word, however, ‘the human word is essentially incomplete. No
human word can express our mind completely’; ‘because our intellect is imperfect—i.e., is
not completely present to itself in what it knows—it needs the multiplicity of words. It does
not really know what it knows’ (424). ‘Whereas God completely expresses his nature and
substance in the Word in pure immediacy, every thought that we think (and therefore every
word in which the thought expresses itself) is a mere accident of the mind. The word of
human thought is directed toward the thing, but it cannot contain it as a whole within itself’
(424-5). The ‘receptacle’ of the word allows the “actualisation” of thought only in the mind
of the Maker- the artist for Stephen; ‘the mouths of the plodding public’ adulterate this
relation between potency and act (SH 36).

Reflecting his scepticism of the ability of language to communicate the truth
following this contamination, Stephen’s ideal language requires the construction of ‘an entire
science of esthetic’; a science that like that of Scholasticism discloses its debt to Greek
philosophy, employed to disentangle the “algebra” of the Trinitarian economy that involves
both letters and numbers in its calculations. According to Heidegger,

In the Greek sense what is “true” […] is aisthēsis, the straightforward sensuous
apprehending of something. To the extent that an aisthēsis aims at its idia [what is its
own] – the beings genuinely accessible only through it and for it, for example,
looking at colors – apprehending is always true. What is in the purest and most
original sense “true” – that is, what only discovers in such a way that it can never
cover up anything – is pure noein, straightforwardly observant apprehension of the
simplest determinations of the Being of beings as such. (80)

Such silent monologue of thought, a science of ‘aisthēsis’ is the model of Stephen’s ideal
language, as his analogies of the poetic word and beauty with the Triniarian Word that
proceeds ‘eternally uncreate’ betray (Noon 119). He responds to the movement of the
Revival of the Irish language by casting doubt on the very idea of language; robed in ‘the
vestment of its appearance’ language cannot communicate the truth (SH 218). Unless the
artist is allowed ‘to pierce to the significant heart of everything’, language functions as a sign
system, as ‘an instrument of subjectivity’ which ‘ultimately leads to the rational construction
of an artificial language’, Gadamer warns (417). As Finnegans Wake will dramatise through
the perpetual creation of “new” languages, ‘Postreintroducing’ the same in an impossible
exhaustion of the meaning of language, the rupture between language and thought (both
individual and collective), does not only lead to miscommunication but also to a ‘reiterative
regress’ of “metalanguages” in a hermeneutical nightmare (246; Gadamer 414-5). While for
deconstructionist critics ‘Joyce’s texts refuse the very category of meta-language’, the
language of Finnegans Wake reflects not only the mythical simultaneity between word and
thing, but also presents a dramatisation of such regress that language as a sign system precipitates (MacCabe, Revolution 14).

In Stephen Hero, however, Stephen does ground the meaning of words in a tradition; ‘they receive more valuable thoughts’, he argues, in the ‘literary tradition’- in the mind of literary authors (34). His fascination with words and hermeneutics, but also scepticism about the ability of language to reflect the truth, indeed reveals his “enamourment” with a Renaissance ‘idealising’ and ‘more veritably human tradition’ (SH 32). ‘In view of the Humanist’s philological task and of the experience of the ambiguity of every word in varying contexts’, according to Ernesto Grassi, ‘the significance of words is no longer a rational definition of being, but a response to historical claims in view of which being – subject and object – is discovered in its meaning’ (32). While the movement of the Irish language revival appears to claim a mythical unity between word and thing in its devaluation of the historicity of language and search its ‘original hen’, Stephen’s view of language is closer to the nominalism of the Renaissance that revealed the creative possibilities in man’s freedom to name things- the poetic character of language (FW 110).

The emphasis on the historicity and creativity of language of Renaissance philosophy, however, makes Stephen’s scientific method appear dubious; his fall into the heterogeneity and indeterminacy of language threatens his quest for ‘certitude’:

He doubled backwards into the past of humanity and caught glimpses of emergent art as one might have a vision of the plesiosauros emerging from his ocean of slime. He seemed almost to hear the simple cries of fear and joy and wonder which are antecedent to all song, the savage rhythms of men pulling at the oar, to see the rude scrawls and portable gods of men whose legacy Leonardo and Michelangelo inherit. And over all this chaos of history and legend, of fact and supposition, he strove to draw out a line of order, to reduce the abysses of the past to order by a diagram. (36-7)

Stephen is shown to seek the experience of art like Pater, rather than a detached scientific determination of the “truth” of art. He is a participant as well as an observer of this spectacle; he appears to have fallen into a Renaissance painting. The history of art is conceived mythically and artistically- through the productions of his predecessors. But he is compelled to become a “scientist” because this tradition imaginatively conceived surpasses logic and understanding; he tries to ‘reduce’ the abysses in order to ‘ascertain scientifically what art is’ (38; Hegel, Aesthetics 13). Stephen feels the need to grasp the ontological foundation of the world and art before he can bring to life his own creations. His essay is conceived on the premise ‘that no-one served the generation into which he had been born so well as he who offered it, whether in his art or in his life, the gift of certitude’, and his art like nature must
have “real existence”, that Stephen will find affirmed in the ontology of Aquinas and Aristotle (81).

vi. The passion for a supremely satisfying order

To treat ‘the philosophy of artistic beauty’ ‘scientifically’, Hegel argues, ‘we must begin with its Conception’; although this does not imply, as it does for Stephen, a mythical journey into the past, but determining the ground of this concept (Aesthetics 27). ‘The object of every science presents prima facie two aspects: in the first place, that such an object is; in the second place, what it is’ (27). The difficulty with the scientific investigation of art is not only that we can’t determine what art is, as ‘what we have at command are merely the elements and aspects of it, as they are or have at former periods been presented, in the diverse ideas of the beautiful and of art in the mere common consciousness’, but also more worryingly, if it is at all: ‘If…the objects are of subjective kind, i.e. are given only in the mind, and not as external sensuous objects, we are confronted by our conviction that there is nothing in the mind but what its own activity has produced’ (29, 28).

In order to try to capture and control this fleeting world of the innumerable manifestations of art in the ‘chaos of history and legend’ and try to interpret the incomprehensible ‘rude scrawls’ that art affords, Stephen appeals for the aid of philosophy. ‘The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition)’, feels to Stephen as to Kant, ‘like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself’, and requires reason and mathematics, in a vain effort to measure the abyss, as ‘for the rational idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort on the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility’ (CAJ 107). This “excess” of the imagination characterises the experience of the sublime for Kant: ‘The mind feels itself set in motion in the representation of the sublime in nature; whereas in the aesthetic judgement upon what is beautiful therein it is in restful contemplation’ (107). Although the idea of the sublime disappears from Stephen’s aesthetic discourse after Stephen Hero, Stephen’s aesthetic education and experiences are still suspended in both the Portrait and Ulysses between the ideal of ‘restful’ theoretical contemplation and the experience of sublime moments of enthusiasm.

‘To talk about the perfection of one’s art’, Stephen’s author explains following Stephen’s discussion with Father Artifoni on the relation between the good and the beautiful,
‘was not for him to talk about something agreed upon as sublime but in reality no more than a sublime convention but rather to talk about a veritably sublime process of one’s nature which had a right to examination and open discussion’ (SH 176). As for Kant, ‘true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, and not in the object of nature that occasions this attitude by the estimate formed of it’, a mind that ‘feels itself elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still unequal to its ideas’ (104-5). This sublime experience of art, moreover, is a cause of Stephen’s isolation: ‘It was exactly this vivid interest which kept him away from such places of uncomely dalliance as the debating society and the warmly cushioned sodality’ (176). Once again Stephen seems to follow Kant, who both lures the young artist to a godlike view of artistic life as disinterested contemplation, and exposes his pretensions through his claim that ‘isolation from all society is looked upon as something sublime’ (130).

Whereas taste is for Kant ‘sensus communis’, ‘public sense’: ‘a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else’, in order to avoid subjectivism, ‘an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgement’, the sublime is distinguished by isolation as ‘a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense’ (151, 98). This private sublimity indeed characterises the artist’s individual experience of art in Joyce’s work as Stephen’s secret experiences of rapture reveal, but also the poems of Chamber Music, where the artist/performer is completely engrossed in an aesthetic experience that is consonant with a lover’s devotion and enthusiasm. In the absence of a Yeatsian traditional ‘community’, aesthetics prevent art from becoming hedonistic.

The ‘science of esthetic’ seems to be needed, therefore, as ‘the discipline (or corrective) of genius’, so that the ‘fantastic idealist’ can avoid becoming a Byronic spontaneous fountain instead of a hardworking founder (39). Stephen’s theories have a demystifying objective; in the long walks of Stephen and his brother that were ‘beguiled’ ‘with philosophic discourse’ and which allowed Stephen to construct ‘an entire science of esthetic’, the two brothers ‘both felt that it was possible to arrive at a sane understanding of so-called mysteries if one only had patience enough’ (41). In the midst of idealistic and heroic traditions that lure the outwardly composed Stephen to sensuous ‘breathless flights of zeal’, such a science grounds his imagination by fixing it to definitive rules and laws (35).

The contents of this science, however, are vague and scattered among various sections and fragmentary dialogues. This scientist is not very methodical; for all his defence of the reality of the “thing” of art, the object of his investigation is unclear. Hegel confesses that the methodology of the aesthetic science is confronted with a mutually exclusive
paradox; that following the law of non-contradiction seems to ‘hinder us from arriving at any true result’: ‘On one side we see the science of art merely, so to speak, busying itself with the actual productions of art from the outside’, while ‘On the other side we see science abandoning itself independently to reflection upon the beautiful, and producing mere generalities which do not touch the work of art in its peculiarity, creating, in short, an abstract philosophy of the beautiful’ (Aesthetics 17).

Although in the Portrait Stephen’s theory is better organised than Stephen Hero into a tripartite structure, 21 Stephen undertakes the dual investigation that Hegel suggests in both books: ‘general points of view that are to govern both criticism and artistic production’ and ‘an abstract philosophy of the beautiful’. But even though the Portrait theory is distinguished by its clearer structure, it lacks the investigation of ‘actual productions’, that Stephen engages with on various occasions in Stephen Hero. The structure of the Portrait, moreover, suggests that Stephen’s theory has enabled him to give birth to art, as it is followed by his composition of the villanelle; in Stephen Hero, the villanelle is composed after an “epiphany” that gives birth to both a “theory” and art. The “end” of theory in the two books therefore seems to differ. Whereas in Stephen Hero the theory of ‘applied Aquinas’ that Stephen presents to the Literary and Historical Society is ‘intended to define his own position for himself’ and is presented in order ‘to satisfy his own taste for enigmatic rôles’, his theories in the Portrait have only interlocutors for an audience and Stephen becomes increasingly resentful of the rôles he is forced into in his deliveries (81).

The essay “Art and Life” appears to correspond to Hegel’s first manner of the scientific investigation of art: giving a division of the genres of art, defining the role of the artist and the qualities of his temper, describing the role of the critic and the ‘modern spectator’ and concluding with a Shelleyan eulogy to the poet - ‘the intense centre of the life of his age to which he stands in a relation than which none can be more vital’ - Stephen provides ‘general points of view that are to govern both criticism and artistic production’ (85; Aesthetics 17). These general formulas of the first manner of investigation have had two differing functions in the history of art, according to Hegel. For writers like Aristotle and Horace, they were ‘meant to stand especially as precepts and rules, according to which, particularly in times of degeneration of poetry and art, works of art were meant to be produced’; although clearly, Hegel argues, they failed in this aim (18). In modern times, their aim has been to form taste, but they have failed on this account too: ‘formation of taste only touched what was meagre and external, and moreover drew its precepts only from a narrow

21 Stephen divides his theory quite clearly into three separate sections in the Portrait: examining the role of the spectator and critic first, then the nature of beauty and the object of art, and finally the role(s) of the artist.
range of works of art and from a borné culture of intellect and feelings’ (19). This has failed to satisfy modern man as ‘we assume something further’ behind the external element of art, ‘something inward, a significance, by which the external semblance has a soul breathed into it’ (23). To avoid abstract speculation, Hegel insists that we need to examine the content of the work of art: ‘Only the scholarship of the history of art has retained its permanent value’: ‘the aesthetic appreciation of individual work of art’ and ‘the historical circumstances that externally condition such works’.

Abstract speculation is avoided in Stephen’s theory through the ‘method’ of the ‘classical temper’, that in contrast to the romantic temper’s ‘figures blown to wild adventures’, ‘chooses rather to bend upon these present things’ (83). It is this ‘classical style’ that prevented, we are told, Stephen’s theory descending into ‘spiritual anarchy’. However, referring to no individual works and no historical circumstances - in fact, as we saw, turning the historicity of the classical into an element of style, abstracting art from history and tradition through the ‘revolutionary’ claim that ‘the tradition of art is with the artists’ and warning critics that they must ‘verify their calculations’ like ancient astronomers or seers ‘When the poetic phenomenon is signalled in the heavens’ - Stephen’s theory is more romantic than classical (84-5).

vii. Beauty and the splendour of truth

If Hegel considers the results of the aims of his first method to have been a failure, he is equally cautious about the second: ‘the study of the beautiful in its separate nature and in its own idea may itself turn into an abstract Metaphysic’, and once again he emphasises the significance of content: of ‘combining metaphysical universality with the determinateness of real particularity’ (Aesthetics 25-6). As we have seen, Joyce’s compatriots felt that he was guilty of this error, and it is certainly puzzling why his aspiring artist-hero needs to define “beauty”, through a theory so abstract that he simply earns for himself a reputation as an eccentric. Abstract theoretical pronouncements, however, allow Stephen to rid art of the interests of nationalism and religion that ‘corrupt the springs of speculation at their very source’ (81).

Philosophy allows the author to perform a dramatic catharsis, as Joyce will defiantly declare in his poetic manifesto “The Holy Office”. Naming himself ‘Katharsis-Purgative’ and armed with ‘the poets’ grammar-book’, he undertakes the project of enlightening the dreary taverns and brothels with the aid of ‘The mind of witty Aristotle’ (PE 103).
‘Peripatetic scholarship’ does not “teach” the Irish writers how to make art, but allows the ‘unprejudiced’ writer who is ‘Steeled in the school of old Aquinas’ to ‘carry off their filthy streams’, leaving them to ‘dream their dreamy dreams’ (103-5). Enticing them with philosophy, he assumes substance by becoming ‘the sewer of their clique’; significantly, he does not purify himself (104). His catharsis is rather a kenosis that explains the mystery of the Incarnation: ‘the Word of God is emptied, i.e., lowered Himself, not by putting away His own greatness, but by putting on human lowliness’ (Summa Contra Gentiles 142). Guarding himself against prejudice does not imply “purity”, but fullness of being; he reaches the Absolute by being everything: ‘To enter heaven, travel hell, / Be piteous or terrible / One positively needs the ease / Of plenary indulgences’ (103).

This is not an abstract conception of being, moreover, but as Joyce emphasised in a letter to his brother, it is particular and individual. The soul is not ‘Formless spiritual’, but is brought to completion as the Aristotelian “form of forms” through embodiment—through performance:

my opinion is that if I put down a bucket into my own soul’s well, sexual department, I draw up Griffith’s and Ibsen’s and Skeffington’s and Bernard Vaughan’s and St. Aloysius’ and Shelley’s and Renan’s water along with my own. And I am going to do that in my novel (inter alia) and plank the bucket down before the shades and substances above mentioned to see how they like it: and if they don’t like it I can’t help them. I am nauseated by their lying drivel about pure men and pure women and spiritual love and love for ever: blatant lying in the face of truth. I don’t know much about the ‘sānce’ of the subject but I presume there are very few mortals in Europe who are not in danger of waking some morning and finding themselves syphilitic. (U 237; Letters II 190-1)

In his polemic against the “profanity” of ‘the antique principle that the end of art is to instruct, to elevate, and to amuse’, Stephen turns to Aquinas’s definition of beauty made in terms of ‘the most abstract relations afforded by an object’ (SH 84). Complicating the relation between theory and praxis, Stephen describes his “theory” as ‘in the main applied Aquinas’ (81). His implementation of Aquinas’s theoretical ideas on beauty to “give the rule to art”, however, is too ‘practical’ for Father Butt (109). As ‘a passionate admirer of the artistic’, Stephen is not skilled for such application, as ‘such people are not always the most practical people in the [side] world’, Father Butt warns. The “end” of Stephen’s ‘Esthetic philosophy’ is indeed very vague, as it does not seem to be either the production of works of art or the formation of taste. Although he defines art in terms of ‘a human disposition’, his theory describes a drama with a limited cast: the artist is the protagonist if not the sole actor, while the critics are given at best the role of the chorus that simply “acknowledges” that ‘beauty, the splendour of truth, has been born’ (81, 85). But what distinguishes this drama is
its lack of an audience: to its ‘spectators’ this drama seems unintelligible—‘a dispute about names’ (83).

Stephen’s perspective, moreover, is not theoretic either, as he carefully avoids the definition of beauty in the delivery of his essay; apart from mentioning that Aquinas’ definition of beauty is very abstract, he does not elaborate his trinitarian theory of beauty in his essay. His ‘esthetic’ refers to art in general which for the Scholastics ‘signified a technique for constructing objects’ rather than ‘the psychological and ontological conditions of aesthetic pleasure’ (Eco 3). As Eco notes, these were treated separately: it was ‘Romantic and Idealist aesthetics’ that ‘identified the aesthetic with the artistic’ (173). Stephen’s “amendment” and “clarification” of scholastic terminology is indeed presented in private discussions with the President, Father Artifoni, and in more detail with Cranly. It is in these discussions and in his discussion with Cranly in particular that Stephen presents himself as a “scientist”; in the modern sense of science primarily, however. Distinguishing his method in terms of its repudiation of the ‘lantern of tradition’, the modern philosopher is not searching for “an honest man” (190).

Like an Enlightenment philosopher, Stephen discriminates between reason and tradition, and attempts to rescue art from falsehood by detaching it from tradition and describing both its construction and its judgment in terms of a “scientific” methodology:

What we symbolise in black the Chinaman may symbolise in yellow: each has his own tradition. Greek beauty laughs at Coptic beauty and the American Indian derides them both. It is almost impossible to reconcile all tradition whereas it is by no means impossible to find the justification of every form of beauty which has ever been adored on the earth by an examination into the mechanism of esthetic apprehension whether it be dressed in red, white, yellow or black. (217)

Tradition cannot be regulated by unequivocal rules and laws and so Stephen turns to physiology; in order to avoid the dangers of scepticism and relativism, he locates universality in ‘the mechanism of esthetic apprehension’. This mechanism is as defining and definitive as reason: ‘We have no reason for thinking that the Chinaman has a different system of digestion from that which we have though our diets are quite dissimilar. The apprehensive faculty must be scrutinised in action’.

This ‘action’, however, is not the same as that which the lantern-holding Cynic Diogenes opposed to theory; Stephen’s action takes place within the mind of the beholder: ‘Consider the performance of your own mind when confronted with any object, hypothetically beautiful’, he tells Cranly (217). The mind, like the modern spirit is ‘vivisective’ for Stephen: ‘Your mind to apprehend that object divides the entire universe into two parts, the object, and the void which is not the object. To apprehend it you must lift
it away from everything else: and then you perceive that it is one integral thing, that is a thing. You recognize its integrity’ (217). In the tripartite definition and apprehension of the beautiful that Stephen maps, this division is followed by ‘Analysis’ that is needed for ‘wholeness’: ‘The mind considers the object in whole and in part, in relation to itself and to other objects, examines the balance of its parts, contemplates the form of the object, traverses every cranny of the structure. So the mind receives the impression of the symmetry of the object. The mind recognises that the object is in the strict sense of the word, a thing, a definitely constituted entity’ (217-8). Stephen therefore meets both of Hegel’s requirements for the scientific definition of an object: ‘that such an object is’ and ‘in the second place, what it is’ (Aesthetics 27). He refutes, moreover, the suspicion ‘that there is nothing in the mind but what its own activity has produced’, as the object is apprehended and analysed in the mind, not created.

The final component of beauty, Stephen confesses, puzzled him for a long time. Aquinas’s use of ‘a figurative word (a very unusual thing for him)’ confused him as an objective scientist. But seeing through the metaphor, he explains that ‘Claritas’- divine splendour, ‘is quidditas’- the essence of the thing (218). This recognition of the essence he renames - following Aquinas’s poetic licence - ‘epiphany’: ‘we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance’ (218). The freedom of the object that Kant wanted to secure is preserved also in Stephen’s definition: the soul ‘leaps’ towards the passive subject. There is no ‘free play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given’, however; Stephen’s aesthetic experience is defined by the ‘organized composite structure’ of the thing (CAJ 58; SH 218).

Stephen “clarifies” scholastic terminology and simultaneously affords the art spectator with the quintessential spectacle- a visio Dei. His tripartite apprehension of beauty is a religious experience; claritas is not simply divine splendour but an epiphany of the Godhead. Theory is a vision of the theion: ‘θεὸς, which is the Greek for God’, Aquinas explains, ‘is derived from θεᾶσθαι, which means to consider or to see’ (Summa Contra Gentiles 101). The dualism of analysis and synthesis in Stephen’s scientific method is dissolved through reference to the ideal and metaphysical model of unity in multiplicity of the Trinity. The object perceived aesthetically assumes the characteristics of the Trinity, and the mind follows its processual character: ‘First we recognise that the object is one integral thing, then we recognise that it is an organized composite structure, a thing in fact: finally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance’ (SH 218).
Despite the emphasis on epistemology, Stephen attempts an ontological definition of beauty. His description of an ‘organized composite structure’ follows Aristotle’s in his refutation of ‘those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good’ (Metaphysics XIII.3). For Aristotle too beauty is an object of science: since ‘Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes’, beauty is an element of Wisdom; or as Stephen points out in his theory, it is the manifestation of Wisdom (I.1). It is both the truth and what allows us to apprehend the truth: a “nicely polished looking-glass”. His identification of claritas with quidditas is indeed closer to the phenomenological emphasis of Hegel’s description of the Trinity rather than Aquinas’s, who as Noon notes, ‘would have said that quidditas is a condition for claritas, rather than claritas itself’ (72). For Hegel, ‘God in Christianity is conceived in his truth, and therefore, as in Himself thoroughly concrete, as a person, as a subject, and more closely determined, as mind and spirit. What He is as spirit unfolds itself to the religious apprehension as the Trinity of Persons, which at the same time in relation with itself is One. Here is essentiality, universality, and particularity, together with their reconciled unity; and it is only such unity that constitutes the concrete’ (Aesthetics 77).

The aesthetic object has “real existence” for Stephen; in his trinitarian definition of beauty, there is a coincidence not only between truth and beauty, but also beauty and “the good”, as he emphasises in his conversation with Father Artifoni. Even though Aristotle in fact distinguishes the good from the beautiful - ‘for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things’ - in order to prove the real existence of the aesthetic object, Stephen has to ascribe to it the ‘absolutely necessitating law’ through which Kant distinguishes the ‘absolutely good’ from the beautiful (Metaphysics XIII.3; CAJ 118).

‘When the poetic phenomenon is signalled in the heavens’, Stephen as a ‘heaven-ascending essayist’ reaches the climax of his argument in his speech to the Literary and Historical Society, ‘it is time for the critics to verify their calculations in accordance with it. It is time for them to acknowledge that here the imagination has contemplated intensely the truth of the being of the visible world and that beauty, the splendour of truth, has been born’ (85). Scholes and Kain trace this description of beauty to a letter by Flaubert, in which he exhorts Art to ‘raise itself above personal feelings and nervous susceptibilities!’, and like Stephen’s vivisective method, advocates that ‘It is time to endow it, through a methodical indifference, with the precision of the physical sciences!’ (248). For the artist, as his contemporary Pater also insisted, this means the perfection of his medium: ‘The great problem, for me, remains style, for, the indefinable Beauty resulting from the conception
itself, which is the splendor of truth, according to Plato’. As style, however, the ‘splendor of truth’ in Flaubert’s modern formulation, highlights the discrepancy between appearance and reality, form and content, rather than the manifestation of the truth. It is a reflection rather than a revelation.

This splendour that defines beauty for Plato, is truly formative in the Christian tradition; it is the agent of creation in the book of Genesis, and allows God as the first “theorist” to admire his creations. But it is also of particular significance for the literary artist; as Gadamer points out, ‘The Christian doctrine of the word, the verbum creans ... follows the Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphysics of light’, and he notes that for Aquinas it is in the word that ‘knowledge is consummated’: ‘Thomas points out that in this respect the word resembles light, which is what makes color visible’ (425). It is conspicuous indeed that Stephen as a literary artist ignores the question of language in his theories. The word that he wishes to beget seems to be this metaphysical self-manifesting and self-interpreting divine Word. ‘It is through the word and not alone through self-introspection that the poet gives form to his own experience and negotiates an insight into the experience of others’, Noon protests against Stephen’s curious creative practices, and Cranly is similarly bewildered: ‘Such concentration upon oneself was unknown to him and he wondered at first with the joy of solitary possession at Stephen's ingenuous arrogance’ (67-8; SH 130).

The Trinity, the model of Stephen’s tripartite aesthetic apprehension, for Aquinas is an emblem of the archetypal creative act: it ‘originates in the primal birth by which the divine wisdom is eternally begotten by the Father’; ‘All other births are imperfect’ (De Trinitate 4). The ‘poetic phenomenon’ that ‘is signalled in the heavens’ is the creative act itself; in the contemplation of ‘the truth of the being of the visible world’, the critics - like the Magi who the celebration of the Epiphany commemorates - follow the sign in the heavens and attend to the birth of beauty. This “theory” is not abstract; the critic witnesses the miracle of the Incarnation, the word becoming flesh: the ‘whatness’ of the object ‘leaps’ out of its schema. All the structural and analytical scaffolding disappears in Stephen’s transubstantiation.

Aquinas’s description of integritas, consonantia, and claritas as the ‘three conditions’ of beauty - an ‘essential attribute’ that he assigns to the Son as both verbum and imago Dei - suggests that the beautiful object for Stephen is modelled on the Word (Summa Theologica I. q. 39, a. 8). Whereas the Father is defined by “eternity”, beauty ‘has a likeness to the property of the Son’. As the Father is ‘a “being” without a principle’, ‘“a principle without a principle”’, through the incarnation of the Son we are able to “see” God. But if the model of the beautiful “thing” is the Word, the critic, according to Stephen, attends to the conception
and birth of art. These two processes according to Aquinas are simultaneous only for God. There is no division as there is in human birth nor is there a lapse in time: ‘God’s Word, abiding in God the Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from God the Speaker... Accordingly in the generation of the Word of God conception is the same as birth’ (Summa Contra Gentiles 57). Moreover, it is not only conception and birth that are simultaneous processes for God, but the interpretation of the Word is also simultaneously performed: ‘for the very reason that He understands Himself His Word must be in Him... Therefore God’s Word must have been in Him always: and consequently His Word is co-eternal with Him and does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves’ (50).

As conception, birth and interpretation are simultaneous processes in the beatific vision that Stephen describes, the critical and the creative act coincide. The human artist does not create ex nihilo, but needs to be ‘confronted’ with an object, at least ‘hypothetically beautiful’ (SH 217). In contrast to the ‘esthetic stasis’ that according to Stephen in the Portrait beauty ‘awakens, or ought to awaken, or induces, or ought to induce’, the mind here is compelled to take part in a ‘performance’ (P 223; SH 217). Even though this is only a noetic experience, the moment of contemplation is presented as a creative event, as Stephen’s comparison of the moment of epiphany with Shelley’s fading coal in the Portrait will highlight. But for Aquinas, Eco explains, ‘the perception of beauty is something cognitive, because it has to do with formal causes’, it is not creative as it is for Stephen; creation is exclusive to God: ‘no body can create a thing, for it is to make something out of nothing’ (57, Summa Contra Gentiles 30).

Despite the ontological weight that Stephen bestows on art and beauty, Stephen as a modern artist cannot completely avoid subjectivism or accept the role of a humble scholar. As his role as a modern scientist betrays, Stephen’s reading of Aquinas is made through the Enlightenment; ‘through Descartes’ spectacles’, as Noon remarks (10). Stephen, Noon argues, confuses ‘the subjective psychological responses to the beautiful with the constitutive ontological principles which might be called the “objective correlative” of this response’ (45). In his description of the critics’ contemplation of the ‘poetic phenomenon [that] is signalled in the heavens’, it is not clear whether it is because ‘the imagination has contemplated intensely the truth of the being of the visible world’ that beauty has been born; whether it is the act of contemplation that gives birth to beauty, or whether the critic is simply a witness of this performance (SH 85). The ‘performance’ of the mind in Stephen’s theory is much more “sublime”, than Aquinas would allow.
The ‘apprehension’ that Aquinas describes in the passage that Stephen refers to is not in fact that of the beautiful object, but of God, whose essence “agrees” with these three properties, but Who we must try to understand in the way that we observe creatures. This is a fourfold process, Aquinas says, following Aristotle’s four causes:

Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. ([*Summa Theologica* I. q. 39, a. 8])

Stephen neglects the final cause in his conflation of three properties that Aquinas assigns to beauty with the four points in the apprehension of an object. The ‘relation to its effects’ is ignored in Stephen’s theoretical approach, as Father Butt notes following his presentation of his essay: ‘just as an act which may be good in itself may become bad by reason of circumstances so an object intrinsically beautiful may be vitiated by other considerations’ ([*SH* 109]). This apparent omission reflects Stephen’s aim of separating art from morality, an aim his esthetic shares with that of Hegel: the ‘perverseness of the question ‘What is the use?’ Hegel argues, ‘lies in the point that the work of art would then be regarded as aspiring to something else which is set before consciousness as the essential and as what ought to be; so that then the work of art would only have value as a useful instrument in the realization of an end having substantive importance outside the sphere of art’ ([*Aesthetics* 61]).

Against this view, like Joyce in “The Day of Rabblement”, Hegel maintains that ‘art has the vocation of revealing the truth’ and ‘has its purpose in itself’, in representation and revelation (61). Representation and revelation are contemporaneous in a divine simultaneity that Stephen lays claim to in his experience of the ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ that characterises the epiphany ([*SH* 216]). The distinction between creator and observer is immaterial in the dissolution of temporality that distinguishes divine creation: ‘not only is the concept of the divine intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the revelation for the divine concept is called the Word’s word’, Aquinas explains ([*Summa Contra Gentiles* 62]). By ignoring the “effects” of art, however, Stephen also disregards the question of the audience, as it is pointed out to him by Hughes following his presentation of his essay. The question of who is having and is able to have an “epiphany” is ignored. Stephen’s argument

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22 The order of apprehension in Stephen’s theory is also wrong, as Noon has noted, which also cannot be ‘divided into “phases”: ‘these three properties regarded as ontological and objective qualities inherent in the thing known rather than the knowing mind’ (48, 46).
that even though his art ‘has its purpose in itself’ he still expects payment for it, accentuates the suspicion that Shaun voices in *Finnegans Wake* that the sole purpose of Shem’s art is to enable him ‘to utter an epical forged cheque on the public for his own private profit’ (181).

**viii. Epiphany and the mechanism of esthetic apprehension**

Stephen’s definition of an epiphany that precedes his tripartite analysis of the beautiful object to Cranly is distinguished by such an instantaneous recognition and confusion between creation and perception, understanding and interpretation. Explaining to Cranly how the clock of the Ballast Office can be ‘epiphanised’, Stephen says, ‘I will pass it time after time, allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it. It is only an item in the catalogue of Dublin’s street furniture. Then all at once I see it and I know at once what it is: epiphany’ (*SH* 216). The moment of the epiphany dissolves the gap between perception and understanding; these two processes are performed ‘at once’- “in one intuition”, as in the mind of God. The experience of the ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ that Stephen has, moreover, is creative, insofar as following this moment of epiphany that “arrests” his mind that has been ‘dancing the dance of unrest’, Stephen composes the “Vilanelle of the Temptress” (216). It seems indeed that in the *Portrait* the epiphany is renamed ‘arrest’: in the moment of an esthetic apprehension, ‘The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing’ (*P* 222). A temporal suspension takes place as in the moment of epiphany. As perception and understanding are identical, moreover, the man of letters is deprived of his critical and hermeneutic role and he can merely ‘record’ these epiphanies with extreme care’, in a moment of stasis comparable to the “verification” of the critics’ ‘calculations’ when beauty is born (*SH* 216; 85).  

As we saw, for Scholes and Kain these epiphanies are ‘not a matter of artistic creation but only of apprehension and recording – to be done not by an artist, necessarily, but by “the man of letters”’ (*WD* 3). But how can the man of letters ‘record’ an epiphany if he has not himself had one? He must have at least been present at the moment when the object was ‘epiphanised’. It is not clear in Stephen’s description if this is a subjective experience or if he expects Cranly to have one too. The passage is preceded, moreover, by the narrator’s revelation that Stephen ‘had come to the conclusion that nature had designed him for a man of letters’; so unless he has also had a sudden conversion, artist and man of letters do not appear to be incompatible vocations for Stephen at this point in his literary career. Indeed,

23 Italics my own.
the only role available to the human artist seems to be that of the man of letters. As the birth of the word is not simultaneous with its conception for the human artist, the lapse in time between the epiphany and the composition of the verses does not mean that the epiphany is not part of a creative process.

Whether the contemplative of Stephen’s epiphanies is a creator or simply a witness, s/he is a participant; not so much in an aesthetic experience, as a momentous event. The critic in Stephen’s essay is present at the moment of the birth of the Word, like John the Apostle; and the man of letters is a witness of His Revelation as Alpha and Omega, like John of Patmos. The one stands in the beginning of time and the other at its end, but both are witnesses of a theophany. This not a Paterian moment of ecstasy or ‘a single sharp impression’; for Stephen ‘the spirit of man makes a continual affirmation’ and the spectator is truly present in this event (Renaissance 210, 85). He witnesses and rationally analyses the spectacle before his eyes, he does not simply “experience”.

Emblematic of the paradox of this “presence” of the spectator of Stephen’s theophanies is the gospel of John the Evangelist who records that another John- the Baptist, was called ‘to bear witness of the Light’, symbolic of both the Genesis and the Incarnation: ‘John bare witness of him, and cried, saying, This was he of whom I spake, He that cometh after me is preferred before me: for he was before me’ (John 1.15). Time is dissolved and in a reversal of the linear narrative of history, even though a precursor he becomes the successor. By being a witness, moreover, John the Baptist is confused with the Word: ‘I am not the Christ’, he has to clarify (1.20). Baptising the Holy as Joyce in the Holy Office baptises the unholy, John ‘saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God’ (1.34). His role of witness to this spectacle, moreover, allows him to become an “author”, a Holy Writer. The Feast of the Epiphany indeed celebrates also the baptism of Christ and manifestation of the Holy Spirit; catharsis and epiphany are linked.

It is this role of John as Holy Writer that Stephen repeatedly assumes. The presumptuousness of what seems to be a humble scholarly role is revealed in the gravity and prestige he assigns to his endeavours; he presents himself as the Liberator of not only his country but also his ‘generation’, and as the sole witness of the manifestation of the Truth (SH 81). The recording of epiphanies, his annotation of the ‘incident’ of his meeting with the President, his hermeneutical mission to explain the word of God (better than his Scholastic masters), his ordination by nature as a ‘man of letters’ and the reputation he builds as a ‘a competent Danish scholar’ - a savant with knowledge of a recondite language (in the eyes of his compatriots), perhaps Pentecostally acquired - suggest this divine calling (104, 213, 46).
By being both a participant and an observer, however, the theorist transforms the very meaning of theory. Stephen may assume the posture of the detached scientific observer and analyse “methodically” the object, but the epiphany is impossible without him; his presence at the scene of the epiphany is essential for the revelation. He contributes to the creation of beauty even without “recording” the epiphanies. The objectivity he wants to lay claim to is contaminated; ‘the gropings of a spiritual eye’ can never produce scientific results, whatever way it may try to ‘adjust its vision to an exact focus’ (216).

The modernity of Stephen’s theories is seen in his eagerness to “test” them experimentally and willingness to sacrifice both the semantic and the symbolic power of language to the altar of his theory with the ostensible claim of “ rescuing” words from the sweeping tide of language in this way: ‘Soon Stephen began to explore the language for himself and to choose, and thereby rescue once for all, the words and phrases most amenable to his theory’ (32). He seizes, moreover, the words of other authors too, quoting their phrases ‘to illustrate his theory’ (34). Even the excellency of ‘the literary form of art’ was examined ‘in favour of his theory’ (82). When he senses the ‘vulgarity’ of Emma and her lack of sympathy, he deplores ‘that it was not for such an image that he had constructed a theory of art and life and a garland of verse’ (164). Reality is disappointing because it does not correspond to his theory.

This “modern” interpretation of theory implies that the truth of art requires the tools of a theory or philosophy for its revelation. Stephen, however, emphasises that the end of art does not lie beyond it: ‘He proclaimed at the outset that art was the human disposition of intelligible or sensible matter for an esthetic end’ (81). His theory merely sets out the principles of his ‘artistic economy’ (37). We are told, moreover, that the original title of his essay was “Drama and Life”, but ‘he had occupied himself so much with securing the foundations that he had not left himself space enough to raise the complete structure’ (85). The dramatic basis of his theory is much more obvious in the Portrait where Aquinas is joined by the author of the Poetics to aid Stephen in the construction of his theory that is more specifically a theory of drama. The position of the spectator in a dramatic performance differs considerably from that of the other literary art forms in Stephen’s tripartite division.

In Stephen Hero, however, Aristotle, the “classical” theorist of the Poetics is considered as the progenitor of the theologian Aquinas, and as a ‘biologist’ whose ‘spirit would hardly do itself justice in treating of the “inexact” sciences’ (191). In another reversal of origins, Stephen challenges Aristotle’s role as custodian of theology: ‘Let him examine me if he is able’, and as patron of the arts: ‘Can you imagine a handsome lady saying “O, excuse me, my dear Mr Aristotle, for being so beautiful”? The domain of art is impervious
to the criticism of philosophy and theology. Although a scientific façade distinguishes the critic of art and the recorder of epiphanies, their objectivity is severely compromised. The role of the observer in both cases is creative; he does not determine the meaning of art, but participates in its construction and shares as a “celebrant” in ‘the sane and joyful spirit that issues forth’ (83).

ix. The gift of certitude

The roles that Stephen assigns to both artist and critic as merely witnesses and scribes compromise, however, the scope of both their creativity and critique. Although we have seen him profess his wish ‘to amend or to clarify scholastic terminology’ and uphold the use of reason as opposed to repetition of ‘the stale maxims of the Jesuits’, the implication of “factualness” in his emphasis on truth is both constrictive and inartistic, and deprives him of the ability to interpret the world in the rule-bound laws he imposes upon art (SH 176, 42). The manifestation of the “thing” in Stephen’s theory is simultaneous with its interpretation, just as the Word of God stands for both the divine intellect and His revelation: ‘all at once I see it and I know at once what it is’ (216). Noon has argued that Stephen’s claritas is not Aquinas’ quidditas, but rather ‘the haecceitas of Duns Scotus’: ‘The specific or universal form rather than the individual form is the inner heart of the object as Thomists view the individual thing’ (72). This ambivalence appears to be a result of Stephen’s belief in the simultaneity of what the thing is and what it means, its significance: ‘we recognise that it is that thing which it is’, Stephen explains, but it is not clear whether we recognise the universal or the particular thing. The task of interpretation and criticism has already been performed, and therefore the critic can only be a spectator.

The beautiful, a manifestation of the truth, dissolves the gap between appearance and reality for the ancients. Stephen, however, uses it as a scientific tool to verify his calculations; to test the credibility of his thoughts, and to make the critic ‘superfluous’ (OCPW 48). Similarly, the doctrine of the Trinity reconciles the one and the many, the universal and the particular: the ‘hard conflict’ which modern man must witness but also embody (Hegel, Aesthetics 59). ‘[T]he source of plurality is otherness’ in the Trinity, not difference, Aquinas argued in his exegesis of Boethius’s De Trinitate; the Trinity is a model for relations, not contrasts (60). However, even though the Trinity presents a metaphysical solution to this problem of universals, rationally and analytically conceived it is a perilous

24 As have Goldberg, Arkins and Beebe (52; 28; “Joyce and Aquinas” 29).
paradox, as the long prehistory of heretics who tried to interpret it reveals. It is a ‘mystery’, as Stephen will concede in *Ulysses*, not a principle for the scientific ‘vivisective’ method (266). Even though the ‘science of esthetic’ was constructed by the two brothers with the premise that ‘it was possible to arrive at a sane understanding of so-called mysteries if one only had patience enough’, this patience - as the reader of *Finnegans Wake* understands - is itself ‘inhuman’ (*SH* 40-1, 131).

The mystery of the Trinity is interpreted by Aquinas through its ‘likeness’ with the human mind (*Summa Contra Gentiles* 115). The relations and unity between mind, intellect and will in the human mind reflect those of the Trinity. These ‘psychological analogies’ that were introduced by Augustine, ‘opened the way to the anthropological turn of theology’, according to Luigi Goia: ‘talk about the Trinity becomes a pretext for the exploration of the self’ (16). Stephen, however, goes beyond psychology; the relation his Trinitarian analogies investigate is not between speech and thought, but between thought and object. The question of language, how the thought is transformed into a word, how it becomes speech, is ignored. The word, ‘the Greek λόγος’ that as Aquinas explains stands ‘for word or reason’, appears to only signify reason for Stephen, who conflates- or perhaps confuses, the rationalism of the Enlightenment with that of the Scholastics in his construction of his ‘insidious theory’ (169; *SH* 108).

If for Kant ‘Taste may be designated a *sensus communis aestheticus*, common human understanding a *sensus communis logicus*’, Stephen exposes this as a silent communion with the external world (*CAJ* 153). Alienating himself from tradition in his investigation of ‘the most abstract relations afforded by an object’, Stephen ignores the question of language and interpretation (*SH* 84). Even though his beautiful object is modelled on the Word, this only exposes his fetishisation of the word as an object; a pure form, as his repetition of words ‘till they lost all instantaneous meaning for him and became wonderful vocables’ betrays (36). He performs as in “The Holy Office” a *kenosis* of the word, but the word remains empty. Aesthetics, following his complete purgation of *aisthesis*, reveal the fraudulence of the artist.

Faced with the ‘ugly artificiality’ of the lives of those around him and the ‘spectacle of the world in thrall’, art assumes greater substance than the spectrality of external reality (164, 199). He undertakes again a ritual *catharsis* by ‘repeating to himself a line from Dante for no other reason except that it contained the angry disyllable “frode”’ (164). ‘Even the value of his own life came into doubt with him’, and he can only conceive his connection with external reality through visionary trances ‘in the similitude of a distorted ritual’ (167-8). His wanders around the ‘ugliness’ of the city reveal his resemblance to Dorian Gray rather
than emphasise his search for truth. He is caught between two ‘spectacles’: ‘The spectacle of the world which his intelligence presented to him with every sordid and deceptive detail set side by side with the spectacle of the world which the monster in him, now grown to a reasonably heroic stage, presented’, and he can only overcome the paralysis of despair through the comfort of ‘melancholy versing’ (45).

Literature, dealing only with the ‘portrayal of externals’, ‘a spacious realm’, ‘seemed to him a term of contempt’ (82). Only in a world of ‘unalterable laws’, that he argues is ‘the realm of the poet’, he feels secure; marking a contrast not so much between genres, but between the gifted individual and a popular profession, producer and production (82-3). Language, moreover, is no longer a vehicle of understanding; the ‘One’ Stephen searches for is ‘incommunicable’ (84). It is only when again in a trace-like state he approaches the One that he obtains ‘the gift of certitude’: “It is so! It is so! Life is such as I conceive it”, he cries (42). In this ironic conception, the certitude he acquires is distinctly modern and philosophical; it seems to be a translation of cogito ergo sum, and succinctly collapses Stephen’s ambivalence between the logical analysis of philosophy and the creative scope of the imagination.

Problematically, this delimiting form even includes language. Although Stephen trains as a philologist and scholar as part of his schooling as an artist, philosophy and philology are increasingly antagonistic in the quest for an “epiphany”- an apophatic vision. Language becomes an obstacle rather than a tool for both the critic and the artist. The critic is warned against semblances and appearances in Stephen’s essay:

The critic is he who is able, by means of the signs which the artist affords, to approach the temper which has made the work and to see what is well done therein and what it signifies. For him a song by Shakespeare which seems so free and living, as remote from any conscious purpose as rain that falls in a garden or as the lights of evening, discovers itself as the rhythmic speech of an emotion otherwise incommunicable, or at least not so fitly. But to approach the temper which has made art is an act of reverence before the performance of which many conventions must be first put off for certainly that inmost region will never yield its secret to one who is enmeshed with profanities. (83-4)

The critic must be able to follow the signs, but what he is searching for is ‘incommunicable’. He must approach the ‘temper’ of the work through a catharsis of everything that is not sacred. Like Stephen’s ‘preparative abstinences’ for the composition of his essay, art involves sacred practices and rituals available only to the initiated (74). Like the man of letters in the theory of the epiphany, the critic is depicted as a spectator. He attends to a ‘performance’, “approaching” in ‘rhythmic speech’ - in tempus praesens - the ‘temper’ as a templum in an etymological procession of derivatives of time [tempus]. As the “experiment”
of the epiphany revealed, aesthetic apprehension, although described as an individual
experience, has the character of event- transcendental rather than public. Having transformed
the world into a ‘spectacle’, Stephen can only relate to it through a dramatic theory. Only
‘naked drama’ overcomes the barriers to truth that phenomenology presents (OCPW 45).
The reason why ‘An aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition’ according to Kant, is because
‘it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found’
(210). By ignoring the medium of language, Stephen resurrects the Romantic genius in all
his divine majesty.

x. Intuition: the moment of radiant simultaneity

Despite the scientific scaffolding that Stephen erects for his analysis of an epiphany,
its resemblance to the moment of intuition suggests that the novelty of his theory is
terminological: ‘all at once I see it and I know at once what it is: epiphany’ (SH 218).
‘What?’, Cranly replies; all that Stephen can say is that ‘the object is epiphanised’, he cannot
say “what it is”. When the object is ‘epiphanised’, it looses its ‘vestment’; as in Kant’s
definition of an intuition, a concept is not adequate to the aesthetic idea, and ‘language,
consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible’ (175-
6). Although described as a moment of understanding, the epiphany signals an overflowing
of the intelligible concept in a paradoxical coincidence of excess and privation, a messianic
sublation of strength that is ‘made perfect in weakness’- a ‘spiritual manifestation’ that is
made possible through ‘vulgarity’ (2 Cor. 12:9; 216).

With no “appearance”, the object is no longer a mere “phenomenon” and the ‘two
worlds’ that Stephen perceives ‘as aliens one to another’ - the ‘monster in him’ and ‘the
spectacle of the world’ - are reconciled (45). The reconciliation of these two worlds is indeed
accomplished through an “epiphany” at the beginning of the manuscript of Stephen Hero:
‘He had all but decided to consider the two worlds as aliens one to another - however
disguised or expressed the most utter of pessimisms - when he encountered through the
medium of hardly procured translations the spirit of Henrik Ibsen. He understood the spirit ‘
instantaneously ‘. Once again, Stephen ignores the medium of language; even though his
encounter is made through translation, the “incessant labour” involved is forgotten and
understanding appears to be instantaneous: ‘Ibsen had no need of apologist or critic: the
minds of the old Norse poet and of the perturbed young Celt met in moment of radiant
simultaneity’. Understanding and interpretation are collapsed in the instant of this
momentous simultaneity; the radiance appears to be hermeneutic: the ‘whatness’ that leaps out is the “meaning” itself, and therefore the critic is unnecessary.

This view of a simultaneity between author and reader in the process of understanding followed the propositions of the Kantian genius, according to Gadamer. The identification of the interpreter with the author is legitimised, ‘insofar as it is not the author's reflective self-interpretation but the unconscious meaning of the author that is to be understood’ (192). Stephen’s focus is on the unique ‘spirit of Ibsen’, disguised ‘behind the impersonal manner of the artist’; Ibsen is the ultimate and unsurpassable example of not only the artist, but also Man, epitomising ‘the dignity of the human attitude’ that ‘one could scarcely advance’ (189, 44-5). Stephen’s prostration before this Christlike paragon of perfection, moreover, contrasts the playful rivalry that is staged between Joyce’s artist heroes (including Joyce himself) and his precursors. The focus in Stephen Hero is on a mystical “recognition” that is founded on psychological and biographical grounds- a compatibility between “tempers”. Therefore, although the choice of Ibsen as a model is controversial, his relation to his predecessor is pious and conservative.

The recognition that the moment of intuition allows is not an abstract, but personal and individual: ‘[Ibsen with his profound self-approval, Ibsen with his haughty, disillusioned courage, Ibsen with his minute and wilful energy.] a mind of sincere and boylike bravery, of disillusioned pride, of minute and wilful energy’ (46). Impersonality is a ‘vestment’ that safeguards the personality, but also allows its manifestation. It is a ‘manner’ that intuitive understanding sees through. Personality and impersonality are therefore not incompatible as is revealed in the evolution of Stephen’s theories. Although in this early work Stephen’s youthful impressionability and his conceited eclecticism are highlighted, this mystical correspondence of “temperaments” will resurface in his Hamlet theory in Ulysses and will mark Joyce’s idiosyncratic selection and engagement with a host of artists in Finnegans Wake. Such “coincidence of contraries” in the later work, however, will problematise and complicate the principles of an ‘artistic economy’.

The ‘dignity of the human attitude’, the individual and unique ‘human personality’ in Stephen Hero rivals the ‘economy of heaven’, revealing the Maker as a notional and immaterial idea: ‘Let the world solve itself in whatsoever fashion it pleased, let its putative Maker justify Himself by whatsoever processes seemed good to Him, one could scarcely advance the dignity of the human attitude a step beyond this answer’ (45-6). In this indifference towards the Maker and multiplication of makers, however, the mind-spirit of the individual artist, like the Geist of German philosophy, is caught in an infinite dialectic between the universal and the particular. Joyce seems undecided whether for Stephen ‘the
very spirit of Ibsen himself” refers to ‘a mind’ or ‘Ibsen’, as the parentheses reveal. There is, as in the moment of epiphany, a hesitation between quidditas and haecceitas. Moreover, the characteristics that he ascribes to Ibsen are remarkably similar to his own– both real and desired.

The influence of history and nationality as an enabling force for this intuitive understanding, moreover, is admitted: ‘Here, and not in Shakespeare or Goethe was the successor to the first poet of the Europeans, here, as only to such purpose in Dante, a human personality had been found united with an artistic manner which was itself almost a natural phenomenon: and the spirit of the time united more readily with the Norwegian than with the Florentine’ (46). Matter and form are united in a hylomorphic manner; the particular and the universal, the potential and actual complement each other so well that the talent of this gifted individual appears to be an ingenium: ‘bestowed directly from the hand of nature’ (CAJ 171). His ‘artistic manner’ is not a façade, but ‘a natural phenomenon’ (SH 46). ‘[A]lmost’, however, as the unanimity of individuals but also of the particular ‘human personality’ and the universal ‘artistic manner’ is shown to be “momentous”– possible only through particular historical circumstances. History plays a significant role as it rescues the artist from becoming a “type”; assuming merely a role or alternately sacrificing all his individual characteristics in order to represent the natural and godlike genius.

The “name” of great authors, however, like the idea of the classical and the beautiful object, is distinguished by its fusion of timelessness and contemporaneity. The name of the author has an extraordinary allure. It is the name of Ibsen that disturbs the nationalists and Stephen’s Jesuit masters rather than his work that they admit they are not familiar with. His name has become a symbol of immorality: ‘you cannot name him even in mixed society’, the President tells Stephen, and fears that his publication of an essay that disregards the authority of venerable names will expose the college (98). The capacity that the author has ‘of absorbing in himself the life that surrounds him and of flinging it abroad again amid planetary music’, celebrated by Stephen in his essay, entails the less desirable consequence that he must embody not only the “truths” of his generation, but also its prejudices, the ‘filthy streams’ he must carry as its ‘sewer’ (85; PE 104).

Ibsen’s name is distorted to denote an entire ideology: ‘To support Ibsenism on Aquinas seems to me somewhat paradoxical. Young men often substitute brilliant paradox for conviction’ (101). Great authors must remain inviolable for the President. Stephen’s declaration in his essay that ‘the tradition of art is with the artists’ implies their ‘freedom from all guidance of rules’, but also from the contamination of the great authors’ truth with the falsehoods of the less reputable who render the standard of excellence of this tradition
problematic (84; CAJ 181). Stephen’s Ibsenist prejudice distorts the credible truth of Aquinas and the notoriety of Wilde’s legacy haunts the “truth” of his own theory. This violation deforms and confounds the symbolic status of the name.

The exemplarity of the author becomes problematical in the multiplication of models, as Stephen uses the creative licence of the genius as a critical standard: ‘You cannot compare Dante and Ibsen’, the President cautions, appealing to the need for reference to ‘a specific code of moral conventions’ (96). The advice that the President gives to Stephen is valid, however: ‘I am sure too that when your studies have brought you further afield you will be able to amend it so as to - fit in more with recognised facts; I am sure you will be able to apply it better then - when your mind has undergone a course of . . . regular . . . training and you have a larger, wider sense of . . . comparison’ (103). If the rule is to be set by a ‘fellowship of artists’, an ever-widening nexus of artists must be proffered to support the theory (Artwork of the Future 205). Although if this fellowship like Wagner’s is ‘new and never-hitherto-existing, and thus … never-to-be-repeated’, the very idea of comparison and indeed relation becomes problematic (204).
Chapter 3: The Age of Reason

i. A Synopsis Philosophiae Scholasticae

The prominence of the idea of “theory” for the poetics and representation of the artist in Stephen Hero, is in the Portrait markedly subdued. The trinitarian economy in the use of the word theory here - carefully ascribed to Stephen’s “discovery” of knowledge through dialectical reasoning, descriptive of his esthetic, and finally expropriated by his author to criticise Stephen’s futile use of theory as a cure for nihilism - reveals the profound mystery that surrounds this term in the Portrait and its theological foundation. Even though Stephen’s interest in theories in the Portrait is not manifested until the last chapter, and is accompanied by the suspicion voiced by his jovial companion ‘Are you laughing in your sleeve?’, a theoretical question underlies the central paradox of the novel: how does the work of art, a product of mimesis- a “portrait”, disclose the truth of its being? (227). As a paradox, truth here does not elucidate the meaning of art, but threatens the career of the artist and the legitimacy of his work. The artist is put in the position of the spectator rather than allowed to claim exclusive insight into truth, and the spotlight on the “performance of his mind” in his ardent quest for truth makes him a tragicomic character in the drama of his eternal contemplator- his author.

Endless “theory” continues to characterise the protagonist whose quest for self-knowledge is guided through inexhaustible reflection. The structure of the novel, however, is presented as an obstacle, as the ‘silent watchful manner’ of Stephen is challenged in each chapter with new “performances” that he is called upon to take part in (71). The ‘agile bullets’ with which he challenged his many opponents in Stephen Hero are turned against him (56). The reader, moreover, finds himself placed before this new literary “genre” of portraiture, and has to learn how to “look at” an ever-changing portrait that desires to be an icon; to disclose ‘the full ontological power of the picture’, a capacity only available to the religious picture, as Gadamer argues (137). 25 As ‘the divine becomes picturable only through the word and image’, in an icon ‘Word and image are not mere imitative illustrations, but allow what they present to be for the first time fully what it is’. Believing in the ability of art to reflect ‘perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose’ his ‘inner world of individual emotions’, however, Stephen’s spectral idea of portraiture exposes his narcissism,

25 In Stephen Hero, the “portrait” is an enigmatic form that does not fit into Stephen’s tripartite division of genres. He refuses, however, to allow it to challenge his theory: ‘he was not greatly perturbed because he could not decide for himself whether a portrait was a work of epical art or not or whether it was possible for an architect to be a lyrical, epical or dramatic poet at will” (81).
but also allows Joyce to revise the idea of *mimesis* and present a drama that relies heavily on autobiography to maintain its link to “truth” that becomes increasingly questionable (*P* 181). Stephen is therefore no longer the sole theorist, as the reader too becomes a vehicle and a victim of his insidious theorist, in yet another trinity of refractions.

The ‘entire science of esthetic’ that labouring incessantly Stephen had been constructing in *Stephen Hero* disappears in the *Portrait*; as does Stephen’s impersonation of the scientist through the links he had been forging between science and art. The demystifying drive of the two brothers who ‘felt that it was possible to arrive at a sane understanding of so-called mysteries if one only had patience enough’ and the ‘light of day’ that aids the ‘vivisective’ ‘modern method’ of Stephen who feels in possession of ‘the gift of certitude’, find a pale parallel only in the last chapter of the *Portrait*, where Stephen, with a surprising newfound and short-lived confidence in the role of the dialectician declares to Lynch the characteristics of his “scrupulous” method: ‘We are right, he said, and the others are wrong. To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to express, to press out again, from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand— that is art’ (*SH* 41, 190, 81; *P* 224). The ‘gross earth’ that the artist here must ‘labour over’ like a humble farmer and the description of ‘sound and shape and colour’ as ‘the prison gates of our soul’, reveal the scientific outlook to be a disguise or simply a paradigm that Stephen lays claim to in order to describe the “work” of the artist and authorise his theory.

His scientific scrutiny of the “object” in *Stephen Hero* in his analysis of an epiphany becomes in the *Portrait* an “image”; as does the basket that Stephen tries to describe to Lynch in terms of ‘the necessary phases of artistic apprehension’ (229). The emphasis on ‘the performance of your own mind’ in Stephen’s description of an epiphany, is replaced in the *Portrait* with ‘the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure’: ‘a spiritual state very like to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani, using a phrase almost as beautiful as Shelley's, called the enchantment of the heart’ (217, 231). The “method” is ironically vivisective in Stephen’s romanticised reference to the Enlightenment physician’s “poetry”; a phrase used by Galvani to describe ‘what happens to a frog’s heart when a needle is inserted in its spine’, as Gifford explains (*Joyce Annotated* 11). The ‘gropings’ of the physician’s punctilious eye become a ‘cardiac condition’ that ardently tries not to appear sentimental (*SH* 216). The ‘significant heart of everything’ that Stephen had tried to ‘pierce’ rejecting ‘dilettantism’ in *Stephen Hero*, is that of a fairy-tale frog (37).
ii. On the (sin-loving) Soul

The divergence from the science of *Stephen Hero* in the *Portrait* is marked by the formal and thematic consequence of Aristotle’s interpretation of the soul, that as Joyce remarked during his early scholarship on Aristotle, ‘is in a manner all that is’ (*Joyce Papers I.ii*, Image: 02-004). Whereas in Joyce’s early writings and in *Stephen Hero* the ideals of isolation, egotism, individualism, the regulation of praxis by theory and scrupulous analysis in the search for Truth and Necessity implied that an act of will by the Wagnerian “Artist of the Future” held the promise of the repair of the fissure between the individual and the community, Mind and Nature, thought and being, the source of union is in the *Portrait* located in that most difficult “object” of knowledge and ‘first principle of living things’ that Aristotle examines “scientifically” in *De Anima*, the soul (126). The soul, ‘as the form of a natural body which potentially has life’, and the ‘intellectual soul’ in particular, as ‘the form of forms’, provides the overall structure to the novel; a malleable structure that accommodates and is “affected” by the movements of the body, and revolts against the rigid order that the scholastic system of education attempts to impose (157, 210). As according to Aristotle in art the form of things ‘is in the soul of the artist’, Stephen’s anticipated ‘encounter’ with ‘the unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly beheld’, would here constitute the moment of epiphany (*Metaphysics* VII.7; P 67).

Aristotle’s functional division of the soul into five faculties ‘nutritive, perceptive, desiderative, locomotive and intellective’, is reflected in Joyce’s five chapters, that do not examine each faculty in isolation, but traverse the spectrum of relations and their variations (*DA* 162). Unlike Bruno and Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the ‘world soul’ from that of man and criticises Plato’s intellectual bias: ‘For Plato is clearly wanting his ‘world soul’ to be of the same kind as that which is ordinarily called the intellect. (At least, he cannot be wanting it to be like the perceptive or desiderative faculties, as their movement is certainly not circular.) But the intellect is a single and continuous thinking as is thinking, and thinking just consists of thoughts’ (141). Seemingly universal, the world-soul is in fact a symbol of the human mind, that in the face of such greatness, ‘becomes lost, denies itself and grows weaker’, as Joyce would remark in his essay on the Renaissance (*OCPW* 187). Aristotle’s hylomorphic soul, neither dualist nor materialist, allows Joyce to examine, criticise, parody and exploit the consequences of the definition of the soul by cognition that had resurfaced in the Enlightenment and had been imparted to Joyce through his scholastic masters. Through

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26 ‘In general, and in all ways, it is one of the hardest things to gain any conviction about the soul’ (126).
the multivalency of the Aristotelian soul, moreover, Joyce reconsiders and transforms the
representation of literary “character”, and participates in the philosophical debate of
modernity on the problematics of the finitude and infinitude of Man and the renewed and
devastating antagonism between reason and imagination, freedom and necessity,
“thrownness” and “spontaneity”.

Rejecting Plato’s mind-body dualism, Aristotle in *De Anima* asserts the essential
unity and correspondence between the soul and the body: “[T]he affections of the soul”, he
argues, are “inseparable from the natural matter of living things” (130). Knowledge is
attained through the senses rather than disembodied Ideas. Sense perception is not deceptive
as it is for Descartes, but as Joyce wrote in his notes on *De Anima*, “The sensation of
particular things is always true” (qtd. in Peterson 214). Theoretical knowledge is one among
five ‘states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial’: ‘art,
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason’ (*NE* VI.3).
Moreover, the intellect for Aristotle is pliant and impressionable: it is ‘in a way potentially in
the objects of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like
that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written’ (*DA* 203). Thinking is
transformed by the object it thinks; perception, says Aristotle, is ‘a kind of alteration’ (169).
The mind is a mirror continuously modified by its reflections: ‘Only when it is separate from
all things is the intellect really itself and this intellect separate from all things is immortal
Even though only the divine mind is capable of perfect mimesis, unencumbered by the
modern dilemmas of subjectivity, thinking does not alienate man from the phenomenal
world for Aristotle: ‘thinking is the thinking of Being’, in Heidegger’s interpretation of
Aristotelian “theory” (220). Even though sensory perception is not scientific knowledge, the
path to truth begins with sensation.

In Stephen’s first artistic performance there is no agony over perfect expression, as
he assumes that sounds and words reflect his movements: ‘He danced: Tralala lala’ (3). The
mimesis of words - their ability to reflect the world - is interpreted dramatically: they truly
“imitate” his performance, allowing the reader to “see” his dance. The expressive capacity of
rhythm had indeed been defended by Aristotle in the *Poetics*: ‘even dancing imitates
character, emotion, and action, by rhythmical movement’; but Stephen here equates the
rhythm of language with the rhythmical movements of the actors’ bodies on stage. Rhythm,
an ‘instinct of our nature’ from which poetry has sprung according to Aristotle, manifests
itself in words (*Poetics*). In his embodiment and interpretation of the word through his
performance, moreover, Stephen becomes an object of theory- a work of art: his father
‘looked at him through a glass’; but performance also makes him an artist: ‘He sang that song. That was his song’ (3). His art - ‘O, the green wotho botheth’ - is both an interpretation and an imitation of a song memorised, following Aristotle’s “poetic” principle that nothing comes from nothing.

The ‘enigma’ of the artist that Stephen ‘was busy constructing’ in Stephen Hero, is in the opening pages of the Portrait presented as the cyclical logic through which Heidegger brings to light the origin of the work of art: ‘The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. In themselves and in their interrelations artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely, that which also gives artist and work of art their names – art’ (143). The relation between the artwork and the artist that becomes in modernity a bitter conflict, appears to require “a third man” to reconcile these adversaries and explain their meaning. The opening of the Portrait performs this dialectic through the problematic position of the actor in the “whole” that art represents: is he an artist or a work of art? Reflecting and highlighting this indeterminacy, the artist is positioned both within and before the work of art in the title of the novel. The inability of Stephen to determine the meaning of art will indeed suggest that he can neither be an artist nor produce a work of art; a quandary that makes Stephen an archetypal modern(ist) artist, but also forms a prophetic commentary on the dilemmas of modern art.

Originality or “genius” is unthinkable in this circle of reasoning. For Aristotle, the preeminent theorist of poetry, it is indeed ‘the imitation that makes the poet’ (Poetics). Imitation, he argues, is an ‘instinct’ ‘implanted in man from childhood’ that is instructive; it is ‘through imitation’ that he ‘learns his earliest lessons’. Man in the Poetics is distinguished from other animals by being ‘the most imitative of living creatures’. Whereas the scientific method of the Metaphysics had been founded on man’s universal desire to know, Aristotle in the Poetics adds that ‘no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated’. The path to knowledge through imitation, however, appears to be perverse; whereas scientific knowledge begins from the senses, the pleasure derived from imitation goes against the senses: ‘Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies’.

The isomorphism between mind and object for the modern sceptical artist, however, reveals what Nietzsche had denounced as an anthropomorphic error, and denies the artist’s freedom and the originality of his creations, as the mind simply reflects the forms that it perceives. The epiphanised object of Stephen Hero, under the influence of Aristotle’s pictographic imagination becomes in A Portrait an ‘image’. In Aristotelian science, the imagination is a subordinate faculty: it ‘cannot occur without perception, nor supposition
without imagination’, and requires the aid of the senses to produce a mental image (DA 198). ‘[I]t is from light, without which seeing is impossible, that imagination takes its name’, Aristotle argues, explaining the etymology of phantasia. The art spectator differs from the scientist, Stephen will argue in his Aristotelian esthetic theory in chapter five; he does not seek to grasp or “gropes” the object: ‘Beauty expressed by the artist’, ‘awakens, or ought to awaken, or induces, or ought to induce, an esthetic stasis’ (223). Aristotle introduces a series of mirrors that although aim to aid knowledge distance the modern spectator from the object of perception. Even though imagination springs from sense perception, the object is held captive by the mind: whereas with belief ‘we at once experience the corresponding emotion’, ‘in the case of imagination, we are in just the same state as if we were looking at the terrible or comforting things in a painting’ (DA 198).

In contrast to Aristotle’s light of the imagination, Stephen’s mind is ‘a dusk of doubt and self-mistrust’ mirroring ‘A dusk like that of the outer world’ (191, 67). The scientific method that he had called upon to aid him in this darkness in Stephen Hero, exposes his alienation from the world in the Portrait in his futile attempt to use a ‘lamp’ borrowed from Aristotle and Aquinas in order to see, that possibly ‘smokes or smells’ (202). Stephen’s expectation and desire for correspondence between the individual mind and outward reality that is accompanied by a romantic idealisation of the individual imagination, precipitates his tragic rise and fall (and rise again), and more comically exposes the narcissistic inclination of his ‘theory’ that depends on (self)reflection for understanding and interpretation, modelled on the Father’s eternal contemplation ‘as in a mirror His Divine Perfections’ (161). Isolation in A Portrait is largely resented by Stephen and is exposed as a vain consolation based on the Romantic ideal of the genius.

Mimesis, following Stephen’s scholastic training, is revelatory of the hapless inexactness of human knowledge. Although ‘speculatio’, as François Dastur explains, ‘comes, of course, from specto, to look at, to scrutinise, and was used by Boethius to translate the Greek theoria into Latin’, ‘in Christian theology this meaning was forgotten, especially by Thomas Aquinas, who derives speculatio from speculum, mirror, and relates the word to what Paul says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13.12) concerning the vision of God who we see now confusedly as ‘in a mirror’ but whom later, that is to say, after death, we will see ‘face to face’’ (in Sparks ed. 78-9). Stephen’s description of the ‘tragic emotion’ as a ‘face looking two ways’, betrays its link to this divine model of theory, but also Stephen’s translation of its impossibility through the imagery of Greek theatre

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27 This is not, however, the relation between the spectator and the drama that Aristotle describes in the Poetics. Stephen will treat drama like a portrait, but drama for Aristotle reaches “beyond” the imagination.
masks he evokes (222). But whereas abstract and obscure “theory” in the Christian narrative is supplanted by an ethical relation between man and God, Stephen’s model is an individual face that reflects the self-division and alienation of modern man. Whereas pity and fear are for Aristotle the vehicles of catharsis, in Stephen’s theory, through the ‘tragic emotion’ - renamed subtly ‘the esthetic emotion’ - ‘The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing’; aesthetics institute distance rather than purgation, reconciliation and recognition.

iii. Scholasticism: a break-water of order and elegance

The attention that had been devoted in Stephen Hero to Stephen’s extra-curricular study of the Irish language, undertaken in order to get closer to Emma, is in the Portrait replaced by an examination of Stephen’s education at the hands of his Jesuit masters, and the details of his home life by a delineation of his school life and education. “Home” is from the beginning a place of longing and desire, and the very first familial relation that the novel registers is pictured ‘through a glass’ (3). The scientific looking-glass becomes a symbol of detachment and isolation; a symbol of an ethical problem in its obstruction of the face to face relation, reflected also in Stephen’s narcissistic gazing in mirrors to ‘know even as also I am known’ (1 Corinthians 13). Epistemology is confounded with ethics after Stephen’s glasses are broken by being pushed into the square ditch by Wells for not trading his snuff box. Unlike his author, however, Stephen, like many of Joyce’s readers, does not find his efforts to comprehend, define, and ultimately replace the realm of ethics with epistemology and aesthetics entertaining; nor is he willing to admit the culpability of his egotism.

The contrast of Stephen Hero between Stephen’s endeavour ‘to pierce to the significant heart of everything’ and his ‘countrified’ bourgeois classmates for who art is ‘a continental vice’ and the artist ‘a man who painted pictures’, disappears in the Portrait (39, 37). The interactions with his peers disclose instead the many similarities that he shares with them despite Stephen’s isolation. His ideas are no less idealistic, Cranly warns him when Stephen refuses to take his Easter duty despite his mother’s entreaties: ‘that bloody bleating goat Temple has ideas. MacCann has ideas too. Every jackass going the roads thinks he has ideas’ (263). The guise of science no longer distinguishes Stephen; science figures rather as a school subject - a subject that Stephen does not excel in.

Stephen’s ineptness as a scientist is highlighted from the beginning. In his first classroom appearance during ‘the hour for sums’, even though he takes part in the “War of the Roses” that Father Arnall stages as a ‘stimulus to friendly rivalry’ - a ‘characteristic
feature of Jesuit pedagogy’ according to Sullivan - and tries ‘his best so that York might not lose’ despite being ‘no good at sums’, he is completely indifferent to the result of either the sum or the competition (78; P 9). Aesthetics distract Stephen from the answer and alleviate his loss: ‘He could not get out the answer for the sum but it did not matter. White roses and red roses: those were beautiful colours to think of. And the cards for first place and second place and third place were beautiful colours too: pink and cream and lavender. Lavender and cream and pink roses were beautiful to think of’. The possible rather than the actual captivates Stephen’s imagination, and memory prevails over history: ‘Perhaps a wild rose might be like those colours and he remembered the song about the wild rose blossoms on the little green place. But you could not have a green rose. But perhaps somewhere in the world you could’.

Sullivan notes that a ‘new educational machinery’ was introduced in the Jesuit system of education after 1890, that marked a shift from the humanities to applied science: ‘a new emphasis was placed on the study of mathematics and the natural sciences, and such subjects as drawing, bookkeeping, and shorthand were introduced into a curriculum which until then, in Irish Catholic educational practice, had been exclusively humanistic’ (71). Although Joyce emphasises that Stephen’s education does not prepare him for the “practical” aspects of everyday life, science and mathematics are indeed much more prominent than the human sciences, and the stage for key scenes in the novel is provided by the theatre of anatomy and of physics.

The lancet and the ‘nicely polished looking-glass’ are in the hands of Stephen’s Jesuit masters in the Portrait; “science”- knowledge, is the mark of a divinely sanctioned authority (Letters I 64). Although this definition of science circumvents its modern sense, a legacy of the Enlightenment’s methodological ideal of the objectivity of the natural sciences, it shares for the Scholastics the same emphasis on “method”. The natural impulse of the ‘desire to know’ is supervised for the Scholastics by a distinguished discipline-“philosophy”, second only to theology. 28 As dialectical reasoning, philosophy is an indispensable tool for the understanding of spiritual truths and reconcilement of human reason with divine revelation. The emphasis on reason rather than inspiration or spiritual intuition distinguished the scholastics from their Patristic forefathers, as did the choice of a

28 Joyce’s familiarity with Scholasticism has been a matter of debate between Gorman and Noon, with Sullivan taking an intermediate position. Although Noon protested against Gorman that ‘No regular course in scholastic philosophy was offered at all in the old University College during the period of Joyce’s attendance’, criticising the curriculum at University College as ‘more suited to the mentality of a schoolboy than to that of a university man’, Sullivan nevertheless calls attention to the emphasis on method and reason- on ‘formal and systematic training’ that had distinguished Joyce’s education in all its grades (Sullivan 165).
different philosophical precursor- Aristotle rather than Plato. Their Aristotelian theory of knowledge is described by Turner as ‘a system of Moderate Realism and Moderate Intellectualism’, conditioned by a ‘scientific method’ that ‘begins with the observation of fact’, in the endeavours to reconcile human and divine knowledge and truth (“Scholasticism”). ‘As well as on the side of art in general as on the side of beauty’, Maritain explains, ‘it is understanding (as the schoolmen teach in thousands of ways) which holds the primacy in art work’ (Introduction to Philosophy 51).

When theology and philosophy no longer shared the same truths- the same Author, however, scholasticism came to an end. This end is marked by the prevalence of “science” defined as method rather than knowledge, an end that the figure of Descartes and his philosophy have come to symbolize. Even though the emphasis on method eventually brought the downfall of scholasticism, however, it had also aided the scholastics in dismissing the two prevalent charges brought against them: ‘First, that they confounded philosophy with theology; and second, that they made reason subservient to authority’ (Turner). The Summa Theologica of Aquinas opens by addressing these charges, and his presentation of the relation between philosophy and theology is founded upon the role of the Author and the hermeneutics of Scripture. Scripture reveals the limits of philosophy and separates its wisdom from that of theology: ‘Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God’ (ST I q.1 a. 1). The Word is a stumbling block for the philosopher and “belongs” for Aquinas to the theologian.

The question of authorship and authority undermines the significance of philosophy. The objection Aquinas proffers poses a mutually exclusive dialectic between reason and authority: either the proof is from authority or it is from reason (ST I, q.1, a. 8). Authority is anti-hermeneutic, rendering philosophy superfluous. Aquinas’s response is defiant: ‘the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest’. This has indeed been seen as proto-anti-authoritarianism; although of course, ‘the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest’. ‘One need not go so far as to say, with Barthélemy Saint Hilaire, that “Scholasticism, in its general result, is the first revolt of the modern spirit against authority”’, Turner admonishes; in the case of Joyce, however, despite Kevin Sullivan’s admonition that ‘Nothing in the scholastic background of a Clongownian prepared him for the role of social or political rebel’, the possibility may be upheld (23).

Scholasticism was shaken by a crisis of faith and authority incurred by the very philosophical method that had set it apart. The scholastically trained Descartes pushed the
emphasis on reason to an ontological extreme; the very being of man is not just distinguished by thinking as it was for Aristotle, but determined by it. Thought is free but both tyrannises and terrorises the existence of the subject: ‘I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist’ (18). The death of the author, a distinctly philosophical tragedy, comes both before and after the death of the subject, resurrected as a spook to deal the final blow. Aristotle, as the ‘maestro di color che sanno’, becomes a martyr in modernity’s rebellion against the Author. As Descartes and Bruno had argued and Heidegger would later confirm, this maestro is the man that the modern author must call upon to help him ‘carry off [the] filthy streams’ of the authorised version of history and tradition (PE 105).

In the melancholic tragedy that is staged in the Portrait, it is similarly a crisis of authority and reason that precipitates Stephen’s endless suffering. Lacking like Mangan ‘the faith, which in middle age, sent the spires singing up to heaven’, or Bruno’s ‘courage of early humanism’, his tragedy is distinctly modern (OCPW 58, 93). Stephen’s proclivity for sensory knowledge in the first chapter is replaced by methodic doubt that dominates the movements of his thoughts for the rest of the novel, and lacking the Enlightenment optimism of his predecessor in Stephen Hero, his recourse to art and aesthetics highlights his Romanticism. Both his despair and his desire for transcendence, moreover, reveal their historical, sociopolitical and psychological foundations.

The desire for knowledge may be universal, but Stephen soon finds out that its satisfaction is the privilege of an elect few who have been ‘rendered immune mysteriously’ from the perils of this indulgence by their ‘ordination’ (P 172). Knowledge is synonymous with power in the school environment, mysterious and incomprehensible in its repeated “unreasonable” manifestations either through divine or human agents. The admixture of pleasure and pain that divine knowledge arouses distinguishes it as “sublime” in Stephen’s Romantic imagination, and its ‘awful power’ will indeed be used in the retreat sermon to purge through pity and fear the listeners’ body and soul, and to seduce Stephen to join the order through the promise that by ‘following up to the end the rigid lines of the doctrines of the church’ he would be ‘penetrating into obscure silences’ (171, 113).
**iv. Sublimity of mind**

In the ‘beautiful appearance of the dream-worlds’ over which Apollo reigned according to Nietzsche, ‘every man is a perfect artist’, and Stephen indeed has no trouble creating “art” in the first chapter, as all experiences and memories are aestheticised (*BT* 2). The ‘soothsaying faculty’ of Apollo allows him to transform even the scene of his martyrdom with which the chapter ends into an aesthetic experience (3). Through the “ek-stasis” that distinguishes his theoretical posture he is “disembodied”- he stands outside himself; the ‘trembling hand’ of this human artist - an image used by Aquinas to symbolize his imperfection in contrast to the divine creator - is presented ‘like a leaf in the fire’, and it is by “thinking” of his hands ‘beaten and swollen with pain all in a moment’ that he feels ‘so sorry for them as if they were not his own but someone else’s that he felt sorry for’ (*P* 51).

The paradoxical amalgamation of pain and suffering with aesthetic imagery and voluptuous vocabulary, highlights Stephen’s growing estrangement from his body- from aesthesis. Bodily pain becomes inseparable from spiritual turmoil during this incomprehensible in its injustice experience. Just like he is punished for something that he has not done, so his hand is made to atone for his sins, and through the transformation of this ‘crumpled burning livid hand’ into ‘a livid quivering mass’, Stephen is “transubstantiated”. Through the martyrdom of his hand that according to Aristotle the soul is analogous to, and therefore according to Joyce’s notes on Aristotle, is ‘not (absolutely) part of the body’, body and soul are united in Eucharistic sacrifice (*Joyce Papers* I.ii, Image: 02-008).

His martyrdom is hermeneutic like that of Christ: “Christ is not only the hero of Scripture, but also, at once, its interpreter; he is, both in the active and passive sense, its logos” (Martella in Balsamo, *Tradition of Christian Epics* 121). Stephen’s composure, his cry that becomes a prayer, the focus on the palms of his hands that shrink into ‘a livid quivering mass’, his “altruism” during his suffering that makes him feel sorry for his hands ‘as if they were not his own but someone else’s’, make his account Christological (51). In this violation of the “truth” and violence that attends Stephen’s defence of it, interpretation is inseparable from performance; his testimony makes use of an assortment of religious symbols to communicate this apophatic experience. The ‘scalding water’ that ‘burst forth from his eyes’ reveals that Stephen is not only the actor and narrator of this scene, but also the spectator who is “purified” at the end of a tragic performance in Aristotle’s account.

The religious iconography of this portrait distances him further from his own experience, as he stands in dreadful awe before this spectacle. With the aid of third person narrative, Stephen retains his position as an aesthetic spectator; he indeed manages saintly-
like to protect his soul by viewing his body as an alien object following the division between body and soul that pain generates. The imagery of fire and water that had also accompanied his narration of Parnell’s death, allows him to conceive this event as both a death and a birth. No longer simply a portrait, the aesthetic object is here an icon, conceived through ‘The attitude of rapture in sacred art, the raised and parted hands, the parted lips and eyes as of one about to swoon’ that would become for Stephen ‘an image of the soul in prayer, humiliated and faint before her Creator’ (162). The “ek-stasis” of the theorist gives way to ecstatic rapture; his “sacrifice” as a tragic hero transforms him into a Dionysian artist.

Aesthetic contemplation of beauty gives way to a sublime experience. Under the sway of such ecstasis, he is ‘no longer the artist’, but has ‘himself become a work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the Primordial Unity’; or in Stephen’s case of the prefect (BT 4). But rather than self-forgetfulness, freedom, universal harmony, and ‘release of all the symbolic powers’, that characterise the Dionysian artist for Nietzsche, Stephen’s self and art are vanquished by the theological symbolism that shapes this scene (7). Moreover, his desire is not to sink back into this ‘Primal Unity’, but to identify with one of ‘the great men whose names were in Richmal Magnall’s Questions’, or with their Author Peter Parley, a hero too by being ‘on the first page in a picture’ (55).

Stephen’s idealisation of a sublimity that as Kant stressed is only ‘discoverable in the mind’, imprisons him ‘in a mental world’ (CAJ 92; P 223). Aristotelian images become Kantian examples that aid the aesthetic theorist’s judgments in the absence of scientific concepts. The ‘motion’ that ‘in the representation of the sublime’ ‘The mind feels itself set in’, is not only elevating, however, but also treacherous, leading the mind to ‘The point of excess for the imagination’, that feels to the mind ‘like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself’ (CAJ 107). Without ‘the development of moral ideas’ and ‘culture’, Kant argues, the sublime ‘merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying’ (115-6). Sublimity of mind as the example of the Jesuits and of Shakespeare in Ulysses indicate, leads to “sundering”.

The “sublime” idea that captures Stephen’s imagination is that ‘truth inherent in the spirit of Catholicism: that man cannot reach the divine heart except across that sense of separation and loss that is called sin’ (OCPW 151). Thinking about his sinful classmates who drank from the altar wine, he feels ‘A faint sickness of awe’ that ‘made him feel weak’, in his inability to understand what prompted them against the background of the mysteriously ‘dark silent sacristy’ (P 40). Re-living the ‘terrible and strange sin’ in his imagination, his ‘deep awe’ of the sin merges with his awe of the sacraments and mysterious and luxurious setting of the altar, and ‘it thrilled him to think of it in the silence’ (47). Through poetic
licensure he alters the account of the event and prefers to think of the sin of stealing ‘the flashing gold thing into which God was put on the altar in the middle of flowers and candles at benediction’, making himself the protagonist, but like his author refusing to receive communion.

Perversity, understood here as a paradox of thinking about the ‘terrible and strange’ sin and the punishment of the fellows ‘smuggling in the square’ in the hands of Mr Gleeson and feeling a ‘queer quiet pleasure’ that that leads to ‘deep awe’, seduces Stephen both to the ‘obscure silences’ of the Catholic Church and to the ‘dark orgiastic riot’ that is ironically narrated liturgically (42, 46, 113, 105). In Stephen Hero, where Stephen openly wagers war against the ‘farce’ and ‘plague’ of the Catholic Church, Catholicism is distinguished by this paradox: ‘Exultation of the mind before joyful beauty, exultation of the body in free confederate labours, every natural impulse towards health and wisdom and happiness had been corroded by the pest of these vermin’, coincides with ‘Contempt of [the body] human nature, weakness, nervous tremblings, fear of day and joy, distrust of man and life, hemiplegia of the will, beset the body burdened and disaffected in its members by its black tyrannous lice’ (151, 198). An “ecstatic reality” which ‘does not heed the single unit, but even seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystical feeling of Oneness’ distinguishes both the Dionysian and the Christian rites (BT 5).

Sublimity, that according to Kant ‘provokes a representation of limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality’ distinguishes also the oratory and imagery of the retreat sermon, staged in the timeless present of the Apocalypse that will signal the collapse of the antithesis between the ‘eternity of bliss’ and ‘eternity of hell’ (CAJ 90; P 122,142). The sermon calls for future memory, to ‘Remember only thy last things’, and employs the fleeting notion of time to inspire insecurity and vulnerability (116). Personal memory has to contend with the eternal ritual cycles of the church year. Through a profusion of oxymoronic phrases and interfusion of the imagery of fire and water that Stephen had already made use of in the scene of his own martyrdom, both Stephen’s reasoning and his sensory perception become bewildered and capitulate to the impassioned voice telling him ‘to confess, to speak out in words what he had done and thought’, to make the inner outer (136).

The word of God in the unequivocal obedience that it demands abolishes hermeneutic ambiguity, leaving simply ‘Forms’ that ‘passed this way and that through the dull light. And that was life’ (119). As ‘earthly beauty’ is ‘dangerous to look upon’, it is only through symbols and emblems that divine beauty can be conceived (125). Images, necessary for cognitive processes according to Aristotle, and for fallen man who can only see “through a glass”, are deceptive for the sinner, as for the modern philosopher. ‘The soot-
coated packet of pictures’, ‘his monstrous dreams’ and ‘the foul long letters’ are symptoms of Stephen’s theoretical malady (124). Catharsis must consummate his tragedy; by giving shape to his sins in confession through spoken words, ‘His sins trickled from his lips’, allowing him to fill the void with the body of Christ (156).

Stephen’s confession does not bring an end to his sufferings, however. ‘[A]wful agony’ must precede ‘awful power’ in an interplay of power and submission that Stephen becomes engrossed in while hallowing himself daily ‘in the presence of some holy image or mystery’ (143, 171). The “instant” that allows man to shatter his bond with God gives Stephen ‘an intense sense of power to know that he could, by a single act of consent, in a moment of thought, undo all that he had done’ (165). But even though Stephen refuses the offer of ‘secret knowledge and secret power’ of the Jesuit Order, the bond that he breaks is not with god, but with his family and friends, falling in love again with Words and their Authors (172). As an artist, he believes that he must preserve the ‘smithy’ of his soul - ‘the workshops of the brain’ through which Mind (“Geist”) for Wagner, thinking itself to be ‘the ground and cause of Nature’ ‘hurls herself; a raging stream of madness, upon the world of actuality’ - inviolate (P 276; 83).

v. Beware of martyrdom

The theme of martyrdom, an emblem of the intersection of Irish history and myth, myth and religion, along with the negation of meaning which is the aim of art for Pater and the Aesthetic movement, leads to Stephen’s association of art with death. Tragedy is indeed the pinnacle in Stephen’s theory and is the model for his aesthetic theory and theorist. Stephen views himself not only as a martyr of “truth”, but also as a martyr for truth in his fantasy of his dead mass. In order to be vindicated, for Wells to be punished and repent, he must die; he has to sacrifice himself for the “truth”. The revelation of the truth, however, a personal reward as everyone else would have ‘sad faces’, is meaningless if he is not there to see it (22). Wanting to become the Author, Stephen must also become his own theorist in order to give meaning to his Word following his total severance from the community. Time is again an obstacle that can be overcome only through godlike transcendence. His declaration of his “indifference” to his plight in the perverse pleasure he derives from the song that accompanies his procession, ironically highlights his egoistic conception of the truth, but also questions the transcendence from suffering that aesthetic distance is thought to afford.
Stephen’s detachment from the scene of his death dramatises the split between the spectators and the artist, the artist and his work of art. Stephen is not the sole theorist in this scene, but has to contend with those present at his funeral, with his author who refers to him in the third person and with the reader. “Truth” is filtered through a series of mirrors. Disinterested contemplation is exposed as a mask of Stephen’s alienation from history. Through aesthetics, he attempts to consolidate personal and communal memory; he confuses his fantastical death with the historical event of Parnell’s death: ‘he had not died then. Parnell had died’, he later realises (99). But the comprehension of alterity through art - either through “experience” or distance - is problematic; instead of empathy for the plight of Parnell, through the artistic depiction of his death Stephen perversely derives aesthetic pleasure. His heroic “fearlessness” in the face of death ironically highlights his alienation from reality and aestheticism. Alterity is shifted to words that “move him” because they are mysteriously ‘beautiful and sad’, and do not demand comprehension (22). In order to understand the significance of the death of Parnell through art, Stephen has to make himself the protagonist, to enact the event of Parnell’s death in a literal translation of “mimesis” that is narcissistic.

Ignoring the consequence of history, Stephen’s thoughts once again become “metaphysical”. He does not try to understand the significance of the particular event and empathise with the particular individual, but rather the mystery of death itself, charging the individual- himself, with the burden of unveiling this mystery, that as tragedy and the fate of national and nationalist artists show, necessitates the sacrifice of the individual. In order to be archetypal, he must sacrifice his ego. Art is more philosophical than history by suppressing the consequence of history that is “unaesthetic” in its privileging of the particular. The criticism of nationalist art in Stephen Hero is replaced in the Portrait with a critique of aesthetics to reveal the problematic role of art in the creation of modern national consciousness. Stephen’s aestheticism in his view of art as a mirror perfectly reflecting his emotions exposes the danger of narcissism in Yeats’s claim ‘that one’s verses should hold, as in a mirror, the colours of one’s own climate and scenery in their right proportion’ (Ideas 5). The quest to revive the consciousness and identity of the nation through art understood as an ideal repository of historical memory, ignores how art privileges the “best self” and collapses the transformations of history in an apocalyptic hermeneutic moment that privileges the ‘now’, but as if it was ‘not part of time at all’ (Physics 374-5).

Art, ironically, has a “therapeutic” effect for Stephen who fantasises about his dead mass while laid up in the infirmary, as he is distracted from his own suffering through the beauty of words, combining both the modern and the ancient function of art: ‘Art is to drive
away hours and moments of discomfort, boredom, half-bad conscience, and if possible, transform the faults of the lives and characters into faults of world-destiny’, Nietzsche complained; ‘Very different were the Greeks, who realised in their art the outflow and overflow of their own sense of well-being and health, and loved to see their perfection once more from a standpoint outside themselves’ (Human, All-Too-Human 319). Like Joyce, Nietzsche was sceptical of the modern interpretation of catharsis - ‘The pathological discharge … which philologists are at a loss whether to include under medicinal or moral phenomena’ - that was in fact ‘merely esthetic play’ for the ancients (BT 83). Both the ancient and the modern function of art are equally self-indulgent in Stephen’s aestheticised “tragedy” that interprets Aristotle’s ‘παθημάτων κάθαρσιν’ as a purgation of feelings rather than happenings and sufferings (παθήματα); emotions that Joyce in his review of Arnold Graves’ Clytemnestra describes as ‘that indifferent sympathy with certain pathological states which is so often anathematized by theologians of the street’ (OCPW 88).

The entanglement of art with history, however, renders aesthetic play dubious. Although Stephen tries persistently to depict himself as a tragic protagonist, the historical, mythical and theological models that he is copying are exposed and deny him the exemplary status he is seeking. Individualism, relativism and the estrangement of modern man from nature and tradition mark the end of ‘tragic culture’ for Nietzsche (BT 64). The sacrifice of the modern philosopher for truth can only be comic, he argues, as long as truth is understood as “theory”, as long as ‘cool paradoxical thoughts’ replace ‘Dionysian ecstasies’ (43). The intersection of the mythical culture of nationalism with the philosophical tradition of Scholasticism will indeed repeatedly deny Joyce’s aspiring artist tragic status and hinder the production of works of art. Behind the trope of martyrdom shared by both traditions, Nietzsche’s warning to ‘These pariahs of society, these long-pursued, badly-persecuted ones - also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas or Giordano Brunos’, ‘refined vengeance-seekers and poison-Brewers’, will be sounded to ‘beware of martyrdom’:

The martyrdom of the philosopher, his “sacrifice for the sake of truth,” forces into the light whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has hitherto contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a philosopher it is easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in his deterioration (deteriorated into a “martyr”, into a stage-and-tribune-bawler). Only, that it is necessary with such a desire to be clear what spectacle one will see in any case - merely a satyric play, merely an epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the long, real tragedy is at an end, supposing that every philosophy has been a long tragedy in its origin. (Beyond Good and Evil 536-7)
Stephen’s “ignorance” - his unfulfilled desire to know - causes him to “suffer”, and from a young age he begins to conceive himself as a tragic hero: ‘It pained him that he did not know well what politics meant and that he did not know where the universe ended. He felt small and weak’ (14). As he does not know ‘what politics meant’ and ‘where the universe ended’, he is estranged from his family and ‘the fellows in poetry and rhetoric’. Communication and social participation are for him contingent on hermeneutics. His plight is indeed not only epistemological, but as the last chapter will highlight, it is also hermeneutical. His alienation from the sphere of ethics and his demotion of kinesis are indeed here foreshadowed, as politics and “science” are regarded as counterparts: ‘[P]hilosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same’, however, as Aristotle argues; in politics it is practical wisdom ‘which is concerned with a man himself- with the individual” that is required (NE VI.7). Stephen, however, will understand this to mean his individual self, a self that will become increasingly self-divided.

Philosophic wisdom ‘will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being)’, and Stephen indeed becomes increasingly despondent (VI.12). Stephen’s mind very quickly becomes old and dejected, not only due to a change in fortune, but also through his acquaintance with the ‘love of sorrow for the sake of sorrow and despair and fearful menaces’ that distinguished ‘the high traditions of Mangan’s race’ (OCPW 59). Even though this ‘delightful sadness’ may have been a divinely or imperially ordained lot that the Irish could not escape, it was also cultivated and idealised by both the Irish and their oppressors and distinguished for Joyce the Romantic “mood” of the Literary Revival (Yeats, Ideas 271). ‘In his head’, Nolan argues, ‘the colonized subject has confounded an historical ill with an eternal and transcendent principle of evil. History is lent the force of myth, and the individual appears powerless, controlled by unseen forces forever beyond his or her agency’ (70). Myth, promising escape from history, reason and isolation, as it had for the Romantics, ‘would establish upon the future a far more cruel tyranny’, Joyce warned (OCPW 59).

It is indeed through his fictional adventures that Stephen’s mind grows ‘older and sadder’, “historicised” not only through reference to historical actors, but also through his assumption of the role of the protagonist (P 65). The ‘scattered and dead revellers who had been the companions of his father’s youth’ are for Stephen simply ‘names’- disembodied phantoms (96). While his father drinks with his friends ‘to the memory of their past’, that past assumes such force and reality for Stephen that his memory of his own past and his very
existence seem to him to be ‘fading out in the sun or … being lost and forgotten somewhere in the universe’ (101, 99). Following Stephen’s apocalyptic sense of history, the last come first: ‘His mind seemed older than theirs: it shone coldly on their strifes and happiness and regrets like a moon upon a younger earth’ (102). Disconnected from the tradition and community that his father shares with his friends, history for Stephen has meaning only through “names”. Like Little Chandler who regrets that ‘his name was not more Irish-looking’, which would allow his identification with ‘the Celtic school’, the remains of tradition are similarly fossilised in names for Stephen that only communicate “The Celtic note” (D 80). But while Stephen will later criticise Davin’s “worship” of ‘the sorrowful legend of Ireland’ - ‘the broken lights of Irish myth’ - he simply fills the void that his rejection of tradition leaves through his incantation of ‘violent or luxurious language’ of an equally “decadent” tradition (195-6).

In response to this “tragic necessity” that the intersection of myth and history establishes, the hermeneutics of tragedy repeatedly take centre stage in Joyce’s work. Stephen rehearses his own definition of tragedy in the Portrait through his Aristotelian theory on the significance of pity and terror for the spectator of tragedy in response to the martyrological character of Irish culture, but also modern culture in its sensationalisation of daily life. As an Irish artist Stephen has to battle with the ghost of melancholy that haunts his art and stands in his way of creating real “drama”, but also as a modern artist contend with the daily spectacle that the newspapers provide. Joyce’s assessment of Synge’s Riders to the Sea in 1903, had indeed similarly focused on his incorrect use of ‘tragic’: ‘It is tragic about all the men that are drowned in the islands: but thanks be to God Synge isn’t an Aristotelian’, and also on Yeats’s ill-judged comment that the play ‘was quite Greek’ (Letters II 35). His response to Synge, like that of his character, was a presentation of his own ‘esthetic’; a presentation that Synge either correctly or prophetically interpreted as theatrical as well as philosophical (‘Synge says I have a mind like Spinoza!’) (38).

Stephen’s approach to drama through Aristotle’s theory is not very promising, however. The “ideal” spectator of his dramatic theory suddenly finds himself contemplating ‘an image of the beauty we have come to understand’ rather than dramatic action; defined, moreover, not by Aristotle, but by Aquinas. ‘What do you mean’, Lynch reminds Stephen of the impertinence of his theological diversion, ‘by prating about beauty and the imagination in this miserable Godforsaken island? No wonder the artist retired within or behind his handiwork after having perpetrated this country’ (233). The retired artist, as the archetypal theorist, is not “arrested” by an ideal ‘static’ ‘esthetic emotion’, but is rather completely indifferent; having ‘perpetrated’ his work of art, he decides to hide.
The conceit of Joyce’s response to Synge over a decade earlier, moreover, is reflected in the complex relation of Stephen with Davin, who comes to Stephen’s mind prior to his presentations of his esthetic theories, as he looks at the statue of Thomas Moore as ‘a Firbolg in the borrowed cloak of a Milesian’ (194-5). The comparison of Stephen’s mind, ‘eager of speculation’, with the ‘reluctance of speech and deed’ of Davin is not only parodic in its disingenuousness, but also parallels the traditions that have shaped and constrained both the intellectual and moral progress of the two characters—religion and nationalism (196). Stephen’s “classical” temper and style, his ‘speculation’ that he believes separates him from the ‘grossness of intelligence’, ‘bluntness of feeling’ and ‘dull stare of terror in the eyes’ of Davin, do not absolve him of romanticism as Donovan points out to him: ‘Goethe and Lessing, said Donovan, have written a lot on that subject, the classical school and the romantic school and all that’; the dualism is itself Romantic (195-6, 229). Classical style manifests itself in Stephen’s theory as exegesis and catechesis that Stephen employs in his endeavour to formulate an abstract theory on the meaning of art—a task set by the dean of studies. 29

Joyce’s ironic stance towards his character, has therefore political as well as artistic resonance, accepting and exploiting his debts to tradition but also refusing to accept it ‘with all its griefs and failures’ or ‘failures and regrets’ and censuring the romantic oxymoron of ‘delightful sadness’ that was used to characterise and create ‘national melodies’ (OCPW 58, 136; Ideas 272). Irony and parody, moreover, allow Joyce to subvert Yeats’s definition of tragedy: ‘All happy art seems to me that hollow image, but when its lineaments express also the poverty or the exasperation that set its maker to the work, we call it tragic art’ (Ideas 329). Joyce was aware, as Wilde had been, that tragedy cannot be a private affair, and how easily sentimentalism could pass as tragedy in Irish theatre. Stephen’s conceited Romantic solitariness questions the quest for the revival of an idyllic concept of community that ignores its debts to Romanticism and the creative input of those it views as mere “spectators”. The representation of the ‘real face’ of Ireland, was indeed not only an ethical issue, but also a political and dramatic concern; Declan Kiberd argues that the foundation of the Abbey theatre was ‘part of a crusade against the Stage Irishman’ that staged the ‘contemporary debate about what constituted the real face of Ireland now that the mask had been tossed aside’ (The Irish Writer and the World 28). This tremendous responsibility that the artist is faced with in terms of mimesis that since Aristotle had defined art, paralyses Stephen and sends him gazing into mirrors to discern his true face.

29 ‘When may we expect to have something from you on the esthetic question?’ (202).
Davin’s tale of his encounter with a peasant woman in response to Stephen’s ‘violent or luxurious language’ that he used to absolve himself from responding to the Irish language question, allows Stephen some insight into “womanhood” that is so alien to him as an ‘unsubstantial image’ (67). But it also aids Stephen’s philosophical quest for truth, as the ‘batlike soul’ that Davin evokes is also a reminder of Aristotle’s warning to the theorist of the limits of human understanding: ‘as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all’ (198; *Metaphysics* II.1). The paradox that the investigation of the truth presents us with, Aristotle argues, is that it is ‘in one way hard, in another easy’: while ‘no one is able to attain the truth adequately’, ‘we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed’. Therefore, he adds, ‘we should be grateful, not only to those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more superficial views’. Knowledge and understanding cannot be attained through individual self-reflection; even the theorist must be sensitive to the communality of truth. Hermeneutics must take the form of an interminable dialogue, the portrayal of which in writing can only be a limited and artificial construction, and in the silence of writing resemble delusively a monologue.

The impression of the figure of this woman to Stephen as ‘a batlike soul wakening to the consciousness of itself in darkness and secrecy and loneliness’ highlights his ethical predicament, but also the problem of representation; the artist’s embodiment of this soul through ‘the eyes and voice and gesture of a woman without guile’, is a “transmutation” and a partial manifestation (P 198). Joyce’s concern that he had not ‘reproduced’ in *Dubliners* the ‘beauty’ and the ‘ingenuous insularity and its hospitality’ unique to Ireland - ‘The latter ‘virtue’ so far as I can see does not exist elsewhere in Europe - a paradoxical combination that the lonely woman ‘calling the stranger to her bed’ reveals, is reflected in Stephen’s anxious and confused feelings towards Emma and inability to make her conform to the archetypes he is familiar with (*Letters II* 166). Gabriel in “The Dead” similarly struggles to praise Ireland’s hospitality in his speech, which in his derision of the living examples that surround him degenerates into a conceited oratorical display.

Whereas Stephen’s earlier poetic composition had been a dedication to Emma through vacuous imagery ‘of the night and the balmy breeze and the maiden lustre of the moon’, the memory of her interrupts his ‘tremulous’ ‘morning inspiration’ of the villanelle (74, 235). In an ironic “substantiation” of the ‘luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure’ in Stephen’s ‘mystery of esthetic’, the typological relation between the Virgin Mary and Eve...
allows him to “transubstantiate” his carnal desire ‘In the virgin womb of the imagination’ (231). “Weary” like Shelley’s moon, his muse betrays his Romanticism. The scholar who has just delivered his philosophical disquisition to an indifferent interlocutor, gives way to an inspired Romantic who authenticates his inspiration by usurping the role of the Virgin in order to consummate his desired encounter with the ‘unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly beheld’ ‘without any overt act of his’ (67).

Once his verses are written down, however, the memory of Emma as ‘a figure of the womanhood of her country, a batlike soul’, dissipates his ideal coincidence of these eternal feminines, and exposes his blindness in her seeming refusal to ‘unveil her soul’s shy nakedness’ to him (198, 240). ‘[R]ather than guiding him to privileged spiritual truths’, Lisa Rado argues, ‘Stephen’s dream maidens reflect his repressed sexual fantasies; realizing this fact leads him almost immediately to doubt his authenticity and ability as an artist’ (30). Reminding him of the physical and spiritual turmoil she had caused him, the memory of Emma lays bare the instincts that have really “inspired” him which he had tried to clothe with liturgical vestments. The ‘distorted reflections of her image’ call up in his memory other Dublin females that he had regarded with fear and awe and excluded from his art. Suspicious of their ‘vanities’ and pitying ‘the dark shame of womanhood’, femininity for him is purely ethereal (239, 72, 242).

His disguise as ‘a monk’ is exposed by Emma who tells him he is ‘a heretic’, although he still makes a vain effort to hold on to the sacramental nature of his vocation as a ‘priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life’ (238, 240). He attempts to distinguish this role from ‘one who was but schooled in the discharging of a formal rite’, despite having just made an offering at ‘the altar of the world’ and turned the earth into ‘a swinging swaying censer, a ball of incense, an ellipsoidal fall’ (240, 236). Through the amalgamation of scriptural and liturgical imagery, and by usurping for himself the fecundity of femininity, he had transcended the difficulty of the artist in making the word flesh, but also allowing the flesh to signify through the word. But as the distorted images the memory of Emma call up reveal, the flesh is not a mirror. His alchemical productions indeed evade all relations and actions that ritual establishes and accomplishes “formally”.

Conceiving his productions as ‘a form of homage’, however, he cannot maintain the indifference of the dramatist (239). Autobiography as well as history war against Stephen’s idealism. As the sole performer, ‘sitting at the old piano, striking chords softly from its speckled keys and singing’ while she ‘leaned beside the mantelpiece’ he can maintain the ideal stasis, but as soon as it is transformed into kinesis through her dancing that urges
participation, the visionary trance is broken (238). He refuses the communion that art would allow between them by sending his verses to her, fearful of the response he might get. His understanding of this homage and his relation to his body is formed rather through ‘The radiant image of the eucharist’ that he invokes in order to overcome his anger (240). Refusing the “sacrifice” that he believes his homage compels him to make, he turns to the Eucharist as an ‘image’ that is poetically expedient, simulating the artist’s union of art and life, while pitying Emma’s “fallen” body, ‘humbled and saddened by the dark shame of womanhood’ (242). The Eucharist, ‘as a symbolic transubstantiation of male body and blood’, as Christine Froula notes, is placed ‘in parallel with the biological menarche that Eliade projects as “the mystery of blood”, sign of a naturally sacralized femininity’ (65).

While Eucharistic images abound in his art as in his author’s, Stephen refuses to receive communion. Uninitiated to ‘the great mystery of love’, a mystery that urges sacrifice and self-division, his communion can only be with himself (162). Willing to ‘unveil her soul’s shy nakedness’ only within the confines ‘of a formal rite’, this veiled female figure - like ‘the veiled face of God’ before which the dramatist ‘stands a mediator in awful truth’ and for the sake of whom he ‘forgoes his very self’ in Joyce’s early essay “Drama and Life” - is an adversary to the artist’s desire to create epiphanic art, as his meditations on the allegiance of women to religion and to the Irish language foreground (240; OCPW 26). His solitary communion is forged through ‘radiant’ imagery and the ‘liquid letters of speech, symbols of the element of mystery’ (242). ‘Passing by ‘the voice of a servant’ singing “Rosie O’Grady”, Stephen’s ‘esthetic apprehension’ is realised only through ‘The soft beauty of the Latin word’ that Cranly quotes to “translate” this experience to Stephen (265). Her voice is a seductive call to ‘formal rite’ once again, as she is imagined as ‘The figure of a woman as she appears in the liturgy of the church’, revealing ironically Stephen’s own translation of desire and action into ritual; a ritual, however, that he observes with ‘quiet indulgence’ from a distance, attaining catharsis through the ‘liquid life’ of a wet dream (265-6, 240).
The mythical and historical traditions imparted to Stephen during his brief interruption of studies by the paternal figures that step in to fill the pedagogic role of the Jesuits - the political and legendary ‘subjects nearer their hearts’ that they discussed ‘Trudging along the road or standing in some grimy wayside public house’ - and the “return” to nature that his adventures with the milkmen afforded him, ironically awaken in Stephen “vulgar” animal instincts and urges that he suppresses by reading about the ‘marvellous’ adventures of *The Count of Monte Christo* and practicing in his imagination the Count’s ‘proud gesture of refusal’ (*P*, 64-5). His “inborn” mythical tradition manifests itself as a ‘savage desire’ ‘before which everything else was idle and alien’, as a ‘dark presence moving irresistibly upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle and murmurous as a flood filling him wholly with itself’ (105). The mythical world for Stephen is masculine, primitive and Dionysian. It is an unconscious and universal realm that he must rebel against through “theory”; a feminised reaction both through the undertones of homosexuality in theory’s links to Aestheticism and to Catholicism and the series of female images of beauty that Stephen ‘exulted to defile with patience’. The mother-tongue is truly “silenced”, reflecting the spectral role of female figures in the novel that are represented as a mirror and vessel of male desires.

Stephen is unprepared for the ecstatic reality of Dionysus; a reality that questions the very essence and consequence of aesthetics. The ‘measured restraint, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that philosophical calm of the sculptor-god’ Apollo, ‘the deity of light’ that Stephen was able to mirror in the first chapter through godlike and aesthetic detachment - even when he was compelled to suffer a ‘mystical self-abnegation’ - is an increasingly fragile theatrical mask that must be worn in order to avoid submersion into ‘Oneness as the soul of the race, and of nature itself’ that would obliterate his ‘symbolic powers’ as an artist (*BT*, 3, 5, 7). He is a reluctant and resentful player, enjoying artistic performance only in solitude, and like the man of letters in the definition of an epiphany in *Stephen Hero*, he ‘chronicle[s]’ epiphany-like scenes ‘with patience’- with the capacity to endure and suffer, rather than scholarly ‘extreme care’ (*P*, 70; *SH*, 216).

He is only ‘seemingly a tranquil watcher of the scene before him’ while ‘sitting in the midst of a children’s party’; ‘His silent watchful manner’ masks ‘the feverish agitation of his blood’ that Emma’s glance excites ‘through the circling of the dancers and amid the music and laughter’ (73, 71-2). The ‘mirth’ kindled by art and play is merely ‘a soothing air’, ‘false and trivial’ that allows him to conceal his intemperate exhilaration (71).
contrast to the fleeting merriment of the games, Emma’s eyes conjure a ‘tale’ ‘from some dim past’ heard many times before; his ‘feverish agitation’ is ascribed mythical dimensions; a myth “authored” by Emma’s ‘vanities’: ‘her fine dress and sash and long black stockings’, that seduce him into a Dionysian ecstatic reality antagonistic to the world of art and the individual (72). The ‘pink-dressed figure’ discovered ‘In a dark corner of the chapel’ while Stephen waits to go on stage, is similarly a “temptress” arousing ‘A low murmur of curiosity’ and eliciting ‘A movement of impatience’ that is conciliated aesthetically by Stephen’s contemplation of the theatre from a distance as ‘a festive ark’ and by ‘the faint rhythm of the music’ that precipitates his “catharsis”: ‘His unrest issued from him like a wave of sound: and on the tide of flowing music the ark was journeying, trailing her cables of lanterns in her wake’ (77-9).

This mythical tradition is incompatible with Stephen’s ideal of beauty, demanding as in tragedy the absorption of the theorist into the drama through ‘pity and fear’, and union with nature. Stephen’s essay presentation before the audience of the Literary and Historical Society in *Stephen Hero* is replaced with his performance in the Whitsuntide play as a ‘farical pedagogue’, the account of which is interrupted by memories of Stephen’s “martyrdom” at the hands of his classmates in his defence of Byron as the greatest writer which follows the “heresy” of his school essay (77). While he is able to share ‘the common mirth’ as he stands ‘in the wings’ of the stage, when he is transposed to the stage ‘amid the garish gas and the dim scenery’, he again feels detached: ‘the play which he had known at rehearsals for a disjointed lifeless thing had suddenly assumed a life of its own. It seemed now to play itself, he and his fellow actors aiding it with their parts’ (90). As an actor rather than theorist, he finds himself ‘acting before the innumerable faces of the void’: a ‘simple body’ that is ‘magically deformed’ at the end of the performance, as ‘the void of faces’ is seen ‘breaking at all points and falling asunder into busy groups’. His ability to see, know and judge is impaired in his immersion in the action of the play. Whereas previously he had countered the impersonality of art by placing himself in the position of both subject and object of theory, his distance from his audience registers an ethical void that Emma’s ‘serious alluring eyes watching him from among the audience’ had momentarily dissipated.

His participation in the school play and perception of the theatrical performance as a ritual celebration in his imaginary transfiguration of the theatre into a ‘festive ark’ is followed by a mystical initiation into ‘a fantastic world of sombre masses’ (98). In contrast to ‘the company of subversive writers whose jibes and violence of speech set up a ferment in his brain before they passed out of it into his crude writings’, and the “greatest writers” that Stephen defends even at the cost of his own suffering, the living father figures whose
company he keeps during this period, fail to draw him into their society (83). Indifferent to ‘his father’s ‘evocation of Cork and of scenes of his youth’, the ‘legend’ that the word ‘foetus’ carved on the desk at his father’s school evokes, is a mirror reflection of the ‘individual malady of his own mind’ (92, 95). The epiphany of his unborn soul - that must experience ‘a slow and dark birth’, as Stephen will later explain to Davin - through the word engraved upon ‘the dark stained wood’ of the desk, conjures a ‘den of monstrous images’ (220, 95).

The lamps of theory cannot illuminate the depths of the soul that Stephen senses as an alien being; the potency of this “inner word” that he reads in the anatomy theatre arouses a timeless unconscious - mythical rather than historical - that obliterates the symbolic function of words: ‘The memory of his childhood suddenly grew dim. He tried to call forth some of its vivid moments but could not. He recalled only names. Dante, Parnell, Clane, Clongowes’ (98). Words become meaningless signs, inscrutable ‘letters’ and he turns to the healing powers of art; to the melancholy of ‘Shelley’s fragment’ that addresses a nameless ‘you’ in order to forget his ‘weariness’ through the aesthetic distance that art affords (95, 102). Mourning the death of his childhood and his soul ‘capable of simple joys’, Shelley’s fragment allows aesthetic transcendence: ‘Its alternation of sad human ineffectiveness with vast inhuman cycles of activity chilled him and he forgot his own human and ineffectual grieving’.

While subject to his carnal desires, he is initiated into and becomes a participant of a ritual procession, wandering through ‘a maze of narrow and dirty streets’ and ‘up and down the dark slimy streets’, whose ‘yellow gas-flames’ appeared to be ‘burning as if before an altar’ (106-7). He is initiated by succumbing to ‘a presence subtle and murmurous as a flood’ that sounds ‘like the murmur of some multitude in sleep’, and he walks among a congregation ‘gathered arrayed as for some rite’. He becomes a tragic actor in the immense suffering that the ‘wasting fires of lust’ and ‘the inarticulate cries and the unspoken brutal words’ subject him to in ‘the hell of sufferers’ he finds himself among (106). Replicating his martyric posture at the hands of the prefect, when the ‘subtle streams’ of the ‘murmurous’ ‘flood’ ‘penetrated his being’, ‘His hands clenched convulsively and his teeth set together as he suffered the agony of its penetration’. His final surrender, ‘body and soul’ under ‘the dark pressure’ of ‘softly parting lips’, consummates his “tragedy”, as ‘the vehicle of a vague speech’ breaks his ‘silent vows’ (108).

This ritual takes cosmic dimensions in the following chapter, as the mathematical signs through which he attempts to visualise his soul become symbols of a ‘vast cycle of starry life’ that ‘bore his weary mind outward to its verge and inward to its centre’ (110).
The symbolism of Catholicism ironically fills the hollow forms that Stephen’s denial of his body leaves: while ‘His soul was fattening and congealing’, ‘the body that was his stood, listless and dishonoured, gazing out of darkened eyes, helpless, perturbed, and human for a bovine god to stare upon’ (119-20). His drama becomes apocalyptic, as he traverses and assumes the form of a series of types and archetypes through the enchanting eloquence of the “mythical” tales of the retreat sermon that transforms the historical actors of his English lesson into ‘mute phantoms behind their veil of names’ (135). The drama that the sermon stages is nevertheless “cathartic”; following his initiation into the Biblical and liturgical mysteries of the retreat, his private encounter with his soul takes place in ‘the dark shell of the cave’, populated with ‘Goatish creatures with human faces, hornybrowed, lightly bearded and grey as india-rubber’ that Stephen will try to escape from like Plato through philosophy (148). His encounter with ‘the unsubstantial image which his soul so constantly beheld’ that the previous chapter had presented as a woman, becomes once again a self-reflection-a ‘face to face’ meeting with his sins (67). Catharsis though the ‘vague speech’ of the prostitute is substituted with redemption through the Word that Stephen struggles to ‘utter’ (108, 151).

During the sacramental purification of his soul in the next chapter, he continues to relate to his body through ritual: ‘he drove his soul daily through an increasing circle of works of supererogation’, by means of which ‘his soul was enriched with spiritual knowledge’ and the world once again acquired meaning as ‘one vast symmetrical expression of God’s power and love’ (159-60). His relation both to the world and to ‘eternity’ is forged through ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental acts’ whose purpose is not ‘To merge his life in the common tide of other lives’ but to produce an effect in the face of the ‘sad human ineffectiveness’ and ‘ineffectual grieving’ that had previously been his response (172, 164, 102). The imagery of ‘a great cash register’ by means of which he solemnly tries to ‘purchase’ his entry into heaven through a simoniacal exchange, parodies his misinterpretation of praxis in its complete detachment from the sphere of ethics (160).

Stephen’s attraction to ‘the vague acts of the priesthood which pleased him by reason of their semblance of reality and of their distance from it’ ironically highlights his alienation from public life and desperate search for a “role” that the artist in modernity had been deprived of in the degeneration of art that served simply ‘to drive away hours and moments of discomfort, boredom, half-bad conscience, and if possible, transform the faults of the lives and characters into faults of world-destiny’ (171; Human-all-too-human 319). His “religion of art” that he will not renounce following his rejection of priesthood but will proudly display as a distinguishing mark of his art, will expose, however, the constrictions that these roles impose upon his art, and the temptation they present the artist with of not
only ‘playing parts’, but more treacherously ‘of living the part of the artist’ (Dublin’s Joyce 354, 44).

Although ‘it displeased him to imagine that all the vague pomp should end in his own person or that the ritual should assign to him so clear and final an office’, Stephen still longs for ‘the minor sacred offices’, where ‘forgotten by the people’ but dressed the part, he can be the sole actor of his drama (171-2). His fantasy of picturing himself as a celebrant ‘as in the pictures of the mass in his child’s massbook, in a church without worshippers’, parodies his models and his ideal of detachment, but also highlights the ethical and political void that Stephen tries to fill through ritual and appropriation of a “holy office”. Requiring ‘an appointed rite’ in order to overcome the paralysis that in Dubliners is an epidemic that has both religious and political origins, Joyce, like Heidegger, criticises the definition of action in terms of utility and power.

For Heidegger, this misunderstanding of praxis is a symptom of the ‘Homelessness’ of modern man in his ‘oblivion of Being’ (242). This exile is traced back to the ‘translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking’ by the Romans, ultimately “uprooted” by becoming ‘a fixed body of doctrine’ in the Middle Ages (149, 65). Highlighting that Being ‘has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light’ and ‘in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps’, Heidegger warns against ‘the thorough neglect of the question of Being’ that results from this uprooting, which leads to a distracting ‘interest in the manifold forms of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophizing in the most remote and strangest cultures, and with interest tries to veil its own lack of foundation’ (65).

The endless metamorphoses of Stephen, however, are a cathartic process, by means of which he tries to cut loose his ties not only with his ‘average everydayness’ but also ‘the constant voices of his father and of his masters’ (59, P 88). He simultaneously acquaints and acquits himself from history and tradition, but ultimately remains ‘ensnared’ by the hermeneutics that these ‘types, directions, and standpoints’ dictate, and continues in the final chapter his endeavour to interpret Being by the ‘reflected light’ of the lamp of Scholasticism, despite seemingly dissociating himself from ‘the broken lights of Irish myth’ (195). These types, understood by Stephen and his author typologically, introduce a complex network of relations that are both historical and transhistorical: past, present and future are collapsed into the contemporaneity of the hermeneutic moment, that is modelled on the moment of Apocalypse that will finally eliminate all doubts. Whereas in the hands of Joyce, as Frances Restuccia has argued, typology ‘function[s] as sabotage’, Stephen’s ‘company of phantasmal comrades’ exposes his alienation from both society and history (34, 88).
Stephen’s hermeneutics are formulaic and he risks becoming like Wilde himself ‘troped (and trapped) by caricatures’, by understanding these types as *roles* that he simply enacts rather than interprets (Mahaffey, *States of Desire* 37). ‘The tragedy of Wilde’s career’, Mahaffey argues, ‘is that he who so determinedly set out to shatter the stasis and unreality of stereotyped images in his writings, himself became a shattered image. He gained notoriety early by marketing himself as a human work of art, a living “character”, which in turn set him up to be caricatured’ (42). In his endeavour to understand his self-image through types and stereotypes but lacking any historical sense, Stephen similarly risks assuming ‘a shape that can’t be changed’, as he did for Joyce after the *Portrait* (Budgen 107).  

But even though Stephen struggles to accommodate history into his aesthetics, his consciousness of their dissonance transforms his understanding of truth. Endless self-reflection is not relinquished, although the “optimism” of the first chapter in Stephen’s quest for truth ‘By thinking of things’, gives way to a premonition of an epiphanic encounter- ‘a happening of truth’; although neither Stephen nor the reader can be sure when and if in fact it- or rather they, have happened (43; Heidegger 162). This encounter, however, is presented as revelatory only for Stephen; he has lost his capacity for representativeness in the instability of both the narrative and the narrator. The burden of the author’s exemplarity falls wholly upon autobiography given the fraught relation of Stephen to his models, although the “epiphany” of the *Portrait* is rather the mystery and mutivalency of both the experience and the human subject.  

Whereas *The happiness of the historian*, according to Nietzsche, is ‘to harbour in himself not an ‘immortal soul’ but many *mortal* souls’, Stephen’s mortal souls, as his esthetic theory manifests, are still founded on an immortal ideal (*Human, All-Too-Human* 275). His parodic anthropomorphic portrait of the deity paring his fingernails, however, as well as the history of aesthetics from Plato to his contemporaries that Stephen traverses in his theory, reveals his growing consciousness of the significance of history, but also his understanding of the significance of parody as a critical and hermeneutical principle. His final mythical self-portrait will be preceded by his record of a ‘sudden gesture of a revolutionary nature’ made while engaged in another self-centred monologue in his conversation with Emma, that ‘must have looked like a fellow throwing a handful of peas into the air’ (275). The dates in the series of epiphanies that are collected at the end of the book also suggest an attempt at historicisation.

30 ‘I have just got a letter asking me why I don’t give Bloom a rest. The writer of it wants more Stephen. But Stephen no longer interests me to the same extent. He has a shape that can’t be changed” (Budgen 107).
Chapter 4: The Age of Liturgy

I. Critic
i. Thinking without chops: the economy of authorship in modernity

‘I know these Bohemian chaps, these poets, who don't consider it waste of time to think. But at the same time they’re damn glad to borrow an odd shilling now and then to buy chops with’, Simon Dedalus responds to his son’s defiant declaration at the end of Stephen Hero that all he has been doing for the past twelve months is think (222). ‘How will you like thinking when you have no chops?’, he warns Stephen, predicting his future in ‘secondhand breeks’ (U 5). ‘Can't you go for something definite, some good appointment in a government office and then, by Christ, you can think as much as you like. Study for some first-class appointment, there are plenty of them, and you can write at your leisure. Unless, perhaps, you would prefer to be a loafer eating orange-peels and sleeping in the Park’ (SH 222). Even though Stephen’s choice of this occupation will be vindicated in Finnegans Wake when a ‘child of a strandlooper’, discovers ‘a motive for future saintity’ among ‘a few spontaneous fragments of orangepeel’ in a ‘limon’ (meadow), both the Portrait and Ulysses highlight the economic sources of Stephen’s plight and melancholy (110). Resuming his efforts of Stephen Hero to legitimate the role of the artist in modern society, but with his own theories having been affected by his ‘new religion of unbelief’, the question Stephen had posed to Madden is still implicit in his public performances in Ulysses: ‘I am an artist, don't you see? Do you believe that I am?’ (SH 145, 60). Confirming rather than dispelling stereotypes, the question nevertheless aids Stephen’s quest for payment; until he admits that he himself does not believe or know what he “is”.

Although the struggle of the artist to discover and repudiate the prejudices and stereotypes surrounding his role is overshadowed by Stephen’s psychodrama in the Portrait, the narrative nevertheless highlights that ‘Not all Stephen’s trouble of mind but all his problem is economic. His poverty has conditioned his relations to women and is in fact at the root of all his distress’, as Frank Budgen remarks (43). The ‘mood of embittered silence’ that characterises Stephen after the second chapter of the Portrait, is accompanied by a ‘change of fortune which was reshaping the world about him into a vision of squalor and insincerity’

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31 In a speech entitled “Liturgia and the Modern State” delivered by Giorgio Agamben in 2009 in The European Graduate School that discussed the consequence of the idea of liturgy on Western culture and politics, Agamben argues that ‘we cannot understand what is a performance in contemporary art if we do not understand that it is a liturgical practice’ and concludes that ‘perhaps the first half the twentieth century is not only the age of movements, but also the age of liturgy’. The significance of liturgy in Joyce’s work will be examined in the latter half of this chapter.
Although he receives no similar warning from his father, his “ambition” to become an artist appears viable only in nocturnal imaginary adventures. The male role models that step in to educate Stephen during his absence from Clongowes fail to introduce him to modern society, as Stephen struggles to comprehend their legendary tradition and political history which seem irreconcilable with his own experiences and ideals. While ‘his elders spoke constantly of the subjects nearer their hearts, of Irish politics, of Munster and of the legends of their own family’, Stephen is left anticipating his consignment of a role in society: ‘The hour when he too would take part in the life of that world’ (64). His ‘unrest’ is wakened not only in his encounters with females, but also upon the sight of ‘the bales of merchandise stocked along the walls or swung aloft out of the holds of steamers’ during his wanderings around Dublin that present him with ‘a new and complex sensation’ (69).

The ‘swift season of merrymaking’ that interrupts Stephen’s ‘moody brooding’, lasts only as long as he has money (104; U9). He suddenly becomes both a “man of action” and a great socialite, if not exactly sociable: ‘Every day he drew up a bill of fare for the family and every night led a party of three or four to the theatre to see Ingomar or The Lady of Lyons’ (P104). His economic affluence allows him to effortlessly forge relationships and ‘take part in the life of that world’ actively (64). The “marketplace” adulterates the value of the currency to suit the interests of the traders, but it also allows the formation of a community based on this currency. It is an unstable community, forged ‘by rules of conduct and active interest’, as Stephen will deplore, but art is similarly open to such charges, despite Stephen’s distinction between the use of words in the marketplace and in the literary tradition (104). He tries to make art “unmarketable” by arguing that the value of words cannot be “exchanged” in the literary tradition, although the greater security that he ascribes to artistic value would attract rather than deter investors. But while he argues that art is “invaluable”, he is nevertheless willing to sell the ‘lamp’ that allows him to fabricate his theory. As the confusion over a tundish in his meeting with the dean of studies highlights, the literary tradition is not inviolate, as it is prey to the volatility of language that is a common currency.

‘Stephen wanders through the noisy streets of Dublin expounding his theory because he cannot afford to go shopping’, Garry Leonard diagnoses (205). For Leonard, Stephen’s aspiration is to become a bourgeois consumer rather than merchant: his ‘theorizing about aesthetics is not so much a work of scholarship in progress as it is a way of life, a means of coping, and a fantasy of immunity from the experience of modernity’ (204). His theorising is certainly presented not so much as a necessary stage in his progress towards becoming an author, or even as an exposition of his misunderstanding of the role of the author, but as a disguise in the scepticism that surrounds this role and (apparent) lack of living examples. He
feels, as the Romantics did, that he must legitimate his role as an artist by emphasising the philosophical and theological foundation of art, and by displaying his dexterity in dealing with these subjects. He has to ‘to dress the character’, as will become more prominent in *Ulysses* (19). When “value” is no longer part of an agreed upon tradition, constructing and experiencing one’s own subjectivity involves a complex theatrics of self-presentation, or “lifestyle”, Leonard argues (11). Having deplored the devaluation or miscalculation of the true worth of art but rejecting recourse to the traditions that had preserved its eminence, Stephen attempts to raise its “interest” by presenting himself - begrudgingly and with the aid of drink - as the peripatetic advertisement of his “paradoxical” or at least eccentric interpretation of art. His affinity to Wilde indeed becomes more than simply intellectual in his attempt to create and market his art through such a character.

Stephen’s growing consciousness of his socioeconomic predicament is reflected in the change that the transition from the *Portrait* to *Ulysses* registers in terms of his self-understanding. While the narrative in the *Portrait* traces the various models of authorship that Stephen aspires to, as a consequence of the diversity of Stephen’s sources of “inspiration” and of the parodic gap that is left between the model and its imitator, the very quest for a stable sense of identity and the ultimate goal of artistic development characteristic of the *Bildungsroman* novel is undermined. Authorship like selfhood is revealed as ‘a fluctuating plenitude of possibilities-in-anguish, constantly beset by external pressures – national, religious, familial – which seek to repress it into integrated definition’ (D. Brown 36). But whereas Stephen in the *Portrait* contributes to this repression in his (self)imposed discipline, search for and scrupulous selection of specific models, and desire as in *Stephen Hero* ‘for a supremely satisfying order’ that continues to be reflected in the diary form which brings the novel to its conclusion, his identity in *Ulysses* is understood as both formed and dispersed, through a series of debts that account in part for the self-divisions that led to shame and isolation in the *Portrait* (210). His representation as a ‘spendthrift saint’ is indeed reflected in the unruliness of the narrative and structural volatility (*WD* 60). Through the widening contexts that both form and content are composed of before which Stephen’s own “models” pale in comparison, ‘the writing becomes an obvious performance, an exhibition of excess’, as Karen Lawrence remarks, of an even more profligate Author rather than narrator, as his creations allow hermeneutic indeterminacy- a form of tyranny in itself in the compulsion it creates to interpret (188).

Stephen’s awareness of the problematic ‘economy of heaven’ that he had idealised in order to validate his egotism and as compensation for his isolation, results, moreover, not in an increase of artistic productions, but in a growing sense of the theatricality of his
character and an inflation of “performances” of art and of the role(s) of the artist that become compulsive - ‘Are you condemned to do this? - in an endeavour to solve the problem of making money (U 274, 266). A ‘cabaret of disjunctive self-roles’ reflects, as Brown argues, ‘the brokenness of the self’s experience through time’, but also characterises the author following his rejection of the unity tradition (141-2). Unlike the dramatic artist of Stephen’s theory, Joyce does not detach himself as a theorist of this performance, but ironically both accepting and denying Plato’s criticism of the rhapsode for admitting he lacks technical skill by claiming he is divinely inspired, he becomes ‘just like Proteus’ “inspired” by language, twisting and turning into ‘everyone at once’, and communicating ‘all these beautiful words about Homer’ ‘knowing nothing’ (μηδὲν εἰδοὺς), seemingly relinquishing his philosophical credentials (Ion). For Hugh Kenner, who has argued that ‘the theatre of roles and surfaces’ is ‘congenial’ to Joyce’s ‘vision of things’, it is indeed through the “excess” of ‘technical rigour’ that Joyce avoids ‘the almost inevitable error of living the part of the artist’ (Hart and Hayman 341, Dublin’s Joyce 44).

The strategies that Stephen devises as a response to the devaluation but also revision of the role of the artist in modern society as a result of the proliferation of authors and the economic model of capitalism that views art as ‘an empty and dissipating dilettanteism’ and the artist as the eternally unemployed - ‘His jymes is out of job, would sit and write’ - link him to the idealists of Dubliners Little Chandler and James Duffy, as he shares with them many of the dilemmas of the modern writer (BT 71; FW 181). While Little Chandler in “A Little Cloud” envies Gallaher’s success and affluence, his aspiration is to ‘appeal to a little circle of kindred minds’ like the societies and the ‘group who rented a room in a mean street to discuss philosophy’ that Yeats refers to in his writing (D 80; Ideas 90). The antagonism of the modern writer towards the journalist is exposed here as jealousy of his success and “popularity”- his prominent cultural position and appeal to an audience that is so wide and diverse that he usurps from the poet the consolation that though destitute and marginalised, he is the voice of the nation.

Conscious of the limited appeal his poetry would have, Little Chandler forges a market plan, intending to advertise his poetry by assuming his mother’s more ‘Irish-looking’ name that would act as a password for entry into such circles, and entice ‘The English critics’ who would categorise him as ‘one of the Celtic school by reason of the melancholy tone of his poems’ (80). The fact that ‘He would never be popular’, would certainly be viewed as an asset by Yeats. Like Stephen, he understands that he must create a character in order to promote his art, and plans to use his isolation to his advantage, understanding the niche market he would appeal to more than Stephen, who rather than readers and publishers,
appears to seek an audience to perform before, conceivable only as ‘the innumerable faces of the void’ in his resentment towards almost everyone alive (P 90). Stephen’s relation to his audience is indeed so strained and artificial that he becomes stereotyped as a “character” in the difficulty he has understanding his audience and appealing to it, and in his self-defeating “unbelief” not in God, but in himself and his “talent” - or lack thereof in the biblical meaning of talent as sum of money - that he repeatedly squanders like the “wicked” servant of the lord in Matthew’s parable.

While Stephen is unable to shop, Little Chandler is unwilling and out of touch with fashion. Going to buy a blouse for his wife costs him ‘an agony of nervousness’ rather that ‘ten and elevenpence’, and he begrudges her ‘prim and pretty’ sense of fashion (91). His outmoded ideal of poetry betrays itself in his inability to understand both the nature of women and fashion, and in his denial of the reality of his home life. James Duffy in “A Painful Case” is similarly resentful of the ‘mean, modern and pretentious’ suburbs of Dublin, and although he shows a keen sense of fashion in the arrangement of his “lifestyle”, in his “abhorrence” of ‘anything which betokened physical or mental disorder’ and understanding of his social life as adhering to a set of ‘conventions which regulate the civic life’, he conceives himself as not only the ideal author, theorist and human being - as the moulding of his self on Nietzsche’s Übermensch reveals - but also, like Stephen, as his own “ideal reader”: ‘He had an odd autobiographical habit which led him to compose in his mind from time to time a short sentence about himself containing a subject in the third person and a predicate in the past tense’ (119, 120, 121). The detailed listing of his collection of books highlights the pride he takes as a reader of the great Authors of Western culture: Wordsworth, Hauptmann, Nietzsche and God.

This conflation of the roles of reader and author that James Duffy’s “empirical” interpretation of the philosophy of Nietzsche reflects and deconstruction celebrates, is here presented as a consequence of an ethical limitation and inability of James Duffy like Stephen to at least envisage imaginatively an audience or a diverse group of readers. In the company of Mrs. Sinico, he similarly becomes his own audience, ‘listening to the sound of his own voice’, ‘the strange impersonal voice which he recognised as his own, insisting on the soul's incurable loneliness’ (124). Disillusioned by Mrs. Sinico’s ‘interpretation’ of ‘his theories’, he leaves her in order to hear his own voice sounded through his copied sentences from Nietzsche. As with Little Chandler, his identity crisis is precipitated not only as a result of his relation to a female who reminds him of the significance of love, but also through journalism. The anonymous voice of the press communicates to him in the impassive manner that has ironically characterised him, the ‘DEATH OF A LADY’ (126). Like Stephen who
had tried to warm himself by touching ‘The pages of his time-worn Horace’ but feels like ‘a shy guest at the feast of the world’s culture’, Mr. Duffy comes to the realisation that ‘he was outcast from life’s feast’ (P 194; D 131).

Lacking ‘material access to the international realm’, ‘modernity is mythological’ for the characters of Dubliners, Emer Nolan argues (31). Living in a purgatorial world where myth and modernity have formed a tentative allegiance but are equally alien from reality, the Dubliners are portrayed in a state of ‘paralysis’- a word that is “sublime” for the young narrator of “The Sisters” in its combination of incomprehensibility and perversity (7). Even the cosmopolitan Gabriel cannot resist this coincidence of contraries. While he watches his soul ‘fading out into a grey impalpable world’ after his acquaintance with the ghost of Michael Furey from the west of Ireland, the anonymous voice of the newspapers announcing that ‘snow was general all over Ireland’ becomes a symbol of the anonymity of death, as he realises the potency of the tropes and symbols of tradition (255). The nameless universality of modernity is translated as an inescapable destiny through the ‘romance’ tale of a pair of star-crossed lovers; a tale that Gabriel himself allows to take mythical dimensions, imagining ‘some impalpable and vindictive being’ ‘coming against him, gathering forces against him in its vague world’ (254, 252). Linking the lovers to the homeland that he resolves to flee but remains haunted by its ghost, he resents ‘how poor a part’ he has ‘played in [Gretta’s] life’, theatricalising it; fearing ‘she had not told him all the story’, he foreshadows the drama of jealousy of Richard in Exiles (254). Rather than a consequence of a ‘resurgence of tradition’, as Nolan argues, Gabriel’s ‘experience of ‘decenteredness’’ results from his mythopoeic impulse that is woken by an ‘incommunicable emotion’ as it is for Stephen, betraying his self-alienation and denial of emotions (34-5; P 78). The relation between myth and the unconscious that Finnegans Wake will dramatise, manifests itself in Joyce’s early works in the psychodrama of his artist heroes. In the absence of a language, or at least a conceptual vocabulary for the unconscious, they turn to the phantasmagorical world of myth.

As the last “epiphany” of Dubliners becomes an Apocalypse of ‘all the living and the dead’ and the artist reaches the limit of representation and communication in an experience that Joyce like Dante will repeatedly present as apophatic, unable or refusing to reconcile the contradictoriness of human experience or simplify its complexity, ‘that agency of collective authorship, the press’ continues to “interpret” (256; Lawrence 63). This characterless ‘continuarration’ announcing the ‘dissolving and dwindling’ of the author, will be painstakingly fabricated in Finnegans Wake, allowing him to participate in both the creation and criticism of the mythologies of modernity and its cycles of repetition of “the new in the repeatedly same, and the repeatedly same in the new”, that enable simultaneously
the resurrection of the now transient name(s) of the Author(s) (FW 205; D 255; Benjamin in Habermas, “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism” 39). Preceding, however, the author’s initiation, the dramatisation in Ulysses of ‘the mythical compulsion to repeat that infiltrates capitalism, despite the modernization of the patterns of existence’- of the theatricality that characterises both the citizens of Dublin and the rhythms and patterns of modernity, allows Joyce to present Dublin ‘to the world’ as a modern capital, and himself as its “first” modern author (39; Letters II 122).

Modernity ‘is mythological’ in Ulysses too; through the dramatisation of the rituals and performances that distinguish the everyday life of the Dubliners, however, Joyce here presents his compatriots as uniquely prepared - even if simply “subconsciously” - not only to take part in the experience of modernity that as Nolan argues, threatens to subsume the individuality of their experience ‘into a larger system’, but also to transform the rhythms and patterns modernity imposes (32). Highlighting that myth was not a thing of the past that needed to be revived, but was also a pervasive feature of modernity, Joyce criticises both the mythologising impulse of modernity and the search for mythical origins of antiquarian scholars and dealers, poets and politicians, while employing their “findings” to display the modernity of his nation and its Author. “Restricting” his own performance to the ‘self-conscious pantomime of indifference’ of the dramatist, he allows its actors - who for cultural theorists should have been the novel’s “ideal readers” - to speak for themselves (Morse 135). Denied the role of the consumer they are presented as its producers through the display of ‘the paradoxical snobbery of a novel that would be almost unreadable by its own protagonist’; ‘His producers are … not his consumers’ (Latham 787; FW 497).32 The ‘creative instinct’ that distinguishes the Celt for Joyce as for Wilde in the cosmopolitan ‘nation of art-critics’ - the ‘weird creativeness’ that Hugh Kenner discerns in the life of the Dubliners in Ulysses - allows Joyce to celebrate the parodic results that such subsumption ‘into a larger system’ would generate (Intentions 125; Dublin’s Joyce 11). The eponymous voices of these Dubliners are pitted against the anonymous voices of the modern world, but they are also conciliated repeatedly through the call to attend to the silent language of thought.

32 Italics my own.
ii. Author-journalist. A literary occupation?

The journalist, the antagonist of the modern writer, a ‘tradesman’ rather than an artist, who caters for the public’s ‘insatiable curiosity to know everything, except what is worth knowing’ and creates the demand for ‘the direct logic, the clear rhetoric, of ‘popular poetry’’, encroaches upon the artist’s territory, but also steps in when his singular voice loses meaning in his alienation from his audience (Soul of Man 29, 41; Ideas of Good and Evil 15). The press, Nolan argues, is presented in “The Dead” as a form of ‘collectivity in anonymity’ in the absence of community in modernity (35). The bond that it proffers, however, is as transient and insipid as the snow that undergoes a symbolic metamorphosis through the personal experience of the artist. Whereas during Gabriel’s oratorical performance before an “ignorant” audience through clichés that would secure his applause he had hailed ‘the memory of those dead and gone’, while glancing outside at the snow as a symbol of escape and detachment from his audience, his discovery of his intimate connection with those memories that he had referred to as a rhetorical commonplace but were “alive” for his wife, transforms the snow into a symbol of a universal destiny.

Collectivity in the anonymity of death exposes rather the absence of community, and the loss of memory as the cycles of history and nature destruct the order and rhythm of the liturgical calendar and festivities of tradition. The commemorative strain in Gabriel’s speech - an oratorical display performed under the compulsion of custom, pandering rather than appealing to his audience - reveals the transformation of the artist in modernity into a ‘public entertainer’ rather than a bard- the voice of the nation or cultural symbol (Friedman 53). He presents himself as an actor, scholar and “exile” rather than rhapsode in his punning assumption of the role of Paris as depicted in “The Judgement of Paris”, a myth popular among Renaissance painters, rather than as the hero of the Homeric tale.

Having taken over the role of the storyteller who is distinguished for Benjamin by his ability to give ‘counsel’ to his readers - or ‘gloomy moralising’ as Gabriel refers to it - ‘the newspapers were right’ in their dissemination of facts (Illuminations 86; D 233, 255). Not only does ‘the communicability of experience’ decrease in modernity, as Benjamin says explaining the loss of this figure, but also experience itself ‘has fallen in value’: the ‘new form of communication is information’ (86, 84, 88). Refusing to ‘linger on the past’ in his speech, Gabriel falls back on mythical imagery as rhetorical conventions that expose his ambivalence between the old world and the new, and his difficulty to carry out the task of the interpretation of the modern world that the newspapers perform with such ease, ‘elucidating all these intricate questions’, as the young narrator of “The Sisters” admires.
Ironically, the informational fact that the newspapers had publicized was orally communicated to Gabriel by Mary Jane, another vapid performer in the story. Whereas Benjamin warns that it is ‘fatuous’ to grieve for the loss of ‘the epic side of truth, wisdom’, ‘to see in it merely a “symptom of decay”, let alone a “modern” symptom’, Gabriel is caught between despondency and optimism; his melancholy before the snow that has become for him a symbol of silence, anonymity and death is juxtaposed with his confident resolution ‘to set out on his journey westward’ (86, 255).

Linking the genre of the short story with the oral tradition, Kiberd argues that *Dubliners* ‘bears positively no trace of the oral tradition’: ‘Where the oral tradition took the spectacular as its subject, Joyce finds poetry in the commonplace. Where the oral tales climaxed in blood-baths and supernatural reversals, Joyce’s epiphanies describe nothing more momentous than the passing of a coin’ (48). The banality of newspaper stories links them with Joyce’s: ‘Every morning brings us the news of the globe, and yet we are poor in noteworthy stories’, Benjamin remarks, holding accountable the conflation of event and explanation that newspapers provide; the “expenditure” of interpretation that results from such ‘prompt verifiability’ (89). In the suspension of disbelief, however, with which Joyce’s stories end as a result of the psychological turmoil and exposition of ‘the profound perplexity of the living’ that distinguishes the modern novel for Benjamin, Joyce reconciles the storyteller with the journalist, raising, as he will continue to, the question of the significance of genre (87). The “epiphany” that ends each story promising revelation, brings partial resolution and highlights this ‘profound perplexity’.

The ‘average comprehensibility’ of the everyday, only ‘demonstrates [its] incomprehensibility’, for Joyce as for Heidegger: ‘It shows that an enigma lies *a priori* in every relation and being toward beings as beings’ (44). This ‘average understanding of Being’, however, is not something superfluous to its meaning, but ‘ultimately belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself’ (46). The coincidence of comprehensibility with incomprehensibility, moreover, does not lead to nihilism, but creates a new “science”: ‘The undefinability of Being does not dispense with the question of its meaning but compels that question’; although in Joyce’s work the need to raise this question recurrently becomes -

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33 The similarities of Heidegger with Joyce can be traced back to their exegesis of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, ardently undertaken by both of these philosophers. Aristotle there begins his ‘investigation of the truth’ with the warning that it is ‘in one way hard, in another easy’: ‘every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed’ (II.1).
problematically and parodically - a compulsion. Heidegger indeed emphasised that this question has yet to be 'formulated' (44-5).³⁴

The ‘real “movement” of the sciences’ for Heidegger is hermeneutic: ‘the revision of these basic concepts’ (50). Modern literature, in distinction from the folk tale that is ‘an echo of old mythologies’, as Kiberd argues, participates in this revision, as ‘a deliberate criticism of actual life’ (46). Joyce distinguishes himself as a modern and modernist writer through his relentless dramatisation of the ambivalence that these conflicting artistic and historical ideals create that will ultimately lead to a declaration of war against language itself. ³⁵ The critical and philosophical impulse that characterises Stephen as an artist, denies him the ability to ‘tell a story’. While this allows him to avoid the philosophical fallacy of resolving theoretical questions by resorting to storytelling - ‘as if Being had the character of a possible being’ - it also condemns him to silence (Heidegger 46). Although the modernist writer distinguishes himself by ‘laying bare and exhibiting the ground’, his philosophical credentials render him a “fraud” as an artist (49). Even though he creates an air of ‘mystery’ through his philosophical theory, he perplexes rather than captivates his audience, luring them ‘to the threshold of sleep’ through boredom rather than enchantment (Ideas of Good and Evil 250). While bawdiness and alcohol help to keep Stephen’s audiences interested in Ulysses, the narrator of Finnegans Wake has to beg for patience: ‘Now, patience; and remember patience is the great thing, and above all things else we must avoid anything like being or becoming out of patience’ (108).

The “moral of the story” that the teller of the Wake attempts to provide, is replaced with the “meaning of life” in the novel according to Benjamin, the incomprehensibility of which exposes the narrator’s limitations and grand aspirations before an increasingly “impatient” reader, who armed with a stack of facts, sees himself as ‘an expert—even if not a professional’ (Illuminations 99; “Author as Producer” 4). The loneliness of the reader transforms him into a critic and “scholar”: ‘In this solitude of his, the reader of a novel seizes upon his material more jealously than anyone else. He is ready to make it completely his own, to devour it, as it were. Indeed, he destroys, he swallows up the material as the fire devours logs in the fireplace. The suspense which permeates the novel is very much like the draft which stimulates the flame in the fireplace and enlivens its play’ (Illuminations 100). The modern writer may try to disguise his scepticism in order to present himself as a source of authority and credibility, but he is confronted with ‘an audience of lonely sceptics who

³⁴ Heidegger was similarly aware of this paradox, prophesying that this ‘crisis’ of ‘basic concepts’ would ultimately lead to the “death” of philosophy (50).
³⁵ ‘What the language will look like when I have finished I don’t know. But having declared war I shall go on “jusqu’au bout”’, he told Harriet Shaw Weaver (JJ 580).
insist on a literature which reflects their everyday lives’ (Kiberd 47). A battle of “Wills” ensues, as Stephen’s Hamlet theory presentation will reveal.

The storyteller, however, is for Benjamin ‘the man who could let the wick of his life be consumed completely by the gentle flame of his story’ (108). Although deconstruction celebrates this consummation- as a modern phenomenon, the Wicker of the Wake refuses such “martyrdom” and flees rather that disappears. His multiple manifestations expose his many disguises through his manipulation of language. Having been the voice of the nation, he cannot be “distinguished” - or can be as Here Comes Everybody - exposing the paradox of the nationalist project whereby an illustrious bard like Shakespeare rather than Amergin, is sought to revive the nation’s literature and morale.

Like all the schemas of Ulysses, this modern antagonism between journalist and artist is both implicitly suggested and explicitly subverted in the ‘parallel courses’ of these two figures that are traced throughout the novel; “parallax” in the disorientation of the narration that even manages to “lose” both characters as a result of visual impairment and distracted by grander processions and imposturous sounds (U 776). Stephen is too preoccupied with ghosts to view Bloom as a rival, while Bloom’s bourgeois fantasy of authorship while ‘Asquat on the cuckstool’ is based on the financial success of Philip Beaufoy following the publication of his ‘prize titbit’ in a weekly magazine; a piece of “art” that although it ‘did not move or touch him’ emotionally, ‘was something quick and neat’ that aided his bowel movements (83-4). Stephen is by contrast pitied, consoled and counselled rather than ‘envied kindly’.

The dualism characterises the narrative rather than the protagonists, reflecting the ‘profound changes in apperception’ in modernity that have confounded its theorist(s) (Illuminations 235). The great mass of cultural debris that litters both content and form appears to announce the ‘birth of the reader-as-writer’, allowing the reader to usurp the authority of the artist in his proficiency as critic and hermeneut: ‘to become the “hero” of a drama involving the editing and deciphering of texts’ (Rabaté, Authorized Reader 152; Politics of Egoism 194). The ‘increased mass of participants’, however, who attend ‘Uninvited’ ‘the feast of the world's culture’, populating the text as both guests and enemies - “Hostis non hostis” - proffer an alternative ‘mode of participation’ to the impatient reader and expose the author’s composition as ‘an epical forged cheque … for his own private profit’ (Benjamin, Illuminations 239; U 686; P 194; FW 181). Revelling in his own distraction and destruction, the author assumes many disguises to elude accountability for the anarchy of his text. Like a bard who freely interrupts his narrative plot with vignettes that showcase his creative talent and sustain the attention of his audience, or an ancient historian
who borrows the bardic method of circular composition and supplements his accounts with diversions in order to authenticate his claims, or perhaps adopting the modern ‘literary occupation’ of ‘author-journalist’ who understands the advertising value of quotations as ‘Wisdom while you wait’, distraction is a key element of his craft (U 584, 361).

Distraction rather than intellectual engagement allows the empowerment of the modern audience for Benjamin. ‘Reception in a state of distraction’ is a radical response to the aestheticisation of political life as a way of seducing the masses to take part in its ritual and cultic practices (Illuminations 240). Film, for Benjamin, ‘makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one’ (240-1). In a similar manner, although Ulysses elevates the reader to the pedestal of scholarship, the spectacle of ‘The absentminded beggar’ that it stages is not only a parody of Stephen as a failed artist, but also exposes the ‘hierophantic’ pretensions of the narrative, and makes intellectual engagement seem preposterous; the reader turned scholar begins to wonder like Stephen whether s/he is ‘condemned to do this’ (239, 280, 266).

In contrast to the epiphanic ‘gropings’ of Stephen’s ‘spiritual eye’ while “glimpsing” at ‘the inscrutable dial of the Ballast Office’, the ‘troubled eyes’ of the new theorist of Ulysses Bloom, are raised towards the ‘ballastoffice’ as a diversion from anxious thoughts (SH 216; U 194). Far from an epiphany, his gropings of the “object”- the ‘Timeball’, lead to further perplexity; he is reminded of his inability to understand the meaning of the word ‘parallax’, highlighting the significance of hermeneutics that Stephen had ignored in his theory of the instantaneous revelation of the ‘whatness’ of the object that the man of letters must ‘record’ (SH 216, 218). Bloom’s bewilderment, however, does not last long, as this memory is supplemented by that of Molly’s creative hermeneutics based on punning that turns bemusement into amusement. The multivalency of language allows the elusion of physical or metaphysical questions, but as well as highlighting this relentless wo/anderer’s “indifference”, it manifests an ever-widening horizon of interpretations, through which the actors of Finnegans Wake will wander.

Having announced the commencement of a ritual performance on the part of the artist-fulfilled most conspicuously in Stephen’s theory presentation in “Scylla and Charybdis” that ends with a benediction in the name of ‘the druid priests of Cymbeline’, and a ritual procession across Dublin on the part of the journalist, it appears that ‘exhibition

36 As “change”, parallax is the antithesis of the stasis that characterises Stephen’s epiphany. It is also the cornerstone of Aristotle’s natural science, a concept that even Bloom, a ‘distinguished phenomenologist’, struggles with in the monotony and routine that distinguishes time in modernity (U 445).
value begins to displace cult value all along the line’, as stylistic experimentation overshadows any other “activity” (280; *Illuminations* 225). The regretful alienation of the modern artist from his audience exposes art’s professed ‘dependence on ritual’ as ‘parasitical’ (224). The one time illustrious bard, named ‘parasites- a Greek word meaning “dining companion”’ of ‘the wealthiest of Celtic chiefs’, is now ‘but a shy guest’ (Freeman 141; *P* 194). Whereas in Yeats’s ideal vision ‘The enchanted audience, having become … “a single mind, a single energy”, are moved to “murmur” these shared rhythms after the poet or reciter’, the audiences in Joyce’s fiction - with the exception of “The Dead” - repeatedly revolt against the speaker (Schuchard 217).

II. Bard

*i. A dreadful bard*

*Ulysses* opens with a parody of a sacrament performed by Mulligan that will pale in comparison to the exuberance of the festivities that the novel will celebrate, but which sounds the call to its ‘displeased and sleepy’ reader to attend ‘Solemnly’ to its ritual performance (1). Dressed in liturgically symbolic vestments, Mulligan usurps Stephen’s role as ‘priest of the eternal imagination’ and exposes the ambitions of the young idealist in his crass interpretation of that role (*P* 240). Rather than having imaginatively transformed this paradigm of the role of the author and his relation to his (national in particular) audience like Shelley and the Symbolists, Stephen is shown to have remained trapped by the language, doctrines and symbols of his Scholastic schooling and the archetypes that his masters imparted to him. The invocation of the muse in this epic is replaced with the priest’s invocation of the Holy Ghost, which ‘answering Pope Gregory’s prayer – descends upon him and enables him to sing the liturgical chant for the Introit’ (Petersen in Havsteen 104). Calling on Stephen to ascend rather than descend, Mulligan ascribes to him the role of the ghost, mimicking his designation of the role of the ghost to the Bard in his theory. Stephen’s gestural poetics are interpreted by making ‘rapid crosses in the air, gurgling in his throat and shaking his head’, while his Eucharistic transubstantiation of his shaving water - a materialist rendition of Stephen’s “epiphany” - is a further parody of the artist’s spiritual contraptions (1).

Stephen has retained his pose as a “theorist”, although here as a reluctant ‘watcher’ of Mulligan’s showmanship. Envious of his magniloquence, the orator before him is seen as ‘Chrysostomos’- ironically a crusader against the abuse of authority. Imagined also as ‘a
prelate, patron of arts in the middle ages’, Mulligan circumscribes antagonistically ‘the freedom and power of his soul’ through which Stephen had prophesied in the Portrait ‘He would create proudly’, following in the footsteps of ‘the great artificer whose name he bore’ (2; P 184). That name, which for Stephen as for Joyce in his youth was invested with mythical powers in the quidditas it had the capacity to epiphanise, is degraded by Mulligan to a ‘mockery’ - a theatrical derisory imitation (2). Whereas his name had sounded to Athy in the beginning of the Portrait ‘like Latin’ - fittingly as the novel relates Stephen’s tale to the Ovidian myth - Mulligan, going back to ‘the original’, and displaying his philological credentials, exposes the ‘mockery’ of the higher power that has cast Stephen as ‘an ancient Greek’ (23).

Disentangling the pagan roots of the Christian ritual, Mulligan dissolves the mystery that keeps the congregation like the audience of his magical tricks enthralled. His scholarship, however, is similarly an idealised pose that Stephen had assumed, but which here belongs to the ‘dreadful’ ‘ponderous Saxon’ who is occupying the tower (2). Intent on finding a fitting ‘name’ for Stephen to distinguish his role among all these adepts, Mulligan turns to another “original” title - bard. As originality in modernity for the Nietzschean Mulligan is only possible as an archaeological search for mythical origins, he proffers to Stephen the role of the antiquarian’s Celtic bard. The “aura” that is seen ‘shrivelling’ ‘with an artificial build-up of the “personality”’ of Mulligan with ritual turning into exhibitionism, traverses a retrogressive course through time; but with his emphasis on the “new” and the “original” Mulligan evokes rather the Romantic genius (Illuminations 231). In a literal rendition of the Fichtean spontaneity of the self-positing I, Mulligan suggests Stephen colours his art through his self-production of snot, turning his ‘noserag’ into a marketable relic (3). While his author had been able to merge the two bardic traditions in “Gas From a Burner” - a bardic invective written by Joyce in 1912 that anticipated the ‘obscene’ production of the ‘alshemist’ of Finnegans Wake ‘from his unheavenly body’ - Stephen is absorbed by ‘moody brooding’ in “Telemachus”, and as in the Portrait, ‘the mystery of his own body’ is still a source of ‘dread’ for him (FW 185; U 9; P 182).

The feminised “bat-like” soul of Ireland, eroticised in its shrouded mystery and expressive of a metaphysical as well as a carnal desire that had lured Stephen in the Portrait to probe its mysteries, a symbol of Stephen’s artistic inspiration but also of his haughty detachment as a philosopher-poet from the dark mythical past of his nation, disintegrates after his mother’s death into a series of material objects: ‘Her secrets’ are ‘toys’ rather than implements he had planned to use to ‘forge’ with in the ‘smithy’ of his soul (10; P 276). As in the Divine Comedy, the veil drops in “Telemachus” to reveal a siren; the soul is
metamorphosed into a ‘Ghoul’, while the dualism of the physical and the metaphysical is transformed into a contrast between the material and the void (11). The symbolic language of Swinburne’s ‘great sweet mother’ is dissolved for Stephen in the face of life- and theology, as the sea turns into ‘a dull green mass of liquid’ like the bowl of bile by his mother’s bed (3, 4). As ‘a bowl of bitter waters’, theological symbolism once again overshadows Stephen’s thoughts, as he presents a Hebrew translation of the name of the mother of the church offered by St. Jerome as ‘pikra thalassa, bitter sea’- ‘mar (bitter) and yam (sea)’ (9; Maas, “The Name of Mary”).

While Mulligan’s mocking chanting initially evokes in Stephen a romantic vision of a harp being played by an indistinct ‘hand’, this stereotypical symbol of Irish nationalism fails to placate the unrest that Stephen’s mythical mothers awaken (9). The cultural memories that the bard preserves are overshadowed by personal memories and the ‘Phantasmal mirth’ of fashionable performances. But the very act of remembrance is also painful for Stephen; the memory of human mortality nullifies the symbolism of the relics of his mother. Rather than Phemius or even Telemachus, Stephen rather resembles Penelope, whose ‘unforgettable sorrow’ prevents her from enjoying the ‘excellent’ singing of the bard and requests a change of subject, as Stephen will when Bloom queries his relation to his motherland (Lattimore 36).

In this vision Stephen finds himself again in the position of an actor rather than a creator; coalescing in his memory the pantomime his mother had enjoyed with his own solitary performance, he creates a nightmare production of a Hamlet-like scene that he cannot wholly lay claim to as its producer, as it is partly an “epiphany” of his unconscious. He assumes the role of the protagonist, although he refuses the sacrifice that his role in this tragic performance commands: ‘No, mother! Let me be and let me live’, recalling the reassertion of authority of Hamlet and Telemachus in defiance of their mother’s wishes; in the case of Telemachus a defense also of artistic freedom in his admonition to his mother to not ‘begrudge this excellent singer his pleasing himself as the thought drives him’, as ‘It is not the singers who are to blame’ but Zeus (U 11; Lattimore 36). In his insurrection against the ghost of his mother, moreover, Stephen recreates the uprising of the audience of the inaugural performance of The Countess Cathleen, reinterpreted here as both an act of resistance against mythical absorption and as a condemnation of the ‘playwright who wrote the folio of this world’ (U 273).

Commanding, however, Penelope to return to her loom, distaff and handmaids, Telemachus declares that ‘the men must see to discussion’, making a distinction which

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37 “We can’t change the country. Let us change the subject” (U 748).
undermines Stephen’s challenge, as he is effeminised in his choice of silence as a weapon and alienated from the male community (36). While Telemachus is prompted by the gods, Stephen mourns the loss of his “inspiration” (that he will recover later with the help of alcoholic spirits) and has to become his own muse, replacing inspiration with philosophical musing. Struggling to maintain his idealised critical distance in the face of a real life tragedy, moreover, his artistic credentials are put in doubt, and he assumes once again the modest role of the exegete of the Bard and playwright, in an increasingly futile denial of performance.

While Yeats had distinguished the performative role of the bard from that of the actor, “because in his art he must possess and retain a strong and unique “personality”’’ and ‘Unlike the actor, he dramatizes only himself in striving to re-live the story, not to act it’, as Schuchard notes, the location of both performances in the theatre had compromised this distinction: ‘When the Abbey Theatre finally became a reality in 1904, it was from the outset envisioned as a theatre of musical speech and chanted verse, a theatre in which actors on the stage would also serve as reciters in the streets’ (214, xxii). The distinction, moreover, was tenuous; the bard for Plato as for nationalism is above all a mouthpiece - of the gods and of national tradition - rather than an author, or even an “individual”. He is a ‘third-removed interpreter’: ‘the interpreter as a paradigm of the poet, himself only an interpreter of divinely inspired knowledge’, and as both the gods and tradition become more difficult to interpret in modernity, he becomes above all an emblem of a lost tradition (Judovitz in Cascardi ed. 31, 30). It is his role in society and relation to his audience that modern writers covet, disdaining the new forms of communication and demands of the modern public. The printed word was associated with the dissemination of information through ‘newspapers, prayer books, popular novels’ for Yeats, that the Irish ‘general public’ read to the exclusion of Irish literature that was celebrated only in England (Autobiographies 296). The artist had to distinguish his mode of communication, appealing to his audience though the spoken word: ‘if Ireland would not read literature it might listen to it, for politics and the Church had created listeners’ (296).

Yeats’s early project ‘to establish a new “Library of Ireland”, comprised of books by the best contemporary writers and scholars for the distribution to small Irish towns’ was sidelined in favour of the creation of a live audience, in his growing conviction that the literary reader was conspicuously absent in Ireland: ‘The people of Ireland respect letters and read nothing. They hold the words ‘poet’ and ‘thinker’ honourable, yet buy no books’, he regretfully remarked in 1892 (McDiarmid in Litz et al. 156). Stephen similarly reflects upon his misinterpretation of the role of the artist and the stagnation of culture in terms of institutional libraries. The ‘studious silence of the library of Saint Genevieve where he had
read, sheltered from the sin of Paris, night by night’ is a reflection of his detachment from life, art, readers and a live audience (U 30). In the company of ‘Fed and feeding brains’ ‘under glowlamps, impaled, with faintly beating feelers’, he is instead caught in the circle of reason- ‘Thought is the thought of thought’; ‘the soul is the form of forms’, as the futility of his youthful quest for the “enlightenment” of his ‘mind’s darkness’ through the lamps of men of letters is exposed (30-1). ‘Come out of them, Stephen’, the creative mind of “Proteus” will urge: ‘Beauty is not there. Nor in the stagnant bay of Marsh's library where you read the fading prophecies of Joachim Abbas. For whom? The hundredheaded rabble of the cathedral close’ (49). His failure to imaginatively reconstruct an “ideal audience”, as the Revival had in order to fill the void of the repudiated rabblement, renders his art meaningless; silent in the absence of an audience, as the ideal recipient of his epiphanies- ‘the great libraries of the world, including Alexandria’, exposes (50).

While the role of the artist for the Revivalists had been constricted by the ideal of the bard and his audience circumscribed by a sublimated ideal of the peasant, Stephen’s own devotion to Ireland as an ‘Isle of saints’ had created a ‘saint’ rather than a poet whose work appealed to a mythically devout reader (49). As Stephen’s interpretation of the role of the artist in the National Library will suggest, the Irish artist has to ‘dress the character’ for his public performance in order to gain success and popularity. He lays claim to the creation of a communal spirit through enchantment and active engagement with his audience rather than through the presupposition of a Kantian aesthetic universality- a subjective universality relying on the universal communicability of the aesthetic experience that modernity had lost faith in. The very idea of universality becomes suspect as the re-emerging spectre of a “rabblement” in Stephen’s thoughts reveals. The narrow group of boisterous intellectuals he revels with instead, however, similarly forces Stephen to market his art in a way that would appeal to his audience rather than allowing him expressive freedom; the narrative indeed traces their transformation into a “rabblement” that Stephen is an indistinguishable part of. As John Nash has argued, while ‘Joyce’s work might seem designed to render any communality impossible’, he also ‘shows that communities are inevitable, if also problematically constituted’ (160).

Universality, moreover, is compromised not only philosophically and politically, but as Allison Pease highlights, through its association with mass culture (179). The bardic pose similarly had an underlying commercial value that was masked through emphasis on the ideological consequence of this role. As a bard, the alienated modern artist hoped to enlarge his audience; presenting this quandary to Georges Borach, Joyce justified his dual allegiance by explaining that although ‘As an artist I am against every state’, ‘I must recognize it, since
indeed in all my dealings I come into contact with its institutions’ (JJ 446). This commercial interest and dependency on the forces of production that becomes apparent in Stephen’s interpretation of the role of the bard, nevertheless brought the modern artist closer to the ancient Irish bard than to his Romantic reincarnation; in contrast to the Romantic bard, ‘an inspired, isolated, and peripatetic figure’ ‘standing apart and transcending [his] particular time and place’, the Irish *fíli* was ‘in the service of an oppressive feudal order’ (Trumpener 6, 212). As Mangan’s poem “O’Hussey’s Ode to the MacGuire” illustrates - a bard’s lamentation in honour of his dead king that Joyce liked to recite according to Budgen - the bards ‘worked for the status quo, for the maintenance of their own status and that of the king. They protected the king against sorcery and they were tightly bound to him in a form of mutual obligation and support’ (182, MacMathúna in Welch ed. 6).

The Revival’s idealisation of the role of the bard as the voice of the people had shrouded this partisan and conservative feature. In “Bardic Ireland” Yeats had presented the bards as isolated figures who ‘kept by rules of their order apart from war and the common affairs of men, rode hither and tither gathering up the dim feelings of the time, and making them conscious’, but were also figures of authority: ‘The bards were the most powerful influence in the land, and all manner of superstitious reverence environed them around’ (*Collected Works* IX 110). Stephen’s unashamed question ‘Would I make any money by it?’ posed to Haines who politely expresses his desire to ‘make a collection of your sayings if you will let me’, brings him therefore closer to the ancient bard employed in the service of his well-spoken king (18). Stephen, acutely conscious and resentful of his servitude, at first resists this role that Mulligan has chosen for him: ‘I get paid this morning’, he replies following Mulligan’s suggestion to ‘Touch him for a quid’- ‘A guinea’, rephrased by Mulligan to make the transaction sound nobler (11). Despite Stephen’s unassuming occupation as a teacher, however, Mulligan insists on his role as a performer: ‘We’ll have a glorious drunk to astonish the druidy druids’, he declares, conceding at least that Stephen’s role as bard is more “pragmatic”.

By the end of the first chapter Stephen successfully dresses his character, as he departs from the tower by casting a spell: ‘Horn of a bull, hoof of a horse, smile of a Saxon’, while Mulligan is disrobed: ‘The priest's grey nimbus in a niche where he dressed discreetly’ (27-8). His appearance in the next chapter suggests he has accepted the role that Mulligan ascribed to him, as he views himself as a ‘bullockbefriending bard’ in his encounter with Mr. Deasy (44). He will recall this epithet three more times, and only under the influence of drink he will find it empowering. His evocation of this theatrical role will nevertheless reflect his increasing self-consciousness: in his advertisement parable in “Aeolus” it will
reveal his understanding that his role is a ‘trade’ rather than (or as well as) a divine calling, while in his theory presentation to the Irish literati he will display his onerous awareness of the influence of history, as he will there rehearse the role of the bard’s Romantic reincarnation as the lonely Hamlet who walks ‘reading the book of himself’ (239). It will be left to the citizen in “Cyclops”, however, to exhibit - more forcefully than Stephen’s silent oath - those mythical powers of the bard to bless and curse, and to exhort the narrative to develop mimetically his ‘gigantesque element’ ‘into a greatness and solemnity’ and his ‘vagueness and indeterminateness into that misty immensity and weird obscurity’, as MacPherson did according to Standish O’Grady (46).

Even in “Telemachus”, however, Stephen finds himself sharing the role of the bard with a growing number of contenders. The milkwoman who enters the scene ‘from a morning world, maybe a messenger’, has similarly been given ‘names’ from ‘old times’, and is like the peripatetic but servile bard ‘A wandering crone, lowly form of an immortal serving her conqueror and her gay betrayer’; although now she too expects payment (15). Like the bard, moreover, she has the power to bless and curse- ‘To serve or to upbraid’, but is also in modernity simply a national emblem as ‘Silk of the kine and poor old woman’ and a “mythical” figure: ‘a witch on her toadstool’. As a server of ‘rich white milk, not hers’, she also symbolises the figure of the nurse, another disappearing figure that once ‘embodied oral abundance’ but in the modern world ‘begins to represent a repressed collective unconscious’: ‘She is at once a figure for the persistence of memory (her own memory shores up the past; the memory of her is a triumph over the forces of amnesia) and like the bard before her, an emblem of how much is irrecoverably forgotten’ (Trumpener 197, 198).

The role of the nurse in shaping the ‘collective unconscious’ had been acknowledged by Joyce in “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages”, where crediting the nurse with the preservation of the collective memory of his nation, he emphasised the political consequence of her guardianship, even on someone ‘in whose veins not a single drop of Celtic blood ran’: ‘If Parnell was a thorn in the side of the English, it was because, in his boyhood in Wicklow, he heard the tale of English ferocity from his nurse’ (OCPW 115, 119). In the Portrait, it is similarly through Dante that Stephen is introduced to the political stage and its religious and ideological divisions with the ‘brushes in her press’- one for Parnell and one for Michael Davitt (3). She even introduces Stephen to bribery, giving him ‘a cachou every time he

38 For Emer Nolan, ‘the milkwoman, the ‘Poor old Woman’, stands as the representative of an uncomprehending Irish audience and Haines for a readily available metropolitan readership’ (62). She is, however, equally misunderstood by the three intellectuals who read her as a clichéd symbol of a mythical motherland. Her incomprehension indeed allows her to elude the roles she ascribed. Like Haines who is both a writer in his editorial role as “collector” and a potential reader of Stephen’s compositions, the milkwoman is similarly both a symbol of oral culture and of silence.
brought her a piece of tissue paper’, and vengeance and subjugation through her ominous poem of eagles that would pull out his eyes if he failed to apologise (4).

With a heavy dose of irony, Dante’s knowledge of national divisions and ‘heartburn’, make Stephen consider her to be ‘a clever woman and a well-read woman’ (7). But she is also herself a divisive figure as a result of the deep-rooted traditions and beliefs that distinguish her character, disrupting the idyllic Christmas scene with her antagonistic hieratic ‘language of the Holy Ghost’ and prophetic vision that Stephen will ‘remember all this when he grows up’ (31). As the foreboding tales of Dante about the future are counterposed with the tale of Mr Casey’s inane and impertinent act of resistance against a hysterical woman, an unbridgeable rift between men and women is registered for Stephen, while the exchange of violent and abusive language alienates him from his elders and their traditions. The door-slamming of Nora in The Doll’s House is re-enacted as the antithesis of Ibsenite “heroism” and “feminism” to highlight the ‘paralysis’ of both men and women that similarly, however, reduces a male protagonist to tears, in a “terror”-generating drama for its theorist, Stephen, not mature enough to critically unravel the subtexts of symbols and idols.

Like the bard, the nurse is an ambivalent figure, Katie Trumpener argues: ‘If the nurse evokes the bards’ traditional strengths – their prodigious memory, their narrative powers, and their loyalty to their masters – she also recapitulates their legendary weakness: their credulity, their partisanship, their uncritical allegiance to the ruling house, and their willingness to fabricate mythic histories in the service of an oppressive feudal order’, which might explain Stephen’s resentment towards the milkwoman- his fear of her magical powers and derision of her servility (212). The tale of Parnell’s nurse is similarly shown to have perpetuated both resistance and ferocity that Joyce identified with the English but also with the ‘internecine strife’ in ‘the three centuries that preceded the arrival of the English’ (OCPW 113). It is a tale, moreover, that Joyce suggests should not be immortalised: ‘Just as ancient Egypt is dead, so is ancient Ireland. Its dirge has been sung and the seal set upon its gravestone’. The “moral” of the tale, Joyce argues, has become a reminder of ‘failures’, betrayals, servitude, violence and a feudal order.

As a ‘messenger’ from ‘a morning world’, the milkwoman is not only an Athena figure - a counterpart to ‘Mercurial Malachi’, the prophetic messenger of the god - but also Yeats’s ‘ideal reciter’ with ‘a magical vision of life that informs his being’, who Yeats describes as the “messenger” of the poet (15, 19; Schuchard 216). ‘As the creative process is analogous, in Yeats’s mind to the magical process, the reciter’s knowledge of ancient secrets significantly increases his interpretive power’, Schuchard explains. However, even though the milkwoman is ascribed all these bardic characteristics, she is like the ‘dreadful bard’ a
“mute” figure: ‘I'm ashamed I don't speak the language myself’ (16). She even lacks ‘interpretive power’, and unable to understand, she has to trust the experts: ‘I'm told it's a grand language by them that knows’. Language is not only in the hands of the occupiers, but also of the professionals- the scholar and the ‘medicineman’.

“Silence”, as the figure of the milkwoman highlights, is not only a consequence of the loss of or alienation from tradition; while the relinquishment of language to ‘them that knows’ designates the link between knowledge and power, it also highlights the specialisation of modern culture that Adorno and Horkheimer argue is paradoxically also a homogenisation: ‘The sociological view that the loss of support from objective religion and the disintegration of the last precapitalist residues, in conjunction with technical and social differentiation and specialization, have given rise to cultural chaos is refuted by daily experience. Culture today is infecting everything with sameness’ (94). While specialisation has lead to severance and estrangement, Habermas argues, it has also resulted in a ‘reified everyday praxis’: ‘The differentiation of science, morality, and art has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and at the same time letting them split off from the hermeneutics of everyday communication’ (9, 11). For Habermas, as for Benjamin before him, he argues, ‘Far from being a guarantor of liberation, the development away from ritual ominously forebodes a specific loss in experience’ (“Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism” 44).

As a ‘cultured allroundman’ with ‘a touch of the artist’, Bloom reveals the paradoxical position that the art-loving layman finds himself in modern bourgeois society: ‘On the one hand, the layman who enjoyed art should educate himself to become an expert. On the other hand, he should also behave as a competent consumer who uses art and relates aesthetic experiences to his own life problems. This second, and seemingly harmless, manner of experiencing art has lost its radical implications, exactly because it had a confused relation to the attitude of being expert and professional’ (Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity” 11-12). While Joyce’s acclaimed elevation of the reader to the pedestal of authorship as an “Authorized Reader” is presented as revolutionary, the dualism of “disinterested” expert and involved consumer is a paradox characteristic of Joyce’s art that cannot be overcome through an ideal expert reader who seizes the functions of the author but also ‘accedes to the play of this incompleation’ (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 32). The celebration of Joyce’s ‘creation of a new reader’, overcomes this dualism through the notional creation of a not quite human functional reader who fails to register the irony in the oxymoron of ‘an ideal insomnia’ (FW 120). While Bloom is able to bridge the gap between the two roles through his role as producer- as ‘THE CANVASER AT WORK’, and Joyce
seems to echo Benjamin’s future vision of ‘the author as producer’ which ‘must be derived from the press’, he also accedes like Benjamin that as the newspapers ‘still belong to capital’, this role is problematic (152; “Author as Producer” 3).

ii. Musemathematics: The decay of the aura(l)?

Although the bardic ideal appears to be undermined in Joyce’s modernist epic, the figure of the bard, the characteristics of his language and method of composition keep reappearing throughout the novel in various forms and disguises, challenging his modern antagonists, as well as being challenged by them. As in Finnegans Wake, a dialogue is set up between eye and ear, between the visual art of the canvasser and the aural of the poet. Joyce saw like Benjamin that the confusion of the nach einander and the nebeneinander was a consequence of technical reproduction and the ‘frenetic sensationalism’ that distinguishes modern culture, a “crisis” of art that Joyce had located historically in the Renaissance, and portrayed negatively in 1912: ‘The Renaissance, to put is briefly, has placed the journalist in the monk’s chair: in other words, it has deposed a sharp, limited and formal mind in order to hand the sceptre over to a mentality that is facile and wide-ranging (as the saying goes in theatre journals), a mentality that is restless and somewhat amorphous’ (OCPW 188). 39

While Joyce celebrated the emancipatory capacity of modern art, he also highlighted that modernity had inherited ‘the restless search for what is new and strange, the accumulation of details that have been observed or read, the parading of common culture’ from a previous Renaissance of culture (189).

Ritual, ‘the parading of common culture’, showed no signs of “decline” for Joyce, and he sought to expose the continuities and “renaissance” of these rituals in modernity. The profusion of staged ritual performances in Joyce’s work highlights the variety of ways that the aural and the oral were still intertwined with the oracular, particularly in Ireland which possessed a ‘powerful tradition of public oratory, ecclesiastical, political, and forensic’ that was still alive in Dublin, as Hugh Kenner has noted, but had been ‘degraded’ to a ‘spectral colloquial reality’ (Dublin’s Joyce 15-6, 21). The spectacle and the ‘spectral colloquial reality’ are shown by Joyce to converge in their shared theatricality: ‘The Irish public man was regarded, like Agamemnon, Parnell’s analogue in Ulysses, as both doctus orator and a

39 Benjamin similarly locates the ‘first deep crisis’ of art in the Renaissance: ‘The secular cult of beauty, developed during the Renaissance and prevailing for three centuries, clearly showed that ritualistic basis in its decline and the first deep crisis which befell it’ (Illuminations 224).
tragic hero’, Kenner argues (16). Reduced by Joyce to a ‘rehearsal of received speculations’, these revered performative roles are repeatedly conflated, parodied and interrogated (20).

In “Ireland: Island of Saints and Sages”, Joyce had presented the Irish oral tradition as a cause of deprivation, deception and delusion, and he had criticised even the traces of this tradition in modern Ireland. Quoting a dialogue between two Irish artists shown to be celebrating that ‘We Irish … have nothing, but we’re the greatest talkers since the days of the ancient Greeks’, he links orality with political failure and emphasises the limitations of the spoken word in the public sphere: ‘though the Irish are eloquent, a revolution is not made from human breath, and Ireland has already had enough of compromises, misunderstandings and misapprehensions’ (OCPW 126). 40 Presenting the nineteenth century as ‘the most insistently parliamentary age in Britain’s history’, Matthew Bevis highlights the significance of oratory in the relation between politics and art: ‘a commitment to literary eloquence involved consideration of how far it might, or should, be both a ‘weapon’ and ‘an art’’ (16, 3). While ‘Prolixity became a weapon in the fight for political freedom’ in the campaign for Home Rule after the Act of Union, however, Bevis shows that Joyce’s scepticism about the consequence of Irish oratorical prowess was shared by many of his compatriots after Parnell: ‘For some, the fall of Parnell and the subsequent split of the party demonstrated the inefficacy of a parliamentary solution to the Irish question; for others, Irish garrulity indicated an eloquence that was self-defeating on account of its self-promotion’ (205, 206). However, despite this hesitancy with regard to the spoken word in its association with oratory, both eloquence and garrulity, song and gesture, particularly in their dialogue with the silence of the written word and isolation of the writer, distinguish Joyce’s idiomatic language. As Kenner highlights, it is Joyce’s esteem for and experimentation with the spoken word that distinguishes his poetics and “dramatic theory”: ‘he scrutinized talk as the old rhetoricians did, intent on systematizing its gestures into miniature dramatic situations’ (Dublin’s Joyce 13). Even the stream of consciousness of Joyce’s characters bears the marks of this oral culture: ‘‘Bloom is the Ciceronian doctus orator in final decay. He goes through the day uttering an immensely intricate monologue that no one hears’’ (214-5).

The newspaper office, the modern fortress of the written word that safeguards the publication and dissemination of the ‘GREAT DAILY ORGAN’ of the nation, is in

40 Alan Friedman, argues that Yeats ‘thought that Wilde himself was primarily an oral performer’; but even though Joyce here appears to implicitly associate Yeats and Wilde as writers who idealised the role of the bard, Joyce’s own criticism greatly resembles Yeats’s own that ‘The antagonist of imaginative writing in Ireland is not a habit of scientific observation but our interest in matters of opinion’ (1; Collected Works VIII 91).
“Aeolus” invaded by aspiring rhetoricians. Their ‘windy Nous’ causes havoc with the order and consensus of opinion that the newspaper titles seek to establish (FW 56). The dramatisation of the dialogue and antagonism between the written and the spoken word marks ‘the most significant change in the style of narration’ in Ulysses (Lawrence 8). The ‘shift of attention from the dramatic action of the plot to the drama of writing’ that this chapter indicates for Lawrence, is indeed presented as a drama- the headings that interrupt the narrative resemble a dramatic script as well as newspaper titles (12). It appears that the ‘narrative voice advertises its own incompetence’, as the narrator has assumed the role of the dramatist, and it is the Word itself that is the primary actor: ‘style’ is ‘replaced by a series of rhetorical masks’ (46, 8). ‘These masks in the second half of Ulysses both reveal and disguise the author’, as the ‘drama of writing’ that he stages advertises the multivalency of the role of the artist. The ‘series of aesthetic experiments’ in the second half of the book may lead to the “death of the author”, but through exhaustion, as he takes part in his play like Shakespeare as both actor and author, having been “atoned” with his Word- even if his presence is slightly “ghostly” (10).

The ‘process of estrangement from consciousness as ultimate authority’ is consistent with this dramatic shift (63). Distracted by the sounds of the office while trying to compose an advert that ‘Catches the eye’, Bloom finds that as in “Circe”, ‘Everything speaks in its own way’ (106, 154). Like a deus ex machina, the printing machines display their dominion over the human actors: ‘Smash a man to atoms if they got him caught. Rule the world today’; ‘Working away, tearing away’ they threaten man with paralysis and annihilation (150). As in drama, visual and aural stimuli compete: ‘All very fine to jeer at it now in cold print but it goes down like hot cake that stuff’, Bloom defends the material of his art (160). He does not, however, idealise the permanence of the written word. Aware of the materiality of paper, he recurrently thinks how it too can be destroyed. Like Stephen, he indeed associates the written word with death, as a letter is for him a reminder of his father’s suicide, just like Stephen’s memories of the death of his mother are associated with a telegram. More optimistically, however, thinking of the ‘huge webs of paper’ that are cinematographically ‘unreeled’ from the mechanical looms in “Aeolus”, he imagines the potential afterlife of all that paper in ‘various uses, thousand and one things’ (152).

41These men’, for Emer Nolan, ‘as their precarious situation among the clanking printing-presses suggests, are stranded in print culture. They are out of their natural linguistic medium, their very high-sounding words perpetually interrupted by the comic parodies which take the form of newspaper headlines’ (91). Karen Lawrence similarly argues that it is the ‘discontinuity created by the headings’ that is significant in this chapter, which ‘destroys the illusion of a stable narrative voice’ (60). These headings, however, also harbour such an illusion insofar as, as Cheryl Herr argues, domination begins with labelling’ in Joyce’s fiction, and ‘Throughout Ulysses ... the press is an agent of stereotyping and distortion’ (Joyce’s Anatomy of Culture 76, 17).
‘The hearer of oratory may be a mere seeker of aesthetic enjoyment, a θεωρός, or one who forms a judgment on what is to come, or on what is past’, Gilbert remarks, and Stephen indeed appears in this chapter once again as a “theorist” of drama (167). He is “inspired” by eloquence to compose a rhyming fragment and is ‘wooed by grace of language and gesture’ listening to Molloy’s delivery of Bushe’s speech (177). He also considers the role of the orator for himself: ‘Could you try your hand at it yourself?’ (180). His delivery of ‘a vision’ at the end of the chapter, the rhetoric of which has shifted from politics to law, philosophy, art, theology and prophecy to end with an advert - ‘A Pisgah Sight of Palestine or the Parable of The Plums’ - to rival Plumtree's Potted Meat, will challenge the ‘Dead noise’ of oratory with the more complex hermeneutics of art - a portrait of ‘Two old Dublin women on the top of Nelson's pillar’, and expose rhetoric as sophistry (183, 189, 182, 187). While Stephen’s “parable” is not a very good example of either oratory or advertising, as a “plagiarist” - ‘Moses and the promised land. We gave him that idea’ - he shows his grasp of the “currency” he must use to appeal to his audience (189). His “scandalous” tale exposes his view that both journalism and rhetoric employ swindling tactics to “woo” their audience.

The criticism of Joyce in his early essay “The Study of Languages” of ‘The notion of Aristotle and his school, that in a bad cause there can be true oratory’ - dismissed as being ‘utterly false’ - appears to be echoed in Stephen’s association of oratory with meaninglessness: ‘Dead noise’ and the ‘Akasic records’ of theosophy (182). While Stephen’s philosophy in Ulysses is distinctly “negative”, he still retains his belief in the epiphanic capacity of language. His Romanticism is exposed, however, in his desire for the poet to be its “hierophant”. The poetic word is set against the rhetorical, while Stephen’s silent thoughts increasingly interrupt the contest of eye and ear. The verse he composes, however, is repeated until it is emptied of all meaning, and the alluring effect of his rhyming echoes is revealed. As he tries to become his own interpreter, to mix ‘RHYMES AND REASONS’, he begins to fracture the architectonics of his art, revealing ‘Dead noise’: ‘Mouth, south. Is the mouth south someway? Or the south a mouth? Must be some. South, pout, out, shout, drouth’ (175).

Following his composition of “Sirens”, Joyce described this disenchantment as ‘scorching’: ‘The word scorching has a peculiar significance for my superstitious mind not so much because of any quality or merit in the writing itself as for the fact that the progress of the book is in fact like the progress of some sandblast. As soon as I mention or include
any person in it I hear of his death or departure or misfortune: and each successive episode, 
dealing with some province of artistic culture (rhetoric or music or dialectic), leaves behind 
it a burnt up field. Since I wrote the Sirens I find it impossible to listen to music of any kind’, 
Joyce wrote to Harriet Shaw Weaver in July 1919 (Letters I 129). The soundless musical 
performance that is conducted in Sirens is a technical exercise as tedious as Mary Jane’s 
‘Academy piece, full of runs and difficult passages’ that Gabriel could not bear to listen to 
(D 211). The very concept of art is questioned in this technical display. No longer a creator, 
the role of the artist is that of ‘an engineer at work with compass and slide-rule’ (Budgen 
123). Ironically, he simultaneously appears to have reached such heights of inspiration that 
language, meaning and grammar are subsumed in the flow of rhythm and memory in a 
rhythmically rather than historically “timed” episode. “Creating” ceaselessly and almost 
compulsively, blending images with sounds, his art is sheer mimesis of rhythm and movement.

Bloom’s thoughts are similarly inspired, and struggle to be “heard” among the noise 
that this focus on aurality creates. ‘Means something, language of flow’, Bloom thinks trying 
to “make sense” of music, although his hermeneutics are just a repetition of cultural clichés– 
‘Was it a daisy? Innocence that is’ (339). The emphasis on sound and random patterns of 
association that it creates, reveal ‘The matrix of this pseudo-community’ to be ‘not ethos but 
pathos’ (Dublin’s Joyce, Kenner 24). Revenge is taken by the orators who had been 
‘stranded in print culture’ in “Aeolus”, as the emphasis on sound renders Bloom- and the 
reader, “blind” (Nolan 91). As both Bloom and the reader are unable to see the performers, 
the ‘song sang from within’ appears to be ‘voiceless’ (U 340). Once again, the performance 
in this chapter is theatrically staged: ‘Down stage he strode some paces, grave, tall in 
affliction, his long arms outheld’, but the reader is allowed to “see” only a dramatic script: 
‘Upholding the lid he (who?) gazed in the coffin (coffin?) at the oblique triple (piano!) wires. 
He pressed (the same who pressed indulgently her hand), soft pedalling, a triple of keys to 
see the thicknesses of felt advancing, to hear the muffled hammerfall in action’ (349, 339).

‘[T]he whole issue of expression and self-expression’ comes into question, Brad 
Bucknell argues, ‘by highlighting a technical linguistic practice which links the 
representation of inside and outside so closely together, and in so intimate an association 
with music as a social phenomenon, that the possibility of mystical depth becomes 
somewhat flattened against a wall of social interpretive practice’ (7-8). All references in this 
chapter indeed seem pre-interpreted in the ability of song to awaken cultural and national 
memories. While song touches the listeners’ ‘still ears with words, still hearts of their each 
his remembered lives’ and the narrative seems to drift into Bloom’s private recollection, the
dialogue between the transcribed words of the songs and the flow of Bloom’s thoughts obscures the ‘border between interiority and outward expression’; ‘to such a point’, for Bucknell, ‘that the very notion of a self existing outside or separate from communal codes of expression and understanding of that self is cast into doubt through Joyce’s representation of music’ (353, 7). The transcription of interiority, however, casts doubt also on the idea of a communal memory that can be awakened through art, specifically through its live performance. In the neglect of the ‘spoken word which knits us to normal man’, Yeats protested, ‘we have lost in personality, in our delight in the whole man - blood, imagination, intellect, running together - but have found a new delight, in essentials, in states of mind, in pure imagination, in all that comes to us most easily’ (Collected Works of W.B. Yeats Volume IV 195). For Bloom, ‘The human voice’ amounts to ‘two tiny silky chords’ that are ‘wonderful, more than all others’, but are not the vehicle of expression and understanding: ‘It's in the silence after you feel you hear’ (357).

III. Philosopher

1. Perverted transcendentalism and the hubbub of Phenomenon

Although the contradictions - or at least diversity - of the roles that Mulligan presents to Stephen and urges him to “perform”: bard, philosopher, celebrant and scholar, is the main source of parody in “Telemachus”, it is again Stephen’s “theory” that distinguishes him as a character in Ulysses, and exposes his eccentric interpretation of the role of the artist. His Hamlet theory is another example of ‘applied Aquinas’, Mulligan tells Haines, constructed ‘by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas’: “propped up” by ‘fiftyfive reasons’ to correspond with Aristotle’s fifty-five ‘unmovable substances and principles’, and proven scientifically by means of algebra (P 227, 202; U 20; Metaphysics XII.8). Prior to his theatrical theory presentation among the Dublin men of letters in “Scylla and Charybdis”, however, the reader is made privy to Stephen’s silent rehearsal in “Proteus”. His author allows him to present to the reader the raw matter of his theoretical constructions by transcribing the uninterrupted flow of his thought, as he will do for Molly at the end of the book.

“Proteus” problematises and reinterprets theory as an act that takes place within the mind, as not only perception, but also sounds, sensations, experiences, experiments, memories, desires, imagination, reasoning and language all contribute to Stephen’s meditations. This theorist even goes “blind” in order to probe deeper the mysteries of being
in his radical questioning of the foundations of epistemology and ontology. While his “scientific” method is seemingly modeled on Aristotelian empiricism and Enlightenment epistemology, his “apophatic” premises are revealed in his quest ‘in the dark’ for ‘eternity’-for a reality beyond space and time (45). Stephen’s emphasis on theory and scant poetic compositions that are counterposed with a torrent of “ineffable” words, link his interpretation of the role of the artist with ‘The nondiscursive logic of negative mysticism’ (Jaurretche 7). His alienation from his body is presented as a deliberate ‘darkness or purgation’ of the sensual in order to allow his spirit ‘to be enkindled and to burn with the love which this dark and secret contemplation brings with it and sets firmly in the soul’ (Saint John of the Cross 29, 35). Failing his spiritual exercise, however, as his metaphysical desire for the ‘word known to all men’ rouses rather than quenches physical desire, he finds himself ‘caught in this burning scene’ of the Dionysian ‘Pan's hour, the faunal noon’ (682, 61). Following Aquinas who had stressed that our knowledge of abstract concepts is limited to “phantasms”, Stephen’s next theoretical endeavour will explore this ghostly generation of “theories”.

Stephen (and Joyce) revisit in “Proteus” the Enlightenment ideas, ideals and manifestos of their youth, as the references to philosophers and philosophy of this era and Stephen’s “empirical” method reveal. In a chapter which takes place wholly in Stephen’s mind, Joyce presents ‘the potentiality of thought itself’ that Cassirer identifies as the driving force of Enlightenment philosophers; ‘the autonomy of the intellect’ of a ‘mind like Spinoza’ (Philosophy of the Enlightenment 4, 45; Letters II 37). The modernity of Stephen’s philosophy is read through Enlightenment ideas: the emphasis on ‘immediate experience’, ‘sensory flux’ and ‘Becoming over Being’ -characteristics of modern philosophy for Schwartz, but also of Enlightenment thought - obfuscate the valences of the two modern eras (34, 21, 37). Stephen’s modern skepticism is ironically communicated through Berkleyan subjectivism that offers Stephen the consolation of theoretical creativity in the ‘void of incertitude’: ‘at least that if no more, thought through my eyes’ (U 866, 45).

The “reality” of “Proteus” is Brunian insofar as for Bruno ‘thought and reality or nature are not opposed to one another – they are essentially one’ (McIntyre 50). Stephen’s

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43 Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms’ (ST I q. 85 a. 1).

44 As for Berkeley ‘perception is never a cause of ideas- only an occasion’, and it is ‘the proper objects of vision [that] constitute a universal language of the Author of Nature’, the human mind contributes to ‘an act of continued “actualization”: the world is eternally present in the mind of God, but it begins to exist in time as it becomes gradually perceptible to finite created minds’, rather than being itself creative (Dupré 303; Berkeley 81; Vitoux 168). It is not clear in Joyce’s text, however, whether Stephen’s thought is the creative source or simply a medium.
thoughts, ‘a complex of elements’, are presented to the reader ‘as the letters of the alphabet are to a printed book’. Psychology and epistemology were inseparable for Bruno as McIntyre explains: ‘The elements of thought when discovered will accordingly give us the constitutive elements of nature and the connections in, and workings of, nature will be understood from the different complications of these simple elements of thought’. The references to Berkeley in this chapter both entertain and undermine the possibility that the secret of nature (or at least of the book) lies in Stephen’s thought, allowing Berkeley’s ‘esse is percepi’ to be read as relativism, but also reminding the reader that ‘the proper objects of vision [which] constitute a universal language of the Author of Nature’ are ‘made by the mallet of Los Demiurgos’ - or Joyce in this case (Berkeley 114, 81; U 45).

The figure of Bruno is significant in this chapter, moreover, as just like Bruno had been presented by Joyce as both a Renaissance and an Enlightenment philosopher, so this chapter weaves these two eras and Bruno’s ‘two very distinct sides’: empiricism and mysticism (McIntyre 109). In his endeavour to read the ‘Signatures of all things’ rather than words, Stephen assumes as Enlightenment philosophers did that the truth of nature ‘is revealed not in God’s word but in his work; it is not based on the testimony of Scripture or tradition but is visible to us at all times’ (Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment 43). His search for ‘the laws of nature’ is made through ‘observation and experiment’, and he puts Berkeley’s philosophy to test: ‘Shut your eyes and see’ (44-5; U 45). His idealistic rather than scientific endeavour to ‘read’ the ‘Signatures of all things’ - the Book of Nature and language of God, ‘the sole auctor of things’ who ‘can use things to signify’, as the reference to Boehme implies - puts him, however, ‘in the position of a blind man’ both literally and metaphorically: ‘man, if he presumes to see into the life of things and know them as they really are in themselves, immediately becomes aware of the limits of his faculties; he finds himself in the position of a blind man who must judge the nature of colour. But analysis is the staff which a benevolent nature has placed in the blind man’s hands’, Voltaire had warned (Minnis 73; Cassirer 12). Incorrectly claiming that Aristotle ‘was aware of them

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45 The unflattering portrait of Aristotle as ‘Bald’ and ‘a millionaire’ could also be seen as a Brunian influence (U 45).
46 As Cheryl Herr explains, for Boehme ‘spirit informs sound with essence or being, a process that makes possible communication through spoken words. The word is the signature or form which is the “receptacle” for spirit; thus language becomes an analogue for the way God's spirit informs all signs, including mineral, vegetable, and animal life’ (“Theosophy, Guilt, and ‘That Word Known to All Men’ in Joyce's Ulysses” 46).
bodies before of them coloured’, as James Cappio notes, Stephen, however, shifts this blindness to the ‘maestro di color che sanno’; his is a brief experience of darkness (U 45). 47

Beginning with ‘Creation from nothing’, Stephen attempts in “Proteus” a mythical reconstruction of history as progress towards an epiphany of an ideal beauty: ‘Belly without blemish, bulging big, a buckler of taut vellum’ (46). While Bruno had more humbly maintained that ‘our knowledge is not concerned with the infinite object in its entirety, but only with the visible back (“dorso”) of the object, with a speck of the infinitely extended universe’, Stephen desires a vision of the ‘immortal’ and ‘everlasting’ (Gatti 282-3). Being able to ‘see truth in its entirety, face to face’, Bruno had argued, ‘would mean penetrating into the depth of the womb (“grembo”), the infinite ocean that remains the dark and mysterious source of eternal life’; Stephen’s quest for truth leads him indeed to the ‘Womb of sin’, as his Enlightenment optimism is halted by the mystery of the fall (283; U 46).

It is indeed the prominence of history in Stephen’s thoughts and “philology” that highlights the difference of his “poetics” from his earlier aesthetic theories. While his return to origins is seemingly consistent with Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge as the knowledge of causes, the theological “Creation from nothing” contradicts Aristotelian metaphysics. Lacking faith, Stephen’s metaphysics are ‘constructed upon the incertitude of the void’ (818). But although his skepticism suggests that he has surrendered the truth of art ‘to unlikeness’, the influence of another Renaissance philosopher whose philosophical architectonics will aid the construction of the “system” underpinning Finnegans Wake, presents Stephen with an alternative pattern of history and a positive relation between history and art, without undermining art’s philosophical credentials.

Philology, the “art” of “Proteus”, is for Vico ‘the science of everything that depends on human volition’, ‘a philosophy of human ‘authority’’ whose aim is to discover ‘the outlines of an ideal eternal history’ (5). The “origins” that Vico searches for are those of language, in the belief that ‘the etymologies of native words contain the history of the things they signify following a natural order of ideas’, a belief that Joyce had echoed in his early essay “The Study of Languages” (15). But the ultimate goal of his philosophical quest is to discover the ‘conceptual language common to all nations’ and to ‘compile a Conceptual Dictionary embracing all the different articulate languages both living and dead’, in an example of the allure of ‘a universal language’ in the seventeenth-century (84; Yates, The Art of Memory 364). 48 In Vico’s metaphysics, the bard is not the ideal progenitor of poetry;

47. In fact, Aristotle argues in precisely the opposite way - from an awareness of change of color to the existence of something unchanging, itself uncolored, which remains the same despite the change’ (Cappio 29).
48 Italics my own.
in his tripartite division of history, in the first era- ‘the age of gods’, language was ‘mute or wordless’, ‘which used gestures or physical objects bearing a natural relationship to the ideas they wanted to signify’ (22). Linking the etymology of “mute” with “mythos”, he argues that ‘speech was born in the mute age as a mental language’, and ‘this is why in Greek logos means both word and idea’ (157).

While “Proteus”, a chapter whose “meaning” according to the Linati schema is “Primal matter”, can be seen to reflect the ‘mental language’ of ‘age of gods’, all three of Vico’s “ages” contribute to the structure of the chapter. The ‘age of heroes’ that follows ‘the age of gods’, ‘used heroic emblems- such as similes, comparisons, images, metaphors, and descriptions of nature- as the principal lexicon of its heroic language’, while the ‘age of men’ ‘used vocabulary agreed by popular convention, and of which the people are the absolute lords’ (22). The procession of religious symbols in Stephen’s thoughts is followed by symbols of Irish myth, until the memory of Deasy’s ‘letter for the press’ leads to an autobiographical narrative full of memories from his time in the cosmopolitan city of Paris (47). But wary of the endeavour of Renaissance systems to ‘simplify the complex’, Joyce violates even Vico’s cyclical order, as he will do in Finnegans Wake, allowing the “progress” of Stephen’s thoughts to mirror the protean flux of a Berkeleyan and Brunian reality, and history and autobiography, as well as reality and language, to coalesce (OCPW 94).

Vico, however, is careful to distinguish his Science from the ‘rational and abstract metaphysics of today’s scholars’ (144). The figure of Proteus had been invoked by Vico in order to illustrate what he calls the ‘conceit of scholars’ who ‘assert that what they know is as old as the world’ (77). ‘Scholars’, he says,

believed that the poets had signified prime matter by their myth of Proteus. In this myth set in Egypt, Ulysses on the shore wrestles with Proteus in the water but cannot hold on to the monster, which keeps changing shape. What the scholars mistook for sublime learning was in fact the extreme coarseness and ignorance of early people. For just as children try to grasp their own reflection when they look in the mirror, so primitive people thought they saw an ever-changing person in the water when they beheld how it altered their own features and movements’. (310-11)

Vico’s interpretation of this myth parodies Stephen’s ‘self-defeating desire for rational knowledge of intuited truths’ (Herr, “Theosophy” 52). But the ‘two metaphysical ideas’ that Vico’s ‘theological poets beheld in humankind’ ‘With their crude physics’, are the very object of Stephen’s inquiry and desire: ‘being and substance’. ‘Being was clearly apprehended by the Latin heroes in a very coarse manner. Thus, the Latin verb esse, ‘to be’,
originally meant ‘to eat’ (312). Stephen’s repeated refusal to eat, therefore, betrays not only his alienation from his body, but also being.

It is ‘impossible for anyone to be both a sublime poet and a sublime metaphysician’, Vico had warned, as ‘metaphysics draws the mind away from the senses, while the poetic faculty sinks the whole mind into them’ (375). Stephen appears to become aware in *Ulysses* of this distinction, as his paraphrase of Dryden’s “prophecy”- ‘Cousin Stephen, you will never be a saint’, his mocking references to the philosophic aspirations of his youth and ‘taste for enigmatic rôles’, imply (49; *SH* 81). Dominated by recollections, moreover, his thoughts exemplify Vico’s description of the poetic mind, which has a trinitarian structure. While the metaphysician thinks by means of reflection, the mental faculty that is most important for the poet is memory, Vico argues, which ‘has three distinct aspects’: ‘memory when it recalls things; imagination when it alters or recreates them; and ingenuity or invention when it orders them in a suitable arrangement or context’ (369).

Vico’s distinction between the poet and the philosopher, moreover, introduces a new notion of subjectivity: while ‘rational metaphysics teaches us that man becomes all things through understanding, *homo intelligendo fit omnia*, Vico argues, his own ‘imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding *homo non intelligendo fit omnia*. For when man understands he extends his mind to comprehend things; but when he does not understand, he makes them out of himself and, by transforming himself, becomes them’ (160). Stephen’s thoughts become increasingly theatrical, as he tries to arrive at self-knowledge through a series of “selves” he has traversed in time and through his familiarity with history and myth and their famous actors. Instead of becoming ‘All in all’, however, his encyclopedic quest, ends with the dualism of ‘All or not at all’; rather than a “form of forms”, he finds that his soul is a phantom that has been walking beside him, as the selves he met in his journey were simply ‘Disguises’ (272, 62, 54).

Although the focus of Joyce’s “Proteus” is epistemological, its ever-changing primal matter that Joyce tries to capture through rhythm and language highlights also an ontological transformation. Once again, the philosophy of Bruno can be seen underpinning this reworking of the material of the Author, in the growing speed and number of metamorphoses that are recorded. For Bruno matter is ‘absolute possibility’ and ‘co-eternal with God’: ‘act and potency, absolute possibility and infinite actuality coincide’ (*Cause, Principle, Unity* xvi). Whereas for the Scholastics God is ‘pure esse- actuality’, for Bruno as for Cusa, ‘God is “wholly in act” (*penitus in actu*)’: He is ‘the infinite actualization of all possibilities’ (Moran in Hankins ed. 180). To illustrate this, Bruno recounts another version of the myth of Proteus- a feminine version. Bruno presents the goddess Thetis as a symbol of ‘the material
substance that underlies all the specific formations that make up the natural world’ (Gatti 260). ‘[A]ssociated with the ocean in its infinite Protean capacity for metamorphosis’, she symbolises like Vico’s Proteus ‘both the possibility and inevitable limits of an inquiry into natural causes’, as she ‘is by no means easy to “catch” or to define in definite and certain terms’. She is presented as ‘the wife of many husbands, none of whom can truly be said to possess her’: ‘Although her forms can be pursued by reason (“subiectum ratione formabile”), she resists all attempts at such dominion, and renders the hunt for her secrets difficult and problematic’. ‘The natural philosopher would be unwise to think that it is possible to penetrate her essence’ Bruno warns, as Gatti explains; ‘All that can be hoped for is to understand something “around and about” her ways and habits’.

While these are characteristics of Molly who remains covered all day until her ‘visible back (“dorso”)’ is revealed to the reader, Stephen’s composition of poetic fragments reflect his desire for a ‘myriadislanded’ female (60). As for Bruno, women for Stephen are ‘a poetic expression of man’s furor for reunion with the One’ (Koch 241). His vision of his courtship of a female and urgent desire to be touched is consummated with a ‘scribbled note’ and recollection of God’s vision of his Creation in Genesis (61). His desire for human contact that is interposed with his desire for ‘that word known to all men’, suggests not only Stephen’s desire for communication and “recital” of his art to a live audience - ‘Somewhere to someone in your flutiest voice’ - but also for the corporeality of his words; for language itself to perform - Eucharistically - the communion with the body that Stephen desires (60).

**ii. That queer thing genius**

The irony of Vico’s “disclaimer” and corroboration of his New Science through his assertion of its resemblance to geometry, ‘which, by constructing and contemplating its basic elements creates its own world of measurable quantities’, ‘but with greater reality, just as the orders of human affairs are more real than points, lines, surfaces and figures’, did not go unnoticed, and is reflected in Stephen’s construction and presentation of a theory which according to Mulligan can be substantiated by means of algebra (129). Like Vico, moreover,

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49 Rabaté in “Bruno No, Bruno Si: Note on a Contradiction in Joyce” and Voelker in “‘Nature it is”: The Influence of Giordano Bruno on James Joyce’s Molly Bloom” have explored Bruno’s association of femininity with Nature and Joyce’s appropriation of Bruno’s paradigm. A further parallel may be drawn between Bruno’s portrayal of Thetis as a dolphin ‘whose back only at times appears as well defined above the moving waters of becoming’, and Bloom’s memories of ‘The first night after the charades’ at ‘Dolphin’s Barn’, following Molly’s request for an explanation of ‘Metempsychosis’ (Gatti 260; U 77).

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Stephen in “Scylla and Charybdis” searches for “the true Bard” - Shakespeare rather than Homer - examining whether he ‘was in fact a philosopher’, and reanimating the antagonism between the bard and the philosopher/scholar (355).

The chapter opens with an invocation of the genre of Bildungsroman to which Stephen’s own “biography” in the Portrait belonged to and which his Hamlet theory interprets metaphysically, while purportedly investigating the historical reality of the life of the Bard. Having himself contributed to this genre and desiring to go beyond the stereotype of the artist that it had created, Stephen attempts to do so with a novel interpretation of the archetypal artist and modern Bard, Shakespeare. Goethe, the first national “genius” that is referred to in the debate that this chapter stages, ‘pioneering the use of artists as central characters’, presented in Wilhelm Meister and Werther an ‘uncompromisingly exalted notion of what the true artist ought to be’; closer to Vico’s bard, however, Stephen presents the artist as ‘simply a commoner’ (Beebe, Ivory Towers 86-7; Vico 363). But while he attempts to desacralise the cult of the genius, as a result of his ‘bodily shame’ the relation between the artist and his art remains metaphysical.

In the company of the Dublin men of letters, Stephen is referred to once again mockingly as an aspiring bard: ‘Have you found those six brave medicals, John Eglinton asked with elder’s gall, to write Paradise Lost at your dictation?’ (235). He is, however, presented as a Romantic bard, as the reference to Goethe and his intention according to Eglinton to compose ‘The Sorrows of Satan’ highlight. “Trying his hand at” rhetoric, as he had challenged himself in “Aeolus”, Stephen interprets the oral tradition of the bard through his oratorical display of his theory, but also invokes the dramatic tradition of Shakespeare, presenting his theory as a dramatic performance. Providing himself with dramatic notes, he tries to disengage himself from his immediate environment in order to inspire “belief” by enacting his theory. As the subject of the discussion is the creation of ‘a figure which the world will set beside Saxon Shakespeare's Hamlet’, taking the lead from the Romantics Stephen presents his own interpretation of a Bildungsroman artist-hero (236).

‘[A]n underlying assumption in the artist-novel is that creative man is a divided being’, man and artist, a historical personage who merely serves as the medium through which the creative spirit manifests itself”, Beebe explains in his survey of the genre (Ivory Towers 6). ‘The man must spend himself, but the artist-spirit saves itself by becoming one with its works and thus escaping the bonds of time’ (7). Understanding as Wilde had in his Portrait of Mr. W. H the theological background of this division and its origins in the hermeneutics of Scripture, where the unity of the Author was maintained at the expense of its human scriptors who were vehicles of a divine inspiration and assumed the blame for any
Proposing to disentangle the ghostwriter from the Holy Ghost, he begins his delivery by asking his audience to deliberate on the nature of a ghost that links in his theory life and art. Probing the nature of the character of the Creator - a solipsist and sentimentalist modelled on the character of Hamlet, but also on the diversity of interpretations of his Creation - Stephen appeals to the theological mystery of the Trinitarian economy to reconcile this paradox of the one and the many. In his influential interpretation of *Hamlet*, Coleridge had indeed distinguished this play in terms of its theological overdetermination: ‘Shakespeare’s refusal to locate his motive in the plot of the play, rather than in the “doubts and hesitations” of Hamlet’s mind, turns the explicable revenge tragedy into a mystery’ (Quillian 2-3). This “mystery” was located in Hamlet’s mind; he is presented as an “intellectual dreamer” - an ‘ineffectual dreamer’ for the librarian - who is an embodiment of the philosophical outlook of his author (235). A ruse for philosophy, however, the mystery of the creation - of the wildness and irregularity of our Shakespeare, an “absentminded” genius - throws into confusion the principles of literary criticism:

> when once the end which our myriad-minded Bard had in view, and the local accidents that favoured or obstructed or in any way modified its manifestations are once thoroughly comprehended, the doubt will arise whether the judgment or the genius of the man has the stronger claim to our wonder, or rather it will be felt that the judgment was the birth and living offspring of his genius even as the symmetry of a body results from the sanity and vigour of the life as an organizing power. (Coleridge in Read 606)

Shakespeare’s creative power was located in his unconscious, in an ‘innate mental aptitude (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art’: he “shaped his characters out of the nature within; but we cannot so safely say, out of his own nature, as an individual person” (*CAJ* 168; Read 613).

But while for the Romantics understanding the genius required ‘a divinatory act of co-geniality’ in the face of the inscrutable mystery of the unconscious, Stephen presents Shakespeare through a web of relations that complicates the ‘nature within’ from without (Gadamer 188). While for the Romantics ‘Composition becomes valorized as an act of supreme philosophical significance’ as ‘the writer’s struggle to overcome his or her own

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50 Jarlath Killeen reads Wilde’s *Mr. W.H.* as ‘a contribution to a major issue for Victorian England: the question of the authority of the Bible and the best way to interpret it’ (45). For Killeen, ‘*The Portrait of Mr W.H.* makes clear [the] link between sexual/textual ambiguity and authority: the greater the interpretive insight of the characters, the more central the passionate relationship between Shakespeare and Willie Hughes becomes’ (52).
limits and finitude’, both ‘the act of poiesis and critical acts of self-reading and revision’ are absent in Stephen’s portrait of the artist (Clark 118). Delivering an account of Shakespeare’s life which rolls concurrently with his reconstruction of a performance of *Hamlet*, Stephen, like Spinoza rather than a Romantic, highlights the need to ‘understand the mind of the author “historically”’, undermining the idea of genius– ‘an innate productive faculty of the artist’ (Gadamer 182; *CAJ* 169). What Spinoza’s emphasis on history implies, Gadamer explains, is the need to ‘overcome our prejudices and think of nothing but what the author could have had in mind’ (182). But while for the Romantics this implied the need for a mystical communion in order to gain access to the writer’s mind, Spinoza uses history to highlight the impossibility of this task, and ultimately to undermine both history and the authorship and authority of Scripture: ‘Spinoza’s method thus ultimately proves, and was intended to prove, that Scripture is unintelligible. The more one “understands” Scripture, the more one understands that it cannot be understood’ (Morrison 68). Stephen’s theory traces the same path towards unintelligibility; towards a mystery that is theologically constructed but located in history.

While Stephen’s esthetic theory had traversed - implicitly - the philosophical history of the terms he sought to explain, his account in “Scylla” of ‘the phenomena of artistic conception, artistic gestation, and artistic reproduction’, traces the history of Shakespeare’s critical reception (*P* 227). Although biographical criticism was popular at the end of the nineteenth century, Stephen’s “biography” is metacritical- and mythical. His bardic “memory” is a gathering, a telling (*legein*) of fragments of tradition. 51 “Forgetting” is indeed a creative tool that promises renewal: ‘Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound’ (242). The preserved historical annals of the library are ‘Coffined thoughts … in mummycases, embalmed in spice of words’ (248). What distinguishes the artist is his ability to ‘weave and unweave his image’, to triumph over time ‘In the intense instant of imagination’, described by Stephen as an actualisation of potency: ‘that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be’ (249). It is an instant of mystic simultaneity not between the artist and his work as it was for the Romantics, but between the artist and the totality of the narrative of history. As according to Aquinas, as Noon explains, it is ‘the Father’s infinite understanding of Himself’ that ‘begets a perfect Image, the Person Who thus proceeds by way of intellection (the Son), ‘a perfect Word or Image generated or begotten in the perfect likeness of His progenitor or Conceiver (the Father)’, so Stephen’s creative ‘instant’ is characterised by perfect ‘reflection’: ‘So in the

51 The philology of Vico and Heidegger highlights the connection between saying and gathering in their common *lex-* root.
future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that 
which then I shall be’ (112, 249). Once again, however, there is no mention of “begetting” or 
generation of the Word, only silent self-reflection.

Noon indeed wonders why Stephen uses the paradigm of the Trinity to describe the 
process of artistic creation, as ‘No poet may dare hope to give himself so perfectly to his 
poems as the divine Father gives Himself to His consubstantial Son’; the ‘theological 
argument for the procession of the second Person of the Trinity as the Son (since He 
proceeds as the Logos) is invariably founded on the Augustinian analogy of the conception 
of the inner word, the soul’s knowledge of itself, and not upon the outward utterance of a 
word spoken or written’ (118-9). ‘This literary experience, it may be, could more easily 
explored on the analogy of a “Creation” or an “Incarnation”’, Noon suggests (119). Stephen, 
however, is not interested in describing the relation between the artist and his audience, but 
between speech and thought that Aquinas used to explain the mystery of the Trinity. The 
librarian’s counsel that Stephen should ‘work out his theory for the enlightenment of the 
public’, ironically highlights that Stephen is describing a silent self-communion, examining 
the mystery of the phenomenon of language (251).

Far from a redemptive even 
t, Shakespeare’s “incarnation” of his word - ‘There is, I 
feel in the words, some goad of the flesh’ - is shown to be ‘driving him into a new passion, a 
darker shadow of the first, darkening even his own understanding of himself” (252). His 
apparent consubstantiality with his work is a cleverly contrived mask ‘to hide him from 
himself”; his theatrical ‘personality’ ‘passes on towards eternity’ ‘undiminished’. Unable to 
decipher or utter his word, he remains ‘untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws 
he has revealed’, and indecipherable, ‘He is a ghost, a shadow now, the wind by Elsinore's 
rocks or what you will, the sea’s voice’. The dissolution of plurality in Stephen’s Trinity, 
makes it heretical despite his assertion of “consubstantiality”, as his parody of Apostle’s 
creed highlights. His Aristotelian and Berkeleyan theorising in “Proteus” ironically coincide: 
Shakespeare’s creation is his world and his world is his creation.

Unable to give birth to the ‘perfect Word or Image’, Stephen presents language as an 
impediment for the human artist. Whereas the discussion turns repeatedly to the composition 
of ‘Our national epic’ by an Irish genius, an artist-hero who ‘must speak the grand old 
tongue’, Stephen stresses the freedom and artistic licence that distinguished the genius for 
the Romantics: ‘A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the 
portals of discovery’ (246). The ‘product of a genius’, Kant had stressed, ‘is an example, not 
for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of 
the work), but to be followed by another genius - one whom it arouses to a sense of his own
originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art itself a new rule is won - which is what shows a talent to be exemplary’ (CAJ 181). ‘[T]hat queer thing genius’, that for Kant ‘cannot be communicated, but requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual’, becomes ‘the standard of all experience, material and moral’, Stephen complains (246). This is an ‘aping when the pupil copies everything down to the deformities which the genius only of necessity suffered to remain, because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the idea’, Kant had warned (181). Insofar as the rule of art must instead be ‘gathered from the performance, i.e., from the product’, Stephen presents himself as the genius the men of letters are looking for (171).

Suggesting that Stephen’s ‘brilliances of theorising’ are outdated, John Eglinton calls for Stephen to produce a more popular performance that might appeal to ‘The bard's fellowcountrymen’ (254). Conglomerating “biographical” facts - ‘a mixture of theologiocophilolological’ - Stephen turns to Brandes’ and Dowden’s interpretation of Shakespeare as a “man of practical affairs”, a member of a bourgeois ‘William Shakespeare and company, limited’, and a product of a market economy ‘made in Germany’ (Quillian 18; U 263, 262). As rumours of Shakespeare’s profligacy and promiscuity proliferate in the discussion, Stephen’s theory is in danger of collapsing. As the Romantic and Symbolist Shakespeare ‘reading the book of himself’ is left behind, the theatricality of Stephen’s delivery increases (239).

Unable to reconcile art and life, the “man of practical affairs” with the intellectual dreamer, ‘battling against hopelessness’, Stephen turns again to the Trinitarian mystery (265). But while in the first version of his theory consubstantiality had allowed Shakespeare to preserve his personality ‘undiminished’ in ‘eternity’, the multivalency of history threatens this unity (252). The legacy that follows the “death of the Author” here is a ‘mystical estate’ that is ‘a legal fiction’ created by an alderman (266). 52 The practical and the metaphysical converge in the Law. More forcefully than in his earlier version, Stephen presents tragedy as the site where the life and art of Shakespeare converge. The mystery is located in an act of hubris, that ‘repeats itself, protasis, epitasis, catastasis, catastrophe’, providing the structure of Shakespeare’s plays (272). Mimesis, as for Hölderlin, ‘is no longer the (re)presentation of

52 While Joyce acknowledged Allen Upward’s The Divine Mystery as a source of inspiration for “Circe”, Stephen is not so gracious (Letters I 156). In his description of the characteristics of the religion of primitive man, Upward argues that ‘The knowledge of the common law of parentage has never driven out the belief in the soul or spirit as something independently implanted in the offspring, at least in human offspring. Neither has fatherhood been accepted as a necessary law’ (63). As Upward’s book was published in 1913, Stephen can present himself as an original thinker- to his listeners if not his readers.
pragnata, but that of the tragic itself in its essence; that is to say, of the experience or the ordeal of the divine as hubris’ (Lacoue-Labarthe in Sparks 132). The mystery of the genius of the Bard is interpreted by Stephen through the Romantics’ interpretation of tragedy as ‘the conflict between immutable orders co-existing in man: the order of nature or of necessity, on the one hand, and the order of freedom on the other, the order of sensible finitude, and the order of practical infinity’; through the ‘paradox’ of this dialectic that both the structure-the “plot” of tragedy and its resolution presents to Romantic philosophy (Sparks 6; Hölderlin 89).

The absence of an assertion of freedom through transgression of the Law in Stephen’s portrait of a tragic hero is conspicuous given his virtual identification of art with freedom in the Portrait and Stephen Hero. More significantly, if the Law is a ‘fiction’, tragedy becomes impossible: ‘the poetical form of tragedy, which is the most rigorous form of poetry, cannot resist when it tries to expose das Schicksallose, ‘the lack of destiny’ of modern beings, of which Oedipus’ living death is only the presentiment. Only lyric poetry can be fitted for the exposition of the dysmoran, the lack of Moira or share … of modern beings, as Hölderlin’s great poetry from the turn of the century shows’ (Dastur in Sparks 86).

The artist in Stephen’s theory becomes ‘All in all’, but his sacrifice does not lead to a revelation: he remains ‘untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws he has revealed’ (U 252). The sin that ‘sundered’ father and son, the unspeakable ‘breach’ caused by ‘bodily shame’, remains ‘in infinite variety everywhere in the world he has created’ (266, 272). ‘Lover of an ideal or a perversion’, his desire for truth is a sign of his perversion, as knowledge must come through suffering: ‘His unremitting intellect is the hornmad Iago ceaselessly willing that the moor in him shall suffer’ (272-3). Stephen’s interpretation of tragedy is a dramatisation of the nightmare of history: ‘If tragedy discloses the universal impact of history on finite being’, Weinsheimer argues, ‘then pathei mathos means there is no knower of history that is not also a participant in history, no theory of history that is not also involved in historical practice, and hence no pure theory of history at all’ (Weinsheimer 36-7). ‘In the light of tragedy, to understand is not to do but to suffer, to be overwhelmed by the course of events’ (35).

The autobiographical focus of Stephen’s theory in “Scylla” questions the very possibility of theory in the face of history. Not only are “facts” distorted through the passing of time, but the attempt to subsume the particular under a universal rule or formula becomes itself a distortion of these “facts”. ‘Historical consciousness’, Gadamer argues, ‘knows about the otherness of the other, about the past in its otherness, just as the understanding of the Thou knows the Thou as a person. In the otherness of the past it seeks not the instantiation of
a general law but something historically unique. By claiming to transcend its own conditionedness completely in knowing the other, it is involved in a false dialectical appearance, since it is actually seeking to master the past, as it were’ (354). The freedom and originality of the genius is in conflict with ‘the poet of “universal human nature”’ in Stephen’s theory- with the Bard as the voice of the nation (Quillian 2).

The culmination of Stephen’s “dialectic” into the formation of an ‘All in all’ Nietzschean superman who ‘sitteth on the right hand of His Own Self’, reflects this attempt to master plurality (253). As his Trinitarian analogy dramatises, ‘the interpreter of history always runs the risk of hypostasizing the connectedness of events when he regards their significance as that intended by the actual actors and planners’ (Gadamer 364). ‘Historical tradition can be understood only as something always in the process of being defined by the course of event’, Gadamer argues, and ‘Similarly, the philologist dealing with poetic or philosophical texts knows that they are inexhaustible’ (366). Only through metaphysics Stephen can impose a limit- an interpretation, and employ history and literature to create his portrait of the artist. His theory indeed collapses as soon as it is presented. ‘The one flaw’ in his theory, as in that of Cyril Graham's in *The Portrait of Mr. W. H.*, ‘is that it presupposes the existence of the person whose existence is the subject of dispute’ (125).

The ‘vaulted cell’ of the library in which Stephen’s play takes place, reflects and ironically inverts the contrast between the philosopher and the historian; the philosophers in “Scylla” are lead out of the cave ‘into a shattering daylight of no thought’ (276). Stephen’s inability to theorise without becoming a ‘lubber jester’, however, is not only an ontological condition. Mulligan’s reference to the Abbey Theatre - ‘Our players are creating a new art for Europe like the Greeks or M. Maeterlinck. Abbey Theatre! I smell the pubic sweat of monks’ - highlights that it is the dominance of a *particular* narrative of history that results in the performance of a single play, and withholds Stephen’s presentation of his drama ‘to the world’ (276-7; Letters II 111).

iii. A distinguished phenomenologist

Stephen is not alone in his quest for truth in *Ulysses*. Although a dualism of stasis and kinesis is established that separates him from Bloom, Bloom is also one of the ‘seekers of the pure truth’ in Joyce’s epic (805). His compulsive rationalisation, demystification, constant recourse to scientific facts, laws and methods, and desire for exposition and justification may not come with the despair of Stephen’s internal conflict, but his search for
truth is similarly tragicomic. His grand plans for social as well as scientific progress and improvement and his desire for knowledge for its own sake, link him to Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet. While Stephen is disillusioned and pessimistic in *Ulysses*, the Enlightenment ideals of his youth manifest themselves in the “phenomenology” of Bloom. Described by Kenner as ‘a parody of the Enlightenment’, Bloom is indeed mocked and upbraided for his scientific perspective, as Stephen had been for his ‘science of esthetic’, by both the Dublin citizens and the various narrators (*Dublin’s Joyce* 217). Moreover, although the introduction of the “kindly” Bloom appears to imply that ‘Joyce holds forth no hope’ for Stephen, Marguerite Harkness suggests that the contrast is not necessarily in Stephen’s disfavour: ‘Stephen’s artistry and his sense of mission as an artist begin, through Bloom’s exaggeration of bourgeois attitudes, to look more positive than they do in isolation’ (Schutte, *Joyce and Shakespeare* 120; 188).

The catechistic method of “Ithaca” is a parody of Bloom’s rationalising more than Stephen’s predilection for dialectic as a ‘jejune jesuit’, or even his ‘classroom techniques vis-à-vis his pupils’ that are marked by his indifference to the facts and knowledge he is obliged to impart (*U 2; Dublin’s Joyce* 241). As the focus of the narrative in the last chapters of *Ulysses* shifts to Bloom, the “scrupulous” regress that characterises his thoughts is dramatised and satirised in “Eumeaus” and “Ithaca” in ‘an exhibition of excess’, before giving way to the flow of Molly’s language (Lawrence 180). Lawrence detects ‘a parody of the basic activity of symbol making and deciphering’ in “Ithaca”, ‘the kind of activities engaged in by everyone, but by writers and readers especially’; but the complete transparency of the language is also a reflection of Bloom’s scepticism of the symbolic capacity of language (200).

His views of language which contrast with Stephen’s anxious quest for ‘that word known to all men’ reflect his modern scepticism, but also the Enlightenment foundation of this discrediting of ‘Useless words’, materially conceived as ‘Inked characters fast fading on the frayed breaking paper’ (682, 208, 113). ‘The exclusion of what a language “is” beyond its efficient functioning as sign material - i.e., the self-conquest of language by a system of artificial, unambiguously defined symbols’, is an ‘ideal of the eighteenth-and twentieth-century Enlightenments’, Gadamer argues, that ‘represents the ideal language, because to it would correspond to the totality of the knowable: Being as absolutely available objectivity’ (414). Stephen is therefore not the only idealist in his search for an epiphanic word; Bloom’s skepticism is founded on an ideal of ‘absolutely available objectivity’.

In a coincidence of contraries of science and metaphysics, this ideal sign language corresponds to negative theology’s “learned ignorance”: ‘That the true being of things is to
be investigated “without names” means that there is no access to truth in the proper being of words as such - even though, of course, no questioning, answering, instructing, and differentiating can take place without the help of language’ (414). But whereas in Renaissance philosophy and theology language as a sign system reflected the creative capacity of man and infinity of the human mind, the quest for infinity in modernity has nihilistic implications, reflected in Bloom’s difficulty to understand and interpret what words “mean”; “nihil” is no longer the “name” of God. 53 A ‘parody of metaphysical intuition, or of allied aesthetic modes of knowledge’ as well as science, the chapter highlights the neglect of the significance of language in both science and metaphysics (Dublin’s Joyce 176). Whereas in “The Study of Languages” Joyce had defended the ‘rigidity’ and ‘neatness and regularity’ that literature shared with mathematics, the ‘uncompromising theorems’ of science had become increasingly questionable by the time he came to write “Ithaca” as McCarthy highlights: ‘in 1921, the year when Joyce was busily writing “Ithaca”, Albert Einstein was forced to admit that “Insofar as the propositions of mathematics give an account of reality they are not certain; and insofar as they are certain they do not describe reality”’ (611). Instead of mathematics being the model for language, mathematics was exposed as just another “language”.

‘By this gesture toward the primacy of style the “Ithaca” technic suggests a notion of language as pure gesture, free both of literal and of figurative signification’, Harold Baker argues- Stephen’s ideal ‘universal language’ in “Circe”: the Pentecostal ‘gift of tongues rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm’ (280; U 564). This apophasic ‘proud gesture of refusal’ links Stephen and Bloom through their shared skepticism towards history that it manifests (P 65). The shared idealisation of these “inhuman theorists” of a ‘mute or wordless language’ that Vico ascribes to ‘the age of gods’, highlights the ‘arrogant neglect of the human for the benefit of humanity’ in the dream of ‘the history of the world as idea’ (22; Nietzsche; Human, All-Too-Human 391, 21). Haines’ duplicitous “blaming” of history while idealising its monuments, reveals the paradox that these Dubliners are faced with in having to both remember and forget the nightmare of history in order to preserve their identity but also move forward.

Although Bloom exercises his ‘mnemotechnic’ predominantly through reminiscence of his personal history and through his endeavour to retain information, he also feels oppressed by the pattern of history that seems to him as an eternal recurrence of the same (834). As William Schutte remarks, although Bloom’s vision of history is ‘not a nightmare 53 .For Nicholas of Cusa, reason and its expression in language do not exhaust the reality of the mind’, Duclow explains; ‘The mind is constitutively related to transcendence and totality’ (260).
full of shattered glass and toppling masonry’, he also ‘sees history as inimical to man’: ‘For him the past and the future combine to form an essentially meaningless continuum. Things do not change day after day; they go on the same’ (“Leopold Bloom” 128-9). But whereas Stephen, ‘Heavy of the past’ filters his experiences through its monuments, conscious that thinking about the past ‘Give[s] you the creeps after a bit’, Bloom concentrates instead on the present and the future, reassuring himself- ‘I am here now’, and looking forward to Molly’s ‘ample bedwarmed flesh. Yes, yes’ (146, 73-4).

As an ad-canvasser, he is very aware of the significance of memory, both for understanding and composing the narrative of history, and he highlights the consequence of meaningful “examples”; examples that ‘instead of forcing “categories”’ allow meaning to ‘show itself to itself on its own terms’, ‘in its average everydayness’ (Heidegger 59). Distanced from religion, the Bible is full of ‘dead names’ for him, while his interpretation of ‘metempsychosis’ is drawn from ‘Naked nymphs’ (73, 78). While Stephen deliberates on the oppression of the grand narratives of history, through Bloom Joyce draws attention to the ‘ephemeral moments’ of history, as Garry Leonard argues: “Official” versions of “historical” events are actually the distortion, whereas the never to be historicized events of the everyday are beneath notice, and therefore, for Joyce, most notable’ (Palgrave Advances 47). Conscious of the materiality of his “art”, Bloom is conscious of its ephemerality that is threatened more than Stephen’s by being unbound and daily recycled.

The examples that adverts provide, moreover, are not “exemplary”, as Stephen’s strange parable in “Aeolus” demonstrates, but involve momentary recognition: ‘Something to catch the eye’ (106). As ‘constellations of desire’, their meaning is variable; like puns or jokes, they ‘have something in [them] capable of momentarily deceiving us’, and ‘when the semblance vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back in order to try it over again, and thus by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation it is jerked to and fro and put in oscillation’ (Wicke, “Modernity Must Advertise” 610; CAJ 202). Adverts are indeed a great source for jokes for Bloom as for Joyce. Far from regulative, the interpretation of the “mystery” of adverts repeatedly leads to an endless regress of random associations.

Puzzled why the reduction to nothing of the joke is ‘a source of very lively enjoyment for a moment’, as ‘certainly understanding cannot rejoice’ at this, Kant concludes that ‘Its cause must consequently lie in the influence of the representation upon the body and the reciprocal effect of this upon the mind’ (201). Attentive to the reciprocity between body and mind in both his life and his art, Bloom is indeed a ‘kinetic’ artist, allowing the composition of an “epic of the human body” and the incarnation of the word through puns (Budgen 21). History is a nightmare for Bloom because being in touch with his corporeality,
he is also aware of his mortality. The preservation of the memory of the dead, he thinks, should be made by means of a gramophone, conserving not only the written word or an image, but also the vocal sound. Such preservation would not allow perfect communication - ‘Kraahrnark! Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullygladaseeagain hellohello amawf krpthsth’ - but would give a fuller picture of the departed person (144). Similarly, Stephen’s “gesture” in Circe, as Lynch’s interpretation of it as ‘Pornosophical philotheology’ suggests, as well as a manifestation of his ideal of absolute representation, reflects his desire for an ideal correspondence between body and soul - a ‘meeting point of man’s inner and outer worlds’ (563; Aubert 93).

Telling a joke as an experiment, Kant analyses the laughter of his imaginary audience by concluding that ‘the bubble of our expectation was extended to the full and suddenly went off into nothing’ (200). Bloom allows Joyce to practice the ‘art of deflation’ intellectually, somatically and linguistically (Gibson 113). The inability of the narrator of “Eumaeus” to signify, mirrored in various clumsy acts performed by Bloom, leads to a series of comic scenes based on ‘Missed Understandings’ (FW 175). This ‘abnihilisation of the etym’ is not “inhuman” but ‘consist[s] in a feeling of the furtherance of the entire life of the man, and hence, also of his bodily well-being’ insofar as it leads to ‘gratification’ (353; CAJ 198). The ‘wit or originality of humour’ required for exciting laughter, Kant argues, is ‘as rare as the talent is common for inventing stuff that splits the head, as mystic speculators do, or that breaks your neck, as the genius does, or that harrows the heart as sentimental novelists do (aye, and moralists of the same type)’ (204). ‘Humour, in a good sense, means the talent for being able to put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind in which everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the beaten track (a topsy-turvy view of things), and yet on lines that follow certain principles, rational in the case of such a mental temperament’ (203). Although this talent is not what is required for ‘fine art’, Kant says, ‘It belongs to [its] originality of mind (des Geistes)’. While ‘no geste reveals the unconnouth’, the position of ‘the gest’ ‘In the beginning’ of Finnegans Wake, allows Joyce to lay claim to the title of genius (FW 227, 468).
IV. Theologian

i. Ritual: a rest for the poet

Dramatised on a more “gigantic” scale, the ‘dreadful bard’s’ theological interpretation of history through ritual processions characterises the bardic narrative of “Cyclops”. The bardic diversions that continuously and antagonistically interrupt the narrative account of the nameless narrator who appears to be delivering his tale full of “I”s, “Ay”s and eyes like Stephen to himself, are either inventories, processions or spectacles, full of anachronisms, clichés, myths and miracles in an inflation of “impossibles” that are presented as ‘a movement’, and therefore ‘an actuality of the possible as possible’ (30). History in this episode is indeed a nightmare as the Revival of culture that is staged leads to a dizzying spectacle: ‘everything is reduced to terms of “events” like those of modern physics and philosophy – events which make up a “continuum”, but which may be taken as infinitely small’ (Wilson 177-8). In a dramatisation of modern philosophy’s understanding of being as an event ‘which occurs when it historicizes itself and when we historicize ourselves’, the narrative of “Cyclops” ceaselessly “historicises” itself (Vattimo 3). Everything is ‘flatten[ed] out at the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity’, and the Revival of history ironically produces ‘a de-historicization of experience’ (10). The coincidence of bard and historian that the Revival had idealised, representing ‘the bard as historian, and indeed, as teacher of history’, as Andrew Gibson argues, leads to the collapse of both history and art, into ritual (111).

The rituals staged in “Cyclops” are not only emblematic of a lost tradition, but also of their disguised continuities, highlighting in particular the affiliation of religion and politics in their “medieval” convergence that the Revival was resurrecting in the collaboration of church and state for the nationalist project, symbolised in the parallel courses of the processions of priest and king in “Wandering Rocks”. The ‘supernatural pomp to the already gruesome spectacle’ that the parade of religious relics lends to these processions, blends the miraculous and legendary of mythology with that of theology, but also exposes the ideological interests behind modern displays of wealth and power that seemingly bring religious and political communities together (396). The masses that attend these processions, are participants as a ‘monster audience’ that is brought together through

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54 For Andrew Gibson, Joyce’s ‘medievalism’ is an ‘assault on revivalist historiographies’ ‘and the politics and aesthetics implicit in them’: ‘O’Grady disparages what he takes to be the medieval ‘thirst for minuteness, chronology and succession, co-ordination and relation’. Joyce’s Dantian aesthetic – his Dantian architectonics – promotes these values’ (108, 113). The similarities that Joyce highlights between the two traditions, however, are also significant in terms of the Catholic Church’s involvement with the politics of nationalism.
‘kinetic’ sentiments: ‘heartrending sob’s and ‘general merriment’ (400). The chapter transforms communal rituals into ‘an immense accumulation of spectacles’, recorded by newspaper reportages (Debord 2). 55 ‘[C]ult value’ and ‘exhibition value’ are indistinguishable (Illuminations 224). ‘All that once was directly lived has become mere representation’, Debord diagnoses, and the spectacle, ‘the material reconstruction of the religious illusion’ as ‘a social relationship between people that is mediated by images’, enables the creation of pseudo-communities (2, 5, 2).

When ‘the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice-politics’, the sinister consequence of which Benjamin identified with Fascism (Illuminations 224, 242). Ritual and politics are indistinguishable in “Cyclops”, in an alliance that the contemporaneity of past, present and future through diversions, narrative frames, anachronisms, myths and legends in the narrative time of this chapter, highlights. The “rabblement” that attends these ritual celebrations, as in Joyce’s early essay, ‘placid and intensely moral’, mournfully or joyfully takes part in ritual celebrations as a spectator, indifferent to the injustice that Bloom as a Marxist spokesman in “Circe” will indict: ‘The poor man starves while they are grassing their royal mountain stags or shooting peasants and phartridges in their purblind pomp of pelf and power’ (OCPW 51; U 602). When the rich and the poor are united in their attendance to a public execution – ‘The children of the Male and Female Foundling Hospital’ having been afforded ‘a genuinely instructive treat’ by ‘the Little Sisters of the Poor’ and the ‘viceregal houseparty’ ‘the most favourable positions on the grandstand’ - it is only the delegates who ‘without exception expressed themselves in the strongest possible heterogeneous terms concerning the nameless barbarity which they had been called upon to witness’ and stage ‘An animated altercation’ ‘as to whether the eighth or the ninth of March was the correct date of the birth of Ireland’s patron saint’ (397-8).

‘History is a great ritualist’, Allen Upward had remarked following his search for the Genius, the ‘Divine Man’ in myth, ritual and the scholarship of ‘Professor Skeat’: ‘Her eye is ever fixed on outward forms and ceremonies, on state processions and sounding proclamations’ (222). The only way that the “genius” of the narrative of “Cyclops” can “remember” appears to be through such ‘outward forms and ceremonies’; rituals which are enigmatically related, however, to the debate that is held between Bloom and the citizen on

55 In Gerty’s sentimental vision of the evening service, the men ‘were there gathered together without distinction of social class (and a most edifying spectacle it was to see) in that simple fane beside the waves, after the storms of this weary world, kneeling before the feet of the immaculate, reciting the litany of Our Lady of Loreto, beseeching her to intercede for them, the old familiar words, holy Mary, holy virgin of virgins’ (U 460).
history, nationalism and identity. Feigning the seduction of the reader through the rituals and spectacles of this “epic” chapter, the narrative instead elicits distraction, boredom and frustration, manifesting the enthusiasm (as well as skepticism) that Joyce shared with Benjamin for the potentially emancipatory capacity of ‘the distracting element’ that distinguished modern art (Illuminations 238). While Benjamin refers to Dadaism as an example, Joyce asked Budgen if this episode came across as being ‘futuristic’ (156). As the voices of past and present blend and clash in the narrative’s constant movements through time, and a distinct parallelism between bardic and medieval diversions is drawn, they become a distorting mirror of each other. Although the ‘Swindling’ of modern culture enrages the citizen who hounds Bloom out of the pub like a scapegoat for disclosing that the ‘secret’ of advertisements is ‘repetition’, the reenactment of the past that distinguishes his own narrative is characterised by repetition, necessary for the preservation of ‘The memory of the dead’ (419, 396).

The contrast between the voice of the storyteller and the silence of the written word of the newspapers is dissolved through the multitude of narrative frames and general commotion that confuses the “script” with the voices of the audience, as rituals and theatrical performances are reconciled - or “silenced” - only in the enthralling “epiphany” that ends the chapter. By the end of the chapter, moreover, the “prophetic” nature of such cultic practices is revealed in the near-crucifixion of Bloom. The theatricality that was exposed at the end of Stephen’s imaginary procession in “Telemachus”, similarly distinguishes Bloom’s exit, described by the nameless narrator as ‘as good as any bloody play in the Queen’s royal theatre’ and followed by a list of its producers’ initials- of “impersonal” modern culture (446). 57

“The Day Rabblement” finally dawns in “Cyclops”, as the narrator’s voice can no longer be isolated from the crowd’s. The “end” of representation is followed by endless performance that distinguishes both the narrator and his narrative. Although a highly political chapter, the multivocality of modern culture disperses any “message” the artist as the mouthpiece of his nation claims to communicate. As in the end of “The Dead”, the storyteller’s voice and role are challenged, but also salvaged, through the anonymous voice of the newspapers that keep disrupting the nameless narrator’s account with lists, reportages

56 Budgen replied that it seemed to him ‘Rather cubist than futurist’ as ‘Every event is a many-sided object’ (156). While Budgen’s reference to a ‘many-sided object’ evokes the “wholeness” in Stephen’s description of aesthetic apprehension, what Joyce appears to view as futuristic is the “speed” with which he sweeps over the past and his version of “divisionism”.

57 Bloom himself links religious ritual with the theatre in “Lotus Eaters”: ‘There’s a big idea behind it, kind of kingdom of God is within you feel. First communicants. Hokypoky penny a lump. Then feel all like one family party, same in the theatre, all in the same swim’ (U 99).
and adverts, but simultaneously disseminating the Word and mirroring his attempts to give an account—antagonistically to a larger audience, as they now embody the voice of the nation. Even a direct satirical attack against the bard is made in a reportage prompted by the sound of the citizen’s dog and the citizen’s own speech on the Irish language, of a ‘really marvelous exhibition of cynanthropy’ that engrossed ‘Our greatest living phonetic expert’ who traced, leaving ‘no stone unturned in his efforts to elucidate and compare the verse recited’ by ‘the famous old Irish red setter woldog’, ‘to the ranns of ancient Celtic bards’ (403-4). In this parody of journalistic reportage, Joyce stages a fictional conflict between the journalist and the bard while exposing the similarities between the two. Presenting ‘a specimen which has been rendered into English by an eminent scholar whose name for the moment we are not at liberty to disclose though we believe that our readers will find the topical allusion rather more than an indication’, the reportage is an exhibition of the way that modern culture seduces its audiences by proffering to them the distinguished role of the scholar (404). The scholarly gloss is not only presented as a testimony to the authenticity of the account, but also as a flattery to the reader who is addressed as or called upon to become an “expert”.

**ii. In duty bound: A server of a servant**

Stephen’s egoistic economy and quest for freedom are transformed in *Ulysses* into an awareness of interminable servitude and infinite debt. Although the historical, political, socio-economic and religious background of Stephen’s condition is emphasised - by Stephen himself, as well as by his author - the despair that characterises Stephen’s thoughts and the philosophical nature of his discourse present his plight as an almost existential condition. His servitude is described in terms of distinct roles he has himself assumed and has been called upon to perform that circumscribe his possibilities as an individual and as an artist. Both a curse and a title of distinction, his role as a ‘server of a servant’ indicates the paradoxical position he finds himself in as an artist (12). A mockery of his ideal role during his composition of the villanelle in the *Portrait* as ‘a priest of the eternal imagination’, he appears defeated in his quest to reinterpret the divine office that he had rejected (*P* 240). This role simply highlights his divisions as a subject of the British empire, the Roman

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58 A curse delivered by Noah upon being exposed by his son Ham: ‘Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren’ (Gen. 9.25). Gifford notes that ‘The Latin phrase *Servus Servorum Dei* (A Server of the Servants of God) is a title once used by bishops and rulers, but since the twelfth century it has now been used exclusively by the pope and is now part of the superscription of papal bulls’ (*Ulysses Annotated* 20).

The constraint he feels in this ministry is conceived as a state of indebtedness - both moral and material - reflecting his enduring attraction to ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental acts’ (P 172). Having ‘shr[unk] from the dignity of celebrant because it displeased him to imagine that all the vague pomp should end in his own person or that the ritual should assign to him so clear and final an office’, ‘the absence of an appointed rite’ has nevertheless ‘constrained him to inaction’. What distinguishes ‘the mystery and power of the priestly office’ for Agamben, is that it ‘institutes a circular relation between being and praxis, by which the priest’s being defines his praxis and his praxis, in turn, defines his being’ (Opus Dei 79). Since the priest ‘has to be what he does and does what he is, the subject of a liturgical act is not truly a subject (on the theological level this is expressed in the thesis according to which his action, as opus operatum, is done by another, namely Christ)’ (83). Like Barthes’ ‘modern scriptor’ who is ‘born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing’ and ‘is not the subject with the book as predicate’, as ‘there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now’, ‘priesthood, of which the character is the cipher, is not a real predicate but a pure signature, which manifests only the constitutive excess of effectiveness over being’ (Image-Music-Text 145; Opus Dei 83).

In this ‘proximity between the ontology of command and the ontology of office’, being for Agamben ‘is totally dissolved into a debt, into a having-to-be’: ‘law and religion necessarily coincide’ (81-2, 99). But ‘In contrast with other human duties, the debt that is in question in religio cannot be satisfied once and for all, because it is in its essence inexhaustible’ (100). In response to Mr Deasy’s motto ‘I paid my way’, Stephen’s list of his debts is presented as similarly endless: ‘Mulligan, nine pounds, three pairs of socks, one pair brogues, ties. Curran, ten guineas. McCann, one guinea. Fred Ryan, two shillings. Temple, two lunches. Russell, one guinea, Cousins, ten shillings, Bob Reynolds, half a guinea, Koehler, three guineas, Mrs MacKernan, five weeks’ board. The lump I have is useless’ (U 37). In “Scylla and Charybdis”, this sense of indebtedness is shown to be behind Stephen’s desire for a protean identity: ‘Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound’ (242). Memory - which preserves identity: ‘But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms’ - is memory of sin and religious duty: ‘I that sinned and prayed and fasted’. Both Stephen’s identity and the language through which he understands it are ‘totally dissolved into a debt, into a having-to-be’:

I, I and I. I.
‘The transformation of being into having-to-be’ that the paradigm of the priest’s office illustrates for Agamben, ‘defines the ethics as much as the ontology and politics of modernity’ (81-2). ‘If being is something that must be realized, if it necessarily implies a putting-to-work, it will be necessary to presuppose a will that renders it possible’ (118). Agamben traces this demand to Aristotle, ‘in whom the concept of will appears for the first time in an ontological context precisely to explain the passage from potential to act: that which has the hexis of a potential can pass to the act “when it wills [hoti boulētheis]” (On the Soul 417a26–27)’. Stephen’s thoughts on possibility and actuality in “Nestor”, however, refer rather to Aristotle’s definition of motion in Physics as the fulfillment of what exists potentially. Preceding here Aristotle’s definition of infinity which ‘exists as potentiality’, Stephen’s thoughts on time and movement - which Aristotle says ‘are indeed unlimited, but only as processes’ - appear as an attempt to erase the Author of history, and like Bruno identify him with Infinity (Physics 247, 257). ‘If one starts from the assumption that the universe is infinite, it no longer makes sense to conceive the coincidence between act and potency as the exclusive property of a fixed point in the hierarchy of being, a privileged point in a finite and physical cosmos conceived as distinct from the intelligible world’, Ingengo explains Bruno’s thought (Cause, Principle, Unity xiv). Bruno’s ‘forms of forms’ is described as an ‘absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency’, but ‘cannot be comprehended by the intellect, except by way of negatives’ (68). The ‘sloth of the underworld’ in Stephen’s ‘mind’s darkness’, however, ‘shy of brightness’, is not capable of such coincidence of contraries; his metaphysics are still trinitarian: ‘Thought is the thought of thought’ (30-1).

Searching for a metaphysical solution that will allow him to free himself from ‘the stoneheaps of dead builders’- from a historically amassed debt, Stephen’s efforts seem doomed (55). Through Stephen’s metaphysics, however, and his consternation before kinesis, Joyce is able to question and examine the idea of the “act” as a concept linking ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics: the citizen, the actor/performer and the author. Stephen’s invocation of ‘gesture’, his theatrical understanding of the idea of character, emphasis on “theory” and penchant for the role of the liturgical server, reveal his struggle to revise and reinterpret this concept as both a verb and a noun. Moreover, while Bloom appears to embody the paradigm of the praxis that Stephen is looking for, he too, wandering around Dublin for work and pleasure, constantly tries to interpret his actions, giving them through this process excess meaning, but simultaneously trying to come to terms with the fact that the search for a truly meaningful act may be “Useless”.
Stephen’s gesture in “Circe” which signals the incarnation of all matter in the drama of this chapter is interpreted by Rabaté in terms of the dualism of potency and act: ‘Act would … perhaps be a better term than gesture here, if by act we understand the performativ power of language and its capacity to reveal the hidden motives of the unconscious’ (Authorized Reader 77). “Circe” for Rabaté ‘presents the textual unconscious in its “acting out” of all the potential fantasies contained in the book – this is the sense of “actualization” developed by “entelechy”’. He warns, however, that ‘the fact that most theoretical pronouncements made by Stephen in this episode derive from the Trieste notebook (dated 1907-9) should inspire some prudence and perhaps imply that these statements reveal Stephen’s immaturity rather than a key to the episode’. His ritual gesture in “Circe” indeed appears to present a satiric portrait not only of his own youthful ambitions, but also those of Yeats, who had influenced Stephen’s conception of the artistic vocation in terms of a priestly office. Yeats, as Schuchard describes, ‘In chanting a poem’, ‘withdrew to an approximation of the magical process in which he created the poem, into the visionary trance in which its images and rhythms arose – recreating the rhythmic breathing and pauses, recovering the cadences achieved through many subtle repetitions of line, conducting the living voice with the hieratic movement of arm and hand, affording the listener some sensual access to the achieved poetic ecstasy of his imaginative world’ (135). What Yeats’s hieratic gestures were divulging, Schuchard explains, was that ‘the psaltery experiments were related to his earlier prophecy that “certainly belief in a supersensual world is at hand again”, and to all the rites, rituals and esoteric practices that he had pursued to that end in the past decade’.

Professing to Djuna Barnes that he had included in Ulysses all ‘the great talkers’ but also ‘the things they forgot’, Joyce claims to have ‘recorded, simultaneously, what a man says, sees, thinks, and what such seeing, thinking, saying does, to what you Freudians call the subconscious’ (JJ 524). “Circe” enables this contemporaneity through its dramatic form. The memory that is awakened in this chapter takes the form of the illicit collective subconscious, the variability and unreliability of which is reflected through theatricality. This unnarratable discourse is “incarnated” through its actors in a “black” reproduction of the drama of the Mass. Initiated through Stephen’s chanting of ‘the introit for paschal time’ and a premature “catharsis”: ‘Vidi aquam egredientem de templo a latere dextro’, ‘gesture’-performance, is announced as the ‘universal language’ (564).

Stephen’s thoughts on potentiality and actuality in “Nestor” revealed his struggle to free himself from Scholastic philosophy; in “Circe”, his epiphanic gesture is similarly

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59 Willis E. McNelly corrects the narrative’s “deviation” by explaining that ‘it is not the Introit for Paschal time that Stephen is chanting: it is the Asperges for Paschal time’ (293).
theologically inscribed, performed as a liturgical act- cathartic in particular. Preceded ‘triumphaliter’ by ‘Salvi facti sunt’ - “And they are made whole” - his act of ‘shivering the lamp image, shattering light over the world’ symbolises the efficacy of his word (564). The substantial reality of his word is secured through an actualisation of potency through this sacramental act. ‘Crucial to the whole Catholic concept of strict sacramentality’, as Noon explains, ‘is the notion that the Sacraments are not merely signs but practical and efficacious instruments which effect what they signify, the conferring of grace. The theological formula insists upon the causality ex opera operato rather than as ex opera operantis … As Aquinas conceives of the sacramental rite, the word (verbum vitae) is the formal cause, the determining and perfecting principle, which gives meaning and instrumental efficacy to the sacramental actions’ (153). Reversing this trope, Stephen turns to the sacramental rite in order to “perfect his words” - to give them ‘meaning and instrumental efficacy’.

While Joyce gives his word substance and efficacy through the incarnation of all material beings that appear in this chapter, Stephen’s sacramental gesture is a kenosis in reverse. Chanting ‘with joy’ what the dramatic notes describe as ‘the introit for paschal time’, he appears to celebrate the Passion, although by in fact chanting the asperges, he also celebrates the baptism of Christ. Commemorating the baptism, Stephen celebrates the commencement of the public ministry of Christ, but also the Epiphany as his act of ‘shattering light over the world’ demonstrates (564). By invoking ‘gesture’, a formal act emptied of its substance - ‘not music, not odour’, ‘rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy’ - Stephen empties the Word of its corporeality. While Christ according to Paul ‘humbled himself’: ‘made himself of no reputation [ἐκένωσεν], and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men’, in Stephen’s fantasy of empowerment ‘the form of a servant’ is shattered (Philippians 2:7-9).

Similarly, Stephen as ‘the vicar of Christ’ in “Oxen” had celebrated the Eucharist with his ‘soul’s bodiment’ but not his body; in “Circe”, however, chanting the antiphon, Stephen refuses the role of the celebrant- the Eucharist is performed by Father Malachi O'Flynn and The Reverend Mr Haines Love (510). In his celebration of a ‘feast of pure reason’, Stephen refuses any kind of sacrifice (696). ‘[A]s the high priest of a sacrifice in which the officiator sacrifices himself (heauton prosēnken, 9:14)’, Agamben explains, ‘Christ accomplishes a liturgical action that is, so to speak, absolute and perfect and that for this reason can be carried out only once (hapax prosenechtheis, 9:28; mian . . . prosenenkas thysian, 10:12). In this sense Christ coincides without remainder with his liturgy - he is essentially liturgy - and precisely this coincidence confers on his liturgy its incomparable efficacy’ (Opus Dei 17). While Shem as ‘Primum apifex’ and ‘altus prosator’ achieves this
coincidence through ‘corrosive sublimation’ by writing on his body until ‘one continuous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marryvoisin moodmoulded cyclewheeling history’, refusing sacrifice - refusing to allow his ‘squidself’ to wane ‘chargreenoldand doriangrayer in its dudhud’ - Stephen’s sacrament is a symbolic gesture of his desire for such unrepeatable and ‘incomparable efficacy’ of his Word (FW 185-6). His metaphysical desire in the Portrait to possess the ‘power of the priestly office’ in order to reconcile himself with the world which ‘for all its solid substance and complexity no longer existed for his soul save as a theorem of divine power and love and universality’ in the face of ‘the powerful recurrence of the tides within him’, is awakened following his entry into Mecklenburgh street (175, 162, 104).

In the dreamlike fantasy world of Circe, a Bacchic-inspired nightmare of history where all movement manifests itself as desire and the Prime Mover is replaced by ‘the causality of the will as the only causality’ while ‘all active force’ is sublimated ‘unequivocally as will to power’, Stephen’s role as an artist is once again interpreted and authorised through the ‘awful power’ of the priest of God with which the director had tempted him to join the Jesuit order (Beyond Good and Evil 546; P 171). As ‘negation of will’ is not possible, neither is the saint, Nietzsche argues, as Stephen reminds himself in “Proteus”; but remembering ‘the proud claims of the church’, he takes part in this ‘dreadful performance’ (175; SL 271). Fittingly- and ironically, “Circe” is modeled on Flaubert’s The Temptation of St Anthony: ‘a philosophic closet-drama … a play about an anchorite, an expressionistic monodrama in which temptation and flagellation were performed by the same actor upon himself’, as Levin explains (qtd. by Baron 135). The surrender of all action in “Circe” to desire, is set against St Anthony’s struggle to avoid temptation, to curb his will. Unlike Nietzsche’s identification of will with power, however, the will in “Circe” is associated with perversion- masochistic in particular; subjugation is presented as another form of desire.

Realising Stephen’s suppressed desire for ‘vague sacrificial or sacramental acts’ and Bloom’s for personal and social advancement, but also dramatising the public image they project, the priest and the king traverse again parallel courses in this episode. Prior to the complete dissolution of Stephen’s being into praxis- as a marionette, the narrative traces the multitude of “offices” that Bloom as a ‘kinetic artist’ assumes. Bloom’s ascendency from

60 I should have served my brethren more effectually by being a simple priest. I might succour the poor, administer the sacraments, and guard the purity of domestic life’, St Anthony thinks meditating on his solitary life (Flaubert 7). ‘Besides, all the laity are not lost, and there was nothing to prevent me from being, for example, a grammarian or a philosopher. I should have had in my room a sphere made of reeds, tablets always in my hand, young people around me, and a crown of laurel suspended as an emblem over my door’. ‘But there is too much pride in such triumphs!’; he reconsiders.
impotence to power is described through another torrent of spectacles and processions, as his role as mayor is inconspicuously transformed into that of ‘His Most Catholic Majesty’ (609). During his residency in office, his being like that of the priest ‘dissolves into its practical effects’ (Opus Dei 9). Bloom falls silent and the dramatic notes record his actions which are distinguished by their “effectiveness”: the coincidence of potency and act in the miracles he performs.

What defines the sacraments, Agamben like Noon explains, is that ‘their being [is] at once a sign and the cause of that of which they are a sign’: ‘in the formula that Aquinas cites as canonical, the sacraments efficiunt quod figurant, effectuate what they signify’ (50-1). Bloom hardly has need for words, as his actions have become effective signs; language becomes superfluous: ‘(shaking hands with a blind stripling) My more than Brother! (placing his arms round the shoulders of an old couple) Dear old friends! (he plays pussy fourcorners with ragged boys and girls) Peep! Bopeep! (he wheels twins in a perambulator) Ticktacktwo wouldyousetashoe?’ (608). The potency of his word is revealed in his reading of a random collection of Hebrew words, the meaning of which lies entirely in their utterance. His ‘universal language’ that will accompany ‘universal brotherhood’, is another ideal “sign language” that will allow unequivocal communication (610). Bloom ‘solemnly’ corrects Crofton’s admiration of his performance: ‘You call it a festivity. I call it a sacrament’.

In a dramatisation of “The Dialectic of the Enlightenment”, Bloom’s schemes for improvement, modernisation and regeneration turn into an ideology or cult; apparently stepping outside conventions and the law, he creates a mirror image of a totalising scheme that consumes all culture, science, morality and industry as its props. The absolute freedom that Bloom announces to his citizens coincides with his absolute power. But rather than highlighting the relative impotence of the word before such ‘absolute and perfect’ act, the narrative’s dramatisation of the gap between description and action succeeds in ridiculing Bloom’s movements, as the identification of his being with performance leads to his transformation into a jester (Opus Dei 17). ‘[P]riestly praxis’, Agamben argues, ‘is always constitutively an “alteration” (vece); it is something “done” or “acted out” and never a substance. The one in whose “stead” (vece) the function is carried out in his turn takes the place of another and precisely this constitutive vicariousness defines the “function”’; like the priest, Bloom is determined entirely by ‘the function he exercises’ (55-6). His being is ‘factical and functional—it refers each time to a praxis that defines and actualizes it’, as his transformations, pantomimic contractions of his face ‘so as to resemble many historical personages’ and repeated calls to prove himself as an expert reveal (56; U 615). Through
typology Bloom is indeed identified with the whole of history when Brini, the Papal Nuncio appears to read out his genealogy- ‘Leopoldi autem generatio’, until A DEADHAND appears and ‘(writes on the wall) Bloom is a cod’ (615-6). Having been completely defined through his actions, he is exposed by the signature of the irreversible hand of divine authority. With a final sacrament- Bloom’s execution, the end of the drama is announced with the arrival of ‘THE END OF THE WORLD’ that usurps Bloom’s role as performer, calling for a danse macabre (624).

Pictured repeating inanely a ‘series of empty fifths’, Stephen emerges as an indifferent theorist of this spectacle: ‘The rite is the poet’s rest’ (621-2). Dismissing the search for the origins of art in ritual as a scholarly matter ‘of no importance’ to the artist, his thoughts turn to the “dissolution” of stasis by ‘the rhythm of beauty’: ‘It is susceptible of nodes or modes as far apart as hyperphrygian and mixolydian and of texts so divergent as priests haihooping round David’s that is Circe’s or what am I saying Ceres’ altar and David's tip from the stable to his chief bassoonist about the alrightness of his almightiness’ (P 223; U 622). His separation in the Portrait of art ‘from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul’ is mocked here by THE CAP which dissolves the soul into “matter”; exclaiming a negatory ‘Ba!’ that is also, however, the soul that survived after death in ancient Egypt, THE CAP replies ‘It is because it is. Woman's reason. Jewgreek is greekjew. Extremes meet. Death is the highest form of life. Ba!’ (224, 622).

The Brunian coincidence of contraries that THE CAP refers to in order to disband the rhythm of Stephen’s thought, exposes Stephen’s dismissal of “the rite” as a consequence of his desire, like Bruno, for the ‘absolute act, which is identical with absolute potency’ (Cause, Principle, Unity 68). To explain ‘The coincidence of this act with absolute potency’, Teophilo, like Stephen in Nestor, refers to psalm 139, ‘described by the divine spirit’ and therefore making the original author irrelevant: ‘David’s that is Circe’s or what am I saying Ceres’ altar and David's tip from the stable to his chief bassoonist about the alrightness of his almightiness’, as ‘Tenebrae non obscurabuntur a te. Nox sicut dies illuminabitur. Sicut tenebrae eius, ita et lumeneius’ [Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee]’ (Cause, Principle, Unity 68).

Although Stephen is unable to make ends meet: ‘The reason is because the fundamental and the dominant are separated by the greatest possible interval which .....’, the absolute act that he desires is messianic; it is a power that ‘is made perfect in weakness’: ‘No voice. I am a most finished artist’ (623; 2 Cor. 12:9; 634). ‘The bird that can sing and won’t
As the *Bacchae* is transformed into Aristophanes’ *Frogs* - ‘Hik! Hek! Hak! Huk! Kok! Kuk!’ - the drama that is staged is Bloom’s masochistic fantasy at the hands of Bello, ending with his loss of willpower and memory (637). But while the appearance of the nymph appears to announce the end of desire: ‘Only the ethereal. Where dreamy creamy gull waves o’er the waters dull’, the stain that appears on her robe ends this brief static interlude (661). ‘To have or not to have that is the question’, Stephen replies to Bloom who desires to retrieve his potato (663). Stephen’s trinitarian metaphysics are increasingly close to Bruno’s dualist philosophy, as the coincidence of Bloom and Stephen into Shakespeare illustrates.

Stephen’s own performance of ‘parleyvoo’ to entertain his audience by ‘gabbl[ing] with marionette jerks’ ends like Bloom’s with a ‘Dance of death’ (672, 680). But whereas Bloom’s fantasy is followed by the loss of his willpower and memory before his grandfather and an ‘Exuberant female’, the usurper in Stephen’s case is the ghost of his mother, who appears asking him to repent (642). Reminded of his commitment to freedom, his refusal to “serve”, Stephen smashes the chandelier and beats the ground as a mark of his revolt against both chthonic and heavenly gods. In the absence of ‘The word known to all men’, the absolute word that requires “weakness”- prayer which is ‘allpowerful’ but which Stephen refuses as a form of sacrifice, here in the reduction of the sign to nothing - ‘Nothung!’ - that is required in tragedy, as Hölderlin argues, to allow ‘original matter, the hidden foundation of any nature’ to ‘present itself’, Stephen refuses mediation: ‘With me all or not at all’ (682; Hölderlin 89; 683). In his inability to solve the mystery of the simultaneous unity and division of mind and body, language and thought, he turns to violence and power. His ideal “stasis” takes the form of an insurrection as the episode ends in an uprising. His dualism which allows only opposites is parodied in the inversions of the black mass that Haines and Mulligan celebrate. As in his attempt in “Oxen” to explain the mystery of the incarnation, in the absence of ‘the third person of the Blessed Trinity’, he refuses ‘subsubstantiality’ having turned the female body into a ghoul: ‘Entweder transubstantiality oder consubstantiality but in no case subsubstantiality’ (511). Stephen ultimately refuses the coincidence of matter and form. His desire to ‘discuss’ rather than act once again exposes him as a ‘morbidminded esthete’, as he taps his head telling Bloom ‘in here it is I must kill the priest and the king’ (688, 550). His denial of ‘arbitrary’, however, is not only a consequence of his metaphysics, but is historically grounded in his position as a servant of two masters: ‘Struggle for life is the law of existence but human philirenists, notably the tsar and the king of England, have invented arbitration’ (688).

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61 The proverb ends “must be made to sing”, according to Gifford (*Ulysses Annotated* 496).
iii. The chaste fancy of the Holy Writer

While “Circe” enacts a largely Bloomian fantasy, “Oxen of the Sun”, the ‘idea’ of which Joyce described to Budgen as ‘the crime committed against fecundity by sterilizing the act of coition’, is a fantasy of the ‘embryo philosopher’ Stephen (Letters I 138-9; U 550). The mystery of language takes precedence over the mystery of life, as the paradigm for the birth anticipated is the Immaculate Conception. The genealogical endeavour undertaken with Aristotelian fastidiousness is complicated and undermined by the exhaustive typology of this chapter which is based on the Renaissance pantheistic cosmology of Cusa and Bruno whereby ‘Everything is in everything, because spirit or soul is in all things, and therefore out of anything may be produced anything else’ (McIntyre 126). The system building and mathematical method that characterised Renaissance philosophy in its attempt to organise this chaos of infinite relations - an endeavour ‘to simplify the complex’ which this chapter reflects in its catalogue of styles - is set against the semantic instability resulting from the humanistic preoccupation with the historicity of language and consciousness of the need to create ‘new words’ for ‘new theories’ in the coincidence of potency and act in this novel cosmos (OCPW 94; McIntyre 106).

The chapter is described as a ‘museum of prose styles’ by Kenner while Spoo draws attention to ‘a claustrophobic quality’ of the styles of “Oxen”, ‘a sense that life has been covered over by the fabric of textuality’ (Dublin’s Joyce 319; 150). In the exhaustive drive of the Renaissance philosopher who has taken over the organisation of the ‘multiplicit concordance’ of history in this chapter, not only the structure - ‘the action proceeds through nine parts, but without divisions’ Budgen notes - but language too, as MacCabe argues, ‘has now become pure system’ (U 514; 223; Revolution of the Word 126). The self-consciousness of the narrative idiom is so prominent and obstructive to “meaning” that for Leo Bersani the chapter ‘initiates us to a radical separation of interpretation from the phenomenology of reading’ (173). The narrative indeed appears to be tracing an intellectual history that coincides with the history of language. Mediated through the word, the simultaneity of the past and the present creates an effect of timelessness, a mythical time that draws attention to the strenuous timelessness of the creative process.

As thought and reality are one for Bruno, this chapter takes place wholly in the mind of its narrator; there is no distinction between his encyclopedic mind and the narrative action. As Kenner argues, “Coition”, as Joyce is exploiting it in these pages, is the basic Aristotelian and Aquinatian metaphor for the intercourse between mind and things. … The word “conception” unites biology and epistemology. We start with sensory beguilements,
whether in begetting or cognizing; we end with an articulated concept, a begotten Logos, word; an affirmation that this or that exists’ (19). ‘Bloom is the spermatozoon, the hospital the womb, the nurse he ovum, Stephen is the embryo’, Joyce explains his parable of creation (Letters I.139).

Philosopher and philologist converge in this tale of the birth of the Word in the figure of the Holy Writer. No longer a creator or a bard, the author in this chapter is merely a scriptor and exegete of the Author: ‘“I interpret the killing of the sacred oxen as the crime against fecundity by sterilising the act of coition. And I think my interpretation is as sound as that of any other commentator of Homer”’, Joyce proudly told Budgen (220). The philosopher comes to terms with his ‘nightmare’ through the narration of a theological version of history, while spirit and matter are reconciled in the Word. The fertility incantation that opens this chapter prefigures the birth of the Word at the end of the chapter which concludes with a testimony of the fulfillment of its scripture: ‘Pflap! Ut impleerentur scripturae. Strike up a ballad’ (561).

These mythical origins come under scrutiny by an enlightened historian who, highlighting the significance of ‘acumen’ for the ‘prosperity of a nation’, tries to put some order to the mixture of ‘sapience’ and ignorance in history (500). He echoes strikingly the opening of Cusa’s Catholic Concordance- an ‘elaborate outline of the hierarchical structure of the universe and of the church’:

Since anyone endowed with the slightest intelligence can draw the proper conclusions if he knows the basic principles, I will begin with a few words concerning the underlying divine harmony in the church. Concordance is the principle by which the Catholic Church is in harmony as one and many – in one Lord and many subjects. Flowing from the one King of peace with infinite concordance, a sweet spiritual harmony of agreement emanates in successive degrees to all its members who are subordinated and united to him. Thus one God is all things in all things. (xix, 5)

While the narrating scholar’s learnedness coincides with his “ignorance” in its magniloquence, and the role of language in communication is set aside - ‘Universally that person's acumen is esteemed very little perceptive concerning whatsoever matters are being held as most profitably by mortals with sapience endowed to be studied who is ignorant of that which the most in doctrine erudite…’ - the narrative nevertheless traces philologically the “history” of the word in the “progress” of language through its eminent authors, perverting the traditions the scholar revives through his “scientific” outlook- his mixture of biology, epistemology and scholarship (500). In a parody of Joyce’s scholastic schooling that had endowed him with ‘a grocer’s assistant mind’, the chapter catalogues dialects and idioms
in a travesty of “style”; ‘divine harmony’ gradually disintegrates into chaos and drunken disorder \((JJ\ 28)\).

Seemingly a “phenomenologist” like Bloom, the narrator rhetorically questions the relation between ‘exterior splendour’ and ‘the surface of a downwardtending lutulent reality’, as he searches for ‘basic principles’ for ‘every most just citizen’ through language, history but also metaphysics, attempting to draw some conclusions through his mathematical “method” \((500)\). Like Cusa, he sees knowledge in terms of ‘a kind of analogy or “proportion”’: ‘as the ends and ultimates of all things accord in some mean and measure with their inceptions and originals that same multiplicit concordance which leads forth growth from birth accomplishing by a retrogressive metamorphosis that minishing and ablation towards the final which is agreeable unto nature so is it with our subsolar being’ \((Whittaker\ 439,\ U\ 514)\).

The divinely inspired Holy Writer of this chapter, however, is faced with the even more arduous task as a chronicler and interpreter of the company of ‘right witty scholars’ who hold a “symposium” while waiting for the birth of the Word \((507)\). His endeavour to construct a ‘concordance’ is disturbed by this bawdy company that constantly presents its narrator with new hermeneutic challenges with its ‘aresouns’. Cusa’s devout attempt to systematically trace and piece together the outlines of the phenomena of the work of God in the world is interrupted by a Brunian symposium, as the evolution of language has to contend with the disrupting voices of this drinking party. The challenge that history and language present to the philosopher is presented through the antagonism between philosopher and scholar - or ‘sacrilegious pedant’ - that characterises Bruno’s philosophical banquets \((Cause,\ Principle,\ Unity\ 29)\). While the subject of these discussions is the philosophy of the Nolan who ‘has freed the human mind and the knowledge which were shut up in the strait prison of the turbulent air’, the philosopher Teophilo who tries to enlighten his company is confronted by pedants who see knowledge as a means of self-promotion \((Ash\ Wednesday\ Supper\ 87-8)\). The discussions take place among a barrage of abuse that is exchanged between the philosopher and the scholar; through a ‘salad’ of proverbs that shows off their learning, and ultimately exposes their similarities - their shared understanding of the significance of language in communicating the truth of this universe \((Cause,\ Principle,\ Unity\ 50)\).

Combining these two roles, the narrator of “Oxen” similarly tries to strike a balance between composition and interpretation. While Stephen’s credentials in metaphysics are on display in this drinking party, the “philosopher”, however, ironically is Bloom. As a phenomenologist, he is once again a victim of grandiloquence, proposing in vain the truth of
the phenomena of nature to a group of drunken scholars narrating, acting and arguing over mythical tales. Stephen on the other hand seeks again to legitimise his role as an artist through “theories”. Assuming the role of the ‘vicar of Christ’ in his heretical celebration of the Eucharist, he refers to the mystery of the Trinity and of the Virgin’s relation to her Son, to draw attention to himself as a creator of words through a contrast between physical and metaphysical creation (510). Interpreted by Aquinas in terms of the relationship between speech and thought, the Trinity has little relevance to the biological process of birth- the ‘successive anastomosis of navelcords’ that is a consequence of the fall of man (511). Even the Incarnation is undermined through Stephen’s heretical and irreverent theories that probe analytically the mystery of the Immaculate Conception.

By “proving”, however, his genetic relation to the word as an artist, he distances himself from reality; the artist’s reality is ‘postcreation’. Exposed by ‘a hubbub of Phenomenon’ as a ‘braggart boaster’ in the absence of ‘the tube Understanding’, his philosophical credential are shaken (516). Only after the birth of the word, only by proving the “reality” of the word can he reclaim that title. Only if language is the reality can he be both Author and philosopher. As a Holy Writer the narrator can lay claim to such coincidence of reality and language: ‘in the biblical revelation of Holy Scripture’ with which William Franke links Joyce’s work, ‘language becomes the medium of a disclosure of human life in its full and final meaning’ (156). Such coincidence allows communion rather than communication through the word; a communion, however, through the ‘soul’s bodiment’, as the ‘chaste fancy’ of the narrator - as of Stephen - ignores the significance of the body as a medium for knowledge and understanding (510, 533).

In Budgen’s account of the development of this chapter, the prose disintegrates into ‘a torrent of living, and therefore, except to those present, half-incomprehensible speech’ (223). As the reader lands along with the characters in “the present”, the narrative dramatises the event of the Incarnation. In Gadamer’s account of the Incarnation, this is the “first” historical event: ‘The uniqueness of the redemptive event introduces the essence of history into Western thought, brings the phenomenon of language out of its immersion in the ideality of meaning, and offers it to philosophical reflection. For, in contrast to the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)’ (418). The incomprehensibility of the language of the present at the end of “Oxen” highlights this emptying of ‘the ideality of meaning’ of the word through its corporeality. The “epiphany” of the meaning of the word can only be achieved in a moment of “stasis”, in an “arrest” of time: “To be” and “to understand” are not the same in us’, as they are in God, as Aquinas remarks (Summa Theologica q. 34, a. 2). The historicity of the word is exposed in the
hermeneutic valences it undergoes; but its final transformation in “Oxen” emphasises also its corporeality; as the characters get drunk, so does language. The narrative consciousness is dispersed both in language and in the body.

While for the Holy Writer the language of the Bible communicates an eternal truth, language is ‘the house of Being’ in modernity because being is historical (Heidegger 217). Hermeneutics is no longer a “method” as it is for the Holy Writer but closer to Heidegger it is presented as an ontological problem; history and interpretation are concurrent. This coincidence does not need to be seen as ‘a model of interpretive nihilism’, although it is modeled on a ‘redemptive’ event, as Bersani argues (175, 178). This redemptive event may “glorify the Father”, but it also highlights the significance of experience and of the body as a medium for both knowledge and communication. In order to be a participant in the feast that celebrated, rather than an indifferent theorist the experience of the reader’s encounter with language must take the form of a perpetual resurrection. In *Finnegans Wake* we are indeed led ‘to Joyce’s mind’, to ‘his cultural consciousness’, but in order to witness the “perversion” of the Author and his all-consuming desire to make his body signify; without its denigration, however, through martyrdom (175-6).

In his emphasis on the idea of language as an event that the Incarnation introduces, Gadamer refers to Aquinas’s reply to the question ‘Whether Word in God is a personal name?’, a question that is implicit also in “Oxen” in the presentation of language through specific literary models (*Summa Theologica* q. 34, a. 1). In his answer, Aquinas highlights the complexity and diversity of the hermeneutics of the word: ‘first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word’. Through this trinity of interpretations, Aquinas emphasises the processual character of the word; ‘Word’ is a ‘personal’ name because it ‘signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin’. ‘Person’ relates not to individuality, but to the ‘personal terms in God’- to the procession of the persons of the Trinity. The ‘word’ similarly ‘signifies that which emanates from another’. Since for God ‘it signifies an emanation of the intellect’, it is also “the same”, as one of the many narrators of the pub tales in *Finnegans Wake* ponders: ‘whereom is man, that old offender, nother man, wheile he is asame’ (356). This paradox of emanation finds its “human-all-too-human” interpretation through Molly’s ‘perfectly sane full amoral fertilisable untrustworthy engaging shrewd limited prudent indifferent Weib’ when her admission ‘I thought well as well him as another’ at the end of
*Ulysses* is presented as a celebration of life rather than as a philosophical riddle (*Letters I 170; U 933*).
Chapter 5: The Age of Hermeneutics

I. Critic

i. The work of art: ef thes es whot ye deuks, then I'm not surpleased ye want that bottle of Sauvequipeu [FW 222.9]

The temporary disfigurement of ‘wideawake language, cutanddry grammar and goahead plot’ in order to implement the ideal “stasis” that is necessary for esthetic apprehension in Stephen’s theory in the Portrait- to allow ‘language to sleep’ while instigating a hermeneutical insomnia, was from the moment of reception of the very first fragments of this nighthwor(l)d that Joyce circulated among a select group of benefactors, seen as artistic suicide (JJ 584-5, 546).  

His ‘experiment in interpreting ‘the dark night of the soul’ appeared to his oldest and most experienced reader Stanislaus as a ‘nightmare production’; his ‘drivelling ringmarole’ as a sign of ‘the beginning of softening of the brain’ (CH 387). Stanislaus’s interpretation of these fragments - that Joyce assured Harriet Shaw Weaver would in time ‘begin to fuse themselves’ - as ‘the witless wandering of literature before its final extinction’, highlighted the self-destructive - and prophetically the de-constructive - nature of such an enterprise (Letters I 204; CH 387). ‘I am made in such a way that I do not care much for the darknesses and unintelligibilities of your deliberately-entangled language system. It seems to me you are wasting your genius’, Weaver protested at being presented with Joyce's “inhuman” novel literary ‘recipe’ (JJ 590; Letters I 258). ‘Nothing would be worth plowing through like this, except the Divine Vision - and I gather it’s not that sort of thing’, Pound replied declining the honorary position proffered to him as an exegete of the Holy Scripture, while H. G. Wells castigated Joyce for having ‘turned [his] back on common men, on their elementary needs and their restricted time and intelligence’: ‘Your last two works have been more amusing and exciting to write than they will ever be to read’ (JJ 585; Letters I 274).

On his part, Joyce felt a victim of ‘the indignant hostility’ directed against him (Letters I 258). Retaliating against this condemnation, he emphasised that rather than being ‘amusing’ or divinely inspired, his Work in Progress demanded immense labour: ‘[T]hey say it is meaningless. Now if it were meaningless it could be written quickly, without thought, without pains, without erudition; but I assure you that these twenty pages [of the ALP

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62 ‘When morning comes of course everything will be clear again … I’ll give them back their English language. I’m not destroying it for good’ (JJ 546).
chapter] now before us cost me twelve hundred hours and an enormous expense of spirit’, he told Valery Larbaud (JJ 598). He proudly drew attention to his ‘punctuality as an engine driver’: ‘I have taken this up because I am really one of the greatest engineers, if not the greatest, in the world besides being a musimaker, philosophist and heaps of other things’, he argued explaining his new vocation to Weaver (Letters I 251). The distinction that George Moore would draw in his letter to Louis Gillet in 1931 between his own artistic temperament and Joyce’s diversion into metaphysical realms of abstraction, indeed appears justified insofar as Joyce’s youthful ‘delusion’ that he was ‘an artist by temperament’ is dispelled: his temperament is now shown to be ‘balanced by the temperament of a philo[lo]gist’ and ‘theologian’, among others (JJ 618; Letters II 110).

Relinquishing his title of distinction, he accedes to the contemptuous vocation of the man of letters, ‘a mere mailman of peace’, that he had distinguished from the divine calling of the artist in his first encounter with Yeats (FW 408). ‘I am quite content to go down to posterity as a scissors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description’, he professed when discussing the composition of an opera based on Byron’s Cain for Sullivan (JJ 626). Claiming that he ‘would never have the bad manners to rewrite the text of a great English poet’, he offered instead his editorial suggestions for this project. With comparable humility, he presented himself as a craftsman to Weaver in 1926: ‘A rather funny idea struck me, that you might ‘order’ a piece and I would do it. The gentlemen of the brush and hammer seem to have worked that way’ (Letters I 245). The emphasis was now laid on the “method” of construction- a ‘radical technique’ according to Ellmann, who describes it as ‘working in layers’ (JJ 546). ‘I feel like an engineer boring into a mountain from two sides’, he told August Suter (Budgen 354).

The heterogeneity of the range of “skills” that he was displaying risked his honorific status in culture and society as a Poet, but it was making him “modern”: ‘I wanted to take up several other arts and crafts and teach everybody how to do everything properly so as to be in the fashion’ (Letters I 252). The modernity of the model(s) of authorship that such representation of his vocation suggests is reflected in the fissure of art’s links to truth that the emphasis on construction rather than creation implies. ‘When the poet depicts the various callings – such as those of the warrior, the silk-weaver, the sailor – he feigns to know all these things thoroughly, to be an expert. […] In so far he is an impostor’, Nietzsche warned of the artist’s role-playing proficiency (Human, All-Too-Human 280). ‘The more bewildered the reader is as to whether you are painter, sculptor, civil servant, sailor, postman etc. the better as the same applies to Ulysses’, Joyce advised Budgen, linking such deceit with his hero- and his work (JJ 665). Contrasting his role as an artist with ‘the political,
philosophical, ethical zeal and labours of the brilliant members of Pound’s big brass band’, he claimed that the sole instrument that aided his constructions was a fanciful and fantastical ‘magic flute’ (JJ 609).

The ancient contest between poetry and philosophy is revived in modernity, although scepticism denies both disciplines their claim to truth. Closer to Hegel rather than Plato, moreover, Joyce sees this “end” of art as a historical consequence rather than epistemological, associating the degeneration of poetry into ‘arts and crafts’ with modern ‘fashion’. ‘Art in the age of work’ is a ‘matter of leisure, of recreation and we consecrate to it the residue of our time and strength’, Nietzsche protested; a prejudice that Shaun the ‘worker’ and “maker” as a ‘tombstone mason’ will proffer against his artist-brother ‘the poorjoist’- a bourgeois, but poor in his failure to be an active member of the economy (Human-all-too-Human 450; FW 113). As a craftsman, an engineer, an editor, translator, advertiser, and printer- 'nichthemerically’ of his own work, and as an advocate of the rights of authors and promoter of upcoming artists, Joyce was not only publicizing his “fashionable” interpretation of the role of the artist and vindicating his vocation, but simultaneously usurping the entire scaffolding that supports the weight of art in society and legitimises its cultural standing (185). As this debasement of art, moreover, was in Nietzsche’s psychological analysis ascribed to the expenditure of ‘too much artistry in our dreams’- ‘symbolic concatenations of scenes and images in place of a narrative poetical language’ which led to our being ‘poor in artistry in the daytime’, Joyce’s ‘esthetic of the dream’ foregrounded and exposed the nightwork of the artist in unravelling this ‘bungled piece of work’ (461; JJ 546).

The “impractical” creative act becomes problematic and is subsumed by production; creativity is superseded by activity. The air of curious mystique that surrounds the “act” of the author that obscures ethics and economics, exiles him from modern culture. Whereas ‘Writers own their texts as one owns one’s property’ as Nehamas argues, ‘Authors by contrast, own their works as one owns one’s actions. Their works are authentically their own (eigentlich). They cannot be taken away (that is, reinterpreted) without changing their authors, without making the characters manifested in them different or even unrecognizable. Authors cannot be taken apart from their works’ (Nehamas in Cascardi ed. 288-9). Defending the “Moral Right of Authors”, Joyce both acknowledges and challenges this fine line of division: ‘while unprotected by the written law of copyright and even if it is banned, a work belongs to its author by natural right’, arguing that the law should be able to ‘protect an author against the mutilation and the publication of his work just as he is protected against the misuse that can be made of his name’ (OCPW 216). The artist is both eternally culpable
in the indissoluble connection between ethics and aesthetics, and impoverished in his inability to indemnify his creations.

Modernity’s entanglement in methodology is for Agamben symptomatic of ‘a crisis of poetry, of poiesis’, a consequence of the obfuscation of the distinction between the ‘three kinds of human doing’ ‘In the Western cultural tradition’- ‘poiesis, praxis, and work’: ‘If the death of art is its inability to attain concrete dimension of the work, the crisis of art in our time is, in reality, a crisis of poetry, of poiesis. Poesis, poetry, does not designate here an art among others, but is the very name of man’s doing, of that productive action of which artistic doing is only a privileged example, and which appears, today, to be unfolding its power on a planetary scale in the operation of technology and industrial production’ (in Kul-Want ed. 252; The Man Without Content 69). Whereas the “genetic” distinction that Aristotle ascribed to art - ‘every art is concerned with giving birth’ - indicated that art ‘has both its end and its limit outside itself’, this end and limit are in modernity ‘identified with the act of production itself’, in an incestuous manner that is thematised and theologised in Finnegans Wake (73). 63

Modern art is poised between such “perversion” and nihilism for Agamben: ‘The original unity of the work of art has broken, leaving on the one side the aesthetic judgment and on the other artistic subjectivity without content, the pure creative principle’ (37). Art is threatened with complete meaninglessness in the absence of this emphasis on endless productivity and potentiality: ‘art is the annihilating entity that traverses all its contents without ever being able to attain a positive work because it cannot identify with any content. And since art has become the pure potentiality of negation, nihilism, then attains an inexpressible deeper zone than that in which aestheticist and decadent poetics move’ (56). The deception that the poet practices by affecting proficiency in ‘several other arts and crafts’ assumes an ontological urgency insofar as it is preferred as a defense against death.

Agamben resumes Heidegger’s quest in The Origin of the Work of Art, reiterating Heidegger’s question ‘is the work ever in itself accessible?’ (165). Heidegger had identified the idea of creativity- ‘the work’s createdness’ which ‘can obviously be grasped only in terms of the process of creation’ and compels the critic to ‘consent after all to go into the

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63 Rabaté’s interest in genetics in Joyce’s esthetic emphasises this reversal or “perversion”: ‘Psychology and aesthetics are both underwritten by what could be called a genetic reason. Aesthetics cannot become a “science of the concrete” or a “science of the particular” without accounting for the genesis of the perception of beauty and therefore its own genesis’ (Palgrave Advances 4). In the Wake, however, while the desire to witness this genesis is pervasive- as well as perverse, the cyclical form of the narrative refuses an epiphany; ‘the acquaintance of Mister Typus, Mistress Tope and all the little typtopies’ is ‘not yet endlike’ (20). In this sense, aesthetic theory is indeed “abandoned”, as deconstruction has argued: when ‘maker mates with made’, the audience says ‘O my’; the desire is dramatised (261).
activity of the artist in order to arrive at the origin of the work of art’, as an obstacle to this possibility of freedom from the ‘technical-theoretical exactness of concepts’ (183, 219). Whereas ‘of everything present to us, we can note that it is’, ‘In a work, by contrast, this fact, that it is as a work, is just what is unusual. The event of its being created does not simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work casts before itself the eventful fact that the work is as a work, and it has constantly this fact about itself’ (190). The ‘work’s workly nature’ should not be taken as an “invitation” ‘to consideration of it by means of thought’, as an indication that the work of art is fated to become an object of critique, Heidegger argues, reiterating Hegel’s objection to the ‘perverse idea’ of art as ‘a useful instrument in the realization of an end having substantive importance outside the sphere of art’ and emphasis on art’s ‘vocation of revealing the truth’ (165; Aesthetics 61). Art as a ‘becoming and happening of truth’, however, suggests that it ‘arise[s] out of nothing’, a notion that Heidegger affirms with the qualification that ‘by nothing we mean the sheer “not” of beings’ - what challenges our view of ‘the being as something at hand in the ordinary way’ (196). The price paid for originality, for “creativity” and modernity, is this fundamental threat of extinction. Thematised and parodied in the Wake through the myth of the Fall, it becomes a cornerstone of creativity allowing the artist to review, reassess, redraft, rehearse and parody the role- or “function”, vocation, personality and public image of the author, while also probing deep and exposing the ‘sobsconcious inklings shadowed on soulskin’ of the ‘fleshlumpfleeter’ (FW 377).

ii. Sifted science will do your arts good. [FW 440.19]

Although a philosophical system provided the schema for the Wake, Joyce distanced himself from its ideological implications; Vico’s historical cycles, he told Padraic Colum, were useful to him simply ‘as a trellis’ for construction (JJ 554). ‘I would not pay overmuch attention to these theories, beyond using them for all they are worth, but they have gradually forced themselves on me through circumstances of my own life’, he warned Weaver after enquiring as to her progress on the reading he had recommended to aid her comprehend - or at least appreciate - his Work in Progress (Letters I 241). Autobiographical “coincidences” rather than philosophical “truth” linked his work with that of Vico, and he hinted that a mutual fear of thunderstorms connected him with this early modern philosopher. His brother’s counsel- ‘I, for one, would not read more than a paragraph of it, if I did not know you’, appears to have been heeded in such biographical exposition (CH 387).
‘I don’t believe in any science’, he told the Danish translator of Eliot’s verse, ‘but my imagination grows when I read Vico as it doesn’t when I read Freud or Jung’ (JJ 693). His identification of imagination with memory was indeed distinctly Viconian. In response to those who like Weaver lamented that he was wasting his genius ‘on a mere curiosity of literature’, he confessed that he lacked artistic inspiration: ‘Why regret my talent? I haven’t any. I write so painfully, so slowly. Chance furnishes me with what I need. I’m like a man who stumbles: my foot strikes something, I look down, and there is exactly what I’m in need of’, he told Jacques Mercanton (599, 661). Like the Mookse, although he is seen to have ‘gaddered togodder the odds docence of his vellumes’ in support of his ‘widerproof’, he simply ‘luckystruck blueild out of a few shouldbe santillants’ (155).

‘[L]ikelihood’ mixed with ‘Unlikelihud’, takes the place of inspiration, while ‘definite rules which are capable of being learned and which must be closely followed’ substitute the ‘innate mental aptitude’ of the genius (12, 21; CAJ 168). The design of the *Wake* was so mechanically constructed that it could be completed by another, Joyce told Weaver, and suggested James Stephens: ‘If he consented to maintain three or four points which I consider essential and showed him the threads he could finish the design’ (Letters I 254). His choice of his successor was indeed not based on any special talent he possessed, but rather on account of his initials which suggested Joyce’s favourite drink: ‘JJ and S (the colloquial Irish for John Jameson and Son’s Dublin whiskey) would be a nice lettering under the title’. Otherworldly inspiration is substituted for a different kind of spirit for this ‘all too unwordy’ ‘mailman’ (FW 408).

Although such unassuming self-assessment of his artistic prowess might seem at odds with Joyce’s youthful egoism and contradict his early interpretation of his role as an artist, it corresponded with and indeed echoed the grating comments of his reviewers, among who the question “is it Art?” resounded. ‘Mr Joyce’s power is not shown in any special inventiveness’, Francis Hackett remarked as early as 1917; Virginia Woolf reproved ‘the comparative poverty of the writer’s mind’; the *Dublin Review* described *Ulysses* as ‘the screed of one possessed’ rather than inspired: ‘This may, or may not, be literature. It is certainly good cataloguing’; Henri Fluchère concluded upon the publication of Joyce’s *Work in Progress* that ‘The author is only an editor’ (CH 95, 126, 201-2, 529). A book that was ‘impossible to read, and in general undesirable to quote’ suggested to Shane Leslie ‘that a gigantic effort has been made to fool the world of readers and even the Pretorian guard of critics’, while John Englinton like Stanislaus expressed his concern for the author’s

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64 Ellmann notes that ‘he often agreed with Vico that ‘Imagination is nothing but the working over of what is remembered’, and said to Frank Budgen, ‘Imagination is memory’’ (661).
wellbeing: ‘There is an effort and strain in the composition of this book which makes one at times feel a concern for the author’ (207, 271-2).

Joyce’s steadfast commitment to craftsmanship, to “work”, bewildered the critics of Work in Progress: ‘He is doing an intellectual and imaginative labor gigantic in its proportions, obdurate in its persistence, with no practical end in view whatever, not even that of communicating experience, but solely to perfect himself in the art of playing by himself in public’, Max Eastman remarked in 1931 (CH 418). The intersection of poiesis and praxis “exposed” the artist and created a perverse situation. What distinguished the artist’s creation from the craftsman’s production in Kantian aesthetics, according to Gadamer, was that while ‘The completeness of everything else that is made or produced is measured by the criterion of its purpose – i.e., it is determined by the use that is to be made of it’, the work of art ‘offer[s] to pleasure and contemplation an inexhaustible object of lingering attention and interpretation’ (81). Following the collapse of the distinction between work and art, the lingering gaze of the reviewer or reader finds itself a witness of an indecorous act. ‘It is quite possible that Mr. Joyce is trying to do too much: that there is a limit to the suggestive power of literature. But this thing brings us back to the realm of aesthetics. What concerns us at the moment is method in Work in Progress’, Leon Edel argued, attempting to separate ‘method’ from ‘aesthetics’ (CH 408).

Undertaking “An Analysis of the Mind of James Joyce”, his ‘everdevoted friend’ and ‘everdevoting fiend’ Wyndham Lewis published a solution to this paradox, exposing the strange pastimes of this author that were disguised as hard work (JJ 595; FW 408). ‘He is genial and comic; a humorous writer of the traditional English School’, he explained, and ‘has the technical itch of the “sedulous ape” (Time and Western Man 74). Describing Ulysses as ‘an immense exercise in style, an orgy of “apeishness”, decidedly “sedulous”, “an encyclopaedia of English literary technique, as well as a general-knowledge paper”, he detects ‘The schoolmaster in Joyce’: ‘what moves Joyce to churn up the English tongue in a mock-elizabethan frenzy, is the burning question still of his shabby-genteel boyhood, namely, To be a “toff”, or not to be a “toff”’ (74, 106). A ‘poet of the shabby-genteel, impoverished intellectualism of Dublin’, his strange representation of the role of the artist is symptomatic of his Irishness: ‘florid personal aplomb’ has distinguished Irish artists for Lewis (75). His deformity, however, is also philosophic: he is a ‘space-timeist’, having been lured by the ‘nineteenth century mechanistic belief’. But he is neither a philosopher nor a poet: ‘what Joyce is above all things, [is] essentially the craftsman’ (88). ‘I do not mean by this that he works harder or more thoroughly than other people, but that he is not so much an inventive intelligence as an executant’, he explains:
What stimulates him is *ways of doing things*, and technical processes, and not *things to be done*. Between the various things to be done he shows a true craftsman’s impartiality. He is become so much a writing-specialist that it matters very little to him what he writes, or what idea or worldview he expresses, so long as he is trying his hand at this manner and that, and displaying his enjoyable virtuosity. Strictly speaking, he has none at all, no special point of view, or none worth mentioning. It is such people that the creative intelligence fecundates and uses; and at present that intelligence is political, and its stimuli are masked ideologies. He is only a tool, an instrument, in short. That is why such a sensitive medium as Joyce, working in such a period, requires the attention of the independent critic. (88)

Lewis authorises himself as an ‘independent critic’ by exposing the ideologies behind the ‘overcharged façade’ of technique that had mystified so many of Joyce’s critics (93). The critic must resist the temptation to “interpret” Joyce’s “scaffolding”, but the ‘god of the scuffeldfallen skillfilledfelon’ must be brought down, in the parallelism that is set up between the god who fell from the scaffold and the felon who skilfully constructed a skeleton (*FW* 355). Disquiet about the author who appeared ‘to be, or to be posing as, stark, staring mad’ was indeed accompanied by alarm with regard to his victims (*CH* 507). The criticism of *Work in Progress* by Pound and Weaver echoed that of Joseph Collins in 1922, who, complaining that only ‘A few intuitive, sensitive visionaries may understand and comprehend *Ulysses*’, suggested that ‘It should be companioned with a key and glossary like the Berlitz books’ (222). ‘As in some dream, we ourselves are unaccountably detached not only from the incidents narrated but also from practical interest of every kind’, Scofield Thayer prophesied Joyce’s sequel in 1918 (174).

While Thayer suggested a new plane of consciousness was necessary to interpret Joyce’s work, others suggested more pragmatically that a question of genre was at stake. The general consensus was that it was neither literature nor language and this suggested to many of its critics that as it was “unreadable”, it should be compared to music- or noise less favourably; the *Saturday Review* proposed ‘a telephone directory’, while the TLS commended that it ‘has a value in advertising’ (507). ‘[N]ot sane enough to be literature’, Joyce’s work nevertheless ‘raises almost very possible kind of problem in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetics’, O’Faolain argued in response to AE’s review in the *Irish Statesman*. Louis Gillet asserted - with more admiration than Moore - that Joyce’s ‘epic’ was ‘a metaphysics and an ontology’ (566, 727).

For Marcel Brion, however, while Joyce was essentially a ‘a director, a constructor’, he still possessed ‘genius’ in his ‘freedom from the constraint of rules’: ‘he orders and constructs according to his own laws and without bothering about traditions or customs. And
this is the prodigiously innovating impetus of the genius which offers us the dazzling spectacle of a Genesis’ (428). Richard Ellmann similarly precedes his account of Joyce’s life after the publication of *Ulysses* by highlighting that ‘With Joyce the reading of proof was a creative act’ (*JJ* 513). But whereas his more sympathetic readers insisted that his artistic merit was simply more “philosophical”, most of his critics and many of his former supporters struggled to estimate the artistic value of Joyce’s scholarship and scholasticism, to which indeed he attributed his constructive proficiency, telling August Suter that his most prized reward from his Jesuit upbringing was ‘How to gather, how to order, and how to present a given material’ (Budgen 352). While Joyce’s emphasis on construction demystified artistic creation, the self-consciousness of this architect and the highly intellectualised nature of his design intimated that the role of the artist had been exchanged for that of the man of letters: the ‘schoolmaster’, or more scathingly, the ‘toff’. Lacking “righteousness”, ‘tighteousness’ had finally driven the aspirant artist to resort to spending ‘his sober moments in correcting the grammatical errors of the more illiterate among the rugged geniuses’ (*FW* 5; S. Joyce 248).

In the lingering suspicion that the author is merely posing as a craftsman in order to conceal his pretension to scholarship, the Hegelian prophecy is corroborated and dramatised; discovering that ‘We are above the level at which works of art can be venerated as divine, and actually worshipped’, the “priest of the eternal imagination” is forced to accept the humble role of the exegete as ‘the impression which they make is of a more considerate kind, and the feelings which they stir within us require a higher test and a further confirmation’ (*Aesthetics* 12). Although an aesthetic theory is “abandoned”, like Stephen Dedalus the author - and also to a large extent the narrator - is presented in the *Wake* as ‘someone whose most interesting and complex contributions are theoretical rather than artistic’ (Mahaffey, “Wagner, Joyce and Revolution” 241). The ancient bifurcation of poetry and philosophy, inspiration and *techne* is presented as a juxtaposition of conscious creation with a study of the unconscious: an ‘experiment in interpreting ‘the dark night of the soul’’ which allows the artist to become an “expert” (*Letters I* 258).

65 The language of abandonment describes the role of artist in the *Wake* for deconstruction as the antithesis of the ‘illusory mastery over texts and meanings’: the author is now seen ‘abandoning his rights over language’ (Rabaté *Authorized Reader* 183; Cixous in *Post-structuralist Joyce* 20). For Rabaté, ‘*Finnegans Wake* signals the abandon of Joyce’s aesthetic discourse as such’ as ‘there can be no hope of holding a discourse describing the function of the artist or creator: the versions and perversions are so numerous, parodies of all kinds abound, all the critical approaches are alluded to without ever allowing one to stand out’ (179). Similarly, Norris argues that Joyce ‘abandons aesthetic theory … to ideological manoeuvres that lead artistic self-reflexivity, and contemporary theory grounded in its rhetoric, to negate history’ (68). Negative dialects displace aesthetic theory.
The threat to art posed by its “theory” - a threat that Romanticism had discerned and tried to quell through the coincidence of philosophy and poetry - is resurrected and dramatised in modernism. Understanding and interpretation are not only inseparable, but also interminable. In the contemporary philosophy of Heidegger, hermeneutics does not only designate ‘a way of knowing but also of being’: ‘A “circle of reasoning” cannot possibly lie in the formulation of the question of the meaning of Being, because in answering this question it is not a matter of grounding in deduction but rather laying bare and exhibiting the ground’ (Weinsheimer 7; Heidegger 49). As the protagonists of Finnegans Wake are painfully aware, interpretation becomes synonymous with exposure rather than exposition. But while the world-disclosive capacity of hermeneutics is exalted in this focus on the ubiquity of the problematics of interpretation, both the poet and the philosopher are relegated to the ranks of a ‘scriptor’ who bears within him an ‘immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt’ (Barthes, Image-Music-Text 147). The penman is engaged in an interminable rereading - indeed of a dictionary, as the instability of meaning brings language as both system and historical monument to the forefront.

This ‘age of hermeneutics’ is for Stanley Rosen an ‘age of decadence’ insofar as writing ‘comes to be more and more like reading: art deteriorates into criticism’ (in Cascardi ed. 211, 213). The ‘history of literature is to become the history of critical problems’ in the ‘drive toward historical actuality’ and ‘tendencies to place research on new foundations’, Heidegger had prophesied (51). The contemplation of the ‘carefully folded ham-sandwich’ of philosophy and philology was becoming very appealing, as Beckett warned Joyce’s readers; ‘soothing’ like ‘a pair of nigger minstrels out of the Teatro dei Piccoli’ who masquerade as artists, in an age that views ‘the word’ as ‘The real metaphysical problem’ (6; Jolas in Beckett et al. 40). Although critics have been hesitant to refute Beckett’s insistence that Joyce’s ‘position is in no way a philosophical one’, Joyce’s ‘enormous and incidental contribution to philology’ makes it harder to deny his distinction as a philologist (3; Paul in Beckett et al. 7).
Philology in the beginning of the twentieth century was indeed “in the fashion”, as both a philosophical and scholarly subject, but also archaeological, historical, anthropological, technological, political, psychological, ethical and aesthetical, in a segregated expansiveness that is indeed indicative of the ‘specialized culture’ that the twentieth century inherited from the Enlightenment and identified by Habermas as being at the root of the hermeneutic crisis in modernity: the ‘differentiation of science, morality, and art’ which ‘has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and at the same time letting them split off from the hermeneutics of everyday communication’ (“Modernity versus Postmodernity” 9). Similarly, while the Enlightenment - distinguished as an ‘epoch of “philosophical historiography”’ - had turned to history which ‘knows nothing really identical, nothing that ever recurs in the same form’ as a weapon against dogmatic belief, this ‘critical-historical spirit’ and ‘terrible historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture’ had been identified as a cause and sign of the estrangement of culture and art in modernity and as a form of dogmatism in disguise (Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment* 209, 231; *BT* 85). Myth, ‘the most vigorous and wholesome nourishment changes into “history and criticism”, Nietzsche remonstrated, arguing that ‘only a horizon encompassed with myths … rounds off to unity a social movement’.

While interest in Vico’s philosophy had been rekindled, the ancient contest of poetry and philosophy had more controversially been revived at the turn of the century by Nietzsche- a philologist turned philosopher who objected to the Enlightenment’s “reduction” of ‘philology to the form of a science’, identifying what Vico had called the ‘conceit of scholars’ as a manifestation, if not cause, of the demise of art (Vico 5, 77). While Romanticism at its peak had looked to the Greeks as both ‘rivals’ and ‘models’ - ‘remarkable people’ who succeeded in ‘uniting at once fullness of form and fullness of substance, both philosophising and creating, both tender and energetic, uniting a youthful fancy to the virility of reason in a glorious humanity’ - the emphasis later shifted to the diagnosis of the cause of the disintegration of this ideal ‘humanity’ (Schiller in C. Eliot 220). In his *Aesthetic Education*, Schiller had identified the ‘antagonism of forces’ as ‘the great instrument of culture’, but as a path rather than a goal: ‘as long as this antagonism lasts, man is only on the road to culture’, prophesying that ‘experimental beauty will be eternally double’: ‘equilibrium remains always an idea that reality can never completely reach’. The “arrest” of this antagonism, was therefore an indication of decadence. Located historically and geographically in the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria, the consequence of this decadence
was examined by Wagner in *The Artwork of the Future* and dramatised by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*; and closer to home, by Wilde in “The Critic as Artist”.

Warning the modern ‘theoretical man’ - the protagonist in Nietzsche’s tragedy - against the nihilistic dangers of allowing ‘Thought’ to ‘look upon itself as its original cause’, ‘the Philosopher’ to come ‘before the Man’, Wagner elicits the ‘humiliating sense of the impotence of our frivolous culture … before the art of the Hellenes’ (83). The Hellenes, he argues, should provide ‘the outlines for the Art-work of the Future’:

Art has become the private property of an artist-caste; its taste it offers to those alone who understand it; and for its understanding it demands a special study, aloof from actual life, the study of art-learning. This study, and the understanding to be attained thereby, each individual who has acquired the gold wherewith to pay the proffered delicacies of art conceives to-day that he has made his own: if, however, we were to ask the Artist whether the great majority of art's amateurs are able to understand him in his best endeavours, he could only answer with a deep-drawn sigh. But if he ponders on the infinitely greater mass of those who are perforce shut out on every side by the evils of our present social system from both the understanding and the tasting of the sweets of modern art, then must the artist of to-day grow conscious that his whole art-doings are, at bottom, but an egoistic, self-concerning business; that his art, in the light of public life, is nothing else than luxury and superfluity, a self-amusing pastime. (89, 182)

The critic in Wagner’s account is an adversary not only of the artist but also of the very value of art and its “appearance” in society; as his influence in society is usurped by the man of letters, the lonely artist can only ‘prefigure’ the Art-work ‘to himself’ (88). Poetry is a future orientated project the accomplishment of which awaits the birth of ‘the Folk’. In the future perfect tense of Wagner’s parable, ‘With Aristophanian laughter, the Folk relinquished to these learned insects the refuse of its meal, threw Art upon one side for two millennia, and fashioned of its innermost necessity the history of the world; the while those scholars cobbled up their tiresome history of Literature, by order of the supreme court of Alexander’ (136). The “end of art” is a consequence of Alexandrian scholarship which marked the end of the civilisation as well as ‘the art of the Hellenes’; a dissolution that is indeed a prerequisite for the birth of poetry.

Seeing Socrates as the ‘Philosopher’ who finally came before the ‘Man’, Nietzsche staged the final epilogue of Greek drama. The “annihilation” of myth by ‘optimism of science’ was similarly set in Alexandria: ‘Our whole modern world is entangled in the net of Alexandrian culture’, he diagnosed:

Our art reveals this universal trouble: in vain does one depend imitatively on all the great productive periods and natures; in vain does one accumulate the entire “world-
literature” around modern man for his comfort; in vain does one depends imitatively on all the great productive periods and natures; in vain does one accumulate the entire “World Literature: around modern man for his comfort; in vain does one place one’s self in the midst of art-styles and artists of all ages, so that one may give names to them as Adam did to the beasts: one still continues eternally hungry, the “critic” without joy and energy, the Alexandrian man, who is at bottom a librarian and corrector of proofs, and who, pitiable wretch, goes blind from the dusty books and printers’ errors. (BT 61, 64-5, 67)

In contrast, the ‘more nobly and delicately endowed by nature’ spectator of art, is the recipient of an ‘unexpected as well as totally unintelligible effect’ (84).

Like Vico, Nietzsche denied that it is possible ‘for anyone to be both a sublime poet and a sublime metaphysician’, although Vico’s emphasis on philology as a “science” and the creative ‘mind of providence’, were in Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy of human authority’ substituted by the “will” rather than a “theory” of power (375, 489). Vico had presented this synthesis as above all a historical impossibility, whereas in Nietzsche the rejection is more proscriptive and the consequence of the coincidence is so grave that it is presented as a violence against nature. Nietzsche’s denial, moreover, was linked with a rejection of the multiculturalism of Alexandria, and the obstacle that the ‘sophistication of life’ of ‘abstract man’ in this ‘abstract state’ presented to the realisation of the ideal Artwork composed by the Folk- a reflection of a model nation (Bury et al. 100; BT 85). In Alexandria, William Tarn remarked in 1927, ‘though the Greek spirit was still of supreme importance, it can no longer be said that every fruitful idea was Greek; for, quite apart from religion and astronomy, the single greatest creation of the age, the Stoic philosophy, originated with one who, whether he had some Greek blood or not, was certainly to his contemporaries a Phoenician’ (3).

Wagner’s ideal “Fellowship of Artists”, however, was a reality rather than a future ideal in Alexandria: ‘Authors of every kind abounded, and the literary man, as a distinct type, is a creation of this epoch. From one end to another of the Mediterranean men were busy expressing themselves in writing; on the other hand there was no lack of readers, since education was more widely if more thinly spread than in earlier periods’ (Bury 33). As Gilbert in Wilde’s “The Critic as Artist” argues, even ‘the inartistic temperaments of the day busied themselves also in matters of literature and art’; and while Gilbert admits that ‘the accusations of plagiarism were endless’, he censures the detractors rather than the fraudulent artists: ‘such accusations proceed either from the thin colourless lips of impotence, or from the grotesque mouths of those who, possessing nothing of their own, fancy that they can gain a reputation for wealth by crying out that they have been robbed’ (Intentions 118-9).

The paradoxical coincidence of Socialism and Individualism in Wilde’s The Soul of Man Under Socialism, is indeed modeled on this nation of art critics: art does not need to
‘try to be popular’ as the public is seen ‘try[ing] to make itself artistic’ (30). As ‘Sheer invention was unnatural to the Greek turn of mind’, the creative and the critical spirit were not incompatible; contrary to the catastrophic and apocalyptic language that has been used to described their conglomeration in Western philosophy, their alliance gave birth to new genres of art (Bury et al. 45). While Wagner had deplored the divisions of genres and separation ‘from the proud and heaven-soaring tree of Drama’ which he compared to the confusion that ensued after the fall of the Tower of Babel- ‘when all national solidarity had split into a thousand egoistic severalities’, Gilbert paid homage to the diversity of art forms that ‘the critical spirit of Alexandria’ produced (105; 124). The revision of the epic genre reflected this rapport between criticism and creativity, science and art: ‘Although ‘no inspired writer appeared able to fashion current history into a great epic … in their search for new poetic material they tried to combine something of the old mythology with the history or pseudo-history fashionable in their own age’ (Bury et al. 45).

The collective implication that distinguished Alexandrian art was reflected in the dialectal changes that are recorded in both literary and non-literary documents: ‘almost without exception these men were either careless of the form in which their thoughts were expressed or at the least quite unskilled in the graces and subtleties of the Attic style as understood by the Neo-Atticists’ (34). ‘Greek of the κοινή διαλέκτος’ [the popular dialect], Barber notes in this collection of essays, ‘was now being written by many persons of non-Hellenic or at least mixed descent. The Semitic origin of several prominent Stoic philosophers has often been noted’; but concurrent with this “vulgarisation” of language, was an evolution in ‘the vocabulary of educated men’ which had become ‘enormously more technical’. While ‘It is true, no doubt’, he argues, ‘that in some ways an increase in technical terms marks an advance in thought (if it were not so, the twentieth century might well despair of itself!)’, ‘the habit among these writers goes far beyond what is necessary. Simple verbs are abandoned for compounds without any gain in expressiveness; abstract terms are found everywhere, and so on’.

Barber’s account of the reader’s exposure to this technical vocabulary, is all-too-familiar to the reader of Finnegans Wake: ‘After a short experience of writing, such as we find for instance in Polybius, we begin, I will not say to approve, but at least to understand, the reaction of the Atticists’. Not only does HCE number among the ‘long list (now feared in part lost) to be kept on file of all abusive names he was called’ that of an ‘Easyathic Phallusaphist’: a combination Asia and Attica, philosopher and poet [of the Alexandrian period- Sappho] and heralding procreation rather than destruction, but also the very attempt ‘to attax and abridge’ is presented as an act of ‘violence, virulence and vituperation’ in the
Wake (72, 97). The accusations of deceit and hybridity are indeed repeatedly framed through references to Asia. Shem’s ‘house O’Shea or O’Shame’ is similarly derogatorily nicknamed ‘Asia in Ireland’ and filled with the ‘stolen fruit’ that the ‘Vulgariano’ rapaciously seized. ‘Instead of chuthoring [tutoring but also authoring] those model households plain wholesome pothooks (a thing he never possessed in his Nigerian own)’ (181).

iv. A learned scholar [FW 31.21]

The absence of the narrator in the first seven chapters of the Wake is indeed felt through the prominence and prevalence of an erratic but commanding scholarly voice. The reader is made privy to the tedious rereading and re-viewing of a punctilious but disinterested theorist who impersonally imparts and interprets a familiar (hi)story that has been heard, read and witnessed one too many times already. His ‘commodious vicus of recirculation’ appears to be linked to his repetitious scrutiny of the objects of his investigation (3). The narrative begins in media res rather than ab ovo as a result of this perusal, as a kind of bibliomancy replaces the invocation of the Muse. A ‘slav to methodiousness’, capturing the reader’s attention is not one of this scholar’s concerns; the reader catches him instead in the midst of his study of the ‘Countlessness of livestories [that] have netherfallen by this plage’ - a page of his book as well as a beach, that appear to him romantically as to Gabriel at the end of “The Dead”, ‘flick as flowflakes, litters from aloft, like a waast wizzard all of whirlworlds’ (159).

Distancing himself from the pagan rituals of the ‘you’ who ‘would quaffoff his fraudstuff and sink teeth through that pyth of a flowerwhite bodey’, the modern theorist is more interested in gazing – inappropriately: ‘let wee peep, see, at Hom’ - at a ‘terricolous vivelyonview’ [the book of life - ‘biblion biou’ (gr) and view from a book], a ‘fadograph of a yestern scene’ [a fading photograph], ‘woebecanned and packt away’ [woebegone and well-known - wohlbekeannt (ger)] in the ‘museomound’ (7, 6, 7, 18, 7, 8). Calling on the modern ‘abcedminded’ reader - a ‘gentlemien’ - to reverentially ‘Stoop’ ‘to this claybook’- the ‘allaphbed’ [alphabet but also riverbed] and its ‘curios [curious and masterful - ‘kyrios’, the Greek onomastic for God] of signs’, following the difficulty of the modern reader to ‘rede … its world’ [read and speak – Rede (ger)] as a consequence of modern subjectivism - ‘since We and Thou had it out already’, the exegete is both fascinated and repulsed by the ‘middenhide hoard of objects’ he discovers (18, 20-21, 18, 19). Lifting his eyes from ‘the tome of Liber Lividus’ he ponders ‘sober serious’ on the ‘babbelers with their thangas’: his
Babelian ancestors that ‘vain have been (confusium hold them!) ... were and went’, as ‘thigging thugs’ [thinking things but also begging thugs] (14, 29, 15). The ‘meanderthalltale’ [meandering and Neanderthal] with ‘an end in view of squattor and anntisquattor and postproneantisquattor’ that ‘unfurl[s]’ before him, is below the ‘ban’ of his ‘infrarational senses’ (18, 20). Rather than inspiring awe for rosyfingered Dawn, this narrator foretells the ‘rubrickredd’ arrival of ‘Gutenmorg’ ‘with his cromagnom charter, tintingfast and great primer’ (20). ‘To say to us to be every tim, nick and larry of us, sons of the sod’, he protests following the discovery of his ‘anartful’ origins (19, 378).

Like Gabriel, moreover, he distances himself from the act of storytelling; his role is merely to record and examine the events. His ineptitude at storytelling is exposed through his inappropriate use of dramatic irony; the plot is divulged in the very first page through a series of provisional negatives. The prankquean tale is narrated by him as a specimen of ‘the first peace of illiterative porthery’ and the clichéd morals that he appends at the end betray the confusion he shares with the reader faced with this prehistoric version of the Oedipal riddle and mystery of the Eucharist [‘why do I am alook alike a poss of porterpease?’] (23, 22). Struggling to understand the language of the ‘mousterious’ [mysterious and moustarian] looking Jute and in turn bewildering the Jute who can ‘beuraly forsstand a weird from sturk to finnic in such a patwhat’ that his ‘rutterdamrotter’ [a version of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, or a twilight of roters, dumps, bellowing and animal sexual activity] seems to speak, he oratorically and evangelically seeks to authenticate his tale by presenting himself as a witness to and participant in the events he chronicles, as the recurrent transition between “we” and “they” reveals (15, 17). Although a surveyor of an archaeological site, tourguide, chronicler of historical events and Biblical exegete, his theoretical viewpoint is compromised by what sounds to him like croaks of Aristophanian frogs, and he presents himself as a choric member in a dramatic performance in the face of the ‘Onheard of and umscene’ events unfolding before him, concealing himself among ‘the ombre players’ (17, 24).

Corroborating but also throwing Nietzsche’s genealogy in The Birth of Tragedy into doubt, the ancient clashes ‘of wills gen wonts’ are interpreted as Bacchic croaks by the ‘unquiring’ modern theorist with a ‘hauhauhauhauacidible’ sense of hearing who undertakes the quest ‘well to the west’ to solve the mystery of the Fall (4, 3, 16, 3). The struggle for power of these ‘thonthorstrok’ Viconian primitive poets [thunderstruck by Thor similarly to the mythological Ragnarök] is not manifested as divine hubris, nor as an ‘astoneaged’ ecstatic desire for oneness with nature, but rather like the Aristophanean comedy it is a squabble between artists for the claim to fame: an endeavour of the ‘Baddelaries partisans’
[the Baudelairean baddy artists], to ‘mathmaster’ [master through maths and learning - mathé (gr)] the ‘Malachus Micgranes’ [Malachi Mulligan and the “soft” - malax - intellectuals with a migraine who are merely “messengers”] (3). The theoretical questions that such sounds elicit indeed echo Wagner’s drama: ‘But was iz? Iseut? Ere were sewers?’ (18, 4). The ‘pharce for the nunce’ that is a consequence of the ‘Phall’, degeneration and decadence as well as fertility and procreation, sees the grandiose tragic performance replaced with the farce, identified with Alexandria through reference to its lighthouse [pharos], with the present age [the nonce], and Christianity [the nun] (4).

The Wagnerian “perfect Artwork” is ironically realised in the confusion of tragedy and comedy amid these epic clashes. In this “common Artwork” - in the implication of everyone in the story of the Fall and ‘innate poetic faculty’ of Vico’s ‘first people’ - nationality is both a cause and consequence of the work of art; the idea of the nation is both created and subverted through dramatic performance (145). The ‘conceit of scholars’ and the ‘conceit of nations’ who think themselves initiators and inventors is exposed through anachronisms borne through language; the primitive past that Nietzsche had turned to as an antidote to the idealism of German Romanticism and the ‘mute or wordless’ ‘age of gods’ that Vico demarcated in order to demonstrate the ‘innate poetic faculty’ that gave birth to metaphysics cannot be freed from the gaze of the modern theorist (76-7, 22). An epitaph to the dead hero as well as a homily to living, the scholar and the “ideal spectator” of German Romanticism coincide in the peripeteia of the Wake: the quest for the ‘agentlike’, the agent who in truth [eigentlich (ger)] ‘brought about that tragoady’, but also the actor who made this performance possible (5).

The choric voice of the Wake, moreover, an emblem of an ideal community for Wagner and an ideal unity with nature for Nietzsche, is far from univocal; the modern ‘hierarchitectitiptoploftical’ coryphaeus turns against the ‘shebby choruysh of unkalified muzzlenimiissilehims that would blackguardise the whitestone ever hurtleturtled out of heaven’, ‘the hoolivans of the nation, prostrated in their consternation and their duodisimally profusive plethora of ululation’ (5, 5, 6). The collective Artwork composed by the ‘Fellowship of all the Artists’: ‘plumbs and grumes and cheriffs and citherers and raiders and cinemen too’ sounds to the modern scholar like a din made by ‘Agog and magog and the round of them agrog’ and performed with ‘the shoutmost shoviality’ (Wagner 196; FW 6). Unity, the ‘search for righteousness’, is inspired by the search for truth - as ‘Drouth is stronger than faction’ - and for the true author: ‘the reise [reason, journey and traveler – Reise (ger)] of our fortunes and the faunayman at the funeral’ (5, 336, 25). Identified with ‘Priam Olim’ [the last king of Troy, the breechless ballad hero Brian O’Linn, and the prime
The prophecy and misgivings of Nietzsche and Wagner regarding Alexandrian culture were symbolically and materially confirmed at the close of the nineteenth century with the archaeological discoveries in the colonised regions of that great empire. The ‘nillohs dieybos’ [those days (in illis diebus) of fictional time beyond time (nullus) in the Nile] when there was ‘no lumpend papeer in the waste’, came to an end, once again, at the close of the nineteenth century (FW 19). While on a ‘bushman’s holiday’ in the Egyptian town of Oxyrhyncus in 1896, the papyrologists Grenfell and Hunt from Queen’s College in Oxford, witnessed during their excavation in a ‘fatal midden or chip factory or comicalbottomed copsjute (dump for short)’ - a Homeric ‘limon’ [meadow - λειμόν (gr)], “throwing up” ‘a few spontaneous fragments of orangepeel, the last remains of an outdoor meal by some unknown sunseeker or placehider illico way back in his mistridden past’: ‘Despite their understanding of the possibilities of rubbish mounds, Grenfell and Hunt hoped for Ptolemaic literary finds from the town’s cemeteries, and for three weeks they persisted in hopeful but hopeless poking around there. Then they – or rather their native diggers – stuck their spades in a rubbish mound, and they opened a papyrological floodgate’ (FW 110; Coles in Bowman et al. 3-4). 66

‘They could and did find’, Coles explains, ‘almost anything that might have landed up in an ancient waste-paper basket: known literature, lost literature, government documents, legal documents, private correspondence’; and while ‘The bulk of all this was in Greek, which had become the administrative language of Egypt since the time of Alexander the Great’, ‘Various other languages are represented from time to time, notably Coptic’. The

66 The Sirens, like Calypso, had a λειμόν ἄνθεμόντα’, a ‘mead’ which ‘is the Greek version of the Semitic root abel and is used to describe the ‘soft meadow of violets and parsley’ which surrounded Calypso’s home’, Gilbert explains in his analysis of Ulysses (219).
dream discovery of modernism in the search for origins and originals was fulfilled through an “invention”, a ‘foenix culprit’, in ‘despondful surroundings’ (110). The irony of these discoveries, Coles highlights, is that ‘the papyri that have survived for us are not those that the ancients tried to keep, but those that they threw away – on rubbish dumps, or left in abandoned houses, or indeed buried in tombs’ (3). The ‘remains of the outworn graveurnure where used to be blurred the Ptollemens of the Incabus’ were unearthed through this archaeological excavation in the form that modernist literature would present its own work of cultural disinterment, preservation, innovation and dissemination: as exhumed fragments and “holey” holo-grams both detrimental to the unity of culture and a strategy of survival-shored against its ruins (FW 13).

This ‘polyhedron of scripture’ had shared a similar fate to the acclaimed ‘relique[s] of ancient Irish pleasant pottery’ of ‘the Golden Age of Ireland’ which preserved and revitalised the ‘art of illumination’ that had ‘originated in Byzantium’, but had themselves been buried in the ‘Heated residence in the heart of the orangeflavoured mudmound’ (111, 110; Flood 1, 110; FW 111). The Ardagh Chalice, one of ‘The most beautiful specimens of their art that have been preserved’, according to Flood, showing ‘the same exquisite skill and taste’ of the designs of the manuscripts, was discovered by accident by ‘a boy digging potatoes’, while both its artist and ‘the king or ecclesiastic for whom [it was] wrought’ have ‘remained topantically [both romantically and completely - το παν (gr)] anonymos’ (112; FW 134). The Book of the Dun Cow had been ‘a spoil of war and held for ransom’, and ‘While being vigorously corrected by its early editor, holes were rubbed in its vellum leaves’ (Slavin 3). The Book of Lismore which ‘contains the most ancient detailed narrative we have about Fionn Mac Cumhail and the Fianna’, was ‘Lost and gnawed by rats inside a castle wall, found in 1814 only to then be pillaged of its pages’ (68).

A ‘museomound’ as well as a rubbish mound full of ‘spoiled goods’, like the gnarlybird’s bag ‘laden with the loot of learning’, such ‘bootifull’ findings bewilder their ‘entychologist’ [finder and reader - ἐντυχάνω (gr), etymologist and specialist in luck - τόχη and walls - τοίχος], and beguile ‘the hardily curiosing entomophilus’ [the lover of insects - ἐντομα, and cuttings things into pieces - ἐντομος] ‘scraping along to sneeze out a likelihood that will solve and salve life’s robulous’ among the ‘middenhide hoard of objects’ (FW 8, 11, 108, 11, 59, 107, 12, 19). Having undertaken the ‘quest of his tumptytoes’ ‘well to the west’, these English “Sunfellas” ‘got rhinoceritis from haunting the roes [fish eggs] in the parik’: ‘The rubbish mounds that yielded Oxyrynchus’s [the ‘city of the sharp-nosed fish’] Greek papyri are scattered out well to the west [of Grenfell and Hunt’s rough site plans], and especially in a zone to the north-west’, according to Coles (11). They did indeed find his
tump, however: ‘The first Egyptological event to create a media circus is often said to be the discovery of Tutankhamun’s tomb in 1922’, Montserrat notes (28).

In their account of the *The Hellenistic Age* published in 1923, the contributors to this collection of essays on ‘aspects of Hellenistic civilization’ drew attention to the significance of ‘the discovery of a mass of contemporary documents, inscriptions, and still more papyri’ ‘Within the last generation’, that ‘has given a powerful stimulus to the study of the period’, and to the similarities of the nature of the society of this age with that of modern Europe (Bury et al. 3). Challenging the ‘notion prevalent that the Greeks were already decadent in the third century’ which ‘has perhaps hardly died out yet, and has probably been the principal cause of the neglect of the post-Demosthenic age’, the Irish historian, classical scholar and biographer of Saint Patrick, J. B. Bury, underlined the detrimental consequence of this neglect:

For anyone who is interested in exploring the history of European civilization and finding out how the past is stored in the present, this period of Hellenism may be said in a certain way to count more than the age of the independent city states; for it was through this period that the earlier age exerted its influence. It was in this period that the culture of Rome was semi-hellenized and it was through Rome that Greece leavened the civilization of Western Europe. We must remember that when a Roman went to Athens or Rhodes or Alexandria he imbibed the ideas and culture of the living Greece of the time; this training would include a knowledge of her past, but the past would be seen by him as by a native Greek through the glasses of the present. (2-3)

Noting that while ‘for a good many years past a number of savants have been engaged on an intensive study of the political, economic, and social life under the Macedonian monarchies’, Bury adds that ‘the results of their work have so far hardly penetrated beyond learned circles into the general knowledge of the educated public’ (3-4).

But Bury’s attempt to highlight the significance of this relatively unknown age had been greatly aided by the papyrological discoveries in Egypt: ‘Bernard Grenfell, Arthur Hunt, and others associated with the Oxyrhynchus digs wrote lively accounts of their discoveries for the popular illustrated press, scholarly articles for more sober periodicals such as *The Times* and *Athenaeum*, catalogues of public exhibitions of the small finds, and lectures, illustrated with magic-lantern slides, that gave not only tantalizing glimpses of the literary riches yielded by the rubbish mounds of the city but also a feel of the romance of digging in Egypt’ (Montserrat in Bowman et al. 28). But while Grenfell and Hunt were searching for literary finds, the ‘long, anecdotal reviews’ that they received revealed the allure that ‘the human immediacy of the non-literary papyri’ had for the public.
In an account of their findings published in 1910, the writer draws attention to the ‘large number of private letters which, like all true letters, are often of the most self-revealing character, and throw the clearest light upon the whole domestic and social relationships of the people’ (qtd by Montserrat in Sex and Society 4). And while the contents of these letters are not ‘of special interest’, the writer admits that ‘it is impossible not to feel the arresting charm of these frail papyrus messages, written with no thought of any other public than those to whom they were originally addressed, and on that very account calling up before our minds, as more elaborate documents could never have done, the persons alike of their senders and recipients’. The papyrus fragments that were discovered, Montserrat argues, ‘were seen as enabling the modern reader to come face to face with the ‘living’ members of a dead society in a way which one papyrologist has recently compared to a Woolffian epiphany, almost a ‘moment of being’. The literary potential of such epiphanies attracted the interest of ‘the first generation of writers exposed to collections of published papyri’, who like Joyce, saw such fragments giving ‘tantalising glimpses, like flesh seen through a torn garment; but no more’, as ‘a vehicle for eroticism, either for what they might contain, or for what they might leave unsaid’ (5).

The ‘erotic potential of the papyrus fragment’ piqued the imagination of ‘decadent fin-de-siècle writers’ in particular, as Wilde’s tale of intrigue and seduction that influences the movement of the intellectual discussion in “Seylla and Charybdis” and exposes the kinetic desires of Stephen’s theories, indicates. Textual and sexual ambivalence and ambiguity, error and errancy, are similarly linked and confused in the Wake. The ‘improbable possibles’ that these fragments arouse reveal a different fount of inspiration, carnal rather than intellectual or metaphysical (110). The ‘hardily curiosing entomophilust’ discerns that the exhumed letter in the litter is a ‘sexmosaic of nymphosis’ exposing both the desires of its author(s) and the predilections of its reader and interpreter (107). The everyday ‘kitchennott darkness’ of the letter stirs these desires, and ‘we must grope on till Zerogh hour like pou owl giaours as we are would we salve aught of moments for our aysore today’ (107). Desire for meaning is inseparable from desire for intimacy and communication.

The quest to discover ‘who in hallhagall wrote the durn thing’, and to picture him and ‘peep, see [him], at Hom’, ‘Erect, beseated, mountback’ while closing our ‘blinkhard’s eyes to the ethiquethical fact’ of the ‘radiooscillating epiepistle’, is similarly shown to be driven by the desire to ‘glypse at [glimpse and lick – γλείφω (gr)] and feel for ourselves across all those rushyears the warm soft short pants of the quickscribbler’ and ‘the uniform matteroffactness of a meandering male fist’ (107-8, 6, 108, 109, 108, 122, 123). The separation of the ‘coincidental parts’ of ‘the enveloping facts’ by the ‘deft hand of an expert’
is also exposed as driven by an expectation of a primal disclosure ‘under the pudendascope’ (109, 115). The ‘Closer inspection of the bordereau’ is stimulated by the expectation that its characters will become anthropomorphic, ‘reveal[ing] a multiplicity of personalities’; the scrutiny of ‘the overcautelousness [cautiousness, craftiness and scorching – καυτός (gr)] of the masterbiler’, 67 by the prospect that ‘some prevision of virtual crime or crimes might be made by anyone unwary enough before any suitable occasion’ (107, 111, 107). If the letter was to be declared anonymous, it would also be ‘anomorous’ (112). The breathless catalogue of the characters of the letters is an extravagant refutation of this claim and a parodic resurrection of the past through a ‘dummpshow’ (and of Sullivan’s narrative style in his description of The Book of Kells) (120). The need to establish the authenticity or historicity of the document, the ‘importance in establishing the identities in the writer complexus’ is asserted by the ‘grisly old Sykos’ ‘who have done [their] unsmiling bit on ‘alices when they were yung and easily freuden’, and warn that ‘Some softnosed peruser might mayhem take it up ergonously’ (114, 115).

‘Papyrologists’, Montserrat suggests, ‘may be scopophiles upon antiquity, people who enjoy reading other people’s mail’; ‘Reading a papyrus letter is like overhearing one side of a telephone conversation’- a fixation and transgression that the Wake both excites and deflates, exposing its libidinous derivation that intellectual ardour and religious enthusiasm cannot extricate themselves from (Sex and Society 6). 68 These ‘tompip peepestrella[s]’, however, ‘receive very little gratification for their intellectual voyeurism’: ‘Most papyrus letters are formulaic, composed of epistolary clichés, enquiries after health and requests for commodities to be sent’ (FW 178; Monseratt 6-7). The revelation of the letter in the Wake, an ‘oldworld epistola of their weatherings and their marryings and their buryings and their natural selections’, registers a similar disappointment, exposing the epiphanic expectations that determine the parameters of our encounter with a work of art (117). The letter unearthed by the ‘original hen’, an act observed by ‘keepy little Kevin’, is a telegram on ‘a

67 Insisting in a letter to Harriet Shaw Waver in 1919 that ‘The elements needed [for the composition of Ulysses] will only fuse after a prolonged existence together’, Joyce explained that ‘The word scorching has a peculiar significance for my superstitious mind not so much because of any quality or merit in the writing itself as for the fact that the progress of the book is in fact like the progress of some sandblast. As soon as I mention or include any person it it I hear of his death or departure or misfortune: and each successive episode, dealing with some province of artistic culture (rhetoric or music or dialectic), leaves behind it a burnt up field’ (Letters I 128-9).

68 The significance of the parallel that Joyce draws between the published text and the postcard, ‘a public document, deprived of any privacy, and which furthermore, by this fact, falls under the scope of the law’, has been examined by Derrida in terms of ‘the virtual totality of experience, of sense, of history, of the symbolic, of languages and writings, the great cycle and the great encyclopaedia of cultures, of scenes and affects, the sum total of sum totals in sum’, and the attempt to go beyond language as ‘tautological’, ‘narcissistic’, or ‘egological’ (in A. Mitchell and Sam Slote eds. 44, 68, 76).
goodishsized sheet of letterpaper’ from ‘the last of the first’ - an apocalyptic interpretation of the signature at the bottom of the letter - ‘to Dear’, inquiring about ‘allathome’s health’, giving an account of a public event attended, referring to ‘a beautiful present of wedding cakes’, closing with more ‘how are you[s]’ and ‘hopes soon to hear well’, and coming to an end with a teastain (110, 111). Like the deflation that characterises the Joycean epiphany - arousing the expectation of a phenomenological revelation but instead presenting a description of a commonplace situation or overheard conversation and splintering if not dissolving the vehicles of its promised transcendence- words and their meaning, through pauses in thought into linguistic fragments - the mystery of the letter is punctuated by clichês and blunted by a teastain.

The hermeneutical paradox that distinguished the epiphanies is dramatised in the *Wake*, and the focus of attention indeed shifts to the ‘man of letters’ who has the seemingly simple task of ‘recording’ the ‘average everydayness’ of these inscrutable events (*SH* 216; Heidegger 59). Having to obey, however, the ‘compulsion’ of the dream in the ‘nightinveils’ of the *Wake* to mould these events ‘into a single whole’, this act of remembrance is accompanied by the obstinate expectation that the ‘contraries’ of the ‘traits featuring the chiaroscuro’ will be ‘eliminated’ ‘in one stable somebody’ (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams* 82; *FW* 541, 107). These ‘spatialist[s]’ are faced with the insurmountable paradox of reconciling the license of everyday life - the ‘unfettered’ Irish daily independence - with the ‘unbrookable script’ [unbreakable and unendurable] of ‘our plumsucked pattern shapekeeper’, necessary to assert ‘its genuine authorship and holusbolus authoritativeness’, which in turn holds together the ‘wee free state’ (149, 118, 123, 118, 117). Their excellence indeed is displayed through the theories they create to overcome this difficulty. While the exegete of the letter overcomes this contrast through psychoanalysis of the individual letters diagnosed with ‘ulykkhean or tetrachiric or quadrumanic or ducks and drakes or debts and dishes perplex’, the ‘photoist’ - a sophisticated photographer, as Hunt was during the Egyptian excavation - explains scientifically the decomposition of the ‘negative of a horse’ into a ‘a positively grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values and masses of meltwhile horse’ (123, 111). Even the vivisective ‘paper wounds’ caused by the ‘ire’ of the modern exegete, ‘acutely professonally piqued, to = introduce a notion of time’ are presented as forms of eucharistic homage to the ‘ancestral pneuma’ of ‘the writing chap of the psalter’ (124, 125).

69 In his defence of the possibility of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the work of the dream interpreter is related by Freud with the attempt to read a ‘a graith uncouthrement of postmantuam glasseries’: ‘Like some letter in cipher, the dream-inscription when scrutinised closely loses its first look of balderdash and takes on the aspect of a serious, intelligible message’, he quotes the remarks of J. Sully (*FW* 113; 46).
The “death of the Author” as well as art that the abundance of authors and pretenders in Alexandria intimated and foretold, was concurrent with the formulation of the pivotal question of authorship that destabilised the ideal unity of culture that the Greeks symbolised; a question that continues to both divide and preserve the critical and cultural industry. ‘The zenith of the historico-literary studies of the Greeks, and hence also of their point of greatest importance - the Homeric question - was reached in the age of the Alexandrian grammarians’, Nietzsche argued a few years before his publication of The Birth of Tragedy (Homer and Classical Philology 8). The ‘horizon defined by myths’ was broken up by ‘the Chorizontes’- the scholars of Homer ‘who represented the extreme limit of the scepticism of a few detached individuals of antiquity rather than antiquity itself considered as a whole’ and who ‘were tirelessly on the lookout for discrepancies’ that were attributed not to Homer, but ‘to those who committed his words to writing and those who sang them’ (8-9).

The coincidence of the one and the many was dissolved with this question: the cultural and national unity that Homer had represented was now challenged by the transhistorical dissemination, division and revision of his work. The novel asymptotic paradox, reflective of ‘a logic of disavowal’, is explicated by Paul Bishop through reference to Thomas de Quincey’s acerbic remark: “Some say, ‘There never was such a person as Homer.’ – ‘No such person as Homer! On the contrary’, say others, ‘there were scores’” (13). While prior to this age ‘an immense flood of great epics had been identified with the name of Homer’ - a misconception reflective of ‘the inability to create a personality’ that distinguished the mythical thinking of the primitive mind - following the conception of the question of the personality of Homer ‘a certain standard of inner harmony [was] everywhere presupposed in the manifestations of the personality’: everything ‘below this standard and opposed to this inner harmony [was] at once swept aside as un-Homeric’ (Nietzsche, Homer 10).

Nietzsche’s conception of the role of the philologist and his relation to that of the philosopher as well as the artist, is reconfigured through his answer to but also reformulation of this question. Similarly, Vico’s New Science opens by highlighting the grave consequence of the disregard of this question: ‘Our previous ignorance of the true Homer kept hidden from us the true origins and institutions in three ages’; an enigma that philology- ‘the science of everything that depends on human volition’ is singularly qualified to solve (4).
‘mockers’ of philology who consider it to be ‘merely a useless, harmless, and inoffensive pastime, an object of laughter and not of hate’ are defied by Nietzsche by highlighting the momentousness of this question that must be raised despite [Romantic] protests against the ‘spirit of negation’ of ‘scholastic barbarism’ that ‘has become a destructive and iconoclastic principle’, ‘scatter[ing] Homer’s laurel crown to the winds’ (2, 5, 6, 5, 4).

However, while Nietzsche emphasised like Vico the significance of the critical ‘method of evaporating apparently concrete personalities’ and ‘recognis[ing] condensed beliefs in the apparently firm, immobile figures’, he also admired ‘the wonderful capability of the soul of a people to represent the conditions of its morals and beliefs in the form of a personality’ (7). The ‘real “Homeric question”’, Nietzsche argued, is ‘the central problem of the personality’: ‘Was the person created out of a conception, or the conception out of a person?’ (11). The paradox of the coincidence of the one and the many and Vico’s “negative” philology are overshadowed by the mystery of the personality; a mystery that Nietzsche compares to the law of gravity: ‘As it is difficult for us at the present day, and necessitates a serious effort on our part, to understand the law of gravitation clearly … it likewise costs us some trouble to obtain a clear impression of that wonderful problem which, like a coin long passed from hand to hand, has lost its original and highly conspicuous stamp’ (11). ‘To conclude purely negatively from the positive absence of political odia and monetary requests that its page cannot ever have been a penproduct of a man or woman of that period or those parts is only one more unlooked-for conclusion leaped at’, the scholar of the letter in the Wake similarly cautions, pointing out like Nietzsche ‘another cant to the questy’ by suggesting the ‘longly’ inspection of ‘a quite everydaylooking stamped addressed envelope’ (108-9).

Vico’s ‘search for the true Homer’ among ‘the multitude of the Greek peoples’, is rejected by Nietzsche as merely ‘a bridge over this problem’ (12). The death of the author that Vico like Spinoza hinted at by problematising the notion of authorship- the authorship of Scripture in particular, is not only a consequence of history for Nietzsche, but also an omen of the dawn of “aesthetics”. 70 The mythical unity and concreteness that disregards the individual in a world of becoming rather than being, mystically embraced by the name of the author, is replaced by aesthetic wholeness. While Nietzsche acknowledges that ‘in Homer the modern world, I will not say has learnt, but has examined, a great historical point of view’, he underlines the confusion of history and aesthetics in the treatment of this question:

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70 The aim of Book III of the New Science, “Discovery of the True Homer” is, in common with the aim of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, to undermine the authority of Scripture, James Morrison argues in his comparison of the use of history by these two philosophers (55).
‘Homer as the composer of the Iliad and the Odyssey is not a historical tradition, but an aesthetic judgment’ (7, 18).

The contrast between ‘Poetical works, which cause the hearts of even the greatest geniuses to fail when they endeavour to vie with them, and in which unsurpassable images are held up for the admiration of posterity’ and ‘the poet who wrote them with only a hollow, shaky name’ is similarly presented by Nietzsche as a consequence of the confusion of history and aesthetics and of a conception of personality that stipulates unity, following ‘the surprisingly rapid development of the Greek feeling for beauty’ (11, 19). ‘The design of an epic such as the Iliad is not an entire whole, not an organism’, Nietzsche argues, ‘but a number of pieces strung together, a collection of reflections arranged in accordance with aesthetic rules’: ‘The Iliad is not a garland, but a bunch of flowers’- a ‘bunckskleydoodle’ (20; FW 258). ‘Those, therefore, who look for the “original and perfect design” are looking for a mere phantom’- an anthropomorphic phantom that haunts aesthetics (Homer 21). ‘The infinite profusion of images and incidents in the Homeric epic’ intimates for Nietzsche ‘that such a wide range of vision is next to impossible. Where, however, a poet is unable to observe artistically with a single glance, he usually piles conception on conception, and endeavours to adjust his characters according to a comprehensive scheme’ (20). ‘Bygmaster Finnegan’ may have ‘lived in the broadest way immarginable’, but as a poet- a ‘man of hod, cement and edifices’, he ‘piled buildung supra buildung pon the banks for the livers’ (FW 4).

‘[T]he real Homeric deed, the real Homeric epoch-making event’ is not that of ‘that stringing together of some pieces’, Nietzsche argues, distinguishing the ‘designer’ from ‘the real poet’: ‘everything which was created in those times with conscious aesthetic insight, was infinitely inferior to the songs that sprang up naturally in the poet's mind and were written down with instinctive power’ (20-1). Drawing the author away from rationalism and unwilling to identify him with an ‘ideal eternal history’, or even a ‘history of human ideas’, the death of the author in Nietzsche’s account personifies the surrender of the philologist’s rights to language. Homer, he concludes, ‘sacrificed his name on the altar of the primeval father of the Homeric epic, Homeros’; the genius like the philologist is a “hostage” to language: ‘neither a Muse nor a Grace, but a messenger of the gods’ (22, 24).

In a final act of surrender, Nietzsche’s “theory” is submitted to philosophy, ‘in which everything individual and isolated is evaporated as something detestable, and in which great homogeneous views alone remain’, and to its ideal ‘community’: ‘Now, therefore, that I have enunciated my philological creed, I trust you will give me cause to hope that I shall no longer be a stranger among you: give me the assurance that in working with you towards this end I am worthily fulfilling the confidence with which the highest authorities of this
community have honoured me’ (25). Like the Professor who pleads with his listeners following his delivery of the fable of the Mookse and the Gripe to ‘insure me that I am a mouth’s more deserving case by genius’, ‘As I have now successfully explained to you my own naturalborn rations which are even in excise of my vaultybrain’, the philologist is the “genius” of modernity in his search for origins and ‘naturalborn rations’ (FW 159). But the inability or perhaps unwillingness of both the artist and the critic to disappear within the ‘wrunes’ of language - Shem’s ‘corrosive sublimation’ and the professor’s “enunciation”, like the ‘assumptinome’ of the Allmookse - exposes their artifice (184, 153).

The quest for the author in the *Wake* similarly begins philologically with a search among the ‘bynames’ that ‘was put under him, in lashons of languages’ ‘in the presurnames prodromarith period’ (29, 30). Invoking the authority of ‘the best authenticated version, the Dumlat [Talmud for those not used to reading boustrophedon]’ to repudiate ‘once for all those theories from older sources’, the narrator of the second chapter distinguishes himself as a Holy Writer (30). Endeavouring to unearth, outline and report the ‘genesis of Harold or Humphrey Chimpden’s occupational agnomen’, his task is riddled with the paradoxes of the dual genealogy of Christ: his divine descent from “a transcendent multitude” that disrupts the ideas of “difference” and “otherness” and deconstructs but does not dispense with the idea of the “person”, and his human descent- an ‘abramanation’ [an abomination as well as an emanation from Abraham] that requires the exegete’s negotiation of moral, legal, national and denominational questions (30, 26).

As an exegete of the ‘longawaited Messiagh of roaratorios’ and ‘vilest bogeyer but most attractionable avatar the world has ever had to explain for’ - Hosty prior to his Eucharistic sacrifice, before he was ‘viersefied and piersified’ and ‘hoisted’ in the ‘chalice for the Loud Fellow’ - he is also faced with the philological version of the paradox of this coincidence of the one and the many that the figure of Homer presented to the Alexandrian scholars: the difficulty of reconciling language, style, content, history, tradition and morality, but also ascribing these to a single individual (41, 42, 31). ‘[H]umile, commune and ensectuous from his nature’, Harold or Humphrey like Christ and Homer embodies the metaphysical paradox and the coincidence of contraries in the mythical symbol (29).

The ‘aim of Hellenistic criticism’, as a later Homeric scholar, Friedrich Wolf, protested, had not been the ‘preservation of the text as a historical document’ but ‘improvement of the text as a literary masterpiece’: ‘they worked harder to ensure that he never seemed inconsistent or weak, often removing verses, elsewhere adding polish where none belonged’ (Grafton 112). The successors of the Alexandrians, indeed became aware that not only had the Homeric epics been altered by ‘those who committed his words to
writing and those who sang them’, but also that ‘the Athenian written text had been further altered, emended, cut and added to by early revisers, or diaskeuastai, and above all by such Hellenistic critics as Zenodotus, Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus’, and therefore ‘A modern editor could only hope to restore the Alexandrian vulgate. He could never know which sections really went back to Homer’ (110).

The “real” Homer for Wolf as for Nietzsche is not the hero ‘in a greak esthate phophiar’- the Greek decadent and feeble aesthete: ‘the songs that sprang up naturally in the poet’s mind and were written down with instinctive power’ have disappeared behind a ‘poisoning volume of cloud barrage’ (Homer 21; 343). As ‘all they who heard or redelivered’, ‘are now with that family of bards and Vergobretas himself and the crowd of Caraculacticors as much no more as be they not yet now or had they notever been’, the saga of ‘poor Osti-Fosti’ is pronounced ‘all falsetissues antilibellous and nonactionable’ (48). Modernity mourns the loss of tradition while simultaneously doubting both its consequence and authenticity. In the absence of its original actors, the ‘zouave players of Inkermann’, the historian reluctantly turns to aesthetics: to ‘the persins sin this Eyrawyggla saga’ and their ‘fishabed ghoatstory of the haardly creditable edventyres’ (48, 51). The theorist not only struggles in ‘slopperish matter, given the wet and low visibility’ of the tales ‘to idendifine the individuone’, but is also faced with a host of popular bardic orators who dress with ‘mythical habiliments’ and ‘spectral appealingness’ ‘Our Farfar and Arthor of our doyne’ with the ‘Dyas in [their] machina’, and ‘timesport’ their audience with the popularity of the journalist of Sporting Times, ‘across the yawning (abyss)’ (51, 52, 56, 52, 55, 56).

The modern audience, however, is not so easily ‘sinduced’ by tales of ‘some lazy skald or maundering pote’, seeking rather ‘the pragma’ and the ‘formal cause’, conscious that ‘the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude, the evidencegivers by legpoll too untrustworthily irreperible where his adjugers are semmingly freak threes but his judicandees plainly minus twos’; the numbers do not add up and ‘We have grown out of Wilde and paradoxes’, as Mulligan tells Haines (3, 56, 57, U 21). Growing tired of the ‘pseudojocax axplanation[s]’ of the ‘gentlewriter’ and calling for him to ‘roll away the reel world’, ‘the real Us’ suspects forgery: ‘We seem to us (the real Us!) too be reading our Amenti in the sixth sealed chapter of the going forth by black’ (FW 63, 64, 62). ‘Come on, ordinary man with that large big nonobli head, and that blanko berbecked fischial ekksprezzion Machinsky Scapolopolos, Duzinascu or other. Your machelar's leg's getting musclebound from being too pulled’, the common reader is warned (64).

In his relentless endeavour to ‘analectralyse that very chymerical combination’, the modern exegete, a scholar of scholars like Wolf, reveals the historical bias of his own
methodological ideals: the “Higher Criticism” of German Biblical scholarship in the eighteenth century that focused on the historical reconstruction of Scripture (67). While in Vico’s philological analysis - the study of ‘the history of words in various languages’ which correspond to ‘the sequence of human institutions’ - historical knowledge was what the Homeric epics disclosed (rather than philosophical), history became the object of an epistemological investigation for historicism (98). While ‘the priority of the spiritual sense’ guided the method of the patristic and medieval commentator, the modern demand for and debate regarding the historical authenticity of Scripture complicates the task of the modern interpreter; truth must correspond with facts for the ‘factferreters’ who examine the events with ‘intouristing anterestedness’ (Minnis 47; FW 55). The exegete of Haromphrey is plagued with the historical ‘kersse of Wolafs’, and his “method” similarly amalgamates the Jewish and the Greek traditions (319). The ‘fata which we read in sibylline’ [the facts but also fate, face and speech - *fatum*], however, must still reflect an ideal balance and draw a clear line of distinction ‘between the *fas* and its *nefas*’ - the lawful and the unlawful; a dualism that demarcates both narrative and historical time (31).

Although a ‘homogenius man’ according to ‘a pious author’, H.C.E.’s Dionysian ‘onesomeness’ gets him into trouble; ‘conceive[d]’ by ‘his detractors’- ‘an imperfectly warmblooded race’, as ‘a great white caterpillar capable of any and every enormity in the calendar recorded’, he is identified with Wildean profligacy (34, 33). The dubious historical authenticity of the text in the *Wake* and suspect methods of the ‘biografiend[s]’ are as in Wilde’s tale of the quest for the true Mr W. H. linked with deviancy and corruption, but are also skillfully deployed to absolve the ‘besieged’ author of the crimes that his creations - ‘an inversion of a [Alexandrian] phallopharos’ - are synonymous with (55, 75, 77). The sacrifice of the author’s humanity in order to conserve and reveal the truth - historical, philosophical or theological - that as Wilde’s story had dramatised the nature of the quest compels, is refused.

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71 Drawing attention to the significance of Jewish Bible exegesis in Alexandria, Maren Niehoff highlights that this dialogue between the two cultures had much earlier roots: ‘Homer’s epics as well as well as Moses’ Torah were foundational texts, irrespective of whether their canonicity was precisely the same, and as such prompted a large corpus of minute interpretations in their respective communities of readers. The hermeneutics developed in both contexts emerged in a similar historical environment and followed surprisingly similar rules’ (3).

72 A two-fold question is asked: ‘Are those their fata which we read [during] the *fas* and its *nefas*’, and ‘Are those their fata [that are placed] between the *fas* and its *nefas*’.

73 The endeavour of exegetes ‘to establish the priority of the spiritual sense … over the historical or literal sense’ resulted according to Minnis in the neglect of the humanity of the authors of Biblical writings: ‘The notion of the *auctor* as an agent engaged in literary activity was submerged; the truth of the Bible was maintained at the expense of its human contributors’ (47, 72).
In the rejection of sacrifice and dramatisation of the “hesitency” between necessity and convention, ‘accidental manners and humours’ and ‘the everlasting hopes, desires and hates of us’, Joyce like Wilde positions his drama on the borders between comedy and tragedy, individualism and socialism (OCPW 23-5). With the aid of Vico’s philological investigation and his Brunian solution to this debate in his claim that the ‘Greek peoples were themselves Homer’, Joyce like Vico ‘acquit[s] [the author] of all the charges which critics have brought against him. Particularly the following: base and uninspired statements, boorish manner, crude similes, local idioms, metrical liberties, dialectical inconsistencies, and his portrayal of men as gods and gods as men’ (382, 384).

But although Joyce allows the author to get ‘lost in the multitude’ and relinquish his divinity, his absolution does not necessitate his renouncement of either his humanity or his philosophical credentials, although it does require a revision of the notion of subjectivity and authorship. In the ‘abnihilisation of the etym’, destruction and reconstruction of etymology [language and hermeneutics], the atom [the individual] and the etymon [the truth] are concurrent and interdependent operations (FW 353). The problematic notion of agency that the sinful human nature of authors had presented to the medieval exegetes and had been resolved by way of penitence and through a revision of the classical notion of inspiration - by means of an excision of ‘its Bacchic and irrationalist connotations’ - is reflected in the complexity and confusion of the genealogy of the Holy Writer in the Wake and in the pattern of fall and resurrection, appearance and disappearance (Burke, Authorship 7).

Aware that authorship entails accountability as well as distinction, the narrator distances himself from the accounts that he chronicles, quoting the claims of other more ‘learned scholarch[s]’: ‘the facts of his nominigentilisation as recorded and accolated in both or either of the collateral andrewpaulmurphyc narratives’, directing the reader to his “sources” (31). But lacking credible sources and witnesses, he has to contend like Vico with the author’s ‘barbarous’ contemporaries ‘who have the mental weakness of children, the vigorous imagination of women, and the seething passions of violent youths’ (355). The author, moreover, shared their ‘savage feelings and customs’, taking ‘much pleasure in wine’ and ‘comfort in drunkenness’, spending his time ‘inventing old wives’ tales, suitable for children’, creating ‘capricious gods and heroes’, ‘bloody battles’ and ‘great variety of extravagantly cruel kinds of slaughter, which constitute the particular sublimity’ of primeval aesthetics and raise ‘doubts’ in Vico’s scientific mind about the ‘sublime and esoteric wisdom’ of this ‘folksforefather’: a ‘practical jokepiece and retired cecelticocommediant in his own wise’ (358, 356, 355; FW 33).
Unable to reconcile ‘so many refined customs with the many wild and savage ones’, Vico concludes that ‘the Homeric epics were composed and revised by several hands in several ages’ (359, 363). In the absence of aesthetic unity, Vico seeks ‘the outlines of an ideal eternal history’ (5). Vico’s historical method and his presentation of history as ‘a direct expression of the truth’, however, relies on an idea of nationality and community - a “conscienza” - that the modern author has to ‘forge in the smithy of [his] soul’ (366; P 276). The ‘singleminded supercrowd’ among which the hero gradually disappears, is as fictional as the portrait of the artist that is painted (42). Haromphreyld’s [három is three in Hungarian, McHugh observes] ‘biografiend’ does not go so far as to identify him with the populace, although he credits ‘the truly catholic assemblage’ with his ‘universalisation’ through its interpretation of his signature: ‘the sigla H.C.E’ as ‘Here Comes Everybody’ (31, 55, 32). The endless catalogues of reports, the web of tales, rumours and gossip, the mythical and evolutionary metamorphoses that are recorded, the perpetual performances that are staged and the riotous nature of the assemblage that always has a battle or a bottle ‘in the baccbuccus of [its] mind’, frustrate both the quest for the true author and any stable notion of a community that seeks to set ‘the laurel of genius’ upon its ‘empty heads’ (118; Nietzsche, *Homer* 15). ‘There's a cabful of bash indeed in the homeur that meal’, we are warned; in any indictment of the author and any attempt to “measure” his ‘amossive’ [massive, but also amusive and mossy] proportions (*FW* 34, 33). Like the ‘proteiform’ of the author and his ‘graph’, community and nationality are continually reconstituted rather than ‘stolidly immobile’ (107, 163).

As H.C.E.’s successors and interpreters are busy trying to ‘reamalgamer’ him and “hypostasise” ‘by substintuation [his] axiomatic orerotundity’ through philosophical theories, quarelling and despairing about the ‘falsemeaning adamelegy’ they are faced with and the facts of his nominigentilisation as recorded and accolated in both or either of the collateral andrewpaulmurphy narratives’, ‘that patternmind, that paradigmatic ear’, has to himself assume the task of composing ‘while he mourned the flight of his wild guineese a long list (now feared in part lost) to be kept on file of all abusive names he was called’ in order to preserve his ‘the canonicity of his existence’, aware of the mythical potency of his name (49, 55, 77, 31, 70, 71, 100). While remaining ‘Wholyphamous’, the poet is also ‘nobodyatall’ for his modern skeptical audience and its ‘Nichtian glossery which purveys aprioric roots for aposterious tongues’ - a language emptied of both aesthetic and historical wholeness (72, 81).

Dismissing ‘the fallacy, as punical as finikin, that it was not the king kingself but his inseparable sisters, uncontrollable nighttalkers, Skertsiraizde with Donyahzade, who
afterwards, when the robberers shot up the socialights’ became ‘amusers’ in ‘a pantalime’ [pantaloon and pantomime], the chronicler of H.C.E. struggles, nevertheless, to discern not only the nature of the ancient theatrical performance that he “records”- documents and remembers, but also to distinguish between the spectators and the protagonists (32). Haromphrey grows so large that he is not only the protagonist - ‘our worldstage's practical jokepiece’ - but also takes up the whole audience: ‘on every point far outstarching the laundered clawhammers and marbletopped highboys of the pit stalls and early amphitheatre’, in an even more ‘cecelticocommediant’ version of Stephen’s early dramatic performance as both witness and protagonist in his own wake (33). The ‘shomers’ are indistinguishable from both the Homers and the showmen; the song “A Nation Once Again” from the nation that ‘wants a gaze’ (34, 43). Like Nietzsche’s philological analysis of the fate of art in modernity, the modern tragedy of the rupture of the unity of culture is both mythologised and dramatised. In the repeated disintegration of the tragic plot into farce, the cultural malaise discerned by Nietzsche is thematised but also exposed as a “recognition” that the structure of the play staged itself elicits; the prominence of repetition over recognition discloses the metaphysical ground of art. Rather than a vehicle for a philosophic recognition, the meaning of art is inseparable from its ‘eternal recurrence’ - historical as well as mythical - through performance and interpretation. This “meaninglessness” of art, however, that is reflected in the ‘Nichtian’ language of the *Wake*, is not nihilistic through its very refusal of a revelation (81).

Transience, which distinguishes modern art entangled in ‘the enormous driving-wheel of logical Socratism’, and modern philosophy ‘In disclosing time as the ground hidden from self-understanding’, is also what separates comedy from tragedy (*BT* 47; Gadamer 86). Whereas ‘In tragedy the eternal substance of things emerges victorious in a reconciling way, because it strips away from the conflicting individuals only their false one-sidedness, while the positive elements in what they willed it displays as what is to be retained, without discord but affirmatively harmonized’, ‘In comedy there comes before our contemplation, in the laughter in which the characters dissolve everything, including themselves, the victory of their own subjective personality which nevertheless persists self-assured’, in Hegel’s genre distinction (*Lectures on Fine Art* 1199). The subject both ‘persists self-assured’ and is revealed as ‘self-dissolving’ in comedy, as in Joyce’s ‘pantalime’ (*FW* 32). In the ‘infinite light-heartedness and confidence’ of comedy, the subject is released ‘above his own inner contradiction’- a release that ‘A narrow and pedantic mind is least of all capable of … when

74 A šomer is a watchman in Hebrew, McHugh explains.
for others his behaviour is laughable in the extreme’ (*Lectures on Fine Art* 1200). But even though the ‘petty and futile aims’ of comedy allow the subject to escape unscathed - ‘because what the individual willed was something inherently trivial, he is not ruined in fact when his purpose fails but can surmount this disaster with cheerfulness undisturbed’ - the end of comedy itself is not insubstantial: ‘In a comic action the contradiction between what is absolutely true and its realization in individuals is posed more profoundly. Yet what is destroyed in this solution cannot be either fundamental principle or individual character’ (1201). This is indeed what distinguishes comedy from Romantic irony: while the comic is ‘limited to bringing to nothing what is in itself null, a false and self-contradictory phenomenon; for instance, a whim, a perversity, or particular caprice, set over against a mighty passion’, ‘The ironical, as ‘genial’ individuality, consists in the self-annihilation of what is noble, great, and excellent’ (*Aesthetics* 73).

Joyce’s extraction of such ‘contradictory contrasts’ upon which ‘the comical rests’ from Bruno’s philosophy as a ready-made formula ‘to explique to ones the significat of their exsystems’, allows both the deferment of the resolution of contrasts and the dissolution of the profound realisation through the comprehensive applicability of the theory (*FW* 147). Cusa’s coincidence of nothing with everything, with God Himself, moreover, allows the evasion of the nihilistic implications of the perpetual dissolution that Joyce borrows from Vico’s system. Bruno’s philosophy, moreover, is central to Joyce’s interpretation of the philosophical either/or of the philological question of authorship, highlighting the confusion of philology and philosophy in the formulation of the question. The “modern” philosophy of Bruno had similarly exploited and exploded the “hesitency” dramatised in the paradox of the philosophical genre of tragedy: the sacrifice of the ‘insignificant, without effect’ ‘sign’ for the revelation of ‘original matter’ ‘in its weakness’, through the dissolution of the dualism of the One and the many (Hölderlin 89). Himself a dramatist, an ‘*Academico di nulla academia, detto il fastidito in tristitia hilaris, hilaritate tristis*’, as Bruno had described himself in the preface to his comedy “The Torchbearer”, he presented the transgression of limits as a principle of creativity and ‘absolute possibility’, and refused to allow ‘the term ‘person’” to be subsumed by a metaphysical abstraction- ‘a quidam’ ‘topantically anonymos’ that Enlightenment philosophy reinvented as “Truth” (McIntyre 19, 172; Rowland 58; *FW* 33, 34).  

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75 Bruno said [to Inquisitors] he could not understand the Trinity “if not in the way that I have explained before speaking philosophically, and designating the Father’s intellect as the Son and his love as the Holy Spirit, without recognising the term ‘person’, which Saint Augustine says is not an ancient term but a new one of his own time” (Rowland 58).
Homer for Joyce, as for Samuel Butler, is synonymous with humour- ‘homeur’, and therefore the question of “the personality” of the author that philology has ‘effectually concealed behind [an] impenetrable hedge of dullness’, focusing on ‘the force of the zeugma, and of the enclitic particle ye’ is central to his work (FW 34; Butler 53). In the absence of the author who ‘morphomelosophophancreatizes’ and his ‘intimologies’, it is indeed the ‘hilariohoot’ that takes over (88, 101, 92). In an inversion of Nietzsche’s paradigm, moreover, the ‘luciferant’ ‘stage thunkhard’ who is unable to understand, pronounce and remember ‘in his secondmouth language’ ‘the bigtimer’s verbaten words’ as ‘the hour of the twattering of bards in the twitterlitter’ has passed as a modern theoretical man, and is instead seen ‘accompanied by his trusty snorler and his permanent reflection verbigracious’ ‘studying castelles in the blowne’, ‘studding cowshots over the noran’ and trying to ‘reamalgamer’ ‘the centuple celves of [his] egourge’, is not distinguished by his “cheerful optimism”, as his interest in Bruno and Cusa also highlight (35, 49, 37, 49). But both his encounters with his bardic ‘folksforefather’ and the ‘musaic dispensation’ [Mosaic, mosaic, musical, and inspired by the muses] that ‘he spat in careful convertedness’ having ‘musefed with his thockits’, are the catalyst of countless ‘tales within wheels and stucks between spokes’, “inspiring” the ‘gossiple’ of the ‘Messiagh of rooratorios’ that ‘resnored alcoh alcoho alcoherently’ while ‘the shavers in the shaw the yokels in the yoats or, well, the wasters in the wilde’ are busy polishing their relics - ‘furbishing potlids, doorbrasses, scholars’ applecheeks and linkboy’s metals’ - becomes the ‘lay of the vilest bogeyer but most attractionable avatar the world has ever had to explain for’ (32, 37, 247, 38, 41, 42).

**ii. Dies is Dorminus: How our myterbilder his fullen aslip [FW 609.28, 377.26]**

A prudent chief not always must display
His pow’rs in equal ranks, and fair array,
But with th’ occasion and the place comply,
Conceal his force, nay, seem sometimes to fly.
Those oft are stratagems which Errors seem,
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.

The reader of the *Wake*, however, is more likely to agree with ‘ahorace’, who admitted that he too gets annoyed when the great Homer nods off: ‘et idem / indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus’ (FW 325; *Ars Poetica* 354-60). Although the bardic ‘folksforefather’ is awakened and resurrected recurrently throughout the *Wake*, as language has been put ‘to sleep’ his wake is the cause of more confusion (33; *JJ* 546). Revived in II.3 through the
‘enginium’ of modern science, the ‘mysterbolder’ is ‘electrically filtered for allirish earths and ohmes’ through a ‘tolvtubular high fidelity daildialler’, ‘so as to lall’ even ‘the bygone dozed’ (309-10). His ‘howdrocephalous enlargement’ successfully ‘pinnatrates inthro an auricular forfickle’, ‘lill the lubberendth of his otological life’- if not ontological, and he ‘immerges’ like Shakespeare in ‘Circe’ as ‘a mirage in a merror’: ‘myrioheartzed’ rather than myriadminded (310, 332).

As Hayman notes, the ear of this bard appears to be both ‘loudspeaker and receptacle’- ‘a vitaltone speaker’, unfortunately also ‘capable of capturing skybuddies, harbour craft emittences, key clickings, viaticum cleaners’, but also both ‘public and private’ (in Crispi and Slote eds. 26; FW 309). The tales emitted from the ear of ‘this ale of man’ as ‘a movement of catharic emulsipotion’, are like all narratives that take place in a pub in Joyce’s work “inspirited” by alcohol and therefore are a collective production of ‘Porterfillyers and spirituous suncksters’: ‘Group drinkards maaks grope thinkards’ (371, 313). As it is uncertain, moreover, whether the tale narrated ‘was not before athwartships’, like the “Oxen” chapter of Ulysses, the voice of the Author is inseparable from that of the Holy Writer(s); the tale is a joint effort of the bard and his scholiasts, aided also by mechanical devices that are given a voice as in “Aeolus”: ‘were it not for that dielectrick, were upon the point of obsoletion’ (322). The ‘talk’ [an interpreter in Danish] is simultaneously its interpretation; everything that is repeatedly “sagd” in this telling is part of the saga that is threatened by an ‘Annexandreian captive conquest’ (317, 332, 318). Even the bard is challenged to ‘show you’re a skolar’ by giving drinks to his customers [a skaal is a toast in Danish, McHugh notes] (326). Even ‘if that he hids foregodden has nate of glozery farused ameet [passed among] the florahs of the follest’, as the dramatist of the play of Butt and Taff remarks, ‘his spent fish’s livid smile giving allasundery [all and sundry and Alexandrian] the bumfit of the doped’; the Homeric question that casts doubt on his night of glory as well as his glossery tricks his interpreters, although by giving them through his fishy discovery at Oxyrhynchus the benefit of the doubt, he also provides them with creative opportunities (339).

The division of history by Vico into three ages and his use of ‘the etymologies of native words’ to show that they ‘contain the history of the things they signify following a natural order of ideas’ is challenged by the synthetic language of the chapter (15). As the ‘old relogion’s out of tiempor’ in the cyclical narrative of this epic - Iliad-like in its endless conflicts - all ages dissolve into a mythical present tense (317). Vico’s claim, therefore, that it is historically impossible that Homer was a philosopher is denied through language that ‘motophosically’ contains all ages: ‘plinary indulgence makes colleunellas’- plenary, but
also viewing historical actors as models of universal truths (319). As the ‘drema’ of this ‘lewdningbluebolteredallucktruckalltraumconductor’ takes place within language, the hero of this tale emerges ‘like the dud spuk [a spook and a joke in Norwegian (spøke)] of his first foetotype’ (69, 378).

Both the form and the content of the narrative also become increasingly more theatrical and like the symposium in the National Library in *Ulysses*, the ‘dielectric’ turns recurrently into a play (322). The customers turn into the ‘Chorus’ and witness the tragic ‘Scaald[ing]’ of ‘ahorace’ (324-5). The teller and the witness indeed become, in a Biblical manner, indistinguishable ‘under all the gaauspices’ (332). The resurrection of the bard that turns into a reenactment of his ‘sulphuring’, moreover, like the phantasmagoria of “Circe” becomes a liturgical celebration, in the ‘methylogical’ [methy - drunkeness (gr)] mission of the pub Host to provide drinks and tales for his customers as ‘a parrotsprate’s [parish priest’s] cure for enseauised [uncivilized] lethargies [liturgies]’ (353, 373, 334). As the stage is ‘set by ritual rote for the grimm grimm tale’, the ‘cyclums cyclorums’ become liturgical; with ‘enterellbo add all taller Danis’, the celebrant enters both the altar and language (Danish)- philosophically, as the reference to Kierkegaard suggests (335).

Transported through the eloquence of the teller: ‘We are once amore as babes awondering in a wold made fresh where with the hen in the storyaboot we start from scratch’, the listeners of the epic tales become witnesses of the original event, and indeed also participants; they become true “theorists” (336). As Gadamer explains, ‘the concept of sacral communion’ ‘lies behind the original Greek concept of theoria’: ‘Theoros means someone who takes part in a delegation to a festival’ (121). The customers indeed become heroes through their positioning as witnesses of ‘a theogamyjig incidence’ (*FW* 332). In the Christian epics, Balsamo argues, ‘the experience of the individual subject’ is similarly presented ‘as a definitive revelation of the ultimate reality of human existence and thereby also of divinity’ (*Tradition of Christian Epics* 15). This is made possible, as William Franke explains, through a ‘phenomenological reduction’ that ‘identifies the real with what appears in experience’ (156-7). But in the *Wake* it is the ‘anononously’ [ever and anon and anonymously] multivalent language that makes this revelation possible, without the aid of phenomenology (367). As ‘There’s a split in the infinitive from to have to have been to will be’, as the children learn in their grammar lesson, the ‘photognomist’ ‘Nolan of the Calabashes’ is both a photographer and a protagonist (271). Shem indeed notes in the margin that in ‘The Eroico Furioso’ the Nolan was himself both hero and theorist, as the confusion with Ariosto’s *Orlando Furioso* highlights (336).
As this modern audience, however, is not so easily impressed by the feats of the mythical heroes - ‘what matter what all his freudzay or who holds his hat to harm him’ - and demands ‘the truce, the old truce and nattonbuff the truce’, the tale has to be recast as a romance in order to capture their attention (336). A (kinetic) “object” of aesthetic contemplation is presented to them: ‘Imagine twee cweamy wosen. Suppwose you get a beautiful thought and cull them sylvias sub silence. Then inmaggin a stoterer. Suppoutré him to been one biggermaster Omnibil. Then lustily (tutu the font and tritt on the bokswoods like gay feeters's dance) immengine up to three longly lurking lobstarts’ (336-7). Still not impressed, they call for a pantomimic performance to be ‘teilweisioned’ (345). Butt and Taff, the performers of this production dramatise the confusion between teller and protagonist, witness and audience, and as Hayman observes, the stage directions further add to the confusion as they ‘function more as asides than instructions. Like those in “Circe” but more so, they record what the protagonists might be imagining rather than what we might actually see on a television screen’ (How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake 274). Even the workings of the television screen become part of the drama: ‘Spraygun rakes and splits them from a double focus: grenadite, damnymite, alextronite, nichilite: and the scanning firespot of the sgunners traverses the rutilanced illustred sunksundered lines’ (349).

As well as enacting the heroic tale, Butt and Taff become the incarnation of ‘Bud Budderly boddily’ as the increasingly carnal ‘longuewedge’ reflects (337, 339). The question of authorship merges with the question of the historicity of Christ, reflected in the concurrently historical and corporeal nature of language; Taff is pursued by both ‘psychophannies’ and ‘psuckofumb[l]ers’ (340). The Shaun-like invective against a ‘grandoper’ who ‘salubrate[d] himself with an ultradungs [orthodox] heavenly mass’, a ‘potifex miximost’, is a parallel to the tale of the fall and the Passion (341, 345). Drama, history and theology become indistinguishable in the ‘howorodies’ [tragedies / Herodotus] that take place in language and the many spectacles that are staged (341). With all the ‘awlphul omegrims’ [Alpla and Omega and awful migraines] that he goes through, Butt becomes a version of the Oedipal riddle: ‘in his difficoltous tresdobremient, he feels a bitvalike a baddlefall of staot but falls a batforlake a borrlefull of bare’ (348) He embodies the battle itself, the event that takes place, not just its actors. The incarnation of the Word gives way to an indiscriminate incarnation of words, and historical personages are turned into new words, like ‘Mr. Twomass Nohoholan’ who becomes an embodiment of his theory by merging with Aquinas (341).

The drama of Buckley’s lack of ‘arts’ - ‘a marrer of act’ - to shoot the Russian General following the exposure of his ‘basemiddelism’ turns into a series of testimonies that
attempt oratorically by ‘passing the unational truthbosh’ to gain the approval of the audience (344-5). The advent of the bardic progenitor who emerges through the television - ‘Down the photoslope’ and ‘through the inconoscope’ - puts an end to the ‘druidful’ antagonism of Butt and Taff (349). Preceded by a ‘gaspel truce’, a photograph of ‘the figure of a fellowship in the wohly ghast’ [fellowship of the Holy Ghost] appears like the apparition of Virag in “Circe” ‘Amid a fluorescence of spectacular mephiticism’ (349). This ‘idolon’, an idol and spectre, ‘exhibisces the seals of his orders’, among which the ‘band and bucklings of the Martyrology of Gorman’ (349). An officiate ‘for the castomercies mudwake surveice’, his anticipated benediction and prophecy is rather a confession. Like Yawn who is wakened by the mamalujo to answer all their burning questions, the speech of this bard on the ‘hellsclyown days’ when he went ‘hand to hand’ with a ‘jiggilyjuggling’ ‘Homard Kayenne’ [Homer and Omar Khayyam], is a Wilde-like defence of ‘Mr Lhugewhite Cadderpollard’ against accusations that simultaneously exposes his culpability (349-50).

Following this diversion for revelation of the sins of the father, the sketches of Butt and Taff that follow are distinguished by their attempts to find a fitting solution for the riddle that the confession of the ambiguous crime of the ‘panthosopher’ generates (364). Taff ‘effaces himself in favour of the ideology’ ‘in an effort towards autosotorisation’; the radio announces ‘The abnihilisation of the etym’; a Hegelian philosopher announces that Butt and Taff as ‘desprot slave wager and foeman feodal unshackled’ are ‘now one and the same person’; a theologian concludes as a critic of their performance that even though ‘he sung dumb in his glass darkly’, ‘speech lit face to face on allaround’; an ardent reader and admirer of ‘natural sins’ rather than ‘manmade Eonochs Cunstunopolies’, who is ‘enlivened toward the Author of Nature’ ‘on the lamatory’, reinterprets and redeems the “sin” of the Russian General, exclaiming upon contemplating his ‘naked I, for relieving purposes’, ‘I, my good grief, I am, I am big altoogooder’ (352, 353, 354, 357-8). But these fragmentary reflections from the ‘Holophullopopulace’ that follow the play are ended with the arrival of the mamalujo, the bard’s official interpreters: ‘a sixdigitarian legion on druid circle’, as the four turn into the twelve customers (342, 362).

The ‘peeptomine’ of the four follows the radio interruptions that re-establish a connection with the outside world (361). This ‘fearsome foursome’ that for Budgen ‘is certainly one of the most astonishing of all Joyce’s grotesque inventions’ is presented as a very awkward blinkered chorus that is ‘Synopticked on the word’, rejecting the heterogeneity of ‘sorratelling’ (338; FW 367). The ‘foreretyred schoonmasters’ [schoolmasters and beautiful (schoon) in Dutch] arrive as witnesses, judges and interpreters and distinguish themselves by their detached theoretical perspective, masking their
‘lunguings’ under ‘the deprofundity of multimathematical immaterialities’ and a ‘higherdimensional selfless Allself’ (395, 396, 394-5). The pistol that turns into an epistle is transformed by these scholars into ‘Epistlemadethemology [epistemology and theology] for deep dorfy doubtlings’ (374). The narrative accounts are ‘anononously’ presented from the perspective of the ‘greatgrandgosterfosters’ who appear to tautologically ‘splane splication’ for the ‘sublation of compensation in the radification of interpretation’, searching for ‘Aletheometry’ although ‘none none in the house his geust has guest’ (368-70).

Performing a ‘glutany of stainks’ [a version of a litany of saints] for the trinitarian fellowship of ‘Porterfillyers and spirituous suncksters’, they put an end to his ‘methylogical mission’: ‘Stop his laysense. Ink him!’ (371, 373). They tear him apart Eucharistically like Osiris to demonstrate ‘how your mead of, mard [a man in Persian and a reference to a nursery rhyme in McHugh’s explication], is made of’, as he ‘canseels under veerious persons’ (374, 373). Once their ‘myterbilder [master, mitre, myth and mother (μήτηρ) builder] his fullen aslip’, his ‘flemsh’ is Eucharistically ‘toastified’; while his ‘sobsconcious inklings shadowed on soulskin’ are scrutinised as ‘thruming through all to himself with diversed tonguesed through his old tears and his ould plaised drawl’, his speech remains incomprehensible (376-7, 381). ‘[T]he gift of tongues’ that Joyce had ascribed to art is shown to be inaccessible under the shadow of the ‘their ouldmouldy gods’ (WD 86; FW 382). Their shortcomings will be exhibited in the next chapter through their monologic “rememboring” that they proffer as a substitute of the bardic art, collapsing all temporal dimensions into a static pre-interpreted present tense.
While German Romanticism reproved the ‘spirit of negation’ of Alexandrian scholarship - ‘the continually more and less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators’ that had ‘scattered Homer's laurel crown to the winds’ - the Alexandrians distinguished themselves as custodians of art, preserving the classical tradition for future generations, even at the cost of their own (Nietzsche, *Homer* 4; *FW* 118). But although universal implication in artistic matters characterised this society, ‘there have survived down to our own day comparatively few examples’ of their creations; ‘It is a somewhat ironic stroke of fate’, Barber observes, ‘that the generations which preserved and handed on to future ages the literary works of Classical Greece should have been unable to ensure the survival of their own writings, especially when those writings were to be numbered by thousands’ (in Bury et al. 23, 33).

The excavations of Grenfell and Hunt unearthed in 1928, however, ‘large portions’ of the poetry of the most renowned Alexandrian lyric poet of this period, Callimachus (Schmitz 151). The discovery of the prologue to his longest poem- *Aetia* (Causes), ‘a series of aetiological legends connected with Greek history, customs, and rites’, presented a new set of ‘historical and biographical problems’ to his scholars who ‘gaddered togodder the odds docence of [their]vellumes’ ‘onto the lapse of his prolegs’ [prologue, insect leg and foretelling - prolexis (gr)] to identify Callimachus’ fictional opponents: ‘The malignant gnomes who write reviews in Rhodes’, ‘tone-deaf ignoramuses out of touch with the Muse’ and ‘brood of cirrhotic adepts’ who criticise Callimachus, as he claims in his poem, ‘because I have not consummated a continuous epic / of thousands of lines on heroes and lords / but turn out minor texts as if I were a child / although my decades of years are substantial’ (Pulbrook 44; *FW* 155; Callimachus 65). Admonishing such critics not to ‘snoop around here for a poem that rumbles’, he consolidates the proficiency of his method by claiming to have been visited by Apollo who joined him as a fellow poet ‘who love[s] / the cricket’s high chirping, not the noise of the jackass’.

Although in his prologue he distinguishes his role as a poet from that of thundering Zeus – ‘for me delicate wings, dewslip in old age and bright air for food’ – he appears to confuse his role as a poet with that of the philosopher in his poem which both in term of form and content is philosophic. The poem ‘develops out of προβλήματα: prose questions and answers in various fields of knowledge’, and with a modern self-consciousness of literary form, ‘Central to Callimachus’ enlarged conception are knowledge and the relations
between the narrator and his characters’ (Hutchinson 48). The objects of the inquiry, however, ‘are not philosophical but scholarly and entertainingly abstruse’. In an inversion of the form of the Platonic dialogue, which is ‘mostly driven by the wish of the superior partner to work out ideas’, ‘the inferior's desire for knowledge’ is the driving force in Callimachus’s poem.

The introduction of the figure of the writer in the *Wake* is similarly philosophically framed- fittingly for a Joycean artist. Shem appears in chapter six of Book I as host and director of the ‘nightly quisquiquo of the twelve apostrophes’, but it is his ‘briefdragger’ that is given the role of Callimachus: ‘The echo is where in the back of the wodes; callhim forth!’ (126). While Joyce’s artist-hero Stephen is famous like Callimachus for ‘turn[ing] out minor texts’ [a villanelle] as a child, following the publication of *Ulysses* the Joycean artist shares more similarities with Callimachus’s arch-rival, the epic poet Apollonius of Rhodes who rivaled Homer’s *Odyssey* with his *Argonautica*. The relationship between the participants gradually surfaces in Shem’s general knowledge quiz like that of Callimachus, overshadowing and dramatising the quest for knowledge, and registering similarly ‘an opposition between searches and struggles by characters for knowledge of information, tactics, and so forth, which are of great practical importance to them, and the narrator's searches for obscure scholarly facts’ (Hutchinson 49). The questioning subjects and the objects of inquiry collapse into one another, and the quest for knowledge assumes metaphysical dimensions in the unreasonable task set ‘to idendifine the individuone’, as the light of ‘philosophy’ is eclipsed by the *Cloud of Unknowing* of negative theology- or rather Shem’s ‘cloud Incertitude’: ‘Who do you no tonight lazy a gentleman?’ (51, 118, 178, 126).

The quiz opens with the question of authorship enigmatically reproposed and reformulated by Shem through a prodigious list of contraries, reflective of the ‘drummatoyed’ ‘myther rector’s ‘illformation’: his literary ‘eatupus complex’ and theological ‘pentecostitis’ (133, 126, 128, 131). The allure of the mystery of the personality of the author- ‘the handwriting on his facewall, the cryptoconchoidsiphonostomata’, is reflected in the breadth of the ‘truly prural and plusible’ question that overshadows the ‘disghost[ing]’ answer (134, 138, 136). Formulated with great difficulty in the boundlessness of the ‘variously catalogued, regularly regrouped’ subject, the question allows Shem to display his artistry in his presentation of this literary riddle and metaphysical mystery of ‘apersonal problem, a locative enigma’ (129, 135). The quest to discover the true author is

76 Perhaps as a nod to Apollonius, the “Wandering Rocks”, Joyce’s supplementary chapter in *Ulysses*, is the route that Jason in the *Argonautica* chooses. Like the *Argonautica*, moreover, *Finnegans Wake* includes a love story in its journey and epic battles.
for Shem a creative opportunity in the combination of ‘truth and untruth’ that is necessary, as Shaun will admit in his own portrait of the artist (169).

Art’s relation to truth and knowledge, the dominant enigma and obstacle in Stephen’s quest to become an author, is revisited through yet another philosophical dialogue and discussion in which the artist exploits the Socratic elenctic method. In a dramatisation and parody of this method, however, the staged dialectic is Brunian rather than logical, both in its use of coincidences of contraries as a method for determining identities and discovering facts, and in the rambling wrangles that break out between the interlocutors, diverting the line of inquiry. Although the form of this chapter also shares many similarities with the catechism of “Ithaca”, the quest for knowledge through the ‘use of raisin’ is not only exploded through the excess of information contained in both the questions and the answers, but also through the rivalries of the participants and the grievances voiced by the audience that becomes frustrated with the reluctance of the ‘auctor’, more interested in the ‘rison’, ‘to explique to ones the significat of their exsystems with [his] nieu nivulon lead’ (130, 146, 147).

In the absence of an epiphany in the ‘Nichtian glossery’ of the *Wake*, Issy indicts the artist for perversion and ‘egoarchism’ in his frustration of desire and dialogue: ‘Tell me till my thrillme comes!’, she pleads (81, 147). His (re)creation of ‘poestries from Chickspeer’s’ ignores her sensual desires that the play of appearance in art both excites and veils in eternal ‘loveliness’: ‘Always, Amory, amor andmore!’ (145, 148). Like the distortion that takes place in a dream according to Freud - dreams he emphasises are ‘absolutely egoistical’ - whereby a ‘wish-fulfillment is disguised beyond recognition’ as ‘an act of censorship’, the literary distortions of ‘remnants of trivial experiences’ of the author appear as a way to disguise suppressed desires (*Interpretation* 161, 68). The ‘sudden spiritual manifestation’ of the epiphany is replaced with the more carnal and carnivalesque ‘queeleetlereec of joyis crisis’ (*FW* 395). In Freud’s account of *Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious*, the two moments are indeed related: ‘A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has occurred to us ‘involuntarily’. What happens is not that we know a moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it then needs is to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I can best compare with an ‘absence’, a sudden release of intellectual tension, and then all at once the joke is there – as a rule ready-clothed in words’ (207).

The ‘perversity and capriciousness of the interpretation of the external stimulus’ in Joyce’s ‘nightynovel’ that is related to the ‘quieting of the mind and senses’ in negative theology, appears as a nihilistic subversion of the very notion of art (*Interpretation of
Dreams 131; FW 54; Jaurretche 6). As a result of the ‘radical separation of interpretation from the phenomenology of reading’, Joyce for Bersani presents ‘a model of interpretive nihilism’ (174-5). In the absence of the fusion of sense and spirit that Hegelian phenomenology has marked as the particular distinction of art - transforming the work of art into ‘a question, an address to the responsive heart, an appeal to affections and to minds’ by presenting the sensory phenomenon as ‘the point at which the content and the mind of the spectator meet’ - the exhortation, presented in the form of riddles, is exposed as artificial and conceited, reflective of the ‘naïve self-centred being’ of the nature of the author who refuses communication (Hegel, *Aesthetics* 78, 167).

Shaun similarly revolts against Shem’s artificially constructed appeal to the ‘tragic emotion’ to gain sympathy for the ‘wee skillmustered shoul’ of the modern artist, ‘a poor acheseyeld from Ailing’ rather than an ‘Ubermeerschall’ (P 222; FW 149, 133). He finally has enough of Shem’s ‘countrary’ complex and evoking Stephen’s youthful arrogance, he rejects the ethical appeal of art: ‘So you think I have impulsivism?’ (149). Denying that he is ‘wrong parcequeue out of revolsician romanitis’ [Romanticism and Romanism], he turns like Stephen to “theory” and ‘sophology’, ‘from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist’ in order to solve the ‘tantumising state of affairs’ of art in the age of the ‘hairs theories of Winestain’ [the mixture of history and theory] (151, 149). Like Stephen who needed to be plugged into ‘the tube Understanding’ to hear and whose role as an author appeared to hinge on his successful exposition of a theory, this learned scientist needs first to be ‘reassured by ratio’ in order to ‘believe heartily in my own most spacious immensity as my ownhouse and microbemost cosm’ (U 516; FW 151).

Revisiting Stephen’s designation of *quidditas* as the end of aesthetic apprehension in his attempt to define the ‘Talis and Talis’ and resolve the controversy over the question of authorship by means of his ‘quantum theory’, he turns as Stephen had in his youth to the ‘determinised case of chronic spinosis’ presented by Enlightenment philosophy (149-50). Viewing his delivery of his theory - as Stephen had - as a way of asserting his mastery, he dismisses the influence and immortality of the archetypal bard: ‘His everpresent toes are always in retaliessian [the *Book of Taliessin*, McHugh notes, is a book on sixth century Welsh poetry] out throuth his overpast boots. Hear him squak!’, and he refuses to pay the debts of his ancestors: ‘I need not anthropologise for any obintentional’ (151). Like Nietzsche’s theoretical man, Socrates, the genre of art that he prescribes is the Aesopian

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77 Joyce is neither of the militant ‘patriot’ type, nor yet a historical romancer’ but simply ‘very ‘irish’”, Lewis had argued (76).
fable, and he instructs his ‘genial and comic’ student Bruno Nowlan to ‘take [his] tongue out of [his] inkpot’ (Lewis 74; FW 152).

In a parodic portrait of the artist as a young man but also a satire of Lewis’s criticism of “The Mind of James Joyce”, Joyce exploits Lewis’s identification of the author with his fictional alter-egos - his claim that Joyce is ‘a young man’ in some way embalmed’ - and rewrites both this portrait and the history of its reception (90). Through a recreation of an ‘orgy of ‘apeishness’’ - Lewis’s interpretation of *Ulysses*, and a parody of ‘the intensive dictatorship of Space-time - the god of Professor Alexander’ that ruled over Joyce’s art for Lewis, Joyce employs Lewis - a ‘spatialist’ in exposing the ‘florid personal aplomb’ under ‘a very complex, overcharged [philosophical] façade’ - to help him solve the mystery of authorship, but also to expose the interests that motivate the quest for the true author and the truth of art (74, 82, 150; FW 149; Lewis 75, 93). Referencing various Professors to help him substantiate his theory, like Lewis criticising the saturation of Joyce’s art with the “time philosophy” by an intricate juxtaposition of another “theory”, this ‘schoolmaster’ with ‘the technical itch of the ‘sedulous ape’, turns to his ‘easyfree translation of the old fabulist's parable’ as ‘a more expletive method’ of explaining his complex ideas to his ‘muddlecrass pupils’, hoping like Lewis had of Joyce that they might become ‘a very valuable adherent’ (74; FW 151; Lewis 87).

Like Vico’s digression to elucidate the myths of Proteus and Cadmus - poetic archetypes that reveal to the modern scholar the inability of primitive men to ‘conceive rational categories of things’ - the scholar’s fables of the Mookse and the Gripes and Burrus and Caseous are an exposition by means of his ‘naturalborn rations’ of the notion of subjectivity and the law of non-contradiction that ‘this [de]graded intellecktuals’, like Bruno, cannot understand (93; FW 159, 161). The primitive Gripes, a ‘brooder-on-low’ to the Mookse, exemplifies like Proteus ‘the extreme coarseness and ignorance of early people’ who ‘as children try to grasp their own reflection when they look in the mirror’, ‘thought they saw an ever-changing person in the water when they beheld how it altered their own features and movements’: he is unable to descry ‘whose o’cloak you ware’ following his meeting with the Mookse (153; Vico 310-11; FW 155). While the Mookse gazes narcissistically upon his own image even in ‘the most unconsciously boggylooking stream he ever locked his eyes with’, the Gripes is seen ‘having the juice of his times’ and ‘quickly for getting the dressers desdain on the flyleaf of his frons’ much to the ‘contemption’ of the Mookse and the modern narrator of the fable (153, 155).

The ‘lac of wisdom’ of the ‘older sisars’ who fail like Joyce to answer the ‘burning question’ ‘To be a ‘toff’, or not to be a ‘toff’, unable to understand the law of non-
contradiction - ‘that I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheeps in your pocket at the same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I've in mindunless Burrus and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves, selldear and soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy’ - are ‘irruminate[d]’ to the scholar’s modern ‘heeders’ by means of a mathematical exposition of his historical parable, like Vico’s elucidation of the myth of the “letter carrier” of antiquity who veiled the vulgar history of the invention of letters (162; Lewis 106; FW 161, 167, 160). Refuting ‘the learned ignorants of the Cusanus philosophism’ and ‘the heroicised furibouts of the Nolanus theory’, the orator proffers a Trinitarian liturgical ‘sermo’ - ‘Exaudi facts!’ - by introducing Nuvoletta and Margareena as a ‘a third man or horse’ to bridge the gap between the Platonic ‘ideal and the individuals’ (163, 152; Metaphysics XI.1). Although Nuvoletta fails and instead makes ‘up all her myriads of drifting minds in one’ in the fable, for the ‘wholesome criticism’ of the ‘seemsame home and histry’, ‘we feel we must waistfully woent a female to focus and on this stage there pleasantly appears the cowrymaid M. whom we shall often meet below who introduces herself upon us at some precise zero of the babbling pumpt of platinism’, the exegete adds in a what appears to be a criticism of both the Trinitarian pretensions of the author of Ulysses and the theological structures of interpretation (FW 151, 163, 161, 164).

In the ‘dreariodreama setting’ of ‘this nightly quisquiquock’, however, the expression of ‘the alternative ‘either – or’’ is more difficult than this theorist thinks: ‘there is not really an alternative in dream-thoughts’, Freud warns, ‘but an ‘and’ – a simple addition’: ‘The attitude of dreams to the category of antithesis and contradiction is very striking. This category is simply ignored; the word ‘No’ does not seem to exist for a dream’ (Interpretation 200, 202). The ‘tremendous work of condensation’ that devastates logical relations in the dream, moreover, has an impact on language as well as the sequence of events in the Wake. In the difficulty to ‘no’ anyone in the ‘heful panepiphanal world spectacurum’ of the Wake, Stephen’s disregard of language in his epiphany theory is vindicated, as it becomes clear that language is not the vehicle for an epiphany, but like the work of art for Gadamer, ‘an experience that changes the person who experiences it’ (FW 126, 611; 103). Failing to establish identity, the ‘changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns’ of the Wake intimate ‘the continually more and less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators’ (118).

In the retelling of Aesop’s tale, the historical, philosophical, political and theological ‘meinungs’ of the tale are borne not only through but also in language; the truth that the scholar wants to communicate through art is inseparable from the language that transports it (151). Delivered through the ideologies of Western culture, the fable of the Mookse and the
Gripes exposes through its ‘tootoological’ language their coincidences, despite the scholar’s quest to assert the distinction of his own theory (468). The coincidence of the one and the many is not only a theory that the deviant student Bruno Nowlan applies to language, but also reflects the phenomenon of language. The ‘phemous themis race’ [famous but also spoken - phemis (gr), supplanting Bruno’s protean goddess of choice Thetis with Justice] that this scholar attempts to run by means of his “edictum” of the mystery of the Trinity, beating ‘so lon’, Vico’s ‘sage of esoteric wisdom’ by means of his ‘unchanging Word’, was indeed completed by medieval theologians through their presentation of a parallel in the relation ‘between human speech and thought’ and ‘the divine relationship of the Trinity’ (167; Vico 165; 167; Gadamer 419). Like Shaun’s arrangement of ‘the rite words by the rote order’, they were linked through their comparably processual character (167).

In an ironic refutation of Lewis’s claim that Joyce is not ‘a tragic writer’, the quiz ends with a sacrifice: ‘Sacer esto? Answer: Semus sumus!’ (168). But Shem’s assertion of his identity through language [We are Shem as well as the same] simultaneously refuses this sacrifice and dissolves the opposition between comedy and tragedy, as eschatology is substituted by ‘escapology’- and in the next chapter scatology (74; FW 168, 427). While for the scholar ‘The speechform is a mere sorrogate’, it is through linguistic ingenuity that the artist manifests both his “genius” and his craftsmanship when he takes off his ‘white toff’s hoyt’ (149, 536). Refusing to allow philosophy- ‘the historical self-penetration of spirit’ for Hegel, to ‘carr[y] out the hermeneutical task’, the artist turns to language which allows the mediation of speech and thought, sense and spirit ‘nichthemerically’- daily in the nightmare of history (Gadamer 161; FW 185). While Shaun turns to his sacred ‘unchanging Word’ to ‘expound, to vend and to velnerate’, his logical arrangement of ‘the rite words by the rote order’ exposes his disregard of temporality and occasionality, having refuted the ‘dime and cash diamond fallacy’ (167, 150).
While the attempt to “rescue” Joyce the genius has been associated with the humanistic inclinations of his critics, it can also be viewed as a response to the growing professionalisation of his image. Rather than a reactionary protest against the ‘perpetual flight of the [philosophical] subject’ in modernity, Arnold Bennett’s complaint that apart from ‘at most a dozen other bizarre human beings’ ‘Work in Progress will not be read, because it cannot be read by any individual normally constituted’, is an admonition concerning the scholarly allure of Joyce’s work: ‘I regard it as a bad sign that an unfinished work should be the subject of an exegetical volume (200 pages) by 12 ardent disciples’ (Post-structuralist Joyce 10; CH 409). Beckett’s challenging remark in this collection of essays that ‘Mr. Joyce has desophisticated language’ is indeed itself a “sophisticated” argument (10). But ironically, the decision that Joyce made to publish this ‘exegetical volume’ that bolstered the charge of elitism could be seen as an attempt to dissociate his own role as an artist from that of the critic and/or scholar.

While the subject of Beckett’s essay is the significance of the authors who are so prominent in Joyce’s latest work- authors famous for their “theories”, the objective of his argument is to convince the reader that Joyce’s ‘position is in no way a philosophical one’, and to preserve the delicate balance required to distance Joyce from their ideas and ideologies while also presenting him as a legitimate member of this Fellowship of Artists (7). Beckett’s own discomfort at having to assume the role of the critic is evident throughout the essay. Alerting the reader to the predilection of literary criticism for the ‘carefully folded ham-sandwich’ of Philosophy and Philology, he begins with a confession that he too is equipped with a ‘handful of abstractions’ and is therefore also prey to the hubristic temptation of ‘self-extension in the world of Mr. Joyce’s ‘Work in Progress’’ (6). His description of Vico’s philosophy with clear but implicit links to Joyce’s work in his emphasis on the significance of Vico’s ‘science’ founded on ‘Necessity’ which was ‘an outrage against tradition’, and on Vico’s ‘empirical investigation’ and role as an ‘innovator’, is paused to highlight that his philosophical system ‘is clearly adapted by Mr. Joyce as a
structural convenience – or inconvenience’, as for Joyce structure is replaced with ‘endless substantial variations’ (6-7).

Turning to Vico’s views on poetry and the poet, he is less cautious in his remarks, as he reveals and extols - without directly associating this claim with Vico - that ‘Poetry is essentially the antithesis of Metaphysics’, rather than a Romantic ham-sandwich of the two (8). Having deposed philosophy with the aid of Vico, he is then able to examine the poetic consequence of Vico’s philology: his “findings” on language from his scholarly quest. Poetry, language, and myth all attest to the ‘spontaneity’ of the human mind for Vico, Beckett argues, echoing with remarkable similarity Cassirer’s argument in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms published in 1925: ‘Language, myth, art – each produces from itself its own world of forms which can be understood only as expressions of the spontaneity of the spirit. But because this spontaneous activity is not carried out in the form of free reflection, it is hidden from itself. In creating its mythical, artistic forms the spirit does not recognize itself in them as a creative principle’ (9; 217). ‘Here it is not so much the case that the I is reflected in things, the microcosm in the macrocosm’, Cassirer explains, ‘as that the I creates for itself a kind of opposite in its own products which seem to it wholly objective. And it can contemplate itself only in this kind of projection’.

Having distinguished the Brunian dialectic of Work in Progress from rationalist ‘stiff interexclusiveness’, Beckett identifies the ‘threefold intellectual operation’ involved in allegorical interpretation with the “decadence” of the ‘Ladies and Gentlemen’ who can attain only ‘dribbling comprehension’ from their ‘copious intellectual salivation’ (9). Dissociating mythos from logos by highlighting repeatedly the ‘early inability to abstract the general from the particular’ and ‘to conceive the abstract idea of ‘poet’ or ‘hero’, Joyce’s role as an artist is differentiated from that of the ‘dozen incredulous Joshuas prowling around the Queen’s Hall, springing their tuning-forks lightly against finger-nails that have not yet been refined out of existence’ (9-10). The paradox that Vico presents through the prototype of Homer-that although he was not a philosopher ‘he was the source of all Greek philosophies’, manifests itself for Beckett in the figure of Joyce (386). Through his emphasis on Joyce’s mythical rather than metaphysical language and thought, Joyce the Poet is shielded from ‘the usual volley of cerebral sniggers’ (10).

The ‘new world of the logos’, Cassirer argues, ‘arose through “critique”, a κρίσις within the concept of being itself’ (2). This “separation” or “crime” transpired by means of the ‘fork, of à grave Brofèsor; âh é’s Brèak – fast – table; ; acûtely profššionally piquêd, to = introdûce a notion of time [ûpon ë plane (?) sû ’ ’ fîç’e’] by pûnc! ingh oles (sic) in iSpace?!’ (FW 124). As it was through the ‘idea of the atom’ - in contrast to the
‘indifference’ in mythical thought ‘between the whole and its parts’ - that the concept of causality developed, the unity of authorship in modernity is a consequence of ‘copious intellectual salivation’ (Cassirer 50; Beckett 10). Both the search for and the death of the author is immaterial for poetry as ‘the first operation of the human mind’, as not only is the whole indistinguishable from its parts, but there is also ‘no clearer distinction between life and death than between sleeping and waking. The two are related not as being and nonbeing, but as two similar, homogeneous parts of the same being’ (Cassirer 36). ‘If all reality is taken only as it is given in immediate impression, if it is regarded as sufficiently certified by the power it exerts on the perceptive, affective, and active life, then a dead man indeed still “is”, even though his outward form may have changed, even though his sensory-material existence may have been replaced by a disembodied shadow existence’.

Like Joyce’s ‘Nichtian glossery’, ‘mythical consciousness’, in Cassirer’s analysis, ‘resembles a code which is intelligible only to those who possess the key to it – i.e. for whom the particular contents of this consciousness are merely conventional signs for something “other”, which is not contained in them’ (81, 38). But ‘Where we see mere “representation”, myth, insofar as it has not yet deviated from its fundamental and original form, sees real identity. The “image” does not represent the “thing”; it is the thing; it does not merely stand for the object, but has the same actuality, so that it replaces the thing’s immediate presence’. For mythical thinking ‘Word and name do not designate and signify, they are and act’. Joyce’s ‘drunk’ words are similarly ‘alive’ in Beckett’s exposition: ‘They elbow their way on to the page, and glow and blaze and fade and disappear’ (11). Such ‘linguistic ambivalence’- or ‘restlessness’ in Beckett’s description, is in Cassirer’s analysis ‘The source and origin of all mythology’: ‘myth itself is a kind of disease of the mind, having its ultimate root in a “disease of language”’ (22).

Resembling Vico’s invective against the ‘savage feelings and customs’ that distinguished “Homer” - a trinitarian ‘highly nutritius family histrionic’ in his embodiment of ‘the mental weakness of children, the vigorous imagination of women, and the seething passions of violent youths’ - Shaun’s ‘violence, virulence and vituperation’ by means of which he seeks to ‘attaax and abridge, to derail and depontify, to enrate and inroad, to ongoad and unhume’ his brother who ‘prediseased’ him ‘with the whooping laugh at the age of the loss of reason’, is to a large extent an effort to deny his philosophical credentials; to expose the apparent ‘sublime and esoteric wisdom’ of the ‘poetesser’- a poetaster who poses as a philosopher (356; FW 230; Vico 358; 97, 423, 232). The disease of the language of the *Wake* is similarly linked to the ‘middayevil’ mind of its savage author, a ‘somatophage merman’ and beastly ‘hybrid’ in his primitive inability to understand the law of non-contradiction and
draw the ‘dividing line between mere “representation” and “real” perception, between wish and fulfillment, between image and thing’ (423, 171, 169; Cassirer 36).

How can we qualify this general esthetic vigilance without which we cannot hope to snare the sense which is for ever rising to the surface of the form and becoming the form itself?’, Beckett asks, and refers the reader to Stephen’s exposition of the esthetic apprehension (10). The Wake proffers the figure of Shem; ‘lodging on as many boards round the panesthetic at the same time as possible’, he suffers from the phenomenological predicament of primitive man according to his brother (173). His struggle like Stephen with aesthetics has repercussions for his role as an artist. Shem’s inability to comprehend the significance of time - to discern like Gripes ‘whose o’cloak you ware’ - denies him the title of the genius as he is shown to be ‘in his bardic memory low’ (155, 172). Growing ‘megalomane of a loose past’ he is shown instead ‘unconsciously explaining, for inkstands, the various meanings of all the different foreign part of speech he misused, and cuttlefishing every lie unshrinkable about all the other people in the story’, but ‘leaving out’ ‘foreconsciously, the simple worf and plague and poison they had cornered him about’ (179, 173). Without understanding the law of causality he cannot narrate a story that captures the attention of his audience: ‘various subconscious smickers’ ‘drivel slowly across their fichers’ (173). His penchant for ‘treasuring with condign satisfaction each and every crumb of trektalk’ that he uses to fill rather create ‘his inkbattle house’, exposes him as both a forger and a hoarder (193, 176).

His ‘shortartempa’ and ‘lapsis linquo’ that threatened to ‘wipe alley english spooker, multaphoniaksically [metaphorically, multi-phonetically and in many ways phonily] spuking, off the face of the erse’, however, are also linked to a theological and dramatical as well as a philosophical ‘fortunous casualitas’ (178, 175). As with the philosophical ‘exclusion of all temporal determinations’ ‘the mythical concept of fate for the first time passe[d] into the logical concept of necessity’, the ‘tragic jester’ who ‘prayed to the cloud Incertitude’ “slips” both as a dramatist and in the eyes of Divine (and earthly) Law by disregarding Necessity (Cassirer 131; 171, 178). Rather than a creator of art, this ‘unremuneranded national apostate’ who is ‘categorically unimperatived by the maxims’, is shown to be a ‘semidemented zany’ with noxious compulsions and psychotic fixations: ‘By that rosy lampoon's effluvious burning and with help of the simulchronic flush in his pann (a ghinee a ghirk he ghets there!) he scrabbled and scratched and scribbled and skrevened nameless shamelessness about everybody ever he met’ (171, 176, 179, 182). Not only does he make himself the hero of his drama - he narcissistically ‘used to stipple endlessly inartistic portraits of himself in the act of reciting old Nichiabelli’s monolook interyerear
Hanno, o Nonanno, acce’l brubblemm’as, ser Autore, q.e.d.’ - but also refuses to end his tragedy with a sacrifice: ‘With the foreign devil's leave the fraid born fraud diddled even death’ (182, 172).

Exasperated with the elusiveness of the author who poses like Odysseus as ‘Niscemus Nemon’ and refuses to ‘psing his psalmen with the cong in our gregational’, Shaun turns the author himself into a ‘shuddersome spectacle’ for ‘gropesarching eyes’ (175, 167, 179, 167). Exposing the commercial ‘mystery of himsel’ of the ‘whirling dervish’ written ‘in furniture’ in the face of ‘coprivight’ as a satanic concoction, Shaun, like Allen Upward, shows the ‘Pagan wizard’ - the forefather of the Genius and ‘ghem of all jokes’ - to be ‘wiser [more perverse in Shem’s case] than the Christian one, because he knows that there are limitations to his psychical powers, and ekes it out by the use of drugs’ (184, 185; Upward 32; FW 193). ‘[B]rooled and cocked and potched in an athanor’, the myth of the ‘Primum opifex, altus prosator’, is shown to be artificially concocted (184, 185). Bottled up in his ‘Haunted Inkbottle’, ‘with his penname SHUT sepia-scraped on the doorplate and a blind of black sailcloth over its wan phwinshogue’, ‘noondayterrorised to skin and by an ineluctable phantom’, ‘Tumult, son of Thunder’, is exposed as a ‘phonemanon’ by his modern interpreter: simply language as a vowel- phonē (gr) and a phoney rather than a phenomenon, but also voice- phone (gr) and utterance- phonema (gr) and indeed god through his appropriation of the vowels (182, 184, 258).

The ‘vanessance of his lownest’ of this ‘mental and moral defective’ dramatises his “forged” esthetic (177). In the face of the complexity of esthetic apprehension, the ‘apophotorejected’ artist turns to occultism (251). In an amalgamation of the katharsis of classical drama and the kenosis that the liturgical drama reenacts, Shem ‘winged away on a wildgoup’s chase across the kathartic ocean and made synthetic ink and sensitive paper for his own end out of his wit’s waste’ (185). Shem’s Incarnation through his Christological “abasement” of ‘His costive Satan’s antimonian manganese limolitrious nature’, ‘cloaked up in the language of blushfed porporates’ by Shaun who exposes his Mangan-like ‘exotic’ vices, is sacramental in the double sense of ‘the holy and the accursed or forbidden’- ‘something consecrated and set apart’ (184, 185; OCPW 54; Cassirer 79). A fulfilment of Stephen’s dream of becoming a celebrant ‘in a church without worshippers’ - ‘a clerical party all to yourself’, as Shaun scoffs - Shem’s “epiphany” to the world through ‘corrosive sublimation’ is a dramatisation of Stephen’s reluctance ‘to go forth to encounter reality’ (P 172; FW 190, 184). The liturgical substantiation of the efficacy of his art through transaccidentation is a remedy for the aestheticism of this ‘alshemist’ whose experiment renders him ‘doriangrayer’ (185, 186).
This ‘reverse kenosis’ which allows Shem to become simultaneously ‘author, enactor, interpreter and script’, is also a transfiguration of the ‘unveiling practice of interpretation’ of Aquinas ‘that frees the Word from the thickly epic, or mythopoietic, façade of wars, covenants, genealogies, love affairs, infatuations, and subterfuges (in one word, form common and ordinary experience)’ (Balsamo, *Tradition of Christian Epics* 117; *Joyce’s messianism* 116, 120). The transcendence characteristic of religion - ‘What appears to the common, profane world view as the immediately given reality of “things” is transformed by the religious view into a world of “signs”’ - is denied through Shem’s mythical, mystical and sacramental subsumption of the “otherness” of empirical/sensuous existence: the ‘dividual chaos, perilous, potent, common to all flesh, human only, mortal’ (Cassirer 255-6; *FW* 186). In a reversal of ‘the development of language’, ‘determined by its tendency to cling to the sensuous and yet strive beyond it, to surpass the narrow limits of the mere mimetic sign’, Shem’s word becomes narcissistically, pure mimesis (Cassirer 256).

Shem’s ‘squirtscreen[ing]’ of his ‘squidself’ links his phenomenological predicament with his ‘mysterious’ relation to language (186). As son of Thunder he is like Upward’s Divine Man ‘the incarnate Word of the Thunder-God’, using his ‘unheavenly body’ to signify (6; *FW* 185). As an ‘antinomian’ who couldn’t ‘be true to type’ - both language and typology, he is presented as an actor rather than an author in his primal but also narcissistic [and drunken] inability to draw the line between the real and the ideal which allows him to claim ‘that he was avoopf (parn me!) aware of no other shaggspick, other Shakhisbeard, either unlike his polar andthisishis or precisely the seem’ (172, 177). Rather than an instrument of communication, the creation of language in Shem’s Eucharistic transformation into the word as ‘one continuous present tense integument’, is presented as a theatrical production (185, 186). The ‘corrosive sublimation’ by means of which he refuses sacrifice - a magical trick performed ‘by the dodginess of his lantern’ rather than ‘by the light of philosophy’ - moreover, transforms the drama of Christianity into a comic performance (186, 184, 118). Following the ‘destruction of representation’ - or the fact that the artist has been denied the light of wisdom - the reader’s relation to language is indeed “revolutionised”, as s/he becomes a participant in a ‘wickedday perfumance’ (MacCabe, *Revolution of the Word* 4; *FW* 251, 219).
Joyce’s mythologisation of the mystery of artistic creation exposes the idealism of modernism’s search for origins. Although Shem as ‘Primum opifex’ secures mythologically the efficacy of his word, when the ‘Big Storey’ is told ‘authorways’ in The Mime, the philosophic foundation of the drama of the ‘phonemonon’ is highlighted (185, 219). In this ritual ‘wickedday perfumance’ ‘in the semblance of the substance, for the membrane of the umbrance with the remnance of the emblence reveiling a quemdam supercargo’, Glugg, ‘that lost-to-lurning’ is ‘at his thinker's aunts’ to guess ‘the calour of [Isod’s] brideness’ (219, 220, 222, 224, 223). The drama becomes a play of appearance focused around ‘that which is one going to prehend’ (223). Emerging as a “dreadful bard”- a ‘trapadour’, Glugg is shown ‘sinking how he must fand for himself by gazework what their colour s wear as they are all showen drawens up’ (224). This ardent theorist has to acquire knowledge ‘by gazework’ of the colour of girls’ pants, and he decides to ‘reloose that thong of his art’ (223, 224).

The Romantic idealisation of drama as a philosophical genre that identified the end of art with the philosophic quest for truth in a ‘tragedy of appearance’ requiring the sacrifice of the individual for the manifestation of the Absolute, is parodied and subverted in Joyce’s ‘perfumance’ in ‘Feenichts Playhouse’- a ‘billed’ production in which nihilism and the cyclical resurrection of the Phoenix coincide (Dastur in Sparks 83; 219). The figure of the artist is once again presented as a distraction from the quest for truth. Emerging with the prophecy of ‘overlu sting fear’, the ‘oathword science’ of Glugg’s ‘visible disgrace’ takes centre stage (224, 226). ‘With nought a wired from the wordless either’- lacking inspiration, Glugg is seeped in ‘that limbopool which was his subnesciousness’ [subconsciousness and below not knowing (nescientia)] (223-4). His oathfull language, ‘A darktongues, kunning’, highlights the consequence of language for the revelation he seeks from the ‘pierceful’ ‘sojestiveness’ of the girls: ‘The howtosayto itiswhatis hemustwhomust worden’ s chall’; the world of becoming [worden (Dutch)] has to be revealed through words [woorden (Dutch)] (223). ‘If he’d lonely talk instead of only gawk’, Isod offers her advice to ‘gooseys gazious’ (225, 227).

In parallel to this quest to ‘prehend’, however, runs the personal drama of Glugg to expose ‘the whole plight troth’ about the ‘satiety of arthurs’ to ‘the old sniggering publickling press and its nation of sheepcopers’ (223, 229). The conflict between necessity and freedom in this tragedy, however, is unending. The ‘split’ of this hubristic artist is followed by repentance rather than sacrifice: Glugg resolves to ‘make one of hissens’; the play ends with the ‘prophitable’ prophecies ‘And he war’, ‘And he deed’ (228, 240, 258). The truth he
wants to expose, moreover, is personal, fictitious and a forgery, as the reference to Samuel Roth suggests: ‘Just a Fication of Villumses’ (241). Rather than revealing the truth, destroying the ephemeral sign for the manifestation the Absolute, this ‘feastking of shellies’ who poses as a tragic protagonist wants to replace it with his own: to ‘fire off, gheol ghiornal [the Jail Journal of the Irish nationalist John Mitchell and a newspaper- giornale (it), as McHugh notes], foul subustedion mullmud [the Talmud through Wilde’s pseudonym Sebastian Melmoth], his farced epistol to the hibruws’ (231, 228). ‘It is so easy for people to have sympathy with suffering. It is so difficult for them to have sympathy with thought’, Wilde had warned the ardent seeker of ‘the intellectual ideal’ (Intentions 181).

As the drama deteriorates into a sentimental romance inspired by Edouard Schuré’s Woman: the Inspirer, the abatement of the ‘angskt’ of this ‘wagoner’ ‘reading off his fleshskin and writing with his quillbone’ to ‘bare to untired world of Leimuncononnuistria’ the ‘great big oh in the megafundum’ of his father and the ‘microchasm as gap as down low’ of his mother, while finding ‘the best and schortest way of blacking out a caughtalock [a catholic catalogue] of all the sorors of Sexton’ through the ‘errorooth of his wisdom’ in a ‘mouthfull of ecstasy’, reveals ‘another cant to the questy’, as the ‘mything smile’ of the narrator and ‘Old grand tuttut toucher up of young poetographies’ before the ‘handmades for the lured’ betrays (224, 229, 230, 109, 238-9, 242). The truth of the ‘ekonome world’ of the human artist, a ‘poetesser’ with ‘his pitcher on a wall’ and ‘his photure in the papers’ [photo and future], cannot be separated from his public image, but also from his carnal desires and passions (230, 232-3). As the children learn in their nightlessons, ‘her minnelisp extorreor’ and ‘his moanolothe inturnedmonoloathe inturned’ are reconciled when ‘your panto’s off’ (254, 257). The search there among the ‘fingures’ [fingers and figures] to ‘rite and reckan’ [also right and recant] for the ‘whome of your eternal geomater’ and ‘paradismic perimutter’ [paradigmatic and paradisiac voice], reveals language as ‘the site where the intellectual and erotic converge’ (282-3, 296-8; Devlin 41).

Set in the ‘pressant’, the Mime is an unrepeatable but also an unpresentable performance that indeed soon turns into childrens’ games (221). There are no spectators in this ‘daily dubbing of ghosters’ and insofar as the players are merely acting out parts, they are interchangeable (219). As the children’s’ play becomes more self-involved, moreover, its meaning becomes more private and it appears to be emptied of any discernible significance. The emphasis falls on performance that seeks hermeneutic simultaneity through the idiolect that the performance engenders. In the self-involved world of play of the children that opens with ‘a community prayer, everyone for himself’ and ‘a chorale in canon, good for us all for us all us all all’, the ‘instinct of play’ of the ideally aesthetically educated man that strives
according to Schiller ‘to suppress time in time to conciliate the state of transition or becoming with the absolute being, change with identity’, is dramatised, thematised and parodied (222; C. Eliot 248).

Attempting to dissociate the concept of play from its Romantic connotations of subjective enjoyment, Gadamer, noting that ‘The being of all play is always self-realization, sheer fulfilment, energeia which has its telos within itself’, highlights the consequence of the ‘presentation’ (Darstellung) of the work of art (112, 103). ‘The performance of a play, like that of a ritual’, he argues, ‘cannot simply be detached from the play itself, as if it were something that is not part of its essential being, but is as subjective and fluid as the aesthetic experiences in which it is experienced. Rather, it is in the performance and only in it – as we see most clearly in the case of music – that we encounter the work itself, as the divine is encountered in the religious rite’ (115). As the games turn into a liturgical celebration, this emphasis on the contemporaneity and fusion of change and identity, becoming and being that the work of art elicits is further highlighted, but also subverted through the historicity of language. ‘The timid hearts of words all exeomnosunt’ [exeunt - exiting, a stage direction in Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, McHugh notes] betray their ‘histrionic’ origins, denying simultaneously the ‘thaurity’ [the aura of authority] of historical and theological facts and truth (258, 230, 359).

Giving the example of the festival whose nature ‘is to be celebrated regularly’ and therefore ‘its own original essence is always to be something different (even when celebrated in exactly the same way)’, Gadamer argues that ‘An entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It has its being only in becoming and return’ (121). Gadamer, moreover, notes that it was to ‘the mode of being of the day and of Olympic games, and hence of the festival’ that Aristotle turned to in order to explain - and refute - the idea of infinity. Aristotle, who argued that infinity is ‘better defined as a part than as the whole’, ‘the accompaniment of the process of dichotomy, always in the making and never made’ and ‘the open ‘possibility for more’’ - ‘not that ‘beyond which there is nothing’, but that of which there is always more beyond’ - indeed seems to have influenced the ‘dimeshow’ of the Wake (Phys 255, 257, 227, 247; FW 163). The space-timeist of the Wake, sees time like Aristotle as ‘entirely made up of the no-longer and the not yet’ (373). The eternal recurrence of the same is punctuated with the momentousness of an infinite present that refuses ‘to retire to the saum’- to the same and to the margin [Saum (ger)], exposing the ‘hairyoddities’ of history [its authors (Herodotus) and its oddities] (FW 249, 275).
‘A festival’, in Gadamer’s definition, ‘exists only in being celebrated’; ‘To be present’ in such an ever-changing performance ‘means to participate’, and therefore ‘watching something is a genuine mode of participating’ (121). While the ‘highly nutritious family histrionic’ of the Wake is distinguished by its implication with ‘a manyfeast munificent more mob than man’, and both feasting and manifesting exhort not only participation but also incrimination - ‘the watchful treachers at his wake’ are soon embroiled in the crime - the ‘comedy nominator’ [the common denominator and comedy instigator] in the ‘pamtomomiom’, as the ‘fingures’ of the Nightlessons highlight, are the ‘charictures in the drame’: language (230, 261, 75, 283, 285, 302). Unlike the mathematical ‘fickers which are returnally reprodicte of themselves’, the ‘mythelated’ [full of myth and drink] language of the Wake ‘far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible’: the ‘Sein annews’ - both the sign and Being (298, 266; Levinas 73; FW 277).

IV. Theologian

i. The phost of a nation [FW 409.6]

While the serial progression of Vico’s three ages is lost in the dissipation of the ‘reel of funnish ficts’ [facts and deceptions - ficta (l)] of ‘our horyhistoricold’ within language in the ‘sequentiality of improbable possibles’ that is staged, the evolution towards ‘modeln times’ is registered through the increasing prominence of questions of subjectivity, identity, individuality, personality and originality (288, 382, 110, 289). The pranquean’s riddle, ‘the farst wriggle from the ubivence’, becomes increasingly Oedipal and is presented to those who have ‘raced Messafissi’ [metaphysics, Mass and Mississippi] following the coincidence of Butt and Taff as ‘whereom is man, that old offender, nother man, wheile he is asame’ (356). This inflation of the ego is largely associated with the character of Shaun who steals the limelight from his brother in the third book. Usurping the models of authorship of Joyce’s artist-heroes, he presents himself as a sublimation of the artist through his hermeneutic skills: he appears (predominantly) as a philosopher and scholar in III.1, as a theologian, celebrant, apostle and even Christ in III.2 and as a bardic genius in his manifestation as Yawn in III.3.

His role as ‘the phost of a nation’ [both ghost and light - phos (gr)] is distinguished by its theatricality (409). He emerges through the fog following an elaborate description of the setting through references to A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Macbeth by the four who squabble for the role of prime theorist and witness of this scene. It is finally ‘the poor ass’
who wakes up like Dante in ‘somepart in nonland’ to witness the beatific vision: ‘in very similitude’ the ‘belted lamp’ of ‘Whom we dreamt was a shaddo’ appears in ‘unliteness’ [alētheia - “unconcealment” in Heidegger’s translation] amid objects ‘nonviewable to human watchers’ that seem to be ‘garments of laundry’ (403-4). The dream of modernity, he is a ‘picture primitive’, and his phenomenal revelation is preceded by sounds of Dionysian revelry: ‘dancetongues of the woodfires and the hummers’; although modern engines and machines can be heard too, and he is also described as a stage Irishman (404-5). Appearing ‘in proper person’, however, this ‘Spickspookspokesman of our specturesque silentiousness’ bridges the mythical world with the Christian (405). In contrast to the darkness that haunts the ‘squidself’ of Shem who is ‘kuskykorked’ in his ‘inkbattle house’, Shaun arrives like the Word as ‘light’; he is the light that shines in darkness, and is ‘lighteyes’ [also lifesize] (186, 176, 404). His witness even “sees” through ‘deafths of darkness greengrown deeper’ his ‘voce’, ‘vote of the Irish’, in one of the many confusions of ear and eye; Shaun is a national Saviour as well as the Messiah (407).

Assuming the role of a celebrant, he is seen enjoying a huge meal ‘in anticipation of the faste [fast and feast] of tablenapkins’ (406). His ‘handpalm’ that ‘gested’ announces a liturgical celebration that like Shem’s oxymoronic Eucharist is intensely egocentric. Absorbing ‘all marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history’ onto his own body, Shem’s Eucharist is Nietzschean rather than Christian; whereas ‘The uniqueness of the redemptive event’ of the incarnation ‘introduces the essence of history into Western thought’, freeing the logos from its spirituality, as Gadamer remarks, Shem’s attempt to signify through his body with ‘a word that would not pass away’ is closer to Nietzsche’s proclamation ‘At bottom I am all the names of history’ (FW 185; Gadamer 418; FW 186; qdt. in Haar 34). By waning ‘chargreenoldand doriangrayer’ Shem enacts the ramifications of this declaration: the realisation, as Michel Haar argues in relation to Nietzsche’s scattered identity following his identification with history, ‘that language cannot shatter the principle of identity without shattering itself, and yet cannot submit to this principle without renouncing the effort to bring the depths of Being to words’ (186; 34). While for deconstruction Joyce’s writing displays the ‘dispersion of the subject’ ‘in a plurality of possible positions and functions’, the ‘splintering of identity in the play of same and other, repetition and difference’, the prominence of the Eucharist in Joyce’s work dramatises the consequence of this modern dualism - either the subject or language - that is proffered as a (dis)solution of metaphysical antitheses (Heath in Post-structuralist Joyce 60, 39).

Although the Joycean subject is certainly dispersed in language, Joyce also enacts its perpetual resurrection. The contradiction of ethics and aesthetics is not only dissolved in
language, but also further dramatised in the catastrophic ramifications that this dissolution has on language. The character of Shaun exposes the perversion of this eschewal of metaphysics by means of a different kind of sacrifice that is modelled on the Eucharist. The ‘all too unwordy’ Shaun is not oppressed by this modern dilemma that ‘the real metaphysical problem’ of modernity- ‘the word’, as Jolas argued, presented (in Beckett et al. 40). His ‘lithurgy’, ‘a general address rehearsal’ that sees him ‘addressing himself ex alto and complaining with vocal discontent’ before ‘a houseful of deadheads’ - like Stephen in the Portrait ‘acting before the innumerable faces of the void’ - is a monologue on the subject that interests both himself and his audience- his self: ‘the autobiography of [his] softbodied fumiform’ (432, 407; P 90; 413). He defines himself through his work and actions and through contrasts with his brother; his ‘other’ who he views narcissistically as his ‘owelglass’ (408). ‘[A]ll too unwordy’ and ‘a mere mailman of peace’, he elicits the pity of his audience (408). His lot is tragically ‘hairydittary’, and he is undeservedly punished: ‘it should of been my other with his leickname’ [nick name and corpse - Leichnam (ger)], he argues (410, 408).

A ‘bearer extraordinary of these postoomany missive on his majesty's service’, he is a custodian of culture and is indeed Eucharistically sacrificed in order to secure its safe delivery: ‘Poumeerme! My heaviest crux and dairy lot it is, with a bed as hard as the thinkamuddles of the Greeks and a board as bare as a Roman altar’ (409). Improved and updated on ‘the Thinker’s Dam’ by ‘a pair of men out of glasshouse’ with new progressive ideologies, ‘making me beliek no five hour factory life with insufficient emollient and industrial disabled for them that day o'gratises’, he distinguishes himself also as a modern theorist (409). He declares his wish to quit his job and ‘to isolate i from my multiple Mes’, like Wilde conflating socialism and individualism (410). His intellectual and moral excellences are also intertwined, and like Wilde again he struggles to prove that ‘Your diogneses is anonest man’s’ - in a denial as well as a defence as a non est man - that he is both a philosopher and a theologian, and he refers to the prophecies of his ‘scripchewer’, delivering another parabolic fable - ‘one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Esaup’ - to substantiate his claims (411, 412, 414). His role as an orator resembles - as it did in the tale of the Mookse and the Gripes - that of Father Arnall during his delivery of the retreat sermon, although the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper is like Shaun himself modernised to appeal to his audience.

While the tale of the Mookse and the Gripes relied on theological references to convey its “moral”, this tale is engendered through modern philosophy and philosophers. A master of ‘entymology’, Shaun ‘spinooze[s]’ his tale by displaying his proficiency as a
scientist and philosopher though the accretion of entomological words and names of German philosophers (417, 414). The names of these authors, however, do not only betray ‘the Ondt’s bourgeois philosophy of life’, as Tindall notes, but they are also used to contrast the Ondt’s abstract ideas and despotic ideologies with the ‘artsaccord’ and ‘bilking’ of the Gracehoper (229-30; FW 415, 416). While the Gracehoper is ‘a schelling in kopfers’, the Ondt is ‘a weltall fellow, raumybult [roomy, Raum (G) - space and Roman] and abelboobied’ and has his hegemony also theologically sanctioned (416). Whereas the Gracehoper and his ‘jigging’ are described through a host of philosophers, the Ondt rises ‘aristotaller’ as he is identified primarily with Egyptian gods, and broader as he feasts on ‘his comfortumble phulluppsy of a plate o'monkeyous’; he is associated with the two pivotal philosophers of antiquity whose philosophy provided the foundations of Christian theology (414, 417).

Shaun’s vilification of his brother that follows the ‘esiop’s foible’, indeed turns into an invective that relies on individual authors to expose and indict Shem (422). While the Gracehoper is portrayed as scattering and dissimulating himself among a swarm of role-personas and persons, ‘ameising himself hugely’, like the Ondt, Shaun, condemning Shem’s ‘stolentelling’ and ‘lowbrown schisthematic robblemint’ [Joyce’s “The Day of Rabblement” is declared a forgery and schismatic- but also systematic], claims to have both ‘Outragedy of poetscalds’ and ‘Acomedy of letters’ in his ‘mine’s I’ and declares his intention to compose ‘the authordux Book of Lief’ (417, 424, 425). Exposing the ‘idioglossary’ of ‘jameymock farceson’- Shem’s artificial language by means of which he had ‘squirtscreened’ his ‘squidsself’ and refused the sacrifice of the individual, Shaun presents himself as the true (intellectual) Incarnation of the Word through his identification with language (423, 186). This ostensible dissolution of the self in language, however, is not only rather a dissolution of language in a ‘wideheight’ [wijsheid is wisdom in Danish, McHugh notes] self, but also renders creativity inconsequent; although I could easily compose ‘a work of merit’, Shaun argues, ‘I would never for anything take so much trouble of such doing. And why so? Because I am altogether a chap too fly and hairyman for to infradig the like of that ultravirulence’, like Gilbert in “The Critic as Artist” claiming that ‘creation is doomed’ as ‘It springs from too primitive, too natural an impulse’ (418, 425; Intentions 208).
After Shaun ‘spoorlessly disappaled and vanesshed, like a popo down a papa, from circular circulation’, however, his role as a modern theorist gives way in the next chapter to that of a theologian (427). While Joyce disclosed his liturgical composition of Shaun’s ‘via crucis of 14 stations’ - ‘in reality it is only a barrel rolling down the river Liffey’, he added - it is in his manifestation as Jaun that Shaun is presented as a ‘lover of liturgy’ (Letters I 214; FW 432). A ‘bigmouthed poester’ with a ‘cothurminous’ leg, he is again a theatrical figure in his role as a clergymen who arrives to deliver a sermon to twenty-nine schoolgirls by means of his ‘eroscope’ (429, 431). In a criticism of the Catholic Church, but also a parody of Stephen’s attempt to mask his desires with the outward forms and spectacles of Catholicism and sublimations of theology, the language of Jaun’s sermon- an incarnation of the Word, betrays his carnal desires and turns into a seductive address. In a parody also of the movement of the “religion of art”, the paradigm of the artist as priest is desublimated.

Rather than drawing parallels between the role of the artist and that of the priest, Shaun’s sermon turns into a recrimination of the artist. Whereas in the previous chapter he had presented himself as a man of letters, he is now an antagonist of art; he threatens to ‘burn the books that grieve’ his sister in ‘an allassundrian bom pyre’ (439). His sermon is a catalogue of warnings against the dangers of the ‘Secret satieties and onanymous letters’ of art (435). As ‘jeune premier’s appearance in the beginning of the chapter is contrasted to the Odysseus-like ‘comestabulish Sigurdsen’ who ‘repelled’ the ‘twentynine hedge daughters’ who were playing games in a garden, Shaun is presented as a new type of hero: ‘Jaun, by the way’, the narrator remarks, ‘was by the way of becoming (I think, I hope he was) the most purely human being that ever was called man, loving all up and down the whole creation from Sampson’s tyke to Jones’s sprat and from the King of all Wrenns down to infusers’ (430, 431).

Much to the dismay of the artist, the ‘priested peasant, with a brother a policeman in Dublin and a brother a potboy in Moycullen’ usurps the cultural prestige and celebrity status of the artist, as Stephen bitterly protested in the Portrait (240). The seductive powers of the spectacles of Catholicism that Joyce had unveiled in “Nausikaa” by synchronising ‘Secret satieties’ with ‘onanymous letters’, are here exposed in the ‘mielodorous’ language of Jaun’s oratory (FW 435, 412). “Inspired” by the romance surrounding Mariolatry - ‘the fragrant names of her who was conceived without stain of original sin’ - as Stephen also is in his composition of the villanelle, Gerty surrenders herself to Bloom like ‘Our Blessed Lady herself’ who ‘said to the archangel Gabriel be it done unto me according to Thy Word’ (U
467). Imagining, moreover, her relation to Bloom in terms of the men’s supplication to the Virgin in the church, she sees her surrender as an act of charity on her part.

Stephen becomes exasperated during his composition of the villanelle that despite the fact that he has fabricated his role as an artist as a sublimation of an ecclesiastic- ‘a priest of the eternal imagination’, Emma still chose to ‘unveil her soul's shy nakedness, to one who was but schooled in the discharging of a formal rite’ (P 240). Warning Issy against the ‘pulcherman’ who will attempt to seduce her by asking her to ‘be an artist's moral and pose in your nudies as a local esthetic before voluble old masters’, her ‘pettest parriage priest’ is indeed shown to deny this unveiling (FW 434, 458). ‘There you'll fix your eyes darkled on the autocart of the bringfast cable’, he prophesies, ‘but here till youre martimorphysed please sit still face to face’, Jaun advises her in an inversion of the Pauline parable, worried about the desires she will arouse ‘if the shorth of [her] skorth falls down to his knees’ (434). Pictured ‘comepulsing payattention spasms [penitential psalms and struggling with his attention span] between the averthisment for Ulikah's wine and a pair of pulldoors of the old cupiosity shape’, poetry is indeed shown as offering ‘the timorous lover aesthetic compensation for frustrated physical desire’ (434, Henke 62) But Joyce here also appears to hold accountable the morality of religion and the commodification of desire for delimiting the male artist’s knowledge of the ‘bat-like’ soul of women.

Through the effeminacy of Jaun and of ‘the four dear old heladies’, Joyce employs ‘The image of the Catholic Church as both socially transgressive and ambiguous in terms of gender and sexuality’, that as Killeen notes, ‘was one constantly rehearsed in Victorian England’, to highlight the seductive power of its “mysteries”, but also to expose the romantisation of the artistic vocation- their mutual ‘praxis of oval owes and artless awes’ (386; 42; 459). The antagonism that is staged between the artist and the priest indeed soon gives way to the customary coincidence of contraries. Beginning to think ‘like thauthor’ following his Improperia, Shaun declares that while he is gone his ‘altar’s ego’ and ‘darling proxy’ ‘Dave the Dancekerl’ will have to take care of her (462). The charge of dubious authorship laid against King David, unites the brothers. Through the parallels as well as the antitheses that are drawn between the artist and the priest, Joyce does not only cenurse the veneration of these idealised roles but also highlights the paucity and inadequacy of models of authorship.
iii. A drama parapolylogic [FW 474.5]

While in his manifestation as Yawn Shaun is presented as the sleeping bard woken up by his inquisitive exegetes who want not only the question of authorship answered but also like Stephen in “Circe” seek ‘The word known to all men’ and meaning of the world it is thought to contain, during his ‘starchamber quiry’ this celebrant turned celebrity rehearses role after role (FW 475). As he is both an inspired genius and a mere mouthpiece as a bard, the voices of the whole family are heard through him, moreover, as ‘everybug’ is his ‘bodiment’: he is himself pure spirit, ‘spancelled down upon a blossomy bed’ (475). The mystery of the inspired genius lures the experts - the ‘stenoggers’, the ‘solons’ and the ‘psychomorers’ who ‘set ward about him, doing obedience, nod, bend, bow and curtsey, like the watchers of Prospect, upholding their broadawake prober's hats on their firrum head’, liturgically ‘circuiting that personer [a prisoner as well as a persona] in his fallen’ (476). A ‘holy messonger’, Yawn is indeed Yeats’s ‘ideal reciter’: ‘a “messenger” of the poet’ (405; Schuchard 216).

In a version of Yeats’s trance-like state while chanting a poem- ‘conducting the living voice with the hieratic movement of arm and hand’, ‘Mesmer’s Manuum, the hand making silence’ is proffered by ‘the thurrible mystagogue[s]’ ‘gawking on him, for the issuance of his pnum [pneuma (gr) - breath/soul] and softnoising one of them to another one’ (135; FW 476, 477, 476). Searching for ‘a young stepschuler of psychical chirography’-gifted with automatic writing like Yeats’s wife, with their ‘chromous gleamy seiners’ nets’ they try to catch and ‘descry’ his ‘scheining’, his phenomenal [Erscheinung] being [Sein] (482, 477, 475, 528). The “pentalectic” between the four and Yawn, however, which begins misleadingly by adhering to novelistic conventions - the ‘drear writer’, the ‘temptive lissomer’, the ‘fuming censor’ and the ‘slipping beauty’ who compose the audience that the narrator addresses - is soon dissipated as the speakers soon become indistinguishable (476, 477, 476, 477).

The return of the address to the reader - who appears to simply be one of the four - hints nevertheless that as the day is dawning we have moved closer to modern times. This is indeed confirmed through the prominence of the question of identity and personality. The ‘momentary “presence”’ that distinguishes the principle of causality in mythical thought has been replaced by the ‘psychous of the Real Absence’; we have moved from mythical symbols to the signs of religion that reflect the ‘opposition between “meaning” and “existence”’ of religious logic (Cassirer, Symbolic Forms 239; FW 536). The ‘new world of logos’ is introduced through the ‘critique’ of the four that Yawn perceives as a quest to
incriminate him; the question of authorship becomes an ethical question (Cassirer 2). The narrative once again becomes dramatic, but the protagonist is distinguished as an ethical subject ‘an independent agent, responsible for his acts’ (199). The subject of the drama is ‘the traumaturgid’; necessity that distinguishes dramaturgy links the thaumaturgy with trauma (*FW* 496).

Yawn becomes a tragic hero; this bard is a ‘sinted sageness’ (482). He refers to the seven cities that claim to be the birthplace of Homer in order to remove himself from the original sin that the “true” author is identified with. Philosophy, philology, psychology, theology, history are employed to solve this paradox of identity. But every time he gets ‘psychoanalised’, Yawn is also ‘psoakoonaloose[d]’ (522). While the speaker tries to distinguish his identity from his ‘namesick’, he finds that he is also his ‘shembable’ (489). The multivalency of language refuses both their coincidence and their complete separation. Original sin, moreover, is the new bond of universality: ‘By him it was done bapka, by me it was gone into, to whom it will beblive, Mushame, Mushame!’ (481, 536). The search for the identity of the author is repeatedly hindered as Yawn both wants to win acclaim: ‘I, a self the sign’, and to dissociate himself from authorship, as it comes with accountability: ‘It looks like someone other bearing my burdens. I cannot let it’ (483). ‘We have caught oneselfes, Sveasmeas, in some incontiguity coumplegs of heoponhurrish [he upon her] marrage [marriage and mirage] from whose I must sublumbunate [must sublimate / sublumbo (l) - under the loin]’, the chorus that takes over in the next chapter, discerns (607). Without the I, without the author’s ‘monumentalness as a thingabolls’ [a symbol] the sign is in danger of ‘Sangnifying nothing’ (543, 515). The ‘illscribed’ sign betrays the sins of the author who has been ‘inchanting causersies’ [philosophical causes and discussions but to enchant his audience] (483, 496, 543). A ‘Shamwork’ has been ‘in our scheining’: St. Patrick’s shamrock - used to enchant pagan Ireland - and the work of Shem have been presented as truth, as an epiphany- *Erscheinung* [appearance] (613).
Conclusion

*Dressing the character. Celebrant or celebrity?*

‘[T]he form in which a man goes into the shadows is the form which he moves among his posterity’, Joyce had prophesied in 1903 about the eternal image of Ibsen, and just like ‘Ibsen the romantic’ was to be forgotten, his own posterity has similarly overlooked that as well as an engineer and philologist Joyce had presented himself in the same letter as ‘an engine driver’, ‘a musicmaker, philosopist and heaps of other things’ (*OCPW* 71; *Letters I* 251). Explaining these roles in a later letter, he admitted that this paradoxical combination made him unique: ‘There is no such absurd person as could replace me except the incorrigible god of sleep and no waster quite so wasteful though there is one much more so’ (245). Joyce had certainly radically departed from his claim made in 1905 that he was exclusively ‘an artist by temperament’, unlike ‘excellent writers’ whose temperament, however, is tempered by other professions (*Letters II* 110). While he preserved his own distinction, artistic economy had turned into profligacy.

Having risen through notoriety as well as literary prowess to “celebrity” status, compelling with renewed radiance in every movement of criticism, Joyce has increasingly become a suspect figure for critics of cultural studies. Disrupting the *Wake* that deconstruction has staged, they highlight not only that Joyce as a “popular” figure is very much alive, but also that he was actively engaged in fabricating and promoting this figure in order to sell books; to widen his audience for commercial rather than ideological reasons. Wanting ‘to demonstrate how Joyce uses the logic of mass-mediated fame to constitute his identity as the author of and in *Ulysses*’, Jonathan Goldman argues that while his stylistic experiments do not ‘refer to the vicissitudes of consciousness’, they nevertheless ‘shift the text onto a register of meaning that we equate with “the author”’: ‘Joyce uses typography and visual style to fashion his text into an object of the gaze, fashioning himself in relation to that object, as “transcendent in regard to languages”, in Foucault’s words’ (84, 87, 88). But for Goldman Joyce was uneasy with the implications of this celebrity image; like Stephen’s ‘fantasy of self-production’ in “Scylla” detaches ‘the author from messy matters of the body’, Joyce’s own removes him ‘from the equally messy problem of cultural visibility brought on by celebrity’ (94). While with his publication of the *Ulysses* schema Joyce wanted to create ‘authorized readers to publicize the novel’, this ‘primer explaining all the mysteries of *Ulysses*’ - in the words of George Moore - acted also as ‘an affirmation of the cultural capital of difficulty, elevating both readers and author above the plebian reader and
infusing *Ulysses* with value by virtue of the restricted community in which it circulates* (CH 566; Goldman 97).

Referring to what Benjamin has called ‘the “spell of the personality”, the phony spell of a commodity’ that was conjured following ‘the shriveling of the aura’ of the work of art, these critics warn that the wake of the author might be premature and that he should be resurrected in order to examine his “embodiment” of ‘cultural capital’ (*Illuminations* 231). Examining a more literal exposition of the “image” of the author, Maurizia Boscagliai and Edna Duffy study Joyce’s poses in photographs published in *Time* magazine, where ‘Joyce “makes a spectacle” of himself as a commodity’ by ‘intentionally stag[ing] his image as an advertisement’ (Dettmar 133-4). While his posture betrays that he is ‘deeply uneasy with his self-display’ and ‘attempt[s] to defuse and deny his self-fetishization through strategies of self-distancing’, his image is still haunted by ‘the aura of the fetish-presence of the star’: Joyce’s ‘physiognomy bears no longer the inscription of the logos, but…rather, it provides the elements that allows a commercial logo to be composed’ (134, 157). The “death of the author” is for Boscagliai and Duffy a “tragedy” staged by capitalism: ‘The tragic element that Joyce’s image speaks for Freund [Joyce’s photographer] is the (humanist’s) necessary renunciation of the self, and the equally tragic loss of signification to the arena of commodity aesthetics’ (157).

The theatrical nature of this paradoxical “image” of the writer in Joyce’s work - as a ‘celebrand’, ‘celebridging’ as well as ‘celescalating’ his ‘galloroman cultous’ - and of the parallactic theorists of *Finnegans Wake* who are made to admit that they ‘cannot say aye to aye’ nor ‘smile noes from noes [noesis]’ in the discrepancy between ‘You, allus for the kunst [alles voor de kunst (Dutch) - all for art] and me for omething with a handel to it [Georg Friedrich Handel & trade (German)], that leads to the conflict between the ‘cerebrated’ [cerebral / berated] and ‘CelebrAted’ brother in *Finnegans Wake*, was highlighted also by earlier critics (484, 305, 5, 288, 295, 421). Robert Scholes had identified in 1973 the ‘problem of self-portraiture’ as ‘the central problem’ that Joyce faced in his work’: ‘Looking at Joyce's work as a whole it appears as if he needed an image of himself in every work as a way of verifying its reality, as a measuring gauge for the validity of his other portraits, real and imaginary’ (“In Search of James Joyce” 7). The intersection of life and art, however, led to a theatrical drama: ‘the great esthetic questions were not the purely formal ones’, but ‘had to be solved finally in concrete ways - by performance’.

Joyce was indeed fascinated with the ‘nice collection’ of ‘legends’ that increasingly circulated about him, as *Finnegans Wake* reveals, although he was also anxious to distance himself from them by highlighting how “monstrous” and theatrical, fake and ultimately false
‘this hybrid actually was like to look at’ \((\text{Letters I 166; FW 169})\). Even prior to the ‘somatophage merman’ Shem, the introduction and prominence of Bloom in \textit{Ulysses} could be seen as an attempt on the part of Joyce to distance himself from this mythical figure and emphasise the importance of ‘establishing the identities in the writer complexus’, that are not only a celebration of modern selfhood as a ‘heterogeneous self-plenitude’ but also a result of celebrity culture and the ease and speed with which gossip circulates through the growing number of media of communication and expanding audiences \((171; \text{D. Brown 36})\). Listing these legends in detail in a letter to Weaver in June 1921 ‘to show you how conflicting they all are’ in response to her concern that he was drinking to excess, he concludes that ‘The truth probably is that I am a quite commonplace person undeserving of so much imaginative painting’ \((\text{Letters I 166})\). Distinguishing ‘a further opinion that I am a crafty simulating and dissimulating Ulysses-like type, a ‘jejune Jesuit’, selfish and cynical’, as an impression that ‘has some truth’, he highlights that no “portrait” can encompass the diversity and contradictions of his character: ‘it is by no means all of me (nor was it of Ulysses) and it has been my habit to apply this alleged quality to safeguard my poor creations, for on the other side, as I stated in a former letter, I removed so much of any natural wit I had that but for your intuitive help I should be destitute’. The portraits are both wildly imaginative and not inventive enough, restricted by the very form of the “portrait of the artist” that should be, he wrote in 1904, ‘not an identificative paper but rather the curve of an emotion’ \((\text{WD 56})\).

His awareness of the marketing significance of these ‘legends’, however, is evident in the concern he voices in the same letter about his “anonymity” in Paris: ‘I have been a year in Paris and in that time not a word about me has appeared in any French periodical’ \((\text{Letters I 166})\). He holds his reticence and detachment accountable, but refuses exposition: ‘I never go to any of the various weekly reunions as it is a waste of time for me at present to be cooped up in overcrowded rooms listening to gossip about absent artists and replying to enthusiastic expressions about my (unread) masterpiece with a polite amused reflective smile. The only person who knows anything about it is Mr Valery Larbaud’. Conscious of how wearisome and distracting from his artistic work his fabrication and display of a public image is, he finds that his very attempt to describe his “true character” and detach himself from these legends is a ‘pose’ that ‘begins to remind me of a preface by Mr Bernard Shaw’. All he succeeds in doing is giving ‘an example of my emptiness’ and he goes on to corroborate his confession that he is in fact even more of a “fraud” than is supposed: ‘I have not read a work of literature for several years. My head is full of pebbles and rubbish and broken matches and lots of glass picked up ‘most everywhere’.
He has not been “trained” for the occupation that he is famous for as a non-erudite: ‘I don’t even know Greek though I am spoken of as an erudite’; but he has been transformed by the nature of ‘The task I set myself technically in writing a book from eighteen different points of view and in as many styles, all apparently unknown or undiscovered by my fellow tradesmen’. The “work” of art itself shapes his role as an artist and the nature of his profession, creating the need for ‘legends’ to explain it in his departure from his ‘fellow tradesmen’. This occupation is so demanding that it becomes self-destructive: ‘that and the nature of the legend chosen would be enough to upset anyone’s mental balance’. While he is employed as an artist, wastefully spending himself, he cannot fit into society with his ‘Inconvenient’ economics: ‘I want to finish the book and try to settle on my entangled material affairs definitely one way or the other (somebody here said of me ‘They call him a poet. He appears to be interested chiefly in mattresses’). And in fact, I was’ (FW 172; Letters 167). His Greek “scholarship” is exposed as “superstition” with regard to the Greeks who bring him ‘luck’. Unlike the scholar’s search for origins and an illustrious tradition, Joyce ‘spoke or used to speak modern Greek not too badly’ and ‘spent a great deal of time’ with living ‘Greeks of all kinds from noblemen down to onionsellers, chiefly the latter’.

Hugh Kenner concludes his comprehensive analysis of the many traditions and figures that have shaped Joyce’s work in Dublin’s Joyce with the diagnosis that ‘Joyce spent his life playing parts, and his works swarm with shadow-selves’- ‘shadowstealers’ as they are called in the Wake (354; 560). ‘Parody was the medium of his art, and he played these parts that he might better write them’ (354). His departure from Ellmann’s autobiographical analysis of the relation between Joyce and Stephen through his emphasis on Joyce’s parodic stance - by ‘suppos[ing] that Joyce could not bear his own hero’, as Ellmann remarked bitterly - allowed criticism’s circumvention of these paradoxes between high and low, content and form, authorship and language, renamed by deconstruction as a “play of différence”- a play of identity and language; a ‘perversion’ that was ‘Joyce’s way of avoiding the aporias of “high modernism”’ (JJ 145; Authorised Reader 186). Kenner, nevertheless, admitted that Stephen is ‘more than comic’, detecting also a ‘tragic’ element that distinguished him in his relation to his audience: ‘There is a tragic necessity in the spectacle of the aesthete’s being fused to the young sensitive’s flesh: the necessity, for a provincial artist deprived of any respectable traditions, of becoming the enemy of his society in ways incompatible with remaining in touch with human wisdom’ (79). It is in his detachment from his audience that Stephen is characterised as ‘tragic’ for Kenner, in the dilemma between self-integrity and self-sacrifice, exile and servitude.
For Joseph Brooker, Kenner is the first ‘counter-humanist’ of Joyce’s critics, whose ‘vision of a mechanical “mind of the text”’, set against ‘the humanist reading of Joyce developed by Ellmann’ and Budgen who draw parallels between Joyce and his characters, ‘has had a broader influence through David Hayman’s notion of the “Arranger”’ (*Joyce’s Critics* 127, 126). The ‘growing emphasis on the role of technology in modernism’ is what brings the death of the author for Brooker; a tragedy that historically precedes post-structuralism: ‘The shaping effects of style and discourse on experience, and the consequent impossibility of objective metalanguage, is the burden of *Joyce’s Voices*, published as poststructuralist theory was arriving in the literary academy’ (126-7). Brooker admits, however, Kenner’s “disavowal” of this distinction as forefather of “theory”. The very title of Kenner’s later work manifests a very clear discrepancy; ‘Joyce has many voices but no “style”, as T.S. Eliot discerned long ago’, Kenner argues, and whereas Brooker links Joyce’s representation of the author as a ‘cyborg’ to Flaubert, Kenner emphasises Joyce’s distinction from ‘pseudo-Flaubertian “scientific” detachment’ parodied in “Ithaca”: ‘we are in the presence not of an exercise in nineteenth century pessimism but of a tribute to the unpredictable creative leaps of the human soul’ (*Dublin’s Joyce* 12, 126, 241, 10).

‘The Joycean world for Kenner is one of artifice, quotation, acting’, Brooker argues, linking its theatricality with the ‘deorganicization of the text’ (127-8). While theory appears to have been displaced by praxis in *Ulysses*, the ‘activity of assemblage’ that distinguishes Joyce’s writing for post-structuralism - an activity in which ‘the writing subject itself’ is dispersed in a plurality of possible positions and functions, read within the others of discourse’, like the association that Brooker makes between acting, artifice and quotation - is an “act” that has little to do with praxis as a political or ethical act, or even the purposive venture of a “producer”, and is instead closer to “kinesis” as the reverse of “stasis” (Heath in *Post-structuralist Joyce* 39). This “useless” activity indicates the disappearance of the storyteller who has been replaced by an ‘arranging presence’, Hugh Kenner argued in 1980: ‘Some mind, it is clear, keeps track of the details of this printed cosmos, and lets escape from its scrutiny the fall of no sparrow. The intrusion of this consciousness is perhaps the most radical, the most disconcerting innovation in all of *Ulysses*. It is something new in fiction. It is not the voice of the storyteller: not a voice at all, since it does not address us, does not even speak’ (*Ulysses* 64-5). This ‘Arranger’, ‘something between a persona and a function, somewhere between the narrator and the implied author’, ‘subtly penetrating the fabric of the narrative’ for David Hayman, in Kenner’s earlier description had not nullified but transformed the role of the bard: he ‘enjoys a seemingly total recall for exact forms of words used hundreds of pages earlier, a recall which implies not an operation of memory but access
such as ours to a printed book, in which pages can be turned to and fro’ (The Mechanics of Meaning 124, 122; Ulysses 65).

While the arranger still ‘epitomises the Dublin knack for performance’ for Kenner, performativity for deconstruction is a characteristic of language: ‘only language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’’ (66; Barthes 143). In this “play of language” it is the (ideal) reader who becomes the actor: ‘The text is never closed and the ‘ideal reader’ will be the one who accedes to the play of this incompleteness, placed in ‘a situation of writing’, ready no longer to master the text but now to become its actor’ (Heath, Post-structuralist Joyce 32). This modern and post-modern play is dissociated from the dramatic act that Joyce had defined ‘with a naif air of discovering novelties’ in the beginning of his career as an ‘interplay of passions’, ‘evolution, movement, in whatever way unfolded’; in contrast to the tautological ‘dramatic drama’ that Joyce had championed, the dramatic act of post-modernism is oxymoronic (SH 81; OCPW 24). Like the ‘inhuman theorist’ of Stephen Hero, who as Jacques Aubert has argued, disregards ‘writing as act, the ethical dimension ... that remains implicit, veiled, in the very narrative of the experience’, the activity of the author as a mechanical arranger is similarly disembodied: ‘the text deliberately acts as if it were cut off from any single creative consciousness’ (22; Lawrence 9). ‘[T]he spectacular and the theatrical’ that Joyce had distinguished in 1900 from drama overshadows all activities (OCPW 25). The artist’s inability to participate in modern society that is dramatised in the Portrait, is remedied in Ulysses through a self-imposed monumental ‘task’ ‘enough to upset anyone’s mental balance’ (Letters I 166). Ironically, however, this all-consuming occupation threatens to alienate the artist even further from society and its ‘material affairs’, despite his interest in ‘mattresses’ (167).

‘Drama, as Joyce uses the word’, Aubert argues, referring to Joyce’s early writings ‘is a concept that formulates through art complexities and contradictions that he was discovering at the vital core of his experience – complexities insofar as he indicates, after Hegel, that drama formulates human passions in words (“The Drama is the highest form of Art in speech”) and through the Word; contradictions insofar as drama presents human bodies as images (i.e., meaning in praesentia) that can be analyzed into symbolic elements, or signifiers (i.e., in absentia)’ (34). The absence of the human body from the acts of language following Joyce’s short-lived career as a dramatist is so devastating that the text appears to be “orphaned”. The drama of Stephen in the Portrait largely revolves around his desire to “mirror” in words ‘perfectly’ an ‘inner world of individual emotions’, and his struggle to reconcile this portrait of perfection with his ‘ill clad, ill fed, louse-eaten’ body
In the absence of the ‘radiant body of everliving life’ of the author, necessary for communion with his audience, language takes the form of a silent monologue (240).

A ‘drama of actors’ is for Kenner what is left following the ‘progressive effacement of the writer, from lyric through epic into drama, from Chamber Music to Exiles’, while the ‘progression from Portrait to Finnegans Wake’ ‘leaves behind a drama of daftly autonomous words, language, not persons, in action, convoluting in a void of non-communication’ (150-1). The departure of the author, however, exposes his faith in the ability of language to embody him in an “epic of the human body” dramatically structured to take place in one day and consummated through ‘das Fleisch das stets bejaht’ that pries apart the mystery of the Word and the singular ‘Ich bin’ of Stephen’s denying Geist (Budgen 21, 272). But refusing martyrdom through “metempsychosis”, his creation is ‘merely a satyric play, merely an epilogue farce’: a “comedy” [a komos (gr) - ‘revel’ of the aoidos (gr) - ‘singer’] that allows the author to reclaim his bardic title (Human-all-too-human 537).

The “erasure” of the author in post-structuralism, who is transformed ‘from a methodological prescription to an ontological statement about the very essence of discourse itself’, as Seán Burke argues, obscures any possible distinction between the social and the existential “origins” of the crisis of authority and authorship; a confusion that Joyce’s work indeed elicits (The Death and Return of the Author 16). The artist’s detachment betrays Stephen’s self-alienation for Aubert: ‘The fight to be conducted is not with others, with society as a whole or individually with its members, but with the “ineluctable” Other in him ... in the confrontation with essential weakness, physical and moral’ (51, 61). The warring twins of Finnegans Wake certainly imply that this nameless Other is ‘asame’, although an audience either as a chorus, a ceremonial congregation or a rowdy rabble is always at hand to commentate, complicate or overshadow the familial drama (FW 356).

The dualism of the Romantic paradigm of ‘creative man’ as ‘a divided being, man and artist, a historical personage who merely serves as the medium through which the creative spirit manifests itself’, but also of the medieval ‘concern with authorial role or function – sometimes termed the author’s ‘office’ (officium)’, ‘manifested by two facets of the author’s individuality which the exegete sought to describe, his individual literary activity and his individual moral activity’, is challenged in modernity by a synchronous claim of impersonality and multiple personality disorder (Beebe, Ivory Towers 7; Minnis 27). While Barthes upsets the authorial hierarchy with his presentation of the ‘modern scriptor’ who ‘no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather [an] immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt’, and Foucault goes further by examining and ‘await[ing] the fluid functions released by [the
author’s] disappearance’, Joyce is wary of the reductiveness of this apparent diversity that entirely subsumes the heterogeneity of Man under a variety of roles and functions (147; 121). Kenner has emphasised that Joyce shows how these roles can become imprisoning rather than liberating, turning its actors into ‘walking clichés’, while Joseph Valente, linking the adverse effects of role playing to what Nietzsche calls ‘the problem of the actor, the figure who actually becomes the role he is to assume’ through complete surrender to ‘the flux of appearance’, argues that ‘the dramatic artist’ is the ‘solution’ to this problem that both Nietzsche and Joyce proffer (Dublin’s Joyce 11; 94). ‘Does the death of man necessarily imply the death of the author? Is the author simply a specific and regional instantiation of the philosophical anthropos?’ Burke interrogates deconstruction’s reductive trope of the author-as-a-Philosopher: ‘All author positions are subsumed under an essentially nineteenth century theocentricism, a tactic which naturally lends to the death of the author a greater urgency, a more direful necessity’ (104, 26).

Going beyond a search for the ‘funnyman's functions’ that ‘characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society’ for Foucault, Joyce does not let the reader forget that s/he is ‘up against a right querrshnorrt of a man’; both a queer sort of man and a product of the German periodical Der Querschnitt (FW 509; 124). As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has argued, while theory is engaged in formulating and answering the question “What is an author?”, the literary response to the question “Who is an author”, should not be forgotten (in Cadava 159). Literature for Labarthe has the means to formulate the paradox of ‘a name without a name’, avoiding ‘the fall of who into the sacrilization of the name’ but also warranting ‘the effort of sounding that call: “who?”’ ‘so that the feeling “that there is someone” can tremble again’, through a pun, made famous by Ulysses: “no one” (in Greek oudeis)…is his proper name (Odusseus) which he only slightly deforms’ (159, 155). Acknowledging that ‘the question “who?” is always necessarily a political one’, but also entangled with the “metaphysical question” “who is man?”, Labarthe highlights the significance of literature’s capacity to address this implication (159).
Works Cited


