This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

- This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.
- A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.
- This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.
- The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.
- When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.
AL-JUWAYNI & AL-GHAZALI

as theologians

with special reference to

(Al-irshad) & (Al-intisad)

Submitted by

M.A.R. BISAR

to

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY

For the Degree of PH.D. in Islamic Philosophy.

May, 1953
I am profoundly indebted to Rev. W. Montgomery Watt, B.Litt., Ph.D., for his supervision of my research, and for his kind and generous help on many nice points of terminology.
INDEX

Introduction 1

CHAPTER I

The Theological methods of Al-Juwayni & Al-Ghazali

I. Al-Juwayni 4
II. Al-Ghazali 26
Comparison 66

CHAPTER II

Nature of God.

Part I 69

The Difficulty of its Definition

Part II

The Existence and One-ness of God

The Existence of God

A. Al-Juwayni 70
B. Al-Ghazali 75

The One-ness of God

A. Al-Juwayni 76
B. Al-Ghazali 79
Comparison 83
INDEX

CHAPTER III

The Attributes of God

Part I.

Knowledge of the attributes
and of their special characteristics 85

Part II.

Al-Juwayni
   A 87

Al-Juwayni
   B 99

Al-Ghazali
   A 102

Al-Ghazali
   B 115

CHAPTER IV

God's Sitting on the Throne
and the Vision of God

I. Al-Juwayni
   A. His Treatment of God's Sitting
      on the Throne 122

   B. The Vision of God 126

II. Al-Ghazali
   A. His Treatment of God's Sitting
      on the Throne 128

   B. The Vision of God 131
INDEX

Comparison 136

CHAPTER V
Free-will and Predestination

I. Al-Juwayni 138
II. Al-Ghazali 155

Comparison 161

General Conclusions 162

Bibliography 167
IN THE NAME OF GOD
-------------------

INTRODUCTION
-------------

The aim of this thesis is to expound and compare the theological aspect of the thought of al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazâlî; we shall seek to discover similarities and differences between them in their methods and in their opinions on identical problems.

There are indeed several aspects from which the thought of these two men may be studied – the philosophical, the juristic, and the theological aspects. And their contribution to theology is an extremely important page in the history of Islamic thought, more particularly in the history of the Ash'arîyah school.

This school went through several different stages of development, but the most important change from the thought of the early Ash'arites (al-Mutaqqaddimûn) to that of the later ones (al-Muta'akhkhirûn) was brought about largely by the exertions of al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazâlî. The originality of their method and the distinctive role they played in the development of Ash'arite doctrine consisted of combining philosophical and doctrinal problems and using rational argumentation to make their points. As a result, their activity in the field of theology introduces the formation of a set body of orthodox belief, a semi-official creed prevailing – except for small and unimportant minorities – in all classes of the Muslim community without constraint on the part of the ruler.
The task which al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī undertook was a dual one. First they had to refute the solutions (1) offered by the Falasifah to theological problems. Next they had to build the new doctrine of the Aghāriyyah on solid foundations, and bolster it with arguments acceptable to the minds both of the community and of the religious institutions of their time. They differed in the relative importance each gave to this or that part of their task, and we shall see that there are other differences, some slight, some great, in some of their opinions. But on the whole the trend which they followed was one and the conclusions they ultimately reached were the same. They may well be said to be complementary, the thought of the one having advanced, on certain points, beyond that of the other.

With this in mind, we may try to find out which of them was more successful in dealing with such problems as the concept of God, His Attributes, and the like, and in clarifying and simplifying theological arguments and expositions to such an extent that the majority of the community could comprehend and accept them.

1) In both Al-Iraqād and agh-Shāmil, al-Juwaynī first expounds then refutes the views of the Falāsifah. Al-Ghazālī, however, devoted one book - Maqāsid al-Falāsifah - to the exposition of their views, and another - Tahārut al-Falāsifah - to criticising and demolishing their arguments.
It is worth noting that this great step in the development of the Ash'ariyyah, which we now ascribe to al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, was not recognised by the Ash'ari theologians of subsequent centuries as specifically the contribution of these two men. We do find them at times ascribing particular ideas to a particular author, but at others they refer to them broadly as Ash'arite views. This often occurs in the works of the mutakallimūn of later date than the sixth century of the Hijrah, such as the Mawāqif of ʿAḍud ad-Dīn al-Ījī or the Maqāsid of Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftāzānī.

In this present attempt to establish the differences and similarities between al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī we shall rely principally on two works, al-Irshād by al-Juwaynī, and al-Iqtisād by al-Ghazālī. Of these, al-Iqtisād is an obvious choice because it is generally regarded as a complete summing up of al-Ghazālī's theological beliefs; of al-Juwaynī's books, ash-Shāmil also had a claim to be considered as a primary source, but al-Irshād summarises everything that is in ash-Shāmil and is in every way an adequate exposition of its author's views. Other works by the same authors deal at length with one particular problem or another, and have therefore been treated as secondary sources.

We have also deemed it more convenient to the reader to make the relevant comparisons between al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī at the end of each chapter rather than group them all together in a final chapter.
CHAPTER I.

THE THEOLOGICAL METHODS
of
AL-JUWAYNĪ AND AL-GHAZĀLĪ

I. AL-JUWAYNĪ

I shall endeavour in this Chapter to deal with the theological methods of both al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, with special reference to their books "The Guidance" (al-Irshād) and (Al-Iqtisād fi l-ītīqād).

It is difficult to find in al-Irshād itself any orderly or methodical statement of al-Juwaynī's theological method. All that this book can reveal is a few paragraphs or brief references that can be drawn upon to ascertain its author's method. Most of these appear in his discussion of Speculation (nazar), which he divides into "right," "wrong," "that which benefits knowledge", "that which does not benefit knowledge", "that which imposes a duty upon the individual", and "that which does not impose a duty upon the individual."

In al-Irshād al-Juwaynī emphasizes at the outset the importance of employing the method deduction (ṭarīq al-Iṣtidlāl) for the purpose of proving theological propositions. The use of such a method, he asserts, is the only means of preserving the firmness and purity of the common man's belief in the doctrines of faith. In his view, theological disputation should employ
firm and unanswerable proofs, and should be based on reason and rational propositions. In this respect he says: "And when we saw that theological proofs were the means of conviction and methods of corroboration; and when we perused exhaustive treatises that contained conclusive demonstrations and convincing proofs which the people of this age were incapable of conceiving; and when we found that beliefs were unsupported by convincing proofs; we were disposed to pursue a course that will contain conclusive proofs and propositions based on reason."

Al-Juwaynī then proceeds to show what he means by these proofs. He divides them into "intellectual" (aqlī) and "traditional" (samī) (samī; lit. "hearing", i.e. relating to what has been heard), and says: "Proofs are things which, when looked at properly, will inevitably lead to knowledge (ilm) of what cannot be learnt in the ordinary course of things; and they are divided into 'intellectual' and 'traditional'. From this we can appreciate the importance of the duty of religious investigation and speculation as a means of adducing proof of theological doctrines. Thereby, we can also appreciate the great extent to which al-Juwaynī goes in evaluating this method. In fact, he goes as far as to assert that the first duty of the normal person who has reached the legal age of majority

2) ibid. p. 5.
is to make use of sound speculation which will lead to true knowledge or to probable views. He then proceeds to prove his views by saying: "The Muslim masses are unanimous on the necessity of knowing God; and reason has demonstrated that it will not be possible to acquire any such knowledge except through speculation; and all things that are indispensable to the performance of our religious duties are in themselves a body of binding duties. This sound speculation is the only means that can lead to the discovery of the stage where the proof can point unequivocally to the thing to be proved, so that the latter will necessarily

1) This contrasts with "wrong speculation" which does not lead to the acquisition of knowledge or the establishment of propositions by the balance of weighty propositions (al-Irshād p.2). Al-Juwaynī does not, however, label wrong speculation as ignorance or as contrary to knowledge. He says that speculation, when good and properly exercised, leads the investigator to the discovery of the kind of proof necessary for the purpose of acquiring knowledge of the thing which is intended to be proved; but when this speculation becomes wrong or false by the intervention of doubt or suspicion, the intervening suspicion cannot form the basis of a firm conviction.

2) Ibid. pp. 6-7.
follow from the former and be associated with it. Al-Juwaynī discusses this doctrine of association and classifies it into two categories: the rational and the ordinary (‘ādi). Examples of the former are the necessary association of light with the sun, or of movement with walking, for the mind cannot imagine the sun without light, or walking without movement; an example of the second is the association of the growth of plants with rain - for rain may fall and yet plants not grow, and the mind can imagine rain falling without plants growing, so that the association between them is said to be ordinary. He then discusses the notion of "generating" (tawallud), i.e., the transmission of a single action through a series of objects where the agent purposed to affect the first object only but the effect on the others followed. He examines this doctrine at length in its various aspects, and seeks to refute the views of the Mu‘tazilites who held that the thing proved was begotten or generated from speculation or intellectually inseparable from it. He prefers the view that this inseparability is only an ordinary one, so that it would not necessarily be true that where a person employs speculation he inevitably acquires true knowledge. Sound speculation, he maintains, may be present without there being knowledge of the thing which
it implies (al-madliil). He demonstrates this by giving an example of the relationship between the desire for a thing and knowledge of its existence - the desire in this case not being capable of fulfilment without knowledge of the thing in question, although it cannot be maintained that the desire had begotten the knowledge or that the knowledge had begotten the desire.

What, then, is this method of deducing knowledge (istidlāl) which al-Juwaynī maintains should be not only the purpose of speculation but an essential prerequisite of Muslim theology?

Al-Juwaynī classifies proof (dalīl) into "traditional" and "intellectual." Traditional proof is that which depends upon true information (khabar ṣidq) or upon a commandment that must be obeyed. What he evidently means by true information and binding commandment are: 1) the Qur'ān; 2) the true Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (as-sunnah); and 3) Consensus (ijmāʿ). He does not confine the use of consensus to the establishment of juristic propositions (masāʿil fiqhiyah), but relies upon it for the purpose of substantiating theological propositions and problems of faith (masāʿil ʿaqīdīyah) although the understanding of the fine details and secrets of these problems might be beyond the comprehension of the investigator. This is made clear by the manner

1) al-Irshad p. 5.
in which he solves many of the problems with which he

The second kind of proof - "intellectual proof" - he defines as that which, by virtue of an attribute embodied in it and inseparable from it, demonstrates the object which it proves, in such a way that the mind will not be able to contemplate the presence of that object except as a proof of the very thing which it sought to prove. An example of this is the occurrence of an event which, by the mere fact that such occurrence was possible, points to the presence of a quality that makes such occurrence possible. A similar case is that of a skilful act, which gives proof of the skill of the person who performed it. Al-Juwaynī, however, does not make it clear in al-Irshād whether he means by this kind of proof the Aristotelian method of Syllogism, or the Sunnites' methods of "rational propositions" (adillat al-‘ugūl) and "the methods of deduction" (ṭuruq al-istidlāl) which they made the basis of theological proof. This method of intellectual proof was based on the following principles:

1. All that of which there is no proof should be rejected.

2. Premises produce conclusions (i.e., that the conclusion should be drawn from the premises - the conclusion nevertheless requiring verification, although the premises would be a priori.
3. The absent or unknown (ghā'ib) should be analogically deduced (qiyyās) from the present and known (shāhid) (i.e. that the absent should be proved by means of a cause, a condition, a proof, or a fact similar to that which has served to substantiate the present).

Al-Juwaynī, in his treatise upon the principles of Jurisprudence entitled al-Burhān, rejects these principles and discredits them as means of proof. He says: "Our religious dignitaries (Imāms) have laid down the methods of proof in a manner which we shall outline and then proceed to show its defects." He criticizes the first principle by saying that although the proof or proofs might be false it does not necessarily follow that the proposition which they seek to prove or indicate is false - for the proposition may be capable of substantiation by another proof or indicator which is stronger and more correct. His criticism of the second principle is based on the proposition that all knowledge is necessary, a view which he contradicts in his book al-Iṣbāḥād where he holds that all human knowledge (al-‘ulūm al-ḥadithah) is either necessary (darūrī) or

---

1) al-Burhān, Vol. I, Chapter "Bāb Madārik al-‘Uqūl."
axiomatic (badīhī) or acquired (kasbī). Examples of the first are knowledge that sugar is sweet or knowledge that the sun gives light; such knowledge reaches all people through the senses and requires no proof. The second is such knowledge as that the whole is larger than its part, or that one is the half of two; it is reached by all people through the intellect, not the senses, and like the first requires no proof. The third, however, is such knowledge as that anything that changes is an accident, or that every accident requires a cause, for it is not agreed among all people, and to reach it requires examination and proof; it is therefore said to be "acquired." Because of this contradiction in his views, his criticism of the second principle of the Sunnite method of proof cannot be conceded. His criticism of the third principle is based on his denial of the interdependence of the condition (shart) and that which is conditioned upon it (al-mushrūt), and between the object and its cause, as well as between the object and its essence and between the object and its proof. Ibn Rushd holds the view that criticism on these lines is one of the doctrines of those people he calls Sufistāiyah (Sophists) and that those who have adopted this line of criticism, headed by al-Juwaynī, had been influenced to a great extent by the Sophists. Ibn Rushd says: "For this reason we find that every one who has not achieved
eminence in theology has resorted to the denial of the necessary relationship between the condition (sharṭ) and that which relies upon it (al-mashrūṭ), between the object and its essence, between the object and its cause, and between the object and its proof; and this is something which is not permissible except in the view of the Sophists, for it has no meaning; and the one theologian who has done this is Abu 'l-Ma‘ālī (al-Juwaynī).

In al-Irshād, al-Juwaynī adopts yet another attitude contradicting that which he adopts in his book al-Burhān. In the first book he appraises this kind of proof and relies on it to such an extent that he resorts to it in almost every theological argument (2) or proposition which he propounds. Thereby he declares in a manner that can leave little room for doubt that he recognizes its merit and value in the theological system. He says: "Let it be known to you that the substantiation of knowledge in an eternal attribute cannot be acquired except by correlating the absent

2) As examples of this, see al-Irshād (Paris Edition): pp. 38, 43, 44, 48, 49, and 52.
to the present." He then shows that this correlation (qiyyās) or parallelism must signify a common denominator between the absent (or unknown) and the present (or known). In his opinion, there are only four phases in which this parallelism and analogy can operate, and these are as follows.

The first phase: "The cause" (ʾillah). If it be substantiated that a verdict (ḥukm) upon a present proposition is dependent upon a particular cause, and if proof establishes that a cause of an identical nature must lie behind an absent proposition, then the same verdict must be given on the absent proposition as that given on the present proposition. (He gives the following example: the verdict that a learned man is possessed of learning, as far as a present person is concerned, is given where it has been established that that person possesses the quality and attribute of learning and knowledge - likewise, the characterization of an absent person as a learned person must come as a result of establishing that he possesses the quality and attribute of learning).
The second phase: "The determinant" (shart).
If it be established that a verdict upon a present proposition is conditioned by a condition, and if proof demonstrates that a similar verdict had been given upon an absent proposition, then the same condition or determinant must be ascribed to the absent proposition. (Example: our verdict that a condition of describing a learned person in the present as "learned" is that he should possess the quality of life, then it must follow that the quality of life should be presumed to be possessed by an absent person described as a "learned person")

The third phase: "Native Essence" (al-haqqah).
If the presence of an identity has been established as regards a present proposition, then the existence of the same identity must be recognised in an absent proposition of the same nature. (Example: the statement that the identity of a learned person is his possession of knowledge.)

The fourth phase: The ground (ad-dalil). If reason decrees that a particular proof establishes or determines a specific proposition, it follows that the same proof can substantiate
and determine the same proposition, both in the present and in the absent. (Example: the act of origination (ihāth) is the ground furnishing an originator (muhdith), and vice versa.)

We thus find that al-Juwayni recognises in his book al-Irshād the analogy and parallelism between the absent and the present in the four aspects outlined above; which he rejects in his book al-Burhān. How, then, can one harmonize between these apparently opposed views which he holds? It may perhaps be said that in al-Irshād al-Juwayni intended to amend or correct the views he advanced in al-Burhān. The validity of such an argument, however, is very much dependent on establishing beyond reasonable doubt that al-Juwayni wrote al-Burhān before he wrote al-Irshād. And so far there is no reliable historical evidence to show that this assumption is a true one. Again, it may be said that al-Juwayni rejected this method as a means of substantiating juristic proposition, while in al-Irshād he accepted it as a means of substantiating doctrines of faith. Whatever the merit of these arguments, it is clear, as I have endeavoured to show earlier, that the principle of analogy and parallelism between the absent and the present has been conceded by al-Juwaynī as one of the fundamentals of scholastic theology.

1) al-Irshād: pp. 48-49.
It remains now to outline the attitude which al-Juwaynī adopts towards Aristotelian syllogism, and especially towards the principle of analytical deduction. Did al-Juwaynī employ logical analytical deduction, and did he adopt it as one of the methods of proof? No scholar has so far advanced the view that al-Juwaynī had ever made use in his theological discourses of the Aristotelian method of syllogism. He used it only in his discourses on the sources and roots (‘usūl). It is highly probable that al-Juwaynī was the first amongst the Ash'arite theologians to adopt this line; and it is certain that he was the first to make serious use of this method and apply it on a wide scale, a thing that paved the way for the employment by al-Ghazālī of this method in his theological discourses. Al-Juwaynī almost stands out in a class on his own, differing from theologians who had preceded him, by the use of a method of investigation that often led to axiomatic propositions conceded by all and not capable of being controverted by any, like the assumed propositions or premises on which Aristotle's syllogism rests. This method was

1) It is stated by Ibn Khaldūn in his Prolegomena (al-Mugaddimah) (pp. 326 - 327), and by Husayn Wallī in his book 'Ilm at-Tawḥīd (The Science of Theology) (p. 75), that al-Ghazālī was the first to confuse philosophy and logic with theology, and to embody in
his theological discussions arguments refuting the philosophers. I would not agree entirely with this view. If Ibn Khaldūn means that al-Ghazālī was the first amongst the Muslim theologians to adopt this line, then he (Ibn Khaldun) was mistaken. We in fact find that many leading Mu'tazilites had retorted against the philosophers and preferred dialectical and polemical arguments against them, and made frequent use in their own theological discussions of this method of disputation. Amongst these as Ibrāhīm an-Nazzām, who put forward arguments against Empedocles and Aristotle and against those who held the view that the movements of the stars were pre-eternal. His demonstration of the falsehood of this proposition is similar to the proof advanced by al-Ghazālī; and it is probable that the views of Ibrāhīm an-Nazzām in this respect formed the basis or foundation of al-Ghazālī's views (see the book al-İntisār (The Victory) by al-Khayyāt: pp. 35 - 36; and the book Tahāfut at-Tahāfut (The incoherence of the Incoherence) by Ibn Rushd - Beirut Edition - pp. 31-32.)

If Ibn Khaldūn, however, had meant that al-Ghazālī was the first amongst the Ash'arites to adopt this line of thought, then I would agree with him with regard to the fact that al-Ghazālī was the first to make use of logic in theological discussions. But I would disagree with him in his statement that al-Ghazālī was the first=
to include in his theological discussions a reply to the philosophers. The fact is that the first Ash aRITE theologian to adopt this attitude was Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, who did so in a brief manner in his book at-Tamhid (The Introduction) which has now been reproduced in Cairo. Al-Juwayni also adopted a similar attitude, but on a more detailed and comprehensive scale, in his book ash-Shamil (The Comprehensive) which is condensed in his book al-Ishahd. Professor Brockelmann says of al-Baqillani on pp. 603 - 604 (Number X of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1911) that al-Baqillani "introduced new ideas into the Kalam from Greek philosophy or perhaps from the dogmatics of the Eastern Church, such as the conception of atoms, of empty space and the view that an accident cannot be the bearer of another accident and that an accident cannot bat through two units of time."

The scholar who peruses at-Tamhid cannot doubt the cogency of these views. In the same way, a glance at ash-Shamil and al-Ishahd cannot fail to induce a preponderant view that al-Shazali had adopted from them or, at least, had derived great assistance from them in his replies to the philosophers. (Compare for this purpose the discussion on the creation of the universe in al-Ishahd, with the same discussion in Tahafut al-Tahafut).
repeatedly employed by al-Juwayni in his theological discourses, especially in his book *al-Irshad*, and was called by him the method of "enumeration and division" (*as-sabr wa it-taqsim*). It implied the division of an object into "X" and "its opposite"; followed by the exposition and substantiation of all the other divisions or terms of this object, until the substantiation of the term intended to be substantiated, or the term intended to be refuted, is arrived at. We may on occasions discover

1) To amplify this statement, consider one of the examples of this method contained in *al-Irshad* (p. 11). It concerns the proof of the existence of "accidents" by way of the agents causing the movement of substances. He says: "The determinant (*muqtadi*) may be either identical with the substance itself, or may be something additional to it; and it cannot be thought to be identical with the substance itself ... And it has been proved that the determinant is additional and fixed. This additional thing may be either identical with the substance, or at variance with it: and it cannot be regarded as being at variance with it... And it has been proved that the determinant is fixed and additional to the substance and different from it. This determinant, which is additional, fixed and different, may be either a free agent or a necessitating form (*ma na mujib*); and it cannot be regarded as a necessitating form... And it has been proved to be an agent; and an agent must have a subjected action; and this action consists in accidents additional to the substance..."
In Introduction à la Théologie musulmane p. 73, and Louis Gardet, M. M. Anawáti refer to a manuscript thesis on al-Juwaynī by Shaykh 'Alī Jabr, one of the 'ulamā' of the Azhar, in which he asserts that al-Juwaynī was the first of the Ash'arite theologians to have made use of "enumeration and division," the "reduction to the absurd" (qiyās al-khulf), and "direct demonstration" (al-qiyās al-mustaqîm). In fact, the qiyās al-khulf and the qiyās al-mustaqîm do not each form a separate method of argumentation, but are parts of the Aristotelian method which al-Juwaynī used not in theology but in jurisprudence. The first to have used it in theology proper was al-Ghazālī.
in the form in which he puts forward his proof the presence of some introductory and binding intellectual propositions or premises which the scholar may be induced to regard as bearing relation to Aristotle's syllogism, by reason of the fact that they bear resemblance in their sequence to the form used by the peripatetic philosophers. That intellectual sequence, however, is essentially a product of al-Juwaynī, in which he follows no recognized rules, and in the use of which he does not adhere to any order of a dialectic system. Thus, if we seek to apply any one of the four forms of parallelism to these propositions, we find that it will not be possible so to apply any of them; and we also find that none of the various kinds of conclusions deduced by any of these methods can be arrived at. The greatest use made by al-Juwaynī of these propositions is found to be on those occasions where he explains a problem or amplifies upon it, or where he proceeds from one problem to another that follows it either in the intellectual or in the ordinary order of things. We also find that an equally frequent use is made of these propositions on those occasions where al-Juwaynī enters into an argument with an opponent and proceeds to direct a series of questions to him in such a way that he will be able to reveal, from the text of the answers given
to these questions, something that will oblige the opponent to admit or concede that proposition of al-Juwaynī or its opposite. In other words, al-Juwaynī would, if possible, utilize his opponent's answers as premises upon which to found an argument leading to a verdict that would either verify the proposition or refute it.

We may now summarize the sources of scholastic theology in al-Juwaynī's system in four main sources. These are as follows:

1. The Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah).
2. The Consensus of opinion amongst the learned (iṣma').
3. The probing and division (as-sabr wa it-taqsim).
4. The correlation of the absent to the present.

It now remains to find out whether al-Juwaynī had passed during his intellectual life through a stage similar to that through which al-Ghazālī had passed, and of which al-Ghazālī speaks in his book al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl (The Deliverer from Error). I have failed to find in al-Irshād anything that can serve to clarify this point. But Tāj ad-Dīn 'Abd al-Wahhāb Ibn as-Subkī, in his book Tabaqāt al-Shāfi‘īyah al-Kubrā (The Classes of the Grand Shāfi‘ites) attributes to al-Juwaynī the
following statement: "I have read fifty thousand by fifty thousand (probably books or manuscripts on this subject - he obviously intends to say that he read a great deal on this subject); and then I left the Muslims to themselves in their acceptance of them and in their apparent knowledge; and I took to the turbulent sea and dived into realms which the people of Islam had forbidden; all that I did in my search for the truth... In the past I used to escape from imitation and the acceptance of religious dogmas on authority (taqlîd); but now I have abandoned everything and have come to the word of truth... You must abide by the "faith of old people"; and if Verity (God) does not reach me with His mercy, so that I would die with the faith of old people, and my affairs will end upon my departure according to the journey of the people of the truth and the word of sincerity, "There is no God but God; then woe to Ibn al-Juwaynî..." If the attribution of this statement to al-Juwaynî be authentic, then it would readily provide the answer to the question that I have posed; for it signifies that at one stage in his intellectual career al-Juwaynî was over-whelmed by a wave of scepticism which caused him to abandon all the theological views which were held by

1) q.v. p. 260. I could not trace this statement in any book or manuscript of which al-Juwaynî is the reputed author. As-Subkî does not specify the source from which he has taken this statement.
the Islamic theologians who had preceded him, and especially by the theologians of the Ash arite school. He had then subjected all these theological views to close examination and scrutiny in the light of the principles which he adopted as the basis of his theological method and as a means of arriving at the exposure of the falsehood and authenticity of doctrines. Such a critical attitude, of course, signifies complete trust in human faculties of reasoning, as well as freedom from the shackles of imitation; and it causes the critic to make intellectual discoveries. And thus we find that al-Juwaynī has, in consequence, delved into those realms of philosophy which were proscribed in particular by the Ash arite school and in general by the Sunnites; and we also find that he has embodied in his theological works commentaries upon these theories as well as exposition as replies to them. Such a critical attitude cannot be profitably adopted by every scholar or individual, for it is essentially the prerogative of those who achieve scholarly distinction and eminence and who possess a mind as able and efficient as that of al-Juwaynī. It is for this reason that al-Juwaynī mentions in his works that the ordinary person must not delve into these realms, but must confine himself to belief in "the faith of old

1) v. supra, p. 23.
people" (i.e. that the ordinary person must believe intuitively and implicitly in those doctrines and articles of faith) without subjecting his belief to searching examination and scrutiny; for otherwise such a person may stray into error and uncertainty, and fall into the pits of doubt and confusion of evidence. In other words, al-Juwaynī does not permit every ordinary or average person to engage in theology or to delve into the realms of theological disputations and arguments. Only the very unique and able few may, he says, be allowed to engage in theology; while the ordinary common folk would be well advised to believe implicitly and intuitively in the doctrines of faith, and to submit without insisting on concrete proof or speculation. Ibn as-Subki says: "And we can ally to this the Imam's (al-Juwaynī's) statement: 'Do not engage in theology; for had I known that theology would lead me to the stage which it has now lead me to, I would never have engaged in it.' "

I shall endeavour at a later stage to examine at length the purpose of this critical attitude of al-Juwaynī. I shall also endeavour to show the effect which al-Juwaynī's attitude of confusing theological problems with philosophical ones had on al-Ghazālī's theological method.

II. AL - GHAZÁLÍ.

With al-Ghazáli we find a more fertile soil that has succeeded in producing a more orderly theological method, differing in many respects from al-Juwaynî's method and exhibiting a trend towards renovation (ta'jdid) and towards the engrafting of new ideas upon old ones, on a more tangible and comprehensive scale. We also find that al-Ghazáli's theological method shows some philosophical trends as well as some tendencies towards mysticism. This, no doubt, came as the inevitable result of his having made an extensive and exhaustive study of the literature and culture of his age and of various trends of thought which developed at that time especially in the sphere of metaphysics which is the special concern of theology - e.g., matters concerning the entity of God, His attributes and His acts, and the proof of His existence and oneness and the veracity of the message of His Apostles, etc.

There were three paths to reaching certain knowledge of these spiritual facts; and these were: 1) the path of the philosophers; 2) the path of the theologians; and 3) the path of the mystics (sufis).
The supreme bliss is the knowledge of God in His attributes and His acts and of the beginning and end of being. There were two paths to this goal—the first by reasoning and argument, and the second by training and discipline. Those who followed the first path were the neoplatonist philosophers; those who followed the first path and the Prophet were the theologians; and those who followed the second and the Prophet were the mystics.

We find that al-Ghazâlî, in his treatment of theological problems and in the method to which he adheres in this regard, often mixes and combines dialectical speculation with the provisions of the Shari'ah (The Islamic canon law, based on the provisions of the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah)) and with the intuition of the mystics.

He presents us in his book al-Munqidh min ad-Dalâl (The Deliverer from Error) with a history of his intellectual life and with the attitude which he adopted towards these and other forms of reasoning. He exposes the hardships which he had encountered in extracting the truth from the midst of the multiplicity of faiths and doctrines, and shows how he elevated himself above the sphere of blind (taqlîd) to the rank of investigation and scrutiny (istibâr) by his examination
and scrutiny of the doctrines of every sect and school of thought. He sought true practical knowledge by means of ascertaining the attributes of the intuitive instincts of man before man came into touch with accidental convictions. Al-Ghazâlî did not discover in his research into this subject anything except the "tangibles" (maḥūsāt) and the "self-evidents" (darūrīyāt) that can possibly be regarded as ranking equally with knowledge gained through personal experience. On further examination and research, however, he discovered that even the "tangibles" are not so free from doubt and illusion as to warrant implicit trust; for the eye of man often deceives, as when it perceives the shadow as stationary while in fact that shadow is transitional, and when it perceives the stars as small in size when in fact they are larger than the earth. For this reason, he abandoned his trust in the "tangibles" and was left with the "self-evidents." At a later stage, he even entertained doubt in the sphere of the "self-evident" for, he says, "Perhaps behind the comprehension by the mind lies another fact which, if revealed, would belie the verdict of the mind, in the same way as the intervention of the mind would belie the verdict of the senses. The fact that such a realization is not revealed does not of itself imply
its impossibility." Al-Ghazali persisted in his doubt of the intellectual "self-evidents" until God restored to him his trust in them. Al-Ghazali says of this: "And that did not come by the advance of proof or the presentation of a theological argument, but came as a result of a light instilled by Almighty God in the heart; and that light is the key to most knowledge... And whoever thinks that the exposition is dependent upon bare proofs degrades thereby from the wide and abounding mercy of Almighty God." At that stage he began to review the intellectual trends of his age and to study the creeds and methods of every sect, critically investigating their proofs and the extent to which these proofs may suit the individual, and examining the benefit which these proofs may confer in confirming the belief in the tenets of faith and in strengthening that belief, and the harm that these proofs may inflict by shaking the belief in the tenets of faith by introducing doubt and suspicion into the mind of the believer.

Al-Ghazali's research in this topic involves two main trends. The first embodied a "negative critical attitude" which takes two forms.

1) Al-Mungidh Min-ad-Dalal p.6.
2) Al-Mungadha min-ad-Dalal p.7.
One of these two forms is his attitude towards the philosophers. He outlines this in his book Taháfut al- Falásifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) in which he proffers a reply to the philosophers, criticizes their views, refutes their dialectics and argues with them on the score of their method of philosophy and disputation and their logic. He opposes their theoretical deductions by similar theoretical deductions, without solving or unravelling the former, in order to show the falsehood of their propositions and their inability to substantiate the arguments they advance. In other words, al-Ghazálí does not furnish irrevocable proof of the propositions he advances and in which he believes, but he impeaches the argument of the philosophers - as he says - "in the manner which a denying claimant would adopt, and not in the manner which a proving asserter would adopt."

The other form concerns al-Ghazálí's attitude to the theologians. He outlines this in his book al-Munigídh min ad-Dalál and on various other occasions in his other works, like Thyá'Ulûm ad-Dín (Revivification of the Religious Sciences), al-Iqtisád fî l-I'tiqád and Iljâm al-'Awâm 'an 'Ilm al-Kalâm (The Reining of the Commonalty from the Science of Kalam(Theology)).

1) Taháfut al-Falásifah: p.13; see also p.78 for comparison.
He criticizes the science of theology and the method of the theologians and rejects the suitability of their scholastic discourses for all manners of people without distinction. He condemns the theologians for limiting their pursuit of knowledge to the extent to which rational proofs and logical arguments can take them. Al-Ghazālī asserts that the purpose of theology is the preservation of the tenets of the faith from confusion by the sceptics, and he outlines the path that will lead to the true and firm knowledge of God and of the other heavenly conceptions and divine facts. The proofs offered by the theologians appeared to him to be weak and insufficient for the purpose of fulfilling this object. Although he concedes that the theologians had done good work in defending the tenets of the faith, he nevertheless says that "they relied in this on propositions which they had received from their opponents and in which they had been forced to concede either as a result of imitation (taqlīd) or of consensus of the Muslim peoples (ijmā‘), or merely as a result of acceptance from the Qur ʾān and the Traditions of the Prophet (Hādīth). Their main efforts were directed to the exposure of the contradictions of opponents and to blaming these opponents for the implications and consequences of their admissions... and this is of little
benefit as regards those who do not admit anything other than those that are self-evidents (daruriyat)...

Theology was not to me adequate, nor did it provide a remedy for the complaint from which I suffered..." 

Al-Ghazālī reaffirms in al-Mungidh min ad-Dalāl and in his book Maqāsid al-Falāsifah (The purposes of the Philosophers), that no person can assert the falsehood of any science or be able to criticize any of its propositions or proofs unless he has complete mastery of that science and can rightly claim to be the most learned and knowledgeable person in it, and unless he be in addition, able to claim that he perceived in his research into that subject more than what has been perceived by those who are alleged to be proficient in that science. For this reason, al-Ghazālī was not happy at the attitude of the theologians to the philosophers, and was not satisfied with the arguments and methods adopted by the theologians in criticizing the arguments of the philosophers, because he held the view that the attitude of the theologians was not inspired or animated by an adequate knowledge of the science of philosophy. He says: "Those theologians who were engaged in criticizing the philosophers did not devote their attention to the complete mastery of their sciences; and that which appeared in the books of the theologians was confined

1) Al-Mungidh min ad-Dalāl: p. 9.
2) q.v. p. 8.
to confused and vague words of apparent contradiction, which it would be thought would not have been adopted by a common ignorant person, to say the least of those who profess meticulous knowledge of science. For these reasons, the methods of the theologians did not lead to the affirmation or strengthening of the tenets of faith in the minds of the believers - on the contrary, it rather disturbed these convictions and made them into something of "a light thread suspended in air" At this stage al-Ghazālī compares the faith of the commonalty with the faith of the theologians; and he comes out with the conclusion that the faith of the commonalty is firmer and sounder than that of the theologians who build their faith and convictions on methods of argument and disputation. The faith of the theologians, he says "is like a thread suspended in the air, moving helplessly in the direction of every breeze." He makes an exception, in this description, of the theologians who have perceived the proofs and adopted them by imitation, in the same way as they had adopted the doctrines intended to be proved. His argument is that there is in essence no difference in the sphere of imitation between learning the proof and learning of the thing which it seeks to prove. But the adoption of

1) ibid p. 9, 10, & 11; see also a similar statement in Ḥaḍā'ātu l-Īlam ad-Dīn; Vol. I, p. 83.
the proof is one thing, and the demonstration by
scholastic speculation is something entirely different.
The **Sharī'ah** did not impose on the commonalty of the
Arabs a greater duty than that of implicitly trusting
and believing in these tenets. The commonalty had
never been charge with the duty of investigating or
embarking upon research into the origin and proof of
these tenets and articles of faith. Whoever desires
to follow the path of eternal life and pragmatism must
train and discipline himself and must follow the path
of righteousness so that the doors of guidance will
ultimately open before him and reveal to him the truth
of these tenets in the light of heavenly inspiration
instilled in his heart.

The second trend involved in al-Ghazālī's research
into this topic is one of positive affirmation. It also
takes two forms.

The first form consists in his reply to the philoso-
phers and to the theologians, where he convinced the
masses of the Muslims of the inherent incapacity of the
human mind to arrive at the truth, especially with regard
to matters of divinity and metaphysics. Thereby he paved
the way for the masses to surrender to the faith and to

1) **Mṣyā' Ulūm ad-Dīn**: Vol. I, pp. 83 -84
make of mysticism, which, he contended, would restore to them a frame of mind capable of conceiving and comprehending divine doctrines by the application of good taste and scrutiny after the purification of the soul with devotions and spiritual exercises. And so we find that he chose the path of mysticism and that finally, as he says, after experiences and experiments carried out by him over many years, he became convinced of the fact that "the Sufis (mystics) are those who in particular follow the path of God; and that their conduct is the best conduct and their method the most correct method." He believed that if a person followed sincerely such a path he would ultimately arrive at what is the essential purpose of religion—viz. the knowledge of the divine facts at which the human mind cannot arrive with the aid of logically demonstrable proofs and propositions. Thus he maintained that a person must realize the fact that the heart has "two doors"—one is "external" and consists of the senses; the other "opens from inside the heart" and consists of inspiration and intuition; "and if a person concedes in all these, it would then be impossible for him to confine the sciences to knowledge acquired by

1) al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl: p. 35.
personal study and to the carrying out of familiar (1) causes."

The second form comprises the formulation of his theological views and doctrines and his presentation of a method of disputation in scholastic theology, while making adequate provision for the aptitudes and capacities of different classes of persons. Al-Ghazali promised in Tahafut al-Falasifah to write another book to be entitled Qawa'id al-Aqa'id (The Bases of Doctrines), in which he would endeavour to substantiate the special theological views and doctrines which he held, on the lines he adhered to in Tahafut al-Falasifah, where he sought to refute the views advanced by the philosophers. The most important of his works which can be relied upon for the purpose of studying his theological views with regard to the scientists is Al-Iqtisad fi l-I tigad, while his books on this subject with regard to the (3) commonalty are: ar-Risalah al-Cudsiyuh and Iljam al-

Awm an Ilm al-Kalam.


2) Tahafut al-Falasifah: p. 78; see also al-Iqtisad fi l-
I tigad; p. 96.

3) In Ihya Ulum ad-Din (Vol. I, p. 37) al-Ghazali mentions these two books and assigns each of them to a partic-
ular class of persons. The book ar-Risalah al-Cudsiyuh is a compendium upon theology which he wrote for the m
Footnote (3) contd.

benefit of uninitiated young persons and those who should be regarded in a status similar to that of such young persons, by virtue of their immature or under-developed mentality or experience. He intended the book to be of particular use in protecting and strengthening the faith of this class of persons at times when false theological innovations arise, so that susceptible persons may not be deceived or tricked by these false and harmful innovations and so that they may utilize the arguments and statements contained in the book as a weapon against the arguments advanced by these false innovators. In al-Iqtisād fī l-I’tiqād he says that he did not depart from the subject of the scrutiny of the doctrines and tenets of faith to other theological discourses. The perusal of this book he allowed only to a person who possesses intelligence sufficiently alert and mature to prompt him to raise a question or to advance an opinion, a comment, or an argument on the views it contains. If the book should provide such an inquirer or critic with an answer that convinces him, then he should be satisfied. Otherwise, the inquirer's or critic's problem should be regarded as chronic, in which case the mercy of God must be prayed for and His enlightenment and guidance awaited. The enquirer or critic in this case may then be blessed with the revel-
Footnote (3) contd.

...ation of the whole and potent truth, or he may remain in the throes of doubt until the day appointed by Him. He says: "The material contained in that book and in treatises of a similar nature is that which can be hoped to bestow benefit... Material of the kind not contained in that book is of two classes - the one is a discourse on matters other than those relating to tenets of faith... and the other is an additional affirmation of these proofs in doctrines other than these doctrines, and additional questions and answers. And this is also an investigation that can only add confusion and ignorance to those who have not been satisfied with that measure."

(İnıyâ' ‘Ulûm ad-Dîn : Vol. I, p. 37)
In the introduction to his book **al-I'tiqād fī l-I'tiqād**, al-Ghazālī wages a very severe campaign against the ḥaṣbawīyah for their acceptance of blind (taqlīd) in the matter of doctrines of faith, and for their adherence to the literal or textual meaning of the religious texts (ṣawātī‘ ah-shar‘īyah). He also directs an attack against the philosophers and the extremists amongst the muṣtilītīs for their having exaggerated the power and authority of the mind and its freedom, so that thereby they put reason in opposition to scriptural proofs (ṣawātī‘ ah-shar‘īyah).

He says: "The tendency of those is towards reminiscences (tafrīt) and the tendency of the others is towards extravagance (ifrāt); and both of them are far from wisdom and caution. But the essential purpose in the dogmas of faith is the adherence to moderation and the following of the rightful path; since both the extremes of matters are abhorrent. And how can enlightenment prevail amongst those who are content with imitating the tradition while denying the methods of speculation and ignoring the fact that the truth of the Prophet is proved by reason..." (1)

This means that al-Ghazālī holds the view that the theological method should be based equally upon reason and tradition (The Qurʾān, the Sunnah and ḥijā‘), and that to confine theology to one of them is an im-

perfection in the method of proving and an ignorance of the thing to be proved. This is so because, he holds, theological propositions, from the point of view of the acquisition of knowledge of them, are divided into three categories. These are:

1. Propositions which can be known by reason without need of the evidence of the Sharī'a.

2. Propositions which can be known by the evidence of the Sharī'a without need of reason.

3. Propositions which can be known by both these means.

Examples of the first category are propositions such as the creation of the world, the existence of the Creator and His knowledge, power and will - all of which are matters precedent in rank to al-Kalām. If these propositions are not substantiated, then al-Kalām can have no basis upon which to rest. Al-Kalām itself cannot be substantiated by means of the provisions of the Sharī'a, and the only means to attain this purpose is the use of reason. An example of the second category of theological propositions is the designation of one of two possible things to occur - e.g., the Resurrection, the Day of Judgement, the reward and punishment accorded.

1) al-Iqtisād fi l-I'tiqād : pp. 53 -96.
in the Hereafter, and similar propositions; since the verification of the truth of these propositions cannot be known except through revelation from God. Examples of the third category are all propositions which fall within the sphere of reasoning but come second to the word of God in so far as matters of proving are concerned - e.g., questions of "vision" (ru'yā) and the fact that God alone is the Creator of all movement, accidents and other similar things.

Al-Ghazālī defines the attitude of reason towards traditional (sanā'ī) proofs; and in doing so he carefully avoids getting involved in the conflict which some have perceived between rational and traditional proofs. In his view, the mind can adopt only one of the following three attitudes towards anything handed down by tradition:

a) the mind may state the possibility of believing in what is proved by the traditional proofs;

b) the mind may state the impossibility of believing in what is proved by the traditional proofs; or

c) the mind may take a passive attitude and refrain from making any statement upon either the possibility or the impossibility of believing in what is proved by the traditional proofs.
In the first case, the traditional proofs may be so conclusive and positive in their transmission (ṣanād) and text (mātān) that what is proved by them must be believed. Where doubt and suspicion about the text or transmission of these traditional proofs occur, then what is proved by them must not be believed. In the second case, the words of the traditional proofs must be interpreted because it is not reasonable to assume that a traditional proof can embody propositions that are opposed to the verdict of reason. In the third case it is also imperative to believe in traditional proofs.

In this manner, al-Ghazālī defines the attitude of the Sharī‘ and of reason towards theological problems and the manner of their substantiation. The meaning of the term "reason" (‘aql), which al-Ghazālī contrasts with the Sharī‘, remains ambiguous, or at least too general and comprehensive in its purport. He makes frequent use of the term ‘aql and conveys with it different meanings on different occasions. What, then, does al-Ghazālī mean by ‘aql? Is it that faculty of knowledge and comprehension which on certain occasions he calls "mind" and on other occasions he calls "spirit."

1) For further elucidation of this view see al-Iqtiṣād fi 1 I‘tīqād: pp. 94 - 95.
(rūḥ), "soul" (nafṣ), and "heart" (qalb)? Or does he mean those self-evident rational propositions, like the proposition that existence and non-existence cannot be present at one and the same time? Or does he mean the dialectical speculation the philosophers and the Mu tazilites employed in their arguments?

It would perhaps be advisable to delay the answer to this question until we examine al-Ghazālī's book al-Iqtisād fī l-Iʿtīqād and investigate some of the methods of proof which he employs in this book and which he lays down as the basis of his theological method.

After referring to the diversity of the methods of proof, which he discussed in detail in his book Miʿyār al-ʿIlm and referred to in his book Mihakk an-Nazar, al-Ghazālī decides to discard and ignore in al-Iqtisād all methods of proof that seemed to him ambiguous and doubtful. He thus confines himself to three methods, which he probably regarded as the most important bases of his theological method.

The first of these methods is the method of "Enumerative and Division" (as-sabr wa t-taqṣīm). According to this method, he classifies a proposition as being one of only two alternatives, and he then

proceeds to invalidate one of these alternatives, thereby proving the other alternative. An example of this is the statement that the world is either a thing originated (ḥadīth) or is a thing pre-eternal (qādim) (i.e., that there was no beginning to its existence). And as it is impossible for it to be prior to all things, he holds that it must be a thing originated. This conclusion, as is seen, is derived from the two alternative propositions, and cannot be so deduced unless these two propositions are correlated one to the other in a special manner and under special conditions.

The second method is the Aristotelian syllogism of two propositions to produce a third proposition. An example of this would be to say: "Whatever is not free from things originated is itself a thing originated"; and "The world is not free from things originated." These two propositions would thus inevitably lead to the conclusion that: "The world is thing originated."

1) The first premise is: "The world is either a thing originated, or a thing pre-eternal"; and the second is: "It is impossible for it to be pre-eternal."
The third method is to assert the impossibility of the opponent's claim. This is done by demonstrating that the opponent's claim will lead to impossibility, and that what leads to impossibility must itself be equally impossible. An example of this would be to say: "If the claim of the philosophers that 'the revolutions of the celestial sphere have no end,' than the philosophers must concede, as a corollary to this assertion, that 'whatever has no end is ended and finished with.'" And the latter conclusion, which follows upon the first, is, of course, evidently impossible, and would invalidate the major proposition.

Al-Ghazâlî proceeds to support and strengthen these methods by elucidating the differences and variations that may exist between some of them, from the point of view of the benefit derived therefrom by speculative analogy and also from the point of view of the cogent force that they may hold in inducing conviction. He demonstrates how we must inevitably arrive at the final conclusions if the opponent concedes the assumed premises. What would happen, however, if the opponent were to refuse to concede all these premises of the proof or some of them? To meet such an eventuality, al-Ghazâlî analyzes and classifies the propositions used for demonstrating evidence into self-evident and non-controversial propositions conceded by everyone. These, he maintains,
should form the basis of the proof, and the introductory premises should thus rest upon them, either directly or by means of another line of reasoning. These premises, which are in their nature axiomatic, fall into six categories:

1. Premises based upon the judgements of the senses.

By this he means things perceived and trusted by outward or inward vision and realization. If we say that "every originated thing has a cause" and that "in the world there are originated things," then we must deduce that these latter originated things must have causes. The truth of the first premise can be readily ascertained by the senses; because we perceive and ascertain by our senses the existence and presence of human beings, animals, vegetation, clouds and rain; and because we perceive and ascertain the condition, colour and movement from place to place of these things. We also perceive by inward realization the occurrence of spiritual phenomena like joy and pain. In these circumstances, the opponent cannot fail to concede this self-evident or a priori major premise.
2. Premises that are purely intellectual.

If we say: "The world is either eternal prior to other things or originated following other things," then every reasonable person must concede the fact that the world is an originated thing. We arrive at such a conclusion in the following manner: Firstly we say that everything which does not precede originated things is itself an originated thing; and secondly we say that the world does not precede any originated thing; and thirdly we say that therefore the world is an originated thing.

The first proposition is an intellectual one, and any reasonable person cannot fail to concede it; because everything which does not precede originated things can either come into existence at the same time as these originated things, or at a later time. There can be no other alternative; and if the opponent should allege such other alternative, he would be in direct opposition to the things that reason made self-evident.
3. Premises supported by Traditions related by successive witnesses. An example of this would be to say: a) "The Prophet Muhammad is truthful because the divine miracle is evidence of his truthfulness"; and b) "The person who has a divine miracle as evidence of his truthfulness is indeed truthful." The opponent cannot deny the existence of the divine miracle, because this fact is substantiated by traditions reported to us by successive witnesses, and because knowledge of it is derived and ascertained in the same manner as knowledge of the existence of Muhammed, Jesus, Moses and all the other Prophets of old.

4. Premises verified by other means. These premises are based upon either "sensual," "mental" or "traditional" evidence. Thus, after we substantiate, by the use of any one of these methods of proof, the fact that the world is an originated thing, the origination of the world would become a given or assumed premise which can then be drawn upon for the purpose of proof and be regarded as having strength equal to that of sensual or intellectual premises.
5. Premises based upon the semā'i (The Qur'ān, the Sunnah and ijma'). If we say that: "All sins occur by the Will of God"; and if we seek to substantiate this proposition as follows: a) "All that occurs in this world is by the will of God," and b) "Sin occurs in this world" - then the truth of the second proposition would be substantiated as much by the senses as by the Sharī'. The existence of "sin" can be proved by the senses, and the factum of its sinful quality is known by the Sharī'. The opponent cannot deny the first proposition, if he at all admits the validity of the Sharī' of Islam.

6. Premises derived from the beliefs held by the opponent and the admissions made by him. Such premises, although not amenable to direct substantiation by cogent proofs, and although not verified by either sensual or intellectual evidence, may nevertheless be made use of if admitted by an opponent. They can then be used as premises in our proof, and the opponent cannot deny them except at the risk of vitiating the whole of his argument or doctrine.
These various kinds of axiomatic premises vary in their power to induce conviction, and also in the scope in which they can be made use of for the purpose of proof. The first and second categories are general and carry conviction in the eyes of all people, excepting, of course, those persons who possess no intellect or trustworthy senses. The third is considered acceptable only to those who have accepted the truth of the report of the Tradition — for there are cases where the report of certain traditions have been brought to and have prevailed amongst certain people but have not been brought to or prevailed amongst others. For example, the view of al-Shafi'i with regard to the question of a Muslim being punished by death for killing a dhimmī (a Christian or a Jew under Muslim rule) is prevalent amongst and adhered to by the Muslim jurists of his school of thought, but it is not so prevalent amongst the Muslim commonalty or amongst those jurists who indulged in the acceptance of authority (taqlīd). The fourth category is considered convincing only by those who are familiar with the method of analogy (i.e., deduction by close comparison) and who appreciate the essential pre-requisites for the operation of this method in a way that will make it possible to draw upon it for the purpose of providing a consistent argument leading to a valid con-
clusion. The fifth category can convince only those who accept the validity of the *samāʾī* and its authenticity. The sixth category of premises does not convince the investigator himself, but is helpful to a person when opposed to another in an argument to convince that other person of things analogous to what he (the other person) believes in.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question posed earlier, as well as the definition and assessment of what al-Ghazālī intends by the term "reason" (‘āqil) as opposed to the "shari‘), have, I hope, become clearer. By the term "reason," al-Ghazālī means the faculty of comprehension in human beings, which ascertains the truth of things by means of speculation and through the scrutiny of antecedent premises advanced for the purpose of proof and through the realization of the manner in which the conclusion must be derived and begotten of the premises. This mental process is usually confined to the deductive method of reasoning known as the Aristotelian syllogism, which has a special composition and form of operation, and which cannot produce convincing conclusions unless certain given or assumed propositions are present. It is as

if the conditions under which al-Ghazālī lived, and the stand which he took against powerful opponents like the philosophers and the Mu‘tazilites, were the factors that forced him to make use of mental reasoning on the lines of the Aristotelian method syllogism, and to resort to that method in solving the complicated problems that had baffled his Sunnite predecessors. The Sunnites had avoided this method of reasoning and did not employ it for the solution of theological problems; in fact, they had strictly forbidden its use in jurisprudence in general and in theology in particular.

Al-Ghazālī sounds an early warning in this respect by pointing out that the method which he outlines must not be employed indiscriminately by everyone nor must it be taught to everyone. In his view, people should be classified into various classes and categories as far as their adherence to this method or their avoidance of its use. He also hastens to point out that the proofs which he employs in theology must be regarded as things in the nature of medicines used for the treatment of those suffering from ailments in belief. The "physician" using these medicines must be sufficiently skillful so as not to cause more harm than good by their use. He also holds the view that

the commonalty, by virtue of the fact that they cannot free themselves of the limitations of the senses, do not possess a wide enough range of mental capacity to be able to seek knowledge through mental speculation and dialectical argument. For this reason, they must not be allowed to go beyond the provisions of the Qur’ān and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (the Sunnah) and the study of jurisprudence. The reason he offers is that the proofs contained in the Qur’ān are akin to food from the consumption of which every person can derive benefit; while the disputations of the theologians are like medicines from the consumption of which only particular individuals can benefit.

1) Al-Ghazālī reiterates similar statements in his book Iljām al-‘Awām ‘an Ilm al-Kalām. He says: "Mental speculation in theology is a great sea, and the ordinary person must not immerse himself in it... He must hold tenaciously to the apparent purport of the Book (the Qur’ān) and the Sunnah, without interpreting their provisions; for interpretation by the ordinary person is like a dive into the sea by one who cannot swim..." In the category of the "commonalty" al-Ghazālī places such persons as the intellectuals, the grammarians, the narrators or reporters of the Traditions, the commentators upon the Sharī‘ah, and the jurists and theologians, and all such persons as have not devoted themselves wholly =
For these reasons, al-Ghazālī divides people, *via a via* this method of disputation, into four classes:

1. Those who believe in God and His Prophet and in the provisions of the Qur'ān, and who are engaged in devotion or in trade. Such persons must be left to their beliefs, and their faith must not be interfered with or disturbed by their being exhorted to study this science. Al-Ghazālī asserts that the *Shari'ah* of Islam does not impose on people or ask of them more than implicit trust in the main articles of faith, be that trust the result of convincing evidence demonstrated or proved to them. A guiding precedent in this respect was set by the Prophet Muhammad who accepted unconditionally the conversion to Islam of some members of the ignorant lower classes amongst the Arabs. These persons were amongst the first to believe in his Message, and their belief was animated not by any examination or proof of the veracity of the Message, but solely by a simple imagination and inspiration that

(Footnote (1), P.53 contd.)

—to learning to swim in the seas of "knowledge" with sincerity, devotion, and submission to the provisions of the law. (see pp. 17 & 18)

Al-Munqiqīn.
entered their hearts and guided them into submitting to the truth. These persons must be regarded as true believers in every sense of the word, and their belief must not be disturbed or muddled by confessing before their eyes theological proofs and the replies to these proofs as well as the rejoinders, surrejoinders, rebutters and surrebutters, etc. which they evoke. Thus we find that the companions of the Prophet Muhammad had at no time indulged in theology or in dialectics, either by their study of these subjects, or by teaching them to others.

2. Those who have departed from true belief, like the unbelievers (kāfir) and the innovators (mubtadīʾ), who persisted in the blind acceptance of things which were inculcated in them by their fathers. With such persons nothing can avail except the application of force and the use of the whip and the sword. It is true, of course, that many non-believers had entered the fold of Islam under the shadow of brandished swords; and "God attains by the sword and the spear what He does not attain by the
tongue and proof..." Al-Ghazālī supports his view in favour of the use of force against those who are opposed to Islam by the fact that many of those who believed in other religions had accepted Islam after the Muslims had achieved victory against them in battle. He also supports his contention by saying that many of the traditional gatherings and councils amongst the Muslims during which were held discourses and debates on intellectual subjects, resulted more often in confirming and strengthening the doggedness and indocility of inexorable sceptics or innovators. Al-Ghazālī, however, makes one reservation in this respect when he says: "And do not think that all that I have related here are detractions from the status of the mind or from its evidence. The light of reason, however, is a blessing which God does not bestow except upon a few of those who love Him (awliyā'); and thus the inability and neglect is more prevalent amongst mankind, for by their incapacity they cannot comprehend mental proofs, in the same way as the
light of the sun does not reach the eyes of bats..."

3. Those who have believed in the truth by imitating others in their beliefs or through tradition and custom, but who also possess an instinctive or innate intelligence which has led them to perceive some doubts or misgivings on the subject of their beliefs and to entertain in their mind some scruples or uncertainties on the subject. Persons falling in this class must be tackled gently and tactfully. An attempt at removing the misgivings or uncertainties which they entertain may take the form either of 1) the quotation to them of relevant texts from the Qur'ān or from the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad; or, 2) the quotation to them of pronouncements relevant to the subject on which they entertain misgivings or doubts, made by a noted person whose eminence and integrity they fully recognise. If their intelligence be so keen that they should not be convinced except by being offered proof which could stand exhaustive scrutiny and examination, then, and only then, may theo-
logical proof be tendered to them. But theological proof in this manner must not go beyond their particular need and must relate, as far as possible, only to the sphere in which they entertain doubts or qualms.

4. Those who have left the fold of truth, but who exhibit signs of aptitude and perspicacity, and who may be expected to revert to the acceptance of the truth by reason of the fact that their belief at its early stages was marred and disturbed by doubt and suspicion, and also by reason of the fact that they exhibit or entertain an instinctive readiness to re-embrace the truth. Such persons must also be tackled gently and with caution and tact. Little can be achieved for the purpose of bringing them to re-embrace the truth by blatant and obstinate argument and disputation; for there is great danger of their reacting to such an attitude by developing a sense of extreme contumacy. (1)

For these reasons, a person is not to be regarded as eligible to practice theology merely because he possesses a high social standing. The practice of theology must be

1) See for these four classes Al-Iqtisād pp. 6 & 7.
confined solely to those who possess the necessary mental aptitude and fitness.

Al-Ghazālī then proceeds to assess the value and efficacy of the science of theology, and to consider its position vis-à-vis the other sciences. He contrasts theology particularly with jurisprudence (fiqh) as a science connected with the Shari‘ah of Islam and with medicine as a science connected with mundane matters. He justifies the fact that the practice of theology is an incumbent duty upon certain fit persons by maintaining that the disturbance of beliefs by the intervention of doubts and suspicions is always possible, although it does not in fact occur very frequently. And when such suspicion and doubt concern essential doctrines of faith, then their removal and eradication is a duty imposed by the provisions of the Shari‘ah. For these reasons, the exhortation and inducement by means of cogent proof to the perception and acceptance of the truth is an important aspect of the religion; and such exhortation and inducement cannot be achieved except through the instrumentality of theology. And thus it is essential that there should be available in every country a fit and capable person who would act as the stalwart of the truth and utilize the weapons of theology against the sceptics and the innovators, and
thereby rid the minds of the followers of Islam from harmful doubts and suspicions. And if one country should not have such a person available, then the whole of its inhabitants should ask for one to be supplied to them. Al-Ghazalí, however, regards jurisprudence as more important in practice than theology. Thus, if a country should have neither jurists nor theologians, and one of the inhabitants of that country should consider that he has an aptitude to learn these two sciences and to master them, then, should the time and opportunity at his disposal permit him to engage only in one of them, it would be his duty to the community to engage in jurisprudence rather than in theology. The reason he assigns for this is that the need for jurisprudence is greater and is on a much wider scale than that of theology; since theology is akin to the science of medicine, medicine being needed only by those who have bodily ailments, and theology being needed only by those who have mental and doctrinal ailments. In this way al-Ghazalí allots jurisprudence a place higher and more important than that of theology; and he reinforces his view by the fact that the Companions of the Prophet had at no time engaged in theology, while they had engaged in jurisprudence. He comments upon the views of those who gave theology an ascendancy over jurisprudence
and maintains that theology is the root while jurisprudence is the branch, by saying: "It is a truthful view; but of little use in this respect. The root is true faith and implicit belief, and these are things that occur as a result of the acceptance of authority (taqlíd); and this makes the need for proof and disputation rather scanty." (1)

In this way al-Ghazâlî demarks the capabilities of different classes of persons, and divides his method into several small compartments which he allots to the appropriate classes of persons in conformity with their needs, mental aptitudes and intellectual or scientific attainments. It should be noted in this regard that he makes no provision at all in this arrangement which is outlines in his book al-Iqtiṣâd for the method of mysticism which he had personally recognised and accepted as a means of attaining true knowledge especially in the sphere of tenets of faith.

I have referred at an earlier stage to al-Ghazâlî's views on theoretical proofs and his assertion that they cannot lead to true knowledge. In this regards, the question may be asked of al-Ghazâlî as to what he would have said if this method (which he outlines in al-Iqtiṣâd) were not to lead to indubitable and incontrovertible knowledge in any one of the problems of theology. Would he have answered that the believers should be left in

1) al-Iqtiṣâd, p. 9.
the whirlpool of doubt and suspicion? Or is there a missing link to complete this chain, or a stage to follow upon this mental process, which, if traced and undertaken by a person, would be likely to lead him to implicit belief? He mentions in al-Iqtisād that this implicit belief comes as a result of Taqlīd; while in Ihyā’ Ulūm ad-Dīn he divides belief into the following kinds.

1. The belief of the commonalty. This is founded entirely upon pure imitation and unconditional acceptance of authority and submission to it (taqlīd). In al-Iqtisād he refers to this kind of belief as "belief by the acceptance of authority" (at-taṣdiq at-taqlīdī).

2. The belief of the theologians. He calls this kind of belief "proved belief" (at-taṣdiq al-burhānī). It is the by-product of different kinds of mental reasoning. The belief of the theologians he asserts, is similar to that of the commonalty.

3. The belief of the gnostics (ārifīn). This kind of belief is the result of incontrovertible perception (binūr al-yaqīn) in the light of truth." He refers to it as "action coupled with belief" (al-‘amal ma‘ at-taṣdiq).

1) q.v. p.9
3) See also al-Iqtisād pp. 101 - 102.
Al-Ghazālī assimilates the belief of the first kind to the belief of a person who, upon hearing that a certain man is present inside a particular house, believes in the fact that that man is so present. Belief of the second kind is akin to that of a person who hears the voice of the man in the previous example and only then comes to believe in his presence inside the house. The third kind of belief is similar to that of the person who believes in the presence of the man inside the house only after he himself enters the house and perceives the man with his own eyes.

In the case of the first kind of belief, there is always the possibility that some error may have crept into what the believers had heard. For this reason, al-Ghazālī places those whose belief is of this kind in the category of "those on the Right" (ashāb al-yamīn) literally those who sit on the right side of God in Paradise and does not consider them to be in the class of "The Honoured Ones" (al-mugarrabūn) - those who sit near God in Paradise.

In the second kind of belief, there is an equal danger of error on the part of the believers. In the third kind of belief, however, it is impossible to fall into error. The knowledge of the believers in that class, in the words of al-Ghazālī, "is the true knowledge and the incontrovertible perception; and is similar to the knowledge of "The Honoured Ones" and the Very Veracious (as-siddīqūn)."
because they believe as a result of perception. Their belief includes the belief of the commonalty and that of the theologians; and they are characterized by their reliance upon evidence which makes error impossible."

Al-Ghazālī thus regards belief animated by blind acceptance of authority as the lowest grade of belief, and one most likely to lead to errors in faith. Ranking above that kind of belief is the belief founded upon dialectic disputation and mental speculation. The belief par excellence, however, and one which al-Ghazālī places in the highest stage, is the one which cannot be attained by either of these two media. The only way to attain it is by the practice of mysticism which al-Ghazālī accepted and in which he trusted implicitly, and which he regarded as the surest and safest way to the realisation of metaphysical facts free from doubt or hesitation of any kind. Those facts, which are the concern of theology, are the same facts that are the subject of mystic knowledge. If intellectual speculation should fail to unfold these facts to the speculator and fails to remove any doubts or to dispel any ambiguities shrouding them, then the functioning and operation of theology must cease and the speculator must relinquish his practices and wait "in the hope that there

will be unfolded before his eyes by the pursuit of
that path which had become fogged to those pursuing
(1)
this path. Al-Ghazâlî quotes evidence from the Qur'ân
and the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammed to prove that
this path is the right path and that it leads to the
perception of facts which the mind can never comprehend
by mere reasoning. One of the verses he quotes from
the Qur'ân is this: "... And whoever keeps his duty to
God, He ordains a way out for him (i.e. a way out of
doubts and suspicions); and gives him sustenance from
where he imagines not (i.e., He will give him knowledge
without learning)"; and he quotes from the Traditions
of the Prophet Muhammed this saying by him: "Whoever
acts upon what he knows, God will impart to him knowledge
of that which he does not know." Al-Ghazâlî maintains
that it is to this kind of knowledge, which is attained
solely by divine inspiration, that God refers when he
says: "... And whom We had taught knowledge from "Ourselves."

1) Mizân al-'Amal: pp. 39 - 40. This is confirmed in
Ityâ', v.3, pp. 16,20,22, and several other places.
2) The Qur'ân (Translation by Muhammed 'Alî - Lahore);
65; 2 & 3.
3) The Qur'ân (Translation by Muhammed 'Alî - Lahore)
q. 18; v.65.
(i.e., imparted to him knowledge other than by the usual channels - education and study).

On these lines al-Ghazālī introduces his mystic tendencies to his theological method, seeking by the former to complement the latter, either directly or indirectly, in accordance with the tenor of his various lines of thought. He does so in spite of the fact that he makes no clear or distinct provision for mysticism in his book al-Iqtisād, where he demarks the boundaries of his theological method. Such traces of mystic thought may be detected in some of the solutions which al-Ghazālī offers for theological problems; and I hope to draw attention to these instances in due course.

**COMPARISON**

In the light of this exposition, we may now compare the methods of al-Ghazālī and al-Juwaynī.

There are many differences, but there is also considerable similarity between them on some points.

Each of them, before founding his own system and reaching his own conclusions criticized the insufficiency of the methods and tenets previously in honour among Muslims. In criticizing these former methods and beliefs, they gave deep thought to what it would be right to

retain and what it would be necessary to reject;
but in the end their doubts gave rise to two different systems.

They both relied on the text of the Qur'an, on the traditions, and on Ijmā' as their main sources, and they both sought the deep rather than the literal meaning of the scriptures. They also each of them conceded a place— but not the same one—to Rationalism in theology.

Al-Juwaynī regarded as-Sabr wa t-Taqsīm the rational foundation of religious belief. He excluded Aristotelian logic in his own theological speculation; yet, by making use of it for juristic argument in al-Burhān, he paved the way for al-Ghazālī to use it in theology and philosophy.

Al-Ghazālī explained his method more fully, as when he spoke of dividing people into four categories regarding their ability to understand, of adapting his methods to each of these categories, of degrees of faith and classes of believers, and of set lines of argumentation.

Because al-Ghazālī was more explicit than al-Juwaynī in these details, Muslims came to consider his method more fruitful and better suited to the understanding
of ordinary people. In fairness to al-Juwaynī, however, it must be pointed out that hints of these processes of thought can be found in his own argumentation.

What distinguishes al-Ghazālī is that when the methods of previous scholastic theologians proved insufficient, he allowed the mystic way to be immixed with them although this appears most clearly in the Ḥiyāʾ; this sphere of experience, al-Juwaynī neglected altogether.
CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF GOD.

PART I.

The difficulty of its definition.

Theology does not give an exact definition of the essence of God. Theological discussions only try to describe His nature by defining His attributes and their special characteristics (ahkāma-hā). These attributes, in al-Juwayni's view, are divided into two classes:

1. **Sifāt naṣī'īyah**: these are essential attributes, which exist as long as the thing described itself exists. There is no casual relationship between them and the nature of God. Such are the attributes of existence (wujūd) and eternity (baqā').

2. **Sifāt ma' nawīyah**: Besides the established attributes of God's nature — as, for example, power, will, knowledge, etc. — there are the grounds for these attributes, namely His being powerful or omnipotent, His being willing, His being knowing. The latter are called sifāt ma nawīyah, which might perhaps be translated as "conceptual attributes."

In this chapter, I shall deal with the first class of attributes, giving special importance to God's existence and unity, and to al-Juwayni's way of proving them; a later
chapter will be devoted to the second class.

God, as al-Juwaynī characterises Him, has no beginning and no end; unlike created things, He is causeless; He is not body (jism), nor is He corporal (jismānī); He is not accident, and not substance. Al-Juwaynī goes to some length to prove that God is not substance (jawhar), arguing against the Christian idea of the Hypotases (al-aqānim ath-thalāthah) and explaining the connection between it and the idea of al-Aḥwāl, in which some Muslim theologians believe.

PART II.

The Existence and the One-ness of God.

1. The Existence of God.

A. Al-Juwaynī

Al-Juwaynī bases our knowledge of the existence of God on the origination of the Universe; this, in his view, requires the affirmation of four propositions:

1) that there are accidents. 2) that accidents are originated. 3) that accidents cannot exist without a substance. 4) that nothing occurs (muḥdath) which has no beginning.

Al-Juwaynī then proceeds to prove all these propositions and to examine and rebut views inconsistent with them; but it is the first and second that he gives the greatest importance.

To prove his first proposition, he examines the movement of substance, its transference from one place to another, and shows that this necessitates a cause for...
the movement. Then he analyses that cause, deducing that it cannot be the nature of the substance itself, but must be something else. This other thing must be either a free agent (fā'īl mukhtār) or a "form" (ma'na mūjab) subsisting in the substance. It cannot be an agent, therefore it must be a "form." And this "form" is the accident, the existence of which he set out to prove.

In proving the origination of accidents, al-Juwaynī makes four preliminary points:

(a) what has no beginning can have no end, or that whose pre-eternity is established cannot be non-existent.

(b) the accident does not inhere in the accident, i.e., cannot subsist except in the substance.

(c) the movement or transfer of the accident from one substance to another is impossible.

(d) the idea of latency and emergence (al-kumūn wa z-zuhūr) is erroneous.

Al-Juwaynī gives special attention to the first of these points, because by proving it he also proves that God is everlasting. He therefore argues at length and in detail along the following lines: "The non-existence of the pre-eternal at a particular time is either

1) Al-Irshād, pp. 10 - 11.
necessary or possible or impossible. The first of these alternatives is absurd. As to the second, it presupposes a determinant (muqtadī) which makes its appearance when the pre-eternal has long been in existence.

This determinant must be either (1) an active agent, or (2) an originated opposite, or (3) the removal of one of the conditions of continued existence.

1. It is impossible that the determinant should be associated with any particular agent, because non-existence is mere negation.

2. It is also impossible to think of it as an originated opposite, as it would necessarily be in opposition to the pre-eternal before it (i.e. the originated opposite) deprived the pre-eternal of existence.

3. It cannot be the removal of a condition of existence, for if the existence of the pre-eternal is conditional, then the condition must be pre-eternal also; it would then need another determinant to determine its own removal from existence - and so on in an infinite regress.

It must be concluded, therefore, that it is impossible for the pre-eternal ever to become non-existent.

When he has made this and the other three preliminary points, al-Juwaynî draws the following conclusions: Substances do not precede accidents; what does not precede originated things is itself originated; consequently the universe, with its substances and accidents, is originated.

Both the existence and the non-existence of this originated universe are possible. If its possible existence comes about - against its continued non-existence, which is also possible - the mind posits intuitively and without recourse to rational proof that there must be a determinant to make it pass from non-existence to existence. In analysing this determinant, al-Juwaynî considers three alternatives: (a) that it is a necessary cause (‘illah mujibah) (b) that it is a natural agent (tabi‘ah) (c) that it is a free agent. (fā‘il mukhtār)

1) Irshād, p.16.
2) These terms need to be accurately distinguished. The free agent is the one that may act or desist from action in accordance with its own will. The natural agent brings about a certain action without exercise of its will or choice, provided that relevant conditions are present, and hindrances absent; such is the effect of fire on other things, i.e. burning: it is dependent on the presence of a certain condition, which is contact, and the absence of
Al-Juwaynī disproves the first two, and concludes that the determinant is a free agent. "It is therefore established," he writes, "that the determinant of originated things creates them freely, choosing for them particular forms and times. This free agent is the Creator of the Universe, or God."

This proves only that the Universe is in need of a Maker, not that the Maker exists, for it is possible to contend that the Maker is non-existent. Al-Juwaynī therefore proceeds with his proof of the existence of God with a comparison of the different concepts of non-existence adopted by Ahl as-Sunnah and the Mu‘tazilites. The latter asserted that non-existent things have attributes, and therefore had to concede that there may be a non-existent Maker of the Universe. Ahl as-Sunnah, however,

Footnote no.(2) contd. from P.73.

a hindrance, which is the humidity of the object, and the fire itself exerts no choice. As to the necessary cause, it is the one from which an action derives irrespective of the presence of certain conditions or the absence of hindrances; such is the movement of the finger, which necessitates the movement of the ring upon it. Here the effect inevitably follows the cause, whereas the natural asent may not give rise to any effect because a condition may be absent or a hindrance present.

1) Irshād, pp. 16-17.
hold that non-existence is absolute negation and that what is non-existent cannot have positive attributes, so that to speak of a negative Maker is self-contradiction. In his exposition, al-Juwaynī ascribes to the previous làmān the view that the existence of God is one of His attributes; he himself, however, maintains that the existence of God is not an attribute of His essence, but is the essence itself. "The acceptable view," he says "is not to consider existence one of the attributes, for existence is the essence itself... The Imāms - God be pleased with them - were being lax in considering existence as one of the attributes."

B. AL-GHAZĀLĪ

Al-Ghazālī's proof of the existence of God in Al-Iqtisād fi l-‘tiqād is, in its substance and in its broad lines, no different from al-Juwaynī's. Like al-Juwaynī, he builds up his argument on the origination of the Universe which consists of both substance and accident, and on the movement and immobility resulting from the transference of a substance from one place to another and its stabilization therein; step by step he comes to prove the need for a Maker both existent and pre-eternal, and in so doing he argues for the proposition that "what has no beginning can have no end" in

1) Al-Irshād, p.18.
much the same way as did al-Juwayni. Al-Ghazâlî differs from his master not in the premises he adopted but in the fact that often in the course of his argumentation he formulated possible objections to his contentions, and then undertook to rebut and confute these objections; indeed it seems that in this part of al-Iqtisâd al-Ghazâlî was strongly affected by his bitter and drawn-out controversy with the Falasifah on the subject of the pre-ternity of the Universe, broached in Tahafut al-Falâsifah.

Similarly, on the subject of as-Sifât an-Nafsîyah, al-Ghazâlî differs neither in substance nor in detail from al-Juwayni, although he devotes most of his space to disproving the attribution of position (jinah) to God, as will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.

2. THE ONE-NESS OF GOD

A. AL-JUWAYNĪ

Al-Juwaynî begins his discussion of the One-ness of God by defining what it means to theologians. He ascribes two meanings to the term:

1. God's indivisibility: there can be no parts and no division in Him, and

2. His Uniqueness: there is none like or equal to Him,

i.e. He can have no associate.

Al-Juwaynī proves the indivisibility of God in the following manner: If God were composed of several parts, each of these parts would be independent of the other, and it would then follow either (a) that only one of these parts would be characterized by knowledge, life, power, etc., or (b) that each would be characterized by all those attributes. The first of these alternatives is absurd, because to posit a pre-eternal Being that is not omnipotent, all-knowing, or living is a bald and arbitrary assertion without any proof to back it. As to the second alternative, it is tantamount to recognizing two gods, not two parts of one god, and is also to be rejected. In arguing against this polytheism, al-Juwaynī rests on the Qur'anic verse: "If there were in them (i.e. the Heavens and the Earth) other gods than Allah, their order would have been disrupted." This proof is the one which Muslim theologians term burhān at-tamānu', and which al-Juwaynī thus casts into the form of as-sabr wa t-taqsiyām: "If we assume the existence of two gods and of one body which one of the gods wills to move and the other wills to keep still, then all the possible results will be rationally unacceptable:

1) Al-Irshād, p. 31.
(a) if the wills of both are carried out, there will be motion and quiescence in the same body at the same time, and this is impossible.

(b) if the will of neither is carried out, there will be:

(i) a body deprived of both motion and quiescence, and this is absurd;

(ii) two gods incapable of exercising their will, and this also is absurd.

(c) if the will of one is carried out to the detriment of the other's the second would be proved to be impotent. Now if a pre-eternal Being is impotent, his impotence must also be pre-eternal and inherent, and this is absurd because impotence manifests itself in preventing an occurrence which is possible in itself, so that the creation of the possible Universe is inconsistent with impotence.

Al-Juwaynī then attacks the hypothesis that there can be two gods one of whom creates substances and the other accidents, without conflict or encroachment between them, and here again al-Juwaynī resorts to burhān at-tamānu'.

1) Al-Ishād, p. 31.
2) Al-Ishād, pp. 30-34.
This is the substance of al-Juwaynī's proof of the One-ness of God; although he devotes several pages of al-Irshād to the question, the bulk of this space is occupied by his anticipation and refutation of the counter-arguments of Muʿtazilite and other opponents.

B. AL-GHAZĀLI

Like al-Juwaynī, and with only slight elaboration of details, al-Ghazāli starts his investigation of the One-ness of God by defining the term. He ascribes to it two meanings:

1. that God is indivisible, for He has no quantity, and what has no quantity cannot be divided.
2. that God has no equal in degree and no opposite. That God has no opposite is evident since the opposite of a thing is that which alternates with it in the occupation of a place, and never shares it; now God has no place, and therefore can have no opposite. What is meant by the peerlessness (lā nidda lahū fī rutbatihī) of God is that no Being created by God and proceeding from Him can equal Him. In proving this proposition al-Ghazāli also makes use of burhān at-tamānu', but whereas al-Juwaynī illustrated it with the conflict of wills, al-Ghazāli drew his argument from the degrees of existence and of excellence: "If God has an associate, then this associate must be one of three:
(a) either equal to God in degree,
(b) or of higher degree than God,
(c) or of lower degree.

Each of these alternatives can be shown to be absurd. In the first case, duality implies variation; this variation may be in the nature (movement and colour, for example, are two different natures, although they may exist in the same place and at the same time), or it may be a variation in place or time, the nature being the same (an illustration of this would be two blacknesses, which cannot reside in one substance at one time). Now if God's associate is His equal in every way, his existence becomes impossible, for they cannot differ in nature since they are both presupposed to be pre-eternal, and they cannot differ in time or place since they are not bounded by time or place. Since therefore there can be no variation, there can be no duality either, and the Unity of God is established. (1)

The second and third alternatives are equally absurd, for God is ex hypothesi the highest Being in existence; in either of the two cases therefore, the higher form is God and the other is not God. (2)

1) Al-Fatisad, p. 36. Similarly al-Juwayni writes, "Our purpose is to disprove that there may be two pre-eternal beings to both of whom the quality of divinity is ascribed." Al-Ifrashad, p. 35.

2) Al-Fatisad, p. 36.
Al-Ghazālī then attacks the theory that there might be two gods dividing between them the creation of the Universe, the dividing line being between heaven and earth, or animate and inanimate, or good and evil. He reduces this theory to two alternatives; either (a) the dividing line cuts through both substances and accidents, each of the gods creating some of the substances and some of the accidents, or (b) one of them creates all the substances and the other all the accidents. Al-Ghazālī then disproves both the alternatives in a manner that scarcely differs from the burhān at-ṭamānu (1) and from al-Juwaynī's argumentation, except that his analysis and refutation of the hypothesis that one god may create solely good and the other solely evil takes an unexpected form. "This amounts to folly," he writes of the hypothesis, "for evil is not evil in its essence; indeed in its essence it is equal and similar to good, and he who has the power to create one thing has the power to create its like." To illustrate this essential similarity of good and evil, and the consequent equality of the power to create either, al-Ghazālī writes:

1) CE AL-Iqtisād, pp. 36-37 and Irshād, pp. 34-35.
2) AL-Iqtisād, p. 38.
To burn with fire the body of a Muslim is evil, but to burn the body of an unbeliever is good and is a prevention of evil. Thus if a person pronounce the shahādah burning him becomes an evil. Now he who had power to burn flesh with fire when he refrained from professing the faith undoubtedly has power to burn it after his profession of it, for his pronouncing of the shahādah is a sound that disappears without altering the essence of flesh or fire or burning...... The burnings are therefore similar, and the power to apply them must be ascribed equally to both gods; the burhān at-tamānu' then applies.

Al-Ghazālī concludes his argument with the assertion that the multiplicity of gods in any form would result in confusion, and he quotes the Qur'ānic verse: "If there were in them (i.e. the Heavens and the Earth), other gods than Allah, their order would have been disrupted."

1) Al-Iqtisād, p. 38.
COMPARISON

It will be observed that al-Ghazali expanded the meaning of the One-ness of God to include the denial of an opposite to God. This idea is implicit in al-Juwayni's explanation of the true nature of the One-ness of God, especially in that he argued against the possibility of there being an associate of God; but al-Ghazali brought it out and expounded it in such detail that he had to devote a special proof to it.

There is also a noticeable difference between al-Juwayni's illustration of burhān at-tamānu with the conflict of will and power in multiple gods, and al-Ghazali's development of the same proof in connection with degrees of existence and his comparisons of Perfect with Imperfect, Higher with Lower. He seems to have realised that the comparison of gods ought not to be based on the efficacity of their wills or the extent of their power, for these are issues which derive from other, more fundamental ones. The comparison ought rather to be based on the degree of perfection attained by each of the gods, for it is this degree of perfection that determines his rank among existent beings, and to this rank power and will are subsidiary - for the higher in rank will necessarily have the wider power and the more efficacious will.
In this, al-Ghazālī was influenced by the Sufi view of progression from the lower to the higher degree of existence, leading up to absolute perfection, which is realized only in the divine essence.

Al-Ghazālī stands alone in his discussion of the Persian philosophic concept of gods of good and evil. His argument here, however, is not altogether devoid of sophistry and speciousness, for good and evil are moral values which may be attached to actions in accordance with the motives behind them. They are not the essence of flesh or the essence of fire or the essence of burning, and they therefore cannot be said to be similar: burning with a good motive is good, burning with a bad motive is bad, and it follows that power to create good is not similar to the power to create evil.

Al-Ghazālī's choice of an illustration for his argument was also infelicitous, for Islam does not teach that it is good to burn the body of an unbeliever; it does not even permit such a practice but forbids it as strictly as it forbids burning the body of a Muslim. I cannot believe that al-Ghazālī was misinformed about these teachings; it rather seems that in this he was trying to enlist supporters from the ranks of Muslim extremists - and in his controversy with the Falāsifah he was sorely in need of supporters.
Chapter III.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Part 1.

Knowledge of the attributes and of their special characteristics.

In this chapter we shall investigate— as has been intimated above— the subject of "the seven attributes of God," or, as they are called by the Muslim theologians, Sifāt al-Maʿānī. The chapter will be divided into two parts:

1. knowledge of these attributes and of their special characteristics,
2. the problem of their being in addition to God's essence.

Before discussing these two questions, it will be necessary to define precisely what points of difference they raised among Muslim theologians.

The Mutakallimūn (i.e. the ʿAshʿariyyah, Māturīdiyyah, and Muʿtazilah) and the Muslim philosophers agree that God is powerful, willing, knowing, living, hearing, seeing and articulate, because they all accept the evidence for associating these concepts with God. They differ, however, on the following question: Once it is established that God is knowing, potent, willing, does it follow that there are such attributes as knowledge, power, will, which are distinguishable from and additional to His essence? Most of the Muʿtazilah and practically
all the philosophers maintain that it does not, but that His essence itself inasmuch as it originates the unveiling of things to Him is knowledge, inasmuch as it makes the possible actual is power, and inasmuch as it makes the possible existent or non-existent is will, so that God is knowing and potent and willing by virtue of His own essence and not an attribute distinct from and extraneous to His essence. Those who hold this view consider that it places God in a higher and more truly perfect degree than if extraneous attributes were ascribed to Him, for His pre-eternity requires that His essence should not be conditioned by anything other than itself in the attainment of perfection.

The remainder of the Mutakallimūn hold that if God is potent and willing, then it necessarily follows that there are such attributes as power and will distinct from His essence. Beyond this, however, they are divided in opinion:

(a) Most of the Ash'arīyah and some of the Mu tazilah hold that these attributes are other than God's essence, and consider it correct both linguistically and from the standpoint of revelations to speak of them as such.

(b) Al-Ash'arī himself holds that although additional to the essence, the attributes cannot be said to be either the essence
Interesting though it would be to discuss these conflicting opinions, our concern here is only with al-Juwaynī's and al-Ghazālī's views on the subject.

PART II.

AL - JUWAYNĪ.

A.

To al-Juwaynī, the question of the attributes is the most important of those that have occupied the attention of Muslim theologians, and it is indeed a crucial one both because it is one of the main points of contact and similarity between Islam and Christianity since it is comparable to the idea of the Hypostases, and because many other theological issues - such as the creation of the Qur'ān, the omnipotence of God, the extent of His power in relation to Man's and so - derive from it. Al-Juwaynī therefore devotes a great deal of space to it in al-İrşād.

He prepares the ground for his discussion of it with two studies, the first investigating the ṣahwāl, and the second seeking to disprove the view held by the Mu'tazilah and the Falsafīyah that God has no cause, for it is one of the premises upon which rests their theory that the attributes are not distinct from God's essence.

1. Al-Ṣahwāl:

Al-Juwaynī considers this question so fundamental that he contends no theologian can fail to investigate it.

1) Al-İrşād, p. 48
"whether under the heading of Āhwāl, or Wujūh, or Sifāt Nafs."

He divides all known things into three categories:

(a) existent;
(b) non-existent,
(c) a condition which cannot be qualified as existent or non-existent; this is what he calls the ḥāl (pl.: āhwāl).

He then subdivides these āhwāl into two:

(i) what is both ascribable to the essence and caused by it. This is any characteristic ascribed to the essence as a result of a quality inherent in it; thus the fact that a being is living or powerful confers upon it the attribute of life or power.

(ii) what is ascribable to the essence, but not caused by it. This is any feature of an existent being which is neither existent by itself nor is caused by another existent being; an example of this is the occupation of space by a substance.

1) Ibid., p. 48
2) Ibid., p. 47
Most of the mutakallimūn deny the ahwāl and consider for a substance to occupy space or for an essence to be potent is identical with the existence of that essence. To prove the ahwāl, however, al-Juwaynī argues that if a person knew of the existence of a substance but not of its occupation of space, and then came to know that the substance occupied space, he would then have acquired new knowledge about a thing already known, and he would then be in possession of two distinct items of knowledge - knowledge of existence, and knowledge of occupation of space. Now the object of the second item of knowledge is either identical with the object of the first, or else it is distinct from and additional to it; it cannot be identical with the object of the first item of knowledge, for it is self-evident to any rational being who has acquired this second item of knowledge that he knows something he did not know before. It is therefore established that the occupation of space is distinct from the existence of a substance, and that power is additional to the essence of the potent being. (1)

2. Has God no ground?

Al-Juwaynī discusses and rebuts at length the arguments of the Mu tazilah seeking to prove that God

1) Ḥiṣbād, pp. 47, 48, 49.
has no ground. He then offers three proofs that God has grounds (is mu’allal) and that the attributes are additional to His essence. Some of his arguments are based on analogical deductions from the present and known to the absent and unknown (qiyaṣ 1 ghā’ib’ala ash shāhid) and the others on as-sabr wa t-taqsīm, and there is therefore no need for us to devote more space to them.

Now if it is established that the ahwāl exist and that God has grounds, then the seven attributes are easily proved; these are described as pre-eternal, ever-lasting (abadiyah) and inherent in God’s essence (we shall show how they differ from the essence when we come to discuss whether they are additional). In his arguments here, al-Juwaynī relies upon generally accepted premises and on the qiyaṣ 1 ghā’ib’ala ash shāhid.

He deems self-evident the attributes of knowledge, power, and life, for it is established that God is the creator of the Universe, and a rational being aware of its orderliness and perfection must concede that it can have emanated only from a knowing, potent, Being. He writes, "Anyone who sees orderly lines and connected, well-traced strokes, yet deems it possible that they

1) Discussed in al-Irshād, pp. 51, 52, q.v.
have been produced by one ignorant of the art of writing
is beyond the pale of reason and is straying into the
maze of ignorance." 

And if it is established that the Creator
possesses the attributes of knowledge and power, it
necessarily follows that He is living.

Similarly, the proof that God is willing is as
follows: that the actions of humans should occur in
particular ways or at particular times to the exclusion
of others necessarily indicates that they willed their
occurrence in a special manner and at a special time.
Just as orderliness and perfection prove that their
author is knowing, so do the special forms and times
of events prove that he is willing. This conclusion
is applicable to God as it is to man by analogy of
the unseen with the seen.

Again, if it is established that He is living,
it follows that He is also hearing and seeing, for if
He were devoid of these attributes their opposites
would be attributable to Him, i.e. He would be imper-
fect. But if it is established that God is seeing
and hearing, why not attribute the other senses -
taste, smell, feeling - also to Him? Forestalling

1) Ḩiṣḥād, p. 36.
2) Ibid., p. 38
3) Ibid., p. 43
this argument, al-Juwaynī affirms that the same process of thought which proves God to be hearing and seeing also shows that it is necessary to attribute to Him the reality of other senses, i.e. the cognition of what is experienced by the senses. However, he deems God to be too exalted to possess the attributes of smell, taste, or feeling (1) because these attributes imply certain contacts unworthy of God, and (2) because these attributes are not the reality of the senses. For a man may rightly say: "I smelt the apple, but did not experience its fragrance," and this shows that there is a distinction between the act of smelling (above which God is exalted) and the experience itself, which is attributable to Him.

Kalām Allāh.

Al-Juwaynī starts his discussion of this point by referring to the argument he had devised to establish that attribute, and he claims that Muslim opinion is unanimous in affirming this attribute, but is not agreed on its special characteristics. The argument is this: "Miracles have proved the truthfulness of prophets, and these - after proving their truthfulness - have informed us in general that speech is attributable to God, and also of certain details concerning this speech. It is therefore necessary to ascribe the attribute of
speech to God." Al-Juwaynī reviews and discusses all the different attempts to define this attribute, and then discloses his private opinion, saying: "It is best to say, 'Speech is coherent notions residing in the spirit.' Or, if further elaboration is desired, it is such notions residing in the spirit as are made recognizable by expression and by conventionally agreed signs." This is precisely what Ahl al-Haqq affirmed. The Mutazilah, however, defined speech as "ordered letters and intermittent sounds denoting definite aims." These do not admit of such "inward speech" (kalām an-nafs) as is posited by al-Juwaynī and the Sunnites. The mu tazilite Abū Ḥāshim al-Jubbāʾī did mention such speech, but he called it khawātir (thoughts) and held that such khawātir were cognized by the faculty of hearing. Abū Ṭālib al-Jubbāʾī however, asserted that the sounds made intermittent by the articulation of letters does not make up speech, but that speech consists of the letters associated with the sounds, these letters being heard at the same time as the sounds.

Al-Juwaynī reviews and refutes these views, and then marshalls his arguments for asserting kalām an-nafs; they may be reduced to three:

1) A rational man giving an order to his slave necessarily has in him a demand for obedience, to which

1) Al-Irshād, p. 44.
2) Al-Irshād, p. 60
he gives expression in spoken words, or certain signs, or the symbols of writing. This abstract notion— which al-Juwaynī calls exigence (iqtida')— is something different from will or belief. It is different from will, for a master may order his slave what he does not really desire him to do and yet feel within himself the exigence that the action he has ordered should be carried out. It is also different from belief, because belief can only be supposition, or knowledge, or ignorance, or the like, and the person who experiences this exigence of obedience is certain that it is neither knowledge, nor supposition, nor ignorance, nor conjecture, nor guess.

2) When one says, "Do such-and-such a thing" he is indicating either the obligation to do a certain action, or its permissibility, or its desirability, or he may even have in mind its prohibition. Now when it is meant to indicate obligation, the expression cannot be said to be the obligation itself because the imperative form into which it is cast is exactly the same as for indicating, say desirability; the obligation therefore is an abstract notion manifested in a certain form of expression.

3) The third proof is based on linguistic usage. The Arabs used the word kalām to include notions in the mind, as in the expressions kana fī nafsī kalāmūn, and sawwantu fī nafsī gawlan; indeed a verse by al-Akhtal runs as follows:
inna l-kalāma la-fī l-fu‘ādi wa innemā
ju‘ila l-lisānu ‘ala l-fu‘ādi dalīlā
(speech is in the heart, and the tongue was made
solely to be the interpreter of the heart).

All this proves that the word Kalām has a wider
significance than the spoken word, and in fact includes
kalām an-nafs.

Such, in brief, are the arguments adduced by al-
Juwaynī to establish al-kalām an-nafsī.

Finally, al-Juwaynī reduces the disagreement
between Ahl al-Haqq and the Mu’tazilah to a conflict
of terms, and he makes out that what the former affirm
is not what the latter deny. For when the Mu’tazilah
defined Kalām as the action of the mutakallim (speaker),
and asserted that the action need not reside in the
agent, they were considering kalām as mere words, and
they accordingly concluded that the Qur’ān was created.
But when Ahl al-Haqq - of whom al-Juwaynī is one - defined
kalām as something residing in the essence of the speaker,
they had to deny that the speaker was the creator of the
speech, else they would have had to concede that God’s
kalām was created and that there could therefore be
originated things within His essence. In this respect
al-Juwaynī writes: “The controversy with the Mu’tazilah
and other opponents on this point centres in what is

1) al-Irshād, p. 67.
denied and what is affirmed. What they have affirmed and called kalām is indeed in itself established. The disagreement then is a matter of language and terminology: what they mean when they say, 'This expression is kalām Allah' is that it is of His creation. That it is created by Him we do not deny, but we refrain from calling the creator of speech a speaker of it, i.e. we are agreed on the idea, but disagree on terms. As to the kalām which Abl al-Hagg describes as pre-eternal, it is the kalām residing in the spirit, and this our opponents deny altogether."

It would seem that Ibn Rushd was familiar with al-Juwaini's analysis of this dispute, for in al-Kashf he has a passage which is almost a textual reproduction of al-Juwaini's.

It is in this sense that the Qurʾān is kalām Allah, and that it is pre-eternal and everlasting, for it consists of notions held in the spirit. It is not the sounds pronounced in recitation or the letters traced on paper, for these are undoubtedly originated things created by God, and can be said to be kalām Allah only metaphorically, in the sense that they indicate His kalām. In the light of this rhetorical

1) Al-Irshad, p. 67.
2) Al-Kashfʾan Manāhib al-Adillah, Cairo ed., pp. 82-83.
3) Al-Irshād, p. 67
usage, the majority of Muslims basing themselves on the qur'ānic verse: "If one of the unbelievers requests thy protection, protect him until he has heard kalām Allāh" - are agreed that kalām Allāh may be heard, or written in books, or retained in the heart; but it must not be understood that it resides in the book or dwells in a heart.

Al-Juwaynī branches off into many details in connection with the Qurān, reviewing and discussing diverse opinions on such questions as the meaning of mutakallim, the difference between the recitation of the Qurān by the reciters and the abstract notions that make it up, and proving that the occurrence in the Qurān of varied forms of expression such as the imperative, the prohibition, the affirmation and the interrogation do not necessitate a division within the attribute of kalām, but that - like all the other attributes - it is unified, even though the features deriving from it differ among themselves. However, it is not for us to follow al-Juwaynī into all these digressions, each of which is worthy of an independent essay.

The Attribute of post-ternity

The mutakallimūn have disagreed about the eighth possible Attribute, that of pre-ternity. The Mu'tazilah denied it, and the Ash'arites previous to al-Juwaynī affirmed it as an attribute distinct from God's existence.
in the same category as His knowledge and power, thus bringing the number of His attributes up to eight. Al-Juwaynī, however, holds that God is pre-eternal by Himself. For God's post-eternity is not a characteristic that has to be established; it is continued existence, and not an attribute additional to the essence. To prove this, al-Juwaynī uses two arguments:

1) if there were such an attribute as everlasting existence, it would itself need to be everlasting. This involves the ascription of a quality to itself, and this he deems to be absurd.

2) if there were such an attribute, it would also necessarily be pre-eternal, and this leads to an infinite regression, which is also absurd.

In his reasoning on God's post-eternity, al-Juwaynī comes close to the Mu'tazilah and their denial of the attributes as distinct entities. They, however, make the attributes inseparable from God's essence, whereas al-Juwaynī reduces post-eternity to continued existence.

1) Al-Irshād, pp. 46, 79.
AL-JUWAYNI B.

The Problems of the Additional Attributes.

In common with Ahl al-Haqq, al-Juwayni believes that God is living, knowing, potent, etc., and that it necessarily follows that there are attributes of life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech; he also holds that these attributes are pre-eternal, inherent in His essence, and additional to it. There are those, however, who deny that the attributes are additional, and they base themselves on two considerations:

1) to accept the attributes as additional is to say that God's essence is grounded, and this they hold to be absurd.

2) to admit that the attributes are pre-eternal and additional to God leads to polytheism. For if the attributes share in God's pre-eternity, which is His most distinctive feature, they must necessarily share in the others, including His divinity. (1)

1) This is, in fact, the strongest argument in the hands of those who deny that there are attributes additional to God's essence, for it lays us open to the same criticism as we levelled at the Christians over the question of the Hypostases: If we deem it absurd of them to post three pre-eternal beings, the more absurd is it for us to posit seven - or, according to another reckoning, "
Al-Juwayni answers the first of these objections along the lines we have already indicated when reviewing his discussion of whether God is grounded. As to the second objection, he says that it is "an assertion devoid of proof," for it is not conceded that participation in the more distinctive features necessitates participation in others, and if it were it is not conceded that pre-eternity is God's most distinctive feature. Al-Juwayni proceeds at length with his discussions and refutations before concluding that the attributes are additional. He uses the attribute of knowledge as an illustration, and writes: "Reason indicates that knowledge is, and it then affirms that knowledge is additional to the essence, being known by traditional report. Thus if Reason establishes that Knowledge is, and the consensus of opinion is that the existence of the Creator is not knowledge, then by collating the objects of Reason it appear that there is Knowledge which is additional to existence."

Footnote (1)p. 99 contd.

- eight - pre-eternal entities. It is this embarrassing argument, wielded by the Falasifah and the Mu'tazilah, which led al-Ash'arī and some of his disciples to say that the attributes are neither God's essence nor distinct from it: they sought to avoid a plurality of pre-eternal beings.

1) Al-Iṣḥāḍ, p. 55
One question now remains: can these attributes be said to be distinct from the essence or not? Before answering, al-Juwaynī attempts to define what is meant by distinct objects; his definition is: "existent beings either of which may be divided from the other by time, space, existence, or non-existence." But he adds that there is nothing either rational or traditional to differentiate absolutely the two distinct entities. He therefore cannot state categorically that the Muʿtazilah are wrong in defining distinct entities as "any two things." But he refuses to describe the attributes of God as either different from, or identical with, the essence: they are "neither He nor other than He." (2)

In this way, al-Juwaynī avoids asserting a plurality of pre-eternal beings even as he avoids contradicting scriptural texts by affirming — as did the Muʿtazilah and the Falāsifah — that the attributes are the essence itself.

1) Ḥrshād, p. 55
2) Ḥrshād, p. 79 see also p. 82 where he writes, "Among his names are some of which it cannot be said that they are He or other than He. Such are any that indicate a pre-eternal attribute, such as the knowing, the Powerful."
In dealing with this same subject, al-Ghazalí ascribes to God the same seven attributes, and divides the discussion of them into two main parts:

(1) what is distinctive of each particular attribute,
(2) what is common to them all.

Al-Ghazalí begins by affirming the attributes and elaborating the special characteristics of each in a way which, as will be seen, is in substance the same as al-Juwaynî's, differing from it only in better organisation and greater clarity and detail.

The First Attribute: Power

It is the attribute by which action becomes possible to the Agent. Among its special characteristics is that it is related to all things possible, and as these are infinite there is no limit to the power of God. To prove the prevalence of God's power, al-Ghazalí bases himself on two propositions already proved: that God exists, and that the creator of the Universe is one. From these premises only two possible alternatives can follow: either God has as many particular powers as there are objects of power (these being infinite), and this alternative is absurd since it has been established that the revolutions of the spheres cannot be infinite; or else He has
a unified power over all substances and accidents, which differ among themselves but have one thing in common, i.e. possibility. Therefore everything that is possible is subject to God's power and is actualised by His power. (1)

Establishing the prevalence of God's power raises a number of theological problems, and in discussing these al-Ghazālī deals with certain questions of the greatest importance. Some of these we shall review in the later chapter devoted to (al-jabr wa l-ikhtiyār); at this point, we need only refer to al-Ghazālī's answer to the following question: can things unknown be objects of power, or in other words, is there a relation between knowledge of a thing and its being subject to power?

Before answering this question, al-Ghazālī affirms that anything possible is an object of power and anything impossible is not. He then explains the meaning of "impossible" and "possible" in order to determine whether a thing unknown is possible and therefore an object of power, or impossible and therefore not so.

Thus he makes out that, viewed from different aspects, the Universe may rightly be said to be "necessary," "impossible," or "possible:"

1) if the Will exists, and wills it to exist, then it is necessary:

1) Al-Iqtisād, p. 39.
2) if there is no Will willing it to exist, then it is impossible.

3) if the Will for its existence or non-existence is left out of consideration, then it is possible, i.e. possible in itself.

It is therefore imaginable that the same thing may be possible and impossible at the same time, but only in the sense that it may be possible in itself and impossible in respect of something else. It cannot be at the same time possible in itself and impossible in itself, for the two terms are contradictory.

Now if it is foreknown to God, for example, that Zayd is to die on Saturday morning, then the creation of life for him at the same time is possible in itself, but impossible if it is considered that something outside of it, i.e. knowledge, is connected with his death; thus life has become impossible because of something outside itself, which is knowledge, otherwise knowledge will have become ignorance. So when we say, "Zayd's life at such a time is an object of power," what is meant is that life in itself, inasmuch as it is life, is not impossible, and that God's power inasmuch as it is power is not incapable (in itself or because of some reason within it)

1) What is meant by "impossible in itself" is what is precluded by the essence, such as the co-existence of two opposites - like blackness and whiteness - in the same substance.
of creating it. Therefore the negation of impotence in the essence of power, and the affirmation of possibility in the essence of life are two matters which no rational being can gainsay. So when an opponent says that what is unknown is not subject to power, meaning that its existence would lead to an impossibility, then he is being truthful, and our quarrel with him is not over this point but over whether it is correct to use the term in an absolute sense. This is a matter of linguistic research, and in such a case as the one above there can be no doubt that it is correct to apply the term "potent" to God.

The Second Attribute: Knowledge.

God is knowing of His attributes and of other things by virtue of His essence, and His knowledge is related to an infinity of objects of knowledge, even as His power is related to an infinity of objects of power.

The Third Attribute: Life.

Knowledge that He has life follows from knowledge that He is knowing and potent, for "living" means conscious of himself, knowing his own essence and that of others.

The Fourth Attribute: Will

This is what determines that a possible thing shall be existent or non-existent. It cannot be dispensed with even where there is knowledge, because knowledge is dependent upon the thing known, related to it in its

1) Al-Iqtisād, pp. 40-41.
actual form, and it is no part of its function to alter or influence it. The Will is involved in every act of origination because every originated thing is created by the power of God, and everything created by the power presupposes a will to direct power to the object of power. Thus every object of power is willed, and every originated thing is an object of power; therefore every originated thing is willed.

Now among originated things are disbeliefs, sins, and acts of disobedience. In this connection, al-Ghazālī investigates several awkward questions: How can God command what He does not will? How can He will a thing which he prohibits? And how can He will abominations, acts of disobedience, injustices, and evils when he who wills such things is debased? Like others among Ahl al-Sunnah, al-Ghazālī settled these questions by differentiating between command and Will, and by defining duty, good and evil. He also reviewed and criticised, along the same lines as his predecessors, other opinions on the subject.

The Fifth and Sixth Attributes: Hearing and Seeing.

In asserting these, al-Ghazālī makes use of the argument from tradition as well as the rational argument. The traditional argument is based on the text of certain Qur’ānic verses, such as: "He is the Hearing and Seeing,"

1) pp. 46-47 (Al-Iqtisād).
or in the words of Abraham: "Why dost thou worship what cannot hear or see, and what avails thee nothing?" The rational argument, however, is as follows: The Creator is nearer perfection than the created; it is known that the seeing is nearer perfection than the one who does not see, and the hearing nearer perfection than the one who does not hear, and it is absurd to attribute perfection to the created and not to the Creator.

Al-Ghazālī enumerates all the objections that may be raised to the premises on which he has built his argument, and he refutes these objections to his own satisfaction. He also considers the other senses - such as tasting and smelling - and concludes, like al-Juwaynī, that it is impossible to ascribe them to God.

The Seventh Attribute: Speech

Whereas al-Juwaynī - as we have seen - relies on the consensus of opinion and on traditional argumentation to assert this attribute, al-Ghazālī objected to this method on the ground that the one who believes God's Speech to be impossible, cannot believe the Apostle, for to deny Speech is also to deny the Message, which consists of the transmission of Speech. He therefore declares, "He who attempts to prove Speech by consensus or by the words of the Apostle has launched himself on a difficult

1) Iḥqāṣ, pp. 51-53.
Al-Ghazali considers it sounder in this connection to follow the same way as he had adopted in arguing for the attributes of hearing and seeing. Thus it may be said that the attribution of Speech to a living being is either perfection, or imperfection, or neither this nor that; the latter two alternatives are absurd, so it is necessarily perfection—"and every perfection existing in a created being must, by priority, exist also in the Creator."

Al-Ghazali attempts to delimit "speech" and therefore examines all the rational concepts with which it may be identified. These are three:

(a) that it consists of sounds and letters;

(b) that it consists of the power to bring sounds and letters into existence;

(c) that it has some other meaning.

The first alternative is impossible because sounds and letters are originated things, and therefore cannot be in the essence of God. The second is also false for, although God has the power to create sounds, yet He cannot be said to be a speaker until He has created the sound itself, and this would entail the existence of an originated thing in Him. Al-Ghazali therefore concludes that what is meant by "speech" is something different.

1) Al-Iqtiṣād, p. 53.

2) Ibid., p. 54.
viz. kalām an-nafs, which is neither sound nor latter; and he marshals, as did al-Juwaynī before him, linguistic arguments to support this view.

But even if it is conceded that there is such an abstraction as is intended by kalām an-nafs, it may be objected that it is nothing but Will, or Power, or Knowledge - it may be something "like knowledge of how to arrange vocables and constructions, and how to form known ideas in a particular way.

This may be said to be an action called Thought, the force from which it derives being called "thinking power." (1) To this, al-Ghazālī answers that kalām an-nafs is different from the will to make certain vocables indicate certain notions, just as it is different from the will to command; for when the master tells his slave "Rise!" the abstraction indicated by this word is speech. But it cannot be the will to indicate an abstraction, because indication presupposes an object indicated and this object is different from the agent of indication (dalīl) or from the will to indicate. It cannot be the will to command, either, because one may command without willing the performance of the action commanded, or even while abhorring the action. Al-Ghazālī then

1 Al-Iqtisād, pp. 54-55.
concludes, "The veil has therefore been taken away, and it appears that there exists an abstraction which is the object indicated by the vocable, and distinct from other abstractions. This we call Speech. It is of a different nature from items of knowledge, will, or belief. It is not impossible to ascribe it to God; indeed it must be ascribed to Him, for this abstraction is a form of speech and is what is intended by pre-eternal Speech. As for the letters they are originated things, and indications of Speech; and the agent of indication is different from the object of it, and has different characteristic from it."

Al-Ghazâlî then refutes the arguments which led the Mu'tazilîs and their associates to deny Kalâm Allâh. These arguments are formulated as questions which al-Ghazâlî called "Istib'âd."

1) How can Moses be said to have heard kalâm Allâh? If you say that he heard sounds and letters, then it is not kalâm Allâh that he heard since you contend that it does not consist of such. And if you say it is not sounds and letters that he heard, then how can what is other than sound or letter be heard?

1) Al-Iqtisâd, p. 56
2) Does Kalām Allāh reside in copies of the Qur’ān?
If you say it does, then how can the pre-eternal reside in an originated thing? And if you say it does not, then you run counter to the consensus of opinion, because Muslims are unanimous in honouring the Qur’ān, so that they have forbidden the impure to touch it; this is for no other reason than that it contains kalām Allāh.

3) If you contend that the Qur’ān is not kalām Allāh, then you are in opposition to the consensus of opinion. And if you contend that it is kalām Allāh, then it consists of nothing but letters and sounds, and its recitation by a reciter consists of nothing but these letters and sounds.

4) The consensus of the Ummah’s opinion is that the Qur’ān is the Prophet’s miracle, and that it is kalām Allāh, divided into surahs and verses, which in turn consist of stops and utterable sounds. How can the pre-eternal be so described? And how can the pre-eternal be a miracle of the Prophet’s when a miracle is “an extraordinary action,” and actions are necessarily created? How then can kalām Allāh be pre-eternal?

5) It is known that in present experience only sounds are heard; and kalām Allāh is heard, as is proved by His saying, “If one of the polytheists request thy protection, protect him until he hears kalām Allāh.” If it is correct to assert, as you do, that the sound heard by the protected polytheist is itself kalām Allāh, which is pre-eternal.
and residing in His essence, what superiority has Moses in that alone he is described as "converser with God" (kalīm Allāh) over the polytheists who hear Him?

Al-Ghazālī carefully scrutinizes and attempts to answer all these questions.

In connection with the first, he argues that "how" can be asked only of things which have a mode of entity, and not of what has no such mode. When one asks, "How is it?" what one means is, "Which of the things we know is it like?" And if the object of the question has no like, there can be no answer to the question. It is therefore impossible to answer the first question except by making the questioner hear kalīm Allāh. For his question is like that of one who asks, "How did you sense, through the faculty of taste, the sweetness of sugar?" There is no answer except to give him a piece of sugar that he may taste it for himself - unless his tasting it is made impossible either because he has lost the sense of taste or because no sugar is available. Now it is impossible to make him hear the pre-eternal kalīm Allāh, because this is the exclusive prerogative of Moses. But the impossibility of answering this question does not prove that kalīm Allāh does not exist. "Rather," writes al-Ghazālī, "it is necessary to believe that kalīm Allāh is a pre-eternal attribute which has no like, even as His essence is pre-eternal and has no
like; and even as His essence can be seen in a way which differs from the visibility of bodies and accidents and has no similarity with it, so is His kalām heard in a way which differs from letters and sounds and has no similarity with them."

In connection with the second question, al-Ghazālī holds that kalām Allāh is written in copies of the Qurʾān, retained in memories, recited by tongues, but that this does not mean that the essence of pre-eternal kalām resides in a copy of the Qurʾān. Similarly, if it is said that "fire" is written in a book, it does not follow that the essence of fire resides in it, else it would be burnt. Again, if fire was in the tongue of the person who spoke the word "fire" his tongue would be burnt. Fire, therefore, is a hot body indicated by sounds so formed as to produce the letters f, i, r, e; what is hot and burning is the object indicated, and not the indication. Thus ink and writing and sounds and letters are originated, for they are bodies or accidents in bodies; and kalām Allāh which is said to be pre-eternal and residing in the essence of God is the object indicated and not the indicator, which consists of letters. And if the canon law invests these letters with certain honours, it is because they indicate something honourable; it is therefore a duty to treat

1) Ibid. pp. 56-58
a Qur'ān with respect because "it contains indication of God's attribute." (1)

To answer the third question, al-Ghazālī distinguishes between three terms: qirā'ah (recitation), maqrū’ (what is recited), and Qur'ān. The maqrū’ is kalām Allah, i.e., the pre-eternal attribute residing in His essence. The qirā'ah or recitation with the tongue is the action of the reciter; it has a beginning before which it did not exist and is therefore and originated thing. As for the term Qur'ān, it may be applied to two different things: (a) the maqrū’, in which case it is pre-eternal and uncreated; this is what predecessors meant when they said, "The Qur'ān is the uncreated Speech of God." (b) or the qira'ah which is the action of a reciter; it is then self-evidently an originated thing.

The fourth question is easily answered once it has been shown that the term Qur'ān is used both for the pre-eternal attribute and for the originated chapters and verses, which have beginnings and ends. It is these which constitute the "extraordinary action" over which the challenge is thrown. In this sense the Qur'ān is indeed a miracle, and there is no inconsistency whatsoever between its miraculous nature and its description as pre-eternal, because the aspect from which it

1) p. 88 (Ibid)
is deemed to be pre-eternal.

Similarly, in answering the fifth question, al-Ghazālī refers to the dual meaning of the words "heard" and "kalam." He says that what Moses heard was the pre-eternal attribute residing in God's essence, whereas that which is heard by the polytheist is the sounds and letters indicating that attribute.

AL - GHAZĀLĪ

B. The Problem of the Additional Attributes.

In al-Iqtisād, al-Ghazālī did not devote a separate chapter to discussing whether the attributes are additional to God's essence. He did, however, deal briefly with the problems while describing the characteristics common to the Attributes. It is, in fact, the first of the characteristics mentioned which raises the point.

Like al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī holds that the Attributes, the existence of which is established, are not the essence of God but are additional to it. Thus the maker of the Universe is knowing by virtue of knowledge, living by virtue of Life, potent by virtue of Power, and so on. After explaining the views of the Mu'tazilah and the Falāsifah on the question, he

1) al-Iqtisād, pp. 56-60.
criticizes them along lines which embody the proof that the Attributes are additional.

Addressing himself to the Mu'tazilah and the Falāsifah, he states that there are only two possible alternatives: either what is meant by "God is knowing" is identical with what is meant by "God exists," or else the first sentence implies more than is implied in the second, i.e. it implies existence and something else additional to it. If the first alternative is held to be true, it would follow that to say "God exists and is knowing" is equivalent to saying "God exists," and this is absurd. If, however, the second alternative is admitted, then only two conclusions can conceivably follow: either the addition is relative to the essence, or it is not. If the Mu'tazilah and the Falāsifah contend that it is not relative to the essence, then they contradict themselves, for their contention would be tantamount to denying that God has Attributes. If they concede that the addition is relative to the essence, Ḥanbalī-Ghazālī has succeeded in what he set out to prove, for what he means by knowledge is no other than an addition to existence relative to an existing essence by virtue of which the existing essence may be said to be knowing.

1) Ḥiqṭisād p.61.
Such is al-Ghazālī's argument. But difficulties can be raised by extending the argument along similar lines. Thus, is what is understood by "command," "prohibition," "affirmation" identical with what is understood by "commanding," "prohibiting," "affirming?" If it is, then these terms are merely redundant; if not, then we should posit in respect of each a special attribute representing a division of Kalam, and we should therefore speak of the attributes of command, of prohibition, and of affirmation. Similarly, is what is understood by "knowledge of the substances" identical with what is understood by "knowledge of the accidents?" If it is, then the knower of substances is also a knower of accidents by virtue of the one knowledge; it would follow that the one knowledge is related to an infinity of objects of knowledge, and this is absurd. If the two are not identical, then we may attribute to God an infinity of knowledge, and this also is absurd. And the same may be said of each of the other attributes.

On the other hand, if the existence of one attribute, i.e. Speech, may at the same time be command, prohibition, affirmation, interrogation, and so on, if the one attribute may stand for all its sub-divisions, then it can be argued that one attribute can stand for all the
others, and it would follow that the essence itself could fulfill this function and embody the abstractions of power, will, knowledge, etc. without any addition, thus proving the contention of the Mu tazilah and the Falasifah.

In refuting this, al-Ghazālī deems it best not to rely on the Qur'ān and the consensus of opinion, as had been done before (he probably had al-Juwaynī in mind in this respect). He would rather say, "Rational beings concede that there is something additional to the existence of the divine essence; this additional thing is what is implied in such expressions as "He is knowing," (or His being knowing), "He is potent" (or His being potent) and so on. Only three possible interpretations may be given to these expressions:

1) that they affirm a single essence, which — according to the Falasifah — would imply the abstractions understood from the Attributes; it would therefore replace them. This, in al-Ghazālī's view, is "falling short" (tafrīt), i.e., understatement of the truth.

2) that they affirm one attribute which, because of all the functions it may fulfill, consists of an infinity of units. To al-Ghazālī, this is excess

1) Iqtiṣād, p. 62
(ifrāt), i.e. overstatement of the truth.

3) that they affirm specifically the seven attributes, and this is the midway course between tafrīt and ifrāt.

Al-Ghazālī expounds this third interpretation at great length. He explains that there are different degrees in the differences between any two objects, these degrees being greater or smaller according to the origin of the difference. Thus the difference may be in the essence, such as the differences between movement and immobility, power and knowledge, substance and accident; the essence of each component of these pairs differs from the essence of the other, i.e. the origin of the difference is the essence itself. Or else objects may differ not in their essence, but in that to which the essence is related, as when two objects united in reality are related to different matters; such is the difference between knowledge of blackness and knowledge of whiteness. Now when two objects differ only in that to which they are related, then either of them can be dispensed with if the other is retained, whereas when two objects differ in their essence, then both are indispensable. Thus knowledge is essentially different from power, and so are all the other attributes, and all therefore need to be affirmed; they must also be held to be other than the essence "because the dis-
tinction between an essence possessing attributes and the attribute itself is more marked than between two attributes."

Al-Ghazālī himself was aware of the weaknesses in this argument. He admitted that his answer did not completely silence his opponents, for he deemed it impossible finally to answer their objection or to do more than explain and expose the mainspring of it because the subject of investigation was the pre-eternal attributes of God, the reality of which transcends our understanding. He writes, "Since one must necessarily believe, and there are no possibilities of belief other than in those three (interpretations mentioned above), and since the third course (i.e. the midway one affirming the seven attributes) is the likeliest, therefore must one believe in it. If the objection leaves some traces in the heart, then these are unavoidable - and there are doubts about other points which are even greater. To explain the objection, in whole or in part, is possible, whereas the object of the investigation - being the pre-eternal attributes transcending the understanding of created beings - is beyond grasp." (2)

Al-Ghazālī then examines whether it is correct to describe the attributes as other than the essence of God. He does not give great importance to this controversy for he holds that it consists of points of difference depending on agreed terminology and juristic prin-

1) Iqtisād, p. 63. See also P. 62.  
2) " 
ciples. Thus when we say, "Allāh" we mean both the essence and the attributes together, not the essence alone, because the word "Allāh" is not the proper name for a pure essence but for an essence qualified with divinity. Nevertheless, there is no objection to saying that the attributes of God are other than His essence provided two conditions are fulfilled:

The first (specifically regarding God) that canon law should not forbid the expression, and the second (which is general, i.e. applicable both to the divine essence and other things) that by the words "other one" one should not understand something that can exist independently of that from which it is distinguished, but only that the two objects so distinguished (1) are different.

These points, al-Ghazālī concludes, are matters of language and terminology, and in themselves are axiomatic; there is therefore no need to expand upon them.(2)

1) Al-Iqtisād p.64.
2) No comparison can be drawn between Al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī because on the subject dealt with in this chapter their views are identical with the exception of only slight details.
CHAPTER IV.

GOD'S SITTING ON THE THRONE

and

THE VISION OF GOD.

The aim of this chapter is to describe briefly and to compare al-Ghazālī's and al-Juwaynī's ideas of "God's Sitting on His Throne" and the possibility of "The Vision." We shall begin by summarizing al-Juwaynī's views.

I. AL-JUWAYNI.

A. His Treatment of God's Sitting on His Throne.

This consists mainly of his interpretation of the Qur'ānic verses the literal meaning of which seems to indicate that God is similar to creatures in body, movement, direction etc. - such as His saying: The All-merciful settled on the Throne" and His saying: "Then He settled on the Throne."

In al-Juwaynī's opinion, there are only three possible positions in respect of the interpretation of these verses:

1) to accept the ostensible meaning of the word īstawa ("settled" or "sat") according to linguistic usage. This is the position taken by the Anthropomorphists, al-Karrāmīyah, and al-Hashawīyah.
2) to reject the ostensible meaning without attempting to interpret or define what was actually intended. This is the position of some of the Salaf called Mufawwiḏah.

3) to reject the ostensible meaning and substitute for it an interpretation which falls within what may be ascribed to Him without detracting from His essence.

This last is the position of al-Juwaynī and the mass of Ahl al-Haqq or Ahl as-Sunnah. Al-Juwaynī believes the second position to be untenable, for if its protagonists hold that what is intended is actual sitting, or even that actual sitting is possible, then they are at one with the anthropomorphists; and if they hold the literal meaning to be impossible, then they are in fact interpreting. Al-Juwaynī concludes, "It is therefore necessary to interpret the verse in a way acceptable both to reason and to canon law. To avoid interpreting for fear of falling into erroneous belief leads to confusion and misguidedness, to mis-teaching the common people, to lack of assurance about the principles of religion, and to laying the Book of God open to doubt." (1)

1) al-Irshād, pp. 22-24
He then interprets "God's settling on the Throne" as meaning one of two things:

1) God's possession and control of the Throne (istīlā')
2) His direction of a purpose (qaḍ) towards it.

The word istawā is frequently used in Arabic in either of these meanings. Thus it is said, 'qād istawā Bishr 'ala 'l-Iraq." meaning Bishr took possession of the country, and the Qur'ān says, 'thumma 'stawi ilā 's-samā'i wa hiya dukhānun," meaning "God purposed (to create) the sky when it was smoke."

Al-Juwaynī refers to the second interpretation as that of Sufyān ath-Thawrī, and he expresses his approbation of it.

Al-Juwaynī's grounds for preferring interpretation to literalism are easily deduced from the pages of al-Irshād:

1) God is unlike any of His creatures, as is proved by his saying, "Nothing is similar to Him." Al-Juwaynī regarded this dissimilarity between Him and His creatures as one of the "negative attributes" of His essence; he writes, "Among the attributes of the essence of the pre-eternal - may He be exalted - is His dissimilarity with accidents; the Lord - may He be exalted - does not resemble any of the accidents, and none of the accidents resembles Him."

1) al-Irshād, p. 20
Al-Juwaynī does, however, draw our attention to the fact that God's existence is analogous to that of His creatures, but he insists that God differs from them in essential qualities, such as the occupation of space, and corollaries, such as direction.

2) Impossibility of God's occupation of space: Al-Juwaynī makes out that it is necessary to deny that God occupies space, because to affirm it would be inconsistent with His pre-eternity.

3) Any concept that implies that God is a divisible quantity is a heresy. Al-Juwaynī makes of this a general rule which he applies not only to the question whether God occupies space, but also to any concept which implies an alteration in the essence of God. He writes, "Any premise which leads to the concept of God as a quantity or as divisible is a manifest heresy." (1)

4) The fact that God participates in existence with His creatures does not make Him similar to them.

These four premises, summarized from al-Juwaynī's book, make it clear that the literal meaning of the verses quoted could not be accepted. They make of God a Being

1) Ibid. p. 23.
transcending any similarity with His creatures in respect of the occupation of space or the like, and therefore the intended meaning of "settling" in relation to Him must be either "possession" or the direction of purpose."

B. THE VISION OF GOD

It will be found that - as has already been indicated - al-Juwaynī's views on "the Vision" are strongly connected with his views on "God's settling on the Throne," as his conclusions on this new subject result from his conclusions on the other.

Al-Juwaynī's argument is founded on four principles:
1) Cognition (al-Idrāk) is possible independently of the senses; in this, al-Juwaynī contradicted al-Jubbārī and his adherents.
2) Such cognition does not require special organ; this was in contradiction of most of the Mu'tazilah.
3) Reason is separable from the five senses.
4) Whether Vision is possible depends solely on whether there is an object of Vision.

On these bases, al-Juwaynī argues as follows: It must be possible to see God because we know of different essences, and we know that their attributes differ but that they all share equally in existence; now our knowledge is related not to qualities, but to the reality of existence; which is found equally in the visible
(as-h-shāhid) and the invisible (al-ghā'ib). He writes, "If, therefore, it is rationally established that cognition is dependent only on existence, and that the reality of existence is invariable, it follows that if any existent thing is visible then every existent thing is capable of being seen..... This is definite proof of what we wished to establish." (1)

From this, it is clear that what al-Juwaynī understands by the Vision of God is not something dependent on the senses and the agency of light, but some kind of intellectual experience related to the existence of the essence, requiring no special organ and unconnected with any of the five senses. It is something which God may create in any one person, in disregard of the natural phenomena and universal laws relevant to the vision of creatures. In this respect, al-Juwaynī trusts God's power far more than did the Mu'tazilah or any of his other adversaries, for he refused to give any weight to natural laws in his explanation of the Vision of God, and he justified himself by saying, "the adherents of Islam are agreed that God is able to create a perfect man without causing him to pass through the stages of creation in the womb... it is also possible for

1)ḥirshād p.100
valleys to run as blood and for mountains to be turned into gold."

In this way, al-Juwaynī tried to circumvent all the objections which the Mu'tazilah raised to the Vision of God. He attributes all the absurdities which they said would follow from such a Vision to the fact that they thought only in terms of ordinary events in our familiar world; had they disregarded natural phenomena and thought of intellectual experiences, they would have agreed that the Vision was possible. It is in accordance with this that the Prophet Moses used the following words in asking God to reveal Himself, "My Lord, let me see You." Such traditional evidence proves that the Vision is possible in the sight of the law, otherwise Moses would be a sinner, and this is unbelievable of a prophet.

II. AL-GHAZĂLĪ

A - "His Treatment of "God's settling on the Throne."

Al-Ghazălī divides people, in relation to their understanding of the verses which seems to point to anthropomorphism, into two categories.

1) Common People.

It is best for them to avoid plunging into any attempt to interpret or determine the intended meaning of these verses, and this for two reasons:

1) Ibid. p.102.
(a) their minds are unable to comprehend abstract concepts.

(b) their imperfect knowledge of the Arabic language prevents them from understanding the Qur'ān, which is in parts figuratively expressed.

Al-Ghazālī considers that the best that can be done for them is to extirpate from their beliefs all erroneous conceptions about God — such as anthropomorphism — and instil into their minds the axiom that "none is similar to Him."

If however, they should seek to discover the meaning of the verses in question, they should be discouraged from the attempt and be made to understand that they are not qualified to understand the intended meaning. They should be given Malik b. Anas's answer: "God's ḥtiwā' (settling on the Throne) is known; how it is done is unknown. It must be believed, but questions about it are heresies (bid'ah)." Al-Ghazālī deems it necessary to accept this dictum.

2) Scholars

They are able to understand the meaning of these verses because they are well-acquainted with the language and can understand the figurative expressions which occur in the Qur'ān. In asserting this, al-Ghazālī — like his master al-Juwaynī — rejects the belief that only God can comprehend the correct meaning of these verses.
In this connection, al-Ghazālī explains in detail the differences between the "common people" and the "scholars," and he discusses the figures of speech which occur in the Qur'ānic verses. We shall mention, as an example, his analysis of the verse: "The All-Merciful settled (istawā) on the Throne." Al-Ghazālī says: "The Throne and settling are related to each other, and their relationship can only be one of five possible relationships:

1) being known - i.e. the relationship of the thing known to the knower.
2) being willed - i.e. the relationship of the thing willed to the being who wills.
3) being an object of power - i.e. the relationship of the object to the being who exercises power upon it.
4) being a substance - i.e. the relationship of the substance to the accident (such, for example, is the relationship of a black chair to blackness).
5) being a place - i.e. the relationship of a location to what is located in it."

Al-Ghazālī carefully examines these five alternatives to determine which is the one intended in the verse in question. The word istawā itself, he points out, is consistent with either the fourth or the fifth possible
relationship, but in the present context these are unacceptable to the mind because they imply God's occupation of space, and He is above that. The first and second alternatives are possible in themselves, but are not borne out by the word istawā. Only the third is both acceptable to reason and linguistically connected with the word istawā, and it is therefore the interpretation to be adopted. Here, al-Ghazālī discusses at length linguistic usage, and quotes many references to show that the Arabs used istawā to mean "overpower" or "master" (ghalaba).

Al-Ghazālī thus interpreted al-istawā, rejecting - as his master had done before him - the literal meaning of "sitting" because it implied God's occupation of space, His having direction, quantity, etc., all of which are impossible.

This interpretation, it must be remembered, was to be available only to scholars and not to common people.

B. The Vision of God.

Although al-Ghazālī rejects any concept which implies or leads to something impossible in relation to God, he believes a mental Vision of God to be possible, and he tries to prove it in two ways:

A. By traditional evidence: this is of two kinds:

1. Moses' plea to God, "Let me see You" implies that the Vision is possible, otherwise Moses would be proved ignorant in what he sought.
Al-Ghazālī examined and refuted the arguments by which the Muʿtazilah sought to nullify the implication of Moses' plains. Thus he makes out that God's answer to Moses, "You shall not see Me," and again the verse "Sight cannot see Him" refer only to natural vision as known in this life.

2. The consensus of opinion among early Muslime: The Companions of the Prophet and their followers looked forward to the pleasure of "seeing His noble face," and it must be inferred that, by word and example, the Prophet Muhammad made it known to them that God would be visible.

B. By natural proof: This may follow two lines of thought:

1. God exists. He shares existence with all other beings, and His existence is similar to theirs. Now any analogy between Him and His creatures which diminishes His sanctity must be rejected; but anything which may be ascribed to an existent being and which does not detract from His essence may be ascribed to Him. For example, it is possible for our knowledge to reach Him because for Him to be known as created beings are known does not impair His essence. Similarly, it is possible that we shall see Him even as we now see substances and accidents; indeed the Vision is possible because it is only a sort of knowledge.

2. Vision is usually taken to presuppose three things:
   a) an abstraction: the essence of vision.
   b) a location where sight takes place: the eye.
visible things: colours, substances, mass, etc.

Al-Ghazālī undertook to prove that the second and third are not essential parts of vision. Thus the eye is only an organ, and has no other purpose than to be the location for the forms of the visible things. If it were the essence of vision, then whenever a form occupied the eye completely the whole of vision would be fulfilled. Again, if we know something with our heart or head, we can say, "We know with our heart and head," and if we know anything through our heart or head or eye we can also say, "We see with our heart or head or eye." Thus the eye is not identical with vision.

The visible things are not identical with vision either, for if, say our relationship with blackness was said to be vision, then our relationship with whiteness could not be vision since the essence of blackness is the opposite of the essence of whiteness.

The ruˈyah or vision, therefore, is an abstraction independent of either organ or object of vision.

Al-Ghazālī then asks himself: "What is the essence of Vision?" His answer is based on the difference between the forms obtained by vision and those obtained by imagination, for he defines vision as "a sort of knowledge which impresses upon the mind the
form of visible things more clearly than does imagination (at-takhayyul)." In other words, the forms which we derive from the ru yah are clearer and more perfect than those which we derive from imagination. Vision is therefore a degree of perception and it follows that there are things which we can perceive but cannot imagine; such are the essence and the attributes of God. This al-Ghazālī states as a general rule: "Whatever has no colour or quantity — such as power, knowledge, love, sight, imagination — is known and not imagined, and our knowledge of these is a kind of perception." (2)

Such knowledge is possible, and reason has no difficulty in accepting it. It is also possible for such knowledge to be created in the eye or the heart or the head. But al-Ghazālī still felt the insufficiency of his definition of ar-ru'yah, and he finally revealed his Sufī inclinations when he said of the Vision of God that this experience may be described by any convenient term such as meeting or seeing God, the actual word used being immaterial. (3)

Has this admixture of Sufism succeeded in giving us a clearer conception of the Vision? We shall discuss this when we compare al-Ghazālī's views with those of al-Juwaynī.

1) al-Iqtisād, p. 32.
2) al-Iqtisād, p. 33.
COMPARISON

If we compare al-Juwaynī's view of God's settling on the Throne with his view of the Vision of God, we find that the four grounds on which he based his view of the former question paved the way for his view of the latter. He formulated those grounds in order at the same time to solve the question of what is meant by God's settling on the Throne and to assert the possibility of the Vision of God without any inconsistency or clash between the two views, and without departing from the principles that there is no similarity between God and His creatures, that God does not occupy space, that anything that implies or leads to a wrong conception of God is to be rejected, and that the fact that both He and His creation exist does not imply that there is any similarity between Him and them.

Guided by al-Juwaynī's light, al-Ghazalī treated those same questions, adding, however, important details which his master had failed or neglected to deal with. He expanded al-Juwaynī's arguments, analysed every idea al-Juwaynī had dealt with, and attempted to dispel the obscurity that surrounds some of al-Juwaynī's ideas.

We find the two, in fact, in agreement on several points, but at variance on some others. On the question of God's settling on the Throne, al-Juwaynī, contrary to
al-Ghazālī, reviews a number of interpretations and examines them in the light of Arabic linguistic usage in order to discover the intended meaning. Al-Juwaynī also explains in greater detail than does al-Ghazālī the reasons why he favours a non-literal interpretation. On the other hand, al-Ghazālī's division of the community with regard to the understanding of these verses into "common people" and "scholars" has no counterpart in al-Juwaynī's work, and his analysis of the relationship between God's "settling" and the Throne is more precise and complete than al-Juwaynī's.

In all else regarding God's settling on the Throne, the two are in agreement.

As for the Vision of God, we have already seen that each of them made his theory about the istiwa' the starting point of his theory about the Vision. They also agreed on the following points:

1. Existence is the sole condition of Vision.
2. The Vision does not depend on the senses, or on sunlight, or on any of the other factors connected with physical sight.
3. Complete faith is placed in God's power, in disregard of all natural laws.

Al-Ghazālī, however, seems to me to have waded deeper than al-Juwaynī into an investigation of the ru'yah, and finding the rational possibilities not entirely
satisfactory, introduced a Sufi bias into his explanation.

On the whole, although al-Juwaynī's and al-Ghazālī's work falls within the same sphere, al-Ghazālī undoubtedly advanced beyond al-Juwaynī's limits of achievement, and it is therefore his views which have gained the greater currency among Muslims.

Together, at any rate, they resolved the controversy between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the Vision of God, for the Mu'tazilites did not deny ar-Ru'yah as conceived by al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, but objected to it only if understood literally; similarly, the Vision which the Ash'arites asserted to be possible was not intended to be a physical experience, but a mysterious sort of knowledge. Indeed, had they studied each other's views on this subject, they would have found themselves in agreement and would have saved themselves much bitter wrangling.

Any further discussion on this subject would be dangerous, as evidenced by the words of the Prophet Muhammed: "Think about God's creatures and not about His essence, else you shall perish." Similarly Ibn Sīnā said, "The Truth is too transcendent to be reached by every seeker, or to be known to more than one person at a time."
CHAPTER V.

FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION

1. AL-JUWAYNI

Al-Juwaynî begins his discussion of this subject with a review of the different views advanced by other scholars. In the earlier days, before differences of view arose on this topic, it was agreed among the Muslims that there was no creator other than God and that all originated things are the products of His omnipotence. In this respect, there was no difference seen between things which only God can do and things which fell within the sphere of the power of the human being. The principle unanimously held by the Muslims was that "anything that is possible to any being is possible to God also, He is indeed its creator and imitator." The Mu'tazilites and the followers of their school of thought, however, later held the view that human beings produced their own actions and originate them by their power; and that such power as falls within the sphere of the capabilities of human beings cannot be attributed to God. In their view, no one thing can fall within the sphere of the two powers at one and the same time. Earlier followers of that school of thought had shied at denominating human beings as "creators" of their actions but

1) al-Irshād: p.106.
later followers were bold enough so to characterize human beings - they called human beings "creators" not merely in a metaphorical sense, but also in the literal and practical sense.

Al-Juwaynī later enters into a disputation with his opponents and submits their views to examination and scrutiny, thereby endeavouring to substantiate his point of view and outlining the points at issue and the arguments he prefers against them. He adopts three types of argument in this respect:

The first type: Al-Juwaynī's method in this case relies in the main upon certain intellectual premises. With the aid of these he endeavours to show that a human being is not the creator of his actions. This variety takes two forms, which are as follows:

1. Here he addresses his opponents and says: "You have alleged that the objects of power which come within the sphere of human power do not belong to God, because you have held that it was impossible to prove that one object of power could belong to two powers (i.e., that no one thing can at one and the same time be the product of two different powers). For this reason, we ask of you this question: "Was Almighty God,

2) ibid. p. 106.
before the creation of human beings and before their endowment with power to originate acts, capable of the act which He had known, by His eternal foresight, that human beings will have power over; or was He not so capable? If you allege in reply that God was not then possessed of power over that action then your allegation is obviously and glaringly false. This is so because such actions as have become possible for the human being to accomplish after his creation should be regarded as possibilities which might fall within the sphere of the power of the human being. The fact that those very actions fall within the realm of the omnipotence of God before the creation of man does not necessarily imply that those acts fall within two powers. There is no valid reason why those actions that fall within the power of man should not have been within the power of God before man became capable of them, for at that stage the originated power (i.e. the power of human beings) did not envelop them. Thus it will be seen that your principle that it is impossible for one object of power to be within the sphere of two powers - is not violated. There is no reason why the power of God should not thereafter continue to govern such actions; indeed, it must so govern them. When God creates man and creates in him power to originate actions, those actions nevertheless continue to lie within
the power of God, despite any views held by scholars to the contrary. And if it be thus substantiated that the actions lying within the power of man also lie within the power of God in eternity as well as at the present, then it would be indubitably proved that God is the creator and originator of the action - for it would be impossible to hold that man can have the exclusive power of creating such actions as lie within the power of God. If in al-Juwaynī's view, as has been seen, it is impossible that man should possess the exclusive power to produce actions which lie within the power of God, what, it may be asked, does al-Juwaynī seek to establish by this argument? Does he intend to prove that the power of God operates by itself to produce the action, so that the power of man would have no influence upon that action? Or does he intend to prove that man is not solely responsible for the production of the action, but that the action is produced by the simultaneous operation of the two powers (i.e. the power of man and the power of God)? The first presumption is made likely by his definition of the meaning of "acquisition" (kash)(1), as we shall see later.

1) ibid. p.107
2) ibid. p.119
2. A human being, when he is inattentive or in a state of unconsciousness, continues to produce actions that are purposeful and well-directed. Theologians have illustrated this point in various ways. One illustration is that a person walking covers a certain distance in a certain time without consciousness of the stretches of road or the areas traversed between the beginning and the end of the journey, or of the moments which make up the time expended. Another illustration is that a speaker produces certain sounds in a certain order without consciousness of the organs which produce these sounds or the motions they go through. Yet another is that a writer traces letters and words by the movement of his fingers without consciousness of the parts making up his fingers or of the details of their movements.

It does not seem, however, that these illustrations are relevant to action without knowledge thereof. For the purpose of the walker is merely walking, and not details of stretches of road, of areas passed, or of moments of time. The purpose of the speaker in the second illustration is but to speak, not the movement of organs. And again the purpose of the writer is writing, not the parts of a finger or their movements.

It would seem that al-Juwaynī himself sensed that it was impossible for man to purpose doing a thing without having knowledge of it. He therefore stated in

al-Irshād that the possibility of a man's acting without knowledge or consciousness of his knowledge is a rational, not a usual possibility. Thus in the course of his argumentation against his opponents he writes: "If they should say, 'According to the principles you enunciate, it will be possible for a man to perform many actions without his having knowledge of them,' then we would answer, 'This is something we consider possible in the light of reason, but it does not occur in ordinary circumstances; if, however, the ordinary order of things is departed from, then it is not rationally impossible for what you require of us to happen.' (1) Such purposeful and well-directed actions denote the knowledge of their originator. But as the human being in that state would not be aware of the exact nature of the actions which he produces, it must be deduced that such actions as he then produces must be animated or originated by the One who is aware of their nature - (2) God the Almighty.

Al-Juwaynī then embarks upon digressions and incidental arguments concerned with replies to any criticisms or objections that may be proffered against any of these two forms or against any of the premises

1) p. 108
2) ibid. pp. 107, 108.
supporting the proofs they advance.

The second type: Al-Juwaynī relies in this type upon tying down the Muʿtazilites to certain intellectual premises in which they have conceded and which had become incorporated in their doctrines. By making reference to these premises, al-Juwaynī only seeks to bring out the contradictions and conflict of views inherent in their doctrines. In this he adopts an attitude similar to that of al-Ghazālī when the latter criticized the philosophers in his book Tahāfut al-Falāsifa. This subject, however, is outside my purpose here, which is to outline the views personally held by al-Juwaynī on this topic.

The third type: This type embodies proofs based upon traditional (ṣamāʿī) premises which establish the validity of the assertions made by al-Juwaynī and other righteous people (Ahl Al Haq) that Almighty God is the creator of the actions of human beings. Al-Juwaynī classifies these proofs into two categories:

1. Those which are based upon the consensus of the Muslim community.

2. Those which are based upon the provisions of the Qur'ān.

The first category of proofs, which is derived from the consensus of the Muslim people takes various forms.

1) Ibid, pp. 109, 110.
One of these forms is the statement that the nation is bent upon praying to God and beseeching Him so that He may grant them faith and resolute certainty and spare them unbelief, immorality and disobedience. If these things were not within the power of God, this common and popular prayer would relate to a request for things which do not lie within the power of God to grant - and such an assumption would be false. To interpret this prayer as a request for power to believe in the ability (of the human being offering the prayer) to create that power, would not be valid. The second form which consensus of the Muslim nation takes in this respect is the fact that there was consensus amongst the Muslims before the emergence of the theory of predestination (qada'i-iyah) that "God is the Master of all things that are created and the Lord of every power of origination." It would be impossible, however, for God to be the Ruler of a thing over which He has no power, or to be the Lord of that which cannot be regarded as falling within His omnipotence. The third form which the consensus takes relates to the view that the creation of knowledge and actions which are in accordance with the divine law ranks above the creation of physical bodies and their symptoms. If man could be characterized with the power

1) Ibid. pp. 110, 111.
2) Ibid. p.111.
to create knowledge, then he would be better than his God, and he would be more able and fitted than his God to reform himself and to guide his soul and deliver it from error. But whoever alleges that man can do more good to himself than his God can, would thereby go against the consensus of the Muslims and depart from the fold of Islam.

The second category of proofs, which is derived from the provisions of the Qur'an, is embodied in the following statement: "..... that is God, your Lord." There is no God but He; the Creator of all things.

This pronouncement lays down that God alone is the Creator of all originated objects, including the actions of human beings. Another verse from the Qur'an concerned with this point is His words addressed to His people: "... .... and God has created you and all that ye do." This pronouncement ordains that God has created mankind, and has created with them their actions.

Al-Juwayni later amplifies upon the doubts and views propounded by the Mu'tazilites with regard to the capability of a human being to create his actions, and proceeds to examine their arguments and to refute

them. The arguments he advances are of three kinds:

The first argument propounds that the reasonable human being distinguishes clearly between things which lie within his power and ability and things which do not lie within his power and ability; and he also recognizes the clear difference between his voluntary movements and his "colours" over which he has no power. He perceives that the occurrence of actions which lie within his ability is governed by his will and animated by his desire; while the occurrence of actions like these "colours" does not come about as a result of his will or desire. For this reason, there should be no doubt as to the fact that a human being is the creator and originator of his actions. Replying to this argument, al-Juwaynī does not say more than that these allegations are not supported by relevant proofs; and he explains and amplifies this absence of proofs.

1) It would have been more appropriate had al-Juwaynī intended by the term "colours" in this regard the colour which appears on a human being's face when he undergoes certain reactions and influences over which he has no power (like the redness of shame or the yellowness of fear). His use of the term in connection with bodies in the second argument does, however, restrict its generality.

2) *al-Irshād*: p. 113, 114.
The second argument propounds that God asks of a human being obedience. It would be evidently impossible, however, for God to ask of the human being what does not fall within his power. Were the view of the Mu'tazilites that the power of the human being and his capability are exclusively within the realm of the omnipotence of God, and that the human being has no effect or influence upon the occurrence of these originated actions, what, it would be asked, would be the purport of what is asked by God of the human being? What, again, would be the intention behind this request; and what would be the difference between asking the human being to account for his "colours" and bodies (which occur by the power of God), and for his actions (which are also created and animated by God)? It would be erroneous and irrelevant for a person to order someone else, saying, "Do the thing that I am doing and create the thing that I am (1) creating.

Al-Juwaynī attempts to manipulate this argument to the detriment of the Mu'tazilites, and to counteract it with a similar argument. He then summarizes his reply to the holders of these views in this manner: "You have known that your opponents do not admit that the human being, who is commanded and enjoined, creates his actions. You have also known that the followers of the different

1) Ibid. p.115
schools of thought are agreed upon the view that those who have a task or a religious duty imposed upon them (mukallafs) are subjected to orders. But despite your knowledge of these two main doctrines you have alleged that to require of the human being actions which he does not produce is itself an impossible thing. We will now, therefore, cut the argument short by saying: "Your claim with regard to the impossibility of this view can but imply two propositions — it either relies upon an evident necessity (darūrah), or upon a proof (dalīl). If you allege that it rests upon an unavoidable necessity, you will be boldly impudent, because the majority of the people have differed from that view. And if you allege that it rests upon proof, then we would request you to submit that proof so that we may subject it to examination — for it would not be right for you to propound a proposition which is bare of proof.

The third argument propounds that the human being is rewarded and punished for his actions as well as reprimanded and commended for them. All this indicates that the actions of the human being are the products of his power; for otherwise it would not be just to reprimand or commend him for what is not in reality of his own making. Al-Juwaynī replies to this argument

1) Ibid. p.117
by saying that the recompense and punishment in this respect and the praise and blame attendant upon them, do not necessarily imply that the person upon whom a religious duty is imposed (mukallaf) is the originator of his actions; for it is valid (in view of the upright (Ahl Al Haq) that God should install a human being in a state of bliss and prosperity (without the human being in question having done anything to merit that), or in a state of dire hardship and misery (without his having done anything to deserve that).

When Al-Juwaynī concludes his discussion of these arguments and his replies to them, he embarks on a discussion of the reality of "acquisition" (kasb). This concept was resorted to by those denying the power of the human being to create his actions, as a means of explaining the relationship between the universal and comprehensive pre-eternal power and the originated power. They also sought to make a subject capable of being commanded to do certain things and not to do other things and capable of being rewarded and punished in such a way that the human being was made accountable for all behaviour and actions produced by him. If the actions of the human being were dependent on the power of God and not by the power of the human being concerned,

1) ibid. p. 118
then why should the individual be held responsible for his conduct? And how would the recompense and chastisement be just? To this the upright reply that there is some kind of connection between the power of the human being and his actions, not in the sense that the actions are created or produced by the human being, for that is dependent only by the power of God, but in the sense that there is some kind of influence upon the action known as "the acquisition."

Al-Juwaynī proceeds to explain this "acquisition" as interpreted by those who profess it; and he selects from these views what he himself believes in. In this respect he says: "Our Imāms" (religious leaders) have differed upon the aspect in which the originated power is related to the object of its creation. Some of them have held that the originated power influences the determination of a condition (state) for the object of creation (i.e., the thing produced) by which the "acquired" thing (al-muktasab – i.e., the thing produced by the exercise of the free-will) is distinguished from the "necessary" (al-darūrī – i.e., the thing which is produced unavoidably and without the exercise of the free-will).

Al-Juwaynī illustrates this kind of an "acquisition" with the following examples:

1) ibid. pp. 118, 119.
If we presume two movements of a certain object in one direction and if we then presume that one of these movements is unavoidable or necessary and the other acquired, then the acquired movement would be characterised by a factor (ḥālah) additional to that possessed by the unavoidable or necessary movement. This additional aspect would be the result of the relationship of the originated power to it. With this additional aspect the acquired movement would also be distinguished from the unavoidable or necessary movement. But the origination of this movement and the creation of its essence is something which is exclusive to the pre-eternal power of God, and no influence in this regard is exercised by the originated power of the human being.

Al-Juwaynī rejects this interpretation of "acquisition" and he holds that its adoption conflicts with what has been proved regarding the omnipotence of God and the impossibility of the proposition that the human being possesses the exclusive power over an action without God having power over the same act. And it cannot be said that the additional thing or aspect with which the acquired movement has been characterized was the product of the two powers acting jointly or concurrently (i.e., the pre-eternal power of God and the originated power of the human being). Such a proposition, he says, would induce
the belief that a created thing can be produced by two creators - which is a false proposition. Al-Juwaynī then decides upon the view which he himself adopts in this matter, and it implies the denial of any influence of the originated power over the object of the power of the human being. In his view, from the fact that the power (whether of man or God) is connected with a thing, it does not necessarily follow that it has influence upon it.

Thus, it is possible for the originated power to be correlated in some way to the action of the human being, without thereby having any influence upon that action. In this regard al-Juwaynī says: "The fact is that the originated power does not originally affect that which lies within its realm. And it is not a condition of the correlation of the state that it should affect the thing which is correlated to it; for knowledge may be considered to be correlated to the thing known although it does not influence it; and in the same way the will correlated to the action of the human being does affect the thing which is correlated to it." 

In this manner al-Juwaynī expounds the reality of "acquisition" - that it is only one manner of correlation and affinity between the power of the human being and its 

1) ibid. p.119
2) al-Irāhād : p.119.
action, and that it does not create or originate the action. From this we see that al-Juwaynī was not in fact able to present us with a sufficiently clear or satisfactory exposition of the nature of "acquisition" and that he was not able to explain its true purpose, which is the determination of a subject capable of religious responsibility. If al-Juwaynī had intended to deny the existence of any influence by the human being upon his action, what it would be asked, was the purport of "acquisition"? And what was the benefit to be derived from the correlation of the power of the human being to the action. Al-Juwaynī's words may possibly be taken to mean that he interprets "acquisition" in the same manner as it was interpreted by some of the later theologians - i.e., that it was an ordinary affinity between the originated power (the power of the human being) and the action; in the sense that custom had established that God creates the action and couples it with a power or will in the hands of the human being over it, but that He does not create the action as the direct result of the power or will of the human being. In either case, this manner of exposition of the nature of "acquisition" by al-Juwaynī as well as by other Ashʿarite scholars is in fact regarded as a reversion

1) Dhuḥa al-ʾIslām: Vol. III; p. 57.
to the doctrine of predestination, although this fact is not mentioned expressly. This is probably what was intended by the Imām al-Shaikh Muhammad ʿAbdū in his symposium upon ʿIlm al-Tawḥīd" where he said that "there were some who favoured the doctrine of predestination but evaded its label."

II. AL-GHAZĀLĪ

Al-Ghazālī does not in his book "al-Iqtiṣād" devote a special chapter to the subject of free-will and predestination, but he discusses this topic under the title of "the second aspect (al-fār al-thānī) of the doctrine of the universality of the power of God, the omnipotence of God, and the fact that it envelops all possible things, including those things that have been originated in fact, those that have not been so originated, and other things.

The doctrine of the universality of the omnipotence of God has given rise to the following retort: "If the power of God is universal, that is if it comprehends all possible things, what would be your view on the objects of power of animals and other living creatures? Do such objects of power belong to God, or do they not so belong? If your answer be "no," you will thereby be contradicting your contention that God's power is universal. If you say that these objects of power belong to God,
then you would be establishing that an object of power
can be the object of two separate powers which is an
impossible proposition. In addition, to deny that human
beings and animals are capable of originating actions
would be contrary to the dictates of reason and of
Shari ah. It is impossible for the human being to be
made to account for something that does not lie within
his power; and it is impossible to hold that God could
say to the person: "You must do that which is capable
of being originated by me and which lies exclusively
within my power, without there being any power possessed
by you over that thing."

Before al-Ghazali replies to these aspects of
doubts and confusion he mentions the various doctrines
and views held upon this particular problem. The determin-
ists (Mujbirah) had denied the power of the human being.
They were thus bound to deny the intrinsic difference
between the movement of a man's hand shaking with fright
and its movement shaking voluntarily. They were also
bound to hold by logical implication that obligations
imposed by religion on the individual have no real bases.
The Mu tazilites had denied the correlation of the power
of God to the actions of His servant, animals, angels,
jinn, human beings and devils ). They have contended
that all the actions arising are of the making and
origination of created beings, and that God has no
power over these actions by way of making them either existent or non-existent. Two corollaries follow upon this proposition: a) the rejection of what our predecessors had agreed upon to the effect that there is no creator other than God; and b) the attribution of the faculties of invention and creation to the power of entities that do not have any knowledge of the movements which they have created. As regards the Sunnites (the orthodox Muslims), al-Ghazālī holds the view that they had in their beliefs taken the middle path between the attitude of extravagance adopted by the Mu'tazilites and the attitude of remissness adopted by the Mujbirah. The Sunnites considered that the two powers (the power of God and the power of the human being) were correlated to the action of the human being. This correlation of the two powers, however, did not operate in one direction or phase but was such that each power was correlated in a manner differing from that in which the other power was correlated. Thus, it was not beyond possibility for the two powers to be correlated to the same object of origination; what would be impossible, however, would be for those two powers to be correlated to the same object in one direction and in one manner. In this respect al-Ghazālī says: "Look now at the Sunnites and see how they succeeded in choosing the right view and in attaining "the right measure in belief." (Al-iqtisād fil itqad).  

1) Al-iqtisād p. 41.
They said: "The contention in favour of determinism (jabr) is impossible and false and the contention in favour of free will (ikhtiyār) is presumption. The right view is to correlate the two powers to the same action and to hold the view in favour of an originated thing being related to two powers of origination. What remains then would be the improbability of the joint operation of the two powers upon the same action; but this becomes improbable only if the correlation of the two powers is in the same mode. But if the two powers differ and the mode of their correlation also differs, then the operation of the two powers upon the same thing would not be impossible." (1)

Al-Ghazālī considers that committal to the view in favour of the possibility of the occurrence of an object of power by the operation of two powers was implied by irrefutable proofs that denote the following: a) that the movement of voluntary shaking is different from the movement of the shaking with fright, in that the human being has to undertake the former but not the latter; and b) that the power of God attaches to every possible thing; that every originated thing is a possible thing; that the action of a human being is an originated thing; and that therefore it is impossible that the power of God should not attach to that thing.

1) Ibid. p.42.
Al-Ghazālī endeavours to clarify the correlation of the two powers to the action of the human being, thereby defining the meaning of what he calls "acquisition." In his view, it is most reasonable to hold that God creates movement in the hands of the human being without that movement itself being under the personal control of the individual. Thus God creates the power of the individual and likewise creates the object to be governed by the power of the individual; and God in this manner reserves unto Himself the exclusive power of creating the power of the human being and the object which is governed by that power of the human being.

In this manner al-Ghazālī considers that all the doubts and ambiguities clouding the doctrine of the Sunnites with regard to the problem of free-will and predestination could be dispersed. He says in this respect: "The creation by God the Almighty of the movement in the hands of the servant (the human being) is reasonable, without the movement necessarily being within the power of the servant (the human being)." He then endeavours to amplify upon this statement and says: "The conclusion is that the Potent whose power is wide, is able to furnish the power as well as the object of the power. And whereas the designation of "creator" and "furnisher" is applied to everyone who has created the thing with his power; and because the power and the

1) Ibid. p. 43.
object of the power are all within the power of God the Almighty. He has been designated as 'Creator'. The object of the power is never invented by the power of the servant (the human being), although it comes with it. For this reason he (the human being) was never designated as a 'creator'. It was imperative that a different name should be given for this kind of relative, and the name 'acquisition' (al-kasb) has been given to it .... But whether it is an action (fi'l) they have hesitated to say. However there is no difference in the names, if the meanings are understood."

Al-Ghazālī then proceeds to analyse the same objection directed against "acquisition" and against the placing of an object of power within the realms of two powers. This, in fact, is the same topic which had been replied and analysed before him by al-Juwaynī. The reply proferred by al-Ghazālī does not on the whole differ from that made by al-Juwaynī.

1) ibid. p. 43
2) Compare for this purpose al-Irshād; p. 107 with al-Iqtiṣād fi al-Iʿtiqād : pp. 43, 44. See also the first type mentioned in the first part of this Chapter (p.139)
A COMPARISON.

The doctrine of al-Ghazālī upon the subject of free-will and predestination can on the whole be regarded as a true reflection or echo of the doctrine of al-Juwaynī on this subject, from the point of view of the elements, proofs, manner of treatment and even of the examples employed for the purpose of expounding the doctrine. Al-Ghazālī's views on this subject, however, differed from those of al-Juwaynī in two fundamental points:

1. Al-Ghazālī credited to the power of the human being some influence upon the occurrence of the action (i.e. upon the creation or origination of the action); he declared that the action occurred through the instrumentality of the power of the human being as well as through the instrumentality of the power of God, while al-Juwaynī had declared that there was no effect whatsoever exercised by the power of the human being over the creation of his actions.

2. Al-Ghazālī was able to expound, to some extent, the nature of "acquisition" and to explain it in a way that could probably serve to give the term "acquisition" some factual significance. Al-Juwaynī could not explain the nature of "acquisition" in a manner that could ascertain the religious responsibility. By his denial of the existence of any power in the hands of the individual for the creation of his actions, al-Juwaynī had made the term "acquisition" one that possessed no significance in fact.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

Our exploration of the theological doctrines of al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, and the comparisons with which we have closed each of the preceding chapters, have perhaps succeeded in clarifying the theological side of the thought of each of these men, or at least made it distinguishable from other aspects of their thought. It may also now be possible for us to perceive what similarities and differences there are between them in their methods, in their approach to and regard for theology, and in the very issues raised, whether primary or secondary. 

Al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī both followed the one trend, and their theological thought was, on the whole, shaped by the same concern - viz., support for the doctrines of the Ash'arites or, more generally, of Ahl as-Sunnah. As we have seen, the problems which they investigated were the same, and they were the very problems which preceding Ash'arite theologians had raised. Neither of them, therefore, stands out against the other as having formulated a new problem, nor did either of them distinguish himself by

1) By primary problems I mean those principal problems around which Islamic Theology took shape and which it continually investigated. The secondary problems are those which were raised incidentally in the course of discussing the principal ones.
original answers or by solutions leading to new positions in respect of the Divinity, in spite of the doubts which each - in varying degrees - entertained about these answers and solutions.

As for their views on theology, they were alike in that they both advocated discouraging common people from concerning themselves with it, reserving it for an elite - a small number, necessarily - qualified for intellectual investigation. By so doing they placed the minds of people under tutelage, and made of the faith of the commonalty a matter of inculcation and unquestioning acceptance, not a question of proof and of truth. Religious leadership came to mean the framing of a policy and its adaptation to the public's mind rather than guidance to the Truth or advancement towards Reality or the furtherance of divine teachings. This bias is, in fact, more pronounced in al-Ghazâlî than in al-Juwaynî.

But for all this similarity, our exposition of their views and the preceding comparisons bring out certain differences between them, some of which are essential and extensive, and others incidental and slight. These differences may be summed up as follows:

1) In method: In his theological methods, al-Ghazâlî made use of Aristotelian logic in its widest sense. More specifically, he made use of the syllogism (qiyas), whereas al-Juwaynî used it not in theology but in connection with principles of Jurisprudence.
2) In the introduction of a Sufi bias, Al-Ghazali sometimes displayed his Sufi inclinations in the solution of theological problems, especially when he was embarrassed by the arguments of his opponents in respect of one particular problem, and could find no logical answer to them. We find traces of this in al-Iqtisād as well as in the Iḥyāʾ.

3) In defining issues: The two sometimes differed in defining the crucial consideration in the one problem — as, for example, in delimiting the meaning of the One-ness of God; al-Juwaynī represented it as the negation of there being any associate to God, al-Ghazālī as the negation of there being either an associate or an opposite.

4) In the application of proofs: The two sometimes made use of the same kind of argument in supporting a proposition, but differed in applying it. This happened, for example, in their use of burhān at-tamānuʿ to prove the One-ness of God; al-Juwaynī applied it to the powers and wills of the gods.

1) See in al-Iqtisād his definition of the meaning of the Vision of God, pp. 32–33 and his use of burhān at-tamānuʿ in proving the One-ness of God, p. 36. See also this thesis, pp. 79, 80 & 34.
assumed to be many, whereas al-Ghazâlî applied it to degrees of existence and the measure of perfection or imperfection resulting in each.

On the whole, the two made undeniable contributions to Islamic theology - they helped to extend, organise, and strengthen it. But there were differences in the extent and value of their respective efforts. Thus although al-Juwaynî took wide steps towards spreading the doctrine of Ahl as-Sunnah, widening its horizons, and blending its problems with those of philosophy, yet al-Ghazâlî - because of his powerful personality, the extensiveness of his knowledge, his ability to analyse theological problems and to adapt his exposition to various degrees of understanding and of cognition - was in this respect more successful than al-Juwaynî, more far-reaching, and more influential on the history of Islamic theology. Thus, after al-Ghazâlî's refutation of the arguments of the Falâsifah, his criticism of preceding theologians, and his utilisation of Aristotelian logic and of all other devices of argumentation and of polemics, we find the problems of theology intimately mixed with those of philosophy, all being dealt with in the one work under the one heading, so that the works of theologians came to resemble Islamic encyclopaedias dealing with philosophy and theology on an equal footing. Examples of such works are Sa'd a-Dîn at-Taftâzânî's
al-Maqāsid and ʿAḍud ad-Dīn al-Ījīʾs al-Mawāqif; the latter consists of eight volumes of which only one—the eighth—deals with the Divinity and with transmitted authority, whereas the other seven are concerned with philosophical problems which, by then, were deemed necessary preliminaries to theology.

It has long been held that, by confuting the Falasifah, al-Ghazālī put an end to philosophy in the Islamic East; this may be true not in the sense that philosophy actually disappeared from the Islamic intellectual atmosphere either in the East or in the West, but in the sense that although in the West it maintained an independent existence in the hands of Andalusian philosophers such as Ibn Bājjah, Ibn Ṭufayl, and Ibn Rushd, yet in the East it was absorbed into Islamic theology, incorporated under its name, its problems cast into a mould which both the cultured and the uncultured Muslims could easily accept. The words "Theology" and "Theologian" were used instead of "philosophy" and "Philosopher," but the subject matter and the problems deriving from it were substantially the same.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Abū Daqīqaḥ. At-Tawhīd. Cairo, 1938.

Ahmad Amin. Duhāʾ l-Islām. Cairo.


--- Al-Iqtisād fi l-ʾIʿtīṣād. Cairo, 1320 A.H.


Rūḥān Wālī. ʿIlm at-Tawhīd. Cairo.


BIBLIOGRAPHY (contd.)


Al-Khayyat. *Al-Intisar*. Cairo.