THE CONTRIBUTION OF WILLIAM JAMES TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
OF RELIGION

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By

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It is the purpose of this paper to set forth the most important phases in the philosophy of William James with the view of evaluating the contribution which he made to religious thought. It is the opinion of the writer that the greatest service which James rendered to religion is in the field of philosophy rather than in that of psychology. This position is in substantial agreement with that of Professor J. S. Bixler when he says, in Religion in the Philosophy of William James, that the issues which James raises in the former field "must form an integral part of any discussion of the subject, and the emphases he makes are of permanent importance", whereas in the latter field James was a pioneer and much of the work he did here has been superseded by more recent investigations. It is, as Professor Bixler says, "his reflective thought on the problem of man's duty and destiny--his philosophy of religion, that is to say--which is of permanent interest rather than his psychology of religion with its hypotheses as to how religious experience occurs at all--suggestive as the latter are." Just as his earlier work in psychology was later used to substantiate and develop his philosophical system, his work in the psychology of religion was really a stepping stone towards the construction of a religious philosophy. Throughout his entire lifetime his primary interest was philosophy. Consequently, it has seemed both desirable and necessary to follow his general philosophical system in trying to arrive at his contribution to religious thought, rather than to deal in detailed fashion with his efforts in the psychology of religion. His thought has been followed largely from the point of view of the philosophy of religion where his chief interest lay and where he made the most valuable and the most lasting contribution to the religious thought of his time.

The philosophy of James easily and naturally falls into four divisions:

First, there is his empiricism which is basic to his entire system and which determines his attitude towards all questions which come under his consideration. His training in British empiricism left him with a desire to trace every portion of reality through the course of experience and rendered it impossible for him to accept as real anything which lay beyond the reach of experience. This fundamental conviction in his thinking colors his view of God, of man, and of the world. His theory of knowledge and of the general nature of reality are a direct product of his empiricism.

Second, his fideism constitutes an important part of his philosophy. This aspect of his thought flows from his empirical approach to philosophy since his thoroughgoing empiricism makes faith necessary if he is not to remain in complete ignorance of a large portion of reality, since a vast amount of reality lies beyond the reach of the empirical method. Such realities as God, freedom, and immortality cannot be dealt with by an empirical theory of knowledge. Thus he must resort to faith.

Third, pragmatism is perhaps the best known doctrine connected with James's philosophy. It, too, derives ultimately from his empiricism in that if knowledge of things which are not immediately present in experience is at all possible, it must be reached by the use of ideas, images, and so on; and for James, anything is an idea which serves in a functional capacity in the business of knowing.
Fourth, pluralism is also a fruit of his empiricism. His unqualified acceptance of the data of the senses and of the feelings, as given in immediate experience, led him to the conviction that the infinite variety and number of such data mitigated against the belief in the essential unity of the world. There remain to the last loose ends of reality which cannot be brought into any scheme of unity which may be imposed upon the universe, and reality is too vast to be brought within the experience of a single knower.

This exposition of James's philosophy has, for the most part, followed the above fourfold classification. Part I, consisting of chapters one and two, gives his theory of immediate knowledge and his view of the nature of the self, both of which issue directly from, and are basic to, his empiricism. Chapter one gives his view of consciousness which renders unnecessary the traditional hypothesis of the soul. James's theory of consciousness is given at some length not only because of its bearing upon the existence of the soul but also because it is fundamental to his whole system of thought. The statement of his argument is followed by a criticism of his position with an attempt to show that it sets in motion anti-religious tendencies and ultimately leads to conclusions inimical to religion, that it constitutes an inadequate foundation upon which to build a philosophy, and fails satisfactorily to explain the facts of consciousness. Chapter two sets forth his view of the self as an empirical substitute for the soul. His view here is given as fully as space permits because his doctrine of the "stream of thought", when converted to metaphysical uses, becomes basic in his view of reality as an "experience-
continuum." The inadequacy of his conception of the self, when brought wholly within experience, is shown. This is followed by an argument which maintains that such an entity as the soul is demanded by certain facts of our conscious life which are otherwise unintelligible. Finally, a brief statement concerning the nature of the soul is given. The phase of his empiricism which is dealt with in these two chapters, while containing much that is valuable to philosophy and psychology, cannot be regarded as a definitely valuable contribution to religion. In spite of his deep interest in religion, his empiricism thus far must be considered as anti-religious in purporting to be a doctrine of the real nature of man.

Part II, consisting of chapters three, four, and five, deals with the fideistic aspect of James's philosophy. The logical order of development would place the section on pragmatism before that which treats of his fideism, inasmuch as the latter applies to the realm of knowledge which remains untouched by the former. Our reason, however, for considering the fideistic aspect of his thinking first is because it really constitutes an earlier phase in the development of his philosophy and because in his later treatment of pragmatism he deviates considerably from his earlier fideistic position; in many instances his later view contradicts much that his earlier one maintains. Chapter three sets forth his theory of belief and will which forms the groundwork for his general doctrine of faith, as well as the basis for his defense of religious faith. His doctrine of the "will to believe" grows out of his general theory of belief and will: here he identifies belief and will and establishes
the doctrine of freedom of belief with that of the freedom of the will. In this stage of his development he arrives at the conclusion that personality is the surest clue to reality, and that it is the determinant of all values. His emphasis upon the "control" of reality is overdone here and if it were consistently followed through would lead him ultimately to a humanistic position as extreme as that of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. His later development of the pragmatic doctrine, although stressing man's creativity with reference to truth and reality, corrects this extreme view which colors his doctrine of belief. Chapter four follows his effort to resolve the age-long conflict between reason and faith. His reasons for elevating will above the intellect are set forth somewhat in detail, and his contribution to religious thought at this point is given along with a criticism of the subordination of reason to will and feeling in religion. Chapter five expounds his doctrine of the "will to believe" and considers especially its application to religious faith. The real value of this doctrine is set forth, accompanied by a criticism of its obvious deficiencies. It is shown that while this view has a certain value within a somewhat limited scope, it cannot be accepted as adequate as a genuine foundation for religious faith because faith has as its very essence the affirmation of the reality of its object, and because, while values form a strong argument for the worth of religion, they do not necessarily carry conviction as to its truth. It is argued that religion, like science, cannot separate itself from metaphysics, and that any attempt to make such a separation weakens the foundation of religious faith.
Part III, chapters six and seven, deals with pragmatism. Chapter six gives a brief sketch of the development of the doctrine of pragmatism, showing the situation in philosophy out of which it arose and setting forth some of the factors which helped to originate it. The pragmatic theory of method and meaning is given with an attempt to distinguish carefully between James's strict pragmatism and his fideism, which he often confuses. The importance of this distinction is obvious when it is realized that the former, as a philosophical method, is not favorable to religion, whereas the latter may be considered as offering support to religion. His theory of method is criticized with the intent of showing that it is not philosophically sound nor valuable as a means of deciding worthwhile controversies. Chapter seven sets forth his pragmatic doctrine of truth. The pragmatism of James is distinguished from that of other pragmatists of the more humanistic school. A general criticism of his pragmatic view is given with an attempt to show that its futurism, its practicalism, and its relativity both as to truth and values render it unsatisfactory from a religious point of view. The bearing of pragmatism upon religion is dealt with for the purpose of showing that the pragmatic attitude is favorable to religion whereas the pragmatic doctrine of both method and truth contains germinal ideas which, if developed consistently, ultimately lead to anti-religious conclusions.

Part IV, consisting of chapters eight and nine, treats of his pluralistic doctrine and its implications for religious thought, and of his doctrine of God. Chapter eight states the reasons for his antipathy to monism of every sort. It treats with his break with logic in the effort
to solve the problem of compounding consciousness. In order to show how his break with logic came about his view of the nature of reality is given; he is brought finally to see that reality is at bottom illogical and that there is always an alogical element in experience. It is shown that his break with logic was really due to the fact that his thinking was based upon idealistic assumptions, and that if he had not proceeded upon this basis it would not have been necessary for him to reject reason. The corollaries of pluralistic teachings are given with a criticism and appreciation as constituting part of his system of religious philosophy. His emphasis upon the value of the individual is regarded as an effective antidote to the enervating teachings of absolute idealism which regard the individual's existence as possessing no reality of its own. He errs, however, in the direction of deism in attributing to the individual an unqualified separateness from God. It is shown that his doctrine of freedom, while offering a way of escape from the chains of rigid determinism, does not solve the problem of freedom, from the religious point of view, because of his resort to absolute contingency and outright creativity on the part of the individual. His doctrine of meliorism is stated and criticized. Chapter nine deals with his doctrine of God, setting forth his conception of the meaning and value of God in human life, his reasons for belief in a finite God, and a criticism of the conception of a finite God and of his solution of the problem of evil.

Chapter ten states briefly, by way of conclusion, some of the ways not previously stressed in which the philosophy of James influences religious thought today.
Any student of James faces a very grave difficulty in trying to render in his own words the thought which James expressed in inimitable fashion. Consequently, those who study James usually find that it is not only the line of least resistance, but often the only safe way, to quote from James rather than attempt to give in their own words what James has said. James's vibrant enthusiasm and forcefulness of expression are largely lost in an effort to expound his teachings. Because of this fact most of those who write on James find it expedient and often necessary to give James's thought in his own language with great frequency. This is especially true when dealing with the more difficult passages of his writing. Further, although James is regarded as a master of the English language, his extravagant use of words is not always conducive to clarity. Frequently he has been misunderstood due to his eagerness to make a strong case in argument which betrays him into overstatement. Also, he often uses more words than are necessary in giving expression to his thought. For instance, anyone who has read his essay entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?" in English has been impressed with its ambiguity. But if the same argument is read in his essay in French called "La Notion de Conscience", his thinking seems to be much clearer and his meaning quite easier to comprehend. This is due to the fact that his vocabulary, when writing in French, is so much more limited than when writing in English. Nor is it easy to interpret all of James's statements as having a particular meaning; many of his statements seem to be amenable to more than one interpretation. It is also true that many seemingly contradictory statements are to be found in James's works. Professor R. B. Perry, who has studied James perhaps more
carefully than any modern philosopher, once told the writer that he finds it very difficult, after many years of study, to know just what James is trying to say in certain points of his system.

It may appear to the reader of this paper that the writer is out of sympathy with James more than is actually true. James's fine spirit and earnestness in dealing with religious questions, his deep and lasting interest in religion, his sincere efforts to get at the facts of religion, his consuming passion to give religion a substantial footing in the fields of science and philosophy, his testimony to man's constant need of religion, his confident assurance of its power and value in human life, his own personal faith, his silent courage, his unshakable convictions—these things are of necessity omitted from such a treatise as this. It may be said that James's conclusions concerning religion and its place in human life are usually right, but he errs in his methods of approach and in the details of his arguments; his penetrating insights seem always to be accurate and illuminating. Strange inconsistencies are to be found in James's thinking which cannot be harmonized until one has studied the life of the man himself. He gives a very unorthodox support to orthodoxy at many points; he is far from orthodox. He opposes the "vicious intellectualism" of rationalistic philosophy, but he does not permit faith to supplant or supersede reason. He attacks the mechanism and the agnosticism of a materialistic science, but he tries to make religion more scientific and more acceptable to scientific thought. He is utterly opposed to determinism, but his conception of the self plays into the hands of the protagonists of a deterministic philosophy, and his doctrine
of freedom involves a mechanical view of the future which is similar to that which the determinists apply to the past. He sponsors a view of reason in religion which makes way for the acceptance of revelation but there seems to be no need of any revelation of divine truth given once and for all. He attempts to bring God down into the commonplaces of human living, and conceives of God as a friend and ally of man but there is no place in his thinking for such a doctrine as the incarnation. He recognizes man's eternal yearning for immortality but his own belief in it seems to waver to the end. He speaks of the value of prayer and declares that it is the most important thing in religion, but he never prayed himself and asserted that he was unable to do so. Such inconsistencies as these seem to be cleared up only in the personal life of the man himself.

Perhaps it is proper and fitting, before bringing this preface to a close, to explain why the writer has drawn so much from the writings of Professor R. B. Perry, of Harvard University. Professor Perry has studied James more thoroughly and masterfully than any other man, and none other has written so much or so ably upon the philosophy of James. He is undoubtedly the greatest living authority on the thought of James. He has rendered James more understandable to those who have studied him less, and to those who have studied him with less ability than Professor Perry. Further, the writer is indebted to Professor Perry in his study of James in that it was his privilege to take a course of lectures given by Professor Perry at Harvard University in the academic year 1938-39 on "William James and Henri Bergson" which was a comparative study of the thought of these two men. Also, Professor Perry directed the writer's
reading of William James in a tutorial course taken at Harvard University the same year. Consequently, the interpretation of James given in this paper has been considerably influenced by Professor Perry. His interpretation of James's general philosophical point of view has been, for the most part, accepted and applied throughout this paper. This is especially true in some of the more difficult portions of James's thought. Also, the writer is indebted to J. S. Bixler, Professor of Theology in the Divinity School of Harvard University, whose lectures on "Current Theology", which included a comparative study of William James, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, and others, enabled him to make a comparative study of these philosophers. In exposition, criticism, and appreciation the writer has gleaned much from others who have pioneered the way in these fields of thought, and it is no doubt true that others are entitled to credit in many instances in which no mention is made of them or of their writings.
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

C. E. R. Collected Essays and Reviews.

E. R. E. Essays in Radical Empiricism.


M. T. Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to Pragmatism.

P. U. Pluralistic Universe.

Pragmatism. Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.


W. B. Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.
PART ONE

EMPIRICISM
The name of William James is popularly associated with the philosophy of Pragmatism, and it may appear strange to say that this doctrine does not contain the most fundamental aspect of his thought, or that it is not the most far-reaching contribution which he made to the philosophy of his time. Pragmatism, while an integral part of his general system, is not the most important part of his philosophical construction which, in its broader aspect, is an empiricism or philosophy of experience. There can be no doubt that James considered the matter in this light. In the preface to The Meaning of Truth he says, "I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which I give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail." Professor R. B. Perry, who is probably the greatest living authority on the philosophy of William James, writes in this connection, in his latest book, as follows: "Not only has he expressly and repeatedly stated that he considers his 'radical empiricism' to be more important than his pragmatism; not only has he introduced the pragmatic method as an accessory to immediate acquaintance or as a compensation for its absence; but the delicate characterization of experience—discoveries of data hitherto ignored, and vivid portrayals of the cosmic scene—constitute the choicest fruits of his philosophical genius." 

In an empiricist, James follows in the tradition of the British school of empirical philosophy, but he dares to carry his empiricism further than any of his predecessors had done. His criticism of his empirical ancestors is that they had not gone far enough. To quote Professor H. B. Perry again, "It may, I think, be said that James's works contain the most thoroughgoing attempt which has ever been made to carry all the terms of discourse back to the original data of sense, or to other immediately discriminated qualia."

The "radical" nature of James's empiricism may be seen from the following brief summary which he makes of it. It is comprised of a postulate, of a "statement of fact", and of "a generalized conclusion". The postulate is "that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience." Things which are not, or which cannot be, experienced may exist without number, but they can play no part in philosophical discussions. James attributes the idea which this postulate embodies to Shadworth Hodgson's notion "that realities are only what they are 'known as'." Here we have "the principle of pure experience" as a "methodical postulate". The "statement of fact" is "that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves." This doctrine of relations is central to James's empiricism and distinguishes his "radical empiricism" from the empirical philosophy of such thinkers as Hume and J. S. Mill, to which it bears close resemblance in other respects. It embodies his attempt to overcome such disjunctions in

3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. H. B. P., p. xii.
5. Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, p. 50; Cf. also, H. B. P., p. 43.
7. H. B. P., p. xii.
philosophy as those between consciousness and physical nature, between thought and its object, between one mind and another, and between one "thing" and another, without the help of any "extraneous trans-empirical connective support", but by regarding such dualities as arising out of differences of empirical relationship among common empirical terms. The actual relation which pragmatism bears to his general system may be seen from the fact that, while the pragmatic theory of "meaning" and "truth" attempts to overcome the disjunction between "idea" and "object", his fundamental theory of relations as given above is not essential to pragmatism. Thus, when pragmatism and empiricism are considered as methods they are essentially the same, but as doctrines, they are independent. Finally, radical empiricism contains "a generalized conclusion": "that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure." This statement of the doctrine shows that radical empiricism is not only a theory of knowledge which includes pragmatism, but that it is also a metaphysical construction which eliminates the "hypothesis of trans-empirical reality", and which interprets reality as an "experience-continuum".

James not only regarded his empiricism as more fundamental and more important than any other part of his philosophy, but he also considered it as especially congenial to religion. This is evident from the following declaration: "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto,

9. Ibid., p. xi; Also, K. T., p. xiii.
11. T., pp. xii-xiii.
through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irre-
ligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy
will be ready to begin." It is obvious that such a doctrine does have an
important bearing upon religion since it involves the treatment of such
fundamental subjects as consciousness, the self, freedom, and the nature of
reality. Whether or not James is justified in holding that his empiricism
is especially compatible with religion cannot be determined until after we
have examined his system at these salient points which are directly related
to religion. Our immediate concern pertains to his view of consciousness
which flows directly from his empiricism. We shall reserve for the follow­
ing chapter our treatment of his view of the self, which came earlier in his
development of empiricism, since it suits our purpose better to follow this
order rather than that which James's own thinking followed. We shall not
consider the wider metaphysical implications of his doctrine of empiricism,
as set forth in his *A Pluralistic Universe*, until after we have dealt with
other aspects of his system.

We have not to examine his view of consciousness. He sets forth his
theory of consciousness in the development of the theory of immediate knowl­
dge. It is characteristic of his empiricism to elevate this type of knowl­
dge, which he calls "knowledge by acquaintance", to a position of supreme
importance as constituting knowledge in the ultimately preferred sense. The
importance which he attaches to immediate knowledge arises from the fact that
it flows from experience itself, and, for James, the verdict of experience
is always final; knowledge is not fully consummated until it coincides with
reality. This is possible only in experience. It is in immediate knowl­
dge, then, that the nature of the reality presented is revealed. The
other type of knowledge which he recognizes and which he terms "knowledge

about, is derived from ideas. "Knowledge about" is a substitute for, and a supplement to, "knowledge by acquaintance", due to the limited range of the latter. Both kinds of knowledge are necessary, but immediate knowledge is regarded as being completer and more conclusive. Thus we may regard his theory of "knowledge by acquaintance", which involves his treatment of consciousness, as the foundation of his entire system of empirical philosophy.

In 1904 he published an article entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?" in which he gives his epistemological theory, and in which he emphatically denies the existence of consciousness, as one ordinarily understands it. That is, he denies that there is any such entity as the soul-substance of traditional philosophy. He points out the fact that, in the course of time, the conception of the soul has been replaced by the transcendental ego. In the writings of such thinkers as Schuppe, Natorp, Lünsterburg, and others, the transcendental ego "attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the 'content' of experience is known." He expresses the opinion that when once consciousness "has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity", it is on the point of disappearing altogether. "It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy."

This denial of a soul-substance does not, however, mean for James a denial of mind altogether, but the rejection of the conception of mind as a spiritual substance possessing some peculiar stuff or quality of being. That is to say,

17. Ibid., p. 2.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. Ibid., p. 2.
he repudiates "consciousness" as the ghost of the quasi-material soul. He does not dispense with consciousness as a unique function in experience by means of which things become known; he does not doubt the function of knowing. But his view of the non-existence of consciousness, as an entity, as a permanent ego, was of long standing. "For twenty years past," he writes, "I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students... It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded."

By rejecting consciousness, as a distinct substance, James is preparing the way for the formulation of a relational theory of consciousness which arises from his biological conception of mind and which is based on his doctrine of "pure experience." Biologically, he regards the mind as essentially a selective agency, "a theatre of simultaneous possibilities." The action of the mind is not creative, but at every stage of its development, on every level of complexity, its operations are selective. It follows from the nature of mind, then, that it derives its content entirely from the environment, and its sole contribution to that content is its work of selection. Thus conceived, the mind is really nothing in and for itself; it is simply the relation which exists between objects when they become known, and its being and substance come from the objects. It is defined in terms of cognition, and is regarded as merely a capacity, a grouping, an objective relation added to objects when they become known. In the earlier phases of James's empiricism, which we shall consider in the following chapter, he attempts to bring within experience such dualities as self and not-self, knower and known, and idea and object, which traditional thought has regarded as falling outside experience,

20. Ibid., pp. 3,4.
21. Ibid., p. 3
or, at least, as occupying a different plane of experience from sense and feeling. Having carried his empiricism thus far, his next crucial step towards constructing a theory of consciousness, as a peculiar type of relation between objects, rather than as a distinct substance implying a metaphysical subject, is to bring within experience the distinction between mind and body. Now in order to do this, experience must be made to embrace the physical world as well as consciousness. But before experience can thus be extended, it must be severed from its association with consciousness. In other words, experience must be neutralized by annulling the traditional distinction between mind and matter.

He begins by asserting that philosophers have been wrong in accepting Descartes's definition of thought as absolutely unextended. He denies that the psychical and the physical are completely heterogeneous. The reality which is sensibly given and the sensation which we have of it are absolutely identical. The "public" life of things, from which our theoretic constructions come, is homogeneous, and numerically one, with our internal life. While objects and images are to be distinguished, the one from the other, images take the place of objects to lead us to them, and there is no reason for attributing to images any essential difference of nature from that of objects. Thought and actuality are made of the same identical stuff. His study of external perception leads him to the same conclusion concerning the homogeneity of the psychical and physical. Here, as elsewhere, the internal and external are fused indissolubly. This would be impossible, he argues, if the object and the idea were absolutely disparate. The un-

23. Perry, op. cit. p. 76.
26. Ibid., pp. 214, 216.
27. Ibid., pp. 215, 217.
certain status of secondary qualities, as shown by the history of philosophy, serves to strengthen his conviction that the psychical and the physical are essentially homogeneous. The secondary qualities are objective for common sense; for the physicist, they are subjective. Even the primary qualities, he thinks, "are undergoing the same fate."

As to appreciations, they also form an ambiguous sphere of being. They belong with emotion on the one hand, and have objective "value" on the other. We repeatedly assign to things external to us the feelings which they arouse in us. We speak of "a painful experience," of "a sad sky," of "a perception of loveliness," and of "a frightful storm." Such experiences seem to waver between "inner" and "outer"; they may be taken as either or both. The distinction of objective and subjective comes later, and arises out of some urgent practical need of life. "There is no original spirituality or materiality of being, intuitively discerned, then; but only translocation of experiences from one world to another; a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for definitely practical or intellectual ends."

Thus subjectivity and objectivity are simply classifications into which experience falls for us, in keeping with our temporary purposes. Further, James maintains that the affectional states are quasi-bodily. These states cannot be classed as belonging to either the mental or the physical realm. The same thing may affect the body and the mind. "Our body itself is the palmary instance of the ambiguous. Sometimes I treat my body purely as a part of outer nature. Sometimes, again, I think of it as 'mine,' I sort it with the 'me,' and then certain local changes and determinations in it pass

29. Ibid., p. 34.
30. Ibid., p. 146.
31. Ibid., p. 148.
for spiritual happenings. Its breathing is my 'thinking,' its sensorial adjustments are my 'attention,' its kinesthetic alterations are my 'efforts,' its visceral perturbations are my 'emotions.'" Introspective analysis leads him to conclude that there is no such thing as "simon-pure" activity, activity an sich; there is nothing like the spiritual activity of the mind. What he "feels distinctly" is found to "consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar notions in the head or between the head and throat." If the word activity means anything at all, he says, "it must denote what there is found... what it is 'known-as' is what there appears. The experiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up, just as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or whatever remaining characters the situation may involve."

His rejection of a mental substance and of the spiritual activity of the mind carries along with it also the denial of the reality of a spiritual subject. He regards the common description of consciousness as an entity, as pure activity, as spiritual, directly knowing itself, as a "pure chimera." He construes the individual self as a peculiar grouping of the elements of experience, which "comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is is 'here'; when the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches is 'this'; all other things are 'there' and 'then' and 'that'... The body is the storm centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train.

32. Ibid., p. 155.
Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I,' then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this,' and 'here.' Activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis, and, if activities have feelings, must be felt in a peculiar way. The word 'my' designates the kind of emphasis...The 'my' of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perceptive-interest in which they are dyed." The annulment of the distinction between the psychical and the physical has been accomplished, and the physical body takes the place of the metaphysical subject. In spite of the fact that it may sound materialistic, he voices his conclusion in the matter as follows: "Let the case be what it may with others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracranial muscular adjustments, etc...), and these increase the assets of 'consciousness,' so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit,' breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are." Thus, as a good empiricist, James searches for the meaning of the word "conscious" in experience and concludes that if it is conceived as an aboriginal stuff or "all enveloping container," it has no meaning.

36. Ibid., p. 380.
38. Perry, op. cit. p. 94.
We have now to consider the description of the "sum of concrete reali-
ties" which James thinks the word "consciousness" ought to cover; that is,
the meaning he attaches to the word in terms of experience, or what con-
sciousness is in a world of "pure experience." The one primal stuff of
which the world is composed, according to James, is "pure experience," which
is neither psychical nor physical. It is "neutral." The term "pure"
indicates that the distinction between the mental and the physical has not
yet been applied to its components. Thus "pure experience" is the "instant
field of the present," and is only virtually or potentially either subject or
object as yet. "For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or
existence, a simple that" which has not entered into any context or assumed
a functional role. As such, it cannot be defined, but can only be experi-
enced. It is the stuff of experience in general. There is, however, "no
general stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs
as there are 'natures' in the things experienced." Experience, then, is
only a class name "for all these sensible natures, and save for time and
space (and, if you like, for 'being') there appears no universal element of
which all things are made." Any one bit of pure experience is "made of
that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness,
heaviness or what not."

These pure experiences, for James prefers to speak of this original
stuff in the plural, are capable of entering into an indefinite number of
varied relations, relations which are themselves essential parts of experience.
That is to say, it is possible for the same undivided portion of pure experi-
ence to play different roles in the various contexts in which it finds itself.

40. Ibid., p. 23.
42. Ibid., p. 27.
43. Ibid., p. 27.
We need only to admit "that every smallest bit of experience is a multum in parvo plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these relations is not by that very fact engaged in all the other relations simultaneously. The relations are not all what the French call solidaires with one another.

Without losing its identity a thing can either take up or drop another thing, like the log...which by taking up new carriers and dropping old ones can travel anywhere with a light escort." Now, according to this principle, the portion of experience which enters and forms the content of consciousness, may also be considered as the same portion or bit of experience which, when in another relation, goes to make up physical nature. In short, the same element of experience can belong to both realms at the same time. Thus it is possible to explain knowing, in such a universe as this, as a special kind of relation existing between two portions of experience. The relation itself is a part of pure experience. Since the elements of experience are neither psychical nor physical prior to this new relation, there is neither subject nor object; but in this new relation one of the terms becomes the subject, or knower, and the other the thing known. James maintains that this involves no inconsistency. It is the problem of how one identical point can be on two lines. This is possible, provided it is situated at their inter-section.

Let us take, for example, the experience of the room in which the reader is sitting. Its walls, tables, chairs, and so on, form a collection of physical things, belonging to the physical world. There is in this experience, in addition to this group of physical associates, the internal, personal

44. P. U. pp. 322-323.
45. J. R. E. p. 4.
46. Ibid., p. 12.
world of the reader, which world is related in his personal biography, just as the physical things are related to the history of the room. There are, then, two processes involved in this experience of the room; they are the physical and the personal. Now, these two processes flow together and coalesce, in this experience, just as the two lines fuse at their place of intersection. That is, the pure experience of the room is a place of intersection of these two processes.  

In one of these contexts the room belongs to the realm of the physical, it is the room in which the reader sits; in the other context it is "one's field of consciousness." In other words, the same room plays a double role; in one grouping it figures as a thought, in another grouping as a thing. The room, as a physical thing, differs in many respects from the room as mental or personal. As a room, it owes its existence to the plans of an architect, and to the labor and skill of carpenters. It has existed for several years; it may continue to exist indefinitely in the future. Fire can easily destroy it and its contents. But as mental, or in personal experience, it has existed for only a moment or two. You can blot it out of existence by closing your eyes. When you leave it, it may remain as a pleasant, or unpleasant, memory for years. In both cases, however, it is the same room of which we are speaking; it forms a part of material nature and is also a fact of inner consciousness. The difference between the physical relationship and the mental may be expressed negatively by saying that the latter lacks dynamic efficacy. Mental fire does not burn, mental knives do not cut or harm, and mental guns do not kill. There are also important positive characteristics of the mental order which occur in James's account, and which Professor Perry states as follows: "There is the process of reflection, in which a first experience is corrected and transcended by a supervening

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47. Ibid., p. 12.
48. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
experience. There is the cognitive reference in which one experience "points to" an ulterior experience. Finally, there is the factor of interested selectivity, so conspicuous throughout all of James's descriptions of mind." But in no case are the elements of experience to be regarded as intrinsically conscious or personal in themselves. It is always the same elements of experience which, according to their context, figure both as physical and as mental, just as the same room in our illustration plays the role of a thing in one grouping and in another that of a thought.

This same principle applies, James maintains, when we pass from percepts to concepts, from things present to things a long way off. "If we take conceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their first intention mere bits of pure experience, and, as such, as single thats which act in one context as objects, and in another context figure as mental states." The room here also plays a double role in that again it is counted twice over; it is both the "object-thought-of", and the "thought-of-an-object". "As 'subjective' we say that the experience represents; as 'objective' it is represented." But this experience is not double; it is simple. That which represents and that which is represented are numerically the same. Such terms, therefore, as "subject" and "object", "represented" and representative", and "thing" and "thought", stand for a distinction which is merely temporary and practical. For all practical purposes and needs it is an important distinction; but it is functional rather than ontological. In memory, a distant scene which we recall, is related to our present surroundings by certain facts and events which are entirely homogeneous on one side with our present

49. Perry, op. cit., p. 96.
50. P. R., p. 15.
51. Ibid., p. 22.
52. Ibid., p. 23.
53. Ibid., pp. 23, 233.
environment, and on the other with the object or objects remembered. This content of thought does not first appear as something internal which we then project to some remote distance; it presents itself as if it were the remote fact. Our consciousness of it is the retrospective way of designating the content itself, once that content has been separated from its physical "intermediaries", and connected with a new group of associations such as the emotions it arouses in us, the attention we give it, and so on. So long as we think of this phenomenon in its first group of associates it remains an "objective" phenomenon. As soon, however, as we place it in the new grouping it is called a "thought".

These parts of experience are related, or known, in the peculiar way which has been described, because of the fact that certain experiences are able to lead to certain other experiences, by means of intermediary experiences. And these experiences are defined in such a way that some find themselves playing the role of things known, and others that of the knowing subject. Both roles can be clearly defined without once leaving the pattern of experience and without an appeal, or reference, to anything transcendent. Neither a metaphysical subject nor an act of consciousness is necessary to explain the way in which things become known. A new set of relations, that is, consciousness, is added to the terms or elements of experience. "Consciousness", therefore, "connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their 'conscious' quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations--these relations themselves being experiences--to one another."  

54. Ibid., p. 214.
55. Ibid., p. 12, 14.
56. Ibid., p. 25.
sciousness, then, like the knowing subject, is found to consist in a peculiar relationship between the terms of experience. It differs from other things as one grouping differs from another grouping of the same elements or terms; just as the Democratic party, for example, differs from the people of the United States. It exists in this sense, but does not enjoy separate existence; that is, it has no existence entirely different from, or apart from, other things, as one object exists outside another in the physical world.

"Thus while it means nothing to say that yellow is made of conscious stuff, or is contained within a conscious receptacle, it does mean something to say that when the yellow of the rose is connected by expectation with other sensory data, such as fragrance, or with melancholy memories or romantic hopes, then these elements compose consciousness." Thus these elements, while not in themselves conscious or mental, constitute a peculiar arrangement the structural characteristic of which is consciousness; these same elements are capable of entering into other particular combinations which constitute the physical world and other orders of being. Since, then, the physical and mental world may overlap in common phenomena or pure experience, there is no occasion to appeal to a transcendent externality.

This principle is used also to explain "how two minds can know one thing," and to show how the same thing may be known by the same mind at different times. These bits of reality or "neutral" elements are capable not only of connecting consciousness with the various objective orders of being, but also of connecting other streams of consciousness, or other minds. They are able to enter into two or more conscious arrangements or groupings at the

57. Perry, op. cit. p. 94.
same time. That is, they can be objects for many different minds. Their capacity to act as common objects to two or more minds enables different minds to become co-terminous and commutable. Similarly, the same mind is enabled to know the same thing at different times. "The different pulses of one consciousness may thus overlap and interpenetrate. And where these pulses are successive, the persistence of these common factors, marginal in one and focal in the next, gives to consciousness its peculiar connectedness and continuity. There is no need, therefore, of a synthesis ab extra; there is sameness and permanence and universality within the content itself."

This original and ingeneous theory of consciousness represents the philosophical genius of James at its best and sets forth the ablest attempt in modern philosophy to avoid both epistemological and psycho-physical dualism. It has had a profound influence upon American philosophy and has served as the point of departure for the American school of Neo-Realism. This school, however, has gone beyond James in its repudiation of the acts of consciousness; it has gone so far as to abolish awareness. But James, as we have seen, does not deny the function of knowing. Professor R. B. Perry, who gives his neo-realistic view in his well known work, Present Philosophical Tendencies, to which we have referred above, writes in his most recent book on James's philosophy as follows: "It is regrettable that James was not more persistently and stubbornly consistent in his own radicalism. If experience is to have the physical and metaphysical scope which he attributed to it, it must be boldly emancipated from all conscious or mental implications."

Despite the fact that James frequently writes as though experience and conscious experience were the same thing, Professor Perry rightly insists that

60. In the Spirit of William James, p. 100.
if consciousness is a special relation of the elements of experience, then the logical issue is to regard the other relations as non-conscious. The neo-realists are carrying James's theory of consciousness to its logical conclusion in maintaining that consciousness is merely a relation between or among physical objects. In this respect the American school differs from the English school of Neo-Realism in that the latter holds that consciousness is a relation between a psychical subject and physical objects. This difference is no doubt due to the fact that James's influence upon the former is very strong and direct, while the English Neo-Realists are influenced by the view of G. E. Moore, as set forth in his well known essay, "The Refutation of Idealism." E. B. Holt, another prominent representative of the American school of Neo-Realism, defines the knowing process in terms of the response of the nervous system to a cross-section of the environment. He says, "the phenomenon of response defines a cross-section of the environment without, which is a neutral manifold. Now this neutral cross-section outside of the nervous system, and composed of the neutral elements of physical and non-physical objects to which the nervous system is responding by some specific response,---this neutral cross-section, I submit, coincides exactly with the list of objects of which we say that we are conscious. This neutral cross-section as defined by the specific reaction of reflex-arcs is the psychic realm:--it is the manifold of our sensations, perceptions and ideas:--it is consciousness." It is obvious that this definition of consciousness bears a close resemblance to James's view, although it goes further than James's theory does in that it does "boldly emancipate" the

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"neutral" elements "from all conscious or mental implications." Mr. Holt makes it clear in the Preface to his book that he regards his view of consciousness as similar to, and an outcome of, James's theory. He says, "The definition of consciousness proposed in the following pages is in no small part inspired by the Radical Empiricism of Professor James; and is, I believe, throughout consonant with that view." F. J. E. Woodbridge, another prominent American philosopher, defines consciousness "as a kind of continuum of objects," and he says that "objects are connected in consciousness in such a way that they become known. He adds, "It is important to note that, while this is so, knowledge is wholly determined in its content by the relations of the objects in consciousness to one another, not by the relation of consciousness to the objects." It is obvious that in the case of each of these thinkers whom we have mentioned as advocating a relational theory of consciousness, there is a striking similarity to James's view; and in each case James's theory seems not to go far enough to meet the logical demands of the situation. In other words, once we go as far as James's theory goes in rejecting consciousness, there is no satisfactory stopping place short of an outright denial of the acts of consciousness altogether.

This doctrine of James has borne fruit in another direction, namely, upon the behavioristic school of psychology. Encouraged and influenced by James's denial of consciousness as a distinct substance, this school has gone all the way and rejects consciousness altogether. It endeavors to interpret all conscious processes entirely in terms of the behavior of the individual. The behaviorist strikes from his scientific vocabulary "all

65. Perry, op. cit. p. 100.
68. Ibid., p. 311.
subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined." He regards the behavior or activities of the human being as the subject matter of psychology, and claims that consciousness is neither a definable nor a usable concept. Thus limiting himself to what he can observe, he says, "we can observe behavior"; that is, "what the organism does or says...saying is doing—that is, behaving, speaking overtly to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball." He is not attempting to place the responsibility upon James for the extremes of either of these two modern schools of thought in our suggestion that he has considerably influenced them, but we do believe that there is some justification for holding that his position, while he simply means to deny a permanent ego, and not the function of knowing, ultimately leads to such extremes, and that, to that extent, he has had much to do with these attempts to repudiate consciousness as an act or state of awareness. We may conclude then, as F. H. Tennant says, that the "recent phase of the effort to get rid of the concept of consciousness, seems to have been initiated by Professor W. James." Nor is it merely a case of these thinkers claiming the distinction of James's influence, as Professor J. S. Bixler seems to regard it. In protest against associating James with such extreme doctrines, he writes as follows: "The fact may be worth dwelling on that James was particularly keenly aware of the importance and significance of human volitional activity. It is desirable to make this emphasis at a time like the present when certain scientific disciplines, claiming direct descent from James, are pressing the mechanistic

70. Ibid., p. 3.
71. Ibid., p. 6.
"James has given us a scientific description of experience with the individual consciousness left out." For despite the fact that James seems never to have denied consciousness as a function of knowing, he appears to have come very close to it when, for instance, he asserts that thinking is identical with breathing; and sometimes he appears to define mental action in terms of bodily action as the following statement shows: "So far as we are 'persons', and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment', movements in our body figure as our activities." Having gone as far as he appears to have gone, it certainly would be simpler and more logical to identify the mind with the body, as Professor Perry seems to do. If James's successors have seen the logical conclusion of his view it may well be because they stand upon his shoulders and look in the same direction in which he was headed; but they see further and perhaps more clearly. This seems to be more probable than Professor Bixler's contention, which evidently implies that they make claims to which they are not entitled concerning James's influence upon their thinking in respect to consciousness.

We have dwelt somewhat at length upon the influence of this doctrine upon these extraterrestrial forms of thought because it is obvious that any view which is capable of being carried logically to such extreme conclusions will arouse suspicion so far as religious philosophy is concerned. Also, we have stressed the fact that James regarded his empiricism as the most important part of his philosophy, and that his epistemology is basic to that system. Further, we noted that he conceived his empiricism to be especially

74. Ibid., p. x.  
75. E. R. E., pp. 36-37.  
77. Ibid., p. 285.
favorable to religion. It does not need any argument to show that any view which discards the soul, and lends itself to such mechanical interpretations as those we have suggested, cannot be considered as favorable to religion. It must so far forth be regarded as definitely anti-religious. And this is true in spite of the fact, as Professor Bixler remarks, "that no one has sketched more boldly than he the possibilities which can only be made actual through individual personal choice." For it is obviously inconsistent to deny the permanent reality of the self while the importance of "individual personal choice" is emphasized; if consciousness is the scanty thing which his theory makes it out to be, he is hardly justified in attributing to it the efficiency which he says it has. It is hardly less absurd to recognize the reality of consciousness while its efficiency is denied, than it is to reduce it to a minimum while claiming for it a maximum of efficacy. Plainly, such a view of consciousness as James gives us renders it necessary for us to account for the place which is occupied in the structure of the world by such realities as choice, purpose, goodness, and so on, ---for he does strongly emphasize the fact that they hold an essential place in the general interpretation of the universe, ---by a consciousness devoid of activity. For when knowledge, along with art, morality, and religion is seen to be ways in which the activity of the mind expresses itself, it is no longer possible to remain content with an interpretation of consciousness as merely an objective relation between objects known. If ethical, social, and religious values are the fruits of spirit and mind, the only adequate view of mind is the concept of inner activity which is not amenable to discovery or description. And there is no good reason for supposing that these values can be fully accounted for without any reference to the activity of the mind. In

short, as J. S. Mackenzie argues, there are various ways in which to approach this problem, such as the empirical, the mystical, and the metaphysical; and the last way does not consist in rendering such an account of the nature of knowledge as to show that nothing can be real except that which knows or is known. It is not altogether epistemological, but consists rather in showing the place which such values as we have mentioned occupy in the structure of reality. To attempt this while regarding consciousness as impassive is futile. Thus the empirical approach is not the only one open to us; nor is it the most satisfactory. We agree with John Dewey when he says that the doctrine that things are only and just what they are "known-as", which is James's "methodical postulate", is the "root paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective, psychological or epistemological." Further, James's account of consciousness, setting out from the standpoint of presentationism, as it does, considerably weakens his argument for freedom. He could hardly make a greater concession to the determinists whom he battles constantly, and who regard any attempt to deny the reality of the self or subject of experience as a victory for them. As J. Ward says, "determinism and sensationalism alike, in common with all naturalistic thinking, set out from the objective standpoint, as if it were absolute. The subjective factor in all experience, which the natural sciences can safely ignore, can, they assume, be ignored by the moral and historical sciences too." Professor Ward says further, in exposing the absurdity of the conception of the mind as "only a bundle of percepts and motives", without a subject of experience: "But since presentationism

cannot consistently regard presentations themselves as purposive, there can 82 be no purpose in the Many at all." It is obvious, then, that James's theory of consciousness does lend itself to a mechanical interpretation as regards freedom, and, as we shall see later, it is because he concedes so much to the mechanistic view with reference to the effort of attention, as the crucial factor in freedom, that he is forced to inject an element of chance into his conception of freedom. But he could have saved his doctrine of freedom from this more objectionable feature by construing the self in more "activistic" terms.

Another reason why his interpretation of consciousness arouses suspicion from the standpoint of religion is its failure satisfactorily to account for the persistence of the individual life. This question is of chief practical importance for religion. He follows Locke and Kant in making the distinction between substantial identity and personal identity, and he stresses the importance of only the latter, the continuity of consciousness being the one thing of importance, whereas the "substratum of that continuance" was a matter of indifference to him. Professor Ward rightly urges the objection against a similar position taken by Lotze, that if we regard the matter in this light we have little ground for assurance as regards immortality. He says, "he 83 would be but a very shallow thinker who could be assured in such a case." For if consciousness has no substratum, as James maintains, we are left in a hopeless quandary concerning the entire question of immortality. This is especially true if we are to interpret his philosophy as never quite fully going over to panpsychism which, according to Professor Perry, he "was repeatedly on the verge of accepting, which he constantly praised, but to

82. Ibid., p. 291.
83. Ibid., p. 390.
which he seems never to have given his explicit and unreserved assent."

For if it is not possible to regard the mind or the self as having a more persistent mode of being than that of the physical organism, the death of the latter would also mean the end of the individual life. It is quite true that our conscious life is very intimately related to a particular organism, and is closely bound up with the condition of the brain and nervous system as well as with other aspects of the physical organism. But unless it were shown that soul and body are identical, the close correlation between the conscious life and the bodily organism would not necessarily imply that the individual's existence comes to an end with the decay and dissolution of the latter. We are not arguing that the category of substance furnishes an argument for the continuity of the individual life after the death of the particular organism; but it does seem obvious that once we discard the conception of substance, we render inconceivable the possibility of continued existence, unless some such conception as panpsychism comes to our aid. Religion cannot rest content with any view of the soul that leaves such a vital question as this without a more satisfactory answer. James's position, however, does serve to bring out an important fact as regards this question, namely, that the mere persistence of the individual subject will not satisfy us, but that our supreme interest is in the continuity of our personal life. Of course we cannot infer the latter from the former, but our quarrel with James's view is due to the fact that his denial of the substantiality of the self renders the conception of the existence of the personal life unintelligible. James rightly emphasizes the fact that the soul itself is not the man. This aspect of the matter may easily be ignored in our efforts to establish the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Christian thought places
emphasis upon the value, dignity and perpetuity of the human body as well as upon that of the soul, and regards the complete man as being body and soul together in one. E. Gilson writes in this connection as follows: "At bottom the whole difficulty comes to this: man is a unity given as such and the philosopher is bound to take account of the fact. When I say that I know, I do not mean that my body knows by means of the soul, or that the soul knows by means of the body; but that this concrete being 'I,' taken in its unity, performs an act of knowing. The same thing holds when I say that I live, or simply that I am; 'I' means neither the body nor the soul, but the man." He goes on to say that the whole man alone deserves the name of substance, but that he owes his substantiality to that of the soul. "For the human soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substance; the body, on the contrary, although without it the soul cannot develop the fullness of its actuality, has neither actuality nor subsistence, save those received from its form, that is to say from the soul." Thus the dissolution of the body, which owes its being to the soul, cannot involve that of the soul; nor does the soul alone constitute the complete man. Gilson does not regard the substance "man" as a combination of two substances, but as a complex substance the substantiality of which derives from only one of its two constitutive principles. To quote him further: "Souls have now become immortal substances, which cannot develop their activity, without the cooperation of sensorial organs; in order to obtain this co-operation they actualize a matter; it is due wholly to them that this matter is a body, and yet they are not themselves save in a body; the man, therefore, is neither his body, since the body subsists only by the soul, nor his soul, since this

86. Ibid., p. 187.
87. Ibid., pp. 187-188.
would remain destitute without the body: he is the unity of a soul which substantializes his body and of the body in which this soul subsists."

We have quoted this author somewhat at length to show that James's "philosophy of the body" does emphasize the important truth that substantial identity is not enough, and serves as a corrective to any view which treats the soul and body as two entirely separate and independent entities while only the importance of the immortality of the soul is stressed. But the recognition of this aspect of the matter does not render it necessary to deny the reality of a permanent self altogether; this procedure is even more unsatisfactory than the one-sided interpretation often given to this question.

This leads us to consider another objection to James's theory of consciousness, from the religious standpoint—that which arises out of its attempt to account for the whole man in terms of evolution. It is characteristic of evolitional philosophy to hold that the elements such as Time, Space, Causation, Logical Unity, and Ideality, in the human mind, are the results of the process of evolution. According to this doctrine, these elements are built outright in the course of evolution from what seems to be their assumed non-existence, and are regarded as explicable by evolution. It does not admit a priori consciousness "in the individual person as an individual, nor in the human mind at all, as specifically human." For the most part, as we have seen, James's theory of consciousness arises out of this evolutionary conception of mind which, supported by the scientific history of the globe and of the race, maintains that man attained this faculty by infinitely gradual steps. But the Christian religion refuses to accept the teaching that the whole man is a product of the evolutionary process. What is meant

88. Ibid., p. 188.
90. Ibid., p. 45.
by Man is not, and cannot be, in his entirety, the result of evolution; this is a fundamental tenet of the Christian faith. G. H. Howison expresses his conviction concerning the incompatibility between Christian thought and an all-inclusive evolutionary view of man in the following words: "Man the spirit, man the real mind, is not the offspring of Nature, but rather Nature is in a great sense the offspring of this true Human Nature...But it is time we all understood how finally at variance with the heart of the Christian Faith and hope is any doctrine of evolution that views the whole of human nature as the product of 'continuous creation': as merely the last term in a process of transmissive causation. The product of such a process could not be morally free, nor, consequently, morally responsible. It must needs be a mass of 'inherited tendency'; and, howsoever fair its effect might appear, no life of genuine dutifulness, no life of goodness freely chosen, could enter into its being."

Further, we are faced with a greater difficulty when we recall that James's doctrine of a finite God makes God Himself subject to the evolutionary process. He conceives God as having an external environment, "being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves," and as capable of "increase of very being." It follows that if God is a finite, struggling, growing Self, "just like ourselves," subject to similar environmental conditions, in the upward surge of the evolutionary process, there appears to be no good reason to attribute to the reality of His selfhood a status any different from that which James assigns to the human self. Both would appear to be the outcome of a long evolutionary process and both would be subject to similar limitations. Moreover, if the whole of man is to be accounted for in terms of evolution, we would be justified, in view of this situation, in considering the entire being of God as a product of the

91. Ibid., pp. 48, 51.
same evolutionary process. Whether or not there is any justification for elevating evolution to an ultimate principle will not be discussed until we come to the treatment of the wider applications of James's theory of reality; at present we are simply pointing out the logical implications of his doctrine of consciousness as a vital part of his general scheme of thought. This criticism would not, of course, apply to any view which, while regarding Mind as one element in Nature,- and as such involved in the evolutionary process- accounts for its appearance in Nature by reference to an Immanent or Transcendent Mind. For instance, William Temple holds that the "more completely we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable must Nature become except by reference to Mind... the more we identify ourselves with the rest of the natural order, the more we are compelled to assert the reality of a supernatural Creator." But this is quite a different conception from that of James which replaces the "supernatural Creator" with a God who is, at best, a larger finite self than man, but who is just as much subject to the process of evolution as other selves. It is obvious that any view of the self which is capable of these interpretations cannot be easily reconciled with the religious view of man and of God; and, any attempt to evaluate the contribution which James makes to religious thought cannot afford to ignore the religious consequences of one of the most fundamental parts of his system.

Our criticism of his theory of consciousness thus far consists in showing why we regard it as unsatisfactory from the point of view of religion. We have now to consider some of the most conspicuous points of weakness, and some of the more obvious difficulties, which the doctrine presents apart from its objectionable features for religion; it cannot be assumed to be false

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simply because it runs counter to certain religious teachings. In the first place, according to James's doctrine of "pure experience," the distinction between the psychical and the physical is functional rather than ontological. That is to say, before any such distinction is made in experience, the stuff of experience is "neutral." He does not, however, satisfactorily explain how this "pure experience" which, by hypothesis, contains no such distinction, which is, indeed, without any definable nature,---a mere "that,"---can affect from within this difference which comes as a result of the peculiar relation into which the elements of experience enter. In other words, if experience, as such, has no inner duplicity, it is inconceivable how he can avoid the necessity of a knower before an element of experience can be "taken" in one context as a knower, and in another as a thing known. His view seems to imply an actual experient before the distinction between the psychical and the physical can come about at all. In short, the very statement of the doctrine implies what he openly rejects. Any other interpretation of it fails to account for the fact that this peculiar relation does not obtain between just any two elements of experience of whatsoever kind. If this capacity is found only where mind is, there must be something accompanying this capacity which is different in nature from, and distinct from, other portions of experience. Moreover, it is not clear how one is to distinguish "pure experience" from indeterminate being, or mere nothingness. Still more, the contention that "pure experience" is prior to the distinction between the psychical and the physical does not appear to be compatible with his view that nothing shall be considered as real except "what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient," whether one's self, a neighbor, or by itself.

It has already been shown that the logical outcome of James's view of consciousness is the doctrine of Neo-Realism. This serves to indicate that his doctrine of "pure experience" does not provide a solid foundation on which to build a system of philosophy. It is a transitional philosophy, suspended in mid-air; it is a half-way house on the road to Neo-Realism. Professor D. C. Macintosh calls it a "disguised psychological idealism," which, he says, arises when the doctrine "that objects depend for their existence upon their being experienced as objects, is applied to the subject as one of the objects." Both selves and things, subjects and objects, depend for their existence upon their relation. Prior to self-consciousness, experience is "pure" or "neutral"; there is no self. Now it is obvious, as Professor Macintosh points out, that such a view is of unstable equilibrium, for, if contents are independent of any relation to a conscious subject, as this doctrine holds, it is only natural ultimately to conclude that they are real independently of their being experienced. Or, to quote Professor R. B. Perry: "If pure experience is indeed neutral, then it is capable of being actual in the absence of that peculiar modification of itself which constitutes consciousness." Thus when "psychological idealism" is no longer applied to the object, the result is the New Realism which is a thoroughgoing epistemological monism, frequently called "pan-objectivism." Thus the philosophy of "pure experience," is merely a transitional stage, and as such, is inadequate as a permanent basis for a philosophy.

It is open to question, to pass on to the consideration of another difficulty which James's doctrine presents, whether a strict rendering of his account of knowledge really gives us what we usually mean by the term

96. Ibid., pp. 109-111.
97. In the Spirit of William James, p. 98.
knowledge. He maintains that, in the experience-train, one experience leads to another until finally the object of thought is actually disclosed and known. If we take him literally, we really have no right to say that an object is known in the sense that we recognize it as the object "meant" or anticipated, until it is actually presented in experience. As A. K. Rogers suggests, the earlier step in the series of experiences which lead up to the experience in which the object is disclosed, is now not there to constitute the object known, and "it will be no more than itself 'enjoying' itself, on a par with any other bit of pure experience that one might select." This version of the matter would appear to render "knowledge of acquaintance" practically meaningless, and "knowledge about" impossible.

For to quote Rogers once more, "unless knowing be regarded as not in itself an experiencing at all, but only the impersonal fact that some later experience is on the way, - the knower can only be the pure experience just preceding, and one experience can only know its immediate successor; but this is wholly out of relation to what we concretely mean by knowledge."

The question of the ultimate distinction between the psychical and the physical leads us to the very crux of the problem of knowledge. To attempt to annul this distinction does not solve the problem; it is tantamount to a refusal to accept the problem as it presents itself. It is to strip knowledge of its most characteristic feature, namely, the reference to a reality distinct from itself. Knowledge does not appear to have any meaning if it does not mean that a subject knows an object. This carries with it the idea of separation and difference as the very conditions of knowledge. If, as we have intimated, James is not really speaking of "knowing" when he says

99. Ibid., p. 304.
that two elements come together in "a unity of experience", less impor-
tance may be attached to his view that the elements of experience are es-
sentially the same in nature. That is to say, if he means to show that
two elements of experience are capable of combining among themselves, with-
out any reference to such an agency as the self, it does not prove that
knowledge is possible without making the distinction between the psychical
and the physical. But this distinction appears to be involved in both
the necessity and possibility of knowledge. To use the words of A. Seth
Pringle-Pattison, "It is individuation, distinctness in existence, that
calls for knowledge and gives it scope. Feelings, images, ideas, beliefs,
volitions--these are the components of consciousness, they have an exist-
ence generically distinct from that which we attribute to things as real
beings, whether material or spiritual. By means of certain of these con-
scious facts--those called cognitive--the being in whom they occur believes
that he is made aware of the existence, nature, and actions of existences
other than himself." Normally, knowledge is mediate; it is the result of
a process; and it involves transcendence on the part of the object with ref-
erence to the knowing thought. That is, it points towards, looks forward
to the object which may be known later. In a word, the world of objects is
trans-subjective, lies beyond, the world of consciousness. Consequently,
it implies the very sort of dualistic transcendence of the world of real
things to the world of consciousness which James repudiates. Thus we are
led to conclude that the distinction between the psychical and the physical
is ultimate, so far as knowledge is concerned, and that the subject-object
relation is the irreducible basis of thought.

100. A. K. Rogers, Ibid., pp. 302-303.
It is very true that the things which we perceive, remember, and image are objects of consciousness. But it does not follow that the things which we perceive, remember, and image, belong to an inner mental world. As J. Laird points out, "When I see a blue sky on a winter's day and notice sadly how different the trees are from their budding greenness in spring, the blue is not conscious of the green, or the green of the blue, and the principle of difference is not conscious of either. It is I who am conscious, I who apprehend the green and the blue and the difference. My consciousness is not a character of the things I observe or think or imagine, and it is very doubtful whether it is ever written on the faces of the things I know. My consciousness is my awareness or apprehension of these things, together with the feelings and strivings which accompany my apprehension." Thus such experiences cannot be regarded as subjective and objective according to their functional role. Further, James's conclusion that the affecional states are either mental or physical seems to arise from an obvious failure to distinguish between feeling and sensation. It is a very doubtful procedure to resolve feeling into sensation. Dr. G. F. Stout holds that the variability of the affecional attitude and the relativity of the affecional values serve to distinguish affecional states from sensations. He finds a further characteristic difference in the fact that "distinct affective states are not capable of existing together in a simultaneous plurality as sensations are." Also, feelings are not governed by the same laws as the objective factors of experience. They cannot be localized like tastes, nor can they be projected into things like colors.

105. Ibid., p. 114.
Feeling does not depend upon external objects or peripheral stimulation as does sensation. Sensations can be analyzed, associated, and reproduced in a way that feelings, for the most part, cannot be. It has not been possible to discover special nerves as centers for feeling as has been done for sensations. "Feeling-tone" is less objective than sensations. There seems to be no good reason for regarding the "feeling-tone" of a percept as a part of the percept or as a quality of a thing. As J. B. Pratt has said, it is "the way one feels, the state of the self rather than its object." In a word, then, feelings are peculiarly subjective. They are moments or aspects of the attitude of the self and are not presented as introspective objects in a diaphanous and inactive consciousness. Professor J. Ward thinks that there are good grounds for holding "that feeling is not obscure cognition nor sensation objectified feeling; that feeling, in a word, is always subjective and sensations always objective...according to this view, the duality of consciousness or the antithesis of subject and object is fundamental."

It is the subjective element or coloring in feelings that enables us to link them up to our own individual life, and were it not for their peculiarly subjective aspect there would appear to be no adequate reason for regarding them as our own at all.

James’s denial of mental activity also arises out of a failure to consider all of the facts involved. If all mental processes are no more than bodily adjustments there seems to be no justification for maintaining the distinction between the mind and the body. It would be simpler, as we have indicated, to identify them. But it is one thing to say that our mental processes are accompanied by organic sensations, and quite another thing to


say that organic sensations constitute mental processes. J. Laird is essentially right in suggesting that if "assent and dissent consisted of such sensations, a treatise on the glottis ought to replace the literature dealing with theory of knowledge." There is one fact which appears to be fatal to any attempt to deny the activity of the mind, namely, that of "meaning," or the "intentional" character of consciousness. We have already said that knowledge implies transcendence on the part of the object as regards the knowing thought. As E. Husserl puts it, cogito means "I have consciousness of something; I perform an act of consciousness." He says that "directedness towards," the "being turned towards," is the distinctive mark of focal actuality; an experience that is a consciousness of something is said to be intentionally related to this something. He goes on to say: "If an intentional experience is actual, carried out, that is, after the manner of the cogito, the subject 'directs' itself within it towards the intentional object. To the cogito itself belongs an immanent 'glancing-towards' the object, a directedness which from another side springs forth from the 'Ego,' which can therefore never be absent. This glancing of the Ego towards something is in harmony with the act involved, perceptive in perception, fanciful in fancy, approving in approval, volitional in will, and so forth. This means, therefore, that this having in one's glance, in one's mental eye, which belongs to the essence of the cogito, to the act as such, is not in itself in turn a proper act, and in particular should not be confused with a perceiving (in however wide a sense this term is used), or

110. Ibid., p. 118.
111. Ibid., p. 119.
with any other types of act related to perceptions." Thus both elements
of consciousness, namely, "idea" and "meaning," are necessary to constitute
a complete psychosis. We do not have a complex psychical whole when either
the "idea" or "meaning" is ignored. In short, it is not possible to con­
ceive the "idea" alone as the sole constituent of consciousness when refer­
ence to something which it means is essential to its very existence. Now
"meaning," by virtue of its very nature, cannot be discovered and described
by the presentationist; it always eludes his grasp. To conclude, therefore,
that activity does not exist, when this fact is ignored, is to rest one's
conclusion on partial evidence, omitting essential factors in the situation.

Another fact which James's effort to abolish mental activity apparently
overlooks is that of attention. It does not fall upon the objective side
of experience. Take, for example, selective attention, which fixes upon a
thing to the exclusion of all that is irrelevant until the physical existent
becomes a psychically non-existent. This process results in greater clarity,
steadiness, and control in the object. No doubt some of the differences
which occur in this process may be attributed to differences in the object.
But there are others which cannot be assigned to the object, such as the
certainty of the differences which are observed, and whatever changes that
may occur in one's attitude towards the object as a result of the act of
attention. In order to show more clearly that attention falls upon the
subjective side of experience, it may be well to follow at some length
Professor J. Ward's analysis of experience. He defines psychology "as the
science of individual experience---understanding by experience not merely,
not primarily, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or

112. Ibid., p. 121.
He regards experience itself as the commerce between subject and object. He distinguishes between the "subjective" and "objective" aspect of experience as follows: the subjective standpoint is that of the "living subject in intercourse with his special environment", while the objective standpoint is that of "science in which the characteristics of individual environments are in general ignored." The latter standpoint consists of presentations, such as sense data, images, and so on. Feeling and attention constitute the subjective side. He limits "feeling" to pleasure and pain, and extends the denotation of the term "attention" so as to include what we should call inattention. "Instead, therefore, of the one *sumnum genus*, 'state of mind or consciousness' with its three co-ordinate subdivisions, cognition, emotion, conation," says Professor Ward, "our analysis seems to lead us to recognize three distinct and irreducible components, attention, feeling and objects or presentations, as together constituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis." It is not necessary to follow Dr. Ward in denying that there is acquaintance with attention and feeling in order to recognize the value of his analysis in bringing out the fact that attention and feeling both belong to the subjective aspect of experience. His view of this matter also serves to bring into the foreground the fact that a denial of the activity of the mind, or of a distinct stuff of consciousness, is equivalent to the argument that the subjective side of experience is really part of the objective side, an argument which we believe

115. Ibid., pp. 16, 17.
116. Ibid., p. 17.
117. Ibid., p. 17.
118. Ibid., p. 46.
119. Ibid., pp. 55 ff.
120. Ibid., p. 45.
121. Ibid., p. 57.
122. Cf. Ibid., p. 58.
to be untrue to the facts.

Another serious objection to the doctrine of consciousness which James sets forth is its phenomenalistic basis. If the real world is one in which anything in order to be real must be an object to some experient, must be amenable to discovery and description within that world, then it is a foregone conclusion that the conscious life can be completely analyzed into ideas or presentations. Now, this principle may apply to a world of "pure experience", but it does not hold good of the real world: the world in which we live is not bound by any such principle. That is to say, consciousness would probably be what James says it is in a world of "pure experience", but it cannot be admitted that his description of consciousness is true in the larger world. Consciousness, defined exclusively in terms of cognition, does not cover all of experience. Thus the failure to find mental activity in a world of "pure experience" does not prove that such activity does not exist, nor does the failure to find the self in this more limited world prove that the self is merely a figment of the imagination. It is no more possible to analyze a volition into ideas than it is to reduce tons to inches. To attempt to know activity as a presentation is to attempt to know it as it cannot be known. S. Alexander says, "I do not in introspection turn my mind upon itself and convert a part of myself into an object." He goes on to say that since the object is distinct from the knowing mind, it is never possible for the mind to be an object to itself in the same way that physical things can be objects to it. But this fact does not warrant us in assuming that there is no self. No recent attempts to find the self in the realm of phenomena have been any more suc-

124. Ibid., p. 89.
cessful than Hume's earlier one because of the fact that it is of the very nature of mind to be incapable of being an object to itself. Professor Daniel Lamont puts this truth as follows: "The notion that I can take my 'I' out of the dark room in order to observe it from the dark room is not an idea at all. It is a freak of the imagination. The 'I' remains the subject all the time and can never be object to itself." And Berkeley was confident, long ago, that "a little attention will make it plain to anyone, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects it produceth." Berkeley realized, however, that the conception of the self is inescapable, and we may wisely follow him in recognizing that while the self cannot be represented by an "idea", we do have a "notion" of an agent or the self. Thus our chief objection to presentationism is that it is inadequate. As Dr. J. Ward frankly says, "it may be adequate to nine tenths of the facts, or - better perhaps - to nine tenths of each fact, but it cannot either effectively clear itself of, or satisfactorily explain, the remaining tenth." He then adds, "No one has yet succeeded in bringing all the facts of consciousness, as Professor James thinks we may, under the simple rubric: 'Thought goes on.' Impersonal unowned experience, a mere Cogitatur, is even more of a contradiction than the mere Cogito of Descartes."

127. Ibid., p. 272.
129. Ibid., p. 606.
Finally, the logical outcome of any doctrine of the mind which ignores the subjective aspect of feeling and effort, the most characteristic feature of the mind, is a thoroughgoing sensationalism. It conceives the active forms of consciousness in terms of sensation complexes and the higher modes of the cognitive experience as a succession of images which are fundamentally sensational. It is obvious that any such description of knowledge, thought, emotion, and volition, does not do justice to the fuller and richer life of the mind. In other words, it substitutes a highly abstract and unreal conception of the mind for the mind as it really is. Further, it is doubtful whether anyone other than a new born babe may experience pure sensa. The mature mind appears to know nothing of such actualities; for very few, if any, of our sensations come entirely void of meaning. As F. R. Tennant rightly asserts: "The pure sensum which is impression and nothing else, can no more be 'caught' than Hume's 'I'." Thus our examination of James's view of consciousness, based on the doctrine of "pure experience", leads us to the conclusion that the philosophy of experience is an abstraction which fails to give a full account of the facts of consciousness; and we are led to conclude, also, that any philosophy which fails to take into consideration all of these facts and thus ultimately rejects the reality of the soul must be regarded as untenable. J. B. Pratt is essentially correct when he puts the matter as follows: "At any rate, be sure of this: no philosophy can long remain credible to man which would destroy man's faith in his own self. In spite of your Naturalism, your behavioristic psychology, your monistic epistemology, philosophy shall once more teach the reality of the soul. And when philosophers shall have abandoned the vain attempt to interpret the psychical in terms of the phys-

130. F. R. Tennant, op. cit., p. 36.
ical or the physical in terms of the psychical, when they shall have re-
turned to the inevitable human belief that individual selves are real and
that the spiritual life means more than logical implication, there will
be some hope of attacking with a fair chance of success the great problems
of philosophy."

Macmillan Company, 1931, p. 140.
II

THE SELF AS AN EMPIRICAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOUL

James's open and outright rejection of the soul did not occur, as has been made clear in the preceding chapter, until several years after he had written his epoch-making work on psychology. In The Principles of Psychology, while asserting that the substantial soul "explains nothing and guarantees nothing," and that "no one can be compelled to subscribe to it for definite scientific reasons," he tentatively accepts the hypothesis of a soul. And in spite of his confidence concerning the "complete superfluity," of the soul-theory, "so far as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes," he recognizes and candidly acknowledges the logical force, and "respectability of the spiritualistic position."

He concludes his convincing polemic against the "Mind-dust Theory" by the statement that the soul-theory is the "line of least logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained." He gives as the reason for suggesting the doctrine of the soul at this juncture, his desire to show the "advanced thinkers" how strong an argument it really is. But as a psychologist, he discards it as the "out-birth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson is: 'Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.'" He postpones further inquiry concerning the existence of the soul on the ground that "as psychologists,

2. Ibid., p. 348.
3. Ibid., p. 348.
4. Ibid., p. 181.
5. Ibid., p. 181.
6. Ibid., p. 347.
we need not be metaphysical at all." But James is never quite able to let the matter rest there and wrestles with this problem practically all of his life. In spite of his outright denial of the soul, which we have given, he can never quite bring himself to forget entirely the strength and tenability of the position which he repudiates. It seems to be a striking paradox that as his prejudice against the soul increases he becomes more increasingly certain that the soul does serve as a useful and even a necessary hypothesis in a philosophy that remains within the bounds of reason. Just nine years before his great denial of the existence of the soul he writes: "I am free to confess that in my own case the antipathy to the Soul with which I find myself burdened is an ancient hardness of heart of which I can frame no fully satisfactory account even to myself. I passively agree that if there were Souls that we could use as principles of explanation, the formal settlement of the questions now before us could run far more smoothly towards its end. I admit that a soul is a medium of union, and that brain processes and ideas, be they never so 'synchronical,' leave all mediating agency out. Yet, in spite of these concessions, I never find myself actively taking up the soul, so to speak, and making it do work in my psychologizing."

By a strange coincidence, this rather contradictory position of James's largely accounts for his view of the self which is generally regarded as the most satisfactory account of the self ever rendered by an empirical philosopher who rejects the soul. That is to say, his recognition of the strength of the argument for a soul, and the value he attributes to the theory as a principle of explanation, along with his inveterate prejudice against it, seem to combine in forcing him either to be thoroughly convinced the soul is

7. Ibid., p. 346.
a "pure chimera," or that it is an indispensable factor in any philosophical construction. And, as we shall see, his denial of the soul in the preceding chapter is not his final word; that is, it does not relieve the tension for him, nor does it end his struggle. But his own view of the self is an attempt to show that it is possible to give a psychological account of the self which covers everything which the age-long belief in the soul had been invoked to explain. He realizes, of course, that if he leaves the soul out of his description of the self, his task becomes all the more difficult if he is not to repeat the errors of his predecessors who made similar denials concerning the soul, but who failed to offer a satisfactory substitute for the soul. He could not fail to take into consideration the inescapable fact of personal unity. For as Professor A. N. Whitehead says, "Any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity. In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man, from birth to death. The two modern philosophers who most consistently reject the notion of a self-identical Soul-Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem remains for them...to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance." Precisely because he fully realizes that this difficulty does confront any philosopher who rejects an abiding self, James sets himself to the task of rendering an empirical account of the matter which would be free from the defects which characterize such a theory as Hume's. Consequently, some of the richest fruits of his philosophical powers are brought to light in his treatment of the self; and although we do not follow him all the way in his view of the self, we cannot fail to recognize the value of much of the work he has

done in this field and we cannot be blind to the worthy contribution he has made to philosophy and psychology in his penetrating and illuminating analysis and description of consciousness.

We can best understand James's doctrine of the self in the light of the teaching of Locke concerning personal identity. He held that personal identity "consists not in identity of substance but in identity of consciousness;" it is constituted by the "sameness of a rational being". His view is expressed as follows: "For it being the same consciousness that makes a man himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only - whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self." It is possible, according to Locke, for the same consciousness to be connected with different substances while it retains its personal identity. And conversely, if the same substance is preserved without the same consciousness, there is loss of personal identity. To use his famous illustration, to be the same person with Nestor one must be conscious of Nestor's actions. Thus the mere ontological self-identity of a soul does not constitute personal identity; it must have a consciousness that remembers past experiences, and it must also remember them as having been its very own. Locke's doctrine takes the question of personal identity out of the debatable realm of substance and places it in the verifiable realm of con

11. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 9, p. 247.
12. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 10, p. 247.
13. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 13, p. 249.
14. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 14, p. 250.
scious selfhood. This is the aspect of Locke's view that James regards as being of chief importance. He says, "The importance of Locke's doctrine lay in this, that he eliminated 'substantial' identity as transcendental and unimportant, and made of 'personal' identity (the only practically important sort) a directly verifiable empirical phenomenon. Where not actually experienced, it is not."

He conceives this view of Locke's as constituting "the great revolution toward empiricism", and he derives the fundamental principle for his own empirical conception of the self from Locke's interpretation. As a result of Locke's version of the subject, "Personality is now explained as a result and not assumed as a principle. It is not something which, by simply being, gives rise to consequences, but something which is made from moment to moment by a cause which can be assigned."

In other words, for James, the cognitive subject, the knowing self, is placed within the field of its own knowing; the knower is to be found among the known. The personal subject is no longer permitted to stand aloof from the common run of percepts; it must prove its existence, and disclose its nature, according to the same methods which are applied to other objects of knowledge. In short, if it exists at all, it must have its dwelling in the perceptual realm. It will be remembered that while Berkeley brought the physical object entirely within the perceptual field, he had made an exception of the agent or the self which is known only by its effects, but of which we have a "notion". James refuses to stop where Berkeley did and submits the self to the same test to which Berkeley had subjected the physical object.

17. Ibid., p. 227
Locke retained a belief in souls as substances, however, and in their identity. But Hume went further than Locke in that he rejected substance, whether spiritual or material, altogether. He held that the identity which we ascribe to the mind is "only a fictitious one". This identity, for him, is "of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies." He maintained that our identity "depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion." There is, he held, "properly no simplicity" in the mind at one time, nor "identity in different". He conceived the unity of the self to be like the unity of a republic; that is, it would have the kind of unity which a changing group has, the kind of unity that one reads into it. Now James follows Locke with reference to the principle of personal identity, but does not follow him in his belief in a spiritual substance. He is in agreement with Hume in his rejection of a soul-substance, but is not satisfied to follow Hume's conception of identity and unity. James's recognition of the useful part played by the soul in explanation of personal unity forces him to search for a conception of the self which gives it real unity rather than the loose sort which had apparently satisfied Hume. But he is at one with both Locke and Hume in attempting to render an account of the self which is wholly within the bounds of experience. The merit of his view of the self lies in the fact that, while based upon a thoroughgoing empiricism, it covers all the functions and distinctions which are usually assigned to a soul or a transcendental ego. His success in achieving this task is chiefly due to the fact that he finds the sameness

20. Ibid., p. 320.
21. Ibid., p. 324.
22. Ibid., p. 315.
of the self to consist either in the unity of the momentary state, as the “passing thought" feels it all at once; or in the continuity of such states, the unifying thoughts of which receive and appropriate the content of those which have preceded them.

In order to see how James arrived at this conception of the self it will be necessary to follow his empirical account of consciousness at some length. James describes consciousness as essentially personal. "Every thought is a part of a personal consciousness." Every thought, wherever found, has an "owner", is "owned." Thoughts do not float around by themselves. Even secondary selves, which develop in abnormal mental conditions, claim a name and develop a memory. In a word, all thought tends towards the personal form of consciousness. A second essential characteristic of consciousness is that it is always on the move; it is ever changing. No state of mind can ever return identically the same as it was before. We never get the same bodily sensation twice, nor precisely the same mental state. Here he opposes the associationists who held that ideas may be simple or complex. A combination of the simple gives us the complex, and analysis of the complex produces the simple. James, while not averse to proper analysis, refuses to believe that an analytic treatment of mind should be construed to mean that the real life of the mind consists of an aggregation of elements or a collection of simple ideas. Also, for the associationists, the same idea can appear in various combinations without losing its identity. But James says, "A permanently existing 'idea' or 'Vorstellung' which makes

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25. Ibid., p. 225.  
27. Ibid., pp. 229 ff.  
its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals, 29 is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades." He attributes this error to the confusion of the objects thought of with the thought of the objects; the mistaking an analysis of the object for an analysis of the thought of it. He also finds fault with the associationists, at this juncture, because they ignored "feelings of relation," which he regards as a serious "omission of introspective psychology." He says, "The principal effort of the Humian school has been to abrogate relations, not only from the sphere of reality, but from the sphere of consciousness." James tries to restore those relationships which give form or order to the objective world and which introspection had failed to find. He proposes to correct the failure of a faulty introspection by going back to original experience as it was before introspection had broken it into bits. He makes a conscious and systematic attempt to secure recognition of the vague, the fugitive, and the transitory in consciousness as opposed to the "block-house" conception of mental life which prevailed. His return to original experience convinces him that the elements have been abstracted from a context and that the relationships have existed all of the time for those who really looked for them. "Restoring the context one finds the elements embedded in a matrix of relationships. Avoiding the natural preoccupation with focal points and substantive nuclei, one can detect not only distinct qualities and things, but spatial and temporal juxtaposition, causal nexus, identity, difference and contrast, and a hundred other relations..." Many of these relationships are represented in speech while others play no part in ordinary discourse and are not

29. Ibid., p. 236.
30. Ibid., p. 236.
32. Ibid., p. 4.
33. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 89.
so represented. But James maintains that "there is not a conjunction or
a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or in-
flection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or
other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between
the larger objects of our thought. . . . We ought to say a feeling of and, a
feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as
we say a feeling of blue, or a feeling of cold." It is characteristic of
these "feelings of relation" so to modify ideas as to render it impossible
for them to be the same again. Thus every conscious state, to use the
words of Professor E. G. Boring, is "a function of the entire psychophysi-
cal totality", and the "mind is cumulative and not recurrent."

The most important function of "feelings of relation" is that of unit-
ing ideas and thereby rendering consciousness sensibly continuous, which
constitutes another prominent feature of our mental life. Thought flows
on with unbroken continuity, like the stream of time. To be sure, there
are time-gaps such as occur in sleep; but Peter will always awake as Peter,
and Paul, as Paul. The changes which occur in our waking life are always
smooth, but our mental life does not always follow the same pace. It,
"like a bird's life, seems to be made of an alteration of flights and
perchings." There are "resting places" and "places of flight". He calls
the former "substantive parts", and the latter "transitive parts", of the
stream of thought. Now thought proceeds from one "substantive part" to
another, and the chief use of the "transitive parts" is to lead from one

35. E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, New York and
38. Ibid., p. 3.
substantive conclusion to another. He strongly opposes the way in which the associationists and Herbartians represented the stream of thought, namely, as a "manifold" broken into bits, called discrete, because his introspective analysis leads him to conceive the stream of thought as presenting itself as a continuum. He says that the traditional view of the mind is tantamount to saying that a river consists of nothing but barrelsful, bucketsful, cupsful, spoonsful, of water, while the free water continues to flow all around and between the containers. For him, it is just precisely this free flow of consciousness which the introspective efforts of his time overlooked, which oversight accounted for the prevalence of "elementarism" with reference to the mind. This conception of the mind in terms of a "stream of thought" is original with James and constitutes a radical departure from traditional thought. Professor R. B. Perry regards this feature of James's thought as his "most important insight". James also holds that, regardless of how complex the object may be, the thought of it is an indivisible unit. Each wave or pulse of consciousness is a single and complete psychosis or state of mind. These pulses cannot be reduced to simpler elements; they are of but a moment's duration and possess a unique identity.

We have now to consider his conception of the Self which arises out of the doctrine of the "stream of thought". The fact that James places the self, as we have intimated, in the perceptual field, does not mean that he

39. Ibid., p. 3.
40. Ibid., p. 6.
41. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
denies or ignores the duality of self and not-self. On the contrary, instead of one self, he finds several selves. After giving an "omnibus" definition of the self as follows: "A man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his", he goes on to describe the self in terms of a hierarchy with four levels. First, there is the "material self", which includes one's body, one's family and friends, and one's possessions. All of these things are considered a part of the self because they arouse in one the same emotions; and loss in respect of any of these things brings a distinct shrinkage in one's personality. The "social self" comes next and arises out of the recognition which one gets from one's associates. Everyone seeks the approval, admiration, and esteem of others. One's appearance, conversation, and general comportment, determine what others think of one. With each person of one's acquaintance there is a "special reputation" to preserve. Consequently, one is different with different people; and "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their minds." The "spiritual self", the third level of the self, consists of one's psychic faculties or dispositions, the bodies of knowledge, habits of thought, feeling, and actions. These, in their sum total, constitute the self "which we most verily seem to be". One's mental ability, power of moral discernment, and strength of will, bring one greater satisfaction than anything else one may have. It is the "spiritual self" that unifies, so far as is possible, one's many discordant desires. The "pure Ego" constitutes the fourth part of the self; it is the knower, the self of selves. This self is not psychologically distinguish-

44. Ibid., p. 291.
45. Ibid., pp. 292-293.
46. Ibid., pp. 293 ff.
47. Ibid., p. 294.
48. Ibid., p. 296.
49. Ibid., p. 297.
able from the "spiritual self", but is necessary for certain philosophical systems. We find that a certain portion of the subjective stream is abstracted from the rest, and seems to form a sort of inner centre, or core, which appears to have greater permanency than the remaining part. This inner nucleus seems to disown the other portion, while it remains. This central part of the self constitutes the active element in consciousness.

"It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest....It is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will." Due to the fact that this part of the self is more persistently present than any other single element of the mental life, the other elements seem to gather round it and to belong to it. This nucleus of the self is felt just as the body is felt. Now, as we have already seen in dealing with his theory of consciousness, James finds that the sense of the self is derived from the fusion of sensory impressions, usually reduced to a matter of postural strains and stresses, centering especially in the head. The word "I" is primarily a noun of position. The words "Me", and "Self", "so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are objective designations, meaning all the things which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort."

Self-love, whether bodily, social, or spiritual, is not love for one's "mere principle of conscious identity". "Bodily selfishness" is a

50. Ibid., p. 297.
51. Ibid., pp. 297-298.
52. Ibid., p. 301 ff.
descriptive term applied to the external acts which interest in one's body prompts. Social self-love grows out of one's interest in, and regard for, what others think of one, and thus it is an interest external to one's own thought. Spiritual self-love is one's interest in one's mental powers, moral sensibility and so on. Thus, in each case, self-love is love for something external and objective. "Its own body, then, first of all, its friends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions, must be the supremely interesting objects for each human mind."

This leads us to the consideration of his theory of personal identity. There are, roughly speaking, two phases in his treatment of this principle. First, he finds identity to consist in the sameness of the things in which the self is interested. I see at different times what I take to be the same object. Of course, this does not mean that my perception of it is the same each time, but that each time I perceive this object it is the selfsame thing. Again, when I think about some person or event on two different occasions, I am not having exactly the same thought each time, but I am thinking about the same thing at different times. Similarly, my thoughts, interests, and plans are never the same from day to day; but it is always the same things about which I think, in which I am interested, and concerning which I make plans. In short, experiences are transitory and they never recur in just the same way, but they derive their apparent sameness from their power to mean the same things. "The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind,

55. Ibid., pp. 320-321.
56. Ibid., p. 323.
57. Ibid., p. 323.
of the phenomena compared." The second part of his theory of identity goes further, however, and attempts to account for the more subtle aspects of the unity of consciousness. He holds that identity consists in the appropriation of past experiences by each succeeding wave or pulse of consciousness. The past experiences come marked by a "warmth and intimacy" by means of which they qualify as being the peculiar property of the newly born owner. "For how would it be," he asks, "if the Thought, the present judging Thought, instead of being in any way substantially or transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past self, merely inherited his 'title', and thus stood as his legal representative now? It would then, if its birth coincided exactly with the death of another owner, find the past self already its own as soon as it found it at all, and the past self would thus never be wild, but always owned, by a title that never lapsed. We can imagine a long succession of herdsmen coming rapidly into possession of the same cattle by transmission of an original title by bequest. May not the 'title' of a collective self be passed from one Thought to another in some analogous way?"

According to this version of the self, instead of an abiding self, or a permanent ego, we have numerous successive selves, or egos, no one of which is conscious of itself, but conscious only of "its glorious ancestors". I become identical with my own past only as my momentary self inherits my past and lays claim to it as its own. My past can never be claimed by another person because his momentary self would not feel the tang of "warmth and intimacy" in respect of my past, that mine would. For the same reason I could never identify the past experiences of another as

58. Ibid., p. 334.
59. Ibid., p. 339.
mine; they lack the "herd mark" which characterizes my experiences. These pulses of thought which claim one's past experiences come and go with each passing moment; they live but a moment before death lays its cold hand upon them. They quickly pass out of existence, but before doing so, they generously bequeath their own self-hood, of which they were never conscious, along with all of the past selves, to their successor. Thus birth and death, and transmitting and receiving, of self-hood continue throughout the whole course of the individual's existence. "Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed." In this unique way James's "stream of thought" presents the self empirically without denying or disregarding the duality of self and not-self, without rejecting personal identity, and without omitting the cognitive subject, which he construes as the "judging thought". In his opinion, this account of the matter renders the soul "at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear." Consequently, there is no occasion for bringing in that superfluous hypothesis.

We shall now examine this view of the self and point out its obvious weaknesses as a doctrine which tries to render a full account of the facts of consciousness without the conception of a soul. We can readily agree with Professor J. Ward's estimate of this version of the self when he says that it is "the most successful attempt I have seen to resolve the knower into the known". James appears to have succeeded in giving us a self which possesses everything, even a certain sort of continuity; but the continuity is only apparent rather than real. At any rate, it is so far

60. Ibid., p. 340.
61. Ibid., p. 344.
forth an improvement upon Hume's conception of the self. The first thing to be said about this account of the self is that, although it is supposed to be an empirical rendering throughout, there appears to be no empirical evidence for it; and this seems to be true in spite of the fact that James says it is a "patent fact of consciousness". As J. B. Pratt has said, you do not "find your stream of consciousness going along bumpity-bump in the fashion indicated by the proposal." The doctrine of "perishing pulses of thought" within the empirically continuous stream of thought, simply does not appear to be a fact which introspection establishes. If James's conception were the true description of the matter, it would be something that one could easily verify; but this is just what one cannot do after searching for the available evidence of such a phenomenon. Further, such an interpretation of consciousness is based upon the assumption of a relation in content which it is plainly not possible to find there. As K. Dunlap argues in this connection, "That I experience a certain red may be defined as a relation between red and other factors of content, and we do actually experience relations in this connection; but the relations we find in the content are all relations which determine the red as it is experienced, and are none of them, severally or together, identifiable as the experience."

The same writer points out that a theory of this kind seems to overlook the fact that when we explore the content in quest of any kind of relation, we do so on the assumption of a perspective that is entirely external to the content. This is a similar assumption which underlies the assertion that the universe is composed of "pure experience", which is mental if taken in

64. J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 280-281.
66. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
one context, and physical if regarded in another. In other words, when the self or subject is discovered in experience, it is objectified, and implies another mental agent not found along with it, since it is the discoverer of the self. This objection is not removed by saying, as Professor R. B. Perry does, "But when the new subject in turn is reflected upon, it reveals the same nature as the old. Beyond a certain point the repetition of this operation of reflective self-awareness yields nothing new, but only corroborates its previous findings, just as one can conclude after several turnings what, if anything, is behind one's back." The fact that nothing new is disclosed beyond a certain point does not prove that there is nothing there; it may be that what is there does not submit to our methods of inspection.

It appears to be obvious, also, that the doctrine of countless miniature selves does not fit consistently into his general teaching concerning the "stream of thought". In reality, it seems highly questionable whether the "stream of thought", or rather, any segment of consciousness, can be divided into complete bits of pulses, which succeed one another, each being capable of description in terms of a separate "pulse of thought", the death of which coincides with the birth of its successor. There is such unity and continuity in the "speciously present consciousness" as it flows on, like the stream of time, that any particular portion of it can be designated as a new ego, separated from what precedes and what comes after it only by abstraction. What James's theory of many selves really does, as L. B. McGilvary suggests, is to make an interruption in the continuous movement of thought in order to unite it. Instead of using one kind of

67. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, pp. 87-88.
glue as Hume did with his principle of association, James uses two:
"quality of warmth and intimacy", and "feelings of transitions". In
Mr. McGilvary's opinion, "The stream of thought is the fact, the pulses
of thought are not facts." He goes on to point out that James is "after
the 'transcendentalist' as well as after the facts, and in his endeavor to
prove that introspection does not reveal an unalterable time-neutralizing
ego, he went to the extreme of asserting the existence of little egos,
constantly neutralized by time and transmuted each into its successors."

Since these little egos are not conscious of their own selfhood, the
only way they can know themselves is by proxy. Each one must pass on to
its successor the power of knowing itself which it never was fortunate
enough to possess. "If they really were the innermost sanctuary, the
ultimate one of all the selves whose being we can ever directly experience,
it would follow that all that is experienced is, strictly considered, ob-
jective; that this Objective falls asunder into two contrasted parts, one
realized as 'Self', the other as 'not-Self'; and that over and above these
parts there is nothing save the fact that they are known, the fact of the
stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of
their being experienced at all. But this condition of the experience is
not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not imme-
diately known. It is only known in subsequent reflection." Now if there
is no consciousness of consciousness, it is impossible to see how con-
sciousness can be anything for itself. It might conceivably be something

68. "The Stream of Consciousness", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 9,
69. Ibid., p. 226.
70. Ibid., p. 230.
for its successor, and yet it does not appear to make sense to say that the predecessor does not feel itself at all, while its successor feels that the predecessor felt itself to be unbroken. In other words, the successor attributes to its predecessor a feeling which it never really had, but we are to accept the former's feeling as valid. The actual situation would appear to be otherwise; the thought is the only one in position to render valid testimony. If it knows itself as continuous, then it does know itself; but if it does not know itself, it does not know itself as continuous. The knowledge it inherits concerning the continuity of its predecessor implies that it was present to receive the inheritance. There is no justification for breaking up the continuity of thought merely for the purpose of reuniting it. As a matter of fact, James is confronted with a similar difficulty throughout the development of his philosophy of experience in that his assertion that reality is a continuum contradicts his statement that perceptual reality comes in bits or drops.

It is apparent that James overlooks the difference between a claim to identity and actual identity. A mere claim to identity proves nothing. It must be supported by facts before it can be accepted as valid. It is open to question whether he has successfully made out a case for the "quality of warmth and intimacy" which is strong enough to bear the weight he places upon it. A mere feeling of kinship or of ownership does not constitute either one of these relations. As to memory, as DeWitt H. Parker observes, the fact that each new act looks to an identical and unique past does not give the remembering experiences any real identity; their relation to a unique object—the individual's personal history—

places them in a class by themselves. "The self identity of the truth remembered by supposedly different memories cannot make them identical."

When personal identity is elaborated into feelings of activity, of warmth and intimacy, or of bodily states, it is explained away rather than recognized as a fact; and no effort is made to show how it is possible. A similar criticism applies to his theory that identity consists in the sameness of the things in which the self is interested. But little plausibility can be ascribed to this view. It certainly does not accord with our experience to regard the evident identity of thought, feeling, and interest as an identity of their objects. For if this were the true view of the question, we might ask why it is that Mussolini does not identify himself with the ancient rulers of Rome who attempted to establish the "Eternal City", and whose problems were very much like his own. Or, again, why do we not identify ourselves with our associates since we are all engaged in a common task, and are all occupied with similar interests, even frequently seeing eye to eye with regard to the same things? In a word, this account of identity does not satisfactorily explain the distinctive identity of a man with himself.

There are other obvious defects in this doctrine of the momentary self. It makes a rather ambiguous use of the term "ownership". Each owner "inherits" or "owns", during its life, all of the riches of the individual's past. That is, it inherits this from its predecessor and in turn passes it on to its successor. Each is "born an owner and dies owned." But just what is the meaning of "ownership" here? If a passing thought "owns" an object,

74. Cf. Ibid., pp. 33 ff.
it must mean that it is conscious of that object, otherwise the term "ownership" has no meaning. But a great deal of the time we are conscious of objects which have not come to us from immediate sense perception, but which, nevertheless, played no part in our experience in the immediately preceding moment. This is the case when our present experience is affected by something of which we were not conscious in the immediate past, but which has been carried over in memory from a more remote experience. Now, if the experience which has just perished did not own this reference to the past, it is inconceivable how the present experience can "inherit" it from its predecessor which never owned it. Obviously, such a view is intelligible only on the assumption that each pulse of thought contains everything in every other pulse of thought which has gone before in the experience of the individual. Otherwise, it is inconceivable how a certain psychosis could possess elements which were not present in the immediately preceding psychosis, but which were owned by an experience in the more distant past.

According to the hypothesis of successive selves, we cannot account for such ordinary slips of memory as the failure to remember a familiar name, or street number, which, after a succession of pulses of thought, comes rushing into our mind after we have ceased to think of it, as though it had been there all the time. Further, this theory does not adequately account for anticipation. When we look into the future, and, let us say, anticipate some unusual experience which awaits us, the anticipatory thought rushes ahead of the "quality of warmth and intimacy", and it does so with the expectation that the very same self which looks forward to the experience shall ultimately realize and enjoy it. Similarly, the doctrine of countless miniature selves renders disappointment meaningless. If it is not the same identical self which both anticipates, and fails to achieve a
certain objective, there is no reason why disappointment should ever occur at all. For one to suffer disappointment, the same self must persist throughout the experience-train. The same thing holds good of the "judgment of regret", or of the sense of guilt. If the self consists of a series of little selves, each dying at the birth of its successor, none of which can live for more than a moment, David's repentance for his crime born of lust, and Paul's lifelong regret concerning his early persecution of Christians, are rendered inexplicable, and meaningless. But in every case, this carrying over into the present of that which belongs to the past, either immediate or remote, would be the natural concomitant if there were an enduring and continuing self or subject. But these many and common instances of everyday life cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of innumerable selves coming to life and passing out of existence in the same moment of time. Such experiences are adequately accounted for only on the assumption that midst the fleeting and transitory moments which constitute our mundane existence, there is an abiding and continuing self which carries on from birth to death, and which, while not indifferent to time, does not succumb to its neutralizing power.

Finally, we do not see that it is any easier to unite two transient experiences without a permanent self than it is to unite the experiences of an entire lifetime. As a matter of fact, this "snowball hypothesis", to use the term applied to it by F. R. Tennant, calls for greater credulity, and more nearly borders on the miraculous, than the doctrine of a permanent self. We can much more readily conceive of the possibility of one subject which binds together all of our experiences, a self that persists and learns

75. F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 86.
by its mistakes and failures, than we can imagine a series of little selves which are endowed with such unusual powers as they would have to be given in order to accomplish the same task. It indeed appears to be a Herculean task which such a theory imposes upon these "homunculi" when they are conceived as unifying themselves so as to constitute a personal life. Plainly, we cannot regard them as capable of performing the Gargantuan tasks for which such a view necessarily makes them responsible. They would have to be capable of projecting into a remote future ideals which require many years of persistent striving to attain; they would have to have the power of tenaciously clinging to those ideals, and of pursuing them, at whatever risk or sacrifice necessary until they are in some measure realized; and they must be able to complete some plan which has been begun, but which, due to interruptions, or temporary lack of interest, has been put aside for perhaps several years. We are led to conclude, then, that while James's doctrine of momentary selves is the best solution to the problem of the self when a permanent self is rejected, it is unsatisfactory as an adequate account of the self; and that since its acceptance must be without the support of actual facts, and demands of us a credulity not involved in the belief of an abiding subject, we are justified in claiming that as an empirical substitute for the soul, it is inadequate.

We have now to state somewhat briefly some of the reasons why we think a continuing self is the only conception which does adequately account for all of the facts involved, and at the same time, offers a satisfactory solution to this difficult problem. We are quite aware, however, that the view of a permanent ego has its difficulties, some of which seem beyond solution; but it is our conviction that, in spite of these difficulties, it
is a more tenable theory than any which denies the existence of an enduring self. In the first place, the fact that all experience is personal implies the existence of a subject; that is, experience itself demands such an existent. James, as we have seen, insists as strongly as anyone possibly could that consciousness tends to assume the personal form, and that all experience is owned. But, as Professor G. W. Allport argues, psychology "must take seriously James's dictum that every mental operation occurs in a 'personal form', and must take it more seriously than James himself did." Precisely because we do take it more seriously than James did we are unable to stop where he did with reference to the self. For when we begin to speak of experience we must immediately postulate three sorts of things: the items experienced, the experiencing of these, and that which experiences them. That is to say, if we are to talk of experiencing at all, we imply an "I" which experiences. For, as J. E. MacTaggart asserts, it is impossible that there should be any experience which is not a part of a self. For him the fact that there can be no experience which is not experienced by a self is evidence as a "synthetic truth about experience." In other words, such a thing as impersonal experience, that is, experience which does not belong to a self, is inconceivable. Once we are thoroughly convinced that experience is personal, we are led to see that the existence of a permanent self is implied by the continuity of thought.

This continuity is revealed by such facts as retention, recognition, and familiarity. To use the illustration of F. R. Tennant, if one has two successive experiences of anything, for instance, blue, this unique experience of blue has a subject. \( S \) has \( S \) while \( S \) appears to another subject, \( S' \), who knows nothing about the quale except by impression. Nevertheless, \( S' \) recognizes \( S \) as being like \( S \), as blue again, and as familiar. Now if \( S' \) never saw \( S \), there is no way by which \( S \) could be compared with it and recognized as the same. It appears that the only possible explanation of an experience of this sort is to postulate an enduring self. A further inescapable characteristic of recognition is that one realizes the sameness of one's present with one's past experience. When, for example, I recognize a picture of Edinburgh Castle, I do not merely see the picture before me, but I also recognize it as the picture of something which I have seen upon different occasions in the past. Thus I regard my present self as experiencing now what I, the same self, have experienced at some past time, and the sense of familiarity is too obvious to doubt.

Obviously, then, the appearance of identity is beyond question when we recognize a sensation, a thought, or a universal, in experiences which more or less resemble those which have occurred at some previous time. In other words, whenever, in memory, we find recognition that the present fact is identical in meaning with the fact experienced by the same subject on a former occasion, it implies identity of the present with the past self, whose experiences are now being recalled. J. S. Mill puts the matter correctly when he says that memory "is not merely having the idea

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of that fact recalled:...It is having the idea recalled along with the
Belief that the fact which it is the idea of, really happened, and more­
over happened to myself. Memory, therefore, by the very fact of its
being different from Imagination, implies an Ego who formerly experienced
the facts remembered, and who was the same ego then as now. The phenome­
non of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact, or
two different modes of viewing the same fact." As a matter of fact,
every past experience which I can remember as having once been a present
experience of my own, is in a real sense a part of one and the same self.
As E. S. Brightman has said, by "a network of memories, each including an
act of self-identification, all my past experiences are bound into my
82 whole past self." J. B. Baillie argues that the testimony of memory-judg­
ments which consist in the implicit awareness of the continuity of the self
or subject, is in the form of an affirmation, rather than in that of an as­
sumption or proof. For him, our self-identity forms the basis of memory­
judgments which by the act of judgment render it explicit in a specific
83 way. "Every time I judge," he says, "that this or that happened in my ex­
pperience, I am affirming the continuity of my individual experience, and
point to certain parts of it which have made up its content....In memory­
judgments we become aware of the continuity of our individual experience;
and this is almost a tautology; for being aware of our continuity is just
84 what memory-judgments consist in." Thus it would appear that the contin­
uity of individual experience is an inexplicable phenomenon apart from the

81. James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, Edited by
82. E. S. Brightman, Personality and Religion, New York: The Abingdon
Press, 1934, p. 34.
XVI, No. 103, 1917, p. 263.
84. Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
hypothesis of a permanent ego.

The testimony offered by anticipation also points towards a future self which is identical with the past and present subject. We have already indicated our objection to any attempt to account for anticipation on the basis of a succession of transitory selves. But we need to go further since anticipation is especially important in religion. We need to see that this feature of our experience offers more than negative evidence against theories which deny a permanent self, and that it presents a strong positive argument for the continuity of the self. Just as memory points to a past identical with the present one, anticipation implies a future self which is identical with the present one. J. Laird has said, "Every pulse of the soul has the signs of its history upon it, and for this very reason is always prospective too." He says further, "Indeed, there may seem to be no conscious experience, however brief, which does not reverberate with a personal past, and press onwards, in some kind of forecast, towards the same personal future." Now it is quite true that the future which the self anticipates is never fully verifiable because, like the "legendary pot of gold at the end of the rainbow", it moves ahead of any present advances towards it. But religion would be as "a valley of dry bones" were we to rob it of its hope in an inexhaustable future, and to hold up before it a future void of the possibility of achieving a greater than that which has been attained. Out of this feature of our human existence arise both life's hope and responsibility which impart to religion much of its profoundest meaning. It is at this point also that moral endeavor becomes pregnant with significance and possibility. Pro-

86. Ibid., p. 70.
Professor G. W. Allport writes as follows: "The past is drawn out in successive and overlapping conscious moments, backwards, twenty, thirty or forty years to early childhood, and the future extends in each overlapping moment of planning and imagination. It is through this dovetailing of the successive moments of consciousness that we somehow possess consistent personalities surrounding the momentary conscious core. Unless we postulated for ourselves a permanence of personality we could not possibly account for the many identical threads running through our conscious states." We can go still further and say that unless we postulated for ourselves permanence of personality, the possibility of developing character would become well-nigh inconceivable. The very thought of the future is meaningless apart from the postulation of a permanent self, and this for two reasons. First, because habit involves choice; there is always an element of choice in the formation of habits. This is especially true in the moral and religious spheres. Such choice is determined by a subject who looks to the future. It is the act and result of conscious choice, performed by a conscious subject; unless we are to regard habitual activity as little more than instinctive behavior, in which case character becomes meaningless. The second reason for postulating permanence of personality is because habitual activity implies identity. The activity which results from habit plainly shows that experiences which belong to the past continue to function in the present, and our choices concerning the future presuppose that this same principle holds true for the future. Obviously, then, the development of character is rendered inexplicable without continuity of the subject.

James himself presents an irrefutable argument for the unity of consciousness as a fundamental fact which necessitates the inference of some

87. G. W. Allport, op. cit., p. 159.
ground of this unity other than consciousness itself. He argues convincingly against the associationists that no possible number of entities can "sum themselves together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for a by-stander who happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some other effect on an entity external to the sum itself." He goes on to say, "Idea of a plus idea of b is not identical with the idea of (a plus b). It is one, they are two; in it, what knows a also knows b; in them, what knows a is expressly posited as not knowing b; etc. In short, the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one and the same thing as the 'associated' idea." This argument has never been successfully refuted, and it applies with equal force and cogency against James's own view of the self; James realizes this later. In the chapter on "The Compounding of Consciousness", in A Pluralistic Universe, he makes his well known "confession" concerning the unsatisfactory nature of his own conception of the self.

If we follow James's struggle in this connection somewhat in detail we can see more clearly the difficulties involved in a denial of a permanent self. He grappled with this problem for many years. He asks, "Shall we say that every complex mental fact is a separate psychic entity succeeding upon a lot of other psychic entities which are erroneously called its parts, and superseding them in function, but not literally being composed of them? This was the course I took in my psychology." This course involves the denial of the Absolute, and reinstates the God of theism. It also involves

89. Ibid., p. 161.
90. P. U., p. 205.
the denial of Fechner's conception of an "earth-soul", as well as all other theories which attempt to compound consciousness. All such denials would be made in the "name of the incorruptible logic of self-identity." He then adds, "But if we realize the whole philosophic situation thus produced, we see that it is almost intolerable. Loyal to the logical kind of rationality, it is disloyal to every other kind. It makes the universe discontinuous. These fields of experience that replace each other so punctually, each knowing the same matter, but in ever widening contexts, from simplest feeling up to absolute knowledge, can they have no being in common when their cognitive function is so manifestly common? The regular succession of them is on such terms an unintelligible miracle. If you reply that their common object is of itself enough to make the many witnesses continuous, the same implacable logic follows you—how can one and the same object appear so variously? Its diverse appearances break it into a plurality; and our world of objects then falls into discontinuous pieces quite as much as did our world of subject. The resultant irrationality is really intolerable." We come now to his renunciation of logic as the only way out of the difficulty. "Sincerely, and patiently as I could," he says, "I struggled with the problem for years, covering hundreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and discussions with myself over the difficulty. How can many consciousnesses be at the same time one consciousness? How can one and the same identical fact experience itself so diversely? The struggle was vain; I found myself in an impasse. I saw I must either forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian education had committed me,—I must, in

91. Ibid., p. 205.
92. Ibid., pp. 205-206.
short, bring back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now singly and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and common sense—or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem impossible, and then either give up my intellectualistic logic, the logic of identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) form of rationality, or finally, face the fact that life is logically irrational." Due to the encouragement and inspiration which he receives from the writings of Henri Bergson, James is finally led to give up logic. "Well, what must we do in this tragic predicament?" he asks: "For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably." It may be remarked, that James could have followed Bergson in rejecting logic without maintaining such an extreme view of consciousness. Bergson's conception, according to which "consciousness means memory", does not involve the rejection of the self in the repudiation of logic. As a matter of fact, the theory of consciousness which he maintains and defends is, as H. M. Kallen observes, "exactly that which, because of his reading of Bergson's works, James abandons." James's denial of the self, then, seems to arise out of his inveterate prejudice against a distinct spiritual agent or self, for his rejection of logic does not necessarily carry with it a denial of the soul.

Just as J. S. Mill and Hume have seen that the unity of consciousness is unintelligible on associationist principles, we conceive it to be unintelligible on any other hypothesis than that of the soul. Our conscious

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93. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
94. Ibid., p. 212.
life cannot be understood except by a synthetic method since it constitutes an organic whole. Our mental processes within our individual consciousness appear as a unity which introspection reveals to be complete. That all of the thoughts of which we are aware, at any moment, seem to form a compact, coherent whole, we cannot doubt. All of them seem, in fact, to belong to one's self; this unity apparently continues from moment to moment, as retention shows, without ever any evidence of disruption. It may be argued that this unity is apparent rather than real, but so long as it is apparent, it calls for some reasonable explanation. The conception of the soul is the most reasonable one. But as Lotze argues our belief in the unity of the soul "rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but on our being able to appear to ourselves at all. Did we appear to ourselves something quite different, may, did we seem to ourselves to be an unconnected plurality, we would from this very fact, from the bare possibility of appearing anything to ourselves, deduce the necessary unity of our being, this time in open contradiction with what self-observation set before us as our own image. What a being appears to itself to be is not the important point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or other things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature."

Whether or not we subscribe to any of Kant's special doctrines, we are forced to recognize that he has made a significant contribution to philosophy by his emphasis upon the fact that the unity of consciousness is explicable only on the presupposition of a thinker who brings and holds together the different objects and separate states involved, who compares and

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Whether or not we subscribe to any of Kant's special doctrines, we are forced to recognize that he has made a significant contribution to philosophy by his emphasis upon the fact that the unity of consciousness is explicable only on the presupposition of a thinker who brings and holds together the different objects and separate states involved, who compares and

comprehends, but who remains separate from the objects and states in consciousness, and is conscious of them as belonging to him. His famous dictum, "It must be possible that the I think should accompany all my representations", remains as an insurmountable obstacle in the path of any theory which purports to deal adequately with consciousness while it denies an abiding subject. For, as Kant points out, "Without our being conscious that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. Each representation would, in its present state, be a new one, and in no wise belonging to the act by which it was to be produced by degrees, and the manifold in it would never form a whole, because deprived of that unity which consciousness alone can impart to it." He continues, "If in counting I forget that the unities which now present themselves to my mind have been added gradually one to the other, I should not know the production of the quantity by the successive addition of one to one, nor should I know consequently the number, produced by the counting, this number being a concept consisting entirely in the consciousness of that unity of synthesis."

Thus Kant plainly shows the necessity of a permanent self.

Another consideration which seems to render the conception of a unitary psychic being a necessary hypothesis pertains to the facts of the relation of sensory consciousness to cerebral events. First, there is the phenomenon which occurs in the awareness of certain qualities such as the sensation of color. For instance, I look at the green of the leaves on

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100. Ibid., p. 85.
101. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
the tree outside my window. The light waves from this mass of greenness
enter into the retina successively, and regardless of any change in their
speed which may occur from their passage along the optic nerve, they re-
main successive. One vibration is not distinguished from another even
in the visual area of the cortex. Now this succession of the vibrations
of the electrons, however close, requires time. But these different
parts of the sensation are so fused in consciousness as to produce one re-
sulting quality, namely, a color; and this fusion occurs without loss of
distinctness. According to W. H. Sheldon, this accounts for the fact that
the unity of the mind which is found in conscious states cannot be expressed
in physical terms; it is incompatible with physical conditions. For physi-
cal processes and particles cannot be fused without losing their distinct-
ness. Then there is the fusion which takes place when, for example, the
eye and the ear receive simultaneous stimulation. As William McDougall
points out, there is a peculiar coherence of the sensory effects of the
stimuli which affect the two sense organs and of the excitations of the op-
tic and auditory nerves which constitutes a partial modification of con-
sciousness. Both the stimuli and their immediate effects on the nerves
are quite separate and distinct, while their effects in consciousness are
so fused as to form parts of one whole. Now, as Professor McDougall shows,
if the fusion of effects of simultaneous sensory stimuli to a unitary re-
sultant, is not a physiological or physical fusion or composition, which
has never been satisfactorily proved, but is peculiarly a psychical process,

XXXI, No. 2, 1923, pp. 113 ff, Cf. pp. 103-134.
103. Wm. McDougall, Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism,
it argues for a psychic being as an agent of unity, for the unitary resultant can be conceived as existing only in the psychical sphere. For if the nervous system is not the scene of this fusion of effects, the problem of the basic unity of the individual consciousness is upon our hands which seems impossible of solution without the hypothesis of a self. He rightly insists that the intellect demands such a conclusion since this phenomenon is explicable only by assuming that both processes influence or act upon some one thing or being. It cannot be a material thing, therefore, it must be an immaterial thing; it must be the self. Further, the way in which memory transcends the present and bridges the gulf of time between the present and the past shows that there is a direct incompatibility between it and the laws which govern physical processes. It misses the essence of memory, as W. H. Sheldon argues, to say that some event in a remote past left paths in the nervous system which a nervous discharge tends to follow because the path of the original event diminishes resistance. For while the neural event is a present fact very much like the previous one which occurred in the nervous system, it is in no sense that past event, whereas in memory the past event is present. Physically, then, the past event does not exist, but mentally, it is present as an element in our conscious experience, and it carries its pastness with it too. No physical process can account for this feature involved in memory; it is intelligible only on the ground that it is the result of psychical processes which imply a psychical being. This unique charac-

104. Ibid., p. 293.
105. Ibid., p. 297.
teristic of memory leads Henri Bergson to assert that pure perception and
pure memory differ not merely in intensity, but in nature. He maintains
that if we make recollection merely a weakened perception we fail to
grasp the essential difference between the past and the present.

McDougall also refers to this aspect of memory as a major difficulty in
any account of the mind that ignores a distinct mental agent. But in
each of the above cases which we have discussed, to assume a self renders
the phenomenon referred to explicable. We believe, therefore, that the
conception of a distinct spiritual or mental agent is a necessary hypothe-
sis, if we are satisfactorily to explain such facts of consciousness.

Any attempt to deny the subject of consciousness is rendered intrinsi-
cally impossible by the fact of givenness. It is one thing for an object
to exist, but it is quite another thing for it to appear. And since, as
F. R. Tennant observes, we cannot derive from the proposition "objects ex-
ist", the proposition "objects appear", "the existence of the subject, as
distinct from what appears to it, is incapable of gainsaying." For when
objects appear, they must appear to something or someone. C. A. Strong
writes in this connection as follows: "Givenness might indeed seem at
first sight to be an intrinsic attribute of what is given. But if it be
remembered that givenness is always to some one--you cannot make a person
a present unless you first have the person." That is to say, an object

Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
109. Ibid., p. 72.
111. F. R. Tennant, op. cit., p. 18.
112. C. A. Strong, The Origin of Consciousness, London: Macmillan and
Co., Ltd., 1918, p. 37.
cannot appear unless there is awareness or consciousness of it. But this awareness which renders appearance possible cannot, we believe, be accounted for other than on the presupposition of a distinct mental being possessing an indivisible unity. A well known passage from Lotze is worth quoting at some length since it expresses this truth clearly and forcibly: "What is apt to perplex us in this question is the somewhat thoughtless way in which we so often allow ourselves to play fast and loose with the notion of appearance. We are content with setting in contrast to it the being that appears, and we forget that appearance is impossible without another being that sees it. We fancy that appearance comes forth from the hidden depths of being-in-itself, like a lustre existing before there is any eye for it to arise in, extending into reality, present to and apprehensible by him who will grasp it, but none the less continuing to exist even if known by none. We here overlook that even in the reign of sensation, from which this image is borrowed, the lustre emitted by objects only seems to be emitted by them, and that it can even seem to come from them, only because our eyes are there, the receptive organs of a cognitive soul, to which appearances are possible. The lustre of the light does not spread itself around us, but like all phaenomena dwells only in the consciousness of him for whom it exists. And of this consciousness, of this general capacity that makes the appearance of anything possible, we maintain that it can be an attribute only of the indivisible unity of one being, and that every attempt to ascribe it a plurality, however bound together, will, by its failure, but confirm our conviction of the suprasensible unity of the soul." We do not see, then, how the appearance of an object is possible

without this awareness of a conscious subject, although we do not con-
ceive the object's existence as depending upon being known. Thus, since
the subject is involved in affirming existence of an experience, whether
it be described as a state or as a relation, there seems to be no escape
from the conclusion that such a subject does exist.

This leads us, by way of conclusion, to say a word concerning the
nature of the self. This is a question on which one certainly cannot be
dogmatic, and yet it is necessary to form some conception of the nature
of the self if our argument for its existence is to mean anything more
than empty words. Professor J. B. Pratt has given us in his latest book,
*Personal Realism*, to which we have referred a number of times, a very sat-
isfactory account, for the most part, of the nature of the self, and much
that we shall say at this juncture is derived from his treatment of the
subject. First, the self is to be conceived as a substance, which means
that it is an existent being which possesses qualities. It is "an exist-
ent substantive", to use Professor Pratt's words, "an existent group of
existent qualities"; it is not, therefore, "a merely abstract and colorless
A." It seems to accompany the dawn of consciousness in infancy, and brings
with it some characters of its own; it possesses qualities peculiar to
it in addition to those qualities or characters of the body with which Na-
ture provides it. Thus, in addition to one's experience and racial inher-
tance, certain qualities peculiar to each subject or ego, enter into the
constitution of character. This latter factor accounts for most of the
unique, distinctive characteristics of each individual. Whatever relation
the self sustains to the "pure ego" of traditional thought, the former must

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115. Ibid., p. 288.
116. Ibid., pp. 298-299.
not be conceived too diaphanously. "A self completely out of time, a
substance without attributes or distinct from them, a permanent and un-
changing identity, a monad with no windows, a soul quite pure from the
taint of the empirical—such an imaginary, or unimaginable, entity might
belong in heaven but surely would have no place on earth." On the other
hand, the assertion that the self is a substance should not be construed
to mean that it is tangible or visible. It cannot be visualized. It
is a substance, but a substance of its own kind; it is sui generis. Just
as we cannot conceive substance without attributes, we are unable to con-
ceive the self apart from its qualities and acts. The self, like other
things, is known by what it does. "It is that which has certain charac-
ters and acts in certain ways." It has both unity and variety; oneness
and multiplicity. Its inherent unity distinguishes it from other sub-
stances; it is the one being which is essentially one. We cannot regard
the self as being in space for neither conscious states nor conscious acts
are spatial; it acts into space. There is wide divergence of opinion as
to whether the self is in time. Again, dogmatism must be laid aside, but
if we regard the self as in neither space nor time it is difficult to see
what significance could be attached to our conception of it as an existent
being; it would belong rather to the realm of essence than to that of ex-
istence. Unless we conceive it as somehow being in time, we separate it
from its character since we render its development and change impossible.
As to how the self is known, we cannot regard the soul as phenomenal.

F. H. Tennant regards the self as "that to which phenomena appear, and is

117. Ibid., p. 300.
118. Ibid., p. 304.
119. Ibid., p. 306.
known otherwise than is the phenomenal." He says that it "is rather the
one known being that must be called ontal or noumenal, if we are to avoid
indefinite regress; or the one ontal thing that is assuredly known." The
self is not to be found among the objects of consciousness; it is not em­
pirically discoverable. Hume's famous attempt to discover it in this
manner led him to conclude: "when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat
or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any­
thing but the perception." We agree with Hume here; we must admit that
the idea of the self is not derived from immediate perception, but must be
reached by inference from the general nature and conditions of conscious
life. As H. Hoffding puts it: "In this Hume was perfectly right. But he
searches in the wrong place. The nature of the ego is manifested in the
combination of the sensations, ideas, and feelings, and in the forms and
laws of this combination, consequently in memory and comparison, from their
purely elementary and automatic forms up to the highest and clearest forms
of which they are capable. Hume cannot see the wood for the trees." To
conclude, then, we may conceive the self as having certain characters or
functions. It plays the role of a subject in cognition; it wills in voli­
tion; and it is the "feeler" of affective states; thus it has determinate
states and activities. Professor William McDougall has offered a very
suggestive description of the soul in Body and Mind, although he studiously

121. Ibid., p. 97.
123. H. Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, English Trans. by Lary E. Lowndes
avoids the use of the term substance with reference to the self here and in his later work in psychology as well. He conceives the soul as a "sum of enduring capacities for thoughts, feelings, and efforts of determinate kinds." "We may then," he says, "describe a soul as a being that possesses, or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psychophysical interaction, of which the most fundamental are (1) the capacity of producing, in response to certain physical stimuli (the sensory processes of the brain), the whole range of sensation qualities in their whole range of intensities; (2) the capacity of responding to certain sensation-complexes with the production of meanings, as, for example, spatial meanings; (3) the capacity of responding to these sensations and these meanings with feeling and conation or effort, under the spur of which further meanings may be brought to consciousness in accordance with the laws of reproduction of similars and of reasoning; (4) the capacity of reacting upon the brain-processes to modify their course in a way which we cannot clearly define, but which we may provisionally conceive as a process of guidance by which streams of nervous energy may be concentrated in a way that antagonizes the tendency of all physical energy to dissipation and degradation." Thus conceived, the self is actively present in every act and moment of our conscious life. Although we cannot establish the existence or describe the nature of soul by the methods of science, considerations such as those we have urged above lead us to believe that we are warranted in holding to the belief in its existence as an indispensable, but super-sensible being. We believe that we are justified in this position until a genuinely satisfactory substitute for the soul is forthcoming.

126. Ibid., p. 365.
This leads us to say that James's view of the self, aside from its valuable results for psychology in many respects, has made an important negative contribution to religious thought. It constitutes a forceful argument for the futility of any attempt to present an empirical account of the self which denies the reality of a permanent ego. James's theory serves conspicuously in this connection because, as we have intimated, it is generally admitted that he has achieved greater success in his efforts to offer a substitute for the soul than any other thinker who has made a similar attempt. But it is a significant fact that no one has seriously endeavored to incorporate this ingenious conception of the self in his philosophical construction; even those who regard it with favor usually are content to let the matter end with an expression of approval concerning it. The obvious reason for this attitude as regards James's empirical self is that it cannot bear the weight which would have to be placed upon it if one tries to make it do the work of the soul. Perhaps Hume manifested the greater wisdom after all; for while he initiated scepticism concerning a permanent self, he did not try to present a better substitute. Further, James's theory of consciousness and of the self has successfully demonstrated the untenability of any thoroughgoing epistemological monism, whether it be idealistic or realistic; no shows us that in the last analysis, the epistemological gulf between mind and object cannot be successfully bridged. Whether it be the denial of the reality of the object as in the case of idealism, or that of the reality of the subject, as in the case of American neo-realism, any view that attempts to eliminate the distinction between the psychical and the physical achieves only apparent success and when closer scrutiny is exercised, it becomes obvious that impor-
tant facts pertaining to our conscious life have been omitted. Idealism leads to pantheism and neo-realism leads to materialism. If the contention that the distinction between the psychical and the physical is an ultimate one must, in the last analysis, be taken to mean that the only theory of knowledge consistent with theism is an epistemological dualism, as L. J. Walker maintains, so be it; for it is better to retain the bridge between the mind and its object than it is to eliminate it if the latter procedure involves the obliteration of the self as well. Finally, James's theory serves to warn those who would retain the conception of a self that it cannot be allowed to become too pure an ego which, as James says, "attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition", and which evaporates to an "estate of pure diaphaneity". A soul quite removed from all contact with the empirical is inconceivable; it must be conceived in a much richer fashion than this if it is to withstand the empirical assaults against it. Thus James issues a challenge to religious thought to remove certain objectionable features which have all too frequently accompanied the belief in a soul, and to achieve a more satisfactory account of the character and functions of this supra-sensible being which is so necessary to an adequate religious view of man and his relation to both the temporal and the eternal world.

PART TWO

F I D E I S M
PART TWO

FIDEISM
So long as the intellectualist tradition prevailed in Psychology belief and doubt were regarded as purely intellectual facts or states of mind, the result of purely intellectual or cognitive processes. For instance, in the opinion of James Mill, belief is purely an intellectual state. According to the Association Psychology, belief was described and explained as the persistence of an "inseparable association". James was among those who led the way in breaking away from this traditional treatment of belief by asserting that belief is an emotion. This view of the matter is in line with that of Hume which teaches that belief belongs to the sensitive rather than to the cogitative side of our nature; that is, as James says, it is an affair of "sensible pungency". Hume did not, however, hold with James, that it is a matter of "emotional pungency", unless, as J. Laird points out, "in the general and probably irrelevant sense according to which all Hume's 'impressions of reflexions' may be said to be emotions." James's treatment of the psychology of belief is an important contribution to the subject, and carries far reaching and important implications for his general philosophic standpoint, and especially for his religious philosophy. His conception of belief serves to give a basis for his defense of religious faith, and it is fundamental to his treatment of values.

Belief, for James, is primarily an attitude of the mind towards its objects. When an object before the mind is regarded as being real we have belief, which may be defined as "the mental state or function of cognizing reality". It means every "degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty and conviction". As a sort of feeling, in its inner nature, it is more closely related to the emotions than to anything else; and is similar to "consent" as studied in the psychology of volition. It belongs to our active nature. It is characteristic of both belief and consent that when an idea controls the mind theoretical restlessness and hesitation come to an end, and action tends to follow.

On the intellectual side, then, rest and repose are distinguishing features of belief and consent. On the practical side, they are intimately related to activity. There is the same attitude of mind in disbelief as in belief; that is to say, the stability of the mind's content is the same in both cases. But doubt and inquiry destroy this equilibrium and throw the content of the mind into a state of restlessness. Thus doubt and inquiry, not disbelief, constitute the psychological opposite of belief.

At this point he is in agreement with A. Bain who holds belief and disbelief to be identical states, and doubt and uncertainty to be the opposite of belief as a state of mind. Belief and disbelief, then, are but two aspects of the same psychic state, the latter being an "incidental complication" of the former.

5. Ibid., p. 283.
6. Ibid., p. 283.
8. Ibid., p. 284.
A judgment is commonly held to be a proposition which connects the "ideas" by a "copula"; and propositions are thought to be of various kinds such as affirmative, negative, hypothetical, and so on. Now James says that the ideas form exactly the same combination in a proposition which is disbelieved or doubted, as well as in a question, as they do in one that is firmly believed. Thus the "way in which ideas are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the thought's object or content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one." Every proposition, then, so far as it is affirmed, doubted, or denied, has four elements; namely, subject, predicate, and their relation, which form the object of belief, and the attitude of the mind in respect of this object. This last element constitutes belief. James, with J. S. Mill, holds belief to be "ultimate and primordial". Belief is a state of consciousness sui generis; it "feels like itself".

Absence of contradiction is the condition of belief. "Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality." This is in substantial agreement with Bain's view of "primitive credulity", according to which we begin by believing everything; "whatever is, is true." This fact is illustrated by supposing a child's first experience to be in the form of a visual impression of a lighted candle against a dark, empty background. This image constitutes the whole universe for the child for the time being. Even if the candle were not real,

11. Ibid., pp. 286-287.
15. A. Bain, op. cit., p. 511.
being only imaginary, and thus not visible to another experient, the inexperienced babe would still accept it, and believe in it, as real. This is due to the fact that, in the experience of the child, there is no idea of any other reality with which to contrast it so as to arouse doubt or cause disbelief. His universe contains no other reality to give birth to an opposing idea. Since, then, the candle is his entire universe, the question of its reality cannot possibly arise; the candle is his all, his absolute. "It is, it is that; it is there." It follows that there is no other alternative, but to believe, since the child cannot conceive any other place or any other object in the space; there is nothing to do, in this situation, but to ascribe reality to the object. As Spinoza showed in his well known example of the boy imagining a winged horse, belief in the existence of the winged horse necessarily follows upon the idea of it unless the imagination of the winged horse is accompanied by an idea which contradicts its existence. It is of the essence of belief, therefore, to affirm all objects which present themselves to the mind unless they clash with other objects which have been admitted to belief.

The only way in which this contradiction can occur is for one thought to say something about the other which is "inadmissible"; that is, something which the mind cannot accept. For example, to say that the child's candle, or the boy's winged horse exists in "the outer world", when not perceived, places an object in "the outer world" which contradicts all previous knowledge of that world. It then becomes necessary for him to

17. Ibid., p. 288.
choose between his present perceptions and the other knowledge of the outer world. The present perceptions must be rejected if the other knowledge is to be retained, insofar as they are related to that world. Outward space contains no candles and winged horses. They and their spaces do have existence as mental objects, but the realities of the outer world occupy an entirely different space. This sort of difficulty, however, is not involved in dreaming of a horse with wings. The dream-horse, its wings, and its place, are all equally real and all belong together. There is no interference of any kind here and, consequently, no contradiction arises. But contradiction does begin as soon as the dream-horse attempts to enter the "world otherwise known". If, for instance, I identify this horse and its place with my horse in the stall, and say that "my horse has grown wings in the stall," I make an assertion which cannot be reconciled with what I know of the world in which my horse and the stall exist; what I know about my horse in the stall is incompatible with the winged horse of the dream.

In this account of the matter, James seems to have overlooked a distinction that is frequently made in the development of the consciousness of reality. J. L. Baldwin holds that two stages of development are involved here. The first is that of "reality-feeling", and the second is that of belief. According to Baldwin, the former stage "denotes the fundamental modification of consciousness which attaches to the presentative side of sensational states—the feeling which means, as the child afterward

18. Ibid., p. 288.
19. Ibid., p. 289.
20. Ibid., p. 289.
learns, that an object is really there." The latter stage, or belief, which he defines as "consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality", denotes the "feeling which attaches to what may be a secondary or representative state of mind, and indicates the amount of assurance we have at the time that an object is there." That is to say, in the first stage of the development of the consciousness of reality, the idea has its own guarantee of its reality, but in the second stage, or in belief, the idea is guaranteed by my knowledge of it, or by its relation to ideas which have already been admitted to belief. James's illustration of the child and the candle belongs to the first stage, or to that of reality-feeling which, according to Baldwin, "is simply the fact of feeling; nothing more, but this much", and does not constitute the real phenomenon of belief. If this distinction between the mere sense of reality and belief is valid, it follows that belief is more complex than James's description has shown it to be. The fact that such inconsistencies as winged horses are accepted in dreams indicates the presence of the simple "reality-feeling" without belief.Positing or affirming involves a distinction in consciousness between the true and the untrue. In saying that any object which "remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality", James is guilty of the "psychologist's fallacy".

We may use the two illustrations which have been considered above to bring out the distinction between existential and attributive judgments.

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22. Ibid., p. 149.
23. Ibid., p. 158.
24. Ibid., p. 149.
25. Ibid., p. 150.
"The candle exists as an outer reality" is a case of the former; and "my horse has a pair of wings" is an example of the latter type of judgment. It follows from the nature of belief, for James, that "all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions." Thus, while the dream-candle has existence, it does not have the same kind of existence, that is, existence extra mentem meam, which candles of our waking experience enjoy. Our dream-horse does have wings, but neither the horse nor the wings can be identified with horses and wings known to us in memory. The ability to think of the same thing at different times is essential to our mental life. It is possible to think of the same thing in compatible ways, but it is not possible to think of the same thing in two contradictory ways at once. It becomes necessary, therefore, to choose which way we intend to think of it. We cannot, for instance, conceive the horse in the stall as both having and not having wings at the same time. "The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts--first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard." Belief is thus a phenomenon of voluntary choice; our choice determines reality for us. The existence we cling to becomes real existence for us; all the rest is ignored, treated as non-existent. This, according to James, is our practical attitude as regards the things and the existence we reject and disbelieve.

28. Ibid., p. 290.
The two propositions, in the quotation just cited, seem to be inconsistent, if taken as they stand. As J. Laird says, it cannot be true "that we believe where, and only where, we have no voluntary choice, and also that believing is an instance of voluntary choice." If "will" be taken to mean "settled principles of action", a sense in which it is sometimes used, it is conceivable that belief might be so closely allied with these, and that they might be sufficiently settled, as to render volitional choice virtually impossible. If, however, "will" is used in the sense of voluntary choice between two alternatives, there is no substantial difficulty in holding that belief is an affair of the will. The latter usage appears to be more in line with the general trend of James's argument.

To resume, then, these things which, from the practical standpoint, are treated as non-existent, do have existence. But it is not the same kind of existence as the real things have. They exist as objects of fancy, as errors, and so on. From the theoretical standpoint they must be assigned a place in the universe as well as the things to which reality is ascribed. Being shut out of the real world, the philosopher's world must include them. His complete world, then, consists of the "realities" plus the fancies and illusions; and several other sub-universes which are but dimly known to the practical man. But the philosopher must take account of these, he must relate them to the whole, and properly place objects in each one. The most important of these sub-universes are:

1. The world of sense, or of physical "things", as apprehended by us, with such qualities as heat, color, sound and so forth.

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29. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 151; Cf. also, p. 152.
2. The world of science, or of physical things as they are interpreted by the scientist. Here, only solids, fluids and their "laws" of motion are real.

3. The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths, expressed in aesthetic, ethical, mathematical, logical, or metaphysical propositions.

4. The world of "idols of the tribe", illusions or prejudices common to mankind. For example, the motion of the sky round the earth belongs to this world.

5. The various supernatural worlds; worlds of fable and fancy. The Christian heaven and hell, and the world of Hindoo mythology belong here.

6. The worlds of individual opinion which are as numerous as men.

7. The many worlds of sheer madness and vagary.

We place every object of which we think in one of these worlds. Due to the fact that for most people these worlds are not clearly distinguished, each world has its own reality only while we attend to it; when we cease to think of it, its reality fades out. Which one of these various worlds is to be "the world of ultimate realities" for any given individual is practically determined by his controlling habits of attention. The objects of the world which he chooses become absolute authority; they speak the final word. Whatever is found to be incompatible with them must be placed in one of the other worlds or entirely discarded. The horse with wings may exist undisturbed so long as it does not try to enter the real world. But trouble starts as soon as it begins to trespass upon the real world, for here horses do not have wings. All these worlds have existence, that

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is, they possess metaphysical reality. But this does not meet our demand for practical reality; we must have reality for ourselves. In order to have this latter kind of reality, an object "must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important." Objects which fail to meet these requirements are relegated to non-existent worlds. Reality, then, for practical men, "means simply relation to our emotional and active life," and we ascribe reality to anything that excites and stimulates our interest. If we do not recognize an object, if we refuse to give it our attention, it is unreal and disbelieved. In this connection, James follows Hume who defines belief as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression", and who goes on to say, "it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas but in the manner of their conception....and in philosophy, we can go no further than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of our actions."

Bain also holds that belief is essentially related to action, that is to volition. According to him, "action is the basis and ultimate criterion of belief." In spite of this fundamental agreement with James, both Hume

31. Ibid., p. 295.
32. Ibid., p. 295.
34. Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. VII, p. 130.
35. A. Bain, op. cit., p. 505.
36. Ibid., p. 506.
and Bain reach quite different conclusions from his, in that for both of them we believe because we have no other alternative and an element of constraint enters into our actions as a result of our beliefs; whereas, for James, as we have seen, belief is a matter of voluntary choice.

To assert the reality of an object in no way changes its intrinsic content. In fact, the object is not affected at all. As Hume says, "when I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither increases nor diminishes." Adding reality to it "only fixes it and stamps it in to us." That is to say, if we believe in an object and ascribe reality to it, we establish relations between it and ourselves. These relations are real, for the time being, and given reality to their objective term. "The fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves." If we were purely logical thinkers, lacking emotional reactions, we would ascribe reality to all objects of which we think. But since this is not the case, we ascribe a greater degree of reality to the things which we "select and emphasize and turn to with a will." Thus our Ego is the starting point of reality; reality begins here and imparts itself to all those things which sustain an intimate and continuous relation to life. Our own reality, then, "that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief." It is impossible to doubt our own present existence, and we ascribe reality to all that is connected with it, just as Descartes

37. Ibid., p. 506; Hume, op. cit., Bk. I, Sec. VII.
41. Ibid., p. 297.
42. Ibid., p. 297.
made the indubitable reality of the cogito do service for the reality of all for which the cogito stood. Thus the reality of self, the feeling of self is our most fixed point of reference. All reality comes to us through our own experiences, and the self and its needs constitute the centre of experience. Thus the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term, serves as the nail on which the world of living realities hangs. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that James's emphasis upon the "active and emotional" side of us as the really living part, and his view that our beliefs are determined by the living part, appear inconsistent with the position that doubt and inquiry, not disbelief, are the opposites of belief. For, as J. Laird argues, doubt and inquiry may themselves be very live things, and are liable strongly to affect action even when they paralyze it. Also, they have the power to disturb us emotionally. If belief is regarded as the "live" part of us, its opposite would seem to be "indifference". In Laird's opinion, belief in this sense is a category of value in the wide sense of the term "value"; insofar as a thing matters to us it may be said to have value or disvalue. In short, value attaches to that towards which we are not indifferent; whereas its opposite is that about which we are not concerned.

Sensations are the strongest rivals among the objects which present themselves for belief. This is because of their power to compel our attention due to their "sensible vividness or pungency" which is the vital factor in settling the dispute between the objects which clamor for recognition by the mind. Before reality will be given to a conception, it must

43. Ibid., p. 297.
44. Ibid., p. 284; Cf. Above, p. 88.
45. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 152.
46. Ibid., p. 152.
"terminate in the world of orderly experience." Before belief attaches to a conceived object it must have some permanent and vivid sensible object for its term; that is, it must show sensible effects just as "verification" is always demanded in science. But all sensations do not enjoy the same degree of reality. "The mind chooses to suit itself, and decides what particular sensation shall be held more real and valid than all the rest." Some, because of permanency, or for practical or aesthetic reasons, happen to interest us more than others. These are selected by attention and given a higher degree of reality, while the rest are relegated to the position of mere signs and suggestions of the more fortunate contestants. For example, the real sound of a cannon is the sensation which it makes when the ear is close by. James follows Lock in holding that sensations which produce pleasure or pain exert the strongest control over belief and are considered most real.

Objects which arouse our emotions and stir our active impulses rank next to sensations as regards reality. As a rule, the reality of a conceived object depends upon its ability to excite us. Belief usually accompanies an emotionally exciting idea. "Every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To conceive with passion is eo ipso to affirm. We may doubt or disbelieve other objects, but we have no doubt or hesitancy concerning the object of passion. We strongly believe it. Thus all conceived objects which arouse hate, desire, or fear are ba-

49. Ibid., p. 286.
50. John Locke, op. cit., Bk. IV, Ch. 2, Para. 14; Also, Ch. 11, Para. 8.
believed. Religious and supernatural beliefs belong to this type, and the
"surest warrant for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our
dear ones; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no such Provi-
dence or help." This attitude towards objects of passion is due to the
bodily commotion which such ideas produce. Our own acts and emotions,
then, our own pleasures and pains constitute the ultimate criterion of
reality. They are the fixities to which our whole chain of beliefs is
fastened, with object clinging to object until the Self is "reached and
held". Also, our belief in objects of theory is determined by the same
general principles. When alternative theories present themselves, the
richest, simplest and most harmonious one will be believed. That is to
say, we believe the one which renders the most satisfactory account of our
sensible experience, which appeals most to our interests, and which most
successfully meets our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.

The relation which belief sustains to emotion, volition, and action
has been touched upon in various stages of James's argument, as we have
proceeded to develop it, and it will now be well to give this matter final
consideration and offer our suggestions and criticism with reference to his
position. The sweeping claim which he makes for the part played by pas-
son and emotion in belief is considerably modified in his enunciation of
the doctrine of "The Will to Believe." Here he not only admits but af-
firms that passion conviction has no legitimate place where anything

52. Ibid., p. 308.
53. Ibid., p. 311.
can be decided "by its nature on intellectual grounds". That is, in this different version of the question under consideration, he does not hold that passional decision should ever be opposed to intellectual, but that the former is justified only in certain cases where intellect fails. As a matter of fact, he so strongly qualifies his defense of passional decision, that J. Laird finds "nothing in the argument to forbid the interpretation that in the lives of most of us these passional decisions, in the limited sphere in which James holds that they legitimately occur, are in reality forced acceptances rather than forced 'options'." Clearly, his view as set forth in the essay in question is the more tenable, and may be taken to represent his settled conviction on the subject. But throughout, James was concerned to show that the whole of our nature demands satisfaction, and is operative in belief, as opposed to the intellectualist tradition with its exaggerated emphasis upon intellect. Stripped, then, of its extravagances, James's contention that emotion exercises an influence upon belief is essentially correct. For, plainly, emotion does influence belief, as the common use of the emotional method of persuasion shows.

In all doubtful matters, as Bain says, when "there are appearances for and against a given uniformity, emotion, lending itself to one side, makes that side appear the strongest for the time, and sweeps belief accordingly."

Also, James is quite right in asserting that we readily believe ideas which

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56. A. Bain, op. cit., p. 522.
strongly excite in us some definite emotion such as fear, hate, love and hope. Our conviction with reference to the objects of such ideas as have the power thus to stir us may be strengthened and intensified by cherishing the emotion which accompanies our thought of them. Two mental processes are at work here. To quote Bain again: "The effect of emotion in intensifying an idea cannot be detached in practical working from the influence of the feelings in keeping back all incompatible ideas. The two mental processes are different, but both unavoidably work together. Whenever a feeling strongly occupies the mind, the objects in harmony with it are maintained in the view, and all others are repelled and ignored." Whether or not we recognize as legitimate the demands of our emotional nature ultimately depends upon our conception of reality. That is to say, if we regard reality as a general term for "that kind of experience which satisfies one or more of the needs of the individual", the demands of the emotional side of our nature will not be ruled out of court. And different kinds of reality are indicated by the various coefficients of belief, sensational, logical, moral and aesthetic; and it would seem that we have the same justification for believing in one as the other, for all are based upon the fact that our nature demands, and succeeds in obtaining, certain kinds of satisfaction. If belief in anything, to use the words of J. H. Baldwin, is "the consciousness of the presence of that thing as fitted to satisfy a need", we are not justified in ignoring the emotional coefficient of belief and the kind of reality to which it testifies. And it is through belief that we are able, after a fashion, to

harmonize and adjust these different kinds of reality to one another. For, as the author just quoted puts it: "Sensational reality will not satisfy our logical demands, for nature is often refractory and illogical. Neither will logic satisfy our moral and aesthetic demands, for the logically true is often immoral and hideous. It is well, therefore, to write large the truth that logical consistency is not the whole of reality, and that the revolt of the heart against fact is often as legitimate a measure of the true in this shifting universe, as is the cold denial given by rational conviction to the vagaries of causal feeling."

As to the relation between belief and will, James holds that both consist in nothing more than a certain way of attending to objects, or consenting to their stable presence before the mind. That is, there is no difference in the attitude of the mind towards its object in belief and will. There is a difference, however, in the objects themselves in the two cases; the objects of belief do not change according to our thought of them, while the objects of the will depend upon our thought or actions for existence. But this difference in the objects does not affect the attitude of the mind toward them. In both instances, the mind recognizes the object, consents to its existence, and embraces it as its reality. Thus both belief and will mean a certain relation between objects and the Self, and "are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon".

With reference to the relation between belief and will there is room for wide divergence of opinion. Our view of this question depends upon the position we assume as regards the coefficients of reality. Present

61. Principles, p. 321; Cf. also, p. 320.
reality may be said to be of two kinds; present external reality, and present memory-reality. The former is guaranteed by its independence of the will and involves "limitation of activity", which presents the coefficient of "incontrollableness". The latter, on the other hand, is guaranteed by subjection to the will and presents "voluntariness" or "control" as ground of belief. If we emphasize the memory-side of reality, or "voluntariness", as ground of belief, and fail to take into account the two-fold nature of the complete criterion of reality, we are apt to make no distinction between belief and will. If, however, we recognize "restriction of activity", in any of its forms, such as "resistence", "consistency", and so on, it is impossible to regard belief as the same phenomenon as will. In that case, volition "would represent work against limitations, belief activity within limitations and adapting itself to limitations." James, following Hume here, overlooks this distinction and recognizes only "voluntariness", or "control". C. F. Stout, and J. H. Baldwin maintain that we cannot ignore the twofold nature of the criterion of external reality, and they agree in making "feelings of resistance", or "incontrollableness", the primary coefficient of reality. Stout regards belief as "at once a condition of activity, and conditioned by activity," thereby recognizing both factors as necessary. As to the element of "incontrollableness", he says that objective coercion "is of the very essence

63. Ibid., p. 112.
64. Ibid., pp. 111-112; Cf. G. F. Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 674 ff.; Also, J. ... Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will, pp. 165-166.
of belief". To quote him further: "Whatever influence subjective needs as such may have in determining belief, they can never be the sole factor." While according to Baldwin, "there is a distinct difference in consciousness between the consent of belief and consent of will. The consent of belief is in a measure a forced consent; it attaches to what is—-to what stands in the order of things whether I consent or no. The consent of will is a forceful consent—-a consent to what shall be through me. Further, in cases in which belief is brought about by desire and will, there is a subtle consciousness of inadequate evidence, until by repetition the item desired and willed no longer needs volition to give it a place in the series deemed objective; then it is for the first time belief, and then it is no longer will." To make this distinction, and to insist upon the primacy of "incontrollableness", however, should not be taken as a denial of the influence of will on belief. It simply means that the control factor, while also present, is secondary. What we are mainly concerned to point out, in this connection, is that James's exclusive emphasis upon volition or the element of "control", leads him to the erroneous conclusion that belief and will are but two names for the same psychological phenomenon. In his development of the doctrine of pragmatism, however, as we shall see later, he recognizes the coefficient of "incontrollableness" in that he admits a "core" of reality which is independent of the will. According to the latter view, it is impossible to identify belief and will.

Perhaps it is not too much to say that James's entire defense of religious belief hinges upon action. His theory of belief assumes that we act according to our beliefs and that we do not act when in doubt. This

conception is fundamental to his pragmatic philosophy. It is open to question, however, whether this is the correct view of the matter. First, it may be remarked that we do not always do those things which we believe to be practicable for us. Many beliefs which would be practicable for us to carry out we do not act upon, while it may be admitted that action is preceded by belief. For instance, I believe that it is practicable to consult a physician, at least once a year, in order properly to safeguard my health, but I do not go to a physician unless some physical disorder renders it necessary. Also, the assumption that we do not act when doubtful does not always hold good. We are frequently called upon to pursue a course of action the success, or even the practicability, of which is doubtful. The larger risks of life, and our greatest adventures, are of this type. For example, Charles Lindbergh could not have been assured of the success and practicability of his epoch-making flight across the Atlantic beforehand. In such cases, one may believe in the possibility of a successful issue, but an element of doubt usually exists, at least until a certain stage in the course pursued has been reached. Further, it is doubtful whether it can be successfully maintained that our beliefs are always essentially related to action. As J. Laird argues with reference to sensory conviction, sensation does not always appear to be related to action. For example, upon looking out of my study window a few moments ago, I saw in the distance, a young man dressed in a baseball uniform, wearing a red cap, with a baseball bat under his arm. He remained within the range of my vision but a few seconds, and yet, as I recall the incident, these impressions are

vivid. But I cannot see that this observation, as well as many others which come to us daily, is in any sense relevant to any probable action on my part. This is also true of many of the beliefs produced by memory. It is no doubt true that we remember best and most clearly the things which are useful to us, but we also possess innumerable memories which appear to have no connection whatever with action. This also seems to be the case in respect to many logical and scientific beliefs. The fact that I believe that it takes light such and such a time to travel from a certain star to the earth seems to have no effect upon my action. Without going to the extreme length of holding that all of our beliefs relate to action, it may be conceded that the function of intellect is primarily or ultimately practical. As Bain puts it: "Other things being the same, a person in the fulness of active energy has an inclination towards the side that promises an opening for this superabundant force."

It follows from James's view of belief and will as the same psychological phenomenon that any questions which arise concerning the latter will also affect the former. And both must be considered in connection with the question of free-will since freedom of belief stands or falls with freedom of the will; that is, our beliefs are indeterminate if our wills are. "The first act of free-will...would naturally be to believe in free-will." It is important, at this juncture, to discuss this question due to the fact that James's doctrine of "The will to Believe" assumes the possibility of free-belief, and his attempt to establish this possibility is to be found in his general theory of belief and will. But this question involves the treatment of his view of Attention as related to belief and will,

for James ultimately reduces the question of free-will, and, consequently, that of free-belief, to one of effort of attention. We shall attempt to develop his argument in this connection.

Now, for the most part, a theory of belief is determined by the criterion of belief which is accepted as being most important. The various theories of belief differ widely in regard to the position accorded to the different coefficients of belief, such as sensational, logical, and so on. Hume and J. S. Sully consider the sensational, and J. Mill regards the logical, coefficient as the principle of belief. Bain differs from all of these thinkers in maintaining that belief flows from the volitional life.

"Preparedness to act upon what we affirm", is for him, "the sole, the genuine, the unmistakable criterion of belief." James's theory of belief is the outcome of his attempt to formulate a more comprehensive view which gives due recognition to each of the various aspects of belief which these thinkers emphasize. "The most compendious possible formula," he says, "perhaps would be that our belief and attention are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is reality; attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations force attention from us." Belief, will, and attention, then, are the same mental attitude with different names.

But in order to see why and how he reduces belief and will to attention, it is necessary to consider his conception of the Will.

According to the ideomotor theory, movement follows without hesitation or delay upon the notion of it. Nothing stands between the conception of an act and its performance; we think it, and it is done. In other words,

75. Ibid., Ch. XLI, "The Will."
consciousness is naturally impulsive, and unless there are other ideas before the mind at the same time to check the impulsive power which the idea of movement has, movement tends to occur. "Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in the voluntary life." Thus the more fundamental and simple type of voluntary action is characterized by the absence of a hiatus between the thought-process and the motor discharge. But when an idea of movement is opposed by antagonistic or inhibitory ideas it becomes necessary to neutralize their effects by an express fiat, or special act of mental consent to the movement, before movement can take place. Thus in deliberate action, a volitional mandate is necessary to a decision. Here the various ideas before the mind are related to one another in either a friendly or hostile manner. One of the ideas is that of an act. This idea, if left alone, leads to action. But the other ideas which are before the mind at the same time are not in agreement concerning the possible action. Some favor action; others oppose it. Uneasiness and unrest, known as indecision, result from this state of affairs. Deliberation continues so long as this situation remains, and the objects in question are kept before the attention; and this process may go on, at intervals, for weeks or months. The desire to relieve the tension involved may hasten the decision; or fear that the decision, once it is made, is irrevocable may delay it. Finally, however, the original idea either wins or loses in the conflict and a decision is rendered. The voluntary fiat is delivered one way or the other. The favorable and unfavorable ideas implicated in this process of deliberation are the reasons or

76. Ibid., p. 527.
77. Ibid., pp. 522-526.
motives which determine the decision.

There are four chief types of decision. When the decision is rendered on the basis of several good reasons, we have the reasonable type. A second type of decision is determined accidentally, either from without or from within. Some outer experience or inward change produces a third type in which we suddenly change from a careless to a strenuous mood, or possibly the other way. Finally there is the type of decision in which, with or without sufficient evidence, we decide the issue at stake by the "slow dead heave" of our own will. The last type of decision differs from the other three in that it involves a choice between two alternatives both of which are steadily held in view, while in the others one of the alternatives is more or less eliminated. But in the case in question there is the realization that a distinct loss is incurred by relinquishing the possibility contained in the rejected alternative. This situation is accompanied by "the feeling of effort". Effort, however, is not present in the majority of our decisions. But James regards the existence of effort as an undeniable fact of consciousness, and as an extremely important fact. Our view of this question, for James, determines such momentous issues as the existence of spiritual causality, and of predestination as opposed to free-will.

Let us consider, then, the conditions under which the feeling of volitional effort is found. In this connection, it is necessary to qualify the statement made earlier, namely, that "consciousness is in its very nature impulsive." This is true only in case it is sufficiently intense. In

78. Ibid., pp. 528-530.
79. Ibid., pp. 531-535.
80. Ibid., p. 535.
81. Ibid., p. 526, also, p. 535.
ordinary "healthiness of will", the impulsive power of various kinds of motive maintains a normal ratio. As a rule, the greatest impulsive power belongs to the ideas which represent objects of instinctive reaction, such as passion, appetite, or emotion; or those of pleasure or pain; those on which we react habitually; or, finally, those present or near in space and time. Thus remote considerations, abstract ideas, unaccustomed reasons, and motives foreign to our instinctive history possess little or no impulsive power. Effort is necessary if these are to prevail at all. The normal sphere of effort is to be found where non-instinctive motives to behavior predominate. It is effort, therefore, that complicates the situation in volition. "It does so whenever a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive and habitual kind; it does so whenever strongly impulsive tendencies are checked, or strongly obstructive conditions overcome." Thus when our lower and higher nature conflict, the better course of action follows the line of greatest resistance. The force of our propensities, in such cases, determines the amount of effort we exert. The amount of effort expended depends upon the strength of our sensual propensity; the former being increased when the latter is large, and, conversely, the former being decreased when the latter is small. In other words, the ideal impulse alone cannot overcome the force of propensity. But if effort is increased in proportion to the force of propensity, the combined strength of effort and the ideal impulse is sufficient to overpower the force of propensity and win the victory. Ideal or moral action, then, is always in "the line of greatest resistance"; that is, in the line

82. Ibid., p. 548.
83. Ibid., p. 549.
of the ideal impulse which, with the assistance of effort, proves too strong for the propensity, the line of least resistance. The decisive factor here is effort which, being proportionate to the resistance offered, does not appear to be an essential part of the ideal impulse; but appears to be adventitious and indeterminate in advance.

The impulsive power of an idea is determined by its ability to "compel attention and dominate in consciousness." This means that if an idea persists before the mind whatever motor effects belong to it are sure to occur. The same principle holds good of the inhibitive power of an idea. "What-we-attend-to and what-interests-us" are regarded as synonymous terms. The chief function of the will, then, is "to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat." Attention with effort is the essential characteristic of volition. The fact that motor consequences inevitably follow when an object is thus held before the mind is merely a matter of physiological observation. Thus to attend to an idea is the act of will; and this is the only inward volitional act we ever perform. The only resistance known to the will is that offered by an idea. "Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will;" and volition is primarily a relation between our self and our states of mind. Volition also involves the phenomenon of consent, that is, the "express consent to the reality of what is attended to." It should be remarked, before we go on to consider the bearing of this doctrine upon the question of free-will, that James's reduction of all voluntary effort to

84. Ibid., p. 559.
85. Ibid., p. 559.
86. Ibid., p. 561.
87. Ibid., p. 562.
88. Ibid., p. 568.
effort of attention seems to be a doubtful procedure. For, while the
ideomotor theory contains much truth, it is open to question whether or
not it explains all conscious action. J. P. Montague more accurately de­
scribes the matter when he asserts that a "prospective act can be at the
focus of attention without being willed and it can be willed without being
at the focus of attention."

Our concern with the question of free-will, at this point, is limited
to the bearing that the issue has upon that of freedom of belief. The
question of fact here pertains to the amount of effort or attention or
consent which we are able at any time to put forth. If the amount, dura­
tion, and intensity of effort are fixed functions of the object to which
we attend, our wills are not free, and our acts are determined in advance.
If, however, the amount of effort is indeterminate; if it is an independent
variable, subject to increase or decrease in any given case, our wills are
free, and our acts are not predetermined. That is to say, freedom is a
fact if we are free to make more or to make less of spontaneous effort at
the present moment to secure the victory of the higher motive; otherwise,
determinism prevails. Our freedom, then, consists in the effort that we
will to make at the moment. But this question cannot be decided on psycho­
logical grounds. While it appears that we are free to increase or diminish
the amount of effort in this situation, it is impossible to ascertain, be­
yond a certain point, whether more or less effort might have been given.
Theoretically, then, determinism and indeterminism occupy the same position.
Ultimately, so far as we are concerned, the question becomes a matter of

89. J. P. Montague, Belief Unbound: A Promethean Religion for the Modern
world, New Haven: Yale University Press, London: Oxford University Press,
1930, p. 54.
personal choice. We may choose one of the alternative theories, or remain sceptical concerning the problem. But either course we pursue is the result of personal choice. Thus, at bottom, either a belief in determinism or scepticism involves exactly the same kind of decision as the belief in free-will. James chooses the latter alternative for two reasons. His first reason is based upon ethical considerations which do not concern us further at this time. His other reason for choosing freedom is that if freedom is a fact, the only way to realize it is freely to choose it from among other possible beliefs. Thus the first act of freedom "should be to affirm itself;" to freely will to believe in free-will.

The conclusion that free-belief is possible brings us to consider the question as to whether or not it is possible for us to believe at will since belief is an emotional reaction of the whole man, and since our emotions are beyond our control. In a word, we cannot believe suddenly, but we may do so gradually. Our will can eventually lead us to belief; "we need only in cold blood act as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real." The truth of this assertion stands or falls with his view that belief and will constitute the same psychological phenomenon, and since our criticism of his position in this respect has been given above, it is not necessary to repeat what has already been said. Also, we shall have occasion to refer to this matter again when we come to consider his application of this doctrine specifically to religious faith. To sum up, we have seen that for James belief is the heart of all judgment, and that the essence of belief manifests itself

51. Ibid., p. 521.
52. Cf. Above, pp. 103 ff.
in choice. It is the same mental attitude as will, and both belief and will are ultimately reduced to attention. Voluntary attention may be considered as free or indeterminate. This renders possible the freedom of will, and, consequently, freedom of belief. Thus he helps to pave the way for his defense of religious belief, especially in connection with the possibility of a free will to believe.

It is obvious that other important results flow from his view of belief as a "psychic attitude towards a proposition." Clearly, belief, when so construed, cannot be regarded as merely an affair of the intellect, but of man's whole nature. We have contended throughout that the whole of our nature is involved in belief, and that "all our needs must stand or fall together, and no metaphysics which does justice to one coefficient only, and calls that reality, can stand before the presence of those who find some other need within them more urgent for the utterance." James's more "activistic" interpretation of belief does not allow us to regard it as merely an affair of objects and relations; for him, the mind is actively engaged in selecting and controlling its objects. This description of belief enables us to conceive it "as an ultimate and characteristic fact of human nature." In regarding belief as flowing from the whole nature of man, James endows it with a strength, vitality, and stability which it would not possess if the intellectual coefficient alone is made the ground of belief. This view also renders it more difficult for intellectual criticism to destroy our beliefs, especially when they have arisen out of fundamental needs of human nature. As F. C. S. Schiller points out, if our nature is not "whole",

conflicting beliefs may be produced by its discrepant parts; and when these clash, the stability, value, and validity of our beliefs are adversely affected.

James's theory of belief also lays the foundation for the recognition of, and emphasis upon, the supreme value of human personality which plays such a large part in his philosophy. F. C. S. Schiller says that the philosophers of James's day regarded him with so much suspicion partly because he "had carried respect for personality to the pitch of professing willingness to consider whether personality was not as good a clue to reality as the method of abstractions; in other words, he was willing to assign it metaphysical status and value." For James, reality is shot through with values; yet they flow from, enter the word with, and exist for, personality. As we have seen, he holds that the reality of the self is the fixed point of reference for all reality. All claimants to reality are selected or rejected on the basis of their connection with the self and its interests. That to which reality is ascribed must demonstrate that it is intimately related to our own life, and that it is superior in this respect to its rival claimants. Thus that which wins out in the struggle for reality, that which is considered true and real as opposed to error and illusion, appears to us to be truer and more real, that is, superior in value. Personality, then, is the source of all recognized values, and as such, is the one thing of supreme value. This implication of personality in value, and of values in all objects of human interest, renders a denial of the value of personality impossible without, at the same time, rejecting values altogether. And any

philosophy which attempts to deny the significance and value of personality does so at its own peril. We may not follow James all of the way concerning his view of values, but we do admit the heart of his contention. He is right in assigning supreme value to personality.

It is obvious from James's conception of belief that doubt assumes quite a different position from that which it occupies in traditional thought. Doubt and inquiry are the opposites of belief, and arise when the present state of affairs proves unsatisfactory. They bring restlessness and hesitation which are followed by an attempt to regain mental equilibrium and poise. The latter state is realized only after judgment has been rendered. Professor William McDougall puts it: "Belief, in the fullest sense of the word, must be preceded by doubt, by the questioning attitude which issues in judgment, returning the answer "Yes" or "No" to the question." This view of the matter makes doubt at once necessary, and positive in its ground and aim; it assigns logical value to doubt. Conceived in this manner, doubt may be regarded as fruitful and beneficial rather than as detrimental. It may serve as a means of strengthening our more valuable beliefs, and it may help to eliminate the dead ones. Since our doubts are disturbing factors, according to this doctrine, we can readily understand why they occupy such a large place in our intellectual life; it is because our minds are actively engaged with them in the effort to remove them. Our beliefs, on the other hand, enable us to lead a more placid existence. But it is our doubts, not our certainties, that stimulate our intellectual powers, since every judgment is conditioned by doubt.

Our beliefs must keep forearmed to meet the challenge of doubt; they must ever be ready to give an answer to every doubt that "asketh them a reason of the hope that is in them." This view of doubt is substantially the same as the method of science according to which inquiry begins with a question which is preceded by a doubt. A belief or theory which cannot satisfactorily answer the question which gives rise to the inquiry must give way to one that does. Again, we may refuse to follow James all of the way in his attempt to make a universal application of a scientific principle, but we can recognize the truth contained in his argument; we may admit that many of our beliefs do arise in this fashion, and that doubt, when positive in ground and aim, may be innocuous and beneficial rather than dangerous and detrimental. Also, we may recognize, as James was wont to emphasize, that whatever our doubts are, we are ultimately responsible for our beliefs, and that we cannot escape personal responsibility for our actions and thoughts. It is true here, as in every other realm of life, that "nothing venture nothing have."
The relation between reason and faith has been the subject of many controversies, and has occupied a large and an important place in modern Philosophy. According to F. Paulsen, the attempt to reconcile the religious view of the world with the scientific explanation of nature may be regarded as the primary motive in the entire development of Modern Philosophy. He says that modern science is the starting point and precondition of this attempt. All thought that is out of line with its fundamental idea, namely, the universal reign of law, lies outside the sphere of philosophy. The second fundamental conviction in modern philosophy is that the teaching of natural science concerning reality does not cover all that can be said about it, since there is more to reality than the physical world controlled by mechanical laws. What is not in accord with this idea is also excluded from the realm of Modern Philosophy. This twofold emphasis characterizes the trend of the two great currents in which philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moves. The truth of the modern physical view of the world is recognized by the "rationalistic-metaphysical" course of development which supplements it with a metaphysical view. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are the leading representatives of this trend of thought. The "empirical-positivistic" train of thought which is native to England, and represented by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, begins with the same presupposition, but is led, through epistemological reflection, to the conviction that the physical view is not absolute truth, "but an accidental view, a projection of reality upon our sensibility."

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Those two views converge in Kant and interpenetrate in a very strange manner. "But what is most important," says Paulsen, "from him we date the significant turning-point which aims to bring about a peace between the religious views of the world and the scientific explanation of nature by separating the religious disposition from the intellectual function and basing the former on volition."

Kant's solution of the problem consists in a delimitation of the spheres of knowledge and faith. For him, knowledge is valid in the phenomenal world, but the moral consciousness and its objects do not belong to this world, but to a transcendent or noumenal world. Man, as an active and ethical being, makes demands upon that real and intelligible world, and as moral postulates, the reality of God, immortality, and freedom are the work of faith.

With the rise of Absolute Idealism, under the influence of Hegel, feeling and conation were reduced to mere stages in the development of thought or reason. When the influence of this movement began to wane, the discussion of the relation of faith and reason was begun anew. For the most part, the renewed discussion of this question followed the two lines laid down by Kant and there arose a sharp distinction between the province of theory and that of practice. Also, there arose the distinction between "judgments-of-fact" and "judgments-of-value;" the former being allotted to science and the latter to religion and ethics. The "judgments-of-fact" were rooted in the cognitive, and "judgments-of-value" in the emotional and conative side of our nature. Nitsch's opposition to

2. Ibid., p. xiii.
rationalism led him to maintain that the religious consciousness is essentially concerned with "judgments-of value." For him, religious truths do not represent intellectual propositions, but values in the experience of him who holds them. They are apprehended and judged by faith. This distinction between scientific and religious knowledge divides the realm of knowledge into two entirely separate areas and creates a hiatus between them which cannot easily be removed. While this separation appears to be to the advantage of faith in that it gives it a sound basis, it is open to serious objections. In the first place, it exposes faith to dangers of subjectivity which Ritschl's insistence upon revelation as an objective historic fact which guaranteed the value-judgments of faith does not completely remove, since an appeal to experienced value is necessary to distinguish revealed truth from that which claims to be revealed but is not. In the second place, it creates a dualism between religious and scientific knowledge which, in certain cases, may easily result in a stalemate since religion could make an assertion on grounds of value which science could deny with equal confidence on the grounds that it conflicts with scientific principles. The question of miracles may provoke an argument of this kind. It is obvious, then, that this opposition between reason and faith cannot be accepted as a satisfactory or final solution to the problem.

James's doctrine of "fideism" or "faith-philosophy" represents the tendency which attempts to resolve this conflict by arguing that the very nature of things—the range of man's needs and the severe limitations of reason—leaves an opening for faith which is regarded as largely an affair

5. The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, James Orr, 2nd. edition, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1898, Ch. II.
of man's volitional nature. "Fideism" is one aspect of James's voluntarism, "pragmatism" is the other; and voluntarism may be regarded as a complement to his empiricism. His voluntarism arises as a result of the severe limits which he places upon theoretical knowledge which necessitates larger drafts upon unverified knowledge. As Professor R. B. Perry says, "There is, indeed, a curious paradox by which those philosophers who are most strict and narrow in their conception of knowledge are compelled to make the largest provision for faith." He goes on to say that more liberal empiricists, like James, "broaden the area of knowledge and rely less on faith, but still fall far short of those rationalists who claim to prove all things." In another connection, Professor Perry says that while James was deeply concerned with the need of belief and with the right to believe, he did not rely on faith to any great extent himself; and that he was essentially a critic of the intellect in that he doubted that much could be proved. But be that as it may, we are chiefly concerned to follow the argument by which he attempts to substantiate his "fideism" and give it a philosophical basis. His treatment of the relation between reason and faith is not systematic, but is found throughout his various writings in several different connections. We shall try to arrange his argument, from these various sources, so as to give it coherence and cogency.

He defines faith as "belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to

8. Ibid., p. 172.
act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance." This definition enables us to conceive faith as preeminently an attitude of the will, and, as such, it is intimately related to action and becomes an affair of the whole personality. It is also obvious from this definition of faith that it involves risks, and is something which calls for serious courage. And, as we have seen, for James faith is expressly concerned with values; that which has no value is not admitted to belief. It is of the essence of belief to affirm the reality of the objects which are regarded as possessing value. In short, it is belief that says what facts exist. "Strictly and technically", on the other hand, "reason is a faculty, not of facts, but of principles and relations. Out of her own resources she cannot say what facts exist; but if one fact be given her, she can infer another fact; and she is supposed to be able, by certain principles that she possesses, to lay down in advance what relations facts must stand in to each other; that causes, for example, must precede, not follow, their effects, and the like."

Thus faith, and not reason, deals with questions of facts. It is important to bear this distinction in mind throughout our discussion of the relation between reason and faith.

It is possible to distinguish several different steps in his argument in defense of religious faith. The first step consists in showing that faith is necessary because of the incapacity of reason to render a rational view of the world due to the intractability of data. This argument is developed at length in the essay entitled "The Sentiment of Nationality"

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in which he sets forth the "motives for philosophizing". He says that when we achieve a rational view of the scheme of things we have a "strong feeling of ease, peace and rest". The feeling of rationality is characterized by the absence of any "feeling of irrationality". So long as our thought flows with fluency and freedom of movement we are not conscious of this feeling. But as soon as something occurs which disturbs this facile movement of thought we become aware of extreme discomfort and distress. This is immediately followed by an attempt to restore the lost equilibrium of the mind so as to enable our mental function to proceed without impediment. Although we are not conscious of this feeling of "self-sufficiency", so long as we have it, we seek to regain it as soon as we lose it. "This feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness,—this absence of all need to explain it, account for it, or justify it,—is what I call the Sentiment of Rationality. As soon, in short, as we are enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect fluency, the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rational."

We may obtain the sentiment of rationality in several ways. First, there is the theoretic way. But two requirements must be met before we can achieve this fluency of thought theoretically, namely, those of unity and clarity. The former demands that the manifoldness of the world be reduced to simplicity. It greatly facilitates the movement of thought to be able to conceive the relation of the earth to the moon and to the apple to be identical; or, as J. S. Mill says, to see that a ship "floats by the same laws of specific gravity and equilibrium, as a tree uprooted by the

12. Ibid., pp. 65-110.
13. Ibid., p. 63.
14. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
15. Ibid., p. 64.
wind and blown into the water." The latter demands knowledge of the unique and particular rather than comprehension of the whole. Thus the intellect fashions theories according to its innate taste for unity and clarity, and our philosophic attitude is determined by the compromise we are able to make between them. While the data presumably lend themselves to either emphasis, it is perilous to emphasize one to the exclusion of the other. Any philosophy, then, that does justice to both of these demands must avoid the "abstract monotony" of a Spinoza, and the "concrete heterogeneity" of a Hume, and must reach some sort of compromise between these two extremes. Now in order successfully to make this adjustment it is necessary to classify things into extensive "kinds"; and their relations into extensive "laws". But this procedure operates from a limited point of view and necessarily results in abstraction. It does not catch in its net the concrete living fact. That is to say, theoretic philosophy cannot get hold of the real essence of things; there is always more than it is able to grasp. "After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the various "points of view" which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other." This deficiency accounts for the unsatisfactoriness of all our speculations. "On the one hand, so far as they retain any multiplicity in their terms, they fail to get us out of the empirical sand-heap world; on the other, so far as they eliminate multiplicity

17. .., B., pp. 66-67.
18. Ibid., p. 67.
the practical man despises their empty barrenness." Most that can be said for theoretical philosophy, then, is that it is a very unsatisfactory and inadequate substitute for the fullness of the truth. But this does not end the matter. For if it were possible to attain the goal of simplicity so that by the use of our universal concept we are able to render the concrete chaos rational, and to conceive the world simply, our progress is only apparent, not real nor final. We would still have to answer the ultimate question of "why?" which the notion of non-entity raises. Thus the "bottom of being is left logically opaque to us, as something which we simply come upon and find, and about which (if we wish to act) we should pause and wonder as little as possible." In the last analysis, then, we are unable to attain a rational theoretical world conception. Having come to this impasse in the theoretical realm, we must seek the solution of our difficulty by seeking a conception of the universe that will stir us to action and thereby divert the stream of theoretical contemplation into the sphere of the practical, and thus restore the freedom of the movement of thought which has been blocked at this juncture. For this fluency of thought is the one mark of rationality.

It is conceivable that more than one conception of the world may equally satisfy our theoretical demands. In this case, however, our aesthetic and practical nature will favor the view which satisfies its demands as being the most rational of the possible views which we may take concerning the world. Practical rationality imposes a two-fold test upon

20. Ibid., p. 68.
22. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
any philosophic conception. First, it must "in a general way, at least, banish uncertainty from the future." Any system which leaves a question mark hanging over the future causes mental uneasiness or distress; upsets the stability of our outlook and robs us of the ease, peace, and rest necessary to the feeling of rationality. Thus it fails to satisfy us.

The wide-spread influence of the philosophy which explains things per substantia is due to the fact that it satisfies the demands of expectancy.

The second test which a philosophy must meet in order to succeed on a universal scale is that it must define the future "congruously with our spontaneous powers." It must not contradict our active propensities and it must give them an object to press against. A pessimistic philosophy fails to feed our desires and tendencies; materialism refuses to recognize them. Either defect is fatal to a philosophy.

James places practical, and theoretical, rationality upon the same footing in that the latter is just as subjective as the former. Philosophy and empirical science have arisen from man's indomitable desire to fashion the world according to a rational pattern. So far the world has yielded to man's desires and needs, and the extent of his success in this respect in the future can be determined only by further trial. But he has the same right to try conceptions of moral, as of mechanical and logical, rationality. There is as much justification for rejecting a conception of the world which violates his moral nature as there is for refusing to entertain one which is incompatible with some aspect of theoretical rationality. Since both yield subjective satisfaction only,
they should be given the same consideration; for the demands of one are just as authoritative as those of the other. And both are equally necessary in attaining a rational view of the world.

While continuing the same general argument, we have reached what may be regarded as a second step in his defense of religious faith, that is, the attempt to assign intellect a subordinate position in the economy of the organism and the assertion of the primacy of our active nature. The intellect is essentially practical, and is but a servant, and subjective expression, of the will. "From the first dawn to its highest actual attainment, we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist at all, appears but as one element in an organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher mental powers,—the powers of will." The subordination of intellect to will flows from the doctrine of reflex action according to which thought occurs in the mid-section of the reflex arc and is only a place of transit. Action, stimulated from without, is moving back to the periphery. It tarries at the centre for counsel, but not for long, it must soon issue in reaction upon the outer world. In case the process stops at the mid-section of the reflex arc, or at the thinking stage, and fails to lead to action, it would fail of its essential function. "The current of life which runs in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips." Thus both perception and thought exist for the sake of action. It follows from this doctrine that the active nature asserts its rights over cognition; the latter is a guide to appropriate

26. Ibid., p. 147.
action, and must always issue in action. How the important thing in the life of the organism is properly to relate itself to its environment. Just as the mind vetoes any view of the world that seems irrational to it, the practical side of our nature refuses to accept any conception which does not enable it properly to relate itself to the world. That is to say, the volitional activities must be given full opportunity to operate. For the results of their operation is the ultimate test of theoretic rationality. This is what is meant by the pragmatic method according to which an idea is tested by its practical consequences. It is what James means when he says that if the hypothesis of God "works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true." This being true, the important thing to know, when an object presents itself to consciousness, is what to do about it. As soon as we know how to behave toward a thing we are acquainted with it; until then it is strange to us. The theoretical inquiry, "what is it?" is a much less important consideration in this case. Insofar as any philosophy demands that our response be of a specific sort it acknowledges that we know the nature of the universe, for we ask the same question when the "cosmos in its totality" confronts consciousness. We have to react upon it one way or another. And "it is more than probable that to the end of time our power of moral and volitional response to the nature of things will be the deepest organ of communication there-with we shall ever possess."

Man has an ineradicable impulse to take life strivingly. The words to which humanity in every age readily responds are, "Son of man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak unto thee." The periods in which the

[Footnotes]
30. *Id.*., p. 249.
32. *Id.*., p. 88.
The greatest expansion of the human mind has occurred have been those when man's active nature has been released by the confident assertion that "The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers which you possess." When men are assured that their dormant powers can be quickened and exercised in the achievement of some great task their despair gives way to hope and faith; something better is envisaged, and a renewed humanity sets to work to make it a reality. In short, the appeal to man's use of his powers meets with such a ready response because it touches the element of his active nature of utmost importance—the element of faith. "Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him." "We cannot live or think at all without some degree of faith."

The quotation with which we closed the preceding paragraph leads us to what we may distinguish as another step in the development of James's argument for religious faith, namely, that faith is necessary to all thought. In other words, all knowledge presupposes faith. Scientific philosophers of his day confined the use of faith to one particular proposition, that of the uniformity of nature. But their limitation of its use in this manner is quite an arbitrary procedure. They had to make this single exception in the interests of cognition. Similarly, faith in a religious dogma, for which we have no outward proof, is postulated for our emotional and volitional interests. James maintains that the scientist and philosopher can no more get along without faith than the man of religion; for our opinions, whether religious or philosophical, involve the whole man and are not the product of intellect alone. "It is almost incredible," he says, "that men

33. Ibid., p. 86.
34. Ibid., p. 88; p. 95.
who are themselves working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy
can be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal prefer-
ence, belief, or divination. . . . The coil is about us, struggle as we may,
The only escape from faith is mental nullity."

This also follows from the doctrine of reflex action. If the process
which has been set in motion from stimulation from without tarries too long
at the mid-section of the reflex arc, as has been pointed out, the occasion
passes and the opportunity is lost. The action moves on to completion be-
fore deliberation at the centre has sufficiently weighed the matter so as to
arrive at a certain conclusion. It is thus a law of life that we act more
or less ignorantly. The purpose of the intellect, as we have seen, is to
facilitate and promote action, not to paralyze it. It becomes necessary,
then, to act without sufficient evidence if intellectual scrupulosity is
not to paralyze action and impair the function of the intellect itself.
Some measure of "vital heat", so to speak, is necessary if we are to be-
lieve at all. Thus there is no avoiding the fact that some measure of
faith is necessary to render thought possible. Faith is the same thing
as a working hypothesis. The only difference is that some hypotheses can
be verified or refuted almost immediately while others may require years or
even generations for verification. In the latter case we act as if our
hypothesis were true and we expect the results to disappoint us if it is
false. The longer verification is postponed the more we are inclined to
accept our hypothesis as true. Religious questions are no exception to
this principle. While we may doubt our religious creed we may yet be of
the persuasion that we have sufficient ground for acting as if it were true,
and verification may be indefinitely delayed.

35. Ibid., p. 63.
36. Ibid., p. 63.
37. Ibid., p. 59.
We now advance to another step in his argument which consists of an attempt to show that action cannot always wait upon evidence. There are cases in which the nature of the hypothesis is such that action cannot be delayed without incurring serious loss. As a rule, it may be possible to wait for verification, but in the type of hypothesis in question immediate decision is necessary; it is so important that we must act now. It is true that action upon an hypothesis which has not been verified involves a risk due to the fact that the justification of our faith in it, in the absence of verification, is to be found in the results consequent upon action. In respect of religious faith, however, while it incurs the risk that it may prove to be false, there is nothing to lose and everything to gain. It envisages something better, and if it is not realized we are no worse off than we would have been without our exercise of faith. When we make the religious hypothesis, then, we do so in the attitude of mind expressed as follows: "I expect then to triumph with tenfold glory; but if it should turn out, as indeed it may, that I have spent my days in a fool's paradise, why, better have been the dupe of such a dreamland than the cunning reader of a world like that which then beyond all doubt unmask'd itself to view."

We shall reserve further discussion of this type of hypothesis for the following chapter in which we shall set forth his doctrine of the "will to believe", which attempts to show when it is proper for the will to influence belief. At present we are chiefly concerned to ascertain the limits he places upon reason which renders some measure of faith necessary, whereas the doctrine of the "will to believe," sets the limits to faith.

By way of summary, we may say that James's "fideism", as we have followed it thus far, has two aspects: that which goes beyond all of the possible facts, and comes to the aid of a necessary agnosticist, and that
which supplements an "accidental ignorance." The former aspect arises out of James's empiricism. As Professor R. B. Perry puts it, "It is a part of James's empiricism to hold that after the intellect has done all that it can the world remains a brute fact—baffling to reason. But if reason cannot be satisfied, it can at least be silenced—by the representation of a world which satisfies the will." The latter aspect, flows from the nature of man himself. He is made for action. He cannot always wait upon the verdict of intellect, but must act without sufficient evidence.

There is another set of considerations in James's treatment of the relation between reason and faith which, while presupposing the principles we have set forth above, deals more directly with the nature of reason, faith, and religious experience. We shall consider his treatment of the nature of reason and faith first. It is obvious, from the definition of reason and faith which we gave at the beginning of our discussion, that reason, which is a faculty of inference, cannot afford a solid basis for religious conclusions because the religious question is entirely a question of facts. In other words, if there be a God, reason may take either a pantheistic or a theistic view of things, but it cannot answer the question "Does God exist?". His reason for this opinion is based upon the fact that men who follow reason arrive at quite different conclusions concerning the world. For example, he says that Santayana is led by reason into atheism, while Royce, following the lead of reason, concludes that God's existence is assured. When pantheism, theism, and atheism can alike appeal to reason for support, we are justified in

rejecting it as a means of attaining truth in such matters.

In fact, "Faith uses a logic altogether different from Reason's logic." Reason is satisfied with nothing less than certainty and finality for her conclusions. Faith must rest content with probability and practical wisdom; "we act on the most probable hypothesis, trusting that the event may prove us wise." Faith argues from what ought to be to what is. The form of the argument of faith runs as follows:

(1) "There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing self-contradictory;
(2) It must have been true under certain conditions;
(3) It is fit to be true;
(4) It ought to be true;
(5) It must be true;
(6) It shall be true, at any rate for me."

This argument presents no intellectual chain like the sorites of the logic-book. "Yet it is a slope of good-will on which in the larger questions of life men habitually live." We express probability in mathematics by a fraction, but we can seldom live fractionally. When once we choose the more probable alternative, we treat the lesser probabilities as non-existent. Now, to demand, as is often done in the name of reason, that we wait until the evidence is all in is equivalent to "forbidding us to live."

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41. Ibid., p. 198.
43. Ibid., p. 224.
44. Ibid., p. 224.
45. Journal of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 199; Cf. pp. 198-199; Also, Some Problems Of Philosophy, pp. 227-238.
Further, if reason is accepted as the final arbiter in religious questions and if it makes its inferences from the ordinary physical and moral facts of the world, without reference to the facts of religious experience, its conclusions are more likely to be irreligious than they are to be religious. 

"Some will see in moral facts a power that makes for righteousness, and in physical facts a power that geometrizes and is intellectual, that creates order and loves beauty. But alongside of all such facts there are contrary facts in abundance; and he who seeks can equally well infer a power that defies righteousness, creates disorder, loves ugliness, and aims at death." It is not enough merely to use the facts of religious experience, such as conversions, mystical insights, or providential guidance, as a means of confirming our religion, while we attempt to establish it from common natural facts. If reason tries to be impartial and undertakes to weigh all of the evidence so as to determine which class of facts tip the balance, it must decide against the religious view unless we give it more specific religious experiences to go by; "for the last word everywhere, according to purely naturalistic science, is the word of Death, the death-sentence passed by nature on plant and beast, and man and tribe, and earth and sun, and everything that she has made." But the facts which religious experience offers enable reason to see another possibility concerning things and this leaves an opening for faith. James describes these facts of religious experience as "experiences of an unexpected life succeeding upon death." It is the death of self-sufficiency, the bankruptcy of all naturalistic standards of virtue, the end of self-righteousness. This death is the open door to the universe's deeper reaches; and

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47. Ibid., p. 199.
48. Ibid., p. 200.
the only door. It is the only way that man can release the springs of his inner life. It is the finding of life in death, hope midst despair, power in resignation. "There are resources in us that naturalism, with its literal virtues, never recks of, possibilities that take our breath away, and show a world wider than either physics or philistine ethics can imagine. Here is a world in which all is well, in spite of certain forms of death, indeed because of certain forms of death, death of hope, death of strength, death of responsibility, of fear and worry, death of everything that paganism, naturalism, and legalism put their trust in." Such experiences as these escape reason, even when she deals with our psychological experiences, for the simple reason that they are discontinuous with natural experience. But these experiences come to us and have their transforming effects in our lives, and, therefore, cannot be excluded from our view of the scheme of things. They suggest that reason deals with only a fragment of reality and for this reason we are forced to regard its conclusions as inadequate; for no religious philosophy is complete which fails to consider and properly interpret these facts. The fact that these experiences are not amenable to intellectual processes arises from the nature of religious experience.

For the most part, James's treatment of religious experience reduces religion to the working of non-rational feelings and subconscious impulses. Religion is essentially a matter of individual experience; and concerns itself with one's personal destiny. As such, it is based upon unsharable feeling. "Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the

49. Ibid., p. 200.
world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. Compared with this world of living individualized feelings, the world of generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is without solidity or life. As in stereoscopic or kinetoscopic pictures seen outside the instrument, the third dimension, the movement, the vital element, are not there. We get a beautiful picture of an express train supposed to be moving, but where in the picture... is the energy or the fifty miles an hour? If we connect with this his doctrine that the "here" with which we feel ourselves to be related in religious experience is on its "hither" side the subconscious extension of our conscious life, it is not difficult to see why James regarded these facts of religious experience as being beyond the reach of intellectual processes. Here, instead of invoking his oft repeated charge against the intellect: "Ever not quite", he concludes in "sad sincerity" that reason's attempt to demonstrate the truth of religious experience is "absolutely hopeless". It is important to note, at this point, that his examination of the "motives for philosophizing" presupposes a coordinated will and intellect, but before he has proceeded very far the old dualism breaks out between demonstrable knowledge and undemonstrable conviction, and he finally decides that since religious experience is essentially a matter of unshareable feeling reason is powerless to grasp and demonstrate its truth. In other words, thus far, he has not entirely succeeded in resolving the conflict between faith and reason.

We are now in position to sum up the results which flow from James's treatment of this subject, as we have followed it, and to estimate their

52. Ibid., p. 512.
53. W. B., Pref., p. viii.
54. Ibid., p. 455.
importance for religious philosophy. Perhaps the most novel, and cer-
tainly the most far-reaching principle which James brings to light in this
connection relates to the function of faith; he insists that it is in-
volved in all cognitive states. When he asserts that all knowledge pre-
supposes faith he lifts the principle that will influences belief from that
narrow theological circle to which it had long been confined and makes of
it a general principle. He brings it forth buttressed by psychological
and epistemological considerations, on purely philosophic grounds, and
uses it to wage a vigorous campaign against an extreme rationalism. Pro-
fessor J. B. Pratt, in commenting upon the book in which this doctrine is
enunciated by James, writes as follows: "The merit of Professor James's
brilliant book lay not so much in its originality, as in its giving this
century-old doctrine a broader philosophical setting and foundation, by show­
ing that not only religious belief but nearly all belief is in part a matter of will." It is obvious that this doctrine has important consequences.

In the first place, it makes faith a more elementary activity than knowledge.
When the mind sets out in quest of knowledge it does so in faith, simply be­
cause reason seeks to fashion the world according to its bent for clarity
and unity, while actual knowledge is partial, and every step of advance made
by knowledge points beyond itself. Science advances by trust in hypotheses
which involves faith that goes beyond the data of immediate experience. If
this were not true, the scientist would not labor so arduously for verifica­
tion. Faith is essential to every theoretical attempt to explain the
facts of nature; there must be faith that the mind can discover unity and
clarity in reality, and faith that reality can be simplified and clarified.
Such faith is elementary in any philosophic construction of the universe,

for, as G. Galloway puts it, "the ultimate synthesis by which reason
seeks to conceive mind and nature as elements in a unity or organic
whole is at the best a hypothesis, which is never verified in such de-
tail as to give it logical cogency. Philosophy has to begin with pre-
suppositions, but its ideal is to return on its presuppositions and take
them up into its fully articulated system; and, needless to say, this it
never accomplishes." Thus a postulate is an assumption which experience
suggests to the actively inquiring mind, but which is not, and, from the
very nature of the case, cannot be proved until after faith has already
done its work. In other words, knowledge is always partial and faith is
operative behind the activity of reason.

In the second place, this principle assigns to faith a wider scope
than that of reason. Faith is operative not only before reason begins,
but also after reason ends. Knowledge not only springs from an element-
ary faith, but it is completed by faith, for the ultimate synthesis which
reason seeks but fails to find is achieved by an act of faith. It is
through faith as well as through reason that man arrives at a conception
of the world in which human life and experience are assigned a satisfying
meaning and significance. Thus religious faith is the perfection of
knowledge. "The ultimate object of all philosophy," writes F. Paulsen,
"is to bring a meaning into things, or rather reveal the meaning which
underlies all things. In the last analysis, however, this meaning is not
a matter of knowledge, but of volition and faith. What the philosopher
himself accepts as the highest good and final goal he projects into the
world as its good and goal, and then believes that subsequent reflections

In a word, knowledge begins in faith and ends in faith. This fact, according to G. Galloway, arises out of the nature of faith as compared to that of reason. Reason seeks to organize the data of experience into a systematic whole, but in so doing it is governed by the principle of continuity; consequently, there must be no break in the series of implications which thought pursues in the form of reference. Thus it cannot pass from what is given to a transcendent ground beyond without losing its specific character as reason. But faith is not primarily intellectual and is not concerned with theoretical explanation. Its primary aim is to seek the satisfaction of the inner nature which includes the effective and conative life of the soul. It, therefore, refers to a transcendent object by means of which our subjective needs are satisfied. But faith does not apprehend this object by the method of theoretical knowing, and the certainty which attaches to faith is rooted in religious experience, and not in logical deduction. Reason can execute no salto mortale; "If it goes beyond the outward appearance of objects, it does so by seeing more deeply into them and explicating the unity which underlies them. It makes progress by bringing refractory elements within a totality or organized whole, and by so doing it establishes continuity within that whole. Now if reason could apply this ideal of system to the universe and work it out successfully, it is obvious that the ultimate Ground of the universe could not be God as transcendent. The kind of God that would be reached by this method could only be the unity of the whole, the absolute system itself. . .if we recognize that reason is al-

ways an unfinished process; if knowledge is always confronted by a non-58
rational; if the conception developed by thought of a final synthesis re-
mains an unrealized ideal; then the place of faith in life is amply justi-
fied. For postulates are necessary by which to organize the ethical and
spiritual values and to secure the fulfillment of the personal life."

It is obvious that a third consequence of this doctrine is to annul
the objection which science and philosophy lift against faith as an atti-
tude of mind to the object, since faith permeates the attitude of both the
scientist and philosopher. That is to say, we have no organized body of
knowledge by which we may either supersede or discredit faith. Our systems
of knowledge are, at the best, partial and incomplete, and there is always a
residuary element of "brute fact", in each one. They cannot fully grasp
the totality of the reality with which they deal, and so cannot be regarded
as final tests of the validity of the postulates of faith. It is this
truth J. Ward is emphasizing when he says,"Faith contradicts nothing that
science is in a position to affirm, and asserts nothing that science is in
a position to deny. Science cannot disclaim it as error, nor can it ap-
peal to science as truth." For when we follow James's principle to its
logical conclusion, we find that faith is an essential element in reason,
rather than an adversary of, or a substitute for it, and, as such, renders
reason less capable of systematically contesting its validity since an
element of faith is essential to the validity of reason. "In science,"
writes F. R. Tennant, "there is much logical connectedness of propositions;
but there are fundamental propositions involved from bottom to top, which
are themselves not formally certified but only pragmatically 'verified',

59. J. Ward, The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism, Cambridge: The
University Press, 1911, p. 417.
and whose 'verification' circularly involves the propositions in question. In other words, there is no antithesis, no hard line to be drawn, between knowledge—or what passes for 'knowledge' most worth having—and belief; the 'knowledge', with which belief was wont to be contrasted, does not exist. Nothing logical constitutes the 'probability' of science's presuppositions; it is constituted simply by faith, of which belief is actually an outcome." In view of this situation, it is simply gratuitous for the champions of reason to object to this exercise of faith from which belief comes.

This leads us to a fourth consideration which follows from the discovery that faith is intrinsic to the foundations of all knowledge, which is the fact that science and theology are assigned the same epistemological status. If religious faith is essentially the same in nature as the faith which is involved in all knowledge, science and theology are on an equal footing; "both are substantiations of the hoped for and the unseen; the electron and God are equally ideal positings of faith-venture, rationally indemonstrable, invisible; and the 'verifications' of the one idea, and of the other, follow lines essentially identical, accidentally diverse." The faith of science serves to make life rational and the faith of religion helps to make life moral, in the highest sense of the word, by the conviction that the ideals of our moral life are in keeping with the nature of ultimate reality, and that there is a "power that makes for righteousness in the world."

61. Tennant, Ibid., p. 303.
The scientific postulate is necessary in order to satisfy man's rational nature, and the religious postulate is equally necessary to satisfy our highest moral needs. And as J. Royce argues, if one gives up one faith, one ought to give up the other too. That is, if one abandons the fundamental postulate of religion, that goodness is at the heart of things, one ought also to give up the postulate of science which expresses for our thought the demand that nature shall answer to our highest intellectual needs for clarity and unity. For if both are leavened with faith, it seems arbitrary to give up the former while retaining the latter. But, as Royce says, "to do both is to lack the courage of rational and of moral life."

It is obvious, then, that if, to use the words of... J. Balfour, "science and theology are so far on an equality that every proposition which considerations like these oblige us to assert about the one, we are bound to assert also about the other; and that our general theory of knowledge must take account of the fact that both these great departments of it are infected by the same weakness," science has no right to object to theology because it relies upon faith, and theology need not take this objection seriously, inasmuch as it is unwarranted.

The assertion that both science and theology, and the sciences of valuation, are on the same plane in this respect, should not, however, be taken to mean that either acts in blind faith. It is faith, to be sure, but not blind faith. In the case of science, the rationality of the world is courageously assumed, not only because the assumption is well worth the risk, but also because scientific progress supports it. In the case of religion,
the assumption that goodness is at the heart of things is prompted by the
same spirit and by a similar consideration; and in neither case is it a
matter of sheer necessity. Cairns writes in this connection as follows:
"Is there not something of fundamental faith in God in that strange preju
dice in favor of order in nature, on which as we have seen all progress in
science today, as always, depends? From this point of view we see that
it is far more than a mere postulate, a "supposition" such as Naturalism is
compelled to suppose it to be. It is a kind of intuitive faith that what­
ever she may seem to be, Nature is really friendly to man and therefore
orderly in all her ways." He then lifts the question: "Does not the very
existence of science show that there is a deep kinship between the vast sys­
tem of Nature and the eager exploring human mind, such as the larger spir­
ital view of Nature maintains on other grounds to be the manifest truth?"
Science is not satisfied to accept the rationality of the world as purely
accidental, and the theistic interpretation of the world is but the effort
to carry to completion and more fully to explain, this implicit belief of
science. As Professor A. N. Whitehead puts it: "The order of the world is
no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some
measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: That
the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the
world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of
life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound together--
not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a

64. E. S. Cairns, The Riddle of the World, New York: Round Table Press,
inc., 1938, p. 151.
65. Ibid., p. 152.
creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God." Thus it is a mistake to regard James's doctrine that all knowledge involves faith as a revolt against logic, and as a defense of irrationalism. Its main object was to shake the complacency of those who plainly saw no logical difficulty in the assumption that man's proper attitude to the "Universe" is that of a "disinterested spectator"; and to show that while both the scientific and religious hypothesis do not depend upon blind faith, all knowledge is permeated by faith, and because of this fact science has neither the right nor the authority to challenge the fundamental assumptions of religion, on the ground that they proceed from faith. A word of caution should be spoken here, however, for in the final analysis, it is not possible entirely to differentiate between scientific and religious truth. That is to say, that which is true in science cannot be false in religion, and conversely, that which religion holds to be true cannot be regarded as false in science. While it is true that they deal with different aspects of reality, science with the quantitative and religion with the qualitative, aspect, reality is not split up by any such sharp lines of distinction, nor divided into water-tight compartments. If religious faith be, as we have said, the more detailed explanation of the faith of science, we cannot allow any such gap between them. We must regard both as leading us ultimately to the same reality by different routes, faith carrying us farther than reason. This being true, Professor Whitehead is right in asserting that "you cannot shelter theology from science, or science from theology; nor can you shelter either of them from metaphysics.

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or metaphysics from either of them. There is no short cut to truth."

But James's doctrine does serve to render science more modest in her claims, and enables religion to proceed with greater confidence. But it should not be taken to mean that religious belief is no longer subject to dispassionate criticism, or that religion is entitled to ignore such criticism. Religion must always proceed with caution for, to quote Professor Whitehead again, "its authority is endangered by the intensity of the emotions which it generates. Such emotions are evidence of some vivid experience; but they are a very poor guarantee for its correct interpretation."

It is well, at this juncture, to point out the respects in which science and faith resemble and those in which they differ. They resemble in that both take the form of hypothesis; their respective demands upon the universe are in the nature of postulates. Both use the experimental method; science says "we must try this thing out in the laboratory," and religion says "we must live this thing out in the world." Finally, both seek confirmation or verification by establishing coherent relations with the whole of our experience. As to the respects in which faith differs from science, the former does not deal exclusively with sense objects; it is not amenable to mathematical formulation; and does not concern itself with empirical causes, as is the case with science. Hence, faith is incapable of the type of verification which characterizes science. The latter predicts and controls sense experience and its hypotheses lead to the particulars to which they refer, as pragmatism maintains. "The religious hypothesis is essentially an unverifiable hypothesis," in the

67. Cf. cit., p. 79.
68. Cf. cit., p. 83.
strictly empirical sense. The religious hypothesis can, however, be verified, in some measure at least, in the total experience of life when it shows itself to be adequate to interpret all facts and values. Another important difference between faith and scientific knowledge is the one which G. Galloway makes, and which we have already referred to above: that while scientific knowledge is governed by the principle of continuity and, consequently, is not able to execute a salto mortale in its processes; faith is not limited in any such manner and it is of the essence of religious faith to refer to a transcendent object. Although the object of faith is not reached by a process of theoretical knowing, it is none the less held to be real and valid, and just as much so as a verified truth in the sphere of knowledge. Apart from these differences, then, James is justified in regarding the scientific and religious hypotheses as essentially the same in nature, and in elevating religion to the same epistemological status as that held by science, in view of the fact that faith is common to both of them.

Another important contribution which James makes to religious philosophy in his treatment of faith and reason arises from the role which he assigns faith in the making of human history. Like the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he conceives faith as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen", and his gallery of the "heroes of faith" covers large vistas of time, and includes the great

71. Heb., 11:3.
periods of history in which men have responded to the good news that the
innmost nature of reality is congenial to the powers which men possesses.
Thus he accounts for the rapid and steady growth of primitive Christian-
ity; for the success of the Protestant Reformation; for the great evangel-
istic waves which have swept over Europe and America; and for the immortal-
ity of influence of such leaders of thought as Kant, Fichte, Schopen, and
Schiller—all such movements have succeeded on so vast a scale because
they have awakened the dormant powers of men by an appeal to faith.

Through faith man faces the future hopefully and resolutely. History is
interpreted in the light of the ideal of the future. This view of the fu-
ture determines the significance of past events and through these points of
history he plots the curve which describes the past as contiguous with that
which lies ahead. This motive to change historical values enables him to
conceive events which were once of major importance as of little signifi-
cance, while events which occurred without contemporary notice eventually
come to be regarded as epoch-making. According to James, it is faith, not
knowledge that enables history thus to move forward. Whatever man's
growth in knowledge may be, his growth in wisdom is certainly not a mere
record of logical analysis. For the great changes which take place in the
belief of mankind, the epochs in the intellectual history of the race, are
seldom brought about by mere arguments, but, rather, as A. K. Rogers thinks,
by "the half-unconscious ripening of experience, the transforming, and suf-
fusing with new meaning, of the old facts, brought about by processes lying
back of anything we can put, at the time, in syllogistic form." That it

73. A. K. Rogers, "Rationality and Belief", Philosophical Review, Vol. XIII,
No. 1, Jan., 1904, p. 44.
is by faith rather than by knowledge by which the human race advances is strikingly brought out by F. Paulsen in the following statement: "But science did not put you there; your own loves and hates, your desires and aversions, put you there: not your understanding, but your will. You cannot prove the truth of your view to one who does not share your loves and your hates, your hopes and your ideals. All you can do is to appeal to the future; but the peculiarity about the future is that it is open to faith, not to knowledge. Perhaps five hundred years from now, when the new order of things will have arrived, everybody will recognize the true importance of the beginnings of the great revolution. We all appreciate the historical significance of the beginnings of Christianity now, and even the reluctant are forced to confess the importance of our Christian era. But if some one had told a Greek philosopher or a Roman historian, eighteen hundred years ago, that all the European nations would date their era from the birth of a poor little boy, occurring several decades ago in the land of the Jews, he would most likely have questioned the prophet's 74 sanity." This principle is of vital importance to religion in the world of today, in a world in which the liberties and powers of men are being suppressed, and servile obedience to totalitarian governments is commanded in some of our leading nations. It may be that these people will again turn hopefully to religion for the assurance that they are more than mere cogs in a brutal machine and a pitiless world, and that they are capable of rising and moving forward towards a newer and nobler destiny than that which seems to await them in their present environment. Since the appeal of faith has usually met with greatest response midst such conditions as these, there is still hope that the renewal of its challenge will come

74. F. Paulsen, op. cit., p. 319.
before it is too late. Few men have seen more clearly than James that if
man is to advance rather than retrogress, he must have something towards
which to move and something to enable him to go forward. For him, faith
does both; it sets the goal and furnishes the motive.

We have now to consider James's treatment of reason as incapable of
getting at the truth of religion. It is a mistake to separate feeling
and knowing; for to do this, if it were really possible, would ultimately
mean the extinction of both. As C. Dawes Hicks argues, "the mind of an
intelligent being cannot be split up into separate and air-tight compart­
ments; there is within it no feeling that is not more or less rational­
ized feeling, no volition that is not more or less rationalized volition;
nor is there, on the other hand, any thought that is not suffused with
feeling, and which does not lead to volition. The mind of man is essen­
tially a unity in which these various factors necessarily imply each
other. They are, that is to say, correlative ways in which the one cen­
tral unity expresses itself." It is probably true, as G. Galloway points
out, that feeling lies nearer to the centre or essence of the religious
consciousness than thought; but to relegate thought to a purely secondary
position appears to be without warrant and impracticable. The fact that
some measure of intellection characterizes those levels of physical ex­
perience which give rise to religion serves to indicate that thought is an
essential element in the religious consciousness throughout. Further, it
does not follow, as James seems to think, that because reason is a faculty
of inference and deals with abstract or general notions, it is thereby es­
entially disqualified for the function of getting hold of the concrete

75. C. Dawes Hicks, The Philosophical Basis of Theism, London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937, p. 130.

lan and Co., Ltd., 1907, p. 132.
living realities of religious experience. The concepts of reason may be used here, as elsewhere, as a means of determining the nature of things which are extremely concrete; and a notion or concept, while itself abstract, can reveal to us something of the nature of living realities. For example, the word "blue" is used to signify blue, although the word itself is not blue. To quote again from G. Dawes Hicks, "Reason is not only the facility of distinguishing and discriminating; it is the facility likewise of apprehending the real world widely and steadily and connectedly . . . Abstraction is undoubtedly one feature, and a very important feature, of the activity of thought, but its importance consists largely in this, that it renders possible modes of insight and discernment that would be unattainable without it." Still more, while we may agree with James that faith occupies a large place in the progress of the human race, we do not believe that it acts alone. Reason also plays an important part in the advancement of humanity. It controls, directs, criticizes and corrects the insights and energies which flow from faith; and in the development of religion, it is thought, not feeling, that generally works for change and advance. For as Principal T. Hywel Hughes points out, "the element of feeling which seems to be basal in the religious consciousness is the most conservative of all the psychic elements." It is thought, not feeling, that endeavors to break the bonds of tradition, and to throw off the shackles of custom; it has to do this often, perhaps most of the time, in spite of the conservatism of feeling. "The doom of thought is restless enterprise. And it is in religion as it is elsewhere: when thinking be-

comes conscious or reflective, it works for movement." Finally, we cannot acquiesce in James's opinion that reason, if left alone with the natural facts of the world, is more likely to arrive at conclusions which are irreligious than it is to reach conclusions which are favorable to religion. The place which natural religion has occupied in religious history and thought does not seem to warrant this sceptical attitude towards reason as a factor in religion. Plainly, if reason is as incapable of affording support for religious conclusions as James maintains it is, Professor Whitehead could not assert as confidently as he does that "the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism". While reason does not demonstrate God, it seems, as we shall see more in detail later, to point in that direction sufficiently strongly to make it a more reasonable procedure to complete the leadings of reason by faith than to stop or take the opposite direction; it is not necessary to increase one's intellectual scepticism in order to strengthen one's argument as a moral believer. We have no more right to reject the results of reason in the realm of religion because they are not infallible or uniform than we have in the field of science, and there are good grounds for supposing that reason is valid in both fields of thought so far as it is able to carry us; that it cannot carry us all the way we have frankly admitted.

It is impossible, also, to subordinate the intellect to the will as James's voluntaristic psychology tries to do. While we recognize the elements of value in his pragmatic contention as to the importance of the will in religion, we cannot agree that the intellect is the second-rate and subordinate thing that his view seems to make it. We can see no good

reason why will should be regarded as the metaphysical first principle, while thought is considered a secondary product of the will. 61. Gallo­
way rightly insists that psychology "gives us no warrant for treating will as the source and explanation of ideation. No derivation of the latter from the former can be made even plausible; and if ideation appears later in time than feeling and will it does not follow that it is 61 inferior in function and value." Further, without reason the will is blind. Reason without volition is not enough, but volition without reason is just as poor a makeshift. "Here conation without direction, end and aim," writes 62. Selbie, "comes to nothing, and only in the harmonious and balanced working of reason, feeling, and will can we find a true explanation of human thought and life." It is no more possible to isolate the will as a factor in human experience than it is feeling. To attempt to do either is fatal. Nor is it possible to pit will and feeling against intellect; for any philosophy of religion built upon this one­sided psychological foundation utterly fails to do justice to the religious consciousness in which the three elements, intellect, feeling, and will, play an essential part and operate in unison rather than separately or by subordination of one to the other. Professor T. Hywel Hughes gives this truth emphatic expression when he states that in reality, "the weakness of all the views which treat religion as if it were derived from any one of the various aspects of man's self-conscious life lies in the fact that they make an unwarranted cleavage in consciousness, and that therefore they make man religious only in a part of his being. Man is not religious, when religion is real to him, in his reason or his will or

his feeling only. He is religious in them all, in his whole manhood at its highest and best, for religion lays every faculty and power under tribute. It raises every aspect of consciousness to a level of higher and more intense life, and in the integrating power of communion with God, it renews and transforms the whole man." We are in general sympathy with James's effort to show that religion subserves life, but we believe that this can be shown without making religion essentially a matter of the will and feeling while reason is regarded as playing a secondary role throughout. We are forced to conclude that reason is essential to human nature in its wholeness and that religion flows from man's entire nature which cannot be regarded in terms of any one element of his conscious experience. It does not make religion an affair of the whole man to ignore, or treat as subordinate a constitutive element of that experience. Religion springs from man's whole nature and when it becomes fully conscious of itself, it affects the whole man, or as Principal Hughes puts it, "religion claims the whole man and lets every aspect and facet of his being under tribute." Because of this fact we believe that James's position is unwarranted and unsound; it fails to do justice to the religious consciousness in trying to correct an exaggerated emphasis upon intellect by undue emphasis upon the importance of will. It does not help us very much to learn that the whole man is involved in religion if it is necessary to strip him of one of his most characteristic features before it is possible to make this claim. For while it may involve the whole man, in this case, it is a much smaller ran. Such is the inevitable outcome of the attempt to make faith by doing away with reason.

In the preceding chapter we followed James’s argument which attempts to show that belief requires a "will to believe", due to a necessary agnosticism which arises from the intractability of data, and because it is necessary to supplement an "accidental ignorance". Also, the nature of faith and reason, as well as that of religious experience, was shown to demand something more than the operation of mere intellectual processes if belief is to be attained. We are now in position to consider the conditions under which we are justified in allowing the will to influence belief. That is to say, if the influence of the will upon belief is necessary in certain cases, it is important to examine the canons by which such a will should be guided, or to ascertain when it is proper that the will should determine belief. It is this question that occupies James in the well-known and influential essay entitled "The Will to Believe", which essay contains his "critique of faith".

In later years, James regretted very much that he had given this essay the unfortunate title, "The Will to Believe". His critics seized upon this "catch-penny" title and used it to argue that James was commending dogmatic and wishful thinking, and advocating arbitrary belief. His sentiment in this matter is expressed in a letter to J. M. Baldwin, in 1901, in response to a request to prepare an article on the "Will to Believe" for the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. "It seems absurd," he writes, "to make a technical term of the 'Will to Believe'. Would God I had never thought of that unhappy title for my essay, but called it a 'Critique of

Pure Faith! Why not define the Will-to-swim, or to get rich, or to sit down?...What I meant by the title was the state of mind of the man who finds an impulse in him toward a believing attitude, and who resolves not to quench it simply because doubts of its truth are possible. Its opposite would be the maxim: Believe in nothing which you can possibly doubt. Pray leave it out of your dictionary. It can't be treated technically and has been the source of utter misunderstanding of my essay." It is important, therefore, to remove this misunderstanding of his doctrine which was a source of profound regret to him, and which has been the cause of much unnecessary, as well as unjust, criticism of his view on the part of those who feared he was arguing for unrestrained liberty in the exercise of faith. First, we should take into consideration the type of audience for which this essay was originally intended. "I admit, then," says James, "that were I addressing the Salvation Army or a miscellaneous popular crowd it would be a misuse of opportunity to preach liberty of believing as I have in these pages preached it. What such audiences most need is that their faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that the northwest wind of science should get into them and blow their sickliness and barbarism away. But academic audiences, fed already on science, have a very different need." James intends his doctrine for this latter group which he regards as having lost its native faith, and as attempting to decide the truth of all questions by strictly scientific evidence. "But there is," he continues, "really no scientific or other method by which men can steer safely between the opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too much. To face such dangers is apparently our duty, and to hit the right channel be-

3. W. B., Pref. p. x.
tween them is the measure of our wisdom as men." James was also addressing himself since he was not credulous, but appears to have suffered from incredulity. We should also take into consideration the actual scope of the doctrine in question as James seems to have conceived it, notwithstanding his frequent extravagances of language which seem to betray his original intention. L. T. Hobhouse wrote a criticism of the doctrine, without explicit reference to James, in which he summed up his interpretation of it in two propositions: "By believing a thing we make it true," and, "we can believe a thing without asking ourselves seriously whether it is true or false." James wrote him as follows: "My essay hedged the license to indulge in private over-beliefs with so many restrictions and signboards of danger that the outlet was narrow enough. It made of tolerance the essence of the situation; it defined the permissible cases; it treated the faith-attitude as a necessity for individuals, because the total 'evidence', which only the race can draw, has to include their experiments among its data. It tended to show only that faith could not be absolutely vetoed, as certain champions of 'science' (Clifford, Huxley, etc.) had claimed it ought to be. It was a function that might lead, and probably does lead, into a wider world." Also, it should be kept in mind that reference to verification is constantly implied throughout his treatment of this question, and verification must be by results of practical working; faith must justify itself by works. Further, he insists that a man can

4. Ibid., p. xi.
"always doubt his creed". James is no doubt partly responsible for this misunderstanding of his view, as has been suggested, by failing at times to express his teaching as clearly as he might have, and by permitting his enthusiasm to lead him into unguarded expressions which could easily be turned against him in criticism. But in view of the above reservations, there seems to be no reason to regard his doctrine as sanctioning unbridled belief.

Considerable confusion has arisen concerning "The Will to Believe" due to the failure to distinguish between this doctrine and pragmatism. A brief consideration of his view of knowledge will help to eliminate this confusion. There are three areas of human knowledge according to James. Professor R. B. Perry states James's view of the threefold nature of knowledge very clearly and accurately as follows: "Human knowledge may then be represented by three concentric areas. There is a nucleus of immediacy where existence and its characters are immediately present; beyond this lies an area of theoretic judgment in which belief is supported by reasons, embracing consistency with other judgments and verifiability in terms of experience; beyond this, finally, lies the area of faith, in which beliefs which transcend immediacy and are only negatively or partially supported by reasons are still justified on moral grounds." His theory of "knowledge of acquaintance" applies to the first area, and we have dealt with it at length in considering his theory of consciousness. Here the object is immediately presented in cognition. His pragmatic theory of knowledge deals with the second area which he calls "knowledge about". It supplements the former by enabling the experient to deal with the content

7. W. B., p. 95.
8. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 72.
of the given when the object is not immediately present to consciousness. His fideism covers his view of knowledge in the third area. Now, in pragmatism he applies practical principles to the theoretical process itself, while his fideism is an attempt to justify, on moral and practical grounds, belief which lacks sufficient theoretic evidence. "The one discovers the practical procedure of theoretic proof, the other affirms the practical right to believe in the absence of such proof." It is obvious, therefore, that the theory of pragmatism which teaches that verification itself is a practical process is quite a different doctrine from that of fideism which holds that belief is, in certain cases, justified in the absence of verification. We shall have occasion to emphasize the importance of the distinction between his fideism and pragmatism more fully when we come to the consideration of the latter doctrine.

The basic principles of thought underlying the "Will to Believe" are rooted in the faith of James's youth, and the view as set forth in this essay is in reality a reaffirmation and amplification of a faith of long standing. At the early age of nineteen years we find him resorting to this faith when thinking about such a trivial matter as what to do during the Thanksgiving vacation. In the fall of 1861, while a student at Harvard, he wrote to his family as follows: "The time will come—Thanksgiving in less than two weeks and then, oh, then!—probably a cold reception, half repellent, no fatted calf, no fresh-baked loaf of spicy bread,—but I dare not think of that side of the picture. I will ever hope and trust and my faith shall be justified." Two years later, while still a student at Cambridge, he expressed the same conviction in writing to his cousin,

Mrs. William H. Prince, in regard to his vocation. "The worst of this matter," he said, "is that everyone must more or less act with insufficient knowledge--'go it blind', as they say. Few can afford the time to try what suits them." These two citations give us an insight into his personal attitude towards life many years before he was known to the world as an advocate of the "will to believe", which view expresses his profoundest thought concerning religious faith. For the most part, his youth was a time of ill health, accompanied by moods of despondency, of uncertainty and vacillation of purpose, all of which served to give him a somewhat pessimistic outlook upon life. He was able to lift himself out of this unhappy state of mind by the adoption of an attitude of faith towards life in general. An entry from one of his notebooks dated April 30, 1870, enables us to see how he went about it, as well as to suggest in germinal form the philosophic outlook that was later to give comfort and courage to unnumbered readers. "I think," he wrote, "that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais' and see no reason why his definition of Free Will--'the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thought'--need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present--until next year--that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere speculation and contemplative Grüberl in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by acting. After the first of January, my callow skin being somewhat fledged, I may perhaps return to metaphysical

11. Ibid., p. 44.
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11. Ibid., p. 44.
study and skepticism without danger to my powers of action.... Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now, I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power." Three years later, after he had begun to teach at Harvard, he exclaimed to his father on one occasion: "Bless my soul, what a difference between me as I am now and as I was last spring at this time! Then so hypochondrical." His father states that William attributed this change in himself to several things: "The reading of Renouvier (particularly his vindication of freedom of the will) and of Wordsworth, whom he has been feeding on now for a good while; but more than anything else, his giving up the notion that all mental disorder requires to have a physical basis.... He saw that the mind does act irrespectively of material coercion, and could be dealt with therefore at first hand, and this was health to his bones."

It is interesting to note that, according to R. B. Perry, the final statement of the doctrine of the will to believe came also at a time of emotional disturbance in the life of James. He had completed the writing of The Principles of Psychology, which required several years of arduous labor. This stupendous task had been quite exacting upon his time and energies and had proved somewhat of a drudgery to him; but having finished it, he was no longer subject to the restraint and the discipline which this work had imposed upon him. He was especially apt to fall into brooding melancholy, and he again felt the need of a saving gospel. Also, social

12. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
and political activities of the time had stirred his human sympathies. He was deeply moved by the Spanish War, and the Dreyfus case. His interest in psychical research had revived his sympathy with religious mysticism, and he was hopeful of being able to find some justification for it.

It may be said, then, that this essay, which was delivered in the summer of 1895, before the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities, is a restatement and amplification of a view which carried through many years of James thinking, and which, as we have seen, in the preceding chapter, was already present in his earlier examination of the "motives for philosophizing". It may also be regarded as a justification of his earlier views.

We have seen from the quotations given above that James was strongly influenced by Renouvier. Professor Perry points out, also, that the influence of Hodgson is apparent in James's position that "all thinking is inspired by a voluntary faith in truth."

It may be shown that the will influences belief in a number of different cases. First, an effort of will may be exerted in order to retain some conception which has come to possess such a deep sense of reality for us that when doubt begins to operate we actively resist its corroding and disturbing tendencies. For example, we may refuse to believe in aspersions cast upon the character of a friend of long standing in whom we have implicit confidence. Again, it often becomes desirable or necessary to uproot some deep-seated conviction by an exercise of the will so as to make room for an incompatible conception which appears to be the nobler and truer of the two. That is, we may come upon a new view of some matter, the truth

of which is beyond question, but which runs counter to some belief deeply rooted in our nature by tradition and custom. We are forced to choose between them. A situation of this kind may occur to a scientific investigator when some new discovery renders it necessary for him to discard some theory to which he has adhered for years, and which he has used to support conclusions which he regards as quite important. Finally, the will may be used to break the deadlock which occurs when confronted with two incompatible conceptions between which we are unable to decide upon theoretic grounds either because evidence is absent or the available evidence is inconclusive. In this case, we may either allow doubt to remain or the influence of the will may overthrow the doubt and we may choose to believe in one of the two alternatives and resist belief in the other.

It is only in such cases as this that James defends the right to believe as being morally justified. He does so in opposition to the champions of science whose maxim, as we have seen from his letter to Baldwin, runs like this: "Believe in nothing which you can possibly doubt." But his defense of the right to believe here is not based upon intellectual, but upon ethical, considerations. It is restricted to certain well defined cases, and does not apply to this class of beliefs as a whole.

If the will does influence belief, as James has argued that it does, the question arises as to whether or not we shall believe, or persuade others to believe, when sufficient theoretical evidence is lacking to produce belief. This is a practical question which must ultimately be dealt with in moral terms. In other words, as Professor R. B. Perry says, the inculcation of belief by using its non-evidential causes, on the one hand,

and the drastic restriction of belief within limits of theoretic proof, on the other, become practical alternatives. Now it is obvious that while these alternatives are not mutually exclusive throughout, they are in some measure incompatible, and at certain points of conflict it becomes necessary to choose between them. Our choice is prompted by moral considerations and we must be able to support it with moral reasons. It is possible to give three moral grounds for accepting only theoretically supported beliefs: It can be argued that the intellect occupies a position of supreme dignity in the moral hierarchy; that intellectual activity serves as a means of common action and feeling, since it is non-competitive; and, finally, that since the intellect enables us to exercise vast control over the forces of nature, its utility entitles it to first consideration. This last argument presupposes that it is good that man should be able to control the forces of nature, and that man's physical life and well-being should be promoted; this is a specific ethical presupposition to occidental minds. The last argument also assumes that general human goods are better than those of the private individual, or of limited groups. Now, according to the same creed which justified the cult of evidential belief and establishes its priority in case of conflict, it is also possible to justify, in certain cases, non-evidential belief. For the creed is broader than its cult, and the cult is not its only implication. "To deny this, or to place a prohibition on non-evidential belief, would be to treat the cult as though it were a complete and fundamental creed. To defend such an ethics of intellectual abstinence, one should take a position similar to that of

the ancient sceptics, who justified their negation of belief by appeal to
the simplification of life. He who reduces his beliefs thereby reduces 18
his commitments."

Proceeding upon the assumption, then, that evidential belief is to be
preferred to non-evidential belief whenever the two are in conflict, there
are three positive reasons for non-evidential belief in absence of such a
conflict. First, non-evidential belief is justified when belief is a con­
dition of, or an aid to, evidential belief. That is, faith is permissible
when it helps to find evidence. "One finds what one looks for, and one
looks for what one believes can be found." Belief that evidence can be
found must precede our search for it. Our search for truth implies the
faith that truth is attainable and our attempt to arrive at a rational con­
ception of the world implies that we believe such a view is, in some meas­
ure at least, attainable. The scientist labors to verify his hypothesis
in the faith that such verification is possible. In short, any procedure
requiring commitment is accompanied by some measure of belief in advance of
evidence. A second case in which non-evidential belief is justified is
when the evidence in question is psychological and belief creates the evi­
dence. Here, as James says, the thought "becomes literally father to the
fact, as the wish was father to the thought." The individual's belief in
his own powers is the best known example of this class. For instance, an
individual, in climbing a mountain, suddenly discovers that he is in a posi­
tion from which escape is possible only by a tremendous leap. The indi­

19. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
vidual has never been in such a predicament before and does not know from experience whether or not he can accomplish this feat. He may do one of two things. He may view the matter calmly and confidently thereby enabling himself to make the jump successfully; or, he may become nervous and distrustfully cautious, hesitating to make the effort until, finally, he stands upon the brink of the precipice, exhausted and trembling. At last, in a moment of desperation he awkwardly flings himself forward but loses his foothold and falls into the abyss. There are, of course, innumerable experiences of life in which it is necessary for an individual to believe in his own powers and possibilities if the end in view is to be achieved. This does not mean that other causes are not operative, nor that they can be ignored; but, all things being equal, the individual who has confidence in himself for the task at hand is most likely to carry it through to successful completion. This is true in sports, in business, in the realm of politics, in temptation, and in illness. As Professor Perry puts it: "The man who puts his trust in God is on that account more likely to prevail, provided he also keeps his powder dry." Belief also has an effect upon other minds. This truth is at the bottom of the frequently tendered advice, "if you want to have friends be a friend." As a rule, other people respond to the attitudes which we assume towards them. If we let them know that we respect and trust them, they usually attempt to prove worthy of such esteem and confidence and thereby verify our opinion. This principle operates with greater potency when several individuals unite in some common aim, whether it be in business, politics, war, or what not; the self-confidence which the group has is a factor in achieving the

purpose it has in view. In situations of this kind a lack of such confidence may prove fatal. Finally, non-evidential belief is justified in the case in which faith borrows evidence. The majority of our beliefs are of this sort. Ordinarily we do not take the time nor expend the energy required to discover the theoretical reasons for our judgment. This holds good in every avenue of life. The scientist and scholar are no exceptions to this rule since they also depend upon the investigations and discoveries of others in their respective fields. Thus, in the faith that finds, creates, and borrows evidence non-evidential belief attends evidential belief. It is justified by the same argument which supports certified knowledge inasmuch as it is a means of obtaining the latter.

It obviously follows, as the above argument shows, that the obligation to theoretical evidence is not regarded as the ultimate consideration in determining beliefs, but that it is itself derived from underlying ethical premises. It does not have the last word in regard to non-evidential belief which has no connection with evidential belief. That is to say, whether or not it is permissible to admit beliefs for which evidence is absent, and for which the available evidence is inconclusive, cannot be determined on the basis of fidelity to theoretical evidence. This question, too, must be determined from the standpoint of ethical considerations rather than from that of theoretical evidence. Such belief is excluded, by definition, from the standpoint of loyalty to theoretical evidence. It really becomes a question, then, as to whether the ulterior ethical premises, from which the obligation to theoretical evidence receives its support, excludes this type of belief. For if they are capable of giving

sanction to evidential belief, they are also capable of fixing limits and 24 of granting exceptions.

James insists that loyalty to theoretic evidence should govern in most beliefs; "the dispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving us, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be our ideal." Such fidelity is so important a condition of personal and social good that we should never sacrifice it for non-evidential belief if the evidence is attainable and conclusive. This is true in scientific questions, and in human affairs in general. It is better to postpone action than to run the risk of believing falsehood. Here the risk of losing truth is not as important a consideration as the danger of incurring error. To cultivate the habit of believing without appeal to evidence is eventually to weaken our respect for such evidence and to endanger intellectual integrity. It is wise, therefore, to discourage such tendencies; they may have deleterious effects upon our quest for truth. In short, the attitude of sceptical balance is, for the most part, the absolutely wise one if we are to avoid mistakes and do justice to the ideal of knowledge. This much being granted, we may ask, then, are we ever justified in believing without evidence or when the evidence at hand is inadequate? The answer to this question defines the cases in which we are morally justified in "willing to believe."

The same general principles apply to both cases in question, that is, when there is no evidence, and when what evidence we have is not conclusive. In the former case there is no disloyalty to fact if the absence of evidence is recognized. In all other beliefs where evidence can be secured, fidelity to evidence is strictly adhered to, and this guards against habitual

24. Ibid., pp. 196-197.
25. W. B., p. 22.
credulity. But the belief we are considering brings hope to the individual who cherishes it, and gives greater meaning to life. He is thus stirred to worthy moral action. In this instance, there is no good reason why abstinence from belief should be exercised since it is not a matter of weighing evil results against good; the results are good. It is a case of losing the good consequence altogether if the belief is rejected. The latter situation arises out of the need for action before sufficient evidence has been obtained to enable theoretical considerations to determine the decision. It is necessary to act upon the evidence at hand. In choosing a vocation, as James wrote his cousin; "Few can afford the time to try what suits them." The business man, the statesman, the soldier, the social worker, the farmer, and all others, are forced to act when it is not evidently certain what the outcome will be; the insufficiency of available evidence renders such certain knowledge impossible.

When this situation prevails, and circumstances combine to form what James calls a "genuine option", it is not morally apprehensible to believe. Three factors unite to form a "genuine option". When we can place credence in both hypotheses which are competing for belief the option in question is "living". When we cannot avoid a decision, when there is "no standing place outside of the alternative", it is a "forced" option. Finally, when the opportunity it presents is unique, when something of tremendous significance is at stake, and when the decision is irrevocable, it is "momentous". James's main thesis, therefore, is that "our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on

27. W. B., p. 3.
intellectual grounds; for to say under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision,—just like deciding yes or no,—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth." When we add to this consideration the further fact that faith in the cases discussed above creates its own verification, we have the conditions under which we are justified in willing to believe. "And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall." This is true of all beliefs concerning the future when that future is determined in some measure by the will. In short, then, we are justified upon moral grounds in believing without full evidential warrant when refusal to believe or suspension of judgment means losing the chance of truth, or is tantamount to disbelief which can no more be supported by sensible facts than the positive and more beneficial belief; and when the conviction helps to create the very facts needed for its verification.

James's main thesis rests upon two presuppositions. The first one has epistemological foundations in empirical dogmatism. It makes two assumptions: that there is truth which it is the destiny of our minds to attain, and that we cannot know for certain when it has been attained. Its dogmatism lies in the first assertion, and its empiricism in the second. James says it is one thing to know and quite another thing to be sure that we know. The only indefectibly certain truth is that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists, and this is the bare starting point of knowledge. Every truth, however evidently certain it may have been

28. W. B., p. 11.
regarded, has at some time or another been called into question. Thinkers have never been able to agree upon a concrete test for truth. In short, "there is indeed nothing which some one has not thought absolutely true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false." To abandon the doctrine of objective certitude does not mean, however, that the empiricist relinquishes as hopeless the quest for truth. He does not. Further, he is little concerned with its origin; "he may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means by its being true." Inasmuch, then, as objective certitude is not obtained by means of an infallible intellect, and since no bell rings in us to let us know when we have arrived at the truth, we are not bound in loyalty to any infallible faculty; nor are we obliged to wait for any such bell to ring. We may do so if we choose. We incur the same risks, however, and assume the same attitude which accompany our decision to go ahead and believe without sufficient evidence. It may be remarked here that James should logically go further than he does with reference to our knowing when we have attained truth. That is to say, his position implies that he acknowledges himself to be in possession of a certain measure of truth. His empirical doubt as to our certainty of knowledge is based upon reasons, and, as A. K. Rogers says, "reasons imply that already we take ourselves to be in possession of something in the nature of truth."

The second presupposition upon which his main thesis rests is that it is our duty to seek the truth rather than to avoid error. These two principles are logically distinct since it is possible to avoid error without

31. Ibid., p. 16.
32. Ibid., p. 17.
getting any nearer to the truth. At bottom, it is a matter of choice as to
which one we shall follow. To choose the latter imperative as our guide in
this matter, out of fear of running into error, is similar to the action of
a general who admonishes his soldiers to keep out of battle in order to
avoid the risk of being wounded. Since we are certain to incur error in
spite of our efforts to avoid it, it is foolish to exercise such undue
caution trying to escape it. It is our duty, therefore, not to shun er-
ror, but to seek truth. This principle is limited, as we have seen, to
the two cases which we have cited as justifying non-evidential belief, but
it is the presupposition which guides James in making these two exceptions
to belief on strictly theoretical evidence.

We have now to consider the application of this doctrine to religious
questions. James states the nature of the religious hypothesis in various
ways. For example, in the essay entitled "Reflex Action and Theism", he
asserts that God is the object of religious belief, and that it is essen-
tial to conceive Him as the deepest power in the universe. Also, he must
be conceived as a mental personality since he ascribes worth to certain
things and recognizes our attitude towards them. He is a power, not our-
selves, "which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which
recognizes us." In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he conceives
the religious hypothesis as including the following beliefs: that the
visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its
chief significance; that union or harmonious relations with that higher
universe is our chief end; and, finally, that through inner communion with
its spirit we receive an influx of spiritual energy which produces effects

34. W. B., p. 122.
in the phenomenal world. Whatever formula James uses to express the content of the religious hypothesis, it always makes two significant affirmations. The first is "that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word." It is obvious that this is an affirmation which cannot yet be scientifically verified at all. The other affirmation of religion is that "we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true." Now, if the religious hypothesis, as we have defined it, be true, and the possibility of its truth must be admitted before discussion is possible, it follows that it involves a live option. Religion also presents itself as a momentous option. Our belief is supposed to bring us a certain vital good, whereas disbelief means the loss of that good. And so far as that good goes, religion is a forced option. If we suspend belief pending more conclusive evidence, we do avoid error in case religion is untrue, but we miss the good as truly as if we had chosen to disbelieve from the beginning. The option cannot be avoided by scepticism; "this attitude is option of a certain particular kind of risk." The decision of the sceptic is not dictated entirely by the intellect as against all passions. He permits his fear of error to offset any hope that he may have that the religious hypothesis is true. It is thus a case of intellect with one passion for him. There are two other considerations which serve to render the position of the sceptic still more untenable. The first is the fact that religion takes the personal form. "The more

36. W. B., p. 25.
perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our re-
ligions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to
us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible
from person to person might be possible here." Since this personal element
enters religion, we cannot receive any response whatever unless we make some
effort at sociability and express some portion of our sympathetic nature.
It is out of the question, therefore, to ignore our willing in this matter.
The second consideration arises from the fact that belief is measured by
action. If the religious hypothesis does not produce action different from
that which the naturalistic hypothesis inspires then religion is superfluous
and we are justified in discarding it. This intimate connection between
belief and action complicates the matter further for the sceptic. When he
refuses to accept the religious hypothesis as true, pending arrival of con-
clusive evidence, he acts meanwhile more or less as if religion were not
true.

It is obvious from the nature of the religious hypothesis that it is
incapable of the same type of verification which characterizes science; re-
ligious belief transcends experience. "It is the attempt of finite man to
live in the light of a hypothetical omnipotence." Religion demands, there-
fore, a belief without full evidential warrant. But religious belief may
help to bring about its own verification. When an act of faith is fol-
lowed by a sense of the presence and saving power of God the faith has
helped to secure the evidence. When religious faith makes life more worth
living, and, consequently, moves us to worthy and beneficial activity, the

40. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Note
41. R. E. Perry, op. cit., p. 203.
faith in question has helped to create the evidence. And James says, "I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity." The religious belief of the great majority of mankind draws upon the deeper insight of those who have carried on "as seeing him who is invisible." But since religion calls for a belief that surpasses evidence such belief does not involve disloyalty to theoretical evidence.

Two things may be said about theoretical evidence so far as the religious hypothesis is concerned. First, the evidence for it is not conclusive. It is not theoretically possible to demonstrate the reality of God, freedom and immortality. In the case of God, there are the dynamogenic effects upon the moral and spiritual energimes of those who believe themselves to be in communion with him. Evidence for freedom is offered by the experience of our personal "activity-situations;" by the lack of uniformity in nature which enables chance or novel events to occur; and by the fact that no concrete bit of perceptual experience is exactly like any other that has gone before, or comes after, it. For immortality we have the evidence that while our "soul's life may be in literal strictness the function of a brain that perishes," our life may continue on after the brain itself is dead, since the brain may serve to transmit thought rather

43. Varieties, p. 455.
44. Ibid., p. 485. Cf. Also, Memories and Studies, pp. 241 ff.
45. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 151.
46. Ibid., p. 149, Pragmatism, p. 119.
47. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 143.
than to produce it. Thus evidence in religion carries us only part of the way; faith must do the rest. While this evidence is inconclusive, if we consider the practical reasons in favor of religion as adduced from the type of option which religion constitutes, we have a belief which does full justice to the demands of our emotional and volitional nature. The second consideration in regard to theoretical evidence for religion which offers an additional advantage to religious faith is the fact that while there is no conclusive evidence for religion, there is none against it; that is, there is not sufficient evidence by means of which the religious hypothesis can be proved to be false. But while it is not possible to prove religion either true or false, by means of theoretical evidence, we can put it to the practical test; for if we act upon the religious hypothesis and thereby find that "it works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true." It follows, then, that there is but one thing we need to do: we need only to act as if it were true, and keep on acting as if it were true, and it will eventually end by growing into such an intimate relation with our life that it will become true.

The full significance of this doctrine cannot be adequately appreciated without taking into consideration the religious situation to which it is addressed. The latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of intellectual uneasiness and the general opinion that the foundations of religion had been undermined, if not destroyed, was, in scientific circles at least, gaining wide currency. Enthusiasm for the comparatively infant doctrine of evolution was running high, and many of its adherents felt

49. Pragmatism, p. 299.
that it meant the end of religious faith. New facts were brought to light daily which served to weaken the claims of religion. These facts called for new interpretations. Scientific generalizations, such as the conservation of energy, the correlation of the physical forces, localization of the functions of the brain, and the theories concerning biological and cosmical evolution were regarded as sufficiently established to render necessary such changes in our ways of thinking as the new discoveries demanded. These facts, for the most part, were interpreted on the basis of "a crude sense realism", to use the expression of B. P. Bowne, which was strongly tinged with materialism and atheism. At that time there was at hand no adequate philosophic equipment by means of which these facts and theories of science could be adequately interpreted so as not to weaken the position of religion. Consequently, mental chaos and deep uncertainty prevailed. James was among those who, while warmly receiving the new developments in scientific thought, were unwilling to permit science to rule religion out of court. The doctrine in question, being enunciated with this situation in view, had a tremendous influence in checking the rapidly advancing tide of naturalistic science, and served to strengthen the cause of religious faith. J. B. Pratt, writing of its influence in this connection, in 1909, says, "I shall be justified in saying that James's 'Will to Believe' has been one of the greatest influences for genuine religious faith that have appeared in the last half century." As to the value which James sets on religious faith, and the importance which he assigns to a persistent and heroic attitude of determination, Th. Flournoy writes as follows: "I hold this point is perhaps the most important in all his

philosophy for intellectual men (I do not say intellectualists!), and that there is nothing for which we owe him deeper gratitude than for the emphasis which he puts on the will to believe, supported as this is by his own personal example." As an attempt to meet the situation which has been described above, the real merit of the doctrine lies in the fact that the empirical opponent cannot drive the religious man from this position. While it is his last trench, it enables him to remain there unless it is possible to produce some unquestionable metaphysical argument against the hypothesis of religious faith. There is no possibility of being able to do this.

If, for example, evidence against the belief in the existence of God were brought forward, the man who believes is not entirely outdone. He could reply that there was still some chance, however small it may be, that his belief is not false, and pinning his faith to that chance and taking into consideration the demands of his practical nature, he intended to go on living as if his religious hypothesis were true. When, therefore, the empirical method is taken to be the only one available for the discovery of truth, and we are left finally with a choice between two sets of probabilities, the sceptic cannot gainsay our right to solve, in this manner, the problem which such a situation creates for us. As A. K. Rogers puts it:

"That I have a right to believe, is the one thing scepticism cannot touch. It must presuppose the right in order to be scepticism."

It is a caricature of James's position to interpret it, as many critics have done, as equivalent to saying that we may believe anything.

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whether it be true or false, if the belief in question has sufficient practical value to warrant our holding on to it. L. T. Hobhouse places this interpretation upon it. That this criticism misses the mark is obvious from the fact that James assumes that the belief is a live one which would not be the case unless we thought credence possible; that is, unless we thought it likely to be true. Nor is there any justification for the criticism urged by D. S. Miller to the effect that James fails to separate the will to believe from the will to know the truth. This separation is not possible even for the sake of argument. Truth is that which corresponds to reality, but if we may, with J. M. Baldwin, define reality as "that kind of experience which satisfies one or more of the needs of the individual;" and belief as "the consciousness of the presence of that thing as fitted to satisfy a need," it is obvious that reality sustains some relation to our will or our practical activity. We deem that true which affects our volition in a constant and invariable manner. We concur in Wm. Caldwell's defense of James's position in this connection when he asserts: "From neither a psychological, nor a logical, nor an ethical, nor a metaphysical point of view can the will to know the truth be separated from the will to believe."

The doctrine of the will to believe is James's characteristic way of saying that man invariably wants to believe that the universe is friendly to man, and that if offers satisfaction to the deeper necessities of his nature. For as F. Paulsen says, "No one believes and no one can believe

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that reality is wholly indifferent or even hostile to that which seems to
him to be the highest goal and good. And though a man might, in prin-
ciple, deny the validity of the belief that reality has regard for human
values, yet, as a matter of fact, he presupposes such an agreement. The
materialist, too, believes in the victory of the good cause, in the ascend-
ency of reason, truth, and right: he believes, therefore, in a moral world--
"order." Even the pessimist clings to the same belief, for otherwise he
would not be a pessimist. This is not merely a reductio ad horrendum
argument, as J. E. McTaggart seems to think it is, but it has deep underly-
ing biological foundations. The fact that beliefs arise out of funda-
mental needs accounts for the widespread existence and stubborn persistence
of beliefs of this nature, often in the "teeth" of facts to the contrary;
they express a hope that will not down because they are based on a need
that will not die. G. F. Stout says, "where there is a practical need to
form a belief, because indecision would paralyze activity, the mind must
rest on whatever objective indications or suggestions it can find, however
slight these may be. On the other hand, where there is no interest to be
satisfied, there will be no tendency to form a belief." We are not at
present contending for the truth of such beliefs merely because they per-
sist, but are concerned to show that such beliefs express a need; of course,
they are believed true. Constituted as we are, then, W. R. Wells is es-
entially correct in saying that "it is biologically impossible that pes-
simistic beliefs should survive in the race, since, for biological reasons,

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60. F. Paulsen, op. cit., p. 321.
61. J. E. McTaggart, "The Inadequacy of Certain Grounds of Belief", The
a pessimistic race would perish from the earth." It is conceivable that science and philosophy might agree that a naturalistic creed which ignores these fundamental human needs is the true conception of the universe; but such a view still would be inadequate to satisfy the part of man's nature which gives rise to these needs, just as one which is repellent to his intellectual nature fails to satisfy his needs. The psychological and biological difficulty would still remain for a larger number of people. On the other hand, beliefs which do satisfy man's moral and emotional nature may be practically universal and yet fail to meet the strict requirements of rational standards of truth, or be incapable of scientific verification. Without disparaging reason, in any way, we may say that, in a situation of this kind, reason will probably have to submit to temporary defeat and regard the attainment of a perfectly harmonious insight as out of the question for the time being. For, to use the words of A. K. Rogers: "Better a fullness of life which outstrips the logical insight, than an intellectual satisfaction won by reducing life to Procrustean limits." It may be, however, that in the long run, a belief which continually refuses to harmonize with the findings of our rational insight will sufficiently arouse our suspicion concerning its truth to cause it to be ultimately discarded. For man can neither deny nor escape the fact that he is a rational creature. But any intellectual construction concerning the scheme of things which provides for man's moral and emotional life stands an immeasurably better chance of winning his acceptance than one which denies or ignores the role played by this part of his nature.

James saw clearly and preached boldly that our most precious convictions express a fundamental need and that they are deeply and vitally rooted in the whole of our nature. The real significance of the doctrine of the will to believe lies, as F. C. S. Schiller says, "in its recognition of how very much more than logical reasoning goes to the making of all human beliefs." In maintaining that there are legitimate beliefs that cannot be proved, and, therefore, not amenable to complete rationalization, he helped to correct the extravagances of an extreme rationalism. For belief has a vital and practical root as well as a logical and speculative one. Life and action cannot be sacrificed to logical processes. The fundamental needs, interests, and instincts are basic in cognition or life. The intellect is motivated and guided by interest; our thinking has teleological foundations. It arises out of our need to preserve and enrich life. We are creatures with powers and aspirations which cannot be put into syllogistic form; our beliefs are often the expression of the deeper urges of the soul. We use them as rules to facilitate our quest for the good life. We prove them by their effects upon our energies and conduct. They satisfy us intellectually and work well practically; and this is a valid test for concrete truth. The result of this view of belief has an important bearing upon religious belief in that it can demand that the testimony of life, history, and action be taken into consideration as well as that of logic and speculation. That is, it can demand that we trust our moral and religious nature as well as our intellectual; for it is as detrimental to morals and religion to distrust our moral and spiritual instincts, as it is to science and intellect to distrust our cognitive instincts. And, as has been well

expressed by J. B. Baillie, the certitude of science "differs from the cer-
titude of religion in that the former proceeds primarily from the intellect
but the latter from the personality as a whole." Further, the emphasis
which James lays upon the practical nature of our beliefs serves to accen-
tuate the fact that our deepest convictions and certainties pertain to the
primary moral values. In spite of the possibility which is always open to
us to doubt our creed, there is always the urgency to act in the direction
which leads to the realization of the highest possible values. There are
things which we know to be worth doing and which we cannot avoid doing without running the risk of losing something which is strongly desired and
therefore extremely valuable. James weakens his position at this point,
however, by the admission that it is not necessary to postulate God to give
validity to the ethical claim. He makes this postulate for himself but
holds that it is not necessary to believe in God in order to establish the
validity of the ethical ideal. "Whether a God exist, or whether no God
exist," he says, "in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an
ethical republic here below." Values are entirely dependent on human in-
terests: "Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes
itself valid by the fact that it exists at all." Also, "every de facto
claim creates in so far forth an obligation." To argue, as he does here,
that our moral values can stand alone, and then to bring God into the pic-
ture to help us realize them not only assigns to Him merely an instrumental
role, but undermines the foundations of both morality and religion. For,

67. J. B. Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1928, p. 376.
68. W. B., p. 198.
69. Ibid., p. 195.
70. Ibid., p. 195.
as J. S. Baillie points out, the fundamental truth of religion "will never be endangered until somebody succeeds in presenting us with a consistent theory of morals which does full justice to the deepest things in our knowledge of good and evil without in any way relating them to a reality beyond ourselves." It is true that James makes the religious postulates both personal and authoritative. God’s claims are as truly personal as any claims can be and at the same time they are more compelling than anything human. But, ultimately, it is personal desires which determine values since God’s own standard of right must be in harmony with our desires before it is to be accepted as final for us. "But the only force of appeal to us, which either a living God or an abstract ideal order can wield, is found in the 'everlasting ruby vaults' of our own human hearts, as they happen to beat responsive and not irresponsive to the claim."

This weakness in his argument is mitigated to some extent by his strong insistence upon religion as a means of giving deeper meaning to life and a deeper significance to our values, and by his own belief that the theistic view is superior to any other in this respect.

In addition to the importance attached to James's emphasis upon the subjective and practical factors in belief, he has made a worthy contribution to religious philosophy in stressing the creative part which man himself plays in the making of reality. It must be remembered that for James belief is an active assertion concerning what shall be real for us, and that both belief and will resolve themselves into attention which, by dwelling upon one possibility more than others, admits it to reality over

72. Ibid., p. 196.
them and thereby brings new reality into being. Of course, belief is part of this entire process of selection and it also creates as it chooses and holds. Thus, that to which belief or faith attaches becomes our reality and when by an act of faith we bring into existence that which before was not, and would not have been, without faith, we have demonstrated the creative power of faith. It is undoubtedly true that there are some regions of reality in which the creativity of man helps to shape and determine things by his own will. If our wills could not help to mould the parts of reality that are pliable there would seem to be little reason for our possessing them. A great many religious beliefs lie in this sphere in which choice and creation operate. "To my mind," writes Professor W. E. Hocking, "I must admit, nothing more illuminating has ever been put forward than just such interpretation of many a religious doctrine; nothing truer to the way in which religious picturing and myth-building does actually take place in the human consciousness....I do not doubt that in religion as in human experience generally, each will sets the level of its own life, determines in large measure its own destiny, and helps to create spiritual reality for all other human life. A faith without a large ingredient of will, is no faith at all." But just how much the will has to do in determining reality is a question concerning which there is a wide difference of opinion. Nor is it entirely clear just how far James conceives the will as carrying us in this respect. We have good reason to believe that he does not intend to make of belief or faith a purely subjective creation of reality. For example, in the creation of reality through attention, he holds that our part in the process is done by the act of attending. "The

rest is done by nature, which in some cases makes the objects real which we think of in this manner, and in other cases does not." And pragmatism certainly does not ignore the external world of fact. It is inconceivable, however, how our fidelity could in any way increase the "very being" of God. It is also open to question whether Professor Hocking is justified in making the statement that it is doubtful "whether immortality is any such predetermined reality that it exists for any person apart from that person's will to make it real." He says further: "The future life may well be such an object as my decision can make real or unreal, so far as my own experience is concerned." This is substantially the same position James takes as regards immortality. But it would seem that the being of God and the question of the fact of immortality are as far beyond the reach of man's will to determine as the facts of life and death themselves. Man may have, and actually does have, according to the teaching of the Christian religion, a great deal to do with the quality of life after death, but there are apparently no good grounds for believing that he can by his own power of will determine its reality. For J. M. Baldwin, the will to believe is effective, or enters into the determination of reality, "only in so far as the belief postulates the result as already accomplished: The existence of the thing believed enters into the psychosis and determines the act of will." He goes on to say that the will, from the psychic point

75. Pragmatism, p. 233.
of view, is as much determined by real existence as is any other sort of intentional act such as moving the head to escape a blow, because psychologically the reality or existence is accepted as true in the act of belief. Thus, for him, belief does not involve the postulation of unrealized reality. Baldwin's position is essentially sound, especially with reference to religious faith. It is of the essence of faith to assert, not create, the reality of its object and, as we have already seen, to refer to a transcendent Object. But James's view concerning the creative role played by man in making truth and reality enriches our conception of faith and enables us to regard it as purposeful vision which runs ahead of things as they are and which, with loyal and courageous determination, grasps them as future actualities well worth whatever risk our commitment to their realization involves. It emphasizes anew the old truth that endeavor is a condition of attainment, and that discovery is the result of patient seeking; it assures us that when a man gets an insight into some reality beyond, and greater than, himself he sets out to realize it in his own life with a zeal and zest that enable him to endure anything which may happen to him in his mundane existence rather than lose that which makes life worth living.

The will to believe places squarely on the shoulders of the believer part of the responsibility for the realization of the belief he entertains; and the achievement of the values embodied in the belief becomes a moral duty. It warns him against regarding the religious life as one of complacent and passive enjoyment of fruits for which he has neither incurred risk

80. Ibid., p. 46.
nor expended effort. Thus, as an appeal to the individual as a moral being this doctrine is certainly of importance. Moreover, the will to believe may produce and maintain a belief long enough at least for the individual who holds it to prove its value. Of course, it cannot indefinitely maintain a belief which appears to receive no endorsement from experience. Many religious beliefs begin with the will to believe, and subsequent experience confirms their value and they remain unless they obviously conflict with rational insight; they may even persist for a time and prove beneficial in spite of this conflict. As to the scope of this doctrine, it is obvious that it would not make any appeal to large numbers of people who have no intellectual difficulties concerning religious beliefs. Also, it would not be acceptable to those who regard it as advocating wishful thinking or arbitrary belief; the "privileged souls", and the "positive minds", as Th. Flournoy describes them, would have no use for such a doctrine. There are others, however, for whom the religious problem remains and, for whom, at times, it is more or less poignant. They have their doubts along with a vital sense of need for the things which religion can offer them. To such as these the will to believe may come as an opportunity of settling, temporarily at least, the burning issues of religion which press upon men and women in everyday life. It is not possible to ascertain the exact percentage of people belonging to this class. If we may rely upon the findings of J. B. Pratt, only about eight per cent belong here. Out of three hundred sixty-seven persons who responded to his questionnaire concerning belief in God, only twenty-nine claimed that their

belief was based on the will to believe. Professor Pratt regards these figures as presumably untrustworthy, and thinks that many respondents who belong to this group gave other reasons for their faith. It may be true that the beliefs of most of us contain an element of the will to believe and that while we may not be conscious of it, it is there and operative throughout our entire structure of convictions. For we are persuaded of the truth of the statement: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine."

We have now to consider some of the more obvious defects in this doctrine as they appear to us. We have been chiefly concerned to show the value of the doctrine merely hinting from time to time, as we proceeded, our objections to points under consideration. The chief objection to James's account of the will to believe is his conceiving the essence of religion in terms of belief rather than in terms of the object believed in. Every belief involves two things: an object and the attitude of belief. The object must be regarded as acutely real, independent of our belief in it which can evoke the believing attitude. While, as we have already pointed out, faith does not reach its object by the process of theoretical knowing, it none the less asserts the reality of its object. That is to say, faith cannot be satisfied merely to postulate values without inquiring into the ontological status which they possess. The religious mind cannot entertain the possibility that the object is perhaps illusory; this would be the death of faith. "Man cannot worship what he feels may turn out to

83. The Gospel according to John 7:17.
be a mental fiction." Tradition, orthodoxy, theologians and instinctive sense agree in saying that the important thing in religion is not the intrinsic character of belief but the object believed in. F. R. Tennant expresses this truth as follows: "Spiritual efficacy, or capacity to promote pious and moral life, is one thing; Reality of the ideal Objects figuring in efficacious doctrines, is another. It is in asserting the Reality of such Objects, that faith essentially consists: not in appreciating the value of statements concerning them, while their ontological status is left a thing indifferent....That moral valuations are closely intertwined with the developments of religious faith and practice, is historical fact; that the essence of faith is worth-appreciation of any kind higher than what is involved in satisfaction of practical need, is too limited a description of faith to be adequate. Moreover, unless theological dogmas, in which religious faith ultimately issues, be existential propositions, underivable from value-judgments pure and proper, they cannot be more than pictorial rules for conduct." It follows that if religion is thus to have its metaphysics, it cannot be derived from considerations concerning values alone. We cannot infer the existence of a reality from the worth of an ideal object, nor from the value which belief in an ideal object may possess; religion cannot depend upon the pragmatic value of its beliefs to take the place of its metaphysics. As Professor A. N. Whitehead says, in maintaining that science and religion both must have their metaphysics: "But science can leave its metaphysics implicit and retire behind our belief in the pragmatic value of its general descriptions. If religion does that, it admits

that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating its emotions." This is precisely what religion does not, and cannot admit. It is true that religion receives its chief support from considerations as to values, but these valuations are and must be appreciations of the existential. Thus, as F. R. Tennant argues, they presuppose existential and theoretic "knowledge" of the world and men, "in order to gain purchase and to yield any theistic argument; while there is no room but for blind hope in their conservation, till the universe is theoretically found to be of such nature as at least to admit of their conservation being possible."

A second objection to James's doctrine is that he attempts to reduce theoretic knowledge to a minimum and thereby creates a "probability" too small to bear the weight of his argument for the will to believe and for the conservation of values. That is to say, we are not called upon to believe in God without good reasons and James's reasons, as they stand, are not enough to offer a reasonable probability for the perplexed believer. In the first place, we have no reason for supposing that religious experience alone offers a satisfactory apologetic for religion. R. H. Thouless rightly maintains that we must take whatever indications with which it may provide us in conjunction with all other sources of knowledge. It does not strengthen the argument for religion to reject theoretical evidence which, while not demonstrative, serves to support whatever evidence may be derived from religious experience, and thereby increases the probability involved in the religious hypothesis and diminishes the gap left

for faith to transcend. Of course, if the traditional arguments for the existence of God demonstrated his existence, we would have no need of faith. But we cannot transcend probability in the theoretical realm; this, however, does not warrant us in closing the doors of access to God which the theoretical approach offers. Further, if it be true, as we have maintained throughout, that the theistic hypothesis completes and explains more fully the scientific hypothesis concerning the rationality of the world, it follows that the order of the world cannot be understood without intelligence as its cause, and that without God reason is thrown into hopeless despair and discord. In the former instance, God is a necessary hypothesis for the understanding of the facts of the world; and in the latter, God appears as a necessary implication of the rational life. Such a view as this implies that the laws of thought are valid and that over against the "subjective necessities of thought are corresponding objective necessities;" and this assumption underlies our whole system of knowledge and is not confined to theism. That is to say, the idea of God is not only a postulate of reason as practical; it is also a "regulative idea" for reason as theoretical. As J. Ward points out, mere pluralism, which begins with the world and marches on in empirical fashion, has to accept the undeniable unity, which is implied in the very idea of a world, as an ultimate fact which we can neither explain nor consider as self-explanatory. "The theoretical demand for the ground of the world then, as well as the practical demand for the good of the world, is met by the idea of God." Now, if the idea of

90. B. P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 35; Cf. pp. 35 ff.
91. J. Ward, op. cit., p. 422.
God is "a regulative principle" for theoretical reason, there appears to be no good reason why we should not trust it. In criticism of Kant, Dr. F. L. Patton, in *Fundamental Christianity*, lifts the question: "If the regulative judgments about existence beyond sense are as much a part of our nature as our constitutive judgments, how can Kant question our right to say that a necessary belief in a necessary being is adequate reason for believing in the existence of that being?" He then adds:

"But if the same rigid test were applied to the argument based on the 'practical reason' that is applied to the principle of the 'regulative reason,' the moral argument would deserve no better fate, for demonstration is as impossible under the one as the other." This last statement is true for two reasons so far as the doctrine of the will to believe is concerned. In the first place, as we have seen the religious hypothesis cannot be verified in the same way that a scientific hypothesis can be. Also, it offers no genuine or sufficient criterion by which to judge beliefs. It is not only possible for different people to hold different beliefs, according to this view, but it may be interpreted so as to justify the position that, in certain cases, different people ought to hold different or even contradictory beliefs. Moreover, as F. R. Tennant maintains, moral considerations are but the coping stone of the teleological argument, not a substitute for it, and we must establish theism before we are entitled to use its moral corollaries. "Had Butler's suggestion been followed," Tennant says, "that probability is the guide of life; and had the deistic tenet, that revealed religion presupposes natural religion, not been evaded: the nineteenth century would have done better than expend much of its

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93. Ibid., p. 91.
theological strenuousness in pursuing blind roads that had the look of
short cuts, and eventually, in sheer weariness, beating the tracks of su-
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perficial pragmatism and airily nonchalant subjectivism." While this
statement puts the matter strongly, it does emphasize the essential weak-
nesses in the attempts to construct a religious view of the world based up-
on moral considerations, or value-judgments, and immediate feeling.

Finally, James is never able to overcome the old dualism between faith
and demonstrable knowledge. He cannot fully harmonize theoretical and
practical truth; his ultimate solution is to subordinate intellectual in-
terests to free will or practical efficiency. This becomes especially
prominent in his abandonment of the problematic attitude in favor of volun-
tary belief. Also, the limitations which he places upon faith assume that
the intellect is absolutely authoritative in all cases in which it is in
position to render a decision. It is even regarded as authoritative when
it cannot decide the issue if practical urgency plays no part in the matter.
Thus faith or free belief is permissible only when it is necessary to act
without sufficient theoretical evidence. That is to say, theoretical truth
and moral conviction exist side by side, but the latter must not contradict
the former, and is not legitimate so long as we are in the realm of sci-
tific knowledge. Thus, he is never quite able to reconcile theoretical
truth and practical effectiveness; they remain separated throughout. Fur-
ther, in spite of the fact that he grounds all knowledge in faith, faith is
less certain than knowledge when the latter is in position to speak at all.
Lastly, as J. Lindsay points out, it is "his complete final identification

95. Ibid., p. 304.
of cognition with will that is so unsatisfactory." Both Lindsay and J. Laird, following Sigwart and Windleband, maintain that the problematic judgment is a true theoretical judgment, and not a decision or result dictated by volition and feeling; for them, the decision that there is a conflict of evidence more or less evenly balanced is not a "passional decision" just like deciding yes or no, as James maintains that it is; but it is an intellectual decision and, therefore, does not belong to voluntary belief. If they are justified in their contention, and there are good reasons for supposing that they are, the argument for the will to believe is fallacious at an essential point. But whatever shortcomings and misjudgments this doctrine contains, its vital principle remains intact: that the whole man is involved in life's deepest convictions, and that these, whether scientific or religious, are alike rooted in faith. James thus built more wisely and more permanently than he knew; in spite of the defects and fallacies of his argument his conclusion is true and extremely important, and will find a permanent place in the philosophy of the future. J. Royce's remark concerning Schopenhauer is quite applicable to James here, as well as at other points in his philosophy: "We may refute a great thinker's accidental misjudgments; we can seldom refute his deeper insights."

97. Lindsay, Ibid., p. 34; pp. 38 ff; J. Laird, Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion, p. 152; Cf. W. B., p. 11.
PART THREE

PRAGMATISM
VI

THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF MEANING AND METHOD

The latter part of the nineteenth century was characterized by the so-called "war" between religion and science. At the same time, Kantian idealism and naturalism were engaged in an uncompromising conflict. Due to the fact that idealism, or rationalism, as James usually speaks of it, was allied with religion in opposition to the mechanistic doctrines of naturalism, the struggle between idealism and naturalism was associated with the conflict between religion and science. Because of this situation rationalism became connected with religion and empiricism with "inhumanism and irreligion." As James construes the situation, rationalism is too far removed from the concrete facts of everyday life adequately to meet the religious needs of man, and empiricism lacks the religious qualities necessary to meet such needs. "You find," he says, "an empirical philosophy that is not religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical enough." In order to resolve this dilemma in philosophy, and to soften the conflict between religion and science, James offers pragmatism as a mediating philosophy which, as he conceives it, is capable of meeting the demands of both religion and science. He writes of pragmatism in this respect as follows: "It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts."

That is to say, pragmatism, according to its leading protagonist, retains the good points of idealism and empiricism, but rejects the objectionable features

1. Pragmatism, p. 20.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
in both of them; it is religious and at the same time it is true to the
facts of life.

Of the many influences which led to the genesis of the doctrine of
pragmatism, the first to be noted is that of science. The modern scientific
view of the use and meaning of hypotheses played a large and an important
part in bringing the new philosophy into being. The pragmatist view incorpo­
rates the hypothetical method of induction and the "economical" account of
scientific theories. Laws for science are not unchangeable principles, but
they are made by man and subject to change in accordance with his purposes.
Hypotheses are nothing more than convenient ways of expressing what has oc­
curred, or what may be expected to happen in the future; when they have ren­
dered this service, they are of no further use. Their whole meaning, for
the scientist, is exhausted when they have performed this function. Thus
the one question of importance concerning hypotheses is whether or not they
accomplish the purpose for which they have been adopted, that is, whether or
not they work. Their usefulness is always a more important consideration
than their truth. If they successfully perform their practical function,
they are accepted as true; but if they fail to work, there is no reason to
regard them as true. Obviously, then, for the scientist, both truth and use­
fulness are forms of value, and the question whether hypotheses are true be­
cause they are useful or useful because true is comparatively irrelevant.

Due to the acceptance and persistent application of the scientific method of
procedure by the exponents of pragmatism, Professor H. B. Perry does not
overstate the case when he says, "the whole 'experimentalist' tendency in
English science and philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pragmatist
theory that truth is achieved by the trying of hypotheses."

The Darwinian hypothesis of evolution also played an important part in the rise of pragmatism. The evolutionary conception of mind assigns thought a functional role, along with other organic functions, in the efforts of the organism to adjust itself to its environment in the persistent struggle for existence. Thought is regarded as a product of vital adjustment. The intellect has no intrinsic value of its own, but is considered as an instrument of the will which has arisen out of the efforts of will to cope with new experiences. Changes in the environment call for corresponding adaptations on the part of the organism; and it is the function of thought to produce, as economically and successfully as possible, the necessary changes of belief demanded by each new situation in which the organism is placed. The forms of thought, like those of evolution, are not unchangeable and eternal, but mutable and relative. They arise out of adaptations to new conditions in an ever changing environment. "It is an evolving process which keeps pace with the evolution of reality and the changing situation of mortal life." Thus truth, like everything else in an evolving world, has its history; thought is no exception to the principle of change and instability. Truths serve as guides to reality but as soon as they fail to be of use in this respect, they are discarded. If they cannot meet the new situations which arise they must perish like any other organic form while their more successful rivals carry on the work which they have failed to do. Thus the history of truth is the history of the attempt of the intellect to meet the needs of life and action. The first attempt in philosophy completely to assimilate the doctrine of evolution was made by pragmatism.

"The "new psychology" of the latter part of the nineteenth century was
another factor which contributed to the rise of the philosophy of pragmatism. As a matter of fact, the influence of evolution upon pragmatism came, for the most part, through the alignment of the latter with the more recent developments in psychology. James is regarded as the father of "functional psychology," which sets out from the evolutionary point of view and attempts to discover what needs of the organism are met by sense perception, by mental images, by emotion, and by thinking. The chief aim of functional psychology is to give psychology a place in the general field of biological sciences. Now James was the first psychologist to make a consistent and thoroughgoing application of the evolutionary principle to psychology. The Principles of Psychology, his first and greatest work, which appeared in 1890, was not only of epoch-making importance in the history of psychology, but was eventually to bring far reaching changes in philosophy as well. For the two central ideas which govern his later philosophical thought—the activity and unity of consciousness—receive explicit formulation in his earlier work in psychological terms. "James's theory of knowledge," writes Professor R. B. Perry, "was developed from this psychological standpoint, and is throughout dominated by its two main characteristics: its emphasis on the categories of interest and practice; and its reduction of relations, substances, activities, and other alleged transcendent elements to the continuities of sense-experience. The former motive in James's thought led to his voluntarism and pragmatism, the latter to his 'radical empiricism.'" Thus one of the chief characteristics of the new psychology, namely, that which construes consciousness as selective, interested, 

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7. Ibid., p. 46.
teleological, became a dominating principle in the new philosophy, due to the fact that James was instrumental in originating both.

The birth and development of the new psychology, with its emphasis on will and purpose, served to bring into the foreground the weakness of abstract intellectualism which looks to the scholastic logic-chopping exercises as the source of the soul's satisfaction. It may be said, then, that pragmatism arose as a revolt against this abstract and vicious intellectualism which overlooks the rest of human nature. Pragmatism rebelled against this "inhuman" tendency in both naturalism and absolutism and contended that man is more than intellect and that, consequently, he does not live by intellect alone. It is no doubt possible to account for some of the extravagances of pragmatism by the fact that it reacts so violently against those theories which regard everything as logically necessary, and place all upon the same level without distinction of values, that it swings to the opposite extreme as a corrective measure to what it regards as an intolerable intellectualism. It may be well to consider more fully the relation which pragmatism sustains to these two schools of thought. Pragmatism is opposed to naturalism insofar as the latter assigns the mechanical categories the fundamental place, but there is not such a wide difference between them as there is between pragmatism and absolutism. For pragmatism and naturalism have much in common apart from the opposition of the former to a universal mechanism which the latter holds. Pragmatism, as Professor R. B. Perry says, "may even in a sense be called 'naturalistic'. For it identifies reality with 'this world,' with the sort of thing that is going on here and now; and regards perception as the most reliable means of knowledge." Thus pragmatism is chiefly concerned with attacking absolute idealism. Pragmatism opposes the mathematical

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and dialectical method of absolutism; and would make all hypotheses submit to the test of experience. It rejects the monism, determinism, quietism of absolutism by proclaiming and defending pluralism, indeterminism, and meliorism. Pragmatism conceives the logical unity of the world, which is fundamental to absolutism, as a meaningless abstraction. "That which for absolutism is mere appearance—the world of space and time, the interaction of man and nature, and of man and man, is for pragmatism the quintessence of reality. The one is the philosophy of eternity, the other the philosophy of time." Perhaps it is not too much to say that pragmatism opposes that which is fundamental to absolutism, while absolutism denies that which is fundamental to pragmatism.

Finally, there is an historical connection between pragmatism and Kant's doctrine of the "prinacy of the practical reason," and the Fichtean Idealists. Kant maintained that, although we are unable to prove the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, it is our right and duty, as volitional, active, and rational creatures, to postulate their reality because they are absolutely essential to moral action. For Kant the consciousness of duty is a profounder insight than knowledge of objects although the latter is more scientific. As to the connection between the philosophy of Fichte and pragmatism, Josiah Royce says, "Fichte's philosophy is a deliberate synthesis of pragmatism with Absolutism." Thus while it is inadvisable to attempt to identify pragmatism too closely with any of the doctrines that bear a resemblance to it, it appears certain that it is related to the Kantian and Fichtean forms of voluntarism as well as to other traditional trends of thought. But the naturalistic and empirical tendencies of pragmatism serve clearly to dis-

10. Ibid., p. 199.
tistinguish it from the idealistic form of voluntarism. There are several important respects in which contemporary pragmatism differs from the Kantian position. The former emphasizes the part which choice plays in belief while Kant insists upon the necessity of belief. Kant’s argument arises out of the needs of our moral nature and reaches out after beliefs capable of supporting it. We do not have to wait upon experience to dictate what we are to believe. Pragmatism, on the other hand, takes its instructions concerning what we are to believe from experience. Again, Kant’s conception that the moral sense gives us our only clue to reality leads him to hold that our moral interests may determine beliefs. But pragmatism allows a wide range of interests to determine belief; every known interest is important to belief. Kant’s appeal to the will is for the establishment of only the three ideas which have already been mentioned; all of these belong to the sphere of religion. Pragmatism holds that basic scientific beliefs have the same foundation; we cannot prove that all events have a cause, but we postulate it in the interest of scientific knowledge. Pragmatism maintains that we are constantly using beliefs which we cannot prove. As has been shown in our discussion of the doctrine of the "will to believe," the scientist also "lives by faith" in objects which he cannot directly observe or discover; "inaccessible objects" such as gravity, electrons, energy, and so on. Such beliefs can be judged only by their effect in guiding action; if they give us the right direction they are true.

Pragmatism is not an essentially new doctrine. It has affinities with nominalism in that it appeals to particulars; it agrees with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; and, like positivism, it steers clear of

verbal solutions, superfluous questions, and metaphysical abstractions. In short, as the title of James's book on pragmatism suggests, it is "a new name for some old ways of thinking." It is not an easy matter to give a summary definition of pragmatism. For, strictly speaking, it is not a philosophy; it is more accurately regarded as a general point of view, or as a certain way of looking at things, rather than as a systematic doctrine. One may say that it is a criterion, an attitude, or a method, which one adopts in dealing with matters of philosophic concern. The doctrine of pragmatism, as such, supposedly does not commit itself to any particular results in metaphysics, but merely insists on an application of the teleological method. James uses the illustration of Papini, the Italian pragmatist, which describes pragmatism as resembling a corridor in a hotel which opens into several different chambers. One may find a free-thinker in one engaged in a polemic against the belief in God; in a second, there may be a man upon his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third, a scientist may be occupied with laboratory investigations; in a fourth, it may be that a system of idealistic metaphysics is being expounded; and in a fifth some one may be proclaiming the impossibility of metaphysics. Each thinker may use the method of pragmatism.

In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James defines pragmatism as the "doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other concept-

13. Pragmatism, pp. 53-54.
ions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences, is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions." It is characteristic of pragmatism to regard the categories of life as fundamental. And it should be remarked, as Professor R. B. Perry suggests, "that the pragmatist means by 'life', not the imaginary or ideal life of any hypothetical being, not the 'eternal' life or the 'absolute' life; but the temporal, operative life of animals and men, the life of instinct and desire, of adaptation and environment, of civilization and progress." It is the bio-centric philosophy and stresses man's mundane existence. It is a bodily philosophy which magnifies the desires, powers and interests of man for this life. It glories in man's accomplishments, and in his ability to achieve still greater things by the free exercise of his powers.

There are two cardinal elements in pragmatism: its doctrine of method and its theory of truth. We shall consider first the pragmatic method and theory of meaning which is an essential and basic principle of pragmatism. We shall reserve for the following chapter our treatment of the pragmatic conception of truth. In 1898 James delivered an address at Berkeley, California, entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," in which he introduced his new theory to the world. He sets out from a principle which C. S. Peirce had enunciated to the effect that the

meaning of every idea which has no sense-imagery in it may be discovered, if there is any meaning in the idea, in the sense-effects which it leads to.

The sole function of thought, according to Peirce, is to produce habits of action, that is belief. If any part of a thought makes no difference in the practical consequences of the thought, then, that part is merely an accretion to it, but no part of it. "To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces. For what a thing means is simply what habits it involves." Thus the conduct which a thought is fitted to produce constitutes for us its sole significance. For Peirce, "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice." For example, when we say that a body is heavy we mean simply that in the absence of opposing force, the body will fall. Again, when we call a thing hard we mean that other substances cannot scratch it. In each case the whole conception of the quality in question lies in its conceived effects. "Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that the thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacraments, if they agree in regard to all other sensible effects, here or hereafter." James modifies and enlarges this principle as held by Peirce because he places a different and broader

19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Ibid., p. 43.
21. Ibid., p. 44.
22. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
23. Ibid., p. 45.
interpretation on the term "practical" than Peirce's statement allows. While admitting that the ultimate test of the meaning of a truth lies in the conduct it dictates or inspires, he thinks it foretells some particular turn in our experience which shall call for that particular type of conduct which fact accounts for its inspiring that conduct. He expresses this broader conception of Peirce's principle by saying "that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact that it must be active." Thus, for him, the term "practical" is taken to mean concrete and particular rather than referring primarily to action. This aspect of his doctrine is essentially the same as his empiricism which, as a method, consists in tracing to a positive, concrete, and particular terminus every substitution, representation or meaning. His empirical method, like his empirical account of knowledge, is a description of a definite process in a world the very nature of which is duration, flux, process, both continuous and discrete. If any part of it is taken intrinsically, it is "a that which is not yet any definite what, tho ready to be all sorts of what's; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught.... But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions... In all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feelings.
The conjunctions are as primordial elements of 'fact' as are the distinctions and disjunctions. Knowing in such a world begins with significances, that is, with knowledge of acquaintance, and passes on to significations, or knowledge about, which, in order to be true must lead back to and be lost in significances. "Every meant, even in error, is more and richer than the meaning which envisages it, never completely foreseen by it, always eclipsing it, and existentially additive to it. Every meant is a possession, not a transition; it is a significance which is held, when known, as directly and immediately 'satisfactory.' Satisfaction is the relation which balances the organism with environment. It is awareness itself, external to its object and intrinsically apprehending and possessing it."

The pragmatic doctrine of method is based on the same observation and, therefore, is essentially no different from the method of empiricism. It involves the 'attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.' It proceeds by reducing the meaning of propositions, as we have seen from James's statement, to particular consequences, it passes from ideals to existences, from facts to principles, and returns to facts. It is characterized by experimentation rather than by legislation, and it expects future experience to bring change in everything; such changes may, or may not, follow a certain order, obey a particular law, or follow some familiar pattern. It is ever ready to face any eventuality that the course of experience may dictate. The essentially analogical nature of experience renders the ordinary logic of method inadequate. James conceives the world

27. Pragmatism, pp. 54-55.
as a place in which everything struggles for the mastery; opportunity, rather than achievement, is the order of the day. Every item is equally there with every other item, but no one is entitled to claim special privileges. The one and only requirement for victory is the ability to demonstrate superiority in the constant struggle for a place in the pervasive flux. Thus classes, concepts, universals, laws, hypotheses, theories, regardless of their origin, are external and additional data in the world of facts which they help to explain and control. They must prove their efficacy by a return to the flux, and by fusing their assences with it. They can claim a right to survive only if they are fit to survive; that is, if they can control the data to which they are applied. For these data, each being its own standard and judge, will not allow anything external to legislate for them or explain them without struggle. "The truth which attains it, the interest which means it, it consumes and assimilates, so that it comes finally to the mind with no veils between. The differentia of its presence is 'satisfaction,' and process which leads to its truth."

The pragmatic view of meaning may be said to have a twofold aim: First, it attempts to offer a definite, exact, and technical theory concerning the nature of meaning; to show what constitutes meaning and when we have it and when we do not. Second, it tries to give us a method by which we may choose our problems which will enable us to eliminate meaningless questions and concentrate our attention only on problems which are worth discussing. For the pragmatist, then, it is simply a waste of time to consider any theories which make no difference in experience, which do not have some specific meaning in terms of experience. It would put an end to many controversies by

eliminating all theories in whose differences no issue that would make a difference can be found. James applies the pragmatic method to several classic controversies, such as the dispute between materialism and theism, the problem of free will, the quarrel between pluralism and monism, and the question of the absolute. In each case he asks "what difference does it make?" if one theory is regarded as true rather than the other. If no difference in concrete experience is discovered between the results of one theory over those of another, then the two theories about which the controversy centers differ in words only, not in fact. Theological controversies form no exception to this principle. "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much."

The application of the pragmatic doctrine of method to theological questions leads him to rather sweeping conclusions. First, when it is applied to God's metaphysical attributes, as distinguished from His moral attributes, the result leads James to conclude that all such attributes are destitute of "all intelligible significance." He cannot see that a single one of these attributes in any way makes any difference insofar as practical consequences go; these qualities make no definite connection with our life, nor call for any distinctive adaptation of our conduct. Thus the question of their truth or falsity is a matter of irrelevance; they in no way affect one's religion. God's asinity, His immateriality, His simplicity, His personality, apart from its moral qualities, His self-sufficiency, and so on,—these are "but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjecites, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word

30. Pragmatism, p. 70.
"God" by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood... (The) metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind." As to God's moral attributes, such as holiness, omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, and so on, the pragmatic method leaves them standing as being of definite value. They enter into definite connection with our religious life; they determine our fears, our hopes and expectations. "If dogmatic theology really does prove beyond dispute that a God with characters like these exists, she may well claim to give a solid basis to religious sentiment. But verily, how stands it with her arguments?" The theological arguments for God's moral attributes are no better than those for His existence; they do not prove that God is a moral being. His final conclusion is that we must "bid a definite good-by to dogmatic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant."

The pragmatic theory of method also determines the relation between philosophy and religion. He says that philosophy, which is always a secondary function in the sphere of religion, can become useful to religion provided it forsakes metaphysics and deduction for criticism and deduction and assumes the form of a science of religious rather than that of theology. Thus it can criticize the religious concepts, eliminating the local and accidental elements; and remove the historical incrustations from both dogma and worship. It can serve to eliminate religious doctrines which run counter to established scientific conceptions, leaving only as tenable religious views those which accord with the results of natural science. Those that remain may be dealt with as hypotheses, testing them in the same way hypotheses are tested, thereby dis-

32. Ibid., pp. 446, 447.
33. Ibid., p. 447.
34. Ibid., p. 448.
covering which ones should be discarded and which ones are worthy of preservation. It can place its stamp of approval upon the latter in proportion as they are verified or verifiable. These hypotheses may be further refined by separating the "innocent over-belief" and symbolical in them from literal fact. This will enable philosophy to become a mediator between believers who differ in opinions, and serve to produce religious belief which represents a consensus of opinion. Eventually, it may be possible to win as wide a public recognition for religious views of this sort as has been attained by physical science. Even those who are personally non-religious might come to accept these religious beliefs, very much as a blind person accepts the facts of optics. Of course, those who have first-hand religious experience are the only ones entitled to speak with authority, and the science of religions would always have to depend upon personal experience for its critical reconstructions.

Theology and philosophy have both proved inadequate, according to the pragmatic theory of method, so far as rendering a positive and constructive service to religious thought is concerned. We have now to consider what the pragmatic method itself can do when applied to philosophical and theological problems, that is, what conclusions it enables us to reach concerning questions in these fields of thought when we proceed solely on the ground of the significance for life of the conceptions examined. First, we shall follow him in the application of the pragmatic theory of method to the issue between materialism and theism. If the world should come to an end this very moment, the entire contents of it having been once for all irrevocably given, what difference can we find between these two rival theories

35. Ibid., pp. 455-456.
concerning the universe? By hypothesis, the world is complete, it has no future; there is no more experience. He supposes that the two views are equally successful in explaining the facts of the world. For the pragmatist there is nothing here which can make any difference in the rival doctrines. There is no experience to which he can return in which to look for differences; both views have shown all the consequences that can possibly ensue. Thus, in spite of the differences which occur in the statement of materialism and theism, they are identical doctrines. For if God's work were finished and His world ended, He is worth only so much as His world is worth. If, then, we made matter responsible for the world and left God out, we could not possibly suffer any loss. Both God and matter mean exactly the same thing, that is, the power which could make just such a world as this; either conception can mean neither more nor less than this. So whether we view the world as governed by the laws of matter or a controlled by the providence of God, so far as the past goes, it amounts to the same thing. But when we look into the future, the issue between materialism and theism assumes an entirely different form. For the theory of mechanical evolution holds for us a very dark and blank picture. "That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, though many a jewelled shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be dissolved—even as our world now lingers, for joy—yet when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely nothing remains, to represent those particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an echo; without a memory; without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for
similar ideals. This utter and final wreck and tragedy is of the essence of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and not the higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last surviving forces within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely see." On the other hand, when taken prospectively, the idea of God brings promise in that "it guarantees an ideal order shall be permanently preserved." Thus while materialism means the denial that the moral order is eternal and the loss of our ultimate hopes, theism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and creates hope. Materialism, in short, renders hope impossible, and theism makes it inevitable. "A world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast....Here then, in these different emotional and practical appeals, in these adjustments of our concrete attitudes of hope and expectation, and all the delicate consequences which their differences entail, lie the real meanings of materialism and spiritualism—not in hair-splitting abstractions about matter's inner essence, or about the metaphysical attributes of God."

James later admits a flaw in this illustration due to the fact that even if matter could do everything which we usually conceive God as doing, the hypothesis of God would remain the truer because of our need for a being who

37. Ibid., p. 106.
38. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
recognizes us and judges us sympathetically.

James's empirical method when applied to the idea of "God" leaves him with the following beliefs:

1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance;
2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end;
3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit 'God' or 'law'—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

Religion includes also the following psychological characteristics:—
4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.
5. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections."

Now if we take these beliefs and these psychological characteristics together, "and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the question of their 'truth', we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind." That is to say, apart from the truth of religion, religious beliefs and the "faith-state" play such a useful part in human life, make such obvious differences in our action and general attitude towards life, that religion vindicates her

39. K. T., pp. 189-190, Note.
41. Ibid., p. 505.
right to a place among the interests of mankind. From a purely subjective point of view, religion's usefulness entitles her to claim that she performs a permanently valuable function for mankind. As to the intellectual content of religion, in spite of all the differences in religious creeds, there is a common element which binds all religions together.

All religions appear to unite in testifying to the fact that there "is something wrong about us as we naturally stand," and that "we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers."

In proportion as the individual is conscious of this wrongness, he is in possible touch with something higher, if such exists; he realizes that there is a better part of him along with the wrong part. When he reaches the point of salvation, he identifies his real being with this higher part of himself, be it ever so small. "He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a more of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck." But the question arises as to the objective truth of the content of such experiences. Does this "more" of our experience really exist, or is it merely a figment of our own imagination? Its value cannot be doubted, but are we so certain of the truth of its existence? What is it like? What is its form? Does it act, as well as exist? How shall we conceive that "union" with it which religious genuises claim to have? Here James, in keeping with his suggestion that an impartial science of religions might select a common body of

42. Ibid., p. 508.
43. Ibid., p. 508.
44. Ibid., p. 508.
doctrine which would be acceptable even to scientists, offers his own hypothesis concerning the "more", of religious experience. It is that this "more" is on "its 'hither' side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life." Now, it is objectively true as far as it goes that the "conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come." The rest is "over-belief." The real effects which flow from our contact with this unseen region are exerted on the personal centres of energy of individuals. This higher part of the universe James calls God. Since the effects upon our lives are real and manifest themselves in our character and conduct, God, who produces them, is also real. Further, most individuals believe that these effects extend over a wider range than the experience of personal union with God, namely, throughout the whole universe of beings to whom God is present. He offers security for all. That is, God must do more than enter the experience of the individual, He must have cosmic relations. He thus becomes the "guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved." Then, and only then, will the individual's confidence and peace be justified. Thus the religious view gives the world a nature essentially different from that which a materialistic world would have. "It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required."

We have followed James's attempt to apply the pragmatic doctrine of meaning to the materialistic-theistic controversy, and to the conception of God at some length in order to bring out a radical ambiguity in the doctrine

45. Ibid., p. 512.
46. Ibid., p. 515.
47. Ibid., p. 517.
48. Ibid., p. 518.
which renders his treatment of the subject confusing throughout. Professor A. O. Lovejoy points out that James overlooks the difference made by believing a certain doctrine and that made by a doctrine's being true. He says that the future consequences in concrete experience, whether active or passive, to which a significant proposition must point may be either:

1) Future experiences which are predicted as about to occur, regardless as to whether it is believed true or not; (2) or future experiences which take place only provided the proposition in question is believed. If we construe James's theory of meaning one way it means that only propositions which predict certain sensations or occurrences in concrete experience of some consciousness in time have real meaning. But if we interpret it the other way, it is not necessary to hold that the propositions pertain to the future. The only thing necessary in this case is that they be carried in some one's mind into the future as beliefs which have the power, emotionally or otherwise, to change that person's experiences so that they will be other than they would have been without the beliefs. That is, there are emotional or subjective differences which may follow from a certain belief, but which do not depend upon the belief's being either correct or verified. Thus there is quite a difference in the results of this doctrine when interpreted in one way and those which follow when it is taken in the other sense. If we take it in the first sense, that is, stripped of the emotional differences which a belief may make, it is allied with positivism and Occam's razor, in which theories are reduced to terms of verifying data,

50. Ibid., p. 8.
and all concepts which do not have that meaning are eliminated. Used in this sense, James finds that the only difference between materialism and theism is reducible to the difference each makes in our anticipation concerning a specific cosmic or personal future. This issue resolves itself to a "conflict between aesthetic preferences." Thus it is easy to eliminate as pragmatically meaningless many of the questions which have divided theologians and metaphysicians. It is possible, according to this version of the matter, to discard as without significance most of the theological creeds and most of the theories of speculative philosophy.

For as Professor Lovejoy points out, "these largely refer to alleged permanent, unvarying factors of reality, from which no specific contents of experience (beyond...the experiences directly arising from the recognition of the presence of those factors) can be clearly deduced. The trinitarian presumably does not necessarily anticipate 'concrete future experiences' different from those anticipated by the unitarian." The behavior of the universe may be expected to remain the same for the pantheist and the pluralistic theist.

If the theory is interpreted in the second sense, that is, so as to include "future experiences" which depend upon belief in the propositions, the doctrine then becomes so universal and inclusive as to deny real meaning to no proposition which makes the slightest emotional difference in the life of any individual. Thus, all beliefs which have been touched by human emotions must be admitted by the pragmatist as having significance. It could not even exclude the sentiment of the woman who liked to hear the

51. Ibid., p. 10.
word "Mesopotamia" pronounced because of the pleasing effect its sound
had upon her; it made her feel better. The belief in a future event,
for example, the ultimate triumph of righteousness, is unverifiable.
We cannot secure evidence to prove that this will be the final issue of
things. But this belief gives the believer more courage to live, enables
him to enjoy life, and inspires him to make sacrifices which otherwise he
would not make. The difference in the believer in this case does not de­
pend upon the correctness of the belief, but upon the belief itself. It
is obvious that this aspect of James's doctrine of method does not belong
to the strictly pragmatic theory of meaning, but more properly to his doc­
trine of the will to believe. For in the former, the difference is made
by the theory's being true, and in the latter by the emotional effect of
the belief whether the theory is true or not. James does not adhere clear­
ly to this distinction in his application of the pragmatic method, and his
failure to do so renders his treatment confusing, and accounts for the di­
vergent results which flow from the method when applied in these two dif­
ferent senses. In applying the pragmatic method to the issue between ma­
terialism and theism he follows the strict pragmatic sense which considers
theories the same if they are not translated in different experiential
terms. But his treatment of the conception of God departs from the nar­
rower method and interprets the significance of the conception in terms of
the dynamogenic effects of the belief in God upon the believer. We are
not concerned with this aspect of his doctrine of method here since it is
dealt with in the treatment of the doctrine of the will to believe, but we
have followed his application of it somewhat in detail so as to show the
precise difference between it and the more strictly pragmatic method.

For due to the confusion of the two aspects of his theory of meaning, the
bearing of pragmatism upon religion is frequently misconstrued; it is only
in the phase of the pragmatic method which properly belongs to the doc­
trine of the will to believe that pragmatism can be said to offer positive
and valuable support for religious conclusions. In fact, it may not be
too much to say that the strict pragmatic theory of method, as such, under­
mines a great deal of the support which the doctrine of the will to be­
lieve offers for religion. The pragmatic theory of method, to quote Pro­
fessor Lovejoy again, "gets its appearance of novelty and of practical
serviceableness in the settlement of controversies, from its one meaning;
and gets its plausibility entirely from the other." He says further, "But
\(^{52}\) (when the distinction is made) in the sense in which the theory might be
logically functional, it seems hardly likely to appear plausible; and in
the sense in which it is plausible, it appears destitute of any applicabil­
ity or function in the distinguishing 'real' from meaningless issues."

Let us consider further this theory of method in the narrow sense.
It is of the essence of this doctrine to claim that the meaning of any
proposition which we entertain consists in some reference to the future,
that is, to some "concrete future experience." Any judgment which con­
tains or implies no such future reference cannot be said to have any mean­
ing at all. The meaning of a proposition is fully exhausted when it has
been made clear what that particular and concrete future experience is to
which it refers. Barely as a theory concerning the meaning of propositions,

\(^{52}\) Op. cit., p. 11.
it cannot approve or disapprove any particular significant propositions; it can only rule out as meaningless those propositions which, by having no practical future consequences, are without meaning. It does not attempt to tell us what beliefs are true, but what beliefs contain enough value in terms of meaning to be worth our time to discuss. It is true that this theory of meaning leads, for James, to a theory of the meaning of truth, that is, to a theory as regards the way in which judgments are verified. For if all judgments must be predictive, their verification consists in realizing the experiences to which the prediction refers.

If the experiences predicted actually arrive, the judgments are true; and, strictly speaking, are known to be true only by their arrival along with the chain of intermediary experiences which the prediction contains. But this theory of the meaning of truth is not the same as the theory of meaning, and does not necessarily follow from it.

In the first place, it is obvious that James's theory of meaning which makes all meaning of a thing to consist in its consequences cannot be applied as a definition. The distinction between what a thing is and what it means cannot be overlooked. Now, as Professor D. C. Macintosh suggests, a definition must be reversible, but this is not possible with special pragmatic meanings, no more than the relation of cause and effect. He says that even if we regard it from the standpoint of an acceptance of the pragmatic method, a universal minimum of pragmatic meaning is stated in the definition: what a thing may mean for certain purposes, or the consequences which shall follow if it is used in a particular way, as means to a certain ultimate end. Thus "what it is" is its most "proximate meaning."

while "what it means", means what it is "more ultimately in special cases."

To regard the matter as James does is to ignore meaning in the sense which is expressible in a reversible proposition, or definition, and to confine it to the numerous "special pragmatist meanings." To ignore this important aspect of meaning is just as one-sided as the tendency of the intellectualist to confine meaning to that which is capable of being expressed in a reversible proposition, and to ignore the fact that all meaning, even definition, is relative to purpose. This oversight on the part of James becomes more serious when he passes from his theory of meaning to the theory of the meaning of truth, and attempts to make his special "pragmatic meanings" do service as a definition in the case of truth. Thus he lays himself open to the charge that he regards his pragmatic meaning of truth as true in "the intellectualistic sense."

The assertion that a proposition contains no meaning beyond some particular future consequences is plainly not applicable to many of our judgments. For instance, I may at this moment believe that a certain friend of mine consciously exists, that he lives in such and such a place, and that he is probably engaged in performing certain tasks which I have known him habitually to perform in the past. The chances are that I shall never have the opportunity of verifying his existence, at any future time, and so far as I know, there seems to be nothing in the future by way of consequences which I may expect to flow from my present belief about his present existence. Undoubtedly, my belief refers primarily to the present rather than to the future and does not reach beyond the present moment in which it

55. Ibid., p. 429.
arises. A strictly past or present reference characterizes many of our beliefs; many, perhaps most of our beliefs are related to things which have a date, and it is not always future. If I recall Calvin's acquiescence in the death of Servetus, the part of my meaning which specifically refers to the remote past in which the incident took place seems to have nothing at all to do with any future particular consequences either in my own, or in another's experiences. The amount of future reference which such a proposition implies seems to constitute only the means of verification. For the most part, beliefs which pertain to facts in the past, and which have no implications concerning future experience, cannot properly be said to be subject to verification at all. Further, this theory of meaning renders all questions concerning past or present facts meaningless. For example, to say at the end of the world, that Judas Iscariot was crucified would mean the same thing as to say that Christ was, since neither statement carries no further consequences, and no future consequences are to be expected. Or, again, it would mean the same thing to say that Hitler was President of the United States in 1938, as it would to assert that F. D. Roosevelt was. This holds true of all such questions once we accept the pragmatic view. As J. B. Pratt argues, "if all meanings can be brought down to consequences 'in our future practical experience,' and if, by hypothesis, we have no future practical experience 

...there can no longer be any meaning in anything." Thus all questions which have no future consequences must be pronounced meaningless. The historicity of Mark, the authorship of the Pentateuch, or that of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the date and manner of Paul's death, are all

57. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., p. 31.
questions which appear to be without future consequences to us and must, according to the pragmatist theory, be regarded as absolutely meaningless.

"In short," to quote Professor Pratt again, "from history, geology, biology, astronomy,—from every field of human thought,—come questions over which scholars are spending years of research, yet which are certainly even now fully as meaningless as the theistic-materialistic controversy will be at the end of time, and which, according to the pragmatist doctrine, are purely verbal disputes."

We have no warrant for holding that future consequences alone determine the meaning of a proposition. We know the meaning of the statement that a certain star or planet is so many miles from the earth irrespective of any consequences, either future or past, to us or to anyone else. Or if it were the end of time, we would know the difference between saying that there are two grains of sand in a place, or that there are two million grains. Even such a trivial instance as the latter shows that meaning is present when no consequences of any kind can be connected with the proposition. It is also obvious that this narrow view of the doctrine of method must exclude countless questions which are pursued out of intellectual interest; for if this view be strictly adhered to, it matters not how deeply we may be interested in a question, if it has no future consequences, it is not worth discussion, it is meaningless. Yet it is quite possible for one to have a much greater interest in some question which appears to have no future consequences than in one which obviously does have. For instance, there are many people who would rather be able to settle the question of the authorship of the Pentateuch than to know the future of

58. Ibid., p. 33.
aviation for, let us say, the next twenty-five years. Yet the development of aviation may tremendously affect their own lives in the future, while the question concerning the authorship of the Pentateuch belongs to the "dead" and meaningless past, according to the pragmatist. The pragmatist, then, is forced to deny meaning where it is obviously present, and allow our desire for knowledge to play no part in choosing what questions we shall discuss. Further, even if we agree with the pragmatist that beliefs which have no future reference, or which do not affect our future behaviour, are without meaning and interest, or are of no moral or religious value, we may yet ask whether or not beliefs of this kind really exist. If so, where are they to be found? For, as Professor A. O. Lovejoy says, "any belief which I am supposed to be capable of carrying with me into the future, ipso facto constitutes an item of my future experience; it will in that future engender its own concomitant states of thought and feeling and call for its appropriate reaction, and it will therefore have importance and efficacy correspondence to the degree of interest and of influence which there attaches to it—no belief, while held, being wholly destitute of such interest and influence." The pragmatic doctrine of method appears, then, to be of little use to us as a means of determining our questions for discussion or controversy, in any field of thought, in that it must either reject meaning where it seems impossible to deny it and rule out many questions which interest and influence us, or submit to such a broad interpretation that it virtually includes all beliefs which persist because of their interest and influence. James does not regard

this theory of meaning as applying to "necessary truths," but holds that they are immediately verified; they have power to coerce the mind. He does not always appear to adhere to this exception, however, but apparently attempts to make a universal application of his theory concerning the way in which judgments are verified. He asserts, "but all roads lead to Rome, and in the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere, which somebody's ideas have copied." Moreover, James's doctrine of method is not compatible with his admission that there are "necessary truths," or "eternal truths." "Necessary truths" are automatically self-verifying; the truth of a self-evident proposition is known without reference to the verification of future facts which it may include. If we admit eternal values of any kind, eternal truths which deal with eternal or past matters, or if we admit the existence of an eternal God, we render James's theory inadequate, for truths concerning eternal realities are not amenable to his pragmatic method. If James admits the existence of "necessary truths," he is not justified in ruling out, as he apparently does, the elaborate systems of metaphysics and rational theology built up by the whole series of Post-Kantian idealists which "constitute affirmations which do not imply the possibility of their own verification, for our minds, by any future sensible experience," because they cannot be verified in this manner. These systems start with some generally admitted fact of human experience and attempt, by following certain necessary and inter-

60. Pragmatism, p. 209.
61. Ibid., p. 215.
related truths, to arrive at the ultimate logical implications of that fact. His sweeping repudiation of dogmatic theology and philosophy can be understood only in the light of a denial of the existence of the necessities of thought.

It is also open to question whether the pragmatic doctrine of method can be of any real value with reference to moral questions. The ethical dilemma is essentially different from a practical situation in that it is primarily a conflict of values; it involves more than a mere knowledge of all of the factors involved, and the use of analysis. Here all of the factors may be taken into consideration, the various courses of action which it may dictate may be known, and yet doubt may remain as to the ethical implications which careful analysis of the situation possesses; because, in itself, it possesses no ethical implications at all. Usually, in respect of our moral questions it is not uncertainty concerning consequences which leaves us in doubt about a certain course of action, but precisely the fact that we are aware of the consequences which are likely to follow. It is quite true that it is often important and necessary to trace out the consequences of a contemplated course of action, but we do so as a means for the application of one of our "intrinsic evaluations." But in arriving at the latter pragmatism does not, and apparently cannot help us; and this element must be regarded as of supreme importance in any moral dilemma. The importance of this aspect of an ethical situation increases as the question under consideration increases in gravity and scope. Thus pragmatism cannot help us to decide the really important and meaningful moral questions. It should be observed also that it is not true, as the pragmatic method implies, that each moral situation is unique
and new. This is no doubt true of many ethical situations, but it cannot be said that all are. It may even be said that no moral situation is completely unique; there is always some element in each one which bears close resemblance to preceding ones.

It is generally admitted that all known differences do have a practical significance, to register another objection to the pragmatic doctrine of method, but, as Professor R. B. Perry points out, the fact that a known difference does make a difference "may serve as a rough and ready test of conceptual distinctions, but it will still be true that to discover the content of the conception or the precise nature of the difference we must resort not to the practical applications, but to the region of experience of which the concept purports to be a description." For, as he further suggests, while scientific concepts differ only insofar as they reveal distinctions in possible practical situations, since real differences in natural science are experimental differences due to the fact that most of its truths are experimental truths, this offers no support for the pragmatist argument. This simply shows that things are as the scientific descriptions say they are. It does not prove anything concerning the truth of arithmetic and algebra which, unlike the descriptions of science, do not deal with spatial and temporal redistributions. "To lose sight," he says, "of the abstract elements in experience to which mathematical systems refer, and to identify them with the practical coordination into which they enter, is to be guilty of the same fundamental confusion to which the pragmatist objects in the case of the conceptions of physics."

64. Ibid., p. 425.
When the pragmatist evaluates only the effects of a concept or proposition it is obvious that he entirely ignores the situation which gave rise to the proposition. For example, the metaphysical attributes of God, which James is quite certain cannot be rendered intelligible according to the pragmatic method, were the product of a certain kind of intellectual atmosphere and were not entirely isolated from religious experience. Further, they had very definite practical connections for the scholastics. We cannot understand the full significance of these speculations for them without reference to the actual situation which produced them. They do become meaningless verbal terms, "pedantic dictionary-adjectives," if we remove them from their original context and continue to regard them as valid. The pragmatist would, no doubt, place the immortal controversy between Athanasius and Arius in the category of the "meaningless," but to do so is to reveal an amazing ignorance or neglect of the real situation which gave rise to this hotly debated issue; that is, it would be to ignore the experiences out of which it grew and to show a failure to catch the practical significance which the controversy had for that time. Religious creeds are the result of profound religious experiences which greatly influence life; because we are no longer able to share or recapture such experiences we have no right to ignore their reality or practical significance for those to whom they were real and important. This is true of most, if not all, of the great issues of Christian thought. For, as Emil Brunner argues, "had not Paul and the Reformers been convinced that their doctrine of righteousness by faith had also a decisive practical significance, they would not have wasted a second reflecting upon it. The seemingly unspiritual, pragmatic criterion—By their fruits ye shall know them—that is, by
the practical usefulness of their doctrine—was decidedly their criterion."

L'en are seldom willing to sacrifice honor, position, the means of livelihood, time-honored institutions, and citizenship, for mere verbal quibbles. Issues for which they make such sacrifices may appear to be so many empty words to those of succeeding generations, but this certainly is not the case with the actual participants in such controversies; they regard themselves as trying to settle the "burning" questions of their time. We can regard them as irrelevant or meaningless questions only by overlooking all the factors in the actual situation out of which the controversies rose. I. King rightly suggests, in this connection, that the failure of the pragmatists to analyze the psychological postulate that consciousness leads to some sort of movement is responsible for their ambiguous position which maintains, on the one hand, that every true difference in thought must make a difference in action, and, on the other, that every mental content does make a difference.

Thought is functionally related to experience both before and after the situation, and the effects can be adequately evaluated only by taking into account the entire situation. If we consider only the effects which any given thought produces, an essential part of the process has been neglected. For if we regard experience as an active process, we must include the entire process which renders it necessary to take thought as an organic part of experience as a whole. If we view the matter in this light, then, there is no such thing as a merely verbal concept nor a meaningless or erroneous idea. Whatever exists has meaning and validity,

if not in one context in another; and the task of philosophy is not one of selecting and rejecting, but of finding the setting of that which is."

Further, it is quite conceivable that a concept could have possible effects which we fail to discover. For instance, Emil Brunner says that the "thought that faith in the triune God might have some relevance to the slums of the great cities, that the Christian doctrine of reconciliation might have some relevance to the problem of nationalism, seems almost absurd, not only to those who are alien to Christianity, but even to Christians and theologians themselves." Yet he thinks that both of these doctrines are of tremendous practical significance and that they should have a decisive influence upon conduct in the various relationships of humanity. Moreover, the pragmatic doctrine that if two apparently different definitions of reality before us have identical consequences, those two definitions would really be identical, may lead us to incredibly absurd vagaries of thought. For instance, one person may conceive God as a tyrant and as a God of vengeance; consequently, he serves Him out of servile fear and produces "fruit meet for repentance." Another person may think of God in terms of love, and as a Heavenly Father. His service is rendered out of love and gratitude. Now, it is conceivable that these two persons may go through life with these different conceptions of God, being differently motivated in their service of God, but their lives, so far as all outward appearances go, bring forth identical fruits; such as honesty, loyalty, morality, piety, and so on. Shall we take this to mean that there is no difference between conceiving God in terms of fear and thinking of Him as a God of love? Do fear and love here mean identically the same thing?

67. I. King, op. cit., p. 524.
68. E. Brunner, op. cit., p. 71.
It would seem so from the point of view of the pragmatic doctrine of method, and yet no pragmatist is willing to say that serving God out of fear is as worthy a motive as service born of love, even if the visible results are the same. But his position forces him to admit that a judgment based merely upon effects, insofar as they can be known, places them upon the same level; that is, fear and love are made to appear identical as motives in religious conduct.

To proceed according to the pragmatic doctrine of method is tacitly to assume greater knowledge about objective reality than is warranted, and such an assumption is in keeping with traditional philosophy from which pragmatism attempts to free itself. I. King states the case as follows: "To hold that the idea which has arisen out of a vital difference in the constitution of things may be distinguished by its effects, is to assume a knowledge of a coherent order of objective reality; for without such a knowledge, how could the proper effects be known as such?" Further, a phenomenon familiar to students of the history of thought is that of some doctrine, or belief, which has been of epoch-making significance for a certain period but which time and change have left behind. After years, or perhaps centuries, it is taken up again and it becomes as influential upon human thought and conduct, and as far reaching in its effects upon contemporary life as it had been at its earlier appearance. In the period between its first and second appearance it was regarded as of little importance, or neglected because of certain undesirable features, or simply buried midst the enthusiasm for some other doctrine which was discovered or rediscovered. In cases of this kind, and there are many of them, the practical significance, or effects, of the revived conception were poten-

tially present but were not discerned during the interval. It is not possible to hold that during the time of its neglect it was a meaningless doctrine. Yet, according to the pragmatic theory of meaning, we would be justified in taking this position. It may have been meaningless so far as the people of that period were concerned but it was not meaningless in itself. The conclusion to which we are led, then, is that pragmatism, as a method, helps us to see that it is a good "rule never to discuss anything unless it has some genuine interest, unless it makes a real difference to someone," but when it attempts to do more than this, that is, when it tries to tell us what questions to exclude from, and what ones to include in, our controversies and discussions, it proves unequal to the task. Further consideration of the pragmatic theory of method will be involved in our treatment of the pragmatic doctrine of truth as set forth in the following chapter.

70. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., p. 39.
VII
THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE OF TRUTH

The central doctrine of pragmatism is its conception of truth. According to the correspondence theory of truth, ideas are true if they correspond to reality. When examined, this notion of truth has its difficulties in that it assumes that we can know reality apart from our ideas of it and compare it with those ideas to see if the two correspond. Obviously, this is impossible, since what knowledge we may have of reality must be derived from our ideas of it. Another notion of truth, namely, the coherence theory, holds that "the truth is the whole"; and coherence or consistency means "the consistency so far as attainable, of the whole body of experience with itself". The difficulty with this theory is that only the whole of truth can be absolutely self-consistent, and we cannot reach certainty short of the Absolute, or complete omniscience. H. H. Joachim, in The Nature of Truth, concludes that no theory of truth as coherence could be completely true since it must be "other" than the truth "about" what it is. This theory fails to attain that concrete coherence which must characterize complete truth. Pragmatism makes much of the weaknesses of these two theories of truth and presents as a more satisfactory view of truth the notion that truth is a value; something which happens to ideas, rather than a logical characteristic of ideas, and that they are validated by their practical use. It should be observed, before proceeding to give James's pragmatic notion of truth, that there is a confusion in

2. Ibid., p. 267.
James's treatment of the subject which corresponds to the ambiguity that we mentioned concerning his doctrine of method, that is, his failure to adhere to the distinction between pragmatism proper and the fideistic aspect of his voluntarism. We must bear in mind that, in reality, these two aspects of his philosophy are distinct, and, in spite of his frequent mixing them up, he regards them as different doctrines. In the fideistic phase of his doctrine, as we have seen, we have a right to believe in the absence of evidence, or without sufficient evidence. Pragmatism is the formulation of a theory of strict truth in terms of a certain operation which culminates in its verification. Both arise out of his empiricism, but they are actually distinct doctrines. It is important to emphasize this distinction here because of the difference in the bearing of the two phases of thought upon religion. His fideism is more serviceable to religion than his pragmatism. In fact, there is much in the latter that may be considered inimical to religion. In discussing his theory of truth, we shall attempt to keep clearly in mind this difference between these two aspects of his doctrine which are often treated as identical.

It is important to remember that, for James, immediate knowledge, or "knowledge by acquaintance", that is, knowledge which is consummated in experience, constitutes knowledge in the ultimately preferred sense. "Knowledge about" is at best merely a substitute for the former. All knowledge is virtually direct or presentative; representation is cognitive only in so far as it is a virtual presentation. "Knowledge about" is not completed until the object is exhibited to the mind. "The maximal conceivable truth in an idea would seem to be that it should lead to an actual merging of ourselves with the object, to an utter mutual confluence and identification."

4. M. T., p. 156.
To know by acquaintance "is for mental content and object to be identical." In short, "knowledge about", with which pragmatism is concerned, is incidental to "knowledge by acquaintance" and is used merely as a means of widening the scope of the latter by substitution. The necessity for "knowledge about" arises out of the limited scope of immediate knowledge. Practically, the mind is forced to transcend sense-experience to such an extent that one must say that it is characteristic of knowledge or belief to refer to the region beyond one's immediate experience. For the greater part of our knowledge pertains to yesterday, to tomorrow, or lies beyond spatial regions which are immediately accessible to one. Only on rare occasions is the reality immediately present. Due to this fact, most of what we call knowledge or belief is a result of limitations; but this should not be interpreted to mean that immediate knowledge is any the less important or fundamental. For it sets our norm of knowledge and that which passes for knowledge, most of the time, does not give the satisfaction which immediate knowledge itself does. Thus "knowledge about" is a device which the empiricist uses to compensate for a lack of confidence in the capacities of thought to know that which is not immediately present, for his rejection of a priori knowledge, or knowledge of universals, and dialectic processes of ideas. It is only by some such practical remedy that he can emancipate himself from the limits of space and time which his view of immediate knowledge, as basic, imposes upon him.

We may ascertain the value of "knowledge about" by a brief glance at what James conceives the function of knowledge to be. The function of "knowledge by acquaintance" is to get things directly acted upon, or directly

5. W. T., p. 50.
introduced into life. This type of knowledge is characterized by the fact that "any one and the same that in experience must figure alternately as a thing and as a knowledge of the thing, by reason of two divergent kinds of context into which, in the general course of experience, it gets woven." 6

In other words, in this type of knowledge the thing itself is acted on and felt about in a way peculiar to an individual conscious field; the most familiar instance of this is sense-perception. Here the only difference between the knowing and the known is that the knowing is simply the context into which the thing known is received. The function of "knowledge about" is to supply us with substitutes for things which it is not possible to know directly so that the original function of knowledge may be widened in scope.

"The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its representative, not in any quasi-miraculous 'epistemological' sense, but in the definite practical sense of being its substitute in various operations." 7 In other words, the function of this type of knowledge is to give us access to the object when it is not actually present. This view involves two fundamental things, namely, that we have a right to believe what our theoretical operation leaves unproved, that is, fideism; and that verifying knowledge is itself a practical operation, that is, pragmatism. It is of the essence of pragmatism to maintain that our theoretical tests are practical or quasi-practical processes.

For pragmatism, ideas assume a functional role. An idea is anything which performs the function of meaning something. Anything which exercises the function of meaning is, in this sense, an idea, such as words, symbols, images, and so on. If I use a word to convey meaning it is an idea. If

7. Ibid., p. 61.
I have a visual image of the city of London, and I use it to mean the city, then, my visual picture would be an idea. In short, according to the functional view of ideas, it does not matter what ideas are just so we "mean", or intend something with them. The primary relation, then, that an idea sustains to its object is to "mean", to designate, or point to, that particular object. An idea must also "agree" with its object, but before we can know whether or not it "agrees" with it, the object must be identified as the object "meant." Thus "it is not by dint of discovering which reality a feeling 'resembles' that we find out which reality it means. We become first aware of which one it means, and then we suppose that to be the one it resembles." "The Tigers of India," for instance, must be identified as the tigers which my idea intended before I can know that my idea of them is in agreement with them. Now that towards which an idea points, that which it means, is that towards which action is directed. The tigers form a terminus, or a goal, towards which action leads, for had it not been for some plan of action or purpose, with reference to the tigers, I would not have an idea of them at all. In other words, pointing is essentially a practical affair. "The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known simply and solely as a procession of mental associates and motor consequences that follow on the thought, and that would lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real context, or even into the immediate presence of the tigers." The thing intended may at first be indefinite, vague or equivocal, but as the process develops increasing clarity and definiteness characterize it until identification of the idea with the object is completed by actually getting hold of the object, or even by pointing to it. If the idea develops itself to this point we may be fully certain that the object we touch or point to

8. Ib., pp. 25.
9. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
is the selfsame thing we intended all the time. But where action on the ob-
ject does not take place, that is to say, when the series of intermediary
experiences are not followed to their ultimate terminus, we may regard the
idea as intending the object to the extent that had we pursued the process
to the end we would have arrived at the object. Thus, although I do not
go all the way to see the tigers in India, I may rest assured that if I
followed my idea of them through the context which the world supplies, I
would eventually come upon the tigers face to face. In short, I have access
to the tigers, by means of my idea of them, although they are not actually
present.

In order for an idea to "agree" with its object, it is not necessary
that it be identical with it, nor that it resemble it; it is merely necessary
that it perform the practical function of leading up to it; that is, agree-
ment means primarily a practical connection with the object. "In the whole
field of symbolic thought," he says, "we are universally held both to intend,
to speak of, and to reach conclusions about---to know in short---particular
realities, without having in our subjective consciousness any mind-stuff that
resembles them even in a remote degree. We are instructed about them by
language which awakens no consciousness beyond its sound; and we know which
realities they are by the faintest and most fragmentary glimpse of some re-
more context they may have and by no direct imagination of themselves."
The best example of such agreement is to be found in the agreement of words
with their objects since there is no resemblance between words and their ob-
jicts. A word agrees with its intended object by leading to it, or by bring-
ing us into its neighborhood. The cognitive relation, then, "consists in
intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of continuously developing

10. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
11. Ibid., p. 31.
progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, when the sensible percept, which is the object, is reached. The percept here not only verifies the concept, proves its function of knowing that percept to be true, but the percept's existence as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function." Thus the entire process of knowledge is "ambulatory," not "saltatory"; we are able to move along the chain of intermediary experiences which extends from the ideas to the object, and there is no self-transcendence, no "leaping of the chasm", about the idea or image whatever; consequently, "their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known." Ideas are merely instruments by means of which we are able to get hold of objects, or enabled to find them, and their role is purely a functional one.

This brings us to the consideration of the pragmatic doctrine of truth, for if the idea prepares me for the thing it intends, or means, we have truth; if it fails to do so, we have error. Truth, then, is the agreement of the idea with its object; and error is the failure of the idea to agree with its object. Truth is not, for the pragmatist, an "inert static relation," nor a "stagnant property" which inheres in an idea. "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events." Truth arises out of, and does not exist apart from, the relation of ideas to their objects. The series of experiences which follow upon the idea, which connect it with reality, form and are "the concrete relation of truth that may obtain between the idea and that reality." The idea is made true by these mediating events. The idea itself is also a concrete event, and truth in the singular is, for the prag-

13. Ibid., p. 57.
15. M. T., p. 201.
pragmatist, simply a "collective name for truths in the plural; these consist-
ing always of series of definite events". Thus James prefers to speak of "true ideas" rather than of "the truth".

It is extremely important always to bear in mind that, for the prag-
matist, truth refers to some particular situation in which an idea is re-
lated to its object. To ignore this fact is to fail to get the signifi-
cance of the pragmatic notion of truth. James attributes much of the mis-
understanding of pragmatism on the part of his critics to a failure to keep
this distinction clearly in mind. He admits, then, with the intellectual-
ists, that truth "is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their
'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'." But
he parts company with them when it comes to explaining the meaning of the
terms "agreement" and "reality". In order to bring out the precise differ-
ence between his view and the one which he rejects, he posits in his uni-
verse of discourse a reality and a mind with ideas. He then asks, "What
can make those ideas true of that reality?" In what does truth in this
case consist? Or, again, "What does the word 'true' mean when we say that
those ideas are true of that reality?" What relation do those ideas sustain
to that object, or that reality which makes those ideas true in this specific
instance?" Now, merely to answer in a sort of vague or general way that
those ideas must "correspond" to, or "agree" with, that reality does not sat-
isf the pragmatist's penchant for concreteness and particularity. He is
satisfied with nothing short of a concrete, detailed account of what we mean by
agreement. For then he says that those ideas "agree" with that reality,

17. Tbid., p. 201.
he means something very definite, namely, that they must point to, or lead towards that reality and no other, and that the pointings and leadings must issue in satisfactory results. Further, he conceives the pointings and leadings, throughout the entire process, to be the work of other portions of the same universe to which the reality and the mind belong; that is, it is the work of "intermediary verifying bits of experience with which the mind at one end, and the reality at the other are joined." When, then, are the ideas true of that reality? The pragmatist gives some such answer as the following to this question: The ideas which one has of that reality owe their existence to some contemplated course of action which has been prompted by some practical need of one's life, or by some vital interest which one has. For if it were not for the existence of conscious beings who act, who are interested, puzzled, curious, and doubting, there would be no ideas at all, and, consequently, no truth process, nor truths. The same thing holds true of the "meaning" or "intention" of the ideas, which relates them to that reality; it also arises out of some practical need or interest, and would not exist apart from beings with needs and interests. Thus, one's ideas of that reality are "true" when the needs or interests which motivated one's selection of those ideas and led one to connect them with that reality are satisfied. In short, one's ideas of that reality are "true" when they successfully perform their function of "agreeable leading" one into, or up to, or towards, that reality.

For the pragmatist, then, ideas are true when they work; that is, when they are successful, when they fulfil their function, or do that which they have been called into existence to do. "True ideas are those that we can

20. Ibid., pp. 191-192.
assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as.” Truth is the result of a process, it is an achievement. Truth is something which we make. “Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.” Ideas are not images, they are instruments. They do not image their objects, they lead us to them. An idea need not resemble its object any more than a word resembles what it denotes. Whatever resemblance there may be between the idea and its object is purely accidental and irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the truth of the idea. Just as the proof of any instrument is in the using, the proof of an idea is in the use we make of it. If a saw cuts well we say that it is a “good” saw. If an idea puts us in prosperous connection with its object, we can say that it is a “true” idea. It is obvious, therefore, that James means something quite different by the term “agreement” from the ordinary interpretation of the word. His conception of truth, while he employs the same terms, is a radical departure from the view commonly held by philosophers and common sense which maintains that the truth of ideas consists in their resemblance to their objects. James’s view attempts to bridge the gap between cognition and the object without appealing to any mysterious faculty of self-transcendence, whereas the traditional view holds that reference to trans-empirical reality is necessary before a satisfactory account of truth is possible.

The fundamental thing in the pragmatic notion of truth is that in the making of truth we have a process which terminates in verification. Before

22. Ibid., p. 201.
23. Ibid., p. 201.
the moment of verification, there are conditions, or stages, which lead to truth, but no truth. Since truth is something which we make, it is in the making so long as the process is in progress. It is prospective and comes into being in the actual course of history. Truth has happened in this way in the past, and so long as there are human beings who act, and have needs and interests, we may expect truth to be in the making. Our theories and hypotheses have proved true in the past, we are proving them true today, and we shall continue to prove them true in the future. But since the truth of an idea consists in its working, its truth is not known until it has been verified; that is, until it has actually worked. In other words, a theory consists in its application to experience. It is true if it prepares the mind for certain experiences, and enables us to control the realities to which it refers. If it fulfils the anticipation in experience it is true, but this can be known only after the experience to which it refers has arrived; only after it has been tested or verified. Thus the question of the truth or falsity of any theory which we may affirm points to the future, rather than to the past, for its answer. This is also true of historical judgments. If I say, for example, that Christ was born in the year 5 B.C., the truth of this statement points to certain efforts of investigation, certain operations, by which the statement may be shown to be true or false. That is, the statement is a candidate for truth, it is a "truth-claim;" it may possibly be true, but the realization of its truth belongs to the future, not to the past. Whatever relation my statement may bear to the event, it cannot be said to bear the cognitive relation. The evidence for historical judgments lies ahead of us, not behind us; it is yet to be found. A retrospective judgment expresses that which was true, even
if there had been no past thinker there. "The present sheds a backward light on the world's previous-processes. They may have been truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story." There is always the possibility of a better truth than that which we now possess. What we call true today, we may have to pronounce false tomorrow. Truth of past centuries, such as Ptolemaic astronomy, and scholastic metaphysics, was expedient for the centuries in which it was adhered to, true within those "borders of experience." But we have transcended those limits and the truth embodied in those systems is now regarded as only relatively true. For experience "boils over" and has "boiled over" since those systems were invoked to explain certain facts. Thus we may have to change our present formulas as new experiences come and prove them false. "The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever realized, they will all be realized together."

So long, then, as new experiences await us, there is the possibility of new truth; and just so long will truth be in the making. Truth is essentially prospective rather than retrospective; it remains so until experience is completed and verification is no more.

What is meant when it is said that an idea is true if it works or succeeds? Or, in what does verification consist? Since the success of an idea is relative to its use, its verification consists in successfully using it. If we do not include the emotional effects of an idea or belief, which belong to

25. Ibid., pp. 222-223.
the fideistic aspect of James's voluntarism, James uses three tests of truth, or modes of verification. The first one is that of consistency. "Above all we find consistency satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of previously acquired truths." These constitute reality, for James, and any belief, in order to be accepted as true, must fit in harmoniously with these realities. If it proves to be in harmony with them, it is true so far forth. Thus verification by consistency places the burden of proof on a belief which conflicts with previous beliefs. For James, however, this is not the final test, for experimental evidence carries greater weight than consistency, and may lead to the rejection of a belief which passes the test of the latter. At this juncture, James eliminates the coherence theory of truth in that, while it is good so far, it may be overruled by other tests. Then, there is verification by "active" rather than by "passive" experience, or verification by practice or "subsequential utility." According to this criterion, a belief which I may have is true in so far as the plans which I make as a result of holding it work out or succeed. A belief means that the object to which it refers is capable of being used for some specific purpose. For example, if I believe that my typewriter is something with which I can write, and, because of this belief, I plan to write a letter by means of it, my being able to write the letter verifies the plan and affords me practical knowledge of the machine. I am thus enabled to use it, and I know how to behave towards it. But, in the final analysis, this test may be said to resolve itself, for James, into the third,

As we have seen, a belief is verified when it agrees with previous beliefs, but previous beliefs have themselves been built upon other criteria, such as practice and "objective experience." Ultimately, then, both consistency and practice are reduced to "objective experience." This fact arises out of his application of the pragmatic method, according to which "some particular consequence in our future practical experience" is the sole meaning of a proposition. Thus "objective experience" is the final and supreme test. That James does regard the matter in this light is evident from his statement that a theory "must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly."

It is the particulars of experience to which every truth must finally resort for the ultimate stamp of approval. "When a moment in our experience, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience again and make advantageous connexion with them." That is to say, an idea is an expectation of sensory experience which awaits us. The idea is verified when the experience which occurs comes with a feeling on our part that the thing which takes place is precisely the thing for which we had looked. That is, if we can say of an experience, "this is the very thing which I anticipated all along," the idea is true; it works for the results are satisfactory. In other words, when there is no feeling of disharmony, or surprise, but a facile, smooth transition from expectancy to fulfilment, the idea is verified; the experience yields satisfaction. Truth in this

28. Professor R. B. Perry uses this term in his lectures on "William James and Henri Bergson," Harvard University, 1938.
30. Pragmatism, p. 216.
31. Ibid., p. 205.
sense is truth in the preferred sense, for James, and takes precedence over all other tests which may be applied. It should be remarked that when James defines truth in terms of satisfaction he does not mean to say that an idea is true simply because it is satisfactory. "The 'satisfaction', in turn," he says, "is no abstract satisfaction überhaupt, felt by an unspecified being, but is assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the plural) as concretely existing men actually do find in their beliefs." An idea must be satisfactory for a particular purpose and under particular circumstances. Before an idea can be said to be satisfactory, according to James, we must take into consideration certain conditions which arise from both the environment and from the interest which gave birth to the idea. The idea has been called into being for the purpose of performing a specific task and before it can be regarded as true it must successfully fulfill that mission. Only then does it bring satisfactory results.

We have thus far attempted to deal exclusively with his pragmatic theory of truth. But James does not always adhere strictly to this view but involves himself in innumerable difficulties by confusing satisfaction in terms of fulfilled expectations and satisfaction as value or as the result desired. Some passages may be interpreted to mean either. Again he undoubtedly uses value as a criterion of truth. In dealing with the relation of truth to utility he, at least in certain cases, means to define the true in terms of the useful. "To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality," he says, "can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed." Again, he regards "the true"

32. II., p. 192.
33. Cf. Pragmatism, pp. 58, 64.
34. Cf. Ibid., pp. 73, 299, 76.
35. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
as "only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course." Here it is general utility which constitutes the criterion of truth. Ideas are true in so far as they work. The discovery that they serve us is their verification. If we find new ideas that will serve us better, the old ideas that were true become untrue; and the new ones become true because they are found to work, and remain true only so long as they work.

It is worth while to get clearly in mind James's attitude towards "theoretical truth," in as much as pragmatism is frequently regarded as primarily an appeal to action. James does not intend to disparage theory and strongly resents the fact that pragmatism "is usually described as a characteristically American movement, a sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and wants cash returns immediately." He accords the theoretical motive a place in the formulation of ideas for the purpose of having a "compact and easily stored" access to these things, by the use of ideas which are different from the things themselves. "in order to be able to find, should one want them, more things than there are room for within the mind at any one time." From the theoretical point of view, then, an idea is true of its object when by means of the idea which is more "compact" than the object, I have access to the latter. Its success as an idea depends upon the extent to which it presents to me the real and complete nature of its object. But the idea is never able to do full justice to the object, and it is always better to have the object itself at hand. We may get a more adequate conception of the way in which

36. Ibid., p. 222.
37. L. T., p. 185.
38. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 362.
James regards applied and theoretical truth from the following statement which is taken from an interview in The New York Times, in 1907: "In point of fact, the use of most of our thinking is to help us to change the world. We must for this know definitely what we have to change, and thus theoretic truth must at all times come before practical application. But the pragmatist writers have shown that what we here call theoretic truth will be...irrelevant unless it fits the...purpose in hand... And, moreover, it turns out that the theoretic truth upon which men base their practice today is itself a resultant of previous human practice, based in turn upon still...previous truth...so that we may think of all truth whatever as containing so much human practice funded... Thus we seem set free to use our theoretical as well as our practical faculties—the practical here in the narrower sense—to get the world into a better shape, and all with a good conscience."

It follows, from James's view that truth is in the making, that reality also is unfinished; it is in the making, and we help to make it. That is to say, reality is additive, cumulative; it grows. It is obvious, however, from the account of James's conception of the cognitive process as we have followed it, that James is a realist in his epistemology. His pragmatism differs at this point from that of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. For both of these thinkers the cognitive process itself is taken as a sample of reality, whereas James has a metaphysics in addition to his theory of knowledge. He maintains throughout that there is a real "core" of reality within the "successive man-made wrappings" of knowledge. Both Schiller and Dewey recognize it only as a "limit," to the process of mediation, or a material with such plasticity that thought can shape it at will. James identifies

40. Pragmatism, p. 249.
that "core" with sensible experience. He writes in this connection as follows: "Pent in, as the pragmatist more than any one else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations?" He starts with two things, "the objective facts and the claims," whereas Schiller starts with the subjective pole of the chain, that is, with "truth-claims." James thinks that ultimately the two views would coincide in that Schiller must finally arrive at the "independent objective facts" and his own theory must end with a subjective view of truth. Due to the influence of the school of British empiricism James places particular emphasis upon the importance of sense perception and upon the immediacies of experience in general. Thus, while he admits that our categories are the product of human thought and that the human factor is strong in all of our thinking, he qualifies his humanism by the assertion that there is known in immediate experience a kernel of reality which is independent of the pragmatic operation, and without which the latter has no application or meaning.

The difference between James and Schiller with reference to the question of making reality is obvious when we observe the extent to which we make reality according to the latter. For him all knowledge is pragmatic and provisional. This applies also to the knowledge of so-called facts. He holds that the object is always what it is for a subject. His reason for this is that so to conceive the object yields satisfaction. He says that our making

41. Ibid., p. 233.
42. H. T., pp. xviii-xix.
of truth really alters "subjective" reality. "It first 'makes' real ob-
jects of interest and enquiry, and then 'finds' realities to satisfy them."
When we apply our knowledge we alter "real reality," and unless it can be
applied it is not real knowledge. In some cases, for example, in human
intercourse, "a subjective making is at the same time a real making of reali-
ty." The opinions of others affect human beings; that is, their actions
are different when being observed from what they would be if no one was there
to observe them. Finally, the knower is always altered by his knowing; "and
as the knower is real and a part of reality, reality is really altered."
He says, "even though the Pragmatic Method implies a truth and a reality which
it does not make, yet it does not conceive them as valuable. It conceives
them only as indicating limits to our explanations, and not as revealing the
solid foundations whereon they rest. All effective explanation, however,
starts from the actual process of knowing, which is pragmatic, and not from
hypothetical foundations, which are dubious. And all effective truth and
reality result from the same pragmatic process." James, on the other hand,
says that whatever "propositions or beliefs may, in point of fact, prove true,
... the truth of them consists in certain definable relations between them and
the reality of which they make report... the first vague notion of 'agreement'
with reality becomes specified into that of innumerable ways in which our
thoughts may fit reality, ways in which the mind's activities cooperate on
equal terms with the reality in producing the fit resultant truth.... Mind
enjoys the role of truth upon reality.... Our minds are not here simply to copy a
reality that is already complete. They are here to complete it, to add to
its importance by their own remodeling of it, to decent its contents over, so

44. Ibid., p. 458.
45. Ibid., p. 458.
46. Ibid., p. 439.
47. Ibid., p. 433.
to speak, into a more significant shape."

This difference with reference to the part reality plays in the truth process leads to a corresponding difference concerning truth. When reality is treated simply as a "limit," as in the case of Dewey and Schiller, truth is regarded as the process of verification which takes place within experience; and it is conceived as consisting in the successful working of the idea, in the concrete events or steps within consciousness which connect the unverified claim and the full and satisfactory issue. James holds to the view that the trueness of an idea is constituted by two things: the process of leading through these intermediary experiences and the subjective satisfaction which follows; and the actual presence of the object or reality which the idea intends. Thus, for James, the object must be actually present if the idea is to be true; that is, it must exist independently of our experience, and in certain cases outside of it. Here truth is a relation between the idea and a reality which may transcend the experience of the individual knower; it is not wholly within our experience. It ceases to be merely a process or a felt transition from one part of our experience to another. Also, James's admission of an external reality as an essential element in the truth situation enables him to hold that an idea may be true before verification takes place. The other conception, on the other hand, maintains that since truth consists in the actual process of verification, the idea must be proved to be true before it is true. But for James, verifiability "is as good as verification." Thus he maintains that the successful operation of an idea proves it true, while the more extreme view holds that the consequences make it true or constitute its truth. According to James's view of the matter,

ideas that are useful may be considered true apart from, and in advance of, their utility since their objects must actually be present before they are capable of successful use. You may say of an idea that "it is useful because true" or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified." His view steers a "middle of the road" course between the extreme pragmatic position and the correspondence theory, and may be said to be more in harmony with the latter notion of truth than with the extreme view of other pragmatists. It is unique in that it purports to be based on a thoroughgoing epistemological realism but at the same time attempts to connect the idea with the object without appealing to any mysterious faculty of transcendence of a different kind from the concrete experiential things which it joins. This he does by means of the "context;" that is, by taking into account the existences that intervene between the experience and the object and unite them into a single world.

By taking this more moderate position James is able to avoid some of the difficulties involved in the extreme pragmatic view, but he is apparently led into an irresolvable contradiction, namely, that of maintaining that "satisfactions" and the concrete events of experience are indispensable to truth, on the one hand, and that an idea can be true apart from, and in advance of, these consequences and series of events, on the other. If he emphasizes the former assertion, his view still differs from the extreme pragmatic theory in that it insists that the object must really be there, and that the consequences and "leadings" are insufficient, yet he must hold that a verifiable belief is not true until it has been verified. If, however, he emphasizes the latter assertion, the unique feature of his theory disappears.

51. Ibid., p. 204.
and the correspondence theory is restored. In other words, if he admits
the existence of a world outside one's own stream of consciousness, and
that we judge concerning its constituent parts, be they things or persons,
he must go further and admit that the validity of such judgments depends
upon their relation to those objects of thought. To do this is to for­
sake the pragmatist's essential contention concerning truth. On the other
hand, if he denies any such relation between our judgments and their ob­
jects, he virtually denies that there is a world outside one's conscious ex­
perience in that, if it does exist, it is negligible and meaningless so far
as human experience goes.

Our account of James's doctrine of method and theory of truth serves
to bring out futurism as an essential and characteristic feature of prag­
matism. According to this aspect of pragmatism, beliefs are tested by the
consequences which issue from them in the future; good consequences are a
mark of their truth and bad consequences indicate their falsity. They are
meaningless unless they make a difference in the life of the one who holds
them. Thus they may harmonize perfectly with the body of established
truths, and they may successfully copy present reality, but unless concrete
consequences flow from them, they cannot properly be regarded as true; that
is, true in any significant sense. When interpreted in this manner prag­
matism becomes primarily an "epistemological inter-temporalism," to use Pro­
fessor A. O. Lovejoy's term. James construes "meaning" and "truth" in
terms of "inter-temporal relations between successive phases of experience,"
instead of defining them in terms commonly used which either did not recognize
temporal distinctions of before and after, or which apparently transcended

53. A. O. Lovejoy, "William James as Philosopher," The International Journal
of Ethics, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1911, p. 149.
54. Ibid., p. 149, cf. also p. 150.
all such distinctions. Truth had usually been conceived as some sort of "cross-wise" relation; a judgment was regarded as in some way corresponding with its object, or with the eternal knowledge possessed by an absolute mind. James interprets the entire affair as one of "length-wise" relations. He conceives a judgment as essentially the act of an individual who occupies a particular place in the stream of time, and who faces the future prepared to act, and who pushes out into the future even as he renders a judgment.

The futuristic emphasis of pragmatism takes its cue from theoretical science which, while it holds that an hypothesis must explain present facts, and harmonize with past knowledge, it must also open the way for an increase of knowledge and prove itself capable of experimental verification and applications to new conditions. How it is the last phase of the scientific conception which pragmatism elevates to a place of supreme importance to the neglect of the other two. It insists that this principle is applicable to philosophical theories and historical movements of the social and religious order. Theology is no exception to this rule, for creed and ritual must be referred to their future consequences for their chief, if not their only, significance.

James’s intense conviction, and true insight concerning the significance for epistemology of the temporal, and the essentially forward-looking, anticipatory nature of human thinking seem at times to blind him to the fact that the past and present are also parts of the temporal process. Without denying the truth contained in his emphasis upon the future, we recognize that there are limitations to the attitude in life and science which fails to take into account the past and present. As Professor Lovejoy puts it, “it obviously will not do to define the import of a judgment or the nature of truth in a way which prevents judgments from truly referring to these phases, which tries to metamorphose the whole meaning of pastness and contemporar-
neity into pure futurity." Plainly it is not possible to confine the "meaning" or "truth" of either scientific hypotheses or of social and religious movements to their consequences in the future. For, as Professor W. F. Montague points out, most theories are adaptations of principles which have been established in the past. In both science and the social order there is a presumption in favor of a theory or principle which past experience has tested. The fruitful results which a hypothesis makes possible are due to the fact that it is in harmony with the present structure of reality. Professor Montague compares a scientific hypothesis to a key which unlocks a door, it does so because it fits the structure of the lock. Similarly, an hypothesis works because it fits into present reality. He holds that the extent to which a theory copies reality does not depend upon the resemblance of its terms or qualities to those of reality, "but on the resemblance of its relations to the relations between facts." For him, it is relational and not qualitative resemblance or identity which constitutes meaningful truth. "In general, when theories that are apparently contradictory prove useful in dealing with reality it does not follow that reality is arbitrary or indeterminate, and that on account of it can be true only in a pragmatic sense. The utility of such theories will always be due not to their qualitative difference from one another and from the facts, but to their rela-

The scientific procedure of induction carries on with the assumption that there are certain data, the "facts" with which our facts must harmonize. That is to say, there are truths of fact which precede the entire inductive

55. Ibid., pp. 149-150.
Cf. also pp. 143-144.
57. Ibid., p. 145.
process. Now these must be "true" in some sense other than that of merely producing satisfactory consequences. But James asserts that what is "fact" is to be regarded as neither true nor false but as something which comes before the distinction between truth and falsehood. "Day follows day," he says, "and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves are not true, they simply come and are. Truth is what we say about them, and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula." A working hypothesis must work theoretically for science; that is, all of its verifiable consequences must be true. For example, the law of gravitation is true for science if it enables us to determine the motions of the heavenly bodies so as to ascertain their position, so far as they are observable, at a certain place and at a given time. This is what it means when it says that a law "works." It has nothing to say concerning the consequences of this law so far as our future welfare or interests are concerned. It may be quite incompatible with these and yet it may still be said to "work" in the scientific sense, for it harmonizes with observed facts. It is obvious, then, that science means a very different thing by "working" from that which the pragmatist means when he assumes that "working" is the essence of truth. It is true, as the pragmatist contends, that truth here is a particular species of "truth," and the working of a scientific law is a specific example of their general conception of working. For the law in question is true in the pragmatic sense in that it enables us to calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies in keeping with our inquiry concerning them. But it does not substantiate the claim of the pragmatist concerning the essence of truth. Further, while a scientific hypothesis must conform to established truths, new facts may at any time render it inadequate. Thus only tentative

assent is accorded it. If, then, the pragmatist takes the scientific conception of truth as his sole criterion, he is depending upon cases in which there is least assurance that truth is present. As a method of procedure, this does not carry a great deal of hope or promise. If it be said that our belief in a hypothesis or theory increases with its demonstrated success in working, it may be replied that in that case there is less likelihood that another one would also work so as to render the one we now hold false.

Futurism fails adequately to account for the great social and religious movements of history. For, as Professor Montague states, "even the most novel and revolutionary of these movements are profoundly and professedly motivated and guided by history." He cites Marxian Socialism as a notable example of the fact that any movement is deeply rooted in the past. This movement is based on a philosophy of history, namely, a materialistic or economic interpretation of history, which is based on a sort of "inverted Hegelianism;" and without regard to the truth or falsity of the interpretation, we cannot understand this new social trend without reference to, or study of, the past. Future planning is based upon the past. There are always certain factors and elements which are given and which serve as the basis for future planning which consists largely in a redistribution of, and new emphasis upon, these more or less permanent factors. Similarly, it is impossible to interpret the social philosophy of the movement in the United States which is popularly called the "New Deal", and led by President F. D. Roosevelt, apart from the history of our political and social life from the early beginnings as a nation. Especially since the American Civil War the conditions which made something like the "New Deal" inevitable have been cumulative and did not begin with the administration of ex-President Herbert

Hoover, nor with the World War. As a matter of fact, Woodrow Wilson was attempting many of the social and political reforms which President Roosevelt has undertaken; perhaps he would have carried many of them to a successful completion had not his attention been diverted from these domestic problems to those of international scope as a result of the War. It should be remembered, also, that President Roosevelt received much of his political training under Woodrow Wilson. Another phase of our social life which the "New Deal" has brought to the front is strikingly similar to the situation which precipitated the American Civil War—the ill-feeling between New England and the South. The Civil War freed the slaves but it did not remove the basic conditions which brought on the war, for example, the economic inequality which exists between an agricultural and an industrial section of the United States. Similar conditions still exist and they are now looming up as a somewhat serious problem due to the fact that the South is beginning to recuperate from the damage suffered during the Civil War and Reconstruction days. Consequently, the South is now threatening the industrial interests of the North and East which have had almost exclusive financial control since the conflict between the states. Slavery enabled the South to threaten these interests in the first half of the nineteenth century. Now it is cheap labor, a more favorable climate, cheaper living conditions, and lower taxes along with other factors which bring back upon our hands this problem over which the Civil War was fought. But the basic principles involved are the same as those which brought on the Civil War without the question of slavery, which served as a means of keeping the real issue hidden, and gave it the appearance of a struggle over a great principle of humanitarianism. The "New Deal" has helped to strengthen the hands of the South and has made the present a propitious time to attempt to regain much of that which it lost
during that war. Thus the situation, which exists in this country today under President Roosevelt is wholly inexplicable apart from the conditions which existed a century ago, and the developments which have taken place in the meantime.

The past is especially important in the interpretation of religious movements. Christianity, for example, is so deeply rooted in Judaism that many of its characteristic features can be understood only in the light of its historical connection with the development of the social, political and religious life of the Jewish people. The experience of the early Christians, at Pentecost, remains a source to which Christianity must ever turn for a renewed understanding of its primitive power, as well as a source of renewed inspiration for the future. Every appeal such as "Back to Jesus," or "Back to Pentecost," which modern Christianity makes means that the past is pregnant with significance, and that the present cannot be interpreted without such reference, and that, without it, the future is impossible. In so far, then, as pragmatism places exclusive emphasis upon the future it fails satisfactorily to explain the great social and religious movements which always grow out of the past and which derive much of their significance for the present and future from their past.

The emphasis which pragmatism places upon the future has been of real value and serves as a corrective to any view which minimizes or neglects this aspect of thought and life. It has given philosophy and theology a permanent modification in its conception of futurism, and the influence of this view shall remain with us in our consideration of social and religious movements. When a new movement is under way, this principle will enable us to study the past as a means of helping us to determine the future course of that movement. The use which we may make of the past with reference to the future will set
us to the task of verifying history and lead us to give it a prospective and selective emphasis. The status quo in social or religious fields, its customs and institutions will be accepted for what they are worth. Our respect for the established order will not be blind and automatic, but reasoned and self-conscious. We shall not regard "the new as not true, and the true as not new," without further ado. When the old confronts new conditions it must assume the burden of proof and if it fails to cope with the new situation it must give way to the new. For example, to refer to the "New Deal" in the United States once more, President Roosevelt's chief source of power and much of his success may be attributed to the fact that the leaders of the Republican party had no way of meeting the crisis which confronted the nation as a result of the economic situation from 1929 to 1933. Plainly, their economic and political philosophy had failed to solve the difficulties which perplexed our country during those years of adversity. As a result, regardless of how much they disagree with President Roosevelt's methods, and in spite of their disparagement of his actual achievements, they are forced now to concede that in case they get control of the government in 1940, they would attempt to carry out similar reforms, and aim at practically the same objectives which characterize the "New Deal." For the most part, they simply claim that they will do the same things that President Roosevelt is doing, but that they will do them far more effectively and with less danger to our democratic form of government and institutions than Mr. Roosevelt has been able to do thus far. The Republicans can do little more, then, than charge him and his administration with failure to achieve what they now conceive to be legitimate reforms; but ten years ago they would have strenuously opposed these reforms as such. Thus the pragmatic emphasis upon the future contains an important element of truth, namely, that the old becomes obsolete and may
be an obstacle to progress when it proves inadequate to meet new situations in a changing world. There are many cases in which the only proof that a theory does agree with the hard facts of the present is to be found in future consequences. The pragmatist view contains this element of truth: while the consequences do not constitute the truth of a theory, they may disclose its truth. "They are its ratio cognoscendi," as Professor Montague puts it, "though never its ratio essendi."

A second essential feature of pragmatism is its practicalism which is closely connected with futurism. There are three types of practicalism in pragmatism which Professor Montague calls "empirical," "humanistic," and "biological" practicalism. Empirical practicalism characterizes James's pragmatism. He uses the word "practical", as we have seen, in the sense of the particular, the concrete, the specific, as against the universal and abstract. His usage of "practical" in this sense is closely connected with pragmatism as a method which, as has been shown, is essentially the same as his radical empiricism when the latter is considered as a method. Since it bases truth upon particular facts of perception rather than on abstract and universal principles of reason, it is virtually the same as nominalistic empiricism. "Humanistic" practicalism holds that truth satisfies our personal needs and desires as contrasted with the notion that truth merely meets a supposed impersonal and merely intellectual ideal. This type of practicalism pervades the pragmatism of Schiller and is dominant in James's doctrine of the will to believe. Finally, "biological" practicalism offers the purely psychological theory of thought. Both in the human race as a whole, or phylogenetically, and in the individual members of the race, that is, onto-

genetically, thought has arisen out of the needs and demands of practical life. It also maintains from both logical and ethical considerations that utility for the preservation and betterment of our practical life constitutes the standard or goal of thought. This latter emphasis which deals with the validity and value of thought arises out of the former which has to do with the manner in which thought arose. It is not necessary to deal separately with each of these types of practicalism in order to bring out the distinctive teaching of this aspect of pragmatism.

For the pragmatist, as we have seen, the mark of the truth of knowledge is the satisfying character of the practical transition from the cognitive expectation to fulfillment. And James does offer satisfaction as a criterion of truth but due to his realistic tendencies his view does not commit him to subjectivism, or to the notion which holds that the knower has it within his power to cause judgments to be true or false. Satisfaction for him is, as has been pointed out, a specific, determined sort of satisfaction. We do not ourselves determine which beliefs will afford satisfaction. We may want to believe one thing but discover that the only satisfactory solution to the problem at hand may be to believe the opposite. If some tragedy should occur to an intimate friend, for instance, the only satisfactory course to pursue is to believe that which I least desire to believe. I never would have chosen to believe what the facts of the case force upon my belief. Unless I believe this undesirable thing my relationship with my environment may not only turn out to be unsatisfactory, but may prove disastrous as well. Thus it does not mean that a judgment which expresses my desire is true. My belief arises because it enables me to realize a better adjustment between myself and my environment. When James departs from this more fundamental

principle of his pragmatic theory and conceives satisfaction in terms of value or utility he confuses truth and the "good." The latter term is ordinarily used to describe objects in so far as they satisfy our desires and needs. In seeking the good we attempt to change the environment so as to make it conform to our needs and desires. We use the term truth to describe our ideas when they agree with reality, that is, in so far as they assert a fact. Here we try to make our ideas and judgments harmonize with reality. Thus it is one thing to say that truth is useful, or "good," and quite another to say that its truth consists in its usefulness. There is no warrant for confusing these two different and opposite ways of trying to affect an adjustment between the individual and his environment, by regarding the satisfaction of reason and desire for knowledge and that of sentiment and desire as the same sort of satisfaction. The former is truth, the latter is goodness, and however closely related and overlapping they may be, they cannot be completely identified. "We can, to some extent, determine reality by our desires and shape the course of nature to our needs. But the overwhelming majority of the things in the world are beyond our power to change, though not beyond our power to know. The things that we know to be true, but cannot and should not regard as good, are equalled in number only by the things which we can and should regard as good, but which we know are not true: To close our eyes to this tragic aspect of existence, and to insist with the humanistic pragmatists that there must be a correlation of the true and the desirable, is as vicious and futile as it is false. Our main hope of improving the human world lies in a clear and unflinching recognition of the difference between facts and ideals, between what we find to be true and what we wish to be true." To maintain that the adequacy of truth depends

on the degree to which it satisfies the individual and society as a whole
does not do justice to the facts of human experience. For in a vast
realm of experience, as R. B. Perry puts it, the "human tendency is not in
the direction of the formation of more congenial beliefs, the construction of
a universe that shall best answer given human needs and hopes, but in the di-
rection of an adjustment of these needs and hopes to things as they are found
to be. Enlightenment is far more likely to bring disillusionment than confirm-
ation of hopes, and this is true not only of the individual, but of the race.
Undoubtedly we do try to find evidence which shall suit us, but such suiting
does not constitute or even strengthen the evidence. Equilibrium between
life and its environment is reached in the end not by getting a truth to suit
our uses, but by getting used to reality."

As to the pragmatic contention that knowledge adds to, and modifies
reality, James is considerably limited in this conception by his realism, as
we have seen, and in so far as he remains a realist he cannot follow the more
extreme humanistic tendencies of pragmatism. On realistic grounds a thing
is not modified simply by being known. It is true that knowledge modifies
knowledge since that which is known is likely to be acted upon and thus modi-
ned. "It is undoubtedly true that knowledge adds what knowledge is."
Every act of knowing renders the world richer. Thus the range and systematic
unity of the world of knowledge are widened and constructed from day to day.
But knowledge does not modify the past and the remote. The past which con-
tinues into the present, or the remote which is brought close may be modified,
but before modification is possible there must be greater proximity than that

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64. R. B. Perry,"A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization,"
which is required for mere knowledge. Unless we have access to a past event as it was, or to a remote event as such, we cannot really be said to know the former as it was nor the latter as remote. It is not possible to know historical events at all if we are unable to know the past "for to every event its own particular time is an inalienable past." This restricted modification by knowledge which an epistemological realism imposes does not seem to be compatible with the view that the world is of our making. Just how far James conceives the world to be of our making he never makes explicit. If we adopt the conception that experience is in its "pristine purity" chaotic, the merely determinable, without any definite inner structure, it is not possible to work it up into anything whatever; it would not tolerate the addition of a predicate. James says that it is now enveloped in predicates which have been historically worked out. This implies that it never was the "pure" sort of "stuff" he claims that it was. He concedes what the realist asks for, namely, three parts of reality, sensations, relations, and previous truths, but he does not make it clear just to what extent knowledge does modify or add to being. In so far as James is a realist he cannot say that knowledge makes the world, for plainly this is untenable. To quote R. B. Perry again, "Knowledge does make its world, it may even be said to make our world; but there is a tremendous significance, practical, philosophical and religious, in this difference between our world and the world."

He says further, "If the difference be retained and construed strictly in terms of a realistic theory of knowledge, then humanism is not a metaphysics but a philosophy of history; not a theory of being, but an interpretation of life." The error of the pragmatist lies in the fact that he disregards

66. Ibid., p. 427.
67. Ibid., p. 427.
68. Ibid., p. 427.
the distinction between psychological genesis and ontological reality; for him reality cannot be other than what it is known as being. Things exist apart from the knower in space and time, but what they are is what they are conceived---sometime, somewhere, by some body---to be, or what they would be perceived as being if there were a perceiver present. This, for the pragmatist, is what they really are. In themselves they are not something else. The result of this procedure is that we are offered a hypothetical pure experience as the primordial stuff from which all things proceed and a functional psychology which is elevated to the queen of the sciences. But the insistence upon the instrumental character of sense and thought has done much to make prominent the purposive character of our mental life, and the human element in the building up the body of scientific truths.

Pragmatism as practicalism maintains that all truth has practical corollaries. The intellect is subservient to life and we can show the manner and method of its working and the purpose it serves. Truth is a utility. Thus far we may agree with the pragmatist but it is quite another thing to assert that the ideal of the intellect, the end for which it strives, is itself nothing more than a utility. For, as H. W. Carr shows, unless we attach meaning to truth other than its "workableness", and independent of, and distinct from, its practical consequences it is difficult to see what value we can assign the intellect at all. "The very essence of its service is reduced to naught; for what else but the conception of an objective truth, a logical reality independent of any and every psychological condition, is the utility that the intellect puts us in possession of? It is this conception alone that constitutes it an effective mode of activity. Therefore, if we hold with the pragmatist that the intellect is subservient to life, truth is indeed a utility, but it is a utility just because it has a meaning distinct
from usefulness. On the other hand, to condemn any knowledge as 'useless' is to deny utility to the intellect." It is quite true that all truths have many practical corollaries and may be related to various human interests, but the relation of collateral interests to truth is accidental, and these do not make or unmake truth. It is possible to conceive of some knowledge which has long been useful to the human race ceasing to exist. But the fact that it ceases to exist does not render the truth it contains false. Intellectual activity does not make an idea true nor does inactivity make it false. Existence is rooted in reality, not in knowledge. Reality does not depend on truth. Truth is the intellectual apprehension of reality. Usefulness is something which flows from the character of the reality which is selectively known rather than something which constitutes a criterion of truth.

We are warranted in regarding with suspicion any attempt to identify the truth of ideas with their effectiveness either in discourse or experiment. As F. J. E. Woodbridge points out, it appears that "the effectiveness must be of a particular kind. And that particular kind, when it takes on an adjective to qualify it, always seems to clamor for the adjective in dispute. Beliefs are obviously effective when they are not true, and no long run of their effectiveness seems adequate to remove them from suspicion." It will not do to assert with the pragmatists that an idea is true simply because it works. As Professor W. E. Hocking shows, the logical error of this teaching of pragmatism is a false conversion of "all true propositions work," into "all propositions that work are true," which is not logically allowable. To say that all crows are black is not the same thing as to say that all black birds

71. W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, pp. 165-164.
are crows. Professor Hocking says that the pragmatic principle "Whatever works is true," can be regarded "as neither valid nor useful." He suggests a negative sort of pragmatism as a means of detecting the presence of error. "That which does not work is not true," is the principle which he adopts. According to this negative pragmatism, "if a theory has no consequences, or bad ones; if it makes no difference to men, or else undesirable differences; if it lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of existence, or diminishes the worth to them of what existence they have; such a theory is somehow false, and we have no peace until it is remedied. I will even go farther, and say that a theory is false if it is not interesting: a proposition that falls on the mind so dully as to excite no enthusiasm has not attained the level of truth; though the words be accurate the import has leaked away from them, and the meaning is not conveyed." At a glance, Professor Hocking's view of the matter seems to be an improvement upon the positive principle of pragmatism, but closer scrutiny reveals that this negative interpretation of the pragmatic principle itself involved some sort of positive pragmatism. That is, as D. C. Macintosh argues, there is no warrant for it unless positive pragmatism is in some sense true. As he points out, "we cannot be critical and say, 'All that works is true'; but it seems very improbable that we should be correct in saying, 'Nothing that does not work is true', unless it were also true that some positive relation of importance existed between working and truth, that some kind of working might rightly be regarded as a criterion of truth." It would seem, then, that we must either grant that there is an element of

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72. Cf. Ibid., p. 164.
74. Ibid., p. xiii.
75. Ibid., p. xiii.
77. Ibid., p. 414.
truth in positive pragmatism or return to the position which holds that
the truth of a judgment in no way depends upon its practical function.

Obviously the pragmatic principle that truth is that which works does
not always hold good. World conditions today show that we cannot use it
to decide the truth of the principles of democracy. Mussolini and Hitler
proclaim quite confidently and vociferously that democracy is a failure,
and that our child-like faith in it is falsely placed. On the other hand,
British and American statesmen and citizens cling to democracy as the ultimate hope of the world. Mussolini and Hitler assure us that it did not
work in Italy and Germany, and they seem to be just as certain that it cannot work elsewhere. We believe that it does work in Great Britain and in the United States and that it would work in Italy and Germany if these two countries would actually give it a fair chance and trial. Again, there is the question of the working of Christianity. Russia has discarded it, and all forms of religion, for that matter, as "an opiate of the people," and regards it as a failure in that country. Other countries regard it as the one way out of the chaotic conditions in which our world is floundering at present. During the World War and also during the financial depression of recent years many people have said that Christianity is a failure; that is, it is a false belief according to the pragmatist. We may ask whether it has really been tried in either case in which it has been pronounced a failure. It would appear that it is not so much that "it has been tried and found wanting, but that it has been found difficult and not tried." Further, such a view must declare that many of the ideals of Christianity are false because the hard facts of life and human nature have prevented their successful operation on anything like a universal scale in the past. For instance, the principles of honesty and unselfishness in business and politics do not
always enjoy a privileged status, and rigid adherence to these principles is frequently regarded as impracticable and impossible. There always seems to be some element of compromise between that which ought to be and that which is, the former being considered impossible of attainment. But does this acknowledged failure to practice the ideals in question, because from a sheerly practical point of view men deem them impossible, render them false? Is honesty a false principle because the man who practices it in a world of "cut-throat competition" goes bankrupt? Is unselfishness a false principle because the man who follows this course loses out where others apply the "tooth and claw" policy? It would seem so according to the pragmatist notion of truth. Moreover, there are the cases in which that which is known to be false does work. As W. H. Carr points out, the hypothesis of ether worked, but it has proved to be non-existent. When the United States entered the World War, Woodrow Wilson stirred the people of this country to a loyal and patriotic support of the nation's cause by proclaiming that "We are fighting a war to end war." Subsequent events have proved his statement false but it successfully achieved the purpose he had in mind, which was to unite his fellow countrymen in a common aim. Still more, there is the instance used by Professor W. E. Hocking of the perfect imitation. There are two bags of coins in which there is an equal number of similar coins. One individual takes the bag which belongs to another, and the other person takes the one which is left. Each individual thinks that he has his own bag. Are these beliefs true? We are justified in the conclusion, therefore, that while true propositions do work, not all propositions which work are true, and not all propositions which fail to work are false. Perhaps it is not too much to say with

J. L. Perrier, that "of all the aspects of pragmatism, the one which James mostly emphasized, namely, the consideration of practical results, is precisely the one that is bound to disappear."

We have now to consider a third essential characteristic of pragmatism, namely, its relativism. The relativism of the epistemology of pragmatism arises out of its practicalism. The thoroughgoing application of the evolutionary principle to psychology with the resultant conception of mental processes as teleological leads to the confusing of the logical interest in achieving cognitive satisfaction with the ethical interest in realizing practical satisfaction, and subsumes the former under the latter. The utilitarian principle of expediency, in the field of ethics is broadened to include the realm of truth. The former makes our moral values relative, that is, depending upon the satisfaction they produce in way of conduct, and the extension of this principle to truth renders the truth relative. That is to say, truth is made to depend upon the practical satisfaction which it brings. Utilitarianism dispenses with the idea of a "good" that is absolute and independent of our changing desires, and pragmatism does away with the notion of truth as absolute and independent of the changing beliefs of individuals.

For pragmatism, then, both ethics and truth are relativistic. Neither the good nor the true has any absolute content apart from the desires and interests of individuals; man becomes the measure of all things. Pragmatism starts with the impulsive, striving, purposive life of man and builds its philosophy of truth and of reality around him. It concentrates upon the conative aspect of his life and derives its cognitive aspect from the former. It conceives man as an active creature, attempting to adapt himself to his environment and

trying to control it and force it into service in the interest of his preservation and well-being. Changing environmental conditions demand corresponding changes in his mode of reacting or of adaptation. This situation affords the pragmatist his basis for the determining of truth and of value.

We cannot acquiesce in the opinion of the pragmatists that our judgments of value are completely relative to human desires and interests. We must recognize, however, that significant changes do occur in our standards of value from time to time; our standards do grow. But we do not believe that we are warranted in applying the evolutionary principle to every aspect of human life and thought, and thereby render all values relative. D. T. Howard puts the matter rightly when he states, "that one might have a firm belief in the efficiency of organic evolution in the field of biology without conceding it a similar potency in the field of mind and morals." Professor E. W. Lyman argues that the intuitive character of many of our judgments of value render it possible to maintain that a sweeping claim for relativity of values is out of the question. He takes, for example, what he considers the supreme principle of ethics, namely, that the "fullest development of every human personality through the co-operative creation of a world-wide community of persons," and shows that it is not relative solely to human desire and interest. "It involves the direct appreciation of personality as having intrinsic worth, and it involves also a direct recognition of the equalitarian principle—namely, that every personality has intrinsic worth, and that hence no person can rightfully be made a mere means to other persons' ends." Now he maintains that an intuition of this sort is not something belonging to mere

83. Ibid., p. 181.
84. Ibid., p. 182.
instinct. It possesses a cognitive quality which instinct and impulse lack. "An intuition is, in its intent, an apprehension of something objective, being in this respect akin to perception. But an intuition also gives understanding of things objective; it goes beyond the new data or stubborn opaque facts which may be all that perception gives and grasps them in their intrinsic nature, in their meaning, in their connection with significant wholes." Thus it resembles reasoning and inference. But intuition differs from these in that it gets its understanding with a directness and immediacy which mark perception. "But the point of special importance for us now is that intuition ranges itself with perception and with inference as one way of knowing objective reality." How desires and interests are subjective in character; they arise within the subject and are decisively determined from within. Intuitions, on the other hand, are objective in their purport and receive their decisive determination from objective reality however much it may be subjectively conditioned. Subjective activity is undoubtedly necessary in intuition just as in perception there must be some contribution made by the percipient; but intuition must render knowledge of objective reality if it is to be of any value to us. "And when intuition is concerned with the good, it is still not simply a registration of desire or interest, but is a cognizing of the good which may help in determining the goodness of desire or interest. It affords a way of laying hold of something deeper, more objective, and more universal about the good than desire or interest as such can discover... But intuition also yields objective truth which is indispensable for judging the goodness of our interests and desires."

A consideration with which any view of the relativity of values must

85. Ibid., p. 183.
86. Ibid., p. 183.
87. Ibid., p. 186.
reckon is that the moral obligation appears to hold universal sway. When some plain moral alternative of honesty or dishonesty, or purity or impurity, of justice or oppression, of selfishness or love, something within man says that one of the alternatives is the better one to pursue. He may not always be able to know clearly what is best, but it is characteristic of man's moral consciousness immediately to recognize that it is his duty to perform that which he sees to be the Good. "The moment we do detect the Good," writes D. S. Cairns, "as between two alternative courses of action, something else becomes manifest in it, something shining and formidable. It becomes not simply higher and finer, it becomes 'imperative.' I know that I ought to do it. The Good in this sense is not simply something wiser, preferable, more beautiful, more desirable. It has a thread of steel in it, a quality of adamant. It is the only course open to me that is 'right', and every other course is 'wrong.'" Morality would be impossible if man did not have the sense of the Good and Right. But if all judgments of good and bad, right and wrong are purely subjective and relative, we cannot account for man's having this sense of supreme value of human beings, or his recognition of the unconditional imperatives of morality. While we must reject the pragmatic contention concerning the relativity of our values, as the above considerations concerning the Good and the Right show it to be untenable, we recognize the service it has rendered in the emphasis it places upon active and intelligent control of human life and upon proper adaptation to environment in the interests of human progress. It serves as a corrective to an extreme otherworldliness, or to an obscurantist attitude towards thought and life. But it also has its dangers in that it may be satisfied with mild compromises when radical alterations in things as they exist are really needed; or it may clamor

for change as such and develop an unwholesome disregard for achievements of the present or past. He must ever keep our eyes open to new values but that does not mean that they must be closed to old ones; for some of our values are objective and imperishable. But with the exercise of proper restraint in these respects pragmatism may render valuable service in the field of law, education, political, economic and religious reform by bringing greater flexibility and efficiency to the methods of procedure and by adhering more closely to the concrete questions at issue.

The pragmatists have accepted the relative element in the realm of values as exhaustive of that field and have proceeded to extend the same principle which they received from utilitarianism into the field of truth. Again, the influence of evolution upon pragmatism is strong. All things are construed as being subject to change, and logic is not regarded as an exception. This is unwarranted. As Professor V. P. Montague points out, change itself is meaningless unless the terms of the process remain fixed. If we are to speak of changing from youth to age, the terms "youth" and "age" must retain their meanings throughout. The same thing holds true of propositions which are relations between terms. If the earth has been spherical in shape from the first until now, but should change its shape tomorrow, it will always be true that it was round. He insists that the following maxim: "True for one, true for all, and once true, always true," must apply "not only to all abstract or non-existential propositions, but to all other propositions in so far as they are made thoroughly unambiguous with respect to the time and space of the facts asserted. Change resides only in physical processes and psychological processes by which we become aware of physical processes. But between those processes and the logical relations which they reveal there

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V. P. Montague, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
is a fixed gulf which no change can cross."

When pragmatism insists that there is no impersonal, absolute truth; no truth with a capital T; and that if there were such truth independent of anyone's belief in it or knowledge of it we could not attain it or recognize it as such; it differs somewhat from the older doctrine of the "relativity" of knowledge, but at bottom it is open to the same criticism. It differs from agnosticism in that while the latter generally maintains that the inmost reality of things is both unknowable and unrelated to human purpose and knowledge, the pragmatic view holds, in so far as is logically possible, that human volition does reveal something concerning the inward meaning of things; that the 'developmental' view of things is, when properly interpreted, the real view, that reality is at least what it comes to be in our 'purposes' and ideals, and not something different from this. Also, pragmatism uses "truth" in the subjective sense, that is, it is what is believed, whereas scepticism uses it in the same sense that other methodological theories do, namely, in its objective sense. All individualistic views of truth suffer from similar defects. John Watson, in discussing Plato's criticism of Protagoras, says that Plato has put his finger on the weak spot of all such notions of truth. "The individualist must assume at least," he writes, "that his doctrine has a universal meaning; and, if he attempts to limit it by saying that it has no meaning except for himself, he obviously lays himself open to the reply that such a view denies that his judgment has a meaning even for himself. The criticism, as it seems to me, applies to every possible form of individualism,... There is no way of proving the absolute relativity of knowledge, for the simple reason that the doctrine that knowledge is absolutely

90. Ibid., p. 164.
relative, must be either universally valid, and so not relative, or it is utterly meaningless." In other words, such a doctrine contradicts itself. For if we maintain that there are no absolutely true judgments, we make the so-called relatively true judgments absolute. Thus if there are absolutely true judgments which are contrasted in principle with the ones which come within our experience, we involve ourselves in the contradiction of asserting that there is an absolutely true judgment, namely, that there are no absolutely true judgments. It is not only self-contradictory, but fails to account even for the existence of particular judgments. A judgment, in order to be true, must affirm what has some bearing upon reality. If its validity is confined to the human sphere of action, to quote the same author again, "it must at least have the truth implied in its being a true statement of what actually obtains in that connection." To claim truth in this sense while denying the possibility of judgments being true in the sense of revealing "the real nature of things" leads to further contradiction, unless "the real nature of things" be taken to mean the notion of an unknowable realm of which we can say nothing, since there is nothing to be said. We concur in Plato's criticism of the ancient doctrine of the "relativity" of knowledge and believe that it is equally applicable to the relativistic teaching of pragmatism however much it may be seasoned with the "acids of modernity."

Josiah Royce, in his essay, "The Eternal and the Practical," uses the pragmatic belief in evolution to show the self-refuting nature of the prag-
matic conception of truth as relative. Now according to the pragmatic conception, which arises out of its connection with evolution, all our beliefs are results which have been brought about by the character of our organisms, by the environment which plays on us, and by our own inner desires. Our thoughts and their inner products, like all other modern achievements or incidents of evolution, reveal a reality in the making. Pragmatism is a corollary of evolution. You can observe what evidence there is for pragmatism as your present thought and its objects. The evidence for evolution must be based upon beliefs which pertain to a large number of objects which must somehow be supposed to exist before any human being could have been present to acknowledge them. If the pragmatist says that he believes evolution to be true, in the pragmatic sense, that is, "as the object of my present conscious and constructive thought, which conceives evolution as a truth, because just now I need so to conceive it," he may be asked, "How, then, can this belief in evolution,—a belief which is a mere instance of your pragmatism, lend back any of its borrowed authority to furnish a warrant for your belief in the very doctrine called pragmatism, a belief you presuppose in expressing your evolutionary creed?" If he answers, on the other hand, that evolution is a universally valid result of modern science, and is to be accepted whether or not we believe it, that is, in the non-pragmatic sense, because it is true, he ceases to be a pragmatist and becomes either a realist or an absolutist. Then his belief in evolution does not support his pragmatic contention, for he has forsaken that conception in order to describe the kind of truth he has assigned to the former doctrine. The pragmatist is thus unable to give a satisfactory account of the universality of truth and is hard put to explain.

96. Ibid., p. 128.
97. Ibid., p. 128.
98. Ibid., p. 129.
the character of logical universality which he, at least in argument, apparently assigns to his own view. It is "on the whole," for James, but we say in the particular. For either we are not warranted in assuming the logical universality of truth, since it cannot always be practically verified, in which case it may, when convenient, be rejected; or it is warranted due to the fact that it is found to apply in many or most instances. Then the appeal is to mere numbers. But when the discussion tries to convince by argument, the principle itself is invoked not merely on the ground that it works but because it seems to be the necessary condition of ultimately effective and harmonious working in a world characterized by rationality and community of interests.

It is apparent from our treatment of pragmatism thus far that, strictly speaking, it is neither religious nor irreligious. Its primary concern is with the notion of meaning, truth, and knowledge. Its chief interest lies in the fields of epistemology and logic rather than in those of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion. It is true, however, that one's metaphysical and religious interpretations are determined, as a rule, by one's epistemology. That is to say, the application of pragmatic epistemology to certain philosophical and theological questions ought logically, (and usually does), to issue in a certain attitude towards those problems. Of course, the individual pragmatist need not apply his pragmatic principles consistently or follow the implications of his doctrine to logical conclusions. The attitude of the pragmatist is favorable to religion; his general approach to the meaning and values of life lead him to an appraisal of the world and of life which is definitely religious. Pragmatism, however, as a strict philosophical

doctrine, when its implications are followed out to the logical conclusion, does not lead to an especially religious conception of the world; it renders meaningless and without foundation many of the convictions which the pragmatic attitude declares to be necessary.

In conclusion, we may say that, after we have eliminated much of the teaching of pragmatism that is untenable and ephemeral, and after we have corrected many of its extravagant claims, there remains a great deal in the doctrine that entitles it to a permanent place in the history of philosophy. It has forced philosophy to take account of the temporal character of reality, as contrasted with the view of absolute idealism which has given almost exclusive emphasis to its eternal and immutable character. Pragmatism has rightly insisted upon the importance of time in its philosophical accounts of reality and has thereby made more explicit the implications of the philosophy of evolution for human life and thought. In its insistence upon the human element in building up reality, it has rendered it impossible for philosophy to regard man as merely a spectator of the cosmic scene. In spite of the fact that it has exaggerated the part that man actually does play in the vast enterprise of making reality, its assertion that he does have a vote in the "cosmic council" has brought about a general recognition that there is an essential element of truth in the pragmatic contention which cannot be denied by any philosophy except at its own peril. To pragmatism belongs the credit for pointing out the human factor in the building up of the body of scientific truths, and for having accurately expressed the value of the scientific use of hypotheses. It has sought to unite culture and efficiency, the ideal and the practical, and our greatest

100. Cf. Below, p 393.
human values and most necessary and useful instruments such as the state, school, and the church, for the purpose of bringing all together under one general aim—to enhance and enrich man's earthly existence and, insofar as possible, to enable him to live more abundantly here and now. The valuable service that it has rendered in this respect serves somewhat to mitigate its obvious deficiency: its apparent neglect of the fact that man is a citizen not only of the temporal world but also of the eternal.
PART FOUR

PLURALISM
Ever since the time of Plato, and before, the problem of the One and the Many, or the question as to whether the world is to be construed in terms of monism or pluralism, has been uppermost in philosophy. James regarded this question as one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy. In his introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James, in speaking of the pluralistic tendencies of popular religion, he says that "the deepest of all philosophic differences is that between this pluralism and all forms of monism whatever." He expresses the same conviction in another connection by saying that the "difference between monism and pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy." His able treatment of the question did much to give the term "pluralism" prominence in modern thought.

Pluralism may be defined as the doctrine that the universe or reality "consists in a plurality or multiplicity of distinct beings." It holds that they are interrelated so as to constitute a world which is one in several respects. For example, as a subject of discourse, we can speak of "the universe"; it is continuous in space and time, and is subject to continuous lines of influence such as gravity and heat conduction. Also, men are united in a vast network of acquaintanceship, and many things in the world minister to a common purpose. The acquaintanceship, however, is not

perfect, not every one is acquainted with every one else, hence the chain may be broken; purposes frequently conflict, and interests are not always in harmony. Thus the teleological union is not complete. Neither is the aesthetic union complete. There is no respect in which the world may be said to be perfectly unified. Monism, on the other hand, is the theory which asserts "the essential and ultimate unity of all being." Or as A. E. Taylor defines strict monism, it is the doctrine "that all assertions are ultimately predications about one and the same real individual or subject of predicates, and that this ultimate subject of all predication is the only genuine individual existent." Another type of monism as distinguished from that which attempts to subsume everything under the absolute, is materialistic monism which reduces everything to a single principle. Pluralism arose as a protest against both of these monisms, but its attack was chiefly aimed at the former.

Strictly speaking, as F. C. S. Schiller maintains, pragmatism and pluralism are not necessarily connected. Pragmatism is concerned with logical method while pluralism is a concern of metaphysical speculation, and the use of a method does not entail adoption of a metaphysic. Yet, in the case of James, there is an intimate relation between the two doctrines. In the first place, he frequently applies the pragmatic method and standard of truth for the purpose of proving pluralism and disproving monism. Also, he regards the pragmatic theory of knowledge as affording

a special case of pluralistic metaphysics. As we have already noted, he considers the acceptance of pragmatism, as a theory of truth, as "a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail." Pragmatism not only supplies a method which can be used in metaphysics, but by bringing the whole process of cognition within the field of possible experience, it furnishes a metaphysics of truth which bears out the general metaphysical view which James champions. Monism receives its chief support from intellectualism, whereas empiricism and voluntarism tend to be pluralistic. If we accept the data of the senses and of the feelings, as reported by immediate experience, the infinite variety and number of such data will not lead to a belief in the essential unity of the world. The intellect searches for, and finds, identities and bonds which it accepts as a fact. "But despite that respect of order which, thanks to science, nature now presents us, there still remains a vast and apparently inexhaustible residuum of disconnected and unique particulars. Taking the world as we find it, the most that could be claimed would be that there is a frame of order enfolded and surrounded by a variegated and nebulous disorder." If, then, one believes that there is absolute order and unity in the world, it is due to the fact that one's intellectual bias has led one to disregard the actual facts as they appear in immediate experience. Since monism is the product of intellectualism, a repudiation of the intellect as the chief instrument of knowledge is at the same time a revolt against monism. Voluntarism tends to be pluralistic because a man's action is an expression or assertion of himself, his own desire or his own

decision. But when a man thinks he merges himself with the empirical principles and systems which he contemplates. Thus pragmatism, as Professor R. B. Perry observes, "both in its negative attack on intellect, and in its positive affirmation of the rights of will or feeling, inclines to pluralism in its metaphysics."

James's opposition to monism arose out of deep-seated convictions which would not permit him to acquiesce in this influential doctrine. He would have retained a belief in it if it had been possible, for he did not fail to appreciate its beauty and value. "As a rule," he says in his psychology, "we believe as much as we can. We would believe everything if we only could." But he simply could not believe the monistic doctrine for personal, moral, philosophical and religious reasons. His personal penchant for variety and change rebelled against the monotonous implications of monism which seemed, as J. Dewey puts it, "to make change a mere incident in the totality of being, or even a partly illusory phenomenon." He struggled to establish an objectively valid dynamic view; that is, he contended for the possibility of real change. He revolted against the "timeless" character of the absolute as stressed by the absolutists. Time, for James, must be conceived as "real as anything, and nothing in the universe is great or static or eternal enough not to have some history." Monism ran counter to his moral convictions; he was not willing to compromise good with evil, or the individual with the universal. He could not acquiesce in the view that the evil facts of life, which he regarded as a genuine

11. Ibid., p. 317.
portion of reality, could ever be so taken up into the good as to render
them ultimately good or any the less evil. Nor could he look with approv-
al upon any attempt to regard individuals as "but syllables in the mouth of
the Lord." James was above all interested in individuals and regarded all
individuals as having "insides of their own", and he was anxious to estab-
lish the possibility of real variety and distinctness with reference to
persons. He could not bring himself to view all differences between indi-
viduals as simply limitations of the one being. The philosophical roots
of his pluralism are to be found in his empiricism, especially in his ex-
perimentalism. His moral proclivities, along with the voluntaristic as-
pect of his empiricism, serve to lead him towards an ethical pluralism or
monadism. Thus he conceives the universe in terms of "a republic of semi-de-
tached consciousnesses," with a God who is simply primus inter pares. His
limitations and external relations make it possible to relieve him of all
responsibility for evil. The third motive is prominent in his A Pluralis-
tic Universe. An empirical account of the world shows that "the sundry
parts of reality may be externally related." Everything in the world has
an external environment; that is, it is related to something which is gen-
uinely other than itself, and of which it must take account without having
any sort of previous complicity. Relations are just as they are found in
experience rather than necessary or constitutional. "Things are 'with'
one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates
over everything." There is free movement between the parts of experience,
they "lean on" one another; they exist together but do not lose their

15. Cf. Ibid., Lecture III, Especially pp. 117 ff. Also Varieties, p. 163.
17. Ibid., p. 321.
identity. "The relations are not all what the French call solidaires with one another." "Ever not quite" must be written after the best attempts at all-inclusiveness. Things are real when taken in their "each-form", that is, individually, rather than as taken in their "all-form", or together. His pluralism when construed in this manner is the same as his "radical empiricism". Closely allied with this third motive is the religious conviction that it is impossible to worship the absolute principle of monism. "The One and only Being," however, the Universal Substance, the Soul and Spirit of things, the First Principle of monistic metaphysics, call it by names as theological and reverential as we will, always seems, it must be confessed, a pale, abstract, and impersonal conception compared with that of the eternal living God, worshipped by the incalculable majority of our race. Such a monistic principle never can be worshipped by a majority of our race until the race's mental constitution change." Pluralism, therefore, constitutes the basis of his religious philosophy.

As James conceives it the leading representatives of monism, namely, Lotze, Royce, and Bradley, present philosophy with a false dilemma between complete unity and utter irrelevance. According to Lotze, if two things are in any sense separate they cannot interact. Royce argues that knowledge is impossible between two things which are in any sense separate; and that, consequently, there is no independence of being apart from being known. Bradley contends that if things are two it is impossible for them to be related. These protagonists of monism conclude, therefore, that since interaction and relationships do exist as a fact, and are implied in any

18. Ibid., p. 325.
19. Ibid., p. 34.
20. The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James, p. 114.
22. Ibid., pp. 61 ff.
doctrine of plurality, we are forced to relinquish any view of independence and distinctness. Unity or oneness must be accepted as the reality while plurality must be relegated to mere appearance. Two further presuppositions of monism which James conceives to be fundamental to this doctrine are, the view that truth is coherent and that mind can only cognize that which is mental and that the real is mental. He attacks the monistic view root and branch. He asserts that the arguments of those who support monism are based upon a "vicious intellectualism" and are vitiated by abstraction. His attempt to refute monism is for the most part an attack upon intellectualism as such. He says that the absolutists are guilty of a double rationalization and falsification of the continual flux of sensible experience. There is "a loyal clinging to the rationalist belief that sense-data and their associations are incoherent, and that only in substituting a conceptual order for their order can truth be found." Further, "the substituted conceptions are treated intellectualistically, that is as mutually exclusive and discontinuous, so that the first innocent continuity of the flow of sense-experience is shattered for us without any higher conceptual continuity taking its place. Finally, since this broken state of things is intolerable, the absolute deus ex machina is called on to mend it in his own way, since we cannot mend it in ours." But for James, experience is a continuous process and the discrete and atomic nature attributed to its constituent parts by absolutism results from a falsifying psychological analysis. It starts by selecting some aspect of a concrete thing to
the exclusion of all the rest, and then identifies the thing in question exclusively with that aspect of it. It ends by denying that the thing contains the aspects which have been excluded. "The treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include, is what I call 'vicious intellectualism,'" If we want to know, according to James, how concrete things do interact, and how they are related, we need only to return to experience. Experience reveals that they do interact, that they are, in fact, related, and that the arguments which are concerned with the question whether or not they can interact or be related are unnecessary. Experience says that they are capable of interaction and of entering into relations with one another, which is sufficient.

One of the chief objections which James urges against absolutism is the familiar difficulty involved in the existence of evil. Evil remains a speculative problem to monism, both intellectually and morally. "Its perfection is represented as the source of things, and yet the first effect of that perfection is the tremendous imperfection of all finite experience." James is unable to understand why the absolute should "ever have lapsed from the perfection of its own integral experience of things, and refracted itself into all our finite experiences." For pluralism, on the other hand, there is no theoretical problem of evil. The existence of evil is accepted as an ultimate datum and the pluralist need only to attempt to eliminate or change it. The question which confronts the pluralist with reference to evil is not "Why does evil exist?" but "How can

26. Ibid., p. 60.
27. Ibid., p. 117.
28. Ibid., p. 120.
we get rid of it?" God is finite, and He, too, is striving to remove the evil for which he is in no way responsible; He is as anxious to get rid of it as we are. He needs and seeks our cooperation in this gigantic task and because we know that He needs our help, and needs it constantly, we must ever be "up and doing" in order to help Him accomplish His purpose; for without our help he may not succeed. He also objects to the absolutistic conception because of its sterility in helping us to understand the world in which we live. "Whatever the details of experience may prove to be, after the fact of them the absolute will adopt them. It is an hypothesis that functions retrospectively only, not prospectively. That, whatever it may be, will have been in point of fact the sort of world which the absolute was pleased to offer to itself as a spectacle." Finally, he objects to the absolutistic contention that the absolute is the "all-knower," on the ground that if this representation be true the absolute is forced to contemplate perpetually all that is only negatively true, useless, trivial and silly. Thus the rubbish in its mind would "appear easily to outweigh in amount the more desirable material. One would expect it fairly to burst with such an obesity, plethora, and superfoetation of useless information." James does not claim to have completely refuted absolutism in urging these objections, but he does think that the defects in this doctrine which his criticism makes patent expose the error in the claim of the absolutists that their doctrine is not a hypothesis but a "presupposition implicated in all thinking, and needing only a little effort of analysis to be seen as a logical necessity." He thinks that by showing this claim of the absolutists to be without foundation he has succeeded in opening the

29. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
30. Ibid., p. 126.
32. Ibid., p. 52.
way for the consideration of pluralism as a plausible hypothesis. For the most part, his objections are valid, but it is open to question whether his objection to the absolute as the "all-knower" does justice to the absolute's sense of proportion and perspective. The objection is justified only in case the unimportant thoughts of the absolute are elevated to an important place in the general scheme of things and are allowed to distract attention from things which are of more importance. Our limited span of consciousness does not allow us to waste either the time or the energy when considering the positive characteristics of a table to ponder over the fact that it is not a chair, not a rhinoceros, not a logarithm, not a mile away from the door, and so on. Also, negative propositions have positive correlates; negative characters flow from, and are consequences of their positive characters. The former are considered empty and barren only when separated from the latter, for if we consider the negative qualities of things thoroughly we shall discover that in fact we are really doing nothing more than "turning over in our minds" their positive relations to one another. For instance, to say that a table is not a chair and not a logarithm is a sort of negative preparation for the expression of the fuller and more positive truth that it is a table.

James is not satisfied merely to point out the weaknesses in the monistic doctrine, but he develops a metaphysical system of his own which he offers as being more tenable than that of monism. We have seen in dealing with his view of the self and of consciousness that James attempts to bring within experience the dualities of knowledge such as those of self

and not-self, of knower and known, of idea and object, and, finally, the
distinction between mind and body. It remains for him to take the final
and culminating step, which is that of identifying experience with the
metaphysical reality. The "stress of consciousness" which had proved so
useful to him in the development of his psychology is now converted to the
uses of metaphysics in his doctrine of "radical empiricism." He is en-
abled to overcome whatever doubts he entertains concerning this radical
step by accepting Fechner's view of the hierarchy of souls. Fechner con-
ceived the universe in terms of a series of souls which overlap. He be-
gins with God and carries his conception down through the earth-soul to
man, and from man to the psychic states below the threshold of his con-
sciousness which are not open to observation. Thus, according to his meta-
physics, there are different levels of consciousness in which the plurality
of the lower constitutes the unity of the higher. Mental fields can com-
pound themselves and the universe is thereby rendered continuous. James's
previous loyalty to logic had prevented him from accepting any such view as
this. But his doctrine of "pure experience" identifies reality with the
field of consciousness which implies that it is possible for two or more
minds to hold parts of the field in common. In other words, portions of
the field of consciousness could be "identical parts of conscious wholes."
This new metaphysics cannot be reconciled with his earlier psychology and
logic. We have had occasion to deal with his struggle at this point some-
what in detail, and need not repeat it here. But it is at this point that
the anti-intellectualism of Bergson proves useful to James, and enables him
to forsake his psychological and logical scruples which had held him in

34. E. R. E., pp. 76 ff.
bondage for so long and leaves him free to elevate "experience" to the rank of ultimate reality. The doctrine of "synechism," as advocated by Peirce, also enables him to take this final step. His problem here is that of reconciling the conviction of common sense that the same things can be at once both distributively and collectively known, with the logical principle which makes it impossible for the experience of things as parts to be identical with the experience of things as a whole. He admits that if he accepts the hypothesis of a soul there is no difficulty involved for it is conceivable that different souls can synthesize differently the same mental states. But James refuses to entertain this hypothesis and adopts that of the compounding of consciousness instead.

Before we follow him in his solution of the problem of the compounding of consciousness, however, it is necessary to see the part which his doctrine of "relations", which is the central doctrine of his "radical empiricism", plays in helping him to achieve the solution he desiderates. He follows Bergson in subordinating concepts, in limiting their application, and in the recognition of the continuity of experience. He gets to the crux of the question, so far as his solution is concerned, by realizing and emphasizing the importance of the question of relations. He is anxious not only to secure the realization of their existence, but also to establish the validity of our experience of them. The denial of external relations by monists, and their efforts to explain them away as states of the terms related logically leads, in the final analysis, to the position that there is nothing in the universe but the whole or the absolute, and that it is impossible for us to have any complete knowledge until we know

35. P. U., pp. 206 ff.
the absolute. According to B. Russell, the consequence of denying that there can be no relations between things is "either that there can be only one thing in the universe, or, if there are many things, they cannot possibly interact in any way, since any interaction would be a relation, and relations are impossible." Now James insists that any one who examines experience "in concrete must see that relations of every sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are, and that conjunctive relations are just as true members of the flux as disjunctive relations are." He opposes the view that sensations are disjoined only by insisting that "conjunctions between them are just as immediately given as disjunctions are, and that relations, whether disjunctive or conjunctive, are in their original sensible givenness just as fleeting and momentary (in Green's words), and just as 'particular', as terms are." Both terms and relations are universalized later as they are conceptualized and named. But the immediate and relatively unnamed phases of experience reveal its thickness, concreteness, and individuality.

The answer to the question of the compounding of consciousness is now at hand; we need only to see that a certain conscious state is and is not the same as another. This is impossible according to conceptualist principles, but where logic says "No," experience says "Yes." If we return to experience, we get behind and beyond the "conceptual function altogether." Here the "concrete pulses of experience appear pent in by no such definite

38. Ibid., p. 280.
39. Ibid., p. 280.
limits as our conceptual substitutes for them are confined by. They run
into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What in them
is relation and what is matter related is hard to discern. You feel no
one of them as inwardly simple, and no two as wholly without confluence
where they touch." These bits of immediate experience are their "own
others" both internally and externally. "Inwardly they are one with their
parts, and outwardly they pass continuously into their next neighbors," and
if logic says this is impossible so much the worse for logic. In other
words, your experience and mine are the same objectively, but not subjec­
tively. It may be conceived in both ways so long as we do not confuse
the experience with the conception of it, and whether this two-fold manner
of conceiving it is permissible is not a question of logic but one of fact.
Reality is essentially of such a nature, for James, that its parts are ca­
pable of being both identical with, and different from, their neighbors.
Thus the doctrine of the "stream of consciousness," with which he began in
his psychology has developed into a metaphysical conception of the "endosmo­sis of adjacent parts of living experience."

James's reasons for rejecting logic will become more evident as we fol­
low his description of the nature of reality somewhat in detail. Some of
the essential characteristics which he conceives reality to possess have
been implied in identifying it with experience. It will be remembered
that, for James, the "deeper features of reality are found only in percep­tual
experience. Here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity, or
the immersion of one thing in another, here alone with self, with substance,
with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time, with cause,

40. Ibid., p. 282.
41. Ibid., p. 285.
42. Cf. Ibid., pp. 285 ff.
with change, with novelty, with tendency, and with freedom." Reality is qualitative, for James; it consists of color, tone, hardness, sweetness, "and all the innumerable and nameless nuances by which such qualities are shaded, mixed, and related." In the next place, reality is characterized by concreteness. Concreteness plays an important part in James's thought because he conceives thought as essentially a selective operation which disregards all that is not immediately useful. Due to this fact it distorts the real nature of things. "We extend our view when we insert our percepts into our conceptual map. We learn about them, and of some of them we transfigure the value; but the map remains superficial through the abstractness, and false through the discreteness of its elements; and the whole operation, so far from making things appear more rational, becomes the source of quite gratuitous unintelligibilities. Conceptual knowledge is forever inadequate to the fullness of the reality to be known. Reality consists of existential particulars as well as of essences and universals and class-names, and of existential particulars we become aware only in the perceptual flux." Reality is the plenum from which thought selects. The abstraction which characterizes metaphysics is not reality. Reality is that from which the abstraction is made and to which it returns. When we are unaware of the part which mind plays, we can take whatever comes as reality and insofar as we make allowances for the selective activity of mind. Reality includes that which has been selected from it, and that which selection ignores; both exist together in the original plenum.

43. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 97.
45. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 78-79.
which must be of such a nature as to permit division according to the selective purposes of thought. "It must be a field of eligibility. As such it is a world suitable to the exercise of freedom."

A further characteristic of reality is its continuity. He conceives reality as essentially a flux of pure experience in which there is nothing that is absolute, determinate or static. This immediate flux contains all life's dynamisms. In Bergsonian fashion he regards the *élan vital* or driving principle of this flux as evolving thought as a secondary or subsidiary activity. It is the function of thought to depict the qualities of the flux in terms which are conducive to adjustment to, and control of, it. These qualities which thought extracts from the flux, and which modify it, are preserved in static form as concepts. In other words, concepts are abstractions, cuts, excerpts, taken from the flux of reality by an interested act of selection. These concepts are useful in that by observing the relations which subsist between them we are enabled to anticipate and control the course of life. But these concepts fail to give us the dynamic aspect of reality. These abstract concepts "are but as flowers gathered, they are only moments dipped out from the stream of time, snapshots taken, as by a kinetoscopic camera, at a life that in its original coming is continuous." That is to say, we may photograph a moving body in the successive positions which it occupies, but the photograph never catches the movement itself. Immediate experience alone can give the element of continuity which characterizes reality. This accounts for the failure of intellect to solve such problems as those with which Zeno

47. P. U., p. 235. Cf. Lectures VI and VII.
grappled: those growing out of space, time and motion; and the difficulty involved in attributing to one and the same system the each-form of distributive plurality and the all-form of collective unity is that the essentially continuous nature of living reality cannot thus be expressed. The intellect introduces discreteness, sharp outlines, distinctness, and presents reality as assuming the aspect of a schematism which is not true of reality. Geometry gives definite relationships, but there is always an "ever not quite" about reality; thus things in reality are not quite circular in the geometrical sense, never quite straight as in geometry.

As R. B. Perry suggests continuity "has to be reconciled with the discreteness of those moments of experience which grasp change 'all at once,' and thus embrace it within themselves; and with that distinctness which is implied not only in James's emphasis on qualitative uniqueness, but in his moral individualism." James attempts to overcome this difficulty in his conception of reality by regarding reality as interpenetrative, as "a manifold of overlapping particulars." If we let $a$, $b$, and $c$ stand for three separate bits or moments of experience, we have a continuous transition from $a$ to $c$. Experience $b$, that is, the present moment of experience, the now, is retrospective insofar as it takes up into itself a part of $a$; and it is prospective insofar as it reaches forward and takes into itself $c$. In short, there is an element of the past and an element of the future in every present moment, yet each moment has its own element of distinctness. Similarly, each individual is unique, but individuals have a community of experience. "Every existent element has its own discriminable character, and yet it is soaked as well as bathed in the context

49. Ibid., p. 109.
in which it is immersed; and there is a chemistry by which each synthesis possesses a uniqueness of its own."

Reality is also characterized by change and novelty. Reality, in its native, primitive conditions has the nature of perpetual change, and this change occurs by means of a novelty which never quite repeats itself. James's unqualified acceptance of the all-pervasive character of change marks him as a modern Heraclitean and puts him in full accord with Bergson's view of reality as ceaselessly changing. Thus, for James, the "essence of life is its continuously changing character;" nothing remains just as it was, there is always an element of novelty involved. But our experiences do not come as entirely new. "Their changes are not complete annihilations followed by complete creations of something absolutely novel. There is partial decay and partial growth, and all the while a nucleus of relative constancy from which what decays drops off, and which takes into itself whatever is grafted on, until at length something wholly different has taken its place." Finally, reality is pluralistic. Its parts, so far as sense-perception acquaints us with them, are not parts of a whole. Experience comes in units, buds; it is strung-along, and there is no inner necessity which binds them together. These units of experience have intimate relations with one another, but the occurrence of one does not necessitate the occurrence of another. Our universe is not a place in which every part is necessitated by every other part. It is not a "block-universe", but one in which there is casualness, irrelevance of part to part; there is no all-pervading unity. What unity it has is of "the strung-along

52. Ibid., p. 258.
type, the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation... you may call it the synechistic type." James carries this conception into his view of man. The individual is a unique, distinct unit and cannot be reduced to the social group. It also applies to religion; good cannot be reduced to evil, nor evil cannot be made good, each is just what it appears to be.

For things in the real world are very much as they come in sense experience.

The history of the real world is characterized by the same richness, variety, and fecundity which mark its internal composition. While we are able to predict to some extent what may happen in our world, it is at bottom a world which cannot be completely reduced to law and order or be made perfectly to fit into any preconceived pattern. For the most part, it is unpredictable, full of surprises; it is a world in which the unexpected is always occurring. It is uncultivated, wild, and this feature predominates over that of its predictability. We can never be quite certain just what awaits us "around the corner." Consequently, there are risks, hazards, dangers; we never know when the "primitive" element of the world may assert itself and render vain our carefully worked out plans and fondest hopes. James prefers this sort of universe to one in which everything is known and assured in advance. It appeals to our love for conquest and adventure, and stimulates our courage. It challenges our powers and stirs our "sporting blood." Thus it is not only a fact of experience that the world is of this nature, it is also the most interesting and exciting kind of world in which to live.

We have now to examine the method by which James is led to his pluralistic conclusions, after which we shall deal with some of the implications.

53. Ibid., p. 325.
of the doctrine of pluralism. We have postponed our final treatment of
his dilemma with reference to the compounding of consciousness until after
we set forth his general pluralistic doctrine upon which his rejection of
logic is based. We have pointed out that he ultimately abandons the tra-
ditional logic and accepts the irrationalism of Bergson which enables him
to accept intellectualistic contradictions since logical concepts and
their relations are simply imperfect instruments to which we resort for
the practical purpose of controlling the flux of experience, or reality,
which is inherently irrational. In the first place, the dilemma as to
how the same things can be at once both distributively and collectively
known in view of the logical principle which makes it impossible to iden-
tify the experience of things as parts with the experience of things as
a whole is real for James only because, in A Pluralistic Universe, he
proceeds upon the assumption of idealism that the thing experienced is

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the experience of that thing. This is a real dilemma for the idealist
who is forced to admit that there are as many objects as there are wit-
nesses. According to the idealistic principle that esse is percipi, to
witness or experience an object constitutes the object experienced. If
it be true that the world is objectively one system of facts there is no
way of avoiding the conclusion that there is only one real self or see witness--the absolute--of whom all finite selves are mere appearances. Once
we accept this assumption of idealism, it does follow, as Professor W. P.
Montague suggests, that it is impossible for things which are experienced

55. Cf. Ibid., p. 149.
collectively, as in the case of the absolute, to have anything in common with things experienced distributively by us, since the experience of a whole is not numerically identical with the experience of its parts.

R. B. Perry says that James's position here is uncertain. He points out that James's rejection of the absolute as a universal mind which includes all experience leaves three alternatives. Reality beyond the horizon of human consciousness may consist in the possibility of experience. This view, however, is incompatible with James's "frequent admission that a possibility must always involve the actuality of some of the conditions of its realization." Then, there is the solution offered by panpsychism which enables him to regard residual existence as consisting in experience of infra-human minds, whatever is not regarded for man or some higher subject is conceived of as "for itself." But Professor Perry is of the opinion that James never quite goes over to this view. Finally, experience may be distinguished from the experienced. Existence and the content of experience would then coincide but the former would not depend upon any act of experiencing by the mind. This view, according to Professor Perry, is more in keeping with James's relational theory of consciousness. But this does not help us a great deal because if we accept Professor Perry's version of the matter, it is difficult to understand why James overlooks what appears obvious to W. P. Montague; namely, that James has at hand the solution to this problem in the relational theory of consciousness. "If the object experienced," he says, "is not identical

56. Ibid., p. 149.
58. Ibid., p. 592.
with the act of experiencing it, that is, if we conceive experience realistically as a cognitive reference to an object other than the reference, there is no more contradiction in thinking of many witnesses of the same object than in thinking of many people pointing at the same object.”

Whether or not it is possible to solve the problem under consideration by means of the relational theory of consciousness, without the hypothesis of a soul, as Professor Montague suggests that it is, does not concern us at this juncture. We are merely trying to show that James's attempt to answer this question without attempting to apply his theory of consciousness, serves to indicate that he is proceeding upon the assumption of idealism rather than upon that of realism.

In the next place, James leaves us in doubt as to whether or not he has really solved the problem by declaring reality to be irrational. In fact, it does not solve the conflict between logic and experience to relegate one of them to the status of unreality. Zeno's solution was to declare appearance an illusion and experience unreal. James seeks the solution in the opposite extreme; that is, by declaring that irrationality is at the heart of things. But it is inconceivable that we have to solve one of the profoundest problems which the universe presents by the acceptance of either acosmism or irrationalism. As J. A. Leighton puts it:

"Philosophy does not get out of the supposed deadlock between the discrete and the continuous, the one and the many, either by throwing away one term of the antithesis, or by plunging headlong in the pre-reflective stream of

crude sense-experience. There is no need to resort to this heroic remedy."

In the case of Zeno, it may not be that motion is irrational, but that he
fails to discover its rationality; his use of logic may be at fault. Simi­
larly, when James asserts the irrationality of the collective-distributive
identity, it may be that he has simply failed to discover its rationality.
For the intellect itself demands both identity and continuity or difference
and discreteness, and both are present in sensible experience, though in
a less fully articulated form. Sense-experience is always accompanied by
some measure of thought. When James takes the position that it is not
logically possible for the same thing to be viewed under different aspects,
but only illogically so, he fails to give a relevant answer to the problem.
It is tantamount to saying that the problem really has no solution, rather
than offering a solution for it. Further, as Professor W. P. Montague
points out, when James attributes to thought the ability to extract certain
elements from reality he falls into the same confusion that characterizes
the "vicious intellectualism" which he repudiates, namely, that of ascrib­
ing "to objects of thought the properties of thought symbols." And we
have precisely the same fault that is charged to "vicious intellectualism",
according to which the activity of thought is regarded as being in some
way "constitutive or reconstitutive of its own objects." When the judg­
ment is made that A is B, it does not extract or tear out these attributes
from the living unity of experienced reality and then attempt to put them
together again by means of the word "is". These oral symbols in no way

60. J. A. Leighton, "On Continuity and Discreteness", Journal of Philos­
affect the objective qualities which they signify. The judgment simply recognizes that these attributes exist alongside each other in the same object. When they are separated and the united the objective qualities which coexist in the object are in no way disturbed. "A judgment about an object is not an event in the life of that object, but only in the life of the person making the judgment." Thus there is no warrant for asserting that a flux or movement is rendered static or discrete merely by becoming the object of thought, or by having judgments formed concerning it. This charge against the intellect can be substantiated only on a basis of "vicious intellectualism", which James rightly condemns. "So far is it from being true," writes J. A. Leighton, "that the outcome of intellectual activity is solely the breaking up of the primitive continuities of immediate experience into discrete elements that in fact the actual work of intellect is synthetic as well as analytic and consists quite as much in linking the immediately discrete by threads of continuity unearthed by a reflective quest."

The assertion that the intellect is incapable of apprehending change fails to take into consideration a great deal of intellectual activity in which the intellect obviously does demonstrate its ability to grasp change. As the writer just quoted points out, if evolution or "pure becoming" be real, it is not discovered by sense-feeling or intuition. The notion of oosmical evolution is not derived from immediate experience. This is also true of the various forms of continuity which are true for science.

62. Ibid., p. 154.
We do not immediately perceive the continuity of the acorn with the oak, or of the jelly-fish with the mammalia. Scientific generalizations, such as the law of gravitation, and the conservation of energy, are the result of the search of the intellect for continuities and identities which are not open to immediate experience. Further, we are constantly using thought for the purpose of overcoming such discontinuities in our everyday experience as those between our needs and desires and the conditions which stand in the way of satisfying them. It is through the exercise of the intellect that we bridge the gap between discomfort and comfort, poverty and plenty, hunger and food, and the like. Furthermore, James attributes to thought the practical role of enabling us to adjust ourselves to the changing conditions of our environment, or to new situations. This practical function of thought accounts for its breaking up the continuities of the flux of experience into discrete elements. But this function which he assigns to thought implies that thought plans for the future as a result of past experiences which indicates the ability of thought to comprehend the continuity of the future with the past. We may conclude, then, with Professor Montague, that to say "that the intellect falsifies a reality that is continuous and mobile because it breaks it up into cross-sections that are discrete and static, is as wrong as to say(207,823),(869,844) that the eye can only see space as a system of colored points. The eye has no difficulty in seeing space as continuous and the intellect has no difficulty in apprehending change." Instead of saying that thought distorts reality, thought should be regarded as the selection of various

64. Ibid., p. 233.
elements, qualities, and relations of the reality which is being attended to, and concepts or symbols should be considered as means of expressing or recording that which has been observed.

We turn now to some of the important implications of pluralism for philosophy and religion. One of the significant contributions which James makes to religious thought in his pluralistic philosophy lies in the value which he assigns to the individual. His originality is seen in his acceptance of the manyness and differences of the world as ultimate and irreducible. It is characteristic of James to welcome this manyness and diversity not only as a fact, but as the great redeeming feature of the world. James rejoices in this aspect of the world. He believes that the practical consequence of his pluralistic philosophy "is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality." Because pluralism does preserve that which is unique in the particular individual, by its doctrine of separateness and distinctness, it is, for James, far superior to monism which makes the human soul a part of, or an element of, or aspect of, and, therefore, in some sense as identical with, the divine.

While we cannot subscribe to the pluralistic contention that other souls are independent of God, we believe that its view of separateness and distinctness of the individual is justified as against the monistic view. "According to monism there is no value in any individual except so far as he sings his part in the chorus, or plays his instrument in the symphony. Unless one can by a comprehensive and synthetic apprehension catch the harmony of the whole, then one can find no value whatever in the activities of the individual." Some monists, Royce, for example, have attributed

value to the individual, as such, but, for the most part, the above quotation states accurately the attitude of monism towards the individual. The extremes to which some monists are carried in their rejection of any value in the individual may be seen from the following statement: "I wish to make open and plain to you whither and past what I have been or am carried; what in looking I close my eyes to, what in searching for knowledge I ignore. What in desire I resist, what in feeling I harden my heart against, is what I may call in a word Individuality. Wherever any part, anything less or other than the whole, sets up a claim to stand by itself....I disallow its claim. I oppose its pretensions, I counter its efforts, I deny its worth. Its individuality is mere seeming, a hollow and delusive mask, the word a synonym for futility, worthlessness, insignificance, unreality. Of individuals—of all individuals—I feel bound to say that none is or can be what it seems to be. They are less than nothing and wholly vanity. It is too little to say of them that they are 'bubbles on the sea of matter (or spirit) borne,' which 'rise and fall and to that sea return,' for their happening also is individual and so unreal, and neither it nor they tell us anything of what lies behind their appearance." This writer goes on to say that some monists have excepted persons or personalities from their arguments against pluralism or individualism. He then adds: "For myself, I must avow that I cannot only find no intellectually satisfactory grounds for this exception, but that in no sense which I am able to attach to the words 'person' or 'personal' do I find what is so qualified unconditionally valuable or overwhelmingly attractive. The beings

or goods which I here and now characterize as 'personal' seem to me often and thereby to contain the seeds of intestine weakness, unworthiness, dissolution and mortality, and by contrast what is impersonal to be more worth caring for and striving after, more deserving to survive and prevail, more likely to be durable or eternal. In a word, 'Personality' seems to carry with it limitation and finitude, bonds and restrictions which I would fain see dissolved." Here we have a vivid contrast between the type of monism which assigns no value to the individual and the type of pluralism which James advocates as guaranteeing the value of the individual life but leaves the value of the whole in doubt. For James, the only guarantee which the value of an individual life needs is its own inward feeling. He does not conceive it as deriving its value by some remote reference to collective mankind, or to a whole. He utterly refuses to reduce the infinite variety of individuals either to the "abstract generic principle human nature, or to some single all-enveloping life like that of the absolute."

The supreme fallacy of absolute monism, as H. Rashdall points out, is the assumption "that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self." Even Royce, who tries harder than other absolutists to assign a place and destiny to finite selves in the absolute, does not succeed in escaping this fallacy by substituting "meaning" or "purpose" for self or spirit. He fails precisely because meaning

69. Ibid., p. 16.
70. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 318.
or purpose is simply thought content which two or more selves may hold in common, while they, themselves, remain distinct from it and from each other throughout. Unity of purpose or meaning does not constitute unity of being. As H. Rashdall argues, "the esse of a person is to know himself, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his own knowledge, and to know that he acts. In dealing with persons, therefore, there is an unfathomable gulf between knowledge and reality. What a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself, and the mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself." Thus he rightly insists that the essence of a person lies in his own knowledge, his own experience of himself, and not in what can be known about him. To regard the essence of a person as consisting of what can be known about him is to assume that feeling and will are not constitutive of reality, but that knowledge alone constitutes the whole of reality. It is possible to enter through sympathy into the lives of others, to understand them, to know something of their joys, sorrows, and heartaches, it is even possible, through similar experiences, to feel very much about certain things as others feel, but the life of another is forever a thing apart and distinct from my own, and my life remains equally apart from that of another. "Two loving hearts may beat as one, but they are forever two." For as A. E. Taylor puts it: "The unique individuality of the self as a centre of immediate

73, Ibid., p. 383.
experience is a datum which as philosophers we are called upon to explain, if we can, but are equally called upon not to explain away." We believe, therefore, that pluralism which recognizes and emphasizes the unique value and destiny of the individual is more in keeping with the teaching of Christianity concerning the value of human personality than absolutism which denies value to the individual as such. The latter school of thought which was so influential in Europe and America during the latter part of the nineteenth century, cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the historic position of Christianity. It was, as Professor A. N. Whitehead says, "undoubtedly a reaction towards Buddhistic metaphysics on the part of Western mentality."

We cannot follow James, however, in his individualistic pluralism which carries the doctrine of the separateness and distinctness of the individual so far that it creates a gulf between God and His human worshippers which renders immanence impossible. To make human selves entirely independent of God fails to meet the full requirements of personality and of religious experience. Monism fails to coordinate with personality because of its recognition of immanence only; and pluralism equally fails in this respect due to its recognition of transcendence only. The fundamental weakness of pluralism in its various forms is, as J. W. Buckham points out, that it "is so taken up with plurality, it is so sensitive to the distinctness and autonomy of each separate self, that it fails to take due note of that intimacy of relationship by which finite selves enter

into each other (each preserving still his own centre of selfhood) and
dwell in each other, while the Supreme Self enters and dwells in all."

If the universe is comprised of the quite independent wills of the human
species and possibly other intelligent beings in other parts of space,
alongside the will of God, it is inconceivable how, on such a basis, God
can directly influence human life at all. A purely transcendent view of
God excludes the possibility of the exercise of divine discipline and
providence in the life of individuals; it apparently leaves no room in
the life of these weak and unstable creatures for the exercise of divine
grace and control. God is forced to stand aside from the course of human
life as an anxious and sympathetic spectator watching us all too often mar
and ruin our souls, but He is as impotent to help us because of the bar­
rriers between Himself and us, as we are to help ourselves. Plainly, such
a conception as this fails to do justice to the religious consciousness,
and to the needs of human personality. In order fully to satisfy the de­
mands of the religious consciousness, and the requirements of human person­
ality, we must believe that the Being whom we worship, to use the words of
J. B. Baillie, "is higher and greater than we, a supreme Soul whose ways
and thoughts are not as the ways and thoughts of the souls of men; and yet
we must conceive Him as working in and through the souls of men, and of
these as having their life, and all that is in them of good, from Him."

Professor Baillie goes on to say: "If there be any truth at all in religion,
ultimate reality must be so constituted that both sides of this statement
are true and (in some fashion hardly to be understood of us) cohere

76. J. W. Buckham, "Monism, Pluralism and Personalism", Harvard Theolog­
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is the outcome of the attempt to harmonize and unify these two complementary truths—immanence and transcendence—and while it may seem a long way from Jesus to the Athanasian controversy, in reality, as J. W. Buckham writes, "from the personality of Jesus to the personality of God is a straight and unavoidable path." The only finally satisfactory doctrine of personality, then, must regard God as both immanent and transcendent, rather than as either the sum of all existence or as an entirely separate unitary individual.

We are in agreement with Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison at this point when he sums up this question as follows: "However impious and intolerable one may feel the image of the potter and the clay, however certain one may be that the integrity of the self-conscious being is involved in the very perfection of the divine nature, still the relation between the finite spirit and its inspiring source must be, in the end, incapable of statement in terms of the relation of one finite individual to another."

We have next to consider the implications of pluralism with reference to freedom. James's pluralism and indeterminism, as Professor Perry suggests, "lie in his viewing the world as a field in which determination is proportional to proximity, and in which forces and influences are centrifugal rather than centripetal." This conception of the universe gives support to the doctrine of freedom which monism renders impossible. The kind of determinism which James attacks is what he calls 'soft determinism' rather than the old-fashioned 'hard determinism.' He describes it as

78. Ibid., p. 397.
81. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 112.
professing "that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning." It was this "soft determinism" of absolute idealism, which James regards as being as deterministic as hyper-Calvinism or materialism, that he is primarily concerned to refute. In contrast to this doctrine which denies "ambiguous possibilities" to the future, James's indeterminism "says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what others shall be. It admits that possibilities may be in excess of actualities, and that things not yet revealed to our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be really possible; and the one become impossible only at the very moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself. Indeterminism thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact." James connects his indeterminism with the concept of novelty; and novelty, for him, apparently means pure indetermination and contingency. "That we ourselves," he says, "may be authors of genuine novelty is the thesis of the doctrine of free-will. That genuine novelties can occur means that from the point of view of what is already given, what comes may have to be treated as a

82. Ibid., p. 150.
83. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
matter of chance." By use of the term "chance" he means that which comes, in a world in which real alternatives exist, that which comes as a "free gift"; it is "not guaranteed, that it may fall out otherwise."

There are two motives which govern James's advocacy of freedom against determinism. In the first place, James wants to be assured that man's present will plays an important and decisive part in events subsequent to his choice. If man's decision makes no real difference in the world, if man has nothing to do with determining the nature of the world, there is apparently nothing to spur him to action at all; and he is deceived in thinking that his choices are a matter of importance. In other words, unless the world contains real possibilities, genuine novelties, unless the past and present environment provide for more than one possible deed, so that man's present act of will alone determines which of the possibilities shall occur, there is no reason for regarding his choice as real or crucial, or in any way decisive. In order for this to be possible no act can be regarded as absolutely predictable; there must be something in every act which is really of its own, "something that is not the unconditional property of the whole." It must come as a matter of chance, a contingency, as a "free gift or not at all." An act can come in this fashion only in a world in which there is "free-play" between its parts, and in a universe that belongs to a plurality of semi-independent forces between which there is mutual opportunity for helpfulness or hindrance. James covets the dignity which one feels when there is the realization that

84. Problems of Philosophy, p. 145.
87. Ibid., p. 154.
one's own choice helps to fashion the world; and the sense of gravity which accompanies the assurance that such a choice may have something decisive to do with the making or marring of reality. In the second place, freedom enables us to exercise "judgments of regret" without falling into pessimism. He thinks that the only deterministic escape from pessimism is everywhere to abandon the "judgment of regret." For, according to deterministic philosophy, the worst conceivable crimes and vices are inevitable. They are so essentially a part of the scheme of things in a world which is all of one piece that they must be considered as necessary from all eternity. But our "judgments of regret" lead us to say that such crimes and vices ought not to be; our universe would be infinitely better without such, and if such things as these are inextricably and inevitably bound up with the nature of the world so as to render their occurrence necessary, we must hate or "regret" the "whole frame of things" of which these repugnant aspects are members. As James sees it, there is no escape from this pessimistic conclusion for the determinist, unless our "judgment of regret" is entirely given up. Determinism, then, leads to pessimism.

It is possible to abandon our "judgment of regret" and to interpret the evil facts of life in terms of a higher value. That is, we may take "the strictly dramatic point of view and treat the whole thing as a great unending romance which the spirit of the universe, striving to realize its own content, is eternally thinking out and representing to itself." According to this view, the tragic conflict caused by evil is attributed a

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88. Ibid., p. 162.
89. Cf. Ibid., pp. 159 ff.
90. Ibid., p. 170.
spiritualizing value. "Not the saint, but the sinner that repenteth, is he to whom the full length and breadth, and height and depth, of life's meaning is revealed. Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human state." This view James calls "subjectivism," and it is open to two objections. First, vice has virtue by the throat; instead of repentance on the part of the evil-doer for his evil deeds, he boasts about and glories in them. Again, in real life, virtue and vice mingle on equal terms; both are of equal importance and dignity in the cosmic romance. The optimism which this subjectivistic view fosters eventually turns to "an ethical indifference, which infallibly brings dissolution in its train." Sensitiveness to, and serious concern about, the evil of life, an uncompromising determination to uproot it, and sincere resentment of it are replaced by moral complacency towards, and acquiescence in, the evil of the world. The subjectivist point of view reduces all outward distinctions between good and evil to a common denominator. The dilemma which confronts determinism, therefore, is either a hopeless pessimism or a destructive subjectivism.

James sees but one way of avoiding this impossible situation: that is to believe that we live in a world in which evil might have been averted, and in which it is possible to get rid of evil. For unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and natural way, we cannot possibly realize any zest or excitement out of achieving the right way. There is no sense in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong way if we do not at the same time feel that the right way was open to us.

91. Ibid., p. 169.
92. Ibid., p. 171.
"I cannot understand the belief that an act is bad, without regret at its happening. I cannot understand regret without the admission of real, genuine possibilities in the world. Only then is it other than a mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best, that an irreparable opportunity is gone from the universe, the loss of which it must forever after mourn." Only in such a world as contains real possibilities can we praise the virtuous and condemn the vicious, and pass judgment upon the evil without at the same time condemning the good. This is the only sort of world that permits us to get rid of the evil without also destroying the good. This kind of world makes an appeal to our wills however repugnant it may be to our intellects; we may and can resolve to achieve that which we think should be, or to get rid of that which we abhor. But it is only a pluralistic conception of the universe that makes this solution of the question of evil possible because it alone offers us a world in which things are separately and independently placed, and their connections are casual rather than vital or necessary. Because of this feature of the pluralistic world we can appraise each aspect of the universe separately and accept or reject it according to its real value, or disvalue. Thus we do not have to take the world mixed as it is with good and evil; we can accept only so much as is good and reject the bad. We can go further, we can attempt to construct a world in which there is only the good and from which the evil has been banished. Thus we must have a world of "ambiguous possibilities," a world of contingencies, a world with chance in it, in short, a pluralistic world, if our "judgments

93. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
of regret" are to mean anything more than empty words.

James's doctrine of freedom delivers him from both philosophic pessimism and religious optimism, and enables him to regard the universe in terms of meliorism; that is, in terms of a moral or qualified hope that the improvement of the world is at least possible. The attempt to eliminate evil is neither doomed to utter defeat nor assured of absolute success. We simply regard the ultimate defeat of evil as a possibility the achievement of which is contingent upon our own and others' efforts. God is even more interested in getting rid of evil than we are, but He needs our support in this tremendous cosmic struggle. Without our help He may labor in vain. Moral agents are given an opportunity of conquering evil decisively, "by dropping it out altogether, throwing it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place and name." But this glorious task may involve "real losses and real losers", and there may be "no total preservation of all that is."

"I can believe in the ideal as an ultimate," he says, "not as an origin, and as an extract, not the whole." Our attitude towards this ideal parallels that of the puritans who were willing to be damned for the glory of God. Even though this lost element may be one's self, there must be no turning back, no crying "I will not play." The danger must be courageously faced; the adventure must be steadily pursued. The attitude of the individual in respect of this adventure is that of the ancient Greek sailor expressed in the following epigram:

95. Ibid., p. 296.
96. Ibid., p. 296.
"A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast,
Bids you set sail.
Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost,
Weathered the gale."

This view of the matter is in line with James's conception of the universe as temporalistic which implies the reality of time. Time does not fall within the world as one of the components of an eternal and changeless whole, but the world falls within time, and undergoes prodigious changes. The past is not regarded as essential to the unitary meaning of eternity, and thus conceived as occupying a permanent place there, but it is considered as being entirely left out. The evil may be annihilated and forgotten, and the world may become as though it never had existed at all. It may be completely purged of its evil and attain an innocence which is untainted by the evil of the past. By applying the idea of growth or progress in time to the universe as a whole with the new possibilities and new horizons which such a view opens up, we are delivered from "a rationalistic block-universe," which renders impossible the utter annihilation of evil. For James, as his view of reality indicates, the fixed laws and stable arrangements of the world have been gradually developed as a result of the efforts of the "semi-independent forces" of the universe in their struggle for the best "modus vivendi." With which to start, the world contains no established order, no reign of law, no system of conditions within which purposive action, the chief characteristic of conscious life, takes place. On this supposition, laws and uniformities of nature, being the results of evolution, are not to be regarded as absolute, or as necessarily obeyed. Thus there is an element of indeterminacy,

98. Ibid., p. 296.
spontaneity, or chance in nature.

We are entirely in sympathy with James's efforts to establish the doctrine of freedom, but we do not believe that there is any necessity to choose between determinism and indeterminism. James construes this choice to be necessary as a result of a faulty psychological description of will in which he fails to do justice to the activity of the self due to his strong scientific desire for analysis. As W. R. Boyce Gibson has pointed out, "the necessity for choosing definitely between these two rival theories arises only when the issue is restricted to the abstract consideration of some specific volitional act." Gibson attempts to define the issue by insisting that freedom is the essence not only of self-conscious volitional activity but of consciousness itself, and he rightly maintains that we cannot profitably discuss its possibility unless we start from the relation in which the conscious subject stands to its object within the unity of experience. As we have already seen, James's theory of ideo-motor action represents appropriate action as occurring when an idea is able to maintain itself before the mind. Here the consciousness of an alternative being possible, as in the case of free effort, is for James, a most certain delusion. Thus his refusal to admit that freedom is the essence of consciousness itself, a permanent attitude of the conscious subject, forces him to take the drastic step of accepting an element of chance in his view of freedom to compensate for his deterministic assumption. For he admits that determinism and indeterminism are on a par theoretically. As Professor

99. Ibid., p. 119.
J. B. Pratt puts it, "his strange unwillingness to acknowledge the reality of a genuine self makes it impossible for him to recognize self-activity, and throws him (when he speaks as a philosopher) into the arms of complete Indeterminism and mere chance. At the other end, so to speak, of his psychological doctrine of will, this refusal to recognize the self forces him to a form of analysis which sounds suspiciously like the associationist type of thought against which he so often protests. Efforts sole achievement consists in getting a given idea to stay before the mind." Having thus set the problem from its own restricted, abstract point of view, there is nothing left to do except to choose between the absolutely unconditioned and the absolutely predetermined, between fatalism and chance; for from this standpoint no meaning can be assigned to freedom in terms of self-determinism, or a relative independence. Such radical discontinuities as James advocates in the name of freedom are not necessary if we take experience as a whole from the beginning; and this is the only way to approach the problem. We are then enabled to carry the possibility of freedom with us from the start and do not have to resort to the Deus ex machina, to save us from determinism. The author just quoted correctly states that "the self discussed in this problem is the same self that is the subject of knowledge, the being that compares and judges, that feels and thinks, and that possesses a type of unity which nothing else does. It is this unitary self that also decides. It decides according to its character on those matters where its character is definite." But indeterminism does not seem to derive freedom from the nature of anything.

103. J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 328.
104. Ibid., p. 328.
Not only does it fail to show that it arises out of the fundamental character of immediate experience, but it also fails to account for freedom in the nature of the free subject himself. It conceives freedom as beginning suddenly; it is like "a bolt out of the blue." Plainly, it is inconceivable how, on the basis of the pluralistic conclusion of absolute contingency; that is, without either the pre-existence of a stable system of conditions, or a subject as the source of freedom, spontaneity can have any meaning at all. For as Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison points out, the actions peculiar to conscious life, which, according to pluralism, have reduced the primeval chaos of the universe to its present state of comparative orderliness, cannot be given intelligent consideration apart from the notion of stimulus and response. When this aspect of action is taken into consideration, "spontaneity can only mean unhampered response according to the joint nature of the interacting factors. The idea of spontaneity in the abstract, apart from such a reference, must reduce itself to sheer wilfulness."

It is open to question whether James is warranted in basing the case for freedom on the connection which he attributes to indeterminism and novelty. His conception of novelty, it will be remembered, is that of absolute novelty; it is the arising of something the like of which has never been before in the universe. James thinks that indeterminism implies this kind of novelty. That is to say, instead of holding with determinism that, let us say, \( a \) and \( b \) are so related that \( a \)'s occurrence

always necessitates the happening of b, indeterminism maintains that a is sometimes followed by c. The electron, for example, may jump to the right or left; it is not predetermined to jump one way or the other. But that this gives such novelty as James demands is very doubtful. If all of the antecedent circumstances of the electron, at a given moment, were known, in what does the novelty consist if it jumps to the left rather than to the right? There is no novel element to be found in the fact that the object moves to the left. This is simply the repetition of a very familiar experience. It is not something really hitherto unknown in the universe. It would not imply that it had never happened before. Thus there would seem to be no necessary connection between indeterminism and the conception of novelty as James conceives it. Nor is it beyond dispute that novelties are possibly only in an indeterministic world; it may be just as possible in one ruled by determinism. For instance, two chemical elements, a and b, for instance, have never been brought together into chemical combination, and when they are combined, the result is something absolutely new. We have an example of determinism united with novelty in the philosophy of S. Alexander; he gives us a deterministic universe, but every new quality that appears presents us with genuine novelty. Much of that which is regarded as novelty may not really be novelty, but unexpectedness, or surprise. But all that surprises is not novelty. Novelty in itself is not valuable; it may mean the possibility of improvement, or it may mean that destruction has set in. We are always justified in striving for the better; but we are not justified in reaching for the new as such.

James's temporalism, which implies the idea of growth or progress in time of the universe as a whole, and according to which novelty means pure indeterminacy or contingence, is an attempt to deliver us from the slavery of our own past and to free us from the peculiar illusion of determinism which, for him and Bergson, the spatialized idea of time produces. Instead of our future course of action being performed or predetermined in the past, James thinks that, "the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago." But when he conceives it to be necessary to introduce contingency as a means of guaranteeing freedom, he assumes that the present mechanically determines the future in much the same fashion as the determinists maintain that the past determines the present. That is to say, his emphasis upon contingency is due to the persistence of the same notion of time with regard to the future that he denies with reference to past. For unless he does assume that the present does determine the future in the same fashion as determinism holds that the past fashions, in advance, the present the necessity for his doctrine of contingency does not arise. Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison points out, in his criticism of M. Bergson, that if we recognize that every being acts from its "own living present," there is no occasion to involve ourselves in the same difficulty which the "spatial illusion" concerning past time involves by conceiving the future as a similar line in the opposite direction, and by regarding the present as

fatally and externally shaping the future beforehand, so as to rob future actions, when they take place, of their proper reality. James will have nothing to do with the conception that the present is determined in advance, but he apparently assumes that the present does so determine the future by asserting contingency at every step. But, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "if we are true to the doctrine of real duration, we have nothing to do with this phantom future any more than with the other phantom of the past. We live and act only in the present; and every action has its own reality and, in the case of conscious action, its own freedom, just as the divine activity which sustains and guides the world is to be thought of as the expression of present mind and will, not as the consequence of past decrees which bind God himself like a fate. The whole deterministic difficulty in its ordinary form arises from our taking time in this spatial perspective. If we avoid the error ab initio, therefore, the dilemma of determinism or freedom does not arise, and consequently there is no temptation to safeguard freedom by the introduction of contingency. If, as M. Bergson says, we act with our whole past, and yet are free, why should this be otherwise in the future, when what is now present will constitute part of the past which we carry with us?"

There are two qualifications necessary in any doctrine of freedom from the religious point of view. First, freedom must not be interpreted so as to involve absolute contingency. We have attempted to show that contingency is necessary only when a dynamic, active self is denied. We

109. Ibid., p. 375.
have registered our objection to the view that makes such a denial and is thereby driven to a belief in contingency to save it from determinism because we do not find it possible to acquiesce in any theory that tends to sever our acts from ourselves. Thus the extreme doctrine of indeterminism is just as impossible as the extreme view of determinism. In both cases the value of moral choice is annulled. If praise and blame are to have any significance when ascribed to our choices and actions, we must have freedom, responsibility, and the power of initiative and origination. But it is inconceivable how any of these things would be possible on the basis of a doctrine that refuses any determination to our acts. Such a view implies that a man's choices and actions are not influenced by his character and that they do not reveal his character. A man's good and evil deeds are equally accidental, and, in neither case, can we say that they flow from his character. To praise a man for his good deeds, or to condemn him for his evil ones, means that we believe him to be the kind of man that makes such deeds possible. This is utterly meaningless unless the deeds are really his own, unless they are an expression of the man himself. On any other supposition the term "character" is equally meaningless. If we are not to dispense with our moral categories, we must regard our acts as determined by ourselves. There must be a certain "predictability of character" in each one of us if our human relationships and moral life are not to be reduced to chaos. Morality and religion both demand a certain stability of nature in the individual, a certain amount of self-determination, as such terms as "responsibility" and "repentance" clearly show. The objection that such a view ultimately leads to determinism since one's
acts and choices could be predicted beforehand if the total condition of things at any given moment were known, is not entirely without force, but it appears to ignore the dynamic nature of the self upon which such a view is based. For if it is the entire self which determines an act, and not some particular series of events, or a single impulse or group of impulses which would not involve the whole self; that is, if it were one's own act, to be able to predict it with absolute certainty does not at all appear possible. For in order to be able to do this, as Professor J. B. Pratt says, "would require a direct acquaintance with all your previous experiences of such an intimate sort as only you yourself could possibly possess...he would have to be you."

The other qualification which a satisfactory doctrine of freedom requires is that it must not be absolute freedom, or freedom of outright creative power as James's pluralistic theory seems to demand. We shall have to be content with the freedom granted to finite beings. This is quite different from what might be called absolute freedom; but it is freedom enough. A man has nothing to do with the time, place, circumstances, of his birth. It is not his to choose the family, or race to which he is to belong. He has no choice as to the hereditary forces that are to work through him. All that he has to say concerning his own endowment is the measure of improvement his own efforts are able to realize. His early life and training are beyond his power to determine and external circumstances beyond his power of control may hedge in his freedom throughout life. He has the freedom to select from and use the various forces of the world, but he cannot create those forces. He can change the combination of chemical

elements to suit his purpose, but he cannot create those elements. In short, man is unable to create, in the outright sense, but he can produce and, as F. J. McConnell says, "production is but slightly inferior to outright creation." In spite of these limitations which the facts of human experience force us to place upon man's freedom, the achievements of the human race bear glorious testimony to the fact that freedom is a tremendous force in human life. The wanton destruction and havoc which man has wrought from time to time also give evidence of the reality of his freedom as a factor in human life. But religion has nothing to gain from the view that man's freedom is absolute, or that his creative power is one of outright creativity; for consciousness of dependence upon God is essential to religion.

We stated above that a certain measure of self-determination is necessarily involved in any religious doctrine of freedom. For without self-determination, which is an essential characteristic of man, we cannot see how it would be possible for man to be called into fellowship with God.

But, as William Temple suggests, "it is not the last word of human development; on the contrary it contains the sentence of endless frustration as truly as it affords the opportunity of entry upon the spiritual enterprise. For the self which determines cannot carry the self which is determined above its own level. Self-determination must fulfill itself in the recognition of an Other which may lift it to heights forever out of its own reach; self-determination fulfills itself in self-surrender to that which is entitled to receive the submission of the self." In keeping with this

line of thought, Temple says that freedom "is not the absence of determination; it is spiritual determination, as distinct from mechanical or even organic, determination. It is determination by what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible compulsion." Ultimately, any view of freedom which may be considered from the point of view of religion must take into account man's relationship to an "Other" with whom it is possible for him to have fellowship. Such an inquiry would carry us too far afield for our present purposes for it would involve a discussion of the method by which God makes Himself known to man; that is, it would lead to the consideration of how God reveals Himself to man.

James's doctrine of meliorism, or of "melioristic theism", is not satisfactory as a religious creed, even though it steers a middle course between the pessimism of crude naturalism on the one hand, and the optimism of transcendental absolutism on the other. In the first place, James is willing to sacrifice the individuals whose freedom he is so careful to assure even to the extent of making them independent of God, and whose creative powers he is anxious to extol, for the sake of merely an ideal, namely, that of eliminating evil from the universe. And for all we know God Himself may suffer a similar fate for the same ideal. Further, it conceives our world as a "moralistic and epic kind of universe," the chief characteristic of which is progress through effort. This view makes a strong appeal to our active nature. But, as Professor Pringle-Pattison suggests, we have no reason to believe that we find in the characteristics of our practical activity "a description in ultimate terms of the fundamental nature of the universe." He goes on to say that a philosophy "may ultimately be tested

113. Ibid., p. 229.
by its ability to reconcile the attitude and postulate of morality and religion; but they are not the same." The universe does serve as a school of moral discipline for man, it does offer an opportunity for moral struggle, and the fundamental religious instinct does develop, as an essential aspect, into an imperious desire to change the world in which we live; but this does not justify us in regarding the universe as exclusively moral. As W. K. Inge intimates, we do not want an exclusively moral God, blind to truth and beauty, whose interest is confined to conduct. Moreover, to regard the outcome of the struggle against evil as doubtful, as James does, has never been the religious attitude towards this conflict. It is the faith that the victory is certain that inspires the man of religion to carry on as an individual and gives him courage and strength with which to face obstacles and temporary defeat. He believes that while his and all other human efforts will not suffice to make victory sure, there is an eternal power that is strong enough to carry the battle through to ultimate victory. If, however, the issue be regarded as doubtful, and dependent upon our efforts for a successful completion, since God is not strong enough to guarantee the final triumph of good, with or without our help, there is little ground for confidence, and a lack of incentive to action. As Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "experience abundantly shows, the assurance of victory won and reconciliation achieved is the most powerful dynamic that can be supplied to morality." The difficulty involved here is that of reconciling the reality of the moral struggle with the certainty of the final outcome. James thinks this is impossible and gives up the latter

115. Ibid., p. 395.
in order to preserve the former. He is right in holding that the struggle
is a real one, in insisting that our efforts to really count for something,
but he errs in thinking that the religious attitude which regards the vic-
tory as won renders the conflict unreal, or that a doubtful issue is more
conducive to the reality of the struggle. Here we have one of the many
curious paradoxes which characterize religion; the difficulty involved ap-
parently does not occur to the religious man himself, but arises as the
product of philosophical reflection.
It has been said that the philosophy of James can be made to prove almost anything we will have it prove. This statement seems to be particularly applicable to James’s conception of God. For while it is no doubt true, as Professor J. S. Bixler suggests in his *Religion in the Philosophy of William James*, that nearly all of the various elements in James’s philosophical system converge in the conception of God, and bear testimony to the existence of God, he appears never to have arrived at any very definite or settled conviction concerning the nature of God aside from his belief in a finite God. His extreme pragmatic pluralism and radical empiricism combine to give what may be regarded as representing the latest stage in the development of his thought concerning God, and which may be described as "pluralistic pantheism."

It is pluralistic in that the super-human consciousness of God is not all-embracing; God is no absolute all-experiencer, "but simply the experiencer of the widest actual conscious span." God is finite since, along with other finite beings, he has an external environment for which he is not responsible and over which he exercises no control. Thus, for James, there is always a portion of reality which lies beyond His ken, and out of reach of His experience. He is simply *primus inter pares*, and consequently, falls within the time process and is subject to growth and development. James is not averse to polytheism. "All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more

godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us."

James appears at times to be strongly attracted towards some such polytheistic view. He frequently mentions the possibility of different orders of being and, as we have seen, inclines towards Fechner's hypothesis of hierarchy of spirits. He regards such a conception as being "thicker" than monistic idealism, since the earth soul is something to which we can pray as men pray to their saints. "Ordinary monistic idealism leaves everything intermediary out...First, you and I, just as we are in this room; and the moment we get below that surface, the unutterable absolute itself! Doesn't this show a singularly indigent imagination? Isn't this brave universe made on a richer pattern, with room in it for a long hierarchy of beings?" James calls this "crasser" view "piecemeal supernaturalism" as compared with the more refined view of transcendental idealism. He regards it as being more in harmony with the views of uneducated people and with the older theology than the refined type is. This is due to the fact that it "admits miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the ideal region among the forces that causally determine the real world's details."

This "crasser variety" of old-fashioned supernaturalism represents the extreme to which James's pragmatic and pluralistic imagination leads him. But his pragmatism attempts to avoid the extreme position which stresses the

6. P. U., pp. 174-175.
merely subjective utility of the idea of God with no reference to, or concern for, its objective validity. While he quotes with approval from the well known article of Professor J. H. Leuba, where he maintains that "God is not known, he is not understood; he is used—sometimes as meat-purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love," he is not satisfied with this purely subjective rating of religion. He goes on to point out that religious experience bears testimony to an objective power of which we have perceptual experience but which is not to be identified with the subconscious self. "But if you, being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it necessarily should."

The pantheistic aspect of James's conception of God is a product of his radical empiricism as set forth in his theory of the continuity of experience. According to this doctrine, it is possible for a single field of consciousness to shade off into other fields; that is, into larger and more inclusive fields until a super-human consciousness is reached. "Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibilities not yet in our present sight. And just as we are co-conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the whole of us? May not you and I be confluent in a higher consciousness, and confluent activity there, though we know it not?"

answer the question by asserting that there are religious experiences of a specific nature which "point with reasonable probability to the continuity of our consciousness with a wider spiritual environment." Thus God is conceived, so far as His limits extend, as the "intimate soul and reason" of the universe and man participates directly in His life in the mystical experience, for human life is "part and parcel of that deep reality." In the mystical state, that "deep reality" "seeps" or "leaks" through, by way of our subconscious mind, and we are enabled to share that co-consciousness which previously was God's alone; the character of isolation or "exness" which ordinarily characterizes our consciousness is removed.

The part which God plays in human life and thought, according to James's philosophy, may be seen from his answers to a questionnaire concerning religious belief to which he replied, at the request of Professor J. B. Pratt, in 1904. Some of the questions and answers are as follows:

Q. "What do you mean by God?"
   A. "A combination of ideality and (final) efficacity."

Q. "Is He a person—if so, what do you mean by His being a person?"
   A. "He must be cognizant and responsive in some way."

Q. "Or is He only a force?"
   A. "He must do."

Q. "Or is God an attitude of the Universe toward you?"
   A. "Yes, but more conscious. 'God,' to me, is not only spiritual reality to believe in. Religion means primarily a universe of spiritual relations surrounding the earthly practical ones, not merely relations of 'value,' but agencies and their activities. I suppose that the chief premise for my hospitality towards the religious testimony of others is my conviction that 'normal' or 'sane' consciousness is so small a part of actual experience. What e'ter be true, it is not true exclusively, as philistine scientific opinion assumes. The other kinds of consciousness bear witness to a much wider universe of experiences, from which our belief selects and emphasizes such parts as best satisfy our needs."

11. Ibid., pp. 299-300.
Q. "How do you apprehend His relation to mankind and to you personally?"
A. "Uncertain."

Q. "Why do you believe in God? Is it from argument?"
A. "Emphatically no."

Q. "Or because you have experienced His presence?"
A. "No, but rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true."

Q. "Or do you not so much believe in God as want to use Him?"
A. "I can't use Him very definitely, yet I believe."

Q. "Do you accept Him not so much as a real existent Being, but rather as an ideal to live by?"
A. "More as a more powerful ally of my own ideals."

Q. "If you should become thoroughly convinced that there was no God, would it make any great difference in your life—either in happiness, morality, or in other respects?"
A. "Hard to say. It would surely make some difference."

This statement serves to bring out three important functions which God performs in human life. First, His nature is such as to call forth our most active response; He appeals to our moral energy. This conception of God dominates the first stage of James's philosophy and is presented from various points of view in The Will to Believe and Other Essays. Here God is defined primarily in terms of His function of creating in men the "strenuous mood" towards life, an essential stimulus to the most vigorous and highest moral life. If we had no other reason for believing in God, it would be necessary to postulate such a Being in order to release our energy, quicken our powers, and stir us to moral action. "The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest." A merely human world, without a God, fails to stimulate our moral energy to its maximal power. The

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second function which God exercises is that of a saving Power. This view of God characterizes what may be regarded as the second stage in James's philosophical development and is set forth, with unusual force and clarity, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. While he continues to think of God as the releaser of man's active energies, he places greater emphasis upon God's power to meet the needs of the human heart. Here it is not so much man's active energy, but his capacity to receive help from God that he stresses. Man is pictured as playing a more passive role than that which the first conception assigns him. It is God who is active. He brings comfort to the sick soul, encouragement to the healthy-minded, integration to the divided self, assurance and peace in conversion, saintliness to those who continually seek Him, and reveals Himself to those who are capable of entering into the mystical experience. In short, this remarkable book consists chiefly in a description of the results for life which follow upon man's experience of the saving power of God. It is the actual power of the religious experience with which he deals, for the most part, at this stage of his thinking.

These two conceptions of God reflect the development which takes place in James's pragmatic theory. His earlier pragmatism tends to define concepts in terms of their practical consequences, and God is conceived in terms of the consequences of such a belief for practical life. As his pragmatic theory develops, an appeal to consequences helps to determine the truth of an idea, or the reality of its object. Thus truth itself is defined in terms of value. Both aspects of his pragmatism are to be found in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, but he appears to move away from the former type, or rather supplement it, by setting up value as a standard of truth. Values lead us to truth and particular facts suggest basic ultimate principles. "Both instinctively and for logical reasons," he says, "I find
it hard to believe that principles can exist which make no difference in
facts. But all facts are particular facts, and the whole interest of the
question of God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for par-
ticulars which that existence may be expected to entail." He appears to
be more confident that religion can claim objective truth, as well as sub-
jective value, than formerly he had been. Finally, James conceives God as
a "more powerful ally" of our own ideals. He is a "great captain" who leads
us in the fight against evil. He is the chief protagonist for the cause of
morality in the world, the strongest enemy of evil. This view of God char-
acterizes the latest development of his pragmatic view, as set forth in his
doctrine of meliorism in the last chapter of his *Pragmatism*, and is es-
sential to his pluralistic conception. God is a larger and more important
member of this pluralistic world. The conception of God as a part of the
world, and as finite, makes Him more approachable, and enables man to regard
Him as a real leader and inspirer. Thus we enjoy greater intimacy with Him
than is possible under any other system. "Having an environment, being in
time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the for-
eignness from all that is human, of the static, timeless perfect absolute."
Our active and moral nature is quickened by the realization that we are work-
ing with Him, and helping Him to achieve goals which we hold in common with
Him. God's function as an ally of man combines the two conceptions, namely,
God as saving power, and God as the producer of the "strenuous mood"; it
demands that the power of God and the powers of men be united for the purpose
of bringing about real changes for the better in a developing world.

If, as has been suggested, most of the different phases of James's

philosophy lead to the conception of God, it is also true that many aspects of his philosophy lead to the belief in a finite God. Various trends in his pragmatism, his pluralism, as well as ordinary common sense, force him to conclude that God cannot be infinite. "The line of least resistance... both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once." His pluralistic metaphysics helps to make this view the "line of least resistance." For he is not confronted with the theoretical difficulty which faces the Personal Idealists, who limit God's power in order to save His goodness, due to the monistic trend of the Kantian premises in their philosophy. James, whose pluralism accepts things just as they come, that is, as many and diverse, has no logical difficulty. For if the universe is as he conceives it, a plurality of "semi-independent forces," there is no theoretical reason why God should not be one of them, or rather, if He is conceived to exist at all, He must be regarded as one of them. Then, his "moralistic" attitude towards the universe prompts him to advocate a finite God. He conceives God as the exponent of man's moral ideals. While He is incomparably greater in power and dignity, He is still motivated by the same ideals and governed by the same will that characterize man at his best. Also, the view of a finite God is the only way to meet the problem set by the existence of evil. He writes to C. A. Strong, "my 'God of things as they are,' being a part of a pluralistic system, is responsible for only such of them as he knows enough and has enough power to have accomplished."

17. P. U., p. 311.
The motive of individualism also finds expression in his belief in a finite God. He regards God as possessing a unique inner life of His own like other finite beings. We must not intrude on His privacy, any more than on that of other individuals. "In every being that is real there is something external to, and sacred from, the grasp of every other. God's being is sacred from ours. To co-operate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us. In such co-operation with his purposes, not in any chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny." Also, his eagerness to safeguard the freedom of the individual renders it impossible for him to look with favor upon any conception of God that interferes with that freedom. For James, our freedom can be assured only in a pluralistic world with a God who is finite.

His unqualified acceptance of the philosophy of evolution as an ultimate principle, with its insistence upon the reality of time, change, purpose, conflict, and achievement, alienates him from the static, changeless, purposeless world which any sort of monism implies. He contends for reality in every sphere of life and thought, and will have nothing to do with any theory that relegates the real life of the real world to illusion or appearance. Time, change, purpose, and achievement must be as real for God as for us. This cannot be unless He is finite. James believes, also, that the conception of a finite God is demanded by ordinary common sense. "'God,' in the religious life of ordinary men, is the name not of the whole of things, heaven forbid, but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person who calls us to co-operate in his purposes, and who furthers

ours if they are worthy. He works in an external environment, has limits, and has enemies." He says, "The 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' God of theology I regard as a disease of the philosophy-shop." It is fundamental, for James, to keep close to religious experience, and he thinks that the God who is worshipped by ordinary men is always a finite God; a Being who sustains actual relations to beings other than Himself. Further, he is anxious to preserve the purity of God. He deems it more important that the Ideal of worship be worthy of worship than that He be worshipped through fear or because of a sense of dependence. "I believe that the only God worthy of the name must be finite." He maintains that God has an environment even when in sympathy with the pantheistic view. His hypothesis is empirical and he refuses to accept the arguments which are used to substantiate the conception of oneness. As against the monistic conception of an all-enveloping idea of God, he contends for a God the worship of whom does not imply the worship of everything. Due to his strong conviction concerning the moral will which endeavors to overcome evil, he can not acquiesce in a view that implies the worship of evil as a part of God. For if all is a part of God, including evil, to worship God is to worship evil. This is incompatible with his view of the moral will.

James defines the issue between traditional theism and pluralism largely in terms of "intimacy" and "foreignness." The essential dualism of the theistic view leaves "the human subject outside of the deepest reality in the universe." It makes the world extraneous to God, and man extraneous to both the world and God. Thus philosophic theism makes impossible any "strictly social relation" between God and man. We are outsiders, and our relation to

23. Ibid., p. 25.
Him remains that of "foreigners." Instead of man being the intimate partner of God's, he becomes His mere subject. Externality vitiates the entire theistic conception. God can affect us, but nothing that we do can ever affect Him. "God is not heart of our heart and reason of our reason, but our magistrate, rather; and mechanically to obey his commands, however strange they may be, remains our only moral duty." Since the need for intimacy is one of the foremost considerations which James advances for his belief in a finite God, he must have a God whose place in the world is more organic and intimate, than the older monarchical theism allows. In this respect James regards absolutism as superior to theism and as more in harmony with his pluralism. For both his view and absolutism "bring the philosopher inside and make man intimate." He says that the philosophy of the absolute agrees with the pluralistic philosophy in that "both identify human substance with the divine substance." Whereas, from the standpoint of orthodox theism, "God and his creatures are toto genere distinct...they have absolutely nothing in common; nay, it degrades God to attribute to him any generic nature whatever; he can be classed with nothing." A system which makes no better provision for intimate relations between man and his universe than this type of theism does is hopelessly defective midst the rising tide of social democratic ideals in our modern world, and "sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion." James offers, then, instead of either the pantheism of absolutism, or the dualism of theism, spiritual pluralism which combines the best features of these two systems both of which he regards as unsatisfactory; it keeps the closest intimacy by conceiving God as

25. Ibid., p. 27.
26. Ibid., p. 36.
27. Ibid., p. 34.
29. Ibid., p. 29.
continuous with us spiritually, while at the same time we are permitted to remain morally independent.

The modern conception of a limited God, which as we have seen, finds a strong and ardent champion in James, is, as a matter of fact, a very old one and may be traced back to the beginnings of thought. Polytheistic systems of antiquity implied that the gods were limited. "Even the 'Mana' conception had pluralistic implications." The Greeks were never able to reduce the fullness and variety of life to a monotonous unity. The more perfected system of Plato could not refer the origin of evil to God, and that of Aristotle conceived form as struggling with matter. The universal sovereignty of the God of the Hebrews appears not to have come to definite expression until the time of the eighth century prophets. The early Hebrews ascribed limitations to Yaweh, and often feared the power of other tribal deities. The question of a limited God has come to occupy a large place in modern religious thought. It will be remembered that Hume pointed out the meaninglessness of the term infinite as applied to Deity, while setting forth some of the difficulties involved in the conception of a finite God. The first modern thinker to proclaim the gospel of a finite God was J. S. Mill. In the Three Essays on Religion, he registers his objection to the conception of an infinite God in emphatic form. He says, "it is impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt his inquiring intellect by sophistry, should be able without misgiving to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants. The adoration of such a being cannot be with the whole heart, unless the heart is first sophisticated. The worship must either

be greatly overclouded by doubt, or the moral sentiments must sink to the low level of the ordinances of Nature; the worshipper must learn to think blind partiality, atrocious cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object of worship, since all these abound to excess in the commonest phenomena of Nature." Thus, Mill strongly protests against the use of two different standards which such worship implies, and he goes on to assert that one who has never tried to reconcile these two standards with one another, but stops with the thought that God's ways are different from man's, is worshiping power only. Mill's forceful repudiation of the traditional conception of an infinite God has echoed throughout the modern philosophical world until today there are many advocates of the doctrine of a finite God. James was among the first and strongest followers of Mill who thought the age-old question "What is God?" could be answered best by placing certain limitations on Him.

In seeking to answer this question we may follow one of three courses; we may refuse to assign Him any attributes, we may assign Him all attributes, or we may exclude some and include others. If we adopt the first method of procedure we end up with the zero of Parmenides. If we follow the second we land in Eastern pantheism. There is, at bottom, no difference between thinking of God as nothing in particular and as everything in general. Both are idle, meaningless notions. That is to say, if the term infinite or non-limited is taken to mean indeterminate as applied to God, He can mean nothing for human thought. It is inconceivable how all positive and negative attributes, if assigned to God, can be compatible with one another. Further, in order to be existent, God must be a determinate, definite being,

32. Three Essays on Religion, p. 112.
33. Ibid., p. 113.
of this character or nature and not of that. In short, we must follow the third course; God must not only be without some attributes, He must have some attributes; that is, we must exclude some and include others. The difficulty arises in trying to determine which ones to exclude and which ones to include. There are two meanings of the term "limit" which modern thought takes over from Greek philosophy. As R. B. Baker points out in *The Concept of a Limited God*, Plato and Aristotle used two concepts, in seeking to give expression to the profoundest truth concerning Reality. The first use they make of the term means a check or obstacle which hinders progress toward the good or perfection; this is the ordinary meaning of the term. They identify "limit" in this sense with matter or non-being which is external to Deity. "Limit" in the second sense means a measure of harmony, the principal of rational spirit, which enhances progress toward the good and gives it meaning. In the sense that the first Greek meaning of limit retards and hinders active spirit it is opposed to the second meaning which has reference to that which alone defines for thought the "free expressing of active Spirit". Thus "limit" in the latter sense not only serves to distinguish being from non-being, order from chaos, but also marks the distinction between right and wrong. It becomes the principle of rational and moral spirit and gives vague expression to what has become a basic tenet for personalistic idealism. This is expressed by saying: "That being and doing are one for a spirit Reality." Modern personal idealists are using the term "limit" in the second Greek sense when they object that the infinite One or God of monism has no positive existence because of the absence of all limit.

35. Ibid., p. xiv.
Roughly speaking, personalists are divided into two chief types. The pluralistic personalists hold that the "All of Reality is a Many," and thus accord finite selves or spirits a place in the "All of Reality." God is Supreme, for them, yet He is One among the Many selves which constitute the ultimate Reality. They conceive God as limited, in the second Greek sense of the term "limit," to a finite personality. But they also apply the term "limit" in the first Greek sense; that is, God is limited in that He has an external environment with conditions and forces for which He is not responsible. In short, He is limited by an "other." J. S. Mill, James, as we have seen, and G. H. Howison are pluralistic personalists. The second type, or the monistic-pluralistic personalists, hold that "all Reality is a One and a Many." They advocate the conception of a limited God, but use the term "limit" as applied to God, only in the sense of measure, or only in the second Greek sense of the term. God, for them, is not only Supreme, but He is Creator of all finite reality. God is conceived after the analogy of human spirit, but He is regarded as a Spirit of another order; that is, of a unique and higher order than the Many. God is the Source and living Ground of everything that is, hence the notion of "limit" in the first Greek sense, that is, as an opposing check or force, "a stuff of the opposite nature from spirit (non-being) with which spirit must contend and for which it is in no way responsible" does not apply. F. J. McConnell, J. Ward, and F. R. Tennant, belong to this group of personalists. H. Rashdall,

36. Cf. The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays, pp. 44 ff.
39. Cf. The Realm of Ends, Lect. XI.
40. Cf. Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, Ch. 5.
and E. S. Brightman also contend for Reality as a One and a Many, but their metaphysical doctrine is so confused with that of the first group of personalists that their general theistic theories are in closer harmony with those of the first type, than with those of the second. But Ward, Tennant, and McConnell consistently maintain that Reality is a One and a Many, while holding to the view of a limited God. While the view of the latter group differs in several important respects from the traditional theistic view, the difference between them is not so great as it is between that of the first group and traditional theism. Strictly speaking, the monistic-pluralistic personalists should not be regarded as advocating the conception of a "finite" God, since the limitations which they place upon God are quite a different thing from those imposed by the advocates of the doctrine of a God who is merely *primus inter pares*. The limitations which the former assign to God are, for the most part, self-lim­

itations which God as Creator imposes upon Himself, while those which the latter place upon God are external concerning which God has nothing to say, and over which He has no control. It is this conception of a "finite" God which is so unsatisfactory from the standpoint of traditional theism which holds "that the universe owes its existence, and continuance in existence, to the reason and will of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise and good."

We have now to examine this pluralistic conception of God, as advocated by James. In the first place, a God who is only one individual among other individuals, even though He be *primus inter pares* cannot do

justice to the demands of the religious consciousness, and fails to stand
the strain of religious experience. The motive of dependence is basic
in religious experience and it prompts man to exalt the Object of his wor­
ship above that which is merely finite, transitory and changing. In a
word, in a changing world, man wants a changeless God; hemmed in as he is
by all that is finite he seeks that which is infinite; and conscious of
his own weakness, he tends to exult the immeasurable power of God and to
take refuge in it. As Professor Flint has said, "the mind of man, although
finite itself, cannot be satisfied with any object of worship which it per­
ceives to be finite. It craves an infinite object; it desires to offer a
boundless devotion; it seeks an absolute blessedness. The aim of the re­
ligious life is the communion of the finite with the infinite; and every
religion, however otherwise excellent, which suppresses the infinite, and
presents to the finite only the finite, is a failure." He is substantially
right when he says further that the heart "can find no secure rest except
on an infinite God. If less than omnipotent, He may be unable to help us
in the hour of sorest need. If less than omniscient, He may overlook us.
If less than perfectly just, we cannot unreservedly trust Him. If less
than perfectly benevolent, we cannot fully love Him. The whole soul can
only be devoted to One who is believed to be absolutely good." It is not
true, as James asserts, that theism makes God an "outsider" to man. The
duality which he finds so objectionable in theism is not thoroughgoing nor
absolute since it conceives man as the offspring of God, and thus regards
both God and man as spiritual beings. Theism represents God as the Source
of man's being and life; they are considered as being skin, and the relation

44. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
45. Ibid., p. 301.
between them is one of spiritual union and communion with each other. Surely the term "outsider" is not applicable to Him in whom man is said to live and move and have his being. The fellowship which man enjoys with God cannot be expressed in terms of the relation between a container and its contents; it is a real communion of the finite spirit with the infinite Spirit which sustain a unique relation to one another. The theistic doctrine of creation represents man as being made in the image of God, and as endowed with special dignity and authority by God, who, in creation, has "inspired" His offspring. Thus, as W. L. Davidson puts it in his _Recent Theistic Discussion_, the "position of Theism certainly is that man is not God; but not less is it the position of Theism that man is nothing apart from God. A duality there is, but it is a duality in spiritual unity; and the ground of it, and the sole ground of it, is God."

In the next place, the theory of a finite God arises from extreme and irrational interpretations of such concepts as "infinite" and "omnipotence". As to the infinity of God, there is no reason for calling Him "finite" or limited merely because other individuals exist who are distinct from Himself. He is not infinite in the sense that nothing else can exist besides or beyond Him. That is to say, God cannot be identified with the totality of things or with the Absolute of the philosophers. Theism should be very careful of any facile identification of God with the Absolute in this sense. The Absolute must include God, other minds, the world of nature and the world of values, and all so intimately related as to form a system, and the other parts sustain a special relation to God. To speak of God as infinite means that he is the ground of the finite

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and limited by nothing "other" to His own nature, but it does not mean that He is the only existent Reality. He must regard Him as one of many existences whose existence, as G. Dawes Hicks says, "cannot be the existence of others, nor the existence of others His." To quote this author further, "If, then, by 'infinite' be meant 'the Absolute', God is not infinite. A quantitative whole of reality, or one Reality that includes everything, would, no doubt, be 'infinite' in the sense of mere bigness or immeasurable magnitude; 'infinite' in the sense of being qualitatively perfect and complete it need not, and I should say, would not be. But it is 'infinity', I take it, in the latter sense that religion is concerned to ascribe to God.... God may be 'infinite', not because He is the world, nor because the world is part of Him; but because in and through Him the world has meaning and significance; because His knowledge of it is complete, and His solicitude for it is perfect." The question of God's infinity is the old and difficult one of doing justice to the facts of divine and human existence. Philosophies that give all that is claimed for God to the extent of identifying Him with the Absolute leave nothing over for man, while humanistic and pluralistic philosophies are so jealous for the rights of man that they appear to allow too little to God. Either extreme is fatal to the God of religion.

The notion of absolute omnipotence makes it impossible to apply the laws of reason to the Divine Reason. James, along with others who expound the conception of a finite God, due to their repugnance to the view of an omnipotent Being, seems to be attacking a theory of omnipotence to which few adherents to theism have held. Omnipotence, as J. Ward says,

47. The Philosophical Basis for Theism, p. 262.
48. Ibid., pp. 262-263.
"is one of those question-begging epithets that everybody uses and nobody defines. Thus it is not uncommonly taken to imply not merely the power to do whatever it is possible to do, but also the power arbitrarily to determine what shall be possible; may even that the impossible shall be possible; in short that omnipotence absolutely excludes impossibility....

Metaphysic of this sort is not met by argument." Such a view of omnipotence, for example, as that which J. E. McTaggart advocates leads to complete agnosticism; for if his view be correct, God ceases to be a possible object of either thought or speech. He construes impotence to mean that there is nothing which God cannot do. If God is bound by the law of contradiction, the law of excluded middle, or personal identity, He is not omnipotent. But to regard God merely as the unconditioned-absolute of whom no limits, qualifications, or predicates can be asserted inevitably destroys theology and ethics. As Professor H. R. Macintosh says, "an omnipotent being bare of all self-limitation—who in the most literal sense was 'capable of anything', no matter how bad or absurd—would not deserve the name of God, but rather be comparable to an infinite mass possessed of velocity without direction." It is obvious, therefore, that if we press the idea of omnipotence beyond that of the power freely to choose its own conditions, we land ourselves into the type of metaphysics to which Ward refers in the above quotation.

For the most part, those who affirm the omnipotence of God do not take it to mean that He is able to override intellectual and moral necessities. Christian theology has maintained for centuries that there are

certain things which God cannot do. He cannot argue that He can at the same
time ordain that all men shall be saved, and some not saved. It is
meaningless to say that God can make an odd number divide evenly by two.
He cannot make true what is false, He cannot act in contradiction of His own
nature, or of the nature of things which He has made. He is not able to
bereft Himself of His Divine nature and He cannot cease to exist. He cannot,
as Professor Lacintosli points out, "make a selfish man happy as long as he remains selfish, cannot force me to love my neighbor, cannot make vice the one avenue to personal goodness." God is not only limited in this sense by His own rational and moral character, but He limited His own will when He created moral beings and granted them freedom in the exercise of which they can reject His will and violate His law. Professor Flint writes in this connection as follows: "The determination to create moral beings was a determination to create beings who should be the causes of their own actions, and who might set aside His own law. It was a determination to limit His own will to that extent and in that manner." The familiar doctrine of theism that God overrules man's choice of evil, or causes evil to contradict itself, so as to bring ultimate good out of the evil choices and acts of man, implies a limitation of the divine will which God imposes upon Himself in the creation of man.

Any satisfactory view of omnipotence must hold, with Edwin Lewis, that the "only limitations that God is under are the limitations that arise out of his own self-determined nature and that naturally go with his chosen pur-
pose." Why the nature of God should be as it is--this is one of those ul-
timate questions to which we can give no answer." The omnipotence of God

52. Ibid., pp. 206-207
does not mean unconditioned power. This does not mean, however, that
God is not omnipotent in the physical or spiritual world; it simply means
that He is not omnipotent in an irrational sense. But it is no more per­
missible to interpret omnipotence in terms of sheer physical power than it
is to construe the term infinite as sheer "bigness". Most objections to
the doctrine of omnipotence, which is a central doctrine of theism, seem
to emphasize this feature of the doctrine. But moral considerations must
be given a place in our thought of the view of God's omnipotence. Profes­
sor H. R. Macintosh gives timely emphasis to this aspect of the question
when he says, "what the Bible leaves upon our minds is the ineradicable im­
pression that the only omnipotence for which our faith is asked is that of
holy love. It is not bare omnipotence that the Christian trusts, but the
omnipotence of grace. What we think possible for omnipotence is fixed by
the fact that it is the omnipotence of perfect goodness, not of devilish
55 caprice." Absolute omnipotence is a contradictory conception, and omnipo­
tence construed exclusively in terms of power is not a Christian conception.
Thus without attempting to give any definition of omnipotence, we may say
that God is omnipotent in the sense that He has the power to accomplish His
purpose in and for the world, or to use the words of Professor Macintosh, He
56 is able "to realize perfectly whatever He wills." Thus we avoid the mean­
ingless doctrine of absolute omnipotence, and do not find it necessary to
rush to the other extreme of belief which adopts a finite God in order to
preserve the reality of finite experience. For undoubtedly, the pluralist,
while saving his soul has lost His God.

56. Ibid., p. 205.
This leads us to consider the difficulty involved in the type of pluralism which James champions; that is, how his pluralistic universe, or "multiverse", which is merely a collocation of independent facts with each existing in its own right, can give a "universe" at all. There is no "back-lying", real, living unity of any sort sufficient to account for the multiplicity of particulars being brought together in such a manner as to constitute a "universe". It is inconceivable how any sort of system can be built up out of independent units. That unity or system there happens to be in such a world must be purely accidental if it is essentially a world without system. To say that the things, or forces, or selves with which the pluralist starts get together merely as a matter of chance in a world of this kind is to account for the unity of the world in an absurd fashion. For as F. J. McConnell says, "Try to work all this through on a basis of sheer coincidence—a host of independent units coming into actual or fancied relations to a finite God by coincidence,—finding a measurably understandable universe, and cooperating, or at least trying to cooperate, in that universe. There is no path through these tangles except by assuming that God and men are alike the creatures or products of some Back-lying Being or Force which is mightier than them both." He goes on to point out that the difficulties involved in this situation lead either in the direction of a God who is a Creator or bring back upon us the problem of the system which renders it possible for them to come together. That is to say, the pluralist cannot stop with the conception of a God who is merely primus inter pares; he must either admit a God who is Creator or assume an endless regress for the world. In the latter case God's role in the universe is somewhat superfluous except as a moral leader and in-

spirer of men. Plainly, this position is incapable of leading to satisfactory theistic conclusions. Professor Ward emphasizes the incomplete and unsatisfactory nature of the conception of a thoroughgoing pluralistic universe when he says that "plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity, seems clearly to suggest some ground beyond itself. The Idea of God presents itself to meet this lack. The Many depend upon God for their existence though still dependent on each other as regards their experience. The idea of God would then be meaningless, unless God were regarded as transcending the Many; so there can be no talk of God as merely primus inter pares." Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison has pushed this type of pluralism to its ultimate implications when he asserts that materialism would seem to be the most natural form for it to take. For, as he says, to "conceive a being of transcendent intelligence and goodness as no more than one of the facts in the universe, seems to make it harder than ever to think of other facts as just happening to be there along with him—just happening to exist also, and getting in his way actively and passively." James's theory doubtless was aimed at Bradleyan monism and as such it offers the line of least resistance, but it cannot be regarded as a line which terminates in a satisfactory theistic position.

Another objectionable feature of James's conception of God is his view that God is a developing, growing God. In his repugnance towards the static and timeless he is unwilling to exclude any part of reality from the

60. Ibid., p. 396.
principle of development and change. The position he assigns God in his pluralistic universe necessarily brings Him within the time process and makes Him subject to the evolutionary principle. We have registered, in other connections, our objection to the tendency to make the evolutionary principle ultimate which characterizes James's philosophy, but there is no part of his system which he vitiates more by this tendency than that which pertains to his view of God. There is nothing to be gained for either philosophy or religion by a doctrine of merely "blank inexplicable change", which any view of the evolution of the universe in its totality implies. Plainly, the universe in its entirety cannot be in process of evolution. The term "evolution" can apply only to its constituent parts. Evolution, as G. Dawes Hicks points out, implies two things. First, there must be something which has the capacity to evolve, if there is to be change. Second, unless we are to have an "absolute becoming", that which changes must have an environment which, while it need not be unchanging, must be relatively more stable than that which it includes. Also, these two must be inter-related. "Clearly, therefore," he says, "Reality in its entirety, the totality of all that is, cannot, as such, be in a condition of evolution, because there can be no environment of Reality as a whole." To talk of change on the part of the whole of Reality lands us in contradiction. For, to quote the same author further, "whenever we speak of change, we are always assuming that there is a reason for such change, and moreover a reason for which we are justified in asking to be furnished. And the reason for any change can never be found in that change itself, but must be sought in

62. Ibid., p. 186.
something beyond it. Consequently, if the whole of physical reality be
in a condition of movement or change, we are logically constrained to the
admission that this whole of physical reality has a non-physical environ­
ment, and that this non-physical environment must be of such a character
as to be capable of determining the direction along which the physical, as
a whole, is changing." It would seem, therefore, that from an ultimate
metaphysical point of view, we are justified in predicating progress only
of those interrelated and interacting parts which draw upon the nature of
that which is beyond, and that it is unintelligible when applied to the
whole.

To deny that the temporal view of things is the ultimate or all-
conclusive view does not mean that time, change and finite existence are
unreal to God. The truth of this question lies in giving both the tem­
poral and the eternal its place. For, as J. H. Muirhead puts it, "Not
only does eternity assert the conception of the hour but the hour asserts
the conception of eternity." No conception of God can be true which
leaves no place for movement, process, change. The difficult question of
the relation of God to time has never been satisfactorily answered. It
is, as E. S. Waterhouse suggests, "virtually impossible to have any idea
upon such a subject that is not in some respect either self-contradictory
or unintelligible, even if only because we can have no real conception of
the significance of the term eternity in its relation to time." Whatever
view one takes of the relation of the divine consciousness to time,
unless the reality of human experience is denied, we must conceive God as

63. Ibid., p. 186.
64. "Why Pluralism?, Symposium", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Epworth Press, 1933, p. 195.
entering into the life of man which implies that His consciousness enters somehow into the time relation. It is not necessary, however, to regard God as being subject to time in the same manner that the consciousness of a human being must be. It may be, as W. L. Davidson suggests, that "the fact of the progress of the Divine plan towards fuller realization as time proceeds changes the aspect of the Divine intuition of the time-process, and, we may suppose, affects the Deity Himself with ever-renewed sympathy for the human labours, hardships, and sufferings that are conducing towards the progress and have drawn forth the Divine aid to the conscious aspiring and travelling souls." But we are not warranted in bringing God entirely within the time process. James's view, however, is not without value. For the many attempts on the part of modern thinkers to grapple with this problem and to arrive at a conception that does justice to both the temporal and eternal aspects bear living testimony to the valuable service which the philosophy of James renders in bringing this question to the foreground of modern thought. His insistence upon the importance of the temporal has made it impossible for philosophers to remain satisfied with any view of the world that minimizes the importance of finite existence, or of the reality of time and process in our world.

The notion of a developing God who grows in insight and moral wisdom through the lessons of experience; that is, emerging from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge, or from a lower to a higher level of character, with the passing of time, is incompatible with theism. For theism primarily consists in the assertions that, as ground of this world, God must be an intelligent and ethical being, and that He is working in and through the world of which He is the Author, to accomplish His sovereign purpose, which

is the realization of the perfection in the universe which He designed. If God is conceived as working out His own character as any other finite creature in the universe there appears to be no reason why He should be honored with the name "God" at all. He is essentially an individual of the human type regardless of the superior dignity and higher stage of development He may have attained. As Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "such a developing demigod would give the same account of his own development as the moral and religious man among ourselves. He would describe it as a new insight into the nature of things, due to the leading of a higher God, who would be God indeed." Further, according to this conception of God, we are at a loss to explain why one, and only one, such being has attained this measure of importance and higher stage of development. This view also renders it impossible to explain why it happened to be this particular being who outstripped all the others in this respect. In short, all sorts of difficulties and absurdities arise to perplex us the moment we begin to entertain the hypothesis of a growing God. We are opening the way for the return of polytheism of a somewhat crude sort. It is obvious that this view makes a much greater draft on either reason or faith than the most extreme views of the sovereignty of God. It is difficult to understand why James regards it as an improvement upon "dualistic theism", for whatever the difficulties are which this type of theism may have, they are much less perplexing than the problems which are involved in the notion of God which he finds acceptable. "The theory of a 'finite' God, of a 'growing' God or of a God in any real sense impotent is not a sign of intellectual daring," writes Edwin Lewis, "as is so often assumed, but of intellectual hesitancy....Men come upon a wilderness in their thinking, and

instead of resolutely setting themselves to find or make a trail across
the wilderness, they throw up their hands in despair. Instead of con-
quering the wilderness they allow the wilderness to conquer them."

We have now to consider the question of evil in a pluralistic universe.
We have seen that James emphatically rejects the omnipotence and infinity
of God in order to free Him from responsibility for evil, and declares that
in a world in which evil and good are not necessarily mixed up the problem
of evil ceases to be speculative. Thus the only difficulty evil presents
is the practical one of eliminating it; James makes provision for this by his
doctrine of improvability, or meliorism. The enigma of evil presents one
of the hardest problems for theism. It is the century-old dilemma stated
so inimitably by Hume in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, where
he says that "Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is He willing
to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is He able, but not
willing? then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing: whence then
is evil?" To attempt to solve this problem by saying that "God cannot
help it", since he is limited by an "other", is merely to recognize the
problem without trying squarely to face it. For if there is an external
limit to God which renders Him impotent before the fact of the existence of
evil, it remains a dull, dark fate for him as well as for man. In fact,
it must be a deeper enigma to God than it is to man. Man's conception of
God as the ground of moral values is his fullest expression of the assur-
ance that the universe is at bottom in harmony with his moral aspirations,
and that these values will be conserved and enriched. But if we accept
James's conception of a finite God, the whole problem breaks out anew in
the cosmic sphere. For if God is forced to struggle with His environment

69. P. 186.
in a manner similar to that which characterizes human life, He is entirely without assurance that the universe possesses an ethical character. Consequently, the very nature of things affords no adequate ground for any hope that He may have of overcoming evil. If another being is postulated to solve His difficulty we have the hopeless infinite regress again. Meliorism is made rational only by belief in a God who is sovereign; He must be a God who purposes, provides for, and supports, the final triumph of good. For by a curious paradox, as Von Hugel points out, evil in the world presents theism with its greatest difficulty, yet this same theism, which evil seems to render impossible, is the only system that offers any real promise for the ultimate defeat of evil.

According to Professor A. N. Whitehead, Christianity is less clear in its metaphysical ideas, in respect to the treatment of evil, than Buddhism; but the former is more inclusive of the facts. He says that Christianity "admits the evil as inherent throughout the world, but it holds that such evil is not the necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality. It derives the evil from the contingent fact of the actual course of events; it thus allows of an ideal conceivable in terms of what is actual." Thus while the presence alike of good and evil in the universe complicates the problem, it complicates it much more for the person who believes in a finite God than for the man who believes in a sovereign God. The belief in a sovereign God, in a God who is the ground of moral values, can admit that there is provision for whatever happens, whether it is called good or bad, in the very conditions of existence. But to say that evil is provided for by

71. Ibid., p. 51.
belief in a sovereign God, does not mean that evil is the final purpose of the conditions that make it possible. On the contrary, it is possible to maintain that the final purpose is good. This is not possible with the adherents to the belief in a finite God.

If God is finite in the sense of being externally limited, and if evil and good are isolated in the sense that James holds them to be, the Christian doctrine of escape from evil is meaningless. It proclaims a doctrine whereby evil is overcome with good, and through the treatment of evil, life is elevated to a finer level. But this is not possible with a God baffled by evil, and for whom evil remains an unfathomable mystery, or if we can no more explain evil by good than good by evil. Thus it is impossible to account for the character of both evil and good as revealed to deepest thought, or to cherish a sanguine hope of ever overcoming evil with good. Professor Whitehead, for example, maintains that evil is essentially unstable in character. "The common character of all evil is that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent realization of a purpose towards elimination. The purpose is to secure the avoidance of evil. The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order in the world." He says further, "evil promotes its own elimination by destruction, or degradation, or by elevation. But in its own nature it is unstable." He rightly says that this instability does not necessarily lead to progress, but that the way is opened for progress towards the good when we contrast the nature of good with that of evil. "There is," he writes, "a self-preservation inherent in that which is good in itself. Its destruction may come from without but not from within."

72. Ibid., p. 95.
73. Ibid., p. 96.
74. Ibid., p. 98.
He conceives the purpose of God as "the attainment of value in the temporal world". For him, the Kingdom of Heaven is the overcoming of evil by good, not their isolation. "This transmutation of evil into good enters into the actual world by reason of the inclusion of the nature of God, which includes the ideal vision of each actual evil so met with a novel consequent as to issue in the restoration of goodness." Paradoxically enough, Whitehead does not carry this line of thought, which allows the world-process to be purposive, to its logical conclusion since it would seem that he feels no need of an eternal purposive will or mind. But we may, and Christianity must, go further and assert teleology as the only method that takes due account of every element in the situation, and God as the Ultimate Ground of things. George Galloway says, "When man seeks to conceive that Ultimate Ground of things on which the teleological structure of the universe depends, he is justified in interpreting it through those ideas which have proved essential to the significance and worth of experience. In so doing he carries out the teleological method to its final postulate, the postulate which ensures the unity and validity of all truths and values. God is the final presupposition of all that is true and good, and the assurance of their final harmony." And when we observe that their "final harmony" has not been achieved, it is well to remember, as Professor Flint says, that history is not yet complete and that the Good may yet be reached.

There are ethical considerations involved in the question of the relation of God to evil which the conception of a finite God seems to ignore.

75. Ibid., p. 100
76. Ibid., p. 155.
In the first place, as C. H. Hamilton suggests, in the eagerness to avoid ascribing evil to God "there is a danger that we ascribe it to other cosmic forces that are not God, and fail to bear our own responsibility which, of course, vitiates the conception from a moral point of view." While Christianity, as Professor Whitehead has suggested, does not hold that evil is the "necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality", it does maintain that human action has something to do with the presence of evil in the world. This being true, Professor H. R. Macintosh rightly insists that "Neither the problem of evil nor that of sin is exhausted by setting it barely and unethically in direct relation to a supposedly sheer crushing exercise of Divine power", whereas James's treatment of this question, in spite of his emphasis upon the reality and freedom of the individual, appears to ignore this aspect of the problem. That is to say, he apparently assumes that man's will can be dealt with "as if it were merely a physical kind of force, which without more ado can be overborne by a stronger force acting irresistibly." But if God possesses a moral character He cannot deal with the will of man after any such fashion as this; He must remain true to His own moral character and recognize the moral character of man's will. It is this truth that F. J. McConnell emphasizes when he says that "God has such respect for human choice that when a man makes a bad choice God carries out the bad choice to its appropriate course in the play and interplay even of havoc-working forces."

To ignore this aspect of the matter is, as Professor Macintosh puts it, "to repeat the mistake...of isolating God's omnipotence 'to the detriment

83. Ibid., p. 211.
even to the exclusion of His loftier perogatives'. It is obvious, therefore, that an adequate treatment of the question involves the discussion of man's relation to God, a thorough handling of sin as alienating and estranging man from God, and what is meant by alienation or estrangement, and an attempt to ascertain "man's chief end in life", and God's purpose for His world. In short, we cannot adequately deal with the problem of evil without a consideration of the Christian conception of God.

This leads us beyond James, for the conception "that God has become man, and that the God man has 'overcome the world'," which is one of the most important points of the Christian idea of God, apparently has no place whatever in James's philosophy. For, as Professor A. E. Taylor says in criticism of A Pluralistic Universe, James appears not to appre- 86 hend the Christian position from the inside and with "sympathetic insight". Professor Taylor's statement that this important work of James's gives no hint that "the Christian conception of God means to him anything different from a sentimental variety of Deism", is essentially correct in view of James's treatment of the matter. It is, indeed, unfortunate that a philosopher whose dominating interest is religion, and who approaches religion with an unusually keen sympathy and penetrative insight, should so far lose sympathy with Christian thought that he can say, "I have grown so out of Christianity that entanglement therewith on the part of a mystical utter- 88 ance has to be abstracted from and overcome, before I can listen."

87. Ibid., p. 585.
This fundamental weakness in James's philosophy accounts for much in his thinking which is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of Christian thought. It especially renders inadequate his treatment of the question of evil since he is led to state the problem in terms that are basically unethical from the point of view of the Christian conception of God. He is led to believe that he has satisfactorily solved it when he places evil beyond the control of God. In reality his view merely recognizes the problem. The God of pluralism is in reality not a theistic but a deistic God, and cannot be identified with the God of Christianity.

The semi-pantheistic tendencies in James's conception of God are as antagonistic to religion as the deistic or polytheistic aspects of his pluralism at the other extreme. The doctrine that man and God are continuous spiritually, since man in his subconsciousness is a member of a continuum which includes also other souls and God, does not afford a solid foundation upon which to base religion. The value of this conception lies in the fact that the religious consciousness, unlike our ordinary rationalizing consciousness, which assumes a more or less detached attitude towards its object, regards itself and its object, that is, man and God, as akin and as capable of intercommunion. It does not, however, as James's theory demands, require that they be actually continuous. Theistic thought, while anxious to preserve the warmest intimacy between God and man, has always, and rightly so, been suspicious of any attempt to conceive them in any pantheistic sense. For pantheism, actual or modified, vitiates the religious conception of man's relation to God. Nor can it be allowed that the religious consciousness is an unreasoned intuitive one, entirely a matter of feeling, and that God always makes Himself known in vague and hidden rather than in definite ways. This view of man's approach to God eliminates the
possibility of vast numbers of people finding God at all, and James himself says, "I have no living sense of commerce with a God." It is unfortunate that James's treatment of this subject was so closely connected with the view of the subconscious-self which he borrowed from F. W. B. Leyers and which, as J. B. Pratt says, lends itself to all sorts of "popular exaggeration and cheap metaphysics", and is also "questionable psychology". Further, the subconscious is as much the "seat" of the lower physiological activities as of our higher spiritual ones, and it is as responsible for the most vicious and perverted promptings of our nature as for the most virtuous and godlike. Again, his appeal to the subconscious really weakens, rather than strengthens, his position against the mechanical philosophers. They can also use the subconscious as their weapon by saying that it simply explains much hitherto inexplicable in ordinary consciousness and may lend itself to a mechanical explanation. Then, as J. H. Muirhead says, "that twilight, semi-conscious experience of the kind revealed by psychical research, seems to bear no relation to the object of religious adoration; nor is it easy to see what light can be thrown upon the reality of the latter by the proof that human consciousness seems to spring from and contains to the end within itself a matrix of the former. It weakens religion to hear it argued on such a basis."

When we consider James's treatment of the self along with his conception with God, it is obvious that he cannot arrive at a satisfactory belief in immortality. In answer to Professor Pratt's question, "Do you believe

89. Letters, II, p. 211.
in personal immortality?" he replies, "Never keenly; but more strongly as I grow older. Because I am just getting fit to live." It will be remembered that we have already pointed out that James cannot logically hold to personal immortality since he does not believe in a soul. His scheme leaves nothing to survive bodily death. He adopts the transmission theory of the relation of the brain to consciousness. Our individual conscious-nesses are but drops of the great "mother" sea of consciousness which engulfs us, and the brain of the individual forms the channel through which the water of the sea flows. The brain is the means of separating the vast unity of consciousness into parts and finite forms. He does not, however, interpret the consciousness behind the brain as one absolute mind but thinks it possible that there may always be many minds in this vague realm. But whether he conceives one or many minds behind the scenes, he apparently relinquishes a belief in personal immortality, since it is still absorption in wider units of consciousness. That is to say, it is not personal immor-tality in the ordinary meaning of that term. This is true in spite of his as-sertion that "one may conceive the mental world behind the veil in as in-dividualistic a form as one pleases." For if one's present personality is merely an extract of one's larger personality, it is difficult to conceive the "reunion" with one's truer self as meaning what the term personal immor-tality is interpreted to mean in ordinary usage. Further, James's denial of God as the Ground of the world and Creator of man, makes it impossible for him to derive any assurance for immortality from the nature of God. And with all due respect to the philosophical arguments which render

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94. Ibid., Preface, p. vii.
invaluable service in clarifying and strengthening our belief concerning
the existence of the soul after death, the strongest argument for immor-
tality flows from the Christian conception of the nature of God which con-
ceives Him as Creator of the souls of men, and as the God of the living
rather than that of the dead. It is not to be wondered at, then, that
James, who rejects both the soul and this conception of God, remains doubt-
ful to the end concerning the fact of immortality.

In spite of the criticisms which we have offered to James's doctrine
of God, he has made a significant contribution to the philosophy and psy-
chology of religion at this point. For regardless of the unfortunate al-
liance of his treatment of the religious consciousness with the doctrine
of the subconscious self, his position, which is based on broad empirical
foundations, has genuine strength. He has forced the deeper thought of
today to recognize the value of the religious consciousness as a revealer
of ultimate reality. W. L. Davidson has pointed out that philosophy recog-
nizes religion as having a distinct philosophical value, and that religion
is a personal relationship of the individual with the object of devotion.
Philosophy now admits that personality must enter somehow into the conception
of God, and any attempt to justify theism. This was not true in the six-
ties and seventies of the last century. Philosophers, as a rule, rather
scornfully dismissed religion. They regarded it as outside their notice,
if not beneath it. It belonged either to superstition or poetry. It is
now generally conceded that if ultimate reality is to be found, the part
which religion plays in the disclosure of it is of supreme importance. If
philosophy is to fulfill its function, it must take account of, and explain,
as best it may, all phases of human experience. Mr. Davidson is right in
attributing this recently awakened philosophic interest in religion in a large measure to the "continued insistence and unwonted vigour (intellectual and stylistic) of William James." "He never tired," writes Davidson, "in his later years, of driving home the fact of the firm hold that religion has, and has had, on mankind--of the variety of its forms and manifestations, and of its lasting and obviously salutary effects on the believer....The result is that scarcely a book of any importance in philosophy now issues from the press that does not contain a handling (fuller or briefer) of the philosophical significance of religion; and, further, a new department of religious study has been created, claiming to be both scientific and philosophic, and designating itself, 'The Psychology of Religion'."

James's extreme doctrine of God has rendered a further service to the philosophy of religion in that it has made it clear that any theism worthy of the name must bring God into actual relationship with His world, and have an interest in the affairs of man's mundane existence and a genuine sympathy for man in his struggles and labors as he pushes on towards the higher life. It has definitely brought out the fact that religion has little to gain by an easy and uncritical alliance with an absolute idealism which pronounces the life, and even the reality of the individual an illusion, a temporary and meaningless phase in the life of the Absolute. James has attempted to bring God "down to earth", so to speak, in order that He may have a real part in the cosmic drama which James's universe presents. If, in his enthusiasm to give us a God of this kind, he has succeeded in giving us merely an "overgrown, friendly sort of man", we should not refuse to recognize the value of his contention that God cannot be isolated from the world nor conceived as being "too nice" to

interest himself in those things which are of vital importance to mankind. Further, James's view of God reveals something of the vagaries of thought open to those who attempt to develop a conception of God without taking into account the basic teachings of Christianity, and shows that philosophy suffers a distinct loss in severing connection with the fundamental principles of Christian thought. If philosophy profits by the mistake of James in this respect his doctrine of God will not have been uttered in vain. Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of much of his philosophy concerning these fundamental questions, he has earned for himself an enduring place "in the republic of philosophers" by his valuable contributions to religious thought, both in psychology and philosophy. We are grateful to him for his insistence upon the values of the human spirit, and for his courageous and persistent declarations, in face of opposition, and even ridicule, that human life manifests a need of God upon every hand, that a God exists to supply that need, and that He does abundantly supply it.
PART FIVE

CONCLUSION
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Thus far we have dealt with the most important features of James's philosophy and have attempted to give a criticism and an appreciation of his special doctrines. In a concluding survey of his thought, which is now appropriate, we may well consider briefly some of the points at which he has influenced religious thought upon which we have not dwelt in our general treatment. No man whose range of interests was so wide, whose insight so penetrating, and powers of analysis so keen, who was blessed with such a diversity of gifts and originality of thought, could fail to exert a wide and lasting influence upon the thinking of those who come after him. Josiah Royce was no doubt right in acclaiming James as one of America's three greatest philosophers. He placed him alongside Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson. His reasons for regarding each of these thinkers as representative American philosophers were two: first, each of them possessed the ability to think for himself, to think fruitfully with true independence and with successful inventiveness. Second, each was able to give utterance to ideas which are characteristic of a stage and of an aspect of the spiritual life of his people. According to this appraisal we believe that James is entitled to be ranked as one of the greatest philosophers of America, and to a lasting place among American thinkers. But James's influence has not been confined to his own country, nor has his interpretation of the spiritual needs and aspirations of mankind been limited to the people of his own country or

language. His influence upon European thought, and the very high regard in which he has been held by European thinkers bear testimony to his ability to give expression to spiritual longings which are of a universal nature. Further, James's earnest plea for the preservation and enhancement of certain values for human life, and his linking up of these inseparably with a philosophic and religious view of the world, have given religion and the values which it cherishes not only a more secure footing in the field of science and philosophy, but greater intellectual respectability as well.

This leads us then to the consideration of James's influence in overcoming the paralyzing effect of absolute idealism, which had reached momentous proportions in British and American philosophy at the close of the nineteenth century. There has been a noticeable trend towards realism in philosophic thinking in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Professor R. B. Perry describes this change of direction as follows: "The first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a widespread reaction against the victorious tide of idealism, and the revival of realism in a more circumspect and stable form." This new movement received encouragement and inspiration from James's courageous efforts to combat idealism.

The modern realistic movement contains a wide diversity of opinion within its ranks, but there is unity of purpose in one direction—in its opposition to idealism. There are, roughly speaking, two groups among American realists. The neo-realists, to whom we have previously referred, constitute one group; the other American thinkers who advocate a realistic philosophy

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2. Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 199.
are known as "critical realists." A. K. Rogers and J. B. Pratt, both of whom we have frequently mentioned, belong to this latter school of thought. Another well known representative of this group is G. Santayana. The view of this school of realists is set forth in *Essays in Critical Realism*. The former group holds to "the immediate presence both of physical existence in perception and of logical (or mathematical) subsistence in thought." The latter group makes a distinction between that which is immediately given and the transcendent "existences" to which it refers. That which is immediately given is usually termed "essences"; but there is no assurance of the object's existence. The existence of the object is a matter of "faith". The "what" of the object may be grasped in intuition but not its "that". Both groups maintain that there is knowledge of extra mental reality and that the object cognized exists independently of its being known. Some of the members of these two schools, as has already been shown, entertain views which we are forced to consider definitely anti-religious. Professor J. B. Pratt, of the critical realistic school, has probably made the greatest contribution to religious thought of any of the members of these two schools of American realists, but the influence of realism in religious thought in America has been definitely felt and can be traced to the teachings of James.

The realistic approach to religion is set forth by a group of American thinkers in *Religious Realism*, edited by D. C. Macintosh, as well as

in the writings of W. M. Horton, among which is his well known work, \(^5\) Realistic Theology. Professor D. C. Macintosh advocates a realism which is a modified type of epistemological monism. He is opposed to both the pan-objectivism of neo-realism and the dualism of the critical realists, but he is a thoroughgoing realist in his epistemology. He speaks of his view as "critical realistic epistemological monism." \(^6\) All of these realistic thinkers have struggled persistently to establish realism as against idealism, and the thinking of all of them has been largely influenced by James. This tendency towards realism in American thought is a healthy sign and shows the waning influence of idealism which had hitherto been strong in this country. Thus James's empiricism, as expressed in his realistic theory of knowledge, has an important bearing upon religious thought, for Christianity is essentially realistic in its philosophy. As E. Gilson puts it, "There will always be realism so long as Christianity's influence continues to make itself felt." \(^7\) While Christian thought can have nothing to do with the materialistic, behavioristic, and sceptical features which frequently color the new tendency towards realism, it can, and no doubt will, profit immensely by this renewed defense of realism against an erstwhile predominant absolute idealism which Christianity must always regard with suspicion. To the extent that it does profit by the polemic of the new movement against idealism, which James was largely responsible for initiating, religious thought will reap the

\(^6\) The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 310 ff.  
\(^7\) Op. cit., p. 244.
harvest which comes from his planting of the seeds of realism in the for-
mulation of his unique theory of consciousness, arising out of his empiri-
cism.

James has had a tremendous influence upon philosophic thought favor-
able to religion subsequent to the nineteenth century in his emphasis
upon the teleological and active nature of mind. It has already been
pointed out that the latter part of the nineteenth century was a time in
which religion seemed to be fighting a losing battle against mechanistic
influences in science and philosophy. Professor William McDougall sums
up the situation accurately as follows: "The history of the psycho-
physical problem since the middle of the nineteenth century is, then, in
the main the history of the way in which the progress of the physical,
the biological, and the psychological sciences has rendered ever more
confident, and secured a wider acceptance for, the belief in the univer-
sality of the laws of mechanism revealed by a study of the realm of physi-
cal phenomena; a belief which necessarily involves the rejection of Ani-

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mism." He goes on to show that such theories in physical science as the
kinetic view of nature and the law of the conservation of energy seemed to
offer considerable support to a mechanistic interpretation of all of life.
Also, in biology, the Darwinian hypothesis of the evolution of species and
the adaptation of species to their environment by the mechanical operation
of natural selection served to strengthen the conviction that all animal
growth and behaviour could be accounted for in mechanical terms. Finally,

the advocates of a mechanical view of life gathered weighty evidence for their conception from physiology and psychology. The failure to find the seat of the soul, the doctrine of the reflex type of all nervous process, the influence of the association psychology, along with the development of the mechanical theory of habit, which regarded habitual action as very similar to reflex action, were responsible for this view of the mechanical nature of physical and psychical processes. These considerations, along with the localization of brain functions and the dependence of thought on brain functions, led to the formulation of the law of psycho-neural correlation or concomitance. According to this law, "All mental process is accompanied by neural process in the brain, each thought or idea having its specific neural correlate." These lines of development of physiological fact and theory all tended to the conclusion, to use the words of Professor McDougall, "that the actions of men are capable of being fully explained in terms of mechanism—that a sufficient knowledge of the structure and physico-chemical constitution of the nervous system would enable us to describe completely terms of physical and chemical changes the causal sequence of events issues in any action, no matter how much deliberation, choice, and effort may seem to be involved in its preparation and determination."

James contended that the mind is essentially teleological and active in all of its operations. This characteristic of mind is fundamental to his system of thought. It is, as Professor R. B. Perry states, the ultimate source from which all his thinking flows. Professor Perry puts it

10. Ibid., p. 112.
as follows: "With all of his versatility and openmindedness he remained unconsciously loyal to certain fundamental convictions. It is even permissible to say that there is one germinal idea from which his whole thought grew, provided we do not overlook the even more important fact that his thought DID GROW. This germinal idea is the idea of the essentially active and interested character of the human mind." In 1934, J. H. Muirhead gives James credit for initiating what he calls "The Revolt Against Mechanism." He writes as follows: "There is a youth movement in philosophy as elsewhere. It was significant perhaps that it first started and gained prominence in America under the leadership of William James. But it since has spread to Europe under various names in the Emergent Evolution of some English writers, the neo-idealism of the Italians Croce and Gentile, but most powerfully and attractively of all in the Creative Evolution of Henri Bergson. Diverse though these manifestations are, they have certain points in common. They all claim for the first time 'to be taking time seriously'; they all direct attention away from the past with its closed doors to the future whose 'gates are open'; they all appeal to the spontaneity of feeling and intuition against the supposed tyranny of logical system, to the freshness of creation as against the staleness of imitation and repetition, to the individual as against the institution, in a word, to the spirit against the letter, mind against matter."

It should be observed in this connection that James turned the Darwinian theory of evolution, which was accepted by the mechanistic philosophers of the period as supporting their interpretation of the nature of

things, into a persuasive argument against mechanism. James apparently accepted this theory without question for he neither doubted nor defended it. In reality he was the first thinker to realize its full significance and to make a thoroughgoing application of it in his psychology and philosophy. Contrary to the trend of his time he did not conceive it superficially merely as the last blow struck by science at religion. He realized that it cast a profound doubt on the final adequacy of the mechanistic philosophy from which it seemed to spring, and of the metaphysical prejudice that this new belief was nothing but a disguised form of an old belief. He wholeheartedly adopted the new explanation of the development of the universe and made it serve as a means of attacking the type of scientific and philosophical thinking out of which the view grew. In so doing he rendered valuable service to religious thought: he helped to pave the way for the philosophical recognition of values which have always been of importance to religion, and he made it clear that the last word cannot be said about reality without coming to grips with the nature and value of human personality.

The influence of James's emphasis upon, and recognition of, the meaning and value of human personality is increasingly felt in religious thought today. His philosophy, which allows persons to take precedence, both in certainty and value, of all other forms of reality, has been especially useful to the advocates of personal idealism in America. The thinking of such men as E. S. Brightman, J. W. Buckham, A. C. Knudson,

13. Personality and Religion.
G. A. Wilson, and other Americans who advocate the philosophy of personal-ism, can, I think, be traced directly to the influence of James. He, along with J. Ward, Lotze, Bergson, Bowne, Royce, and Howison, to name only some of those who have stressed the value of personality, has contributed much towards the understanding and appreciation of the place which personality must occupy in any satisfactory interpretation of the nature of things. The modern advocates of a personalistic philosophy have been strongly influenced by, and have largely profited from, the explorations of their predecessors in this line of thought. Whatever our opinion of the philosophy of personality may be, we cannot fail to recognize that it is a good corrective to the mechanistic philosophy which it opposes because of its failure to allot any place in ultimate reality to human personality.

Another direction in which James's influence upon religious thought has been strong is that of theological method. The pragmatic philosophy has forced theology to become more scientific and historical. This development is in line with the general movement in theological thought which stemmed off from the teaching of Schleiermacher, who was a pioneer in the attempt to work out a system of theological thought based upon religious experience. Today, we find few students of religion who deny the value of such an approach to theology, and the large number of thinkers in recent times who have made an effort to arrive at sound theological conclusions, with experience as a starting point, gives evidence that this method in theology contains much that is permanently valuable.

It may be added that Catholic and fundamentalist thinkers do not follow the empirical approach to theological questions. The former regard it with suspicion because of their attempt to maintain a rigidly fixed system of theological thought. The latter suspect it because it weakens their doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration of the Bible, and injects a measure of tentativeness into all theological speculations. The value of the empirical method has been recognized in American religious thought by such thinkers as D. C. Macintosh and H. N. Wieman, both of whom have constructed a theological system with an empirical basis. F. R. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* constitutes another able effort in modern theological thought to ground theology on an empirical basis.

The application of the empirical method, as well as the scepticism of pragmatism which emphasizes the tentative nature of all religious conclusions, has served to render theology more flexible than it was when based entirely upon rationalistic presuppositions and methods. The static conception that religious truth, "the faith delivered once and for all to the fathers," does not admit of changed interpretation has had to give way in many quarters before the pragmatic insistence upon the possibility of empirical evidence changing existing beliefs. Even a theology which stresses the authoritarian view in religion, as does Barthianism, cannot entirely escape from the sceptical and tentative influences of pragmatic philosophy. Here, since theology is a human product, it is not entitled to claim finality for its doctrine. It has erred in the past, and is always liable to err. Its work is never done. Of course, its

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standard of appeal, in its work of interpretation, is the Word of God itself, and since there is no continuity between it and human thought concerning it, it may at any time demand that the responsive theologian change any previous interpretation that has been offered. Thus the outcome of theological effort is always tentative and always incomplete; it must recognize its limitations and be willing to work within those limits rather than assume a note of finality which is unwarranted.

Without in any way minimizing the importance of James's contribution to religious thought at this juncture, we regard his extreme pragmatic emphasis upon empiricism, as a basis for religious thought, as both erroneous and dangerous. It makes religious experience the decisive fact and ultimate court of appeal by which we test the validity of any theological conception, that of God along with others. No such concept, however we may define it, is itself any longer absolute or theologically necessary. Thus the accepted methods of theologians from the time of Origen are thrown aside and are replaced with another. This new method does not begin with a definition of God and proofs of His reality, but with human experience of whatever has religious significance; and it proceeds by tentatively analyzing the experience to determine what light it throws on the nature of the world in which it occurred rather than by deducing the implications of a definition. In other words, the empirical method in religion begins with religious experience and seeks by analysis the underlying conditions which produce it. And the idea of God, if it is retained, will be defined in terms of those conditions and will be rendered experientially verifiable. This method would regard the

conception of God not only as lacking in finality, but it would construe it in terms of what it means in experience. This being true, no concept is necessary except that of religious experience itself. We grant that God's reality, when interpreted in terms of religious experience, may empirically be placed beyond doubt and His nature may be derived by analyzing the experiences to which the definition directs our attention. But that this means what is ordinarily involved in the religious man's conception of God we cannot grant. Belief in God for the ordinary person is not merely a belief in future experiences of our own or of another's which will be true if God exists, but it is a belief in the actual present existence of a divine being who by definition is not within the experience of any of us. This is just as true of other concepts which the religious man uses. We believe, therefore, that while pragmatism has rendered a valuable service in unstiffening theology, if it is to be of permanent value to theology it must strip itself of this extreme empiricism and allow theology the right not only to deal with the concepts of religion because of their usefulness, but also because of their truth.

James has made a distinctive and permanent contribution to the psychology of religion in his powerful forthsetting of the value of religion for human life. His conception of religion as a means of putting an end to the attitude of struggle and inward conflict adds a new dimension to life and spreads out a new reach of freedom which makes "easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary" and has greatly enriched our view of the genuine nature of religion and the part that it plays in human life. It is true that there appears to be a contradiction in James's view of
the nature and value of religion. First, he thinks of it as calling forth men's deepest powers; it is a moral stimulus, a sort of tonic which brings new life to men in their mundane struggles. This aspect of his conception of religion emphasizes the active element in religion. Here, such beliefs as those concerning God, freedom, and immortality are required by our moral nature, and in order to satisfy its demands we have to postulate them. When dealing with this phase of religion, he asserts that our power of moral and volitional response is probably the deepest organ of communication with the nature of things. But in his mystical approach to religion he states that the passive experience, the experience of reconciliation, when man touches the power greater than himself, which brings a new authority and a new source of strength, constitutes the deepest organ of communication with ultimate reality. Hence, he lays greater stress upon the passive and the contemplative in religious experience. The experience of illumination in mysticism becomes an end in itself rather than regarding ideas and truth as means as he does in pragmatism. Instead of postulates which lead to tentative belief, the mystical experience affords an access to truths which are intuitively certain.

In his pragmatic and pluralistic moments he plays upon the active element in religion, and it is this phase of his thinking that leads him towards polytheism. In his mystical moods the passive element comes to the foreground, and he is inclined towards pantheism. This approach to religion fits into his general attitude towards psychical research and spirit-communication. The former strain of thought is prominent in A
Pluralistic Universe and the latter dominates The Varieties of Religious Experience. These two conceptions overlap somewhat in James's thinking, but in reality they are contradictory. A brief statement concerning the differences between these two philosophies will serve to show how fundamentally diverse they are. The Varieties of Religious Experience maintains that the universe as a whole is in its essential reality a continuum, not a complex of discrete elements. Individuation, or differentiation of separate individuals out of this continuum, and distinctive desire of divine and human personality are afterthoughts in the development of the universe. Man appears to be distinct from God only so far as he is actively conscious; subconsciously he is continuous with God. The development of conscious personality is regarded as a process whereby that which is first "diffuse soul-stuff", and nothing more, becomes a distinctive human being through embodiment in some properly prepared physiological organism. Religious experience consists in a temporary sinking back of the conscious personality into the subconscious sea from which it arose. At death, the individual sinks back permanently into the continuum, the soul is no longer individualized in the physiological organism, and the transmission of thought between the various parts of the universe is no longer impeded by the clumsy tool, the human brain. A Pluralistic Universe, however, presents a quite different picture. Here the universe is not all of a piece, but a collection of independent beings which do not have a common origin. They arose independently, and afterwards entered into relations with each other. Things and their relations are
data of immediate experience and have no reality beyond that experience as given. The God of this universe is finite and man is working with Him in building up a better world. It is obvious that if these two views are carried out to their logical conclusions they lead in quite opposite directions.

The inconsistency which is undoubtedly involved in his view of religion first as an energizing power and then as an experience of passive contemplation appears to characterize even the best religious thought. In order to secure a proper balance between the experience of worship and the active life of the world both factors of the religious situation must be taken into account. That is to say, the experience of passivity with its dynamogenic effects upon the worshipper should ordinarily be followed by a period of activity in which the new power, peace, and joy which are derived from the mystical experience can find adequate expression in the practical situations of life. Professor W. E. Hocking, in dealing with "The Psychology of Mysticism", in The Meaning of God in Human Experience, enunciates what he calls "The Principle of Alternation" as a means of resolving this apparently contradictory position common to religious thought. He states the meaning of this principle as follows: "There is something about our practical attention to any part or parts which turns self-defeating, and requires such complete abandonment of the parts, and reversion to the whole as religion has demanded, that whole which is different from all parts. And there is also something about practical attention to the whole which turns self-defeating, and can only be recovered by occupation with the parts. Hence the movement
of our temporal life must swing between them." James's emphasis upon these two phases of the religious life shows that he saw both of these factors to be necessary to the normal religious person without making any attempt to resolve their seeming contradiction. It may be possible to account for the differences in his view concerning the fundamental nature of the universe, as we have stated them above, as Professor J. B. Pratt does, when he says that the pragmatic attitude is favorable to religion while the logical consequences of pragmatism are anti-religious. He points out that the doctrine of the will to believe is a defense of the pragmatic attitude and temperament against the claim of logic to universal authority, and, as such, it is a valuable defense of religious faith. But in his pragmatic efforts, James lays so much stress on methodology and its anti-religious doctrine of truth that much of his earlier defense of religious faith is in a large measure contradictory. The pragmatic distinction between useful and useless knowledge, its doctrine of truth, and the phenomenalism and pluralism to which it logically leads, is destructive to theistic religion. But the real value of James's treatment of religion is his deep and abiding conviction, and his repeated assertions that religion is indispensable to human life because of the deeper meaning it gives to life and the help it offers to man in his earthly pilgrimage. This opinion of the value of religion dominates every phase of James's thinking and it is especially prominent in his keen and penetrating analysis of the religious consciousness in The Varieties of Religious Experience. The real and lasting value of this book

does not consist in any special doctrines which he sets forth nor in any additional facts which he discovers for the psychology of religion, but in the fact that throughout this interesting and illuminating treatment of religious experience he is thoroughly convinced and persuasively argues that man cannot live his fullest life or achieve his highest destiny without the aid and inspiration of religion, nor without the realization in his own personal life of those values which religion alone can help him to create, enhance, and preserve.
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