THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF GEORGE TYRRELL,
ROMAN CATHOLIC MODERNIST.

A Thesis
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PREFACE.

Modernism is, at least, one of the most important life and thought-tendencies which has appeared in the Church since the Reformation—of which, in fact, it is a development and in relation to which it must be judged. In Roman Catholic Modernism, George Tyrrell was a constructive and conservative critic, constructive in aim, conservative in method; and to many his views seemed to place religion in a truer perspective than any in which it had been presented in recent generations. He had, at once, that sense of the past, in which Protestantism is so often lacking, and that of the present, in which Catholicism necessarily fails; and so he pled, as he himself said, "for a greater realization of the issues at stake than is common with our more lighthearted reformers, and a greater sympathy with the instinctive (even if not intelligent) repugnances of those whose temples and altars seem doomed to a somewhat ruthless despoliation." Thus, as A. L. Lilley states, his writings as a whole are prolegomena to any future doctrine of revelation, and may be regarded, also, as A. R. Vidler asserts, as a reply to Liberal Protestantism. His
apologetic, therefore, is of the first consequence, yet it is not an apologetic which can be exploited in the interests of the Catholic, perhaps, of any Church.

However, that apologetic is not presented in any systematic form; in fact, it would be possible, as Percy Gardner writes, to extract from the works of Tyrrell both a vigorous assertion and a complete rejection of the Modernist position. This 'wavering line' of thought may have been made necessary by the Roman censorship or by an unwillingness to express fully an unanswerable problem as long as he believed that the answer was hidden in his faith; or, more probably, by the very character of Tyrrell's mind which experimented endlessly and discarded most of its experiments as valueless almost as soon as they were expressed. But whatever the reason, it creates a confusion in which one realizes that in quoting Tyrrell's views he is very likely to emphasize what Tyrrell regarded as unimportant, and was quite ready to give up; and another is content to regard Tyrrell's mind as a book sealed with seven seals.

Thus, it is necessary to escape confusion
in relation to an apologetic of such consequence to gather up in some systematic fashion the elements of George Tyrrell's thought and to present it in some consistent form. Yet, if one is to feel the moral and devotional strength of his spirit, it can be found only in the works themselves as they came from his hand.
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CHAPTER I.

Influences Affecting Tyrrell's Thought

Qualities of Personality

'Except I see and touch I will not believe' were the words of a man who had been born with a keen sensitivity to the stimuli of his human environment, a spirit with a body of flesh and blood; and such a man was George Tyrrell, born in Dublin on February 6, 1861. His senses were unusually keen, his emotional powers were generous, his temperament was intense. The external world in all its varied manifestations poured in upon him with a vividness and vehemence which only his life and writings can illustrate. This was his description of a maid-of-all-work, whom he knew when he was eleven:

"She abounded in stories and songs, and was persistently good-tempered and jolly. At the


2Ibid., pp. 12, 33, 67: see Note.

same time she was a good practicing Catholic, and if she was on handkerchief-waving terms with most of the engine-drivers who sped past the end of our garden on the Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Line, it was part of her general buoyancy and gaiety, and quite remote from any sort of impropriety or flightiness.  

And this his description of Damgan in Brittany, written in 1906:

"A shabby little Irish village, a dingy cheap church. The beauty is in the interlocked arms of sea and barley fields ripe to the harvest, the mingling of lighthouses and windmills; also in the archaic simplicity of manners that make one feel 3,000 years old, and look on the Church as a raw intruder who has extinguished the fires, and cast down the fetiches and altars that were the centres of now centreless mystic dances."  

His impressions of the world of nature were further intensified by the influence of his ardent will to love and be loved. His was a nature which wished, rather needed, to draw all things within the bounds of its affection and to know sympathy and love in turn. He disliked barriers of any sort between himself and the lives of others: he disliked anything that set

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2Ibid., II, 18.
him apart. And in the intensity of his love and his need for love he would emphasize, now this element, now that, of his personality, according to the nature of his companion, and one could watch him take upon himself the spirit and life of his friend. He was all things unto all men in his will to love and be loved.

His sympathy did not limit itself to men. From his childhood even to age he loved all animal life and destroyed it only by necessity and even then not without tears. He made animals his equals according to their natures and treated them as personal friends and enemies. He felt, in some sense, a kinship with them even as with fellow men, and his love for them was a love returned by them.

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Even for inanimate nature he felt a love and found a kinship of spirit. In the country landscape, in quiet villages apart from industry and excitement, but abundantly in the sea he found rest and peace, a freedom from fuss and controversy, a cleansing and healing power. The stars of the night sky were somehow too cold and distant; but the sea was a present power, a true companion bringing him into the presence of all creation, of all that had been, of all that was to come; by his side was the shadowy mysterious presence of nature's eternity.

This apprehension of the world of nature, intensified by his will to love and be loved, awakened his powers of reflection, his analyzing and constructive capacity, his will to know.

And these were possessed by nature of a keenness


3Ibid., I, 26; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, pp. 96-7.

4Petre, Ibid., I, 38.
and intensity like to that of his sensory apprehensions.¹ Nor were they handicapped by the forceful restraining power of ideas possessed of the authority of tradition. ² Consequently, he was quick to grasp the elements of a situation, realize their relations, make them an experience. Often he reached conclusions with a rapidity which was amazing.³ He was, in school days, disinterested in books and studies, given to idleness, yet he could 'pass muster'. He was low in scholarship, yet in student gatherings, conversations, and arguments, he was never disregarded.⁴ And in later life this power did not diminish.⁵


⁴Ibid., I, 57, 59, 60, 64, 74, 82, 96; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 64.

⁵von Hügel, quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 96-7.
But his reflective procedure was by no means logical. He proceeded in his mental development much as he first proceeded in his mechanical contriving: he would take what looked interesting, either as apt for some purpose already conceived, or as suggestive of some new purpose; then he would consider 'what would fit on to what'. Sometimes, having fixed upon the end, he would search for the means; sometimes, in handling the means, he would stumble on some end he had not imagined.¹

Moreover, the very keenness of his reflective powers caused him unconsciously to grant unto them not only undue exercise but undue authority.² For once convinced of the possibility of a world-explanation, he set out in search of it, analyzing, synthesizing, constructing and reconstructing as any new idea presented itself, seeking a final coherence, a final system of ideas in which he might find certainty.³

¹Dr. Newport White in Petre, Ibid., I, 55-6, 82; Goût, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 20; P. Gardner, Modernism in the English Church (New York, 1926), p. 49, 51.


³Ibid., p. 51; Petre, Ibid., I, p. 96, 124, 275; Goût, Ibid., p. 20-1; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, p. 4-5; Ward, The Wilfred Wards and the Transition, I, p. 309.
Nor was he ever released from this passion for philosophical construction and reconstruction, though his search for authority passed beyond it into other realms, but in it he built up such a mind as he possessed.

However, at the same time, these powers of reflection allied with his will to love and be loved and his will to know, were quietly turned upon the world of nature, the world of flesh and blood, of substance and form. And George Tyrrell came to know things as they are. He developed a feeling for the difference between character and character. He knew the joys and the terrors of animal life. He knew the remorselessness of nature. Around

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3Petre, Ibid., II, 8; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 271; Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 44.


5Ibid., II, 15, 17.

6Ibid., I, 260; II, 15; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 151; George Tyrrell, Oil and Wine (London, 1911), p. 254.
him he saw fear, prejudices, restlessness, loneliness, love. He saw birth, suffering, misery, ambition, hope, old age, death. He saw growth and starvation, the ruthlessness of wind and rain and water, of fire and the forces of decay. He knew the mighty power of the sea, its wrath and its calm.¹

And in the power of reflection he saw more. He saw the cruelty and bitterness of life as a law, a law where life gave way to life, where growth was growth which ended in decay, where life and development were the result of sacrifice and death and were themselves destroyed for a different life and a different development.² Each individual lived only through all other individuals, and each had only a momentary place in the interdependent current of life.


And so it was he saw the past in the vividness of the present, the present in the depth of the past;¹ so it was that he defended the past, even its superstitions and mythologies, and hesitated to depart from it;² so each step forward, no matter how experimental or extreme, had to be in keeping with the fundamental impulses which had preceded it;³ not in his scientific knowledge of life, its forms and relations, but in his will to know; and, perhaps, even more in his intense will to love, which broke down the barriers of time and place, recognizing them for what they were, claiming a kinship and demanding a unity with all the animating forces of creative life and personality.⁴

¹Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, I, 152-3; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, pp. 15, 96, 251; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, pp. 16-17.


³Fawkes, Ibid., p. 22; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 225; Lunn, Ibid., p. 159; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 297, 334.

⁴Petre, Ibid., pp. 38, 146, 206; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, pp. 182, 184, 198; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 348.
Nor was this all. All life was within the law, but the law did not comprehend all life. Life in its concreteness was more than the law. There was that in every creature which defied analysis: every person was for him a modified Tyrrell but every person was more; every animal was known only by analogy—not in the joy of rabbit-hunting nor in the terror of the rabbit, not in the meaning of sunshine and rain to the roses, but only in joy and terror, in the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, and in this one thing beyond: the consciousness of mystery.

This consciousness, this sense 'of things as they are,' as M. D. Petre describes it, was

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2Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, I, 28-9; II, 26: letter of Tyrrell to Housman; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 325.

the content of Tyrrell's sense of reality, reality as a man of keen sensitivity and reflection knew it in his individual experience. And this was a powerful factor in the life of George Tyrrell. It was a criterion of all his thought and action. Each experiment was weighed in this balance and found true or false. Each was directed in its development under this guidance. And in it, too, Tyrrell judged himself and others. He was conscious of pose, of unreality whether in men or in systems and despised it. Time and again friendships were tested, courses of action were changed when Tyrrell exposed some pet self-delusion of a friend, recognized some inconsistency in sentiment or action.

Nor was he lighter on himself than on

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others: he would permit himself no mask before his friends but exposed himself in his weakness and frailty; he wrote the ruthless self-revelation of his autobiography: and in it he wrote: 'Yet I could never rest in a deliberate and approved schism between my theory and my life and conduct. It was all one thing and, as such, had to be taken or left.'

Moreover, the consciousness of mystery which the sense of reality possessed as its partial content stimulated Tyrrell's will to know. Here was something to be known and understood. Here was something as yet beyond his comprehension. And this stimulus was intensified by the influence of his will to love. His sympathy for all creation, his desire to be at one with all, kept him revolting against the miserable restrictions of here and now. He could never enjoy the

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1Ibid., II, 2; Ward, The Wilfred Wards and the Transition, II, 168; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 67-8.


3Lunn, Roman Converts, pp. 144-5; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, pp. 154, 247; quoted from letter of Tyrrell to von Hugel.
walk he had chosen for thinking of all the others he might have selected instead; on the hill-tops he longed to be along the riverside, and when there he wished for the hills. He could never forget the countless possible advantages excluded by the choice of any single advantage. Nor could he forget man's littleness in the presence of the immensities. He longed to be free of limitation, to love fully and to be loved in fullness, to know fully and to be known in fullness.

This will to know, as Tyrrell himself says, was neither moral nor immoral in itself. It was merely a wish to know as another might wish for wealth. It was a will not to be illuded, to have nothing to do with unreality. But under the stimulus of mystery and in combination with his will to love it led him


3Letter of Bremond in Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 44; Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, xvii-xviii, introduction.

4May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 91; quotation from Tyrrell; Petre, Ibid., I, 120.
constantly to strive to get behind appearances, to go to the heart of any matter that interested him. He wanted the real whatever it was. He recognized in it a certain necessity, a certain eternity.\(^1\) It was an infinite manifested in finite forms, an eternal in the now. In the presence of the sea, he mused on it, finding in the sea's bigness and might and ruthless disregard of every human interest, combined with its animation and expression, an illustration of its life. Every wave was a man, an animal, a plant, who lived in and by the truth.\(^2\) Nor was it a transient element of his personality. Always he felt the mystery of life and the will to know. Always he moved onward, never yielding his sense of reality, never yielding his will. He was always an enquirer, always a seeker. He was forever roaming with a hungry heart'.\(^3\)

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Yet, its great strength lay in the fact that it had become Tyrrell's self. Brought to birth in the interaction of the external manifestations of life and Tyrrell's will to know, his will to love and be loved, it had cried out in him and unto him, and he had answered; he had adopted it as his own. To deny it was to deny himself. To know at all, to love at all, to will more knowledge and more love was to recognize its validity as an analogical presentation. Consequently, to a striking degree he was lacking in that self-regard which is characteristic of human beings. Again and again, in his autobiography, in his letters, in his published works, in the expressions of his friends and acquaintances, we see evidences of this: like Moses he labored not for himself but for others, caring not for his own welfare but only for that of Israel; he feared not to suffer by word or

1Petre, Ibid., I, 101, 107; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 304.

2Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 221-2; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, pp. 228-9; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 52.

3Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, pp. 3, 11; Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, pp. 6-7; Lunn, Roman Converts, p. 136.

deed, to die in martyrdom, even to fall into the pit of eternal condemnation if thereby he revealed the danger and saved others from a like fate; he had not the caution nor the carefulness, the restraint nor the deliberateness of prudence. He was unimportant, momentary, finite, while Reality was eternal. And man must know the Real.

Rashdall describes this selflessness as a product of Tyrrell's love for 'the idea of the priesthood', but that is hardly adequate. Many men have been in love with the idea of priesthood while lacking that detachment, that horror of earnestness and dogmatism which was so large an element of Tyrrell's lack of self-regard. In relation to a certain religious

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3Rashdall, Ideas and Ideals, p. 135.

leader, Tyrrell emphasizes that difference with exactness: "He seems to have yielded himself to the belief in his own mission without any sort of criticism or self-distrust; without any fear of fanaticism or illusion."¹

More probably, in Tyrrell's personality the will to know and the will to love were stronger than the will to be. And as his apprehensions of the sensory world served gradually to stimulate the one and to atrophy the other, the weaker was displaced by the stronger in a battle fought and won in the mists of dawning personality.² Tyrrell might well draw the distinction between moral and psychological selflessness, and apply to himself the latter characteristic, thus defined:

"Psychological selflessness is not a good term, but a useful one for the state of him who, seeing no foundation for proper self-respect and self-love, entertains neither sentiment and cherishes no sanguine illusions."³


²Ibid., I, 133; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 62; Gout, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 28; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, p. 133; Petre, The Autobiography and Life ..., I, pp. 103, 109, 118.

³Petre, Ibid., II, 3.
But this selflessness was not apart from a consciousness of self; rather, in its very nature it contained a strong awareness of self-existence, of separateness, of isolation, of finiteness. The two poles of its existence were eternity and temporality, the infinite sea, the finite wave.¹

To this consciousness George Tyrrell woke early. As he describes it, he began to feel that he had the making of himself in his own hands, that he had a character to build up, a course to shape, an end to select.² And in it he fought for independence, for free activity, against friends, against evil habits, against forms, against the Church. He was perverse and combative in its interests. He lost his temper in its defense. And in it, at last, he became a martyr.³


³Ibid., pp. 66, 103; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 188; Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, p. 155; Nédoncelle, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, p. 22; Rivière, Le Modernisme dans l'Eglise, pp. 194-5.
In one of his letters Tyrrell wrote this in relation to his independence:

'There is no man or body of men on earth whose belief would have the least influence on mine; and so whatever seeming buoyancy I have is due to my own continued and conscious exertion.'¹

And in his autobiography we find this:

'I think now that the Christ that others impose on us can help us little, and may even hinder us in finding Christ for ourselves ... It is only so far as we see in His multiple personality some likeness to ourselves with our circumstances and temptations, that He begins to live for us.'²

These passages suggest an individuality and a self-assertiveness which seem to be entirely at odds with that lack of self-regard we have just considered. But this independence is intimately connected both with his selflessness and his sense of reality and cannot be understood apart from them: he fought not to be but to love and to know; he fought not for his existence but for all that which he apprehended of the external world. To yield up his independence was to yield up and lose forever his sense of reality, to become part of the unconscious machinery of nature. To yield up his independence was to lose that element of truth which

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¹Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 159.
was distinctly his own, that part of the mystery of truth which he possessed and which could not be translated to another. To yield up his independence was to yield up that self which he had made his own.\(^1\)

But this assertion of independence, of the inviolability of the sense of reality, suggests the presence of faith, of hope and trust. And so there is. In fact, this faith, this will to believe, is a constant, if not always a conscious, element of Tyrrell's personality. He realized in an unintelligent and uncritical reading of Butler's *Analogy*, when he was about fourteen, 'that there was a world-problem to be solved'.\(^2\) But long before that he had been groping toward this light.\(^3\) The impatient resolve to have nothing to do with unreality,


with illusion, however attractive the guise, the impatient will to love and be loved by all that is, may not have arisen from a love of truth for its own sake, nor had any root in the spiritual, as J. Lewis May states, yet the recognition of mystery in reality contains a certain element of faith, a consciousness of nature's incompleteness. And the search for truth which demanded more and more violently the recognition of mystery and the inwardness of reality would have only faith as its impulsion.

In this connection it is apt to mention and to quote part of a passage in which Tyrrell is speaking of his 'wish to believe':

"I am quite sure...that I believed then. For to recognize the value of religion, to live for it and work for it, is already to believe. What one works for is not belief; but a satisfying formulation and defense of belief."²

¹Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 91.
³Tyrrell, Medievalism, pp. 107, 160-1; Holl, Modernismus, p. 29; letter of Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 415.
⁴Ibid., p. 275.
It may be objected that the faith of this earlier period was not religious faith; perhaps, it wasn't, but it was the faith that becomes religious. It could not rest in the meaninglessness and unreality which it recognized in external life and in obedience to external life, but sought refuge in the mystery. By seeming chance it turned to religion, to Catholicism which combines the largest element of the concrete with the largest element of mystery: but there is no such thing as chance, and, as Tyrrell wrote:

"When the mind is turned to a certain interest it vibrates to every little suggestion bearing on that interest; and sees light flashing from words previously dull and insignificant."

Soon it recognized—first in Catholicism, then in Christianity, then in Theism—a satisfying quality, the answer to its need, in which it

1Ibid., I, 94, 116; II, 73, to Brémond; Petre, George Tyrrell’s Letters, pp. 10, 16, 75, 151, 233; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 163; Hurley, "George Tyrrell—A Character Study," p. 418.


found sustenance and support. Only in it did Tyrrell find escape from chaos, only in it did his life have point and meaning.¹ Nor may we forget as religious qualities of his faith, his apparent priestliness and awareness of sin. His constant purpose in life was to save mankind from that unbelief and chaos which he had known and to bring them into the presence and power of God. Whether he labored among the poor, the afflicted of body, the broken of spirit, or among the confused and tried of mind, he labored not only as a priest of the Church but as a priest of the eternal, mediating between the real and the actual.² And always he was marked by a sympathy toward the sinner, the sympathy of one who was touched by their weaknesses and who understood their temptations, yet one who apprehended fully the devastating significance of their


²Petre, Ibid., I, 113, 189; II, 33–4, 276, 286; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 221; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 169; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 8; N. Smyth, Passing Protestantism and Coming Catholicism (New York, 1908), p. 55.
However, we must recognize definite differences between the faith of Tyrrell and that of conventional Christianity. His was not characterized by that direct devotion to God which manifests itself in prayer and fasting and formal meditation. He could not love God as God nor conceive Him as the external object of worship and petition. Rather he found Him only in the love of His creatures, in devotion to their welfare, in the love of Christ Jesus and His sacraments; as he felt within himself an inward response to these, an impulse moving him to its expression in thought, in word, in deed.

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2 Lunn, Roman Converts, pp. 144-5; Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 44; Hardy, Ibid., pp. 50-1; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, pp. 26-7, 299.

Nor did he know the joy and peace of believing, the assurance of unchanging eternities, the possession of timeless certainties. He was not a saint giving of an objective treasure unto sinners, nor a mediator drawing upon a lasting deposit. Rather, he was a priest among seekers, a saint in conflict, a soul storm-tossed in the world, knowing trial after trial and temptation after temptation, seeking, yet never finding an end of doubt and fear, of illusion and evil.¹

For always in Tyrrell's personality there was conflict, not the conflict between the 'law' and the 'mystery' in his sense of reality—that was merely the conflict between the consciousness of God as immanent and as transcendent of which Baron von Hügel speaks,² the conflict between two poles of reality as we know it—but a more vital conflict, a more intense antagonism, in the midst of which Tyrrell was a 'double-faced Janus looking heavenwards and hellwards':³ it

¹Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 6; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, p. 6; letter to Bremond as quoted by Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, p. 117; Lunn, Roman Converts, pp. 144-5, 145-6; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, pp. 19-20, 149-50, 155; Tyrrell, quoted by May, Ibid., p. 277; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, pp. 271-2.

²von Hügel, "Father Tyrrell, some memorials of the last twelve years of his life," p. 250.

was the conflict between the concrete apprehension and the more personal apprehension of reality; between the reality of what is, and what ought to be, conceived as mutually destructive elements.

In earliest childhood he found the invisibility attributed to God suspicious and exciting a sort of subconscious distrust. Nor was it long, until, conceiving God humanwise, he found the formulas of religion vanishing completely because there seemed to be no object to lay hold of. And it was only as at Grangegorman and in Roman Catholicism he felt the difference between an altar and a communion table, as in reading Montalembert's *Monks of the West* with its concrete presentment of the reality and force of religion in action, that he was drawn to Christian ideals of life, that he found a reality in religion and set out to establish it intellectually.

Yet, in the upward way of faith, in its

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2Ibid., p. 70; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 148.

3Petre, Ibid., pp. 98, 119, 97; II, 275; Goût, L'Affaire Tyrrell, pp. 20-1.
positive rather than its negative aspect, there remained a certain lack of reality, not so much because religious faith is a freely-chosen, actively-sustained aspect of life, but because "the highest reason which yields to faith is the feeblest element in most lives, a still small voice rarely heard, more rarely obeyed."¹

It stands alone in its endeavor to reach eternity. In its negative judgment of what is, it has been sustained and supported by the will to know and the will to love, by faith in reason and faith in sentiment, but in its positive task these elements of faith leave religious faith alone. Not logically but practically they may be satisfied with the outward world, they may rest in their labor, whereas the ethical faith of religion must face death and conquer it.²

This was the conflict in Tyrrell. His lower rationalism, his imagination, his senses and

passions, sympathetic with doubt and denial, drew back from eternity. At the same time, his religious faith had felt too strongly the impulse from the eternal Mystery to rest long in forms or images, in traditions or authorities. Thus, it was inevitable that he should know moments of weariness, of dullness and dryness, that he should lean on his lower self and be tempted to rest and peace in the denial of his higher faith. And, while he cried out for a sign, for a sign that God existed, yet that sign did not come apart from the moral conscience, apart from Jesus Christ and the body of Christ, the Church.

Friendships.

Such a conflict within a personality could

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2Stewart, Modernism, Past and Present, p. 324; Rivière, Le Modernisme dans l'Eglise, pp. 193-4; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 155.


not fail to have definite influence, particularly upon the life of one as well equipped in powers of reflection as George Tyrrell. Normally the sense of reality would have maintained a balance between the 'law' and the 'mystery'; but this conflict upset that balance and created a sense of unreality in connection with the religious system which Tyrrell wished to believe.¹ This, in turn, generated a driving need to establish the reality of that system, such a reality as could be established only in the solution of mystery, in the discovery of a final and absolute truth contained within that religious system.²

For Tyrrell, this need for a final and absolute truth naturally gave primary value to logical elements in the religious system, for his was a youth characterized by an intense and rational seriousness, undoubtedly a product of his brilliantly intellectual brother's influence.³ And his early reading and concern for

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²See Page 27, Note 1.

religion was largely theological and controversial. Moreover, this valuation of the system was encouraged by the attitude of Dr. Maturin of Grangegorman; and already the subconscious appeal of Roman sacramentalism and catholicism was lending its strength to the Roman claim of coherence in doctrine and priority in institution. Under these influences Tyrrell was 'in danger of becoming a narrow precisionist in ascetical theory—not in practice,...of taking sour and Jansenistic views, which would narrow salvation to a small body of elect; of applying logic and abstract reason to principles of conduct.'

But he was not as yet dissatisfied with Grangegorman. He found its worship most reverent and impressive, as against the tawdriness of the decorations and the perfunctoriness of

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1Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, pp. 96, 100, 110, 129, 130, 155; Tyrrell, letter as quoted by Gout, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 11.


3Petre, Ibid., pp. 97, 104, 126, 132, 152, 275; Lilly, "George Tyrrell," p. 816.

4Petre, Ibid., pp. 129, 131; Gout, Ibid., pp. 20-1; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, pp. 4, 5; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, p. 9.
the priests in their ministrations. Again, he still fundamentally assumed that "the religion he was brought up in was the only authorized and tenable form of Christianity."  

It was at this stage of his development that he met Robert Dolling ("Father Dolling"); Dolling was at the time about twenty seven years of age, Tyrrell about seventeen.  

However, Robert Dolling at twenty seven was already a man of a comprehensive sympathy and a wide personal influence. His sphere was practical moral action, and his every endeavor was directed to the solution of the life problems of the poor. To such solution he believed Christianity vital. But moral diseases, as he saw, require varying applications of the remedy, and the cure is the end to be desired, rather than the mere dosing of the sick. He himself was

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1Petre, Ibid., 126, 127.
2Ibid., p. 98.
3Ibid., p. 128.
5Petre, Ibid., pp. 128, 131; Osborne, Ibid., pp. 7, 23, 39, 287.
6Osborne, Ibid., pp. 16, 45, 105-6, 107, 324.
7Osborne, Ibid., pp. 16, 105, 110-111, 322; Petre, Ibid., pp. 128-9.
attracted to Catholicism with its combination of sacramentalism and ceremonial expression, and was convinced of the value of the sacramental communion in drawing people to Christ. But the need of people was the law of his Christianity, all else was matter of indifference. As Tyrrell writes: "the governing motive of his life...was the love of a man for men, not the love of a man for a system or religion for which he wants to secure proselytes or victims."2

In such a paramount interest and in such a spirit, there was no room for theological and philosophical questionings. And there were none. He passed through no period of anxious speculative trial as to the fundamental matters of the Christian faith. He was personally untouched by the analytic and sceptical side of the thought of his day.3 Yet, he had no impatience with honest doubt, and had sympathy with

1 Osborne, Ibid., pp. 16, 101, 103, 111; Petre, Ibid., p. 128.
2 Osborne, Ibid., pp. 20, 37; Petre, Ibid., pp. 128-9.
3 Osborne, Ibid., p. 15; Petre, Ibid., pp. 129, 154.
those passing through it. He was ready to put forth a helping hand if he might, but he moved with difficulty in intellectual problems.¹

Dolling was drawn to Tyrrell by his problem of doubt.² He associated himself with him and invited Tyrrell to work with him. He introduced Tyrrell to books presenting a broader and more harmonious conception of Christianity than Tyrrell had previously possessed, but he did more for him by revealing his own attitude toward Christianity with its grand contempt for law and logic when they stood in the way of love and life.³

For under the strong influence of Dolling Tyrrell saw something both of the inadequacies of a narrow, precise, logical religious system and the immensities of variation in the religious needs and satisfaction of humanity.⁴ Even more, he was encouraged and supported in the broadening demands of his own nature to love and be loved by all of humanity, to give himself to that truth which should be the salvation

¹Osborne, Ibid., pp. 15, 20; Petre, Ibid., p. 129.
²Petre, Ibid., p. 129.
³Ibid., pp. 129, 130; Osborne, Ibid., p. 20.
⁴Petre, Ibid., pp. 128-9, 131; Osborne, Ibid., pp. 20, 105; Gout, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 20.
of all. And these, for the moment at least, served not to allay but to increase his doubt and sense of unreality. For while they did not destroy the faith in a final and absolute truth of law and logic, they did reveal clearly that he had not as yet found the truth in which his conflict of wills might cease. And Tyrrell was not one of those who could dispell doubt by arbitrarily assuming as final and absolute that which he knew as tentative and hypothetical. So, the influence of Dolling launched him upon further search and, in measure, even upon the direction of that search.

For, though Tyrrell knew the attraction of 'the old business being carried on by the old firm, in the old ways;' of that 'continuity that took one back to the catacombs,' where there was no need of, and therefore no suspicion of, pose or theatrical parade,' he was restrained by the offensiveness to his personal nature of certain Catholic practices and attitudes until Dolling revealed them in the light of humanity's

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1Petre, Ibid., p. 130; Osborne, Ibid., pp. 7, 20; Goult, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 33.

2Petre, Ibid., pp. 131, 135, 154; Osborne, Ibid., p. 20.

3Petre, Ibid., p. 136; Lunn, Roman Converts, p. 136.
needs. Yet, the influence of Dolling's spirit and method remained as a seed germinating in the hidden depths of Tyrrell's nature to burst forth again and again as a deliverance and guide in his quest for religious certainty.

In this attitude Tyrrell was taken into the Roman Church and the Jesuit order, feeling that here was the end of his seeking, the end of controversy. And in the Church he gave himself up to the priesthood, resolutely fulfilling its demands, militantly attacking the opponents of its faith, satisfying the needs of men in the Holy Spirit, confident that it was the priesthood of humanity.

And then, as a product of Tyrrell's devotional life, came books of spiritual musings such as *Nova et Vetera*, *Hard Sayings*, and *External Religion*. These writings, while they were thoroughly orthodox and scholastic in their approach, revealed a freshness and freedom which

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was not possessed by their more formal scholastic kinsworks. They revealed something of a spirit rebelling against sharp, unnatural separations, against a persistence of literal and precise tradition into the present, against autocraticism in man and in the Church. They revealed a spirit holding fast to the bars of its prison and yet crying for freedom, for the satisfaction of needs which it sees in itself and in all men of its position; a spirit seeking and yet retreating back into the darkness; a spirit uncertain, at a moment of crisis.¹

This spirit revealed in *Nova et Vetera* attracted the active attention of Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Von Hügel had noted earlier some of the articles written by Tyrrell and published in *The Month*,² but *Nova et Vetera* drew from him a desire to meet Tyrrell which he did on October 9, 1897, and from this acquaintance ripened a friendship which survived


²The *Month* and Catholic Review, Manresa Press, Roehampton; article largely collected in *The Faith of the Millions* (London, 1902).
until Tyrrell's death.

Both of these men had made religion the ruling interest of their lives; both were deep believers in the validity of the Catholic Church; both believed her adaptable to new needs and new knowledge; both knew something of her immediate inadequacies.¹ But while Tyrrell had seen only the borders of contemporary knowledge, Baron von Hügel was one who had steadily progressed to its center, had claimed his heritage, and was using it to the ends of the Catholic Faith. The Baron was a scholar, a man of vast knowledge on many subjects, a mind balanced in its outlook, thorough in its endeavors. Moreover he possessed an immense power of imagination and theoretical reasoning in dealing with his learning and was able to attack any subject which engaged him from a multitude of directions and by a variety of methods which gave vividness and suggestiveness to his thought.² Yet, the Baron was not only a scholar but was also an apostle, a mystic, dedicated to the definite mission of awakening the Church to the historical problem and of

creating a new apologetic in the light of its consideration. In this mission he recognized the value in the association and fellowship of scholars and thinkers; and he had done much to draw together the leading Catholic scholars, critics, philosophers, thinkers by his enthusiastic sympathy and help in suggestion and criticism, in promotion and protection.

Such a man was sure to be a critic for George Tyrrell. For the young thinker, seeking the light, often finds his way into by-paths, often rests in inconsistencies, often is rashly confident and dogmatic. Amid inferior minds he is a pioneer, subject to all the dangers of the pioneer; amid unsympathetic minds, he is a rebel, affected by his own rebellion; but amid minds more advanced than his own in the way that he would go, he finds valuable criticism, guiding his strength, correcting his

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2Rivière, Ibid., pp. 104-5; Petre, Ibid., pp. 6-7; Petre, My Way of Faith, pp. 255-6, 267; Bremond, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., p. 267; Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 87.
weaknesses.

But the Baron was more than a critic: he was guide and spur. Being possessed of knowledge in relation to modern science and philosophy and being possessed of the friendships of Catholic thinkers, he led his new friend out of the borderland between Scholasticism and modern knowledge into the rich materials of his kingdom. He, together with Bremond, introduced him to the Philosophy of Action, formulated by Maurice Blondel and his creative interpreter, Abbé Laberthonnière, to the work of Bergson, and to that of the German Eucken. He introduced him also to the work of the Catholic critics Loisy and Duchesne and to the wide fields of German Biblical and historical criticism. Where the Baron did not introduce, he reawakened interest. And it is probable that von Hügel moved Tyrrell to reconsider the work of William James and Arthur Balfour, and that of Newman in the light of a broader knowledge of science and criticism. More than this, he did not allow

1Rivière, Ibid., p. 194; Petre, Ibid., II, 87, 94.

2Petre, Ibid., II, 89, 90, 92; Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 95, 96; Rivière, Ibid., pp. 104-5, 194-5; Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, pp. 55-6, 72, 75.
the education of his friend to be starved in shallowness, to be strangled in difficulties; though, perhaps, he did expose it to the contrary danger of confusion and mental indigestion, in the abundance of material, of sympathy and criticism he offered.¹

What Tyrrell might have been, might have done if he had not met von Hügel at this moment of crisis, is difficult to say; but it is certain that von Hügel, in sharpening his historical and critical sense, in making him conscious of the tremendous difficulties of the Scholastic assumptions, in pressing upon him the immediacy of the problem and the apostolic character of struggle with it, broke down the barrier of Scholastic authority and personal desire and sent Tyrrell into a wider field in search of that Truth which men live by and which is alone authoritative. As Dolling had freed Tyrrell from the prejudices and bonds confining him in Anglicanism and had liberalized his conception of religion, so von Hügel freed him from the prejudices and forms binding him to Scholastic Catholicism and

¹Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, p. 72; Ward, Ibid., I, 309.
broadened his concept of knowledge.¹ As Tyrrell freed by Dolling, had moved on to Rome, so, freed by von Hügel, he moved on to Modernism.²

Yet, von Hügel would willingly have held him back.³ For a dominant conception of the Baron's philosophy was that of life as a painful balancing of diverse and opposing tendencies and interests, not to be simplified by throwing out recalcitrant elements nor by the 'one-thing-only' fallacy of an impoverishing asceticism, nor by an artificial simplification of its environment, but only by the annexation and subjection of the richest and most diversified experiences,⁴ and a dominant value in his experience was the historical and institutionalized Church with its machinery of organization and


³von Hügel as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 95, 295; as quoted by Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, pp. 111, 183-4; Loisy, Mémoires, III, 130.

its constituted ecclesiastical authority. But Tyrrell was of another spirit, concerned for the needs of humanity in the storm and stress of life, eager in the pursuit of truth and authority by every twist and turning, concerned with the Church only as a means to these ends, concerned with himself only as an instrument of this priesthood. His was the work of experimental endeavor, of trying and testing, rather than that of scholarly formulation: and von Hügel, like Dolling, could not check that movement at the resting place of his own life.

The early writings of Tyrrell attracted also the attention of Père Henri Bremond, at the time, of the Society of Jesus in France. And, although they were not to meet for some years, a correspondence was initiated by Bremond

1Nédoncelle, Ibid., p. 20; Tyrrell, Ibid., 105; Loisy, Mémoires, III, 127; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 258; May, Ibid., p. 176; Rivière, Ibid., pp. 104-5; Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, pp. 6-7, 169; von Hügel as quoted by Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 95.

2Loisy, Ibid., III, 129; Petre, von Hügel and Tyrrell, pp. 6-7, 8; Bremond, as quoted by Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 45; Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., pp. 117, 155; Nédoncelle, Ibid., p. 22; Rivière, Ibid., pp. 194-5.

which later actuated a close and abiding intimacy.

For these two, again, had much in common. Possessed of remarkable intellectual gifts and of artistic sentiments and capacities,¹ both, moreover, had entered the novitiate very young, in point of formation and character; both were suffering from an intellectual repression;² both found their religious sustenance in an unphilosophic mysticism;³ both were pondering the same question: 'can the Society of Jesus rise to the height of her mission towards the Church?'⁴ But while Tyrrell was more or less indifferent to external incongruities and ascetical characteristics of the Society, while he was concerned not at all for his own salvation, Henri Bremond was concerned much more by

¹Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 265; Petre, Ibid., II, 71; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 269; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, p. 3; Hurley, "George Tyrrell--A Character Study," p. 410.

²Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 73, 76; Petre, Ibid., II, 71; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 260; Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 4.

³Petre, Ibid., p. 269; Loisy, Mémoires, III, 126; Bremond, as quoted by Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 160.

⁴Bremond, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., p. 267-8; Loisy, Ibid., p. 4; Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, The Autobiography and Life ..., II, 74-5, 76.
ascetical demands than by intellectual problems,\(^1\) and he was concerned with these as an intimately personal problem.\(^2\) He had not identified himself with the priesthood, as had Tyrrell, but regarded it as something against which he rebelled even as he desired it. And external problems disturbed him much less than his own inward conflict, save as they immediately affected that conflict. Thus, for him, personal release was sufficient, without any struggle to release humanity; his moral and mystical experience possessed a certain detachment from priestliness.

However, he was concerned with the religious movements of the souls and spirits of men, with their struggles and victories, their defeats and tragedies, their hopes and dreams. He was concerned with them as the artist is concerned, conscious of their glories and their pathos, their beauties and uglinesses, their freshness and enthusiasm, their shallowness and their depths. And as an artist he brought to bear upon them

\(^1\) Petre, Ibid., II, 71; Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., pp. 134-5; Bremond, as quoted by Petre, My Way of Faith, pp. 263, 265; Petre, Ibid., p. 260.

\(^2\) Petre, Ibid., pp. 253, 261, 266; Bremond, quoted by Petre, Ibid., pp. 263, 265; Loisy, Memoires, III, 126; Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 7; Bremond quoted Loisy, Ibid., p. 29.
his intellectual gifts, with sympathy and yet with detachment, revealing for the participants of the struggle something of the esthetic appeal of their efforts and ideals, yet not apart from a whimsicality and mockery of spirit.

In such a man, then, Tyrrell found not so much intellectual and scholarly assistance—though Bremond did introduce him to the French Philosophy of Action—but rather a certain sympathy and a certain contrast which clarified and advanced the movement of his own mind and spirit. Thus, in Bremond’s personal crisis, Tyrrell clarified his own personal relation to the Society of Jesus as an aid to his friend, and was induced to undertake a comment upon the Spiritual Exercises, which, though finally discarded, undoubtedly advanced his own approach

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1 Bremond, as quoted by Loisy, Ibid., p. 8; Loisy, Memoires, III, 126; Petre, My Way of Faith, pp. 253, 261, 269; Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, Life, p. 265.

2 Petre, My Way of Faith, pp. 261, 266; Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, Life, p. 265.

3 Tyrrell as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 91.

4 Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 72, 73, 74, 75; Bremond, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 446.

5 Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 77; Petre, Ibid., II, 84.
to religious problems and helped him to realize the real character of the existing Society. Moreover, as Bremond was a student of Newman and inclined toward a pragmatic and subjectivistic interpretation of his thought, Tyrrell hesitated at greater length than otherwise in the consideration of Newmanism. But, perhaps, the greater benefit of Bremond's friendship was the relaxation, the recreation, the rest of mind and body and spirit which Tyrrell found in Bremond's sympathetic, yet contrasting interests. Here the tension of struggle might disappear since the battle was afar off as in another world, and every enemy was still. Here there might be laughter and pleasant mockery and the enjoyment of nature and literature.

However, there was yet another friendship which became a part of Tyrrell's life, which filled even more completely the needs of his personality: his friendship with Maud Petre. She and he were as unalike as possible in

1Ward, The Wilfred Wards and the Transition, II, 172; Williams, as quoted by Ward, Ibid., II, 173.

2Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 265, 305; Bremond, as quoted by Petre, My Way of Faith, pp. 267-8; Loisy, Memoires, III, 126; Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 4.
temperament and character; he was elusive, she was direct; he was subtle, she was simple; he was utterly without self-regard, she was self-conscious.\textsuperscript{1} But, nevertheless, from the time that they became closely acquainted\textsuperscript{2} Miss Petre felt herself spiritually drawn to Tyrrell both by his keen sense of moral and religious problems and by the character of his heroism.\textsuperscript{3} This attraction and Tyrrell's influence did much to strip Miss Petre of her conventionality, her Victorian stiffness and propriety, even as her dogmatic rigidity was yielding to the demands of faith;\textsuperscript{4} and in this new freedom she chose as her vocation the sharing of Tyrrell's dangers, the checking of his imprudence, the ensuring of his perseverance.\textsuperscript{5} To this, her whole life was consecrated as long as Tyrrell lived, though at times she defended actions with which she was not in agreement, or presented an independent contribution.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1}Petre, \textit{My Way of Faith}, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{2}Petre, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 273.
\textsuperscript{3}Petre, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{4}Petre, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{5}Petre, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{6}Petre, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 253, 270, 276, 208.
Such a devotion naturally served a purpose in the life of a man who possessed such an immense, though repressed, capacity for love as did Tyrrell. The knowledge that Miss Petre cared for him as no one else cared, that she persistently believed in his abiding spiritual value, renewed his strength in the dark days of difficulty and bitter opposition, and lent weight to her opposition to any cooperation with groups she deemed unworthy of his sympathy and cooperation. And it was in her hands that Tyrrell rested his case when he himself was called by death.

Philosophical and Critical Movements.

When Father Tyrrell first became known to the Catholic world it was thought by many that in him had arisen a successor to Cardinal Newman: one who would be an originator as well as follower, but who would, in some sense, carry on and develop the message of the great Convert. For Newman had been the one great creative thinker of the Church in the nineteenth century, perceiving

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1 Petre, Ibid., pp. 276-7, 280, 282; Loisy, Memoires, III, 129.


vaguely the coming intellectual revolution, foreseeing the historical problem in regard to the changes and variations of Christian doctrine and worship, realizing that there must be a preliminary study of man's mind, a determination of its first principles, that the vital truths of the Christian faith might be successfully presented; and around his figure clustered the hopes of many who were watching the signs of the times and asking how the bark of Peter was to be steered through the approaching storms.

Moreover, Tyrrell held that he owed much to this great teacher. Though he was not a specialist in the study of Newman, he had read most of his works at least once and both the Grammar of Assent and the Essay on Development more often. The first of these, in the year 1885, effected a profound revolution in his way of thinking just when he had begun to feel the limits of Scholasticism. Seeking for certitude,

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2 Ward, Ibid., II, 172; Loepert, Ibid., p. 120; Tyrrell, Ibid., p.xvii; H. R. Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief (N.Y., 1924), pp. 182-3; Petre, Ibid., II, 99.

3 Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 209.
he had found that the inferential method, the logical demonstration of Scholasticism could give him only a convergence of probabilities, a situation which Newman had faced in the Grammar of Assent and had resolved in the recognition that certitude is based in assent, that the functioning of the will is a necessary and vital element of assurance,¹ a resolution which Tyrrell willingly seized upon as a guide to his own seeking.² Again, as he became more conscious of the historical and critical problem and felt the limits of Scholasticism in that respect, as he endeavored to pour Catholic truth from the Scholastic into the modern mould, without losing a drop in the transfer—³—a task which Newman had undertaken in the Essay on Development and had resolved for himself in the conception of revelation's content not as a statement but as an 'idea,' an 'idea' regarded as a spiritual force


²Gout, Ibid., pp. 29, 30; Rivière, Ibid., pp. 193-4.

³Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 57; Wilfred Ward, as quoted by M. Ward, Ibid., II, 322.
or impetus rather than an intellectual conception, and embodied in statements and institutions which are susceptible of development but which never exhaust the 'idea' which is itself always the same under all the variety and progress of its embodiment—an he appropriated also Newman's 'idea' of development for his own need.

There were, also, apparent resemblances between the spiritual attitudes of Newman and Tyrrell. Both were profoundly sceptical of temper, distrusting reason and emphasizing mystery, conceiving that there was no logical resting place between scepticism and the Catholic faith; yet both felt deeply for troubled consciences and in their relationships with others,

1Cross, Ibid., p. 102, 104-5; Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 185; C. Harris, Creeds or No Creeds (N.Y., 1922), p. 35; Fawkes, Studies In Modernism, p. 40; Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-Roads (London, 1910), p. 33.


4Tyrrell, Introd. to The Mystery of Newman, xv-xvi; Fawkes, Ibid., p. 30; W. Ward, Witnesses to the Unseen, p. 28
showed extraordinary tenderness and respect toward their souls;¹ both were conservative of spirit, with a keen sense of the past and an attachment to its truths;² yet both were protagonists of new apologetics, employing methods alien to the past;³ both were possessed of keen and vigorous intellects, characterized by an ascetic rigor and exactness;⁴ yet both failed to make their own the exacting nature of the scientific method, to systematize or even to engender a philosophy, to fill in the gaps in their knowledge;⁵ and both leaned upon their moral and religious senses or sentiments as of compelling authority and protective of truth.⁶

¹Fawkes, Ibid., p. 43; Cross, Ibid., p. 88; Wilfred Ward, Witnesses to the Unseen, pp. 117-8.

²Houtin, Ibid., p. 53; Fawkes, Ibid., p. 43; Inge, Ibid., p. 201; Cross, Ibid., pp. 103-4; Loeppert, Ibid., pp. 127-8.


⁵Wilfred Ward, Ibid., II, 257, 492-3; Fawkes, Ibid., p. 31; Lunn, Roman Converts, pp. 66, 69; M. Ward, Witnesses to the Unseen, pp. 12-3.

⁶Gout, Ibid., pp. 36-7; Cross, Ibid., pp. 77, 100; Mellone, Ibid., pp. 79, 80, 81; M. Ward, Ibid., pp. 17, 28.
and to urge the theologians to grant such liberty without fearing a revolution; since the true results of science were sure to be appropriated by theology in the life of Christian faith and devotion.\(^2\)

However, there was in Mr. Ward's attitude a certain detachment both from humanity's agony and from humanity's weakness. He could conceive neither the possibility of human tragedy nor that of human failure in vividness and intimacy.\(^3\) For in his faith the human child of God was redeemed by the divine, the human body of Christ upheld by grace. And this detachment Tyrrell found objectionable.\(^4\) For while he hoped and trusted that there would be no ultimate tragedy nor failure, in his concern for humanity here and now he saw that there was tragedy with its devastation and agony in the lives of men and women, that there was a present failure through selfishness in the Church, and that these could

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\(^2\)M. Ward, Ibid., II, 177.

\(^3\)Herbert Stewart, Ibid., p. 70; Dell, Ibid., p. 134; Petre, Ibid., p. 230; M. Ward, Ibid., II, 296, 301.

\(^4\)M. Ward, Ibid., II, 301, 170, 169; Wilfred Ward, as quoted by Stewart, Ibid., p. 71.
not be resolved by any mediation between the hu-
man and the divine but only by a resolute minis-
tering to that tragedy and overcoming of that
failure. ¹

This objection became more fully apparent
as Tyrrell recognized limitations in Newman's
theory of development. For, though Tyrrell knew
that Newman had accepted the idea of a static
deposit, a body of truths which were communi-
cated to the world once and for all in apostolic
times; that he had presupposed a miraculous
revelation and a no less miraculous magisterium;
that he had applied his theory within these lim-
its, ² he had not realized either the vast extent
of the historical problem or how severely de-
velopment was confined by the conception of a
static deposit. But when he did, he knew that
these two were incompatible, that dynamic de-
velopment limited by a static deposit would be
paralyzed, that a static deposit, subject to
the presuppositions of dynamic development,

¹M. Ward, Ibid., I, 316-7; Petre, My Way
of Faith, p. 230; Petre, The Autobiography and
Life of George Tyrrell, II, 125-6, 108.

²Tyrrell, introd. to The Mystery of Newman,
xiv; Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, p. 28; Godt,
L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 113; Tyrrell, Through
would be explained away; that the substance of religious truth and authority must be sought elsewhere.\(^1\)

However, his contacts and consideration of Newmanism, together with his own mysticism, prepared Tyrrell's mind for the reception of that philosophy which suggested a revolution in epistemology, the philosophy manifested in the thought of Blondel and Labethonnier, of William James and Arthur Balfour, of Eucken and Bergson.\(^2\) And this philosophy was impressed upon him fundamentally through the works of Blondel and Labethonnaire: for although he had touched upon the thought of James and Balfour earlier\(^3\) and found much of value in Eucken and Bergson later,\(^4\) yet it was through the works of Blondel and Labethonnaire that the influence was fixed and expanded.

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\(^3\)Tyrrell, in Petre, *George Tyrrell's Letters*, p. 22; Tyrrell on *The Foundations of Belief in the Month*, April & May, 1895.

forward and backward. And, perhaps, more through Labertonnieré than Blondel since he was the more vivid writer of the two and more akin to Tyrrell by nature.²

Yet, we must not imagine that Tyrrell's thought was entirely the result of this influence. Rather, it might be regarded as an independent, though interrelated, movement, an individual tendency, strengthened, confirmed, stimulated by the suggestions and conclusions of this school of philosophy.³

The philosophic suggestions and conclusions, of which Tyrrell availed himself in the particular direction of his own thought, are to be found both in this school's statement of the problem and in its suggestive solution, which are, on the one hand, largely the accepted conclusions of that critical philosophy which had challenged and undermined the philosophy of

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¹Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 90-1, 91-2.

²Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 91, 264; Petre, My Way of Faith, p. 228; M. Ward, Ibid., II, 188.

Naturalism and, on the other, the pursuit of the direction suggested by Lange and, perhaps, by Pascal. Thus, as in Blondel and Laberthonnière we find the finality and certainty of the rational method impugned because it copies reality and does not penetrate or possess it, it treats the relations of a thing rather than its substance, its instrumental quality of analysis and classification is not complete in that it does not synthesize; in Bergson because reality does not possess the systematic and logical structure which reason represents, but a fluidity, continuity, and perpetual novelty which cannot be represented truly by reason; in Eucken because the concepts and categories of reason are not presented to consciousness ready made but are moulded in measure by a subjective element which reason ignores; in James because reason cannot translate Reality into practical, concrete, and

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2Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York, 1911), ix, pp. 29, 164, 195-6.

comprehensive form:¹ we find these same ideas accepted and employed by Tyrrell in his own anti-intellectualism.² However, most of these philosophers retain some check on their anti-intellectualism: Bergson grants that of the material aspect of nature, reason renders an approximately adequate account, and that in the higher aspects of nature it fails through partiality rather than through absolute contrariety to fact; James asserts that the liberty to believe should be applied only to those practical questions which the intellect is unable to answer; and Blondel and Laberthonnière also leave room for an objective rationalism.

Again, as these philosophers seized upon the recognition, by critical philosophy, of the will as a constituent element of knowledge and certitude and of ideals as the legitimate expression of the moral, aesthetic, and religious nature compared in respect of their value, to formulate a system appealing to direct experience, to the


²George Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charby-dis (London, 1907), pp. 87-8, 97, 184, 195, 196, 230, 244; George Tyrrell, The Church and the Future (London, 1910), p. 45; George Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, p. 59; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, p. 138; Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, vii.
immanent activity of the life of will, to the needs and demands of will as the method for the comprehension of truth:—Blondel distinguishes two aspects of all will: a steady flowing, primitive elan and the confusion of the manifold detail of the will's course, the sum of empirical desires within which there is a longing, a felt need, revealing itself in action and known only in activity;¹ Laberthonnière, his disciple, presents it after this fashion: man does attain to a kind of provisional sense of unity and permanence in every act of the moral will; the moral will is the act by which man affirms himself amid the show of things that change and pass alike within and without, by which he constitutes himself through whatever is real and permanent in the phenomenal and impermanent; it is the act to which life can put no term, the act which must continue and deepen so long as man continues and grows:² Bergson declares that life can be


understood only as one original vital impulse, an élan vital which is experienced in its free activity, in its vital movement, by an act of intuition; we may, instead of objectifying ourselves and so bringing ourselves under the spatializing categories of science, change our point of view, unmake that which our practical needs have made, and become immediately aware of that 'duration' wherein we act and wherein our states melt into one another: ¹ James conceives a Reality which exists in our integral experience, of which God, the soul, and the world are indivisible aspects; God and the world are complete ab aeterno outside ourselves, but live and are transformed with us, and with us rise to higher levels of truth and harmony; our thought is an active elevation of reality to a higher form; our personality which is clearly grasped lives in continuity with a more vast, obscure life of which it has direct experience:² Eucken finds life in an active synthesis of the great complexes of human experience through

¹Henri Bergson, Ibid., pp. 11, 237-8.
the unifying power of the personality, reserving its immediate state in the recognition of Spirit as one and the same in all men and in all Nature, and living in a world-life in which the distinction between self and not-self can have no place, at once realizing the sense-world and using it for its own realization\(^1\):--we find Tyrrell accepting and employing their ideas and concepts in his presentation of religious experience.\(^2\)

Moreover, apart from these essential concepts, we find within Tyrrell's thought and works the presence and use of other, more particular, ideas of these philosophers, adaptable in that they were suggestive answers to problems consequent upon similar approaches. Thus, in the endeavor to define the character of experience, to avoid any limitation of the appeal either to thought, moral will, aesthetic feeling, or to irrational desire, sense-perception, blind will,


\(^2\)Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 22, 23, 37-8, 108, 129, 289; Lex Orandi, xviii, xxii, xxix, pp. 8, 15, 22, 87, 89; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 273-4; Essays on Faith and Immortality, pp. 89, 90, 91.
instinct, either to the higher or the lower, Tyrrell declares, as do Blondel, Laberthonnière, and Eucken, that the character of experience must include the whole complex of normal personal experience; that the appeal to experience must be to the direct experience of the whole man.¹ Again, in establishing the place of the past, of tradition, of history, Tyrrell asserts, as do Blondel and Laberthonnière, that tradition and history are insufficient yet necessary, that history is really a psychology of humanity and as such is often a condition for the subsistence of faith though remaining distinct from it;² yet he suggests Eucken, Bergson, James in the power he grants to the living personality with


²K. Gilbert, Ibid., p. 21; L. C. Lewis, Ibid., pp. 35-6; le P. L. Laberthonnière, Introduction to Essais de philosophie religieuse, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi; "le problème religieux," Ibid., pp. 175-8; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 133, 297, 333-4; Lex Orandi, pp. 31, 36, 46, 69; The Church and the Future, pp. 57-8, 63-4, 66, 82-3.
regard to the past.\footnote{Rudolf Eucken, The Truth of Religion (New York, 1913) pp. 545-8; Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 249-50; James, Pragmatism, pp. 63-4, 223, 224, 225; Baron Friedrich von Hügel, "The Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken," Hibbert Journal, pp. 663, 672-3; Tyrrell, Essays on Faith and Immortality, pp. 32, 48, 76, 120, 124, 126; Oil and Wine, pp. 37-8, 40, 297; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 13; Lex Orandi, pp. 11, 121.} In the problem of testing experience, of determining the true and the false, Tyrrell apparently leans heavily upon James declaring true that which works to the benefit of humanity,\footnote{James, Pragmatism, pp. 47, 222; The Will to Believe and other essays (London, 1897), p. 27; Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, pp. 55, 57, 73, 169; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 195; E. McClure, Modern Substitutes for Traditional Christianity (London, 1920), pp. 189-90.} yet checks this inclination by resort to Balfour, Blondel, Eucken in dependence upon the truth behind or within the action.\footnote{Tyrrell, letter quoted by E. Buonaiuti, \textit{le modernisme catholique} (Paris, 1927), p. 146; Blondel, quoted by K. Gilbert, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35; K. Gilbert, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 24, 25, 32; Rudolf Eucken, quoted by Herman, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 99; Rudolf Eucken, \textit{Life's Basis and Life's Ideal} (London, 1912), p. 256-7; Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, pp. 58, 79, 80, 90, 98, 209-10; The Church and the Future, p. 158; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 196-7.} In the problem of individual and social experience, Tyrrell emphasizes, with Blondel and Laberthonnière, the immense, in fact, absolute necessity of intercommunion in actions...
carried out together; yet finds in Eucken and Bergson, and emphasizes more fully, the constant importance of personal opposition.\(^1\) in the problem of nature and experience, Tyrrell acclaims and accepts the immediate and costly dualism of Eucken and Bergson;\(^2\) yet accepts also their synthesis of the one and the other in the realization of the spiritual life.\(^4\) And in the problem of experience and transcendence, Tyrrell leans heavily, again, upon Blondel's and Laberthonnière's


conception of the transcendent as the infinite end of the immanent will.  

Yet, even as Tyrrell was fitting the ideas and conceptions of this philosophy into the framework and movement of his own thought, he was being introduced also to the critical study of the Gospel and of Christian history, to the work of Wernle, Troeltsch, Holtzmann, Schmiedel, to that of Harnack and Bousset, of Loisy and Johannes Weiss; and gradually, chiefly through the reconstructions of Loisy and Weiss, certain of its underlying conclusions were imposed upon his thought, even as its methods confirmed historically the movement of his own faith. However, these conclusions, together with the problem
they raised, never became of primary importance to Tyrrell, as they were to Loisy, but remained an enlightening factor in one aspect of the larger devotional problem which concerned him, determining immediate actions and pain yet not his activity and suffering.¹

The critical reconstruction of the Gospel which Tyrrell accepted was that of the Eschatologists, of that school originally founded in a spirit hostile to Christianity as known in German Protestantism but later modified and revised in a stricter application of the critical method by Johannes Weiss and his followers. According to this view, we find Tyrrell declaring the central determinant of Jesus' action and utterance to be His Christ-consciousness, His awareness of Himself as the apocalyptic Son of Man; that His work on earth was to prepare and hasten the Kingdom, to preach its imminent advent, to close the last chapter of human history with a great human repentance and storming of its gates; that the morality of Jesus was for

¹Vidler, Ibid., pp. 163-4; Lunn, Ibid., p. 150; Loisy, Memoires, III, 159; Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 395, 398.
this life—the passing condition and not the abiding substance of blessedness—representing only the highest dictates of man's purified heart and conscience, colored by the immediate expectation of the end and in measure applicable only to such an expectation; that his imagery of the Kingdom and its advent was simply that of the Jewish apocalypticism.¹ For this conception of the Gospel drew him not only in virtue of its historical sincerity, and sober conservativeness, but also and chiefly in virtue of its confirmation both of Jesus' essential humanity—sharing man's labors, his struggles, his disappointments, his darkness, his ignorance, his sorrows—and of His mystical and sacramental Spirit and significance—no Christ at all in terms of this world but a deluded prophet; Christ only for those who realize an other world, transcendent and supernatural.²

It was of this critical reconstruction of the Gospel, together with the early results


²Petre, Ibid., II, 397-8, 401; Vidler, Ibid., p. 157; Lunn, Ibid., pp. 159-60; Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 269-70.
of historical criticism tracing a continuity and organic growth in Catholic tradition from the New Testament writings to the present, of which Loisy was not slow to take advantage in *L'Evangile et l'Église*, directed against Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* primarily but presenting also a critical reconstruction of Christian history, which Tyrrell accepted. According to this reconstruction we find Tyrrell declaring the hierarchic organization of the Church to be the Christian response to the necessity of its environment, to the demand for unity and authority as over against diversity and individualism, to the demands of life as over against death; its dogmatic forms to be the Christian response to the demands of outward conduct and discussion, to the need of a practical construction of the facts of Christian experience as a means of guiding our feet into the way of peace; its cultus to be the Christian response to the demands of feeling and sense and imagination, to the need of an artistic construction of Christian experience as a means of uniting
men in Christian fellowship.¹ For this conception of the Church, even as the apocalyptic conception of the Gospel, attracted him in virtue of its confirmation both of the Church's essential humanity—at one with mankind's struggles and errors and disappointments, with its sorrows and ignorance—and of its mystical and sacramental Spirit and significance—meaningless in terms of this world but the bearer of salvation unto those who believe in a Kingdom of God transcendent and other.²

However, as Tyrrell accepted these critical reconstructions of the Gospel and of Christian history, as he recognized Jesus as conditioned by His surroundings and His period and the history of Christianity as influenced by the character of human necessities and by the content of human consciousness, he accepted also the historical principles or conclusions underlying these reconstructions: the principles

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of historical unity and diversity. Thus, the Gospel did not enter the world as an unconditioned absolute doctrine, but as a living faith, at once concrete and complex. Thus, it was in the maintenance and preservation of its life subject to the laws of historical growth and change, adapting, adjusting, transforming its embodiment according to its necessities. It was subject as a historical phenomenon to the science of history and master only as it effected historical development. It was approached by humanity or itself approached humanity only in and through the whole of its tradition.¹

Such principles could be accepted only in such a radical application of Newman’s theory of development as Loisy employed, finding the essence of Christianity in an ‘idea’, its expression not in its origin but in its development;² and Tyrrell, in accepting the


²Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 44; Fawkes, Ibid., p. 64; Alfred Loisy, My Duel with the Vatican (New York, 1924), p. 173.
principles of history, faced more immediately and sharply then conflicts of religious faith which concerned his life and those of his fellows. Conflicts.

Over against this philosophy and this criticism, in contradiction and conflict stood Catholic dogma and theology; and in that conflict, from the beginning of his religious experience, George Tyrrell had been engaged,¹ not consciously perhaps nor explicitly, but as one within whose spirit and life the terms and their issues are comprehended. Thus, as in the external contest the terms and issues were clarified and declared, the inward conflict of Tyrrell became conscious and active, seizing now upon this clarification, now upon that declaration, which the external struggle gave to its hand, as a means to its own solution. And consequently, though in measure and perhaps in large measure it created its external definitions actively and independently, it was dependent upon the adequacies of clarification and declaration in the terms

¹Gaut, L'Affaire Tyrrell, p. 27; May, Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement, pp. 9, 12; Tyrrell, letter to Father Martin, included by Petre, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 463; N. Smyth, Passing Protestantism and Coming Catholicism, p. 55.
and issues expressed in the external conflict: these determined the wounds given and received and, perhaps, the character of the remedy, yet neither its application nor the healing in this inward conflict of Tyrrell's spirit, nor yet again its application and the healing in the external conflict which Tyrrell attempted.¹

As the movement of Tyrrell's faith carried him into the Roman Church, it brought him into touch and relation with Catholic dogma and Scholastic theology and science; and quickly it seized upon Scholastic declarations and systematizations as means and weapons in its inner conflict with scepticism.² As Tyrrell understood and employed it, exactly enough as it seems,³ it is presented in the first article entitled "Semper Eadem."⁴ Here, Scholastic theology,


²Petre, The Autobiography and Life ..., II, 51; Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 47.


⁴in Tyrrell's Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 106-32.
regarding the 'deposit of faith' as its principal object, understands by that term a certain body of divine knowledge revealed supernaturally to the Apostles and delivered by them under the form of certain categories, ideas, and images, to their immediate successors. What the apostles saw they recorded and formulated. To their followers they transmitted the record; not the privilege of direct vision.¹ Thus, it becomes all important to preserve, if not the exact words, yet the exact sense and meaning which the record had for the minds of those to whom it was first delivered by the Apostles; to represent to ourselves just what it represented to them. Thus the ideas, categories, and symbols which constitute this representation are of the very substance of the 'deposit of faith'.²

Round this substance, and concerning it, a vast body of doctrine has gathered through the prolonged collective labor of Catholic thought. But this was so only in the measure that Catholic thought had busied itself about the meaning of


²Tyrrell, Ibid., p. 114; Lebreton, Ibid., p. 54.
the 'deposit of faith' and its bearing on other departments of knowledge; about its 'explanation' and its 'application'. By its 'explanation' is to be understood that process of analysis by which what is from the first actually, although confusedly, contained within the limits of the 'deposit of faith', becomes more distinctly and explicitly recognized, through inferences drawn from revealed data. And by 'applications' scholastics mean inferences drawn from the combination of revealed with unrevealed premises; and other adjustments of secular to sacred knowledge. Yet, this was necessary in that every category, idea, and image of the 'deposit of faith' is either philosophical or historical and implies a whole system of philosophy and an affirmation or denial of the whole of history threatened ceaselessly by obliteration in the changes and developments of secular knowledge. Thus, scholastic theology has always and consistently fought tooth and nail for those philosophical categories and historical beliefs which it conceives to be involved in the very

1Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 117, 118; Loisy, My Duel with the Vatican, pp. 68-70; H. G. Hughes, "Catholic and Modernist Theories of Development" American Catholic Quarterly, XXXVIII (June, 1913), pp. 390-1.
substance of the 'deposit of faith', in which the faith has been forever enshrined.\textsuperscript{1} Moreover, though the logical development of this accumulating body of deductions is largely the work of theological inquiry and reflection applied to the deposit of faith in its relation to the rest of knowledge, yet the justice of such developments is ultimately determined by the infallible criterion of the Church's authority—a criterion as manifestly supernatural as is the 'deposit of faith' itself; and scholastic theology consistently teaches that the value of such infallible decisions is not causally dependent on the theological reasonings on which they are based, and by which they are occasioned but that they are in some sense prophetic, from above.\textsuperscript{2}

However, not only did the coarse psychology of Scholasticism with its magic-lantern or photographic-camera categories explaining intellect and its scale and weights view of the will and its motives prove indigestible, but also the


\textsuperscript{2}Tyrrell, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 120-1; Loisy, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 68-70.
development of its principles—impregnated with such psychology—seeking clear answers to eternal questions on the suppositions that they can be comprehended and by reason, provoked only increasing trials of faith.¹ And these trials were not eased by spiritual directors valuing human acts externally as separate entities apart from their living context in the personality and applying a correction according to pre-determined rules rather than individually.² Thus, the development of the divine attribute of Justice seeking a clear explication of its nature brings us to the doctrine of hell which tries more definitely our faith in God's goodness. And this is corrected only by a still more definite and material conception of hell.³

Nor was this true for him alone. For both as a pastoral confessor and as professor he was forced to temper and qualify the rigid narrowness and definiteness of Scholastic rationalism for others in order to keep them in good faith,


²M. D. Petre, The Soul's Orbit (London, 1904), p. 12; Tyrrell, Ibid., I, 239, 248, 159-60, 161; II, 63: Petre

to free them from tormenting ideas which made exorbitant demands, to lead them into an active religious life of love in relation to their fellow men.\(^1\) And this necessity, more than his own suffering, caused Tyrrell to recognize that Scholasticism had

"no room for such conceptions as spirit and life since it explains these higher things—thought, will, love, action—mechanically and artificially, in the terms of those that are lower...,"

that it was

"too opaque a medium to admit the full light and beauty of Christianity to shine upon the eyes of those who think and speak in terms of experience higher than those of the workshop..."\(^2\)

Yet, for a time, Tyrrell maintained a hope in Neo-Thomism ('Aquinas his own interpreter'), since, in the inspiration of an early professor, he had become intensely interested in it and had pursued his studies through the years, encouraged in the fact, as he wrote to Baron von Hugel:

"that Aquinas represents a far less developed theology than that of the later schoolmen, and by going back to him, one escapes from many of the superstructures of his more narrow-minded successors, and


thus gets liberty to unravel and reconstruct on more sympathetic lines..."1

But inasmuch as it was impregnated with the same psychology and physics inseparable from its metaphysics and in that it was opposed by the whole spirit of the Jesuit schools living on the theology of a past age and desiring repetition of conclusions and methods, limiting strictly any judgment of foundations or reality,2 it could not meet the needs of life, it could not realize the greatest religious faith and action.

It was in this consciousness of inadequacy that Tyrrell came to consider origins, that he realized how here too the materialistic prepossessions of Scholasticism had conceived a complete separateness and independence of cause and effect, of creator and creation and had built upon it an unreal supernaturalism based upon the intervention of the divine cause in its created effects, that he perceived here, also, something of limitation and bondage.3

1Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 45, 44, 42.

2M. Ward, Ibid., II, 18, 20, 22, 28, 30, 35; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 54-5; The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, I, 251-2, 268, 271; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 121; May, Ibid., pp. 120, 163.

3Tyrrell, A Much-abused Letter, pp. 48-9; The Church and the Future, pp. 16, 17, 19, 28, 163-4.
It was in this spirit, too, that he faced the developments of modern science and philosophy undermining the supports and conclusions of Scholasticism, that he perceived its accomplishments in the sphere of practical action, that he began to realize that reason, in its own powers, is not adequate to express faith. And so—in the evidences of Christian bondage, in its limitations in activity, its handicap on the battlefield, its wounds and nakedness and poverty in weakness, its confinement and restraint in success—we see the growing evidence of Tyrrell's anti-intellectualism.

Yet, Tyrrell received under the influence of Scholasticism much of positive value in his mental development. For his reflective powers, keen by nature, yet by former habit undisciplined, received a power of order and method, a real faculty of logic and definition, fully evident in his writings. And these powers were directed, through the apprehension of the main outlines and chief prominences of the world of spiritual and intelligible realities, to the quest for a complete and harmonious system of thought.¹

¹Tyrrell, The Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, I, 270-1; M. D. Petre, Ibid., II, 45, 61.
A second conflict of Tyrrell's life, and one related to the first, was that between Ultramontanism on one hand and, not private judgment but, moral and spiritual judgment on the other. Consequently it was also inward and personal by nature, yet not so immediately a part of his religious experience, save as it was implicitly contained in Tyrrell's fundamental search for a principle of authority. Rather it was created as he came into external contact with Ultramontanism in the Roman Church and, more particularly, in the Jesuit Society. Here, in the direct and indirect consequences of Ultramontanism, in its absolutism and despotism, the moral and spiritual judgment of Tyrrell was goaded into revolt, into open warfare; and a character was imposed upon this aspect of his thought by the exigencies and tribulations of war.

The dogma of papal infallibility, as Tyrrell understood it, was merely the logical con-

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1M. D. Petre, Ibid., II, 71; Henri Bremond, quoted from funeral discourse, Petre, Ibid., II, 443; Rivière, Ibid., pp. 194-5; May, Ibid., p. 61.

2Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 288, 165; Petre, Ibid., II, 292; Loisy, Memoires, III, 139; May, Ibid., p. 191: letter of Tyrrell.

sequence of that official theory which regarded the guardianship of the 'deposit of faith' to have been delivered to St. Linus and the episcopate united with him by Christ and His apostles, creating the distinction between the teaching church and the church taught. As Christ stood outside, over, and above His disciples—as a shepherd over his flock,—and as they were purely passive and receptive of His teaching and guidance, so the teaching Church, the Pope and the Episcopate, is related to the Church taught. Thus, not the whole Church but a portion of it becomes the organ of the Spirit who bears witness to the revelation of Jesus Christ.¹ And from this conception of the relation of the bishop to his diocese—in which his teaching is regarded as coming from his own mind working upon the 'deposit' and is accepted in virtue of a personal supernatural grace—the relation of the Pope to his bishops, analogous as it was, was sure to be interpreted. Thus, the Pope becomes the external head of the Church in regard to whose functions the Church

taught is passive and receptive. The Pope, and
the Pope alone, holds the guardianship of the
'deposit' and declares infallibly with regard
to it under the guidance of the Spirit.¹

However, it was rather in its practical
implications and consequences that Tyrrell found
it difficult, as it was interpreted and applied
within the Jesuit Society. For the obedience
demanded by the Society—not merely outward
practical obedience but also inward speculative
assent grounded in this supernatural infalli-
bility²—was productive not only of mental me-
chanics but of the paralysis of conscience, the
destruction of spiritual sympathy and accord,
the crushing of personality, the distrust of
any ascendancy of mind and character, the dis-
couragement of friendships and confidences, the
increase of coercion, legislation, espionage,
protection, the cultivation of religious senti-
mentalism.³ And these, as he saw their evidence
in others and felt their pressure upon himself,
brought him to realize that here was "authority

¹Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, pp. 30-1; Medievalism (London, 1908), p. 58.
³Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 490, 478, 479, 481, 482, 487, 489.
misinterpreted as the contempt of liberty."¹

Yet, for a time, Tyrrell was kept from this realization by the ideal of Jesuitism inspired in him by his early reading of the histories of the Society,² and by his steady conviction that the conception of Ignatius Loyola had been that of an Order whose first principle should be elasticity and accommodation; whose rules were to be valued as mere exemplary applications of the spirit that made them, and might unmake or remake them.³ But gradually he came to see that Loyola never attained to a perfect inward consistency but strove to combine with the principles of his originality others derived by tradition and education from Spain of the sixteenth century;⁴ and that, as his original principles became inapplicable to masses of men and artificially forced vocations,⁵ these others of despotic Spain had survived as the spirit of the Society.⁶

²Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 463, 474.
³Ibid., II, 463, 475.
⁴Ibid., II, 475.
⁵Ibid., II, 476-7; I, 197-8.
⁶Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 475.
In this awareness of Jesuit authority, Tyrrell was driven in moral and spiritual revolt to publish and yet conceal in publishing the needs and the resistance of the moral and mystical character, to avoid a relentless espionage and suppression by 'the wavering line' and anonymity. Moreover, it is probable that the consciousness of this authority with its leaning upon the transcendent and supernatural caused Tyrrell to neglect or suppress in an immediate need that emphasis upon the transcendent which is so apparent in his last book.

Yet, it has been suggested also that, during that period when Tyrrell's spirit was eager to claim no sort of privilege or immunity, there was gain in this submission to authority, in these fetters imposed from without but accepted from within, a gain in the freedom that is known when one has endured bondage.

1P. Gardner, Modernism in the English Church (New York, 1926), p. 49.


4Petre, Ibid., II, 52.
A third conflict of Tyrrell's life, and one, again, related to the first, was that between Liberal Protestantism on one hand and Catholic Modernism on the other;¹ for as each faced the problem of faith and knowledge they came into conflict in the field of apologetics. And here, in the unhistorical development of Harnack, in the naturalistic and individualistic symbolo-fideism of Sabatier, in the puritanical righteousness of Matthew Arnold, the catholic and mystical nature of Tyrrell rose in protest;² and placed an emphasis upon these aspects of his thought which rendered it liable to distortion.³

To Harnack, who separates the kernel from the husk, the essence of the Gospel is ethical. The message of Jesus is of the Fatherhood of God.

¹H. R. Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, pp. 186-7; Vidler, Ibid., pp. 161-2; Lunn, Ibid., pp. 159-60.


God and the brotherhood of man; the Kingdom is that of righteousness, to be established here on earth, in Him and through Him; salvation is from evil and misery: this is the conscious Sonship and Messiahship of Jesus.¹

Of course, He was, to some extent, of His time. He believed in miracles, in diabolic possession, in the immediate end of the world; and much of his ethics, colored by that belief, was the ethics of a crisis. But these were only accidental and incidental to His central idea.² However, this righteousness of Christ was obscured by the Church: Greek intellectualism made it a Creed for the learned; paganism made it a system for the mechanical transmission of grace; imperialism made it a system of government. And it is only by going back to Jesus that the Gospel is re-discovered.³

In the liberal theology of Sabatier, God is known in His evidences in Nature and in the

¹Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 39-40; Quick, Ibid., pp. 9-10; A. Harnack, What is Christianity (New York, 1901), pp. 67, 68, 75-6, 77, 78.


universal religious experiences of mankind which are accessible to all, at all times and by which all theories and doctrines as to the origin, nature, and end of these experiences can be experimentally tested. Of course, tradition is requisite for the development of this theology but the doctrines of tradition do not stand firm and unchanged. Rather, those of each age are supplanted and discarded by those of the next. Again, the collective mind of a society, the public mind is recognized as the arena in which religious truth must be elaborated and developed, as in measure the rule for the individual mind; but this simply as a consequence of purely natural laws that more or less govern fallibly the development of the human mind, and apart from any belief in supernatural and infallible guidance. And Christianity, though usually viewed as the so far highest and fullest development of the religious spirit, is but one of many revelations that have been and may yet be.¹

Matthew Arnold, in his Literature and Dogma, recognizing the inadequate, analogous, and non-

scientific character of religious affirmations, and rejecting the theoretical and speculative approach of reason, finds that religion is primarily concerned with conduct, life, experience, that it is, or may be described as, morality touched by emotion, and that this righteousness tendeth to life. God is the not-ourselves that makes for righteousness and all else is superstition, human tradition or practice.\(^1\)

But Tyrrell saw that Harnack had not explained satisfactorily the sudden and immediate loss of the Gospel in the first century of Christian history nor had he explained its identity with all the highest principles and aspirations which belonged to the modern age, the principles which would insure the progress of civilization,\(^2\) that Sabatier had in measure violated the psychology of the individual and of the multitude and had placed his trust in a continuous evolution,\(^3\) that Arnold, in his own approach to religion, had failed to apprehend its full content;\(^4\) and in that realization, Tyrrell

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\(^3\)Tyrrell, *The Church and the Future*, p. 57; *Christianity at the Cross-roads*, p. 136, 89, 69; *Essays on Faith and Immortality*, p. 74.

emphasized Catholicism to the point of obsession, yet not the Catholicism of the Western councils of Trent and the Vatican; rather that catholicism which was of all humanity because it was of Christ Jesus, that catholicism which was the possessor of His Spirit, human, fallible, imperfect, in need of correction and criticism according to the flesh and yet the sacramental body of His grace.¹ And in it, for it, by it he lived, cut off from that which he regarded as its true body, yet refusing to go into schism, denying with all his strength and his suffering the divisive tendency of Protestantism.² Again, as he emphasized Catholicism, so he emphasized the transcendent and supernatural in Christianity, depreciating the moral teaching upon which Liberal Protestantism laid such exclusive stress and that earthly Kingdom which they would build, declaring the uniqueness of Jesus' revelation to lie in His Spiritual otherness—lest mankind become bankrupt.³


³Tyrrell, letters in Petre, Ibid., II, 398-400.
CHAPTER II

Tyrrell's Religious Philosophy

Moderate Agnosticism.

Tyrrell himself described the due sense of the limitation of our mind by this and the like term, temperate agnosticism, and consequently it seems proper to use it; but it becomes even more appropriate as we realize how aptly it describes his conclusions regarding our capacities for the knowledge of ultimate reality. For certainly Tyrrell found faith and agnosticism traveling the same path and their reconciliation to lie in a deeper agnosticism, a truer agnosticism as well as a deeper and truer faith. But certainly, too, there was no sympathy in his spirit for that narrower agnosticism which retains a secret vein of positiveness, which resents the darkness in which ultimate truths are shrouded as indicating a radical crookedness in the nature of things.

Undoubtedly this deeper agnosticism sprang

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1Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., II, 121; Tyrrell, Ibid., II, 123-4; Letter written to the Times by Tyrrell, Sept. 30, 1907.


4Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 56-7.
from Tyrrell's sense of reality, from the inadequacy of the human intellect and its reasoning powers in satisfying that sense, from his love of humanity, seeking and caring only for men's salvation. For it was a primary experience of Tyrrell's personality to know an intellectual insecurity, a dullness and emptiness, a hesitation and fear, in every intellectual position, more particularly as such positions were taken with regard to God and the life of religion. And it was characteristic of his love for all of humanity to go forth willingly into tractless wastes and unknown dangers in search of that way and truth which should insure the fruitfulness of their destiny.

But it formulates and expressed itself in relation to and in the development of the subjective aspects of life and knowledge. In the

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1Rivière, Ibid., pp. 193-4; Lunn, Ibid., pp. 144-6; Petre, Ibid., II, 9; Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 94.

2Tyrrell, The Autobiography and Life..., I, 116, 201, 226; II, 10; Tyrrell, quoted in Petre, von Hugel and Tyrrell, pp. 117, 155; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, pp. 156-7, 26-7, 158-9; Lunn, Ibid., p. 148; May, Ibid., pp. 19, 149-50, 152, 162, 163; Tyrrell, Essays..., p. 143.


4Rivière, Ibid., pp. 193-4; Vidler, Ibid., pp. 159-60; Leclerc, Ibid., pp. 190-1; T. J. Hardy, Modernism (Bournemouth, 1915), pp. 24-5.
consideration of critical epistemological studies he came to recognize a subjective element in all of our perceptions, not only sensual but rational, aesthetic, and moral as well;\(^1\) a subjective element which might well be expressed in the words, 'men do not care to know, nay, they do not and cannot even see, what in no way affects them or can affect them.'\(^2\) Yet, while this subjective element was hostile to that realism which strove to exclude every sort of subjective contribution from the interpretation and presentment of Nature and of God in the hope of getting at them as they are in themselves and out of all relation to man, it was no less hostile to the subjectivism that would find the only reality in the soul of man and would value the objective world merely in relation to man, his feelings and activities.\(^3\)

It was a subjective element characteristic of and inseparable from all of phenomenal life, yet suggestive of an absolute Real behind, above,


\(^2\)Tyrrell, *The Church and the Future*, p. 88.

\(^3\)Tyrrell, *Essays...*, pp. 90-1; Petre, *George Tyrrell's Letters*, p. 32.
beyond, and permeating the endless series and
grades of relative worth and reality; of an
ultimate Whole in which they are included and
explained.¹

Moreover, it anticipated in experience the
realism and objectivity which are the premises
of logical inference, the separateness and mechanical relationships which are requisite to uniformity and law. These were, in fact, only the products of reflection upon experience, abstractions from a more primitive concreteness, created in the human need for some map and guide in the interpretation of the present,² and finding truth essentially in that there is a real objectivity in the Absolute³ but practically in their adherence to the facts of experience.⁴

Thus reason, as a reflection upon experience,

¹Tyrrell, Essays..., pp. 91, 93, 98-9, 135; Lex Orandi, pp. 8, 28-9; The Autobiography and Life..., II, 413-4; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 371, 376, 377.


³Egerton, Ibid., p. 43; Tyrrell, Ibid., p. 85; Essays..., p. 132; Lex Orandi, p. 79; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 194-5, 197.

⁴Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 96, 105, 196, 199; Essays..., pp. 32, 137.
is unable to rise beyond the phenomenal, to comprehend that which transcends the facts of experience. Its proper realm is and remains the world of the outer senses common to us all; in which our natural life is lived; which is our medium of inter-communication, the basis of our language and symbolism.¹ Insofar as uniformity exists, it enables us to go by inference beyond the range of actual experience; yet as its actual experience does not and cannot hope to comprehend the entire mechanism of Nature its hypotheses remain inadequate, finding value only as they unify and comprehend more and more of previous irregularities, as they provide a surer guide to experience.² Thus, we cannot draw ideas from ideas, we cannot infer from our inferences, yet within its proper realm reason is an instrument of life and action necessary to their maintenance and advancement.³

Again, in dealing with the spiritual and

¹Pascendi Gregis--Programme of Modernism (London, 1908), pp. 181-2; Petre, The Soul's Orbit, p. 49; Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, pp. 74, 81, 82; Oil and Wine, p. 59; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 164, 166, 281; Lex Orandi, p. 87.

²Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, pp. 81, 82; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 86, 87, 88, 179-80; Essays..., pp. 129, 132, 44-5; Oil and Wine, p. 150.

³Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 10, 131-2, 137, 81; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 96, 97-8, 175-6, 204-5; The Church and the Future, p. 47.
supernatural world of God and religion, reason is at a further disadvantage, for it is dealing only with that experience of the supernatural which may be expressed in the terms of the natural and after the manner that it finds such expression.¹ And this expression is but the reaction, spontaneous or reflex, of the human mind to God's touch felt within the heart, characterized wholly by the ideas, forms and images wherewith the mind is stocked in each particular case.² These ideas, so far as they preclude from all sensible determinations of being and deal with the merest outline and empty framework of thought, may have some literal value in the supersensible world. Wisdom, justice, truth, and the like may be used in conceiving that world as well as this. Yet such are, by the necessity of their character, the most barren and shadowy of all ideas in this world.³ And it is only in those forms and images which belong to this creation that the supernatural world acquires flesh and color for us. However,

¹Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 88, 89, 177; Essays..., pp. 4, 8, 49, 107; Oil and Wine, p. 59.

²Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 208-9; Essays..., p. 47.

³Tyrrell, Ibid., p. 89; Lex Orandi, p. 26; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 89, 90; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 203-4.
these forms and images of this world can but express the truths of the supernatural world in mysterious fashion, in expressions which can be understood only in two or more complementary but partly contradictory statements. Thus, predestination and free will, the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation, stand as presentations of contradictory statements held side by side in the mind, revealing the truths of the supernatural not in themselves but indefinably between themselves.¹

Not only, then, is reason inadequate through defect of evidence in the natural order and through defect of vision in the supernatural order; but also, because of these defects, it is subject to the handicaps of bias and error both in experience and in its reflection upon experience.² In experience of the supernatural there is the bias of Faith and Hope impatient to find that Ideal or object in which their satisfaction will be complete: they interpret the kingdom of God as near; believe that what, according to their limited outlook upon history and nature, ought to be, already is; that what ought to have been, actually was; they narrow up prematurely to an apex the slowly convergent

¹Tyrrell, Essays..., p. 4, 19, 139, 164; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 91-3, 97, 177, 178, 184-5; Medievalism, p. 157; The Church and the Future, p. 104.

²Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 177-185; Medievalism, pp. 149, 150.
lines of God's providence; and find the fullness of His scheme in the brief pages of our recorded history. They see facts but facts transfigured and rearranged so as to bring out the underlying meaning of the whole process.\(^1\) Also, there is acting upon experience the narrowing force of materialism, the finite self seeking to confine it to its own limitations, conserving without discrimination prophecy and superstition, creating out of itself beliefs and devotions of religious decadence, resisting with all its strength the demands of the spirit even as it mantles in increasing measure the spirit's expressions with the contradictory and deadening materialism of the letter.\(^2\)

In reflection upon experience, there is the bias of the understanding, striving to reduce all experience to the categories of a single systematization, to attain a clarity and adequacy to reality in which it would possess complete knowledge,

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to free itself from the criticism of experience and establish itself as the absolute and independent expression of truth. Its tendency is to twist and warp experience by omissions and rearrangements, and even by fictitious additions, into agreement with the schemes, hypotheses, and categories of its predilection; to make ridiculous and to degrade the beliefs of devotion; to deepen men's belief in an all-pervading determinism of the physical world; to petrify and sterilize both itself and experience.¹

Moreover, not only is human understanding and knowledge confined to phenomena and the limitations of phenomena, not only is human experience bound by an infinite relativity and mystery in its relations to the supernatural, but such limitations and relativity are constant and characteristic. As we establish a truth, we sow a new error; as we uproot error, we tear up with it truth. The effort to live and express an infinite and eternal life under the conditions of a temporal and finite life is inherently absurd and self-contradictory; the goal is not only unattainable

¹Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 92-3, 100, 180-1, 187, 210, 224-5, 235, 236, 362, 237; Essays..., pp. 6-7, 82; Lex Credendi, p. 17.
but unthinkable. For the eternal is not reached by any relative victory over time however great; nor is the infinite a piling up and fusion of finitudes. All God's works perish from the least to the greatest while He alone abides and works eternally; all Nature is subject to the sway of sad mortality. And we, in the apprehension of Faith, struggle valiantly toward a clarity of vision and consciousness which is impossible for our humanity.\(^1\)

Yet, within these forms and images of finiteness, within the relativity of our human minds, there is a revelation of the supernatural, a presentation of Reality. God reveals Himself to us in an inward experience as a cause reveals itself in its effects or a power in its works. And in that experience, according to our capacity for apprehension, He impresses upon us certain forms and images, certain sentiments and impulses as permeated by His Spirit, as a part of an ultimate Whole which is at the same time infinitely beyond, above, behind them. These, perhaps, are not a divine expression of the Spirit of God, nor even an

exact expression of matters of fact; but as shaped and presented in our inward experience of God they are and remain an inadequate, yet direct and practical expression of God in relation to ourselves.¹

The Religious Sense

This revelation of the supernatural, however, cannot be apprehended by the faculty of reason, as reason is confined within the field of phenomena and this presentation of reality is knowable only as a cause is known in its effects. Such a different sort of existence demands a different faculty of apprehension, a faculty capable of penetrating to the mysterious meanings of religious facts, capable of re-creating the affective and impulsive elements of the inward experience of which these religious facts are but a part.²

This faculty must be a capacity of enlightenment in us, which if it does not absolutely demand revelation is at least susceptible of it and porportioned to it. It must be a response


²Programme of Modernism, pp. 80, 139; Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 305; Lex Credendi, p. 13; Essays..., p. 138; The Church and the Future, pp. 90-1; J. M. Salter, Ibid., p. 27.
of spirit to spirit, appropriating the word of God, recognizing it as its own, as the explanation of itself, and imposing it imperiously and absolutely. For were it not sprung from the depths of our being where the spirit is rooted in God, it could not recognize the revelation of God.\(^1\)

Thus, in the revelation of the supernatural, we find at hand within ourselves a power of recognition and appropriation which is at once vision, feeling, impulse, for there is not a consciousness of the spirit in which these do not interpenetrate; yet which manifests itself more largely as a liking and impulse or as a dislike and repulse, dissatisfied and demanding.\(^2\) It is not, however, a blind power but is charged with an implicit reason: its determining perceptions and experiences are too infinitely complex to admit of any sort of analysis. When used as the equivalent of the whole personality, it may best be described as that abiding massive sentiment or state of feeling which is determined by the totality of our experience,

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\(^1\)Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 143, 276, 304, 305; Pascendi Gregis—Programme of Modernism, pp. 185-6; Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, xxvii-xxx; The Church and the Future, pp. 72, 127; Programme of Modernism, pp. 118, 125.

\(^2\)Tyrrell, Lex Credendi, p. 16; Lex Orandi, xiii, xvi-xviii; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 169, 282, 287; The Church and the Future, p. 48; Letters ..., p. 46.
past and present, forgotten and conscious. ¹ Tyrrell commonly referred to it as a sense, defining that term both as meaning 'the consciousness of certain realities to which we have to adapt our conduct, of certain feelings and intuitions with regard to the same,' ² and to express its intuitive immediacy, to distinguish it from any formal conception or inference of the understanding. ³

Within the higher strivings of this sense, there may usefully be distinguished moral, aesthetic, and intellectual aspects or senses, apprehensions of righteousness, truth, beauty as realities to which we must adapt our conduct and with regard to which we have certain feelings and intuitions. Yet neither these nor their sum present a direct awareness of, a felt relation to, God. But in relation to them we do discover an eternal discontent and disappointment. Beyond every achievement there are ends to be achieved; beyond every ideal there are further ideals. And not only is


²Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, xxiii.

³Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, p. 75.
there no ending, no attainment of that full reality in which we may rest, but also there is failure, constant and inescapable. Truth, beauty, righteousness, happiness are in conflict in our life; and he who applies himself to these ideals as his ultimate aim is shattered and broken.¹

This dissatisfaction with the ideal and with all future ideals by anticipation suggests a higher power of recognition and appropriation within man which must seek its object elsewhere. That we are capable of such a judgment is suggestive of the possibility that we possess within us, as a standard and criterion, a certain obscure consciousness of the Infinite, of the Absolutely Real. For it is with their finiteness, their relativity, that we are dissatisfied and discontented.² Moreover, this obscure consciousness of the Infinite explicates itself as a sense that the world of our clear perception and competent action is but part of a whole; that it is not self-explanatory; that its ends are worthless except as subordinate to further ends which we cannot formulate so

¹Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, ix-xiv; Essays..., pp. 56-7; Oil and Wine, p. 22; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 160.

²Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, xv-xvii; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 160, 163.
clearly; that is governed by some secret universal power for some secret universal end and that we understand just the middle of the matter. And it is only in dynamic union and harmony with this whole, with its power and end, that man feels secure on the ocean of existence, that he has a sense of permanence, of reality, of significance.¹

Though this sense of the whole as over against the part, of the Infinite as over against the finite, explicates itself through, over, and behind our aesthetic and scientific, as well as our moral senses, practically it appears most quickly and most often in relation to the moral sense, for it is the word-sense alone whose claims are limitless, which demands of a man a complete sacrifice of himself and his own interests, which declares that the destruction of the universe is a lesser order of evil than the violation of right. And this absoluteness implies most clearly that there is a Being, a Will, compared with which the being or reality of our universe and our finite selves is as nothing.² Thus, we may regard the moral impulse and the mystical impulse as two closely related factors of man's spiritual constitution which

¹Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 161, 272, 273-4; Essays..., p. 135; Hardy, Ibid., p. 43.

²Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, pp. 13, 15; Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 3, 6, 9, 94, 41-2; Lex Orandi, xxiii-xxvi.
together constitute his religious sense.¹

This religious sense manifests itself positively as well as negatively, not only as an eternal discontent and disappointment but as a feeling of inexplicable hunger, as an attraction toward, as a love of, that Absolute and Eternal which is at once the source and end of all our action. It does not merely accept that which seems true or right, but determines what is true and right, seeks and finds Reality.² But it is only by experiment, by groping, by trying this or that suggestion of reason or tradition that it finds what it wants, what explains and satisfies its restless discontent and hunger. It leaps forward at times by an act of eager recognition to grasp its own; but it is rather critical and selective of the materials offered to it than constructive and initiative, it works negatively and preferentially rather than by way of final affirmation.³


²Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 177, 189, 276-7; Lex Orandi, xvii-xviii.

³Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 172, 205, 277; Essays..., pp. 76, 121; Lex Orandi, pp. 53-4, 203.
However, it may be plausibly contended that this eternal quest or the absolute life is the secret root, not only of that upward movement of the soul and its labors for riches not yet clearly conceivable, but also of that by which she spreads out in all directions over the plane of the earth and heaps up those riches of experience which are within the grasp of her present modes of conception and action. ¹ Certainly, the religious sense puts our inventive imagination and reason into play, with a success conditioned by the purity and intensity of the sense, on the one side, and, on the other, by the native vigor and the cultivation of the said faculties of invention and hypothesis. Such invention, consists in a re-arrangement of the world in accordance with desire, and yet in such a way as not to conflict with established and accepted truth, but simply to interpret doubts and uncertainties in a manner favorable to our longing. ² And upon these materials which reason and imagination make manifest to our minds, the religious sense exercises a selective criticism, weaving them into the texture

¹Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 168-9; The Church and the Future, p. 38.

²Tyrrell, Essays..., p. 120; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 279.
of its own experience. Indeed, it may be safely said that without this apprehension of the imaginative reason men could not deal with the apprehensions of the religious sense at all; that it is given to them in and along with the experience, and it is a necessary instrument for the further control of that experience. Yet we must remember that it is composed of images and figures as it shares the experience of supernatural apprehension, and not of concepts; that it is a passive impression, and not an active expression of truth.  

It must be remembered, also, with regard to the religious sense that it is capable both of conservative and creative apprehensions of Reality according to the purity and intensity of its being; that the normal and universal experiences of the moral and mystical life as well as its transforming and heightening experiences impress themselves upon us as revelations of God and the supernatural world; and that its conservative apprehension is a perennial phenomenon which obtains in every soul that is religiously alive and active while its creative consciousness is the privilege of a very few.

1 Tyrrell, Essays..., p. 121; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 280, 278, 279, 287-8; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 111.

2 Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 182-3, 280-1, 292; The Church and the Future, pp. 77, 131.
Again, the religious sense is not only the last aspect of our spiritual sense to explicate itself, but also it is inconstant thereafter. We do not live constantly in the presence of the Absolute; we do not feel continuously the dissatisfactions and attractions of a love for Him.

Rather much of our life is lived in a world of habit, of animal instinct and reason, wherein we yield ourselves to the patterns of a determinism. We do not adjust ourselves but allow ourselves to be adjusted to it. And it is not a world of the religious life, for in it exist the deposits of countless actions which were not determined explicitly or implicitly in predominant measure by the religious sense. And yet we are not spiritually dead, for sleep is not death, and this is sleep which every man needs. We are not capable of continuous aliveness; we are finite and temporal spirits. And this is part of our finitude.¹

Thus, many of us scarce rise from that plane of spiritual sleep; others awake to a dim and confused awareness at varied moments; and the

¹Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 16-17, 260-262; Lex Credendi, p. 69; Essays..., p. 121; External Religion (London, 1899), pp. 42-3, 107; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 31, 221; Petre, George Tyrrell's Letters, p. 30.
few are creative and alive in diverse degree and make those transformations and developments of our spiritual life in which the whole world of our spiritual reality is transformed. Yet, the world of the human spirit is never entirely given over to sleep. The religious sense does not disappear but remains alive and moving in the varied few who are its guardians, being passed as a torch from hand to hand.¹

The Character of Reality

Though we have presented the religious sense under a separate heading as the faculty of our religious apprehension, it must not be forgotten that, in Tyrrell's thought, it reveals and impresses in itself the chief and governing aspect of Reality, that only so does it possess its validity in the apprehension of Reality. The infinite and eternal life is thus revealed as primarily the life of the infinite Subject, in which such distinctions as subject and object no longer obtain, of a Spirit whose knowledge and power and action and life realize that victory over limits towards which we in our life approximate ever more closely

¹Petre, Ibid., p. 235; Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 22, 179, 263-4; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 305-7; Essays..., pp. 74, 101-2; Lex Orandi, pp. 27-30; The Church and the Future, pp. 66-7.
in the feeling, thought, love, will, action, born of our moral and mystical needs and valued for what they together are in themselves and not primarily for what they may effect outside themselves.¹

In relation to the manifestation of this Infinite Life, Tyrrell was impressed by the current assumption of the practical character of such spiritual consciousness, according to which any creature is automatic, insentient, unconscious, as far as it is passively determined by the forces of physical Nature and forms part of her universal mechanism; it is perceptive and conscious as far as it possesses any true activity, any power of self-government and self-adjustment, any power of opposing itself to and controlling the mechanism of physical Nature.² And in that impression he noted that 'our dreams or dreamy states, in which we are to a great extent passive, are marked by a sense of unreality,'³ that our hours given

¹Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 158-9, 162-3, 189, 271, 273, 286; Essays..., pp. 4, 184; Lex Orandi, pp. 25, 51; Oliver Chase Quick, Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition (London, 1922) p. 110.

²Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 157-8, 194; Essays..., p. 178.

³Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, p. 8.
over to the claims of habit, routine, mechanical obedience are shadowy and incoherent; while those moments when we actively oppose such determinism and freely choose are marked by a reality which is undoubted and unshadowed. And he noted, also, that consciousness concerns itself with the renewing and extension of itself, that it gives itself to habitual unconsciousness only as a means of fuller life and activity. And from this and other evidence he concluded that the spirit which acts and wills is alone felt to be real in the full sense, that the reality which man knows is a reality of action, a will-certainty.

More than this, Tyrrell asserts the primacy of willing and acting as a characteristic of Reality. 'It is in our action, and as acting that we know ourselves; we cannot go behind it in thought, or compare it to anything else, or classify it among the contents of our understanding.'

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1 Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, p. 8; Essays..., pp. 93, 178; Oil and Wine, p. 23.
2 Tyrrell, Essays..., p. 178; Oil and Wine, p. 22; Through Sevilla and Charybdis, pp. 158-9, 175.
3 Tyrrell, Oil and Wine, pp. 37-8, 50-1, 133; Essays..., pp. 91-2; Lex Orandi, pp. 8, 11; Lex Credendi, p. 40; ...Letters, p. 19; The Church and the Future, p. 41.
4 Lex Orandi, p. 89.
Our 'free action is better and earlier known to us than anything else and is presupposed to all possibility of further knowledge.'\(^1\) 'It is through acting blindly and instinctively that we come, by experiment, to have any notions of the world at all; and it is similarly by acting instinctively and on hazard that we are able to extend such notions and develop them.'\(^2\)

Thus, in our action we not only know ourselves but we constitute ourselves. Each single willing leaves as its deposit a will-attitude, and it is by the totality of these will-attitudes converging in their influence upon our present willing that we are determined; yet each willing changes the character of the whole will-attitude and has its place in deciding the quality of our reality. And life consists in the very transition from lower to higher; in forgetting what is behind and in reaching out to what is before; in a movement and not in a state; in valuing this spiritual action as an end in itself.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Lex Orandi, p. 89.

\(^2\)Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, p. 45.

\(^3\)Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, p. 11, 89; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 159, 164-5; Oil and Wine, pp. 209, 295, 297; ...Letters, p. 226.
Further, as we are not isolated willings but members of a will-world, we share in a more comprehensive activity. Since no living will is ever at rest, each modifies and dissolves itself into something new in response to its necessary needs and ends; each changes its attitude with regard to all the rest, as moment by moment the shifting situation demands a new response.¹

This activity, however, finds its ends in two definite directions; in an outwardness which requires an extension of its capacities to the remote reaches of the present plane upon which its faculties are perfectly at home; in an upwardness which requires a continuing elevation of its capacities towards the infinite heights of an eternal plane upon which its faculties are inadequate and incoherent, though dimly suggestive.² And it moves successfully toward either one, broadly speaking, only as it moves also toward the other. For in its movement towards the eternal plane, toward an eternal here and now, omnipotence and omniscience, and one all-embracing act, it must move

¹Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, pp. 11-2, 22; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 110; Oil and Wine, pp. 323, 325-6.

²Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 160, 33.
under the conditions of the here and there, the past and the future, knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability, action and stillness, to the height of our present capacities; and must tremble between the chasms of absurdity and superstition as it weaves from one extreme to the opposite.2

This activity of life, moreover, is evidenced in the material and mechanistic aspect of reality, in that aspect which is characterized by habits, laws, customs, institutions. Here, general and abiding changes of circumstances, and the progressive enrichment of individual and public life by accumulating experience demand a continual formation of new habits, laws, and customs, and a modification or abolition of those that have become inadequate or obstructive; an endless labor of reform and readjustment.3 And these demands must not be confused with the demands of logic in which all activity is a process of passive unfolding of

1Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 161-4, 185-6; Lex Orandi, p. 49.
2Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 162-3, 177-8, 186; The Church and the Future, p. 67.
3Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 52, 159, 229-30; Lex Credendi, p. 11; Essays..., pp. 93, 95.
which each step is rigorously determined by the preceding; but rather must be recognized as the immediate expressions of that spiritual activity which is manifest in growth and decay, in the process of evolution.¹

However, this spiritual activity does evidence itself in the terms of the understanding both directly in the powers of imagination and invention and indirectly through its manifestations in growth and decay as the subject-matter of reflection. Growth and decay manifest spiritual activity in a multitude of forms and experiences; and our imaginative, our inventive, faculty brings us enlarged visions and suggestive arrangements of our physical world; and our categories and classifications, our images and ideas are stretched until, their utmost limits being found confining and distorting, they burst and reconstitute themselves only as they are transformed in a new organization of experience, the product of revolution. So, it is that, now and again, an old world of reason is swallowed up in a new; and the revelation, the activity of spiritual reality manifested in old forms and categories, translates

¹Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 13, 24-5, 237; ...Letters, p. 21.
itself into the new in so far as the old forms and categories retained capacity and mobility.\textsuperscript{1}

This spiritual activity, as we have said, reveals itself in relation to a will-world of which we are members; and here we may distinguish a second characteristic of reality. For in this world our will lives its inmost life and finds its deepest rest or unrest according as it succeeds or fails in adjusting itself to its laws.\textsuperscript{2} The reality of our will is known to us in relation to, and not apart from, other wills. Wherever we find another will accordant with our own in any particular, our spiritual life and reality is re-enforced and expanded; and this re-enforcement and expansion of our reality is in proportion to the extent of our agreement and to the number of wills in agreement. On the other hand, wherever we recognize a will-force in opposition to our own, our spiritual reality is contracted and impoverished; we are falling away from it into nothingness.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 13, 165, 183, 237; Essays..., pp. 194-5, 11.

\textsuperscript{2}Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, p. 11; ...Letters, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{3}Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, pp. 12-3, 33.
Apart from the will-world, in relation to extra-human affairs, we know nothing of Reality, save as their results resemble those of our own power and wisdom and as we ascribe them to an agency like ourselves; save as we feel it in each concrete action that is submitted to our freedom of choice.\textsuperscript{1}

Of course, there is a purely psychological witness to reality which may be established in the consentient testimony of one's entire world and which may be used in the interests of evil and error as well as goodness and truth,\textsuperscript{2} and there is a barbarous savage agreement of wills which may be established in the upsurge of a buried mentality into the consciousness of a crowd and becomes possible in the resignation of individual responsibility as each singly holds the rest responsible;\textsuperscript{3} but the fullness of Reality is known not in a union of paralyzed wills nor in the uniformity of unanimous agreement; rather it is, in our relation to each several will, to be found in the evolving of a complex system of feelings, determined by and determining an equally complex system of judgments,

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 8, 15, 25, 145-6; Essays..., pp. 111-2.
\textsuperscript{2}Essays..., pp. 112-3.
\textsuperscript{3}Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 256-7.
issuing in a similarly complex system of impulses, according to the innumerable elements into which each moral personality, each total will-attitude, may be resolved: an evolving determined in relation to the difference of evil and good, false and true, fair and foul, saved and realized only in union or agreement with, as well as subordinate to, that supreme, eternal Will, which we call God, manifest in the absolute and imperative character of the right.  

Indeed, even were the created will at variance with each and every other will of its world, it would be saved and realized if it were in union or agreement with the Eternal Will. For this love of God, this dynamic union with Him, is the very substance and reality of our spiritual being; other lovings and agreements belong to the perfection, but not to the essence of our blessedness.  

However, it is in the relative and unsatisfying goodness of the human will, that the absolute and satisfying goodness of the Eternal Will  

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Tyrrell, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 38; \textit{Lex Orandi}, p. 12; \textit{The Church and the Future}, pp. 118-9; \textit{Medievalism}, pp. 131-2.}
\footnote{Lex \textit{Orandi}, pp. 14, 15.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 15; \textit{Essays...}, pp. 105-6.}
\end{footnotes}
is revealed to us, in that sanctified humanity clustered round the Cross of Calvary. Union with God means necessarily and identically union with the whole body of His Saints, with those who like Christ have gone forth in all ages and peoples as sheep in the midst of wolves. For the spirit of Christ is in no man adequately and independently but only in virtue of his membership with the whole body of the faithful throughout which it is diffused; and his subjective faith is nothing else than his response to the attraction exercised by Christ's spirit in the Church upon the same spirit as latent in himself.¹

Thus, it is to this society, to this many-membered corporate Christ of all times and ages, that we must go in order to perfect ourselves in the art of Divine love and to bring our will into more extensive and delicate sympathy with God's; we must appropriate and master what is common to all: the gathered experience and reflection of multitudes and generations, the stimulus yielded by cooperation with others animated by the same

¹Lex Orandi, pp. 25, 29, 63; Essays..., p. 213; ...Letters, pp. 138, 52, 235; Oil and Wine, p. 42.
spirit. For no person, no nation, no age exhausts the infinite richness of the Spirit of Christ as each seizes only some particular aspect of its rich potentiality; but by the communion and interaction of spirit with spirit, by the conference of people with people and age with age in the Christian community the Spirit receives a progressively fuller manifestation as the slow logic of spiritual life and experience gathers and retains that which is fruitful. And he who fails to appropriate it is not original but eccentric; he differs because of his ignorance and narrowness, because he is content with something less.

However, this appropriation of the common heritage must not be a slavish or literal imitation but rather an appropriation of will, an application of the Spirit of Christ to one's individual character, condition, country and period. It must re-clothe itself in our own words and images and receive the mould of our individuality. For the experience of another

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1 Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, p. 28, 62; The Church and the Future, pp. 79, 93; Through Sevila and Charybdis, p. 261.

2 Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, p. 79; Lex Orandi, p. 210; Medievalism, p. 82.

3 The Church and the Future, pp. 93-4; Lex Orandi, p. 36.
can never be wholly our own but its essential nature may be revealed in an endless experimental process.¹

But when this appropriation has been accomplished not finally but practically, we are in a position to effect those original and personal modifications and enrichments of the same, by the accumulation, criticism, and selection of which the heritage of the community is extended and elevated, and apart from which it would quickly degenerate.²

Beside this direct relation with the Divine Will in the many-membered community of Christ's spirit, there is another way in which we are referred to it: in the sharing of that love which the Community as a whole offers to God and in that with which He embraces the Community as a whole. Here, as in the human relation of family life, we share in a collective action and attitude and are enriched by the communized blessings poured out upon it. For we act and are enriched

¹Tyrrell, The Church and the Future, pp. 73-4; Lex Orandi, p. 39; Petre, The Soul's Orbit, p. 12.

in the augmented will-strength which is ours in association and agreement with each and every other will of the Christian community and which is added to that will-strength which is ours in agreement with the Divine Will.¹

Yet, this community of wills in which we live must and does evidence itself, also, in the visible world of the phenomenal and under its conditions. Here, as an institution it faces the material difficulties of bringing the scattered fragments of the common will-attitudes into contact and communion with each other and in togetherness with God, the difficulties of time and space; and finds necessary the machinery of an official teaching class centrally established whose function it is to gather up, formulate, and propose for the guidance of each that truth which under the Spirit's influence has been worked out in the minds of all.² It, also, finds necessary an insistence on a uniformity of expression, of ritual, of practice;³ and employs these necessities in relation to the

¹Tyrrell, Lex Orandi, pp. 39-44.

²Tyrrell, Ibid., pp. 210-1; The Church and the Future, pp. 58, 60, 64, 95, 73; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 260-2; ...Letters, p. 90.

³Tyrrell, Essavs..., p. 112.
ministry of the Sacraments and the Word, of which it is the guardian.

A third characteristic of Reality is its transcendence of our experience. It is an absolute as opposed to our relativity, an infinite to our finitude, a permanent to our evanescence, an actual to our potentiality, a repose to our restlessness. If we call it will or action, it is only another name for what it is when viewed as the presupposition of all action; and the same may be said of love and thought: perfect love is that which finds rest in full communion, perfect knowledge abides in complete understanding, even as perfect action is in the undisturbed center of the cyclone. Struggle is not an element of love, limitation is not a condition of love; but rather those factors which it strives

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2. *Lex Orandi*, pp. 90, 141.

3. Through *Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 13, 230; *Lex Orandi*, pp. 75-6, 104; *Essays...,* p. 139.

to overcome, which are overcome in God.\(^1\)

Moreover, Reality is given, rather than achieved; revealed rather than understood; inspired rather than attracted. We can learn our own limits, and recognize the futility of our ends and desires. We can rise to the sense of a Beyoncé and the need of a Beyond; but to believe in it, to live for it firmly and prevalently, we cannot. We can impede its growth or foster it; we can dispose ourselves to receive it and can co-operate with it when received; we can do and say those words and deeds which are its outward expressions; but over Reality itself we have no direct command. It is something which must be given to us, like the inspirations of genius; and for it, we are as dependent upon Providence as we are for the bread we eat, for rain and sunshine, for all those conditions without which all our efforts were in vain.\(^2\)

This given Reality is transcendent with respect to clear thought and perception; it looms through clouds, it is revealed piecemeal

\(^1\) *Letters*, p. 39; *Lex Orandi*, pp. 48, 49; *Oil and Wine*, pp. 324, 328-9.

\(^2\) *Lex Orandi*, pp. 166, 200; *Lex Credendi*, p. 71; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 13, 314; *Oil and Wine*, p. 289.
by glimpses and vague shadowings; it is revealed in thought and word with no more exactitude than music in the terms of color. Only in the balance of opposing and never perfectly reconcilable tendencies can it be expressed and communicated, and each individual expression which is of value only contributes to the perfecting of that balance, for no conceivable accumulation of expression could achieve exactness with regard to Reality. It is not indefinitely greater in measure and degree than anything we know in the way of being, unity, spirit, power, knowledge, goodness; but rather it includes these in one simple absolute perfection in some way more different from them all than thought is from matter. There is no common measure, no relation of more and less, but an absolute difference in kind.¹

Likewise, Reality is transcendent with respect to our upward desire and effort; our practical response to the attraction which it exercises upon our spirits is marked by a corresponding incoherence. In it we will something that serves no purpose in the whole compass of this natural life,

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 50-1, 89, 186, 230; Lex Orandi, pp. 75-6, 90, 141-2; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 124; Essays..., p. 55; ...Letters, p. 16.
something that is altogether aimless and superfluous even for the highest ends that can be realized on earth; yet, we will it.¹

And so we come to realize in conflict and in absurdity, at least as being fundamentally and equivalently true, a dualism in Reality, which tends to resolve creation into the opposed and complementary realms of freedom and determinism, of subject and object.² It is plain that there are vital and progressive forces at work everywhere, but it is equally plain that there are destructive forces, that life is strangled by its own fertility, that it is faced by the insoluble problem of finding room for its expansion in every direction. Our world is the arena of a conflict between a multitude of irreconcilable ends. Within it goodness, beauty, truth, and happiness are at discord. It is so ordered throughout that each part thrives at the expense of some other: we cannot be kind to spiders without being cruel to flies; we cannot fight

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 177-8; The Church and the Future, p. 165.

²Lex Orandi, pp. 144-5; Essays..., pp. 92, 99; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 120.
for freedom without weakening authority. ¹ And so we find ourselves in the freedom of Reality facing the idea and workings of a law-bound love manifesting itself in the relentless, blind regularity of a mechanism, turning neither to the right nor the left, to protect the just or punish the unjust; a love which to all appearance is indifferent to its own cause, which ignores its lovers, disappoints, betrays, and finally forsakes them in the last darkness of death. God's son has always been crucified by the world 'from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same'.² Even should Conscience prevail in the terms of this world, it would be destroyed: for conflict and limitation are necessities of its expression; it is at once intended and not intended to prevail. Fulfilling itself, it would become an absurdity, a disease working its own death. Perfect blessedness is not compatible with the laws of our world.³

So, in the measure that we try to live widely,

¹Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 119-20, 124; Essays..., pp. 93, 94, 95-7, 250-1.
²Essays..., pp. 56, 57; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 118, 120, 124.
³Essays..., pp. 55, 67, 92, 251; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 50-1.
deeply, nobly, in the fullness of our consciousness of Reality, we are bound to become pessimists. For the verdict of the deeper spiritual intuition on this life is always pessimistic, and it is a verdict that is only confirmed by experience and reflection. As we awaken to the attraction of Reality, we feel a contrast between the actual and the ideal, a transcendence of our present experience; as we progress mentally and morally we find the discord increased rather than diminished, we ask more and not less and seem to receive less and not more: until, at last, we recognize and face the deep and incurable tragedy of human life, the inevitable and unconquerable schism which exists in Reality's transcendence of our experience. Doubtless those among Christians who recognize this tragedy and feel this pessimism are in a minority, but they are what all men tend to become in the measure of their spiritual development. And, after all, five hundred millions of Buddhists share their pessimism.¹

Yet, in the Christian experience this pessimism is relieved by hope as the transcendence of Reality is realized as that of the Whole over the

¹Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 117-8, 119, 124-5, 126-7; ...Letters, p. 206.
infinitesimal part, of incomprehensible fullness over comprehensible minuteness: and this is the expression of a relationship to Reality in which our humanity is sacramental, a relationship which is a characteristic of Reality. If God is to enter into practical relations with man, He must in some way become man; He must present Himself to us humanwise; the Idea must become imaginable; the Truth, incorporate; the Word must be made flesh and dwell in our midst. For man cannot deal practically with what the heart of man has never conceived, with what is neither the self nor the not-self; with what is as distinct from him as the latter, yet quite differently distinct; as close to him as the former, yet quite differently close. He cannot deal with the Absolute in its absoluteness.

Our humanity, however, is known to us only as bodily and in relation to the body. It is conscious

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2 Lex Orandi, pp. 2, 60, 77; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 110; The Church and the Future, p. 60; ...Letters, p. 235; C. E. Osborne, ibid., pp. 255, 259-60; von Hügel, ibid., p. 250.
of itself most definitely in terms of physical sense, of that which can be pointed at, weighed, and measured; and it is in and through these terms that it awakens to spiritual being and tries vainly to know and realize itself spiritually. It acts on and is affected by the sensible, in its fullness of words and gestures and intonation, of music and form and color and movement, of act and existence, for a look, a smile, a tone of voice may often convey what volumes could not utter. Nor can we conceive it as conscious, out of all relation to the sensible. Neither do we desire to escape from all that is beautiful and wonderful in physical nature, or in human life and interests. Whatever the body be, it belongs to the integrity of human nature. Not only in it, but by it and with it, we live and move, and are.

If, then, our spiritual life is known to us only in relation to the body and its world, Reality in its fullness must also be revealed to us in the terms of physical sense. As soul and body make up one being, so do our inward and outward experiences make up one life, and so do the realms

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1Lex Orandi, pp. 2, 12, 66-7, 185; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 206-7; The Church and the Future, pp. 73-4, 122-3; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 33, 185-6; External Religion, pp. 5-6.
of spiritual reality and of material appearances make up one world. They belong to one self-explanatory whole: they act and react; they have a common history to some extent. Of course, the precise relation of Reality to appearance, of inward to outward, is one of the persistent problems of the soul, the solution of which seems to evade that rational understanding whose forms are derived from, and whose language is adapted to the lower member of each antithesis, but the sacramental principle gives us at least a practical answer whose proven fidelity to the laws of life warrants our faith in its fundamental truthfulness. ¹

Thus, the truths of Reality's fullness are revealed in its selections and repulsions, its attractions and modifications of material and sensual truths. Its materials are drawn from the products of the human understanding wrought of sensual phenomena and claim to be in harmony with every true product of the human understanding but its essence and spirit is revealed and revealed effectually in the terms of the human spirit, of

¹Lex Orandi, pp. 39, 66, 68-9, 159-60; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 185; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 205; External Religion, pp. 7-8.
feeling, of will, of imagination acting upon those materials. These not only signify the relation of the Whole to the part of which they are the natural issue and evidence, but they also effect and deepen that relation.¹

Moreover, while there can be no ultimate conflict between what is true for the religious sense and what is true for the understanding, there exists the apparent dualism which is impressed in the transcendence of Reality and which must be resolved if we are to maintain the sacramental aspect of Reality. According to it, Reality manifests itself under the twin aspects of determinism and freedom, of uniformity and novelty, of sequence and creation, of habit and experiment; and the forces of the latter may triumph over the former only within limits, the limits of circumvention and management, and may not triumph at all, as the law-bound mechanism grinds on its blind self-existent way, unconscious of good or evil, of love or tears.² And yet, the more man yields himself to this determinism and becomes subject to the

¹Lex Orandi, pp. 53-4, 121, 161-2, 165-6, 167; Lex Credendi, p. 49; Essays..., p. 71; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 33, 282-3.

²Lex Orandi, pp. 119, 137, 161, 167; Essays ..., p. 89; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 187; External Religion, p. 27.
mechanism of its laws, the less sensitively sympathetic does he grow even to the aesthetic appeal of its physical phenomena. Every advance in sensuality is in the direction of brutishness, of insensibility, and, at last, of total unconsciousness. \(^1\) And the more man refuses to yield, the more he opposes, corrects, overcomes this determinism by understanding it, the greater is the expansion of his freedom and its strength. Despite apparent exceptions, none is so awake to the loveliness and the loathsomeness of physical phenomena as he who, in his own person, has overcome the determinism which characterizes them. \(^2\) Thus, as the opposite and counterpart of our will and freedom, this vast material determinism is the foe whose conquest is our glory; whose persistent opposition calls forth those undeveloped and unguessed spiritual energies by which it is overmatched and robbed of its sting while retaining its strength and utility. By eliciting the deepest protest of our soul—the protest of sentiment, and of utterance, and of active opposition—the confusions, the scandals, the godlessness of the world's determinism bring out

\(^1\)Essays..., pp. 30, 92; External Religion, p. 77.

\(^2\)Essays..., p. 92; Lex Orandi, p. 137.
and establish all that is best in us, and range us on the side of Reality's fullness against all that is opposed to the Divine Will as revealed in the best aspirations of our own. By enabling us to deal with and to extend our mastery over the world by its comprehension and subjection to our action, this determinism makes possible our subjective or spiritual growth. Law is thus the presupposition of life and of the development of our personality: in a world governed wholly by caprice or in which endless and incalculable relaxations of law were tolerated we should remain children forever; in a world of law and regularity we are able to put all things under our feet.\(^1\)

Simply as a determinism, then, this aspect of Reality cannot be regarded as kind or wise any more than it can be regarded as cruel or foolish; it can have no more moral character than a stick or a stone, except so far as it is personified. The only pertinent question would be: What purpose does it indicate in its author, and how far does it fulfill that purpose? To answer this would demand an almost infinite comprehensiveness.

\(^1\) *Origini, pp. 120, 135-6; Letters, pp. 181, 203; Essays..., pp. 10, 89; External Religion, pp. 12, 15-16.*
of experience and perspicacity of judgment. ¹

Only in relation to the aspect of freedom, of the subjective and the spiritual, does this determinism acquire a moral significance as its elements are invested or modified by spiritual sense and life, and retain those investitures and modifications as significant and effectual for the continuance and development of that spiritual life; apart from our spiritual and moral life, it simulates in many of its effects the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, but it works blindly and blunderingly and betrays at every turn its lack of inherent consciousness and intention: it is the very embodiment of Evil and Folly—for evil is the caricature of goodness, and folly, that of wisdom. ²

Likewise, simply as a subjective creation, the spiritual life cannot be regarded as true or real any more than it can be regarded as false or unreal; it can have no more practical or scientific character than a dream or a fancy,


²Lex Orandi, pp. 126, 136-7, 145-6, 161; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 118, 125-6, 127; Essays..., pp. 89-90; External Religion, p. 43.
except so far as it is actualized. The only pertinent question would be: what characteristic of personality does it suggest in its author, and in what intensity? And to answer this would be as difficult as the other. ¹

Only in relation to the aspect of determinism, of the physical and the practical, does the spiritual life acquire a real significance, as it acts upon and re-acts to the sensible, as it affects and is affected by it; apart from our physical and actual life, it may attain the appearance of truth and fact, but it moves self-consciously and infallibly and betrays at every turn its lack of law and embodiment. ²

Yet, in the sacramental relation, "it is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing," in that the material and practical determinism is no more than the vehicle and instrument of the spiritual life, finding all its life-giving power in the divine and eternal. Our whole upward progress from animalism and savagery towards rational and spiritual life consists in slowly

¹Lex Orandi, pp. 57, 110-11, 164-5; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 247-8; Lex Credendi, pp. 26-7, 37; Essays..., p. 9.

²Lex Orandi, pp. 1-2, 28-9, 57, 120, 135-6; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 290-1; Essays ..., pp. 15-6; External Religion, pp. 24-5, 42.
effecting an inversion of our surface estimate of things: in controlling our life and action ever less by impulse, ever more by idea; in shaping our conduct to an ever wider apprehension of things; in guiding ourselves less in the light of what is present to us here and now, and more in view of what is distant and future, and finally, of what is infinite and eternal. Our spiritual progress is ever towards a deeper reading of ourselves and of reality; it is a bursting through veil after veil of illusion, an approach to that absolute totality to which our conduct is adapted by the instinctive judgments of Conscience. Its last stage is that in which the spirit shakes off every dream and returns once more to perfect self-consciousness.¹ For the judgments of Conscience, though future and non-existent as effects, are present and existent as causes of reality; they are contained in the physical and practical as the potential in the actual, as the organism in the germ. They are the end or the idea viewed as already governing the beginning and process of things—as struggling to realize itself. In

¹ *Lex Orandi*, pp. 1-2, 3-4, 54; *Essays...*, pp. 40, 48-9, 60, 136; *The Church and the Future*, pp. 87, 89-90.
theological language, they are the experience of God, considered precisely as immanent Creator, and as realizing His own image in the finite order.\(^1\) And while we may err and falter in our judgment as to what is true, fair, or right; we may turn away from our duty when we know it; but we can never falter in our conviction as to the absolute and imperative character of these judgments of Conscience: in them we know the very substance and reality of our spiritual living and being.\(^2\)

It is in these driving-forces of our being that we find the continuity of Reality, the cohesiveness of the past with the present, and the future with the present: for the driving-forces of our being—the wills to truth, to beauty, to righteousness, to the ideal, and beyond and in these the will toward the Whole—do not change in their essential character, though their intensity and extension may vary from person to person and from age to age. It is in their sameness

\(^1\)Essays..., pp. 136-7; Lex Orandi, pp. 47-8; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 245-6.

\(^2\)Lex Orandi, pp. 14-5; Lex Credendi, p. 71.
that the unity of every diverse experience, every revelation and every sin, is found, after the same manner as we find the unity of our personal experiences in the I which persists from day to day and from year to year: for it is the I which in its intensity and extension remains the subject and center of experience, which acts and re-acts and gives meaning thereby to that which is relaxed and transitory.¹

Yet, this spiritual sameness is progressive even as it is conservative, revolutionary even as it is traditional. Each additional experience changes the quality, the truth-color, of all that has gone before, as each new ingredient changes the quality of a chemical compound. It is a process of active reconstruction. Every moment we unmake our world and build it anew. Every act is a new creation transforming every previous act as to character and direction, neutralizing sin, transcending rightness, falling into error, upholding truth, drawing all within itself as the will of Reality creative and infinite. Yet, every moment of bygone experience enters into and deter-

¹Medievalism, p. 177; Essays..., pp. 65, 79, 123; Lex Orandi, pp. 8-9; Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 233; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 21, 295-6; M. E. Dowson (W. S. Palmer, pseud.), The Church and Modern Men (London, 1907), p. 94.
mines our present action. One behind another, foreshortened to an invisible point, all our form­mer deeds are here, each characterized by all its predecessors and characterizing them in turn, mak­ing with them a new and original resultant which itself is transformed in and by our present de­cision. The new does not contradict but compre­hends and justifies the old; the past is part of us forever.¹

However, the past is comprehended in the present not as determining its direction but as characterizing it. The Real Will remains original and creative, progressive and revolutionary not after the fashion of organic development in a path fixed and predictable from the beginning but after the manner of free being in a path freely chosen from moment to moment and revealed only in the creative act itself. The Real Will, as it has created the past, continues to shape it and re-shape it in every new creation.²


²Essays..., pp. 21, 126-7; Lex Orandi, pp. 68-9; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 136-7; Medievalism, pp. 160-1; Oil and Wine, p. 297; ...Letters, pp. 21, 99; Programme of Modernism, p. 49.
Still, this characterization of Reality is not meaningless but is part of a process in which the Infinite Will is struggling toward full self-consciousness in the finite, part in the sense that, though a separate and whole expression in itself, it aids in characterizing every new expression and contributes, in its relation to every other whole expression, to an approximation of the truth of Reality in the terms of this world. Our life-task is one of unification, of balancing, of building in the accumulating experiences of every new moment so skilfully as not to destroy, but rather to perfect the harmony of our multitudinous thoughts, desires, and sentiments. Each good choice should prepare the way for a better; every step towards our ideal should show it to us more closely and clearly; should expand and articulate our conception of it; should reveal to us more distinctly the implicit content of our governing will. Yet, as our progress is not even either outward nor upward, we cannot escape the presence of tares among the wheat, the false amid the true, and our advance must be toward the manifestations of falsehood as well as of truth, in going back to the point of deviation as well as forward to more intense and comprehensive expression, in
reconstruction as well as construction. Thus, it is only by the accumulative effect of a great variety of impressions and manifestations, correcting and supplementing one another, that we can gradually approximate that precise and unique quality of sentiment which belongs to the Infinite Will, that direction of movement which characterizes the Real; it is only as the leaven of the Infinite Will slowly permeates every natural interest, the intellectual, moral, social, political, and religious, struggling in alliance with all that is best and worthiest and strongest in the natural order; it is only as it expresses itself at every level of spiritual development even as it transcends each level; it is only as it includes its every expression in the unity of a living organism apart from which no single expression is rightly intelligible.¹

However, the religious process is one; and the unity of the need and of the end on one hand, and the unity of the human spirit on the other,

¹Essays..., pp. 18, 19, 23, 101, 123-4, 125; The Church and the Future, pp. 67, 94, 131; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 18-9, 37-8, 40, 41, 56; Lex Orandi, pp. 62, 214; Lex Credendi, xi, p. 13; "Medievalism and Modernism," pp. 311, 312-3, 314; Medievalism, pp. 145-6, 150, 168; Letters, pp. 21, 23, 30, 38, 57, 90, 109, 117.
secure a certain uniformity characterizing all religions. Each presents the unmistakable family features. For our seemingly simplest ideas and words have been elaborated by generations of organized human life in obedience to that law of least resistance which causes us to receive a new idea or a new system of ideas with as little alteration of our mind as possible. If, at times, the individual mind is capable of a radical revolution or new birth, and unravels to the very first stitch a thought-system which years have knit up, in order to find place in its texture for some hitherto irreconcilable element, yet it is not often, and the collective mind cannot at all, by any unanimous agreement of its components, suddenly unmake and remake itself. Only in the slow lapse of decades, or even centuries, can it be transformed to the nature of a newly imbibed principle. Thus a new religion takes on itself the clothes, the regalia, of the old gods into those temples it enters. It adopts the institutions, rites, and terminology of the old so far as it can, and much further, perhaps, than it ought; it finds for them a new significance in its own interests; it uses them as a fuller and richer vehicle of self-expression. So in a
thousand ways the new religion will be preached and apprehended in terms of the old; yet in the measure that the new is more deeply and fundamentally self-conscious, in the measure that it apprehends better the will and law of human progress, it will necessarily appear more radical in its criticism, even as the old seems inert and indifferent. So, each tries to force the other violently to its own shape, the old still holding its own part, still claiming in part what has been wrested from it. And there remain incoherencies and inconsistencies until the conflict is ended in synthesis.¹

Yet, that synthesis comes only in the experimental creation and discovery of new categories and methods in which the old may be integrated into new relationships so as to accommodate itself to new kinds of experience and to explain that which it could not before. Otherwise new experiences are wasted; they cannot be registered or fertilized. The old channels simply overflow. Yet this creation is not dialectical, for dialectical development is confined simply to the extension of categories and cannot effect their

¹ *Essays...*, pp. 79-81, 124; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 21-2, 45-7; *Christianity at the Cross-roads*, pp. 234-5, 248.
intensity. But it is at once spiritual and organic, achieving a greater unification and simplification of itself, yet comprehending an immense variety of activity and understanding, realizing a universal extensiveness.¹

¹Essays..., pp. 10-11, 32, 125; The Church and the Future, p. 67; Lex Credendi, pp. 46, 48; Letters, pp. 92-3.
CHAPTER III

Implications of Tyrrell's Religious Philosophy.

Scripture.

Scripture is in its images and figures a product of contingency. It was composed of those materials which happened to lie in the mind and experience of the prophet and the apostle; in accordance with, or in opposition to, situations and conditions born of particular events, actions, attitudes; in the presence and consciousness of individual impulses and emotions. And these were both narrow and broad, ignorant and wise, blunt and subtle, scant and profuse; like and diverse, complementary and contradictory, simple and complex; vivid and vague, moving and dull, lively and lifeless.¹ Also, these conditions and situations, emotions and impulses, cultures and philosophies and appearances have now largely ceased to exist. At most, they are analogously represented in our times; and the more closely and critically they are studied in the light of the past, the more evident is the measureless gulf

that divides their mind and sentiment from ours.¹

Yet, if there is a gulf which divides the mind and sentiment and circumstances of the Scriptures from ours, there is also a certain continuity. For we have taken the Scriptures unto ourselves, receiving and interpreting them at first after our own fashion, with as little self-modification as possible; rejecting wholesale what was immediately or permanently indigestible; and yet gradually, over the years, yielding to the transforming power of their Spirit, shaping our conceptions by the necessary implications of that Spirit recognized as possessing a certain uniform character and tendency. Likewise, it has been through the centuries: a hundred religions, having received into their bosoms the Scriptures, bear witness unto the persistent character of their transforming power, find in it order, meaning, force; even as the Scriptures themselves bear witness inwardly to this same power of transformation adapting and revising their figures and images ever in the interests of the moral, putting all else under

¹Lex Credendi, pp. 47-8, 50-1, 53; Essays..., pp. 80-1, 255-6; Lex Orandi, p. 39.
its feet.¹

This continuous power, however, is revealed in Scripture only as a tendency, a will, a direction, an experience. It is not represented in its figures and images, nor are these analogies of its mysterious nature. Rather, they are but illustrative of a presence which lies at once between and beyond them, as an ocean lies between and beyond its shores; and possess only a prophetic truth, a guidance toward an experience of the supernatural, of which experience they are an essential part.² Thus, though its figures and images are drawn from history, from morality and ethics, from philosophy and theology, these do not contain its religious truth but enter into it as they have been selected, modified, or rearranged according to that truth; they are a record of it but not its explanation.³

¹Essays..., pp. 16-7, 69-72, 80-1, 231-2; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 22, 37-8, 41, 45-7, 301-2; The Church and the Future, pp. 161-2; Lex Credendi, pp. 51, 53-4.


³Lex Orandi, pp. 54-5; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 296-7; Lex Credendi, p. 51; The Church and the Future, pp. 87, 88, 89; Egerton, Ibid., p. 156.
However, as the religious truth of Scripture claims historicity, as it is revealed in the whole process of history, actual, ethical, intellectual, its figures and images must be substantially true to fact, and must be continually opposed and corrected by that historical criticism pursued according to the rules of evidence.\(^1\) Yet, this correspondence of Scriptural figures and images to factual history is analogous to that of an artistic or dramatic rendering of some verifiable episode to its barren matter of fact. For these facts are told us not strictly as they did happen, but rather as they ought to have happened in the interests of religion.\(^2\) But, as the whole process of events is shaped ultimately according to these interests, Scriptural images, in their infidelity to facts, get at the essence of history, at the immanent power which seeks to objectify itself in the history of men and peoples; and yet never

\(^1\) *Essays...*, pp. 15-6, 17-8, 142; *Lex Orandi*, pp. 168-70; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 243, 249.

finds adequate utterance therein. Owing to the
narrowness of even our widest critical outlook
and to the partial character of even the fullest
evidence attainable, the true inward meaning and
import of history may at any given moment be not
only obscured from us, but perverted altogether,
very much as may the sense of a sentence prior to
its completion.

Moreover, there is evident within Scripture
the workings of natural theology, of sentimental­
ism, and materialism not only in the images and
figures which have been seized upon by the relig­
ious truth for its self-presentation but also apart
from such presentation of religious truth as sep­
parate and distinct elements of Scripture. Such
presence is in large measure due to the easy con­
fusion of primitive representation with presenta­
tion and of ideal history with actual history:
primitive representation is largely imaginative
and pictorial even as presentation, and the actual
and ideal have not yet been distinguished from

1 Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 248, 249­
50; Lex Credendi, p. 50; Lex Orandi, pp. 167-8;
Egerton, Ibid., p. 62.

2 Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 229-30,
307; Essays..., p. 121.
one another by any law. But these remain as active forces in Scripture and in Scriptural interpretation, resisting and denying the leaven of religious truth, issuing in the superstitions of the multitudes and the sterility of intellectuals.

Thus, Scripture must be regarded in its wholeness. It cannot be taken verse by verse or passage by passage since these are not so many separate representations of religious truth but simply elements of its illustrative aspect in terms of the actual mingled with certain products of theology, sentimentality and materialism. Rather, each passage complements or corrects every other not as fact is complemented or corrected by fact but as experience is modified by experience. And as each experience integrates or resolves one unifying spirit, each element of its illustrative aspect becomes an essential part of a complex system, integral to every other part. Moreover, the

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1Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 278-9; Essays..., pp. 107-8; Christianity at the Crossroads, pp. 145-6; Lex Orandi, pp. 191-2.

2Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 45-7; Essays..., pp. 25-6; Lex Credendi, p. 98; ...Letters, pp. 80-1.

3Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 38, 63, 162-3; Lex Credendi, p. 52; Essays, pp. 18-9.
historicity, the morality, the philosophy of any single illustrative element, while subject to criticism, are finally determined as they affect the historicity, the morality, the philosophy of the whole Scripture.¹

Thus, again, Scripture must be regarded as something sacred, to be retained pure and intact. As the illustrative aspect of religious truth, as the immediate impression of religious experience, it cannot be altered or discarded in part without falsifying the experience of truth it illustrates. For this it is which is left to us of the total experience and this it is in which the total experience may be recreated. And the total experience of which it is the record and embodiment is the most vigorous, most intense moment of our religious consciousness, standing as the criterion and corrective of every other moment. For there is no development of religious experience: the great driving-forces of life are constant, and are to be found sporadically in their highest intensity at any time in history, at any stage of mental development; there is no progress in goodness, i.e. in the love of what is right.

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 251-3, 302-3; Essays..., p. 24; Programme of Modernism, pp. 72, 75.
nor in religion, i.e. in the spirit of Faith, Hope, and Charity.  

Of this love and spirit in its highest intensity, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments stand as prophetic. They are the instruments of our spiritual awakening and education; through them the living water flows from the soul of Christ into ours to produce in us the fruits of the same spirit. And we may trust to their effectiveness. Though the first impressions of the Gospel are as various and different as the minds impressed, the longer it is pondered, the more it will shape those various minds to its own truth and bring them toward a perfect agreement with one another. Differences lie in regarding its elements as isolated oracles, in looking to their logical implications, but are overcome as we seek and feel in them the spirit of the whole, as we strive to bring our wills and spirits into the same Godward attitude as that of the patriarchs, prophets, apostles,

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1Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 11, 94, 290-2, 295-6, 301, 324-5; Essays..., p. 83; Lex Orandi, p. 38; Lex Credendi, p. 51; The Church and the Future, p. 169; Medievalism, pp. 176-7; Egerton, Ibid., p. 134.

2Lex Orandi, pp. 37, 39; Essays..., pp. 19-21; Lex Credendi, p. 45; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 302, 303, 307; H. C. Corrance, "George Tyrrell's Letters," The Quest, XII (1920), 48.
martyrs; and through them into the will-attitude of Christ Himself.¹

Dogma.

But the Scriptures only stereotype the self-consciousness of the Church up to the sub-apostolic age; they are but a part, however central and important, of her present self-utterance. They are wrapped round with copious exegesis, with a highly developed dogmatic system, with a body of moral and ascetical teaching, with disciplinary enactments and institutions, with all that is meant by Catholic tradition. And of all this the educative value is the same in kind as that of the Scriptures. Thus, like the Scriptures, the whole of Catholic teaching is a sort of "word of God": something to be kept and pondered in the heart, to be gradually realized and understood according to the growth and need of our spiritual life, to be digested, discriminated, fed upon.²

However, the doctrinal and dogmatic system of Christianity differs in form from the mental presentation of revelation. For, whereas that is in

¹Lex Credendi, pp. 45, 46; Lex Orandi, pp. 36-39; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 277, 307.

²Essays..., pp. 23-4; Pascendi Gregis: Programme of Modernism, p. 200.
terms of illustrative figures and images, dogma is in terms of ideas, theories, formulas, the terms of the reflective understanding. It is a translation not of poetry into prose nor of the vulgar and concrete into the philosophic and abstract but rather of the whole revelational experience shadowed in its mental presentment into the forms and terms of the understanding which are implicitly a part of it.¹ For all experience connotes a theory of life and existence, a doctrine of God and the world and man, and of their relations to one another.

Thus, it is a selection of theological, philosophical, ethical, scientific, and historical beliefs and conceptions, shaped and inspired by the Spirit of Christ. From the chaos of current beliefs, the Spirit of Christ seizes those that are most appropriate for its own embodiment and progressive expression, and weaves them into a garment adapted to the present stage of its own growth; but the beliefs and concepts in themselves are worked out and elaborated by the human understanding.

¹The Church and the Future, pp. 45, 80, 83; ...Letters, pp. 58-9; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 229-30, 283, 289; Pascendi Gregis: Programme of Modernism, p. 192.
in its quest for truth.\(^1\)

Consequently, dogma has a double reference: a reference to the world of man's outer experience; a reference to the spirit of Christ and to the order of eternal realities of which that spirit is the product. Under the former aspect, it is practical and regulative. It represents spiritual realities in the terms of our understanding; it establishes them in our schematisations of experience that they may be discussed and spoken about, that they may regulate our outward conduct.\(^2\) Under the latter aspect, it is protective and preservative. It re-asserts and maintains the apostolic revelation in its original form and purity; it stands as a bulwark erected by Faith in the defense of Revelation that the inexhaustible richness of the spirit of Christ may be progressively unfolded and developed.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) *The Church and the Future*, pp. 87, 89, 92; *Essays...*, pp. 120, 121; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 269-71, 277, 278.

\(^2\) *The Church and the Future*, pp. 45, 80-84; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 282, 302-3, 323; *Lex Credendi*, p. 254.

\(^3\) *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, pp. 4, 12, 293, 332, 343; *...Letters*, pp. 59-60; *Medievalism*, p. 50; *Rivière, Ibid...*, pp. 271-2, quoted from Loisy.
prophetic in character, deriving its practical and regulative truth not primarily from its correspondence to the outer and actual but rather to the inner and spiritual of which it is an infallible approximation whereas it is necessarily a fallible approximation to the actual; it partakes of a like unity in variety, deriving its unity from the re-asserted truth of revelation, its variety from the accidental circumstances of storm and stress; it possesses a like sacredness of form as the mental aspect of a protective experience of revelation, though it may be superseded by a new utterance in the need of the uninstructed.

Still, as protective and preservative of the apostolic revelation, it remains secondary to

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Scripture both as a guide to religious experience and as a revelation of the spirit of Christ. For regarded as primary it may not only bring the mental presentment of revelation to meaninglessness but also it may stagnate and stultify the prophet-ic spirit. The figures and images of Scripture remain the means of religious experience, the inadequacy of which is defined and corrected in measure by the assertions of dogma.\textsuperscript{1}

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Theology.

Beside the true revelation of spiritual realities given in religious experience, there is a striving for and development of a religious philosophy, the product of natural reason in observation of and reflection upon the facts of nature and the facts of religion. This striving and development proceeds according to the laws of the understanding, seeking to turn facts to account and make of them instruments whereby we can pass from the near to the distant, from the present to the past, and the future, and thus adapt our action to an indefinitely wider view of the world.

\textsuperscript{1}Lex Credendi, pp. 254-5; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 90-5, 213-4, 235; The Church and the Future, pp. 47, 93; Pascendi Gregis: Programme of Modernism, pp. 193-4; A. L. Lilley, Modernism, p. 20; Lebreton, Ibid., p. 67.
than else were possible. Yet, in so far as its procedure is scientific, it is but one department of the systematizing and unifying of all knowledge, and is subject to periodic revolutions owing to the progress of the whole complexus of knowledge whereof it is a part even as its restatement of its own theories and conceptions involves a readjustment of the whole. So far, then, as the understanding reflects on the data of religious experience and upon the ultimate problems raised by the totality of all sorts of experience, and strives to frame a theory of these matters harmonious with the rest of its systematized knowledge, it gives us a theology.¹ This theology, as we have said, is present in Scripture, sometimes in its own right, more often as the form and embodiment of the spirit of Christ. But it is itself the creation of the religious experience and finds in the prophetic presentation of that experience even as in the natural world, its subject matter. Viewing

this total experience as an effect, it endeavours
to divine the nature of its causes and to draw
certain theological and metaphysical conclusions;
it seeks to discern what historical and philo-
sophical truths are implied in such prophetic
visions viewed as psychological experience and to
unite them logically in a theological system. Yet,
always it is controlled by religious experience
reconstructed through its prophetic mental pre-
sentment, as any science is controlled by its
subject-matter: it is free to proceed according
to its own laws, to advance its own conclusions,
to make its own adjustments, to solve its own
problems; but it cannot ignore or deny the facts
with which it works, it cannot distort nor pervert
them; as a science it cannot stand out against
facts of religious experience which are adverse
to its conclusions.¹

However, working upon the facts of revela-
tion, this theology grants unto the believer al-
most a new power of vision, a power of observing
and recognizing and remembering order where be-
fore he had seen only chaos. And in this lies
the great advantage of scientific consideration:

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 12-3, 76,
96, 104-5, 206-7, 237-8, 284, 303, 351; Lex
Credendi, pp. 254-5; Salter, Ibid., pp. 29-30;
Egerton, Ibid., p. 115; George Tyrrell, Medievalism, pp. 47, 152.
in it we can digest our experiences piecemeal which else would remain in confused unsorted masses; and in it we are better able to distinguish between the true and the false of religious experience, that which is Christian and Catholic and that which is not. But, perhaps, the chief value of theology lies in the fact that it impresses upon us the necessary inadequacy of our human way of regarding God, that it is corrective of our literalism and materialism. For our materialism would deprive the spirit of some of its excellence and would create a multitude of difficulties for our faith if it were not balanced by an opposing concept of infinity established by theology.¹

Yet, theology cannot and does not accomplish these things without a certain unreality and poverty of content. For not only are its categories not exhaustive of religious reality but they may be practically false. They may make prayer seem nonsensical, or encourage laxity, or make havoc of the ordinary sane and sensible notions of the faithful. If the theologian forgets that he has only determined the locus of truth, the extremes

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 87-8, 91-3, 104; Lex Credendi, p. 144.
between which it lies inaccessibly; if he thinks that these two extremes may be combined into a direct expression of the truth, he may wake up to find that, in combining two incompatible ideas, he has got zero for his result.¹

Thus, theology must be conceived as the product of a process of the spirit-life, parallel to that of experience. As such, it is produced according to its own way and subject to its own laws, yet even in its separateness it is dependent upon the other, as helpful neighbors are dependent, as they render one another indispensable services. Neither can be independent of the other without paying the penalty of sterility: experience that ignores the check of theology, that speaks in a dead language, that uses an obsolete and unintelligible thought-system; a theology that ignores the check of revelation, the continual progressive self-manifestation of God in the religious life of humanity, and seeks Him only in the sub-human—both these are alike fruitless.²

¹Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 12, 74, 87-8, 92, 93, 95, 96, 104-5, 271, 299; The Church and the Future, p. 64; Medievalism, pp. 48, 129, 157; Lex Credendi, p. 142.

²Lex Credendi, pp. 139-41, 146, 254-5; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 238, 249, 324; Medievalism, p. 47.
But still theology remains secondary to experience. While it matters much for successful management whether one understands or misunderstands his own physical constitution, and while unhistorical and sectarian theories of Christianity are plainly great obstacles to the Church, they are not so important as to endanger the existence of religion. For the Church lives by her own vitality and not by our ingenuity, and runs her course for the most part independently of our assistance. And it is less misleading to take a confused, general view of the Spirit of God than to view one of its parts or elements violently divorced from the rest. The rudest clown knows better what man is, than would some being who should know nothing but the articulation of the human skeleton.¹

Christology.

Tyrrell, however, could not concern himself with the fundamental questions of religion and ignore the Christological problem; but he faced it in the manner that he did—at once fearful.

¹M. D. Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., II, 107; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 74-6, 88, 91, 95; 182, 211; The Church and the Future, p. 64; Medievalism, p. 47.
and resolute—because for him the Personality of Jesus Christ was the supreme and central feature of the Christian religion: he was a Christ-lover and his love went hand in hand with complete truthfulness.¹

The question, 'What think ye of Christ?' brought forth from him, as over against the theologians and philosophers, the materialists and supernaturalists, an insistence upon the humanity of Christ. He is not the Christ who puzzles us by knowing things that would be useful to mankind and not revealing them, by crying out as one utterly overwhelmed with pain and agony, when all the time a part of his being is in supreme joy. He is not the Christ who is tempted, without suffering thereby the least trouble or distress. Nor, again, is He a modern Christ with modern theories, a socialistic Christ with a scheme of civil renovation. Rather He is the Christ who labors with man as his yoke-fellow, sharing his struggles, his disappointments, his darkness, his ignorance; a partner in his sorrows, but more than a partner in his faith and his hope. For those who look to this life, to

this world, to the human race in its purely human presentment, He is no Christ at all but a deluded prophet, taking His ethic from the prophets, distorting it in his conception of the nearness of the end, taking His vision of the Kingdom of God from the apocalyptists, and identifying Himself with the Son of Man.¹

And as His words, His thoughts, His acts are those of His day and people, they are wholly different from the matter upon which, and the conditions under which, we have to work. The religious errors He combated were not those of to-day; the needs and social conditions of the crowds to which He ministered were unlike those of ours; and in the mechanical imitation of these we would nail Him to another Cross, and then bury Him in the tomb of the past without hope of resurrection.²

This humanity of Christ, this human finiteness and relativity, would be difficult for us

¹Vidler, Ibid., p. 157; Petre, Ibid., II, 400-1; Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 399-400; Lex Credendi, p. 50; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 211-12; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 51, 95-6; Essays..., pp. 44-6; Lunn, Ibid., p. 156; Moyes, Ibid., p. 71; Quick, Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition, p. 33.

²Lex Credendi, pp. 47-8, 250; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 374; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 270-1.
to accept if our Lord had come to present unto us a final and absolute philosophy and language and therein to embody exhaustively the inexhaustible meaning of His Love. For thus it would mean the loss of faith in His Godhood. But His revelation was no divine 'summa theologica'; it was His own Spirit and Personality which He bequeathed. For even as behind the words and actions of our fellow men we recognize their personalities, so behind and in the words and actions of Jesus there is to be distinguished His Spirit. We recognize it as acting upon the moral and social and religious ideas and practices and institutions of His day, correcting and reinterpreting all that was harsh and unlovely, broadening what was narrow, deepening what was shallow, softening what was harsh, raising what was low, selecting, attracting, repelling according to its own exigencies and interests. And we know it as the Spirit of Holiness, that love of divine and universal goodness, that longing for divine and universal ends.

1Lex Credendi, p. 19; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 366-7; Essays..., pp. 46, 48; Riviere, Ibid., pp. 271-2; Loisy, Memoires, III, 139.

2Lex Credendi, pp. 11, 14-5, 19-20, 22-3, 50; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 264-5, 269.
which rigorously subordinates every psychic self-regarding feeling and affection to its own satisfaction, yet does not destroy but perfects, elevates, strengthens what it subordinates; that passion for truth, that antagonism to avoidable ignorance and error which seeks fearlessly for light in darkness, yet recognizes the solidarity and continuity of heaven and earth; that will making for righteousness, subjecting our individual wills unto itself, yet knowing the limitations of our individuality.¹ But the Spirit of Christ possesses not only moral pre-eminence but metaphysical depth. It was the seed of eternal life blossoming in the Kingdom of God, differing in kind as well as quality from those of other saints and prophets, natural rather than moral. Righteousness was the condition of its reception and retention, but was not the substance of Divine Sonship, not the essence of the Spirit of Christ. He is not divine because He is moral but He is moral because He is divine. Yet, in Him the balance of spirit against flesh tilted

¹Lex Credendi, pp. 70-1, 80, 168, 241-7; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 374-5; ...Letters, pp. 206-7, 230; Petre, The Soul's Orbit, pp. 49-50; Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., II, 401-2, 413-4.
in favor of the former with a sort of finality which not only created a new order, a new level of spirit-life, but was suggestive of a natural divinity apart from moral identity.¹

This moral and mystical Spirit is revealed in the human life and utterances of Jesus. It fashions unto itself a body as occasion demands in the accidental circumstances of its Presence. And this human life and utterances of occasion and circumstance, for all its limits of time, place, language, tradition, is a pure revelation of the Spirit of Christ; the limitation is solely on the part of the vehicle. Given such material to work upon, it could not have been more divinely shaped and mastered. The greater the limitations within which it works, the more fully is the creative power of the artist revealed: the immanence of God shines through the language of transcendence; the mysterious through the miraculous. Had Christ come in another age to another people, the Gospel, written in different words and deeds, had been still the same Gospel.

¹Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 181, 72, 82, 102; Lex Credendi, p. 71; Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., II, 397; May, Ibid., p. 258.
the record of the same Power and Spirit, although in conflict with another class of oppositions and obstructions.¹

For the heart of Jesus' Gospel is His identification of Himself with the Son of Man, His presentation of Himself as the mediator between men and God. His power over men's lives is the mystical power of deep and universal sympathy with the individual soul and the moral power of righteousness; and He arrogates unto Himself the highest categories with which the mind is equipped for the glorification of a human being as men find in Him their Redeemer, their hope, their love, their rest, the Lord and Master of their souls. His life and death are a continuous protest against the abuse of externalism, of priesthood, of ritual, of the Altar, a continuous emphasis on the spirit as opposed to the letter, on the end as controlling the means; always He slights

and repulses the love of His human self and strives to win love and loyalty to His Spirit and to Himself only as embodying that Spirit.¹

In this sense Jesus is the Sacrament of sacraments, the incarnation of incarnations, revealing in its purity and transcendence the Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of Life, protesting against those fundamental corruptions common to every religion, against perverse and unspiritual conceptions of God and the soul, of Heaven and Hell, of priesthood and sacrifice, of sacrament and ceremony, of sin, prayer, atonement, repentance, asceticism; asserting those principles which are ever struggling against the principles of religious decadence: and so possessing a uniqueness not only of a master as over against his disciples but of God as over against man, of the Mediator as over against the prophet, despite the immanent presence of God in the conscience of man. And this uniqueness He imparts to us in the sacramental act of righteousness, revealing in the willing subordination, the complete subjection,

¹Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 75, 77, 82; 96, 97, 98, 102, 155, 180-1, 183-4, 282; Lex Credendi, pp. 22-3; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 290; The Church and the Future, p. 48; . . . Letters, p. 93; Quick, Ibid., p. 33.
of the human soul to the Divine Will, the Infinite Spirit, the moral manifestation of that mysterious adoption of which He is the Mediator.¹

Sacraments.

Consequently Tyrrell insists in like degree on the naturalness of the Sacraments, that they are as rites and ceremonies akin to all the ritual and ceremony of humanity, finding their origin both in rites and ceremonies which had preceded them and in prosaic and utilitarian acts and usages peculiar to the age and circumstances in which they were instituted; finding their expression in other rites and ceremonies peculiar to other ages and circumstances.² They are not the Sacraments carefully instituted by the historic Jesus, nor carefully embodying His historic

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acts; neither are they mere reminders of a moral fellowship with one another, established by Jesus. Rather, they are Sacraments which were born among men and which live among men, reflecting our labor, our struggles, our disappointments, our sorrows, our ignorance in the humanity of Christ. And as materially they are the products of particular ages and circumstances, they are largely different from the matter upon which, and the conditions under which, we must shape our devotion. They are not the unique and perfect satisfaction of every devotional capacity for sacrifice; nor are they the fulfilment of every prayer, the revelation of every necessary grace. And to seek such satisfaction and fulfilment in their mechanical use is to abuse and deny their true efficacy. Indeed, for those who look to this life in its purely human presentment, they are not Sacraments at all but

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1Hughes, Ibid., 286; Moyes, Ibid., p. 75; McClure, Ibid., 197; Mackintosh, Ibid., 188.

2Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 80; Oil and Wine, p. 161.

3Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 43; External Religion, pp. 76-7; Lex Orandi, p. 39.
rites and ceremonies taken over from other faiths, distorted, and rendered capable of unusual effects by an abnormal conception of the Divine Presence.

But the Sacraments were not intended to impose upon us a final and absolute symbolism but to be the means of that grace which is the love and Spirit of God, of that love and Spirit as incarnate in the body of humanity.\(^1\) We recognize it as acting upon the symbolism, the ritual and ceremony of every age but particularly upon that associated with the life of Jesus, confirming, deepening, extending, renewing, unifying, intensifying, developing and exalting according to its own exigencies and interests.\(^2\) And we know it as the Spirit of the mystical Christ, that love in which we have been true and obedient even unto death and have been exalted and given a name above every name; in which we have become members

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one of another and as making one with Christ and
the whole Church have taken part in the great
interchange of love between God and redeemed hu-
manity; in which as members of the Church united
with Christ we are bound together with God in a
new bond: 'I in them and thou in Me, that they
may be made perfect in one.' For we are related
to the Divine Will and Presence not only by the
love of personal dearness and intimacy but also
by the love like unto that of human consanguin-
ity, the love which is ours through our solidar-
ity with others; we share in that love which
the whole Church as united with Christ offers
unto God and in that with which He in return em-
braces the whole Church.\textsuperscript{1} And of this love the
Sacraments are the means. Through them the
Church measures out and distributes the riches
of Divine love and favor bestowed upon her cor-
porately.\textsuperscript{2}

But the main fruit of the Sacraments is not
natural but supernatural. They are effectual

\textsuperscript{1}Lex Orandi, pp. 28-30, 39-40, 41-2, 44;
Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 79, 267-8;
Lobstein, Ibid., p. 76; Programme of Modernism:
Pascendi Gregis, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{2}Lex Orandi, pp. 31, 40-1, 43; Pascendi
Gregis, Programme of Modernism, p. 211.
pledges of participation in a Heavenly Kingdom, storing up potential glory in the soul which shall be liberated by death, making us sons of God and members one of another. In them, a change—a veritable transsubstantiation—is effected by an irruption of the transcendental into our natural being and we are united with one another and with God in the eternal life of the Spirit of Christ.¹

This moral and mystical grace is revealed and transmitted in the external forms and ceremonies of the Sacraments. These are the valuable aids of the Spirit, the vehicles and agents of divine grace which bring down to us the stream of inexhaustible revelation and love. They themselves are limited according to the limitations of this world, yet they do not limit the transmission of God's grace to us.²

The Church

The Church, even as the Sacraments which

1Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 52, 72-3, 80; Lex Orandi, p. 41; Oil and Wine, p. 161; The Autobiography and Life..., I, 167-8; May, Ibid., p. 124.

2Lobstein, Ibid., pp. 74-5; Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 266.
is for Tyrrell a creature of two worlds. As a visible institution it was human, fallible, imperfect, in need of correction and criticism, liable to the governmental vices of every monarchical constitution. But the flesh was the clothing of the spirit and in its spirit he saw the mystical Christ, Christ united with that redeemed humanity in the midst of which we live and move and grow.¹ It was not that Church instituted by Jesus the Christ in His life-time on earth. Nor was it that institution which moved unerringly through the ages of history guided by an absolute revelation and possessed of an infinite authority, conferring eternal life upon men and women.² Rather it is a natural expression of our humanity, a changing manifestation of our human relations to one another in our finite world.

As such it is a community of human feelings, wills, ideas, words, acts, organizing and adapting


itself to human conditions in the light and
strength of human intelligence, employing natu­
ral means of instruction and discipline, of de­
votion and authority, endlessly experimenting.1
Its offices, sacraments, dogmas, laws, and pen­
ances have been evolved in that experimentation,
and have been shaped from the materials and ele­
ments of human life.2 Its members include the
wise and foolish, the learned and ignorant, the
saintly and sinful, the active and passive, the
practical, intellectual, aesthetic, puritan.3
Its systematizations conserve that which is past
and anticipate that which is to be, hold fast to
that which is near and gather up the distant,
maintain freedom and establish authority, all as
the fruit of a process of selection and modifica­
tion accomplished in the struggle of the old
against the new, the individual against the group,

1Lex Orandi, pp. 30, 42-3, 211; Oil and
Wine, pp. 143-4; Lex Credendi, pp. 173-4; The
Church and the Future, pp. 54-5, 66-7, 71, 73-4,
95; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 51-2, 260;
"Medievalism and Modernism," p. 311.

2The Church and the Future, pp. 73-4; Lex
Credendi, p. 174; Through Scylla and Charybdis,
pp. 44-7.

3Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 28-9, 53,
55-60; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp.
277-8; Oil and Wine, pp. 72-3.
the Church against the world, and, more intimately, in the more or less discordant assertion of the competing claims of intellect, feelings, senses;\(^1\) this process proceeds through fluctuation and error, through deviation and recovery and reaction laboriously and imperceptibly after the slow but sure fashion of the natural, subordinating unto itself both fact and theory, matter and intelligence.\(^2\) Its diseases have arisen invariably in some exaggerated emphasis upon some single one of its elements, an exaggeration born of a marriage with unhealthy and evil elements of growing civilization and as such an inevitable part of its existence;\(^3\) its truth is that of an unending process of approximation, of a way and a
direction born of a unity and continuity with the principles, ends, aims of the life and mission of Christ Himself as contained in the Gospels and in Christendom during its pre-institutional and fluid stage when it was yet vibrating and radiant in the glow of its first fervor.¹

But these 'beggarly elements', this visible institution, constitute not simply a school or society; rather they are the sacramental elements, the means, through which we may enter into the Spirit of Christ, into His Holiness and Catholicism, His devotion and authority; the Church is the Mystery and Sacrament of Christ.² As a mystery and sacrament it is the Indwelling Christ not in the whole body of its visible membership truly but at least in the unanimity of its saintliness,³ not in the whole range of its devotions

¹The Church and the Future, pp. 64-5, 72-4, 104; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 58-60; Medievalism, p. 157; "Medievalism and Modernism," pp. 314-5.

²Lex Orandi, pp. 42-3; Oil and Wine, pp. 142-5; The Church and the Future, pp. 54, 74, 103; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 275-6; Medievalism, pp. 116-7; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 76.

³Essays..., pp. 109-10, 116-7; Lex Orandi, pp. 208-9, 212-3; The Church and the Future, pp. 48-9; Medievalism, p. 78; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 384.
but in that complexus of devotion which fosters the communion of saints,\(^1\) not in the fullness of its assumed authority but in the authority which fosters and belongs to Holy Catholicism.\(^2\) Thus, it manifests the Spirit of Christ only in those institutions and practices which reflect a free agreement in thought, feeling, will of those united with Christ in every age, a free agreement arrived at in conflict with the passive and conservative majority;\(^3\) it speaks with the authority of Christ's Spirit only so far as its dogmas and institutions are imposed in a relative jurisdiction as a moral and mystical imperative in the light of Christ;\(^4\) it prays in the faith and love of Christ only so far as its devotions escape individualism and externalism.

\(^1\)Lex Credendi, p. 171; Lex Orandi, pp. 62, 210.

\(^2\)Lex Credendi, pp. 170-1; The Church and the Future, pp. 38, 54, 95.

\(^3\)The Church and the Future, pp. 50, 72-3, 95, 101; Lex Orandi, pp. 38, 38, 40-1; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 261, 368-9; Medievalism, pp. 82, 131-2.

\(^4\)Lex Orandi, pp. 30-1; Essays..., pp. 117-8; The Church and the Future, pp. 102-4, 152-3, 155; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 368-70; Medievalism, pp. 65.
and express the unity and continuity and inwardness of communion with Christ. For the Spirit of Christ is that of the Kingdom's Son of Man and He came not to destroy but to fulfill. His is the Spirit of the Kingdom and as such He demands the breaking down of all barriers between God and man, between man and man; the gathering of the whole spirit-world into one communion, the final fusion of many discordant hearts and wills into one divine harmony of truth, love and aim wherein is holiness. The spiritual Church and her children were latent in Him.

This sacramental significance of the Church, this moral and mystical Catholicism, is, for Tyrrell, an essential aspect of Christianity protesting against both the auto-centricism and the schismatic tendencies of the visible Churches.

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1 The Church and the Future, pp. 70-73; Lex Credendi, pp. 170-1; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 24-5, 364-6, 367-8; Lex Orandi, pp. 62-3, 209-10, 213-5; Medievalism, pp. 131-2, 134-5, 163.

2 Lex Credendi, pp. 162-5; Medievalism, pp. 54-6, 74; External Religion, pp. 72, 74; Lex Orandi, p. 29; H.D.A. Major, "The Case for Modernism," The Nineteenth Century, CIV (Nov. 1928), 633-4.

3 Lex Orandi, p. 215; "Medievalism and Modernism," p. 311; Petre, ...Life, II, 404, 406; May, Ibid., 187; McGiffert, Ibid., 41; Major, Ibid., 633-4.
affirming an interest and concern in every thought, will, and feeling of humanity and its world,\(^1\) exalting a communion and union of the Christian experience.\(^2\) In it, he faces or is faced by the question of the necessity for the visible Church organization. For he finds constantly the failures of existing institutions and even their contradictions.\(^3\) Thus, he comes to declare the relative and not the absolute necessity of the visible Church;\(^4\) the necessity of remaining in it and clinging to it as long as one finds any blessing or retains any hope in it,\(^5\) yet asserting the possibility of a level of enthusiasm, which he terms the 'heroic', which abounded in the

\(^{1}\)Lex Orandi, p. 215; Lex Credendi, pp. 51, 167, 173-4; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 22-4; "Medievalism and Modernism," pp. 312-3.

\(^{2}\)Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 81; McGiffert, Ibid., p. 39; Fawkes, Ibid., 19.

\(^{3}\)Essays..., pp. 115, 117-8; Letter as quoted in...Life, II, 406; Letter as quoted by May, Ibid., 190; Fawkes, Ibid., 16-7, 19; Petre, Von Hügel and Tyrrell, p. 155.


\(^{5}\)The Church and the Future, p. 153; Essays ..., p. 110; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 81; ...Letters, pp. 111-2; Letter, as quoted in ...Life, II, 408.
pre-institutional stage of Christianity, and which rendered the individual independent of social help.\(^1\) However, he does not abandon the emphasis upon Sacramentalism but finds the visible element rather in the unperceived body of the invisible Church dwelling within the world of humanity, in that multitude of saints obedient unto death in leavening the world in the leaven of Christ.\(^2\) Protestantism.

For Tyrrell, Protestantism, like many another heresy, was simply the exaggeration and over-emphasis of a long-neglected truth.\(^3\) As a revolt against the excessive externalizing of religion in which faith came to stand for correct theology, holiness for a routine of practices, the Church for a policy of a purely secular type governed by methods of moral, and indirectly physical,

\(^1\)The Church and the Future, pp. 66-7, 79; Quoted in ...Life, II, 348, 413, 417; McClure, Ibid., 188; "A Catholic Crapsey," The Nation, 84: p. 100; Letters, p. 171.

\(^2\)Lex Orandi, p. 30; Quoted in ...Life, II, 408; McGiffert, Ibid., 43; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 25, 37-8; Essays..., p. 115-116; Letters, p. 30.

\(^3\)The Church and the Future, p. 121; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 77-8.
coercion; and as a thirst for inwardness and more immediate communion between the soul and God, it sought to revive the original outpourings of the Spirit, the ecstasy of inspiration and of 'divine possession', the presence of spiritual originality, the prophetic power as the ground of authority and salvation, forgetting that inwardness is not a heroic degree of enthusiasm and inspiration but an exercise of intelligence and of free-will whereby the soul strives to raise itself God-wards, to make itself what it was made by grace in those brief moments of prophetic illumination; forgetting the collective mind of the Church, the social standard of right thinking, right feeling, right speaking, right acting concerning the Spirit of Christ, the corrective of individual eccentricity and fanaticism: and thus succeeded only in reproducing the dissensions and confusions incident to the enfeeblement of the waning Spirit and its failure to overwhelm the individual personalities of its instruments.¹ As a revolt against the

¹The Church and the Future, pp. 56-60, 99, 117-21; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 54, 124-5; External Religion, pp. 64-5; A. L. Lilley, "George Tyrrell," p. 821; McGiffert, Ibid., p. 41; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 67; Quick, Ibid., p. 27.
abuse of living authority, and as a thirst for liberty, originality, and personality, it sought to re-establish as the rule of faith and practice the record of the earliest and least developed phase of the Christian Spirit contained in the New Testament, misunderstanding its own spirit in accepting the current valuation of theological truth which viewed the New Testament as adequate philosophically, scientifically, and historically in the realms of human understanding, in accepting the purely ecclesiastical and non-Scriptural doctrine of Scriptural infallibility, in denying life and development to the Christian spirit and making of the Past an inflexible rule for the Present and Future: and thus succeeded only in denying all rights to living authority and affirming the dead letter as an authority equally tyrannical, though less decisive and intelligible.\footnote{The Church and the Future, pp. 37, 118, 119-20, 121-2; Lex Credendi, pp. 47-54; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 18-9, 23, 220-1; Essays ..., pp. 105-6; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 81; Rashdall, Ibid., p. 107; Mecklin, Ibid., pp. 235-6; McGiffert, Ibid., pp. 44-5; Quick, Ibid., pp. 27, 31.} As a revolt against the superstitious use of symbolism and sacramentalism, and as a thirst for purity and truth, it sought to establish
worship in the highest life of man, in the intellect and moral sense, to the denial of the lower, the formal and mechanical, the sensual and aesthetic, forgetting that the highest cannot live without the lower, that their union is a necessity of life: and thus succeeded only in establishing a tendency which would take Christianity out of the category of religion altogether and confine it to that of ethical philosophy.¹ So, Tyrrell found Protestantism both narrowing and flattening, antagonistic both to that catholicity and that mysticism, that supernatural mysticism, in which he believed as the very heart of religion, notwithstanding the fact that Protestantism had come to recognize a value in the social community, and that there existed within it a mysticism which he did not find in Catholicism;² so, he opposed it in a sympathy embracing at once its self and its

¹The Church and the Future, pp. 122-4; Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 28, 30, 35-6; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 39-42; Lex Credendi, pp. 38-40; ...Letters, pp. 199-200; Mackintosh, Ibid., pp. 186-7; Osborne, Ibid., pp. 259-60; Quick, Ibid., pp. 33, 36.

²Through Scylla and Charybdis, pp. 23, 126-7, 334; Lex Credendi, pp. 38-41; Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 277-8; ...Letters, pp. 50-1, 89, 199-200; May, Ibid., p. 251; Tyrrell, as quoted in Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., pp. 367, 398, 400.
opponents, which sought to establish the larger implications of its own spirit not in those conclusions it had reached and expressed but in a living catholicism and a supernatural mysticism.\(^1\) And yet his Catholicism struggled with contradictions which seemed impossible of resolution; his Catholic mysticism was interpreted as a tendency toward Protestantism.\(^2\)

Other Religions.

If we would understand Tyrrell's conception of other religions in relation to Christianity, we must remember both his fundamental insistence upon the naturalness and humanity of religion, its unity and continuity with all that is of nature and humanity; and his faith in the simplicity of the Spirit underlying and transcending this nature and humanity. For it was in these that he could envisage within the experience of faith an "abomination of desolation", a period wherein the believer might not find sanctuary in


any existing Church but must travel alone toward the promised land of a truly catholic Church; it was in these that he dreamed of a final synthesis, a catholicism transcending all historic antitheses between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Roman, Protestant and Catholic, Christian and unchristian. It was in this sense that, though he believed in the Church, he believed even more in humanity, in a humanity subject to the stern logic of history with its ruthless criticism of all unreality, and to the spread of knowledge which no selfish interest can hold back for long; in a humanity in which the spirit of Christ is working steadily, seeking itself from soul to soul across the confessional barriers of theological religion. It was in this sense that, though he believed in Catholicism, his was not a catholicism which could be used in the interests


3Medievalism, pp. 148, 169, 170; External Religion, p. 74; The Church and the Future, p. 156; Lex Credendi, p. 51; Letters, pp. 25, 30-1; Mecklin, Ibid., pp. 230-1.
of any particular Church.¹

According to these principles, Tyrrell rejected that conception of other religions which would condemn them as creations of the devil and would proceed to exclude and replace them root and branch,² yet he had no sympathy for that toleration of all religions which would find the essence of religion in some few truths upon which all agree and regard all else as accretion,³ or in a syncretism of the beliefs and practices of all religions.⁴

Rather he recognized fully that other religions were separate, independent organisms fulfilling particular destinies. They were not moving toward but away from sameness to one another and no synthesis could be accomplished by any composite collection of beliefs gathered from them all.⁵ But he felt also that every religion was

¹Fawkes, Ibid., pp. 5, 16-7; Gates, Ibid., pp. 50-1.

²The Church and the Future, pp. 136-7; Medievalism, p. 147; Lex Credendi, p. 97.


an expression of the One Spirit of God, some lower, some higher, yet all real and valid expressions.\(^1\) Accordingly, a synthesis of religions might be found in some one religion which attained fully the subordination of its material embodiment to its spiritual truth, thus gaining a capacity for material catholicity in which it could comprehend nearly all the principal advantages of other religions even as it surpassed them in spiritual significance; the religion of this achievement would become the principal, and, at last, the only religion of the world by its natural survival as the fittest, and its spiritual uniqueness.\(^2\)

Thus, the right of lower religions to exist side by side with the highest might be accepted in the pedagogic functions of these religions in preparing men for the highest. For to cast the full seed of the spirit on an unprepared soil is to waste it; and even, perhaps, to rob that soil

\(^1\)Lex Credendi, p. 97; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 23; The Church and the Future, pp. 136-9; ...Letters, pp. 17-8, 21.

\(^2\)Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 234-5, 253; The Church and the Future, p. 138; ...Letters, p. 18; Gates, Ibid., pp. 50-1.
of productivity. As there are persons of less and greater capacity, of less and greater spiritual insight, these religions have their place.¹

Yet it remains the function of the highest religion to prepare all men for that which is highest as far as it is possible, not violently nor outwardly but inwardly and morally according to its essential spirit. This must be the end of its teaching and the essence of its missionary effort, seeking not uniformity of practice but unity of spirit.²

Of this highest religion, Tyrrell conceived Christianity to be the manifestation. He believed that in Christ Jesus the complete subordination of the material to the spiritual had been attained and that this full manifestation of the Spirit was contained in Christian Catholicism,³ not that of any particular Church, perhaps,⁴

²The Church and the Future, pp. 137-8; ...Letters, p. 13.
⁴Christianity at the Cross-roads, p. 280; Letters, pp. 25, 30-1; Loisy, Memoires, II, 395.
but logically to become incarnate in one of the older, wider, more chaotic, more spontaneous religions whose chaos may contain more than is needed for the cosmos of law and order but whose excrescences and spurious developments may be cut off with greater ease than new characteristics may be assumed by a narrower and more rigid religion:¹ such a religion as Catholic Christianity.

¹Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 253-4, 278-9; Through Scylla and Charybdis, p. 369; Letters, p. 30.
CHAPTER IV

Criticism and Evaluation

of Tyrrell's Religious Thought.

Orthodox Christianity--Roman Objections.

The criticism and evaluation of George Tyrrell's religious philosophy has centered about the main contention of that philosophy: the conception of the indwelling Christ.\(^1\) It has taken form according to the characteristic emphases of orthodox Christianity, Roman and Protestant, and according to the accepted principles of philosophy and history.\(^2\)

Thus, it is regarded, by Romans particularly, as endangering the Christian truth of the transcendence of God, not in one or more of its

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elements but in its treatment of the whole range of Christian belief; yet, of course, its ideas of revelation, of sin and grace, of traditional dogma and of religious authority and its Christology have been individually considered. And it must be admitted at least that in its critically destructive principles regarding reason and the rational mechanism upon which the Christian truth of transcendence has been upheld it does endanger it. It might even be admitted that in its constructive principles there are elements which endanger the truth of divine transcendence and risk the creation of a religious humanism or

1Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church, p. 125; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 56-7; Inge, Ibid., p. 164; Hardy, Modernism, pp. 12-3; McClure, Ibid., p. 197; May, Ibid., pp. 15, 17, 199, 217-8, 229.


naturalism. For certainly the maintenance of the catholic element, the world-embracing inclusiveness, of Tyrrell's philosophy risks such a possibility. But largely the validity of such a criticism is dependent upon the degree in which the rational mechanism is necessary to the maintenance of the truth of divine transcendence, upon the degree in which it expresses the Christian truth of the transcendence of God. For undoubtedly Tyrrell is concerned to maintain all the essential elements of Christianity, of Christology and revelation and sin as well as of authority. He recognizes the value of a standing-point, of something which in relation to man is absolute and real. He asserts the uniqueness

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1Hardy, Ibid., pp. 24-5; McClure, Ibid., p. 190; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 46-7; Quick, Ibid., p. 38.

2Vidler, Ibid., p. 125; Hardy, Ibid., p. 45; Rashdall, Ideas and Ideals, p. 17; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 46-7; Inge, Faith and Its Psychology, pp. 176-7.


of Jesus, the abiding Christliness. He confesses the reality of sin and the fact of revelation. And he accepts submissively and continuously the presence of a catholic authority.

Tyrrell's religious philosophy is regarded also by Romans as endangering the conception of Catholicism in its theory of revelation and of religious authority. And certainly it is true that Tyrrell himself saw no future save in revolution for Roman Catholicism. It may even be contended that his ideal of catholicism struggles with limitations and contradictions which it

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1Loisy, Memoires, III, 129-30; Osborne, Ibid., p. 263; Tyrrell, letter in The Autobiography and Life..., II, 397; May, Ibid., p. 256; Smyth, Ibid., p. 54.


3Delmont, Modernisme et modernistes...(Paris, 1909) p. 33; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 78; Mackintosh, Ibid., p. 192.

4Loisy, Memoires, Ill, 139; My Duel with the Vatican, pp. 274-5; Lebreton, Ibid., pp. 75-6; Leclerc, Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme (Paris, 1909), p. 190; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 46-7.

never succeeds in overstepping. But it is true, too, that Tyrrell recognized this, and, probably, rested his justification before criticism upon that law of failure which he saw working throughout all creation, and that struggling optimism and triumph which he found in Christ. The validity of such criticism depends on the degree in which a true catholicism can be achieved in the world, in what degree Tyrrell's idea, as a sacramental element, inspires a consciousness of spiritual catholicism.

Orthodox Christianity—Protestant Objections.

Again, more particularly by Protestants, Tyrrell's religious philosophy is regarded as endangering the historical reality of the Incarnation as a unique revelation of God together with that

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2Fawkes, Ibid., p. 19; Corrance, Ibid., pp. 44-5; Tyrrell, Medievalism, p. 157.

3Tyrrell, quoted in The Autobiography and Life..., II, 408, 415; Letters, p. 206-7; Essays..., pp. 51-8; Young, Ibid., p. 367; May, Ibid., p. 203.

4Fawkes, Ibid., p. 60; Inge, Ibid., p. 46; Loisy, Memoires, III, 129-30; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 67.
ideal of righteousness, that moral character taught and exhibited by Jesus.¹ And it is certainly true that his extreme depreciation of the ethical teachings of Jesus as incidental to His other-worldly character, and his violent disparagement of the understanding and its categories as materialistic and temporal lessen the significance of rational and historical distinctions, even as they weaken the whole structure of ethical and historical religion.² Again, his emphasis upon the unity and continuity of the humanity of Jesus with all humanity, with all its accompanying elimination of the miraculous and supernatural and its practical evaluation of sin;


²Quick, Ibid., pp. 33, 36, 38, 43-4; McClure, Ibid., pp. 174-5; Burke, Ibid., p. 525; Lunn, Ibid., p. 69; Lebreton, Ibid., pp. 93, 99; Hardy, Ibid., pp. 12, 15, 24-5; Rashdall, Ibid., p. 141; May, Ibid., p. 17; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 46-7; Inge, Ibid., pp. 144, 156; Riviere, Ibid., pp. 273-4; Petre, The Autobiography and Life..., II, 179-80, 402.
together with his emphasis upon the Spirit of Christ indwelling in the Christian community, with its accompanying regard for the unity and continuity of present beliefs and practices, serve to establish nature and history, faith and practice as comprehensive unities and to ignore the relative freedom of their parts. Yet, Tyrrell neither abandons the importance of facts nor the uniqueness of Jesus, though he finds their religious truth in their mediation of the spiritual life. And his religious experience remains pre-eminently moral. The validity of such criticism, thus, depends on the degree in which and

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the manner in which historical facts mediate religious experience.¹

Strictures of Religious Philosophy.

Thus, the chief criticism of Tyrrell's religious philosophy lies within the realm of philosophy itself and assumes two forms: that which examines its primary contentions, and that which considers its omissions and rejections. The first questions chiefly the capacity of his philosophy to escape pantheism and to establish a standing-point in the movement of life;² the second questions its denial of reason from the spiritual life as a fundamental violation of that life, as the establishment of a false dualism and pessimism and an encouragement of pragmatism.³ And certainly such questions must be considered. For there is


³Inge, Ibid., pp. 156-7, 159, 169, 170; Faith and its Psychology, pp. 176-7; Young, Ibid., p. 367; McClure, Ibid., p. 175; Salter, Ibid., pp. 37, 39; Gates, Ibid., pp. 43, 47; Rickaby, Ibid., pp. 16-7; Vidler, Ibid., pp. 169, 174; Hardy, Ibid., pp. 12, 15, 27-8; Rashdall, Ibid., pp. 17, 105.
much in Tyrrell's apprehension of the 'indwelling Christ' which seems to merge all distinctions and reduce God to the highest fulfilment of humanity's natural powers;¹ and the lacunae in his philosophy revealed in its inadequacy to handle certain bodies of fact suggest a violent and impossible dualism and an evident pragmatism.² But we must remember, also, that Tyrrell was concerned to treat nature and history as wholes, and to find truth in their particulars only as parts of the whole;³ that he declared a standing-point in the moral and mystical consciousness of Jesus;⁴ that he bridged the gap between reason and faith, fact and fiction by subordinating the world of fact to

¹May, Ibid., pp. 227, 229, 256; Tyrrell, quoted by May, Ibid., p. 184; Santayana, Ibid., pp. 46-7; Lebreton, Ibid., pp. 75-6, 93; Hardy, Ibid., pp. 23, 24-5, 26; Rashdall, Ibid., p. 186; Gates, Ibid., p. 51; McClure, Ibid., pp. 174-5; Young, Ibid., p. 367; Tyrrell, letter in The Autobiography and Life..., II, 398; von Hügel, "Father Tyrrell, some memorials...," p. 250.


³Fawkes, Ibid., p. 22; Corrance, Ibid., p. 40; Lilley, Ibid., p. 20; Tyrrell, letter quoted by May, Ibid., pp. 218, 220-1.

⁴Corrance, Ibid., p. 48; Loisy, Memoires, III, 129-30; Osborne, Ibid., p. 263; Tyrrell, ...Letters, p. 230.
that of value;¹ that he did not complete his
synthesis and regarded its achievement as re-
quiring in all probability radical changes in
its particulars.² And thus, while he may not
have escaped pantheism and pragmatism, it may
well be that his constant struggle against them
in his spiritual life³ marked a direction in
which escape lay—the same direction marked by
the dogma of the two natures in Christ—though
his theism might have rested upon a subjective
revolution⁴ rather than an objective distinct-
ness, and his metaphysics upon the mediation of
human experience⁵ rather than its explanation.

¹Mecklin, The Survival Value of Christianity,
pp. 236-7; Tyrrell, quoted by May, Ibid., pp. 220-
1; Bernard Iddings Bell, Post-Modernism... (New
York, 1926), p. 7; McClure, Ibid., pp. 174-5;

²Dell, Ibid., p. 552; Will Spens, Belief and
Practice, p. 72; Petre, The Autobiography and
Life..., II, 450; Tyrrell, ...Letters, p. 119.

³Henri Bremond, quoted by Loisy, George Tyr-
rell and Henri Bremond, p. 44; Tyrrell, ...Let-
ters, pp. 34, 35, 116; Vidler, Ibid., p. 169;
Gates, Ibid., pp. 44-5.

⁴Tyrrell, letter in The Autobiography and
Life..., II, 397; Quick, Ibid., pp. 110, 111;
Rasdall, Ibid., pp. 105, 107; A. C. McDuffett,
The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas (New York, 1915),
p. 210; A. Aliotta, in Science, Religion, and Re-

⁵Inge, Outspoken Essays, pp. 157-9; Gates,
Ibid., pp. 44-5; Spens, Ibid., pp. 41, 68, 69;
Lebreton, Ibid., p. 67.
Naturally, certain aspects of his historical bases were subjected to critical attack, particularly his emphasis upon Christ Jesus' apocalypticism and his identification of catholicism with the Roman Church. The truth of this criticism cannot be denied; it can be understood, however, that Tyrrell was emphasizing that element of Jesus' historical teaching and faith which, to his mind, constituted the expression of His Christliness, and that historical institution in which he himself saw the seed of catholic fulfilment.

Recognized Values in Tyrrell's Religious Philosophy

Tyrrell's contribution to religious thought revolves round his conception of the indwelling Christ even as does the opposition to his ideas;


3 Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-roads, pp. 56-60; Fawkes, Ibid., pp. 5, 17; Sterrett, Modernism in Religion (New York, 1922), p. 175.


5 Petre, Ibid., II, 418-9; Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, Ibid., p. 419.
it is the outcome of his reverence for, and belief in, the validity of the religious experience of the whole man. In all that he said, he was asserting and emphasizing the importance of seeing God here and now.¹

Thus, with regard to dogma, Tyrrell made the suggestive claim that its fundamental significance lies in view of its proved value as a guide to religious experience, a significance paralleling that of science rather than metaphysics. Accordingly, theology must so take account of the value of any doctrine, and in so far as any system of thought exists which has been primarily determined by such experience, and which incorporates and synthesizes into its system the vital ideas in other religions, that system may legitimately be regarded as our truest available outlook.² No longer is apologetic mere intellectual fence and defence but it becomes instead living interpretation.³

¹Bell, "Father George Tyrrell," p. 1142; Osborne, Ibid., pp. 259-60; Lobstein, Ibid., pp. 82-3; Rashdall, Ibid., p. 107.

²Will Spens, "A Study," pp. 265, 266; Belief and Practice, pp. 22-3, 41, 68-9, 71; M.E. Dowson, The Church and Modern Men, pp. 94, 98; Bethune-Baker, Ibid., pp. 9-10; Coût, Ibid., p.105.

And that religious experience of which it is the interpretation consists, according to Tyrrell, in a vital impulse as known to history, a strong and persistent activity and movement through the centuries, manifesting itself in a continuous embodying and re-embodying of itself in words and acts and ideas peculiar to the varied societies and circumstances of history.¹ This idea of the religious manifestation in history is the same as that employed by Loisy in his apologetic;² but Tyrrell has modified it in two important respects as he has recognized that Loisy justified too much.³ First, he has identified this vital impulse as known to history with the moral and mystical consciousness of humanity, particularly as expressed in the New Testament.⁴ Second, he

¹M. D. Petre, Modernism, its failures and its fruits, p. 54; Major, English Modernism, pp. 31-2; Quick, Ibid., pp. 27, 49; Rashdall, Ibid., p. 107; Mecklin, Ibid., pp. 236-7; Inge, Outspoken Essays, pp. 144-5, 170.

²Inge, Lay Thoughts of a Dean, p. 350; Harris, Ibid., p. 35; Lilley, Modernism, p. 68; Loisy, The Gospel and the Church; Fawkes, Ibid., p. 63.


has recognized not only the possibility but the fact of human misinterpretation and the necessity of periodic returns to points of error in order to recover the true course of religious experience.¹

In relation to the identification of the Christian moral and mystical consciousness with the idea of a vital impulse in terms of history, Tyrrell has emphasized the necessity of a genuine humanity in Christ Jesus, a humanity subject to human limitations, on the ground that Christian experience postulates such a character in Christ.² This was a truth which traditional theology had obscured.³

Again, Tyrrell claimed that the truth of religion lay in its wholeness, that no one element of dogma or ceremony or law could be broken off and interpreted separately. He insisted that both the true sacramentalism and the true historicity of religions be determined after this

¹The Church and the Future, pp. 67, 118; Letters, p. 37; Inge, Ibid., p. 350; Loisy, Ibid., p. 127.

²Tyrrell, letter quoted by Petre, Ibid., p. 188; Vidler, Ibid., pp. 157, 163-4.

³Vidler, Ibid., p. 157; Petre, Ibid., pp. 400-1.
fashion. Equally he claimed that the true verdict of history as to its own nature lay in its wholeness, that the authority of history could be granted to no single fact.\(^1\) For he himself found in such wholeness a reality and unity of religious experience which comprehended the past, the present, and the future, the near and the distant, in its living being and which lighted each with the light of the whole.\(^2\)

But, perhaps, Tyrrell contributed most to religious thought neither in intellectual originality nor in theological emphases\(^3\) but in the practical religious importance of the spiritual significance with which he invested his essential thought.\(^4\) He had a peculiarly high sense of the value for character of thought as well

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\(^1\) Fawkes, Ibid., p. 22; Lilley, Modernism, p. 20; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 65; Quick, Ibid., p. 49, 27; Tyrrell, ...Letters, pp. 57, 90, 121.

\(^2\) Fawkes, Ibid., pp. 16-7; Bethune-Baker, Ibid., p. 15; Mecklin, Ibid., pp. 237-8; H. L. Stewart, Modernism, past and present, p. 324.

\(^3\) Bell, Ibid., p. 1142; Mecklin, Ibid., p. 240; Bremond, quoted by Loisy, George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond, p. 45; Harris, Ibid., p. 35; J. M. Sterrett, Modernism in Religion (New York, 1922) p. 175; Lobstein, Ibid., p. 77; Inge, Outspoken Essays, pp. 158-4.

\(^4\) Lobstein, Ibid., pp. 63, 78; Mecklin, Ibid., p. 240; Dell, Ibid., p. 545; "Father Tyrrell and Modernism," Spectator, 103 (July 31, 1909), p. 158.
as practices, and he thought of much that he wrote in this sense. Thus, the permanent value of his works may well consist in the help they afford in maintaining religious attitudes and in utilizing religious practices by those who have given up many of their traditional beliefs and who are, perhaps, also guilty of much vagueness in intellectual outlook.

Influence of George Tyrrell's Thought.

Though Tyrrell was relatively a late comer in the ranks of the Modernists, though he was cut off by the barriers of language from the main centers of Modernist activity, he possessed the mystical fervor, the literary artistry, the spirit of the revolutionary and the martyr, which, together with a good selection of translators, quickly caused the combat to center round him. His works were translated into Italian and French


3 Rivière, Le modernisme dans l'Eglise, pp. 85, 300-1.
and were read also in Germany as well as his English homeland, though his greater influence was in France and, more particularly, northern Italy. In England he counted among his disciples Miss Petre and Mr. H. C. Corrance and was an active influence upon Baron Friedrich von Hügel; yet the Modernist controversy was not extensive among Catholics in England. In Germany, Friedrich Heiler was an ardent disciple of his mysticism, his anti-intellectualism, his catholicism.

But the stern repressive measures of the Papal Encyclical which Modernism called forth, together with Tyrrell's premature death and the real weakness in the Modernist faith and fellowship, quickly drove underground or overcame the thoughts and attitudes associated with Tyrrell,

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2Rivière, Ibid., p. 397; Loisy, Mémoires, III, 127.

3Rivière, Ibid., p. 401; Maisie Ward, Ibid., II, 181; Delll, Ibid., p. 547.

save for the few staunch enough to endure the consequences and to carry on. However, there are those who claim that Modernism has permeated the Roman Communion and that the greater liberty of thought and word enjoyed by Catholics today may be traced to the fact that such men as George Tyrrell said them first and were excommunicated for it.

In England, George Tyrrell, by his many remarkable utterances, his character, and his tragic fate, drew the attention of various Anglicans to his position and arguments. And as their own Anglican ministry raised a problem similar to that of Roman Catholic Modernists, the problem of reconciling allegiance to the Catholic creeds and other Catholic elements retained in the Anglican Church with an innovating standpoint, they developed a Modernism which is analogous to that

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Tyrrell's influence upon this segment of Anglicanism is like that of Newman upon Roman Catholicism: as Newman's principles and points of view, those which he introduced and the adoption of which his writings widely stimulated, are the necessary basis of any presentation of Roman Catholicism which commands serious attention at the present time, so conceptions of dogma originally inspired by Tyrrell are playing an increasing part in Anglo-Catholic circles, afford as other conceptions do not afford a justification of a position which is at first sight peculiarly illogical or perverse; and do so as a by-product of work which is primarily concerned in providing an adequate defense of supernatural religion of a Catholic type, in face of modern difficulties.

It can hardly be said, however, that any Anglo-Catholic writers are, strictly speaking, disciples of Tyrrell. They found it necessary

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to reject too many of his views and to modify the
rest too much. Again, they have never become
in their Modernism a distinct set of men. Some
degree of Modernism has been accepted in each
of three sections of the Church, but very few
have been thoroughgoing or have followed the trail
to the end.2

Yet, from England this influence of George
Tyrrell has invaded the American Episcopal Church,
without losing all of its coherence and clear dis-
tinctness from liberalism.3 And the seeds of his
influence may be found within almost every denomina-
tion.4

It is interesting to note that Tyrrell influ-
enced the New Theology of Campbell in that Camp-
bell was vastly impressed and disturbed by Tyr-
rell's contention that the real Jesus, when viewed
in the light of the eschatological interpretation
of his life and teachings, was much more like the
Christ of Catholic orthodoxy than he was like the

1Spens, Ibid., pp. 264, 267; Major, English
Modernism, p. 21; Gardner, Ibid., p. 55.

2Gardner, Ibid., p. 11.

3Hall, Ibid., p. 19.

4Bethune-Baker, Ibid., p. 17; Papillon,
Conclusion.

Despite the early death of George Tyrrell, it may well be, as he himself wrote, that his work was done; and that work was to raise a question which he failed to answer. But in his faith it was more than that: it was to inspire others with the courage to seek and to enter upon that answer which he discerned from afar.

1W. M. Horton, Contemporary English Theology, p. 40.

2Tyrrell, ...Letters, pp. 117, 119.

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Consequently, Tyrrell quickly came into contact with those in the Church who were the interpreters of Newman and advocates of his methods in the problems of the day. Among these, Wilfred Ward was a chief figure. And Tyrrell found himself at first essentially in agreement with Ward's Newmanism and receptive of his sympathy in his own endeavor to transfer Catholic doctrine from the Scholastic to the modern mould.

The basic assumptions of Ward's position were: the vital truth of Christianity; its power of adaptability available in Newman's theory of development; the principle of change and growth in human science. In these, Ward was able to urge scientists to be content with a provisional liberty, a patient waiting upon theology for the appropriation of their results;

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1Petre, Ibid., II, 71, 98; M. Ward, Ibid., II, 165.
2Tyrrell, as quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 99; Petre, Ibid., II, 100-104.
3Wilfred Ward, quoted by M. Ward, Ibid., II, 322; Tyrrell, quoted by Petre, Ibid., II, 57.
5W. Ward, Ibid., 70, 81; R. E. Dell, "Wilfred Ward's Apologetics," The Nineteenth Century, XLVIII (July 1900), 132; Petre, Ibid., II, 103.