THE FEELING ASPECT
OF
THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

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Part I. Psychological

Chapter I.

INTRODUCTION. The proposition which it is the aim of this thesis to prove is that the prius of the religious consciousness is a feeling of dissatisfaction with all existent reality both physical and spiritual and a consequent urge towards fellowship with the Supreme Cause of all things for the purpose of solving the contradictions, limitations and failures of life.

Having traced the origin of religion to this vague feeling of dissatisfaction it will be then necessary to prove that feeling is the primary element in consciousness from which its other elements derive. This will lead to an examination of the nature of consciousness from two different standpoints: firstly, from the standpoint of the three irreducible states of mind, and, secondly, from the standpoint of the instincts. These two investigations will establish the fact that feeling is primary in consciousness.

Instincts develop into sentiments which are organised round three main sentiments, and form the system known as personality. These three main sentiments are three irreducible phases of one ultimate sentiment, namely, love, which is feeling par excellence, and the ultimate metaphysic of mind and being. The sentiment, as
the word implies is regulated by the element of feeling in it, so that the conception of the sentiment corroborates the contention that feeling is regulative in mind and personality.

After demonstrating the regulative function of feeling in mind and personality, further demonstration of this fact will be furnished by a discussion of the relation of feeling to reason and will in the apprehension of divine realities.

Thereafter the nature of communion with God which is the essence and goal of religion will be considered. This communion issues from the supreme sentiment of love which is the basis of both human and divine personality and activity.

The final chapter will be devoted to recapitulation and a final vindication of the above argument.

1. The Definition of Religion.

Most writers on religion are perplexed with the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition of religion, so much so that one writer (Professor C.C.J. Webb, "Group Theories of Religion", p. 59; quoted from Waterhouse, "Philosophy of Religion", Epworth Press, London: 1923) concludes that religion "cannot be defined". Another writer (Höffnung, "Philosophy of Religion", Eng. Trans: 1903, p.109) remarks that the definition of religion is a "matter of taste", In contrast/
contrast to the above, a third writer, Professor Leuba ("A Psychological Study of Religion", New York, MacMillan: 1912, Appendix) enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from forty-eight great men, and adds two of his own to complete the fifty.

Professor Pratt in his book, "The Religious Consciousness" (New York, MacMillan: 1924, p. 1) says: "All definitions of religion are more or less arbitrary, and should be taken as postulates rather than as axioms. In this sense I shall myself propose a tentative definition of religion, not at all as a final or complete statement, nor because I think it of any great importance, but because I intend to write a book about religion, and it, therefore, seems only fair that I should tell the reader in advance, not what the word means, but what I am going to mean by the word". Farther on (op. cit., p. 3) he says: "Again let me admit, or rather insist, that this, like all other definitions of religion, is more or less arbitrary. Whosoever wishes to do so has certainly a perfectly logical right to give a narrower or much broader definition of the term, provided he is willing to take the consequences". It may be here possible to understand the writer's meaning as an effort to disclaim infallibility for his definition, but the flavour of arbitrariness is disappointing in a serious discussion, as the reader ought to feel that the writer had been compelled to adopt his definition by the logic of facts, after due consideration of all the facts of the case. A discussion of religion on such an arbitrary footing, as the writer proposes, might be an exercise in dialectics/
dialectics for the writer, but it might not be edifying to the reader; that would depend on the adequacy of the definition or conception of religion with which the writer set out.

In spite, however, of this initial lightheartedness with regard to the impossibility of arriving at a complete definition Professor Pratt gives a definition of his own, and most writers on religion do the same; they propose a definition of their own which, though not proposed as final, still embodies what, in view of all the facts seems to them to be the essential notes of religion. With regard to these definitions, however, Professor Pratt says: (op.cit,p.1.) "But the striking thing about these definitions is, that, persuasive as many of them are, each .... seems quite unpersuaded by any but his own. And, when doctors disagree, what are the rest of us going to do? Can we be justified in talking about religion at all?" If the situation is as above represented, then the protest is justifiable. If, according to Professor Webb, religion "cannot be defined," then it is practically the unknowable, and if, according to Professor Höffding, religion is a "matter of taste," then it is so infinitely varied that a science of it is well nigh impossible.

But the situation as regards our knowledge of, and power to define, religion ought not to be so hopeless as above represented. Religion ought no longer to be regarded as the unpredictable, because now for fully a century a great deal of specialised study of different aspects of religion has been done, resulting in the production of a great mass of material for the student of religion. In producing this material different schools with different methods
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in different countries have been engaged. The British School of Anthropology, the Dutch School of the Comparative Study of Religions, the American School of the Religious Convert, the German School of Mysticism and the "A priori" Faculty, the French School of Sociology, the Viennese School of Psycho-analysis, and the Swiss School of Analytical Psychology, all have made invaluable contributions toward the formation of a science and philosophy of religion.

But it is just this plethora of collected material that has led to the confusion of the writers above referred to, and it has made the subject of religion the happy hunting-ground for collators of facts pertaining to religion, most of whom view these facts from the narrow angle of their own particular study, and end by producing a one-sided definition which omits more than it contains. Thus the student of anthropology will produce a definition which leaves out what is characteristic of the higher religions; the sociologist will equate religion with something social; the philosopher will equate it with values, and so on. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the collation of facts is one thing, and their interpretation is another, and that what is required is a discipline that can gather up the results of all the sciences, and use them in the interpretation of religion. One distinguished Professor used to say that what was required was men who could look over the garden wall, and see what the man in the next field was doing. But quite as much as the comprehensive discipline that will gather up the fruit of all/
all the gardens there is required for the interpretation of religion personal appreciation or personal experience of religion.

It may be that religion is of such a nature that it will not yield its secret to any but the person who combines with the comprehensive discipline a first-class experience of what religion can be. For example, "caeteris paribus", the person, who studies religion with a mechanistic view of mind, is not likely to get to the heart of religion, as soon as the student to whom religion is a vital experience. Professor Leuba ("The Psychology of Religious Mysticism", Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd: 1925, p.325) concludes his exhaustive work on mysticism with a chapter on the "Disappearance of Belief", in which he displays a table of statistic showing the relative success in the sciences of believers and unbelievers in a personal God according to an investigation carried out in the United States which is quoted to prove the author's contention. The report says: "I do not see any way to avoid the conclusion that disbelief in a personal God, and in immortality, is directly proportional to abilities making for success in the science in question", that is to say, belief in a personal God is a hindrance to success according to Professor Leuba. This conclusion is due to the fact that Professor Leuba is, throughout this book, and throughout all his writing, operating with a mechanistic view of mind, which also is the view of the new psychology writers, and it is this fact that makes their conclusions so antagonistic to religion.
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A heavy collation of facts and statistics, supposed to relate to religion, may not prove the contention of the collator, but only that he has missed the point. In the same way those who spend all their energies on primitive religions, and give us a definition, which leaves out the higher religions, have made the assumption that primitive man is more religious than the modern man. With regard to this Professor Pratt says: (op. cit., p.12) "We must not forget (as the students of primitive religion seem to do) that the modern man is as genuinely religious as the savage; and that the real nature of religion may be as truly seen in one's next door neighbour as in the Toda of Central India, or the Semite of 1500 B.C. If religion is a distinct thing, then, it must contain some genetic principles which underly the religious consciousness everywhere making religion what it is. It seems as if we were on the wrong track, if we say that religion"cannot be defined," or that it is"a matter of taste," or that"all thoughts, all feelings, all volitions of all men are always religious;" or that religion is"permanent admiration;" then, religion becomes synonymous with consciousness, and theology becomes psychology. We shall now examine some of the definitions of religion that have been offered, classifying them into one-sided definitions and into those that are more complete, and, finally, we shall propose the view of religion which will be herein put forward for proof.
2.-One-sided Definitions of Religion.

As an example of a definition biassed on the side of primitive religions we may take that of M. Salomon Reinach: (quoted from Principal Galloway, "Philosophy of Religion", p.182, Edin., T & T. Clark: 1925) "religion is a body of scruples which act as an obstacle to the free exercise of our faculties". With regard to this definition Principal Galloway says: "We can safely say that to identify religion with a system of taboos is to ignore what is most valuable in it, and to select a subordinate feature, and call it the whole. You cannot do justice to religion by trying to reduce it to magic and superstition which gather round its beginnings".

An example of a definition founded on a faulty psychology, as well as on a faulty anthropology, is that of Max Muller, who, in his "Science of Religion" termed religion "a mental faculty or disposition which enables man to apprehend the infinite". (op. cit., p.181) The mental faculty for apprehending the infinite, however, as well as the savage apprehending the infinite, are proved by psychology and anthropology to be myths. C. P. Tiele in his "Elements of the Science of Religion". (Edin., Blackwood: 1897 and 1899 Vol: II, pp. 230 - 231) gives a similar definition founded on the old faculty psychology which divided mind into distinct faculties each possessing a function of its own. Another well-known instance of this class of one-sided definition is that of J. G. Frazer, who in the 2nd edition of "The Golden Bough" explained the rise of religion as due to the failure of magic, according as the more intelligent among
primitive man became conscious of the inefficacy of magic. The relation between magic and religion has been widely discussed, and it has been shown that religion and magic may both have been derived from the same elemental attitude of mind towards the abnormal, and the awesome, but that they differ in standpoint, the idea in religion being trust, and dependence, and in magic control, so that, being polar opposites, the one cannot have been derived from the other.

Of the sociological definitions, one type is that of Professor Ames who is only one of the many writers, especially in America, who are impressed by the part the individual plays in society, and the influence of society on the individual. This enthusiasm for society is a reaction from the individualism of the 18th century, and has had a salutary influence in emphasising a forgotten truth, but preoccupation with the social factor leads to the resolution of religion, and every other activity of man into the needs of society. In his book, "The Psychology of Religious Experience", (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin: 1910, p.168, quoted from Professor Pratt, op. cit., p.8) Professor Ames identifies religion with morality, especially with social morality. Religion is the consciousness of the highest social values: "Non-religious persons are those who for lack of some mental endowment are not interested in the welfare of society, whereas the typically religious people are those who work for social improvement". The confusion here is/
due to the fact that in all the great religions both moral and religious elements are to be found very closely associated, and the closeness leads to identification of the one with the other. Also, among primitive peoples particularly, the social nature of religion is very marked; but there is this important objection to this definition that the social interpretation of religion does less than justice to the part played in religion by the individual, who has always been the means of progress in religion, and, moreover, there are many facts connected with social life that have no significance for religion. Another type of sociological definition is that of Professor Durkheim, who construes religion in a somewhat different manner. In his book "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" (London, MacMillan: 1915) Professor Durkheim finds the essential characteristic of religion to be the distinction between the sacred and the profane. This reference to practice is so far right in that it emphasises the fact that religion is an activity which serves practical ends, and is not merely a theory or a matter of feeling, because among primitive men religion is intensely practical, and the definition will apply to a great deal in religion at that stage; but it leaves out a great deal of what is most important in advanced religion. Moreover, there is a great deal in religion which cannot be expressed in terms of group consciousness, and has no definite relation to the distinction between the sacred and/
profane. To Durkheim and to Sociologists in general religion is an activity of the social organism which it developed in the process of evolution on account of its protective value to society, but religion, as we shall see, is not merely utilitarian.

3. Completer Definitions of Religion.

Professor William James ("Varieties of Religious Experience", London, Longmans: 1903, p. 508) suggested as a minimum characteristic of all religions "an uneasiness and its solution". But "uneasiness" or unrest is not characteristic of religion alone, because there is mental unrest, physical unrest, political and social unrest, industrial unrest, and many other forms of unrest or uneasiness which have nothing to do with religion, so that this definition is far too wide, as it does not specify which of these forms of unrest is peculiar to religion. Professor Menzies in his "History of Religion" defines religion as "The worship of spiritual beings from a sense of need". Principal Galloway in his admirable book on the Philosophy of Religion (p. 184) which is the most adequate text book on the above subject which has yet appeared in our language (op. cit., p. 184) proposes as a tentative definition of religion: "Man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service". In explanation of/
of his definition Principal Galloway says: "The cognitive side of the religious consciousness is represented by faith, and faith is stimulated by emotion and posits the object which will satisfy the needs of the inner life. One of the most urgent and constant of man's needs is that which is expressed in the desire for self-conservation, or, as we have put it, for the stability of life in the face of the manifold forces which threaten and limit him". It will be seen at once that this is a more comprehensive definition; it takes into account what is an invariable feature of the religious consciousness, its reference to the transcendent, and this is characteristic of religion from the lowest to the highest. It also takes account of the fact that the reference to the beyond is due to dissatisfaction within, a dissatisfaction induced by a feeling of powerlessness in the face of the mysterious powers around him, and the desire to be allied to the source of these powers. Moreover, it emphasises the fact that such a search for help satisfies the emotions within, and leads to stability of life so that on this satisfied stabilized life follows a life of devotion and service.

The above are all authentic notes of religion at all stages, but what requires clarification is the exact needs in virtue of which man is religious. Man has a great many needs, physical, mental, and spiritual, but which of these needs are satisfied by religion the definition does not tell. It simply says that they are/
are "emotional needs". Now this qualification does not carry us very far, because the subject of the emotions is a very complex one, and it is very difficult to select which or what group of the emotions is operative in religion. Professor William McDougall in his book, "An Introduction to Social Psychology", (London, Methuen & Co., 1926) enumerates seven principal instincts, each with an accompanying emotion, and he maintains that these seven instincts with their emotions are the source of all motive forces in the individual. Other psychologists, however, have criticised this position and they have enumerated many more instincts, some with, and some without, any accompanying emotion. Also they have pointed out that the same instinct may have two accompanying emotions related to one another as opposite polarities. Furthermore they have shown that there are human emotions which can be associated with any particular instinct. Thus to attribute religion to the satisfaction of emotional needs, when it is not clear what the nature or function of the emotions is, is only to explain one unknown by another unknown. Out of the numerous emotions that come into play in the life of the individual, it will have to be specified which of these emotions it is that are satisfied by religion, because there are some emotions that are obviously not religious. For instance, out of the seven primary emotions enumerated by Professor McDougall the emotion of "anger" which is evoked by the instinct for "pugnacity", the emotion of "disgust" which is evoked/
evoked by the instinct of "repulsion", can hardly be regarded as the source of the religious spirit, and on the other hand the remaining emotions in his list, the emotions of "fear", "wonder", "Submission", and "tender-emotion" might well be regarded as combining to form the religious mind.

Principal Galloway, not in his definition, but in his comment on his own definition quoted above, does specify one need as the most fundamental. We again quote: "One of the most urgent and constant of man's needs is that which is expressed in the desire for self-conservation, or, as we have put it, for stability of life in the face of the manifold forces which threaten and limit him". (op. cit., p.184). In writing the above the author seems to have had his eye on man as a living organism engaged in the struggle for existence, and not on man as a religious being. Religion does help towards self-conservation and stability of life, but every living organism from the lowest to the highest endeavours to do the same thing, so that this activity is not peculiarly religious, and one cannot agree that the roots of religion are to be found in a need which is the common foundation of the life of all plants, and animals, as well as of man. We do agree, however, with the writer's insistence throughout his book that religion is due to a need, and that it is in a conspicuous degree concerned with emotion, but what is emphasised here is that the particular need involved in religion will have to be first specified, until which time we have not yet distinguished the religious need from any other of the needs of the human mind, or even of the human constitution.

Another method of defining religion arises from the modern propensity to orientate the enquiry into the nature of religion from some psychological consideration like the tripartite division of mind into volition, cognition, and conation. This results in one or other of these three divisions being taken as the source of religion by many writers. For instance Professor Pratt in his first book "The Psychology of Religious Belief" (New York, MacMillan: 1907) emphasises emotion as the chief constituent in religion. This he retracts in his later book on "The Religious Consciousness" (p. 52n). He says: "I take this opportunity to acknowledge the justice of certain criticisms of Chapter I of the book referred to. There is no doubt that in that work I identified feeling too closely with the background, and gave it too preponderating a position over thought". Other writers again emphasise the cognitive element in mind and reduce religion to "a belief", "an attitude", or "a value", or they emphasise the third element, and they make religion to mean "duty", or "loyalty", or "morality". But though religion engrosses all these elements of "belief", "duty", "loyalty", and "morality", and is in a large measure also "an attitude", and "a value", still there is no common agreement that any one of them in itself constitutes religion. They are all subsumed under religion, but religion itself is something over and above them all, and it is this elusive something, therefore, that has to be brought to the forefront/
forefront of our thinking.

We have seen that different kinds of biases in favour of particular lines of study have been the cause of the ambiguity that exists still as to the nature of religion. The evolutionary bias is another of these, and as we shall see it has serious defects. With regard to this Professor Ward (Psychological Principles", Cambridge University Press: 1920, p.25) says; "Now this idea of gradual evolution has certainly exerted a powerful influence upon modern psychology. It is the less surprising, therefore, especially when we remember the defects of the older psychology, to find that the attempt is now frequently made to treat psychology wholly according to the historical, or, as it is oftener called, the genetic method. In biology such a procedure is possible; for the protozoan, as well as man, the paragon of animals, is equally accessible as an organism. But the only experience immediately accessible to us is our own, and this - in spite of its complexity - is the first we know, and the one we know best. Lower forms of experience, notwithstanding their greater simplicity, we know later, and know less. Accordingly all attempts - regardless of this difference - to treat of human experience as merely the culmination of a long but entirely objective development, have so far been marked by serious defects. The start is avowedly physiological, from what is metaphorically described as "organic behaviour", meaning thereby such adaptability of organism to environment as seems/
seems to be determined solely and completely by the organism's structure, and from its apparently automatic and invariable character to require mechanical explanation. Later on, psychological conceptions are gradually introduced to eke out the shortcomings of the mechanical interpretation. Here we see the result of the evolutionary bias; it proceeds from biology to psychology, as Professor Ward observes, from the living protoplasm of the amoeba to the living experience of man, from mechanism to mind, and ends in a physiological psychology of the very worst sort. If we wish to proceed from the known to the unknown, he says, "then Analytical Psychology starting from human experience should precede any attempt to treat of the genesis of experience as a whole, or to correlate psychology with physiology". Such a psychology with a bias towards levelling up the phenomena of mind with the rest of the evolutionary process need not be expected to do justice to the facts of mind which do not fit into its evolutionary hypothesis, and, useful as its findings may be within the limits of its own method, its verdict with regard to experience as a whole need not be regarded as final. Thus the great defect of the view of mind of evolutionary psychology is that in its preoccupation with theories of determining forces it fails to realise the autonomy of the mind or self, whereas it is the existence of this mind or self or ego that is of paramount importance to our present study, and it is necessary to give some consideration to the evidence for and against its existence.
Different from the evolutionary bias is the bias of the "man as man" psychology which focusses on a cross section of the stream of consciousness. This is in the interest of specialisation, but there is no interest in the question where the stream comes from, or whither it goes past the cross section. An instance of this type of psychology will be found in Professor Webb's article on Psychology in Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Looking into this stream Professor Webb finds a flow of sensations beyond which psychology can pronounce nothing; we can never get beyond sensation; it is the only thing we are certain of. The reply to this, however, is that, if we watch the stream, we shall see some of the sensations not only flow, but flow up-stream; there is reflection; and the reflection is due to something that is above the mere flow of sensations; it is due to mind which is as much a datum as the sensation.

Division of labour, however, wherever it is possible, is desirable in the interest of progress and efficiency, but the tendency is for each science to explain everything. In the stream of sensations the self is forgotten. Wundt from a different standpoint denies that there is a soul, and other psychologists would only admit a soul with a qualification. The fact seems to be that the soul or self has been lost sight of, and we need a "magnum opus" on the subject of the "soul" which would combine the results of all the sciences of mind. It is, undoubtedly, a defect of the division/
division of labour that they lose sight of the whole in the process of distinguishing the parts. "It is not enough", says Professor Ward, (op.cit., p.35.) to talk of feelings, or volititions: what we mean is that some individual - man or worm - feels, strives, acts, thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem it has been frequently forgotten or gainsaid. It has been forgotten among details, or through the assumption of a medley of faculties, each of them treated as an individual in turn, so that among them the real individual was lost".

To Professor William James, on the contrary, there is no "soul", or "self" or thinker, but only thoughts. He says: "Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought dies away and is replaced by another. The other among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it "warm" greets it, saying: "Thou art mine, and part of the same self with me". Each later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle - and appropriating them is the final owner - of all that they contain and own. Each Thought is thus born an owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realised in itself to its own later proprietor.......It is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and "adopting" it, which is the foundation of most of the remoter constituents of the self ("Principles of Psychology", 1890, Vol.1, pp.339f: "Textbook of Psychology": 1892, p.216', quoted from Professor Ward, op. cit., p.39). This "provisional solution" must be the final/
final word of psychology concerning the self or subject: "the thoughts themselves are the thinkers" according to Professor James. But it is certain that the passing thought does not think; it represents a process belonging to an organism, and that organism is thinker, and there are certain structural factors by which the passing thought is determined, and the sum total of these structural factors is personality or self from the psychological point of view.

From such a deliverance we turn to Professor Ward whose article on psychology written over forty years ago is still the foundation of much of the current psychological teaching in our country. He says: (op. cit., p. 24) "The so-called operations and states of consciousness are not mere moies "in vacuo": they imply an active and affectible subject, and it can only conduce to clearness to make this fact as explicit as possible." Again he writes: (op. cit., p. 36) "Still this unity and continuity of the contents of consciousness is not what we mean by the psychological subject; on the contrary we look to the psychological subject for an explanation of that unity, and we may have to look to it too for an explanation of the unity of the organism". Further than this we could not expect a psychologist to go; further than this no one could go in the matter than to say that the self is responsible for the mind, and not only for the mind, but possibly also/
also for the organism itself.

We are now able to proceed with some sense of security with the assumption that there is a self or soul, and that the ancient division of man into spirit, soul, and body is a completer description of man than that afforded by some modern psychological sciences. The body is that part through which mind at the present stage of existence functions, and, as Professor Ward said above, we may have to look to mind for the cause of the articulation of the body. The soul is that part which is the source of the sensations, volitions, cognitions, and conations, and is common to man and animals. The spirit is that in virtue of which man possesses conscience, self-consciousness, and ideals. Animals have the power of reasoning and memory of a very rudimentary type, but they do not possess self-consciousness like man. The difference between man and the lower animals whereby man possesses self-consciousness may only be of degree, that is to say, spirit may be only a higher level of soul, and conscience, and self-consciousness only a higher degree of the rudimentary reason possessed by animals, but, like many other phases of evolution, the difference of degree may be such as to constitute a new category which we call spirit. The words of Principal Galloway on the subject of immortality are applicable here: (op. cit., p. 371) "We set out from the fact that the unity of the soul cannot be explained through the bodily organism: it is not created by the interaction of the bodily elements. This psychical unity, present /
present at all stages of development from pure sentiency to rational self-consciousness, is the teleological principle which makes development possible. Living elements do not evolve a unity, but because they already form a unity, they develop. Now the human organism we suppose to be a graduated order of elements, and these elements are monads, because each possesses a degree of inner or psychical life; while the soul is the supreme or dominant monad which gives unity to the whole. By its selective and assimilative activity it builds up the body, in other words, unifies and develops in a specific teleological way the system of monads we call the body. Hence the germinal soul, by the active selection and disposition of subordinate elements constitutes a psychical life which grows from sentiency to self-consciousness. So it is conceivable that the soul, or dominant monad, persisting after the disintegration of the present organism might build up a new and higher order of body.

With this agrees Dr. Drever ("an Introduction to the Psychology of Education", London, Arnold: 1923, p.77-78.) He says: "Analytical Psychology has much to answer for in the way of giving a false impression of concrete psychical processes, and the fact is well exemplified in the present case. The rise of ideational consciousness makes possible the development not of one but of many sentiments....The self-sentiment, therefore, is not merely a sentiment among sentiments; it is a synthesis of all the sentiments....It is obvious that there is in psychical life a co-ordinating/
co-ordinating factor, which becomes clearly manifest at the higher levels, where it has been identified with Reason. But this co-ordinating factor is found at all levels. Reason is not a new force entering mental life from without at the higher levels. At the lowest levels the life and behaviour of the organism is co-ordinated but the co-ordinating factor is not conscious of itself. When the ideational level emerges, however, the possibility of a conscious co-ordinating factor is present". Dr Drever remarks (ibidem) that "McDougall has called attention to the fact that he has not sufficiently investigated the conditions under which the hierarchy among the sentiments is established". This among other things is what would require to be done if we are to have an adequate history of the human soul. At present, however, we are not able to pursue the subject of the soul any further. It is sufficient to make clear that, though its existence is denied by various members of Psychological Schools, yet there is a great preponderance of opinion in favour of its existence, and we are justified in maintaining that man is made up of body, soul, and spirit. It must here be pointed out that soul is used both in a theological and in a psychological sense, and that in the tripartite division of body, soul, and spirit, the term soul is used in the psychological sense, and the term spirit is used to imply what is understood by soul in the theological sense.

It is now possible to indicate to which sphere of man's nature religion/
religion belongs; it belongs to the sphere of man's spirit. With this agrees the statement: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship him in spirit and in truth." Jn. IV. 24. The greatest teacher of all acknowledged the threefold division of man's nature into body, soul, and spirit, when He said: "I am the way, the truth, and the life". No doubt this definition of himself was an answer to the questions that occupied the minds of the age into which He was born, nevertheless the combination was the originality, and it was not an invention but a record of His life in which can be distinguished three parts. Firstly there was His life of service, and service was the subject of a large part of His teaching; it was the fruit and final test of life: secondly there was "the truth", His teaching. "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free". (Jn. VIII. 32) He emphasised the necessity of clear thinking, a clear ethic, and a clear theology. He taught the world how to think in all directions. But over and above these two aspects of His life there was His secret life of communion with the Father, which He calls "the way". What the world required was to know how to come to the Father, and His life of communion pointed them to the way, but there is more in the statement "I am the way" than the fact that He taught people the way of fellowship with the Father, just as "I am the truth and the life" means all that is implied in philosophy and ethics. "I am the way" points to that which is essentially religion, as distinguished/
distinguished from philosophy and other interests; it is in this activity that we find the moment that is peculiar to religion, and distinguishes religion from philosophy and ethics, and that moment is the felt need for communion with God. Even in the lower nature religions, communion with the god is what is aimed at, according to Principal Galloway. (op. cit., p. 76) "In nature-religions, he says, there seems to exist a sense of sympathy between man and the objects of his worship, which is not purely selfish". The same writer says (op. cit., p. 82) "Religion can only be stated in terms of a relationship, and any human experience which annuls all relation "eo ipso" ceases to be a religious experience". But "relationship", again, is not definite enough; there are many kinds of relationships, but the relationship involved in religion is that of friendship, or of fellowship, or of communion. There are many kinds of relationships, international, national, political, public, private, professional, and many other kinds, so that to describe religion as "relationship" is not enough; the kind of relationship in religion must be distinguished from other relationships.

The nature of religion is expressed by Augustine as communion in his famous saying: "Fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te". This is the authentic cry of religion in all ages: "As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God". (Ps. 42: 1) The urge that impels primitive religions and that creates the unrest of the modern/
modern man are both due to the fact that man was made to find his rest in God. Any description of religion, therefore, that does not place in the forefront this urge towards union and communion with God fails to distinguish it from other aspects of human activity. Religion cannot, of course, develop apart from theology, philosophy, and ethics; it includes volition, cognition, and conation, but it is not, as some maintain who are impressed by the importance of "will"; mostly conative; it is not mostly "duty"; nor is religion mostly cognitive, a belief only; nor is it feeling only, but it begins from feeling the core of which as we shall see in the next chapter is a need. It is in virtue of this need that man cannot stop at philosophy or ethics. This need is the measure of man's greatness, and it is because he is capable of religion or of communion with God that he is also capable of philosophy.

In the same way we see that to equate religion with "values", as many writers do, fails to take account of the fact that many value attitudes do not bear any religious significance, and that it is impossible to say which values they are that are concerned with religion. Religion is a need and a quest for values, but they are values of a certain kind, namely, the values for which fellowship with the divine stands.

Likewise to define religion as loyalty omits what is characteristic of religion. Professor Royce ("Sources of Religious Insight", Edin. T&T. Clark: 1912, p.8) says: "Now for my present purposes, this interest in the salvation of man shall be made in these/
these lectures, the essential feature of religion, in so far as
religion shall be here dealt with... The central and essential
postulate of whatever religion we in these lectures are to con-
sider, is the postulate that man needs to be saved". "Religious
Insight means then, for my present purposes, insight into the need
of, and into the way of salvation" (op.cit., p.17) This salvation
comes about by means of loyalty. Professor Royce in the interest
of science elects to omit all reference to revelation as being sub-
jective, because it is always a revelation to some particular person,
therefore he finds religious insight to come from the common ex-
periences of man, outside revelation, particularly, loyalty; the
cattle lifting Highlander becomes very religious later on because
of his former loyalty to his clan. The obvious criticism of this
is that it is not loyalty that makes the cattle-lifter religious
later on but something else, namely, divine grace revealed in Christ
Also it may be asked, if it is scientific to omit revelation which
is one of the facts of the case, and, further, there is this im-
portant consideration for Professor Royce to get over that wherever
man is exercised about salvation, he is also very much concerned
with the idea of the Divine Being, through whom salvation is expect-
ed. Here we quote the words of Professor W. P. Paterson in another
but similar connection. He says: ("The Nature of Religion", London,
Hodder & Stoughton: 1925, p.471-472) "It has been overlooked that
a hope of salvation is inextricably bound up with the idea of a
Divine/
Divine Being who is adequate to the hope of fulfilling the task. I have quoted from Bradley and Bosanquet striking tributes to the depth and efficacy of the Protestant conception of the way of Salvation, but they have not equally dwelt on the grandeur of the doctrine of God which was its presupposition; and it may be said that the way of justification by faith only commended itself, as it did to awakened consciences and anxious hearts, because it was conjoined with the doctrine of the living God who is able and willing to save sinners, and who also embraces the soul in the individualising love of the Heavenly Father". The need of salvation, in fact, is the sense of separation from the Divine Being and salvation is attained when man finds himself in fellowship with God and he feels this need because God has made him for Himself. The view of religion, therefore, which is proposed in this thesis for discussion and proof, and which underlies the prophetic consciousness, is that it is a life of communion with God, a communion which is only possible on the understanding that the essence of both human and the divine nature is love, and that out of this loving communion develops on the part of man a knowledge of God, self, man, and nature which issues in a life of self-realisation through service which is prompted by love, and on the part of God in a revelation of Himself which is also prompted by love. If, then, there is anything new in this thesis it is the use that is made of this conception of love in the explanation of religion, for up to the present the fundamental nature and metaphysical import of love has been left unnoticed by writers on religion. This neglect is due to an Aristotelian tradition that love being a feeling cannot be predicated of God. Our first task therefore will be to show what feeling is, and the regulative position it holds in mind. Thereafter it will be shown that love which is also feeling is the core of personality and also the cause of communion with God.
Chapter II.

CONSCIOUSNESS

1. The Different Meanings of Consciousness.

Having defined what we mean by the term "prophetic" which we took to mean prophetic in the religious sense, so that the term "prophetic consciousness" is synonymous with the term "religious consciousness", it is necessary next to define what we mean by the term consciousness.

In popular speech consciousness is very often limited to "awareness", but, as we shall see a little later, in psychology, consciousness extends beyond the limits of "awareness". In popular speech consciousness has also a second and wider application, whereby it comes to mean the whole of psychical experience, so that the religious consciousness includes the whole of religious experience with its objective as well as its subjective implications. It is with the religious consciousness in this latter sense that we are concerned in the present discussion.

At the outset, therefore, we wish to dissociate from any attempt to give a more limited meaning to the term than that given above, as has been done by a well known writer, Professor Thouless in/
(Cambridge University Press. 1924, p.5) He distinguishes between
the religious consciousness and religious experience thus: "The
religious consciousness is that part of religion which is present
to the mind and is open to examination by introspection. It is
the mental side of religious activity. Religious experience is
a vaguer term used to describe the feeling element in the religious
consciousness - the feelings which lead to religious belief or are
the effects of religious behaviour. Examples of what is meant by
religious experience are: the sense of the presence of God describ-
ed by the mystics, which also is not very uncommon amongst other
people; the feeling of peace after Prayer or Sacrament; and the
less intense, hardly perceptible, emotional undercurrent which
accompanies ordinary religious life".

It need hardly be pointed out that this is a very restricted
meaning of religious experience. By this meaning religious ex-
perience has no objective reference whatsoever; it is limited to
feeling which is purely subjective. "The sense of the presence
of God described by the mystics", "the feeling of peace after
Prayer or Sacrament", and the emotional undercurrent which accom-
panies ordinary religious life" are purely subjective states of
consciousness, and do not prove anything beyond their own existence,
whereas religious experience as commonly understood witnesses to a
reality beyond towards which it strives. On these restricted
terms/
terms religion would have no need of theology, philosophy, or ethics, but only of psychology which when it proved the presence of these states thereby proved the presence of religion. But, as we have seen already, religion is not concerned with feeling only, but with knowing and willing as well, and it is in this wider sense that religious experience, or the religious consciousness will be used.

2. Psychological Description of Consciousness

Although our main concern is with consciousness in its widest interpretation, we have first to discover what light psychology can throw on the nature of consciousness in its narrower psychological sense, because this is the focus of mind through which all that ever enters mind must pass, and it is necessary to find out how consciousness arises, and especially how consciousness of the realities implied in religion arises. This if we can discover will help to elucidate the nature of the prophetic or religious consciousness.

According to Dr Drever "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education" (London. Arnold. 1923 p.20) "Consciousness is another word that defies definition", because it is an ultimate fact. All that we can do is to try and describe it, and even that is not easy. In Mind, then, we can distinguish two elements "process" and "structure"/
Consciousness is a characteristic of certain processes, but it is not an entity. In consciousness, "we have a peculiar inside knowledge of certain conscious processes, which is direct and immediate, but not direct and immediate in the same sense as our knowledge of external objects". Thus conscious processes have two characteristics, firstly, an inside view of the event and, secondly, a unique type of synthesis of life action: "Conscious process must be described as a unique kind of synthesis or integration - psychical integration in which the life process of an organism and physical processes resulting from enironing conditions are combined or integrated into a product that is neither physical nor physiological, but psychical." (op.cit., p.21)

Feelings and impulses are types of conscious processes and these are ultimate and unanalysable. These processes are events that go on, but they are not permanent facts or entities.

Consciousness again is not awareness because there may be conscious processes in which the individual is not personally aware. Dr. Drever says: (op. cit., p.21) "The Psychologist is constantly coming across facts, in normal as well as in abnormal mental life which point in the direction of conscious process below the level of personal awareness. Even from the introspective standpoint it is incumbent on him to attach a sufficiently wide meaning to the word "conscious" to include a wider field than the field of awareness in the ordinary sense of that term".

These processes and phenomena in mind other than the conscious are/
are called "the subconscious", but the latter is a term which, Dr. Drever thinks, ought to be discarded, because we thereby suggest that subconscious processes are different from conscious processes, whereas subconscious processes are the same as conscious processes, the characteristic of a conscious process being psychical synthesis or integration, and not merely presence in personal consciousness. He says: (op. cit., p.22) "Conscious process is the primary mode in which the psychical is manifested. The older psychologists recognised no other modes. But modern psychology has realised that the conception of the psychical must be widened so as to include processes and phenomena other than conscious process. These phenomena are grouped together under the designation of the unconscious. Unfortunately the psychology of late years has been pursued with much assiduity, but with little scientific caution or logical precision, and the result has in many cases been a psychology verging on the mythological".

Over and above the conscious processes in mind some of which we are aware, and some of which we are unaware, there are also structural elements, the best example of which is the sentiment. "The sentiment is not an experience or conscious process, but a determinant of conscious process, and of the external behaviour which results...We may be clearly conscious that we possess a certain sentiment, as we are conscious that we possess a pancreas or adrenal glands, but the sentiment itself is never in consciousness. So too memories...customs, habits, prejudices, and the like". (op. cit., p.23).
This, then, is as far as psychology can describe mind. So far we have seen it consists of two elements, of processes and structural factors. The processes are conscious, but the structural elements consisting of what are commonly known as instincts, interests, sentiments, ideals, prejudices, opinions, habits, customs and organised knowledge are unconscious. These two elements are related in this way that structure determines what conscious processes we are going to have; they are unconscious determinants of conscious processes, and are the real "unconscious".

Now these structural elements are not inactive or inert, but are active at all times in relation to environmental conditions, and in interacting with one another. This is process also, but it is different from the process in consciousness inasmuch as it does not possess the characteristic of psychical integration. An example of this process is the Freudian "Censorship", and is called endopsychic process. This is, therefore, a third element in mind so that in our final analysis of mind we have firstly, structural mental elements, or the "unconscious", secondly, the processes involved in the interaction of these structural elements with one another, or the "endopsychic" processes, and thirdly, there is conscious process.

3. The Focus of Consciousness.

Having described the nature of mind and reduced it into its various elements, it will be evident that in order to investigate how/
how consciousness of the realities implied in religion arises we are not primarily concerned with the unconscious or with endopsychic processes, but with conscious processes which are the focus and core of consciousness and of experience. These conscious processes have a threefold nature. They are feeling, thought and activity or volition, cognition or perception and conation. But, when we have reached this far a new difficulty begins, because, when we wish to find out with which of the above three phases consciousness begins, we find a great deal of controversy as to which of these is first. Professor Ward says: "Psychological Principles" (Cambridge University Press. 1920 p.40) "While it is agreed - practically on all hands - that the ultimate facts of mind are cognition, feeling, and conation, there is no corresponding unanimity either as to the category to which these facts belong or as to how they are related. They are spoken of as processes, states, affections, actions, and so on: formerly they were for the most part dealt with in separation as the "energies" or "functions" of corresponding faculties. At other times we are told that they are never presented to us separately, but always in conjunction... Again feeling and cognition are sometimes regarded as antithetical, "in inverse ratio"; sometimes it is said feeling may be absent altogether: by some, "will" is said to be dependent throughout upon feeling, by others it is regarded as a veritable "primum movens". After this Professor Ward proceeds to ask two questions, firstly what we find invariably present in a concrete state of consciousness secondly/
secondly, if there is any order of succession among these con-
stituents of a single psychosis. He then begins with feeling and
considers its right to be regarded as primordial. He begins with
answering the contention often put forward that feeling is primordial
and invariably present wherever there is consciousness at all.
Every living creature, it is said, feels though it may never do
anything more. This doctrine he maintains derives its plausibil-
ity from the vagueness of the term feeling which he finds to be
used in five different senses: it may mean (a) a touch, as a feel-
ing of roughness; (b) an organic sensation, as feeling of hunger;
(c) an emotion, as feeling of anger; (d) any purely subjective state
as feeling of certainty; (e) the one subjective state that is pure-
ly affective, as feeling of pleasure or pain. He then finds there
are three common traits connecting these various significations
together: (1) Feeling as in organic sensation (2) Passivity as
in all sensations (3) Immediacy as in touch. All these three
qualities are present together only in one of the above, namely,
in the feeling of pleasure and pain, and it is in this sense he
proposes to employ the word feeling. This is also the sense in
which it is used by those who maintain that all the more complex
forms of experience are evolved from feeling.

Professor Ward disagrees with the latter position. He says:
(op. cit., pp. 42-43) "So far as we can judge, we find feeling
everywhere; but as we work downwards from higher to lower forms of
life, the possible variety and definiteness of sense impressions
both/
both steadily diminish. Moreover, we can directly observe in certain organic sensations - and these come nearest to the whole content of primitive or infantile experience - scarcely any evidence of any assignable "quale". Finally, in our sense of experience generally, we find the elements of feeling at a maximum in the lower senses and the cognitive element at a maximum in the higher... If, then, feeling predominates more and more as we approach the beginning of conscious life, may we not conclude that feeling is its only constituent? On the contrary, such a conclusion would be rash in the extreme". We have quoted Professor Ward at great length to make his position clear, because it is a position that we wish to contest for the reason that the view of the origin of religion put forward in this discussion is one which leads to a conception of mind and of the order of the states of consciousness which is directly opposed to that put forward above by Professor Ward.

It will be easier to criticise his position if we give his reasons for the above denial of the primacy of feeling. He says: (op. cit. p.43) "Broadly speaking, in any state of mind that we can now directly observe, what we find is (1) that we are aware of a certain change that has occurred either in things without or in our thoughts within, (2) that we are pleased or pained with the change, and (3) that, being pleased or pained, we want and strive for, the continuance of what pleases us, and still more urgently for the cessation of what pains us. But we never find that feeling alters - i.e. without the intervention of the action to which it prompts - either our sensations or our situation, but that regularly/
regularly these latter with remarkable promptness and certainty alter it. We have not, first, a change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but, these changing, change of feeling follows. In short, feeling appears to be an effect, which, therefore, cannot exist without its cause”.

The great virtue of the famous work on psychology from which the above quotation is taken is that it does more justice than older psychologies to the unity and continuity of mind and of external reality. The faculty psychology of Scottish philosophers regarded mind as a congeries of faculties which the mind used as the body uses hands and feet. It was displaced by the newer Sensationism or Presentationism, or Associationism Psychology in England. This psychology regarded mind as made up of elements or atoms due to sensations. These elements combined together by a cohesion of those that had affinity with one another, this was the beginning of the psychology of interest. A similar psychology was produced in Germany by Herbart for whom consciousness was like a dome; ideas entered the dome from below and attached themselves by the principle of interest to other ideas in the dome and the most powerful combination secured the place at the top or apex of the dome of consciousness, while those which failed to secure combination by interest fell out. The dome did justice to a certain extent to the unity of mind, and to the fact of interest. Professor Ward’s "continuum objectivum" and the unity and continuity of mind emphasises truths that are still apt to be forgotten by psychologists/
psychologists, but in the above quotation Professor Ward himself seems to have fallen into the mistake of Presentationism which it is his aim to avoid. Let us consider what he says: "We have not", he says in the above quotation, "first a change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but, these (sensations, perceptions, and ideas) changing, change of feeling follows". This is nothing else but Presentationism. The fallacy here is in assuming that "sensations, perceptions, and ideas" can change. They can change and act and interact according to Presentationism, but in reality they have no meaning or reality at all apart from mind, and mind implies feeling, so that we conclude that the feeling determines what "sensations, perceptions and ideas" mind is going to have, and not "vice versa", and in this way feeling is prior to the sensations. On the contrary, to Ward "feeling appears to be an effect, "which, therefore, cannot exist without its cause". What Ward is thinking of here is not feeling but an emotion with a "feeling-tone". One more sentence from the passage quoted above: "But we never find that feeling alters - i.e. without the intervention of the action to which it prompts - either our sensations or our situation, but that regularly these latter with remarkable promptness and certainty alter it". But if the feeling prompts to the action how does it require the intervention of the action in order to produce it? The feeling cannot both be the cause and the effect at one and the same time. Here again Ward is thinking/
thinking not of feeling but of the emotion which is always evoked by any situation that is presented to mind. Again he says: "we never find that feeling alters but that regularly these (sensations or our situation) latter with remarkable promptness and certainty alter it". Thus if feeling never alters we have no feeling before dinner but promptly dinner comes along we get a change of feeling. Most ordinary people, however, are sure that they have a feeling before dinner, and that it is different from the feeling they have after dinner appears; the first is a feeling of hunger, an organic sensation, but the second is an emotion.

To do Professor Ward justice, then, we give his own definition of emotion: (op. cit., p.276) "intense feeling is essential to emotion .... a state of emotion is a complete state of mind, a psychosis, and not a psychical element, if we may so say. Thus, in anger, over and above pain, we have a more or less definite object as its cause, and - added to the "diffused" wave of excitement, we have a certain characteristic reactive display consisting of frowns, compressed lips, erect head, clenched fists, etc. in a word the combative attitude as its effect". Feeling on the other hand is less complex than the pain or pleasure element in the emotion. Thus we see that before any sensation or situation what we have is feeling, but on presentation of any definite sensation or situation we have an emotional reaction towards it which includes as one of its elements a feeling of pleasure or pain, but the psychical state itself is a complex one of emotion whose characteristic is bodily disturbance. The cause of Professor Ward's contradiction of himself is his effort to avoid the conclusion that feeling is primordial in consciousness.
We shall illustrate this contradiction still further, but we cannot delay any longer an explanation of why we maintain that feeling is primordial among the three states of consciousness.

Our reason for this is that the view of religion here entertained as a felt want or need for communion with the Deity leads us to examine the nature of consciousness, one of the characteristics of which we saw to be a unique type of integration or life synthesis. This integration or synthesis is by means of three irreducible aspects of consciousness feeling, knowing, striving, aspects which have no resemblance to one another, and are unanalysable. Of these three elements feeling appears to be a want or a capacity or a need. In this capacity to feel its need lies the possibility of the future development of the individual. The individual might possess the power of cognition and of conation, but he might remain inert as a Sphinx cognising the void, unless he felt a want in himself for something outside himself. It is his capacity to feel his need that urges the individual to desire to satisfy that need and in doing so he is compelled to take notice of things in his environment that promise to minister to that need; this results in cognition, and, because he possesses the capacity for conation, he strives to secure these things. But the order of his activity is not, as Professor Ward supposes, that first of all things are presented to him; these produce effects called feelings, and his feelings urge him to avoid them or secure them. It is equally true, of course, that unless he was cognitive and conative/
conative the individual could not develop, but what is emphasised here is that religion originates in a feeling, a feeling of need of fellowship with God, and, therefore, the authentic cry of the religious soul in all ages has been for fellowship with the Deity, and the cry is expressive of an urge or impulsion or need that refuses to be satisfied except by the presence of God. "O God, thou art my God; early will I seek Thee; my soul thirsteth for Thee in a dry and thirsty land, where no water is". (Ps. 63: 1) In satisfying this need the cognitive and conative elements in mind come into play, in fact, all three play and interplay without ceasing. But what we wish to point out here is that one of these elements, feeling, is regulative of the rest, and that element of feeling is the one which is pre-eminently characteristic of religion. For instance, in the case of the Hebrew Prophets, it could be shown, how their career as prophets began out of a profound feeling of the need of personal religion, or knowledge of God. This knowledge of God in turn aroused in them a profound sympathy with the needs of others of the same acquaintance with the Divine Being. The root of this sympathy was love without which they could never have been prophets, for, they were not simply ambitious politicians, or narrow patriots, but men in whom had been developed a profound love of their fellow-beings, a love engendered by their knowledge of the love of God for themselves, which they acquired by communion with God.

With reference to the relation between these three states of consciousness, and the order or cycle in which they proceed, Dr. Driver says: (op. cit. p.33) "The last word would appear to be, that knowing, feeling and striving are irreducible to one another, though every conscious process involves all three as aspects, and the different modes of conscious process - perceiving, fearing, desiring..."
hoping, striving, and the like - are different because of differences in the emphasis or prominence of particular aspects in each case. It is certain that pure knowing, feeling, striving, do not exist in the concrete; they are psychological abstractions".

And again with reference to the question, important for our present discussion, as to which of these three is regulative he says:

(op. cit., p.35) "The general conclusion, then, to which we are led, is that in the last analysis feeling, interest and meaning are identical, and constitute this third or central factor in conscious process, the other factors being the cognitive and conative, of which, more presently. The biological function of this central factor is regulative; that is to say, it regulates the direction the activity of the organism will take, and therefore the behaviour as a whole. Thus feeling or interest is the regulative factor that is unceasingly guiding the processes of consciousness into "a unique type of integration or life synthesis", and is not the effect of other elements in mind; it is not a servant waiting on something else, but the ruling principle which guides the mind that determines the personality, and this agrees with what we know to be the highest principle that has ever been promulgated in religion; it is a law which calls for the exercise of a specific feeling, the feeling of love: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets". Mt.22:37-40. This statement of/
of the highest law takes account of the fact that emotion or feeling is primordial and regulative among the states of consciousness, but when it is evoked it calls out all the powers of mind to its service, the heart, the soul, and the mind.

This question of the place of feeling in religion is of fundamental interest to our present discussion and it is in urgent need of investigation, because there has been such a vast amount of controversy about it, ordinary people declaring in its favour, and the learned regarding it with suspicion. And the controversy has a history: before the Romantic Revival, feeling or emotion was regarded as a sign of a lack of culture, refinement, and breeding, but the reaction came; feeling came to its own as the regulative principle in consciousness and, in consequence, progress began in literature, art, science, theology, and philosophy, and it may be that we are again living in an age where feeling and emotion have become suspect, and life flows on in stereotyped channels of thought and behaviour, and progress is arrested, at any rate in the sphere of religion.

In the sphere of theology the place of feeling in religion has always been a subject of debate. Immediately the subjective school of feeling of Schleiermacher comes into being the objective school of Ritschland Herrman comes forward to contest its position, putting all the emphasis on the objective revelation of God in Christ and refusing to have anything to do with mystical religion. Theological thought since that time has divided its loyalty between these two/
two positions the majority siding with the objective position, and this error on both sides is due to a lack of appreciation of the relative importance of the part played by the subjective and the objective factors in religion. The words "subjective" and "mystical" have at present got a most unhappily connotation. To call any experience subjective or mystical is to condemn it as fanciful and unreal, but the subjective is a necessary aspect of every experience quite as much as the objective.

Nowadays the reaction against feeling can be seen on the one hand, among the writers on religion who construe religion as philosophy, morality, duty, or values, and on the other hand in the teaching of the Church where the emphasis is on morality and social service and a reticence about spiritual revival except by education, the old theory of the Greeks that virtue is knowledge which theory is at the foundation of such otherwise hopeful movements as Young Peoples' Christian Associations, Student Christian Movements, Copec, and Geneva, and Lausanne Conferences; it is to such movements that the faith of people is turned nowadays rather than towards the hope of spiritual revival through the Church. In this way the Church may be shutting off the individual, the society, and the nation from the most powerful forces there are for regulating and determining the direction of the will and personality, namely, the forces of the spirit.

But what it will be asked is Spirit? Spirit can only be one thing; it can only be another term for the total personality in its dynamic/
dynamic, emotive, outreaching, aspiring aspect, the moment of its
completest unification, expressiveness and creativeness, the moment
when all the powers of personality are present together. With this
agrees the use of ordinary speech in which spirit and feeling are
identified; to speak or act with spirit means to speak or act with
feeling. Moreover, we always think of spirit as existing at the
apex of personality regulating it and determining it, a position
analogous to that of feeling in its regulative relation to the other
aspects of consciousness. In fact whatever is predicable of feel-
ing is also predicable of spirit which indicates that there is a in
close relation between them. For instance, we have seen that
feeling is most adequately regarded as a want, need, capacity for
something beyond itself, a capacity for progress, a vital force,
an "elan vital" and this is also how spirit would be most adequate-
ly described. Cognition and will wait upon feeling; until the
feeling is there they do not attend or act, but when feeling comes
the mind or personality moves through the whole gamut of feeling
knowing, and willing. This is also descriptive of spirit. More-
over feeling, like spirit, is immediate, intuitive, and needs no language.
Spirit is personality with all three elements functioning together.

We have then to remember that feeling is not as some writers
term it "pure feeling", and they spend a large amount of space and
time proving that pure feeling cannot do what the advocates of feel-
ing say it can; they say that a state of pure feeling is a purely
subjective state, and to this we wholeheartedly agree, because "pure
feeling" can do nothing, because it is nothing; it does not exist
and likewise pure feeling would be purely subjective if it could exist, but it cannot exist, because to feel is to feel something; there is no purely subjective state of mind.

This error is due to the tendency to regard mind not as a unity but as a combination of three states, and that is how writers tend to abstract one or other of these states, and discuss it "in vacuo" whereas these elements of mind contain one another, and never exist in solution, so that feeling is a knowing and a willing as well and vice versa, because they are only names for three different modes of the same mind. This is also how spirit has come to be regarded as almost a supernatural, extra-personal entity, on the outer fringe of personality as if it did not wholly belong to us.

But there is another reason why spirit has become detached in thought from the rest of personality, and the reason is that the three modes of consciousness, being each only the prominence of one particular mode of consciousness over the others two modes thus inhibit one another so that the constant requisition of any one of them may lead to serious under-development of the others. For instance constant use of the intellect tends to inhibit the emotions and the will, and on the other hand the emotions and the will may be woefully misdirected from want of exercise of the intelligence. So that what is required is the harmonious development of all sides of one's nature; but in practice what happens is that one of these elements in mind is always being neglected, and of these our spiritual nature suffers most neglect, because our existence/
existence as part of a civilized social system compels attention to mental development, and the necessity to maintain good works, but there is not the same compulsion to attend to the spiritual side of our nature, and yet we have seen that it is that part of our nature that is most determinative and regulative of the whole. The neglect is also partly due to ignorance as to what spiritual development requires; sometimes it has been asceticism that was required, at another time emotionalism, and at all times something difficult to achieve, so that there is no sphere of our nature where more light is required.

We shall therefore pursue a little further our examination of the nature of feeling as such further examination will help to consolidate the position already attained, and will also help towards an answer to questions that will arise later on in the discussion. We wish therefore first of all to examine the description offered by psychology of feeling as a seeking pleasure and avoidance of pain or unpleasantness, in order to show how difficult it has been to understand feeling, and how far it has been misunderstood, and in order to point us to the true nature of feeling. In doing so we again take Professor Ward's exposition as being more metaphysical, and, therefore, better suited to our present purpose. Such a description of feeling may be all the length psychology proper cares to go, but it falls short of the whole truth with regard to feeling, and does discredit to its real nature.
Professor Ward says: (op. cit. p. 275) "From Plato downwards psychologists and moralists have been fond of discussing the relation of pleasure and pain. It has been maintained that pain is the first and more fundamental fact, and pleasure nothing but relief from pain; and, again, on the other side, that pleasure is prior and positive, and pain only the negation of pleasure. So far as the mere change goes, it is obviously true that the diminution of pain is "pro tanto" pleasant, while the diminution of pleasure is "pro tanto" painful; and, if relativity had the unlimited range sometimes assigned to it, this would be all we could say. But we must sooner or later recognize the existence of a comparatively fixed neutral state.... On the whole it seems, therefore, more reasonable to regard pleasure and pain as emerging out of a neutral state which is prior to and distinct from both - not a state of absolute indifference but of simple contentment.... Most men and all the lower animals are content to "let well alone". Now our criticism of this is that if this is a state of simple contentment then, it is tantamount to a state of pleasure, because contentment is not a neutral state; it is the most positive thing we can ever achieve. Moreover, a "state which is prior to and distinct from both" pleasure and pain is a "tabula rasa", a state in fact, of no feeling at all, and yet we are told by Professor Ward that no matter how far back one goes biologically one finds feeling. This is the contradiction one is landed in who tries to give an ultimate explanation of feeling as pleasure seeking and avoiding pain, because these terms do not supply an adequate description of the fundamental nature/
nature of feeling. Professor Ward is evidently in search of a metaphysical explanation of feeling, and he ends by giving an explanation which may apply psychologically to certain phases of feeling, but is not a metaphysical explanation.

As a matter of fact, feeling is the first phase of the animal organism; it is not to begin with concerned with pleasure or pain, but with satisfying the needs that it feels; it begins to go out of itself because of a sense of incompleteness, and there is no point at which this feeling of need or incompleteness does not exist from the very beginning up to the end of life. To be is to feel. Therefore to describe the nature of feeling as a dodging of pain, and a seeking of pleasure is to offer a negative account of mind and feeling when it ought to be positive; for, of the two, pain and pleasure, he regards pain as the more characteristic of feeling for he says: (op. cit. p.279) "To ascertain the origin and progress of purposive action it seems then, that we must look to the effects of pain rather than those of pleasure".

Our criticism here is that there is no such initial neutral state of any living organism; the tiniest organism is a vortex of activities from the very first impelled by needs or wants or capacities within wanting satisfaction and expression, but these wants are not adequately described as mere pain; they are more correctly described as a vital force or an "élan vital". Professor Ward seems to be thinking more of the objective stimuli, his "presentation continuum" rather than of the subjective mind itself, and that is due/
due to his preoccupation with the continuum and his misconception of the fundamental nature of mind. This misunderstanding is apparent in the self-contradictions to which his conception of mind leads. We shall give one or two instances of this self-contradiction; he says (op. cit. p. 54) "We should not be justified that feeling is ever determined solely by sensation. For we cannot imagine the beginning of life, but only life begun. Psychology cannot start with a "tabula rasa." In this passage Professor Ward maintains the direct opposite of the position he took up in the earlier passages we quoted. There he said that it would be rash in the extreme to say that feeling was first and thereupon proceeded to show that "sensations", situations", presentations or ideas were first, and that feelings were the effects of such sensations without which they could not come into existence. His words there were: (op. cit. p. 43) "If, then, feeling predominates more and more as we approach the beginning of conscious life, may we not conclude that feeling is its only constituent? On the contrary, such a conclusion would be rash in the extreme". And again (ibidem) he said: "We have not first a change of feeling, and then a change in our sensations, perceptions, and ideas; but these changing, change of feeling follows. In short, feeling appears to be an effect, which, therefore, cannot exist without its cause". But he has just said above that "we should not be justified that feeling is ever determined solely by sensation". These two statements are direct opposites inasmuch as the first maintains that feeling cannot exist without its cause which is sensation and the second maintains/
maintains that it can, in spite of the modification "solely".

This glaring self-contradiction is as we have said due to his fundamental misconception of the nature of mind which leads him to assert one thing of mind at one time and the opposite thing at the next. For instance, in the first quotation he complains that he cannot get back to the beginning of mind which he expects to find a "tabula rasa" beyond the range of sensations, whereas he says:

(op. cit. p.45) "The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the cause of its feelings". These two statements again form a contradiction; and it is certain that the simplest form of psychical life does not begin with qualitatively distinguishable presentations, and it is equally certain that it begins not as a "tabula rasa" but with a capacity to feel which makes it possible for it to have presentations so that the feeling capacity is prior to and not the effect of presentations as supposed by Professor Ward. The prior thing is the feeling organism; "to be" is "to feel"; as Professor Ward himself says: (op.cit. p. 245) "feeling as such is, so to put it, a matter of being rather than of direct knowledge", and because it feels its need it comes into contact with external objects; it does not begin with "qualitatively distinguishable presentations", but with a vague organic sensation of want; in going out to supply that want it meets external objects, and then gets qualitatively distinguishable presentations. Thus we see that Professor Ward's account of the order of the states of consciousness is a misconstruction/
misconstruction of the facts, and being so naturally leads him in self-contradiction, and it obscures the real nature of mind and feeling.

It is, therefore, necessary, here to repeat that this description of feeling as essentially an avoidance of pain and a seeking of pleasure is a very partial account of feeling which is a sense of want or need, of incompleteness and imperfection wherein the glory of the organism consists, and it will avoid pleasure, and seek pain, if need be to attain that end. This same misreading of facts of Professor Ward is seen again in the Freudian "Pleasure Principle" with regard to which Dr. Breuer writes: (op. cit. p.66) "Freudian psychologists have made the conflict between the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle one of the foundation-stones of their psychological theory. Superficially regarded, the facts seem to be as they assert. But their analysis is inadequate and far from complete. Abstract "principles" explain nothing. Nor can we accept the view implied in the use of the designation "Pleasure Principle" for the most primitive type of motive. The child or the savage may be insatiable in the pursuit of the satisfaction of crude and primitive impulses, but to call this the seeking of pleasure is to misread the facts of the psychological situation altogether". This same criticism applies equally to Professor Ward's description of feeling, and when two great psychologists like Professors Ward and Freud fall into the same error, though in different/
different ways, mind being to Freud practically mechanically determined, though not, as we have seen, to Ward. It shows the elusive nature of feeling and consequently of mind itself, and as a clear conception of the nature of feeling and of mind are indispensable to our present inquiry we shall consider further its nature in a later chapter in connection with the instinctive tendencies. So far as our inquiry has gone it has shown feeling to be of the nature of an urge for completeness, the élan vital of H. Bergson, and it is with this urge that we connect the need felt by mankind for religion which at its highest and most characteristic level is a desire for fellowship with Deity which it conceives as complete personality.

With regard to this urge Professor J. A. Hadfield says: ("Psychology and Morals". London. Methuen. 1925. p. 61), "Every organism is impelled to move towards its own completeness. Fulness of life is the goal of life; the urge to completeness is the most compelling motive of life. There is no motive in life so persistent as this hunger for fulfilment whether for the needs of the body or for the deepest spiritual satisfaction of our souls which compels us to be ever moving onwards till we find it. We see the law of completeness operating in physiology, in psychology, in morality, and in religion. In physiology we call this completeness health, in morality "perfection", in religion "holiness", in psychology "self-realisation"....So persistent and strong is this law that no organism can rest until it has satisfied its hunger by achieving its complete self".

Our conclusion at this point, therefore, is this, that the essential/
essential nature of religion is a feeling of need, a need of fellow­ship with the divine owing to a feeling of incompleteness or imperfection, and to understand the nature of religion we have first to understand the nature of the religious mind, especially the nature of the feeling element of mind in which religion originates, because not only has the place of feeling in mind been misunderstood in the past, but the nature of feeling has also been misunderstood; it has been regarded as "pure feeling" a state which does not exist, because feeling is never "pure feeling" but contains elements of knowledge and will as well. And it is because it has been confused with this abstract non-existent "pure feeling" that it has been denied its regulative place in consciousness and in life and religion. We shall, therefore, in a later chapter consider the regulative function of feeling in the life-history of the organism.
Chapter III.

1. THE RELIGION OF FEELING.

In the preceding chapter an attempt was made to indicate the place of feeling in conscious life. This was done by means of a brief criticism of Professor Ward's theory of the nature and function of feeling, his treatment being the fullest and most metaphysical of the psychologies of the past. But his account was shown to be inadequate on three grounds: firstly, because he maintains that the original phase of mind is a state of inertia or simple contentment without pain or sensation of any kind; secondly, because he supposes that this state of equilibrium is maintained until the organism is impelled to activity by the supervention of painful feeling, so that feeling is avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, and of these two, to him, pain is the more characteristic, so that pain is the ultimate nature of feeling; thirdly, he makes feeling dependent on presentations, that is to say, feeling is secondary to cognition in consciousness.

In the present chapter an effort will be made to demonstrate the/
the failure of writers on the subject of religion to render an adequate account of its nature on account of their entertaining this same inadequate psychology of mind and feeling according to which as we have seen ideas or presentations or cognition is primary, and feeling is secondary, a mere accompaniment of cognition, its ultimate nature being an avoiding of pain. We shall, therefore, take two instances one early and one recent of writers on religion whose account of the nature of religion fails on account of an inadequate psychology of mind. The first of these is Schleiermacher whose work on religion initiated a new era in the study of religion, and the second is a recent writer Professor W. E. Hocking, so that from Schleiermacher down to the present day the same tradition has been maintained with regard to mind and feeling with great consequent disadvantage to the study and understanding of the nature of religion.

To begin with, then, it is hardly necessary to suggest that if, as has been shown in the previous pages, feeling is the regulative principle in mind, and enters so largely into the determination of mind, it will not be surprising, if sooner or later in the history of religious thought the discovery is made of the importance of feeling in the determination of religion which is allowed to be one of the most fundamental needs of the human spirit. This was the discovery made by Schleiermacher and which he gave to the world in his famous "Discourses on Religion" and later in more systematic/
systematic form in his "Glaubenslehre" which inaugurated a new era in the history of theology and the philosophy of religion by initiating the psychological approach to religion which appealed to the witness of experience and called in question the adequacy of the speculative theological methods of his time.

By his time theology had become a branch of philosophy or a system of natural theology, based on the theistic proofs which derive religious conclusions from what were mostly natural premises, and thus sought to support the religious view of the world on what was actually a system of metaphysics. This was the age of reason; the Hellenic spirit was in the ascendant; emotion or feeling was a matter of reproach and the rationalistic spirit pervaded all departments of human interest as well as religion, while the Romantic movement was slowly making headway. The philosophers of the time had evolved systems of theology from within the bounds of pure reason; Schleiermacher appealed to the feelings as the source of religious experience and doctrine. His position is generally speaking that in the world there are churches with creeds and doctrines; the source of these doctrines is the faith of the Church at any particular time; these doctrines and creeds have their genesis in feeling, and their criterion is their power to create and sustain Christian feeling. The doctrines of the Christian faith, therefore, are interpretations of the states of feeling of pious people.

Schleiermacher's great service to religion has been his emphasis on the autonomy of religious experience, but his proof fails as we shall see. While, then, his/
his general position may be summarised thus, it is necessary to follow a little more closely and in detail his exposition of the theology of feeling in order to see how far it covers the facts of religion. Before it will be possible to criticise or appraise his position, full opportunity must be given of stating the case fairly, making due allowance for a certain amount of exaggeration and for what was transient or one-sided in the thought of his time, as many strands of thought enter into his theology, because Schleiermacher was not only a man who had experience of intense piety, but was also a deep thinker who had absorbed into his thinking about feeling and experience all the various speculations of his time.


"These manifold elements, - Herrnhutist piety, Leibnitzian illumination, Kantian criticism, Fichtean idealism, Schelling's philosophy of identity, Spinoza's pantheism and Plato's dialectics - all entered into Schleiermacher's thought. Nor did he merely connect them externally in an arbitrary eclecticism; his mind was no less actively reproductive than receptive on every side, and these elements were fused into a whole which was new, and bore the stamp of originality. The power which fused them was not so much that of speculative thought developing itself from one principle as that of a peculiar moral and religious way of feeling, and a peculiar aesthetic mode of view. We spoke above of the general tendency of Romanticism the/
the movement which broke up and continued the genial movement of
the 18th century, it consisted, we saw, in protesting in every
sphere of life against reasoned reflection and enlightenment and in
an assertion of the right and value of what is immediate, feeling
and fancy, impression and presentiment. This tendency, Schleier-
macher, the theologian among the Romanticists, applied to the sphere
of religion.

With these elements of Idealism, pantheism and mysticism, how­
ever, we are not primarily concerned at present so much as with the
main question of Schleiermacher's account of religion, and his
psychology of feeling to see whether his account of religion stands
on solid grounds and to see whether his psychology of feeling actu­
ally explains the nature of mind. For it is admitted on all hands
that Schleiermacher's protest against the intellectual schematised
account of the religious life and his plea in favour of the feeling
element was opportune and serviceable in the cause of religion, but
it is quite a different matter whether he has thereby rendered a
true and full account of the nature of religion, for until such a
true and full account is rendered there will still be doubt as to
the lawfulness of this emphasis upon feeling, no matter how much
it carries conviction at first, and no matter how much it agrees with
the experience of the majority of people, this emphasis on feeling
will not carry conviction with those who are critical among mankind,
until it is shown on some more objective ground than the appeal to
experience that feeling is responsible for the rise of religion in
the soul. And this objective ground cannot be discovered until it
is shown from the psychology of mind itself that feeling is the fundamental mode of consciousness. As Professor Hocking says in another connection: ("Meaning of God in Human Experience" Yale University Press. New York 1924 p.377) "The whole truth lies surely in this direction - that all our human impulses and loves are akin. And the psychology of mysticism waits less for an analysis of the love of God than for an analysis of all other human desires". Before, therefore, we agree that religion is largely feeling we shall have to see whether Schleiermacher offers us an impressive and convincing psychology of feeling itself which will explain also mind in its totality and thereby explain the religious mind also and religion itself, for only by so doing can he convince us that he is in possession of the truth. A general description of religion as being largely concerned with feeling may win from us a certain amount of consent but it is mere guess-work, and proof is absent, until it is supplied by demonstrating the nature of mind itself. We agree, therefore, with Professor Hocking that the proof of the nature of religion waits on the demonstration of the nature of mind itself. Schleiermacher is conscious of this fact and he not only offers a description of the nature of religion, but he also offers a psychology of feeling in which the genesis of religion is supposed to be found. We shall, therefore, begin with a consideration of his theory of religion, and thereafter proceed to his psychology of feeling.

In the Discourses he describes religion as "those pious elevations of the mind, in particular, in which all other activities are repressed or almost suspended, and the whole soul fused in an immediate feeling of the infinite and eternal and of her union with it. For it is in such moments that the disposition you say you contemn
originally and visibly manifests itself (Professor Pfleiderer, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 306) Again he says: "That piety springs up necessarily and spontaneously from the inward parts of every better soul, that she has in the heart a province of her own in which she bears unobstructed sway, that she is worthy to vivify by her own inner power the noblest and most excellent, and to be welcomed and acknowledged by them, for her own inner nature's sake; this is what I maintain" (op. cit., Vol. 1 p. 307) Later on in the more scientific form of the Glaubenslehre he expresses himself in almost similar terms: "Religion in its essential nature is neither a form of knowledge nor a form of activity, but a determination of feeling, or of self-consciousness"; and again he writes: "the common element in all the varied utterances of religion, that which immediately differentiates it from all other feelings and constitutes the invariable essence of religion is that in it we are conscious of our absolute dependence upon God". (Glaubenslehre, 663 & 4. Quoted from "Religious Experience its Nature and Truth". Kenneth Edward D.Ph. The Kerr Lectures, 1926, p. 8, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark.)

The discourses are addressed to the cultured among its despisers to whom Schleiermacher makes a plea for religion as a necessary part of a full-orbed culture. It is the confusion of religion with systems and doctrines that has brought religion into contempt. At the outset, therefore, he announces to his readers that it is his intention to leave doctrines and systems of religion severely alone and to lead them to the innermost springs of religion and the faculties/
faculties from which it is evolved, which faculties are the highest part of man's nature. The doctrines of religion are merely the secondhand version of the real inner experience which is of the nature of communion with the Infinite and eternal.

In his second discourse Schleiermacher advances a step farther, and tries to describe what this inward immediate nature of religion is. He describes it at first negatively: religion is neither metaphysics nor morals. It is not knowledge, because the degree of piety is not proportionate to the degree of knowledge; nor is it morality, because many have lived moral lives who had no knowledge of ethical theory; nor yet does piety consist in action, because while the essence of action is the consciousness of freedom, the essence of religion is self-surrender to the influence of the whole. But contemplation is characteristic of religion, and it is out of this contemplation religion springs, but this contemplation is not like the contemplation of the sciences which seeks to find connections between finites, whereas religious contemplation is concerned with viewing the infinite whole. Here, however, Schleiermacher puts in the caveat that, though religion is neither metaphysics nor morality nor action, yet it makes use of all these, and they are essential to its completion. In this way he expressly guards himself against the interpretation of subjectivity, but this caveat which finds its way in at this point is not given any importance in the subsequent argument, and is only mentioned to be left alone, while/
while he goes onto investigate the special moment at which religion comes into being. That moment is the moment of contact of the universe with our senses. It is "the first coming together of the universal life with a particular life, it occupies no time, and forms nothing that can be grasped, it is the immediate wedded union, sacred beyond all mistake and misunderstanding, of the universe with the incarnate reason, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Of such a nature is the first conception of every living and original moment in your life, to whatever sphere it may belong, and from such a conception religious excitement also springs" (Professor Pfeiderer, op. cit., Vol. I. p. 308) Again he says: "Your feeling, in so far as it expresses the common existence of you and the all, in so far as you have the several moments of it as the operation of God in you, mediated by the operation of the world upon you, this is your piety: your sensations and the operations upon you connected with them and conditioning them, of all that lives and moves around you, these and no others are the elements of religion, but these all belong to it; there is no emotion that is not religious, unless it be one that indicates a diseased condition of life". (op. cit., p. 309) It is difficult to criticise Schleiermacher's definition and description of religion. It is at once too wide and too narrow inasmuch as it makes religion on the one hand co-terminus with feeling and on the other hand it narrows the sphere of religion down to one of the tripartite divisions of mind. Even though we find Schleiermacher/
Schleiermacher including in his definition the idea of God, when he defines religion in the passage above quoted from the Glaubenslehre, the admission is more or less accidental, and his undisguised intention is to make religion identical with feeling. This is due to his polemical zeal in excluding knowledge and action from religion but these on occasion he finds it necessary to recognise as essential to religion, but the admission is only a temporary aberration from his main contention in favour of religion as exclusively feeling. It certainly simplifies matters to reduce religion to one element in consciousness, and disregard all the rest, but the rest is not so easily disposed of, and it returns to upset the too simplified theory by reminding the philosopher that all feelings are feelings of things without which the feelings could not exist. All subjective feeling have an objective reference of some kind which has to be taken into account in any definition of feeling, but if feeling is purely subjective, then all feelings are the same, and there is no difference between true and false. Moreover, if religion is pure feeling, then the nature-religions in which the feeling elements greatly preponderate over the intellectual are purer religion than the higher religions in which the use of reason has been at work in correcting wrong ideas, and in purifying emotions and sublimating them to higher and higher ends. To Schleiermacher on the other hand reason instead of being a help to religion distorts truth. But everyone knows that it is not reason that distorts the truth so much as prejudice and that because of the greater element in it of feeling unenlightened by reason. In fact, the work of reason is to correct wrong ideas and prejudices, restrain and control extravagant and
misdirected feelings, and guide them to more exalted ends, which results in the refinement and sublimation of feeling; so that the relation between feeling and reason is not one of antagonism, but of cooperation.

This is the natural result of a consistent theology of feeling; it ends in contradiction like the rational theology which it sought to displace; but while Schleiermacher failed in his attempt to show what religion in its fullness is he succeeded in emphasising one element in religion which is fundamental, and which was being despised and forgotten. As Professor Pfleiderer says: (op. cit., p.316) "Looking back from this standpoint at Schleiermacher's notion of religion, we cannot but allow it to be an original attempt to comprehend the nature and the manifestation of religion scientifically from the point of view of idealism. Religion appears no longer as a phenomenon coming to man from without whether by divine or human instruction, and necessary for the sake of outward ends (salvation in the world to come, earthly utility, support to morality, etc.) and thus more or less accidental to man himself, but is demonstrated as a fundamental fact of man's higher mental life, necessarily founded in his own nature and relation to the universe. Religion being made thus inward in the human mind, the old dogmatism (theological or metaphysical) was transcended which never allowed the religious spirit to come to itself". But while Schleiermacher showed the importance of feeling to religion he did not succeed in showing its place in religion. That the place of feeling/
in religion, however, is of great importance is shown by the sub-
sequent history of the school of feeling which formed into two
wings the right wing being represented by Frank of Erlangen and the
left being represented in Germany by Otto and Schweitzer, in France
by the Symbolofideisme School of Menigoz and Sabatier, by James
in America, and Percy Gardner in Britain, while the School of
Ritschel and Herrman, and nowadays of Barth, Gogarten, Bultmann, and
Brunner, emphasise the objective side of religion. Both positions
rest upon a one-sided view of human nature and a defective view
of feeling, and, to the present moment, the debate continues, some
emphasising the feeling element in mind to the disparagement of
reason, and the representatives of reason overlooking unconsciously
the tremendous importance of the feeling element, the result of both
positions being incalculable loss to the cause of religion in keep-
ing two elements in the religious life apart which ought to be com-
bined to the great enhancement of the religious life of mankind.

A good deal of our effort in these pages has been to show that
the conception of religion entertained by writers depends upon their
conception of mind; if the conception of mind is biased in favour
of reason to the disparagement of feeling and will the conception of
religion will tend to be that of a philosophy; if the emphasis is
placed on will there will be a tendency to regard religion as an
ethical system, and if the emphasis is unduly placed on feeling to
the exclusion of the other elements in mind the conception of re-
ligion/
religion will be one of subjective idealism, mysticism, or pantheism. Or on the other hand the writers in question may start with a preconceived notion of religion as predominantly concerned with one of these three elements in mind, and therefrom deduce a psychology of mind in line with their preconceived notion. We have just seen this in the case of Schleiermacher's notion of religion which supposes to be in its essence a pure feeling so that all feelings are religious, and being religious are all equally true. The feeling part of every psychosis is the religious part, and the other elements are the non-religious parts, so that if we wish to isolate the religious moment, the feeling will have first to be divorced from the rest of the mental content, which operation is, however, more easily said than done.

It will be of interest, therefore, to consider briefly Schleiermacher's psychology of mind to see what difficulties arise out of giving to the feeling element in mind a fictitious importance to the belittling of other elements, which difficulties are a sufficient refutation of the theory, for any theory is not likely to be true which raises more difficulties than it solves, and when we find a writer landing in an enigma, it is safe to conclude that the truth is somewhere else than in the universe of discourse with which he is conversant at the time.

According to Schleiermacher feeling originates from the interaction of our senses with the universe. This interaction results in/
in two things being distinguished, a feeling and a view, but this
distinction is not the primary thing; the primary state is one con­
sisting of the union of sense and object, a state anterior to both
feeling and view, before the two have become separated and disting­
ished. It is a state, moreover, that cannot be conceptualised and
of which nothing can be predicated.

According to Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit., vol. 1. p. 309)
Schleiermacher in the first edition of the Discourses maintained that
feeling and view were inseparable, that the one involved the other,
so that there could not be feeling without view nor view without
feeling. Both of them have reality only because they were origin­
ally one and undivided at the moment of the first coming together of
mind and the universe. In the 3rd edition, however, he emphasises
the autonomy of feeling and its independence of view, and its es­
sential nature and genius is discoverable in this moment of first
union of mind and the universe before anything can be grasped or dis­
tinguished as either feeling or view, and this is the original mo­
ment of religion which is outside of all reflection and speculation.

This original moment of Schleiermacher is reminiscent of the
neutral state in consciousness of Professor Ward which was criticis­
above in the second chapter. There we saw that according to Pro­
fessor Ward the original state of mind is a neutral state of poise
or equilibrium between pleasure and pain, a state prior to either of
these, that is a state prior to any feeling or consciousness what­
ever which would be tantamount to unconsciousness. Thus both these
great/
great thinkers get hopelessly involved in difficulty because in the case of Professor Ward he makes presentations or ideas primary which is not true, and to get over the difficulty which his wrong conception of mind has landed him into he is obliged to posit an original neutral state devoid of feeling of either pleasure or pain. But because he is sensible of such a state being very unreal he tries to give it substantiality by calling it a state of contentment which, however, is "toto caelo" removed in character from a state devoid of pleasure or pain, because a state of contentment is one of pure and profound feeling, a state as the psychologist would say of the harmonious functioning of all the instincts and sentiments. Schleiermacher lands in difficulty in a different way and for a different reason in trying to divorce feeling from view or idea, which procedure equally does violence to the facts of mind, and so he also, to seek escape from his predicament, has, like Professor Ward, to take shelter in a neutral state of consciousness anterior to either feeling or view of which nothing can be grasped or predicated simply because it cannot be thought or imagined. Professor Ward tried to give reality to this hypothetical state by calling it a state of contentment; Schleiermacher in his turn endeavours to give it reality by calling it "an indifference to opposites".

How Schleiermacher justifies this appellation will be seen from a relevant passage from Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit. Vol.1 p. 321). He says: "It may be said in Schleiermacher's defence, that this one-sided/
one-sided view is chargeable only to the bold paradoxes of the Dis­
courses, and that his later theory of religion is free from it.
But a glance at his Dialectic suffices to show how firmly he held,
up to the end of his life, the identification we have described of
feeling with religion. In fact, he seeks to establish it by a de­
duction of feeling, which, however acute, is yet at more than one
point halting. Feeling, he here argues, is the unity of our being
in the play between knowledge and will. There must be between the
predominant activity of the one, and the predominant passivity of the
other, a point of transition and balance at which the antithesis of
the different function results in indifference. This indifference
or identity of the Ego in the interchange of the different functions
is immediate self-consciousness or feeling. The same indifference
of opposites which exists in us subjectively as feeling, is object­
ively, in the Universe, God. This objective unity cannot be given
as a unity either in our thought or in our will, each of these being
already engaged in the opposition. God, therefore, is found immedi­
ately and originally only in our feeling, as the unity, free from
antithesis of our being; in fact, feeling as this subjective indif­
ference to opposites, is nothing but God, as He is posited in our
consciousness, namely, as a constituent element of our self-conscious
ness. Thus, Schleiermacher concludes, feeling is immediately as such
abstracting from any particular contents of it, simply as this for­
mal unity of our being, the being of God in us, the only being of
God/
God in us, and therefore religion".

One can detect here a supreme heroic effort to accord to feeling its full legitimate value and significance, but it will be at once apparent how invalid the reasoning on which he endeavours to support the case is. It is evident, however, that Schleiermacher recognises that somehow or other feeling is responsible for the unity of the Ego, but he has failed in his effort to explain how this is so. Moreover, he has recognised that somehow or other feeling is accountable for the bringing of God into relation with consciousness, and hence accountable for religion, but again he has failed to explain how this is done. The above are two profound truths with which we are in agreement, for, it is our contention in the present pages that feeling, interest, meaning, value are the principles responsible for the unity of the Ego as Schleiermacher maintains, and are the regulative principles in mind. Moreover, it is our contention that it is feeling or an urge or impulse, an "élan vital," a sense of incompleteness that initiates, and regulates the elaborate process of feeling, knowing, and willing that brings God into our consciousness.

That there is a unity of the Ego, a psychical unity present at all stages of development from pure sentiency to rational self-consciousness, we have already seen, a teleological principle/
principle which make development possible, and which we have elected to call the spirit of man. We have also seen that this principle begins in sentiency, and reaches rational self-consciousness, but that reason is not a new force superinduced upon life from without at the higher level as Dr Drever pointed out. This co-ordinating factor is present throughout all the stages of development, at the lowest stages as well as at the highest stages of life and behaviour, but at the lowest levels this integrating synthetising factor is not conscious of itself. At the lowest stages, therefore, and throughout long tracts of this development this co-ordinating factor will be predominantly of the nature of feeling and to the end, we maintain, that feeling regulates the development, and this is the important truth that is at the foundation of Schleiermacher’s insistence upon feeling. What he insists on is that the religious consciousness does not depend on the clearness of its concepts or of its ratiocinative processes, otherwise the majority of mankind would be congenitally debarred from religion; the religious mind depends on something else, on feeling, presentiment, faith and intuition. The religious mind intuits God and intuition is largely feeling.

This is the fundamental mistake of Schleiermacher; in endeavouring to demonstrate the importance of feeling in mind and in the religious consciousness he tried to show that it was all important, and thus banished from the religious consciousness all other elements of thought and will. This abstracted feeling he identifies with the Ego and more paradoxical still with the being of God Himself as He/
He is in and for our consciousness as well as the unity of the world both of which are presented with the feeling from the first; to have feeling at all is to have this consciousness of the unity of self, of the world and of God without the help of reason or will, that is to say, all feeling is religious. This is the result of imagining that feeling can be pure feeling functioning independent of the rest of mind. Feeling, however, can never be abstracted from the rest of mind in this way; it is only one of the three modes of mind which are all inextricably mingled together, and so far from being religious from the beginning it may be either good or bad. Moreover the ideas of God and the universe which are supposed to be presented in feeling automatically from the first are ideas that come after a long history of thought and activity. Thus we see that to maintain that feeling is all important and independent of reason and will and the original unadulterated source of our knowledge of God as Schleiermacher maintained is a vastly different proposition from what we here maintain, namely, that feeling is the regulative principle in mind and has a much larger share than is commonly allowed in the determination of the nature of mind and of religion.

2. The Relation between Feeling and Idea.

We have considered the attempt of Schleiermacher to explain religion as feeling, and though his emphasis on this side of religion due to his religious experience was of vital importance to religion and theology it failed to settle the question of the true nature of religion/
religion because of his failure to make clear the exact place of feeling in religion owing to his fundamental mistake of drawing a sharp line of demarcation between feeling and other mental elements and attributing to feeling alone what is due to the activity of mind as a whole, and so the debate on the nature of religion has continued down to the present day.

We shall, therefore, now consider the relation between feeling and thought or idea, because it is not enough merely to emphasise the importance of feeling in religion; no one can convince others of this fact until he has first of all gone to the root of the problem and offered them a clear psychology of feeling as well as of the other elements of mind. Anything short of this will leave us in the realm of conjecture. For this reason many writers have seen the necessity to show the relation between feeling, knowing and willing. One of these expositions therefore we shall briefly consider, namely, that by Professor W. E. Hocking in his book "The Meaning of God in Human Experience" (Yale University Press, New York, 1924) This is one of the great and brilliantly written books that have come from across the Atlantic. We shall, therefore, consider what solution he offers of this problem which seems to us to be the crucial one in settling the nature of the religious consciousness, for it will settle whether we are to regard religion as pure mysticism or a philosophy, or a system of ethics. If, therefore, Professor Hocking's exposition is found to be free from such contradictions as we found in the case of Professor Ward and Schleiermacher, there will/
will be the presumption that he is in possession of the truth, but if he leads us into a "cul-de-sac", and goes into innumerable footnotes and appendices over the matter, the suspicion cannot be helped that we have been led the wrong way, and that the truth is somewhere else, and that, had his conception of mind been different, he might with his brilliant pen have offered us a much more interesting, because truer account of religion. Such a procedure, if it does not discover for us what either feeling or religion is, may, at least have the important result of showing us what they are not, and thus enable us more readily to suggest what feeling is, and wherein religion consists, so that in this and all other apparent deviations we have taken we are all the time heading for a solution.

Professor Hocking begins by stating the case in favour of the primacy of feeling; he says: (op. cit., p.33) "We have now to deal with this view that religion is a matter of feeling. We may agree to use the word feeling in a very wide sense - as a name for whatever is consciousness, deeper than explicit thought, is able to give a bent to conduct. Feeling is not as we sometimes think it, a wholly vague and uncertain principle; it is capable of bearing much responsibility in the direction of practical living. In the form of moral disposition, it may be the highest, as well as the most individual determinant of conduct and bearing. The question whether religion belongs to this realm of practical and responsible feeling rather than to the realm of thought is an issue of greater practical interest/
interest than may appear in this formal statement". In the above quotation, though the writer has thrown out very weighty thoughts suggestive of the importance of feeling, he feels that its importance transcends his expression of it. He, therefore, expresses himself a little later in another passage apologetic of feeling, as follows: (op. cit., p.39) "Further if the essence of religion is feeling, it is to be judged by feeling and not by argument, - it is to be judged as beauty and right are judged: we are not only at liberty to bring our instincts to bear, we are compelled to bring them to bear, - a responsibility from which we too easily escape when religion is gained by accepting a creed. Who will say that this requirement is not more adapted than the old one to keep alive the spirit of genuine religion? That forced conclusion which has driven religion from intellect toward feeling may thus prove a literal god-send to religion. But there are other grounds for this change; it is, in fact, the outcome of converging tendencies so various that they can only be called the labour of an age".

Of these converging tendencies which have served to emphasise the importance of feeling Professor Hocking to begin with mentions two main divisions, the comparative study of religions and the history of religions. The spread of civilization through conquests, crusades, or missions has made comparison of different religions inevitable, which has resulted in the deliberate and scientific comparison of the different religions. Such comparison has brought into prominence the identity of essence in all religions. This essence/
essence is something else than the religious ideas, such as myths, prophecies, angelologies, and eschatologies, which seem to vary indefinitely whereas the essential part of all religions seems to be independent of all these, something grounded in the instinctive part of human nature, in feeling. The feelings of religion all mankind share, whereas the ideas are a continual cause of discord; they are what keep religions apart and at variance with one another.

Of the effect of the study of the history of religions on the other hand, Professor Hocking speaks in a classical passage which we reproduce for its pointedness here as well as for future reference. He says: (op. cit., P.41) "A similar impression is made by the life histories of religious movements, as we are now able to understand them. Religion renews its life in great outbursts of impulse which emanate not from new thoughts, but from rarely impressive personalities, capable of inspiring exalted and passionate devotion in their friends and followers. Their utterances are poetic oracular, couched in figure and parable, not in thesis. While their power and meaning seems to be propagating itself by the medium of words and thoughts, it is in reality propagating itself immediately, by infection, by contact, by the laying on of hands, by leaping across of an overpowering fire. In the presence of such men, leaders and carriers, others are lifted, not to high knowledge but indeed to a high degree of moral potency which is capable of executing great deeds, sometimes on the most visionary basis. With the crisis of the critical business of thinking and philosophising the/
the decline of religious vitality keeps even step. As passion cools, theology spreads; and as theology spreads, passion cools still more. Remoteness from religious leadership can infallibly be read in the conditions of religious life in a given place or age. The stream which at its source is impetuous, fierce, channel-plowing, here at its mouth lies lazy, divided, straggling off to the dead-level of religious homogeneity, through the arms of shallow, reasoning sects, where by the very multitude of distinctions between the believers there is hardly any more distinction between river and bank, saint and sinner!.

In arriving at this comparative and historical judgment on religion Professor Hocking points out that many sciences have co-operated which have themselves no direct religious interest but whose results have turned out to be serviceable in the solution of the religious problem. Of these scientific currents of thought Professor Hocking mentions four - the psychological, the biological, the pragmatic, the critical.

With regard to the first of these, the psychological, this particular line of study has produced the almost unanimous conviction among philosophers that nothing is real which does not belong to conscious experience with the result that nowadays public events, development of crafts, the making of States and the shaping of ideals are all examined from their inner ends, their significance to mind. Most/
Most of the reality of the world is its reality for mind; the world is what it feels to mind. Behaviour is the all important subject which is the reaction of mind to the world and the world is therefore best regarded as a stimulus. This points to the importance of feeling which is felt to be real, fundamental, immediate, and personal.

The biological current of thought points in the same direction. This line of study seems to find the real in what is aboriginal and germinal; it emphasises the significance of the origin of life in the interaction of organism and environment and the development of organisms through higher and higher stages from sentiency to rational self-consciousness and the question to be asked is what it is that determines this development. Reason cannot be the primary determinant because reason is only characteristic of the higher stages of development, whereas feeling is found at all stages from the highest to the lowest reaches of behaviour. This then would seem to be the real because it is the permanent constituent in life. Feeling is prior to ideas which are only signs and signals of the deeper reality.

The next modern scientific tendency which Professor Hocking considers is the pragmatic one, which insists that nothing is real which does not work. According to this view it is not fact consciousness but value consciousness that works and value depends on feeling. Moreover essences are known to be energies and not ideas, and/
and mind is a continual source of energy which is feeling. Ideas on the other hand, are to the pragmatist a cause of failure of spontaneous reaction; they delay and hinder action.

According to the above three currents of thought ideas have to be tested by a higher authority which involves to a large extent feeling. With this agrees the critical current of thought. According to this tendency of thought if ideas are to be examined they cannot be examined without bringing feeling to bear on them; the idea has to be felt first before we can criticise it and the idea as felt is very much richer than the exposition or rationale of it. The feltness is the test.

Professor Hocking allows that the above group of tendencies are a weighty consensus in favour of the view that religion is grounded in feeling, and he goes on to remind us of the fact that religion is commonly regarded as an affair of the heart more than that of the head, that religion must be accessible to the unlearned as well as to the learned, to babes, in fact, which can hardly be so, if religion depends on the results of thinking. Moreover, religion is not strongest in the clearest thinkers nor can thinking produce religion. These truths that have been from earliest times regarded as axiomatic are nowadays receiving the imprimatur of philosophical scientific thinking which brings additional assurance that feeling is the essence of religion.

Therefore, as a result of the above cumulative evidence the following picture of religion emerges according to Professor Hocking:

(op. cit., pp. 49 - 51)
"Religion is to be understood as a product and manifesto of human desire; and that of no secondary and acquired desire, such as curiosity, but of deep-going desire, deep as the will to live itself.....If we should venture to name this deep-set desire which we call religious it might be represented as an ultimate demand for self-conscious preservation: it is a man's leap, as individual and as species, for eternal life in some form, in presence of an awakened fear of fate......Religion is a reaction to our finite situation.......as instinctive as a start or shudder... an appalling recognition of what and where I am in the Universe...... a great emotional response to the felt perils and glories of the weird situation...... If we resist the impulse to refer the whole experience to a special faculty, different alike from thought, feeling and from will, in short to a "supernatural sense", we must certainly choose the realm of feeling as fittest to contain so unique and intimate a transaction. The history of religious agony and despair, of hope, attainment, exultation, the whole gamut of the intense inner drama, shows beyond doubt the locus and eternal spring of the vitality of religion. Such feeling is peculiarly able to retain the position which religion must hold in our living - the position which reason is always exposed to losing. There is something unspoiled and original about human feeling: it lies beyond the reach of dispute, refutation, and change. Religious feeling is the adequate counterpart of those metaphysical first principles upon which so much used to be hung, in everything that made those principles attractive. It has the same primordial and original character, the same cosmic scope and dignity; and it had in additio
what these principles had not, "the energetic property which fits it not alone to guide, but also to instigate and to sustain what it has produced".

After having put the case for feeling in this very impressive way Professor Hocking then goes on to put forward the case for idea. He points out that religion has never yet taken itself as a matter of feeling. The religious consciousness of prophets and originators of religion has been essentially objective, concerning itself with metaphysical objects, with God and the life beyond, and the more important the prophet the more important his metaphysic for which reason he has always been regarded as a revealer of truth. Mighty religion and mighty strokes of speculation, Professor Hocking points out, have always gone together; a great religion will produce a great system of ideas. But religion seems to be in this predicament; it has to express itself in theoretical terms, and at the same time is not able to claim scientific validity for its truths, because its objects are beyond experience. This dilemma shows itself in the case of the Scholastics of Medievalism who maintained the theoretical validity of religious doctrines, and of the Mystics on the other hand who asserted the hopelessness of the idea to render any adequate account of religious experience. The Mystics, therefore, found a solution in paradoxes, such as that God is real and at the same time He is nothing, infinite emptiness. The cause of the dilemma is the necessity of the idea which, inadequate as it may appear to be, cannot be dispensed with, nor can the dilemma be removed/
removed by investigating such distinctions in knowledge as those suggested by faith and reason, thought and intuition, intellect and insight.

Professor Hocking, therefore, suggests a method of procedure towards a solution; it is that of investigating the relation that exists between feeling and idea. He says (op. cit., p.63) "The best hope lies in a different direction, namely, in attacking the division already set up between feeling and idea. The advocates of the religion of feeling are not mistaken in referring our various religious ideas to a higher authority, which they call feeling: the mistake is, as I think, in not observing that the higher authority is itself still idea. Idea can only be judged and corrected by idea; but these most authoritative ideas are so much more intimately related to experience and to feeling than other ideas as to justify nearly all that the religion of feeling asserts. It seems probable that in religion idea and feeling are inseparable; and that whatever valid ideas religion may have are to be found in that region of human nature where the cleavage between idea and feeling, never more than a tendency to diverge, no longer exists."

Our writer has here with great facility arrived at a solution which immediately removes this old difficulty of this cleavage or division between idea and feeling. His "attack" at one fell swoop causes the division to vanish completely, and we are conducted in peace to "that region of human nature where the cleavage between ideas and feeling never more than a tendency to diverge, no longer exists. If/
If then "the cleavage no longer exists" the problem has been solved and this supposed crucial question that separated Scholastics and Mystics has been effectively answered. If "the cleavage no longer exists" we may say that idea has coalesced with feeling or that feeling has coalesced with idea, and they are no longer two but one thing without any division or distinction between them, and it is a matter of indifference what designation we apply to the resultant entity "idea" as we shall see immediately later on that according to him the rationale of feeling is to "fund itself in idea".

This is rather a simple and convenient explanation of the relation between feeling and idea, if it were not so unbelievable that two elements, that play such very different parts as Professor Hockings own exposition shows, should in the end be found to be only one and the same thing. Further he says that the cleavage between idea and feeling is never more than a tendency to diverge, but on his own showing, which we reproduced at considerable length for this purpose, feeling and idea are so divergent as to cause a division between them from the dawn of philosophy, through the whole course of religious history down to the present time. And the division between them is happily not going to be done away with in this facile way, because psychologists assure us that the three states of consciousness are absolutely irreducible to one another, so that, whatever the ultimate explanation of feeling is, it is not going to be amalgamated and lost in something else. The motive underlying this reduction into idea and the desire to give feeling a decent burial and to/
to give the credit to some supposed higher part of our nature like idea or will is the unconscious feeling on the part of the present writer and of many writers that feeling is primitive, aboriginal, "infra dignum", and this unconscious prejudice acts disastrously on the writer's exposition of religion, for, instead of developing a conception of religion in line with his lucid description of the place of feeling in religion, he spends his energy on a brilliant effort to show how feeling is lost in idea, and how idea struggles to get rid of feeling and other such mental acrobatics, and, when he has reached this point, we feel that the writer has entered a labyrinth. We are treated to wearisome footnotes and appendices which make "confusion worse confounded". Thus a wrong psychology of mind puts the writer permanently off the track; very charming pages the same writer provides, but what might he not have produced with a truer conception of mind?

Lest there be a suspicion that this criticism is made on insufficient evidence we give a few more quotations. He says: (op. cit. p.65) "It follows that that which can satisfy feeling is something which will destroy it as feeling .......In the movement of life feeling is always present, for the destruction of feeling is as a rule the inception of another: one feeling debouches into another. Thus emotion maintains a perpetual circle while life lasts. But it remains true that to satisfy any given feeling is to bring that feeling to an end. And if the attainment which religion offers is indeed a satisfaction of all desire, and not of some fragment of our nature, it must intend a living escape from this perpetual circl
we should expect to find in religion the destruction of all feeling as such". Again he writes: (op. cit., p.66) "If we are right, feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea: it refers always to something beyond the present self and has no existence save in directing the self toward that object in whose presence its own career must end". And again he writes: (op. cit., p.67) "All positive feeling, I dare now say, reaches its terminus in knowledge....In the satisfaction of feeling, the guiding idea coalesces immediately with the object then known as present; to the including mind there is perfect continuity between prophecy and fulfilment - the feeling is unaware of death".

The language here, "feeling unaware of death", "feeling reaches its terminus in knowledge", "its own career must end", "in religion the destruction of all feeling as such", "a living escape from this perpetual circle", is reminiscent of, and applicable to, consciousness as conceived by Buddhist philosophy in its idea of Nirvana and absorption, but it is certainly not applicable to religious feeling as we find it, say, in a religion like Christianity. If, as we in these pages maintain, the genesis of religion is in a feeling of incompleteness and a desire for union and communion with the Infinite, when that Infinite is recognised, let us say, in the objective fact of Christ, the feeling that sought fellowship with the Infinite is not annihilated in the acceptance of Christ; rather is the feeling more expanded, enriched, informed and enhanced. The " quale" of the feeling has altered; before it was dissatisfaction; now it is satisfaction; but in becoming satisfied it has not ceased to be, nor passed over into the idea or fact of Christ, an unimaginable
process. And so is the case with all other feelings and their ideas; at first there is feeling after idea and then feeling of the idea or feeling modified by idea, but feeling meeting fact or idea does not mean the death of feeling followed by the growth of another brand new feeling. What Professor Hocking seems to have in mind here is not feeling, but desire, because desire does come to an end on the attainment of its object, and then a new desire succeeds in its place with a new object in view, but this description does not apply to feeling which is a mode of consciousness, and is as continuous as consciousness itself. Another statement that is contradictory in one of the above quotations is where he says that "feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea"; in that case what is the great necessity of feeling to immolate itself to idea as being its end. It has been on the contrary always understood that feeling is not as objective as idea, but that feeling is distinctly subjective, and that it bears the relation to idea of subject to object, or that the rationale of the one is subjectiveness and of the other objectiveness.

We conclude, then, that the writer has failed to comprehend the nature of feeling, and consequently of religion. Another reason why he fails to comprehend the nature of religion is because he sets out with too low an estimate of religion which he regards as an instinct of self-preservation according to one of the passages above quoted. But this instinct of self-preservation as we mentioned already/
already is characteristic also of the lower animals who have no re-
ligion; therefore, we have to look for the genesis of religion in
something higher and more characteristic of human nature, namely, in
his sense of incompleteness and desire for union and communion with
the Infinite. There are two cardinal mistakes of writers on re-
ligion: one is to take religion at its lower stages as character-
istic whereby they miss what is most characteristic at the higher
stages, and, secondly, they place the seat of religion too exclu-
sively in the intellectual part of human nature to the too great
exclusion of feeling in which largely the dynamic of personality re-
sides.

That there is this tendency among thinkers we shall adduce as
proof one more instance namely that of a writer who makes not idea,
but will the primordial element in mind. Principal Galloway writes
(op. cit., p. 431) "The type of unity manifested in psychical pro-
cess, in the forms of life, and in the most rudimentary individuals
is conative unity. In every organism the active principle brings
about an order and connexion of parts and processes, so that each
and all co-operate to realise a final purpose or end. Within the
world this active principle or will brings into being and sustains
those interacting systems which we call organisms. That conation
operative in the simplest individuals, successively builds up higher
and more complex types of unity within the experienced world, is a
highly significant fact. If will be taken to cover all forms of
conation/
conation, then will, thus broadly conceived, is the unifying principle of experience. And if will is the basis of life, it is likewise the active principle which co-ordinates and unites the interacting elements of the organism. But if Will can build the elements of reality into those more and more complex systems which mark the evolution of life, it is plausible to suppose that a Supreme Will conferred their initial unity on the interacting monads or centres of experience themselves. On this theory the Supreme Will, which is the fundamental principle of unity or synthesis behind experience, is reproduced in type in those living systems that appear within experience".

From this quotation one can see that Principal Galloway regards the essential nature of God as Will and it is the fiat of this Will that brings into being and sustains all created beings. This principle of will is also the basis of the life of the individual and it controls his whole evolution. But we have already adduced evidence that the will is not primordial in man, but feeling which is a feeling of incompleteness, an urge towards fuller life, an élan vital and, in reaching out to this fuller life, thought and will come into play. Without this urge from within thought and will would be inert not knowing what to think or do.

Will is, therefore, not the determining principle in the nature of the individual nor is it the determining principle in the nature of God as the above writer supposes. The determining principle in the nature of God is not will but love which is of the nature of feeling.
feeling, and it is this love that is the cause of the creation of the Universe and the cause of the creation of creatures in its own image. Mere Will it is certain would never trouble to create a universe, much less innumerable troublesome beings in its own image, and of a Good Will on the other hand, which the writer considers God to be, all that could be said is that it might or might not create other beings like itself, but the love which is overflowing goodness and lovingkindness makes the creation of the universe and of mankind inevitable, so that a description of God which does not insist on love as the primary attribute of God is as far short of the truth as a description of mind which does not do justice to its primary nature of feeling, because mind is derived from and made in the image of the mind of God. God, therefore, cannot be adequately represented as anything less than love which may be defined as goodness in continuous action; He certainly cannot be adequately represented as Supreme Will which is the description of God offered by Mohammedanism and Calvinism, and that is why both these religions though possessing strong points are rightly regarded as defective. To Mohammedanism God is supreme, predestinating will or fate and the religious duty is Islam or Surrender to that will, and, as is well known, among the ninety-nine names that Allah possesses he is not once called love. To Calvinism God is no doubt ostensibly love, but He is love that can predestinate beings made in His own image to everlasting punishment, and nothing can prevent this if God in His essential nature is Supreme Will. No doubt to Principal Galloway also/
also God is love, but it is quite evident that he has not oriented his thinking on religion from the conception of God as love, because the word love does not appear in the index of his Philosophy of Religion, nor does it receive any treatment in his book.

In the next chapter therefore, we shall deal with the subject of the instinctive tendencies whereby it will be shown that the instinct of love is the foundation of and integrating force in life and character, and in religion, because it is that fundamental impulse that accounts for our self-preservation, love towards our fellowmen, and love towards God.
Chapter IV.

THE INSTINCTIVE TENDENCIES.

In the last chapter we have been considering the views of religion of two writers whose account of it fails because of their inadequate account of mind, and we further saw that their account of mind fails at the point where they try to explain the nature of feeling. Schleiermacher, indeed, does make feeling the primary element in mind, but fails to make clear its function and nature. Professor Hocking, on the other hand, like Professor Ward makes cognition or idea, prior to the rest of mind. Both these latter writers, while apparently aware of the importance of feeling, seem reluctant to accord to it the primary place in mind, as if such an admission was "infra dignum". But the above two writers are not alone in this, and examples could easily be multiplied of this reluctance on the part of writers on psychology and religion to acknowledge the rock from which consciousness is hewn, and the pit from which it has been dug, and as a result their theories come to unsurmountable passes.

Three random instances of this tendency will suffice. Professor Höfding ("Outlines of Psychology", London, MacMillan, Eng. Trans., p.308) says: "As in Greek mythology Eros was made one of the oldest and at the same time one of the youngest of the gods, so in psychology the will may, according to the point of view, be represented as the most primitive, or as the most derivative of mental products/
products. A second writer, Principal Galloway, ("Philosophy of Religion", Edinburgh, T.& T. Clark, 1925, p. 284) writes: At the lowest level is the mere feeling of awareness, which is, however, only possible through the presence of conation. Again (op. cit., p. 354) the same writer says: "Psychological analysis suggests, I venture to think, the line of advance is from activity, through interest, to ideas of value and to the notion of end". And once again (op. cit., p. 423) he says: "Without doubt the basal element in psychical process, the element which underlies the development of feeling and thought, is will, or put more generally, conation".

A third writer, Professor E. S. Waterhouse ("The Philosophy of Religious Experience", London, Epworth Press, 1923, p. 67) writes: "Feeling appears always as the accompaniment of activity, by which it is conditioned, and on which it depends, varying with the vital character and intensity of the activity". To the above three write who are typical of a great many, conation is prior to, and is the cause of, feeling, but we have seen that to Dr Drever, for instance feeling is primary and the regulative principle in mind. To Professor Höfding conation is primary, but, as he says, it may be secondary "according to the point of view".

In a state of knowledge, therefore, where the psychology of mind depends on "the point of view", of the writer, it is necessary to find some more objective ground than abstract theory on which to base our conception of the nature of mind and being. It must not be imagined that it is immaterial to an enquiry into the nature of the prophetic consciousness what view we hold of the order or sequence/
sequence of the states of consciousness, and consequently of mind and being. As a matter of fact our psychology of mind is going to determine very materially our conclusions with regard to the nature of the religious consciousness. Of this dependence of theology upon psychology we have an egregious example in the case of Professor Höf f ding, quoted above, for whom the nature of will or conation changes "according to the point of view"; it is this same writer whom we quoted in our first chapter as saying in his "Philosophy of Religion" that the definition of religion is "a matter of taste". And this must be the plight of any writer who does not first come to a definite understanding with himself that mind must have a determinate nature which is independent of "the point of view". Another example of this dependence of theology upon psychology is that of Principal Galloway to whom, as we have seen above, conation or will is primary, and in accordance therewith he regards God as Supreme Will, and man as Monad Will created by God in his own image. We also venture to think that we could have been spared the great majority of the fifty definitions referred to by Professor Leuba, if only writers on the subject of religion began by determining the nature of mind itself. We would also have been spared the melancholy admission by Professor Webb that religion cannot be defined, if the said writer had been in possession of a truer conception of mind, but, as we have seen above, according to Professor Webb all we know is a stream of sensations, but we have no right to postulate a mind or self or soul over and above this stream. No wonder then that/
that with this stream our writer is at sea, and that in his opinion religion cannot be defined. We admit that it cannot be defined with any degree of adequacy, until first of all the essential nature of mind itself has been determined, and, when that has been done, it may be possible then to discover the essential nature of the religious consciousness which is one of the phases of mind. There seems, therefore, to be ample justification for not leaving this part of our subject, until we have established as far as possible beyond doubt, the argument initiated in the last chapter that the view of mind which does justice to the facts of mind, and to the religious consciousness, is that whereby feeling is regarded as the "primum movens", the regulative principle in consciousness, for on this conception of mind is founded the view of the prophetic consciousness put forward in these pages as the consciousness of a want or need of fellowship with a personal God, a relationship impelled by love wherein feeling or emotion plays a very important part, and the stages of progress in that communion such as repentance, conversion, faith, self-sacrifice, love and mystic union can only be fully comprehended by realising clearly what feeling involves and its relation to knowing and willing. But here, again, we must issue a reminder that feeling, though primary, is only one of the three modes of consciousness, and that it is inextricably associated with intellectual and conative tendencies, and is only one of the three states of mind.

It will, therefore, be necessary to consider the nature of mind from/
from another point of view, namely, that afforded by the instinct psychology, and we shall thereby at one and the same time be considering the nature of the instinctive tendencies in a way that will carry us a stage forward towards our solution of the nature of the religious consciousness, and we shall also thereby further confirm the view of mind that has been upheld in the previous chapters, and which is essential to the view of religion submitted herein. In this chapter, therefore, we shall see how a faulty view of mind, which puts the mental cycle out of gear by placing cognition first, acts disastrously on the theory of a brilliant exponent of the instinct psychology, namely, Professor McDougall. The fact is that while we have works that deal exhaustively with cognition we have not yet any first rate "magnum opus" on feeling. If we open any of the orthodox textbooks on psychology, and compare the small amount of space allotted to the treatment of feeling with the multitude of pages devoted to cognition and its allied topics, we shall be convinced that an adequate psychology of feeling or interest or meaning is long overdue. The only large work that has yet appeared on the subject is by the Austrian scholar, Uth, which however has not yet been translated into English. And we are convinced that this lack of an adequate psychology of feeling has been a great loss to the study of religion, as well as to its teaching and practice in a variety of ways, and has been the cause of the vagueness as to the nature of religion that exists up to the present among the most eminent/
eminent scholars, as we have seen, some regarding it as metaphysics or ethics, or aesthetics, or an evolutionary process, whereas religion, while engrossing all these in its development, remains pre-eminently a spiritual relationship with the Divine, a relationship determined by love, and its true nature can never be fully comprehended until we have first of all comprehended the nature of the spirit or soul or self which is behind all the processes and activities. There is nothing that displays more of the characteristics that we associate with spirit than feeling which we shall see is very deepseated and prior to and determinative of the rest of mind. And the lack of a "magnum opus" on feeling has not only been a loss to the study of religion on its theoretical and practical side, but it has been no less a loss to the cause of education where feeling, interest, and meaning are so important. We shall therefore in this chapter, firstly, offer a justification of the theory of the instinctive tendencies which are still debated, and thereafter we shall consider the origin, nature and function, of these tendencies by criticising the theory of them propounded by Professor McDougall which seems to be founded on a faulty conception of mind, and by so doing we shall get nearer to the true nature of mind, or soul, or self, or spirit.

To begin with, therefore, we shall consider the nature of instinct in general, because most of the divergence of opinion with regard to mind and religion is due to the tendency of writers to concentrate on one phase of experience and interpret the rest of mind in accordance with it. It will be necessary, therefore, to seek/
seek a point of view which will include within its ambit all the phases of mental life. This point of view is claimed to have been reached by the exponents of the instinct psychology. We shall, therefore, consider in this chapter the account of mind offered by this school through one of its representatives, Professor McDougall.

In the supplementary chapter of his "Social Psychology" (London, Methuen, 1926, 26th Ed., p.303) on "Theories of Action", Professor McDougall claims that his theory of instincts does more justice to all the facts of the realm of life than any rival theory because it "is applicable to every form of animal and human effort, from the animalcules pursuit of food or prey to the highest forms of moral volition". He says that there are two words, conduct and behaviour, conduct being applied to the behaviour of self-consciousness and rational beings, while behaviour is the wider genus of which conduct is the species. There are four distinguishing marks of behaviour according to McDougall: 1. The creature does not simply move mechanically impelled by external force; it strives towards an end. 2. It not only strives towards an end; it also varies the means of attaining that end, if necessary. 3. The striving is not due to reflex action of independent parts; the whole organism is involved in the activity. 4. The striving is not simply a repetition of the previous process; there is increased efficiency of action. The whole world of material things, then, is divided into two classes, 1. A class of things explainable on mechanical principles, 2. A class of things whose changes display the above four marks of behaviour, and are, therefore, to be described as teleological or purposive.
Now it is over this word purposive that opinions diverge on account of the fact that many writers make the meaning of purpose too narrow. They take as the type of purposive action our own volitional efforts, and they refuse to admit to the same category any actions that do not evince clear knowledge of the end.

McDougall mentions the instance of Descartes who solved this difficulty by relegating to the mechanical category all the actions of lower animals, but this solution has two serious defects, according to McDougall. 1. It ignores the fact that behaviour on the lower, and on the higher levels exhibits the same four marks of behaviour mentioned above. 2. It also ignores the evidences of evolitional continuity between the lower and higher forms of life. This second difficulty has resulted according to McDougall in forcing the purposive type of process into the mechanical category, and from this originates the mechanical theory of mind. According to this view mind is mechanically determined, and we are deceived when we imagine we are free agents; our purposive striving towards an end is illusory. This theory would make moral philosophy, ideals, norms and standards of conduct meaningless.

The way out of this impasse, therefore, is to give to purposive activity a wider range so as to include both the activity of the lower animals, as well as of the higher. And the facts demand such an extension of the range of purposive activity, because to restrict purposive activity to those which are guided by clearly conceived ends is a quite unwarranted restriction for this reason that the end is
is conceived with very different degrees of clearness throughout the different stages and levels of mental life, but life is none the less purposive all through. There is therefore no justification for confining purposive activity to instances of clearly conceived end or goal; for example, in the case of man, ends are conceived with all degrees of clearness from the most clear down to the most vague ideas, and from this we infer that the actions of lower animals are also purposive.

Thus, as McDougall shows, purposive behaviour does not depend on clearness of knowledge of the end; there is purpose as long as the animal feels a want, and strives to satisfy it; it may feel its want only in the vaguest way, just as we ourselves sometimes cannot clearly tell what we want. So it is not knowing that determines the purposive activity, but something else, what McDougall calls a conative tendency or disposition. This conative disposition may be of a specific or of a more general kind, and is brought into play by the perception of some object. Each organism is endowed with a certain number of such conative dispositions, and in the course of life they undergo certain modifications. These are the instinctive tendencies or instincts; they are the fundamental conceptions of the science of psychology, just as mechanical process is that of physical science, and McDougall claims that the conception of the instinctive tendencies covers the facts of mind and behaviour better than any other theory of mind.

But the instinct psychology has not yet commanded universal acceptance.
acceptance. For instance in his famous "Psychological Principles" Professor Ward does not deal with instincts at all. This might be expected because the work was done many years ago, but in his recent work, "Psychology applied to Education" (Cambridge University Press, 1926) he still does not mention the instincts so that to this great psychologist this conception is not fundamental to the understanding of mind. McDougall, therefore, reviews the leading theories of mind that have been offered in order to show their inadequacy to explain mind and behaviour, and to establish his thesis that the conception of the instinctive basis of mind is the only theory that in any degree adequately explains the nature of mind and behaviour.

The first theory that he mentions is the mechanical theory of mind according to which all behaviour is due to reflex action, and consequently mechanically determined, and so all organisms, including man, are mere machines. This is the theory beloved of the Behaviourists, and McDougall says it is the theory that is most widely accepted at the present time. It certainly does, at first, simplify our task to reduce all activity in the universe to mechanism, but it leaves out more than it includes; it leaves out, for example, all the four characteristics of behaviour mentioned above because they do not admit of mechanical explanation.

One instance of this Behaviourist School is Professor Leuba whom we happened to mention above who writing on the subject of religion produced no less than fifty definitions of religion. There is/
is, of course, a peculiar delight to a Behaviourist in an indefinite number of definitions of religion, because there is no reality to the Behaviourist beyond reflex actions, and religion is, therefore, a case of "quot homines". This same writer in his recent book "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" (London, Kegan Paul, 1925) after an exhaustive collation of facts relating to Mysticism, comes to the conclusion that religion will gradually coincide with physical science. This is a typical Behaviourist reduction of the higher activities of mind to mechanism. He has in the above book a final chapter on the "Disappearance of Belief" in which he says: (op. cit. p.322) "a psychiatrist in possession of the higher and finer psychological knowledge takes the place both of the physician and of the Director of souls". Belief in a God of providence who has individual knowledge of persons and answers prayer is a myth that will disappear with the advance of scientific knowledge. Thus the mechanical theory is most disastrous when applied to religion. It may work in a few cases on the lower mechanical level where the machine has got unhitched and the mechanical trick of the psychiatrist works to restart it, but it is of no avail on higher normal levels of mental life, and is therefore useless for our present purpose of explaining mind and behaviour.

The second most important theory of mind is that known as psychological hedonism. This is the theory of Bentham and Mill the founders of Utilitarianism. According to this theory the object of all action is to obtain pleasure and avoid pain and according to utilitarian/
utilitarian principle a lesser present pleasure will be sacrificed for the sake of a larger future pleasure. A great deal of our actions seem to conform to this theory which fact gives this theory its plausibility, but there is a great deal of activity which does not come within its range; for example, the activity of the lower animals does not fit into this theory, because it is quite evident that the activity of lower animals is not a pursuit of ends that will produce the maximum amount of future pleasure. This theory, therefore, while it applies to some parts of human activity, leaves out some other parts of it as well as the behaviour of lower animals. This theory also fails to supply the explanation that will cover all the facts of behaviour and conduct.

A third theory of mind is that called the pleasure-pain theory. The pleasure here referred to is not like the Utilitarian pleasure a future pleasure or pleasant end envisaged by the subject, but a present pleasant or painful feeling which is a spur to present action and initiates all our actions. One example of this school we have seen in Professor Ward whose theory we already examined in Chapter II. The main defect of this theory, as we saw, is that it regards certain things as intrinsically pleasurable, or painful, whereas these qualities are dependent on the need of the organism also, and vary from pleasant to unpleasant according to the need or feeling of the organism at the time. Some of this school regard pleasure as the source of action and others like Professor Ward regard painful feeling as the source of motive power, but it is certain that not all/
all the actions of man and much less the actions of animals are all
impelled by painful feeling. This theory, therefore, explains not
all but only some of the facts of mind and behaviour. Professor
Ward thinks that a great deal of present day psychology will not
survive long, and to the last he was not converted to the instinct
psychology, but it is quite evident that the idea of the instinct
has got a dynamic which explains much about the forces and motive
powers that determine life and character, whereas Professor Ward's
account of feeling as originating from inertia lacks dynamic, and if
he is to dispense with the idea of the instinct, then he has got to
import a very different meaning into feeling that will convert it
into the source of motivation and the dynamic of character, but
according to the present theory the credit for this goes to presentations.
This theory therefore fails to give us an adequate account
of feeling or the motivepowers that determine life and leaves out
more than it explains.

The next theory of mind that we shall consider is the intellectualist theory of mind. This is the school of Herbart, of Bosanquet,
and of Bradley. One representative of this school we already con-
sidered in Chapter III, namely, Professor Hocking. According to
this school mind consists of a mass of ideas, an apperception mass;
the dynamic is in the idea in the form of interest. Professor
Hocking, as we have seen, acknowledges clearly enough the importance
of feeling, but he cuts the knot and arrives at a solution of the
problem of the relation of feeling, knowing and willing by suddenly
drawing/
drawing attention to the fact that this feeling which seems to ac-
count for so much in life is after all only his beloved "idea".
To explain two absolutely different things by saying they are one
and the same thing is far too easy a solution to be convincing.

Another form of theory of this school is the "ideo-motor" theory.
The solution here is analogous to the one above; it claims for idea
or cognition what is usually considered as belonging to conation.
This theory fails when applied to a great deal of human activity,
and to the activity of lower animals where the activity is out of all
proportion to the "idea", so that apparently idea and movement are
not so closely associated as this theory would lead us to suppose.
This school also has very little account to give of feeling, because
its qualities have been transferred to "idea".

Other theories of mind are those which regard mind variously as
primarily reason, rational will, sense of duty, or some such faculty.
These are all survivals or recrudescences of the old faculty psycho-
logy. As Professor McDougall says: (op. cit., p.325) "Most of those
who attribute moral conduct to any such special faculty recognise
that human nature comprises also certain lower principles of action,
which they call animal propensities, instincts, or passions; and
these are regarded as regrettable survivals of our animal ancestry,
unworthy of the attention of a moral philosopher". But these pro-
pensities or instincts have to be taken into account before we can
get a complete account of mind. All these theories, according to
Professor McDougall, are open to two objections: 1. that they are
incompatible,
incompatible with the principle of evolution, and 2. that they are forms of the faculty theory. It is quite certain that the springs of action are not in intellectual processes, but somewhere else. Professor McDougall would say that the explanation of mind is in the instinctive tendencies. We do agree that the theory of the instinct does supply a great deal which did not come within the purview of older psychology, but we do not think that Professor McDougall can dispense with the psychology of the tripartite division of mind, all the same. Professor Ward thinks that the older psychology of the three divisions is going to yield more light yet than much of the newer psychology, and this is possible as we have seen that no theory of mind yet propounded has yet given a consistent account of mind, the reason being that something is all the time being overlooked, and that something, we think, is the nature of feeling, and when that has been adequately explored the tripartite psychology will come to its own, but it cannot dispense with the instinct theory, and the best results would be from a combination of the school of Professor Ward and the School of Professor McDougall and the combination would then reveal the origin of the instinctive tendencies to be largely due to feeling which at present McDougall attributes to cognition. Now we are in the following chapters going to make use of the quality of love which is a feeling, and hence our concern to make the nature of feeling clear.

Before then, we accept McDougall's account of the instinctive tendencies/
tendencies in our exposition of the religious consciousness it will be necessary to call attention to his account of the nature and origin of instinct with which we are in disagreement, and which conflicts with our view of mind, and the religious consciousness which we maintain originates in a feeling of want or a need for fellowship, but not in cognition. This conclusion of McDougall's is due to his preoccupation with the instinct theory, and to too little appreciation of what can be derived from the older psychology of the three divisions. The account he gives of the instincts is useful and is more comprehensive than the older psychology, but the instinct psychology which places cognition first is not capable of giving us a complete account of mind, and the nature and relation of the three elements in mind has still got to be worked out. Our criticism of Professor McDougall is that if the theory of the instinctive tendencies which he propounds, and which is widely accepted as the one which throws much light on many features of life at all stages is correct, then it must be shown in his exposition of nature of the instincts where it is that feeling which is the regulative principle in mind comes in. But we shall look in vain in his various efforts to explain the nature of the instinctive tendencies for any admission of any such primary or regulative part played by feeling. Instead of this we shall see that our author attributes the primary place in mind sometimes to cognition, but far more often to conation, while he makes very little mention of feeling, though he deals very much with emotion which however is not the primary feeling of the triple division, but a later phase of feeling evoked/
evoked by the object. It may seem at first sight that it is going
to make small difference which of these states is regarded as first,
but we maintain that it will make all the difference in the world to
psychology or religion or any other branch of mental science whether
we regard mind and instincts as primarily, feeling, or cognition, or
conation. McDougall seems to have little use for the tripartite
division and takes over uncritically the tradition that conation is
primary, and this brings his theory of the instincts into difficulty
at more than one point. That the instincts are conative tendencies
is the refrain of his psychology. He says: (op. cit., p. 310)
"When any creature strives towards an end or goal, it is because it
possesses as an ultimate feature of its constitution what we can only
call a latent disposition or tendency to strive towards that end, a
conative disposition which is actualised or brought into operation by
the perception (or other mode of cognition) of some object". Again
he says: (op. cit., p. 311) "To attempt to give any further account of
these conative dispositions would be to enter upon a province of
metaphysical speculation, and is a task not demanded of psychology.
I will only say in this connection that we may describe all living
things as expressions or embodiments of what we may vaguely name,
with Schopenhauer, Will or with Bergson, the vital impulse (l'elan
vital) or, more simply life. And each specifically directed co-
native tendency we may regard as a differentiation of the funda-
mental will to live, conditioned by a conative disposition. At the
standpoint of empirical science, we must accept these conative dis-
positions as ultimate facts, not capable of being analysed or of
being/
being explained by being shown to be instances of any wider more fundamental notion".

In the above quotations McDougall regards the instinctive tendencies as conative tendencies which are not capable of being analysed into anything more fundamental; they are ultimate features of the constitution of mind. But most psychologists will agree that though instincts are innate they are further analysable into feeling, willing and knowing, and that this analysis is useful and worthy of investigation. McDougall has evidently jumped to the conclusion that a consideration of the tripartite division is not going to be of much service, and he therefore adopts the tradition that conation is the characteristic fact about mind and instinctive tendency, and consequently obscurity creeps into his theory at this point, because he has not taken trouble first to clearly distinguish the ultimate elements in mind, their order and relation to one another.

This obscurity is very noticeable in the above quotations; for instance, he maintains that instinctive tendency is ultimate, unanalysable, and conative, but at the same time he makes it dependent on perception or cognition for he says," it possesses as an ultimate fact of its constitution what we can only call a latent disposition or tendency to strive towards that end, a conative disposition which is actualised or brought into operation by the perception (or other mode of cognition) of some object". If instinctive tendency is brought into operation by cognition in this way we ought to seek for its ultimate nature in cognition and not in conation, but/
but any suggestion more distant from Professor McDougall's mind than this could not be imagined, because his whole theme is that instinct is strongest where cognition is weakest, and that cognition inhibits instinct, in which case it is impossible to see how cognition can be at the same time the originating cause of instinct. In another passage he maintains that conation is independent of cognition. He says: (op. cit., p.323) "This is the intellectualist theory of action which attributes action immediately to "ideas", ignoring the obvious fact that the development and organisation of character, or of the conative side of the mind, is largely distinct from and independent of the development of the mind". The same thing is implied in another passage where he maintains that reason is helpless to initiate desire, and we must remember that desire to McDougall is of the essence of conation. He says: (op. cit., p.326) "To create desire is a task beyond its competence; it can only direct pre-existing tendencies towards their appropriate objects. It is, therefore, a grave error on the part of some authors to say that reason may create a desire for a moral quality; or to say (as Sidgwick said) that in rational beings as such the cognition or judgment that this is right or ought to be done gives an impulse or motive to action". Thus our author maintains at one time that cognition is the cause of conation and at another time that cognition is helpless to initiate action or conation. Which of these two statements are we going to believe? They cannot both be true. This is the condition that preoccupation with his theory of instincts brings a brilliant writer to. He has formed the conclusion that the instincts, because they are important, and do explain much of mental
life are all important and are the only way of approach to the study of mind and that no other way of approach is deserving of consideration, and he has not troubled himself to enquire whether the tradition of cognition first of conation first, which are the two that have been usually placed first by psychologists of the past, is safe to apply to his theory of the instincts. Professor McDougall was in a peculiarly advantageous position for seeing in the clearest possible manner that instinct which is an inherited innate tendency, a product of evolution cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as primarily cognition except by reverting to the old faculty psychology which he is all the time seeking to replace. Not having realised from the first that instinctive tendency originates in feeling, as it is one of the purposes of the present thesis to establish, Professor McDougall wavers in his opinion at one time to the side of cognition and at another time to the side of conation as the primary dynamical element in mind, these being the two elements in mind which different traditional schools of psychology regard as primary. Professor McDougall, we again say, was in a particularly advantageous position for seeing that instinctive tendency is a feeling tendency primarily, because in the beginning, and on his own showing, throughout, the organism is largely guided by this feeling which precedes thinking, because it is innately given, being physiologically represented by a physical structure the thalamus which had a long history when intelligence was at a minimum before the development of the cerebral cortex which developed out of the thalamus.
on the advent of the fuller stage of intelligence or reason. Professor Ward at one point describes feeling as simply "being" and that is what the primary stage is like, an existence with a feeling continuum capable of development, because it contains in germ cognition and conation which develop after a long time, while the primary feeling is comparatively strong from the very beginning of "being".

Another proof that Professor McDougall has confused the states of consciousness is the fact that whenever he is describing conative tendency he seems to us to be describing feeling itself. In one of the above quotations he describes conative tendency by comparing it with Schopenhauer's will or with Bergson's vital impulsion (l'elan vital), but these two conceptions are different because "for Schopenhauer, for example, the blind appetitions displayed by lowly organisms were acts of will, equally with our greatest moral efforts". (McDougall, op. cit., p.311) whereas McDougall himself describes the élan vital of Bergson by the Greek word ἐρυθ which he translates as "an urge" to action (op. cit., p.409). Now there is a vast difference between an urge to action and the action itself, namely, the difference between feeling and conation; a feeling which is an urge naturally ends in conation or action, so that under the name of conative tendency our author is all the time describing feeling, but even then he is not consistent, because a feeling or urge or ἐρυθ is a vastly different thing from the will of Schopenhauer which/
which McDougall himself admits is equal to our own "greatest moral efforts". In that case McDougall's conative tendency if it is an urge which applies also to lower organisms cannot be described as Schopenhauer's will. That Professor McDougall has not definitely distinguished between the three elements in mind is still further evidenced by the way in which he compares conative tendency with mental phases of feeling. For instance he identifies conative tendency with craving and desire which are both phases of feeling connected with an object. He says: (op. cit., p. 316) "Therefore in the lower realms of life all action must be attributed by the pleasure pain theory to present pain. But the pain of hunger seems to be in our own case the pain of unsatisfied craving; that is the pain is conditioned by the craving, and presupposes it - if there were no craving there would be no pain. But the craving is essentially a conation, a tendency to action, however vaguely directed", Again he says: (op. cit., p. 317) "Both the pleasure and the pain of hunger seem, then, to be conditioned by the craving, the conative tendency, the specifically directed impulse or appetition, And this seems to be true not only of the desire for food, but of many other desires. When, for example, we desire the applause of our fellows, when we are consumed with what is called disinterested curiosity, when we desire to avenge ourselves.

Now the pleasure and pain of hunger and the desire for food are not particularly conative; we do not understand how they can be considered conative; the desire for food is an organic sensation a feeling of want. Nor is the desire for applause in any sense a conation/
conation; it is a feeling for exaltation; nor are disinterested curiosity, nor the desire for revenge in any sense of the term conations. If we are to call feelings such as these conations then there is no use in the distinction made between feeling, knowing and willing, and it might as well be dispensed with, but, if the tripartite division means anything, we must be accurate in the use of it otherwise nothing but confusion will result. We have always understood that feelings, cravings and desires are potential, dynamic, as yet incomplete phases of mind, but that a conation is of the nature of an accomplished fact, a "fait accompli" a debouchment, actualised action. Therefore there is a vast difference between a craving or a desire and a conation, and between the urge to action and the action itself.

But Professor McDougall may reply that he never said that craving and desires were conations, but that they were conative tendencies. Now one would like to ask Professor McDougall how he distinguishes between a conation and a conative tendency or in other words between willing and a tendency to willing. The distinction between them is too subtle. On the same analogy we would be entitled to speak of feeling tendency and a knowing tendency as well as of a conative or willing tendency. But what again one would ask is the reality that one can attach to a feeling tendency or a knowing tendency, and what then to a conative tendency? Where do these tendencies differ from feeling, willing, and conation proper? Do the conative tendencies always become a conation? If so we might as well discard the term conative/
conative tendency, and use the same old term conation. Or does the conative tendency remain sometimes at the stage of tendency without ever becoming a proper conation? If it does then it has no right to be called conative; it is some phase of mind anterior to conation, that is to say, either feeling or knowing. It is quite evident that Professor McDougall has never accurately defined his terms a virtue in which psychologists are supposed to excel as compared with theologians. Professor McDougall compares his conative tendency to the "libido" of Freud and Jung, but the "libido," of Freud and Jung is essentially of the nature of an unrealised and often unrealisable wish and has passed into literature now as the "Freudian Wish," a wish which seeks satisfaction by conation but it is not itself conation, and because it cannot realise itself finds conation in dream and complexes.

One feels sure that Professor McDougall having failed to realise the place and importance of feeling is compelled to import it under another term, namely, conative tendency, and all the time he is speaking of this term as desire, craving, tendency, we are certain that what he has unconsciously in mind is feeling, and his account of the instinctive tendencies would be much more intelligible if he use the old term feeling itself, and then even the unsophisticated would understand what he means, because what the ordinary person says is "I have an instinctive feeling" or "I know instinctively" or "I do it instinctively." Instinctive tendency is not simply conative because instinctive tendency contains feeling, knowing, and willing, and it is not clear why it should be called conativetendency rather than
feeling tendency, or knowing tendency. For example, the instinctive
tendencies of hunger, thirst, rest, exercise, nausea, etc.,
might be more correctly regarded as feeling tendencies; those of
admiration, awe, fear, curiosity, self display, self abasement,
etc. might be more correctly called cognitive tendencies, while
those of flight, pugnacity, hunting, acquisition, might be regarded
as preeminently conative tendencies. Thus the term conative ten-
dency does not add any definite meaning to the word already in use,
namely, instinctive tendency or instinct, and it would be far better
discarded and the word feeling used in its place, because feeling
has no lack of scope and range and it covers all that Professor
McDougall wishes to include in his conative tendency without multi-
plying new and unfamiliar terms and that is why Professor Ward thin-
that a great deal of the new psychology will come to admit some of
the wisdom of the older sooner or later.

Professor McDougall has a whole chapter on "Volition" which is
vitiated throughout by this fundamental mistake of confusing conati
with feeling or phases thereof such as desires and aversions. He
says: (op. cit., p.204)"We have recognised that all impulses, all
desires and aversions, all motives - in short, all conations - fall
into two classes: 1. those that arise from the excitement of some
innate disposition or instinct; 2. those that arise on the excite-
ment of dispositions acquired during the life of the individual by
differentiation from the innate dispositions, under the guidance of
pleasure and pain. We may, then, restate our problem in more gen-
eral/
general terms, as follows: Is volition only a specially complex case of conation, implying more conjunction of conations of these two origins rendered possible by the systematic organisation of the innate and acquired dispositions? Or does it involve some motive power, some source of energy, some power of striving, of an altogether different order? Clearly we must attempt to account for it in terms of the former alternative, and we may only adopt the latter if the attempt gives no promise of success. It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be accounted for as a special case of conation differing from other conations not in kind but only in complexity. We may see this most clearly if we form a scale of conations ranging from the simplest type to the most complex and obscure type, namely, moral choice achieved by an effort, which in the struggle of higher and lower motives, brings victory to the higher but weaker motive. If types of conation can be arranged in such a scale, each type differing from its neighbours only very slightly, that will afford a strong presumption of continuity of the scale; for if volition involves some peculiar factor not operative in other conations, we ought to be able to draw a sharp line between volitional and non-volitional conations." Here McDougall is plainly confusing conation with feeling or forms of feeling. For example, he here says that a conation arises from the excitement of an instinct and he mentions that aversions are forms of conation. Now aversions or repulsions on McDougall's own showing previously are emotions which are associated with the instinct of disgust and not conations at all but forms/
forms of feeling, and it certainly does not conduce to edification to be told that aversions at one time are emotional responses evoked by the excitation of the instinct of disgust and at another that aversions are conations, unless we are to believe that conations are emotional responses which would be a "reductio ad absurdum". Likewise impulses, desires, and motives, all which McDougall equates with conation can be shown to be forms of feeling, though desire and motive imply an end in view, and are to that extent cognitive also, but they are not conative. McDougall is unconsciously aware of this and therefore, concludes that there are two kinds of conations volitional and non-volitional as he says above. But surely volitional and non-volitional phases of mind are very different things absolutely opposite and different enough to form two different categories, and that is exactly what they are; as a matter of fact the volitional are will proper and the non-volitional are only feeling, for, McDougall's own account of volition is as follows: (op. cit., p. 212) "We recognised that in the typical case of volition a man's self, in some particularly intimate sense of the word "self" is thrown upon the side of the motive that is to prevail", but where the self is not so thrown there is no act of will, the state is non-volition, that is to say, it is one of feeling, or wish or desire. Again in the above quotation McDougall maintains that volition is only a specially complex case of conation and conations are two types volitional and non-volitional, so that we arrive at a very easy "petitio principii" that volitions are of the volitional type. Thus by calling feelings non-volitional conations McDougall fails to distinguish/
distinguish between feelings and conations, and has to include the two of them under conation, whereas they are two irreducible states of mind, although in the beginning of the organism feeling and action are very closely related, and it is this close relation that causes their identification and confusion with one another, and because there is in feeling a potential, dynamic, e-motive element, and it is this relationship that makes McDougall imagine he can form a scale of conations ranging from the simplest type to the most complex, as he says above. In very primitive organisms, however, action is as decided as in the maturest act of will, but the action is due to a prior feeling of want which makes the organism move towards what it wants and away from what it does not want. The confusion caused by mistaking feeling for will or action which is due to the fact that feeling knowing and willing partly involve one another, is also evident in McDougall's conception of desire which to him is also conative. He says: (op. cit., p.212) "The essential operation of volition is the same as that of desire, namely, the holding the idea of the end at the focus of consciousness so that it works strongly towards the realisation of its end, prevailing over rival ideas and tendencies". This is an inversion of facts as in the case of desire it is the idea that retains hold on the focus of consciousness in spite of all we try to do to remove it as is well known in Indian religions where the effort is not to retain the idea at the focus of consciousness but how to dislodge it therefrom; desire implies no effort of will.

Having then displaced feeling proper by his new term conative tendency Professor McDougall naturally finds it difficult to understand/
understand where feeling proper comes in. He writes: (op. cit., p. 318) "When, then, the pleasure-pain theorist tells us that feeling determines conation, we must ask what determines the feeling; and, if he replies that cognition of some object is the immediate condition of feeling, we point to these numerous instances in which the feeling-tone of the thought of the object varies from pleasure to pain, its quality and strength being obviously determined, not directly by cognition, but by the conation it evokes". According to this quotation conation determines the feeling tone due to the experience of an object. We maintain here that feeling determines cognition and conation. But McDougall asks us in that case what determines the feeling. It is here that McDougall is making the mistake; the feeling that McDougall is enquiring about is not the primary feeling of the tripartite division, but a secondary phase of feeling, an effect, a feeling-tone. Feeling in the first instance, is a cause of the conation; it was because there was a prior feeling of some kind that the conation took place at all; in the second case the feeling is a later stage of the original feeling, an effect of the cognition and conation, a feeling-tone, or emotion. If we hark back to the second chapter, there Professor Ward differentiated five different uses of the word feeling. One of these was a feeling-tone it comes about this way: suppose we have a feeling for fellowship, this is the primary feeling of the tripartite division. When the person comes, our feeling still remains, but the coming of the object of our feeling has differently toned the feeling, and the resultant feeling is a feeling-tone, an emotion. Of the latter category are all the emotions which are roused by the exercise of the instincts, such as wonder, awe, and so on; they are effects toned by
experiencing the object, feeling tones or emotions, whereas each instinct begins in a primary vague feeling for something which it has not got, and is thus quite a different stage of feeling from the secondary feeling tones or emotions.

We therefore, think that Professor McDougall's famous definition is defective in not distinguishing between these two stages of feeling represented by the primary feeling and the secondary feeling-tone or emotion. The second of these stages the definition has got, but there is no acknowledgement of the first, and having left it out McDougall makes the essential nature of instinct to be conative. His definition runs: (op. cit., p. 25) "We may then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action". It ought to read: "We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition to feel a want or need which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience a change of feeling or an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such an action". We have here in the amended definition what McDougall had not got before, namely, feeling, knowing and willing all present in their proper order, whereas the primary feeling is absent from the original definition, because McDougall has no room for it in his psychology.

As a result of his omission of feeling from his psychology we find/
find Professor McDougall again astray in his theory of the relation between instinctive tendencies and the emotions. McDougall enumerates seven primary instincts with their accompanying emotions, as follows: the instincts of flight, of repulsion, of curiosity, of self-display, of self-abasement, the parental instinct, and the instinct of pugnacity which have associated with them the emotions of fear, disgust, wonder, elation or positive self-feeling, submission or negative self-feeling, and anger. These he regards as primary and the source of all the motive forces in the individual, because they have accompanying emotions. But it has been pointed out by other psychologists that there are other instincts equally important to which McDougall has given a secondary position, because they have no manifest accompanying emotion, such as the instinct to seek pleasure and avoid displeasure, the instinct of play, experimentation, imitation, sympathy, of prehension, locomotion, vocalisation, of hunting and of gregariousness. But these are all quite as much native impulses in human nature, and in all creatures, and they are all important and necessary as the emotional group.

As Dr Drever for instance, points out McDougall was biassed by the fact that he concluded that the instincts must be accompanied by some particular emotion, and so had to exclude those that had not. But this is not valid and we must include three groups:

1. The appetitive group which comprises the following: the instinct to seek pleasure and avoid pain, the instincts of hunger, of thirst, rest, exercise, courtship, and nausea.
2. The emotional group of Professor McDougall.

3. A non-emotional group including the general reactive tendencies with no clear emotional association with them, such as, the tendency to play, sympathy, imitation suggestibility etc. mentioned above.

Now the above are all equally natural native interests of the human being. The appetitive and non-emotional group are as truly innate and instinctive as the emotional group out of which McDougall supposes that all the motive forces of the individual come. Therefore we deduce this fact that Professor McDougall's reading of the nature of instinct is wrong simply because he has mistaken the true nature of feeling and its true place in mind, and he confuses feeling with emotions which are effects.

We shall see this more clearly if we give his own account of instinct. He says: (op. cit., p. 28) "In order to understand these complications of instinctive behaviour we must submit the conception of an instinctive tendency to a more minute analysis. It was said above that every instinctive process has the three aspects of all mental process — the cognitive, the affective, and the conative. Now the innate psycho-physical disposition which is an instinct, may be regarded as consisting of three corresponding parts — an afferent, a central, and a motor or efferent part — whose activities are the cognitive, the affective, and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive process". It is evident from the above quotation that as we have seen many times already, McDougall regards the states of consciousness to begin with cognition which gives rise to feeling/
feeling which in turn results in a conation. This is also the order we have seen in his definition. Now if this is the true order it ought to hold good when applied to all the instincts, but what we find is that this order holds good only of the emotional group, while it fails in the case of the appetitive, and non-emotional group. That is to say, according to McDougall's theory of mind the appetitive and non-emotional groups would only yield two mental elements, namely, cognition and conation, while the central element, the affective or emotional which McDougall regards as the permanent element in instinct, is absent.

This is another proof of our contention that the order of the states of consciousness is not cognition, feeling, and conation, but feeling, cognition, and conation, and this proof we found in the preceding chapters from a consideration of the three irreducible elements in mind, and in this chapter from a consideration of the nature of the instinctive tendencies which are innate and inherited, though not as McDougall says unanalyzable. When cognition or idea or the intellectual element is put first the theory proves unworkable. We maintain, therefore, that the correction suggested above of his definition of instinct is necessary to make it apply to the nature of mind, and of instinct, because with his present definition, and with his present order of the states of consciousness he has to relegate to a secondary position two groups of instincts which have as much right to be regarded as innate and instinctive as the emotional group which he chooses to call primary for no reason that he can make apparent except that they have accompanying emotions.

On the other hand if he accepted the order of the states of consciousness/
consciousness suggested in these pages, namely, that consciousness begins in a feeling of want in consequence of which it meets its object and on meeting its object it reacts towards it, and this reaction is conation proper, while, what McDougall calls conative tendency, is simply what we call feeling proper. With this version of mind, then, all the three groups of instincts begin with feeling; next they have a cognitive part which produces a change in the original feeling that is to say makes it into a feeling-tone or emotion which results in a conation or characteristic reaction towards the object. In the case of the non-emotional group the feeling tone or emotion is not absent; it is there all the time, only, from the nature of the instinct, the feeling-tone or emotion is not so easily perceptible, as in the case of the emotional group, being less marked, and not so strong. It is quite certain that the so-called non-emotional group, for example the instincts of play, sympathy, hunting gregariousness, etc. have emotional accompaniments, only we have not got names for them because they are not so strong; otherwise we would have to believe that there were states of mind without affective states in their formation. With regard to the last mentioned of these, the gregarious instinct, Professor McDougall himself admits that it does possess an affective aspect though we have no name for it, and the same will be true of all the rest of this group. He writes: (op. cit., p. 71) "The gregarious instinct is one of the human instincts of greatest social importance, for it has played a great part in moulding societary forms. The affective aspect of the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense or specific to have been given a name."
Thus by giving feeling its proper place as primary and regulative we get a consistent account of the instincts. When McDougall refuses it its proper place his account of the instincts is confusing and unintelligible, because he cannot explain why some instincts and emotions are primary, and some secondary, why some have emotions, and some havenot. This is due to the fact that he does not realise that all activity begins in feeling, and that feeling passes into an emotion of greater or less intensity on experiencing its object. The emotion is only a phase of the original primary feeling. It is this primary feeling which is the dynamic and determinative part of mind that McDougall is thinking of when he speaks of conative tendency. But it is entirely misleading as has been said already, to call feeling conative tendency any more than cognitive tendency, because each of the states of consciousness involve one another to some extent as has been often pointed out. Nothing therefore, we think, can restore clearness and consistency to McDougall's exposition of the instincts except to substitute feeling for conative tendency and also make feeling in the sense used above the basal element in mind.

One final particular in which McDougall's wrong idea of the fundamental nature of mind as according to him cognition, volition and conation, acts disastrously, is in the case of the relation of the instincts to the emotions. McDougall takes for granted that each of his primary instincts has an invariable accompanying emotion of a particular kind. But the matter is not so simple as this. For instance, if the instinct of flight is evoked, the emotional reaction will be fear if the avenue of escape is closed,
but, if the avenue is not closed the emotion is a pleasant relief, and so on with other instincts also. The emotions evoked are pleasant if the instinct is satisfied and unpleasant if thwarted or baulked, and thus the quality of the emotions vary between the two polarities of pleasant and unpleasant, or of joy and sorrow which are the terms used of emotion. Now what forms the gauze of these variations between the two polarities? It is the original feeling, and that is why it is called regulative and determinative. If one has a feeling of superiority in face of any situation, he has an emotion of elation, and if he has a feeling of inferiority, he has the emotion of submission, and the intensity of the emotion ranges between the two polarities of elation and submission according to the degree of superiority or inferiority. Thus feeling determines the emotion, being the primary element in mind.

One other very important indication of the primacy of feeling in the history of the organism is that supplied by psychologists working in the field of biology and reproduced by Dr Rivers in his book "Instinct and the Unconscious". (Cambridge University Press, 1924) He distinguishes the difference between the feeling stage of the organism which is first and the intelligence cognitive stage which develops later by showing the difference between protopathic and epicritic sensibility. He describes protopathic sensibility thus: (op. cit., p.22) "Observations on the sensory changes which accompany the regeneration of a divided and a reunited nerve have led Head/
Head and his colleagues to distinguish two different kinds of mechanism on the afferent side of the nervous system. In one of these the protopathic stage, the sensations are vague and crude in character, with absence of any discrimination or localisation, and with a prolonged feeling-tone usually on the unpleasant side, tending to lead explosively, as if reflexively, to such movements as would withdraw the stimulated part from contact with any object to which the sensory changes are due. The sensations are such as would enable one to know that something is there and that it is unpleasant or unpleasant, but there is no power of distinguishing differences in intensity, nor of telling with any exactness the exact spot where the processes underlying the changes are in action. The above description of protopathic sensibility answers to what we know of primitive feeling or sensation whereas epicritic sensibility bears the characteristics of intelligence or cognition. He describes it thus: (op. cit., p. 23) "The second stage of the process of regeneration is characterised by the return of those features of normal cutaneous sensibility such as exact discrimination and localisation, by means of which it becomes possible to perceive the nature of an object in contact with the skin, and adjust behaviour according to this perception. The modes of reaction which make this exactness of discrimination and power of external projection possible are grouped together under the heading of epicritic sensibility". Now these two different kinds of sensibilities are represented by two kinds of structures/
structures in the organism, and these two structures belong to widely separated stages of the development of the nervous system which indicates that the stage of feeling had a long history of development before the stage of intelligence supervened. In support of this contention Dr Rivers adduces the following facts: (op. cit., p.27) "If we now pass to the central end of the nervous path by which the impulses subserving cutaneous sensibility reach the brain, Head working in conjunction with Holmes has discovered a relation between the cerebral cortex and the optic thalamus very similar to that existing between protopathic and epicritic sensibility. In this case the special modes of activity they have studied are associated with structures which belong to widely separated stages of the development of the nervous system. The optic thalamus represents the dominant part of the brain of lower vertebrates while the cerebral cortex or neopallium developed far later". Further he writes: (op. cit., p.49) "The optic thalamus is now hidden away in the interior of the brain overlaid and buried by the vast development of the cerebral cortex. Just as I have supposed that emotive and instinctive reactions are buried within the unconscious hidden from consciousness by the vast development of those reactions which are associated with intelligence, so do we find the organ of the emotions and instinctive reactions has been buried under the overwhelming mass of the nervous structure we know to be pre-eminently associated with consciousness". According to the above exposition it would seem that the stage of feeling and of the formation of the instinctive tendencies/
tendencies long preceded the stage of intelligence, so that the primary element in instinct must be feeling and if the formation of the instinctive tendencies long preceded the stage of intelligence, then the primary element in instinct must be feeling and not cognition as McDougall and others suppose.

An excuse must be tendered here for the space this proposition has taken to establish, but in the absence of authoritative psychology it had to be done, and the proposition that feeling and not cognition or conation is primary is vital to our view of the prophetic consciousness and of religion which is a feeling for fellowship with the Divine into which the feeling or emotion of love is the primary element, and in the next chapter we shall endeavour to show from a consideration of the instincts how the instinct of tender emotion or love is primary and regulative and determinative of the other instincts and its analysis will show us the comprehensive nature of love which is the highest attribute of Deity, as well as the highest characteristic of worship and fellowship which is the core of religion; and the determining factor in the prophetic consciousness.

Meanwhile we have so far shown, firstly, from a consideration of the three irreducible states of consciousness, secondly, from a consideration of the nature of the instinctive tendencies, and thirdly from a brief consideration of biological psychology that feeling is the primary and regulative and determinative element in mind, and has got to be reckoned with in any complete account of religion and the religious/
religious consciousness. But there is one point more which needs to be re-emphasised before we close this chapter and that is that this regulative feeling remains the same except for the change of tone in it caused by later cognitions and conations in virtue of which we get the changes in the feeling-state called feeling-tone and emotion which are only different shades of the original feeling with which the organism starts, and which regulates and determines all its later processes. In support of this we shall quote a passage from a great psychologist, Professor Otto ("Idea of the Holy", p.44) He says: "But it is important here to recognise the true account of the phenomenon, what passes over - undergoes transition - is not the feeling itself. It is not that the actual feeling gradually changes in quantity or "evolves", i.e. transmutes itself into quite a different one, but rather that "I" pass over or make the transition from one feeling to another as my circumstances change, by the gradual decrease of the one, and the increase of the other. A transition of the actual feeling into another would be a real "transmutation" and would be a psychological counterpart to the alchemists production of gold by the transmutation of metals". This is the metaphysical form of our psychological statement with regard to feeling and it emphasises the same fact that it is the same feeling-self that is behind all processes of mind affective, cognitive and volitional, regulating and determining them, and this interpretation of the self makes the relation between feeling and the emotional states intelligible.
Chapter V.

THE SENTIMENTS.
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1. The Biblical Conception of the Sentiments.

When the greatest teacher of all was asked which commandment of the law was first, He replied: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength", and "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (Mk. 15:30) This reply implies that life is concerned not with one but with three ultimate realities, namely, self, neighbour, and God. In the first place man owes a duty to himself of self-preservation and self-realisation. Secondly he owes the same duty to his neighbour of helping him also to self-preservation and self-realisation, because he cannot attain self-realisation for himself except in as far as he helps his neighbour to attain the same. And neither he nor his neighbour can attain to self-realisation, except in as far as they love the Highest, namely, God.

Further, the above reply denotes that the three ultimate interests or values of the individual, or, as we shall call them in this chapter sentiments, include the whole psychical life of man and are organised in a hierarchy round one supreme emotional disposition or sentiment, namely, love, under which are organised all other emotional dispositions that go to make up the complex structure of personality.

Thus we shall begin our discussion of the place of the sentiment in the religious consciousness by noting that the sentiment/
sentiment of love has three supreme objects, namely, 1. the Supreme Being, 2. one's neighbour, 3. oneself. With this classification agrees a recent writer, Professor A. N. Whitehead. (Lowell Lectures 1926, Cambridge University Press, 1927) He says: "Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness....These concepts are: 1. That of the value of an individual for itself. 2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other. 3. That of the value of the objective world". The third it will be noticed is different from the corresponding one in our classification above, as the writer does not admit a personal God, a question which will engage our attention later.

The present chapter, therefore, will be devoted, firstly, to an explanation of the nature and function of the emotional dispositions called sentiments; secondly, the nature of the supreme instinct and sentiment of love, out of which religion is generated, will be examined; thirdly, the three fundamental forms of this ultimate sentiment of love which have as their objective God, neighbour and self will undergo investigation in the order in which they arise, namely self, neighbour and God. This will help to establish our thesis that love to God and desire for and fellowship with God is the genesis of religion and of the prophetic consciousness, and the life of fellowship constitutes the religious life which is a life determined by love which is the integrating, evolving, creating force in man's life.
2. The Nature and Formation of Sentiment.

We shall begin by studying briefly the nature of the sentiments, the process of their formation, and their development. We already saw in our chapter on consciousness that there are three sets of mental facts: firstly, there are the structural elements in mind represented by such facts as instincts, sentiments, dispositions, complexes, habits, prejudices, customs, and so on; they form the unconscious and are represented physiologically by the thalamus and the cerebral cortex; secondly, there are the processes involved in the interaction with one another of these structural elements in the unconscious called endopsychic process, the distinctive characteristic of which is that it lacks the characteristic of psychical integration and inside view which conscious process possesses; it is typified by the Freudian Censor; in fact the honour of discovering this element in mind belongs to Freud and Jung and their followers; thirdly, there is the psychical synthesis or integration which we call conscious process or experience, the distinctive characteristic of which is that it contains an inside view of the process or experience.

Now the sentiment, as we have seen above, belongs to the first of these three classes of mental facts; it belongs to the structural part of mind called the unconscious, and, as such, it can never be present in consciousness, but at the same time it can influence by action and interaction the other structural elements in mind, and also/
also conscious process, and consequently behaviour, whenever it is evoked. Such is the case with all the other structural elements in mind. Again the sentiment like the other structural elements is an emotional response which is called forth by a specific object, and when the sentiment is in operation this emotion colours the mental process, and ends in a specific form of action. This is what is meant by saying that the sentiment or other structural elements are determinants of conscious process, and, as mental development is mostly on this principle, it can be easily realised on what a larger scale the nature of mind and of the native interests and endowments of the individual can be studied compared with the older method of preoccupation with mental processes alone, as the newer method leads us to, and compels us to study, behaviour as well.

Being a more or less permanent structure of mind the sentiment remains throughout comparatively unchanged whereas the emotions evoked throughout its existence by the specific object will be variously tinged from time to time according to the situation of the object with a varying emotional or feeling tone. There are as we have seen many other structural elements in mind analogous to the sentiment and their definition will help to clarify the nature of sentiment. The most important of these to distinguish are instincts, dispositions and complexes. The instincts we have discussed already, they are the chief raw material for the formation of mind and character, and are different from the sentiments in that they are inherited, whereas the sentiments are acquired during the life history of/
of the individual and in their development modify the instinctive tendency on which they have been grafted. The instincts are present in all in varying degrees; they each serve a biological end and come into play at different stages in the life of the individual and they can be sublimated and made to serve higher ends through the development of sentiments and ideals.

There is another close relation between all the structural elements which have been named, namely this, that they have all come into existence as emotional responses to some specific object or situation. This fact is of great interest to our later discussion of the "a priori" view of religious knowledge, and it is necessary here to emphasise the fact that these structural elements have all come into existence in different ways through the interaction of mind and object. The most primitive of these emotional responses are the instinctive tendencies which are physical and psychical structures which have come into existence during the course of evolution through the interaction of the organism with specific objects and situations in the outer world. The nature of any particular instinct, therefore, depends on the nature of the objective reality through which it has come into existence, and at the same time the objective reality would have no effect upon mind if there were no innate tendency going out to meet it. This fact that the existence of instincts presupposes specific objects that call it into being is important to expounders of the "a priori" theory, and for that reason the fact must be stressed here.

The sentiments are formed on the same principle as the instinct that is to say, they are structural elements of mind which have come into
into existence through emotional responses to specific objects or situations in the course of experience, but they are different in that the instincts are inherited while the sentiments are acquired. The sentiments are also closely related to the instincts in that they are on the one hand, a continuation of the instincts by which the sentiments are made possible, and on the other hand the sentiment are capable of modifying and sublimating the instincts. A sentiment therefore, is formed by an instinctive emotion becoming attached to objects events or persons in the environment.

Dispositions again are distinguished from sentiments in this respect that sentiments are consciously accepted whereas disposition are those emotional attitudes to things which are unconsciously accepted, while complexes are those which are rejected as unacceptable and tend to be repressed according to the degree to which they are unacceptable. Habits again are responses which have lost their dynamic emotional quality. A sentiment, therefore, is an emotional response towards an idea, thing, or person which is acceptable to th individual. For instance, religion is a sentiment which centres round the idea or person of God and varies with the aspect in which God is conceived. The sentiments form a hierarchy under one domi­nating sentiment which is not simply one among many, but an integration and synthesis of all the rest with which the self is identified; that is to say, the self has one dominating sentiment, or interest, which is the primary cause of its synthesis and development, such as politics or religion. The aim of all education, therefore, is to create sentiments for the objects that are considered right, but these sentiments have further to be established and become dispo­sitions/
dispositions which are the source of our habits and character, character being the nature of the self acting through its sentiments and dispositions. The sentiments on the higher level of reason become ideals. Well systematised harmonised sentiments are the cause of strength of character and happiness, and badly systematised sentiments are the cause of strain, unhappiness, and weakness of character.

The laws of development of these emotional tendencies have been deduced and defined by psychologists. Dr Drever enumerates seven which have been formulated as a result of the work of James, McDougall, and Shand. We can do little more than mention them. They are:

1. the law of development by stimulation: an instinct may die out for want of use.
2. the law of selection by result: those actions tend to be discontinued which lead to unsatisfactory results, and vice versa.
3. the law of inhibition: the tendency to refuse to respond to any other except the first type of stimulus.
4. the law of transience: many instincts ripen at a certain age and then fade away.
5. the law of transference of impulse: an impulse may be transferred from the original object to a new one.
6. the law of fusion of feeling: primary emotions simultaneously evoked, fuse into one new emotional experience analysable into its elementary components.
7. the law of complication of behaviour due to the fusing of different emotions.

As a result of the operation of these laws we get three stages or levels of mental life. These three levels are apparent on the feeling, knowing and willing side of mind. From the point of view of feeling the various stages appear as primary immediate crude feeling.
feeling or emotion, interest or sentiment, ideal or principle. From the point of view of intellectual process they appear as, perception, ideation, and reason, and from the point of view of behaviour they appear as instinctive or purposive or teleological behaviour. These stages, however, are not separate but each stage involves all three, the relation between them being that at the perceptual level it is crude feeling, at the ideational level it is sentiment, and at the rational level it is ideals and principles that come into existence.

3. Love the Supreme Sentiment.

Having briefly indicated the nature and manner of formation of the sentiments we proceed now to show that there is always a hierarchy of sentiments and that love is the supreme sentiment. As Dr Drever says: (op. cit., p.77) "The mere predominance of some one sentiment will not yield a hierarchy. The only possible way of accounting for a hierarchy is by showing how all the sentiments can be caught up into a larger comprehensive system". This is what we shall now endeavour to do by showing that love embraces all other sentiments.

Professor McDougall points out that it is impossible to make much headway in classifying the sentiments by considering the various objects about which the sentiments are formed, because if we have sentiment of love towards a man or object, the emotion will change according to the different situations in which the object is placed. For example, there will be fear or anxiety if the object is in danger, sorrow when it is lost, joy when it is restored, gratitude towards...
towards those who do it good, and on the other hand if there be hatred towards the object there will be fear or anger at its approach joy when it is injured, and anger when it receives favours. This points to the fact that the only practicable way of classifying the sentiments is according to the nature of these emotions. McDougall points out that all the sentiments are of two kinds, love and hate. These words are used to denote both the emotions and the sentiments, that is to say, there are the familiar emotions of love and hate, but there are also enduring complex emotional dispositions of love and hate which are not merely emotions, but permanent tendencies to experience these emotions whenever the loved or hated object comes to mind.

The class of sentiments represented by love and hate includes all forms of likes and dislikes, affection and aversion, and are thus very comprehensive, but McDougall thinks that there is a third class, namely, respect, so that his final classification of the sentiments is that they are a triad of love, hate, and respect. We have, however, in the beginning of this chapter agreed with the view implied in the Biblical quotation that there is one supreme sentiment which includes all the others both likes and dislikes, as well as respect, namely, the sentiment of love, so that there is no necessity but, on the other hand, confusion, as a result of supposing that there is a triad. What McDougall's reason for this trinity is, is not clear. There might be some excuse for regarding them as two, namely love and hate, but we do not see why respect should be put into a wholly different category from love. McDougall's reason for doing so is as follows: (op. cit., p.138) "We must, I think, recognise
a third principal variety of sentiment which is primarily the self-regarding sentiment, and is, perhaps, best called respect. Respect differs from love in that, while tender emotion occupies the principal place in love, it is lacking, or occupies an altogether subordinate position in the sentiment of respect. The principal constituents of respect are positive and negative self-feeling and respect is clearly marked off from love by the fact that shame is one of its strongest emotions".

Now there are three distinct reasons given in the above quotation for placing respect in a category by itself apart from love. 1. The first reason given is that while tender emotion occupies the principal place in love, it is lacking or occupies an altogether subordinate position in the sentiment of respect. Here McDougall is plainly indefinite as to whether tender emotion can be always lacking or not from respect. If it is ever completely lacking then it certainly is of a different genus from love and cannot be included in it, because the essence of love is tender emotion. But the writer admits that it may be sometimes present in a subordinate degree. What one cannot understand is how it can be absent or lacking at one time and present at another, although in a slight degree, or how can any one distinguish between the stage at which it is lacking, and the stage at which it is present in a slight degree only. The distinction is too subtle, and the two statements are incompatible. Either tender emotion is always absent from respect or it is present, but our writer cannot have it both ways. Now it is/
is certain that the former of these alternatives is not true, namely that tender emotion is always absent from respect. On the contrary it is always present though, as he says, "in a subordinate position", because he himself admits that the sentiments of love, hate, and respect, may be present in all degrees of intensity. He says: (op. cit., p. 139) "Besides the sentiments of these three main types, love, hate, and respect, which may be called complete or full-grown sentiments, we must recognise the existence of sentiments of all degrees of development from the most rudimentary upwards; these may be regarded as stages in the formation of fully-grown sentiments, although many of them never attain any great degree of complexity or strength. These we have to name according to the principle emotional disposition entering into their composition". Again he shows that there are a great many sentiments which are included under the two main heads of love and hate. He writes: (op. cit., p. 138) "We have the names love, liking, affection, attachment, denoting those sentiments that draw one towards their object, generally in virtue of tender emotion, with its protective impulse which is their principal constituent; and we have the names hate, dislike, and aversion, for those that lead us to shrink from their objects, those whose attitude or tendency is one of aversion, owing to the fear or disgust that is the dominant element in their constitution. The two names, love and hate, and the weaker but otherwise synonymous terms liking and dislike, affection and aversion, are very general; each stands for a large class of sentiments of varied though similar composition". Now it is apparent that respect is of "similar composition" to the sentiments/
sentiments in the first list and must be included in that list. Besides, according to his own analysis, the most essential constituents of respect are the two self-regarding tendencies of positive and negative self-feeling and regard implies tender emotion. One, moreover, said, that no one hateth his own flesh, but doth cherish it and commanded man to love his neighbour "as himself". Surely, therefore, respect for self or others implies liking, and liking, on McDougall's own admission, means tender emotion in a certain degree, and this brings respect under love the supreme sentiment.

The second reason McDougall adduces for placing respect outside the category of love is that the principal constituents of respect are positive and negative self-feeling, but here again his reason is strangely at variance with accepted opinion with regard to the relation between love and positive and negative self-feeling. One always thought that humility was of the essence of love. One of the greatest thinkers says: (1. Cor. 13, 4-5) "love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly". Here we have love described as humility and respect together, and these two together yield the most solid positive self-feeling, the very opposite of being puffed up. This second reason of our writer, therefore, is one for including respect under love rather than for placing it in a separate category.

His third reason for excluding respect from love is equally strange. We repeat again what he says: "respect is clearly marked off from love by the fact that shame is one of its strongest emotions. But is it certain that there is a sharp line of demarcation between love and shame in this way, or is it not rather the case that shame is an essential constituent in love? Again we quote the words of
St. Paul that love "doth not behave itself unseemly". What keeps love, then, from unseemly, shameful conduct except the sense of shame without which it could not distinguish between what was seemly and what not? This also is the substance of Professor Drummond's beautiful pamphlet "The Greatest Thing in the World" that love makes gentlemen. Shame therefore, is a constituent of respect simply because it is a constituent of love. A person incapable of feeling shame would be also incapable of love.

Another mistake into which Professor McDougall is led by excluding tender emotion from respect is this: he asks how we can have respect for others if tender emotion is excluded as he supposes from respect. His answer is that our respect for them comes into existence through sympathetic reflection, that is to say, we respect those who respect themselves. Now it is patent that our writer is driven to this very far fetched, reflex, or mechanical conception of respect for others, simply because from the beginning he has made the fatal mistake of excluding tender emotion from respect, and sympathetic reflection, an old solvent of various psychological troubles was ready to hand to fill the gap. It is more likely on the other hand that we respect others not by mechanical reflex sympathetic reflection, but because their lives and their self-respect are a beautiful thing which evokes our tender emotion like any other form of beauty, truth, or goodness. McDougall's account of respect, therefore, is all along an under estimate which he could not avoid, because he elected from the beginning to exclude tender emotion from it.

Thus McDougall's three reasons for making respect a separate type of sentiment are on the contrary all reasons for including it in/
in the category of love, so that we are now left with love and hate, and we now wish to enquire whether love and hate are really two independent, exclusive categories, or, whether or not the one class includes the other, leaving us with one supreme sentiment as we have undertaken to prove. This leads us to consider more closely the nature of love and its relation to hate. Unfortunately as regards the primacy or position of love there is not yet agreement among psychologists and philosophers. With reference to this, Professor McDougall says: (op. cit., p.56) "As regards the parental instinct and tender emotion there are wide differences of opinion. Some of the authors who have paid most attention to the psychology of the emotions, notably Mr. A. F. Shand, do not recognise tender emotion as primary; others, especially Mr. Alex. Sutherland and M. Ribot, recognise it as alone primary, and see in its impulse the root of all altruism. Mr. Sutherland, however, like Adam Smith and many other writers, has confused tender emotion with sympathy, a serious error of incomplete analysis which Ribot has avoided".

Professor McDougall himself in his account of tender emotion gives it the primary place among the instincts and sentiments. He points out that the parental instinct can become more powerful than any other and can over-ride any other even fear itself. The reason he gives for this is that this instinct works in the service of the species while the other instincts work in the service of the individual for whom nature cares little. What he means by this may not be altogether clear, but what he intends probably is that the species could not exist without the protecting care of parental love, nor could/
could it even have come into existence without it; without it the human species, if it ever could come into existence, would rapidly die out. The emotion of love that accompanies this instinct is, therefore, sure to be very strong, but McDougall points out that it has been very generally ignored by philosophers and psychologists, the explanation he gives being that this instinct and its emotion is much stronger in women than in men and in some men perhaps altogether lacking, and philosophers as a class, McDougall thinks, are men in whom defect of this endowment is relatively common.

McDougall next enquires into the origin of parental love which begins as tender emotion, and becomes organised into the sentiment of parental love. He criticises the theory of the origin of parental love advanced by Bain, namely, that parental love is generated in the individual by the frequent repetition of the intense pleasure of contact with the young. This theory, McDougall points out, does no give any reasons or facts to show why this pleasure is so intensely pleasureable as to be accountable for such a powerful instinct.

An equally impossible theory of the genesis of parental love in our writers estimation is that it is due to the expectation by the parent of filial support in old age. This he points out is one of the constantly renewed attempts to derive all altruism from the seeking of one's own pleasure. But as he says, this theory fails to explain why a mother's sacrifices for her child are not painful but joyful, whereas on this theory, they ought to be a succession of painful efforts. He says: (op. cit., p.60) "Parental love must always appear an insoluble riddle and paradox, if we do not recognise this primary emotion, deeply rooted in an ancient instinct of vital importance/
importance to the race. Long ago the Roman moralists were perplexed by it. They noticed that in the Sullan persecutions, while many sons denounced their fathers, no father was ever known to denounce his son; and they recognised that this fact was inexplicable by their theories of conduct. For their doctrine was like that of Bain's who said explicitly: "Tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure and makes no enquiry as to the feeling of the beloved personality. It is by nature pleasurable, but does not necessarily cause us to seek the good of the object further than is needful to gratify ourselves in the indulgence of the feeling". McDougall's own comment on the above quotation from Bain is very striking and we reproduce the passage because it also gives an account of love, the nature of which we are trying to learn. He says: (op. cit., p.61) "This doctrine is a gross libel on human nature, which is not so far inferior to animal nature in this respect as Bain's words imply. If Bain and those who agree with his doctrine, were in the right, everything the cynics have said of human nature would be justified, for from this emotion and its impulse to cherish and protect spring generosity, gratitude, love, pity, true benevolence and altruistic conduct of every kind; in it they have their main and absolutely essential root without which they could not be. Its impulse is primarily to afford physical protection to the child by throwing the arms about it; and that fundamental impulse persists in spite of the immense extension of the range of application of the impulse and its incorporation in many ideal sentiments".
This last sentence regarding the impulse of love to protect by throwing the arms round the object reminds us of the saying: "How often would I have gathered thy children as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not", (Mt. 23, 37.) and it shows how accurately Professor McDougall has gauged and fathomed the true nature of love, so that one of the profound lessons of the instinct psychology is that it widens our conception of what is included in the innate endowments of the individual, for, while we were under the dominance of the older psychology of the states of consciousness, then, everything, even parental love, was evolved from reason through pleasure-seeking, but the instinct psychology has produced this very important result that it has revealed the instincts also to be innate endowments though they work through the states of consciousness, and it has further shown that of these instincts parental love is the most fundamental, because on it depends the very existence of the species as well as its preservation and welfare. And not only so, but, according to this theory, of this impulse to cherish and protect spring generosity, gratitude, love, pity, true benevolence, and altruistic conduct of every kind. If it is true that all these virtues are derived from self-seeking or pleasure-seeking then we self-conscious beings are of all creatures the most to be pitied, because all our virtues are merely disguised selfishness, but if, on the other hand as instinct psychology maintains, these virtuous impulses are in us innately, that is, are present in us in germ as potentialities when we come into the world, then/
then we have to look for their origin to some other source than our own reason which develops later, to a source beyond ourselves, namely, to a creative cause that was at work before our individual existence. It does not need much demonstration to show how important a result this is.

We have just now shown something of the innate origin and the nature of love which is one of the main purposes of this study, but in so doing we have deviated a little from our immediate purpose which was to enquire whether there is one only or whether there are three fundamental types of sentiment, namely, love, hate, and respect. The last of these we have disposed of already, and now we have to enquire whether the two remaining, love, and hate, are two separate, exclusive, ultimate types.

Now with regard to parental love, Professor McDougall says: (op. cit., p. 61) "Like all other impulses, this one, when its operation meets with obstruction or opposition, gives place to, or is complicated by, the pugnacious or combative impulse directed against the source of the obstruction; and the impulse being essentially protective, its obstruction provokes anger perhaps more readily than any other....This ultimate alliance between tender emotion and anger is of great importance for the social life of man, and a right understanding of it is fundamental for a true theory of the moral sentiments; for the anger evoked in this way is the germ of all moral indignation, and on moral indignation justice and the greater part of public law are in the main founded. Thus paradoxical as it may seem, beneficence and punishment alike have their firmest and most essential root in the parental instinct". It is evident from the above/
above quotation that there is a very close affinity between love and hate, what he calls an "ultimate alliance" and the alliance is so close that both of them comprise many of the same emotional dispositions, the difference only being that these emotions are called forth by opposite objects or situations. With regard to the relation between the different emotions in relation to the different objects McDougall says: (op. cit., p. 106) "As Shand points out, when a man has acquired the sentiment of love for a person or other object he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow when it is lost, joy when its object prospers or is restored to him, gratitude towards him who does good to it, and so on; and when he hates a person, he experiences fear or anger or both on his approach, joy when the other is injured, anger when he receives favours. It is going too far to say, as Shand does, that with the inversion of the circumstances of the object all the emotions called forth by the loved object are repeated in relation to the hated object; for the characteristic and most essential emotion of the sentiment of love is tender emotion, and this is not evoked by any situation of the hated object; its disposition has no place in the sentiment of hate".

Now it is very incomprehensible, if in the different situations of the loved object tender emotion, fear or anxiety, anger, sorrow, joy, gratitude and so on are felt, and if, in the different situations of the hated object also some of these same emotions are felt, namely, fear, joy, anger according to the change in the situation of the hated object, how McDougall proposes to exclude from the different situations in which the hated object might be found, the situation/
situation which evokes tender emotion, for, on the analogy of the situations cited above we can easily supply situations of the hated object where tender emotion is certain to be evoked. Take for instance the hated object of slavery; surely there is tender emotion evoked towards those who hate this object with us and so on with every other hated object there is tender emotion towards all those who sympathise with us in our hatred towards them. Even thieves love one another.

We, therefore, agree with Shand against McDougall when Shand maintains that all the emotions called forth by the loved object are repeated in relation to the hated object in the inverse order, and our agreement is on account of this reason, that towards both the loved and the hated object it is the whole self that reacts and functions with any or all of its emotions in turn, and the nature of the emotion called forth will depend on two conditions: 1. firstly, it will depend on the nature of the object, and 2. secondly it will depend on the nature of the situation in which the object is placed, for instance when a nation once friendly becomes an enemy. With regard to the first it is clear that tender emotion will always be felt towards the loved, and hatred towards the hated object, and in this law there is no change, that is to say, tender emotion can never be felt towards the hated object, or hatred towards the loved object. But it is different with the question of the situations in which the objects are placed, because, we have seen, there can be situations in the case of either object where all the emotions can be evoked, the difference only being that they will be evoked in either/
either case in the inverse order, so that it is clear that McDougall is confusing the above two conditions 1 and 2 which determine the nature of emotional response, and while he correctly applies 1 and 2 to love, he wrongly applies 1 only to hate, whereas 2 applies to it also equally well. And the reason for this mistake is that many modern psychologists of whom McDougall is an example have a very imperfect grasp of the nature and function of the self, but when we do look at the problem from the point of view of the self what we do find is that the self reacts with all its emotions in turn to one set of objects or situations in a particular way, and to the opposite set of facts or situations it reacts in the opposite way, so that love and hate are related to one another not in the way that McDougall supposes, but as opposites dependent on the nature of the object, and the question now is which of these two is the greater, and the answer is - love, because love is positive and hatred comes into existence in the service of love being the response of love to what ought not to be in the form of moral indignation, so that love is the supreme sentiment which embraces all the rest.

Whatever mistakes Professor McDougall's exposition of mind and human nature may or may not have, he has made no mistake about the supremacy of love, for, as we have seen, he makes it the source of all the virtues, and to show further his appreciation of it we give two more passages in this connection. He writes (op. cit., p. 65) "How is this great fact of wholly disinterested anger or indignation to be accounted for, (that is, say, at seeing ill-treatment of any child or creature) if not in the way here suggested? The question is/
is an important one; it supplies a touchstone for all theories of
the moral emotions and sentiments. For, as was said above, this
disinterested indignation is the ultimate root of justice and of
public law; without its support law and its machinery would be
most inadequate safeguards of personal rights and liberties......
Those who deny any altruistic motives to man and seek to reduce
apparent altruism to subtle and farsighted egoism, must simply deny
the obvious facts, and must seek some far-fetched unreal explanations
of such phenomena as the anti-slavery and Congo-reform movements".

One must acknowledge here the important contribution to our
knowledge of mind of the instinct psychology in the way that it has
placed at the centre of personality an instinct and sentiment which
was misunderstood and neglected by the philosophers. Nothing could
be higher than the appreciation of McDougall of this instinct. He
says: (op. cit., p.63) "Wordsworth's poem on the pet lamb is the cele-
bration of this emotion in its purest form; and, indeed, it would
be easy to wax enthusiastic in the cause of an instinct that is the
source of the only entirely admirable, satisfying, and perfect human
relationship as well as of every purely disinterested conduct".
Now moral indignation or anger or hatred is one of these forms of
"purely disinterested conduct" which are here traceable to love as
their source so that on our author's own showing hate is included in
love as one of its essential constituents and there is no necessity
to make it into a separate category. This is in agreement with one
of the profoundest discoveries of Hegel namely, his principle of the
dialectic unity of opposites. According to Hegel opposites which
in separation negate one another are actually necessary moments in
a living thought process which forms a unity so that the opposites, though opposed to one another in separation, are not opposed to unity, and it is the presence of the two opposite moments that produces movement and development: the one could not exist without the other or develop without the other. This principle is at work in many other aspects of life also. We seem, therefore, justified in maintaining that there is one supreme sentiment of love which includes itself two opposite moments of love and hate. What we find in the last resort, then, is not three main parallel sentiments but a hierarchy of sentiments with love primary and regulative and the source of all the rest. It is therefore, important to emphasise the superlative service of psychology in unravelling the nature of the instincts and sentiments, because as we have seen important works on religion can be written even to-day which contain next to nothing on the instinct of love and its place in religion, whereas modern psychology compels us to look for the origin of all that is noblest and highest in man, and hence to the origin of religion also to this very instinct, and when theology has oriented its thought from this central fact a more natural and simpler account of the origin and nature of religion will be forthcoming. And in that account love will be displayed as the genesis as well as the end of religion which is a faith that worketh by love, and so the emphasis will be on the works of love more than on intellectual beliefs, because the conception of love will revolutionise theology and through theology preaching, and the theology will be simpler, more intelligible, and more popular, and religion more within the reach of everybody.
Professor McDougall in the above passages gives to love a very high place, but it would have been more satisfactory if he had made love supreme, as it actually is, instead of one of three, but he was prevented from doing this by his faulty view of mind as originating in cognition and conation instead of in feeling which is at first a vague feeling of physical need which develops into a need for fellowship with God, a feeling the essence of which is interest or meaning or value on which all our higher ideas and susceptibilities depend, and the regulative factor in this interest, meaning, or value is tender emotion or love, because as will be seen further on the ultimate categories of the true, the good and the beautiful depend for their recognition upon the parental instinct, tender emotion, and the sentiment of love.

4. The Three Supreme Objects of Love.

It has been shown above that there is one supreme sentiment regulative of all the rest, and now an effort will be made to show that this sentiment has three principal objects, namely, self, neighbour and God, and we shall now discuss them briefly in this order. The origin of our consciousness of the self and not-self was a question which engaged the attention of older psychology, but the more recent psychology has revealed the importance of the social factor in the not-self and has thereby enabled us to envisage a large number of factors in the problem which did not enter into the purview of the older psychology. It will be, therefore, of advantage to consider the account which is given by this psychology which is/
is oriented from the point of view of the social factor as presented by one of its leading exponents Professor McDougall whose theory of the instincts and sentiments we have been discussing, and it will conduce to clearness and consistency of treatment if we consider very briefly his view of the origin and formation of firstly, the self sentiment, secondly, of its counterpart the social sentiment, and finally, of the religious sentiment.

We begin then with the question of where and how consciousness of self emerges in the development of the individual. We have seen already that many psychologists like the "man as man" psychologists of whom Professor Webb is an instance cannot find any evidence of a self, and consequently consciousness is to them a stream of sensations. To Professor James again there is no self and the thought is the only thinker psychology can discover, but it is certain that the passing thought does not think, because as we have seen thought is a process belonging to an organism which is the thinker, and the thinking is carried on by a mind with certain structural elements which determine the thinking, and it is the sum total of these structural elements that form the self. The mistake of the above writers who cannot discover a self is due to the fact that they limit mind to process or complex process, and they exclude from mind structure which is the self. And this self is more than an aggregation of structural elements and different from other wholes in that it is self-conscious and capable of reflection which Professor Webb's stream is not; it flows in one direction only. There is, therefore, a self and a self sentiment which comes into existence with it.

The self-sentiment then is a continuation or development of the
the self-preserving instinct, and develops firstly through the gradual distinction between the self and the not-self. The child at first has one vague undifferentiated "continuum" of experience, which becomes gradually separated into three groups, according to Dr Drever. Firstly, there is one group which is entirely within the control of the child as far as experience from free movements of limb is concerned. Secondly, there is a group entirely beyond his control like experience of day and night and of his own body like hunger and thirst so that from none of these could he know of self or external reality. But there is a third group partly within and partly without his control and in these he finds the distinction between self and the world and this distinction emerges in the course of motor-adaptation. It is in experiences of this kind which is both in and beyond his control that the distinction between self and not-self is found and when this distinction has been made other experiences are referred to these two classes and thus knowledge of self and external reality arises. As this process of knowledge proceeds, further distinctions are made between the self and other objects which he interprets in the light of his own experience. The attention of the child is soon drawn to the behaviour of other persons, his neighbours, and their behaviour also he interprets in the light of his own experience and progress in knowledge of himself proceeds "pari passu" with knowledge of his neighbours, that is to say, the whole process of self-knowledge is a social process. And it is in analysing these social factors that Professor McDougall and/
and other writers on Social Psychology have rendered such important service in showing the importance of our neighbour, and the emphasis of their psychology goes to prove our contention here that next to the self our neighbour is the most important factor in our development. From the earliest stage the instincts and general tendencies, sympathy, imitation, and suggestibility come into play, and on account of having to accommodate his behaviour to that of those around him as his experience proceeds the ideas of reward and punishment, right and wrong, praise and blame emerge, and according to McDougall these have the greatest part in the determination of conduct. The behaviour at this level in non-moral.

Then Professor McDougall traces the origin of negative and positive self-feeling. In contact with those stronger than himself negative self-feeling is evoked from which humility, gratitude, respect and reverence are evolved, and makes us capable of the receptive attitude of imitation sympathy, suggestibility which renders the individual further capable of profiting by advice, precept, exhortation, moral approval and disapproval. In contact with weaker persons positive self-feeling, courage, confidence, self-respect, initiative and so on are developed. Thus these two dispositions of positive and negative self-feeling render us capable of a large range of moral emotions.

Another factor which operates in various degrees, according to McDougall, in different persons to develop their regard for praise and blame, their sensitiveness towards moral approval and disapproval is active sympathy, that tendency to seek to share our emotions and feelings with others which as we have found is rooted in primitive or passive sympathy which again is the essence of the gregarious instinct.
instinct. It is this instinct which makes love to one's neighbour possible.

Now the self-sentiment and this social sentiment which arises out of the gregarious instinct and its object the herd, that is to say the self and neighbour sentiments are only intelligible on the understanding that there is innately in the organism a self-determining principle which leads the individual to regard himself and also his neighbour, and that principle we maintain is love which is the original innate image of God in man, and it is out of this original endowment of love that all the virtues develop, as we have seen above. Out of this germinal endowment of love emerges first of all the instinct of self-preservation which develops into the self-regarding sentiment. This self-sentiment may be anything but clear, because when the ideational level is attained at which sentiments emerge there are many sentiments already come into existence which shade into one another and are thus very complexly related, but one fact is certain that they all form a system in the form of a hierarchy with one dominant sentiment. As Dr Drever says: (op. cit., p. 77) "McDougall has called attention to this fact, but he has not sufficiently investigated the conditions under which this hierarchy is established. The mere predominance of some one sentiment will not yield a hierarchy. The only possible way of accounting for a hierarchy is by showing how all the sentiments can be caught up into a larger comprehensive system. The development of the self in relation to other selves, and through interaction with other selves, and the rise of a self sentiment is the one indispensable/
indispensable condition. As a separate and distinguishable entity
the self-sentiment may be far from prominent, since the idea of self
may be anything but clear and definite. Nevertheless, as a unifying
principle, the influence of the self-sentiment is all-pervading, and
such hierarchy as exists may besaid to exist in the self sentiment,
into which all the other sentiments are necessarily swept up. The
self sentiment, therefore is not merely a sentiment among sentiments
it is a synthesis of all the sentiments". The self sentiment is
seen in such sentiments as those felt for our home, native town,
school, college, country and so on; anything belonging to these be­
longs to our self sentiments which contracts and expands according to
our feelings towards these. It thus tends to organise all other
sentiments and interests within itself, subordinating and controlling
all discordant sentiments, so that it becomes the supreme dominant
sentiment.

Now we have seen already when we considered the nature of senti­
ments apart from their objects that there was one supreme sentiment,
namely, that of love, which was regulative of all the rest which
formed a system under the hierarchy of love and here on the other
hand we have discovered that the supreme object of love is the self
and everything that belongs to it. But we also saw that knowledge
of the self is accompanied by knowledge of other persons, our neigh­
bours, and these become the object of this supreme sentiment of love
also. McDougall says that he has not sufficiently investigated the
conditions under which this hierarchy of love to self and then to
other objects is established and we shall see later that he has
failed to do so because he has not realised that the integrating
synthetising factor is the sentiment of love which is a sufficient
condition/
condition for the formation of the self, the neighbour, and the religious sentiment, because the essence of love is appreciation, and its object in the realm of things is the true, the good, and the beautiful, and in the realm of personality (which includes the realm of things as its products) our self, neighbour, and God. Now the essence of appreciation is the capacity to distinguish differences by noting that which transcends so that it contains the seed of infinite progress until it seeks to grasp and possess the Absolute or God Himself. Love, therefore, is capable of infinite expansion and sublimation; "Love never faileth"; it is capable of infinite progress, is the integrating principle of personality, the source of all the virtues, of all altruistic conduct, and of religion which is a life issuing from fellowship with God. The love sentiment, therefore has three supreme objects, the self, one's neighbour, and God, because being of the nature of infinitely expanding appreciation or valuation it cannot stop at one's self, or at one's neighbour, and of its own nature it is compelled to reach out to God in whom it finds infinite opportunity of expansion. Moreover, it is well known that appreciation of the true, the good and the beautiful, the ultimate categories of valuation or appreciation, is not of the nature of abstract sentiment, if such could exist, but of the nature of love. Furthermore, of these three forms of valuation the one that may be regarded as the most basic and regulative and inclusive of all the rest is love of the beautiful or aesthetic appreciation, as it has not only to do with the beautiful in art, but is also at the basis of all phases of conduct, such as deportment, tact, good-humour and love. Then, again, aesthetic appreciation is/
is the one which is most apparently of the form of love; love for
the beautiful object is more palpably present than love for the true
and the good, but these three involve one another like the three
states of mind to which they are related, the beautiful which is the
most fundamental of the categories of valuation being most related to
feeling which is the most fundamental of the states of mind, while
truth is more related to knowing, and the good to willing. In this
connection there is one other observation requiring to be made, namely
that it is admitted by most writers on religion that aesthetic feel­
ing is the feeling most closely allied to the religious feeling and
aesthetic feeling as we have seen is essentially a form of love so
that the religious feeling "par excellence" is love, but it cannot
develop except in a state of fellowship or communion with its object.
It may, however, be argued that this is too narrow a basis for reli­
gion which tends to become our master sentiment that embraces and
dominates all our other sentiments and interests, but to this it will
be replied later on that there is nothing like communion or fellow­
ship that is so pregnant with possibilities of developments of the
highest kind in all directions; that is to say, communion or reli­
gion is the only means of the highest development.

It has been pointed out above that McDougall has not sufficient­
ly investigated the conditions under which the hierarchy of the
sentiment comes to be established. This failure on the part of our
writer to give light on this very important point which we wish to
know, namely, what it is that accounts for the existence of all these
sentiments, what it is that integrates and synthetises them into a
system/
system which forms a distinctive character or personality, points to the fact that there is a missing factor in his theory on account of which it refuses to give the light which is expected of it. And the factor which is left out, we think, is love. McDougall himself, as we saw, has the fullest possible appreciation of love and he blames the philosophers for never having given it its due place in their philosophies, but he himself has failed to make use of his own and his associates' very important discovery of the creative, integrative, sublimating function of love, and having failed to realise that the integrating factor he wants is present in love, McDougall as we shall see is hard put to to find a satisfactory theory that will explain the progress of the individual from non-moral to moral conduct. We shall see this if we briefly consider his effort to construct a theory that will explain this progress in conduct without invoking the conception of love, and, if his theory, which omits love, fails, the presumption will be that the failure is due to its omission and that to explain the very existence of the sentiments, the hierarchy among them and progress in personality, we have to postulate the conception of love.

In his account, then, of the rise and development of the self-sentiment we note that McDougall is unduly preoccupied with the social factor, and takes too little account of the importance of individuality, so that when he arrives at the stage of the question where he has to explain how the individual ever manages to escape from the apparent determinism of the social factor to the freedom and self-determinism of ideals, McDougall seems to get into difficulty.
McDougall attributes the development of the self in its earliest stages almost entirely to the social factor in this way that in the earlier stages he maintains that it is rewards and punishments that are the determining causes of the formation of the self, and later on it is praise and blame, approval and disapproval out of which develop negative and positive self-feeling which are at the core of the self-sentiment and according to which the self becomes aware of its place in the social scale. According to McDougall there is no doubt that approval and disapproval are very powerful determinants of the self-regarding sentiment and he enquires why this is so and the answer he supplies is that they are so because approval and disapproval are of the nature of the early rewards and punishments. Another factor that makes the individual susceptible to praise and blame is activesympathy, the tendency to seek to share our emotions and feelings with others. With regard to the above two determinants of conduct McDougall writes: (op. cit., p. 173) "The two principles we have now considered - on the one hand the influence of authority or power, exercised primarily in bringing rewards and punishments, on the other hand the impulse of active sympathy towards harmony of feeling and emotion with our fellows - these two principles may sufficiently account, I think, for the moralisation of the self-regarding sentiment, for that regard for the praise and blame of our fellow-men and for moral approval and disapproval in general, which is so strong in most of us and which plays so large a part in shaping our sentiments, or character, and our conduct. This regard leads on some men to the higher plane of conduct/
conduct, conduct regulated by an ideal that may render them capable of acting in the way they believe to be right, regardless of the approval or disapproval of the social environment in which their lives are passed".

In the above passage it is apparent that McDougall's idea of moralisation is conformity to social opinion, although such opinion as in the case of some savage tribes may be very much the reverse of moral in the true sense and this fact McDougall admits. He says: (op. cit., p.180) "The regulation of conduct by regard for the approval and disapproval of our fellowmen in the way discussed in the preceding chapter has certain limitations and drawbacks in spite of its supreme importance for the great mass of mankind". The first drawback he mentions is that the motives involved are fundamentally egoistic. Secondly the individual will not act on them when there is no danger of being "found out", and in order to remedy this defect the doctrine of the all-seeing eye has been introduced by some. Thirdly, there is no universally accepted moral tradition, but it varies with the society in which the individual grows up. Thus the sanction of public opinion contains no guarantee against the greatest absurdities and moral aberrations, nor does it contain any element of progress.

Our writer then considers how the individual advances from this non-moral stage to the higher stage of moral judgment when diversity of opinion arise in the community regarding the moral standards and this compels the individual to exercise his own judgment. This leads/
leads McDougall to enquire whether such judgments are dependent on the intelligence or on the emotions. He points out that there are two kinds of moral judgments, the original moral judgment and the imitative moral judgments (i.e. those derived from maxims). He agrees that the former proceed directly from emotions, but with regard to the latter he says: (op. cit., p. 186) "As regards these imitative judgments, we may go even farther than Dr Fowler and the intellectualists, and may say that they may be made, not only without antecedent emotion, but also without any consequent moral emotion, that they may be purely intellectual, though this is seldom the case. That is to say, we accept certain maxims of conduct, either purely by suggestion or in part also in virtue of original judgments springing from our emotions and sentiments; thereafter the accepted maxims or principles may give rise to moral judgment by way of a purely intellectual process, the recognition of the agreement or disagreement of conduct with those principles, a process which may be expressed in syllogistic form - all lies are wrong; that is a lie, therefore that is wrong".

Now here we see creeping in again the same fallacy we noted earlier that there can be states of mind devoid of emotional accompaniments as for example McDougall maintains with regard to certain of the instincts. But we reasoned that on the understanding that feeling was primary and regulative and a permanent element of mind, it was still active in the case of the so-called non-emotional group of instincts because active in all states of mind; only the feeling/
feeling or emotional accompaniment was not so noticeable, and the same can be said of moral judgments of all kinds provided they are real moral judgments and not academic exercises which is the kind of judgment McDougall seems to have had in mind when framing the above paragraph. All such judgments provided they are a real part of experience and not the judgments of Logic text books involve feeling and emotion, and in the world of experience there is no such a purely intellectual judgment as McDougall imagines. He himself says in the above paragraph that they seldom happen, and we question whether they ever happen. For take his own example of a judgment, namely, "that is a lie", unless this is a fanciful unreal suppositional case, we never make this particular judgment without a good deal of emotion; our whole moral being is in the statement, and this is still more certain, if love is the supreme sentiment out of which are derived all other sentiments of moral indignation and justice. Thus McDougall having missed the primary, regulative function of feeling has also missed the primary and regulative function of love in the moral life, and thus falls back again and again into the intellectualist fallacies which he has set out to demolish, although he has clearly enough at one point grasped the leading role played by the sentiment of love. What a different account therefore he could have given, if he showed the moral life to be a development of the sentiment of love instead of resorting to purely intellectual processes, and to abstract sentiments for its explanation!

These abstract sentiments are another invention of our author to explain the means of progress in the moral life due to the defect in his psychology mentioned above. He says: (op. cit., p. 188) "The abstract sentiments, on the other hand, such sentiments as the love of/
of justice, truth, courage, self-sacrifice, hatred of selfishness, of deception, of slothfulness - these alone enable us to pass moral judgments of general validity. These sentiments for abstract objects, the various qualities of conduct and of character, are the specifically moral sentiments. It is, then, through the development of such abstract sentiments that the individual's moral development and the refinement of his moral judgment, both of his own acts and those of others is effected, and his moral principles are formed. Just as above our writer thinks that we can have purely intellectual judgments so he imagines we can have purely intellectual or abstract sentiments whereas all real practical judgments are of the nature of values which are determined by feeling or interest, and sentiment on the other hand is never "abstract" because according to the writer's own definition a sentiment is an emotional response so that an abstract sentiment is a contradiction in terms. What he means by abstract sentiment is the ideal or principle with which the individual by means of reflection consciously identifies himself. But an ideal belongs to the affective side of mind as was shown already. Thus there are no regulative aspects of mind that are devoid of emotion, and when our writer attempts to show that there are he contradicts himself and this is what would be expected, if after all feeling and particularly the feeling of love, is the determinative principle in mind and life, and it is likely that no consistent theory of mind, or of the moral or religious life can ever be constructed that does not give to feeling the first place in mind, and to love which is the highest type of feeling the first place in the moral and religious life, and we, therefore, endorse what Professor McDougall says about the neglect of it by the philosophers and the high estimate he gives of
of this sentiment although he has not availed himself of its help in his exposition, because he has not made it one predominating sentiment which is the unifying principle and the synthesis of all the sentiments which form the personality or self.

Not a great deal has been said in this chapter with regard to the third of the objects of the supreme sentiment of love mentioned above, namely, God, as that topic is outwith the scope of psychology and belongs to the realm of metaphysics. At this point, therefore, the discussion will leave the sphere of psychology and enter the sphere of metaphysics, and as these two sciences shade off into one another we shall have in the next chapter first of all to consider a theory of religious knowledge propounded by Professor Rudolf Otto, a theory which from within the province of psychology itself and by psychological methods essays to construct an "a priori" proof of the existence of God, a proof which beforetime used to be the concern of metaphysics alone. But what we think has been established here is that the love which is responsible for the organisation of the self and finds that it cannot live without its neighbour also cannot cease until it finds rest in God.

In our treatment here of the self and neighbour sentiments we have been more concerned with disproving the theory of Professor McDougall which attributes the rise and progress of these sentiments to rewards and punishments, praise and blame, approval and disapproval, and abstract sentiments. This, however, has the important result that it shows that this or any theory that leaves love out of the question is bound to end in inconsistencies and thereby the necessity of requisitioning love in any theory that is going to account satisfactorily for the motive power required for the rise and development/
development of the self and neighbour sentiments has been proved.

And when this solution has been found its application is not
difficult, but here we have not the space to trace the stages of
this impulse of love onward from its first form of love to parents,
the family, and friends. The self-sentiment arises from love to all
that belongs to the self and "pari passu" arises love for one's
neighbour. Progress and development in the individual life takes
place by this impulse of love attaching by way of sentiments to
objects of the true, the good, and the beautiful, in fact, the sentiment
of love in the course of the individual life will have any number
of objects the feeling-tone with regard to which will vary with the
nature of the object in each case. This process will be quite
unconscious and spontaneous at first unless hindered by inherited
weakness or wrong traditions of society. It will be found that it
is aesthetic appreciation, that will develop first in the child;
the child will be attracted to the beautiful before it develops a
conscience, but very soon after a rudimentary conscience appears,
and somewhat later a sense of consistency or truth, but it is
with the realms of goodness and truth that religion is most imme-
diately concerned. Praise and blame from society, no doubt, help
the development, but by emphasising exclusively this factor the
individuality of the person is lost sight of, and it is this indi-
viduality, this inner endowment of the individual, that this theory
of love as the regulative force in personality brings to the fore-
front, and it is through this innate impulse of love which is the
originating integrating cause of personality of the instincts and of
the sentiments that the individual very early begins unconsciously
to select his own objects and develop his own sentiments and person-
ality.
It is not, therefore, praise and blame from society that determines his development so much as his own innate inner nature. The truth about the influence of society in determining the sentiments of the individual is largely that where mankind think correctly they think very much alike, so that where the individual is accepting an opinion of society he is not accepting something foreign but what is home-coming, because it corresponds with feelings within. The dictates of society would have no response in the individual's minds did they not arise from an endowment common to the whole species. This is why the maxims of human society make no impression on irrational animals.

It is this native impulse or innate endowment that Professor McDougall while recognising it clearly enough fails to apply, and his exposition gives the impression of social opinion being a cast-iron system which moulds the individual into a type from which he can only escape by means of abstract sentiments, a kind of sentiment which, if it could exist would be absolutely inert and static, wholly incapable of the progress which Professor McDougall attributes to it. On the other hand, it is "the motive power of a new affection" the affection of love that supplies the motive power and determines the progress of character and personality according as this affection becomes attached by way of sentiment to new and sublimier objects, as for example, in the Christian religion it gets detached from mundane things and becomes attached to the idea of God in Christ. Progress in the moral life depends upon this affection being sublimated by becoming attached to higher and higher ideals more than
on rewards and punishments, praise and blame, or abstract sentiments, as we are being told.

Then, again, Professor McDougall has made very little use of the gregarious instinct in explaining the development of the moral life, because he has not sufficiently made use of the conception of love. For Professor McDougall this instinct has very little emotion about it: he says: (op. cit., p. 71) "The affective aspect of the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense or specific to have been given a name". "Not sufficiently intense" implies that the affective aspect is still there, and the fact seems to be that in situations where there is very little acquaintance or friendship the affective aspect may be very slight, but where there is fuller acquaintance the affective aspect may be very intense. In fact, it is this instinct that provides occasion for the highest development of the sentiment of love. We are not gregarious simply because we are fated to be constantly meeting or living or trading with our fellowmen, but because there is in man an emotive, outgoing nature of love, which searches out its fellows in order to communicate itself to them, the essence of love being to communicate or give. But it is a receiving as well as a giving, and what it wants to receive in return is not rewards for itself, but love in the other person, because the object of love is to create love, and it is not satisfied until it sees love created in the other. That is why man is a gregarious animal, because he is born with a nature to give and receive, and was created for brotherhood, and it is the person who gives most who receives most, and has most to give.
Altruism and self-sacrifice, therefore, are not the enigmatical things that they have been often represented, because they are the foundation of our being, an outgiving impulse. On any other theory, however, they are inexplicable. It is certain that the praise and blame of society will overcome the individual's own opinion only when the praise or blame of society embodies a completer ideal of love than the individual's own. When his own ideal seems to him completer it will determine his conduct and not the praise and blame of society.

The gregarious instinct, again, is not simply the exhilaration of the crowd; that is only its most rudimentary form and consequently there is no name for its accompanying emotion. Its highest form is fellowship with and service for others by which we endeavour to communicate good to them. And, finally, this same impulse of love which is responsible for the parental instinct and the gregarious instinct and all the other instincts and sentiments is also that which causes the need for complete fellowship, and it is because it cannot find this complete fellowship in nature or man that the individual is compelled to seek fellowship with God.
Chapter VI.

The Religious Consciousness and Feeling.

In the previous chapters we were occupied with the study of the instincts and sentiments, and we may here recapitulate the chief points therein established in order to reveal more clearly their bearing upon the subject of the present chapter. We saw that there is in all living organisms a nature, the primary characteristic of which is a feeling of incompleteness, and an urge towards completeness. In primitive organisms this appears as the self-preserving instinct, and in the higher animals, particularly in man, on account of self-consciousness there appears as a development of the instinct of self-preservation the self-regarding sentiment, and the altruistic or social or as we have called it here the neighbour sentiment, both of which, we saw, were due to the innate impulse of love which makes these sentiments, not merely possible, but inevitable, for, if we postulate love as the ultimate element in this nature, then, it is inevitable that it will seek out objects, because the nature of love is to possess an object, and it will react to these objects in ways that are dependent, on the one hand, on its own nature and needs, and on/
on the other hand on the nature of the objects themselves. Thus, we saw that the instincts were structural elements in mind which came into existence in the course of evolution as a result of this interaction of the organism and specific objects. Similarly the sentiments are structural elements in mind which came into existence during the individual's lifetime as a result of the interaction of the individual mind and certain objects, ideas, and situations in the individual's environment.

These instincts and sentiments have emotional accompaniments which are, on the one hand, indicative of the nature or needs within of the individual, and, on the other hand, of the nature of the object which calls forth the emotion; that is to say, the object would not make any impression unless there was a receptive mind with which it could interact, and, on the other hand mind would be an undifferentiated "continuum" or chaos, if there were no external world of reality with objects of definite qualities and characteristics capable of recording these qualities in mind, so that the study of mind from the point of view of the instincts and sentiments and their accompanying emotions reveals to us, on the one hand, the nature of the individual as disclosed in his impulses or instincts, because he expresses himself in the satisfaction of his instincts by their becoming attached to objects round which they form sentiments and find their satisfaction and harmony and poise has been established/
established in the system of sentiments that forms the self, and happiness has been attained, we discover what is the ultimate nature or end or ideal of that self by discovering what it requires for its stabilisation, satisfaction, and complete development.

But we not only discover the nature of mind, we also discover the nature of the external world of reality with which mind interacts, the reality in which mind finds its satisfaction and completeness, and which causes it to be developed from the original undifferentiated "continuum" into a variety of instincts and sentiments arranged into a system or self. The nature of these objects is revealed and expressed in the impressions they make and the feelings or emotions they evoke, which feelings become witnesses to the ultimate meaning or value of the objects. Feeling, therefore, is of importance because it is our ultimate metaphysical point of contact with external reality. As we saw at an earlier stage many lines of study have contributed to draw the attention to the importance of feeling as a witness to ultimate realities. In this chapter, therefore, we propose to examine the witness of the feelings to the third of the main objects of the sentiment of love, which occupied us in the last chapter, namely, the reality of the Supreme Being, and in this connection we intend to consider the "a priori" theory of Professor Rudolf Otto.

This is a theory which from within the province of psychology itself and by psychological methods proposes to find a proof of the existence of God by an examination of certain religious feelings or emotions, that are supposed to witness directly to the presence of the Divine Being. At this stage, therefore, our discussion leaves the/
the sphere of psychology proper and enters the realm of metaphysics at the point where these two sciences shade off into one another, because, though the method of this theory is psychological, its implications are metaphysical.

The importance of this proof of the existence of God, if it can be established cannot be overestimated, because it at once brings the discussion and proof within the range of practical verifiable experience, for nothing can be more direct or convincing than the witness of our feelings on which the proof is founded, and this theory has created an unusual interest, because it offers to supply what all other methods of approach to the study of religious reality have hitherto failed to supply, namely, objective, verifiable proof of the existence of God. For it is commonly believed that the reasoning faculty has failed to supply such a proof, because its record in this respect has been one of supplying newer and newer premises as progress in knowledge proceeds, so that proofs once held valid are being repeatedly discarded as obsolete, and inadequate to the newer facts that are constantly coming to light. Then again the animistic theory of the genesis of religion instead of supplying a direct proof interposes a long history of natural mental development between us and the idea of God, while modern psychology finds nothing in religious and worship but subjective processes which witness to nothing but their own existence. An account of religion, then, which puts the proof for the existence of God within a region which is within everyone's reach, where they can test its validity for themselves, would confer/
confer an inestimable benefit upon those who find belief in God difficult. Such a theory, therefore, deserves consideration, and its investigation will lead us on to the consideration of the rational proofs for the existence of God in the next chapter, and, when both methods of approach to the question, the empirical and the rational, have been thus examined, it may be then possible to decide which of these forms of evidence underlies the prophetic consciousness.

Now we have been all along trying to show that feeling is the element in mind which has been least investigated on account of being the most metaphysical. We further saw the important contribution of the instinct psychology in affording us a deeper insight into certain feeling elements in mind which made possible the explanation and systematisation of many mental elements which on the older view of mind were unexplainable. But it was found that though the instinct psychology as propounded by Professor McDougall helps much in the systematisation of mental phenomena, yet the ultimate and essential nature of feeling and its relation to other states of mind eludes his investigation. In the case of Professor Otto, on the other hand, we seem to have a psychologist who has a thorough grasp of the metaphysics of feeling and of its relation to the other mental states in such a way that it is impossible ever to confuse the one with the other, or resolve the one into the other, or, again to make feeling dependent on cognition or conation. On the contrary, Otto irrefutably demonstrates that the feeling phase of mind is primary, and that the cognitive, conceptive, rational phase of mind is dependent thereon, and it is because he has obtained a truer view of mind that he has found so much fresh insight into the nature,
nature of religion, although his theory contains a mistaken element, also, which demonstrates what was said earlier in these pages that the demonstration of the nature of religion waits upon the demonstration of the nature of mind itself.

The present theory, therefore, is of special interest to us here because it supports the view herein maintained that to understand the nature of religion and of the religious or prophetic consciousness it is necessary first to understand the nature of feeling, and what will be found in the present writer is an analysis of great penetration of the feelings that enter into religion before their meanings have been conceptualised or rationalised. What the writer shows is that the feelings involved in religion cannot be expressed in words, and can only be described by means of analogies and symbols, or, as he calls them, "ideograms". It will readily be admitted that all ultimate experiences like feelings and sensations are inexpressible, but Otto's proposition is different from this, and what he endeavours to show is that words expressive of feelings in the ordinary sense, such as, fear, wonder, awe, when applied to religious feeling, represent totally different feelings from what they do in the ordinary sense, and the task which Otto sets himself is to discover how the feelings of fear, wonder, awe in the religious sense differ from their ordinary sense, and, when he has isolated the peculiar nature of feelings in the religious sense, showing them thereby to form quite a unique category of valuation which he calls "the category of the holy" he draws the deduction that the religious feelings/
feelings witness to a reality which ordinary feelings of an analogous kind are not conversant with, namely, the reality of the Divine Being, and the different religious feelings are caused by different qualities in the Divine Being, so that we have here inside consciousness itself the opportunity of proving the existence of God in our feelings which are directly caused by the Deity, so that we have no need of external proofs or postulates because he says: (op. cit., p.140) "Religion does not draw its life from postulates", but from direct contact with the Divine Being; God, in short, is known primarily in these feelings. This is the point at which his critics will join issue with Professor Otto, but, before any criticism or estimate can be offered, it will be necessary to give a brief summary of his argument which is rather difficult to appraise because it includes much that is true, and also, because it omits from its purview much that is necessary for the full explanation of religion.

Professor Otto, then, begins by pointing out that in the theistic conception of God the Deity is thought of by analogy with what is highest in ourselves, such as, Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good-will Supreme Power, Selfhood, etc., thought of as absolute and infinite. Now these terms are all concepts admitting of definition, and, therefore, the description they offer of God is rational. Otto, however, is far from disparaging reason, and he says that before he ventured on the present line of study he had "spent many years of study on the rational aspect of that Supreme Reality we call God". He makes clear his position in this regard by emphasizing the fact that, the truer a religion, the more vigorous will be its theology. But these theological conceptions, he maintains do not exhaust all our knowledge or experience of Deity. Our theological attributes of
of God, for instance, are only predicates of a subject which is not fully comprehended in the rational concept. These rational concepts in fact, imply a supra-rational subject of which they are the attributes; that is to say, the fact that we have the concept or predicate means that we have the subject within our grasp, otherwise nothing could be predicated of it. Moreover there is great need to investigate the content in these terms that remains over and above the rational meaning, the non-rational or supra-rational, because preaching and orthodoxy and theology emphasise these rational concepts only, and fail to take account of, or give expression to this non-rational element in the idea of God, and thus they have failed to keep this element alive in the hearts of the people, by giving to the idea of God a one-sided, intellectualistic or rationalistic interpretation.

On this point Professor Otto says: ("Idea of the Holy", Eng. Trans., Oxford University Press, 1925, 3rd impression pp. 3-4) "This bias to rationalise still prevails, not only in theology but in the science of comparative religion in general, and from top to bottom of it. The modern student of mythology, and those who pursue research into the religion of primitive man, and attempt to reconstruct the "bases" or "sources" of religion are all victims to it. Men do not of course in these cases employ those lofty "rational" concepts which we took as our point of departure; but they tend to take these concepts and their gradual "evolution" as setting the main problem of their enquiry, and fashion notions and ideas of lower value, which they regard as paving the way for them. It is always in terms of concepts/
concepts and ideas that the subject is pursued, "natural" ones, moreover, such as have a place in the general sphere of man's ideational life and are not specifically "religious". And then with a resolution and a cunning which one can hardly help admiring, men shut their eyes to that which is quite unique in the religious experience, even in its most primitive manifestations. But it is a matter for astonishment rather than for admiration! For if there be any single domain of human experience that presents us with something unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assuredly it is that of the religious life.

From the concluding words of the above passage it can be seen that Professor Otto is convinced that there is a peculiar element in experience which is unmistakably the religious element or "moment". This something, however, as will be seen, reminds us in some distant way of the supposed religious faculty or religious instinct of earlier days. This element he attempts to isolate in the following way. He begins by considering the idea of "holiness" or "the holy" and points out that this is primarily a category of valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion. It is often transferred to the sphere of ethics, but it is not itself derived from this sphere. It is not a simple element but a complex one, and though it contains an ethical element which is definable, and, therefore, rational, it also contains a specific element or moment which is quite distinct from the rational, a moment which is inexpressible, an ἀπρονόσις or "ineffable", in the sense that it completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts, like the beautiful. Thus it is evident that the original meaning of the word "holy" is quite different from its derivative/
derivative meaning in common parlance or in philosophical or theological usage. He says: (op. cit., p.5) "It is true that all this moral significance is contained in the word "holy", but it includes in addition - as even we cannot but feel - a clear overplus of meaning, and this it is our task now to isolate. Nor is this merely a later or acquired meaning; rather "holy", or at least the equivalent words in Latin, Greek, Semitic and other ancient languages, was devoted first and foremost only to this overplus: if the ethical element was present at all, at any rate it was not original and never constituted the whole meaning of the word".

Seeing, then, that the word "holy" has in common usage acquired an ethical sense which has driven the specific religious meaning out of use, so that it no longer implies this specific religious moment, Otto finds it necessary to invent a new term for this specific religious moment, and the term he has selected is the term "numinous" from the Latin "numen". It is implied, and is very dynamic, in the Hebrew שָׂרָא, the Greek ἁγιός, and the Latin "sanctus". The word, "holy" may be used to translate these, but this only represents the gradual shaping and filling in with ethical meaning, a process which Otto calls "schematization", so that "good" is a mistranslation of holy and altogether inadequate to express the "numinous" or the religious moment in the holy.

How, then, is this numinous feeling to be described? Here Otto cautions the reader who cannot remember any distinctly religious feelings not to read any further; but those who have had experience of such unique feelings can easily recall that in religious worship over/
over and above such ordinary feelings as those of gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble submission, and dedications there are other quite unique and incomparable feelings. The first of these unique types of feeling which he mentions is what he calls by another new invented term, namely, "creature consciousness" or creature feeling". The implication here is that the creature feeling is produced by the "numen praesens" who is felt as it was by Abraham. Otto, therefore, condemns Schleiermacher's definition of religion as a feeling of dependence, because such a feeling, being felt by the good and the bad, is not peculiar to religion, and besides it reaches the idea of God only by an inference, whereas the numinous is a direct immediate experience of a "numen praesens". He says: (op. cit., p. 11) "Now this object is just what we have already spoken of as "the numinous". For the creature-feeling and the sense of dependence to arise in the mind the "numen" must be experienced as present, a "numen praesens", as in the case of Abraham. There must be a felt something "numinous", something bearing the character of a "numen", to which the mind turns spontaneously; or (which is the same thing in other words) these feelings can only arise in the mind as accompanying emotions when the category of the numinous is called into play. The numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self".

In the above quotation there are two main contentions that require criticism. The first is that the religious moment consists in the few primitive feelings or emotions which the author has isolated, and, secondly, that these emotions are caused by the direct impact of the/
the Deity on consciousness. With regard to the first of these it is far too like the old fallacy of the religious faculty or instinct to be too readily accepted. While it can be admitted that creature-consciousness is present to a certain extent in religion and the more so the more primitive the religion, it is not understandable how Otto finds in it and the few other primitive feelings he has isolated the real moments of religion and consigns to the secular such feelings as gratitude, trust, love, reliance, humble-submission, and dedication, which are exactly the feelings that are expressed in prayer and worship at its best. This reveals the absolute cleavage that Otto has made between religion and the rest of the moral life. There is no doubt that it needs to be emphasised that morality alone is not religion but the difference between them is not one of absolute antithesis and exclusion, because the two advance "pari passu", morality giving content to religion and religion giving a goal to morality. Progress in religion depends on progress in morality, because progress in morality depends on our apprehension of values in the universe, and these values become our religious values when the search for values leads us to the idea of the Supreme Being who is the source of all values. Thus moral values become religious values so that the values are the same in both cases only they are looked at from different points of view. It is not possible to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the two as Otto has done, making moral values one thing and religious values the "wholly other", outside the bounds of reason. It is not possible to point to one duty and say that it is religious and to another and say that it is secular in this way.
Then again if these highest feelings of all are to be excluded from true religion we are left with those primitive feelings which are characteristic of the religion of primitiveman, feelings which anthropologists tell us exist everywhere among primitive peoples. As we shall see Otto derives most of his facts for his theory from primitive religions rather than from the religion of the New Testament, and it is the universality of the phenomena to which he appeals that gives the theory its apparent plausibility. But, as the religious life of man develops, these primitive feelings fall into the background, and in religion at its highest it is these very feelings that Otto rejects as secular that characterisethe religious life. There are passages in Otto which imply that these maturer feelings grow naturally out of the specifically religious ones, but other passages on the other hand emphasise their essential difference throughout. And as a matter of fact there is no hint or suggestion of how the two sets are related, that is to say how the specifically religious experience is related to the rest of the moral life of the individua On Otto's theory the two are independent of one another.

On the other hand our present line of study leads us to suggest that by employing the conceptions of instinct and sentiment supplied by ordinary psychology the primitive emotions can be intelligibly related to the more developed emotions or sentiments because the primitive instincts which are structural emotional tendencies in man get in the course of the life time of the individual attached to objects in the outside world round which gather sentiments which develop into ideals. At first the response will be the crude emotion/
emotion of the kind which Otto isolates, but as knowledge of the object grows the emotion gets rationalised, refined, and developed, and especially will this be the case with the idea of God which continues to grow throughout the individual life, so that in the process the primitive instincts are sublimated and transmuted to an incalculable extent. And the sentiments that will gather round the idea of the Divine Being will not be simple and few, but complex and many, because the Deity is the richest conception that the mind can grasp. Moreover our knowledge of the Deity like our knowledge of everything else proceeds "pari passu" with our knowledge of our self, our neighbour, and our environment, and in any account of our knowledge of the Deity this process of mediate, middle-class knowledge has to be taken into account; but such procedure would be fatal to Otto's theory which seeks to confine religion to a few select emotions which he maintains remain constant through life. No doubt the primitive instincts do, to a certain extent, retain their original character, but equally important is the fact that they become the basis of many sentiments which are partly determined by the character of the objects to which they are attached, so that a theory of religion, which fails to take account of all this moral development of sentiments, is not likely to give a true or full account of religion which tends to become a master sentiment, which synthesises all the rest. But in his effort to find a direct proof of the existence of the Deity Otto confines religion to a few forms of feelings, which are strong because they are of the innate and primitive type, and thus suit his theory better than the more developed kind. The great importance of Otto's work, then, is his emphasis on the autonomy of religious experience, but his method of proof is faulty, as we are trying to prove.
The second point to which we called attention is Otto's contention that these feelings which he has isolated are caused by the direct impact of the Deity which he calls "numen praesens". That this is his contention is abundantly evident from the above quotations. Furthermore, he says: (op. cit., p. 12) "We said above that the nature of the numinous can only be suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling. Its nature is such that it grips or stirs the human mind with this and that determinate state". There is no room for doubt here as to the author's meaning; the Deity "grips" and "stirs" the human mind and causes determinate feelings. Let us, therefore, see whether the feelings so aroused are such as would make it believable that they are caused by the "grip" of the Deity. For this purpose we shall follow a little further his exposition. After, then, discussing the feeling of creaturehood which is produced in the creature by the "numen praesens", Otto considers the next form in which the Deity is felt; He is felt as the "Mysterium Tremendum" with regard to which Otto has the following paragraph: (op. cit., p. 12-13) "Let us consider the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion. Faith unto Salvation, Trust, Love, - all these are there. But over and above these is an element, which may also on occasion, quite apart from them, profoundly affect us and occupy the mind with a well-nigh bewildering strength. Let us follow it up with every effort of sympathy and imaginative intuition wherever it is to be found, in the/
the lives of those around us, in sudden strong ebullitions of personal piety and the frames of mind such ebullitions evince, in the fixed and ordered solemnities of rites and liturgies, and again in the atmosphere that clings to old religious monuments and buildings, to temples and to churches. If we do so we shall find we are dealing with something for which there is only one appropriate expression, "mysterium tremendum". The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a more set and lasting attitude of soul, continuing as it were thrillingly vibrant and resonant, until, at last, it dies away, and the soul resumes its profane, non-religious mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul, with spasms and convulsions or lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to transport and ecstasy. It has its wild and demoniac forms, and can sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering. It has its crude barbaric antecedents and early manifestations, and again it may be developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious. It may become the hushed, trembling, and speechless humility of the creature in the presence of whom or what? In the presence of that which is a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures.

Now let us notice that in the above feelings, we have, according to the writer, "the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion". The feeling of this most fundamental element is described as "sudden eruption up from the depth of the soul", "spasms and convulsions", "strangest excitements", "intoxicated frenzy", "transport", "ecstasy", "wild demonic forms", "almost/
"almost grisly horror and shuddering", "crude barbaric antecedents and early manifestations", and these are said to be due to the "presence of that which is a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures" or as he said earlier to the "grip" of the Deity. But it makes one very sceptical to be told that the action of Divine Love and Holiness upon the human consciousness results in the above manifestations. To attribute these manifestations to the presence of the Divine Being is to make Him the author of confusion, and not of harmony and of a sound mind. The effect of the presence of the Divine it can be safely presumed would be to stabilise and pacify the feelings, and so far from proving a "numen praesens", the above feelings are more likely to prove his absence, for it is notorious that such manifestations are capable of being produced by people who have no pretence whatsoever to religion, as well as by sects and persons in the Christian Church who are well known to make use of physical means in bringing about the phenomena. Such phenomena as is well known to students of the comparative study of religions are found everywhere and are no decided proof of the presence of the Divine, so that Otto here is appealing to phenomena which every religion normally outgrows in the course of its evolution. On the other hand he says above, "Again it may be developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious. It may become the hushed trembling and speechless humility of the creature in the presence of - whom or what"? Now the question one would like to ask is whether the writer maintains that the "who? or what"? which causes the corybantic manifestations mentioned above is the same objective reality, if such it be, as causes the "pure and glorious" manifestations. Why in the/
the one case in the effect of the Deity like that of the heathen mysteries, and in the other case like that of Christian faith.?

This Otto does not explain and cannot explain because these two sets of manifestations are due to two different causes altogether, the one set being derived from heathen rites and the other derived from the New Testament, and they are strung together on one string to support his theory. Yet Otto throughout his exposition maintains that it is the Deity who produces all the above diverse feelings, and that we can trace the nature or "quale" of the Deity from the manifestations. This will be clear from a passage in which he goes on to analyse the "Mysterium". He says: (op. cit., p.13) "Conceptually "mysterium" denotes that which is hidden and esoteric, that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar. The term does not define the object more positively in its qualitative character. But though what is enunciated in the word is negative, what is meant is something absolutely and intensely positive. This pure positive we can experience in feelings, feelings which our discussion can help to make clear to us, in so far as it arouses them actually in our heart. To get light upon the positive"quale" of the object of these feelings, we must analyse more closely our phrase"mysterium tremendum," and we shall begin first with the adjective".

Here again it is clear that the writer maintains that the feelings witness to the "quale" of the object, and he therefore enters upon an analysis of the "mysterium tremendum" in order to show us the nature of the Deity who causes these feelings. The first feeling which he examines is that suggested by the adjective "tremendum". Tremor/
Tremor itself is merely the ordinary emotion of fear, but here it is used to throw light on the kind of feeling present in religion which is quite distinct from the ordinary emotion of fear, but yet is to some extent like it, so that the ordinary term, fear, may be used as an analogy to give us a hint or suggestion of what is implied in religious fear. With regard to this fear he says: (op. cit., p. 15) "Its antecedent stage is "daemonic dread" (cf. the horror of Pan) with its queer perversion, a sort of abortive off-shoot, the "dread of ghosts". It first begins to stir in the feeling of "something uncanny", eerie, or weird. It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primaeval man, forms the starting point for the entire religious development in history. "Daemons" and "gods" alike spring from this root, and all the products of mythological apperception, or fantasy are nothing but different modes in which it has been objectified."

From the above paragraph it is evident that in the antecedent stages of religion it is "daemonic dread", "dread of ghosts", "gods", "mythology" and "fantasy" that are the objective causes of this feeling, whereas, in the case of the feelings caused by the "mysterium", it was the presence of "a mystery inexpressible and above all creatures" that was regarded as the cause of the barbaric and refined forms of the feeling alike, that is to say, in the former place Otto says that the feelings were caused by the "numen praesens", but here the feelings are attributed to fancy.

The incongruity of these two positions points to a radical defect in Otto's theory. His preoccupation with the thought of establishing a direct proof of the existence of God by making the Deity
as "numen praesens" the direct cause of these feelings from start to finish makes it impossible for him to leave any room for the evolution of religious ideas or of religious life and feeling or for divine revelation as we have in the prophets or Christ. Otto discusses all these, namely primitive religion, the prophets, and Christ but because religious feelings are, according to his theory, the same always and everywhere and always caused by the "numen praesens", therefore the prophets and Christ as well as the non-Christian religions only provide additional examples of the numinous, so that the total impression on reading his book is much less religious than that produced by reading a regular book on the history or philosophy of religion. The writer speaks of the antecedent stages of religion but the feelings which he describes as characteristic of that stage are not very different from those of the stage when the "numen" is present, nor does he give any hint of the point at which the "numen" comes or what difference he makes in the feelings when he does come. If it is not the "numen praesens" who is present from the dawn of the consciousness of primitive man, but only the objects of his own imagination, then, at what point in man's history does the "numen praesens" begin to operate? There is no mediate process or hint of any kind to fill in this blank in his explanation, and, if man in his primitive stage carried on with the objects of his imagination causing much the same emotions as those caused by the "numen praesens", then it is not apparent what advantage the "numen praesens" conferred by his coming. The account of religion that Otto's theory offers is, therefore, much less intelligible than that of the ordinary books, because it takes no account of the historic development of religion and of morality which is the handmaid of religion, and
so, as we have said already, his account would have been much more clear if he had made use of his analysis of his specific religious feelings which he has so ingeniously analysed along with the conception of the instincts and sentiments, and then the religious feelings would be no longer simple and constant, but growing in complexity depth and refinement with the progress of revelation in the prophets and Christ, in history and nature. Then the few special religious feelings which Otto isolates would find their place as the few primitive instincts with which man comes into the world, and they remain latent to the end, because they are structural and innate, although in the meantime the great system of sentiments, dispositions, habits etc. which go to form character and personality and the moral life have branched out of them. It is true also that without these primitive instincts man would not be religious, and what Otto's theory proves is not the direct presence of God in man's instinctive feelings, but that man feels his need of God, and has a capacity for fellowship with God, so that Otto's theory has value in emphasizing the fact that man even in the process of his evolution must have been divining in very rudimentary ways the nature of the Creator from the creation around him, otherwise he would never have these instincts or feelings, but that is a very different question from maintaining that these elementary instincts are the only truly religious feelings, and that they are caused directly by the presence of God, for many have the above feelings very strongly who have very little fellowship with God, because the presence of God is only vouchsafed to those who have progressed in the moral life, to the pure in heart, and to those who seek, and the emotions become refined with growing intimacy/
198.

intimacy with the Divine, and become very different from those which Otto regards as specifically religious. The history of this process of refinement Otto omits from his view of the religious life. Another defect in Otto's theory is that in spite of all his elaborate effort to demonstrate its uniqueness he fails to convince us that in religious feeling there is anything more inexpressible or non-rational than in any other feeling. A difference there ought to be, but that difference Otto has failed to make explicit. This is apparent from a perusal of his chapter on " Analogies and associated feelings" where he compares the numinous with other feelings in order by help of these analogies and associated feelings to explicate the numinous. The net result of this performance is the opposite of the author's intention, so much so, that instead of convincing us of the uniqueness of the numinous, he only succeeds in showing us that the numinous is on a par with all other feelings as regards non-rationality, inexpressibility, wholly-otherness, and the other essential characteristics of the numinous, so that we are forced to the conclusion that what the author is up against throughout his whole book in not the uniqueness of religious feeling only, but the uniqueness of all feeling and its essential difference from reason, and it is this uniqueness of feeling as such, which he calls the non-rational.

Ordinary psychology would simply call this element the "irreducible" element in feeling which cannot be expressed in terms of anything else and so with conation also. And the service of the author to religion and psychology is of importance in drawing attention by his brilliant analysis of it, not to the non-rationality of religious feeling/
feeling so much as to the amount of rational interpretation it can bear, although, of-course, there is an overplus or irreducible in feeling just as there is an overplus or irreducible or unique element in reason and conation, and we welcome his invaluable contribution to the psychology of feeling which as has been said here more than once already is in need of investigation.

In order to support the criticism of Professor Otto's work now offered we shall follow a little his comparison of the numinous with other feeling states of mind. He says: (op. cit., pp.42-43) "The analogies between the consciousness of the sublime and the numinous may be easily grasped. To begin with "the sublime" like the "numinous is in Kantian language an idea or concept "that cannot be unfolded" or explicated.....it has in it something mysterious, and in this it is like that of the numinous. A second point of resemblance is that the sublime exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the numinous; it is at once daunting, and yet singularly attracting, in its impress upon the mind. It humbles and at the same time exalts us, circumscribes and extends us beyond ourselves, on the one hand releasing in us a feeling analogous to fear, and, on the other, rejoicing us. So the idea of the sublime is closely similar to that of the numinous, and is well adapted to excite it, and be excited by it, while each tends to pass over into the other". Here, then, we have in the author's own words the same characteristics of the sublime as he has given us of the numinous, namely, inexplicability, dauntingness, fascination. These features exist in many natural phenomena and we do not need to postulate a "numen praesens" for/
for their excitation in mind. Moreover they each tend to pass into
one another a detail which is gratuitous if as we have seen the es­
sential features are the same without any noticeabledifference.
There is therefore on the basis of Otto's analysis of the feelings
no comprehensible distinction between religious and sublime feeling,
although there ought to be distinction. The only distinction that
could be made would be on the basis of sentiments and their objects,
because though the feelings which are organised on the form of in­
stincts are constant the feelings have a different feeling-tone or
emotion according to the nature of the objects round which they form
sentiments so that the feeling of the sublime or of awe and mystery
will be differently tinged according to whether it is evoked by the
sublimity of the Divine or the sublimity of natural phenomena, so
that for intelligibility we require not only the analysis of Otto,
but also the conceptions of instinct and sentiment of ordinary psy­
chology, because Otto's psychology fails to distinguish between the
different feelings.

Professor Otto supplies another analogy to the "Mysterium",
namely, the category of moral obligation which shows that the"Myste­
rium" is not such an ineffable entity after all, if there is such a
copious supply of analogies to it, as we shall see. By means of
such a supply of analogies we ought to grasp most of its features,
although the author does not encourage us to believe we can; we can
according to him only hint at it. He says: (op. cit., pp. 45-46)
"Now it is just the same with the feeling of the numinous as with
that of moral obligation. It, too, is not to be derived from any
other feeling, and is in this sense involvable. It is a content
of feeling that is qualitatively "sui generis", yet at the same
time one that has numerous analogies with others, and, therefore, it
and they may reciprocably excite one another and cause one another
to appear in mind.....such a power of stimulation characterises the
feeling of the sublime, in accordance with the law we found, and
through the analogies it bears to the numinous feeling..... It is
probable that the feeling of the sublime is itself first aroused and
disengaged by the precedent religious feeling - not from itself but
from the rational spirit of man and its "a priori" capacity".
Here we have again the same characteristics of the numinous possess-
ed by the moral category as well, with the additional significant ad-
mission that the feeling of the sublime is disengaged by the prece-
dent religious feeling and that religious feeling itself is disen-
gaged by the rational. Now this latter detail is incomprehensible,
if the religious feeling is non-rational, beyond the reach of reason
as the author has all along been trying to prove, but here he admits
that it must have some rational elements otherwise the rational could,
not appeal to it or disengage it. It seems, therefore, that there
is here nothing more than the three ultimate categories of valuation
of ordinary philosophy, namely, the true, the good, and the beautiful
and the distinctive notes of the "Mysterium Tremendum" of Otto apply
to these three equally. They are each inexplicable, "sui generis"
daunting, and fascinating in different degrees, the sublime or
beautiful being the most profoundly so of the three. And so the
Supreme Being who is the source of all three is bound to be ineffable
mysterious, daunting, fascinating. But all this has been long ago
admitted, that we cannot know the Deity to perfection nor describe
him except in symbols derived from our own experience. A certain
amount/
amount of mystery will always remain in religion, nor, in the nature of the case could religion live without it. Then again, these three involve one another, and are aroused, or disengaged in a perfectly natural way by one another, and by the reason, so that there is no need to posit a "numen praesens" for the disengaging of "the holy" any more than for the sublime. It is this postulating of a "numen praesens" for the excitation of "the holy" alone that makes Otto's theory a case of special pleading and constitutes the main fallacy in his argument. Another source of obscurity that may be mentioned here is that in places where he implies objective reality, the author imperceptibly glides into the use of the "numinous" which is mainly subjective, so that it is often difficult to see what he is trying to prove.

There are two other feelings which Otto regards as being analogous to the numinous, namely, erotic and musical feeling. With regard to the analogy between the erotic and musical feeling he writes: (op. cit., p. 47) "But though the two I am comparing are thus manifestly opposite extremes, they have a closely corresponding relation to that which lies between them viz., the reason... Whatever falls within the sphere of the erotic is therefore always a composit product made up of two factors: the one something that occurs also in the general sphere of human behaviour as such, as friendship and liking, the feeling of companionship, the mood of poetic inspiration or joyful exaltation and the like; and the other an infusion of a quite special kind, which is not to be classed with these, and of which no one can have any inkling, let alone understand it, who has not learned from the actual inward experience of "eros" or love. Another/
Another point in which the "erotic" is analogous to the "holy" is in having in the main no means of linguistic expression but terms drawn from other fields of mental life, which only cease to be "innocuous" (i.e. only become genuinely erotic terms) when it is realised that the lover, like the orator, bard, or singer, expresses himself not so much by the actual words he uses as by the accent, tone, and imitative gesture which reinforce them.

Without waiting to enquire why the writer regards erotic and musical feeling as opposite extremes with reason midway between them, we here notice again that all that the writer proves from his analogies is that all feeling is limited for its expression to rational concepts, language, imagery, and gesture, and that numinous feeling is in that respect not different from all other feelings. The same criticism applies to what he says with regard to musical feeling. He writes: (op. cit., p. 50) "Musical feeling is rather (like numinous feeling) something "wholly other", which, while it affords analogies here and there will run parallel to the ordinary emotions of life, cannot be made to coincide with them by a detailed point to point correspondence". The author's comparison, therefore, of the numinous with analogous and associated feelings only more fully evinces the fact that in regard to dauntingness, mysteriousness, fascination, ineffability, and inexplicability the numinous is on a par with all other innate instinctive feeling, and that, therefore, to argue from these characteristics in the case of the religious to a "numen praesens" with corresponding characteristics is a conclusion that is absolutely unwarranted by the facts. On the other hand what Otto's theory/
theory has demonstrated is, firstly, the importance of feeling in interpreting ultimate realities in religion art and morals and other departments. Secondly, he has emphasised the fact that we have not perfect acquaintance with these departments if we have only rational descriptions of them; they have to be felt and experienced before they can be known. Thirdly, he has drawn attention to the limitation of ordinary language and imagery, and the necessity of analysing more carefully our feelings if we would attain to profounder knowledge of the realities that produce them. More important than this he has shown from the nature of man's feelings man's capacity for the Divine and also he has shown tokens of the Divine Nature in those feelings, though he has not succeeded in giving us a direct proof of the presence of the Deity.

We have left to the end the element of Fascination in the "numen" which is of special interest to us here, because it corresponds to the sentiment of love which we have taken to be the highest force in life and the explanation of the existence of the self, society, and of religion. It will be seen, therefore, whether Otto's explanation of this feeling, the highest of all, supplies further light or only further difficulty. He describes the element of fascination thus: (op. cit., p.31) "The two qualities the daunting and the fascinating now combine in a strange harmony of contrasts, and the resultant dual character of the numinous consciousness, to which the entire religious development bears witness, at any rate from the level of the "daemonic dread" onwards, is at once the strangest and most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion. The daemonic-divine object may appear to themind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures
with a potent charm, and the creature who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own. The mystery is for him, not merely something to be wondered at, but something that entrances him; and besides that in it which bewilders and confounds, he feels a something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication; it is the Dionysiac element in the numen”. Here again we have the "a priori" idea that the feelings are directly due to the influence of the "numen", but the best that we are offered from this element of fascination is the religious frenzy of Dionysiac religion and we are asked to believe that this is an element in the Deity. But surely we are not here dealing with the Deity at all but with the religion of the savage. Fascination out of which the writer promised love would be explained, turns out to be only the curiosity of primitive man. We, therefore, much prefer to the point-blank pursuit of the religious "a priori" the more pedestrian route of tracing the growth of the religious consciousness from its early gropings and manifestations in daemonic dread and self-induced excitements through the sublimation of instincts and sentiments that form the moral life till the individual becomes the temple of the Holy Ghost and God is present to him even when the feelings are absent.

Further, Otto tells us that the ideas and concepts of this element of fascination such as Love, Mercy, Pity, Comfort, are all only natural elements of the common psychical life, but that in numinous love, grace, bliss, there is "something more". But when already we realize/
realise that ordinary love is unfathomable it is a gratuitous "extension of the limit" to be told there is "something more" because if we have to go beyond love, we have to go outside experience. The same result as this could be much more intelligibly reached indirectly by the conception of the instinct of love which is the core of the person and regulates all the other instincts and out of it develops the sentiment of love which has for its object the self, others, and the Supreme Being and these three main sentiments comprise an infinite number of subsidiary ones ranged round them in the form of a system on the principal of interest or value. Love as a sentiment has an infinite number of objects and the sentiment which gathers round each one of them will be differently tinged or have a different feeling-tone from every other and this is the "something more" which Otto is driving at, but it is not "something more" than love. So that the sentiment which attaches to the Divine Being will be of a much more exalted kind and have "something more" in it than any other like every other sentiment. In the same way the "wholly other" than human fear, awe, and reverence in the "Divine Wrath" would be far more simply explained as the difference in the sentiment regarding the Divine Being. Into this account would come in fear, awe, mystery, in the earlier stages, and faith, reason, self-dedication and love at the highest, all forming a gradual evolution. This implies that these elements of majesty, overpoweringness, energy and urgency in the "numen" are felt by man not directly as if they are due to the impression of the "numen", but inferentially because these qualities belong to personality, which is the product of the evolution of self and social consciousness. Man could have no clue to/
to majesty or energy unless he had the consciousness of it developed in himself, and just as knowledge of the personality of others is a deduction from their behaviour, so the consciousness of the majesty, energy, and urgency of the Divine is an impression gained from His created works as well as from consciousness of these in ourselves, but not derived in this "a priori" fashion from the numen. In the same way he construes the feeling of sin and the necessity for atonement as the result of the direct action of the "numen". He says: (op. cit., p.53) "It does not spring from the consciousness of some committed transgression, but rather is an immediate datum given with the feeling of the "numen". In this way he overlooks the presence in man of an innate moral nature and the part played by society in forming conscience and in making a man feel his shortcomings and sins, all which normally happens without the presence of the "numen".

Thus Otto in his anxiety to get a direct proof neglects all this mediate knowledge. But we cannot dispense with the knowledge that comes from inference, reason, and faith which reasons from what is to what ought to be. Faith is a certainty obtained through valuation and is of no less importance than the direct knowledge which Otto is thinking of. Even direct contact with the Deity would not give perfect knowledge of Him any more than direct contact with the physical world can give us perfect knowledge of physical reality. This, however, does not mean that real direct fellowship with God is not possible as well as knowledge of Him by the mediate way of growth of knowledge and of experience. He does so reveal himself but conditionally to the pure in heart, and to those who seek Him, and what is denied is that He reveals Himself in a mechanical way of a "deus ex machina" and is the direct cause of all religious feelings/
feelings in the way that Professor Otto maintains, independently of moral preparedness for that revelation.

But, if, on the other hand, we wish to estimate at its full value the witness of the feelings as distinct from reason to the existence of God, and we do maintain that they do so witness in their own indirect way, then in order to have all the facts before us the investigation must commence from the very beginning of feeling including the evolutionary stage of the formation of the instincts with a minute analysis of the various instincts in the manner of Otto McDougall and others; then on the advent of self-consciousness of the individual the growth of sentiments, disposition and character would have to be traced with their systematisation under one master or self sentiment which forms the nucleus of the self or personality, then the line of proof would not be so very different from that of Otto's, but it would avoid hiatuses and the mistake of aiming at direct proof. The proof though indirect would still be of immense value, and the brunt of it would be borne by the very fact of the existence of the instinct and feelings which Otto describes. The proof would be to the effect that the instincts and sentiments are structural feeling elements in mind which have come into existence as a result of the interaction of mind and specific objects, situations, ideas or values in the external world. If there were no external world with values of that specific kind then mankind would never have possessed those instincts. The feelings of the sublime, of awe, reverence, fascination etc. are there as structural elements innate in man as a result of his evolution just because there are these values in external reality. In the same manner on the advent of sentiments they cannot develop "in vacuo", but only when there are specific forms of objective/
objective reality to call them into existence. When, then it is discovered that there are religious sentiments or feelings the investigation of the nature of the idea or object round which they gather is legitimate. And, if, as Otto says, it is found that there are feelings absolutely different from the secular, and with "something more" in them than in the secular, and these are connected with the idea of the Divine, then it is legitimate to draw the conclusion that there is a divine reality, by which they are evoked. And not only does Otto maintain that the reality is there, but he also maintains from his analysis of the feelings that the reality is personal, and we agree that the instincts are of such a nature as to suggest personality in the universe as the cause of them. The position that we are here advocating is the same as that of a recent Kerr lecturer who has approached the subject from the psychological standpoint, and although somewhat over-sympathetic with Otto's position he contributes a very illuminating chapter to the discussion. Dr Edwards says: ("Religious Experience, its Nature and Truth", Edin., T. & T. Clark. 1926) "I am not sure that a good deal of Otto's analysis of religious experience could not be better expressed in terms of this exceedingly useful and illuminative conception of the sentiment. The various emotions which he so well describes and which he seeks to educe as aspects or elements of an experience which is yet in some paradoxical fashion regarded as simple, primary, undeveloped, and irreducible, would then appear as representing some of the more intimately characteristic of these emotion which are linked in the religious sentiment with the divine object... Such a presentation of the matter would, not it seems, to me, be destructive of the essentials of/
of his analysis, and it would obviate a certain awkwardness in method of exposition which sometimes gives it an entirely undeserved semblance of unreality and strain. The essential point of his theory would remain in that the "numinous" reality is the divine object itself, around the idea of which the religious sentiment gathers and to which the religious emotions are attached. Its "numinous" quality is reflected in the idea which embodies it, and which still arouses and attaches to itself the characteristic emotions of the numinous experience".

This is the maximum deduction that can be made, but it is a very important one, not simply that through his evolutionary and self-conscious stages man has put the valuation of Divinity and personality upon his universe, but that unless there were Divinity and personality in the universe he would never have the nature which he has, attuned as it is to fellowship with the highest that he finds, and as Otto would suggest something infinitely more. The unfathomable depth of feeling points to an unfathomable Being. The essential characteristic of man that distinguishes him from the lower creation is that he has thoughts of God and desires fellowship with God, and he has acquired that desire during his evolutionary and self-conscious life, as a result of contact and communion with external reality, and not simply by imitation of and suggestion from the herd, because suggestion is fruitless, unless the capacity to receive it is there, but man is born with the capacity to divine the presence of God in the universe, and to seek and hold fellowship with Him. The evidence of the existence of the instincts and sentiments such as Otto describes, points to the fact that man's desire for fellowship with God is not merely due to subjective process, but to objective reality as well.
But Otto's work would have been far more convincing had he contented himself with this indirect proof and shown us the two processes developing "pari passu" from the beginning, namely, the subjective feelings and the growth in religious ideas by which they are caused and then we would be better able to judge of his facts by not having them "en masse". But this would not suit his method of direct proof. Otto has a chapter on "The Numinous in the Old Testament" in which he deals with the numinous stage of daemonic dread; then Isaiah is taken as the stage when "The Holy One of Israel" became the expression "par excellence" of the Deity, and Ezekiel and Job are taken as examples of the mysterious. If the test of a theory is its capacity to explain then Otto's theory ought to throw more light on the Old Testament prophets than it does. It seems as if the clearer the knowledge of God becomes in the minds of the prophets the less of the numinous there is left to describe. That there was a non-rational non-ethical element in the religion of Israel there is no doubt, but the instances that he quotes are few, because what we have in the Old Testament is the history of the progress of an ethical and spiritual ideal in the process of which the non-rational falls into the background. On his theory when spiritual communion increased there ought to be more of the numinous, but the reverse is the case, and this is still further borne out by his chapter on "The Numinous in the New Testament". In that chapter where communion with God is more to be expected the instances of the numinous are fewer and very far-fetched. We may take one example, "The Kingdom", he says, (op. cit., p.85) "is just greatness and marvel absolute, the "wholly other" heavenly thing, set in contrast to the world of here and/
and now, "the mysterious" itself in its dual character as awe-compelling yet all attracting, glimmering in an atmosphere of genuine "religious awe". The arbitrariness of this description is seen when contrasted with St. Paul's with which all would agree that the Kingdom of God is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost". (Rom. 14:17.)

The remaining part of Otto's book is taken up with his theory of divination on which a few words fall to be said. By divination Otto does not simply mean the believer's mode of knowing God but something else, since he questions whether even Schleiermacher possessed it. He says: (op. cit., p. 154) "It is questionable whether Schleiermacher himself, in spite of his (re-)discovery of "divination was a really "divinatory" nature, although in his first "Discourse" he maintains that he is". Moreover this faculty is not the possession of man in general but only of a few special people. He says: (ibidem) "Not man in general (as rationalism holds), but only special divinatory natures possess the faculty of divination in actuality". From this description we conclude that, not being the ordinary faith of the believer but a special possession of the few, it must be some psychic gift and if so it is not the way by which knowledge of God is obtained, because God is not known only by those few who can, to use Professor Hocking's phrase, look up the "back flues of consciousness". Our conclusion then is that what Otto is engaged with all the time is simply the irreducible element in all feeling and feeling varies in people to a great extent, some being comparatively passionless; and his divinatory natures are those who make the greatest emotional response; either that or they are purely theoretical.
We set out in this chapter to show the part played by feeling in the religious consciousness, and, as the chief topic under this heading usually is the status of intuitive knowledge, we have examined a theory which maintains that all genuine religious knowledge is intuitive and this we saw leads to exaggerated claims for intuitional knowledge which cannot be substantiated. It is necessary, therefore, to define the status of intuitional knowledge which is of prime importance to religion. That there is such a thing as intuitive knowledge is being admitted more and more, especially since the work of Bergson, who has shown that reality is grasped by intuition, but that, while reason can analyse this reality, it can never put it together again, so that an account can be given of it that can fit into a philosophical system so as to convey it to other minds. This is what Otto has endeavoured to do. In insisting that there is intuitive religious knowledge he is right, but in endeavouring to separate that intuitive knowledge from religious knowledge that is inferential he has failed as might be expected, because to have anything at all to say he confined himself to those intuitions that are characteristic of primitive minds where the inferential element is at its least, while his theory is plainly inadequate to the task of following up the intuitive element in the more developed mind.

What is intuitive in religion, therefore, cannot be conveyed to other minds in a way that can supply a proof to others, although the religious mind itself is certain of its own intuitive experience. But the fact that its reality cannot be demonstrated to others does not diminish its truth. For instance, there are other things in our experience the reality of which we cannot doubt though we cannot describe them to others, for example, sensation. The different elements/
elements in mind, in fact, feeling, knowing, and willing in the last resort defy analysis or description. Intuition then must be of the order of fact. It must be a leap of the mind in its totality at concrete facts, an immediate apprehension like direct physical sensation without any inferential process. Just as sensation forms the basis of the ordinary consciousness, religious intuitions must be the foundation of the religious consciousness. On this primary immediate intuitional religious knowledge, ordinary religious inferential knowledge is built just as ordinary knowledge of the physical world is built on the basis of our sensations. It is possible then to conclude that intuitional knowledge is only a more fundamental form of inferential knowledge. This seems probable from the fact that while it is certain that all have intuition in some degree only certain persons possess it in a marked degree and these are the prophets among mankind. The conviction, authority, and knowledge with which prophets speak indicate that they have received more vivid and comprehensive intuitions of reality than ordinary people have. But these intuitions are very difficult or impossible to give expression to. What we get in the case of the prophets is not the intuitions themselves but the inferences or teaching drawn from them. The intuitions themselves are incommunicable, and this is what causes Otto's difficulty in describing them. The task is impossible; the irreducible in mind cannot be described. Even if we get all the insight that can be derived from all Otto's different qualities in the numen it would fall short of what real intuitive apprehension of the Divine would be because such an experience cannot be conveyed in language.

These immediate religious experiences, therefore, cannot admit
of any logical proof. They are proof to those who experience them but not to those who have no such experiences themselves, and so they cannot be related to ordinary knowledge or fit into any philosophical theory. But, although there is no logical proof, there is still the pragmatic test. The Old Testament prophets were not accepted on the authority of their own asseverations but on the authority of the truth of their message. If they spoke not according to the law and the prophets there was no truth in them. Exponents of mysticism nowadays offer as a proof of the reality of mystic visions the fact of the creativeness of mysticism. It yields fruit worthy of its origin, and there is no denying that this is a proof, for "by their fruits ye shall know them". Visions on the other hand, that are self-induced or merely subjective lead to mental deterioration. Applying this test to Otto's own example those which lead to frenzies grisly horror, and so on, betray their own origin by their results.

The mistake of Otto as well as of the mystics generally is to extend the range of intuitive knowledge too far and credit it with what belongs to the inferential sphere, while ordinary people tend to deny the reality or extent of intuition which they regard as only a form of inference. But the two as we have seen are two essential and different stages of mental process like sensation and reason. On this point Professor Waterhouse has an illuminating passage. He says: (op. cit., p. 103) "Unless we have some experience of reality which is not inferred, in what way can we have ground for inference? The chain of inference cannot hang upon inference. Spinoza's "scientia intuitiva" was the third and highest kind of knowledge. It would, perhaps, be better to regard an immediate grasp of reality as
as the basis of knowledge. If that is to be so, it is not possible to deny that the religious consciousness may have an immediate sense which forms the basis of its knowledge, which can be apprehended as reality without inference”. One striking illustration of the truth of this theory is the case of the discoveries of great scientists. They witness to the fact that their greatest discoveries have been in the form of an intuition, that in the process they were passive, and that the truth found them, rather than they the truth, as if reality had advanced to meet them and impinged upon their minds in the form of a sensation. We may not readily take the mystic's account of his own intuitions on account of his bias, but there can be very little motive for bias in the case of the scientist. Such discoveries might be supposed to be the result of former thinking processes carried on subconsciously and coming to a point, but the scientists themselves disavow any such former thinking, so that intuition must be regarded as a basal phase of mind which is common to all minds in different degrees.

To conclude this chapter on feeling, then, a word or two must be said about the function of feeling generally in the religious and prophetic life. Feeling proper as we saw is different from feeling tone or emotion which accompanies sensations or experience of objects ideas, and situations. It is the initial phase of mind, and is of the nature of an urge or compulsion due to needs or capacities. These needs demand values for their satisfaction, and so we get feeling-value which is a stage of feeling which comes between the initial stage and the feeling-tone or emotion. The feeling-value is like intuition in that both are feeling plus knowing, but they are different in that intuition is immediate while feeling-value feels grad-
gradually Montessori-wise all round its object in order to know it, and the feeling-tone or emotion is the result of the satisfaction. Feeling proper then, is the urge for satisfaction, feeling-value is the search for it, and feeling-tone or emotion is the result of the satisfaction.

Feeling proper, therefore, is the dynamic aspect of mind, but it owes its importance to its being closely associated with the other aspects of mind particularly the will, because development takes place only through action. The will is dependent on feeling and hence vitality in religion depends on feeling. Thus the importance of feeling is not in itself, but in its power of inciting the will to action and thinking. Feeling has dynamic also only as it is connected with ideas or concepts, and it is evanescent unless it is harnessed to ideas. This is what is called a sentiment, as we saw. The nature of the feeling, therefore, will depend on the nature of the idea or object round which it centres, the idea having power to refine the feeling, but the greatest change is produced in the feeling self by the act of will which expands the capacity of the feeling-self for higher experience.

With this proviso against undue emphasis on the feeling element in view of the modern over-emphasis on the non-rational, it is our concern here nevertheless to point out the importance of feeling in religion and in the religious consciousness. Space does not permit here, but it could be shown how in religion at its best, in the religion of Israel and throughout the whole course of the Christian religion, it was always a rising tide of feeling centring round a great intuition in the form of a conviction or idea in the mind of a prophet/
prophet that always marked new departures and revival in religion by changing the attitude and wills of the people. When the original idea or form of religion ceases any longer to give satisfaction, because the religious consciousness has outgrown its usefulness, having advanced to higher ideas, the feeling is transferred to the higher ideas, and, if the older form of religion lives on without being discarded, it lives on as ritualism which is a form of religion out of which the religious interest or feeling has departed. When such a stage arrives it is the new feeling for, or interest in, the higher truth or form of religion that protests against the inadequacy of the old, and prompts the will to the acceptance of the new. The task of the prophets of Israel was to protest against old forms of religion out of which the value had gone. Then again when falsity is tolerated in religion it is feeling in the form of an intuition that detects the flaw. Reason later will elaborate and clarify the situation to mind, but the process of criticism begins in an original intuition. Or, when apathy creeps in, its detection is due to an intuitive feeling. Sometimes the intellect may dissipate the feelings by explaining them away, but the importance of the ideas is obvious, because they are the objects round which the religious sentiments gather strength and momentum, and it is from the point of view of the ideas that religious development can be best described, but those scholars interpret the prophets to us best who along with the ideas fathom the feelings with which the ideas are charged, the indignation, pathos, disappointment or love that forged the words.

All great preaching like that of the prophets of Israel, preaching such as leads to great results in changing the will, is preaching where there is great conviction or great feeling which arises out of profound/
profound intuitions. It is not the idea alone that counts, the cardinal mistake of much preaching, but idea with feeling, which alone is able to change the will. The ancient prophets of Israel knew this intuitively and their writings are accordingly not logical disquisitions, but torrents of burning lava, and that is why being dead they yet speak, and still change peoples' wills. Their age needed it and every age needs it before wills can be changed. It is this need of conviction, intuition, or feeling that made Professor Denney say in his "Death of Christ" that the ideal state of affairs would be when every theologian was an evangelist and every evangelist a theologian. There is a prejudice against cheap evangelism which is a form of preaching where the feelings are not real, and cost nothing because they do not arise from profound intuitions as in the case of the prophets whose intuitions were obtained as a result of close and prolonged communion with God. What sent them to God was some deep problem of their own. As Wesley said, their own nest was stirred first, and that sent them to their watch tower to await God's deliverance, and while waiting they received that knowledge of God that made them prophets. But we can never fully understand the prophets apart from the conception of love. They were not merely politicians or patriots, but men who had acquired a love for, and sympathy with humanity, because they had experienced the deliverance and love of God in their own need, and it was this love in their hearts that supplied the motive power and inspiration to stand and deliver their message in the name of Jehovah. Without a due understanding of the love that their own experience of the love of God generated in their hearts, we have no key to the minds of the prophets.
Chapter VII.

Reason and the Religious Consciousness.

The result of our discussion in the last chapter has been to emphasise the importance of feeling in religion, not by way of showing that it is something non-rational in the sense that we cannot give intelligible account of it, as Otto maintains, but in the sense that it has a metaphysical scope which is indicative of the infinite and eternal background, and this is so because feeling as we saw is in one phase an intuition, our ultimate contact with reality, and in another phase it acts as feeling-value, both of which facts are of great importance in dealing with the problem of religious knowledge.

And precisely because this is so, feeling can bear a great deal of rational interpretation and description, and ordinary human nature can grasp its infinite, metaphysical import, and thus feel in touch with ultimate realities, and this is what forms the ground of assurance of the ordinary mind that it does know reality, because values of reality come to him through his feeling experience.

Feeling, therefore, is not the subjective unreality which writers have often taken it to be, and, having taken it to be essentially subjective, they have spent a great deal of argument in proving that it cannot contribute anything to our knowledge of external reality.
Mere feeling, however, as we pointed out earlier, simply does not exist, and, if it did exist, it would be purely subjective, as they say, and would witness to nothing external. But feeling is always a feeling of something, a feeling-value, and real feeling always presupposes an object, and witnesses to the nature of that object.

The theory of Otto, though it attempts to prove that beyond the intelligible rationalised area of feeling there is a non-rational region which defies analysis, has only had the contrary result of showing us by his analysis of and analogies to that region that it can be rationalised, at least as far as any other region of mind like reason or will, for these also defy ultimate explanation and description.

Moreover, his theory has yielded another important result in the attention it has drawn to the fact that feeling is not "mere" feeling but that it is objective as well as subjective, and witnesses to external reality, though like Otto it is possible to be mistaken about the exact nature of that reality, and that is why the witness of the feelings has to be supplemented by that of reason.

Still, the line of investigation which consists in showing that the instinctive feelings, when they are occupied with divine reality, are differently tinged from what they are when occupied with secular realities, is of importance, because it is in accordance with the view of the formation of instincts and sentiments which has developed earlier in these pages, namely, that such specialised instincts and sentiments could never have developed without an objective reality to call them into existence, and they have assumed their specific character/
character as a result of the interaction of mind with certain object situations, ideas, or values in the external world, and thus they are of immense value as witnesses to the nature of that external reality.

But the feelings are not the last word about that reality, important as its contribution is, and it is being emphasised here, because the function of feeling has been often neglected or misinterpreted. There is, then, besides the witness of feeling, the witness of reason as well, and also of the will, the will also being a test of reality. Feeling we described as a sense of incompleteness and an urge towards completeness, but there is the same compulsion and urge on the part of reason and will to function, just because they belong to the same personality. Reason as well as feeling demands a satisfaction, and is compelled to come to conclusions with regard to reality. This controversy of feeling versus reason, head versus heart, is due to the same old fallacy of imagining that there are states of mind that are pure feeling or pure reason, but as was said already, they each involve one another to a certain extent, so that the feeling which Otto appeals to as non-rational is after all a feeling that involves a knowing element as well, as his own analysis suggests. Non-rational feeling simply does not exist. It may be called non-ethical, which it is, but not non-rational. Thus feeling though the primary and regulative principle in mind, is not the only element or the highest element in mind, and, to exalt it over the other states of consciousness, is as fatal a mistake as to undervalue it, or neglect it altogether. Having, therefore, realised to some extent its function and importance in the last chapter, we/
we propose in this chapter to examine the witness of reason to the existence and nature of the Supreme Being.

The Theistic Proofs are the historical way in which the attempt was made to prove the existence of God by means of reason. They are not proofs in the strict sense, because proof implies logical connection, which cannot be secured in the case of these Proofs, as the conclusions are made to contain more than the premises. Nevertheless, because these are the traditional ways in which the human mind sought to prove the existence of God, the premises on which it worked must have been the only ones available, and, respect for the history of human thought compels us to believe that these Proofs are concerned with the permanent problems of reason. As a matter of fact the Proofs are the ways in which the human mind in every age naturally argues from the facts of reality to the existence of God. But the fault of the Proofs is not so much with the idea of drawing conclusions from such premises, because they are the only premises we have, if we are to reason at all, as with the idea that we can pronounce finally on the sum total of reality by means of logical abstract reason alone. This tradition which has come down from Plato has dominated religious thought, and, as long as it remained, it rendered the Theistic Proofs unsatisfactory, because, being cast in logical form, they were liable to be refuted by logic, and finally their logical inconsistencies were exposed by Kant, and the Theistic Proofs were supposed to have become "hors de combat". But as Pfleiderer says: (op. cit., vol. III p. 254) "Kant, notwithstanding they will always occupy human thought........The critical philosophy/
philosophy of Kant, it is already a historical fact, did not speak the last word on these questions, and it is quite illegitimate to appeal always to him as if philosophy had come to an end with him". In the compass of a brief chapter, then, in which we have to deal with the vast subject of the part played by reason in the prophetic consciousness, it is convenient to follow the line of reasoning suggested by the Theistic Arguments, as, it is here maintained, that these are the premises from which the human mind in all ages, and consequently the prophetic mind also, rose from the contemplation of the things that are seen and temporal to the things that are unseen and eternal. But the transition of the prophetic mind, and of the ordinary mind also, from the things that are seen to those that are unseen, is by the reasoning of faith, and it has always sufficed, whereas the reasoning of the Theistic Proofs was by logic, and could never satisfy, because logic alone is not adequate to adjudicate on the whole of concrete reality. Owing to the philosophical tradition these proofs were always presented in logical form, and consequently Kant's refutation was considered final, and the mistake was on both sides, but Kant's criticism has not invalidated the premises, nor the right to argue from the things of existence to their cause, so that we shall here proceed to discuss the problem, as it exists for, and is solved by, the prophetic consciousness, in order to show the train of thought by which mind attained to its knowledge of God. For this purpose the assumption underlying the Proofs and Kant's refutation of them, that the only means of arriving at ultimate truth is by logical reasoning, will be examined.
Mention has been made above of the antithesis between faith and reason, and, while it is not necessary to go into a lengthy discussion over their difference, it is desirable to state briefly how they differ. Faith, then, is often regarded as the opposite of reason or an inferior kind of knowledge. This, however, has never been conceded by religion, nor does this antithesis constitute the real difference between faith and reason. For instance, Professor H. R. Mackintosh points out that the older theologians used to divide faith into "notitia", "assensus", and "fiducia". He says ("Some Aspects of Christian Belief", Hodder & Stoughton, 1923, p.153) "Into faith, then, enters not only faith as surrender of the heart, but also the faith of cognition, that divining insight of knowledge which seizes as it were prophetically, upon supersensible objects and relations. "Notitia" may exist without "fiducia" for a man may defy God, but "fiducia" without "notitia" is blind". Thus knowledge is an essential constituent of faith, as well as feeling and will, and the knowledge into the future which it attains is a knowledge which is regulated by its experience of the past. Without that experience of the past faith with regard to events in the future could not function; for example, an imprisoned mind, if such were possible, at the moment of liberation could have no faith regarding the future, just because it knew nothing of the past. The facts of past experience are the premises from which faith reasons from sensible experienced facts to what must be supersensible universal fact. Thus faith is a postulate because it is also an inference.

Faith has also been contrasted with science, but the two are on a par, in this respect at least, that science, as well as faith, works by postulates. From a number of certain known experienced facts.
facts, science postulates that certain things will happen in the future, and, when the postulate has been established, it becomes a law of science. Moreover the man of science is compelled to make assumptions that go beyond experienced facts, and thus exercise faith. For instance, he has to have faith that the laws or uniformities that he has established will hold good in the future, as they have done in the past, and that this connection between things will hold good everywhere and always. Also he has to have faith in the ability of our faculties to give us a knowledge of reality as it is. Science in these and other respects has to act on faith, and faith, on the other hand, cannot work without knowledge, and seeks to possess itself of all possible knowledge, but the attitude of faith towards knowledge is different from that of science. Science is interested in knowledge for its own sake, whereas faith is interested in knowledge with a view to finding in it that value or meaning in reality which it wants in order to satisfy its inner needs and feelings; that is to say, the interest of faith in knowledge is personal and that of science impersonal. Faith endeavours to keep abreast of the findings of science, because they help it to find confirmation of values which it wants. Science again seeks, by bringing as many phenomena as possible under laws, to demonstrate the rationality of the universe, but this ideal is never realised, because the laws of science can never give us all the concrete reality of things, so that science can never take the place of faith, although it helps to confirm it. Moreover, science limits itself to certain aspects of reality, and ignores others, whereas faith considers every aspect of reality that it can find in order to discover the particular meaning in/
in things that religious faith postulates. Thus faith is not compelled to stop at the same point as science, or logic, because it envisages aspects of reality to which logic does not apply.

Thus the difference between faith and knowledge is not that the one possesses less and the other possesses more of reason, but that their objects or ends differ, the end of science being rationality in the universe, and of faith, religious value. In these pursuits they both equally use reason, because it is the same mind that works in both cases, and the human mind in all its thinking is regulated by the well-known laws of thought, the law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and the law of sufficient reason. These laws regulate the thinking of faith as well as the thinking of science, and that is why faith cannot believe in a chimera any more than science can, but faith, because it operates with value-judgments, can believe in the possibility of things which science is not competent to pass judgment on, for this reason that the value-judgment is able to comprehend potentialities in things which do not come into the view of science. It is sufficiently clear, then, that abstract reasoning is not the only method of apprehending reality, and this criticism will be now applied to our consideration of the theistic arguments, and, in showing the defect in the artificial traditional form, we shall be able to indicate the way in which the ordinary and the prophetic mind have always reasoned from the premises which they contain to the existence of God.

The Theistic Proofs, known as the Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, Historical and Ontological Proofs, are divisible into three groups/
groups. The first group consists of those which attempt to deduce the existence of God from the nature of physical reality, namely, the Cosmological and the Teleological Proofs. The second group consists of the Moral and Historical Proofs which reason to the existence of God from the facts of man's moral nature. The third consists of the Ontological Proof which reasons from the sum-total of reality to its cause. Together they include all the premises we have for reasoning about the existence of God. They are not proofs but arguments, because logical proofs in the nature of the case are impossible. But their consideration will lead us to discover the real reasoning which must have made so many centuries of thinkers interested in the Proofs and made them think that they gave them logical certainty of the existence of God. Though they did not realise it, their real reasoning was different from logical reasoning, because it was reasoning of a different order; a higher synthesis of reasoning, the reasoning of the whole personality in its threefold capacity of feeling, knowing and willing, the reasoning of faith which was the reasoning also of the prophets. This reasoning, however, cannot be put into a single syllogism, neither can the existence of God be proved with logical certainty, though it can be proved with a unique degree of moral certainty.

We begin, then, with the Cosmological Argument. It has two forms. The first concludes from the contingency of all things and occurrences to a necessary Being who is their cause. That is to say, the things in the world may be or may not be, because there is no principle in things themselves to bring them into existence, and, therefore, there must be a necessary being outside the universe as their cause. The second form of the Proof argues from the principle of causality, the existence of God as First or Uncaused Cause.
There is an unbroken series of cause and effect going as far back as one can go in thought, but an endless series is impossible, so there must be a point where the series begins in a First Cause.

Against this, Kant made two objections. In the first place he said that the law of causality is only valid inside the world of phenomena, and it is a misapplication of the law of causality to use it to arrive at an extra-mundane God. Secondly, he maintained that it was an unwarranted assumption that the world was contingent; events might be contingent, but not the world as a whole, so that it is not necessary to postulate a cause for the world outside itself; it may be caused by an extra-mundane principle, and so we do not need to appeal to an extra-mundane cause. Kant's objections to the Proof as it stands are acknowledged to be correct, just because the Proof set out from logical premises to prove the existence of God, and Kant offered a logical refutation, and there the Proof has remained, and the commonbelief with regard to it and all the Proofs is that they have received the "coup de grace" from the hands of Kant, and no one thinks of discussing them nowadays, but the Proofs are actually only the main aspects under which the problems of religion are discussed from generation to generation, and they have their modern forms, but the real form of the arguments is not that in which they were presented to Kant, or refuted by him. They are, therefore, convenient for our present purpose because their treatment raises the main topics of the religious problem as it presents itself to reason.

1. The Cosmological Proof.

The problem of the Cosmological Proof which is an ever present problem, and the problem which must have engaged the prophetic mind like/
like every other mind, is what is the cause of the universe. That the ordinary mind does employ the real train of thought which is implied in the Cosmological Proof is evident from the testimony of the prophetic writings. Their train of thought, therefore, must have been different from Kant's because his reasoning arrived at a "non liquitur". It is their unsophisticated lines of reasoning, therefore that we wish to unravel. Kant's contention was correct that there is no proof that the world is contingent. On the contrary it forms an articulated system whose sufficient cause might be in itself. As a matter of fact causality which unites the world into a system witnesses from its very idea against any external cause, for, each change in the world is the consequence of some preceding change or cause, and is , again, the cause of the next change, and this nexus between events is inviolable, if causality is to prevail, that is to say, no cause can exist without its effect; but the world which is supposed by the proof to be not self-existent, but contingent, must have come into existence in time, and thus there must have been a time when it did not exist, and so its cause which produced it would have existed without its effect which would constitute a breach of the law of causality.

Whatever the train of reasoning is by which the prophetic mind rises from the conception of the world to that of God, it is certainly not that of the above reasoning of Kant's. The fact is that Kant's preoccupation with the formal element in knowledge leads him as it does all extreme idealistic philosophy to an attenuated idea of causality which does not go beyond logical connection. But this is not all that causality means; it implies logical connection but not that only. This brings us to the question of what causality actually
actually is. Logical connection implies a relation between things, and, so far, it agrees with the idea of cause. It also implies sufficient reason which is also an idea in causality, as well as succession which is also implied in causality, but the relation that exists in cause and effect is a concrete time relation which is not included in the logical connection, or sufficient reason, or the succession implied in a logical syllogism, but the latter, because of a similarity which exists inverbal statement only, is confused with real causality.

Another form of causality which is confused with real causality is mechanical causality. This is the conception with which science operates. It also implies relation, sufficient reason, and succession, all characteristics of real causality, but it, again, is one specific abstract form of relation between things, namely, quantitative relation. But this conception, again, just like logical relation, because of its intelligibility and workableness, is taken to be the whole sum and substance of cause. It is the nature of science to abstract one workable aspect of reality and neglect all the rest, but the tendency is, that in the case of cause this one aspect is regarded as the only one, and hence philosophies oriented from science tend to explain all the facts of the universe by means of the conception of mechanical cause. For instance, the Behaviourist School which we have noticed already, explain consciousness as the result of physical stimuli, which are all quantitatively determined.

But it is not agreed that mechanical cause is a sufficient explanation of the origin of consciousness, or of behaviour. We already saw that behaviour has four characteristics: firstly, it moves towards/
towards an end, and is not simply impelled in a straight line by mechanical force. Secondly, there is variation employed in the means of reaching the end; thirdly, action is not simply the reflex action of parts, but the organism moves as a whole; fourthly, there is increased efficiency of action. None of these characteristics are explainable by means of mechanical action, and therefore, all these are outside its scope. Qualitative, biological, psychical relations are all outside the explanation offered by mechanical cause, so that real causality in any particular instance is a very complex, and a very vague conception, and may contain any or all of the above characteristics. Thus causality is not a simple concept. On this point one recent writer says: (Mind, Oct., 1927) "There is an irradicable vagueness about the idea of cause; if you try to make a causal proposition, you realise that psychological propositions are involved, and you hastily change the subject and consider instead the non-psychical universal of fact."

There is, therefore, sufficient reason to deny the legitimacy of logical or mechanical causality alone to pronounce on the subject of the cause of the world, and yet this is what has been done by extreme idealistic and scientific philosophies all along. Another assumption of the scientific philosophies is that cause, by which they understand mechanical cause, excludes purpose or teleology, and this may be granted if the only form of cause is quantitative relation. It is, therefore, necessary here to enquire whether causality and teleological are really opposed. And to begin with, it has been shown that causality is not quantitative relation merely, but that it has also qualitative, vitalistic, and psychical forms, in virtue of which things simply do not stand side by side in the universe, until/
until mechanical force acts on them, but, on the other hand, in order that one thing may act upon another, there are in virtue of these varied relations a great variety of potentialities in the one thing, and a corresponding variety of potentialities and adaptations in the other thing. There is, moreover, a determined regularity with which effects follow causes, and these interactions of things within the world, form, not a chaos of independent objects or substances existing side by side, but a regular systematised whole pervaded at all points by definite laws of different orders, forming a hierarchy of causalities, and not merely one kind of causality, the mechanical form of causality being very different from the biological, and the biological from the psychical, and these different grades of causalities are evidently adapted to one another. They are not exclusive, but subserve one another, the organic by imperceptible degrees subserving and passing into the organic, and the organic in turn passing into the psychical and spiritual.

Thus our contemplation of the idea of causal connection leads naturally to the idea of teleology, and that is why many thinkers have regarded the Cosmological and Teleological arguments as closely related together. Even Kant himself said that causality and teleology were equally valid and equally indispensable, and he endeavoured to unite the two. Professor Pfleiderer (op. cit., p. 260-262) quotes Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Zeller, and Teichmuller as agreeing with the view that causality and teleology are illustrations of the same principle. The latter he quotes as saying: "The interaction of all the elements presupposes laws which go beyond the existence of each separate element, and embrace all particular things in a unity. Whosoever, therefore, assumes any laws of nature what-
whatever must also assume a system of laws, and must consequently refer the different laws to one ultimate unity, or to one ultimate end. Every student of natural science, therefore, if he seeks for laws of nature at all, is inevitably from that time forward a teleologist, i.e. he assumes a unity or an ultimate end, from which all laws can be explained, as from the simplest principle".

This, then, is the proper use of the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments whereby causality is regarded not as a principle of determinism and consequently a proof against teleology, but as an instance of teleology. And, as the above writer says, the causality or teleology does not belong to any of the objects in the universe taken separately, so that each object is responsible for its own teleology. On the contrary, it is imparted to it from outside itself in the form of a law which embraces all these particular objects in a unity, and the simplest explanation of this teleology, design, or purpose is that it is imparted to the world by the Supreme Lawgiver or Designer whom we call God.

The Teleological Argument is regarded as the simplest of all the arguments and the one which appeals most to unsophisticated minds, and it certainly is one of the ways in which the prophetic mind like all other minds rose to the idea of God as the Author of design in the universe, and the idea of a God of providence who rules and conducts all things towards the fulfilment of His own ends and purposes is at the foundation of all prophetic teaching, and in this scheme the individual fulfils the end of his own being as well as the purposes of God which includes the self-realisation of many individuals in the universe there is a divine plan which is being progressively worked/
worked out and is going to culminate in the final consummation of
the Great Day of Jehovah. That day will be a day of judgment for
individuals and peoples, and they will be judged according to whether
they have conformed to the divine plan or not. There will be re-
stitution as well as retribution in order as far as possible to ful-
fil this plan. There is no part outside this teleological scheme,
heaven as well as sheol, earth and sea and sky, and all that move
through the paths of the same, are included in it.

But, though the uniformity and design in nature is one of the
ways by which mind apprehends God, it is only a secondary way. The
first reason why man recognises causality and design in nature is
because he has the consciousness of cause in his own mind. Irra-
tional animals, because they are not self-consciousness, cannot
interpret design in nature, though all the time confronted by it,
but primitive man has already got the idea of causality, and attri-
butes the events in nature to the will of his god. It is by the
same reasoning that civilized man also who has all the knowledge that
science can give him concludes that it must be a will like his own
that is the cause of all the events in nature, and, without the con-
sciousness of this fact in himself, he could not arrive at the con-
ception of a Supreme Will any more than the irrational animals.
And the same reasoning that gives to man from contemplation of events
in nature the idea of Supreme Will or Cause, also gives him the con-
ception of personality which includes feeling, knowing and willing.
As we wish to canvass this view that it is right to regard the Su-
preme Mind as embracing even feeling also, we shall quote a relevant
passage/
passage from Dr Hastings Rashdall. ("Philosophy and Religion", London, Duckworth, 1914,p.45) He writes: "If, therefore, on the
grounds suggested by the Hegelian or other post-Kantian Idealists,
we have been led to think that the Ultimate Reality is Mind or Spirit
we should naturally conclude by analogy that it must be Will as well
as Thought, and - I may add, though it hardly belongs to the present
argument to insist upon that - Feeling. On the other hand if, with
men like Schopenhauer and Eduard Von Hartmann, we are conducted by
the appearances of design in nature to the idea that nature is striv­ing
after something, that the ultimate reality is will, we must
supplement that line of argument by inferring from the analogy of
our own consciousness that Will without Reason is an unintelligible
and meaningless abstraction, and that (as indeed even Hartmann saw)
Schopenhauer's Will without Reason was as impossible an abstraction
as the apparently will-less universal Thinker of the Hegelian: while
against Schopenhauer, and his more reasonable successor Hartmann, I
should insist that an unconscious Will is as unintelligible a con­
tradiction as an unconscious Reason. Schopenhauer and Hegel seem to
have seen each of them, exactly half of the truth: God is not Will
without Reason or Reason without Will".

The above writer goes nearer than most to acknowledge the three­
fold elements of personality in God on the analogy of human person­
ality. Most writers stop short at Reason and Will. The reason for
this may be that Reason and Will are those conceptions that are mostly
used to explain the facts of Nature and the moral consciousness,
but no writer makes adequate use in such a discussion as this of the
element of Feeling in the Divine Nature. Dr Rashdall, for instance,
mentions it more than once, but makes no deductions from it. In
the above quotation he introduces feeling more or less apologetically, and forgets it before the end of the quotation. It may be implied in most writers, but it is not sufficiently explicit, nor do they make clear what difference it would make to their philosophy of religion to postulate feeling in its highest form of love, as well as reason and will as an element in the divine nature.

We submit, however, that the admission of feeling or love as an element in the Divine Mind could with adequate treatment throw much light on many of the problems connected with creation and existence and Divine Providence. As has been suggested in the above quotation, the admission of reason enables Hegel to grasp one part of the truth about God, and the recognition of Will enables Schopenhauer to grasp another part, but there is a whole aspect which cannot be adequately grasped until feeling in the form of love also is admitted as a constituent element in the Divine Mind. For, even though Hegel regards the Supreme Being as Reason, it is a very different reason he has in mind from that reason which is the reasoning of love; it is mere logical reason. "Thought of Thought" is another of his descriptions of God, whereas it ought to be "Love, Thought, and Will". God as abstract reason and Will is the God of Speculative Rationism, but it is not the God of the religious or prophetic consciousness. It was Hegel who said in his reaction from Schleiermacher's theology that if religion was "mere" feeling then a dog had more religion than most people, but feeling is not "mere" feeling, but feeling which operates with reason and will. And this tradition of Hegel with regard to the exclusion of love from the Divine Nature has come down from Aristotle who excluded all feeling or emotion from the divine nature/
nature, and love, therefore, has to be included in will or reason where it escapes notice, and to the present writers go on calling God, Supreme Will, an instance of which fact we saw in an earlier chapter in Principal Galloway who calls God Supreme Will, and individuals, monad wills. Love, in this case, is no doubt implied, but it is evidently regarded as of secondary importance to Will, which is apparently considered the determining factor in personality. In an earlier chapter, however, we showed that the determining, regulative, integrating, factor in personality is feeling, and in this chapter on the sentiments we identified this feeling with love.

This attenuated conception of Absolutist Philosophy has this barren result of preventing writers on the philosophy of religion from risking any affirmations about God that are too concretely human, for fear of causing too great a gulf between the God of religion and the Absolute of philosophy. Especially is it difficult for writers on the philosophy of religion to deal with the conception of God as feeling or love, and work out its implications for philosophy and religion, and these implications if made explicit might help to throw light on problems that are difficult to understand, if we fail to consider it.

For instance, we have seen that God as Reason or Will is not the God of the religious or prophetic consciousness, because the prophetic consciousness has no conception of a God who has not the three aspects of mind of a complete personality. The God of the prophets was a God who was love, reason, and will. And it was because the prophets came to know God not only as Reason and Will but as Love also that/
that the problems of nature and existence were solved for them. And it was not that they did not probe into these problems. We have only to call Job, Ecclesiastes, psalmists and prophets to witness how none of the deepest problems escaped them, but they worked them all out by means of the conception of the God of love, who, just because he was love, hated evil and injustice, because hate is a constituent of love. And He was a jealous God, because love includes jealousy also. Moreover, he was a judge, because love is never indifferent, but takes sides. Without this conception of love, there would be no solvent for the prophets for the many problems that exercised their minds.

In an earlier chapter we saw that the essence of personality was the systematisation of all the sentiments of the individual under the hierarchy of one supreme dominant sentiment, and we saw that that supreme sentiment is love. It is the only sentiment that can harmonise all the rest, and is capable of forming a complete personality which is only possible, when there is complete harmony among all the sentiments. This love at first takes the form of the self-preserving instinct; it then expands into love for others, and finally to love for the Supreme Being, which it conceives of as Perfect Love. It is the core of the parental instinct, of family and social life and all altruistic service. Without it the species could not continue. It is the very highest dynamic and potential thing we know, and there can be very little doubt that it is right to postulate this element as the very essence of the divine nature, rather than reason or will. And because it is regulative of the divine as well as of human reason and will the 'principle' of love ought to explain more than that of reason or will.
In dealing with the Cosmological Argument we saw that our will in ourselves enabled us to understand causality and our experience of reason enabled us to understand purpose in nature, and, because the cause of this causality and teleology was not in individual things themselves, we reasoned by means of our own conceptions of cause and purpose to a God who was endowed with like faculties to ourselves as the cause of this teleology. But neither reason nor will can ever give us a clue as to why God created the world at all. If God is pre-eminently Reason or Will then it is impossible to comprehend where the motive came from that caused Him to create systems upon systems of worlds with only one spot in that universe, as far as we know it, inhabited. It is not characteristic of calculating reason to take apparently aeons upon aeons to build up systems with only one small spot of it yet inhabited. As far as reason can gauge it appears needless waste, and the vastness of the universe is as much a cause of Agnosticism as any of the problems of existence. And then, also the question of freedom is unintelligible from the point of view of God as Reason, the bestowal on a limitless number of the gift of freewill which many of them use to their own harm. But if we posit love, no labour is too great, aeons do not count, and any risk is worth the creation of beings whom He can love, and who can love Him in return. It was Huxley who said that the solar system after having taken the upward road for millions of years was destined to reach the summit some day and then decline and be extinguished in darkness, and the poet reminds us of "whispers from the dying sun", but even in that case love would be guaranteed to "keep the home fires burning", in some higher form. Reason again has no surprises; we know what it is likely to do, but in the contingency
suggested above, love would offer a surprise with something better. The physical universe may be nothing compared to one returned prodigal. Then, also, if reason were everything we might have teleology, but there might be no flowers or birds, or beauty, or sense of humour which manifestly are tokens of love. Reason alone, or will does not explain the existence of these things, and it leaves more unexplained than it explains, and is, therefore, not a full account of the divine nature.

Then again, there is no adequate solution of the problem of evil except on the hypothesis that the pre-eminent characteristic in the divine nature is love. Why Reason and Will or Power should permit such possibilities is unintelligible, but Love took the risk in order that there might be free-will and personality even at the risk of sin and suffering, and consequently whatever light is possible on the problem of sin and suffering is from the fact of their having been permitted in love for an end of infinite value which was otherwise not attainable. This knowledge has transformed pain and suffering to an incalculable extent. There are two sets of persons to whom pain and suffering is insoluble, on the one hand, the onlooker, and, on the other hand, the sufferer, both with endaemonistic views, and all mankind have naturally that standpoint in certain moods and at certain times, when they contemplate the suffering apart from the fact of the love that permitted it, but when either party looks thoughtfully into the motive of that love, and that the suffering is the inevitable result of giving countless beings the opportunity of being free-willed, then the pain is transformed as by the power of alchemy; it is oftener the endaemonistic onlooker rather than the believing sufferer to whom suffering is an unmitigated evil, because the/
the latter confess to compensations in the way of insight into the meaning of life and the divine love that the world has not got, and as one writer said: "Those who have learned in the University of Suffering have not much more to learn in this life." That implies compensation and a happiness which the world knows not of. In viewing the problem however, the best while free from suffering, are incurably endaemonistic in their outlook, and it is said, that after all has been said about suffering being remedial, particular, perfecting in its action, there is a great deal that is insoluble. But the extent of this region also might be reduced if the solution of love was applied. It is very probable that love would never have permitted the possibility of evil unless it was adequate to the task of turning sorrow into joy. There is a great deal of suffering that need not be if the remedy was only sought and applied, but the complaint against humanity is: "Ye will not come unto me that ye may have life". The great bulk of the world's suffering is simply due to neglect of the remedy which works wherever it is applied. The conception of love, then, as the essence of the divine nature gives all the light we can have on this problem.

The prophetic consciousness solved the problem of pain in the light of the divine love. There was no evil in a city that Jehovah had not done, and for that reason it had a divine purpose. Job the classical instance of unmerited suffering had his pain and suffering stanched simply by God revealing Himself to him. As soon as Job relinquished his human standards, and began to see spiritual values, and began to pray for his friends, from that hour God turned the captivity/
captivity of Job by revealing Himself. The psalmists are full of those who found peace because the hand of a loving God had done it. The eleventh chapter of Hebrews supplies a catalogue of those who similarly endured "as seeing Him who is invisible". The mystics also of all ages were those who through the duress of pain and suffering sought God and found relief from their pain in the vision of God. Thus, if pain is inevitable, there is also a remedy, and it is of wider efficacy and potentiality than our pessimism and small faith often admits, and that remedy is the love of God. Love also solved the problem of immortality. Once united to the family of God by filial love it was impossible ever to be separated from God by any contingency, even by death which was only a door which ushered into the fellowship of God's family above.

Moreover, unless God is a personality who is feeling, thought and willing, it is difficult or impossible to establish the present thesis that the essence of religion is an urge towards communion with God, for unless we posit love as the primary element in the divine nature, there is no guarantee that the love will be reciprocated. Religion will then be contemplation, but not communion. There is no incentive towards communion with mere Will or Thought. Communion is only possible on the understanding that God made man in His own image, that is, on the analogy of what was highest in Himself. And the highest in man is feeling, knowing and willing.

Likewise providence or teleology would have no meaning, or it would be difficult for us human beings to give it meaning, unless it is the providence and teleology of love. A providence that was mere will would not satisfy the religious consciousness; it might, in fact, be dangerous. The prejudice against including love in God and the habit of/
describing Him as Will, as we saw has come down from Aristotle who excluded all feeling or emotion from the divine nature, and, therefore, love has to be stowed away in will or reason where it escapes notice, and so to the present, writers go on calling God, Supreme Will. On the other hand we have shown that personality cannot exist without love which is the justification of the existence of reason and will which are ancillary to love.

Usually a compromise is made either by describing God as Good-will, or by warning us that we can have no conception of what mind can be in the divine nature. It is this latter assumption that we wish to examine now. If, they say, we are to use feeling or love of God, we must remember that we can have no distinct conception of what feeling or love is like in the case of the Divine Being or of reason or will either. Thus Rashdall says: (op. cit., p.46) "What feeling is for a Being who has no material organs, we can form no distinct conception". For this reason Rashdall thinks that the term "Super-personal is right to apply to God; he says: (op. cit., p. 55) "If anyone prefers to speak of God as "super-personal", there is no great objection to so doing, provided that phrase is not made (as it often is) an excuse for really thinking of God after the analogy of some kind of existence lower than that of persons - as a force, an unconscious substance, or merely a name for the totality of things". On the same point Principal Galloway says: (op. cit., p.524) "Nevertheless, to say that God is supra-personal, is not in itself anti-religious. It certainly is not so if what is meant is, that God is personal in a deeper, richer, and more perfect way than man is. For God is a supra-mundane and transcendent Being: he is beyond the limitations/
limitations under which a human personality develops and from which it can never completely escape." In spite of the provisos to the use of the term put forward by the above writers, the use of the term super-personal or supra-personal is misleading, because it suggests that, as Rashdall says, "we can form no distinct conception" of what feeling is for the Divine Being. That suggests that a degree of Agnosticism is necessary with regard to the divine nature which the religious mind will not tolerate, because it insists that we have knowledge that God is love, reason, and will. It is not that these are beyond any distinct conception, a fact which would make them intrinsically different, so that we would have no clue to what they were in the divine, but what is different in the divine is the degree to which these three elements exist in perfection, and harmonious co-ordination. Of that degree we have no distinct conception, but the religious and prophetic mind will insist that love in the divine and in the human are essentially the same. If another term is desired for the Deity, it ought to be super-personality, but not supra-personal which is suggestive of the God of the speculative philosophies.

It is necessary, then, to protest against the tendency to deprecate all anthropomorphism as, for example in the case of the prophets. Extreme anthropomorphism there is, but it is impossible to exclude it entirely, because we can only speak of God in terms of the highest we know in the human, and it is more likely that the prophets are nearer the truth in so doing than if they attempted to speak of God in "supra-personal" terms to which they had no clue in their own experience. Such an effort would immediately inhibit the religious spirit, because there can be fellowship only where the parties/
parties are sure that they know one another through and through, and there are no reserves. If there is a suspicion that God is a different grade of being, then no fellowship is possible, but be He never so high and perfect—and the religious consciousness demands that the object of its worship be perfect — then there can be communion and attraction, provided the perfection is in essence the same as we experience in ourselves in our limited degree.

The more clearly, then, we grasp the meaning of personality and its various elements in ourselves, the more shall we be able to comprehend the nature of God and an element of anthropomorphism in our knowledge and in prophetic knowledge is inevitable, because man is akin to God, and comes to know God as consciousness of self develops. But anthropomorphism is not confined to our knowledge of God. In this respect our knowledge of God is on a par with the knowledge of our fellowmen. Them also we know by analogy and inference from ourselves, and that knowledge by inference and analogy is never immediate or complete, and approximates towards completeness by growing acquaintance. Acquaintance can only grow between human beings where there is mutual trust, admiration, and love. But no one in going to describe his friend can speak of him other than in terms derived from consciousness of his own personality. Thus, while it is necessary to insist that the perfection of God is beyond our conception, it is at the same time necessary for the religious mind to believe that there are no dark reserves depths of unknown elements in the divine nature to which we have no clue whatsoever, and that it is perfectly legitimate to speak of the divine nature after the analogy of/
of the human, provided the analogies are the most ethical and spiritual that we can find. Thus, Personality, Father, Friend, Love, Fellowship are the highest conceptions we have, and are the only ones we can legitimately use, but not terms of which we do not know the meaning, like "supra-personal." Knowledge of God, then, comes by acquaintance, and fellowship with God deepens as experience grows, in which we come to infer his nature by analogy from his works in the physical world and in the world of spiritual realities, and thus the root of religion is communion or fellowship which is possible on one condition only, namely, that He is a God whose essence is love, because love is the only real foundation of friendship among human beings also.

2. The Moral and Historical Arguments.

(a) Morality and Religion.

We have now come to discuss the next of the Theistic Arguments namely, the Moral and Historical Arguments. We have in the discussion of the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments anticipated some of the topics of this problem, but from a different angle. In the former case we saw that causality and teleology implied mind as cause, and that mind always implied all the elements of personality of feeling, knowing and willing. Moreover we saw that personality cannot develop without an integrating force, and that force we saw was love which alone is capable of explaining the existence of personality. Here we approach the same problem of religion from a different angle. The traditional form of the argument was that the moral life or conscience exists, therefore, there must be a God who implanted/
implanted that moral nature in man. Such a deduction, however, is of no value as it seeks to prove too much and is, therefore, incapable of producing conviction. The real form of the argument, the form in which the religious mind naturally employs it, is that the moral life exists, therefore it is necessary to enquire why it exists at all and how it acquires its sanction and authority. What guarantee is there that the moral life is founded on ultimate reality and not on convention.

All that the Moral Argument implies is that seeing that man has a moral consciousness which conceives of a moral Good or End, and he strives towards that End, therefore, that impulse must be due to the ultimate nature of things. What, then, is the character of this universe, or its ultimate reality, that man is by nature compelled to seek the Good. That there is this compulsion is one of the things that man is certain of. He is certain that there is a distinction between right and wrong, and that he ought to do the one and not the other.

The old legalistic view was that this moral law was communicated by God to man, but this view is founded on an antiquated psychology which ignores the fact that man in his moral progress is not determined by an external moral law which he finds established in the world, but by a law of his own inner nature, an urge, or "élan de la vie" out of which develops his instincts, interests and moral nature. This fact was recognised by the early Greek philosophers who recognised that the Good or End for man was to be determined by the nature and needs of man. Without such a nature and needs within, no externally imposed law would have any effect on him. This is the defect of the old legalistic view as well as of the categorical imperative.
imperative of Kant. Kant's categorical imperative contains truth in as much as it insists on the fact that the moral law is a matter of inward conviction rather than a matter of logical proof. It exists above us and demands obedience, but the categorical imperative is also founded on an inadequate psychology, and so he has failed to relate it to the needs of the self on the one hand except in this external way, and, on the other hand, he has failed to connect it except again in an external way, with the need of religion. It is, therefore, necessary to insist that the categorical imperative or sense of duty, is a thing which is determined by man's own nature and interests, and is not something externally imposed upon him against his will.

Man first of all begins to live by unconscious instinct. Gradually he becomes self-consciousness and begins to think that he ought to do or not do certain things. At first he does these things unconsciously during which time his conduct is non-moral, but when he becomes self-conscious, and begins to conduct himself according to certain preconceived ends and ideals his conduct becomes moral. At first he acts without thinking or instinctively in obedience to an inner law of his own nature, but, on the advent of self-conscious reason, he begins to question why he and others feel this compulsion from within to act in certain ways, and not in others. He is certain that it is not due to the conventions of society, because his ideal sometimes rises above that of society. It, therefore, must be in his own nature, because his ideal is his highest interest and highest Good. The imperative is not a thing necessarily requiring an effort of will, but the natural goal of life or self-realisation which is determined by the individual's interests and tendencies.

Kant's/
Kant's categorical imperative does not make it clear why it should be obeyed: the reason is that it is the individual's natural Good to which his interests impel him, otherwise the imperative could never command obedience. The duty may require an effort of will at times, but the will is exerted at all, because the act is seen to contribute to the individual's highest Good.

This consciousness of a higher and higher moral ideal which goes on expanding with experience leads to the question as to what is the nature of the universe, which makes possible the moral life of the individual. What is the ultimate and sufficient cause of the presence of the moral nature of man in the physical universe? Man is helped towards the solution of this question in the case of contemplation of the physical universe, as we saw, by the consciousness of himself as a cause or purposive will. It is in the same way from the consciousness of his own sense of duty or conscience that he is able to divine the ultimate cause of the universe, whose nature it is to produce moral beings, as also being a moral being like himself, for in no other way could a moral being who is not his own cause appear in the universe. This is the gist of the moral and historical arguments, and this is how the prophetic mind arrived at the idea of God as moral, and holy, and righteous. Unless man had a moral consciousness in himself he could never apprehend it in God. The Hebrew prophet externalised the law of conscience: instead of being the still small voice it became the "ex cathedra" command of the Deity, but this is also due to the fact that certain regulative ideas come to form sentiments which thus take on an external character demanding the obedience of the individual, though coming from within.

It is at this point that the controversy between morality and religion/
religion begins, and we must consider the relation between them for a little in order to make clear that religion includes morality and gives it its sanction. We have already disposed of the view of Professor Otto that religion is independent of morality altogether. Religion is not on his view mediated through morality, but is directly given. This thesis we saw Otto failed to prove, because as we saw religion without morality would have no content or permanence. The other view of the relation of morality and religion is that which was common in part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which held not that religion was independent of morality but that morality was independent of religion. Faith in God was not required; all that was required was faith in duty or morality. This view was popularised by Kant to whom nothing was good but the good will, and religion in his view was only an appendage to morality. For Matthew Arnold religion was morality touched by emotion, that is a slightly heightened form of morality. The independence of morality was still further emphasised by the American Pragmatic and Behaviourist Schools of thought, morality in the case of the first being a matter of utility, and, in the second case, being mechanically determined.

From the history of the case, therefore, it is clear that the connection between the two is so close, that it is difficult to define where the one ends and the other begins or what are the distinguishing marks of either. As a result there are a great many ordinary people, and a great many writers on religion who declare that faith in duty is faith in God, and that faithfulness to duty brings a man to God; the more a man sticks to his duty the nearer he comes to God, therefore, a man need not trouble himself about faith in/
in God, because he will naturally meet God in his daily tasks. This theory misses the real nature of religion just as much as Otto's theory misses the nature of morality. The doctrine is very common, and is destructive of both religion and morality. It is the essence of Pharisaism. At the root of this doctrine there is the fallacy that our duty is a compact well defined little set of duties which are quite within our abilities to perfectly perform.

The conceit of the moralist attitude in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consisted in its claiming its ability to perform perfectly all the commandments of God and all the duties of this life. Such an attitude at once betrays a limited and circumscribed idea both of duty and religion, and consequently of God. Religion cannot exist without morality, but morality may exist without religion, but such morality is very different from the morality which is "touched" by the emotion generated by religion. The morality of the moralist is the morality of his own definition, but not the morality of religion which demands that a man shall love the Lord his God with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his will, and his neighbour as himself.

When a poet or a preacher or a teacher tells us that the way to God is the way of duty we invariably find that his reason for doing so is that he is working with a limited idea of duty. The Westminster Confession correctly estimates the religious view of man's morality in maintaining that no man is able perfectly in this life to fulfil all the commandments of God, but doth daily break them in thought, word and deed. Morality is of itself natural; religion is supernatural. What drives a man to God and religion is the sense of/
of his utter inability to perform all the commandments of God, as witness St. Paul, St. Augustine, Luther, and all the saints that have ever been. The morality of the moralist - and all mankind are moralists until they become religious - is selfish, self-complacent, self-satisfied, self-righteous, and occupied with self-justification, whereas the morality of religion is self-sacrificing, self-giving, self-effacing, confessing its shortcomings, because its essence is love. Matthew Arnold truly enough realised that the difference between morality and religion was that religion had the addition of emotion, but he did not see sufficiently clearly that the emotion was love, nor did he realise the dynamic of that emotion. As a matter of fact what he implied was what all others imply who try to reduce religion to morality, that there is very little difference between them, namely, a "mere" emotion. But love is not "mere" emotion; it is the very nature of God Himself and "whosoever loveth is born of God and knoweth God". Such emotion makes morality religious.

There is much human natural love among men and even animals, but altruistic love that loves even enemies is derived from God. Such love is not natural; it is supernatural, it is derived from consciousness of human imperfection and of the divine perfection which is love; it is therefore the essence of the morality which is the foundation of religion and that is why religion is essentially supernatural, because the knowledge of this love comes from God who takes the initiative, and it is the consciousness of this initiative on the part of God that lends incentive to morality, life, and service, and to the love of God being reciprocated. "Herein is love, not that we loved God but that He loved us". 1 John, 4, 10. "If God so loved us, we also ought to love one another". 1 John, 4, 11.
But the morality which is without religion or faith in a God whose essence is love lacks this incentive to, and joy in, self-sacrificing service. Thus the morality which has come under the suzerainty of religion has a very different quality and range from ordinary morality. Ordinary morality is circumscribed like that of the Pharisees and being circumscribed it can never reach the highest levels. On the other hand religion lays an infinite obligation on morality and the religious life begins when the individual realises that his own morality is as filthy rags, that is, infinitely short of the divine standard. At the same time he realises himself as the object of divine love, and, in this divine love, he recognises the possibility of the fulfilment of the law. Thus religion imposes on morality an infinite obligation, but also supplies the possibility of infinite fulfilment. The morality of the natural man is of a human limited standard, but that of religion is of divine infinite standard. The motto of the moralist is "duty", but of religious "faith", "love", in which "duty" is transcended.

It has been our effort in these pages to show the nature and supremacy of love. We found it solved the problem of personality, it also solved the question of the nature of the Deity, and of creation, and the existence and destiny of man, and here we find it supplies the solution to the problem of morality, for no morality is complete without religion and religion can only exist if the essence of the Divine Being is love, that is to say, the morality is incomplete which is not founded on love to God, whereby the idea of duty is replaced by a faith that works by love. This is the connection between morality and religion.

But there are writers who exalt natural morality at the expense of/
of religion who say that there are many people who lead good lives without a belief in God. Here again faith in God is replaced by faith in duty. But, as we saw, duty, in that case, is limited to a code of rules, or to certain limited ideals, or imperfect Goods or Ends, in which case morality does not reach God, and it is because of their limited code that such are satisfied with their achievements and do not feel their need of God or religion. They no doubt are good and love their neighbours, but the good is often the enemy of the best. They are near the Kingdom without being in, and the higher the standard of their morality the nearer they are, but that does not say that their morality is enough for them or that they are as well outside. If they were inside their morality would be infinitely enhanced, and their joy infinitely increased, and for that reason it is a duty to help such to exercise faith in God and not acquiesce in the creed that faith in duty is the same as faith in God. Such people have come to anchor by their faith in duty because faith in God was presented to them, in some form which they could not accept, a form by which faith in God appeared to them as less worthy than faith in duty, and their honesty and sincerity led them to chose the worthier of the two, namely, faith in duty.

Another argument of those who wish to level religion down to morality or below morality which is the tendency of the new psychology writers is that there are certain people who, while apparently very religious lead immoral lives and there are many genuinely religious whose characters are very unstable. The former of these cases, however, proves nothing as they are simply cases of abnormal psychology, and one can find parallel cases of a man imagining himself a Croesus while possessing nothing, or a Napoleon while innocent.
innocent of the art of war. But these cases do not prove that riches or strategy are nothing. And as to the latter case, there is surely more hope for them with religion than without, and we do not know what handicaps they may have had in life to begin with.

(b) Values and Ultimate Reality.

As we have seen, our knowledge of God depends on our knowledge of reality which includes ourselves and our universe, and from these we reason to God. It is, therefore, necessary here to enquire how we obtain knowledge of reality, and whether the knowledge so obtained gives us true and full and reliable knowledge of it, and of the Supreme Reality which is God. This question has to be answered because Agnosticism declares God cannot be known and Pessimism declares there is a discrepancy between our knowledge and reality, and both these affected the prophetic mind as well as the ordinary mind at different times throughout history. There has always been a discrepancy pointed out by philosophers between the Absolute of philosophy and the God of religion and nowadays the reliability of our knowledge is called in question by such writers as Bertrand Russell for whom the Supreme Good is a fabrication of our own minds, a mere projection of our own desires hanging in the air without any support or reality.

To begin with, then, it is now recognised by philosophy that our mode of apprehension of reality is by means of value-judgments or feeling-value. This is a conception introduced into philosophy by Lotze, and especially by the Ritschillian School. It is of special interest to us in this study, because it emphasises what has been urged frequently enough in these pages that for the apprehension of
reality feeling is required as much as knowledge which corresponds to value. And there is no reason why the conception should be limited to feeling and knowing to the exclusion of willing, because our apprehension of reality as we shall see in the next chapter depends on the will as well. This is the discovery of the new German school of psychology the Gestalt School, for whom apprehension of reality is given in the form of a "gestalt" or configuration.

The conception of feeling-value, then, is an illustration of how the different elements in mind, the feeling, and the knowing, and, we maintain, the willing element also, enters into the apprehension of reality. All human activity, we saw, originated in a feeling of incompleteness which results in attention being drawn to those things that minister to the satisfaction of those needs. Other aspects of reality which do not for the time being minister to the need are ignored, and, as far as the individual is concerned, are non-existent, but, with the development of the need, and the emergence of fresh needs, fresh values are realised, and thus needs and values create fresh needs and values. The nature of his needs depends on the nature of man, and hence the values that he finds in reality depend on the chief end of man himself. And these values that he finds in his environment are the individuals facts so that facts are not the solid objective realities that they are commonly supposed to be. Neither is truth because truth is often taken to be what we believe to be truth - facts and truths as commonly understood are in reality values which vary with the completeness of our knowledge of reality.

Values, therefore, go on varying through life as higher and higher values are realised and they also vary with different communities and ages. The question, therefore, is how these values of conscious ness/
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consciousness are related to ultimate metaphysical value. Are these values merely subjective or are they objective as well, and how do we know that they are objective? How do we know that there is a Supreme Good or God corresponding to our idea of the Deity? This problem was often before the prophetic mind, and their solution was derived from an appeal to experience and to history just as our solution here will be.

For, if we dismiss the absolute subjectivism of Berkeley which maintained that things had no existence apart from mind, and consider the idealistic view of reality as set forth, for example, in Ward's "Naturalism and Agnosticism" that things have, not as Berkeley said, no "existence" apart from mind, but no "reality" apart from mind, as Ward says, that allows that things have some degree at least of objectivity apart from mind, and it is the interaction of mind and object that creates value. How then can we know that mind receives correct impressions of reality seeing that the subjective element is so large? The answer to this is the same as the answer which we found for the criterion of faith and also of reason. Reason justifies itself by the criterion of the laws of thought, particularly the law of non-contradiction. This also is the criterion of faith because it includes reason. And faith is also a value, and the criterion of value also is the principle of non-contradiction, or coherency of particular values with the system of values.

But the principle of non-contradiction unfortunately is not so easy to apply, and mistakes have been made in its application which have had serious consequences both for philosophy, and for religion. The grand mistake of philosophy from the beginning is in the assumption as we have seen already that the only test of truth is logical consistency.
consistency. The best examples of this reduction of all reality to one logically reasoned system are the philosophies of Spinoza and of Hegel. Everything was explained according to the logic of these systems, and nothing had any reality which did not come within the scope of their logic, nor had anything any value beyond that accorded to it by their logically constructed schemes. Religion and the Christian religion had only that value which fitted in with their principles of interpretation.

After these philosophical interpretations of reality came the scientific explanation with the rise and progress of science and the assumption was that the sciences combined could give us a full account of reality, but, as we saw, science operates with one aspect of reality only, namely, quantitative relations, so that a great many of the aspects of reality do not come within its view at all. Neither the philosophical nor scientific explanation took account of any other values than the logical and mechanical, whereas reality has many other aspects which are quite as important for ministering to man's needs. Man is not only reason but feeling and will as well, and these create values of their own. With regard to this claim of idealistic philosophy to explain all reality on logical principles, Professor H. R. Mackintosh (op. cit., p. 290) writes: "Increasingly one feels that a purely logical construction of things, like that of Absolute Idealism, is quite irrelevant and non-committal in regard to those elements of human life that make it best worth living. Other aspects of experience than the logical are ignored, or, as with Bosanquet, they are subsumed under a conception of logic so enlarged as to become unintelligibly vague. It is however, a wholly unjustifiable assumption on the part of Speculative Rationalism that there exists/
exists only one right method by which reality can be apprehended". The other aspects of human nature, therefore, have to be taken into account, and these are feeling and willing which correspond to aesthetics and morality, and in these also reality is reached by the same principle of non-contradiction. These are in a different category from reason in that they cannot be expressed in logical syllogisms like the truths of reason, but in their case the law of contradiction holds with equal validity for a thing cannot be both beautiful and not beautiful, or good and bad at one and the same time. And there are degrees of goodness and badness, of beauty and ugliness, and out of the recognition of these differences in experience ideals of beauty, truth, and goodness are evolved, by which the particulars are judged. These vary to some extent with every single individual, but not to an absolute extent, and in the historic process of development these ideals obtain clearer and clearer definition, so that the subjective element belonging to the individual is more easily detected and the common basis of reality on which the ideal values are founded is more easily recognised. Absolute non-contradiction or absolute coherency of all parts of experience can never be attained, for that would imply absolute knowledge which is impossible for finite beings, but what is demanded by the human consciousness is a degree of coherency that is adequate to the needs of its existence in its threefold aspects of feeling, knowing and willing. Such a criterion cannot be deduced from individual experience but only from the united experience of the whole race, and this is just the point where the importance of the historical argument comes in. Individual experience has to be supplemented by the experience of the history of the race which corrects the individual coefficient, and makes the ideals/
ideals and values display a much greater degree of consistency and coherence than any individual values can. And thus a higher degree of certainty is obtained of our being in possession of reality as far as our finiteness allows. Thus the final test of the correspondence of values with ultimate reality is a test of adequacy, but it is not an absolute test.

But certainty will increase when love will be admitted along with reason, and the effect of this will be of the greatest importance for religion which is still not absolutely certain about the ideal of life, nor of the divine nature on account of the influence of rationalistic philosophy which presents a God with which the religious consciousness is not satisfied. We, therefore, think that when the whole nature of man is taken into account the nature of the Divine Being will be more apparent, as a Being whose nature is love, a conception which alone satisfies the religious consciousness.

The objection to anthropomorphism is from rationalistic philosophy, and not from the religious consciousness, for, if God made man as the crown of Creation, and represents His highest thoughts, then His thoughts also in some sense are anthropomorphic, although it is allowed that His thoughts are infinitely above our thoughts, and they are so as expressed even in man, for we are yet a very far distance, it may be an infinite distance, from comprehending even man, let alone God Himself.

But as we progress in our knowledge of man so we shall progress in knowledge of the divine nature also, and there are recent movements whose results have not yet been fully exploited, which will bring us nearer to comprehending God because they come nearer to comprehending man. With regard to these movements, Professor E. S. Waterhouse/
Professor E. S. Waterhouse says: ("The Philosophy of Religious Experience", London, Epworth Press, 1923, p.218) "within the present century a number of lines of thought, diverse in many ways, have yet tended to modify the rationalistic methods of philosophy. Variously expressed in some part by Pragmatism and Humanism; in another way by certain forms of Personal Idealism and of Pluralism, and again by Vitalism, there has none the less been a certain unity throughout all. No one has been more convincing than Bergson in showing the limitation of intellect to represent the actual nature of living experience, in saying what a "logic of solids" fails to grasp. Still more recently, the philosophical implication of Einstein's principles has borne in the direction of emphasising the human factor. But perhaps the greatest pressure is coming from psychological and biological conceptions of experience. The work of such writers as McDougall, Rivers, Freua, and Jung has brought home the immense significance of instinctive reaction and unconscious experience upon mental life. Modern psychology has given us a wholly new idea of the origin and process of experience, and the full meaning of this for philosophy has yet to be realised". In this study we have been trying to show that one of the elements in experience whose significance for religion has yet to be worked out is feeling which gives us love as the integrating principle in personality and as the essence of the divine nature. Love is a conception which cannot survive in the high latitudes of absolutist philosophy, but as the above writer points out various movements are insisting that what is highest in experience is indicative of the highest reality, and so one day this highest principle will come to its own. In the same way another element whose significance for the/
the religious life particularly has still to be worked out is the will which will be considered in the next chapter.

So far our argument has been to the effect that knowledge of God as a Creator, Designer, Personality, Author of moral law is derived by inference from the consciousness of these characteristics in ourselves. The validity of the proof of God by inference therefore will depend on the nature of the inferential process. Logical inference we saw already has validity within a certain circumscribed universe of discourse, but it is not competent to pronounce judgment on the whole of concrete reality. If, therefore, our inference is merely a logical one, our proof rests on a very inadequate foundation, on premises which do not include all the facts. It is therefore, essential to point out that the inference referred to in our argument is not an inference which is drawn by the individual when he reaches the stage of philosophical reflection, but a fact of life which begins to be given to him in the process of living from the very beginning of the life process. The belief in God is part of experience, and is given us in the constitution of things; it is given us with the other common-sense facts of life, and undergoes verification with all the rest of our common-sense knowledge.

In the beginning of this study stress was laid on the fact that the instinctive tendencies which are the germ of personality develop through interaction with external objects and reality, so that the roots of personality which draw the inference grow out of the nature of development of personality through the system of sentiments which again are developed round the objects of external reality. Similarly the conception of value-judgments stresses the fact that in the vital process the human mind is never subjective, but
in as close a touch as it can achieve with external reality. Further there is a process of verification going on through the application of the principle of non-contradiction which is unconscious and experimental rising not out of mere curiosity, but out of the needs of life, and this process of verification is continuous as the history of the race, and it is not of the reason alone, but is a three fold process of feeling, thought, and will. It is as a result of such a process that the deduction of God as Creator, Designer, Personality and all the other attributes of God is made. This is what the above writer means when he says that modern psychological and biological conceptions of experience have given a wholly new conception of experience the implications of which for philosophy have not yet been fully worked out. This shows the importance of modern philosophy and psychology. Intransigent philosophies and psychologies there are, but there are also results that will abide. For instance, the attributes of God are simply the highest values that have emerged in the historic process, and what the modern humanistic philosophies teach us is that we must trust our own common-sense faculties, and when all these values are teleologically arranged, and point to a supreme value, then we are justified in attributing the highest we find in our experience of things to the nature of God. Thus love which we found is the supreme principle in life, must also be the essence of the divine nature, otherwise we have no clue yet to the divine nature, if the highest we know does not supply it.

That the prophets, for instance, arrived at their convictions regarding God and reality by this concrete way of personal experience is evidenced from the gradual development of the apprehension of divine/
divine and human values as seen in the Hebrew prophets. In a book of essays on the subject of "Immortality" (London, Putnam, 192-, p. 58) Professor A. C. Welch writing on the gradual development of the idea of immortality among the Hebrew prophets, says: "Now on one side the higher religion could have no quarrel with the idea of the continuance of life after death. So far as life of a kind was believed to continue in Sheol, there was nothing in the thought to offend. The one place where at first the higher faith came into collision with the earlier forms of belief was in connection with the people's mourning customs; and here it made a significant difference. All those customs which implied no more than the belief in a continuance of the spirit after death was quietly left alone; but every practice which seemed to suggest the belief in any other God than Yahweh having power in Sheol, or which could be construed to mean a cult connected with the dead, was put under the ban. These were proscribed as emphatically as the arts of necromancy which implied the possibility of consulting the dead or the powers which presided over death. Yahweh alone must be acknowledged by the Israelite, whether in life or in death". This passage graphically illustrates the working out of the principle of non-contradiction among moral and spiritual values in the historic process in the way of gradually eliminating what contradicts the higher values. The application of the principle was not a matter of speculation but a gradual process arising out of experience. This is confirmed by Professor Welch in another passage: (op. cit., p.62) "Israel in its religious minas was never given to speculation. Its religious thinking was rooted continually in experience. Devout men, who held firmly the faith in a God who revealed His will as a guide and inspiration to conduct, were bringing/
bringing its principles to bear on the life of men lived in the flesh. The faith referred to above is a faith which, while developed by communion with God, would never have had a beginning apart from the experience of life in a world which had been created by God and expressed His mind. This is illustrated by another passage from Professor Welch (op. cit., p.66) "The prophets believed in a new order which was to appear in this earth, because to them God brought the world, as well as man into being, and brought it into being to manifest His will. The fulness of the whole earth was God's glory. It, like man, had for a time been turned aside from its true end through the moral confusion which reigned in it. But, in His day, when God revealed Himself, it should all return to the order which is eternal, because it was that which was in God's mind when He created it". This is the postulate of the prophetic mind, and it is derived from the data of experience, and history justified the postulate, because it was grounded in reality, intuitions of which the prophets obtained in more than ordinary vividness and comprehensiveness, and that is what made them unique among mankind.

3. The Ontological Argument.

We come lastly to examine the implications of the Ontological argument. It is not our purpose here to deal with it in its historical aspect any more than we did with the others, but, as with them, we are only concerned with the underlying thought that gave rise to the argument. The Cosmological and Moral Arguments are only special forms of the Ontological which implies them both. The movement of thought is the same in all, namely, from what is, to what,
what ought to be. The Cosmological Argument argues from the principle of purpose in the world to a supreme Designing Cause; the Moral Argument reasons from the fact of conscience to a perfectly moral Being; the Ontological Argument is not limited to any phase of reality, but reasons from the whole of experienced reality to the permanent ground or reality behind it. The movement of thought is from a sense of dissatisfaction with reality as it is experienced to the Source of all reality, and from this idea of the source of all reality, man is compelled to think the existence of God, and because man is compelled to think God, therefore God must exist. This is the thought underlying the Ontological Argument.

As these arguments imply one another, some of the topics that have been already taken up will be touched on here, but the venue and the emphasis will be different. We have already seen that man's nature as revealed in his instinctive tendencies which are the raw material of his personality issues in the course of experience in a personality with emotional, intellectual, and practical needs which find expression and satisfaction in values in the outside world. These values summed up under the heads of truth, beauty and goodness, exist in infinite degrees and varieties, but they are teleologically arranged so as to serve one another so that they form a system. This system exists in varying degrees and in broken outline which stretches beyond man's knowledge so that it is never complete. It only exists as a postulate, but it is a postulate which if it cannot be verified leaves all the values without any foundation hanging in the air, and all life illusory. All the springs of life and conduct are contained in this postulate or idea of God, and God must exist, otherwise there is a discrepancy between experience and reality, be-
because this demand comes directly from experience, but, as Professor Waterhouse says, there must be a way "out and home" between experience and reality. The Ontological Argument implies the demand of the religious consciousness that there must be this way which ends in God and that the values in reality are expressions of His nature. This is undoubtedly one of the trains of thought by which the prophetic mind as illustrated in the Hebrew prophets reached out to God. Profound dissatisfaction with existing values led them on to God in whom the highest values existed in perfection.

This brings us to the question of what kind of God would satisfy the religious consciousness, because the religious consciousness is not satisfied by being assured that God exists; it demands that the nature of God should satisfy religious needs. The history of religion reveals two indubitable facts, firstly that the religious consciousness demands that the ultimate reality or Supreme Being be personal, and, secondly, it demands that communion with the Supreme Being be possible so that religion on the historic view of it appears as communion with God. Thus conceptions of religion that fail to satisfy these two tests are rejected by the religious consciousness, as for example, Polytheism, Pantheism, Deism, Absolutism, Naturalism, Agnosticism, Positivism, and Pessimism, and all the later conceptions that have been advanced as explanations of the Supreme Reality.

But while many writers agree to the essence of religion being communion with a personal God, they tend to qualify both the idea of personality and of communion in such a way that the resultant conception takes us beyond experience into a region where the conception has no meaning, because we have no clue to it in our own experience. Thus while they reject the Absolutist God they re-introduce him under other/
other epithets. We may take as an example of this tendency, Professor Waterhouse who has been quoted already. In the argument on which he builds up his "Philosophy of Religious Experience", he maintains that experience gives us reality which must be sufficiently close to us to be comprehended by our intelligence, and, therefore, we must interpret the Supreme Reality on the analogy of what is highest in ourselves. He says: (op. cit., p. 250) "Since the existence of God is itself postulated, the characteristics of that existence are similarly of the nature of a postulate. But they are postulated to account for the fact of the divine-human relationship. What is fundamental is that such relationship implies intercourse, communion with a Being who responds. This raises the question, so often treated as if it were solely one of philosophical appropriateness, of speaking of God as personal. Yet the actual and most urgent reason for doing so is the sense of communion which the religious consciousness experiences in the divine-human relation...... The divine-human relationship conveys to those who seek it the conviction that God responds to human approach directly and immediately, and that fellowship with him exists. Fellowship as far as we know it exists only between personalities, or at least creatures of a nature sufficiently similar to be mutually responsive.....It seems, therefore, a natural corollary to the religious postulate to regard the reality which assists in the attainment of human good as interpretable after the analogy of ourselves. The spectre of anthropomorphism which has had a long life since Xenophanes, is surely getting somewhat needless. The crasser forms have vanished. Reality we believe to be sufficiently close to man to be comprehended by our intelligence, and since that which offers no analogy is unintelligible/
unintelligible to us, we are surely justified in preferring the analogy of mind to that of matter, and of personal to impersonal existence. If the character of nature can be reflected in human mirrors so may the character of God. A humanistic philosophy which acknowledges what all philosophy must illustrate, the anthropic character of knowledge, finds little to criticize in the postulate of divine personality”.

By the above reasoning then, we are justified in interpreting God after the analogy of human personality. This is in consonance with the writer’s argument throughout, because the postulate of personality in God arises out of the vital process of living and reality must be given in experience. Anthropomorphism is to the writer a needless objection, and there is nothing to criticise in arguing from personality and its characteristics in ourselves to personality with like characteristics in God. But what the writer seems to give us with one hand he seems to take away with the other hand in the following passage: (op. cit., p.252) "As far as the religious consciousness is concerned, the personality of God is a well-nigh unanimous conviction. As such it must testify to a true apprehension of the nature of reality, but not necessarily be regarded as a consistent conception. None of the normal beliefs of mankind are baseless, but few are accurate. The common-sense, real world of things is a true apprehension of the nature of reality, but that does not justify our assumption of the explanation which calls God personal". In this passage the writer declares that to attribute personality to God is an unjustifiable assumption; personality cannot be consistently applied to God, while in the former passage he encouraged/
encouraged us to believe that there was "little to criticise in the postulate of divine personality" and that God was "interpretable after the analogy of ourselves". These two statements are incompatible with one another, and we are left in darkness as to what the writer really wants us to believe. The writer refers to personality as not a consistent conception, but there is little use offering us an inconsistent one unless we are told how it is inconsistent. In the former passage the utmost he dares to call God is "a Being who responds", but this is not enough for the religious consciousness. Many grades of being can respond. God must do more to satisfy the religious consciousness. He must reciprocate love, mere response is not sufficient qualification for God. This conception would only give us the unknowable of Agnosticism or the depersonalised Absolute. It is true as the writer implies that some beliefs are baseless, some only relatively consistent, and only a few that are consistent, but the idea of the personality of God may be one of the latter. Nor is the author's position cleared by an argument from Lotze. He says: (op. cit., p.255) "Every monad, or centre of perception, has being-for-self, and, therefore, the germ of personality. Is a word which is capable of covering so much, really helpful when applied to God? Must we not with Lotze, speak of perfect personality as existing only in God, and regard the question as being whether we are entitled to be called persons. Yet to do so is to rob the analogy of value and leave us characterising God by an idea which has little intelligibleness for us. On purely philosophical grounds there seems to be as much against as for, ascribing personality to the principle of reality. Recollecting, however, that the sense of communion is found/
found in all religious experience, and that communion implies simi-
larly of nature, we may speak of a personal God in the sense of a
responsive God, but we can hardly ask for more on the basis of reli-
gious experience". In reply to the above argument, it may be af-
fixed most emphatically, that we are entitled to be called persons
but "every monad or centre of perception" is not. Mere perception
is not equal to personality because every individual is not a per­
nality, so that if personality is made to cover "every centre of per-
ception" which includes animals and even insects, we agree with the
writer that it is not "helpful when applied to God", but that is not
true personality. Moreover, the argument is topsy-turvy, because
the conception of personality is derived from ourselves, and yet we
are not allowed to predicate it of ourselves, but only of God. This
is anthropomorphism with a vengeance, and this dire extremity of a
philosophy of religious experience whereby it is obliged to clothe
Deity with garments saved over from ourselves, indicates a fundamental
misreading of facts, and it makes one stop and enquire what the mis­
sing factor in the situation is.

The confusion very manifestly is with regard to what constitutes
personality in the human as well as in the divine nature. In an ear­
erlier chapter we traced the origin and growth of personality, and
saw that it originates in the self-regarding instinct or instinct of
self-preservation out of which develops the gregarious or social
instinct, which is the source of all altruistic tendencies. The
only sufficient explanation of these altruistic tendencies is that
the root of this instinct is love, and it appears at first as love
of self, and then as love of others, and finally as love of God, in
accordance with Christ's definition of the first commandment to love
which
which means that He demanded nothing more than that man should actualise what was present in him in germ. Love is the only principle which is sufficiently dynamical to reconcile all elements in human nature, and bring them into an organised system under its own service in the form of personality, or which is sufficiently dynamical to love one's neighbour, or to love God. And on the other hand there would be no inducement on the part of the individual to love God unless he were assured that God also was a personality whose nature was love. Religion, which is now proved by the science and history and comparison of religions to be essentially communion with God, is only intelligible as a universal phenomenon, if we posit love as the essence of personality, both in the human and divine natures. And these conceptions of love and personality in God are not, in spite of what Professor Waterhouse and others say, beyond our conception, and different from what they are in the human, which would inhibit the religious spirit immediately among the most enlightened people; on the contrary, they are in essence the same, but differ infinitely in degree, and it is of the degree of perfection in the divine personality or love that we shall never have perfect knowledge, nor does the human being desire it. But he cannot do without personality and love in the divine nature.

Love also, we saw, is the highest conception we possess, and humanistic philosophies encourage us to believe that the highest we experience is indicative of the highest reality there is. It is also the conception which explains most of the deepest things of life and solves the deepest problems. As we saw already we took it to explain the why and wherefore of creation, and without it there is no answer. It explains freewill, the problem of pain, the
question of immortality, and the necessity and inevitability of re-
ligion. This was also the conception by which the great poets of
the Christian era solved the problems of existence. To Wordsworth,
nature was friendly because he saw in it the presence of God. Ten-
nyson saw in it the purity of God, and Browning saw in it the love
of God. They each saw the love of God in their degree, but Browning
of the three was the one who looked into the seamy side of life
which the Pantheism of Wordsworth did not allow him to do, and he
needed a profounder solvent than communion with nature. This sol-
vent he found in love. Browning had imbied the distrust of know-
ledge of the Agnostic Schools of his earlier years, a distrust
which never left him; knowledge could never comprehend the real.
As Sir Henry Jones says: ("Idealism as a Practical Creed", Glasgow,
Maclehose, 1910, p. 183) "Subjectivity, solipsism, relativity, limi-
tation, inconsistency, insecurity - every defect in knowledge which
philosophy could discover or invent is asserted and reiterated by
Browning.......There is a fated inconsistency here which no dialec-
tical skill on the part of the poet - and he tries many methods -
could finally overcome". But Browning found the only solution he
could find in the love of God. The writer says: (op. cit., p. 184)
"When Browning comes back to "Love", he speaks with the "great
mouth of the gods". Taking his work as a whole it is scarcely
possible to deny that Love is at once the supreme motive of his art,
and the principle on which his moral and religious doctrine rests.
He is always strong and convincing when he is dealing with this theme.
It was evidently the light of his life; it gave him courage to face
the evils of the world......It plays in his philosophy the part that
"Reason"/
"Reason" filled for Hegel, or the "Blind Will" for Schopenhauer; and he is as fearless as they are in reducing all phenomena into forms of the activity of his first principle. Love not only gave him firm footing among the wash and welter of the present world, where time spins fast, life fleets and all is change, but it made him look forward with joy "to the immortal course". For all the universe seemed to him love-woven, all life is but treading "the love way", and no wanderer can finally lose it. Love is the sublimest conception attainable by man - the one way in which he dares define his God. To love, he tells us once and again, is the supreme the sole object of man's life, the one lesson he is set to learn on earth; and that once learnt, in what way matters little, "it leaves completion in the soul". Thus Browning solves the meaning of life, the moral ideal, the problem of immortality, the nature of God, by means of the conception of love. He also sees the principle of love at work in the process of creation from primaeval chaos to order, from matter to physical life, and from physical life to the life of reason and love in man. In the light of love he says, "The secret of the world was mine".

Sir Henry Jones, who believed Christ to be only a historical person, concludes his comment on Browning with a passage in which he implies that love is what makes Christianity sublime and probably the final religion of mankind. He says: (op. cit., p.190-1) "Many poets - may I not say all poets? - have sung of love, some of them with more exquisite utterance and lighter grace than Browning. But there is a respect in which Browning stands alone. He has given to love a moral significance, a place and power amongst the elemental conditions of man's nature and destiny, and he has given it a religious and/
and metaphysical depth of meaning which I believe are without ex­
ample in any other poet. By means of Love, daring to believe the
Nazarene teacher and to adopt as the light of all his seeing the
conception which makes Christianity sublime and probably, the ulti­
mate religion of mankind, he identified the human with the divine,
and found in love the atonement of the world. Here lay the secret
of his power and all his hope". It is a noteworthy admission from
a moral philosopher like Sir Henry Jones who never recognised in
Christ anything more than the Nazarene teacher, that no other religion
is likely to surpass Christianity because it is founded on the con­
ception of love which is the highest conception known to man. Com­ing from a moral philosopher, this tribute to love is of very great
value. This reminds us of what we quoted from Professor McDougall
in an earlier chapter, that the parental instinct or the instinct of
love is the only perfect and completely satisfying one among the
instincts. From more directions than one, then, we find, as Pro­
fessor Henry Drummond said, that love is "The Greatest Thing in the
World", and it is so because it is the essence of the divine nature.
We conclude, then, that the religious experience demands that God be
conceived of as a personality whose essence is love, and that it was
thus He was conceived of by the prophets in different degrees.
Hosea, with no less insight than Browning, saw into the profoundness
of its nature. The perfect love of Christ like Hosea's, perfected
through experience of suffering, caused Him to give as the supreme
rule of self-realisation the command, "Thou shalt love". Thus the
philosophy that leaves love out of its reckoning is hard put to to
find an adequate conception of human personality or of God, and ends
up by offering us the Absolute in some disguised form. Considera­tion/
Consideration of the religious problem viewed from the point of view of the Cosmological, Moral and Ontological Arguments yields degrees of light according to the comprehensiveness of the metaphysic involved in each, in the same way as the philosophies of the poets or philosophers yield light according to the depth of their metaphysic. The philosophy of Wordsworth, for instance, was a reconciliation of God and Nature, that of Tennyson was a reconciliation of religion and science, that of Browning went deeper into the mysteries of the moral and spiritual life. Each gave light according to the comprehensiveness of their metaphysic, and so Browning gives fuller light because of his use of the profounder conception of love, but the greatest insight of all was reserved for Him, who "brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel, because it is a Gospel of love. He not only pointed out the way, the truth, and the life, but was Himself in His own person the way, the truth, and the life, and He not only spoke to us of love, but was Himself, Love Incarnate. If, therefore, reality belongs to that which explains and illumines, the supreme reality belongs to love which must be the essence of the being of God, and no satisfactory philosophy of religion can ever be constructed which leaves it out of its reckoning, or refuses with Aristotle to predicate love of God, because it is a human emotion, a pre-supposition which implies a gulf between the divine and human nature which does not exist. In conclusion, then, the function of reason is to establish connections and relations between the various items of experience, out of which process we derive theology, philosophy, and science, but it is not the highest element in mind, being subordinate to love, for reason alone is not sufficient or safe, because, for instance, it can contemplate with equanimity the destruction of millions of beings made in the image of God with poison gas, whereas Love would gather all under her wing.
Chapter VIII.

THE WILL AND THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. The Nature of the Will.

The nature of the will is about as obscure and as much debated as the nature of feeling with which it is very closely associated, and in its more primitive stages very often confused. Consequently it is useless to go on to discuss its relation to the religious consciousness until we have first determined its nature and mode of operation. For this purpose we shall to begin with discuss the theory of the will propounded by Professor McDougall as being the fullest and best suited to the present discussion. Regarding the problem of the will and McDougall's treatment of it, Dr Drever says: (op. cit., p. 136) Psychologists have great difficulty, and have exercised much ingenuity, in explaining how we will an act, and how when we will an act, that act comes to be performed. McDougall has given us an account which seems to meet satisfactorily all the difficulties, and to include what is essential for the explanation of all the phenomena. But theology is a wider discipline than psychology, and for that reason McDougall's explanation, as we shall see in our criticism of it, is insufficient and requires to be supplemented.
In an earlier chapter the growth of personality from the raw material of the innate tendencies by means of the formation of sentiments was traced. First of all appeared the self-preserving instinct with the self-regarding sentiment which became modified by the social instinct. The nature of the self-preserving instinct as we saw, was love, because the core of personality is love and love for self or the self-preserving instinct is the first form that love assumes. As the individual develops the social instinct comes into play. This social instinct is the source of all altruistic tendencies, and these altruistic tendencies so apparently opposed to the self-instinct are a perfect enigma except on the understanding that the sentiment of love is the core of personality. Later on emerges the religious instinct, the essence of which is the desire for complete fellowship. This desire, again, is not explicable except on the understanding that the fundamental instinct in human nature is that of love. Each of these three instincts, then, the self, the altruistic and the religious are only different manifestations of the original endowment of love which is the integrating force in organising the sentiments and is the core of the master sentiment at each stage. The three emerge in the above order very close on one another, because they come from the same root. They help one another's development through interaction, and the three persist in varying degrees till the end.

Progress from the lower selfish levels of conduct to the higher altruistic levels is effected by a process of subordinating the lower to the higher. This is possible by means of the individual's capacity to conceive ideals, which capacity consists in the ability to recognise/
recognise or love the beautiful, the true, and the good, but the individual is greatly helped forward in the task of framing his ideals by means of the moral tradition, the most refined part of which is absorbed by the individual through the instincts of admiration, fear, and awe which make up the complex emotion of reverence.

In this way the formation of the ideal and the desire for the ideal is explained, but, as McDougall says, the question to be asked now is how this desire for the ideal which is bound to be weaker and thinner than the less refined and stronger desires of the lower nature subordinates those coarser desires to itself. The answer to this question would explain what the will is, but the answer is not so easy. McDougall says that William James was so impressed by this victory of the higher over the lower and stronger, that he defined moral action as "action in the line of the greatest resistance", and beyond that James fails to offer us any further explanation of the ultimate nature of will. The utmost he can define will is that it is that which exerts itself on the side of the weaker motive, some unexplainable force or energy.

Our author next discusses the problem from the point of view of moral science, the fallacies of the libertarians and determinists. The libertarians maintain that the moral tradition has been slowly evolved by the influence of the precept and example of great moral geniuses, but this is only to explain one mystery by another, for no one can account for the appearance of genius, so that, if the moral tradition has its source in this mysterious and incomprehensible source, it can, as McDougall says, be described, but it cannot be explained, and no amount of acquaintance with its development in the past can justify us in predicting anything about its development in the
On the determinist presupposition, again, there is no room for will at all. All the individual's actions are determined before his birth. He may act in accordance with his own nature, which is all the freedom the determinist allows, but when the nature is predetermined the actions are equally so, and there is no room for the exercise of the will. If, then, man is not free to act according to his own will, there is no responsibility, and hence no foundation for morality, and no meaning in rewards and punishments, praise and blame.

A third theory that of indeterminism has been put forward by Dr Schiller according to which it is maintained that there are often situations in which the issues on both sides are equally balanced like a billiard ball on the edge of a knife, so that a minimal force of will could decide the balance either way, and, if the experiment were performed on the top of the Rocky Mountains, the ball might reach either the Atlantic or the Pacific, so great is the reality and potentiality of will. But, though it is admitted that such situations often occur, the theory does not explain the nature of will, or where this independent deciding factor comes from. These are the solutions which McDougall considers from the moral point of view.

Next he enquires whether psychology can offer any better explanation of the will being exercised on the side of the weaker ideal motive against the coarser, stronger and more primitive motive. McDougall thinks that psychology can render the help required, and, before propounding his own theory, he clears the ground by disposing of certain faulty theories that are ruled out by his own criterion.
He begins by enquiring what volition is, and for this purpose he divides all conations into volitional and non-volitional types, a procedure as we shall see later of doubtful utility, and so that we may criticise his theory later we reproduce his argument here. This division, he points out, is not allowed by Schopenhauer for whose blind appetitions displayed by lowly organisms were acts of will, equally with our greatest moral efforts. McDougall is undoubtedly correct in criticising Schopenhauer for this, because acts of will are not "appetitions," but "acts." For Bain, he again points out, there was no such distinction as volitional and non-volitional, since all activities are prompted by pleasure and pain, more in the way of reflex actions. But McDougall thinks that the propriety of the distinction into volitional and non-volitional conations has been generally recognised of late years owing to the greater insight into the large part played by the simplest modes of action in our lives. Herbert Spencer's idea of volitional action, according to McDougall, is action which is preceded by the idea of movement, but this McDougall points out is only the mark of ideomotor action which often takes place automatically in machine-like fashion very different from volition, and this view of Spencer is evidently due to concentration of attention on those conations that are expressed in bodily movement.

Others again according to McDougall confuse volition with desire by representing volition as determined by the antecedent idea of the end to be attained by it. But this is a mark of all desire, and, as he says, a man may struggle against the promptings of a desire whose end/
end is clearly represented, that is to say, the will struggles again.
st the desire so that volition is something else than desire, or de-
sire issuing in action.

Our author then represents Professor Stout as defining voli-
tion as "a desire qualified and defined by the judgment that, so far
as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the desired
end". McDougall criticises this by saying that this judgment is
characteristic not of all volitions, but of the volitions which we
call resolutions. Such a judgment does not have the force which in
the case of hard moral choice comes to the help of the weaker motive
against the coarser and stronger. The judgment, in fact, is only
the form in which the act of will is expressed after it has taken
place in mind.

Another view of will which McDougall contests is that of Pro-
fessors Bain and Stout. Bain maintains that we can only will a
movement of some part of the body and this view is endorsed by Stout.
But McDougall points out that will has power over ideas also to re-
tain them at the focus of consciousness, when, but for the volition,
they might be driven away by other ideas or sense impressions. The
advocates of the above view, however, reply that the cases of vol-
untary direction of attention to ideas or sense-impressions is due
to motor adjustment of some kind of sense organ which aids in the
retention of the idea or sense-impression at the focus of conscious-
ness. This view of Stout, McDougall thinks, is refuted by the fact
that desire always retains the idea at the focus of consciousness,
and mind goes back to it again and again without any motor adjust-
ment.
adjustment, so that it is hardly right to deny to volition, which is desire and more than desire, that which we concede to desire. This theory McDougall points out owes its plausibility to the fact that the closest and most demonstrable form of volition is that in which it is followed by movement.

Lastly he considers the explanation of will offered by Professor James, and Wundt, namely, that will is one aspect of apperception which consists in the inhibition of all presentations except the one which is selected to be retained at the focus of consciousness. Thus volition has only a negative function according to these two great authorities, and, as McDougall says, neither of them explains how the inhibition is effected, or where the force or motive comes from. Their theory owes its cogency to the fact that all attention involves innervation, but innervation is characteristic of the whole of the nervous system being the negative process that accompanies enervation. Thus inhibition is only a secondary aspect of volition, and not its essential characteristic.

Having rehearsed Professor McDougall's views regarding other theories of will, we now come to examine his own theory of it. For this purpose we reproduce here a paragraph in which his view is fairly fully expressed. He says: (op. cit., p. 204) "We have recognised that all impulses, all desires and aversions, all motives in short, all conations - fall into two classes: (1) those that arise from the excitement of some innate disposition or instinct; (2) those that arise on the excitement of dispositions acquired during the life of the individual by differentiation from the innate dispositions"
dispositions under the guidance of pleasure and pain. We may, then, restate our problem in more general terms, as follows; Is volition only a specially complex case of conation, implying some conjunction of conations of these two origins rendered possible by the systematic organisation of the innate and acquired dispositions? Or does it involve some motive power, some source of energy, some power of striving of an altogether different order? Clearly we must attempt to account for it in terms of the former alternative, and we may only adopt the latter if the attempt gives no promise of success. It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be accounted for as a special case of conation, differing from other conations, not in kind but only in complexity. We may see this most clearly if we form a scale of conations ranging from the simplest to the most complex and obscure type, namely, moral choice achieved by an effort which in the struggle of higher and lower motives, brings victory to the side of the higher but weaker motive."

According to the above paragraph volition is "a special case of conation differing from other conations, not in kind, but only in complexity". When we enquire what a conation itself is, we are told that "all impulses, all desires and aversions, all motives" are all conations. On examining these elements, however, that we are told are conations, we find that they all belong to the feeling element in mind, having nothing in them of the nature of will. For instance, an impulse is an impulse or feeling to act, but is not an act of will itself. A desire or aversion is a desire or aversion towards some-
something, but it is not an act of will. Likewise a motive is a motive to act, but not an act itself. These are all purely subjective states that precede action which is what feeling is. Professor Ward, among the five kinds of feelings which were quoted in an earlier chapter, mentions feeling as a purely subjective state as one of the five forms of feeling which he defines, and he deals with desire under the heading of feeling, and not under conation. Professor McDougall then, cannot want us to believe that will is only a complex kind of feeling in the form of an impulse, desire, or aversion, or motive, and yet that is what his words mean, namely, that volition is a special case of conation, and yet conation is defined as impulse desire or aversion, or motive, all of which are subjective feeling states. But, McDougall defines a volition as an act of will. He says: (op. cit., p.205) "It is convenient and justifiable to reserve the name "volition", or act of will, for a particular class of conations." But if conations are limited to impulses, desires, aversions, motives, then they exclude volition, because none of them can be defined as acts of will. There is evidently something wrong here in McDougall's psychology and what is wrong is that McDougall has failed to distinguish between the three irreducible elements in mind with the result that he is confusing and mixing up feeling with conation which lands his exposition in contradiction and obscurity at those points where the analysis of mind is concerned. We found that this same failure on his part to keep distinct the three elements in mind lent to confusion in his account of the instincts and sentiments.
sentiments, and here, again, the result of his failure is obvious, for the impulses, desires, aversions, and motives, are not conations, but feelings; nor can he find anywhere among such feelings that which he calls volition, if volition as he describes it is an act of will.

It is the same want of grasp of the essential nature of mind in its three irreducible aspects that also leads to his mistaken distinction between volitional and non-volitional conations. That McDougall is sensible of the radical difficulty of making such a distinction may be gathered from his words in the last quotation, where he says: "It may fairly be claimed, I think, that we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be accounted for as a special case of conation". Immediately after this he writes: (op. cit. p. 205) "If types of conation can be arranged in such a scale, each type differing from its neighbour only very slightly, that will afford a strong presumption of continuity of the scale; for if volition involves some peculiar factor, not operative in other conations, we ought to be able to draw a sharp line between the volitional and non-volitional conations. That such a scale can be made, is, I think, indisputable; and an attempt to illustrate it will be made on a later page. But, though we cannot draw any sharp line between volitions and conations of other types, it is convenient and justifiable to reserve the name "volition" or an act of will for a particular class of conations, and we must first, try to determine what are the marks of the conations of this class". Here the confusion is very apparent, for, in the first instance, he says that "we can vaguely understand " the relation between volitional and non-volitional/
mon-volitional conations, while immediately after he says that "we ought to be able to draw a sharp line between volitional and non-volitional conations", and so he proposes to draw up a scale in order to indicate the division between them, while in the next line, almost in the same breath, he says that "we cannot draw any sharp line between volitions and conations of other types". These last two statements are contradictory, and this contradiction is due to the fact that McDougall is mixing up will with states of feeling. If volition, then, is a deliberate act of will, then it does not cover all the cases of will, because many acts of will are not of this conscious and deliberate type, but are unconscious and instinctive. These latter are not allowed by McDougall to be volitions or will at all, as will be seen from his scale of conations, but, had he made use of the threefold analysis of mind, he would have realised that the unconscious and instinctive type of will is as essentially will as the conscious and deliberate type which he calls volition, for the three aspects of mind always involve one another, and never exist in isolation, so that the most undeveloped mind, for instance, the mind of the child possesses a will, each three phases entering into each psychosis in different degrees, so that from the dawning of mind and intelligence there is an embryo will, and it is essentially the same nature as that of the adult, and most developed will, the difference between them being that the undeveloped will is unconscious and instinctive to the extent that it is undeveloped, while the developed will is self-conscious and deliberate to the extent
that it is developed. The terms, therefore, that should be employed of these two extremes of will are unconscious and instinctive of the one, and self-conscious and deliberate of the other, but not volitional and non-volitional, for the one class are as much acts of will as the other. The term "non-volitional" implies that in primitive life there are no acts of will, whereas activity is one of the most obvious characteristics of primitive life. It is impossible at any stage of life to have a non-volitional or will-less mind any more than a feeling-less mind. If volition is an act of will, as McDougall defines it, then all conations are volitions and they range between the two extremes of unconscious or instinctive and self-conscious or deliberate, but to think that we can draw a sharp line between the two as McDougall suggests above is absurd. McDougall's non-volitional conations are evidently mistaken feelings of the form of impulses, desires, aversions, and motives, but nothing but confusion results from calling feelings conations, a term which ought to be reserved for will. Preoccupation with instinct and social factors has debarred McDougall from considering the usefulness of the threefold division, and what he forgets is that the essence of will is action.

There is another point in which McDougall's explanation of will appears to be faulty, and that is in his conception of what he calls "the weaker motive". In defining will he says: (op. cit. p.206) "The essential mark of volition - that which distinguishes it from simple desire, or simple conflict of desires - is that the personality, as a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the personality, the man himself, or all that which is regarded by himself and others/
others as the most essential part of himself, is thrown upon the
side of the weaker motive". What is questionable here is the as­
sumption that the highest forms of will are those in which the mo­
tive is weakest. If that is so then ascetisism ought to be the
highest life. McDougall all along is comparing the higher ideal
motive with the coarser stronger and more primitive, as if the lat­
ter were always stronger than the former, and will "par excellence"
is when the decision is made in favour of the ideal and weaker mo­
tive. Strength of accompanying feeling, however, is not the cri­
teron of competing motives, but value for the self. All feelings
are value-feelings, but the strongest, coarsest and most primitive
have not necessarily the highest value for the self. Those with
the highest value may have a relatively weak accompanying feeling,
but being recognised as of higher value to the self, they have more
influence over the will. But very often the value is not clear,
and in order that mind may discover which of a number of competing
motives is of most value it has to deliberate. Deliberation, there­
fore, is one of the factors that is operative in the highest forms of
will. For the purpose of deliberation, in order that a certain ob­
ject may be kept before mind, until it is finally judged to be the
one of highest value, effort of attention is required, and this
holding of the object at the focus of consciousness is an essential
part of will. The act of will, however, takes place when, after
holding the idea at the focus of consciousness, and after deliber­
ating on its claims against all others which thereby become inhibited
the mind makes the appropriate reaction towards that idea. Till
this reaction has taken place the will has not functioned. Every
idea/
idea has its own feeling value and its own characteristic reaction, and until that reaction takes place the value of the idea has not been realised nor has it produced its proper effect upon mind and character. "Woe is me", said Kinglake in Eothen,"if I hesitate on the bridge which leads from thought to action". Thought, deliberation, attention, are not enough; there must be the act of will, the reaction appropriate to the idea, a debouchment, otherwise the will has not been moved, and we have only sentiment.

It is here that the importance of will comes in, because without the activity of the will there can be no character or personality. Etymologically character means a mark and this mark is produced by every act of will. We have seen that personality is formed by the systematisation of sentiments into a hierarchy under one dominant master sentiment, but the degree of integration of the personality will depend on the extent to which less important sentiments are made to subserve the higher so that there may be harmony throughout the whole system. This harmony is produced by the will, and the way it is produced is as follows. When the highest ideal has been discovered a characteristic feeling or sentiment gathers round it, and whenever the will acts in accordance with this feeling or sentiment the more real the ideal becomes and the more the individual becomes like his ideal. The more real the ideal becomes the more it systematises all other interests and sentiments round it, until there is complete harmony among all the sentiments. This is the condition known as mental poise or strength of character or complete personality. When, however, the will does not act in accordance/
accordance with the promptings of the feelings that have gathered round the ideal, the individual does not realise his ideal, nor does his ideal control or systematise his sentiments, but sometimes one, and sometimes the other, gains the upper hand, and is obeyed. The sentiments are all there, but the highest is not being acted on, and the condition is that of sentimentalism, weakness of character, and lack of personality. Thus the acquirement of sentiments is not enough; there must be habitual action in accordance with the motives supplied by the system of sentiments. Moreover the system of sentiments must be a true ideal, because the will may be exerted in the interest of a wrong as well as in the interests of a right ideal, and so there can be strong character that is bad as well as strong character that is good.

On this point Professor McDougall has a paragraph which illuminates this point. He says: (op. cit., p. 224-5) "For the generation of character in the fullest sense, the strong, self-regarding sentiment must be combined with one for some ideal of conduct, and it must have risen above dependence on the regards of the mass of men; and the motives supplied by the master sentiment in the service of the ideal must attain an habitual predominance. There are men so well described by Professor James, who have the sentiment and the ideal of the right kind, but in whom nevertheless, the fleeting unorganised desires repeatedly prove too strong for the will to overcome them. They lack the second essential factor in character, the habit of self-control, the habitual dominance of the self-regarding sentiment; perhaps because the native disposition that is the main root of self-respect is innately lacking in strength; perhaps/
perhaps because they have never learnt to recognise the awful power of habit, and have been content to say, "This time I will not trouble to resist this desire, to suppress this impulse; I know that I can do it if I really exert my will". Every time this happens the power of volition is weakened relatively to that of the unorganised desires; every time the self-regarding sentiment masters an impulse of some other source, it is rendered according to the law of habit more competent to do so again - the will is strengthened as we say, and, when the habitual dominance of this master sentiment has been established, perhaps after many conflicts, it becomes capable of determining the issue of every conflict so certainly and easily that conflicts can hardly arise... In this way the self comes to rule supreme over conduct, the individual is raised above moral conflict; he attains character in the fullest sense and a completely generalised will, and exhibits to the world that finest flower of moral growth, serenity. His struggles are no longer moral conflicts, but are intellectual efforts to discover what is most worth doing, what is most right for him to do". The three characteristics of the highest type of will, therefore, are deliberation, concentration and action, but action is the essential characteristic of instinctive as will as of deliberate self-conscious will so that action is that without which will cannot exist.

In will, then, the self is thrown on the side of the motive that is to prevail. McDougall, then, asks what that force is which causes the self to be thrown on the side of the motive. His answer to this is that it is the self-regarding sentiment. This we think is an insufficient answer as will be shown later on, but as the self-regarding sentiment is undoubtedly of great importance we shall reproduce/
reproduce his account of it here. The self-regarding sentiment is not a mere idea because no idea except the pathological fixed ideas and quasi-pathological ideas of hypnotic suggestion has any force to oust any strong desire. The idea of the self has force to exclude all other ideas, because it forms the nucleus of that system of emotional dispositions that form the self-sentiment, and this system is always called into play whenever the idea of self comes into the focus of consciousness. It is by means of the system of feelings that centres round the self that the self is enabled to will whatsoever it wants. Apart from this powerfully organised system of feelings the idea of the self, however rich, clear, and accurate its content can have very little power to move the will. Thus, as McDougall says, there may be a man with complete self-knowledge, but he may have no self-respect, or he may have lost it like the drunkard; such a man may have excellent moral ideals, and may wish their realisation both for himself and for others, but he cannot act because the sentiment or feeling which is the driving power of the will has been lost or has atrophied; in spite of his possession of the highest moral ideals he may be a villain, because there is no sentiment to move the will. McDougall therefore defines volition as: (op. cit., p.214) the supporting or reinforcing of a desire or conation by the cooperation of an impulse excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment'. It may be pointed out here, by the way, that "supporting or reinforcing" are not a sufficient account of will, because every desire or idea has its appropriate reaction for the self and an act of will means bringing about its appropriate reaction for whatever idea is selected, and not simply "supporting or reinforcing/
reinforcing it", which would apply to mere attention.

The next factor that McDougall considers as being operative in the activity of the will is the sentiment for self-control. He calls it a special development of the self-regarding sentiment, and the master sentiment for volition and especially for resolution. He says: (op. cit., p. 218) "For the man in whom this sentiment has become strong the desire of realising his ideal of self-control is a master motive that enables him to apply his adopted principles of action, the results of his deliberate decisions, in spite of the opposition of all other motives". McDougall calls the sentiment for self-control an abstract sentiment a term which we have criticised already. In this case it is impossible to see how there can ever be sentiment for abstract self-control or self control alone, as self control is only a means to an end, the end of self-realisation, and is never sought for its own sake except in asceticism. What he has described in the above quotation is simply the same thing over again, namely, the activity of the will under the influence of the self-regarding sentiment.

A third motive force that affects the will mentioned by McDougall is the instinct of self-display or self-assertion, the influence of the gallery. The way in which this sentiment works is also not convincingly dealt with by McDougall, and the reason is that he has omitted some of the greatest factors for influencing the will, and it is here that his theory needs to be supplemented. Now the greatest forces for moving the will, we think, are not one as McDougall imagines but three, namely, the self-sentiment, the altruistic sentiment, and the religious sentiment. McDougall has correctly seen that the self-sentiment is one of the forces that moves the/
the will, but he has not seen the importance of the social or altruistic sentiment, while the religious sentiment has not come into his view at all. The self-sentiment, the sentiment for self-control, and the instinct for self-display or self-assertion which McDougall considers are the only motive forces of the will are all occupied with self, but, as the individual develops, the social or altruistic sentiments comes into play, and also the religious sentiment, and these move the will quite as much as the idea of self. As a matter of fact the more perfectly moral a person is the less he considers self, and the more he considers others, and he considers God most of all. McDougall failed to see this, because he failed to see that the self-sentiment is only one manifestation of a supreme force which lies behind it, as well as behind the altruistic and religious sentiments, namely, the force of love which is the core of personality. This position at the centre of personality which is occupied by love, McDougall gave to the self-sentiment and its offshoots, whereas they are only phases of love which is the supreme sentiment. Thus McDougall's metaphysics is far too inadequate.

What, then, is love and how does it move the will? We have already referred to the profound principle enunciated by Hegel the principle of the dialectic function of opposites whereby opposite elements like love and hate are opposite just because they form a living unity, and it is the presence of the two opposite elements within the unity that is the cause of activity. Neither of the two could function apart from the other, and it is their opposition which causes the origin of activity, and it is in this relation between love and hate that we are to look for the "fons et origo" of/
of the activity that moves the will. And we must remember that love and hate include all degrees and kinds of likes and dislikes. This suggests that love is not the mild passive sentiment that it is supposed to be, but it is kept alert and active by the presence of an opposite principle. This alertness again suggests a highly cognitive element in love. This cognition takes three forms; love of the beautiful, of the true, and of the good. That love is highly cognitive is seen most clearly in the case of the beautiful for the most developed knowledge of the beautiful is still of the form of love, and, though it is not so apparent, our knowledge of the true, and of the good, is also a form of love. Love in its different forms is the only power that can move the will, and McDougall is right, when he says that a mere idea has no force to move the will, but only sentiment, which is a feeling, and love as we saw is feeling, and we have seen here that it is knowing, and also that it is that which moves the will.

Love of the beautiful, the true and the good, finds expression and embodiment in the self, social, and religious sentiments, and these three persist together till the end, because the three are fundamental in personality. Which of these three is the most important for influencing will and consequently character it is difficult to say. McDougall seems to think it is the self-sentiment whereas the rest of his book on Social Psychology suggests that it is the social sentiment, but the history of religion has nothing more convincing to show than "the expulsive power of a new affection" introduced by way of the religious sentiment which indicates the power of the religious sentiment to move the will. At the same time it is essential to realise that the three are required for/
for the full development of will and personality, and not merely the self-sentiment as McDougall maintains.

Love is not mere feeling, but though it is not mere feeling it is all the same feeling, and it deepens with knowledge. It also develops through use or exercise. Feeling and knowing react on one another all the time, and make possible one another's development. Love is feeling, knowing and willing in perfect combination and function. The profound nature of love is also seen in the fact that love is a form of interest and interest is at the foundation of all education and all learning. This is why we cannot learn a subject we do not like, or know a person whom we do not love. The completest form of love will exist in that personality whose sentiments are completely harmonised under one master sentiment, and we saw in our discussion on the relation between morality and religion that without religion the sentiments cannot be completely harmonised. They can only be harmonised where the self, social and religious sentiments each play their proper part, so that Professor McDougall's answer to the question of what the forces are that move the will is insufficient, as he only mentions those sentiments that belong to the system of the self-regarding sentiment, and neglects the social and religious sentiments. This is due to the fact that McDougall as a psychologist fails to make use of that metaphysical force which creates all the sentiments, and is the cause of the organisation of personality, namely, love. McDougall himself as we saw in an earlier chapter accuses the philosophers of neglecting this basal and regulative element in human nature, namely love, and the philosophers cannot therefore be quoted in its support. We have therefore to go to those who have examined the nature of love, namely/
namely, the students of mysticism. Mrs Herman says: ("Meaning and Value of Mysticism" London, James Clarke, 1922, p. 276) "Mystical intuition is not something which is isolated from the intellect. It is, in fact, the action of the intellect and the will energising Godward under the supreme impulse of love. It is love which is "the true hierophant of the mysteries of God", and "love with Divine fulness is the unity of will and reason in the highest power of each"... But to love truly, be it God or man, is to love with the mind. And thus we find Pascal for whom thought applied to religion was essentially a passionate activity of his whole being - an "amor intellectualis Dei" - flinging out the striking dictum that "love and reason are only one thing. Love is a precipitancy of thought which rushes in one direction without examining every detail, but none the less it is a kind of reason". Whether it be the Nοῦς ἔρως of Platinus, or the "God known of the heart" of Pascal, where the heart is understood as "an implicit of Reason and Love", it is, as we have already pointed out, the intellectual element which, by adding light to heat, gives a luminous glow, a convincing passion, a vital logic, to the utterances of the great mystics which no esoteric theosophy or mysticism of "pure feeling" can give. Will, as we saw, is the personality functioning as a whole, and the force that causes it to function or exist at all is love, and we saw that its activity is dependent on an opposite principle of hate, an illustration of which principle we see also in nature in the case of the atom of physical science which is not as was once supposed indivisible, but consists of a system/
system of negative electrons functioning round a positive nucleus. We thus see the same principle explaining the ultimate source of activity on the one hand in the realm of matter and on the other hand in the realm of mind. The positive nucleus in mind which is regulative of all the elements in mind and personality is love with all its forms of likes and it is the cause of the activity of its opposite quality of hate and all forms of dislikes, and they at the same time minister to its activity, so that it is here in the positive nucleus of love that we find the power that moves the will in its three main forms of the self, social, and religious sentiments, and not in the form of the self-sentiment alone as Professor McDougall supposes, so that his explanation has to be supplemented. But one of the most important of his findings in the above discussion of the will is the fact that no mere idea can ever move the will, but only the idea that is strongly infused with emotion or what he would call sentiment, and we emphasise the fact here because we wish to refer to it later on.

2. The Function of the Will in Religion.

(a) The "Will to Believe".

Having examined the nature of the will and how it functions it now requires to be considered how it operates in religion. In so doing it will be necessary to examine one or two forms of the general objection that religion being a divine gift cannot depend in any way on the will of man. The first of these forms that will be considered is the doctrine of the "Will to Believe". This theory was popularised by William James thirty years ago by the publication of an essay on "The Will to Believe". The doctrine had great vogue,
and brought comfort and practical help to a great many people who were assailed by doubt instilled by the nineteenth century scientists like Huxley and Tyndall who taught that to adopt beliefs uncritically and on insufficient evidence was dishonest, sinful, and immoral. Professor James pointed out that the scientists themselves adopted beliefs on insufficient grounds, and made postulates, and hypotheses, and he argued for the right to believe wherever in the absence of logical proof there was a wish or a will to believe. A superficial understanding of his doctrine gives the impression that it implies that a man can produce religious faith at will, and so can believe anything he likes. This misunderstanding, therefore, has to be dealt with before we can advocate the use of the will in religion. The misunderstanding was not due to James' exposition, but to his critics. "The fact that his critics", says F. C. S. Schiller, ("Problems of Belief", London, Hodder & Stoughton) "one and all, ignored his reservations and restrictions is not, of course a proof that James did not make them, but merely an (involuntary) illustration of the power of prejudice to blind itself to what it does not wish to see, and so really a confirmation of James' contention".

James' theory arose out of his consciousness of the fact that our beliefs are seldom the result of pure reason but are dependent on tradition, prejudice, imagination, and other non-rational factors, and these forms of belief are neither pure reason nor pure unreason, but are embodiments in varying degrees of truth, so that we have to be content with the degree of truth we have and act on it, for if we shrink from action, and do nothing we are in danger of missing what further truth we might have got if we had willed to act according to our lights.
In order to understand, therefore, more fully the right to believe or the will to believe we have to explain a little the meaning of belief. Belief arises out of the feeling of reality independent of us through the development of the distinction between the self and the not-self. It has thus a double aspect the one dependent on the subject, and the other dependent on the objective reality. Psychologically described also it has two aspects, namely, believing as a process and believing as an attitude. Belief as a process may be described as a complex of feeling, knowing, and willing, whereas belief as an attitude belongs to the structural part of mind like disposition and character, as we saw in an earlier chapter. Belief as process has many forms such as doubt, denial, supposition, conviction, surmise, guess and so on. There are two great groups of beliefs, (1) beliefs involving matter of fact, (2) beliefs involving valuation. The former can be subdivided into four classes according as they rest on (a) a sensation coefficient (b) a memory coefficient (c) a coefficient dependent on the valuation put on the evidence of others (d) a reasoning coefficient. The second group the group involving valuation, can be subdivided into three classes, namely, (1) those that are dependent on an aesthetic coefficient (2) those dependent on an intellectual coefficient and (3) those dependent on a moral coefficient. These beliefs are not mutually exclusive, and any one may depend on more than one coefficient. It is thus evident that belief is dependent on the object as well as on the subject, and that it depends on other coefficients besides the coefficient of reason which is the only one which the scientists like Huxley and Tyndall considered. "Rationalism insists", says William James/
William James. ("Varieties of Religious Experience", London, Longman's, 1902, p.73) "that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds. Such grounds, for rationalism must consist of four things: (1) definitely abstract principles; (2) definite facts of sensations; (3) definite hypotheses based on such facts; and (4) definite inferences logically drawn. Vague impressions of something indefinable have no place in the rationalistic system." He admits that the above principles yield the excellent fruits of philosophy and physical science. "Nevertheless" he says, (ibidem) if we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have to admit that the part of it which rationalism can give an account of is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige undoubtedly......but it will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intentions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions at all they come from a deeper level of your nature......your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your needs your divinations have prepared the premises of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely "knows" that the result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk however clever, that may contradict it. This inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when it argues against it".
As we have seen reason is only one of the foundations of belief, and we "know" in other ways than by reason alone. What James taught by his "Will to believe", then, was that we have often to act on something else than logical certainty, although it may be irreducible to logical form, because it is of a different nature, and implies a different criterion from logical certainty like the criterion of moral, and aesthetic truth. He did not mean that we can believe anything provided it possesses practical value as pragmatists believe. The "Will to believe" as his critics understood it in the sense of believing by sheer effort of will is psychologically an impossibility, because belief as we have seen depends on an independent reality outside us, and has a share in determining what belief will be acceptable to mind. "Ideals", says Professor Hocking, (op. cit., p.162) "do not come out of the void; postulates and moral principles are not whispered to us in the form of "innate ideas"; it is on the spur of experience that our wills adopt their aims and their deepest meanings. Whatever is present in ideal, is first present in independent reality. In the order of existence we are first passive and then active". It is impossible then for the will to adopt any belief like, for example, a religious belief, unless it has received it through experience, because such a belief would lack that emotional quality that alone could make the will react towards it; it would be a mere idea, and, as we saw, a mere idea in the absence of a strong sentiment could never enable the will to act. And James never meant that such a thing as voluntary belief was possible. The choice or act of will for James had to be an urgent/
urgent one arising out of fundamental needs.

We may, therefore, dismiss this objection against the use of will in religion, because it is based on wrong psychology and on wrong epistemology, and the "will to believe" in the sense of James' critics of believing "in vacuo" is a contingency that can never occur in regard to religious belief, or any other belief. And we are in accord with James' contention that logical certainty is not the only kind of certainty, and that we are entitled to act upon convictions that cannot be expressed in logical form. Faith, for example, is a postulate adopted, not as a result of logical reasoning altogether, but as a result of the more fundamental synthetic reasoning which is carried on by the total personality in the process of experience, a reasoning involving all three elements of feeling, knowing, and willing, which again include aesthetic, intellectual and ethical valuations. And to exercise the will in accordance with such a faith is not only perfectly legitimate, but imperative, because as James contended, if we do not risk acting, we are losing truth every time we refuse to act, truth in the form of virtue and character, as well as in the form of knowledge. Religious truth will never be able to produce complete logical proofs in its own support. The utmost that we can ever attain to is a degree of certainty that is adequate to our emotional, intellectual and aesthetic needs, and if, in these circumstances we are not to will to believe, we are lost. As long as a belief does not contradict our previous experience, and the experience of history, we are entitled to/
to regard it as true, and to act on it even without logical proof, because, as we saw, there are other coefficients besides the reasoning coefficients determining our beliefs, and they are equally valid, though they are of the non-rational kind that are not reducible to syllogisms.

James' theory, then, emphasises the necessity of action according to our light which is the theme of the present chapter. There is a close connection between belief and action which is implied in the ideo-motor theory of action. As we saw above, belief is a complex of feeling, knowing and willing, and each item of belief, therefore, has its appropriate feeling and action. It may not be possible to trace the form of activity of each mental item or idea, because ideas form complexes in mind, but when one item of belief gains possession of the focus of consciousness, the appropriate action ought to follow; otherwise, as James contends, there is loss, and the idea does not make that contribution to mind and experience that it might if acted upon, nor does will and character receive that development and expansion which the effect of the action would bring.

Beliefs that are not acted upon remain mere sentiment, and have a demoralising effect in producing in the individual the consciousness of a discrepancy between belief or intention and action, a consciousness of insincerity or hypocrisy, because the individual thinks one way, and yet does not act in that way, but in some other less noble way. A test of the truth and reality of a belief is its reducibility to action. What we believe, we are generally ready to act upon. How little we believe certain things is revealed by our want/
want of preparedness to act in accordance with their demands. The reason of our want of preparedness to act is that we are not sufficiently interested in them, or, in other words, we do not sufficiently love them, for it is love that moves the will. The conclusion with regard to the doctrine of the will to believe, therefore, is that in cases of doubt, as well as in cases of complete conviction, the action of the will is necessary, if we are to make progress in character, and this doctrine is implied in Christ's oft quoted verse in this connection - "If any willeth to do His will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God". The saying is addressed to the person who is in doubt about the will of God, as well as to the person who already knows it, and, for the latter person, there is the greater necessity to act, because there is less excuse for inactivity, and it is this latter class of person that we are primarily considering here, namely, those who already know beyond a doubt what the will of God is, and our thesis is, that due exercise of the will in accordance with that knowledge will, according to the words of Christ, yield a knowledge of God otherwise unattainable.

It was because prophets and saints of all ages were ready to act to the utmost limit on their convictions that they acquired a knowledge of God which made them channels of divine truth to their generation. And it was because He would have no discrepancy between preaching and practice that Jesus spent His whole strength in doing God's will, and thus acquired a consummate knowledge of God. The/
The above words imply that doing God's will is not always easy, and Christ Himself once prayed that He might have an easier task, but it was at the end of a week of the severest strain ever imposed on human weakness. Nevertheless, after further wrestling in prayer His spirit overcame His human inclinations, and He yielded to the will of God, and, as is always the rule, the severer the effort of the will the more glorious is the result. What failure of the will or its action may mean in loss or gain respectively in any pivotal case, it is impossible to estimate. Not only the life of Christ, but His teaching also, gives abundant proof of the value He attached to action; for example it is the theme of the parable of the talents of the two sons, of the vine, and of the Judgment day; it was the test and the end of life. So that if right beliefs are important, so also is the right use of the will, and that is why its consideration is of the utmost importance in a discussion on religion, so that we shall now proceed to discuss another form of objection against the use of the will in religion; namely, the objection that religious beliefs are produced by an effort of the will operating by way of auto-suggestion.

(b) The Will and Auto-suggestion.

The use of the will in religion is concerned with religious practices such as prayer, worship, and service, and so, before we can come to discuss the use of the will in such practices we shall have to consider a common criticism from a certain class of psychologist, that the use of the will in such cases is nothing more than a form of auto-suggestion. To a certain class of psychologist especially/
especially the "man-as-man" type or the Behaviourist type, there are objective facts corresponding to religious beliefs, because religious beliefs are purely the result of auto-suggestion. An example of this type of writer is Professor Leuba who in his elaborate work on "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" (London, Kegan Paul, 1925) proves that all the authentic marks of mysticism such as the feeling of exaltation, expansion, the feeling of power, ecstasy and trance, can be produced by natural means such as drugs, and by ordinary mental processes and experiences. He, therefore, concludes: (op. cit p. 318) "For the psychologist who remains within the province of his science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God, but of man". That is to say psychology cannot produce any evidence of divine action, which only proves that psychology is not competent to decide what is of divine origin, because, what is due to divine influence in mind, is not a separate entity in mind to be found among the interstices between other elements, but is to be found in a specific kind of valuation set upon all reality. The facts may appear the same as in the natural man, but in the religious mind they have a different valuation and this valuation cannot be caught in the psychologist's net. They have also a different result, for the ecstasy of the alcohol, hashish and opium addict, end in degeneration, while the ecstasy of the mystic leads to integration and enhancement of personality, which bespeaks a different origin, the one being of God and the other of man.

In spite of this, "to the psychologist who remains within the province/
province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God but of man'. But, "remain within the province of his science" is what Professor Leuba does not do, and we find him usurping the place of the philosopher and the theologian, and pronouncing dogmatically on ultimate truths. He says, (op. cit., p.327) "The traditional belief in divine personal causation, strikingly embodied in religious mysticism, works perhaps nowhere so mischievously as in its implication that ethical knowledge and moral energy are in custody of a personal Divinity, and that this knowledge and energy are transmitted to man in consequence of a personal relationship with that God, in particular during mystic worship'. But no thinker of any consequence ever imagined that "ethical knowledge and moral energy are transmitted to man" in this way. If they were thus transmitted they would not be ethical. Ethical knowledge and moral energy can only be acquired in the process of living, but that process has two aspects - a subjective, and an objective one; man's part and God's part; and God's part is mediated through nature and history as well as through the individual life. But the psychologist takes no account of the historic or other factors, and only sees states of mind, and, therefore, concludes there are no other factors. Belief in a personal God, therefore, is to the psychologist only the result of auto-suggestion. He writes: (op. cit., p.330) "Let it be recalled, further, that neither the production of the mental state characteristic of mystic worship, nor its essential effects, necessitate a belief in the causal activity of a personal agent, and that when the causal conception is detached from the mystical method its kinship to certain recent psycho-therapeutic methods becomes obvious/
obvious. It will be sufficient to mention here the therapeutic
use made of suggestion during hypnosis and near-sleep states".

In another passage he suggests that belief in God is due to
auto-suggestion or self hypnotism. He says: (op. cit., p.296)
"This description of the hypnotizer upon the hypnotized corresponds
with striking exactness to that given by the mystics of their re-
lation with God". And because God is thus auto-suggested accord-
ing to Leuba, He has no objective reality. He says: (op. cit., p.
323) "The belief that the conception of God embodied in Christian
worship corresponds perfectly to objective reality and that "it works!
adequately is so profoundly rooted in the Christian worshippers that
a mere hint of possible evil resulting from it will seem to them
preposterous...... It may be shown that a belief in a God who, ac-
cording to the biblical saying does not even permit a sparrow to
fall to the ground without His will, is open...to serious objection!

Seeing that there is no reality corresponding to the belief in
God, Professor Leuba sees the belief dying out everywhere. He
says: (op. cit., p.326) "The maintenance of gestures and professions
of belief, in the presence of persistent and detailed denial in
action, works nowhere more disastrously than in the churches. Un-
belief in God-providence is, in churches and theological seminaries
fatal to intellectual honesty, and it is the main cause of their
weakness. Their influence has waned because of the decline of
faith in the fundamental Christian dogma", namely what he calls God-
providence. We have quoted Leuba at considerable length not with
the intention of criticising his statements in detail, because his
position/
position is the position of all behaviourist psychologists for whom mind is mechanically determined, but because his statements contain a totally wrong view of the function of suggestion in mental life, and we have, therefore, to examine the psychologists charge that religious beliefs are propagated by suggestion, while they have no foundation in reality.

Suggestion, then, in the first place is one of the innate general tendencies which include sympathy, suggestibility and imitation. These tendencies, therefore, are all normal and natural, and it is by their means that interaction between individual minds and exchange of ideas and learning from others is possible. Thus it is by their means that communal life is possible, and the individual is able to enter into the social heritage of knowledge and culture of the race. Without them, in short, the individual would be a solipsist. Sympathy mostly works through the emotions, and is consequently called "sympathetic induction of the emotions". It is an instinctive tendency to respond to the expression of emotion in others, and in this way it makes the individual feel one with others. Imitation, on the other hand, is an instinctive tendency to reproduce the actions which we see performed by others. But the most important of the three for us here is suggestibility which is an instinctive tendency to accept with conviction any proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds. This does not mean that suggestion is always without such grounds, but that the purest form of suggestion is that wherein the logical grounds are least apparent. Suggestion as a matter of fact is not void of reason but contains all/
all degrees of a coefficient of reason from the most obscure, to the case where the reasons are fully given.

The suspicion with regard to religious beliefs being produced by suggestion arose from the fact on the hand that suggestion gave to anti-religious thinkers a handy explanation of the origin of religious beliefs, and also the anti-religious thinker is supported in this suspicion by his confusion of normal with hypnotic suggestion, as we have seen Leuba do in one of the passages quoted above: God, he said, was to the mystic what the hypnotizer was to the hypnotized. The mistake of such writers is due to the fact that they do not realise the difference between normal and hypnotic suggestion. Normal suggestion is a process of believing which is a complex of feeling, knowing and willing. In this way any suggested proposition has got to pass the test of the feelings, of the reason and of the will, so any suggestion which does not feel acceptable, or seem true, or practicable cannot be received by the individual. Any suggestion that does not fit in with previous experience of the individual and of the race has no hope of being accepted or regarded seriously; it is immediately rejected, so that whatever religious beliefs have been accepted by the individual have been tested in this three-fold manner.

The conditions in hypnotic suggestions on the other hand, are the reverse of this. In hypnotic suggestion the higher normal reason is put to sleep, and the suggestion is made to the un-conscious mind, the characteristic of which is that it is not fully integrated, like, for instance, the mind of a child; so that a proposition can be accepted/
accepted by it which does contradict previous experience, just as a child is apt to accept any statement that is made. Thus normal suggestibility is vastly different from the hypnotic kind, and makes the acceptance of any kind of belief, as in hypnotic suggestion, impossible. As a matter of fact it is a characteristic of mind that if we try to suggest to it some idea that it does not accept of its own accord, our effort to suggest it creates a counter suggestion which neutralises the former idea, and this would be the effect of trying to suggest to the mind religious ideas which the mind did not accept on grounds of its own, so that whatever religious ideas mind accepts by ordinary suggestion, are accepted because they agree with previous knowledge and experience.

It is true that to begin with the child is very suggestible as we observed already, because his knowledge is not yet systematised. It is because of this suggestibility that the child is able to acquire knowledge so quickly, and to adopt the social traditions, including religious beliefs; but as reason develops it re-examines these beliefs as necessity arises, or whenever they are called in question, and those that are contradicted by later experience, or do not minister to individual needs, tend to disappear. Thus the belief in God and other religious beliefs would have long ago disappeared if they had been found by experience not to meet the needs of the race.

Another important fact with regard to suggestion which is of interest to us here, because it is in line with the prominent part we have all along attributed to feeling, is the important part played by feeling in suggestion. As we have seen the germ of personality/
personality is the instinctive tendencies, which are predominantly feeling tendencies, and the personality gets organised through the sentiments round one master sentiment, and these sentiments are feeling systems organised round specific ideas or objects. It is on account of the appeal that any suggested idea makes to any of these feeling systems or sentiments that makes it to be accepted as a suggestion. There may be no expressed or expressible rationalisation before its acceptance, but there is a feeling test which, besides being feeling, also includes a reasoning and will element. This is why it is said that suggestion is the acceptance of a proposition in the absence of adequate logical grounds. There are, however, other grounds than the logical as we have seen again and again. There are also moral and aesthetic grounds, and sentiments of different kinds which have been organised in personality as a result of experience, and these also decide in the acceptance and rejecting of suggestions. The operation of these sentiments in making decisions without an appeal to reason is one of these mechanisms in life like habit, that make a reduction of labour in conscious thinking. But to say that the decisions are made mostly by the feelings does not mean that the decision is false, because the feelings share in the illumination of the reason, and in many cases feeling is apparently the sole arbiter as in aesthetic and ethical matters.

Thus suggestion operates not in the religious sphere alone, but in all spheres of life, creating our beliefs; and in every case it operates most powerfully through the presence of strong feeling. This is well illustrated by a recent Kerr lecturer, Dr Edwards. He/
He says: ("Religious Experience, its Nature and Truth", Edinburgh, T & T. Clark, 1926, pp. 161-162) "So far from religion being in any unique way a product of mass suggestion, there is actually at the present time a very strong force of mass-suggestion in favour of secularism, so-called rationalism, and irreligion. This operates naturally as a violent counter-suggestion against all religious ideas and beliefs.... Its doctrines are taught to the young from their earliest years through suggestion greatly heightened by conditions of highly impassioned sentiment, and no arguments will in future years prevail to shake the convictions thus formed. Nothing but a complete reversal of the whole life's conviction will suffice to change the mind."

According to the above quotation there are two main conditions of suggestibility, one is the presence of emotion and the other is the presence of a crowd in which the herd instinct comes into play, in which sympathy and imitation also operate, thus creating conditions highly favourable to suggestion. It is on account of these two facts that united worship, for example, is so important. In this connection Dr. Edwards says: (op. cit., p.148-9) "The usefulness of a church is that it forms a repository of religious beliefs, and by its collective influence aids its members in the building up and the keeping of the faith. Its membership provides the means of nurturing, maintenance and propaganda of the religious sentiment. There are, further, in the various practices of religious devotion, both social and private, many examples of the use of suggestion in the formation and strengthening of belief and sentiment...... All the/
the associations of a church lend themselves to the establishment of a condition of suggestibility. Suggestibility is heightened in each individual by his finding himself one of a congregation of worshippers. Here the emotional crowd suggestibility operates. Hence without public worship religion would languish".

Throughout his lectures Dr. Edwards has in an admirable manner held the balance between the rational and non-rational elements in mind, and the distinctive feature of his work is the way he has demonstrated the function of the non-rational or feeling element in mind. We shall, therefore, quote what he says with regard to prayer also, as we shall come to it again later. He says: (op. cit., p. 150) "In private devotion also, suggestion plays a great part. Prayer in its various forms, upon its subjective side, exerts a very great auto-suggestive influence. In its meditative form it may approximate to pure auto-suggestion. In its more usual form of petition, thanksgiving and adoration, it has a distinct objective reference........This psychological account of its influence upon the worshipper, however, must not be held to prejudice the question of the reality of its objective reference. It is a well known fact which has been called the problem of worship, that it exerts its strong suggestive influence upon the worshipper by reason of his belief in God".

In case it may seem that too much importance is given to the fact of suggestibility, it may again be repeated that suggestion is the foundation of all teaching. Dr. Edwards quotes Thouless as saying that in the University classroom, even suggestion is largely used./
used. The lecturer does not argue, he "conveys" his views of the matter, by illustrating, amplifying and reiterating the statement until it is impressed on the student, giving the impression that he is not arguing merely, but suggesting that he is only letting truth speak to them. "Should a lecturer", says Dr. Edwards, "fail in his purpose of impressing his ideas upon the minds of his hearers, he has also failed as a teacher. All teaching is either suggestive or inefficient".

But, important as suggestion is, equally important is the fact to be suggested. No teacher can succeed in suggesting anything unless his facts are truths, and truths such as are of vital importance to his hearers, meeting emotional, intellectual and practical needs. In the same way prayer and worship may be rendered effective by means of the fact of suggestion, but suggestion would contribute nothing apart from belief in God. The object of prayer and worship is to bring God into our lives by bringing truth first into our minds and suggestibility is only one of His own gifts like feeling, knowing and willing, given in order that we might know Him, and when we use suggestibility in prayer and worship we only use the means He gives us of knowing Him and having communion with Him.

Thus it is clear that not only is suggestion permissible in religion, but that it is indispensable, if it is to be effective, but the suggestion that is operative in religion is not the hypnoidal kind, because there is a healthy law of mind whereby, immediately suggestion approaches the stage of being hypnoidal, mind puts up a counter suggestion, and renders it inoperative. But the lesson we do receive from suggestion is that which it teaches us with regard to the/
the part played by feeling in suggestion and consequently in the will throughout the whole life. The use of the will in religion consists in creating conditions favourable to the religious ideas being accepted by ourselves, or others, as the case may be. In private prayer for instance, and in public worship, one of the most important conditions of receiving religious truths is provided for by the fact that in such practices the mind adopts a passive attitude, which is one of the chief conditions of suggestibility, as is shown by the Law of Reversed Effort of the therapeutic schools, whereby beliefs which could never be instilled by dint of direct argument are immediately received when the passive attitude is adopted.

Another favourable condition of suggestibility, as we saw, was feeling or emotion, because suggestibility is innate tendency with a large instinctive feeling basis, and an idea is suggestible to the extent that it finds sympathetic response among the feeling systems or mind which we call sentiments. The phenomenon known as religious conversion is due to a revolution among these sentiments caused by the acceptance by the mind of a new and powerful suggestion which causes a complete re-valuation of the facts of life. The well-known saying "the expulsive power of a new affection" by which the fact of conversion is so well described emphasises particularly the "affective" side of the new idea or value of life, which is the cause of conversion. But on the other hand affection without the idea would be as ineffective as the idea without the affective element. The human will, therefore, can render service in making conditions favourable for the religious appeal by making provision for/
for religious truths being presented not as mere ideas addressed to
the intellect which is only a fraction of personality, but as con­
crete facts addressed to the total personality which includes feeling
knowing and willing. Thus a concrete emotional fact such as we have
in the Gospel, cannot be presented without true feeling on the part
of the preacher, and he can only possess these feelings by himself
having first experienced what he is endeavouring to convey. This
is what Dr. Denney meant by his saying, which we quoted already, and
is worth quoting again and again, that the ideal state of the church
would be when every theologian was an evangelist and every evangelist
a theologian.

The fact "par excellence" for producing religious conversion is
the fact of Christ, not an aesthetic, or intellectual, or ethical
Christ, but a concrete living Christ which is a different fact al­
together from the partial presentation of Him. The partial pre­
sentation is not a concrete fact, but an abstraction, and can never
move personality or will, because it is devoid of feeling. It is
a case of "Aut Caesar aut nullus", either the concrete Christ with
emotion or no Christ at all. The reason for a concrete manifestatio
of God, or in other words the Incarnation was that we might have a
concrete living fact that could appeal to and satisfy our whole na­
ture. It is a fact which in its concreteness appeals to the whole
personality in its religious, intellectual and moral aspects.
Christ was not merely a religious devotee, or philosopher, or moral­
ist. He is epitomised in His Cross, and, for this reason any true
presentation of Him must be from an angle which displays the Cross.
The reason for this is that the Cross is the highest and most in­
dubibable, intelligible, and convincing expression of His love, and
it is His love that revolutionises the sentiments and moves the will. The Cross, or the preaching of the Cross, "suggests" and "conveys" the love. This is what determined St. Paul in trying to make God known to men not to take account of any of the philosophy current among men, but only Christ and Him crucified. True emotion is infectious; it is transmitted, not taught; it is the non-rational of the psychologists, and yet it can convey truth more completely than the intellect as we have seen, for it has a logic of its own, because emotions form systems like ideas, and have a rational element as well, being always organised round an idea. Love is the completest emotion.

The use of the will also comes in for the individual in the case of religious practices like prayer, worship and service. And the proposition here is that whether we wish to be assured of the truth or are assured of it already the will can lead us into deeper and deeper truth. Further knowledge of divine realities will not come, and what has already come will evanesce, unless an effort of will be made through religious practice such as prayer, worship and service. Truth becomes unreal that is not acted upon, and the will becomes weaker and weaker in religious matters if it is not being brought into use. On the other hand, "he that seeketh, findeth". Habits of prayer, worship and service bring increase of conviction, knowledge, fruitfulness and joy. The treatment of this subject has, however, been reserved for the next chapter.

But before we close this chapter we shall see the part played by the conception of love in the prophetic consciousness. The doctrine of love in the Old and New Testaments would require a volume each/
each, but here we can only refer to the subject in the briefest manner.

In the Old Testament it is the love of God that is most often appealed to in order to change the will of back-sliding Israel. God is variously set forth under figures that reveal His love, such as Father, Husband, Shepherd: "When Israel was a child then I loved him and brought my son out of Egypt; Return unto me ye backsliding people for I am married unto you; All we like sheep had gone astray".

In the New Testament the doctrine is still more prominent, and becomes the theme of almost all its writers. We have already referred to Christ's highest commandment as that of love, and how it included love for God, neighbour, and self, with all the heart, mind and will. Many of His parables taught that love is the most powerful moral force in life. The Prodigal Son is one of a series of parables the object of which is to inspire love and move the will.

In St. Paul, though, he is known as the apostle of faith, love has the supreme place. "The logical root of St Paul's ethics" says G. B. Stevens, ("The Theology of the New Testament", Edinburgh, T.&T. Clark, 1906, p. 446) "is found in his doctrine of love, the most fundamental and comprehensive virtue".

St. John is pre-eminently the apostle of love, and his first Epistle is an exposition of the nature and operation of love. St. John has three great conceptions which he applies to God: namely, light, life, love. "God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. (1 : 5)....."This is the true God and eternal life".....(5:20) "God is love, and he that abideth in love abideth in God"...(4:16) The three are all the same nature and principle of love. And this love is/
is not mere sentiment, but implies action: "My little children let
us not love in word, neither with the tongue; but in deed and truth" ...(3:18) These deeds, are required to be not mere formal exercises in piety, but deeds of practical help; "Whoso hath the world's goods, and beholdeth his brother in need, and shutteth up his compassion from him, how doth the love of God abide in him?" These deeds, again, are not bare charity, but the spontaneous outcome of a new life compared with which the former life was only a living death, because it lacked love, the principal of true life: "We know that we have passed over from death into life, because we love the brethren" (3:14) The distinguishing mark of this new life is love for our fellowmen, and it is impossible to love God without loving our fellowmen also; "If any man sayeth I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen. This commandment have we from Him that he who loveth God love his brother also". (4: 20-21)

Now what we are interested in specially at this point is the cause or source of this new principal of love, the distinguishing characteristic of which is spontaneous love to God and voluntary altruistic service to mankind. And the cause is found in the prevenient grace or love of God, which is the power that moves the will to altruistic service: "Beloved if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another"...(4:19) "Hereby know we love, because He laid down His life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for our brethren". (3:16) "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He/
He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins"... (4:10) "We love, because He first loved us"... (4:19)

Another feature of love that we are interested in, in St. John's exposition is that as we saw already love is righteousness, because it includes its opposite principal, namely, hatred of whatever is evil and unrighteous; it is righteous indignation as we have seen, that is the source of social morality and social justice; it is indignation which owes its existence to the presence of love. Thus love is not mere good-natured benevolence which acquiesces in all things, as it is often represented: such love instead of being a virtue is a defect, for it means insensitiveness to evil and toleration of what is wrong. Love, we saw, hates what would do harm to the object of its love, and, therefore, true love hates sin and evil, because they destroy happiness. The sweet-natured, amiable, everlastingly pleasant man who is never angry, is a man who is not much account in the business of making the world better. Love devoid of righteousness has been the undoing of many. St. John was the disciple who leaned on Jesus' breast, the foremost member of the inner circle of those who understood the love and mind of Jesus best, and because he was the foremost in love, so he is the most emphatic in regard to the condemnation of its opposite, namely, sin: "Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother" (3:10) "Everyone that doeth sin doeth also lawlessness, and sin is lawlessness". (3:4)

But, while it is the precedent grace and love of God which initiates the will to love God and mankind, the continuance of that love/
love as well as its increase in depth and scope depends on the cooperation of the will of man which is the lesson which we are trying to impart in this chapter. The action of the will is demanded for the purpose of walking in the light as He is in the light...(1:7) for the purpose of keeping his commandments, (2:3) for the purpose of purifying oneself...(3:3) for the purpose of loving the brethren (4:1). As a result of such effort the individual receives increase of the grace of love which results in the increase of knowledge of God; "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and everyone that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God". "He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love". (4:7-8) Thus love conduces to knowledge of God and the problem of religious doubt and religious apologetic can only be solved completely by the exercise of the will in the direction of love and active sympathy.

And, in service of love, it has to be remembered that quantity also counts as Jesus taught us in the parable of the talents, and other passages in his teaching. "My Father", He said, "worketh hitherto and I work"; that is to say, the Father's active love was unceasing; and St. Paul said that "love never faileth". True love or sympathy is not limited or spasmodic, or selective, otherwise as Jesus said, "it hath no reward". Love for our friends, our own select coterie, or clique, may be only varnished selfishness; true love is like the love of the Father, who maketh His sun to rise on the just and the unjust. Love to Christ, to St. Paul and to St. John was unqualified; they did not labour to distinguish between ordinary human love and religious love as is shown by the parable of the Good Samaritan, by St. Paul's love hymn, and by St. John's saying, that/
that, "he that loveth is of God, and knoweth God". Human love and sympathy of every kind that is not merely selfish, is of God, for God is love, and makes His sun to shine upon the evil and the good without distinction. Such love brings the individual nearer to God, and to fuller knowledge of God.

Love, again, expands the personality of the lover and the loved; "thy gentleness hath made me great". In this way love is the way of salvation for both parties. No one can save himself without saving others; it is only through the exercise of love that personality as we saw, can develop, or be salved, because love is its original nature and foundation, and, while one is seeking to salve, or save, the personalities of others, his own personality also is being salved or saved. Thus love is not a means to an end conceived of as our own or others salvation; it is an end in itself; it is at one and the same time both our salvation and "our reasonable service" and "sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour unto God", whereby others are also being saved.

In all these writings of the Old and New Testament, therefore, it is prevenient divine love that is depended upon on the divine side to operate and lever the human will; but on the other hand all these scriptures are equally insistent on the necessity of the exercise of human will on man's part in all the issues of life. There is no obscurity about the part played by man's will or about the part played by the will of God in the act and process of salvation. The prophets, Christ, St. Paul and St. John all preach the necessity of the operation of the human will; "Choose ye this day whom ye will follow"; "enter in at the straight gate"; "Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light"; "let us love one/
one another, for love is of God".

The exercise of the will in loving service was the divine intention in endowing man with freewill. "In this is my Father glorified," said Christ, "that ye may bear much fruit". It is therefore the end and object of all life and of all learning. It is the way of self-realisation, the way of fulfilling the law of the inner life of personality, the social law, and any other law of God that there is. It is also, as we saw, the only satisfactory solvent of religious doubt that there is, and the only adequate way of knowledge of God. Intellectual proofs of the Being of God will never be final, or fully convincing, but the knowledge that comes from love and service is complete in proportion to that love and service, and it is apparently so contrived, or the nature of existence is such that real knowledge of God is only attainable in proportion to love and service; the vision of God is reserved for the pure in heart. Most of God's plans serve more than one purpose; service ends in knowledge also. William James was very near the truth, therefore, in his doctrine of the "will to believe", but he would have been nearer the truth still, if he had advocated the "will to love", for it would have solved the problem of belief as well. Love, therefore is the supreme virtue, wisdom and service, for there is no ethic or philosophy higher than this; "Bring forth quickly the best robe and put it on him".

It is the doctrine of the "will to love", then, and not simply the doctrine of the "will to believe" that is the outcome of the present chapter, because the "will to love" goes beyond the "will to believe"/
believe" and carries the solution of it within itself. And of all things in this world it is this love that this world of mankind stands most in need of, love in its different aspects of sympathy and help for the poor, the unfortunate, the hopeless, the sinful, and most of all the selfish, worldly and indifferent. This is the form of crusade that is required nowadays: adventures and exploits in love. This is the most effective apologetic for Christianity especially among civilized races with long established religions of their own which claim nowadays to find all the truths of Christianity already present in their own religious books. In such circumstances the Christian apologist is not simply non-plussed, because his religion has enabled him to act upon the doctrine of a God and Gospel of love by a life of love, which non-Christian religions cannot enable their votaries to do, and success in Christianising the non-Christian world nowadays is due to life and conduct inspired by love rather than to argument, though argument also has its value.

Now love like this is not always a simple matter or easy to accomplish. Those who do accomplish it are those who shine like lights in the world, and the light that makes them conspicuous is the love that shines through their works, and through that love the world sees and understands the nature of God. "Let your lights so shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven". But this love does not come to people in their sleep; it involves many an effort of will, and many a failure and struggle, before success and ease of performance comes; it is, in fact/
fact, the supreme art of life which spells success or failure of life itself. But in this situation God's part enables the individual to perform his part. God's part is the revelation of Himself in Christ. This revelation energises the will of the individual in the direction of the life of love and service by producing on the one hand the consciousness of one's own selfishness and want of love for others, and the unsatisfactoriness, and incompleteness of such a life, and on the other hand by awakening the individual to the consciousness of the possibilities of love as the fulfilling of the law of God, the law of the inner man, and the law of social life. This is the origin of the life of love which strives henceforth to bring everyone outside into possession of the same gift that has enriched itself.

This love cannot be produced by an effort of will, but what can be produced by an effort of will on man's part is the putting of ourselves in communication with God by all the means of grace at our disposal, such as, prayer, worship and service, and through such fellowship love like the love of God Himself will come into the life in a deepening, broadening, endless stream. This brings us to the subject of the next chapter which is communion with God, communion which is the source of religion and salvation; for man is saved when he is no longer separate from God in the far country of selfishness, but is "brought nigh by the blood of the Cross", the continued vision of which is the dynamic and generating cause of love, love/
love which through the result of communion tends to become spontaneous, comprehensive and sublime as the love of God which is its source.

What we have been endeavouring to express in this chapter may be succinctly conveyed by saying that the highest life or the love of God cannot be learned or practised without severe discipline and application, much less is the highest art of all, the art of loving. And it is to the practice of this art by means of self-discipline and self-sacrifice that the modern world calls all believers. In support of this we shall in concluding this chapter quote two passages, one from an eminent preacher in the West, and another from an eminent social reformer in the East. The Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard says: ("The Impatience of a Parson," Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1927, p. 130) "For an individual to be involved in treating God as if he were a Father and his neighbour as if he were a brother is to exact from him every conceivable virtue that Christianity can demand. To love God and to love your neighbour as yourself is the beginning and end of the Christian religion. We have only to pause for a moment to think in what that would involve us, to realise how hard it is for men to be Christians, and how much easier it is to make Christianity some sort of a philosophy rather than a definite commitment to a certain kind of life." Karawa the Japanese social reformer writes: (quoted from S.C.M. Liverpool letter No. 1, 1928) "What is wanting in Japan, as in Britain, America, France and elsewhere is not the knowledge of Christianity, but rather the practice of love. There is a famine of love throughout the world; in the churches/
churches, in the schools, in the factories, on the farm, everywhere. St. Paul said "Love suffers long and is kind". Belief in this eternal love of Christ finds a voice in the Cross, it forgives humanity's sins, it redeems us, it sanctifies us, it links the skill of science with the needs of daily life, it unites the nations, it binds the factory owner to the labourer, the intelligent to the ignorant, the favoured nations to the less favoured nations, and it teaches to each generation of the human family the profound lesson of sacrifice for succeeding generations. It is to this love that young Christians of Japan give their allegiance. They believe that it expresses the essential character of God and testifies to the eternal significance of Christianity.

"We cannot believe in the Christianity that discounts this redemptive love, or that fails to practise love in human relationship. Without this love no forms of communism or socialism, no kinds of social construction whatever can succeed........Love is the eternal and revolutionary principle, and without it social progress in any true sense is unthinkable. The clue to this meaning of this eternally revolutionary love is the Cross. Expressed in these ultimate and concrete terms, love becomes the universal religion which transcends language, race and national boundaries".
Chapter IX.

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNION WITH GOD.
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The proposition that we set out to prove in these pages was that the basis of religion, and hence of the prophetic consciousness was communion with God. This conception of religion was based on the fact that the essence of the divine, and of human nature was love, which fact necessarily implied reciprocal fellowship or communion between God and man. In this chapter then, the nature of communion with God will be considered.

But, when we look about for material for such a study, it is difficult to find any great body of examples of communion except that which has already been dealt with under the title of mysticism, and the question thus immediately arises as to what the relation of ordinary communion with God of the average normal person is to mysticism. Some writers regard all ordinary communion as falling under mysticism of an extreme type. Others again regard all mystics as a special type of person and normal communion as something different from mysticism of either type, something of which the ordinary person is not capable. The answer to this question is of vital importance to our view of communion. Is all communion mystic or not? This is our first subject of enquiry.

It will be therefore, necessary at the outset to examine the nature/
nature of mysticism to see whether it is something essentially dif­ferent from ordinary communion, and wherein it differs from it. When we begin, then, to enquire what mysticism is, we are immediately confronted with a great variety of definitions. This is due to the fact that mysticism combines in itself many characteristics of opposite polarities which are one cause of the difference of interpre­tation. Another reason for the differences of interpretation and ambiguity with regard to its meaning, is the fact that it has been investigated mainly by psychologists who have made use of the mater­ial supplied by the comparative study of religions. This latter science has collated a vast quantity of material about mysticism re­lating to every age, and climate and race. This material, psycho­logy has examined according to its own method without reference to theological, philosophical, or historical factors, with the result that different psychologists draw very different conclusions, most of which are very disastrous to the reputation of mysticism, denying it any objective validity. This is the fallacy of the psychologist who only sees the subjective factor in mental process and pronounces on the truth of mysticism as if there were no other factors. By the method of psychology almost anything can be deduced from the facts of mysticism when regarded in this time-less fashion, because the facts are infinite in variety and can be made to prove almost any conclu­sions.

"Murisier", says Pratt, (op. cit., p. 339-340) "is not the only writer who tells us that mysticism is the heart of religion, and then proceeds to examine the most extreme cases of the most extreme type, identifying/
identifying these with mysticism, and proving thereby that the heart of religion is rotten. Thus it has come about, quite naturally, that the pathological side of mysticism has been greatly over-emphasised, and that mysticism, and with it religion, is beginning to get a bad name. The result of this is that at present a great many eminent theologians are biased against mysticism, and regard it as alien to Christianity and dangerous to its truth. For this reason many books are, nowadays, printed on the subject of religion which contain no treatment of mysticism, or of the subject of communion with God, because it would involve the treatment of mysticism. We, therefore, understand that the meaning of Christian mysticism which we are mostly concerned with is communion with God in Christ, and the question that we are trying to answer is whether ordinary communion with God of the ordinary person is also mysticism.

Professor Pratt who is one of the more philosophical psychologists tries to distinguish between the milder forms of mysticism and its extreme type. This is a step in advance on Leuba and others who regard all cases of mysticism as the same. This is a step in the right direction, and it may be as far as a psychologist can go, in as much as he is not competent to deal as a psychologist with the theological, philosophical and historical factors. Still the distinction between the milder and the extreme forms is of value as it suggests that the extreme type are an exaggerated form of something that is moderate and normal. And the question now is, whether or not we are to identify this milder mysticism with ordinary communion with God which we are proposing to deal with here. In order to answer/
answer this question we shall quote Professor Pratt's own description of the two types. He says: (op. cit., p.339) "The two classes I have in mind might be called the mild and the extreme types. The former is commonplace and easily overlooked; it is to be found among perfectly normal persons, and is never carried to extremes. The other is usually so striking in its intensity, and in its effects that it attracts notice, and is regularly regarded as a sign either of supernatural visitation or of a pathological condition......I cannot too strongly emphasise the importance of making and keeping clear this subdivision within religious mysticism. No just idea can be formed upon the subject, and no sound conclusion as to the nature and place and value of mysticism can be reached, unless one constantly keeps in mind the distinction between these two kinds of mystic states. A great deal of otherwise very valuable work on the subject has become exceedingly misleading for the incautious reader because of a failure to make this distinction. It is a common thing for a writer to make some general statement about mysticism as such which really applies to only one of the two types, and not to the other. And the failure to make the distinction in question is particularly unfortunate because, when either type is taken alone and by itself to represent mysticism the choice is not likely to fall on the mild and unobtrusive sort".

It would seem from the above quotation that what Professor Pratt is describing under the name of mysticism of the milder type is simply the ordinary communion with God of religious faith such as we have in ordinary religion, and is taught in the Bible; the communion of Jesus, of St. Paul, and of St. John. From the above quotation it would/
would seem that all ordinary communion is of the mild mystic type, and that thus ordinary communion has found a footing inside mysticism and that grand mysticism is only an exaggeration, an abnormal form which it takes in persons of abnormal, but not necessarily in every case, pathological constitutions. And there does not seem at first sight to be much objection to this, because all religious communion is mystic, or mysterious, or ineffable, which is all that the word "mystic" means. "Mystic" in ordinary usage does not mean esoteric, occult, or due to a special faculty. Communion with God is mystic if it acquires any depth or reality at all. This has got to be made clear because mysticism has come to have such unfortunate connotation, implying something abnormal or psychic.

But we are hardly esconced within this position that ordinary communion is the same as the milder type of mystic communion, than we are confronted by other authorities on the subject of mysticism, who maintain that mysticism cannot be so divided, that mysticism is a distinct experience which is only realisable by persons of a certain nature, and that ordinary communion is an experience which is below even the milder form of mystic experience. An example of this attitude is Mrs Herman in her valuable treatment of mysticism where she says: ("The Meaning and Value of Mysticism", London, James Clarke, 1924, p.39) "In accordance with our finding, we proceed to the task of separating the normal and spiritual from the abnormal and psychic elements in mystical literature, but on the very threshold we are brought to a standstill. Even the most rigid theorist, if he be honest, cannot go very far without discovering that, like all/
all real worlds, the world of mystic experience cannot be cut in two with a hatchet. Speaking ideally, it is quite easy to picture the perfect mystic entirely guileless of any aberrations into the psychic realm. But such abstractions cannot in the long run satisfy us. It is another instance of the unsatisfying delusion of a fragment of "nature morte"—a dull, hard-edged lump cut out of the warm, living landscape as with a knife; it not only utterly fails to convey the magical quality of the whole, but, in its correct deadness fatally misrepresents it." The writer's argument here is that the visions of the great mystics cannot be separated from the rest of their lives and even milder mystic experiences also have their visions, which seems to make mystic experience one indivisible whole and different from the communion of the ordinary individual.

In maintaining that mystic experience is one and undivided seamless garment united together by warp and woof, the writer is correct, but what we wish here to deny is the writer's contention that ordinary communion of the ordinary believer is outside the pale of mysticism. That this is her position will be made clear by a passage where the writer answers her own question whether there is a class of Christian "initiates" who possess a secret withheld from the generality of believers. She writes; (ibidem) "But take the case of two healthy and well-developed children, the one genuinely dutiful and affectionate, but somewhat unimaginative and easy-going, takes his father's affection for granted, and makes no conscious effort to get into sympathy with that father's mind. The other makes himself his father's companion and almost instinctively anticipates his wishes. That child/
child may be said to have found a way to his father which the other does not dream of. And when the ground of this perfect sympathy of one son with a father who loves both is investigated, it will be found that while painstaking love is one essential element in it, and an impelling desire to enter into his father's mind and life another, yet they cannot completely account for the difference. Deepest of all there is something that defies analysis - an instinctive sympathy an inborn divination, a genius for filial affection; something which the other boy could not wholly attain, took he ever so much pains. And in admitting this we have granted the esoteric principle, not, indeed, as defined by quasi-mystical secret societies, but as inherent in life itself”.

Now in spite of the qualification of the word esoteric implied in the closing words of the above quotation the esoteric principle in mysticism is here plainly admitted. It is "an inborn divination, a genius for filial affection, something which the other boy could not wholly attain, took he ever so much pains.".

Now if we look closely at the two examples supplied by the writer, we see that the two boys have got affection for the father, the first as well as the second, and the first is also "genuinely dutiful". And, if a boy is "genuinely dutiful" and "affectionate" towards his father, we cannot see how he "takes his father's affection for granted, and makes no conscious effort to get into sympathy with his father's mind". One would conclude that his being "genuinely dutiful" implied a great deal of understanding of his father's mind, and a much better way, if we apply Christ's parable of the two sons/
sons, of getting into sympathy with his father's mind than the way of the second sentimentalist with the divination or genius for sympathy. How a "genuinely dutiful" and "affectionate" boy can take "his father's love for granted", which would imply a want of affection and selfishness on the part of the boy, is incomprehensible. These two aspects of the boy are obviously incompatible and cannot exist together in fact.

Such a hybrid boy cannot be found and the writer has invented this forced example to prove the esoteric principle by trying to show that there may be people who are affectionate and dutiful enough who may not have it, while others have the mystic gift by reason of an innate gift of divination or genius, quite divorced from the ordinary moral life, as we saw in the case of Otto's gift of divination. Now what we maintain is, that if a man loves God, and is "genuinely dutiful", he is in possession of the most inmost esoteric secret there is, but, of course, if he is loving and dutiful, he cannot at the same time be easygoing, or make no effort to get into sympathy with the mind of God, or take God's love for granted without being guilty of the sin of presumption, a most deadly sin.

As the decision on this point, as to whether only people with psychic gifts can have the deepest and most inmost fellowship with God, is of the greatest importance, and, lest we misrepresent the above writer by judging her by one illustration only, we shall quote a second illustration of hers which immediately follows the above illustration. She says: (op. cit., p. 39-41) "Here is a trusty, unimaginative, well-intentioned Christian man doing his duty in life and sending many an honest prayer heavenwards as he goes along. Who/
Who would deny that such a one has found a plain and sunlit road to his Father's heart? But here is another, - an unlettered and obscure toiler, maybe - who finds deep in his heart the instinct for communion with the Eternal, and, having found this treasure, for the joy of it goes and sells all that he has, that he may own the field of his soul. Such a man may never have heard of the stages of the Mystic Way, but the less acquaintance he has with mystical jargon the deeper his hidden life is likely to be. He may never do any outstanding work in the world, but he will wear that indefinable hall-mark of spiritual aristocracy which never fails to be recognised by those who live at the King's Court........We ask why the difference between him and his good-hearted but obtuse brother in Christ? Why is not the in-seeing eye given to all God's children? There is only the answer which is and is not an answer: "My sheep hear My voice"; "All men have not faith". We have arrived at a gateless barrier. There is this star in the darkness, however: the mysterious gift of mystic apprehension is bestowed upon elect souls not for their own glory, but for our sakes and for the sake of the whole Church of God. They are not a segregated caste of adepts; they are pioneers, beating plain with bleeding feet the road we all in our measure are called to tread".

Now, here again, the capacity for communion with God is dependent on a psychic gift which makes the possessor into a spiritual aristocrat, while the rest of us who do not possess this psychic gift are termed "obtuse" brethren in Christ, sheep who do not hear the shepherd's voice, men who have not the faith, and yet supposed to be following/
following in the footsteps of the psychic pioneers.

It is quite evident that the writer who at most times is clear and lucid in her thinking is here not sure of her own position because the example here again is not consistent: for the first man, the obtuse brother, is admitted to be a prayerful man, doing his duty, who has "found a plain and sunlit road to the Father's heart", and yet further on he seems to be turned into one of those who do not hear the shepherd's voice, and who have not the faith. With such a chameleon of a man anything can be proved, especially the esoteric principle, for it not only divides all mankind into two classes, but it divides one man into two different natures. The writer is vaguely conscious that it is inconsistent, because she says, "it is and it is not an answer", and certainly any impartial person would agree that it is not an answer.

In the above illustrations the writer's reasoning is vitiated by the fact that she has taken a natural illustration and literally deducted from it a spiritual conclusion, while in the second illustration she began with a spiritual case and ended by regarding it as a natural one. The two classes of people, mystics and ordinary people and the two facts of ordinary mysticism and ordinary communion, are not reconciled in the mind of the writer, or the proper connection between them clearly thought out, and this want of clearness in thought appears in her illustrations. In the first illustration the unimaginative boy is, and is not affectionate, and, in the second illustration, the man is and is not a man of faith, and so this answer, "is and is not an answer".

The writer's real answer is both No and Yes. The question to which the above two illustrations are the answer she puts thus: (op. cit. p.38)
"Are there really two ways to God? And is there a body of "initiates who possess a secret withheld from the generality of believers? We answer both No and Yes. If the term "a body of initiates" implies that God fails to satisfy the humble soul that approaches Him in faith, because it does not possess a certain genius for the Absolute, the answer is unequivocally No......There is in this sense no favoured class of initiates upon whom the less gifted need look in envy. Fulness of life is promised, not to the illuminated, but to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness. Yet there is a profound difference between, say, the spiritual life of St. Paul and that of the average well-meaning Christian soul. Wherein does that difference consist, and can it be said that Paul was master of a special and more immediate "way" to God?

The two above illustrations are the answer to the above question and their purport is that "we have granted the esoteric principle" that the one has an "inborn divination, a genius for filial affection. Now the consequences of this admission if allowed to pass unchallenged as the final deliverance with regard to communion would be of incalculable harm to the Christian life which depends on every believer being vitally united to Christ as the branches are united to the vine. The knowledge that we were obtuse brethren in Christ, a class to which most of us belong, and that real fellowship with Christ like that of the mystic was not possible for us, because of our want of inborn genius for communion would immediately inhibit all effort at communion and drive us sullenly to the attitude of "do your duty and take your chance" with envious eyes at those who "wear that indefinable hallmark of spiritual aristocracy".
It may seem that too much space is being here devoted to this question, but the importance of this point cannot be over-estimated as it is the crux of the problem of ordinary communion, on the one hand, and of mysticism on the other hand, because the subject of communion is not nowadays in favour because of its affinity to mysticism, and mysticism is not in favour because of its esotericism, and even careful writers like Mrs Herman make the mistake of making Christian mysticism more esoteric than it is, and of putting it out of reach of the ordinary believing Christian. Her position is also the position of Miss Evelyn Underhill, and of Dean Inge our greatest exponents of mysticism. It will therefore, be of service if we consider whether any other answer is possible to the above question of our writer which will explain more satisfactorily the nature of ordinary Christian communion on the one hand, and the nature of mystic communion on the other, for, it is incredible that the highest gift of God, the gift of fellowship with Himself is dispensed to His creatures in this parsimonious and niggardly fashion, that puts a slur and a profound suspicion on His impartial love for all by debarring the majority of them from His presence, because we shall try and prove there is only one way into His presence for mystics and "obtuse brethren" alike.
What now requires to be done is to seek for some illustration or explanation that will explain the nature and conditions of Christian communion, and its connection with mystic communion. And the only explanation that can fit the problem is one which explains what happens when a natural man becomes a spiritual man. The natural man becomes a spiritual man, when he experiences the forgiveness of sins through the realisation of the love of God revealed through the Cross of Christ. Professor H. R. Mackintosh explains what happens in these circumstances, as follows: ("The Christian Experiences of Forgiveness", London, Nisbet, 1927, p.257) "The effects of the Gospel are in tune with its meaning; and its meaning is that it brings men the knowledge of something that God has done, and bids them rejoice in a salvation that He has wrought. It thus sets man free from the chains of their past, transfers the centre of their expectations and opportunities from themselves to God, and calls them to a life of unrestricted fellowship with Him. It has frequently been argued that the Christian religion is self-centred, interested and prudential; but the truth properly understood is simply that apart from such religion of the loftiest kind - in which the majesty of God's holy love overshadows all - morality cannot attach itself to what stands sublimely at once above the individual and above society, and wakes the reverent and self-abandoning homage of the soul. To owe everything to God as the pardoned do, is to have taken the first decisive step in escape from self-absorption, even though that may have been the not ignoble self-absorption of seeking out ways in which the inner independence and harmony of the individual soul may be/
be maintained. But when the focus of a man's interest has been definitely occupied by the great friendship and transcendent claims of God who has blotted out all his offences, a new principle of moral health has been implanted, and it is this emergence from egoistic isolation, this opening gateway into the immeasurable world of Goodness, Truth and Beauty, all dependent on a Father who makes His children free of its wealth, which renders a man for the first time capable of wholly unreserved fellowship with others."

Now we maintain that in this Christian experience of the forgiveness of sins is to be found the only esoteric principle there is in the Christian religion, and all who have this experience of forgiveness possess this esoteric gift. The exoteric people are those who have not this experience of forgiveness, but all those who have it are admitted into the innermost knowledge of God that there is, to "a life of unrestricted fellowship with Him", to "a new principle of moral health, to the immeasurable world of Goodness, Truth and Beauty", to the "wholly unreserved fellowship with others". This is the only esoteric principle there is in Christianity which distinguishes Christianity from other religions which cannot confer the same gift on their votaries, but it is a gift which is shared by every Christian believer, and it is impossible for anyone who is admitted into this knowledge and fellowship to take the Father's love for granted; The most practical, naturally unemotional and unimaginative becomes stirred with a new emotion and illumination as soon as he experiences the love of God in Christ. As St. John says: "We know that the Son of God has come and that He has given us an understanding/
understanding", and all Christian believers have this "understanding" in their own degree; the most obtuse as well as the most psychic, the most matter of fact and practical as well as the most affectionate and imaginative. Communion therefore, depends, not on the possession of psychic gifts of divination or genius, but on the "Son of God" who has come and given us the "understanding". The degree of "understanding" will depend on the emotional, intellectual and practical gifts of respective persons, and some will attain to infinitely higher knowledge than others, but the nature of the understanding is the same in the case of all, and there are no two ways to God, the mystic and the ordinary. If the beginning of the Christian life is the entering on a life of unrestricted fellowship with a loving forgiving Father, then that communion is bound to be mystical communion, because there is no other way of describing communion with an unseen spiritual Personality such as God is. And this too is how communion with God and Christ is described by Jesus, by St. Paul and St. John.

Mysticism is only the attitude which the mind or soul adopts when it endeavours to hold converse with the unseen, and it is common to every age and climate and race. Pure mysticism is pure pantheism, but Christian mysticism is only to be found in the Christian religion, and what determines and necessitates that mystic communion in the Christian religion is the fact of God's love in Christ. A religion which comes into existence out of such facts as the Cross of Christ, can only exist on the basis of communion and fellowship; fellowship is its foundation and in this connection we shall again quote Professor H. R. Mackintosh. He says: (op. cit., p.255) "The supreme secret of goodness which carries all else within/
within itself, is, of course, the new fellowship with God on which the pardoned man has entered. This of itself makes him a new person, and turns the world he inhabits into a new and astonishing hopeful place. To be in filial contact with the Father has once and for all abolished the painful and disabling solitude of the moral conflict; it affords the certainty of an inward presence by which moral weakness will be sustained, because the deepest springs of joy have been unsealed. I feel that at this point our thoughts about God cannot be too human. Every great friendship is felt by us as a fount of animating and uplifting power, and the first question we ask regarding a person of uncertain or immature character is whether he has good friends, whose stronger nature will fortify and inspirit his efforts to be brave and true, and the most important thing about the forgiven man, from the standpoint of ethics, is just that his eyes have been opened to the amazing truth that God is his friend, who can be trusted never to let him down. Whatever his temptations, whatever the weakness bequeathed by previous failure, God is still there, unchanging infaithful as well as in enacting stringency of precept, so that never again need he face alone the onset of evil. That friendship, that communion, that overshadowing presence, whatever be the theological terms used for its designation - have changed his moral prospects utterly. For the first time he has learned from Jesus, most of all from His passion, what God is, and is for him; and the perception has recreated him in moral being".

The above quotation amply supports the view of religion set forth/
forth in these pages as originating and developing out of communion or fellowship with God, for fellowship with God is "the secret of goodness which carries all else before it". So vital is the importance of fellowship that "the first question we ask regarding a person of uncertain or premature character is whether he has good friends. The truth of this remark is borne out by the evidence of experts in Criminology who say that if there is any hope of improvement for a discharged prisoner it is by some good person like the Court Sister becoming his friend. As long as he is so stationed that the friendship can continue the discharged prisoner resists temptation and makes progress, but as soon as circumstances compel him to lose touch with his friend, he falls back again. Moreover the friendship with God as described in the above quotation is of the most intimate and real kind. It is a fellowship with regard to which "our thoughts about God cannot be too human", a fellowship in which God is "an inward presence" as well as "an overshadowing presence". Now such a fellowship as this makes communion with God necessarily mystical if it is to have any depth or reality at all, for there is no other manner of communion possible with a spiritual personality except mystic communion, and it is essentially of the same nature whether it is found in the most ordinary believer or in Santa Teresa or in St. Paul. But they each have it in their own measure according to their capacity to receive and their diligence in keeping up the fellowship. Our conclusion then, is that ordinary Christian communion is not something outside and lower than mystic communion, but that all real communion with God is necessarily mystical, and the/
the communion is first caused by the love of God revealed in the forgiveness of sins through Christ.

Before we pass on from this question we shall briefly apply to it the conception of love which we have been developing all along to see whether there are two ways to God through Christ or not, the mystical and the ordinary. We saw that the essence of the nature of God is love, and that the essence of human nature also is love, which is the core of personality. What personality, therefore, requires for its integration, development and perfection, is love. Personality is integrated, developed and perfected only as love finds sway in the life; it is disintegrated as love is contracted by finding unworthy objects, and what every personality needs is that that love be transferred to the supreme object of love, namely, the love of God, which finds supreme expression in the Cross of Christ. This is what wakens and generates love in the individual. "We love Him because He first loved us". And this love has to be maintained alive and operative in each life by fellowship, otherwise it will languish, and die, and get transferred to worldly objects, in which case the early promises are not realised, the first love is lost, and disintegration of personality by degrees is the inevitable result.

There are, therefore, no two ways to God through Christ, one for the unemotional, practical, unimaginative Christian, and another for the more emotional, more spiritual or psychical. Personality of whatever "make-up" requires love for its integration, development and perfection. Some, it is true, require more friendship than others, and make great demands on, and exhaust, their friends, just because they/
they need it more, while others are more independent. But no human being whose nature was meant to be developed by love can do without the love of God in Christ, diligently sought and maintained by means of a life of communion with God, and, as was said already the communion, if it has any depth or reality at all, is mystical. And it has to have depth, if it is going to be effective at all. As Mrs. Herman says in another connection: (op. cit., p.66) "No genuine spiritual height can ever be attained along the path of the average. It is in our steady and unremitting struggle with the average that our salvation lies - to conform to the average is to lose one's soul". The philosopher said: "Cogito ergo sum", but the Christian says: "diligo ergo sum". This is why Jesus said; "A new commandment I give unto you that ye love one another", and St. Paul said: "the greatest of these is love", because love is creative and there can be no growth or expansion or depth in personality without love. And St. John says: (1 Jn. 4-7) "everyone that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God", love not simply to God and to friends, but love without limit and in all directions to all persons, is what makes the creature come to full development and makes him like his Creator. And moreover it is love that brings the believer knowledge of God according to the above verse and not any psychic gift.

Having answered the question as to whether ordinary communion is the same as mystic communion we shall next enquire what relation ordinary mystic communion has with that stage of mysticism where visions and locutions are seen and heard, and to the further extreme stage where trance and ecstasy are experienced. It is only possible here/
here to refer to the problem in the briefest manner. It is the presence of these phenomena in Christian mysticism that has made it to be suspected and to be regarded by eminent scholars as alien to Christianity.

So far our argument has been that mysticism is a natural phenomenon common to every age, race and country, to all humanity in fact, whenever they attempt to have communion with God. All mysticism, except Christian mysticism, therefore, is of the same nature and its division into a milder and extreme type as proposed by Professor Pratt does not serve any useful purpose, and is quite arbitrary. We maintain, then, that the only real division of mysticism is into Christian and non-Christian. Some theologians recommend the division between mysticism of absorption and ordinary mysticism, but the division into Christian and non-Christian is more correct as it includes the division between mysticism of absorption and ordinary mysticism, because Christianity with its emphasis on personality both human and divine as well as on the transcendence and immanence of God which are the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and of the Holy Spirit respectively, "eo ipso" makes absorption illogical and impossible. True Christianity, therefore, informs, regulates and sets the limits to mysticism, which otherwise would be without any norm or guide in seeking communion with God, and, therefore liable to all kinds of dangerous extravagances, excesses and errors. "Pure mysticism", as Von Hügel says, "is pure pantheism". It is a voyage of adventure on an uncharted sea.

The division into Christian and non-Christian, therefore, ought to/
to be the first starting-point on any treatment of mysticism, and it is the failure to make this distinction on the part of exponents of mysticism that is the cause of so much misunderstanding with regard to it, and consequently so much opposition to it, on the part of eminent theologians, because when this distinction is not clearly made Christian mysticism is confused with non-Christian mysticism which brings Christian mysticism into undeserved dispute. When this distinction is not made Christian mysticism of the Dark Ages which was half Christian and half pagan, rivalling that of the Yogi and the Sufi was taken as the true type of Christian mysticism, whereas the mysticism of the Middle Ages is in very important respects different from the highest form of Christianity of to-day, which is the very fact that would make the greatest difference between Christian and Non-Christian mysticism, for what makes the difference in mysticism is the objective reality with which it is concerned, the view of God, man and nature which is entertained. All forms of Christianity throughout history have not been equally Christian; the mysticism of the Roman Catholic Church was very different from that of the Protestant Church of the Reformation, and again from that of the Cambridge Platonists, and mysticism approximates normal spiritual experience according as it gets informed by the Spirit of Christ, who is the norm, "the way", to the Father. Mysticism alone does not conduct mankind to the Father but only to the Absolute, to Pantheism, and absorption, and a depersonalised absolute has been proved by the religions that entertain it to have little saving effect upon personality. If mysticism alone could have shewn us the/
the Father then the Incarnation would have been superfluous. But Christ assures us that He is the Way and the only Way to the Father, and He guides mankind to the Father simply by shewing Himself, as He said: "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father", and, "I and the Father are one". Whenever Christ is fully presented, mankind finds in Him the Absolute as St. Peter did, and St. Paul, and St. John, and the early Church did, and the Reformed Church, and again the Church of the present day. But when Christ is obscured and He becomes an ecclesiastic or something else, the way to the Father is immediately obscured and all sorts of mystic vagaries begin, with which intelligent people will have nothing to do.

What is necessary, therefore, in order to commend communion with God in Christ to the present generation, and to the world, is to shew that the gift of communion with God in Christ through the Spirit is the very gift which Christianity has brought to all mankind, whosoever cares to ask it, as Professor Mackintosh has shewn above, and it is this fellowship with God stripped of its archaic trappings, and pagan associations, and displayed in its simplicity and naturalness, as it was in the life of Christ that is the only power which is going in any age to revive and restore spiritual religion by giving to people first-hand personal experience of what the religion of Christ can be. That Christ conceived of communion with Himself as the "sine qua non" of the life which He came to give to the world, is shown by the fact of His institution of a rite which is intended to perpetuate that communion until He come, for the church can never by any higher wisdom outgrow the necessity of this communion, because it is the only way of enlightening the mind in the knowledge/
knowledge of God, of energising the will, and expanding personality all which are only possible through a fellowship of love such as we have in Christ.

It is, therefore, of incalculable harm if this communion which is only the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and of "Christ in us", and of "fellowship with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ", of the New Testament, is so confused with non-Christian mysticism or imperfect forms of Christian mysticism, that eminent theologians principally those of the Ritschlian School, condemn mysticism as alien to Christianity. The reason of their condemnation is due to the fact that the experts fail to distinguish real Christian mysticism from non-Christian mysticism, and the failure to make the distinction is fatal to their presentation of mysticism, because they fail to demonstrate the difference between the supposed indwelling of an imaginary conception like Brahma or Allah and the indwelling of Christ through the Spirit. This ought to have been the beginning, middle and ending of their exposition, but as we have seen, none of these experts, neither Baron Von Hügel, nor Dean Inge, nor Miss Underhill, nor any of the exponents of mysticism have made clear that Christianity has introduced a mysticism which is possible for all, safe for all, and necessary for all believers. Instead of this the way in which their presentation of mysticism is orientated has the unfortunate and baneful effect of making it like non-Christian mysticism dependent on a psychic gift, because it is only the psychic who attempt it, but what even the non-Christian psychic could not attain, every Christian believer/
believer can attain by the revelation of Christ, for no non-Christian mystic ever obtained a vision of God the Father, but only of an imaginary Absolute. The revelation of Christ immediately makes the believer into a mystic; "behold he prayeth" was the immediate effect of his conversion on St. Paul, as well as his retirement into Arabia and his lifelong effort to realise the presence of Christ through fellowship with His sufferings; and it would be inconceivable if the result of such facts as we have in the Incarnation, Cross, Resurrection, and High Priestly Intercession of Christ, were to yield anything else but a religion whose essence was to be spiritual communion with God in Christ.

That we are falsely accusing the friends of mystic or spiritual religion of being its worst enemies may be understood from the fact that the best theologians do not yet believe that the experts have made out a clear case for mysticism, and their failure we have seen is due to two cardinal mistakes: the first is that they do not sufficiently differentiate Christian from non-Christian mysticism which has the effect of making them appear keener on their mysticism than on their Christianity; we "advisedly say "sufficiently" because there is a differentiation at points, but it is not sufficiently clear to make the ordinary reader see where the centre of gravity lies, or what the real truth about mysticism is: the second cardinal mistake is that of making communion with God depend on a psychic gift. These two great mistakes have defeated the objects of the exponents of mysticism in commending Christianity as essentially a religion of spiritual mystical communion, and this task still remains to be accomplished/
accomplished and it constitutes the great need of the Church in every age, for no Church can be spiritually alive without spiritual experience which means spiritual enlightenment and spiritual or moral or religious power, and the very persons who could give us this exposition of Christianity are the above authorities on mysticism themselves and what they would require to do in order to give us a true picture of Christian communion would be to put the emphasis on the difference between Christian and non-Christian mysticism or communion, in which case the word mysticism as applied to Christian communion would tend to disappear as the meaning is sufficiently conveyed by the name, "Christian communion", and then communion would appear as the greatest gift of God to man, and the natural goal of the human spirit, through which the highest gifts of God come to mankind.

In case we may appear to judge the protagonists of mysticism on insufficient evidence, and, as it is a question of the utmost importance whether religion of spiritual communion is only for psychic people alone, as they allege, it will clarify our position if we examine the account of Christian mysticism given by one of them, namely that given by Dean Inge in his "Christian Mysticism" (London, Methuen 6th Ed. 1925). To begin with, he gives a definition of mysticism which appears to apply more to non-Christian mysticism than to Christian mysticism, although the title of his book is "Christian Mysticism", and, as there is no other definition of mysticism except this/
this one given by the author in his book, it is clear that this definition is intended to describe Christian mysticism also. The same definition is made to serve for Christian and non-Christian mysticism alike and nowhere in the book is it made clear what the essential difference is between Christian and non-Christian mysticism. The definition is also exceedingly long which is another sign of obscurity of thought, but we reproduce it "in toto" as we wish to examine it in detail. He says: (op. cit., pp.4-6) "The phase of thought or feeling which we call Mysticism has its origin in that which is the raw material of all religion, and perhaps of all philosophy and art as well, namely, that dim consciousness of the beyond, which is part of our nature as human beings. Men have given different names to these "obstinate questionings of sense and outward things". We may call them, if we will, a sort of higher instinct, perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary process; or an extension of the frontier of consciousness; or, in religious language, the voice of God speaking to us. Mysticism arises when we try to bring this higher consciousness into relation with the other contents of our minds. Religious Mysticism may be defined as the attempt to realise the presence of the living God in the soul, and in nature, or, more generally, as the attempt to realise in thought and feeling, the imminence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal. Our consciousness of the beyond is, I say, the raw material of all religion, but being itself formless, it cannot be brought directly into relation with the forms of our thought. Accordingly, it has to express itself by symbols, which are as it were/
were the flesh and bones of ideas. It is the tendency of all symbols to petrify or evaporate, and either process is fatal to them. They soon repudiate their mystical origin, and forthwith lose their religious content. Then comes a return to the fresh springs of the inner life— a revival of spirituality in the midst of formalism or unbelief. This is the historical function of mysticism—it appears as an independent active principle, the spirit of reformations and revivals. But since every active principle must find for itself appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed a speculative and practical system of its own. As Goethe says, it is "the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings". In this way, it becomes possible to consider it as a type of religion, though it must always be remembered that in becoming such, it has incorporated elements which do not belong to its inmost being.

Now in criticism of the above definition we remark that to say that mysticism is "that dim consciousness of the beyond, which is part of our nature as human beings" and "has its origin in the raw material of all religion, and perhaps of all philosophy and art as well", does not tell much that is definite about mysticism; all that it implies is that it is a consciousness of there being a reality beyond what we actually see which is characteristic of the thought of all people civilised and uncivilised alike, so that mysticism in this sense is only another synonym for consciousness. For the purpose of a definition the above sentence is useless, being exceedingly vague, and obscure, the reason being that in his treatment of mysticism the writer has no definite landmarks, so he makes mysticism begin/
begin where everythings else begins, namely, "all religion, all philoso­phy and art". The truth of this cannot be denied, but it adds nothing to our information about mysticism.

Next, the definition tells us that mysticism is "a sort of higher instinct, perhaps an anticipation of the evolutionary process; or an extension of the frontier of consciousness". Here we have the main fallacy of the champions of mysticism namely, that it is due to psychic endowment such as "a higher instinct", or "an extension of the frontier of consciousness" whatever that may mean psychologically. If this is mysticism, then it is not a thing for the normal person, but only for the person with a psychic gift, and, if that is so, then it is not Christian mysticism; the description may apply to non-Christian mysticism and to certain cases of Christian mysticism, but not to Christian mysticism which is the theme of the writer. Christian mysticism as we saw above, is not limited to a few cases who possess a higher instinct, or an extension of the frontier of consciousness, but it is a possibility for all believers, and this all important fact ought to be acknowledged in the definition of mysticism in a book which professes to deal with Christian mysticism. But the definition does not from start to finish mention the name of Christ or Christianity which conclusively shows that to the writer it is not the fact of Christ that is vital to Christian mysticism, but the above psychic endowments; that is to say, the writer does not consider the objective factor or determinant in mysticism, but only the subjective factor.

This neglect of the objective factor is still more obvious in his next sentence which says that "Mysticism arises when we try to bring this higher consciousness into relation with the other contents of/
of our mind". What the mental process implied in this statement is, it is rather difficult to understand, and yet we are told it is the moment out of which mysticism arises. But though it does not seem to convey much meaning it is clear that it is a purely subjective process, and shows that the writer so far has failed to realise that mysticism has to be defined with reference to the objective reality with which it is engaged, as well as by the subjective factor.

This subjectiveness would seem to be corrected in the sentence immediately following the above in which he says: "religious mysticism may be defined as the attempt to realise the presence of the living God in the soul and in nature, or, more generally as the attempt to realise, in thought and feeling, the imminence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal". Now here the objective reality of God is for the first time referred to, whereas our idea of mysticism is that it arises whenever the attempt is made to have communion with God, which is the definition of non-Christian mysticism: and the definition of Christian mysticism would be the effort to have communion with God in Christ, and, therefore, the objective reality of God ought to come into the definition right at the beginning, but up till now the writer has been occupied with subjective processes which are so obscure as to be well-nigh unintelligible, which gives the impression that mysticism is a kind of mental gymnastics produced inside the mind. And, when the writer does introduce the objective fact of God at this stage, it is in such a way as to convey the impression, not of communion with divine personality which mysticism ought to be, but of a subjective process inside/
inside the mind, for, "the attempt to realise the presence of the living God in the soul and in nature" is more suggestive of the doctrine of deification in the one case, and of nature-worship in the other, than of communion with God. We do not attempt to realise the presence of God in nature which is Pantheism, but the contemplation of nature leads us to the thought of God; nor do we simply look into our souls to find God there, which would not be communion with God but a subjective mental process. Moreover "the attempt to realise in thought and feeling, the imminence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal," might be a description of philosophy or metaphysics, but not of religion, much less of communion with God, and still less communion with God in Christ, so that this is neither a definition of Christian mysticism nor even of non-Christian mysticism.

The absence of the objective factor is still more glaringly evident in his next sentence where he says: "our consciousness of the beyond is, I say, the raw material of all religion, but being itself formless, it cannot be brought directly into relation with the forms of our thought. Accordingly it has to express itself by symbols". Now formless consciousness seems to be nothing more than mental vacuity which is the result, when there is no objective reality present to consciousness, and there are only subjective processes to be considered. A formless consciousness is a consciousness without concepts, or thought of any kind. What he means is a consciousness of God which is not expressible in words, but only in symbols; but such a consciousness is not formless, because it has the definite idea that/
that God is there. The writer has two concluding chapters on "Nature-mysticism and Symbolism" as if we had mysticism wherever we had symbolism; but symbolism is not employed by mysticism alone, it is used in ordinary secular life as well, so that we are treated to all this vagueness, because the writer fails to realize that mysticism itself is subjectively nothing except the ordinary consciousness attuned to communion, and that what determines the nature of mysticism is the objective reality with which it is concerned whether the Absolute, or the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is on this basis alone that mysticism can be defined, as it varies indefinitely with its conception of God.

Finally, he says: "But since every active principle must find for itself appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed a speculative and practical system of its own. As Goethe says, it is "the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings". In this way it becomes possible to consider it as a type of religion". Now it is this anxiety on the part of its protagonists to regard mysticism as a type of religion different from ordinary Christianity, a more or less esoteric type of Christianity that rouses so much well deserved suspicion and opposition to it on the part of other theologians. This differentiation into a separate type is, however, absolutely unnecessary as mystical communion is nothing different from ordinary Christianity. Mysticism of any kind is essentially communion with God: nature-mysticism is communion with God through nature, philosophic mysticism is communion with the Absolute through philosophy, non-Christian mysticism is communion with God through some form of higher power or some form of Absolute, and Christian mysticism/
mysticism is communion with God through Christ.

Christianity as communion with God in Christ through the Spirit is not a type of Christianity, but is the only Christianity we know. Christianity as defined by Christ, by St. Paul and by St. John. In these days also there is no real Christianity without fellowship with God in Christ through the Spirit. It is only through this communion and fellowship that the blessings of God are imparted to believers, and their redemption worked out. The fellowship may be broken and intermittent, but every believer if he knows anything, knows this as the first and indispensable article of his faith, that the sundering veil is rent in twain and that a way has been opened by Christ into the Holiest of all, into the very presence of the Father. It is this faith, in fact, that has made him a Christian, and, without this faith, he could not very well be called a Christian, for the facts of the Incarnation, Cross, Resurrection and Priesthood of Christ, as was said already, are such as to make a life of fellowship or communion a "sine qua non" for the believer; such facts not only make communion possible, but such is the gift of God in Christ, that for the true believer it compels communion, and he is not happy unless he is endeavouring to preserve by habits of prayer and worship, as unbroken fellowship as possible, because the love of God constrains him to do so. His public worship may be a distracted enough affair, but, at any rate he has endeavoured as far as human conditions allow, to hold communion with the Father, and publicly to show his faith and gratitude to God in return for His unspeakable gift. His family worship also may be formal enough, but at least it has brought him, with his family for a brief moment into the presence of God who daily loadeth them with His benefits, and that brief act of worship, thanks giving,
thanksgiving and prayer, keeps heart and mind in the knowledge and love of God and of His Son Jesus Christ. But when he closes the door behind him and engages in private prayer on his own behalf and on the behalf of others he has as real communion with God as any of the mystics. It may not be as deep, or as long, but it is not anything different in type from what we know the communion of the mystics to have been. But we would not call such a man a mystic, but only an ordinary Christian, or his religion a special type of Christianity.

What then is the difference between the Christian mystic and an ordinary Christian? The difference seems to be, if anything, only a difference in degree, and the name Christian mysticism seems hardly necessary, as Christian communion expresses all that is required, so that, if we wish to preach to the world the necessity of deeper and more real communion with God, and of a more spiritual life, it is not necessary to tell them that this can only be achieved by a type of religion called Christian mysticism. But this is what Dean Inge implies, for he says that, "since every active principle must find for itself appropriate instruments, mysticism has developed a speculative and practical system of its own.....in this way it becomes possible to consider it as a type of religion”. Now mysticism is not a religion, but only a phase of every religion, namely, the communion phase, which is the vital moment of every religion that possesses any vitality. The writer does not specify which mysticism he is referring to, but, as his book is on Christian mysticism, presumably he is talking about Christian mysticism, and in that case his meaning/
meaning is that Christian mysticism is a type of religion different from ordinary Christianity or ordinary Christian communion, because he says that it has "developed a speculative and practical system of its own". Now this claim can be substantiated only if the protagonists of mysticism can produce for examination and comparison a substantial body of speculative and practical theology which differs from ordinary Christian theology to such an extent that it is entitled to be called a distinct type of Christianity. But when we read the works of the mystics and their exponents, we do not find any such speculative or practical systems, but only what one would call ordinary Christian theology and practice. The emphasis of the mystics and their exponents is no doubt on communion and life in the Spirit, but that is where the emphasis of Christianity ought always to have been, and always is, wherever Christianity exists in its genuine form. This claim to being a distinct type of religion with a speculative and practical system of its own on the part of the experts in mysticism cannot be substantiated, and it is this claim to esotericity, uniqueness and peculiarity, that brings mysticism into disrepute, and with it the whole subject of spiritual communion with God, because anyone who nowadays writes on communion with God, or preaches it, is suspected of being an infatuated dabbler in mysticism, who is trying to revive the Christianity of the Middle Ages, with the result that most sane people avoid the subject of communion, with incalculable loss to the cause of true religion.

There is, therefore, urgent need of a "magnum opus" on the subject of communion, which would at the same time clarify the meaning of mysticism, for evidently the vaguest ideas exist about it. Above Dean Inge agrees with Goethe in calling mysticism "the scholastic of the/
the heart, the dialectic of the feeling" which implies that mysticism is entirely concerned with the heart or feelings, and yet he calls this at the same time a type of religion, in which case it would be a religion of the feelings only, but such a religion could not very well develop a speculative and practical system of theology, as feelings are inarticulate and all we would have would be "formless" speculation as he suggested above, whatever that may be, or symbolism, another word dear to supporters of mysticism because they endeavour to find in it the roots of mysticism.

The need for this clarification of the meaning of mysticism would be still more apparent if we were to review the twenty-six definitions, by different philosophers and theologians, reproduced by Dean Inge in Appendix A of his book. The lengthy definition of Dean Inge reiterates the mistakes contained in most of them, namely, that mysticism is due to a psychic gift, or faculty the soul in which God works immediately, or that it is a subjective process, or that it is symbolism. A few particularly emphasise the fact which we have been emphasising here, that mysticism always has an objective reference and arises only when man endeavours to hold communion with God. One of these is Professor Seth, who says: (op. cit., p.339) "It (mysticism) appears in connection with the endeavour of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the highest". Another of the same viewpoint is Lasson; he says: (op. cit., p.343) "Religion is a relation of person to person, a life, which in its form is an analogy to the earthly, while its content is pure relation to the eternal. Dogmatic is the skeleton, mysticism is,
is the life-blood of the Christian body". With this agrees Baron Von Hügel, who says: ("Essays and Addresses", London, Dent, 1924, p.131) "All mysticism is mysticism, in proportion as it thus apprehends and cultivates Presence as the centre of religion". Thus mysticism is not merely subjective, but is objective as well, and it does not arise except through the interaction of the divine reality and mind.

The most interesting and vital criticism of mysticism is by various members of the Ritschlian School; Harnack, Herrman, and Kaftan who accuse mysticism of dispensing with Christ and history, and of substituting subjective delusions in their place. Their contention is, that true Christianity is faith in the historic Christ, and that in the historic Christ we have "a fact the contents of which is incomparably richer than that of any feelings which arise within ourselves". This is perfectly true, but a historic fact is of no value to the individual, unless it is value for him, and value as we have seen is experienced first in the feelings, so that the feeling factor as well as the objective historic factor is necessary. The charge of the Ritschlians would be justified only if the mystic maintained that they owed their experiences not to Christ, but to feelings derived from some other source, but no mystic ever maintained this, instead, they always averred, as strongly as possible, that from first to last Christ was the author of all their experiences.

But the mystics may be accused of a contempt of dogmatic theology and of institutionalism, which, however, is to a certain extent excusable, because most of them did not profess to be either expert theologians or expert historians, but only seekers after God.

With regard to the Ritschlians, Dean Inge writes: (op. cit. p, 346) "They are neo-Kantians whose religion is an austere moralism,
and who seem to regard Christianity as a primitive Puritanism, spoiled by the Greeks, who brought into it their intellectualism and their sacramental mystics. It entirely ignores the Pauline and Johann doctrine of the mystical union, according to which Christ is not "external" to the redeemed soul, and most assuredly can never "vanish" from it. Instead of the "Lo I am with you always" of our blessed Lord, we are referred to "history" - that is, primarily, the four Gospels confirmed by "a fifth" the united testimony of the first Christian community. The above criticism has force because, in the case of the Ritschlians the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme of putting all the emphasis on the objective factor till they neglected altogether the subjective, but, though they carried their emphasis to such an extreme that it became untruth, the real meaning of their contention was much required as a corrective to the excessive subjectivism of mysticism, and their emphasis on the objective fact of Christ is still very much required at the present day, because all our labour from the beginning of this chapter has been to show that it is the objective factor, which gives rise to, and determines the nature of, mysticism, and consequently it is the objective factor of Christ which gives rise to Christian mysticism, and not any subjective psychic gift, and our emphasis on the objective factor is justified when, as we have seen Dean Inge can write a lengthy definition of mysticism without once mentioning the name of Christ, while almost the whole of his definition is occupied with descriptions of the subjective processes involved in mysticism.

Before we leave Dean Inge's definition of mysticism, as a result of/
of which he declares that mysticism is entitled to be regarded as a special type of religion, with a speculative and practical system of its own, we shall reproduce his reason for so regarding it. They are contained in a passage which immediately follows his definition. He says: (op. cit., p.6) "As a type of religion, then, mysticism seems to rest on the following propositions or articles of faith: first the soul (as well as the body) can see and perceive.... We have an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which, in its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensation in theirs. The second proposition is that, since we can only know what is akin to ourselves, man, in order to know God, must be a partaker of the divine nature.... This brings us to the third proposition - "without holiness no man may see the Lord".... There is one more fundamental doctrine which we must not omit. Purification removes the obstacles to our union with God, but our guide to the upward path, the true hierophant of the mysteries of God, is love..... The mystic, as we have seen makes it his life's aim to be transformed into the likeness of Him in whose image he was created. He loves to figure his path as a ladder reaching from earth to heaven, which must be climbed step by step. This "scala perfectionis" is generally divided into three stages. The first is called the purgative life, the second the illuminative, while the third, which is really the goal rather than a part of the journey, is called the unitive life or state of perfect contemplation.

Now with the second, third and fourth propositions, there can be little disagreement, as they are admitted on all hands to be articles of the Christian faith, namely, the existence of a divine image in man, and the necessity of holiness and of love, for communion with God.
These three articles, then, do not make mysticism into a "type of religion" different from ordinary Christianity; it is the first of the four articles, therefore, that makes mysticism into a separate type of religion, and this article maintains that "we have an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which, in its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensation in theirs". Here it is plainly admitted that mysticism is dependant on a mystic organ, or faculty or psychic endowment for the discernment of spiritual truth, and it is spoken of as singular, so that it is one particular organ or faculty. But when we enquire as to its nature, and how it is related to the other elements in mind what we find a little further on is a complete denial of any such organ or faculty. He says: (op. cit., p.19) "The mystic then, is not, as such, a visionary; nor has he any interest in appealing to a faculty "above reason", if reason is used in its proper sense, as a logic of the whole personality". In the same way Mrs Herman after supplying two illustrations to show that mysticism is dependant on a special psychic endowment, contradicts this a little later on when she says: "Few modern writers are bold enough to argue for the existence of a separate mystic sense, different in kind from those faculties of the soul which the mystic shows with the rest of humanity". The fact seems to be that the exponents of mysticism, when they attempt to show that Christian mysticism is a type of religion different from ordinary Christian communion, have nothing to advance in support of their contention except this mythical mystic sense or faculty, or organ which they bring forward at the beginning of their theory of mysticism to prove the uniqueness of mystic experience, and its difference from ordinary communion, but when they leave their theory/
theory of mysticism, and come down to facts of experience, the theory of the mystic organ or faculty has to be abjured.

We conclude then, that a case for mysticism has not been made out, and that, therefore, Christian mysticism is not a "type of religion" different from ordinary Christian communion, because nothing substantial can be produced by the supporters of mysticism to prove their contention that in Christian mysticism we have something more than Christian communion. It is time then that the myth of mysticism was abandoned by its votaries so that they may turn their attention to giving us an untrammelled exposition of communion with God, as it is found in the Old and New Testaments, in the Psalms, in the life of Christ, in St. Paul, in St. John, and in history. In such an exposition the results of the comparative study of religions, of psychology, ethics and metaphysics, would be put under contribution in order to show that communion with God through Christ in the Spirit, is the natural goal of the human spirit, the only means by which human personality can come to complete development and self-realisation.

Dean Inge has a smaller work on "The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought", (The Hulsean Lectures 1925-26, London, Longmans) The lectures are really a plea for religion as spiritual communion with God according to Pauline and Johannine theology. The title of the book might give the impression that Plato had more to do with spiritual communion than Christ, and if, instead of this apologetic title the author had called it "Christian Communion", and used Plato to supply parallels, he would be more convincing and true to facts, but there is this propensity on the part of such writers to regard/
regard ordinary Christian communion as not being "in the same street" with what they call mysticism, and so the title has to be "The Platonic Tradition" instead of "Christian Communion" to supply the esoteric flavour.

In spite of this defect the author has very weighty statements to make about the necessity of regarding Christianity as a religion the essence of which is communion. In his preface he says: "It is as the religion of the spirit that I plead the cause of what I have called the Platonic tradition." Professor W. P. Paterson, in his excellent Gifford lectures on "The Nature of Religion", recently published, says that "popular Christianity has never apprehended the spirituality of the Christian revelation". Again he says: (op. cit., p.27) "My point is that the religion of the spirit, that autonomous faith which rests upon experience and individual inspiration, has seldom had much of a chance in the world since the Christian revelation, in which it received its full and final credentials. We may call it the Platonic tradition since the school of Plato ended by being completely dominant in the last age of classical antiquity. We may venture to call it the true heir of the original Gospel, while admitting that no direct Hellenic influence can be traced in our Lord's teaching. We may confidently call it Pauline and Johannine Christianity".

Thus when the author leaves the theory of mysticism behind, and comes to close quarters with facts, he is perfectly sound, and admits that the essence of Pauline and Johannine theology is communion with God in Christ. With regard to Paulinism he says: (op. cit., p.30) "The Paulinism of the Reformation is not a true interpretation of St. Paul's religion. The Apostle of the Gentiles is far better understood/
understood now than in the days when an elaborate theology of a forensic type was built upon the Epistle to the Romans. The Christ-mysticism which is the heart of his personal faith is seen to be far more important for an understanding of his Christianity than his arguments about justification by faith and vicarious atonement'. While one does not agree with the opposition between Christian mysticism and theology expressed above, because theology as well as experience is indispensable, yet one welcomes the admission here that Christian mysticism or communion is simply ordinary Christianity and is not the preserve of an esoteric coterie. He sums up by saying; (op. cit., p.33) "My contention is that besides the combative Catholic and Protestant elements in the churches, there has always been a third element, with very honourable traditions, which came to life at the Renaissance, but really reaches back to the Greek Fathers, to St. Paul and St. John, and further back still. The characteristics of this type of Christianity are a spiritual religion, based on a firm belief in absolute and eternal values as the most real things in the universe - a confidence that these values are knowable by man - a belief that they can nevertheless be known only by whole-hearted consecration of the intellect, will, and affections to the great guest - an entirely open mind towards the discoveries of science - a reverent and receptive attitude to the beauty, sublimity and wisdom of the creation, as a revelation of the mind and character of the Creator - a complete indifference to the valuation of the worldling. The Christian element is supplied mainly by the identification of the inner light with the spirit of the living, glorified and indwelling Christ. This was the heart of St. Paul's religion, and it has/
has been the life-blood of personal devotion in all branches of the Christian Church to this day. In such a presentation of Christianity lies, I believe, our hope for the future.

In this presentation of mystical Christianity we have nothing more than ordinary spiritual Christianity and one could easily subscribe to most of what is here presented as being the essence of Christianity, all except the mistakes of making spiritual communion into a type of Christianity like the combative Catholic and combative Protestant, these being so far deviations from the true form; Christian communion is not merely a type of Christianity, it is the root out of which grows Christian theology and Christian ethics, "the way" out of which develops "the truth and the life". The second point to which we could not subscribe in the above presentation of Christianity is that Christian communion goes further back still past St. Paul and St. John. What we have past St. Paul and St. John is a different phase of communion, communion with the Absolute, a phenomenon parallel to, but vastly different from, Christian communion with the Father, because the Cross stands at the parting of the ways in the history of religion, making from that point "all things new", especially communion with God, and, the presentation of Christian communion that is going to make the future new, will place the Cross in such a relief and perspective at the centre of history that it will enlighten the past as well as the future instead of appearing to be a stage on the way of a process which began with Plato.

What is required then, is a presentation of Christianity as a spiritual or mystical religion which would give to mysticism a thorough airing in the clear sunlight, and render the word "mysticism" innocuous.
innocuous as a term, making it synonymous with spiritual communion, without any esoteric implications. This view of Christianity we have arrived at from our conception of love as the essence of both human and divine personality. Unless communion was the essence of Christianity this love could not find expression or means of development, but Christianity is the divine plan for creating and developing this love in human beings, and this is done by communion inspired by the continual vision of the love of God in Christ. Whatever the mistakes have been in the theory of the Christian mystics of the past as regards spiritual communion, they have made no mistake with regard to love being the essence of that communion, and it is here they score and become our teachers, and the love the best of them aimed at was a love which expressed itself in acts, and one of the ways in which the church of the future will be able to propagate this love, is by inculcating the pricelessness of acts of ordinary human kindness and sympathy in the ordinary affairs of life, by showing that such acts of ordinary human love and sympathy are, as Christ, St. Paul and St. John showed them to be, essentially the same as the love of God, and that "he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God". The parable of the Talents, of the Judgment and of the Good Samaritan shew that what is wanted is a big balance of good works in proportion to our gifts, that it is impossible to forgive those who have no good acts to their credit, and that even individual small isolated acts also are of eternal value. And there were none who were more insistent on the supremacy of love than the Old Testament prophets, but they used for it other terms, namely, "mercy", subjectively, and "righteousness"/
righteousness", objectively. And the supreme truth that the Old and New Testament alike teach, is that it rests with the will of man to realise or neglect this love.

The truth of this contention with regard to the supremacy of love may be further demonstrated from the physical effects of love. For instance, medical science tells us that the function of love is anabolic, and that of hate catabolic. That is to say, love is proved to build up the physical constitution as well as spiritual personality, whereas, for example, fits of blind anger, which are poles apart from the sacred tempered thing we call righteous indignation, are known to cause a discharge of adrenalin poison through the system which impairs physical as well as spiritual well-being, whilst, on the other hand, love controls the vital processes at the centre and fountain-head of being, and enables body and spirit to function naturally, and at their best.

Love, therefore is the original force that sustains in well-being, body as well as spirit, just as it is this force in the nature of the Godhead that has brought all things into being and sustains them in being. And, what love and hate respectively perform in the human body and life, they also perform on a proportionally larger scale in the body politic, in the life of society, and in the life of nations. This catabolic effect of hate is seen most clearly in the aftermath of a war like the last world war.
In this concluding chapter an effort will be made to gather up the results of our investigation so as to coordinate its main ideas into one constructive argument, which will be used in the second part of the chapter for the purpose of a final vindication of our theory of the religious consciousness against what is its most formidable opponent, namely, the theory of the religious consciousness propounded by Kant and accepted uncritically by so many of his followers down to the present day.

All the results obtained so far have been preparing us for this final vindication of our thesis, the thesis that feeling is primordial and regulative in consciousness, and, therefore, also in the religious consciousness which we maintain, is the most fundamental part of consciousness, and not the ethical part, as Kant and his followers maintain. If our theory proves effective in demonstrating the falsity of this Kantian position, we shall have supplied still further corroboration of the fundamental soundness of our theory.

Some writers regard Kant as the profoundest of all psychologists; others regard him as no psychologist at all. But the fact is that Kant had very little need of psychology or investigation into the nature of mind, because he found all the psychology he wanted in the categorical/
categorical imperative, the moral sense of duty. This was the foundation of all his philosophy and theology. The sense of duty was to him the foundation of the moral life, and the moral life again was the foundation of the religious life.

But, because we refuse to admit that religion is ancillary to morality, or an appendix to morality, we have been in the present thesis compelled to seek for the foundation of mind somewhere else than in the consciousness of right and wrong, namely, in the region of feeling where the religious feeling par excellence evinces itself as a feeling of dissatisfaction with all created things including the categorical imperative, and a desire for communion with God.

This purpose led us, in the first place, to examine minutely the nature of consciousness, and the attempt was made to prove that feeling was primordial in mind. Some test examples were taken, and it was shown that theories like those of Ward, Höfdding, and Galloway, who put cognition or conation first, landed their theories in serious and palpable contradictions.

Then, having, as it were, isolated the element of feeling, and having indicated its nature and function, we submitted it to a more minute examination by taking two test examples, one at the beginning of modern psychology and one more recent, namely, Schleiermacher and Hocking. This examination disclosed the very elusive nature of feeling, and how difficult it is to explain even for a great psychologist like Schleiermacher, who albeit he is amply aware of its fundamental nature, yet fails to give any definite intelligible account/
account of it, because the net result of his examination is to reduce feeling to absolute indefiniteness or nothingness. Hocking on the other hand who is equally alive to the primary nature of feeling, the regulative role of which he dilates on in eloquent terms, failing to find an ultimate explanation thereof, turns an intellectual somersault, as it were, and finds that feeling which he had been pursuing all the time is, strange to tell, the same as "idea".

Having indicated, therefore, in contradiction to the above authorities, what we considered the real nature of feeling in relation to the other states of consciousness we proceeded to seek for confirmation of our theory by a consideration of the explanation of mind offered by the "instinct psychology" a region of study from which a great deal of most valuable information about mind has been gleaned, information regarding the origin and nature of mind, its structure and primitive workings. All this information the Kantian student regards as superfluous because he has found the ultimate truth about mind in the categorical imperative.

From this study, then, was elicited the fact which amply confirmed our theory that instincts originate from a feeling of want or need on the part of the organism. This need compels it to emerge out of itself to find in the environment outside that which can satisfy its needs within. This feeling for something outside, results in awareness or cognition as a result of contact with external reality. This cognition or contact thereupon produces a reaction or conation appropriate to, or depending upon, the nature of that object, and so the experience continues and progresses. Instincts, then/
then, are formed as a result of the reactions of the organism towards particular events, situations, or objects in the external environment. The nature of the instincts thus formed depending upon the specific nature of the element in the environment which causes them. Instincts, therefore, witness to the fact of, and nature of external reality as well as to the nature and function of mind itself. If, then, it could be shown that there was a religious instinct, the conclusion would follow that there was an objective spiritual reality, in contact with which the religious instinct had emerged. It was found that no one particular instinct could be singled out as being the specifically religious one, and this result was hardly to be expected, but it was pointed out that just as there are several senses required for the apprehension of physical reality, and there are again several instincts engaged in the apprehension of ethical truth, so there may be several instincts involved in the apprehension of religious reality, and it was pointed out that the instincts of love, fear, awe, self-effacement and sociableness might well be considered as most of those that combine to form the religious consciousness.

As a result of our study of the instincts, three facts emerged that were emphasised as being of special value to our main purposes, firstly, the primary part played by feeling in the formation of the instincts, secondly, the fact that the nature of the instincts witnessed to the nature of external reality, thirdly, the fact that the instincts were evolved during the process of evolution of the race, and/
and were thus inherited by each one and formed the basis of the sentiments of the individual. Thus instincts were found to be feeling responses to specific aspects of reality which emerged during the process of evolution.

This result, again, led us to examine the nature of the sentiments to see what evidence they supplied of the nature of consciousness, and it was discovered that sentiments were built on the foundation of the instincts and were feeling complexes that formed round specific objects, situations, and events in the environment. The feeling complex or sentiment in each case was toned in a manner characteristic of that particular object round which it formed, so that the sentiment witnessed to the nature of the objective reality to which it referred. So, then, if it could be shown that there was a specifically religious sentiment or sentiments their presence would prove that there was some divine reality by which they were evoked. Here again we were encouraged by finding that leading psychologists admitted the existence of a self-sentiment and an altruistic sentiment. Our theory however, led us to emend this classification of the psychologists by adding to the above two sentiments the religious sentiment which certainly does exist, and forms round the idea of God, as the history of religions amply proves. There is hardly a race anywhere which has not got a religious sentiment that is evolved by the idea of divinity.

The religious sentiment, therefore, points to the existence of an objective reality which is the cause of it, and so the next part of/
of our task was to investigate the religious sentiment itself, in order to elicit therefrom information regarding the nature of the religious object. This was done by an examination of the religious consciousness offered by Professor Otto, and it was found that it was proved conclusively by Otto that a religious sentiment exists consisting of several allied sentiments. Otto's result however, was shown to be vitiated, and rendered almost nugatory by a wrong method of investigation whereby he failed to take account of the progressive development of the religious sentiment or religious knowledge, from the initial vague indefinite instinctive groping for the Divine, to more and more refined intimations thereof as experience developed. A clear description of these sentiments from their crude beginning through all their progressive stages to its most refined manifestation would afford so far proof that a divine reality exists, because sentiment is not "mere sentiment" but is an implicit of feeling thought, and will, and thus the reality with which the sentiment is concerned in each case undergoes the threefold test of these three elements in mind, so that if a sentiment persists from the beginning of life to the end acquiring more and more strength, clarity, and power to influence the life, then, that persistence is so far proof of the reality of the object of that sentiment and its progressive self-revelation to the mind of man. Thus the work of Otto while it failed to present the phenomenon of the religious sentiment in its historical development - the task on which Ernst Troeltsch was engaged - still his investigation had one result of supreme importance for the argument of the present chapter, namely, his inexpugnable proof/
proof of the existence of a religious sentiment as distinct from the ethical sentiments, a conclusion that Kant would deny, and Kantians spend much time and labour in refuting. This contention, however, is the very core of the argument of this thesis, namely, that the Divine is apprehended in a different way from that in which our sense of duty, or the nature of physical reality is apprehended.

Further it was pointed out that Otto did the cause of religion a real disservice in endeavouring to prove that religion is independent of morality. His unhistorical method helped him to do this with an appearance of success which at first sight seems splendid, but which on reflection produces profound disbelief in that part of his contention. Otto, then, fails to show how the religious sentiment, in the course of its development, presses morality into its service for the realisation of its own ends. The result is that he reduces the number of genuinely religious people in the world to a few seers and diviners with an inherited psychic gift. Otto failed to realise that the relation of morality to religion is not separation but subordination. Religion comes into play at all just because the human consciousness cannot find permanent satisfaction in mere morality. Then, when religion has found its goal in the vision of God, morality also is transformed and finds its goal in and through religion. Morality by itself has no goal; it can only find its goal through religion, and its goal and function in the economy of things is to enable religion to attain its goal. Here, it is worth asserting as clearly as possible that there is only one goal to life, not two, and it is attained through religion by the help of morality. In attempting, therefore, to show that religion is independent of morality/
morality Otto did the cause of religion harm. He should have been content with showing that religion was different from morality though dependent on it for the realisation of its own end.

The positive evidence from Otto's work bearing on this argument with regard to feeling went to show that our intimations of divinity come to us mostly by means of feelings of various kinds, thus proving that feeling is a positive phase of mind in which reason and will are also latent and ready to serve if required, but the divine reality is of such a nature as to be felt easier than described. Here it is desirable to make another strong assertion with regard to feeling, namely, that feeling is as positive and practical a phase of mind as reason or will, but it deals with a phase or moment of reality with which these two cannot deal. We saw that there were five kinds of feelings enumerated by Ward, and we could name four more which he did not mention, namely, instinct, intuition, sentiment, and interest or meaning or value. These latter four are halfway between feeling and cognition, so that feeling is not blind, but is also cognitive in its own way. Of the above four, sentiment and value are on the same intellectual level and practically connote the same thing. But though the three irreducible phases of mind intermingle to a certain degree yet each of them deals with a moment of reality with which the others cannot deal. Thus it is the function of feeling to bring cognition and will into operation. In the same way religion brings morality into operation and regulates it and supplies it with a goal.
After discussing the function of feeling, attention was then diverted to the role of reason in developing the religious consciousness. It was pointed out how reason is a want or urge of the human mind quite as much as feeling is. Man, by a necessity of his nature is under an urge or compulsion to give a reason for the faith that is in him, and thereby justify the reasonableness of his feelings, thoughts, and actions to himself and to others. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that reason never operates in isolation, but only in conjunction with the other two elements in mind. There is a conative element also in reason though it may not always be so obvious, but the feeling element is obvious because one of the favourite working conceptions of philosophic thinkers nowadays is that of "value" or more fully "feeling-value", a term which explicitly indicates the two elements in cognition, namely, the feeling or interest or meaning element alongside of the reason or judgment element; and on our theory there is bound to be a conative element also, as is suggested by the ideo-motor theory of action of some philosophers. Thus feeling or interest is shown to be regulative of reason. It is also regulative of all processes of attention which are the raw material of reason. It is, moreover, the fundamental principle of all effective education which is largely a work of supplying reasons, and reasons cannot be supplied or retained without interest.

From this point our discussion took the form of a consideration of the traditional rational so-called proofs that have been put forward to prove the existence of God, the proofs known as the Theistic Proofs/
Proofs or Arguments. It was shown that two fundamental mistakes were made with regard to these proofs. The first mistake was that these proofs were for so long taken as logical proofs and great pains were taken to prove that no valid conclusion could be deduced from any of them because the conclusion was made to contain more than the premises. And so Kant taking them as a piece of logical reasoning refuted them by means of logic and so the proofs were discarded largely on his authority. But logic is not the only test that is applicable to this case, and it would be better to discard the word proof which suggests logic, and use the word argument which implies evidence, as these so-called proofs are of the nature of evidence each supplying its own contribution.

The second mistake was in dealing with these proofs in isolation as if each could yield independent proof. In spite, however, of Kant's isolation of the Moral Argument in order to find in it the absolute certainty of duty, we maintain that no one of the arguments can be taken by itself, and that no one of them can by itself yield ultimate certainty. Their significance lies in the fact that they form one whole, and support and supplement one another, and the three together yield cumulative evidence that is still, in spite of Kant, of the greatest value possible, and of infinitely greater value than the Moral Argument taken alone. The three taken together are in fact the only evidence we have of the truth of religion apart from the revelation in Christ.

It is now necessary to prove this statement by referring to the Arguments themselves. The Arguments may be classified into three groups, the first group comprising the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments, the second, the Moral and Historical Arguments, and the
third, the Ontological Argument. These three groups deal with the whole of existent reality between them, as follows: the Cosmological and Teleological deal with physical reality, the Moral and Historical with ethical reality, and the Ontological with religious reality. The significance of these Arguments is simply this that they summarise man's thoughts about these three ultimate phases of reality, by the contemplation of which the human mind ever rises to the thought of God, whose existence is alone sufficient to explain the presence of these three phases of reality.

This movement of thought from the three phases of reality to God may be illustrated by a very brief consideration of the nature of the three Arguments. Firstly, with regard to the first group the Cosmological and the Teleological which as we saw imply one another, it is indisputable that the causation and purpose which they imply are our first tutors to take us the first stage forward towards morality, and hence towards religion. Without experience of cause and effect and of teleology or purpose we should have no appreciation of moral law, the essential conception of which is purpose or end. Morality does not begin until teleology, purpose, end or good is conceived by mind in some shape or form.

It will be objected that the sense of duty or the moral instinct is present in us innately. The reply, however, is that the physical universe is prior to living beings who came into existence upon it, and the nature of the physical universe had a great deal to do with the shaping of the instincts including the moral instinct, and this is believable because nature expresses the mind of God as far/
far as it is expressible through the medium of physical reality.

It is therefore, futile to dismiss the evidence from nature by mere logic, and regard it as of no value for proof, while all our certainty is supposed to come from the moral sphere. The evidence from nature has its own importance, and the evidence is gaining in prestige day by day. Nowadays, for instance, scientists are speaking of living atoms and a living universe, and some do not even hesitate to use the term spiritual of these same realities, so that the rapprochement between science and religion is closer than ever before. The evidence, therefore, of a spiritual cause of the universe is increasing in strength, but there is no such thing as an absolute logical proof or certainty of the existence of God as first cause from this or from any of the arguments; nor need the absence of such an absolute proof be regretted, because the God, who could be proved by logical demonstration, would very likely not meet our religious needs.

Secondly, the Moral and Historical arguments in the same way yield their own contribution of evidence in their own characteristic way, but this argument also, in spite of Kant and Kantians, does not yield absolute certainty, as we shall see later. The evidence from this proof, however, is of the greatest importance and supplements that yielded by the first group. The Moral Argument points to the ultimate cause of the universe being a Good Will.

Then, thirdly, the Ontological Argument is a form of reasoning which originates in the human mind as a result of its dissatisfaction with the finiteness or imperfection of all things physical and moral which it experiences in the life process. The vastness, complexity
mystery of the universe compels man to postulate God as first cause and sufficient explanation. In the same way the moral life with its mystery of good and evil, success and failure compels man to postulate a supreme Being, perfect in all moral attributes from whom moral nature emanates and in whom moral values are conserved. In this way physical reality and moral reality lead to the thought of religious reality or God. Thus the Ontological Argument is the religious argument par excellence. It argues that if experience of physical nature and of moral nature compel man to postulate God, then, there is strong evidence that these phases of reality are expressions of his mind in different forms and that, therefore, God exists and His essential nature may be known from physical ethical and religious nature as it exists in the world. The argument is the expression of a feeling of need - the need for God to explain existence.

We now come more particularly to Kant's preferential treatment of the Moral Argument. The sense of duty in man was an insuperable and self-evident argument to Kant that the Supreme Good must exist. This sense of duty formed the keystone of his philosophy, and he found in it the ultimate authority for the moral life, as well as for religion. The other proofs Kant refuted logically, and thereafter he had no further use for them because he came to find in the Moral Argument all the certainty he wanted both for morality and for religion.

In criticism of this partiality of Kant towards one of the traditional proofs and his rejection of the others as valueless it may/
may be remarked that it will seem strange in the light of what we have said above of the mutual relation between the three arguments that one of the arguments should be found so valid, and that the others which formed one unity with it should have no validity whatsoever. One of the reasons was that Kant's test of validity was a logical one, and the only one that passed muster was the Moral Argument, while the others fell out. And it passed muster because it fell readily into a succinct form like the Cartesian formula which owed not a little of its popularity to its succinctness and intelligibility. We maintain, however, that the Arguments are to be taken together because they refer to the three ultimate phases of reality. The arguments thus form a hierarchy culminating in the religious. The three are related to one another like three logical steps in one argument, and no one of these steps can be omitted without invalidating that argument. Moreover, these three irreducible phases of reality are the means of developing the three irreducible elements in man's spiritual nature, namely, feeling, knowing, and willing. The existence of physical reality compels a man to know, the existence of a moral reality somewhere in the nature of the universe compels him to distinguish between good and evil, and the existence of a religious reality compels him to seek God. It is strange, therefore, if the nature of reality is such that absolute certainty was to be found in one of these spheres, and no certainty from either of the other two. We maintain however that the certainties that can be derived from these three spheres of/
of reality also form a hierarchy, each one making the next higher possible.

As was said above, causation and teleology prepares the mind for the conception of purpose and end which is the foundation of the conception of the moral consciousness. "Thou must" of the moral law would have no force for the individual, unless it was felt by the individual to serve an end or purpose for him. And, finally, without experience of the moral law man would never feel any need for religion. Thus it seems quite arbitrary to fix upon the moral law and affirm that it is the only source of certainty. The "ought" of the moral law, it is here maintained, is not more insistent than the "ought" of religion "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God". The proof of this, and that a very ample one, is the spectacle of religious devotion from the first dawning of human intelligence down to the religious condition of man at the present day. Had there been no religious imperative or compulsion there would be no spectacle of religious devotion. And further, we maintain that the religious sphere is higher than the moral sphere, and that it lends to morality all the sanction it possesses, and not vice versa as Kant maintained. Having arrived at this position we shall now proceed to prove it.

From what we have said, it has been already made clear that there can be no attention except through interest. Therefore, there can be no "absolute" moral command. The individual would pay absolutely no attention to an absolute imperative, unless he saw that it was good for him. And the good for the individual is never absolute; it is determined partly by the moral ideas of the society around him, partly by his own individual idiosyncrasies, and partly even by his physical/
physical nature. When it comes to be recognised that the moral imperative contains a personal equation depending on the degree of enlightenment of the conscience or moral ideal of the individual, then doubt creeps in as to its absoluteness.

There are, of course, certain commands that are obvious like most of the Ten Commandments, but there are a great many cases in which the categorical imperative fails to inform us. Take the case of a preacher who has conducted Divine Service. After it is over he feels that he ought to have prepared his sermon better, been more earnest, been more simple, and ought to have presented the Gospel better. In such cases the categorical imperative cannot inform us what to do; what degree of earnestness, for example, is right or what degree is wrong.

Then, again, and more serious still, when we question the moral imperative, it fails to tell us why we should perform it at all, or why we are here at all to perform it. There are these doubts regarding the moral law all the time hanging about on the periphery of consciousness, and often invading its centre, and paralysing moral effort, producing the sense of doubt and uncertainty. Moreover there is the consciousness of failure, failure not only in the less clear cases, but also in the case of the clearest deliverances of consciousness. And the failure is felt to be due to sheer lack of inspiration to perform the duty. So that as a result of the operation of the moral law, man does not as Kant imagined, find himself on the only solid ground there is, but on the contrary he feels himself/
himself sinking deeper and deeper in debt to the moral law. He is tortured with his past failure and future inability to fulfill all the commandments of the law perfectly, as he knows he ought to perform them.

It is this dissatisfaction with the moral law that creates in man the need for religion or for some "way" in which this problem of failure, of imperfect obedience to the moral law, can be solved. This, we saw, is the truth implied in the Ontological Argument, a dissatisfaction with the physical universe and the moral law, so that the human mind feeling the inability of the law to give satisfaction is compelled to postulate a higher phase of reality in which satisfaction for its moral nature may be found. This higher phase of reality man conceives of as a Spiritual Being who is infinite in all the perfections - perfections in which man himself has failed. Friendship or fellowship with such a person it is felt, would provide an inspiration and guarantee that life was worth living and immortal life as well. The existence of such a Being is the only hope in sight of ever attaining to that perfection of the moral life for which man strives and longs. It is when faith in this possibility comes that religious conversion takes place, and the man who was formerly a legalist becomes a man of faith.

This is why Jesus offered Himself as the Way, the Truth, and the Life. The Truth and the Life can never reach their goal except through the Way. Kant on the contrary maintains that the human mind comes to rest in the "ought" of morality as the anchor of the soul.
That the individual must obey the ought is the only thing in the universe he is sure of. But we are seeing that this theory is untenable. The ought of morality could give satisfaction only if we limit our duties to a defined number, as the Scribes and Pharisees did, but this is not morality, but mere legalism, so that legalism and self-righteousness is the only possible outcome of Kant's theory, but despair of the moral law, the sense of the need of forgiveness, and the desire to have complete fellowship with the Forgiver, is the essence of religion. This forgiveness aims at purity of heart, a condition which involves the complete fulfilment of the moral law. Thus the moral law finds its inspiration as well as its goal in religion and not vice versa as Kant affirmed.

The point that has been reached, so far, is this, that there are three phases of reality, namely, physical reality, ethical reality, and religious reality. The Theistic Proofs were the traditional forms in which thinkers endeavoured to make deductions from these three realities. The modern scientific methods and the psychological historical methods being unknown logic was the only critical instrument and, being inadequate to deal with all aspects of reality, it could not make any valid deductions about these realities much less make them into any proof of the divine reality. According to our theory, then, we dispute Kant's right to seek for all his certainty in one sphere only, namely the moral, and derive therefrom his only certainty for religion also.

Human certainty, however, is not an absolute thing, but progressive/
progressive, and it begins in contact with physical reality. The certainty derived from nature is the foundation of ethical certainty, and their combination serves to form a higher certainty than either of them could be in isolation. The certainty derived from contact with nature and from the moral life, again, forms the condition of religious certainty. Each form of certainty in kind is different from the other, and they form a hierarchy, religious certainty being the highest because it deals with the highest and most inclusive reality of all. Whatever certainty we have, therefore, is derived from all three spheres, and not from one only as Kant maintains, namely, the ethical. From this absolute ethical certainty he deduced our certainty in religion, but the certainty that we have is not an absolute one, for absolute certainty, as applied to morality and religion, no one can ever define. What we have is a degree of certainty adequate to our needs as human spiritual beings, namely the certainty of faith, which is advancing to more and more certainty.

In accordance with our theory then, which posits three ultimate phases of reality corresponding to three ultimate phases of mind, we venture to emend what may be considered as Kant's confession of faith in his "Critique of the Practical Reason" where he says in accordance with his theory of a twofold reality: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them; the starry heavens above and the moral law within". We would venture to emend it so as to make it say: "Three things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration the/
the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above, the moral law within, and man's quest for Goz".

Lest it may seem sheer arrogance to question the position of such an intellectual stalwart as Kant, it is desirable to enlist on our side another great mind, namely, Ernst Troeltsch who "was cut off from the land of the living" before he had finished his life's work.

Troeltsch followed Kant in making a twofold division of mind into the theoretic and the practical. The theoretic dealt with physical reality and the practical with ethical-religious-aesthetic reality. This uncritical acceptance by Troeltsch of Kant's twofold division is only part of the spell which the great philosopher has cast over so many of his successors; even those who departed from him in important respects retained much of the framework of his philosophy. Troeltsch moved away from Kant towards a more psychological and historical method. In this connection it may be here pointed out that it has been particularly difficult for Kantian students to move out of this El Dorado of the categorical imperative out of which is mined the precious ore of not only morality but also of religion; it is difficult for them to go afield and prospect for some other explanation than the categorical imperative. Consequently we find that Ritschlians and Kantians have very scant use for psychology; there is in fact to them no other psychology worth talking about except this certainty of the "oughtness" of duty which sufficiently explains for them the origin of consciousness, morality, and religion.

Ritschlian/
Ritschlian and Kantian theologians, therefore, lose a great deal by not exploring other ways of explaining the nature of mind as, for example, the explanation of the origin and nature of mind offered by the instinct and sentiment psychology, the possibilities of which are so clearly adumbrated by Otto's effort, although he came short of complete success on account of the inadequacy of his method which failed to demonstrate the mutual relations between the religious sentiment and moral ideals in the historical process.

The instinct and sentiment psychology, however, seem to us to be worthy of study as being a hopeful line of investigation of the moral and the religious consciousness. In spite of his faulty unhistorical method Otto has thrown much fresh light on the nature of the religious consciousness, but how much more important the result would have been had his method been more adequate! It is not asserted that direct proof can be attained as Otto hoped for, but at least important fresh sidelights may be obtained of the origin and nature of the early beginnings and development of man's apprehension of divine things. And one of the important facts that will be found is what we have been endeavouring to demonstrate in the course of our argument, namely, the regulative part played by feeling, and this part it plays right up to the end of life. A second result would be the witness of the feelings to objective reality from which the religious idea of God springs and the mutual influence of feeling and idea in furthering one another's development could be demonstrated by/
by a study of these in the historic process. It was because of the prospect that it offered of some fresh insight into the nature of the religious consciousness that we ventured to follow this line of study in this thesis. Only the fringe, however, of the subject has been touched here, because the field of religious history and experience is so vast. What such a study would yield would be not proofs but a new viewpoint. But then a new viewpoint might mean ever so much to religion.

This was the work that Troeltsch hoped to perform and in collecting his data he proposed to follow the American school of religious experience of James, Starbuck, Leuba, and Coe, and, having collated all possible facts regarding the religious consciousness he then proposed to rationalise them in order to come to definite conclusions regarding religious experience. Otto's method of investigating the religious consciousness was also by way of the instincts and sentiments, but Troeltsch's method was more hopeful because more historical, and, therefore more scientific.

Though Troeltsch followed Kant theoretically in the twofold division of reality, as we have seen, he departed from him practically in making the sphere of religion a sphere entirely by itself independent of morality. To Troeltsch it was incomprehensible that the apprehension of the Divine by the soul should depend upon, or be developed from, a rationalisation like the categorical imperative. He refused to admit that this alone could ever constitute the organ of religious insight, and maintained, in spite of the fact of his binary division, that religion had an independent sphere of its own.
We have, therefore, Troeltsch's support as against Kant that there are three avenues of knowledge, and not two, and they correspond to the three realities of physical nature, moral nature, and the Divine nature. The most fundamental classification of reality, therefore, is into physical, ethical, and religious, and not physical, ethical, aesthetic, because the aesthetic is not separate, but underlies all three; nature, ethics, and religion: either that or it ought to be subsumed under religion to which it is most related, as the aesthetic element is of the nature of worship, worship of perfection or the ideal like religion.

Troeltsch called the religious consciousness the religious a priori. This name, however, is objectionable in that it suggests something like a religious sense or faculty. His method, however, showed that he really meant the religious sentiment which could be studied historically; an a priori is timeless and cannot be studied historically, which was the delusion in Otto's mind. The term a priori should, therefore, be discarded and the study of the religious consciousness should be conducted historically from the point of view first of all of the three irreducible states of consciousness, in order to show their different functions and effect upon one another. Then after this should proceed the investigation of the instincts, which witness to reality more objectively than a so-called a priori, and thereafter the sentiments should be studied in their historical development.

A few observations will suggest how such a line of study worked up into a "magnum opus" would alter appreciably the centre of gravity in/
in religious teaching and practice.

For example, too much in the past, religion has been announced to people for acceptance like Kant's categorical imperative, whether they wish it or not, the effect often being the creation of a counter suggestion. But a due understanding of the nature of feeling, interest, or meaning, and of the fact that there cannot be any attention without interest would foster the conviction that there is no use preaching religion unless first of all people feel that it is going to mean something to them, and is going to meet some need of theirs. Why people neglect or oppose religion is just because they are not interested; they do not feel that it contains anything that is going to meet their need. Secondly, the function of cognition would disclose the fact that there is an urge in mind to know the rationale of religion - how and why religion works. This would make preaching more religious instead of ethical or social or aesthetic or political. And thirdly, a proper realisation of the function of the will would reveal the necessity of service. Moreover the existence of social instincts would reveal that man is meant to be social and can only achieve his salvation by fulfilling his part as a member of society; he cannot enter heaven alone. Then also it would be seen that the instinct which is the basis of the social or the gregarious instinct is the parental instinct or the instinct of altruistic love, and it is this instinct that leads man to seek in God what he fails to find in man, namely, perfect fellowship. This fellowship with God is the only thing that can make a better social being. Each instinct has its/
its own lesson, but space does not permit to go into them in details.

The fact, however, that these instincts indicate what kind of life we were intended for would come home with far greater impressiveness than religious authority or the categorical imperative, especially to educated and scientific people. And lastly the sentiment which is a feeling or complex of feelings that gather round an object, and religion being a sentiment that gathers round the idea of God, reminds us of the important fact that feelings grow cold unless kept warm by practices of devotion, worship, and service. When religion fails, for instance, it fails for lack of sentiment or dryness.

These are the lessons that are being emphasised to-day, and they are the facts that appeal to present day people. They are being emphasised at all because they have filtered down from the above studies. More intensive study, it can easily be believed, would yield more information still that would be of immense practical value to religion. It is not suggested that these are new truths that we have not got in revelation already; what is suggested is that these new facts corroborate revelation, and are invaluable because of the scientific and critical temper of the age which is disinclined to authority.

Troeltsch, as we saw, based the religious consciousness on a religious a priori on the analogy of Kant's imperative, and thus failed to supply proof of a separate avenue of religious knowledge, but his method was on a broader basis than the idea of a priori would suggest, and sooner or later his method would have delivered him/
him from the Kantian tradition by causing him to discard the idea of a priori in favour of the instinct and sentiment.

So far we have essayed to vindicate our views of consciousness and its corresponding objective reality as divisible into three parts as against Kant's binary division. In concluding our criticism of this topic it may be pointed out that Kant himself varied as to his estimate of the imperative. His characteristic position is that the imperative is absolute and can, therefore, be made the premise of a logical proof for the absoluteness of duty, for the evidence of God, and for immortality.

At other times the imperative is almost the opposite of this, and contains a personal coefficient, and although it serves the practical ends of life, yet it cannot form the ground of a metaphysical theory of life. At such times he asserts that there is a need and a compulsion in duty, but that it is voluntarily accepted. Or he describes it as something approaching the will-to-believe of William James. And strangest of all he makes the ultimate springs of conduct issue from love, for he says that in the end we must have something to love. But "practical value", "voluntary acceptance", the "will-to-believe", and "love" are all forms of feeling, interest, or meaning, so that Kant, after having already described the ultimate organ of certainty as a combination of reason and will (practical reason), is now evidently forced to acknowledge that feeling or interest also enters into our volitions.

The above four supplementary descriptions of will prove that Kant unknown to himself is compelled to acknowledge that the three phases of consciousness are occupied in every conscious process, and in/
in every conscious process we saw that feeling or interest is regulative. Duty is, therefore, not an order addressed to reason from a transcendental sphere, but is the effort of the individual to satisfy his instinctive or characteristic needs.

In the same way Kant having divorced feeling or interest from duty in this life has to supply the defect by a "deus ex-machina" who will in the next life dole out by instalments the happiness missed in this life. We close this criticism of Kant, then, by observing that any theory like Kant's that explains the metaphysics of mind by ignoring the regulative function of feeling is bound to come to contradictions, as we have been seeing all along.

In order to further vindicate our theme we shall now briefly consider two topics of the theology of Albert Ritschl which have a bearing on our present discussion: the first is his division of reality into two classes, and the second is his derivation of ultimate religious certainty from morality. This was the Kantian schema but in Ritschl's case the provenance was different, and so its consideration will further vindicate our theory.

The fundamental conception of Ritschl for explaining the nature of consciousness was "value", and value, we may observe here by the way, can be recognised as of the same category as feeling, interest, or meaning, so that his discovery was the discovery of the primary place of feeling in any ultimate metaphysical explanation of mind.

The term value was prepared for Ritschl by Hermann Lotze who followed Kant in dividing all reality into two divisions of physical nature/
nature and spiritual nature, but Lotze called the two divisions "fact" and "value". Lotze also followed Kant in finding in duty the ultimate source of certainty. But this certainty was not like Kant's an absolute one, but was decided by the feeling or interest or meaning which duty had for the personality. And this value yielded a certainty of its own kind which was as final and absolute for the total personality as logical truth was for the reason.

The discovery of feeling, interest, meaning, or value as an ultimate metaphysical explanation which is the theme of this essay, was a great advance in the history of thought. The doctrine was first given to the world by Fichte in the form of the doctrine of interest whereby he demonstrated that thinking must begin, not from external reality, but from the nature and constitution of consciousness and its interests.

Lotze took up the idea of the interests of the self as the starting point of philosophy, and pursued the subject under the form of the relation of value to reality. He essayed to pass over from value to reality, but found it difficult. Here Ritschl came in and solved the difficulty. Ritschl took up the idea of value and, while retaining Kant's division of reality into two departments, Ritschl endeavoured to reconcile these two.

To Kant, as we saw, reality was divisible into two parts, namely nature or facts or scientific knowledge on the one hand, and spiritual realities on the other. His "Critique of Pure Reason" dealt with the/
the first of these and his "Critique of the Practical Reason" with the second. The object of his division was in order to distinguish as clearly as possible between these two domains in order to show the independence of morality and religion of science. The study of the natural sciences led to materialism and scepticism, but Kant showed that investigation of the laws of nature can never affect the foundations of faith. The sciences deal with fact, but philosophy with worth. Science cannot tell the worth of things. The thing of supreme worth is the good will. We can only know nature as phenomena, not the real essence, but in regard to duty we know it absolutely. It is the only thing we are certain of. Kant thus showed the independence of morality and religion of the claims of science which offered a Natural Theology based on science and independent of Revelation. Kant thus, in the interests of morality and religion made a breach between these two phases of reality which he failed to reconcile. Lotze attempted to reconcile them under the form of fact and value, but failed to make any effective reconciliation.

Ritschl was successful in effecting a reconciliation between fact and value but failed on the other hand to accord to religion an autonomous sphere in his classification. Ritschl reconciled fact and value by recognising that nothing theoretic or practical can obtain the attention of consciousness unless it possesses value for the individual. Thus scientific facts have interest or value for consciousness as well as moral and religious realities. Accordingly Ritschl divides all values into two classes: scientific facts he included/
included under the rubric of concomitant values, and spiritual facts under independent values.

The twofold division into concomitant and independent values, however, does not seem to us to be adequate to the problem in hand. We, therefore, venture to differ from Ritschl's classification. Our reason for doing so is this, that our theory requires a threefold division of values into physical, ethical, and religious values. No two of these can be combined together without doing violence to either, because all three realities are essentially different and irreducible to one another like the three irreducible states of consciousness. So that we have to recognise not two but three phases of reality.

Our second criticism of Ritschl bears on his affirmation following the Kantian tradition, that the ultimate certainty in religion is derived from the sphere of morality. This position is inconsistent with Ritschl's fundamental tenet which is that the starting point of religion is the consciousness of the need of the forgiveness of sins.

But this forgiveness surely, implies that the most certain fact for the forgiven person is not the categorical imperative but the existence of Deity who forgives the sins, and having discovered this supreme fact, which he embraces by faith, the subject is now in possession of a new kind of certainty which infinitely transcends in quality and range any certainty that he may have had of the categorical imperative. As a matter of fact, as we endeavoured to show already/
already, it was his dissatisfaction with the moral law that started
the individual out on the quest for God. Right and wrong, we saw,
might be perfectly clear in a great many cases, but in a great many
cases also the decision was not so clear. Over and above that there
was failure to follow the right even in the clear cases, and also
there was the deep down questioning as to why right was right and
wrong was wrong. But, once the individual acquires certainty of
God and the forgiveness of sins, the moral law appears to him in a
new light invested with a new sanctity as the expression of the mind
of God. This certainty the individual now feels he must keep firm
hold of by establishing a relationship or fellowship or communion
with God, because his belief in forgiveness means that he has taken
God for a real existent person.

This was our reason for inserting the last chapter on the nature
of communion with God, because, as we set out to prove in the begin­
nning of our thesis, religion is the quest for God, and communion or
fellowship with God is the goal of religion. In that chapter object
ion was made to exponents of mysticism who implied in their exposition
that this communion was only possible for those who possessed a
special psychic gift, thus divorcing the moral life from the insight
obtained through religion. In spite, however, of this initial mis­
take in the exposition of most writers on mysticism, they nevertheless
take great pains to show that, after the initial illumination, progres
in the divine life depends on the effort of the will to maintain a
good life. But this effort of the will is rendered infinitely
easier/
easier because it now has received the sanction and inspiration derived from the vision of God. Quietists, Antinomians, and Pantheists there are among them, but the exception only proves the rule. Thus morality derives its sanction and inspiration from religion and finds its goal in religion and not vice versa as Kantians maintain and Ritschlians in as far as they are under the dominance of the Kantian tradition.

In the hands of such Kantians, religion becomes a mere appendix to religion; all they need to know is what the duty is and straight way like the sons of Zebedee they are ready to say "We are able". To such Kantians the unfolding of the moral life itself reveals God; every moral life lived is a further revelation of God, and adds certainty to the certainty already obtained; and when they come to consider Christ they regard him according to Kant's doctrine, as only one more instance of what they have seen in themselves in the categorical imperative, and in countless other human lives around them. Christ is admitted to be the supreme example of moral victory, and is so much the more inspiring and helpful, but there is nothing new in Christ but what was seen in many lives before. Every age possesses a high-priest of this doctrine from the Stoics to Kant, from Kant to Emerson, and from Emerson to the present day.

On this theory one can hardly see what the necessity of the revelation of God in Christ can be; one cannot see why, instead of Christ, God did not arrange to send some great ethical teacher, a Socrates for each successive generation. This is the logical outcome of Kant's doctrine, and Kantians reduce it to a veritable "reductio/
"reductio ad absurdum", and the more it is polished and elaborated the more crude the doctrine becomes. The revelation in Christ is hardly required. Man sees God in his own will. "In the soul let redemption be sought", said Emerson. So the Kantian looks inside at his own will and fancies he sees God, but what he actually sees is only his own Kantian self. And so glued is the Kantian to his idol of duty that he is prepared to sacrifice anything to it, even the divinity of Christ, and we would be inclined to leave him alone except for the incalculable harm that this doctrine can do and is doing in reducing religion to legalism. It is true that every human life is a revelation of God in its own degree, but the degree of light contributed by one life or all combined is not sufficient for human needs. After man has seen all human example, it only makes him cry out in despair for God.

Kantians, however, have an objection, namely, that such knowledge of God as mystics and others profess to obtain is not demonstrable, and, therefore useless, because it cannot be made use of in any philosophical theory. We shall come to this point a little later. Meantime it is enough to say that this question depends on what kind of demonstration is expected, and finally it must be admitted that no demonstration of any kind of the ultimate reality in religion could possibly convince a person without faith. Besides there is nothing worth while in the universe that can be proved. One, however, feels that Kant and many of his followers had more religious faith than their doctrine permitted them to express, but the doctrine has to be/
be condemned because of the prestige of its author, and the spell he has cast over his followers whose doctrines permeate down to the masses, and strike at the root of belief in supernatural revelation, or such facts as religious conversion and communion, both of which yield certainty far beyond that afforded by the moral conscience. These latter facts have a very slight hold nowadays on account of this Kantian philosophy of the subordination of religion to morality.

Though Ritschl followed Kant in thus deriving ultimate certainty from the moral consciousness, his fame rests on something else, namely on the emphasis he laid in contradiction to Kant and Kantians on the uniqueness of the revelation of God in Christ, and the way it meets the religious needs of man. Wilhelm Herrmann developed the teaching of Ritschl. Starting from the origin of religious need as originating not in the sense of duty, but in the sense of moral failure, he shows how the revelation of God in Christ meets that need. Herrmann opposes mysticism because Christ alone has the value of God for man, and we can find God nowhere else except in Christ. Communion with God cannot, therefore, take place except through Christ, the "way". Mystics on the other hand leave Christ and run off to have fellowship with some other God or Absolute.

Thus Ritschl and Herrmann are poles apart from Kant in their estimate of Christ and Revelation, but the defect in their theology is their neglect of metaphysical explanation. This want of a metaphysical system leads them to affirm metaphysically one thing one time and its opposite the next. For example they assert the categorical,
categorical imperative at one time and Christ at another to be the ultimate authority in the Christian religion. They take refuge in positive authority which they believe to be above logic and metaphysics. But metaphysical explanation is an urge of the human mind, and its neglect cannot but result in confusion and obscurity. When the metaphysics is wrong the theory of religion founded thereon is bound to be askew somewhere.

This derivation of certainty from the ethical sphere alone, is, therefore misleading, not so much in the hands of Ritschlian as in the hands of Kantian theologians. We have, therefore, to acknowledge what is the theme of this thesis that there are three avenues of knowledge, the physical, the ethical, and the religious, and not two only, and these three sources supplement one another, so that ultimate certainty can only be obtained when we have reached the highest of the three. Comte divided reality into religion, metaphysics and science. Religion was myth and therefore lowest in the scale. Metaphysics was speculation, but science was the highest certainty of all and any real metaphysic of religion had to be derived from science. This however is a faulty classification invented for a polemical purpose because the second order of reality is not metaphysics but ethics, and ethics is not speculation.

We shall proceed to draw this thesis to a close, then, by again asking the question: "Is there a religious sense or instinct or sentiment?
sentiment or awareness as distinct from the ethical variety of
these? This is the question we have been answering all along, but we
ask it again by way of summing up our answer in more or less logical
form as Kantians will demand a logical statement that can be used in
a philosophical theory of religion.

All the steps of our reasoning from the beginning of this essay
until now have been preparing us for the answer. Our argument may
be put as follows: We have seen that there are three phases of
reality:—the physical, the ethical, and the religious. Each of
these is apprehended in its own peculiar, characteristic way. For
example: reason is more occupied than the rest of mind in investi­
gating the laws of nature, the will is more involved in the esti­
mation of ethical matters, and feeling or interest, which witnesses
to what we need, is the phase of mind that leads us on to religion.
None of these mental phases exists in isolation, and all three phases
enter into each mental process.

If, therefore, we can speak of a physical sense or sensation,
a physical instinct, a physical sentiment or a physical awareness,
and, if we can speak of an ethical sense, instinct, sentiment, or
awareness, then, according to our line of reasoning, there is no
reason why we should not speak of a religious sense, instinct, senti­
ment or awareness, these terms indicating the form of knowledge in
each case in its different stages from its most rudimentary stage to
its complete form, the sense becoming an instinct, the instinct a
sentiment.
sentiment, and the sentiment knowledge. If then, it is wrong to use these terms in the sphere of religion, we maintain that it is equally wrong to use them in the other two spheres. But what our investigation has taught us is this, that just as there are five senses with which we experience physical reality, so there are more than one instinct or one sentiment going to form our ethical appreciation, and likewise more than one instinct or one sentiment combining to give us religious knowledge, as we have seen already. So that our answer is that there is a separate avenue of knowledge for religion, religion being in its origin a felt need for fellowship with the Divine Being and in its development and goal a realisation of that fellowship. It is the same total personality and not "one compartment of it which is involved in religion as well as in physical and ethical experience, but the sentiments or values vary in each case giving physical, ethical, and religious values respectively.

Our second question is: "What is the nature of the knowledge of God which comes through this avenue?" The answer to this is admittedly difficult. Kantians would say that no clear affirmation can be made of any demonstrable knowledge derived from this quarter, and, therefore, they say that the only definite knowledge we have is of the ethical, which knowledge is expressible in the word "duty". Mechanistic and Behaviourist psychologists on the other hand, would say that the feelings of the mystics of ineffableness, unification of consciousness, nearness of the presence of God, power and expansiveness, and ecstasy can all be produced by drugs. But the question depends/
depends on what kind of proof or statement is possible or adequate to the case of religion. One suspects that what Kantians would like is a logical formula like "duty", and what the Behaviourist would like is a photographic representation.

Religion as we saw in its origin and essence, belongs more to the sphere of feeling like aesthetics, and the beautiful is very difficult to describe, as are all feelings. Yet religious feelings are as susceptible of description as moral or aesthetic feelings, as Otto has conclusively proved.

But not even this way can we get a complete answer. A more satisfactory answer is to be got by observing what religion does. Drugs may in their effect simulate the experience of the mystics of God, but the effect of drugs is degeneration, while the effect of the vision of God is integration of personality and permanent, not temporary unification of character, leading to a higher potency of of spiritual life. And the element in the vision of God which achieves this result is the experience of God as Love.

The question, however, will be asked as to how we know that it is the love of God we are experiencing. The addict, Professor Leuba tells us, thinks that he feels the love of God around him while in his stupor. This is true; but his is a delusion which he knows himself to be a delusion when he wakens. Not so, however, is the case with regard to communion with God. So that, when the Kantian challenges the mystic to produce as a result of his experience of communion with God a body of demonstrable verifiable information comparable to that derivable from the categorical imperative, the mystic/
mystic can reply that he has such a body of information, namely, that "God is love".

All prophets, saints, and mystics witness to the fact that they have felt the presence of God as a God of love, and the proof of their affirmation is that this self-revelation of God satisfied their need, and energised their lives, and raised them to an infinitely higher potency than before. Now the reason for this satisfaction is not mere delusion, as Professor LeuLa maintains, but the fact that love is the richest, most comprehensive reality in the world, and, therefore, the most illuminating, self-revelatory, and satisfying. It is the very essence of the divine nature as well as of human nature; and, when God is experienced as Love, then as complete a knowledge of God is obtained as is possible for finite beings. So that, if we ask the mystic what information he can give about God from his mystic experience, what he can tell is that God is love; if we ask the moral philosopher, he will say that God is moral law; and if we ask the scientist he will say God is physical law. Thus each of these is a form of certainty peculiar to its own sphere and entitled to be recognised as such, and they supplement one another, for God is love because He is law, and law because He is love. Thus the mystic need not be afraid of the challenge of the Kantian - there is direct experience and knowledge of God and demonstrable information derivable from communion, as definite as that obtainable from nature or from the categorical imperative. We do not admit therefore that as the Kantian asserts, morality is everything and religion only a number of improvable assumptions added to morality. As/
As Cyril Hepher says: ("Fellowship of Silence", London, 1915) "We knew God, and we knew that we knew Him. If this sound too bold a claim to make, my excuse must be that to say less would be to belittle the generosity of God".

Now with regard to the question of certainty we observe that from religion we derive a certainty of its own, but it is not absolute certainty, any more than the certainty we derive from ethics is an absolute certainty, or the certainty we derive from nature is an absolute certainty. This absolute certainty, which is so glibly talked about, nobody can define, much less possess. The utmost that human finite beings can possess is a degree of certainty which is adequate to their needs. An infinite being might possess absolute certainty, but human finite beings can never transcend faith, which is a degree of certainty which is adequate to human needs. The mystic says that he knows God in communion, The Kantian says that he knows right and wrong by his conscience, and Samuel Johnson, in spite of Berkeley, said that he knew physical reality by kicking a stone. All three have certainty of a different kind and in a different way and sufficient for their needs, and the glory of human nature consists in the fact that as the needs and experience grow, the certainty grows apace and our conception of certainty itself becomes more adequate with experience. And the certainty is a real one because it undergoes a threefold test of feeling, knowing and willing which are all positive in character, and aiding and abetting one another in every process.

In the event, then, of our possessing not absolute certainty, but/
but only the certainty of faith, which is a certainty which is adequate to our needs, we may point out in conclusion that the evidence of the combined religious history of the race or the Historical Argument cannot be dispensed with. Kantians have scant appreciation for this argument, because according to their logic by looking inside your own mind at the categorical imperative you obtain your authentic religious data as reliably, and much more so, than if you had all religious history before you; history or the revelation in Christ may add confirmation to the certainty of the imperative, but its evidence is mere supererogation. This however, we saw is founded on the myth of an absolute ethical and religious certainty, but we have proved that such certainty does not exist, the certainty we have being that of faith, and, therefore the "e consensu gentium" or Historical Argument is still indispensable. This is why we have a Bible, and why Christ became incarnate and this also is why Troeltsch intended to examine all possible religious history before pronouncing upon the certainty of religious knowledge.

But the historic method is not as easy in its application as is often imagined. For instance, many writers think that it is sufficient to collate all the history of movements, biographies, and religious psychologies of individuals and that these when brought side by side will, as it were, of themselves begin to speak and disclose their own nature. An example of this method is Professor Leuba/
Professor Leuba as we have seen in a former chapter. His array of religious facts in his "Psychology of Religious Mysticism" is most imposing, but his interpretation of these facts is nothing short of grotesque. Mere compilation of religious data is an easy work, but their interpretation is a most difficult task. A huge monument of facts will not disclose its own meaning, or speak of itself any more than the Sphinx can. It requires an interpreting mind, and one whose only qualification is that of a psychologist is not qualified for the task of interpretation; it requires the mina of a Troeltsch, and granting such a mind there would be sidelights and intimations forthcoming from the study of history regarding religion that can never be derived from any amount of hypnotic gazing on the categorical imperative.
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